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text: Mishnah Bava Kamma
  משנה בבא קמא
  The Mishna with Obadiah Bartenura by Rabbi Shraga Silverstein
  
  
  Mishnah Bava Kamma
  
  
  
  
  
  	There are four avoth (prototypes) of nezikin (damages) [Because each one of them has toldoth (derivatives), they (the prototypes) are called avoth.]: shor (lit., "ox") [This is regel ("foot"), i.e., what the beast damages with its feet as it walks, viz. (Exodus 22:4): "And he sends his beast," and (Isaiah 32:20): "senders of the foot of the ox and the ass." A toldah of regel is (the beast's) damaging with its body as it walks, or with its hair as it walks (vessels becoming attached to its hair and being dragged and broken), or with the shalif that is upon it (the load in its saddlebag or its pack-bags), or with the bell upon its neck.], bor (pit) [one's opening a pit in the public domain and an ox or an ass falling therein and dying, if the pit is ten tefachim (handbreadths) deep; or being injured, if it is less than ten tefachim, viz. (Exodus 21:33): "If a man open a pit, etc." A toldah of bor is one's phlegm or mucus causing damage after falling in the public domain.], maveh [This is shen ("tooth"), his beast's eating in his neighbor's field, viz. (Ibid. 22:4): "…and it eat in another's field." Shen is called "maveh" because it (the tooth is sometimes hidden, sometimes revealed, viz. (Ovadiah 1:6): "niv'u matzpunav," the targum of which is "itgalyan matmorohi" ("His hidden things are revealed.") And a toldah of shen is (the beast's rubbing itself against a wall for relief (of its itching), as is common with beasts, and breaking the wall in doing so, or sullying fruits in rubbing itself against them for relief.], hever [fire going forth and damaging, viz. (Exodus 22:5): "If fire go out … and there be consumed sheaves, or the standing corn, or the field, etc." A toldah of esh (fire) is one's stone, knife, or burden, which he placed on top of his roof falling in a normal wind and causing damage, like fire, which is driven by the wind. The reason that our tanna does not reckon keren ("horn") among the avoth nezikin is that only the nezikin that are muadim ab initio (i.e., which pay full damages from the beginning) are being discussed not those which are first tamin (paying half damages), and then muadim.] The instance of shor is not like that of maveh, and that of maveh is not like that of shor. And neither the one nor the other, which have a spirit of life, is like esh, which does not have a spirit of life. And neither the one nor the other, whose way it is to go and cause damage, is like bor, whose way it is not to go and cause damage. [That is, if the Torah had written (only) shor, maveh could not be derived from it. For I would say that regel, for which it is common to cause damage, was made liable by the Torah; shen, for which it is not common to cause damage, was not made liable by the Torah. And if the Torah had written (only) shen, I would say that shen, where there is enjoyment in damaging, is liable; regel, where there is no enjoyment in damaging, is not liable. And if the Torah had written shen and regel, and had not written esh, I would say that shen and regel, which have a spirit of life — that is, which come from the force of a living creature — are liable; but esh, which does not have a spirit of life, should not be liable. And if the Torah had written those three and not bor, I would say that those should be liable, for it is their way to go and cause damage; but bor, which does not go and cause damage, should not be liable — for which reason all must be written. The gemara concludes that if bor and one of the others were written, all the others could be derived (with the exception of keren), through their common factor, viz. it being their way to cause damage. All had to be written only because they are distinct in their halachoth, there obtaining with the one what does not obtain with the other: Shen and regel are exempt in the public domain, as opposed to bor and esh. Scripture exempted bor from (liability for) men and vessels, viz. (Exodus 21:33): "…and there fall into it an ox or an ass," which is expounded: "an ox," and not a man; "an ass," and not vessels, as opposed to the other avoth nezikin. Esh is exempt from (liability for) what is hidden; so that if clothing were hidden in a stack (of corn), the starter of the fire is exempt, it being written (Ibid. 22:5): "…or the standing corn" — Just as standing corn is in the open, so (there is liability for) all that is in the open (as opposed to what is hidden). And with the other avoth nezikin, there is no exemption for what is hidden.] What is common to all of them — it is their way to cause damage and it devolves upon you to guard them, [so I shall include all things whose way it is to cause damage and the guarding of which devolves upon you], and if it (one of those things) caused damage, the mazik (the causer of the damage) must pay for the damage with the best of his property, [from the highest quality, if he comes to give land in payment for the damage, it being written (Ibid. 4): "The best of his field and the best of his vineyard shall he pay." But if he wishes to pay metaltelin ("movables"), the ruling is that all things are 'best'"; for if it cannot be sold in this place, it can be sold in another, and he can give whatever he wishes, even bran. This, with damages. But with a debtor, if he has money, he is obliged to give money, and if not, he gives whatever metaltelin he wishes, and if land is claimed, he gives him beinonith (middle-quality). And, with a hired laborer, even if the hirer has no money (of his own), he must give him money as his wage, and he is obliged to sell his property so that he has enough to pay him.]
  	Everything that I am obliged to guard, I have effected its damage, [i.e., If I did not guard it properly and it caused damage, it is I who effected and "readied" that damage, and I am liable for it. If one, for example, gives his ox to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor (and it causes damage), he is liable for it, for the guarding of his ox devolved upon him, and he did not guard it properly.] If I effected part of its damage, [even though I did not "ready" the whole], I am liable for payment as if I had effected the whole, [as when one dug a pit nine tefachim (handbreadths) in the public domain and another came and completed it to ten, and an ox or an ass fell therein and died, in which instance the completer is liable. For though he readied only part of the damage, it is as if he had effected the whole, there being no death in nine.] [And for which property am I liable to pay if I damaged it?] Property not subject to me'ilah (desecration), [i.e., non-Temple property. For if I damage hekdesh (Temple property), I am not liable, it being written (Exodus 21:35): "the ox of his neighbor" — and not the ox of hekdesh. The same applies to all other damages.], property of "the children of the covenant" [If one damaged property of a gentile, he is exempt.], distinctive property, [i.e., property which has distinctive owners. If he damaged property of hefker (ownerless property), he is not liable.] [Wherever what belongs to a man damages what belongs to his neighbor, the mazik is liable] except (in) the domain which is exclusively that of the mazik, [so that if the ox of the nizak (the one damaged) entered the domain of the mazik, and the ox of the mazik injured it, the mazik is not liable; for he can say to him: "What is your ox doing in my property!" This, only when his (the mazik's) possessions caused the damage; but if the mazik himself injured his neighbor, though he (the latter) is standing in his (the mazik's) domain, he is liable. For the nizak can say to him: "Granted you have the right to eject me, but you have no right to injure me."], and (except in) the domain [which is distinctively that] of the nizak and the mazik [i.e., In a courtyard belonging to both, if the ox of one of them damaged by shen or regel, he (the owner) is not liable. This, if that courtyard is set aside for oxen too. But if it were set aside for fruits and not for oxen, and it damaged by shen or regel, he is liable. And if it damaged by keren, he is liable in any event.] And if it caused damage, the mazik must pay for the damage with the best of his property.
  	The estimate [of damage must be made only in] money. [Beth-din estimate the amount of the damage, and that is what he pays him. And if Reuven's cow damaged Shimon's cloak, treading upon it in the domain of the nizak (Shimon) and trampling it, and later the foot of this cow were broken by (being caught in) Shimon's cloak, which is also a bor in the public domain, we do not say that since this (cow) damaged and this (cloak) damaged, the damages cancel each other out, but the two damages are assessed, and whoever damaged his neighbor more (than he was damaged) pays (the difference).] [And when they come to pay damages from the property of orphans, they pay only in land, which is] the equivalent of money [and not in metaltelin, which is money itself. For all movable things are regarded as money. For if they cannot be sold here, they can be sold elsewhere.] [And the assessment and payment of damages must be only] before beth-din, [who are experts, and not before a lay beth-din], and by witnesses who are free-men and "children of the covenant" [to exclude bondsmen and idolators, who are not kasher (acceptable) for testimony concerning damages.] And women are included in (the halachoth of) damages. [Whether she damaged others or they damaged her, the laws of damages are the same for men and for women.] And the nizak and the mazik (share) in payment. [Sometimes the nizak shares with the mazik in the payment of damages. As when the carcass deteriorated in value from the time of death until the time of the judgment, in which instance the loss (through deterioration) of the carcass is incurred by the nizak, whether the (damaging) animal be a tam or a muad. It is found, then, that the mazik does not even pay that half-nezek awarded him by the Torah if the animal were a tam, or the full nezek, if it were a muad — so that the nizak loses, thus "sharing" in payment with the mazik.]
  	There are five tamin, [which are not accustomed to cause damage; and if they damage, they pay a half-nezek.], and five muadin, [which are accustomed to cause damage, and which pay a full nezek.] A beast is not accustomed to butt [with the horn] or to push [with its whole body], or to bite, or to lie down, or to kick. [All of these are a toldah of keren and pay a half-nezek; thus, "five tamin."] The tooth is accustomed to eat what is fit for it. The foot is accustomed to break as it walks. And an ox which is accustomed [three times, to butt, or gore, or lie down, or kick or bite — these are five muadin to pay a full nezek; but in respect to (the enumeration of) "muadin," they are reckoned as one.], and an ox that damages in the domain of the nizak. [Even keren tam is considered a muad (in a private domain) to pay a full nezek. Our Mishnah is in accordance with the view that keren is "different" in the domain of the nizak, paying a full nezek, even if it is a tam. This is not the halachah.], and a man, [too, is a muad from the beginning, and pays a full nezek if he damages.] A wolf, and a lion, and a bear, and a tiger, and a leopard, and a snake — these are muadin [from the beginning. The reason that they are not included with the "five muadin" above, to make eleven muadin, is that they are not found within the settlement.] R. Eliezer says: When they are domesticated, they are not muadin, and a snake is always a muad. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Eliezer.] What is the difference between a tam and a muad? A tam pays a half-nezek from its body, and a muad pays a full nezek from the best [of his property, even if the goring ox is not worth the amount of the damage. For in respect to a muad it is written (Exodus 21:36): "He shall pay an ox for an ox," and it is not written that payment is to be made from the body of the goring ox.]
  
  
  
  	How is regel a muad? [i.e., In respect to what is regel a muad?] In respect to breaking [vessels] as it walks. The beast is a muad to walk as is its wont and to break. [The first part speaks of avoth — regel per se — treading with the foot. And the second part speaks of toldoth, a beast walking as is its wont and breaking things with its body, through (entanglement in) its hair, or with the shalif that is upon it (see 1:1) as it walks.] If it kicked [This is a shinui (a deviation from the norm), and a toldah of keren, for which reason he (the owner) pays a half nezek and not more], or if pebbles (tzroroth) sprung from under its legs [(Even though this is not a shinui, but the norm, still, he pays a half-nezek and not more, it being a halachah to Moses upon Sinai. And this, in a private domain, for in the public domain it is exempt, tzroroth being a toldah of regel, and thus, exempt in the public domain.)], and it broke vessels, he pays a half-nezek. If it stepped upon a vessel and broke it, and it (fragments thereof) fell upon a (second) vessel and broke that — for the first he pays a full nezek, and for the second, a half-nezek. [The first is a nezek of regel, for which reason he pays a full nezek, and the second, breaking by tzroroth, pays a half-nezek.] Chickens are muadin to walk as is their wont and to break. If dalil were attached to its leg [(Anything that becomes attached to a chicken's foot is called "dalil." Some read it as "d'li" (a pail)], or if it were mehadess ["dancing" (Others explain it as digging in the earth with its claws in the manner of chickens)], and it broke vessels, he pays a half-nezek. [For "dalil" is tzroroth. For with that dalil it flings tzroroth upon a vessel. And hiduss, too — as when it flung tzroroth, which broke vessels.]
  	How [i.e., in respect to what] is shen a muad? In respect to eating what is fit for it. The beast is a muad to eat fruits and greens. If it ate clothing or vessels, he pays a half-nezek, [this being meshuneh (a deviation from the norm)]. When is this so? In the domain of the nizak; but in the public domain, it is exempt. [This refers to eating fruits and greens; for in the public domain it is exempt, it being written (Exodus 22:4): "…and it eat in another's field." But if it ate clothing or vessels, even in the public domain, he pays a half-nezek. For people are apt to place clothing and vessels in the public domain temporarily, so that it (eating them) is keren in the public domain, and liability obtains.] If it derives benefit, he (the owner) pays the (amount of) the benefit. [Not actual payment; but, if it ate something dear, it is perceived as if it were barley, and he pays only the "cheap price" of barley. That is, a third less than the market price. And if it ate something cheaper than barley, he pays the "cheap price" of what was eaten. And if it ate something harmful to it, such as wheat, since it did not benefit, he is not liable.] If it ate from the midst of the thoroughfare, he pays the (amount of the) benefit. (If it ate) from the sides of the thoroughfare, he pays the (amount of the) damage. [i.e., If it went and stood on the sides of the thoroughfare in a place where oxen are not wont to walk, it is not like the public domain and he pays what it damages.] (If it ate) from the shop-entrance, he pays the (amount of the) benefit. From the midst of the shop, he pays the (amount of) the damage.
  	If one's dog or goat jumped from the top of a roof and broke vessels, he pays a full nezek, for they are muadin [to jump. This, in the domain of the nizak, it being a toldah of regel.] If one's dog took a chararah [a cake baked on coals], and went to a (grain stack, and ate the chararah and set fire to the stack — for the chararah he pays a full nezek, [it being shen in the domain of the nizak], and for the stack, a half-nezek, [it being like tzroroth, which pays a half-nezek — a halachah to Moses upon Sinai.]
  	Which is a tam, and which is a muad? A muad — an (ox) which was testified against (as having gored) three days. And a tam? Desisting three days [i.e., If it sees oxen and does not gore them, it reverts to its state of tam.] These are the words of R. Yehudah. R. Meir says: A muad — (an ox) which was testified against three times, [even in one day. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Meir, it not being a muad until it is testified against (as having gored) three days.] And a tam — any (ox) which the children fondle, [i.e., which they pull and play with] without its butting. [And in this the halachah is in accordance with R. Meir, that an ox which is a muad does not revert to its state of tam until the children fondle it.]
  	"An ox that damages in the domain of the nizak" (1:4). How so? If it gored, butted, bit, lay down, or kicked, [all toldoth of keren] — In the public domain, he pays a half-nezek; in the domain of the nizak, R. Tarfon says he pays a full nezek, and the sages say a half-nezek. R. Tarfon said to them: Now if in a place where (Scripture) was lenient with shen and regel — in the public domain — where they are exempt, (Scripture) was stringent with them in the domain of the nizak, making them pay a full nezek — then, in a place where (Scripture) was (relatively) stringent with keren — in the public domain — making it pay a half-nezek, does it not follow that we should be stringent with it in the domain of the nizak and make it pay a full nezek! They said to him: It is sufficient that what is derived from a law be like the law it is derived from. Just as in the public domain (he pays) a half-nezek, so in the domain of the nizak (he pays) a half-nezek. [Keren in the domain of the nizak, which you derive from the law of keren in the public domain, saying: "Keren, with which Scripture was stringent in the public domain, does it not follow that we should be stringent with it in the domain of the nizak" — it is sufficient that it be as (stringent) as the law it is derived from, keren in the public domain, and that it be liable for only a half-nezek in the domain of the nizak as it is in the public domain.] He said to them: I shall not derive keren from keren: [as above, but] I shall derive keren from regel. [In a place where Scripture was stringent with shen and regel, does it not follow that we should be stringent with keren, viz.:] Now if in a place where (Scripture) was lenient with shen and regel — in the public domain — it was stringent with keren — then in a place where it was stringent with shen and regel — in the domain of the nizak — does it not follow that we should be stringent with keren! They said to him: It is sufficient that what is derived from a law be as (stringent) as the law it is derived from. Just as in the public domain (he pays) a half-nezek, so in the domain of the nizak (he pays) a half-nizak. [For in the last analysis, if not for keren in the public domain, the a fortiori argument (kal vachomer) could not be constructed. And R. Tarfon, even though he holds that "It is sufficient, etc." is a Scriptural principle, viz. (Numbers 12:14): "And if her father had spat in her face, would she not be humiliated for seven days!" — a fortiori, vis-à-vis the Shechinah, fourteen days! — but it is sufficient that what is derived from a law be as (stringent) as the law itself, for which reason she is confined for seven days and not more — still, in our instance R. Tarfon does not hold that "It is sufficient, etc." obtains, holding that it applies only where the a fortiori argument is not refuted, as in the above instance, where the seven days of the Shechinah not being written, the a fortiori argument is adduced for fourteen-day liability, and "It is sufficient, etc." removes seven and leaves seven, so that the a fortiori argument is found to establish seven-day liability and is not entirely refuted. But here, where, Scripture prescribes a half-nezek both for the public domain and the domain of the nizak, and the a fortiori argument is adduced for an additional half-nezek, making it a full nezek — if "It is sufficient, etc." were posited and payment were established as a half-nezek as in the beginning, the a fortiori argument would have been entirely refuted, availing naught. And the rabbis hold that even in such an instance, "It is sufficient, etc." is posited. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]
  	A man is a muad always, whether unwitting or witting, whether sleeping or awake. [If he were sleeping and another came and slept at his side and caused him injury, he is liable. But if the first injured the second, he is not liable. And if they lay down together, each who injures the other is liable, both being muadim, vis-à-vis each other.] If he blinded his neighbor's eye or broke vessels, he pays full damages. [Even (if he blinded his eye) unwittingly, he is liable for the injury, but not for the four (other) things (see 8:1), one being liable for these things only if his act is witting or nearly so.]
  
  
  
  	If one places a pitcher in the public domain, and another comes and trips upon it and breaks it, he (the one who broke it) is not liable, [for men (i.e., pedestrians) are not wont to look upon the ground]. And if he were injured by it, the owner of the pitcher is liable for his injury [even if he had renounced ownership of it. For if one renounces ownership of objects that can cause injury, which he had no right to make (i.e., to place there) in the beginning, it is as if he had not renounced ownership of them.] If (he tripped and) his pitcher broke in the public domain, and someone slipped on the water or were injured by its shards, he is liable. [For he (this tanna) holds that tripping is (to be regarded as ) dereliction, and not as accident, for which reason he is liable.] R. Yehudah says: If he has intent [to acquire the shards and the water after his pitcher is broken], he is liable [for the damage that they cause, for it is his bor that caused the damage], but if he does not have intent [to acquire them, then, since they originated in an accident (R. Yehudah holding that tripping is not dereliction), the shards and the water are (regarded as) hefker (renounced) after the accident, and] he is not liable. [The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah, that tripping is not (regarded as) dereliction. And since it is (regarded as) accident, and he had no intent to acquire the shards and the water, it is as if they never belonged to him and he is not liable for the damage they cause.]
  	If one spills water into the public domain, and another is injured by it, he is liable for his injury. [Even if he is permitted to do so, as in the rainy season, when it is permitted to spill water into the public domain, still, if another were injured by it, he is liable for his injury.] If one secretes thorns or glass [in the public domain], or if one studs his fence with thorns [so that they project into the public domain (but if he keeps them within his domain and another is injured by them, he is not liable, for men are not wont to rub themselves against walls)], or if his fence fell into the public domain and others were injured by it, he is liable.
  	If one takes his hay and straw out to the public domain for fertilizer, [i.e., so that it decay and become fertilizer for fields or vineyards], and another is injured thereby, he is liable for his injury. And whoever is first (to take them) acquires them, [the rabbis having penalized him.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: All who spoil the public domain, [even if they do so licitly (as in the time when fertilizer is taken out)], if injury is caused thereby, they must pay; and whoever is first (to take the things put there) acquires them. If one turns over animal dung in the public domain, and another is injured thereby, he is liable for his injury.
  	If two potters were walking, one behind the other, and the first tripped and fell, and the second tripped over the first, the first is liable for the injury of the second. [This, in an instance where the first could have risen and did not do so, in which instance he is derelict. But if he could not have risen, he is not liable, the ruling being that tripping is not dereliction.]
  	If one were coming with his pitcher, and the other, with his beam, and the pitcher of the first were broken by the beam of the second, he is not liable, for both are permitted to walk there. If the beam carrier were (walking) ahead, and the pitcher carrier, behind him, and the pitcher were broken by the beam, the beam carrier is not liable, [for he was walking at a normal pace and the other was rushing.] And if the beam carrier stopped, he is liable. And if he told the pitcher carrier to stop, he is not liable. If the pitcher carrier were (walking) ahead, and the beam carrier behind, and the pitcher were broken by the beam, he is liable. And if the pitcher carrier stopped, he is not liable. And if he told the beam carrier to stop, he is liable. The same applies with one coming with his lamp and another with his flax.
  	If two were walking in the public domain, one walking and one running. Or if two were running and they injured each other, both are not liable. [Our Mishnah is defective. This is what was taught: If one were running and the other walking on the eves of Sabbaths or festivals, or if both were running on the other days of the year, both are not liable. For on the eves of Sabbaths and festivals, one who runs is authorized to do so, running as he does for the sake of a mitzvah, to prepare his Sabbath and festival needs, wherefore he is not liable. And on the other days of the year, when they both run, since both are deviating from the norm, they are both not liable.]
  	If one were chopping [wood] in a private domain and he caused damage in the public domain; in the public domain, and he caused damage in a private domain [of others]; in a private domain [his own], and he caused damage in a different private domain, he is liable. [Even though he does so in his own domain and many are not found there that we should say he should have been careful, still, he is liable.]
  	Two oxen, tamim, which injured each other, pay a half-nezek of the excess. [They estimate the excess of one over the other, and the one that caused the greater damage pays a half of that excess.] Both of them muadim — they pay a full nezek of the excess. One a tam; the other, a muad — the muad in the tam [i.e., if it caused greater injury to the tam than the tam to it] — it pays  full nezek of the excess. The tam in the muad — it pays a half-nezek of the excess. Similarly, two men who injured each other pay a full nezek of the excess. A man in a muad, and a muad in a man — he pays a full nezek of the excess. A man in a tam, and a tam in a man — a man in a tam pays a full nezek of the excess, [a man being a muad always]; a tam in a man pays a half-nezek of the excess, [it being written (Exodus 21:31): "Or if it gore a son, or if it gore a daughter, according to this ordinance shall it be done to it." According to the ordinance of ox goring ox, so is the ordinance of ox goring man. Just as in the ordinance of ox goring ox, a tam pays a half-nezek, and a muad, a full nezek, so, in that of ox goring man, a tam pays a half-nezek, and a muad, a full nezek.] R. Akiva says: A tam, too, that injures a man pays a full nezek of the excess. [R. Akiva expounds "according to this ordinance" as referring to the law preceding this verse, that of a shor muad (an ox which is a muad), viz.: "According to this ordinance" of a shor muad, which pays a full nezek, "shall it be done to it" — to any ox that gores a man, even if it be a tam. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Akiva.]
  	An ox (a tam) worth one hundred which gored an ox worth two hundred, and the carcass is worth nothing — he (the nizak) takes the ox. An ox worth two hundred which gored an ox worth two hundred, and the carcass is worth nothing — R. Meir said: Of this it is written (Exodus 21:35): "And they shall sell the living ox, and they shall halve its money." R. Yehudah said to him: "And this is the halachah." [i.e., This is assuredly the halachah, that he gives him one hundred, which is half the nezek.] You have satisfied: "And they shall sell the living ox, and they shall halve its money," but you have not satisfied (Ibid.): "and also the carcass shall they halve." Which, (rather, is the instance of which Scripture writes?) An ox worth two hundred which gored an ox worth two hundred, and the carcass is worth fifty zuz. This one (the nizak) takes half of the living (animal) and half of the dead, and that one (the mazik) takes half of the living and half of the dead. [R. Meir and R. Yehudah differ where the carcass appreciated in value, as when at the time of death it was worth nothing and it acquired value thereafter, being fit to be fed to dogs or to be sold to non-Jews. R. Meir holds that the appreciation of the carcass is entirely the nizak's, the mazik receiving nothing thereof and paying a half-nezek. And this is the intent of R. Meir's statement: "Of this it is written: 'And they shall sell the living ox, and they shall halve its money.'" That is, he must give him the half-nezek payment from the sale of the living ox, and he deducts nothing because of the appreciation of the carcass. And R. Yehudah holds that half of the appreciation of the carcass goes to the mazik, so that when the mazik comes to pay the half-nezek to the nizak, he deducts half of the appreciation of the carcass from the time of death until the time of judgment. And this is the intent of R. Yehudah's statement to R. Meir: "You have satisfied: 'And they shall sell the living ox,' but you have not satisfied: 'and also the carcass shall they halve,'" it being necessary to divide the amount of appreciation of the carcass and for the mazik to take half. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	Sometimes one is liable for the act of his ox and not liable for his own act; and sometimes he is not liable for the act of his ox and is liable for his own act. If his ox shamed (a man), he (the owner) is not liable, [it being written (Leviticus 24:19): "a man … in his fellow," and not "an ox in his fellow." Or else, there is no liability for shaming without intent to shame, which does not obtain with an ox.]; if he shamed (a man) he is liable. If his ox blinded his bondsman's eye or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable, [and his bondsman does not gain his freedom thereby]; if he blinded his bondsman's eye or knocked out his tooth, he is liable, [viz. (Exodus 21:26-27): "free shall he send him."] If his ox struck his father or his mother, he is liable [for damages]; if he struck his father or his mother, he is exempt [from payment, a man not being put to death and also being made to pay.] If his ox set fire to a (grain) stack on Shabbath, he is liable [a half-nezek, this being a deviation from the norm]; if he set fire to a stack on Shabbath, he is not liable, for he incurs the death penalty.
  	If one ox pursued another, and it (the second) were injured — this one (the owner of the second) says: Your ox injured (mine), and the other (the owner of the first) says: No, it bruised itself on a rock — "the burden of the proof is on him who would extract (payment) from his neighbor." If two [oxen of two different men] pursued one [belonging to another man] — one says: Your ox injured; the other: Your ox injured, both are exempt, [both pushing him off]. If both belonged to one man, both are liable. [The gemara explains the instance of the Mishnah as one of two tamin, a tam paying from its body alone. So that if both are before us, the nizak receives the half-nezek from between both. But if both are not present, he (the mazik) can say: Go and bring proof that this ox did the damage, and I will pay you!] If one were big and the other small — the nizak says: The big one injured (mine), [and his body contains the worth of a half-nezek; and the mazik says: No, the small one did the damage [Take the worth of the small one and lose the rest of your half-nezek], if one were a tam, and the other, a muad — the nizak says: The muad did the damage; and the mazik says: No, the tam did -- "the burden of the proof is on him who would extract (payment) from his neighbor." If the injured (oxen) were two — one big and one small; and the injurers were two, one big and one small — the nizak says: The big injured the big, and the small, the small; and the mazik says: No, the small injured the big, and the big the small, [and even though the half-nezek of the big one is large, you may take it only from my small one; and the half-nezek for your small one, take from my big one]; if one were a tam, and the other a muad — the nizak says: The muad injured the big one, and the tam, the small one; and the mazik says: No, the tam injured the big one, and the muad, the small one — "the burden of the proof is on him who would extract (payment) from his neighbor." [With all of these "the burden of the proof, etc." in our Mishnah, if he does not bring proof, he receives nothing, not even the value of a tam, and not even the small one that he (the mazik) admitted. For if one claims wheat from his neighbor, and he admits to barley, he is not liable even for the price of barley. But if the nizak seizes the amount admitted by the mazik, it is not confiscated from him.]
  
  
  
  	If an ox gored four or five oxen, one after the other, [and with all of them it were a tam, which pays from its body], it pays [a half-nezek] to the last of them [first. The Gemara explains the instance as one in which the nizak seized the ox of the mazik to collect from it, in which instance he becomes a shomer sachar (a hired watchman), so that when it leaves his hand and causes damage, the first nizak is liable for it, for which reason the last nizak receives a complete half-nezek.]; and if something remains, it reverts to the one (the nizak) before him; and if something remains (from that), it reverts to the one before him. And the very last (nizak) gains. These are the words of R. Meir. [This is what is meant: If something remains from the nezek, it reverts to the one before him. As when the half-nezek of the first were a hundred, and the half-nezek of the last, fifty, and the ox were worth two hundred. In the beginning, when this one's ox gored the ox of the first nizak, whose half-nezek was a hundred, the nizak owned a hundred in this ox, and its owner, a hundred. And when the nizak seized it and it gored under his hand, the owner should not lose his hundred in it, for the responsibility of guarding it was not his, but that of the nizak who seized it. And when it caused a half-nezek of fifty to the second (nizak), the first nizak loses fifty from his hundred, which he gives to the second nizak, and what is left, until a hundred, reverts to him, and the owner takes his hundred.] R. Shimon says: If an ox worth two hundred gored an ox worth two hundred and the carcass were worth nothing, the first takes a hundred and the second takes a hundred. If it afterwards gored an ox worth two hundred, the last (nizak) takes a hundred, and the one before [i.e., the preceding nizak] takes fifty zuz, and this one [the owner] takes fifty zuz. [For the first nizak owns half the ox, for which reason he pays half of its nezek. R. Shimon holds that the owner and the nizak are partners in the ox which causes damage and both are liable for its damages. How so? "If an ox worth two hundred, etc."] If it afterwards gored another ox worth two hundred, the last (nizak) takes one hundred, [a half from whoever it may be, for it pays from its body. So that it is found that the nizak before him, to whom half of it belonged, pays half of the hundred that the last one takes], and the one before him, fifty zuz, and the last two, a golden dinar (each), [twenty-five silver dinars (twenty-five zuz). The first two, the first nizak and the owner, each of whom owns a quarter (of the ox) — each pays a quarter of its damages.]
  	If an ox were a muad to (animals of) its kind, and not a muad to (animals) not of its kind; a muad to men, and not a muad to beasts; a muad to small (animals) [i.e., calves], and not a muad to large — for what it is a muad to, it pays a full nezek, and for what it is not a muad to, it pays a half-nezek. They [his disciples] asked R. Yehudah: What [is the halachah] if it were a muad for Sabbaths but not for weekdays? [("a muad for Sabbaths":) Because it does not work then and its "mind" has free rein; or else, because it sees men in Sabbath finery, they appear strange to him, and he does not recognize them.] He answered: For Sabbaths, it pays a full nezek, and for weekdays, a half-nezek. When does he become a tam (again)? After desisting on three Sabbaths. [If, after being (confirmed as) a muad for Sabbaths, they pass before him oxen on three Sabbaths and he does not gore them, he reverts to his status of tam, after which, if he gores again, he pays only a half-nezek.]
  	If the ox of an Israelite gored an ox of hekdesh (Temple property), or if an ox of hekdesh gored the ox of an Israelite, he (the owner) is not liable, it being written (Exodus 21:35): "…the ox of his neighbor" — and not the ox of hekdesh." If the ox of an Israelite gored the ox of an idolator, he is not liable, [it being written (Habakkuk 3:6): "He arose and measured the land. He saw and he freed the nations." When He saw that the nations did not abide by the seven mitzvoth commanded unto the sons of Noah, He arose and "freed" their money to Israel. And (Deuteronomy 33:2): "He revealed from Mount Paran" — from the time he took the Torah around to the idolators and they would not accept it. ] And if the ox of an idolator gored the ox of an Israelite, whether a tam or a muad, he pays a full nezek.
  	If the ox of a pikeach (a "knowing" person) gored the ox of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, he (the owner) is liable. And if the ox of a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor gored the ox of a pikeach, he is not liable. [For a caretaker is not assigned for a tam to collect from its body, it being metaltelin ("moveable"), and it is ruled in the Gemara (14b): "shaveh kesef" ("the equivalent of money") — We are hereby taught that beth-din deal only with bound property (this, in an instance of orphans)]. If the ox of a deaf-mute, and imbecile, or a minor gores, [i.e., if it is established as a "gorer"], beth-din assign a caretaker to them, [not to pay a half-nezek, but to make it a muad, so that if it gores again, it pays from the aliyah ("prime property"), and the nezek is collected from the land of the orphans], and they are forewarned (to guard the ox) in the presence of the caretaker. If the deaf-mute and the imbecile recovered their faculties and the minor came of age, it reverts to its status of tam. [He holds that a muad which leaves the authority of one owner for that of another reverts to its status of tam, different ownership changing the law vis-à-vis monition (of the owner)]. These are the words of R. Meir. R. Yossi says: It retains its status. An ox bred for fighting is not put to death (for killing a man), it being written (Exodus 21:28): "And if an ox gore" (by itself), and not if it is made to gore.
  	If an ox gored a man and he died — a muad pays kofer (see Exodus 21:30), and a tam is exempt from kofer. [And even though it is killed the first time it gored (and killed), we find an instance of muad, as when it killed three non-Jews, or as when it killed three Israelites who were treifah (i.e., who had mortal organic injuries), an ox not being killed for (killing) a treifah, it having killed "a dead man," or as when it killed and ran off to the field after being testified against.] And both (tam and muad) are to be put to death. And thus with a [minor] male or female. [It is subject to stoning and kofer for them as for adults.] If it gored a bondsman or a bondswoman, he (the owner) gives thirty sela'im, whether they be worth a hundred or only one dinar.
  	If an ox were rubbing itself against a wall, and it fell upon a man (and killed him), [it is not put to death. And if it were a muad, as when it were a muad to rub against walls and cause them to fall upon men, and it rubbed itself upon a wall to relieve itself and overthrew it upon a man and he died, the ox is not put to death and the owner pays kofer. The ox is not put to death, it being written (Exodus 21:29): "The ox shall be stoned and also its owner shall die" — As the death of the owner, so is the death of the ox. Just as the owner is not liable unless he killed with intent, so the ox is not liable unless it killed with intent. And the owner pays kofer, it being written (Ibid. 30): "If kofer." It could have been written: "Kofer shall be set for him." Why "if kofer"? To include non-intentional killing in kofer liability.] If it intended to kill a beast and killed a man, to kill an idolator and it killed a Jew, to kill a nefel (one of non-viable birth), and it killed a ben kayama (one with "life"), it is not put to death.
  	The ox of a woman, the ox of orphans, [who do not have a caretaker], and the ox of a caretaker [i.e., an ox belonging to orphans, which a caretaker is charged with guarding], a wild (i.e., ownerless) ox, an ox of hekdesh (Temple property), and an ox of a proselyte that died without heirs are to be put to death (if they killed a man). [For "ox" is written seven times in the section which speaks of goring a man — one for itself (i.e., the common instance) and six for these (other) oxen.] R. Yehudah says: A wild ox, an ox of hekdesh, and an ox of a proselyte who died are not put to death because they are ownerless. [R. Yehudah rules thus even if it gored and he then dedicated it to the Temple or if it gored, and then the proselyte died. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	If an ox were taken out to be stoned, and its owner dedicated it (to the Temple), it is not dedicated. If he slaughtered it, its flesh is forbidden, [it being written (Exodus 21:28): "The ox shall be stoned and its flesh shall not be eaten." From "the ox shall be stoned," do I not know that it is neveilah [carrion], which may not be eaten? Why need it be stated: "and its flesh shall not be eaten"? To teach that if he slaughtered it after its judgment (to be stoned), it is forbidden.] And if before its judgment were pronounced, its owner dedicated it, it is dedicated. [A (practical) difference — If he benefits from it, he is guilty of me'ilah (abuse of sacred property)]. And if he slaughtered it, its flesh is permitted.
  	If he gave it (the ox) to an unpaid watcher, a borrower, a watchman for hire, or a hirer, they stand in place of the owner — a muad pays a full nezek, and a tam, a half-nezek. If its owner tied it with a rein and closed it in appropriately [with a door that could withstand a normal wind, this being "minimal" guarding], and it went out and caused damage, whether tam or muad, it is liable. These are the words of R. Meir. R. Yehudah says: A tam is liable; a muad is not liable [in point of its muad aspect, but its tam aspect remains in place, and it pays a half-nezek as a tam], it being written [in respect to muad] (Exodus 21:36): "and its owner did not guard it" [at all, then he is liable as a muad]; but this one was [somewhat] guarded. R. Eliezer says: It [a muad] has no "guarding" but a knife [i.e., He must slaughter it. There are three different views here: According to R. Meir, with minimal guarding, it is liable; with "prime" guarding, not liable. According to R. Yehudah, with minimal guarding, too, it is not liable in point of its muad aspect, but liable in point of its tam aspect, not being completely exempt) unless there is prime guarding. And according to R. Eliezer, with prime guarding, too, it is liable. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah. In any event, ab initio, it is a mitzvah to slaughter an ox that is a muad to remove (the possibility of) damage.]
  
  
  
  	If an ox gored a [pregnant] cow, and its fetus were found [dead] at its side, and it were not known whether it gave birth before it was gored, [so that the fetus did not die because of the goring], or whether it gave birth after it was gored, [and it miscarried because of the goring], he (the owner) pays a half-nezek for the cow and a quarter-nezek for the fetus. [For a tam pays a half-nezek, and the status of this fetus is in doubt, so that they divide. Our Mishnah is in accordance with Somchos, who says that money whose ownership is in question is divided. But the sages say: This is a great principle in law — "The burden of the proof is upon him who would extract (payment) from his neighbor." And the halachah is in accordance with the sages. And even if the nizak says: "I am certain" (that your ox injured mine), and the mazik says: "Perhaps" (it did), "the burden of the proof is upon him who would extract (payment) from his neighbor."] Likewise, if a cow gored an ox, and its fetus were found at its side, and it is not known whether it gave birth before or after it gored, he pays a half-nezek from the cow and a quarter-nezek from the fetus. [He pays a half-nezek from the cow if it were found (a tam paying a half-nezek from its body), and, if it were not found, he pays a quarter-nezek from the fetus. For if it were known that it gored before it gave birth, the entire half-nezek would be paid from the fetus. For if a pregnant cow gores, it and its fetus gores. And if it gored after it gave birth, nothing would be paid from the fetus, the fetus not having gored. And a tam pays only from its body, so that now the status (of the ownership of the money) being in doubt, it is divided; and of the half-nezek that he must pay, a quarter-nezek is paid from the fetus.]
  	If a potter brought his pots into the courtyard of the ba'al habayith (the owner of the courtyard) without permission, and the beast of the ba'al habayith broke them, he (the ba'al habayith) is not liable. And if it were injured by them, the potter is liable. And if he brought them in with permission, the ba'al habayith is liable. If one brought his fruits into the courtyard of the ba'al habayith without permission and the beast of the ba'al habayith ate them, he is not liable. And if it were injured by them, the owner of the fruits is liable. [This, if it slipped on them and were hurt; but if it ate of them until it died, the owner of the fruits is not liable. For (he can contend that) it should not have eaten.]
  	If one brought his ox into the courtyard of the ba'al habayith without permission, and the ox of the ba'al habayith gored it or the dog of the ba'al habayith bit it, he is not liable. If it gored the ox of the ba'al habayith, it is liable. If it fell into his pit and fouled his waters, he is liable. If his [the ba'al habayith's] father or mother were in it [(The same applies with others, but the common instance is given)], he pays kofer. [as when it were a muad to throw itself upon people in pits, and that day it saw greens in the pit and threw itself into the pit to eat the greens and killed a man, in which instance the ox is not put to death, since it killed without intent, and the owner pays kofer (Scripture indicating kofer liability even in the absence of intent, as stated above)]. And if he brought it in with permission, the ba'al habayith is liable. Rebbi says: In all of them (the aforementioned instances), he (the ba'al habayith) is not liable unless he takes it upon himself to guard (against damage). [The halachah is in accordance with Rebbi. Therefore, if he brought in his ox with the permission of the ba'al habayith, unqualified, the ba'al habayith not undertaking to guard, he is not liable, not having assumed responsibility. And the one who brings it in, too, is not liable, having brought it in with permission.]
  	If one ox had intent to (gore) another and it struck a woman and she miscarried, he (the owner) is not liable to compensate for the miscarriage. And if one man intended to (strike) another, and he struck a woman and she miscarried, he must compensate for the miscarriage. [Since it is to be taught "If one man intended to strike another, etc.", it is also taught: "If one ox had intent to gore another, etc." For even if it had intent to gore the woman, the owner need not compensate for the miscarriage, such liability obtaining only with a man.] How is the miscarriage compensated for? The woman is assessed — how much she is worth (for sale as a bondswoman) before giving birth and how much after giving birth. R. Shimon b. Gamliel said: If so — a woman is worth more after giving birth! [If it is thus assessed, he will give her nothing! For a woman is worth more after giving birth. For before giving birth, her sales value is less, in that she is in danger of dying in childbirth.] Rather, the (sales) value of (what would have been) the children is assessed, and that is given to the husband. And if she has no husband, he gives it to his heirs. If she were a freed bondswoman [married to a proselyte or to a freed bondsman] or a proselytess [married to one of them, and the husband died], he is not liable. [For one holding the property of a proselyte who dies and has no heirs acquires it. And this one (who caused the miscarriage) is first to acquire what he holds. The same is true for a Jewess who married a proselyte. If the proselyte died, he (the causer of the miscarriage) is not liable, for the miscarriage compensation goes to the husband. But because it is generally a freed bondswoman and a proselytess who are married to a proselyte, we have "bondswoman" and "proselytess."]
  	If one dug a bor (see 1:1) in a private domain and opened it to the public domain, or in the public domain and opened it to a private domain, or in one private domain and opened it to another private domain, he is liable. [Even though there is no public domain element here, he is liable (this, on condition that he declare his domain with the opening to the bor hefker (ownerless)]. If one dug a bor in the public domain, and there fell into it an ox or an ass and it died, he is liable. Both one who digs a bor, [which is round], a shiach, [long and narrow], a me'arah, [square and vaulted, but having a mouth], charitzin, [broad and square like a me'arah, but not vaulted], or ne'itzin, [narrow below and wide above] is liable. Why, then, is "bor" written? Just as a bor is deep enough to kill — ten tefachim (handbreadths), ["bor," unqualified, being ten tefachim deep], so [are included] all that are deep enough to kill — ten tefachim. If it were less than ten tefachim and there fell into it an ox or an ass and it died, he is not liable. And if it were injured, he is liable.
  	A bor of two partners — If the first passed by it and did not cover it, and the second, and did not cover it, the second is liable. [This, if the first gave the second the cover of the bor as he passed by and he did not cover it.] If the first covered it and the second passed by and found it uncovered and he did not cover it, the second is liable. If he covered it properly and there fell into it an ox or an ass, [as when the cover became worm-eaten], and it died, he is not liable. If he did not cover it properly and there fell into it an ox or an ass and it died, he is liable. If it fell forwards because of the sound of the digging, he is liable. [If he were digging and the ox heard the sound of the hammer and took fright and fell into the bor and died, he is liable. And though we can contend that since it fell because of the sound of the digging, bor liability falls away and there remains only the factor of his causing the sound of the digging, which, being an indirect cause, should not render him liable — still, he is liable, the nezek itself having occurred in the bor.] (If it fell) backwards because of the sound of the digging, he is not liable. [If the ox stumbled on the mouth of the bor because of the sound of the digging and fell backwards, outside the bor, and died, he is not liable. For the nezek itself did not occur in the bor, and the sound of the digging is only an indirect cause, for which he is not liable.] If there fell into it an ox and its implements and they were broken; an ass and its appurtenances, and they were torn [("breaking" applies to the implements of the ox — yoke and plow; "tearing," to the appurtenances of the ass — the clothes bundles and the pack-saddle on its back)], he is liable for the beast and not liable for the implements, [it being written (Exodus 21:33): "…and there fall into it an ox or an ass" — an ox, and not a man; an ass, and not vessels.] If there fell into it an ox that were deaf, or deranged, or "minor," he is liable. [But he is not liable for a "sound" ox, which should have looked while walking.] He is not liable for (minor) son or daughter, bondsman or bondswoman.
  	Both an ox and any other beast are subsumed in (the halachoth of falling into a bor), [it being written (Exodus 21:34): "Money shall he restore to its owner" — anything that has an owner.], and in separation from Mount Sinai, [it being written (Ibid. 19:13): "Or beast or man, he shall not live." "Animal" is in the category of "beast"; "Or" — to include birds (in the injunction)], and in the paying of kefel ("double payment"), [it being written (Ibid. 22:8): "For every thing of violation" — every thing which he violates.], and for returning a lost object, [(Deuteronomy 22:3): "…with every lost object of your brother."], and for unloading, [(Exodus 23:4): "…help shall you help with him." Though it is written (Ibid.): "the ass of your foe," all beasts are included, this being derived "ass" (here) — "ass," in respect to Shabbath, where it is written (Deuteronomy 5:14): "…your ox, your ass, and all of your beasts."], for muzzling, [(Ibid. 25:4): "You shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing." We derive "ox" - "ox" from Shabbath.], for kilayim (forbidden admixtures) [In respect to (forbidden) mating, though it is written (Leviticus 19:19): "Your beast you shall not mate with a different breed," animal and bird are also included by derivation, "beast" - "beast," from Shabbath. Likewise, in respect to the kilayim of driving (them together), viz. (Deuteronomy 22:10): "You shall not plow with an ox and an ass together," we derive, "ox" - "ox" from Shabbath, that the same applies to any two types of beast, animal, and bird. However, as to the Torah halachah, one is not liable unless he plows with or drives two kinds (of animal), one of which is unclean and the other, clean, as is the case with ox and ass. But the sages forbade all two kinds, even if both are unclean or both clean.], and for Shabbath, [it being written: "your ox, your ass, and all of your beasts." "Animal" is included in "beast," and "all" is a term of inclusion, to include birds.] If so, why is it written (Exodus 21:34): "ox or ass"? Scripture speaks of the common instance.
  
  
  
  	If one brings a sheep into a shed and closes (the door) before it properly, and it goes out and causes damage, he is not liable. [For he guarded it. "What (else) could he have done?"] If he does not close before it properly, and it goes out and causes damage, he is liable. If it were breached at night, or if robbers breached it and it went out and caused damage, he is not liable. If robbers took it out, the robbers are liable. [Even if they did not actually take it out, but just stood before it until it went out, it is as if they took it out with their hands and they are liable.]
  	If he left it in the sun or gave it to a deaf-mute, imbecile, or minor, and it went out and caused damage, he is liable. [("If he left it in the sun":) The sun distresses it, so that "proper closing," with a door that can withstand a normal wind is not sufficient.] If he gave it to a shepherd, the shepherd stands in his stead. [And we do not say in such a case that "A watchman who gives (his charge) to another watchman is liable." For it is customary for a senior watchman to give (his charge) to his junior, for which reason the latter is liable.] If it fell into a garden and derived benefit, it pays the (amount of the) benefit derived. [("If it fell into a garden":) As when it slipped and fell, but if it were pushed down (into the garden) by the other sheep, it pays what it damaged, the owner having been derelict in not having led them single file. ("the benefit derived":) what it benefited (by eating) and not what it damaged.] If it went down as was its wont and damaged, it pays what it damaged. How does it pay what it damaged? A beth sa'ah (fifty by fifty cubits) is assessed in that field — how much it was worth and how much it is worth. [The furrow is not assessed in itself. For the mazik would then lose, the furrow being assessed at its complete worth, (whereas Scripture states (Exodus 22:4): "And it eat in another's field," which is expounded: Damages are estimated on the basis of another field.) Rather, a beth sa'ah is assessed in that field — how much it was worth before this furrow was eaten and how much it is worth now, so that the mazik does not now pay the complete worth of the furrow. For one who buys a beth sa'ah with its produce pays only a trifle less if one furrow is missing.] R. Shimon says: If it ate finished fruit, it pays (the value of) finished fruit — if a sa'ah, a sa'ah; if two sa'ah, two sa'ah. [If it ate finished, completely ripened fruit, it pays the entire nezek. When do we assess it on the basis of the field? When the fruit is not yet finished. The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon.]
  	If one heaps a stack in his neighbor's field without permission, and it is eaten by the beast of the owner of the field, he is not liable; and if it (the beast) were injured by it (the stack), the owner of the stack is liable. And if he heaped the stack with permission, the owner of the field is liable. [The Gemara construes this as relating to a valley where each of them was wont to thresh his stack on one threshing floor. A watchman was appointed. When he said: "Come and stack," it was as if he had said: "Come and I will watch it for you." But, otherwise, even if he stacked with permission, the owner of the field is not liable until he undertakes to watch it.]
  	If one sends a fire by the hand of a deaf mute, an imbecile, or a minor, he is not liable by the laws of man, but he is liable by the laws of Heaven. If he sends it by a pikeach (a "knowing" person), the pikeach is liable. If one brought the fire and another (then) brought the wood, the bringer of the wood is liable. If one brought the wood and another (then) brought the fire, the bringer of the fire is liable. If another came and fanned (libah) the fire ["libah," as in (Exodus 3:2)): "belabath esh." Some books have "nibah," as in (Isaiah 57:19): "niv sfatayim" ("the expression of the lips"). When one speaks, he moves his lips and wind (i.e., an air current) is produced.] If the wind fanned it, they are all not liable. If one sent a fire and it consumed trees or stones or soil, [singeing one's furrow and spoiling it], he is liable, it being written (Exodus 22:5): "If fire go out, and find thorns, and there be consumed sheaves, or the standing corn, or the field, then pay shall he pay, he that lights the fire." If it went over a fence four cubits high, or a public way [sixteen cubits, as the (distance of the) flags of the desert], or a river, he is not liable. If one lights a fire in his domain, how far may the fire go (for him still to be liable)? R. Elazar b. Azaryah said: He is perceived as standing in the midst of a beth kor (liability obtaining up to about 137 cubits on all sides.) R. Eliezer says: Sixteen cubits, as (the distance of) the public way. R. Akiva says: Fifty cubits. R. Shimon says: "Then pay shall he pay, he that lights the fire" — all according to the fire [i.e., according to the height of the fire and its mass. The bigger it is, the farther it travels. The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon.]
  	If one lit a stack [If he lit it within his own domain and it spread to his neighbor's], and there were within it vessels and they burned, R. Yehudah says: He pays for what is hidden, [R. Yehudah holding one liable for tamun ("hidden") damages in fire, not expounding (Exodus 22:5): "or the standing corn" — Just as the standing corn is in the open, so (there is liability for) all that is in the open.], and the sages say: He pays only for a stack of wheat or barley. [For they expound "or the standing corn" and exempt tamun damages in fire. It is just that they assess the space of the vessels as if it were (part of) the stack, and he pays for that part according to the space taken up by the vessels. And from what is stated below, "And the sages concur with R. Yehudah that when one sets fire to another's house he must pay for everything that is in it," the Gemara infers that R. Yehudah and the sages differ also in an instance where one sets the fire in his neighbor's domain, R. Yehudah holding that he pays for everything within it, even a purse, and the rabbis holding that for those vessels which it is customary to hide in a stack, such as threshing sledges and cattle gear, he pays; but for vessels which it is not customary to hide in a stack, he does not pay. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] If a goat were bound in it and a bondsman close to it, and he were burned with it, he is liable. If a bondsman were bound in it and a goat close to it, and he were burned with it, he is not liable. [For animals are also included in "or the standing corn." And he is not to be exempt from payment by virtue of receiving greater punishment (kam leih biderabbah mineih), for he is not liable for the death of the bondsman. For since he was not bound, he should have run away, and he is liable neither to be put to death nor to pay for him. But if the bondsman were bound in it, he is exempt even for the goat and the stack, for he is put to death for the death of the bondsman, and kam leih biderabbah mineih obtains. (With the goat, "bound" or "unbound" makes no difference. It is mentioned only by way of "bondsman," where it is relevant)]. And the sages concur with R. Yehudah that when one sets fire to another's house he must pay for everything that is in it, for it is customary for men to place vessels in houses. But in a stack, where it is customary to place only things like threshing sledges and cattle gear, even if he lit the fire in his neighbor's domain, he pays, according to the sages, only for those things that it is customary to hide in a stack.] If a spark went out from under the hammer and caused damage, he is liable. If a camel laden with flax passed through the public domain, and its flax entered a shop and was ignited by the shopkeeper's lamp and set the building afire, the owner of the camel is liable. If the shopkeeper placed his lamp outside, the shopkeeper is liable. R. Yehudah says: With a Channukah lamp, he is not liable, [because he is engaged in the performance of a mitzvah. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  
  
  
  	The measure of paying kefel (double payment) is broader than that of the measure of paying four and five. For the measure of paying kefel obtains both with that which has a sprit of life, [viz. (Exodus 22:8): "…for a lamb, for a garment, for every lost object … he shall pay double."], whereas the measure of paying four and five obtains only with ox and lamb alone, it being written (Exodus 21:37): "If a man steal an ox or a lamb, and slaughter it or sell it, etc." One who steals after the (first) thief does not pay kefel; and one who slaughters and sells after the thief does not pay four and five, [it being written (Exodus 22:6): "and it be stolen from the house of the man" — and not from the house of the thief.]
  	If two witnesses testified that a man stole, and they or two others testified that he slaughtered or sold, he pays four and five. If he stole and sold on Shabbath, [(he pays four and five), but if he slaughtered, the punishment being stoning, kam leih biderabbah mineih (see 6:5)], if he stole and sold to idolatry, if he stole and slaughtered on Yom Kippur, [(he pays four and five), for its deliberate transgression is punishable only by kareth (cutting-off). And this, in an instance where he was not forewarned, the ruling being that all who are liable to stripes (if forewarned), if unwitting (i.e., not forewarned) are liable for payment. But those who are liable to judicial death penalty (if witting), even if unwitting, are exempt from payment.], if he stole from his father and slaughtered or sold, and then his father died, he pays four and five, [but if his father died and then he slaughtered, it is taught below (7:4) that he is exempt, having sold and slaughtered his own by virtue of having inherited his father.] If he stole and slaughtered and then dedicated (the flesh to the Temple), he pays four and five. If he stole and slaughtered for healing (a sick man) or for feeding to dogs, if he slaughtered and it was found to be treifah (ritually unfit), if he slaughtered chullin (a "mundane," non consecrated animal) in the Temple court, he pays four and five. R. Shimon exempts these two [treifah and chullin in the Temple court. R. Shimon holding that slaughtering which is not fit for eating is not called "slaughtering." But for healing and for (feeding to) dogs, it is valid slaughtering, for if he wishes, he may eat of it.]
  	If two witnesses testified that a man stole, and also that he slaughtered or sold, and they were found to be scheming witnesses (edim zomemin - see Deuteronomy 19:19), they pay everything. If two witnesses testified that he stole, and two others that he slaughtered or sold, and both were found to be zomemin, the first pay kefel and the second, three [for the ox, as when the second were rendered zomemin first. For if the witnesses to stealing were rendered zomemin first, the testimony of slaughtering is nullified, for it may be that the owner sold it to him, so that if they (the witnesses to slaughtering) are rendered zomemin, why should they pay?] If the last were found to be zomemin, he (the thief) pays kefel and they pay three. If one of the last were found to be a zomem, the second testimony is nullified [and the thief pays kefel because of the first testimony, and they (the second pair) are exempt, for witnesses do not pay money until both have been rendered zomemin.] If one of the first were found to be a zomem, the entire testimony is nullified. For if there is no stealing, there is no slaughtering or selling. [And he (the accused) is exempt (from payment) and they the witnesses) are exempt. And even if the second pair were rendered zomemin afterwards, they do not pay, for their testimony had already been nullified and they had been refuted (i.e., if he had not stolen, he had not slaughtered), and for this (being refuted) they are not liable (to pay), but only where they were told: "You were with us," in which instance the substance of the testimony itself is voided. And it goes without saying that if both of the first witnesses were rendered zomemin first, the second testimony is nullified. It is just that when only one of the first witnesses is rendered zomem both pairs are nullified. But when both of the first witnesses are rendered zomemin, their testimony is not nullified, but they pay kefel.]
  	If two witnesses testified that he stole, and one witness or he himself testified that he slaughtered or sold, he pays kefel but does not pay four and five. [Even though it is obvious that he does not pay four and five by the testimony of one witness, we are being apprised that his testimony is comparable to that of one witness, viz.: Just as with one witness, if another witness comes after him, he combines with him and makes him (the accused) liable, so, with his own testimony, if witnesses come after his admission, they render him liable; for if one admits to a penalty payment and witnesses come thereafter, he is liable. This, when he said: "I did not steal," and witnesses came and testified that he did steal, and he then admitted to slaughtering or selling, and witnesses then came and testified that he slaughtered or stole, in that instance he is liable. For when he admitted to slaughtering or selling he did not impose any liability upon himself, realizing that one who admits to a penalty payment is exempt (from payment), so that there is no admission here at all. But when one says: "I stole," and witnesses came thereafter to that effect, he is exempt (from the penalty payment), for he rendered himself liable to pay the principal in any event through his admission, so that this is a bona fide admission and he is exempt from kefel even if witnesses come thereafter.] If he stole and slaughtered on Shabbath, if he stole and slaughtered for idolatry, if he stole from his father and his father died and then he slaughtered and sold, [so that, being his father's heir, his slaughtering is not entirely forbidden], if he stole and dedicated (to the Temple) and then slaughtered or sold, [so that he slaughtered what belonged to the Temple and not to the (original) owner], he pays kefel, but does not pay four and five. R. Shimon says: For kodshim (consecrated property) which he (the owner) must replace, he (the thief) pays four and five. (For kodshim) which he need not replace, he is exempt. [R. Shimon is not referring to the words of the preceding tanna, viz.: "If he stole and dedicated and then slaughtered or stole," and he does not differ there. Rather, he is referring to the statement of the rabbis elsewhere to the effect that if one steals hekdesh (consecrated property) from the house of the owner he is not liable (for kefel), it being written (Exodus 22:6): "…and it be stolen from the house of the man" — and not from the house of hekdesh. Concerning this, R. Shimon tells us that he is liable for kodshim which he must replace, this satisfying: "and it be stolen from the house of the man." For since the owner must replace it, when he slaughters it, he slaughters what belongs to the owner. And even with kodshim that he must replace R. Shimon rules the thief liable for four and five payment only when he slaughters them unblemished within (the Temple) for the sake of the owner, the blood spilling (and not being sprinkled, in which instance the slaughtering is valid but the owner must replace it), or when he slaughters them blemished outside, even though they were not redeemed, R. Shimon holding that everything awaiting redemption is regarded as redeemed, so that the slaughtering is valid. But if he slaughtered them unblemished outside, the slaughtering is not valid, and R. Shimon holds (7:2) that slaughtering which is not valid is not called slaughtering and does not make one liable for four and five payment. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon.]
  	If he sold it except for one-hundredth of it [i.e., If a thief sold all of the ox except a small thing in it, of those things which are permitted in it through slaughtering, he is not liable (for four and five), it being written (Exodus 21:37): "and he slaughter it or sell it" — (he is not liable) until he sells all the things that are permitted by slaughtering (as opposed to holding back its shearings or its horns, this not being "leaving over," and not exempting him)], if he (the thief) owned it in partnership (with the one he stole it from), if he slaughtered it and it became carrion under his hand, if he tore it [from its nostrils to its heart], if he tore out [the slaughtering sites, he is exempt, even according to the rabbis, who say that invalid slaughtering is called slaughtering, for this is not slaughtering at all.], he pays kefel and does not pay four and five. If he stole it in the owner's domain, and slaughtered or sold it outside of his domain; if he stole it outside of his domain, and slaughtered or stole it in his domain; if he stole and slaughtered or sold it outside of his domain, he pays four and five. But if he stole and slaughtered or sold in his domain, he is not liable.
  	If he (the thief) pulled it and it started going out and died in the owner's domain, he is exempt [from kefel]. If he picked it up [(even in the owner's domain, for "picking up" effects acquisition in all places)], or took it out of the owner's domain and it died, he is liable. If he gave it [to a Cohein] for [the five selaim of] the redemption of his first-born son, or to his debtor, to an unpaid watcher, to a borrower, to a watchman for hire, or to a hirer, and he [the Cohein, or the creditor, or the watchman] pulled it, and it died in the owner's domain, he [the thief] is exempt [from all payment]. If he picked it up or took it out of the owner's domain and it died, he is liable.
  	It is forbidden to raise small beasts in Eretz Yisrael [because they spoil what is sown], but they may be raised in Suria [lands conquered by David, which are not considered "conquest," and where we are not concerned about settlement. And if the fields of others are spoiled, compensation is made], and (they may be raised) in the wilderness areas of Eretz Yisrael. Hens are not raised in Jerusalem because of the (flesh of the) offerings [which are eaten there. Hens peck in the refuse and they might bring up a bone the size of a barley-corn from a sheretz (a creeping thing) and render the flesh unclean.] And Cohanim may not [raise hens] in [all of] Eretz Yisrael because of the taharoth ("pure things") [For the Cohanim eat terumah and must safeguard its purity.] Pigs are not to be raised anywhere. [The reason is given in the Gemara. When the Hasmonean kings besieged each other, those on the outside (of the wall) would send up (animals for) daily burnt-offerings to those on the inside. One day, they sent up a pig. When it reached the mid-point of the wall, it stuck its claws into the wall and Eretz Yisrael "quavered" (a distance of) four hundred parasangs by four hundred parasangs. At that time they said: "Cursed be he who raises pigs!"] One may not keep a dog unless it is chained [because it bites and barks and frightens women into miscarriage]. Traps may not be set for pigeons unless they be thirty ris [= four mil] from the settlement [so that "settlement pigeons" not fall into them.]
  
  
  
  	If one injures his neighbor, he is liable for five things: nezek (injury), tza'ar (distress), ripui (healing), sheveth (layoff), and shame (bosheth). "Nezek" — How (is it assessed)? If he blinded his eye, or cut off his hand, or broke his leg, he (the injured one) is perceived as a bondsman being sold in the marketplace, and it is estimated how much he would have been worth (without the injury) and how much he is worth (with it). [For if he had to, he could sell himself as a Hebrew bondsman, so that the one who injured him caused him to lose this amount.] "Tza'ar" — If he burned him with a spit or with a nail, even on his fingernail, a place where no wound is made, it is estimated how much such a man would ask for (in payment) to be thus afflicted. [The more "delicate" he is, the greater his distress and his pain.] "Ripui" — If he struck him, he must heal him. If growths [white blisters] developed — If because of the wound, he is liable; if not because of the wound, he is exempt. If it healed and returned; healed and returned, he must heal it. If it healed entirely, he need not heal it. "Sheveth" — We perceive him as a watcher of gourds, for he has already received payment for his hand or foot. [All the days of his illness we perceive him as a watcher of gourds, and we give him his daily pay. For he is not fit for any other labor, even if he were not ill. For his hand or foot were cut off, and he has already been compensated for this.] "Bosheth" — all according to the shamer [(The "lesser" the shamer the greater the shame)] and the one shamed. [The greater he is, the greater the shame.] If one shamed a naked man, a blind man, or a sleeping man, he is liable. And if a sleeping man shamed (someone), he is not liable. If one fell from a roof and caused injury and shamed, he is liable for the injury and not liable for the shame, it being written (Deuteronomy 25:11): "And she send forth her hand and seize his privy parts" — One is not liable for shaming unless he has intent (to shame). [All five are derived from verses: Nezek — (Exodus 21:24): "An eye for an eye." This cannot mean an eye, literally, for it is written (Numbers 35:31): "And you shall not take kofer ('ransom') for the soul of a murderer." For the soul of a murderer you do not take ransom, but you do take ransom for organ prominences (which do not grow back). For if one blinded his neighbor's eye, he gives him the value of his eye. And this is the intent of "An eye for an eye." Tza'ar is derived from (Ibid. 25): "A wound for a wound." This is a superfluous verse to make him liable for tza'ar even where there is (payment for) nezek — that it not be said that he has acquired (payment for) his hand and he must have it amputated in any event; but we say that he could have had it amputated medicinally and this one cut it off with iron and caused him tza'ar, for which reason he pays tza'ar. Ripui and sheveth — (Ibid. 19): "Only his sheveth shall he give and heal shall he heal." And this, only when the sickness is caused by the wound. But if the injured one were derelict and failed to heed the doctor's instructions, the mazik need not pay the sheveth and ripui incurred thereby. Bosheth — (Ibid. 11): "Then you shall cut off her hand" — monetary compensation. And by Torah law "no law in the world" can be adjudicated by any judges except ordained judges in Eretz Yisrael, it being written (Exodus 22:8): "Until elohim shall come the matter of both," and only judges ordained in Eretz Yisrael are called "elohim." (Litigations involving) loans, buying and selling, penalties, admissions, and denials, however, are adjudicated outside of Eretz Yisrael as if the judges were the messengers of the beth-din in Eretz Yisrael and acted in their behalf. And this, only with common occurrences entailing monetary loss, such as a beast causing damage through shen and regel (muadim), or a man injuring a beast. But (litigations involving) a beast injuring a man or one man injuring another are not adjudicated outside of Eretz Yisrael at all. Rather, the one causing the injury or the damage is ostracized until he goes up (for judgment) to Eretz Yisrael with the party to the dispute or agree to a compromise close to that deemed just by the judge. But nothing determinate is ruled upon there. And this applies to all of the penalty payments indicated in Scripture and in the entire Talmud. They may not be imposed by judges outside of Eretz Yisrael. But the one liable for them is ostracized, as we have explained.]
  	This is a stringency of man over shor, that man pays nezek, tza'ar, ripui, sheveth, and bosheth, and he compensates for miscarriage, and shor pays only nezek, [it being written (Leviticus 24:19): "…a man upon his neighbor" — a man upon his neighbor, and not an ox upon his (i.e., the owner's) neighbor.], and (shor) is exempt from compensation for miscarriage, [it being written (Exodus 21:22): "If men fight, etc." — men, and not oxen.]
  	If one strikes his father or his mother without making a wound, and if one wounds his friend on Yom Kippur, he is liable for all (five payments). [And even though throughout the entire Torah, if one commits a transgression entailing stripes and monetary payment, he receives stripes and does not pay, here (on Yom Kippur), he pays and does not receive stripes, Scripture having explicitly stipulated monetary payment and not stripes for wounding one's neighbor, viz. (Deuteronomy 19:21): "a hand for a hand" — monetary payment. Let us analyze this. It is written (Leviticus 24:19): "As he did, so shall it be done to him." Why, then, need it be written: "a hand for a hand"? To include wounding one's neighbor on Yom Kippur as paying and not receiving stripes.] R. Yehudah says: There is no bosheth (payment) to bondsmen, [it being written (Deuteronomy 25:11): "If men fight together, a man and his brother" — one who is subsumed in "brotherhood," to exclude a bondsman, who is not. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor — their encounter is evil: If one injures them, he is liable; if they injure others, they are exempt. A bondsman and a woman — their encounter is evil. If one injures them, he is liable; if they injure others, they are exempt, [having nothing to pay.] But they pay afterwards, (i.e.,) if the woman is divorced and the bondsman freed [and they acquired property], they are liable to pay. [For they were liable in the beginning, but just lacked the money to pay with. For the melog (usufruct) property of the woman is bound to the husband for fruits and inheritance.]
  	One who strikes his father and mother and causes a wound, and one who wounds his neighbor on Shabbath is exempt from all (five payments), for he is subject to the death penalty. [For even though he "razes" (by wounding), he "repairs" vis-à-vis his (evil) inclination), his wrath abating and his anger being assuaged thereby.] And one who injures his Canaanite bondsman is exempt from all (five payments).
  	If one strikes his neighbor with his fist, he gives him a sela [for bosheth]. R. Yehudah says in the name of R. Yossi Haglili: A maneh. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.] If he slaps him [on his cheek, the bosheth being greater], he gives him two hundred zuz. If he strikes him with the back of his hand, he gives him four hundred zuz. If he pulled his ear [(Another version: if he struck it)], or tore his hair, or struck him with his spittle, or removed his cloak, or uncovered a woman's hair in the marketplace, he gives four hundred zuz. This is the rule: All according to his distinction. [All of the aforementioned payments are only for one of special distinction. But, for a common person, the amount is less.] R. Akiva said: Even the poor in Israel are perceived as if they had lost their property, for they are children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. [R. Akiva differs with the preceding tanna, holding that these penalty payments are the same for all, whether distinguished or common. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Akiva.] A man once uncovered a woman's head in the marketplace, and she came before R. Akiva, who ruled that he give her four hundred zuz — whereupon he said: "Master, give me some time." He gave him time. [This, with respect to bosheth, where there is no monetary loss. But with nezek, where there is, time is not given.] He (the man) waited for her [until he saw her] standing at the entrance of her courtyard, whereupon he broke a pitcher containing an issar's worth of oil before her. She, thereupon, uncovered her head, "palmed" the oil, and anointed her hair. He assigned witnesses to her, came to R. Akiva, and said to him: "Master, shall I give four hundred zuz to one such as this!" [who cheapened herself for an issar's worth of oil, revealing thereby her indifference to bosheth] He responded: "You have said nothing. One who injures himself, though he is not permitted to do so, is not liable; others who injure him are liable. And one who cuts down his plants, though he is not permitted to do so, is not liable; others who cut down his plants are liable.
  	Even though he gives him (bosheth payment), he is not forgiven until he asks pardon, viz. (Genesis 20:7): "And now, return the wife of this man (Abraham), etc." And whence is it derived that one should not be cruel, but pardon? From (Ibid. 17): "And Abraham prayed to G d (that Avimelech be forgiven), and G d healed Avimelech, etc." If one says (to another): Blind my eye, cut off my hand, break my leg (and the other does so), he is liable. (If he asks:) "On condition that I not be liable?" [and the first responds: "Yes," in spite of this,] he is liable. [For there is a "Yes" which is like a "No." The "Yes" in this instance is to be understood as a "questioning" one; for men are not apt to "waive" bodily pain.] (If one says to another:) Tear my clothing, break my pitcher (and the other does so), he is liable. (If he asks:) "On condition that I not be liable?" [Even if the first responds: "No"], he is not liable. [For his "No" is like a "Yes," as if he said to him: "Did I not tell you, on condition that you not be liable?" Therefore, he is not liable, men being wont to "waive" property damage.] (If one says to another: "Do thus to that man," (and the other asks:) "On condition that I not be liable?" he is liable both for (injury to) his body and (damage to) his property.
  
  
  
  	If one steals wood and makes vessels of it; wool, and makes clothing of it, he pays as at the time of the theft, [the cost of wood and wool, and he need not return the vessels to him, having acquired them with shinui (change of state). ] If he stole a pregnant cow and it gave birth; a (wool-) laden sheep, and he shore it, he pays the price of a cow standing to give birth, the price of a sheep standing to be shorn. [And the additional worth of the calf and the shearing belong to him, having acquired them by shinui.] If he stole a cow and it became pregnant in his domain and gave birth; a sheep, and it became (wool-) laden in his domain, and he shore it, he pays as at the time of the theft. This is the rule: All thieves pay as at the time of the theft, [to include one's stealing a lamb and its becoming a ram; a calf and its becoming an ox, and slaughtering and selling it, in which instance he is exempt from four and five payment. For since a shinui took place in his domain, he acquires it, and slaughters what is his and sells what is his.]
  	If he stole a beast and it became old; bondsmen and they became old, he pays as at the time of the theft. R. Meir says: With bondsmen he says to him: "Here is what is yours before you" (i.e., Take him) [For a bondsman is likened to land, which is (always) in the domain of the (original) master. The halachah is in accordance with R. Meir.] If he stole a coin and it split; fruits and they rotted [(If only some of them rotted, he says: "Here is what is yours before you"; but if all of them rotted, he pays as at the time of the theft.)]; wine and it soured, he pays as at the time of the theft. (If he stole) a coin and it were voided [in that province, but not in another]; terumah and it became unclean; a beast and it had been transgressed with, [i.e., sodomy were committed with it or it had been served idolatrously, in which instance it is unfit for a sacrifice], or if it had become unfit for the altar [with an unmanifest blemish, such as a dok (a withered spot) in the eye], or if it were going out to be stoned, he says: "Here is what is yours before you."
  	If he gave to craftsmen to construct and they took apart, [i.e., if he gave them wood to make an object, and after they made it they took it apart], they must pay [the price of the object, and not the price of the wood alone]. If he gave a smith a shidah [a wooden wagon made for women to ride in], a chest, or a closet to repair, and he damaged it, he must pay. [We are hereby apprised that if he gave a finished object to a craftsman to repair, and he damaged it, he must pay the price of the object. This is taught to shed light on what precedes, i.e., that we are not to say it refers to a finished object.] If a builder undertook to take down a wall and he broke the stones or caused damage, he is liable for payment. If he took it down from one side and it fell from the other side, he is not liable. And if (it fell) because of the blow, he is liable.
  	If one gives wool to a dyer and the vat burnt it, [by overboiling], he gives him the cost of his wool. [ Here there is no shvach (appreciation of the object) at all, it having been entirely burned, so that it cannot be said: "If the shvach is greater, etc." ] If he dyed it (so that it looked) ugly, [dyeing it with the lees of the dye and deliberately spoiling the wool, he has "the lower hand" according to all.] — If the shvach [of this wool] is greater than the expense [of the dye], he [the owner] gives him [the dyer] the expense, [but not a full wage, and he takes his wool. And we do not say that he (the dyer) gives him (the owner) the cost of his wool, acquiring the shvach of the wool, for he used the stipulated dye, and there is no shinui (change) which would cause him to acquire it.] And if the expense is greater than the shvach, he (the owner) gives him the shvach. (If he asked him) to dye it red, and he dyed it black; black, and he dyed it red, [acquiring it with shinui], R. Meir says: He (the dyer) gives him [only] the cost of his wool, [or the owner pays the full wage and takes the wool.] R. Yehudah says: If the shvach is greater than the expense, he (the owner) gives him the expense; and if the expense is greater than the shvach, he (the owner) gives him the shvach. [For this dyer, who deviated (from his charge) is penalized and given "the lower hand," not benefitting from the shvach and also not receiving his wage, but only his expenses. And if the expense is greater than the shvach, he (the owner) gives him the shvach. And if he wishes to give him his wage, the shvach being greater than the wage, he may do so. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	If one stole the worth of a p'rutah from his neighbor, and swore [falsely] to him [and confessed], he must take it to him even to Media, [there being no atonement for him until he returns it to the one he stole it from himself, it being written in respect to one who swore falsely (Leviticus 5:24): "To whom it belongs shall he give it."] He may give it neither to the son [of the one robbed] nor to his messenger, [it not being deemed "restoration" until it reaches his (the robbed one's) hand]. But he may give it to a messenger of beth-din, [a rabbinic provision on behalf of the penitent, that they not be constrained to pay for travel expenses.] And if he [the robbed one] dies, it is returned to his heirs.
  	If he gave him the principal but not the fifth (see Leviticus 5:24); if he (the robbed one) waived the principal but not the fifth; if he waived both except for less than the worth of a p'rutah in the principal, he need not go after him, [and we are not concerned that it might appreciate in value to the worth of a p'rutah, in which instance, even if the stolen object is intact, he need not go after him.] If he gave him the fifth but not the principal; if he waived the fifth but not the principal; if he waived both except the worth of a p'rutah in the principal, he must go after him.
  	If he gave him the principal and swore on the fifth, [i.e., a second oath, that he had given it to him, and he confessed that he had not given it], he pays a fifth on the fifth [i.e., a fifth of the fifth, the first fifth becoming principal (and so, progressively)] until the principal is less than the value of a p'rutah. [i.e., If he afterwards gave him the first fifth and swore (falsely) on the second, and then confessed, he pays his fifth and a fifth of the second fifth, and so on, it being written (Leviticus 5:24): "And its fifths shall he add to it" — the Torah added many fifths for one principal.] And so with a pledge, it being written (Ibid. 5:21-22): "…a pledge, or a deposit, or a theft, or if he oppress his neighbor," [holding back the wage of a hired man], "or if he find a lost object, and deny it, and swear falsely," he pays the principal and a fifth and brings a guilt-offering, [there being no fifth or guilt-offering unless he confesses, it being written in respect to stealing from a proselyte (Numbers 5:7): "And they shall confess."] (If one asks:) "Where is my pledge?" and the other replies: "It was lost." The first: "I put you under oath." The second: "Amen" — and the witnesses testify that he ate it, he pays the principal. If he confesses of his own accord, he pays the principal and a fifth and brings a guilt-offering.
  	(If one asks:) "Where is my pledge?" and the other replies: "It was stolen." The first: "I place you under oath." The second: "Amen" — and the witnesses testify that it was stolen, he pays kefel. [If he confesses of his own accord he does not pay kefel, it being written (Exodus 22:8): "Whom the judges incriminate shall pay double" — to exclude one who incriminates himself.] If he confesses of his own accord, he pays the principal and a fifth and brings a guilt-offering.
  	If one steals from his father and swears (falsely) to him and he (his father) dies, he pays the principal and a fifth to his (father's other) sons or to his brothers [if he has no sons. And even though the inheritance fell before this one (the thief), he must make restoration, and may not retain even as much as his share in the inheritance, it being written (Leviticus 5:23): "Then he shall return the theft" — There is no amendment for him until the stolen object leaves his hand (this, on condition that it be intact, not having been acquired by him through a shinui)]. And if he does not wish it [to lose his share in the inheritance] or if he does not have [enough property to forego his share], he borrows [and returns the stolen object to his brothers to fulfill the mitzvah of restoration] and the creditors [from whom he borrowed] come and exact payment [from the portion of the thief in the stolen object. And if he is his father's only heir, he himself gives the stolen object to his creditor in payment of the debt, telling him: "This is what I stole from my father." Or he gives it thus for his wife's kethubah (marriage contract) or for the charity fund, in each of these instances apprising the recipient that he had stolen it from his father.]
  	If one says to his son: "I vow that you will not benefit from me," if he dies, he inherits him. (If the father forbids such benefit) in his lifetime and after his death, if he dies he does not inherit him, and it (his portion) reverts to his (his father's) sons or to his (his father's) brothers. And if he does not have (what to eat), he borrows [and he eats], and the creditors come and exact payment [from his share in the inheritance. And the payment of his debt from those monies is not considered "benefit," viz. (Nedarim 33a): "If one is bevowed of benefit by his neighbor, he (the neighbor) may pay his debt."]
  	If one stole from a proselyte and swore (falsely) to him (that he had not stolen), and he (the proselyte) died, he pays the principal and a fifth to the priests, and a guilt-offering to the altar, as it is written (Numbers 5:8): "And if the man has no redeemer to whom to return the debt, the debt which is returned to the L rd, (belongs) to the priest, aside from the ram of atonement, with which atonement is made for him." [And there is no man in Israel who has no redeemers "upwards" until our father Jacob except this proselyte, who died without heirs.] If he (the thief) were bringing up the money and the guilt-offering (to Jerusalem), and he died, it is given to his [the thief's] sons. [For he had already acquired it with the proselyte's death. It is just that it is incumbent upon him to make restoration so that he have atonement for his oath, and now atonement no longer obtains, since he has died.], and the guilt-offering grazes until it acquires a blemish, the ruling being: "Whatever in a sin-offering dies (i.e., is caused to die), in a guilt-offering is caused to graze."], and it is sold and its money falls as a donation [to kayitz hamizbeach ("the altar's summertime," i.e., "slack" time), for the purchase of burnt-offerings.]
  	If he gave the money to the men of the (Temple) watch and he died [before bringing the offering], the heirs [of the thief] cannot take it from their hands. [He cannot take it from the Cohanim, who have already acquired it], it being written (Numbers 5:10): "A man, what he gives to the priest, to him shall it be." If he gave the money to Yehoyariv [the first of the twenty-four priestly watches in the Temple], and the guilt-offering to Yedayah [the last of the priestly watches], he has fulfilled his obligation [as explained below, that if one brings (restoration for) his theft before bringing his guilt-offering he fulfills his obligation, and one watch acquires what is theirs, and the other, what is theirs.] If he gave the guilt-offering to Yehoyariv and the money [afterwards] to Yedayah, if the guilt-offering still obtains, [the sons of Yehoyariv not yet having sacrificed it], the sons of Yedayah sacrifice it, [the theft and the guilt-offering reverting to Yedayah], and if not, [in which instance he has not fulfilled his obligation with the guilt-offering that he gave to Yehoyariv, not having given his theft (before the sacrifice of the guilt-offering)], he must bring another guilt-offering. For if one brings (restoration for) his theft before bringing his guilt-offering, he fulfils is obligation; if he brings his guilt-offering before bringing his theft, he does not fulfill his obligation. If he gave the principal [to the priests] and not the fifth, the fifth does not stand in the way [of sacrificing the guilt-offering if he has not yet given it but gives it in the end].
  
  
  
  	If one steals and feeds his sons (therefrom) or places it before them, they are not liable to pay [if they ate it after their father's death. If it no longer exists, they need not pay. For they did not steal it, and metaltelin (movable property) is not bound (for payment) to the creditor. But if they did not eat it, and it exists, they must return it.] And if it were something that is bound, they are liable to pay. [That is, if their father left them bound property, i.e., land, they are liable to pay, even if they already ate it. The Mishnah is thus construed in the Gemara. As to the halachah: If one steals and feeds his sons, whether they ate before yeush (the owner's "despairing" of recovery) or after yeush, they are liable to pay from the money left them by their father, both from bound or unbound property. For in our time metaltelin is bound to the creditor. And if the thief left nothing, if his sons ate the theft before yeush, they must pay of what is theirs, and if after yeush, they need not pay of what is theirs unless their father left them property.] Change is not made [selaim for p'rutoth] neither from the tax collection box nor from the purse of the collectors [of the king, who collect head-taxes and crop-tax, it being "theft." This, with a gentile tax collector or with a Jewish collector who has no stipulated amount but takes as much as he wants. But with a Jewish collector, even one appointed by a gentile king, if he takes a stipulated amount by royal ordinance, he does not have the status of a thief and change may be made from his box. What is more, it is forbidden to evade his taxes, for "the law of the kingdom is the law."], and charity is not taken from them, but it is taken from his house [i.e., from the house of a tax collector whose status is that of a thief] or from the marketplace [if he has money in his house or in the marketplace which is not in the tax collection box. And if one owes a half-dinar of p'rutoth to the tax collector and he has no p'rutoth, he gives him a silver dinar and receives from him p'rutoth for half its worth, even though he gives it to him from the tax collection box; for it is as if he rescues it from his hand.]
  	If tax collectors took his ass and gave him a different ass; if thieves stole his garment and gave him a different garment, they are his, the owners "despairing" of them. [In all probability the owners "despaired" of them immediately, so that he acquired them with yeush and change of domain.] If one rescued something from a river or from a troop or from robbers, if the owners despaired, they are his. [This, if it is known that they had despaired, saying: "Woe for what I have lost!" But otherwise, they are not his. As to "if thieves stole his garment, etc.", above, which implies that yeush is assumed, this is so in the instance of Jewish robbers. For since Jewish judges say: "Bring witnesses; bring proof," as soon as the robbers take it, he despairs. The other instance, however, is one of gentile robbers, gentile judges judging with "pride, might, and conjecture," without witnesses and proof, so that the one who is robbed does not despair. Accordingly, if we know that the owners have despaired, it is his; if not, not.] Likewise, a swarm of bees [with their king] — if the owners despaired, they are his. R. Yochanan b. B'roka said: A woman or a minor is believed to say: "This swarm came from here," and one may enter his neighbor's field to rescue his swarm; but if he damages [something in doing so], he pays for the damage. But he may not cut off his branch. [If the bees settled on his neighbor's branch, and he fears that if he takes them off one by one, the others will escape, he may not cut off the entire branch, even] with the intention of paying him. R. Yishmael, the son of R. Yochanan b. B'roka, says: He may also cut (the branch) and pay for it. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yishmael.]
  	If one recognizes his vessels or books in the hand of another and it was bruited about in the city that they had been stolen, [(Our Mishnah speaks of a man who is not wont to sell his vessels, so that since it was bruited about in the city that they had been stolen and there are witnesses that these vessels and books are his, we do not fear that he might have sold them)], the buyer swears how much he had paid for them and takes (that sum from the owner) [and returns his vessels to him. This, before yeush.] And if not, not all depends upon him (the owner). For I say: He sold them to another and this one bought them from him.
  	If one came with his jug of wine and another with his pitcher of honey — If the pitcher of honey split and the first spilled out his wine and rescued the honey into it (his pitcher), he has only his pay [for his vessel and for his work]. And if he said: "I shall rescue yours and you pay for mine," he must pay him. If a river swept away his ass and that of his neighbor, his (ass) worth a hundred and his neighbor's two hundred — If he left his and rescued his neighbor's, he has only his pay. And if he said to him: "I shall rescue yours and you pay for mine," he must pay him. [Both cases of the Mishnah must be taught. For if only the first were taught, I would say that it is only there that if he stipulates it he receives full pay, for he loses (what is his) by his own act, spilling out his wine with his own hands for the sake of the other; but in the second instance, where (his loss comes) of itself, I might say that he has only his pay. And if only the second were taught, (I would say) that it is only here where if he says nothing he receives only his pay, (his loss) coming of itself; but in the first instance, where it comes through his own hands, I might say that even if he says nothing he receives the full amount. Both, therefore, are necessary.]
  	If one robs a field from his neighbor and mesikin take it [i.e., if plunderers seize it from the robber. The Targum of "tzlatzal" (crickets), (Deuteronomy 28:42), is "saka'a," the locust being a thief, eating in the fields of others.] — If it (the plundering) is an "endemic plague," [the fields of others having been seized along with this], he (the robber) says to him: "Here is yours before you"; and if it (was seized) because of the robber, he must provide him with another field. If it was inundated by a river, he says to him: "Here is yours before you."
  	If one steals from his neighbor, or takes a loan or a pledge from him in the settlement, he may not return it to him in the desert. On condition that he go to the desert, he may return it to him in the desert. [Not that he says to him explicitly: "On condition that you go to the desert and pay me," for that goes without saying. Rather, (the meaning is that) his neighbor says to him: "Let this be with you as a pledge, for I am going to the desert"; and the other says to him: "I also have to go to the desert." In such an instance, if he wishes to return it to him in the desert, he may do so.]
  	If one says to his neighbor: I stole from you; you lent me; you deposited a pledge with me, and I do not know if I returned it to you or not, he must pay. [This, if his neighbor claims that he definitely stole from him, and he says: True, I stole from you, but I do not know whether or not I returned it. In that instance, he must pay. But if his neighbor claims that he might have stolen from him or borrowed from him, and he says: True, I stole from you, or borrowed from you, and I do not know whether or not I returned it, he is not liable by the laws of man; and if he wishes to satisfy (the laws of) Heaven, he pays him.] But if he said to him: I do not know if I stole from you; if you lent me; if you deposited a pledge with me, he is not liable to pay. [However, he swears that he does not know whether he owes him, for uncertainty (that of the claimee) is not greater than certainty (that of the claimant). For even if he had said: "I owe you nothing," he must swear a sh'vuath heseth (a consuetudinal oath)].
  	If one steals a lamb from the flock and he returns it, and it dies or it is stolen, he must make restoration. [For from the time he steals it, it is in his domain. And his returning it (to the flock) is not considered restoration.] If the owners knew neither of its being stolen nor of its being returned, and they counted the sheep, and it (the count) was whole, he is not liable. [Our Mishnah is to be understood thus: He must make restoration whether or not they counted it (the flock). When is this so? When the owners knew neither of its being stolen nor of its being returned. But if the owners knew of its being stolen, and they counted the sheep, and it (the count) was whole, he is not liable to pay. The explanation: If the lamb died or were stolen after the thief returned it, he must make restoration, whether the owners counted the flock and found it whole or they did not count the flock. When is this so? When the owners did not know that the lamb had been stolen. For every lamb which is wont to wander (from the flock) must be guarded with special care. And this lamb, since the owners did not know that it had been stolen and that it was wont to wander, and they did not take special care, the thief must pay, for he led to the sheep's going lost. But if the owners knew that the lamb had been stolen, and then they counted the flock and found it whole, the stolen lamb having been returned, they already knew that there was a particular sheep which was wont to wander, and they should have taken special care in guarding. And if they did not, it is they who lose, and the thief is not liable to pay.]
  	It is not permitted to buy wool, milk, and kids from shepherds, [it being possible that they stole these from the owner's flock which was given them (to guard)], nor (is it permitted to buy) wood or fruit from watchers of fruit. But it is permitted to buy from women woolen garments in Judah, flax in the Galil, [women's work, which they themselves fashion and sell with their husbands' approval], and calves in the Shomron [a place where calves are bred, the calves belonging to them]. And with all (of the above), if they asked to conceal (the sale), it is forbidden. And eggs and chickens may be bought in all places.
  	The lumps (of thread) which the washer takes out of [the wool (He removes a small amount by soaking it) belong to him, [the owner not objecting; and even if he does, it is not considered an objection.] And what the carder removes belongs to the owner, [what he removes being of significance, and the owner objecting (to its being taken)]. The washer removes three threads and they belong to him. [It is customary to leave three threads of a different variety in woolen garments after weaving them. And the washer removes them and straightens out the garment. And if black threads are woven into a white garment, the washer is permitted to remove all of them, black being unseemly in the white.] If a tailor left over in the needle enough thread to sew with, [i.e., a needle's length] or a three by three patch, they belong to the owner. [If a tailor ended off his sewing and was left with a small patch, three by three fingers, he must return it to the owner of the garment.] The chips that the carpenter makes with the adze, [which are thin], belong to him, and (those which he makes) with the axe, [which are thick], belong to the owner. And if he were working in the owner's home, even the saw-dust [made by the bore] belongs to the owner.