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text: Mishnah Ketubot
  משנה כתובות
  The Mishna with Obadiah Bartenura by Rabbi Shraga Silverstein
  
  
  Mishnah Ketubot
  
  
  
  
  
  	A virgin is married on the fourth day [and not on the night preceding the fifth day, for we apprehend that he might then be preoccupied with the wedding and not be able to cohabit], and a widow on the fifth day. For the batei-din convene in the cities twice a week, on the second day and the fifth day, so that if he have a claim of (absence of) virginity, [such as: "I cohabited and did not find blood," whether she be a minor, a na'arah, or a bogereth, or: "I found an open door," if she were a minor or a na'arah (but not if she were a bogereth)], he can rise early to beth-din [when his anger is still upon him, lest he be assuaged and "cool off," and keep her; and it may be that she were adulterous under him (i.e., during the time of betrothal), in which instance she is forbidden to him. The gemara asks: Let him marry her on the first day, and if he has a claim of virginity, he can rise early to beth-din on the second day. And it answers: The sages were solicitous of the welfare of the daughters of Israel, that the groom occupy himself with the (wedding) feast three days: the first, second, and third day, and that on the fourth day he marry her. And when batei-din do not sit on the second and fourth days, a woman can be married on any day, provided that he occupy himself with the feast for three days. And out of solicitude for the poor, it is the custom in some places to marry on Sabbath eve. The reason that a widow is wed on the fifth day is that the sages were solicitous of the welfare of the daughters of Israel, so that (in this instance) he can rejoice with her three days — the fifth, the sixth, and the Sabbath. One who marries a widow is forbidden to work for three days and one who marries a virgin may not work all seven. As to birchath chathanim ("the blessings of the groom"), both a man being married for the first time, who weds a widow, and a widower who weds a virgin, bless birchath chathanim all seven days. And a widower who weds a widow blesses birchath chathanim one day.]
  	The kethubah of a virgin is two manah, and of a widow, one manah. A virgin who is a widow or a divorcée or a chalutzah from betrothal [and who remarried] — her kethubah [from the second] is two manah, and she is subject to a claim of virginity [i.e., if the second found her not to be a virgin, she loses her kethubah, it having been a "mistaken purchase"; for he had married her on the assumption that she was a virgin.] A proselyte, and a captive, and a bondsmaid, who had been redeemed and proselytized and freed (when they were) less than three years and one day old — their kethubah is two manah, and they are subject to a claim of virginity.
  	A (male) adult who lived with a minor [less than three years and one day, whose act is not regarded as intercourse], and a (male) minor [less than nine years and one day, whose act is not regarded as intercourse], who lived with an adult, and a mukkath etz [ a woman who had been accidentally deflowered] — their kethubah is two manah. These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: The kethubah of a mukkath etz is one manah. [The halachah is in accordance with them. And even if he were not aware of it, her kethubah is one manah, and it is not a "mistaken purchase."]
  	A virgin who was a widow or a divorcée or a chalutzah from the marriage [If she then remarried without any apprisal (of that fact)] — her kethubah is a manah [for she entered the chuppah in a status of non-virgin] — and she is not subject to a claim of virginity. A proselyte, and a captive, and a bondsmaid, who had been redeemed and divorced and freed (when they were) more than three years and one day — their kethubah is one manah, and they are not subject to a claim of virginity.
  	If one had eaten at his in-laws without witnesses in Judah, she is not subject to a claim of virginity, for he is left alone with her. [When they made the betrothal feast in the house of the bride's father in Judah, it was the practice that the groom be left alone with her to become familiar with her. Therefore, when he afterwards married her, he did not have a claim of virginity.] Both the kethubah of the widow of an Israelite and that of the widow of a Cohein are one manah. A beth-din of Cohanim would claim four hundred zuz for (the kethubah of) a virgin (who was the daughter of a Cohein), and the sages did not protest.
  	If one married a woman and found her not to be a virgin — if she said: "After you betrothed me, I was forced, and 'your field was flooded'" [i.e., a torrential rain smote your field and ruined it, i.e., "It's your hard luck," and give me my kethubah], and he says: "No, it was before I betrothed you, and my purchase was a mistaken one" [and you have no kethubah from me] — R. Gamliel and R. Eliezer say: She is believed [and she is made to swear a shevuath heseth (an oath in equity) that it is as she says, and she takes her kethubah. And this is the halachah. And if she says: "He found me a virgin," she is not believed, the sages having believed the husband, even without an oath; for it is premised that a man does not exert himself with the (marriage) feast only to lose it.] R. Yehoshua says: "We do not live by her mouth," but she is assumed to have been lived with before she was betrothed and that she deceived him, unless she brings proof for her words.
  	If she says: "I am a mukkath etz," and he says: "No, you were 'trodden' [i.e., lived with] by a man," R. Gamliel and R. Eliezer say: She is believed. And R. Yehoshua says: We do not live by her mouth, but she is assumed to have been 'trodden by a man' unless she brings proof for her words.
  	If she were seen speaking [i.e., closeted] with someone from the marketplace, and she were asked: What is the "nature" of this man? and she replied: It was that and that man and he is a Cohein [i.e., pedigreed (not forbidding a woman to the priesthood)] — R. Gamliel and R. Yehoshua say: She is believed [and she is permitted to the priesthood], and R. Yehoshua says: We do not live by her mouth; but she is assumed to have been lived with by a Nathin or a mamzer unless she brings proof for her words.
  	If she were pregnant and she were asked: What is the "nature" of this fetus? (If she replied:) It is by this and this man, and he is a Cohein, she is believed [and both she and her daughter are permitted to the priesthood. But as to inheritance, R. Gamliel does not say that this fetus inherits him (the one she says is the father). And the halachah is in accordance with R. Gamliel in all these cases of our Mishnah. But even so, ab initio, she does not marry into the priesthood (neither the "speaking" one [(1:8)] nor the pregnant one) unless most of the men of the city were pedigreed and one of them, who had "separated" from the city, had lived with her (for we say: "All who separate separate from the majority." And in that instance, she may marry into the priesthood even ab initio, both she and her daughter.] R. Yehoshua says: We do not live by her mouth, but she is assumed to be pregnant by a Nathin or a mamzer unless she brings proof for her words.
  	R. Yossi said: It once happened that a child went to draw water from the well and was raped. R. Yochanan b. Nuri said: If the majority of the men of the city (are kasher and their daughters and widows may be) married to the priesthood, she may marry to the priesthood. [Even though one majority is generally sufficient, "pedigree" was accorded special status, and in this instance the rabbis required two majorities — the majority of (traveling) companies passing through there (as being pedigreed) and "the majority of the city." Women are not married ab initio to the priesthood without two majorities. And this is the halachah.]
  
  
  
  	A woman who was widowed or divorced [and who claimed her kethubah] — if she said: He married me as a virgin, and he said: No, I married you as a widow [This refers to one who was divorced. In the instance of one who was widowed, the heirs say: Our father married you as a widow, and only a manah is owing you] — If there are witnesses that she went out with hinuma [Some say it is a canopy of myrtle that they make for virgins; and others, a veil placed over the eyes, in which one "slumbers" (mitnamnemeth)], and her hair were undone, [hanging loose on her shoulders, it being the practice to conduct virgins in this manner from their fathers' house to the wedding hall], her kethubah is two manah. R. Yochanan b. Beroka says: The distribution of parched grain is also evidence (of her being a virgin). [In the locality of R. Yochanan b. Beroka it was the practice to distribute parched grain at the weddings of virgins. And if there were no witnesses that such customs were followed at her marriage and her kethubah were lost, the husband is believed and she claims only a manah.]
  	And R. Yehoshua concedes that if one says to his neighbor: This field was your father's and I bought it from him, he is believed, for "the mouth that forbids is the mouth that permits." [Even though above, in the first chapter, re "If she said: 'After you betrothed me, I was forced,'" R. Yehoshua differs from R. Gamliel, saying that the woman is not believed in this (even though) she thus forbids herself to the priesthood, when she could have said: I am a mukkath etz and have been permitted to the priesthood — this is so in an instance of "forbidden" or "permitted," i.e., to be forbidden to the priesthood or permitted to it. It is in this instance that R. Yehoshua differs from R. Gamliel, saying that she is not believed with a miggo ("I could have said, etc."); but here, where there is no question of forbidden or permitted, but (rather a question of) monetary loss, as when one says to his neighbor: "This field was your father's and I bought it from him," R. Yehoshua concedes to R. Gamliel that in such an instance he is believed with a miggo, having been able to say: "It is mine," so that if he says: "It was your father's, and I bought it from him," he is believed.] And if there are witnesses that it was his father's, and he says: I bought it from him, he is not believed. [The gemara explains that this Mishnah speaks of an instance in which he (the possessor of the field) ate from it only two years before (i.e., in the lifetime of) the father and one year before the son. The Mishnah apprises us that since the three years of chazakah (possession) were not completed in the father's lifetime, the year that he ate before the son does not accrue to the sum of the years of chazakah.
  	If witnesses said: This is our signature, but we were forced (to sign) [their lives being threatened (but if it were "money forcing," their money being "threatened" and, it goes without saying, if they said: (We signed) because of the great sum of money given us, that they are not believed; for "a man does not render himself an evildoer." For "a man is kin to himself" and is not believed to testify vis-à-vis himself neither for nor against)], or (if they said) we were minors, or we were unfit to testify, they are believed. [Here, too, (they are believed only if they claim that they were) unfit to testify because of kinship; but if because of transgression, they are not believed.] And if there are witnesses that it is their signature or if their signature were corroborated from a different source, they are not believed. [If their signature appeared on a different deed which had been certified in beth-din, and that deed came before us together with this one, and the signatures were alike (they are not believed)].
  	If one says: This is my signature, and that is my friend's signature; and the other says: This is my signature, and that is my friend's signature, they are believed, [there being two witnesses for each signature.] If one says: This is my signature, and the other says: This is my signature, they must join another (witness) with them. [For they testify to their signature, and not to the manah (the amount) of the deed, and each signature requires two witnesses.] These are the words of Rebbi. And the sages say: They need not join another with them, but a man is believed to say: This is my signature. [For they testify to the manah of the deed, and when each says: This is my signature, there are two witnesses for the manah of the deed. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]
  	If a woman says: I was married, but I was divorced, she is believed, for "the mouth that forbids is the mouth that permits." And if there are witnesses that she was married, and she says: I was divorced, she is not believed. If she said: I was taken captive, but I am clean (i.e., I was not forced), she is believed (to marry a Cohein), for "the mouth that forbids is the mouth that permits." And if there are witnesses that she was taken captive, and she says: I am clean, she is not believed. And if after she were married witnesses came, she does not leave. [Not that she had actually been married; but if after she had been permitted to marry, witnesses came and testified that she had been abducted, she does not "leave" her first license and she may marry ab initio. But if witnesses came that she had been defiled, even if she had several children, she leaves.]
  	If two women were taken captive, [i.e., if there are witnesses that they were abducted] — If one says: I was taken captive, but I am clean, and the other says: I was taken captive, but I am clean, they are not believed. And when they testify for each other, [each one saying: My friend is clean], they are believed. [For the sages were lenient in the case of an abducted woman, accepting the testimony of one witness — even a bondsman, even a woman, even a minor "speaking in his innocence" — so long as the witness testifies that he had not left her from the time she was taken captive until she had been released by the gentiles.]
  	Likewise, with two men, if one said: I am a Cohein, and the other said: I am a Cohein, they are not believed [to be given terumah]. And when they testify for each other, [each one saying: I and my friend are Cohanim], they are believed.
  	R. Yehudah says: One is not elevated to the priesthood by the testimony of one witness. [Even if there are no "reciprocal" witnesses, and, it goes without saying, if there is a possibility of reciprocity, i.e., Testify for me, and I will testify for you.] R. Elazar said: When is this so? Where there are "objectors" [who declare him to be unfit for the priesthood; and there is no "objection" with fewer than two], but where there are no objectors, one is elevated to the priesthood by the testimony of one witness [where there are no reciprocal witnesses. And this is the difference between R. Elazar and the first tanna (R. Yehudah)]. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says in the name of R. Shimon the son of the sagan (the adjutant high-priest): One is elevated to the priesthood by the testimony of one witness. [The gemara asks: "Aren't R. Shimon b. Gamliel and R. Elazar saying the same thing!" And it concludes that they differ on the question of "combining testimony" — as when we know that this man's father was held to be a (fit) Cohein, and a report went out that he was the son of a divorcée or of a chalutzah, and he was "taken down" (from the priesthood), and then a witness came and said: I know him to be a (fit) Cohein — at which he was re-elevated; and then two witnesses came and said: He is the son of a divorcée or of a chalutzah — at which he was again taken down; and one witness came and said: I know him to be a (fit) Cohein — R. Shimon b. Gamliel says that he is re-elevated to the priesthood by the testimony of this last witness, for we "combine" him with the first witness who nullified the report by saying: I know him to be a Cohein. And even though they did not testify at the same time, their testimony is combined, and we say: Set these two who say that he is a Cohein beside the two who say that he is the son of a divorcée, and "set the man into his (original) status" (as a fit priest). And according to R. Elazar, he is not re-elevated until two witnesses testify at the same time that he is a (fit) priest. The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel, that the witnesses are combined even though they did not testify together.]
  	If a woman were imprisoned by gentiles — if because of money, she is permitted to her husband, [for out of fear of losing their money, they will not be wanton with her. And this is so only when Israel has the upper hand over the idolators. In that instance she is permitted to her husband, even if he is a Cohein. (This instance is not similar to that of a captive woman; for in this instance they are afraid of losing their money.) But if the idolators have the upper hand, even (if she were imprisoned) because of money, she is forbidden to her husband if he is a Cohein. And if her husband is an Israelite, she is permitted in any event. For the wife of an Israelite who was forced is permitted to her husband]; if (she were imprisoned) because of "life," [having been sentenced to death], she is forbidden to her husband [even if he were an Israelite; for we fear that she may have cohabited voluntarily with one of them (to save her life).] If karkom (besiegers) captured a city, [the targum of "matzor" (siege) is "karkuma"], all women married to Cohanim, who are found therein are unfit [forbidden to the priesthood; for the wife of a Cohein is forbidden when she is forced. And if there is in the city one hiding place, where one woman could hide, each of the women of the city is believed to say: I hid in the hiding place and I was not defiled. And since she is believed to say: I hid, she is also believed to say: I did not hide, but I was not defiled.] And if there are witnesses for them — even a bondsman, even a bondswoman — they are believed. And a man is not believed (to testify) for himself. R. Zechariah b. Hakatzav said: [I swear by] "this abode!" (the Temple), "her hand did not leave my hand from the time the gentiles entered Jerusalem until they left" — whereupon they said to him: "A man does not testify for himself." [and if a man testified about a captive woman that she is clean, he may not marry her if he is a Cohein because of suspicion (of false testimony). And if he redeemed her from captivity with his money, he may testify for her and marry her; for one does not "throw away" his money for nothing. If he did not know that she was clean, he would not have given his money for her.]
  	And these are believed to testify when they come of age, as to what they saw when they were minors. A man is believed to say: This is the signature of my father, this is the signature of my rabbi, this is the signature of my brother [and the deed is certified by his word. For the certification of deeds is a rabbinic ordinance, and the rabbis believed him in respect to rabbinical ordinances.], I remember when this woman went out with hinuma (see 2:1) and her hair was undone [in which instance she takes a kethubah of two hundred. And though money is claimed only with bona fide testimony, here it is different; for since most women marry as virgins, it is merely a recounting of events], and (I remember) when this man went from school to immerse to eat terumah [when we were youngsters in school. On the basis of such testimony, he is fed terumah d'rabanan (terumah by rabbinical ordinance), such as terumah which is taken from an unperforated pot, and the like. But he is not fed terumah d'oraitha (terumah by Torah law) by such testimony. And we do not suspect that he might have been the bondsman of a Cohein, for it is forbidden to teach a bondsman Torah.], and (I remember) when he shared (terumah) with us on the threshing floor [And we do not suspect that he might have been the bondsman of a Cohein, for terumah is not distributed to a bondsman unless his master is with him.], and (I remember) that this place was a beth-hapras [If one plows over a grave, he makes a beth-hapras of one hundred cubits, this being the estimated distance that the plow moves the bones of the dead; and the tumah (uncleanliness) of beth-hapras is by rabbinical ordinance.], and we would walk (only) until here on the Sabbath [for (Sabbath) boundaries are a rabbinical ordinance.] But a man is not believed to say: This man had a road in this place, or: this man had ma'amad and misped in this place [i.e., he had a place here to eulogize (lehaspid) his dead, and to make the standings (ma'amadoth) and the sittings that they used to make for the dead. In this, he was not believed, for it is a monetary matter and requires bona fide testimony.]
  
  
  
  	These are the maidens [who, although unfit (pasul, receive knass (the penalty payment). If a man forced one of them, he gives her father fifty kesef.]: one who lives with a mamzereth, a Nethinah, [one of the Giveonites. Because Joshua made them (nathnam) hewers of wood and drawers of water, they were called "Nethinim," and they are forbidden to enter the congregation.], and a Cuthite [This tanna holds that Cuthites are "lion proselytes" and are regarded as gentiles], one who lives with a proselyte, a captive woman, or a bondswoman who had been redeemed, proselytized, and freed when they were less than three years and one day old. [For they are assumed to have been virgins (when he lived with them). For even if they had been lived with in their captivity or when they were gentiles, their virginal signs return.] If one lives with his sister, his father's sister, his mother's sister, his wife's sister, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother [if she were betrothed to one of them and was divorced during betrothal and was still a virgin], or a niddah, they receive knass. [For] even though they are subject to kareth, they are not subject to judicial death penalty. [Kareth does not exempt one from payment. This is so when there was no fore-warning (hathra'ah), but if there was, he is exempt from knass, the ruling being that all those liable to kareth who are fore-warned receive stripes, and one does not both receive stripes and pay.]
  	And these do not receive knass: one who lives with a proselyte, a captive woman, or a bondswoman who had been redeemed, proselytized and freed when they were more than three years and one day old. [For since they are fit for cohabitation, they are regarded as "abandoned," and they are cohabited with when they are gentiles, as is the captive woman in her captivity.] R. Yehudah says: A captive woman who was redeemed remains "in her holiness" [and is not assumed to have been lived with] even [if she were abducted] when she was grown. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.] If one lives with his daughter, his daughter's daughter, his son's daughter, his wife's daughter, her son's daughter, and her daughter's daughter, they do not receive knass, for he is liable to death, his death (penalty) being at the hands of beth-din; and all who are liable to death do not pay money, it being written (Exodus 21:22): "and there be no death, then punishment shall be exacted" [but if there be death, one of the two men who are fighting being killed, then the one who killed him is not punished by paying money, for he is liable to judicial death penalty for having killed him. And it makes not difference in a transgression punishable by judicial death penalty whether the act was wilful or unwitting — he is always exempt from monetary payment. But in a transgression punishable by kareth or stripes, one is not exempt from payment unless there be witnesses and fore-warning and he receive stripes, in which instance he does not pay.]
  	If a maiden were betrothed and divorced, R. Yossi Haglili says she does not receive knass, [it being written (Deuteronomy 22:28): "who was not betrothed"; but if she were once betrothed, she no longer receives knass.] R. Akiva says: She does receive knass, and her knass belongs to her, [for we expound: "who was not betrothed…" (then the knass shall be given) to her father, (the implication being that) if she were betrothed, it belongs to her. The halachah is in accordance with R. Akiva.]
  	One who seduces gives three things, and one who rapes gives four. One who seduces gives bosheth (shame), p'gam (injury), and knass. One who rapes, in addition, gives tza'ar (affliction). What is the difference between one who forces and one who seduces? One who forces gives tza'ar, and one who seduces does not give tza'ar [For being forced is not like being seduced; and the one who was seduced does not receive tza'ar, "inui" (affliction) being written in the Torah in respect to forcing, but not in respect to seduction.]; one who forces gives immediately [to her father, even though he marries her], and one who seduces, when he sends her out [(that is, if he does not marry her. For if he does marry her, he does not give knass, it being written (Shemoth 22:16): "then he shall take her as a wife … and if he refuse … then money shall he pay"; but in respect to forcing, it is written (Deuteronomy 22:29): "and he shall give … fifty (shekels of) silver … and to him shall she be as a wife.")]; and one who forces, drinks in his "earthen vessel" [in the repugnant vessel that he chose for himself; that is, he must marry her perforce]; and one who seduces, if he wishes to send her out (i.e., not to marry her), he may do so.
  	How does one drink "in his earthen vessel"? Even if she were lame, or blind, or covered with [leprous] boils. If he found in her a thing of nakedness (i.e., indecency), or if she were not fit (halachically) to marry a Jew, he is not permitted to take her, it being written (Deuteronomy 22:29): "And to him shall she be as a wife" — one who is permitted to him as a wife.
  	An orphan who was betrothed and divorced — R. Eliezer says: One who seduces her is exempt (from knass) and one who forces her is liable. [For since she is an orphan and her knass belongs to her, she waives it, for she cohabited with him consentingly and he is exempt. And not an orphan alone, but any maiden who was betrothed and divorced — one who forces her is liable, and one who seduces her is exempt, just as in the instance of an orphan, for her knass belongs to her, as R. Akiva says above, and this is the halachah.]
  	Which is bosheth (shame)? All according to the one who shames and the one who is shamed. [The bosheth of a common man who shames is greater than that of a lowly one or of a distinguished one. Thus did I find it in the glosses of my rabbis. And in Hachovel (Bava Kamma), I found that the bosheth of a lowly man is greater, and this is the essential interpretation. ("and the one who is shamed":) His bosheth is proportionate to his eminence.] (Which is) p'gam (injury)? We perceive her as a bondswoman to be sold. How much would she be worth, and how much is she worth (now). [We assess how much more a man would want to give to marry a virgin bondswoman to a favored bondsman than one who is not a virgin. The gemara asks how we know that one gives bosheth, p'gam, and tza'ar. Perhaps the Torah ordains the fifty kesef to cover everything. And it answers that we derive it from (Deuteronomy 22:29): "Then the man who lies with her shall give the father of the maiden fifty kesef" — the enjoyment of "lying" alone is fifty kesef, aside from bosheth, p'gam, and tza'ar.] Knass is the same for all men. Anything which has a fixed amount in the Torah is the same for all men.
  	Wherever there is selling [i.e., selling rights of a father in his daughter (that is, when she is a minor)], there is no knass [i.e., he has no knass rights in her, there being no knass for a minor. The halachah is not in accordance with this Mishnah; for this Mishnah is in accordance with R. Meir, who says that there is no knass for a minor. But the sages say that there is knass for a minor, and the halachah is in accordance with the sages. A minor (k'tanah) in this connection is a girl from three years until twelve years and one day, when she shows two (pubertal) hairs.]; and wherever there is knass, [from the time she is a na'arah; that is, when she is twelve years and one day old and shows two hairs, at which time she receives knass], there is no selling, [a man not selling his daughter when she is a na'arah]. With a minor, there is selling, and there is no knass; with a na'arah, there is knass, and there is no selling. With a bogereth, there is neither selling nor knass. [From the age of twelve years, six months and one day and showing two hairs, she is called a "bogereth." Her father cannot sell her and she receives no knass.]
  	If one said: I seduced that man's daughter, he pays bosheth and p'gam by his own testimony [Not only if he says: I forced her, where he does not injure her that much, the la'az ("ill report") of one who was forced not being that great — not only in such an instance does he pay by his own testimony; but even if he says: I seduced her, where he injures her more, the la'az of one who was seduced being great, so that we might think we do not believe him to strengthen the la'az — we nevertheless say that she would prefer this (that he be believed) in order to gain the money thereby.], and he does not pay knass. [For one who admits to knass is exempt from it, it being written (Exodus 22:8): "Whom the judges incriminate shall pay double" — to exclude one who incriminates himself.] If one says: I stole, I slaughtered, and I sold, he pays the principal (keren) by his own testimony, but he does not pay the double payment (kefel) and the "four and five" payment. (If he says:) My ox killed that man [and I owe kofer (the "ransom" payment), he pays by his own testimony, it being held that kofer is monetary payment (and not knass)], or (if he says: My ox killed) that man's ox, he pays by his own testimony. (If he says:) My ox killed that man's bondsman [and I owe thirty sela], he does not pay by his own testimony, [for it (thirty sela) is knass, thirty sela being given even if he is not worth one sela.]
  
  
  
  	If a na'arah were seduced, her bosheth, her p'gam, and her knass belong to her father, and her tza'ar, [too,] if she were forced. If she appeared before beth-din before her father died, they belong to her father. If her father died [after she appeared before beth-din as a na'arah, whether or not she became a bogereth before he died], they belong to the brothers, [for since he appeared before beth-din, the father acquired them.] If she did not appear before beth-din before her father died, they belong to her. [For since he did not appear before beth-din, there is no money to bequeath to his sons.] If she appeared before beth-din before she became a bogereth, they belong to her father. If her father died, they belong to her brothers. If she did not appear before beth-din before she became a bogereth, they belong to her. R. Shimon says: If she did not collect before the father died, they belong o her. [Even if he appeared before beth-din, it is not the father's money to bequeath to his sons until it reaches his hands, it being written (Deuteronomy 22:19): "Then the man who lies with her shall give the father of the na'arah fifty kesef" — the Torah caused the father to acquire it only from the time of "giving." The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon.] The work of her hands [that she performed in her father's lifetime, even though she did not collect her wage] and her metziah (the objects that she finds), even though she did not collect it, if her father died, they belong to her brothers. [The gemara asks: From whom does she collect her metziah? And it answers: This is the intent: The work of her hands is like her metziah, viz.: Just as her metziah, in her father's lifetime belongs to her father, and after her father's death, to her (that is, the brothers do not acquire what the daughter found after her father's death), so the work of her hands in her father's lifetime belongs to the father and is acquired by her brothers even if she had not collected her wage; but the work of her hands (that she performs) after her father's death belongs to her, and her brothers have no rights in the daughter's handiwork after the father's death.]
  	If one betrothed his daughter and she were divorced, and he betrothed her and she were widowed, her kethubah, [which she claims from both of these betrothals] belongs to him, (this tanna) holding that there is a kethubah for a betrothed woman, and we are speaking of the period when she is a na'arah (or when she is a minor. If he married her and she were divorced; and he married her and she were widowed, her kethubah belongs to her. [For after he married her, his authority over her lapsed, and we follow (the time of) collection, which came afterwards. We do not follow the (time of the) writing, to say that since the first (kethubah) was written while she was yet under her father's domain, the kethubah belongs to her father.] R. Yehudah says: The first one belongs to her father, [R. Yehudah holding that we follow the (time of the) writing, and that since the first kethubah was written before the marriage, when she was still under her father's domain, it belongs to her father. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	A father has rights in his daughter [when she is a minor or a na'arah] in her betrothal by money, [her betrothal money belonging to him, it being written in respect to a Hebrew maid-servant (Exodus 21:11): "Then she shall go out free, without money," which is expounded: Money does not revert to this master (that is, the master who bought her, from whom she goes out free, with the signs of a na'arah), but money does revert to a different master. And who is that? Her father, the betrothal money reverting to him, even when she is a na'arah, until she becomes a bogereth.], by deed, and by cohabitation. [He receives a betrothal deed for her, and presents her for cohabitation for betrothal to whomever he wishes, it being written (Deuteronomy 24:2): "And she shall go out … and she shall be," the "beings" (i.e., being taken in marriage) being likened to each other, viz.: Just as money, which is one of the "beings," is in her father's domain, so, betrothal by deed and by cohabitation are in her father's domain.], and he acquires her metziah [because of eivah (rancor, i.e., desisting from feeding her)], and the work of her hands, [it being written (Exodus 21:7): "And if a man sell his daughter as a maidservant" — Just as the handiwork of a maidservant belongs to her master, so the handiwork of a daughter belongs to her father.], and the absolution of her vows, [it being written (in this connection) (Numbers 30:17): "…in her maidenhood, the house of her father."], and he receives her get, [it being written (Deuteronomy 24:2): "And she shall go out … and she shall be" — "going out" (of marriage) is likened to "being." Just as her father receives her betrothal when she is a minor and when she is a na'arah, so he receives her get.], and he does not eat fruits in her lifetime. [If land fell to her from the house of her father's mother, her father does not eat their fruits in her lifetime, unless she dies and he inherits her.] Superior to him (in rights) is her husband, [who has all the rights mentioned above that a father has in his daughter, and] who (in addition) eats the fruits [of the property which fell to her by inheritance after she married him.] And he (the husband) is obligated to feed her, to redeem her [if she were taken captive], and to bury her, [the sages having instituted that he bury her; this, in consideration of her inheritance, her husband inheriting her at her death.] R. Yehudah says: Even a pauper in Israel should not provide less (at the burial of his wife) than two flutes (for the eulogy) and a wailing woman.
  	She is always in the domain of her father [If she were the daughter of an Israelite betrothed to a Cohein, she does not eat terumah. Even if the time appointed for her marriage arrived, and she was not married (the husband being obligated to feed her) she does not eat terumah] until she enters the domain of the husband, [i.e., the chuppah, whereby she enters her husband's domain] for marriage. If her father handed her over to the messengers of the husband, she is in the husband's domain. If her father went with the husband's messengers, or the father's messengers went with the husband's messengers, she is in her father's domain. If her father's messengers [meeting the husband's messengers] handed her over to the husband's messengers, she is in her husband's domain.
  	A father is not obligated to feed his daughter [in his lifetime. For after his death, his daughters are fed from his property as a condition of the kethubah. And this applies not only to his daughter, but also to his son, a father not being required to feed either his sons or his daughters when they are minors, unless he be a man of means; that is, a wealthy man from whom beth-din take perforce (as the men of the city in general are compelled to give charity), and they feed with it his young sons and daughters. And if he is not a man of means, beth-din berate him, telling him that it is cruel not to feed his children, that (if he refuses to feed them) he is worse than the wild animals, who are merciful to their young. But they cannot force him to feed them whether they be male or female. And this is so only when they are (merely) young; but if they are extremely young, below the age of six, beth-din compel the father and take from him by force in order to feed them, whether they be male or female. This was expounded by R. Elazar b. Azaryah before the sages in the Vineyard of Yavneh (so called because they sat there row upon row, in the configuration of a vineyard)]: "the sons will inherit, and the daughters will be fed." [It is among the conditions of the kethubah that the males inherit their mother's kethubah and the females be fed from his property.] Just as the sons do not inherit [their mother's kethubah until after their father's death], so the daughters are not fed [from their father's property as per the conditions of the kethubah], until after their father's death.
  	If he did not write her a kethubah, a virgin claims two manah, and a widow, a manah, because it is a condition of beth-din. If he wrote her (in her kethubah) a field worth a manah (one hundred zuz) instead of two hundred zuz, and he did not write her: "All of my property is collateral for your kethubah, [(for he cannot say: You are to receive only the field mentioned in your kethubah)], he is liable (for such collateral), this being a condition of beth-din.
  	If he did not write her: "If you are taken captive, I will redeem you and restore you as my wife," or, if he were a Cohein, [who is not permitted to take her back after she was abducted (the wife of a Cohein, who was forced, being forbidden to her husband), in which instance he writes to her:] "I will redeem you and I will return you to your land," he is (nevertheless) liable (for this) [and he must give her her kethubah, even though he must divorce her perforce], for this is a condition of beth-din.
  	If she were taken captive, he must redeem her. And if he said: "Here is her get and her kethubah — let her redeem herself," he is not permitted to do so, [for he was obligated to redeem her as soon as she was taken captive]. If she were taken ill, he must heal her, [healing being like feeding]. If he said: "Here is her get and her kethubah — let her heal herself," he is permitted to do so. [For he is not obligated to feed his divorcée.]
  	If he did not write: "The male children that you will have from me will inherit the money of your kethubah over and above their share with their brothers," he is (nevertheless) liable (for this), for this is a condition of beth-din. [If you died in my lifetime, and I inherit you, your sons will take your kethubah after my death when they come to divide my property with the sons that I will have from a different wife. This will make a difference if her kethubah is more than the other's, or if the other's sons are more numerous than her own, in which instance it will profit these to take their mother's kethubah, even if (the amounts of) both be equal. The "male-children" kethubah, even in our days, is claimed only from land, but not from chattel. And it is only when the father left over the amount of the two kethuboth and an additional dinar that the sons can inherit the "male-children" kethubah, since room was left for Torah-inheritance. For after each of the sons takes of his mother's kethubah, there remains a dinar of their father's property to share among them. But if the father left only the amount of the two kethuboth, or less than this, they share the property equally among them, the "male-children" kethubah not obtaining.]
  	(If he did not write:) "You will sit in my house and be fed from my property all the days of the duration of your widowhood in my house," he is (nevertheless) liable (for this), for this is a condition of beth-din. The men of Jerusalem would write thus. The men of the Galil would write as the men of Jerusalem. The men of Judah would write: "…until the heirs desire to give you your kethubah." Therefore, if the heirs wish, they give her her kethubah and "exempt" her. [The halachah is not in accordance with the men of Judah; but so long as she does not marry and does not claim her kethubah in beth-din, she is fed from her husband's property, and lives in the house she lived in when her husband was alive, and uses all the vessels she used in her husband's lifetime.]
  
  
  
  	Even though they said that a virgin claims two manah, and a widow, one manah, if he wishes to add, even a hundred manah, he may do so. [And we do not say that he is not permitted to add so as not to embarrass those lacking the means to do so.] If she were widowed or divorced, whether from the betrothal or from the marriage, she claims the whole. R. Elazar b. Azaryah says: From marriage, she claims the whole; from betrothal, a virgin claims two manah, and a widow, one manah; for he did not write it [the addition he consented to] except to marry her. R. Yehudah says: If he wishes, he writes to a virgin a deed of two manah, and she writes: I have received a manah from you." [Even though she did not receive it, she waives it and writes that she has received it.] R. Meir says: If one accords a virgin less than two manah, and a widow, less than one manah, his cohabitation is an adulterous one. [The halachah is in accordance with R. Meir in his decree.]
  	A virgin is given twelve months [to the time of the chuppah] from the time he [the husband] solicited her [after he betrothed her, to give thought to the exigencies of the chuppah, to prepare her adornments.], to provision herself [with adornments for twelve months, it being written (Bereishith 24:55): "Let the maiden abide with us days." What is the intent of "days"? A year, it being written (Leviticus 25:9): "Within days (i.e., a year) he may redeem it." And just as the woman is given (time), so is the man given (time) to provision himself [for the needs of the wedding feast and the chuppah.] And a widow is given thirty days, [for she does not need to busy herself too much with adornments, already having them.] If the time arrived and they were not wed, [the groom delaying the wedding (Since the first part of the Mishnah was stated with reference to her, the second part was similarly stated)], she eats of his, and she eats terumah [if he is a Cohein and she is an Israelite. For from the time he betrothed her she eats terumah by Torah law, it being written (Leviticus 22:11): "And a Cohein, if he acquire a soul, the acquisition of his money," and she is "the acquisition of his money." It is just that the rabbis decreed re the daughter of an Israelite married to a Cohein that she not eat terumah, lest they pour her a cup (of terumah) in her father's house and she give her brothers and sisters to drink of it. But when the time (for her chuppah) arrived and she was not wed, when she eats of his, she does not eat in her father's house, but her husband, the Cohein, designates a place for her where he feeds her, so that there is no longer any need for decreeing lest she give her brothers and sisters to drink of a cup of terumah.] R. Tarfon says: She may be given all terumah [if he wishes, and when the days of her (niddah) uncleanliness arrive, she sells it and buys chullin (non-terumah).] R. Akiva says: (She is given) half-chullin [to eat in the days of her uncleanliness], half-terumah.
  	A yavam does not cause (a yevamah) to eat terumah [when she is still awaiting yibum, it being written (Leviticus 22:11): "And a Cohein, if he acquire a soul, the acquisition of his money," and she is the "acquisition of his brother.] If she spent six months before her husband, [six of these twelve months set aside for her after having been solicited by the husband] and six months before the yavam, or even all of them before the husband and six of them before the yavam, or even all of them before the husband and one of them before the yavam [Even though most of them were before the husband, there is a double reservation here: a) he was not obligated to feed her in his lifetime; b) even if he was obligated to feed her in his lifetime, she did not eat after his death, the "acquisition of his money," having been dissolved (but if all of them were before the husband, she could at least have eaten in his lifetime)], or all before the yavam less one day before the husband [and, it goes without saying, if all of them were before the yavam], she does not eat terumah. This is (in accordance with) the first Mishnah [that if the time arrives, she eats terumah]. The beth-din after them ruled: A woman does not eat terumah until she enters the chuppah. [For we fear lest he find a blemish in her, so that she be found to be a "stranger" (to the priesthood) retroactively and his "purchase" be a mistaken one. And according to the first Mishnah we do not entertain this apprehension. Neither do we fear that she might give her brothers and sisters to drink (a cup of terumah), for he (her husband) sets aside a place for her, for which reason they permitted her to eat terumah when the time arrived.]
  	If one consecrates (to the Temple) the handiwork of his wife, she works and eats, [for they instituted that he feed her in exchange for her handiwork, for which reason, according to all, she works and eats.] [If he consecrated] the surplus [of her handiwork, what she makes above and beyond what she needs for her food, and not the handiwork itself], R. Meir says: It is consecrated, [for he holds that one can consecrate something that has "not yet come to the world."] R. Yochanan Hasandler says: It is chullin (non-consecrated). [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Meir, but with R. Yochanan Hasandler, who says that it is chullin, for one cannot consecrate something that has "not yet come to the world."]
  	These are the labors that a wife performs for her husband: she grinds [with a small hand mill. And if the mill is large, she does all that is necessary for the grinding, such as placing (the grain) in the hopper and collecting the meal.], she bakes, she washes, she cooks, she nurses her child, she makes his bed, and she works in wool. If she brought in to him one bondswoman [i.e., money or property with which to buy one bondswoman], she neither grinds, nor bakes nor washes. Two — she neither cooks nor nurses her child. Three — she neither makes his bed nor works in wool. Four — she sits on a cathedra [an easy chair, and she does not run errands for him — in spite of which she pours his cup for him and spreads his bed, and washes his face, hands, and feet. For these labors are not performed by another woman, but by one's own wife.] R. Eliezer says: Even if she brought in to him a hundred bondswomen, she is compelled to work in wool, for idleness leads to lust. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: Also, one who, by vow, forbids his wife from working, must send her away and give her her kethubah, for idleness leads to shiamum [disorientation. The targum of (Deuteronomy 28:28): "timhon levav" (confusion of heart) is "sha'amimuth liba." R. Eliezer and R. Shimon b. Gamliel will differ with respect to a woman who is not idle, but who plays games — the lust factor obtaining; the shiamum factor not obtaining. For shiamum obtains only where one sits and wonders and is completely idle. The halachah is in accordance with R. Eliezer.]
  	If one forbids his wife by vow from cohabitation [as when he says: "Let the enjoyment of your cohabitation be forbidden to me" (But if he says: "The enjoyment of my cohabitation is forbidden to you," she is not forbidden, for he is obligated to her, it being written (Exodus 21:10): "…and her (conjugal) time he shall not withhold")] — Beth Shammai say: Two weeks. [If he vowed thus, he must wait two weeks (before resuming relations); for thus do we find with a woman who gave birth to a female, that she is unclean for two weeks.] Beth Hillel say: One week. [For thus do we find with respect to a niddah, that she is unclean for seven days; and we derive what is common (a man's becoming angry with his wife and forbidding her by vow) from what is common (niddah, which is a common occurrence) — as opposed to childbirth, which is not that common. And Beth Shammai hold that we derive something which he causes (the vow of the man, which causes her to desist), from something that he causes (childbirth, which comes through him) — as opposed to niddah, which comes of itself. If (he forbids her) more than one week according to Beth Hillel, or more than two weeks according to Beth Shammai, he must send her away and give her her kethubah — even if he were a camel driver, whose conjugal time is once in thirty days, or a mariner, whose conjugal time is once in six months.] Torah scholars may leave for Torah study without (their wives') permission for thirty days. [This Mishnah is in accordance with R. Eliezer. The rabbis differ with him, saying that he may do so for two or three years. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] Workers may do so for one week. The conjugal time mentioned in the Torah: tayalin [who have neither work nor business], every day; workers, twice a week; donkey drivers [who bring bundles on camels from afar], once in thirty days; mariners [who set sail on the Mediterranean], once in six months. These are the words of R. Eliezer. [And if in the beginning one were a tradesman whose conjugal time is frequent, and he wished to change to an occupation whose conjugal time is infrequent, his wife can prevent him — except if he desired to study Torah, one's wife not being able to prevent her husband, who was a tayal or a worker from becoming a Torah scholar.]
  	If one rebels against her husband [refusing to live with him, (But if she refuses to work, she is compelled to do so and she is not judged as a "rebel.")], seven dinars a week are deducted from her kethubah. R. Yehudah says: Seven tarpikin (a tarpik is half a dinar). Until when does he deduct. Until there remains nothing of her kethubah, [at which point he gives her a get and she leaves without a kethubah; but he does not detain her to deduct from the property that fell to her from her father's house and to cause her to lose it.] R. Yossi says: He can keep on deducting, so that if an inheritance falls to her from elsewhere, he can claim from it. Likewise, if one rebels against his wife, three dinars a week are added to her kethubah. R. Yehudah says: three tarpikin. [For conjugal denial is more painful for a man than for a woman. Therefore, if she rebels and causes him to suffer, seven dinars are deducted, whereas if he rebels and causes her to suffer, only three dinars are added. The gemara states that in the instance of the wife's rebellion it was ruled that proclamation be made against her four consecutive Sabbaths in the synagogues and the houses of study, saying: "This woman rebelled against her husband." And she is apprised by beth-din: "Be it known to you that even if your kethubah is one hundred manah, you will lose everything," whether she were betrothed or married; and even a niddah, and even one who were ill, and even one awaiting yibum. Before the proclamation they apprise her of their intention, and afterwards they apprise her that the proclamation has been completed. If she persists in her rebellion, she leaves without a kethubah.
  	If one feeds (hamashreh) his wife through a third party [through a caretaker, not eating together with her, (The targum of (II Kings 6:23): "And he prepared for them a great meal" is "sheiruta.")], he may not give her less than two kavs (measures) of wheat [a week], or four kavs of barley. R. Yossi said: Only R. Yishmael, who lived near Edom [where barley was especially inferior] stipulated barley [twice as much as wheat.] And he gives her half a kav of pulse, half a log of oil, a kav of dried figs, or a manah of d'veilah [figs trodden into a circle and sold by weight and not by measure.] And if he lacks these, he cuts her "matching fruits" from a different place. And he gives her a bed, mapetz [softer than machtzeleth] for her things, shoes from festival to festival [new shoes for all three festivals], and clothing worth fifty zuz from year to year. And she is not given new clothes [that are uncomfortable for her] in the summertime, [making her hot then, but being appropriate for the wintertime], nor worn clothes in the wintertime. But he gives her clothing worth fifty zuz in the wintertime, and she wears them in their worn state in the summertime, and the worn clothes are hers [even when he buys her new ones; for she wears them when she is a niddah.]
  	He gives her a ma'ah (a sixth of a dinar) of silver for her needs [every week for small purchases]. And she eats with him from Sabbath night to Sabbath night. [Even though all the other days he may feed her through a third party if he wishes, on Sabbath night, which is the night of the conjugal time, he must eat together with her.] And if he does not give her a ma'ah of silver for her needs, her handiwork belongs to her [the surplus of her handiwork, i.e., what she earns above and beyond (the cost of) her food] And what does she make for him? The weight of five selaim of warp in Judah, which are ten selaim in the Galil [The warp is twice as difficult to weave as the woof, and the weight of Judah is double that of the Galil.], and the weight of ten selaim of woof in Judah, which are twenty selaim in the Galil. And if she were nursing, we deduct from her handiwork and add it (that amount) for her food. To whom does this (reckoning) apply? To a poor man in Israel; but with an eminent man, all is in accordance with his honor [and also in accordance with the custom of the land.]
  
  
  
  	The metziah of a woman [i.e., what she finds] and her handiwork belong to her husband, and her inheritance [i.e., if an inheritance fell to her], he eats fruits in her lifetime. Her bosheth (payment for shame) and her p'gam (her injury, the depreciation in her worth — her market value (as a bondswoman) before (her injury) less her market value now] (these) belong to her. R. Yehudah b. Betheirah says: When it (the injury) is in a hidden place, she receives two-thirds and he one-third; and when it is visible, he receives two-thirds and she one-third. [For the shame is his, and, what is more, she becomes repugnant to him and he bears it.] His share is given immediately, and for her share, land is bought and he eats fruits [in her lifetime, and the principal belongs to her, to revert to her when he dies or when he divorces her. And if she dies, he inherits her. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	If one committed money to his son-in-law, and his son-in-law died, [and she fell before the yavam], the sages said: He can say: "To your brother, I desired to give; to you, I do not desire to give." [Either give her chalitzah or take her in yibum (whereas with his brother, he either gives what he had committed or she sits (unmarried) until her hair turns grey.) And even if his brother were an am ha'aretz (unlearned) and he were a Torah scholar, he can still say: "To your brother, I desired to give; to you, I do not desire to give."]
  	If she committed herself to bring in to him (as dowry) one thousand dinars, he designates them as fifteen manah. [One thousand dinars are ten manah; and when the groom comes to accept it and to write it in the kethubah, he writes one-third more, which is fifteen manah (If the bride brought in to him actual dinars; for he earns through them.)] And relative to assessment, he designates a fifth less. [If she brought in to him clothing and jewelry which need to be assessed, he writes (in the kethubah) a fifth less (than the assessment). For example, if she brought in an assessment of one thousand zuz, he acknowledges only eight hundred. For it is the practice of the assessors of the bride's property to assess it at more than its worth to lend distinction to the bride and to endear her to her husband.] If the assessment were a manah and the worth a manah, [that is, if they assessed the bride's property at its actual worth in the marketplace], he has only one manah. [They write in the kethubah only a manah, as they assessed it.] (For) an assessment of a manah, she gives thirty-one sela and a dinar. [For an assessment that he accepts as a manah, i.e., where they told him: Write a manah in the kethubah, and she will bring in to you the worth of a manah, it must be assessed in the bridal chamber as thirty-one sela and a dinar, which is a manah and a fifth.] And for four manah, she gives five manah. [When the groom took upon himself to write four manah, she gives five manah according to the estimate of the assessors.] Whatever the groom writes, he writes a fifth less. [If they assessed it first, and she brought it in to him, whether a small assessment or a large one, he writes a fifth less.]
  	If she committed herself to bring in silver to him, [actual dinars with which he can trade immediately], a sela of silver [which is four dinars] becomes six dinars. [It is written into the kethubah as six dinars, an addition of a third. The tanna hereby apprises us that with actual dinars, whether they be many (such as the "thousand dinars" [6:2] or few (such as the "sela" here), they are always written into the kethubah at a third more, for they are immediately negotiable. And with things that require assessment, such as clothing and jewelry, whether they be many (as in "and relative to the assessment" [6:2], which refers to the thousand zuz mentioned above) or few (as in "for an assessment of a manah" [6:3]), she gives thirty-one sela and a dinar. In the kethubah, we always write a fifth less than the assessment of the bridal chamber. In this connection, it makes no difference whether it was assessed first and then came to be written into the kethubah, in which instance we must deduct in the kethubah a fifth of the assessment of the bridal chamber (as we learned [6:3]: "Whatever the groom writes, etc.,") or whether he writes the kethubah first, in which instance the assessment must be a fifth more than what is written in the kethubah (as we learned [Ibid.]: "And for a four manah assessment, she gives five manah.")] The groom takes it upon himself to give to the "fund" twenty dinars for every manah [i.e., to give her ten zuz for every manah that she brings him, with which to buy spices and perfumes. Our Mishnah does not specify whether every week, every month, or every year.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel said: "All is in accordance with the custom of the land.
  	If one marries his daughter without specifying [how much he will give her], he may not give her less than fifty zuz. If he stipulated to marry her off "naked," the husband may not say: "When I bring her into my home, I will clothe her in my garments" (i.e., in the garments that I shall provide for her), but he must clothe her while she is yet in her father's house. Likewise, one [i.e., the charity overseer] who marries off an orphan may not give her less than fifty zuz. If there are (funds) in the "pocket" (of charity), they provide her in accordance with her honor.
  	If an orphan were married off by her mother or her brothers by her consent, and they wrote to her (a dowry of) a hundred or fifty zuz, she can, when she comes of age, take from them what was rightfully hers [a tenth of the inheritance]. R. Yehudah says: If he [the father] married off the first daughter [in his lifetime], the second is given what was given to the first [whether less or more than a tenth. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah, that we follow the father's judgment. And if we cannot ascertain what that judgment was, she is given a tenth of the property extant at the time of her marriage — from land, but not from chattel. (There are those who hold that today she is given a tenth of chattel, too.) And if at the time of her marriage she did not claim it from the heirs, she may claim it after her marriage, and we do not say that she waives it to them. And this applies only when she is fed from her father's property; but if the heirs ceased feeding her, (it is assumed that) she waived it, unless she indicated otherwise. And if she were a bogereth, who is not fed by them, and she got married without claiming what was due her as dowry from her father's property, (it is assumed that) she waived it to the heirs, and she can no longer claim it, even if she were fed from their property.] The sages say: Sometimes a poor man grows wealthy and a wealthy man grows poor. Rather, the property is assessed, and (her share) is given her.
  	If one deposits money for his daughter [If he deposits money with a third party for is daughter's needs, to buy her a field or dowry when she marries], and she says: "I trust my husband" [i.e., Give the money to him], the third party does as he was instructed. [He buys the field, and she is not heeded, for it is a mitzvah to fulfill the behest of one who has died.] These are the words of R. Meir. R. Yossi says: Is it not only a field? If she wished to sell it, she could sell it now. [That is, even if the field had already been bought and she wished to sell it, she could do so. Therefore, we heed her.] When is this so, when she is of age; but if she were a minor, the act of a minor is of no import. [R. Yossi and R. Meir differ only vis-à-vis one who is of age, during betrothal. For after she has been wed, all agree that she is heeded. And in respect to a minor, too, R. Yossi agrees that the act of a minor is of no import and she is not heeded. The halachah is in accordance with R. Meir.]
  
  
  
  	If one forbids his wife by vow from deriving enjoyment from him, until thirty days, he appoints a "provider." [The vow does not take effect vis-à-vis the enjoyment of cohabitation, because he is obligated to her in that regard, and he is not empowered to abrogate that obligation. And, as to the enjoyment of food, even though he is obligated to her (in that regard, too), the vow can take effect by her food being supplied through (the proceeds of) her handiwork. The gemara asks: In that case, why need he appoint a provider? And it answers: When it (her handiwork) does not suffice for those things she was accustomed to in her father's house. For this purpose alone he appoints a provider. He does not appoint a messenger to provide for her, for "a man's messenger is as the man himself." He just says: "Whoever provides (for her) will not lose thereby."] Beyond that time, he sends her away and gives her her kethubah. [For until thirty days people do not hear of it and there is no "cheapening"; beyond thirty days, they do hear of it and there is "cheapening."] R. Yehudah says: With an Israelite, [who can remarry his divorcée], he keeps her (as a wife) one month, and on the second, he sends her out and gives her her kethubah. And with a Cohein [(who, if he divorces her will not be able to remarry her, the rabbis gave him more time)], he keeps her two months, and on the third month he sends her out and gives her her kethubah. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	If one accepts his wife's vow not to eat a certain fruit, [as when she says: "I vow not to eat this fruit," and he upholds it], he sends her out and gives her her kethubah. R. Yehudah says: With an Israelite, he keeps her one day, and on the second he sends her out and gives her her kethubah. And with a Cohein, he keeps her two days, and on the third he sends her out and gives her her kethubah. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	If one accepted his wife's vow not to adorn herself with a certain adornment [as when she says: "I vow not to use this perfume," and he upholds it], he sends her out and he gives her her kethubah. R. Yossi says: With poor women, [it is] where he does not set a limit [as to how long it is forbidden her that he sends her out and gives her her kethubah; but if he sets a limit, she waits until that time. And how long is the limit? Twelve months.], and with wealthy women, thirty days. [For a wealthy woman savors the fragrance of her perfumes for thirty days, so that this one savors the fragrance of the perfumes which she applied thirty days before the vow. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yossi.]
  	If one accepted his wife's vow not to go to her father's house — When he (her father) is with her in the same city, he keeps her one month and on the second he sends her out and gives her her kethubah. And when he is in a different city, he keeps her for one festival, and on the third he send her out and gives her her kethubah. [The gemara explains this Mishnah as follows: "He keeps her for one festival": When is this so, with the wife of an Israelite; but with the wife of a Cohein, he keeps her for two festivals and on the third he sends her out. Our Mishnah is in accordance with R. Yehudah, who distinguishes between the wife of an Israelite and the wife of a Cohein. The halachah is not in accordance with him.]
  	If one accepted his wife's vow not to go to the house of mourning or to the house of feasting, he sends her out and gives her her kethubah, for he locks before her [the door of joy and alleviation of sorrow; and, re the house of mourning, he locks before her (the "door of eulogy"), for on the morrow she may die, and none will eulogize her. And if he claimed (that he upheld the vow) because of "something else" [as when it were known that dissolute men were there], he is permitted (to uphold the vow). If he said to her: (I shall absolve you of your vow) only on condition that you say to that man [the demeaning things] that you said to me or that I said to you, or on condition that she fill up and pour it into the dung [Some say (the meaning is): After intercourse, when her womb is full of seed, she is to douche it, so that she not conceive. Others: She is to fill up ten pitchers of water and pour them into the dung (in which instance she seems deranged)], he sends her out and gives her her kethubah.
  	And these go out without a kethubah: One who transgresses the law of Moses and (the law of) a Jewish woman. Which is (transgression of) the law of Moses? If she fed him untithed produce [and it did not become known to him until after having eaten from it. As when she said to him: That man, a Cohein, tithed the pile for me, and he (the husband) subsequently went and asked, and found her to have lied.], and if she cohabited with him in her niddah state [as when she were known to be a niddah by her neighbors, who saw her in her niddah apparel, and who told her husband that she was clean], and if she did not take challah [as when she said to him: That man took challah from the dough for me, and he subsequently went and asked, and found her to have lied.], and if she vowed and did not keep her vows. And which is (transgression of) the law of the Jewish woman? If she went out with her hair uncovered, and wove in the marketplace [exposing her arms to men], and spoke with all men [i.e., the young men]. Abba Shaul says: Also, if she curses his progenitors before him [i.e., if she curses and blasphemes her husband's father in her husband's presence.] R. Tarfon says: Also, a "vocal" woman. Which is a vocal" woman? One who, when she speaks in her house, is overheard by her neighbors. [She solicits intercourse so loudly that she is overheard by her neighbors. All of the above require witnesses and fore-warning to cause them to lose their kethubah. They receive neither kethubah nor addition, and take only their intact worn possessions.]
  	If one betroths a woman on condition that she is not bound by any vows, and she is found to be bound by vows, she is not betrothed. [Which vows? That she not eat drink, or drink wine, or dress herself in colored garments. But with other vows, she is betrothed.] If he married her without specifying (anything about vows), and she was found to be bound by vows, she goes out without her kethubah. (If he betrothed her on condition that she have no blemishes, and she were found to have blemishes, she is not betrothed. If he married her without specifying (anything about blemishes), and she were found to have blemishes, she goes out without her kethubah. All the blemishes which render priests unfit (for the priestly service) render women unfit. [These (the priestly blemishes) are enumerated in Bechoroth, and, in addition, in women: (profuse) sweating, mouth-odor, offensive odor in another place in her body, a mole with hair, whether large or small, when it is near her face, as when it is under her head-cap, sometimes visible; sometimes not. For if it were in a constantly exposed spot, he saw it and accepted it! And if there were no hair in the mole, it is not considered a blemish unless it is as large as an issar. And (also considered a blemish) is a thick voice, different from that of other women, a scar like a burn-mark, produced by a dog-bite, breasts a hand-breadth larger than the norm, and breasts separated from each other by more than a hand-breadth. These are blemishes in women, though they are not blemishes in priests.]
  	If she had blemishes when she were still in her father's domain, her father must bring proof that these blemishes appeared after she had been betrothed and that "his (the husband's) field had been flooded." [If he (her father) came to claim her kethubah from betrothal from this man who refuses to take her (in marriage), he must bring proof that these blemishes appeared after she was betrothed. And even though a woman has a body-status (of non-blemished), since the blemishes were found in the father's domain, and it can be contended that they were there before betrothal, if he did not bring proof (to the contrary), the husband is believed.] Once she entered her husband's domain, [If he married her and now wishes to send her away without a kethubah because of her blemishes], the husband must bring proof that these blemishes were there before she was betrothed [for (otherwise), since these blemishes were found in his domain, we say: "They were found here; they originated here" i.e., they appeared after he married her and "his field was flooded."] These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: When does this apply? With concealed blemishes, but with revealed blemishes, he can make no such claim [for he knew about them and he accepted them]. And if there were a bath-house in that city, he cannot make such a clam even for concealed blemishes, for she was inspected by his (female kin, and he accepted her as she was.)
  	If a man became blemished [after marriage], we do not compel him to send her out. R. Shimon b. Gamliel said: When is this so? With small blemishes. But with large blemishes [e.g., if his eye were blinded or his hand were amputated, or his foot broken], he is forced to send her out. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel, and even with large blemishes we do not compel him to send her out.]
  	And these are the men who are compelled to send out their wives: one afflicted with [leprous] boils or polypus [an offensive odor in the nose], a "collector" [one who collects dog dung], a copper miner, [the odor of the mined copper being offensive], and a tanner, whether the condition obtained before marriage or originated only after marriage. Of all of these, R. Meir said: Even though he made a condition with her (to accept these things), she can say: "I thought I would be able to tolerate it, but I cannot." And the sages say: She must accept it perforce, except for [leprous] boils, for they consume him, [as in (Zechariah 14:12): "hamek besaro" ("His flesh was consumed.") The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] It happened in Siddon that a tanner died. He had a brother who was (also) a tanner (and his wife fell before him for yibum.) The sages said: She can say: "I could tolerate it with your brother, but I cannot tolerate it with you."
  
  
  
  	If property fell to a woman before she were betrothed [and she were then betrothed], Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it as a gift, and it (the transaction) stands. If it fell to her after she were betrothed, Beth Shammai say: She may sell it [while she is still betrothed, but not after she were married], and Beth Hillel say: She may not sell it. Both agree that if she sold it or gave it as a gift, it stands. R. Yehudah said: They said before R. Gamliel: If he acquires the woman, [the woman becoming his betrothed], should he not acquire the property! He answered: "We are ashamed over the new [which fell to her after she was married. Why did the sages see fit to say that if she sold it or gave it as a gift, her husband can take it from the receiver], and you would "roll" the old upon us!" [property that fell to her while she was still betrothed, saying that if she sold it the sale is void, her husband having acquired it.] If it fell to her after she were married, both agree that if she sold it or gave it as a gift, her husband can take it from the receiver. (If it fell to her) before she were married, and she were then married, R. Gamliel says: If she sold it or gave it as a gift, it stands. R. Chanina b. Akiva said: They said before R. Gamliel: If he acquires the woman, should he not acquire the property! He answered: "We are shamed over the new, and you would roll the old upon us!"
  	R. Shimon differentiates between property and property. Property which is known to the husband, she may not sell; and if she sold it or gave it as a gift, it is void. Property which is not known to the husband, she may not sell; and if she sold it or gave it as a gift, it stands. [Some understand "property which is known" as land, and "property which is not known" as chattel. And others understand both of these as "property that is known," and what fell to her abroad while she resided here as "property which is not known." The halachah is that both property that fell to her before she was betrothed and property that fell to her after she was betrothed — if she sold it after she were married, her husband may take from the receiver fruits in her lifetime, and the land itself after her death. And the halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon, who differentiates between property known to the husband and property not known to the husband.]
  	If money fell to her, land is bought for it, and he eats fruits. (If there fell to her) fruits torn from the land, land is bought for them and he eats fruits. And, as to what is attached to land, R. Meir said: The land is assessed — how much it is worth with fruits and how much it is worth without fruits, and land is bought with the difference, and he eats fruits. [For he holds that what grew in his domain is called "fruits," and what did not grow in his domain is called "keren" (principal). Therefore, the greater worth of the land now because of produce is "keren," and she must be given the money, and land be bought, and he eat the fruits.] And the sages say: What is attached to the land is his [Even what did not grow in his domain was accorded the status of "fruits," since the land "stands" for her. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.], and what is torn from the land is hers, and land is bought for them, and he eats fruits.
  	R. Shimon says: The place where his strength is superior when she enters, his strength is inferior when she leaves [if he comes to divorce her]; and the place where his strength is inferior when she enters, his strength is superior when she leaves. Fruits connected to the land are his when she enters [That is, when the land falls to her, they are his, as per the sages.], and when she goes out, they are hers. And what is torn from the land — when she comes in they are hers, and when she goes out, they are his. [The sages and R. Shimon will differ in regard to fruits connected to the land when she leaves, the sages not speaking of them. They do not agree with R. Shimon that when she leaves they are hers, holding that what grows in his domain is his. The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon.]
  	If there fell to her, old bondsmen and bondswomen, they are sold, and land is bought for them, and he eats fruits. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: They are not to be sold, for they are the "pride" of her father's house. [She can prevent it. The halachah is in accordance with him.] If old olive (trees) and vines fell to her, they are sold for wood and land is bought for them and he eats fruits. R. Yehudah says: They are not to be sold, for they are the "pride" of her father's house. [The halachah is in accordance with him.] If one expended money on his wife's property — if he expended much and ate little, [even a minute mount], or if he expended a little and ate much — what he expended he expended and what he ate he ate. If he expended and he did not eat, he swears how much he expended and takes. [This oath is similar to a Torah oath. This is so when the appreciation were as much as the expenditure or more; but if the expenditure were more than the appreciation, he swears a Torah oath that he expended against the appreciation, and he takes only the amount of the appreciation and forfeits the rest. And all this is when the husband divorced her. But if she rebelled, whether or not the husband ate, he swears how much he expended and takes against the appreciation. And in tzon-barzel (mortmain) property, all of the appreciation is his, for we say: "If they increased (in value), they increased for him."]
  	One awaiting yibum, to whom property fell [from her father's house, while she was still awaiting yibum] — Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that she may sell it and give it as a gift, and it stands. If she died, what should be done with her kethubah [one manah, or two manah, the addition, and the dowry that she brought in to him and for which he assumed responsibility], and with the property that goes in and goes out with her [nichsei melog, which, when she goes in, goes in with her, and, when she leaves her husband, goes out with her]? Beth Shammai say: The heirs of the husband (i.e., the yavam) divide it with the heirs of the father, [for there is a possibility that she is (considered) married to the yavam, who acquires half the inheritance as per this possibility.], and Beth Hillel say: The property [tzon barzel] remains in its status [And it is not specified whether in the status (i.e., ownership) of the heirs of the husband, in that he had been responsible for it, or in the status of the heirs of the woman, the property having been hers. This Mishnah is to be found in the fourth chapter of Yevamoth (4:3)], and her kethubah is in the status of the heirs of the husband. The property which goes in and out with her is in the status of the heirs of the father.
  	If his [the yavam's] brother left money, land is to be bought for it, and he eats fruits. [For her kethubah rests on the property of her first husband, so that the property of the dead brother stands security for her kethubah. It is just that the yavam eats fruits if he takes her in yibum. He (this tanna) holds that chattel is bound (as security) for her kethubah.] (If his brother left) fruits torn from the land, he buys land for them, and he eats fruits. (If his brother left fruits) attached to the land, R. Meir said: The land is assessed — how much it is worth with fruits and how much it is worth without fruits, and land is bought with the difference, and he eats fruits. [For whatever grew in the domain of the dead brother is bound (as security) for the kethubah.] And the sages say: Fruits attached to the land are his. [The gemara asks: But are not all of his possessions bound as security for the kethubah? And it answers: Read it "hers" (instead of "his.")] Fruits torn from the land — Whoever takes them first acquires them. [They hold that chattel is not bound (as security) for the kethubah, unless she seized it; and such seizure is necessary in the husband's lifetime. And they differ likewise in respect to money. For how is money different (in principle) from torn off fruits? And the halachah is in accordance with the sages.] If he (the yavam) took them first, he acquires them. If she took them first, land is to be bought for them and he eats fruits. If he married her, she is like his wife in every respect. [He divorces her with a get and he may take her back, and we do not say: The Torah said (Deuteronomy 25:5): "Veyibmah" ("And he shall take her in levirate marriage"), and her first yibum (obligation) is still upon her, so that a get does not suffice. And, likewise, once he divorced her, we would say: He already performed the mitzvah imposed upon him by the Torah, so that she should now remain forbidden to him as "his brother's wife," and he should not be able to take her back. The Torah, therefore, apprises us (Ibid.): "And he shall take her for himself as a wife." Once he has taken her, she is as a wife to him (in all respects).] It is only that her kethubah rests upon the property of her first husband.
  	The yavam) may not say to her: "Here is (the money to cover) your kethubah lying on the table"; but all of his property [that he inherited from his brother] is bound (as security) to her kethubah. Likewise, a man may not say to his wife: "Here is your kethubah lying on the table," but all of his property is bound to her kethubah. If he (the yavam) divorced her, she receives only (the amount of) her kethubah. [But so long as he did not divorce her, she is like all other women, and she has only her (original) kethubah alone. [For one who divorces his wife and takes her back, takes her back within the framework of her first kethubah. And it is necessary to apprise us that this obtains, too, with a yevamah; that we not say that this is so only with his wife, whom he had written a kethubah resting upon his property, but not with a yevamah, where he had not written it, but where the property of her first husband had been bound as security for it — so that in an instance where he divorced her and took her back, I might think that he would have to provide her with his own kethubah. We are hereby apprised that this is not so.]
  
  
  
  	If one wrote to his wife: "I have nothing to do with your property," he eats fruits in her lifetime, and if she dies, he inherits her. [If, while she were still betrothed, he wrote to her: When you get married to me, I have nothing to do with your property — even though they (the receivers) did not acquire it from him, she may sell it and give it as a gift, and the transaction stands. For a man may make a condition not to inherit an inheritance falling to him from elsewhere. And if they did acquire it from him, even after marriage her sale stands. But he eats fruits, and if she died, he inherits her. For this is what is implied, viz.: "I have nothing to do with your property, but I do have something to do with its fruits. And so long as it is your property, (i.e., during your lifetime) I have nothing to do with it. But after you die, I do have "something to do with it."] If so why does he write her: "I have nothing to do with your property"? So that if she sold it or gave it away, it (the transaction) stands. If he wrote her: "I have nothing to do with your property or its fruits," he does not eat fruits in her lifetime. And if she dies, he inherits her. R. Yehudah says: He always eats fruits of fruits, unless he writes: "I have nothing to do with your property, or its fruits, or the fruits of its fruits forever." [The gemara explains which are fruits and which are fruits of fruits. If she brought land in to him, and it produced fruits — these are fruits. If he sold these fruits for land, which produced fruits — these are fruits of fruits. If he tells her only: "I have nothing to do with your property or its fruits," he eats fruits of fruits according to R. Yehudah; for he "removed" himself only from fruits. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah.] If he wrote her: "I have nothing to do with your property, or its fruits, or the fruits of its fruits in your lifetime or after your death," he does not eat fruits in her lifetime, and if she dies, he does not inherit her. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: If she dies, he inherits her; for he made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah; and if one makes a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah, the condition is void. [For it is written (Numbers 27:11): "And he shall inherit her" — whence it is derived that a man inherits his wife. But the conclusion is that a man's inheriting his wife is not a Scriptural but a rabbinical enactment and the (above) verse only serves as support — notwithstanding which the halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel. Not because he makes a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah, but because the sages gave it "Torah strength."]
  	If one died, and left a wife, a creditor, and heirs, and he had a pledge or a loan (owing him) in the hands of others, R. Tarfon says: It is to be given to the "weakest" among them. [Some explain: to the one whose deed is latest, he being the "weakest" of all, not being able to seize property which had been sold before him (i.e., before the date of the deed.) Others explain: to the (kethubah of the) woman. She is called "weakest," it not being proper for a woman, as it is for a man, to seek out a dead man's property and to inquire where he has land. And even though the chattel of the orphans is not bound to the creditor or to the kethubah of the woman, here, where it is not in their domain, R. Tarfon holds that it is taken from the debtor's hand or from the hand of the one who has the pledge, and given to the creditor or to the (woman for her) kethubah.] R. Akiva says: "There is no mercy in judgment," and it is given to the heirs [and seizure (by the others) is of no avail.] For all require an oath, but the heirs do not require an oath. [For if one comes to collect from the property of orphans, he can do so only with an oath. And so long as they (the claimants) do not swear, we do not know whether they are owed anything at all. Therefore, when the father dies, the heirs inherit it (the loan or the pledge), and it is in their domain.]
  	If he left fruits torn from the land, whoever is first (to seize them) acquires them. [If the heirs were first, they acquire them; and it is not taken from their hands. For the chattel of the orphans is not bound to the creditor or to the kethubah. If one of the others were first — the woman or the creditor — he acquires them. For R. Tarfon holds that seizure after death is valid.] If the woman acquired more than her kethubah [If she came first and seized more (fruits) than her kethubah (is worth)], or if the creditor [came first] and [seized] more than his debt — the remainder, R. Tarfon says, should be given to the "weakest" [the holder of the deed, who has the "lower hand." And if they (the fruits) come to the hand of the orphans, they can no longer be taken from them, neither by the woman nor by the creditor. And today, when all courts in Israel rule that the chattel of orphans is bound to the creditor, if one died and left chattel with claims upon it by a creditor and by (the kethubah of) a woman, whoever comes first acquires it, whether a creditor with an earlier claim or a creditor with a later claim; for there is no law of priority vis-à-vis chattel. And if neither of them came forward, the chattel is divided between them, as stated below (Chapter 10).] R. Akiva says: "There is no mercy in judgment," and it is given to the heirs. For all require an oath, but the heirs do not require an oath.
  	If one sets his wife up as shopkeeper [to buy and sell in the shop], or if he appoints her a caretaker [to look after his money and to trade with it], he can administer an oath to her whenever he wishes, [an oath similar to a Torah oath on a claim of "perhaps" (you misappropriated, etc.), and he may "roll" onto her (another oath) that she did not "cheat" with her spinning or with her dough.] R. Eliezer says: Even for her spinning and for her dough. [Even ab initio, without "rolling," he can make her swear for her spinning and for her dough. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Eliezer.]
  	If he wrote to her: "I will impose upon you neither vow nor oath," he cannot make her swear; but he can make her heirs swear [If he divorced her, and she died, and her heirs claim her kethubah from him, they swear the "oath of the heirs," viz.: She did not tell us at her death, and she did not tell us before that, and we did not find among her deeds, that her kethubah had been paid.]; and (he can make) those coming by her authority (swear). [If she had sold her kethubah to others, and she had been divorced and had died, and the buyers had come to claim her kethubah, they, too, swear the oath of the heirs.] (If he wrote:) "I will impose neither vow nor oath upon you, your heirs, or those who come by your authority," he cannot cause to swear either her or her heirs or those who come by her authority; but his heirs can cause to swear: her, her heirs, and those who come by her authority. [If she were widowed and she or her heirs claimed it from the orphans, they require an oath, for he exempted them only from (the exaction of an oath by) him, if her kethubah were claimed in his lifetime.] (If he wrote:) "Neither I, nor my heirs, nor those who come by my authority [(if I sell my property, and you come to collect from the buyers)] will impose either vow or oath upon you, your heirs, or those who come by your authority," neither he nor his heirs, nor those who come by his authority can cause to swear either her, her heirs, or those who come by her authority.
  	If she [the one her husband exempted from an oath] went from her husband's grave to her father's house [not occupying herself with the property anymore] or returned to the house of her in-laws and did not become a caretaker, the heirs cannot cause her to swear [in connection with her dealings between the death and the burial. For if the heirs could cause her to swear in this regard, because she would thereby be constrained to bring witnesses as to what she sold and bought for the burial of the dead, the body would remain unburied and would become repulsive.] And if she did become a caretaker, the heirs may cause her to swear as to the future [i.e., that she did not misappropriate anything in her caretaker dealings after her husband's death. For his having exempted her does not avail, the property belonging to the orphans]; and they may not cause her to swear as to what has passed [re her dealings in her husband's lifetime].
  	If a woman "impairs" her kethubah (see 9:8), she exacts payment only with an oath. [When one is paid by another, he is not (always) careful to ascertain that he has been paid the exact amount; and this one (the woman), since she was (by her own admission) paid in part, might have been paid in full. And the rabbis imposed an oath upon her so that she be exact (in her reckoning).] If one witness testifies that it has been paid, she can exact payment only with an oath. [This is a rabbinical ordinance designed to set the husband's mind at rest. And these oaths, though instituted by the rabbis, are like Torah oaths, requiring the holding of a (sacred) object. For all oaths instituted in the Mishnah are like Torah oaths.] (If she came to claim her kethubah) from the property of the orphans, or from bound property, or not in his (her husband's) presence, she can exact payment only with an oath. [For if one would claim from the debtor himself, and he would say: Swear to me that I did not pay you, he would have to swear. And we argue for the receiver (of the property), viz.: Perhaps if she had claimed from the debtor (her husband), he would have said: "Swear to me that I did not pay you," and she would have had to swear. Here, too, she has to swear.]
  	"If a woman impairs her kethubah": How so? If her kethubah were a thousand zuz, and she said: I received only one hundred, she exacts payment only with an oath. "If one witness testifies that it has been paid": How so? If her kethubah were a thousand zuz, and he said to her: You have received your kethubah, and she said: I did not receive it, and one witness testifies that it was paid, she exacts payment only with an oath. "from bound property": How so? If he sold his property to others, and she claims payment from the receivers, she can exact payment only with an oath. "from the property of the orphans": How so? If he died and left his property to the orphans, and she claims payment from the orphans, she can exact payment only with an oath. "not in his presence": How so? If he went abroad, and she claims, not in his presence, she can exact payment only with an oath. R. Shimon says: Whenever she claims her kethubah, the heirs can make her swear; and if she does not claim her kethubah, the heirs cannot make her swear. [This refers to the ruling of the rabbis (9:4): "If one sets up his wife as a shopkeeper or as a caretaker, he can administer an oath to her whenever he wishes," and (9:5): "If he wrote: 'Neither I nor my heirs will impose either vow or oath upon you,' the heirs cannot make her swear." He (R. Shimon) comes to differ and to say that whenever she claims her kethubah, the heirs can make her swear, even if he wrote: "Neither I nor my heirs will impose vow nor oath upon you." And if she does not claim her kethubah, the heirs cannot make her swear as to her caretakership in her husband's lifetime, even if he (himself) did not exempt her from an oath, R. Shimon differing from R. Eliezer and those of his opinion who say (9:4): "He can administer an oath to her whenever he wishes." The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon.]
  	If she produced a get, but there were no kethubah with it, [in a place where they do not write a kethubah, but rely upon the condition of beth-din], she collects her kethubah. [For the kethubah-condition is (regarded as) an act of beth-din. And (with) every "act of beth-din," it is as if one is holding the deed. And it is only the one manah or the two manah that she collects, but she does not receive the addition unless she produces the kethubah.] (If she produced) a kethubah, but there were no get with it — she saying: I lost my get, and he saying: I lost my receipt; and, likewise, if a creditor produced a deed of indebtedness, but there were no prozbol with it [(Hillel instituted "prozbol" so that the shemitah year not cancel a debt. By the institution of prozbol, one relegates his deeds to beth-din to collect his debt from the debtor whenever he claims it, so that it does not come under the interdict of (Deuteronomy 15:2): "He shall not exact it," the creditor not exacting it at all, but beth-din doing so.], payment is not exacted. [For we suspect that the woman might have collected her kethubah, and that the debt may have been canceled by the sabbatical year.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: From the "danger" on [i.e., after the gentiles had decreed against the observance of mitzvoth and the Jews were afraid to keep their gittin, so that they burned them upon receiving them, and, likewise, with their prozbols], a woman collects her kethubah without a get, and a creditor collects his debt without a prozbol. (If she produced) two gittin and two kethuboth, she collects two kethuboth. Two kethuboth and one get, or one kethubah and two gittin, or one kethubah, one get, and (witnesses that he took her back and) he died, she collects only one kethubah. For if one divorces his wife and takes her back, it is within the framework of the first kethubah that he takes her back. If a minor were married off by his father, her kethubah (written when he was a minor) is valid, for it is within this framework that he kept her (as a wife after he came of age). If one became a proselyte together with his wife, her kethubah (written when they were non-Jews) is valid; for it is within this framework (i.e., that it apply after they became proselytes) that he kept her.
  
  
  
  	If a man were married to two women and he died, the first comes before the second (in collecting her kethubah), and the heirs of the first come before the heirs of the second [if his wives died after him before they had collected their kethubah.] If he married the first and she died, and then he married the second and he died, the second and her heirs come before the heirs of the first. [For she (the second) is a creditor, whereas the heirs of the first come to inherit from their father the kethubah of "the male sons," concerning which it is written (in the kethubah): "They shall inherit." For this reason the debt is paid first, and they inherit what is left. And it is only when the second swore (that she had not collected) the kethubah that she or her heirs take her kethubah. But if she had died after her husband and had not sworn, her heirs take nothing of her kethubah, the ruling being that "a man does not bequeath an oath to his sons"; that is, money which is acquired only by an oath. If he died before he swore, that money is not bequeathed to his sons.]
  	If a man were married to two wives and they died. And then he died, and the orphans claim their mother's kethubah [ in an instance where the kethubah of one of them is larger than that of the other, and her sons (those of the first) say: We will take the "male-sons" kethubah, and you, likewise, and we shall divide the rest ], if (the amount of) only two kethuboth were there, they divide equally [as with all other inheritances, and they do not take the "male-sons" kethubah. If there were a surplus of a dinar, these take the kethubah of their mother, and those take the kethubah of their mother. If the orphans [ those with the larger kethubah] said: "We raise our father's property an additional dinar" in order to receive their mother's kethubah, they are not heeded. [ (If they said:) We raise its worth, accepting it as being worth more, (so that there be an additional dinar, enabling them to take their mother's kethubah) ], they are not heeded, but the property is appraised in beth-din.
  	If there were potential property [such as merchandise in the hands of others or a loan], it is not considered as "held." [It is not considered as if it were held in his (the father's) hand so that an "additional dinar" obtains. R. Shimon says: Even if there were unbound property [i.e., chattel] there, it is as naught — until there be bound property [land] worth a dinar more than the two kethuboth. [And the halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon. And even nowadays, when the chattel of orphans is held to be bound to the debtor, the "male-sons" kethubah obtains not with chattel, but with land.]
  	If a man were married to three women, and he died — if the kethubah of one were a manah; of the other, two manah; and of the third, three manah, [and all three were signed on the same day (for if they were signed on three different days, the first signed is the first to collect. Or (the instance may be one) where he left only chattel, there being no law of precedence with chattel)], and there were only a manah (of property), they share equally. [For the "strength" of all is equal vis-à-vis the manah, all of them being owed (at least) a manah.] If there were two manah (of property) [Only one manah is bound to the manah kethubah; but not the second manah], the manah woman takes fifty, and the two and three manah women take three golden (dinars) apiece. [The gemara asks: She (the manah woman) should take one third of a manah (a hundred). How does she take fifty, which is half a manah! And it answers that our Mishnah speaks of an instance in which the two manah woman says to the one manah: I shall not contest the manah that is bound to you. Your share shall not be diminished because of me — for which reason she and the three manah woman divide it. And because the two manah woman did not give the one manah woman her share as a gift, but only said to her that she would not contest it with her and that her share would not be diminished because of her — after the one manah woman takes fifty, the rights of the two manah woman remain equal to those of the three manah woman in the remaining manah and a half, and each one takes three golden dinars, which are seventy-five silver dinars, each golden dinar being worth three silver ones.] If there were three manah (of property) [The first manah is bound to all of them; the second to the two manah woman alone], the manah woman takes fifty; the two manah woman, one manah; and the three manah woman, six golden dinars. [This, in an instance in which the three manah woman says to the one and two manah women: I shall not contest the (first) manah with you. Therefore, the first manah is divided between the two manah woman and the one manah woman, so that the one manah woman takes fifty, and the second manah is divided between the two and three manah women. The two manah woman, then, emerges with one manah — the fifty that she took from the division with the one manah woman, and the fifty from the second manah that she took from the division with the three manah woman. And the third manah is taken entirely by the three manah woman, so that she emerges with six golden dinars, which are a manah and a half — the entire third manah which remained for her, and the half-manah from the division with the two manah woman.] Likewise, if three put money into a "pocket" (i.e., a joint venture), and it diminished or increased in value, they divide in the same manner. [The gemara concludes that our Mishnah is in accordance with R. Nathan. But it is not the halachah, for Rebbi says: I do not agree with R. Nathan in this, but they all share equally. For since all of his property is bound to the kethubah, all three manah are bound to the one manah woman as they are to the others, until she collects all of her kethubah. Therefore, they share equally, the one manah woman taking as much as the two and three manah women. But with "three who put money into a pocket"; one, one manah; a second, two manah; and a third, three manah, in which instance they take in accordance with the appreciation of their money, it is just that each take in accordance with his money (input). And it is only when the money appreciates in and of itself (as when there is a currency change, its value increasing or decreasing) that the profit or loss is distributed according to the money (input itself); but if they bought merchandise with the money they put into the "pocket," and they profited or lost on the merchandise, this profit or loss is divided only according to the number of partners and not according to the money (input) — so that the one who invested little takes as much as the one who invested much, unless they stipulated beforehand to divide in proportion to the investment. And this is how it is adjudged in all of our courts.]
  	If a man were married to four women, and he died, the first comes before the second; the second, before the third; and the third, before the fourth. [The one whose kethubah is dated earliest comes before the second, and so with all. The first swears to the second; the second, to the third; the third, to the fourth, and the fourth collects without an oath. [(The first swears to the second) if the second says to the first: Swear to me that you collected nothing from my husband (in his lifetime), for (if you did), there might not be enough left for me to collect my kethubah from. And, similarly, if the third says thus to the second, and the fourth to the third; but the fourth collects without swearing (in an instance where there is no heir or other creditor to make her swear)]. Ben Naness says: Now should she profit just because she is the last! She, too, collects only if she swears. [The gemara explains the difference between the first tanna and Ben Naness as applying to an instance where one of the fields received by the three first women was found not to belong to him (the husband), it having been discovered to have been stolen, so that in the end the owner will come and claim it. When the fourth woman comes to collect her kethubah from the fourth field, this one (the woman with the stolen field) comes and says to her: The owner of this stolen field is bound to come and take it from me; I want you to swear that you did not collect your kethubah in my husband's lifetime. The first tanna holds that if a later creditor were beforehand in collecting (before an earlier creditor), what he collected is not (validly) collected. Therefore, why should she swear? If the robbed one comes and seizes (his field) from this woman, she will go to the fourth one and take from her what she had collected, the fourth woman being a "later creditor." And Ben Naness holds that if a later creditor were beforehand in collecting, what he collected is (validly) collected, so that if she holds this field, the third woman cannot come to her (and claim it). Therefore, she swears to her that she had collected nothing from her husband's property. The halachah is in accordance with the first tanna. We infer, in any event, that if she seized chattel she must swear according to all, there being no law of precedence vis-à-vis chattel, and what she has collected is (validly) collected.] If all (of the kethuboth) were issued on the same day, if one is even one hour earlier than the other, that woman takes precedence (in collecting). And, in Jerusalem, they would, accordingly, write the hour (of the kethubah). If all were issued in the same hour, and there were only a manah (of property), they all share equally.
  	If a man were married to two women, and he sold his field, and the first woman wrote to the buyer: "I shall not contest it with you," [in an instance where it (the field) was acquired from her hand — The gemara asks: Why can she not say: "I was just pleasing my husband" ("and I did not really mean it")? And it answers: We are speaking of an instance in which her husband sold this field to a different man before this one, and she refused to sign for him, whereas she agreed to sign for this one. For if it were merely a matter of pleasing her husband, she would have signed for the first, too.], the second takes it from the buyer; the first, from the second; and the buyer from the first; and so, all over again, until they reach a compromise among them. And, likewise, a creditor [and two buyers. If Reuven were owed a manah by Shimon, and he (Shimon) had two fields and sold them to two buyers, to each, for fifty (a half-manah), and Reuven wrote to the second buyer: "I shall not contest it with you," he takes it from the first buyer, who cannot say to him: "I left you a place to collect from," the debt embracing both, and the first buyer takes it from the second, and Reuven takes this, too, from the first, and the second buyer takes it from Reuven; and so, all over again, until they reach a compromise]; and, likewise, a woman creditor [a woman who was owed a kethubah by her husband, who sold two fields to two buyers, the two fields sufficing only for the amount of the kethubah. If she wrote to the second: "I shall not contest it with you," she takes it from the first buyer, and he, from the second, and she from the first, and the second, from the woman, and the first buyer from the second; and so, all over again.]
  
  
  
  	A widow is fed from the property of the orphans [from both land and chattel, this being a condition of the kethubah, viz.: "And you shall sit in my house and be fed from my property"]; her handiwork belongs to them, and they are not obliged to bury her. Her heirs, the inheritors of her kethubah, are obliged to bury her. [For her husband is obliged to bury her in lieu of her inheritance, and now that her heirs (i.e., her children, who are not his) collect her kethubah from the husband's heirs, they bury her. And we incidentally infer that if she died and had not sworn (that she had not collected) her kethubah, in which instance her heirs do not collect her kethubah, the husband's heirs are obliged to bury her.]
  	A widow, both from betrothal [in which instance she is not fed (from the property of the inheritance) and she sells her kethubah], both from marriage [in which instance she sells (from the property of the inheritance) for food], sells not before beth-din. [That is, not before a beth-din of experts. But in any event, she must sell before three who are expert in the assessment of land.] R. Shimon says: From marriage, [in which instance she sells (property) for food], she sells not before beth-din, [for she cannot sit and suffer until she finds a beth-din, but] from betrothal [where her sale is only for (collection of) the kethubah], she sells only before beth-din. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon.]
  	If she sold her kethubah [a manah, or two manah] or a part of it; if she gave her kethubah or part of it as a pledge; if she gave her kethubah or part of it to another as a gift, she may sell the rest [the addition] only in beth-din. [Our Mishnah is in accordance with R. Shimon, who says that she may not sell it outside of beth-din except for food. And this one, since she collected part of her kethubah receives no food (from the remaining property).] And the sages say: She can sell (her kethubah) even four or five times [i.e., in installments, in spite of which she can sell (her kethubah) even four or five times [i.e., in installments, in spite of which she can sell (property) in the intervals for food, not having lost her obligation to be fed though she has collected part of her kethubah. ] And she sells (property) for food not before beth-din, and writes [in the bill of sale]: "I sold it for food." And a divorcée may sell (her kethubah) only before beth-din. [For the reason the rabbis said that a widow both from betrothal and from marriage sells her kethubah not before beth-din is that a man does not wish his wife to be demeaned in beth-din. But since this woman is a divorcée, he is not apprehensive in that regard. The halachah is in accordance with the sages, that a woman sells both (to collect) her kethubah and for food, not before a beth-din of experts. And even if part of her kethubah were received, she can sell (property) for food, until she receives (the amount of) all of her kethubah. And when she sells, either for kethubah or for food, she requires an oath, but not proclamation (of the sale).]
  	If the kethubah of a widow were for two manah, and she sold (property from the inheritance) worth one manah for two manah; or the value of two manah for one manah, she has received her inheritance. [For we say to her: "It is your loss." And with the value of one manah for two manah, even though she has gained, she cannot say: "It is my gain," for if one sends his messenger to the marketplace to trade, and he purchases something cheap, everything belongs to him who gave the money. We learn from here only about something which has no fixed price, such as land, which is wont to be sold by estimate; sometimes more, sometimes less. But if something has a fixed price and the messenger bought it for less, the ruling is not clear from (what we learn) here. I have found the rabbis to differ on this, and it would seem to me that (in such an instance) the messenger and the sender divide.] If her kethubah were a manah, and she sold the value of a manah and a dinar for a manah, her sale is void. [For she was not permitted to sell that dinar, so that the entire sale is "in error," the whole sale having taken place at one time.] Even if she says: I shall return a dinar to the heirs, her sale is void. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: Her sale is always valid [and she returns the dinar to the heirs. For what did she make them lose?] — unless there is [such a great overcharge] that there would remain [in the absence of that overcharge] in a field, nine kavs [the size of a field], and in a garden, a half kav [the size of a garden.] And, according to R. Akiva, a quarter of a kav. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.] If her kethubah were four hundred zuz, and she sold to each one (of three buyers the value of a manah) for a manah; and to the last, the value of a manah and a dinar for a manah — the last (sale) is void, and all the others, valid.
  	The (property) assessment of the judges — if they diminished a sixth (of its value) or added a sixth, their sale is void. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: Their sale is valid, (for) if so (i.e., if it is void), how is the "strength" of beth-din superior (to that of all men)? But if they issued a "writ of visitation," [a proclamation (of sale), hearing which, men come to "visit" (beth-din) (here, the first tanna concurs with R. Shimon b. Gamliel and the halachah is in accordance with the first tanna)], even if they sold (property) the value of one manah for two manah, or the value of two manah for one manah, their sale is valid.
  	A mema'eneth (one who "refuses" her marriage when she comes of age), a sh'niyah (one of the "secondary" illicit relations, interdicted by the scribes), and an eilonith (one who cannot bear) have neither kethubah [(a mema'eneth, since she leaves of her own accord; a sh'niyah — penalized by the rabbis for inducing him to marry her. For she loses nothing through the marriage, not being rendered unfit thereby and her child being kasher; eilonith — a "mistaken purchase")], nor fruits [He is not made to pay for the fruits eaten by him], nor food [If she borrowed and ate when yet with him, and then "refused," the husband is not required to pay; but he is required to feed her when she is yet with him. But he is not required to feed the sh'niyah and the eilonith when they are yet with him, and, it goes without saying, that if they borrowed and ate, the husband is not required to pay.], nor belaoth (worn-out garments) [which were lost or entirely worn, whether from nichsei melog or from nichsei tzon-barzel. The mema'eneth cannot claim these from her husband. But her existing belaoth, she always takes — whether she be a mema'eneth, a sh'niyah, or an eilonith. And even if she were adulterous, she does not lose her existing belaoth. A sh'niyah has no belaoth of nichsei melog, but she does have belaoth of nichsei tzon-barzel.] And if he wed her in the beginning, knowing she was an eilonith, she does have a kethubah. A widow (married) to a high-priest, a divorcée and a chalutzah to a regular priest, a mamzereth and a Nethinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a Nathin and a mamzer do have a kethubah.
  
  
  
  	If one married a woman and she stipulated with him [with writ and kinyan (act of acquisition) or he told witnesses: You are my witnesses that I obligate myself] to feed her daughter [that she has from another] for five years, he must feed her for five years. If (the first divorced her within the five years and) she married another, and she stipulated with him to feed her daughter for five years, he must feed her for five years. The first may not say to the second: If she came to me, I would feed her [i.e., Had I remained married to her mother, I would have fed her], but he must bring her food to the place where her mother is. [For we rule: A daughter (whether a minor or grown) may remain with her mother so long as she (the mother) wishes it. And a son remains with his mother for six years and the father is obliged to feed him while he is with his mother if she so wishes.] Likewise, the two should not say: We shall feed her as one; but one feeds her and the other gives her food money.
  	If she (the daughter) married, her husband gives her food, and they (the mother's husbands) give her food money. If they (the husbands) died, their (own) daughters are fed from free property [and not from bound property, for we do not take from bound property for food for one's wife and daughters, because of "the general good"; for the buyers do not know how much feeding them will cost that they could take care to leave them a place from which to collect.], and she (the step-daughter) is fed from bound property, for she is like a creditor, [having a deed for sustenance against that property.] The "clever" ones would write: "…on condition that I feed your daughter five years, so long as you are with me" [but not if I die, or you die, or I divorce you.]
  	If a widow said: "I do not want to move from my husband's house," the heirs cannot say to her: Go to your father's house and we will feed you; but they must feed her in her husband's house, and they must give her living quarters in keeping with her dignity. [Likewise, vessels, bondsmen, and bondswomen, as she was wont to use in her husband's lifetime. But if the house fell, they are not required to build her another one. For (in the kethubah) it is written: "And you shall dwell in my house." And even if she desired to rebuild it from her own money, she is not heeded.] If she said: "I do not want to move from my father's house," the heirs can say to her: If you are with us, we shall feed you, [the "blessing" of the house being greater]; if not, we shall not feed you. If she based her request on her being very young and their being very young, they feed her while she is in her father's house.
  	So long as she is in her father's house [and the heirs feed her there], she can always [i.e., whenever she wishes] claim her kethubah. So long as she is in her husband's house, she can claim her kethubah for twenty-five years; for there is in the twenty-five years (enough time) for her to do good against (the amount of) her kethubah. These are the words of R. Meir in the name of R. Shimon b. Gamliel. And the sages say: So long as she is in her husband's house, she can always claim her kethubah. So long as she is in her father's house, she can claim her kethubah for twenty-five years. [The twenty-five years were not mentioned to cause her to lose her kethubah because of the good she does from the property of the orphans, but (they were mentioned) in respect to "waiving" (the kethubah), i.e., since she remained silent and did not claim it all of these years, she has waived it. Therefore, so long as she is in her husband's house, her silence does not constitute "waiving," for since they honor her, she is ashamed to claim her kethubah. But in her father's house, if she remained silent for twenty-five years, this constitutes "waiving."] If she died, her heirs "mention" her kethubah for twenty-five years. [That is, they must claim her kethubah within twenty-five years. And this is only when she swore to (not having collected) her kethubah before she died. But if she had not sworn to her kethubah, her heirs collect nothing of it, for "a man does not bequeath an oath to his sons."]
  
  
  
  	There were two judges of decrees in Jerusalem, Admon and Chanan ben Avishalom. [They made decrees against robbers and imposed penalties upon them.] Chanan says two things [with which the sages do not concur]; Admon says seven. If one went abroad and his wife claimed food, Chanan says: She swears at the end [When they hear that he died, and she comes to claim her kethubah, she swears that she did not hold back aught belonging to her husband.], and she does not swear at the beginning [when she claims food. Rambam explains: "She swears at the end": When her husband comes and denies what she says, saying that he did leave her food, she swears that he had left her nothing.] The sons of the high-priests differed with him, saying that she swears in the beginning and at the end. R. Dossa b. Harkinas ruled in accordance with them. R. Yochanan b. Zakkai said: Chanan said well. She swears only at the end [and the halachah is in accordance with him. And it is only after three months from the husband's going abroad that food is provided for his wife if she claims food; but not before this time. For it is assumed that a man does not go abroad, leaving his house "empty."]
  	If a man went abroad and one arose and fed his wife, Chanan says: He has lost his money. [For he (the husband) says: I did not say to you: Lend me and I will repay you. But if he lent the woman money for her food on condition that she repay him, he claims it from her, and she claims it from her husband, and he pays. And if the husband claims: I left her food, and she denies it and desires to extract it (payment) from him, the husband swears an oath of equity (shevuath heseth) and exempts himself, and the money (lent her) is a debt to be paid when she is widowed or divorced.] The sons of the high-priests differed with him, saying: He (the lender) swears how much he lent and he takes it (in payment). R. Dossa b. Harkinas ruled in accordance with them. R. Yochanan b. Zakkai said: Chanan said well. He (the lender) placed his money on "the horn of a deer."
  	Admon says: If one died and left sons and daughters, when the property is ample, the sons inherit and the daughters are fed. And with meagre property [lacking sufficient sustenance for males and females for twelve months (Rambam explains: If there is not enough to feed the sons and daughters until the daughters come of age, it is called "meagre property.")], the daughters are fed and the sons go from door to door. Admon says: Because I am a male should I lose! [That is, because I am a male, and fit to inherit ample property, should I be a loser with meagre property!] R. Gamliel said: I subscribe to the words of Admon. [the halachah is not in accordance with Admon.]
  	If one claims from his friend pitchers of oil, and he admits to [empty ] pitchers, [without oil, as when his friend says: "You owe me ten pitchers of oil" ], Admon says: Since he admits to part of the claim, he swears. [The claim connotes oil and pitchers, so that his admitting to empty pitchers constitutes partial admission, which entails an oath. ] And the sages say: This does not constitute admission similar to the nature of the claim. [The claim connotes oil alone in the amount of ten pitchers, so that when he admits to empty pitchers, "what is claimed is not admitted and what is admitted is not claimed," so that there is no admission similar to the nature of the claim, and an oath is not entailed. ] R. Gamliel says: I subscribe to the words of Admon. [The halachah is in accordance with Admon.]
  	If one committed himself to give money to his (prospective) son-in-law, "and he spread his foot before him" [(This has a pejorative connotation, viz.: "Take the mud and dust under my feet." Another interpretation: "Hang me by my feet upon a tree, for I have nothing to give you." Rambam understands this as connoting keeping a distance)], she sits (unmarried) until her hair turns white [until she becomes old, and he is not compelled either to wed her or divorce her.] Admon says: She can say: If I had committed myself to it, I would sit until my hair turned white. But now that my father committed himself for me, what can I do? Either marry me or divorce me! R. Gamliel said: I subscribe to the words of Admon. [The halachah is in accordance with Admon.]
  	If one protested against (another's possession of) a field [If Reuven protested against possession of a field by Shimon, telling him: "Levi, who sold it to you, robbed it from me,"] and he (Reuven) were signed on it as a witness, [on the writ of sale, where Levi wrote to Shimon that he sold it to him], Admon says: He can say: "The second was easy for me, and the first, hard for me." [The reason I did not protest at the time you bought this field from Levi and I signed as a witness in the deed is that Levi is a strong man, and it would have been hard to take the field from him. I preferred that it be in your possession to take it from you.] And the sages say: He has lost his right. [For his signing is acknowledgement that he no longer has anything to do with it. The halachah is not in accordance with Admon. And it is only when he is signed as a witness that Admon and the sages differ, but if he is signed as a judge to certify the deed of sale, all agree that he does not lose his right, for he can say: I did not know what is written in the deed. For a judge signed on a certification in endorsement of a deed does not need to know what is written therein, but only to recognize the signatures of the witnesses.] If he made it (acknowledgement of the other's possession of the field) a sign for (the status of) another (field), he loses his right.
  	If one went abroad, and the road to his field were obscured, [the field-owners on the boundaries having seized it], Admon says: He takes the shortest route. [Against their will he takes a road to his field, but he chooses the shortest possible way, not appropriating more than necessary. And when four men surround him on four sides, Admon admits to the sages that each of them can say: "Bring proof that the road was through my field, and take it." And if one man surrounded him on four sides, the sages admit to Admon that, whatever the case, the road passed through one of his fields. They differ only in an instance of one man coming from the power of (i.e., having bought the respective fields of) four others. Admon says that he can tell him: "Whatever the case, my road is with you."] And the sages say: He must purchase a road for a hundred manah or fly in the air (to get to his field). [The other can say to him: "If you keep quiet, all good and well; if not, I will return the deed of sale to the respective owners, whom you will not be able to sue!" The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]
  	If one presents a bill of payment to his neighbor, and the other presents [a bill of sale, dated after the bill of payment] to the effect that the first sold him his field, [saying (in effect): Your bill (of payment) is a forgery, for if I were indebted to you, you would not have sold me your field, but would have claimed your debt] — Admon says: The second can say: If I were indebted to you, you should have claimed your debt when you sold me the field. And the sages say: This one (the first) was being "clever," selling him the field in order to be able to take it as a pledge (for the debt). [For the second had dispersed his chattel so that the first could not take it as a pledge for his debt, and now he (the first) could take the land. In a place where the buyer pays and then the deed of sale is written, all agree that the seller should have kept the money he received for his debt and not have written the deed. The fact that he did write it, then, is proof that he is not indebted to him. The difference (between Admon and the sages) obtains in a place where they write the deed and then the buyer pays the money. Admon holds that the seller must apprise (others): "I am selling it to him only to be able to take it as a pledge." And the sages say: His not apprising others stems from his apprehension of its getting out and the other not buying the field. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]
  	If two men presented bills of indebtedness to each other, Admon says: (The one with the bill of the later date can say:) "If I were indebted to you, how could you borrow from me?" And the sages say: This one claims his bill of indebtedness, and that one claims his bill of indebtedness. [The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]
  	There are three lands for marriage. [If a man married a woman in one of them, he cannot compel her to go out after him from land to land]: Judah, Trans-Jordan, and the Galil. One may not take out (his wife) from a city (in one land) to a city (in another), or from a krach to a krach. [A krach is bigger than a city. It is a place of markets; people come to trade there from all around, and all things are found there.] But in the same land, one may take her out from city to city and from krach to krach, but not from city to krach [For it is difficult to dwell in a krach, krachim being highly congested, and the houses pressing upon each other and keeping out the air.], or from krach to city. [For all things are found in a krach, but not a city.] One may take her out from a bad abode to a good one, but not from a good one to a bad one. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: Not even from a bad one to a good one, for a good abode "searches out" [the body and makes it ill. For "change of regimen," even for the good, is the beginning of intestinal illness. The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel. And if a man from the Galil married a woman from Judah, or the opposite, we compel her to go out with him, for it was on this understanding that he married her. Whatever the case, he takes her out from a city with a majority of idolators to one with a majority of Jews, but not from a city with a majority of Jews to one with a majority of idolators.]
  	All are brought up to Eretz Yisrael, and none are taken out. All are brought up to Jerusalem [A man may compel all the members of his household to go up with him to Jerusalem. Even if he bought a Hebrew man-servant, he must, perforce, go up with him, even from a good abode to a bad one, and even from a city with a majority of Jews to one with a majority of idolators], and none are taken out, neither men nor women. [If he wishes to go up, and she refuses, she is divorced without a kethubah. And if she wishes to go up, and he refuses, he divorces her and gives her her kethubah.] If he married a woman in Eretz Yisrael and divorced her in Kaputkia, he gives her Eretz Yisrael currency. If he married a woman in Kaputkia and divorced her in Eretz Yisrael, he gives her Eretz Yisrael currency. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: He gives her Kaputkia currency. [Kaputkia is Crete. Its coins are larger and heavier than those of Eretz Yisrael. And because a woman's kethubah is an ordinance of the scribes, they were lenient, allowing it to be paid with the lesser currency. And R. Shimon b. Gamliel holds that a woman's kethubah is Torah-ordained, for which reason he takes the more stringent view. The halachah is not in accordance with him.] If he married a woman in Kaputkia and divorced her in Kaputkia, he gives her Kaputkia currency.