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text: Mishnah Sanhedrin
  משנה סנהדרין
  The Mishna with Obadiah Bartenura by Rabbi Shraga Silverstein
  
  
  Mishnah Sanhedrin
  
  
  
  
  
  	Monetary litigations (are presided over) by three (judges) [(even) non-experts, the rabbis not requiring three experts, so that "the door not be closed to loans," (i.e., lest the debtor deny (the loan) and he (the creditor) not find experts to force him to law. But one expert or three non-experts suffice.] Thefts and injuries (are presided over) by three, ["elohim" ("judges") being written three times in the section on shomrim (caretakers) (Exodus 22), whence we derive that three experts are required.] (Litigations of) nezek (damage), [a man or a mued ("habitual damager") ox, which pay a complete nezek for damaging], a half-nezek, [a tam ("non-habitual damager") ox, which caused damage. (Even though nezek comes under chavaloth (injuries), since "double payment" (kefel) and "four and five" payment are to be taught, where the payment is not equal to the damage, but more, half-nezek is also taught, where the payment is, likewise, not equal to the damage, but less. And since half-nezek is taught, nezek is also taught)], double payment, and "four and five" payment (are presided over) by three. (Litigations of) ravishment and seduction and imputation of "an evil name" [viz.: (Deuteronomy 22:17): "I did not find your daughter to be a virgin," (Ibid. 19): "Then they shall fine him a hundred (shekels of) silver"] (are presided over) by three. These are the words of R. Meir. And the sages say: Imputations of an evil name (are presided over) by twenty-three, for they may involve capital punishment. [For if it were (found to be) true that she was adulterous, then she is stoned; and capital cases are tried by twenty-three (1:4).]
  	(Adjudications of) [forty] stripes (are presided over) by three, [it being written (Deuteronomy 25:1): "And they shall draw near to judgment, and they (two judges) shall judge them," and since beth-din cannot be evenly balanced, a judge is added, making three.] R. Yishmael says: "Twenty-three. [He derives it by identity: "wicked"-"wicked," it being written here (in respect to stripes) (Deuteronomy 25:1): "And they shall incriminate the wicked one," and, elsewhere, (Numbers 35:31): "…who is a wicked one (condemned) to die." Just as there, twenty-three, so here, twenty-three.] Intercalation of the month [i.e., sanctification of the new moon (Since "intercalation of the year" follows, "intercalation of the month" is taught.)] (is presided over) by three. Intercalation of the year (is presided over) by three. These are the words of R. Meir. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: They begin with three, deliberate with five, and end with seven. [They begin with three to see if it is necessary to seat a beth-din for this. If one of the three says that beth-din must sit and see if it is necessary to intercalate the year because of the season, the spring, or the fruits, and two say that it is not necessary, that there is no doubt here, that of a certainty, intercalation is not called for, the one is in the minority and he is overruled. If two say to sit, and one, not to sit, the two are followed, and two more are added to deliberate the matter, so that now there are five. If two say that it is necessary to intercalate, and three, that it is not, the two are in the minority and they are overruled. If two say that it is not necessary, and three, that it is, the majority is followed and another two are added, making seven, who intercalate the year. The Gemara explains that these "three, five, and seven" correspond to the priestly blessing, there being three words in the first verse, five in the second, and seven in the last. The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.] And if they ended with three, it is (nevertheless) intercalated.
  	The placing of the hands of the elders (semichath zekenim) [on the bullock of he'elam davar, (communal transgression through judicial error)] (required three judges.) [Also implied is the appointment of a judge — the senior, ordained judge requiring two to join him when he wishes to ordain a sage to be called "Rebbi" and to rule in penalty (knass) judgments. The term "semichah" is used by reason of (Numbers 28:23): "And he (Moses) placed his hands upon him" (Joshua). It is not necessary (in our instance) that he place his hands upon him but that he add the title "Rebbi" to his name. There is no semichah outside of Eretz Yisrael, but both the ordainer and the one to be ordained must be in Eretz Yisrael. If this condition is satisfied, he has the authority to rule in knass judgment even outside of Eretz Yisrael, Sanhedrin functioning both in Eretz Yisrael and outside it following ordination in Eretz Yisrael. Rambam writes that it seems to him that at the present time, when there is no ordination, one man by another back to Moshe Rabbeinu, if all of the sages in Eretz Yisrael agreed to ordain one or many, they are duly ordained, and they are authorized to rule in knass judgments and to ordain others. The matter requires determination.] ("the placing of the hands of the elders") and the breaking of the neck of the heifer (see Deuteronomy 21:2) require three judges, [it being written (Leviticus 4:15): "the elders of the congregation." The minimum of elders is two, and a beth-din cannot be evenly balanced, so that another is added, making three.] These are the words of R. Shimon. R. Yehudah says: Five are required, [viz.: "And they shall place" — two; "the elders" — two, and a beth-din cannot be evenly balanced, so that another is added, making five. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah.] Chalitzah (levirate refusal) and miunin (refusals) require three. [("Chalitzah":) It is written (Deuteronomy 25:9): "Then his yevamah shall draw near to him before the eyes of the elders": "elders" — two; and a beth-din cannot be evenly balanced, so that another is added, making three. The two others that are added are (added in order) to publicize the matter. ("miunin":) If a minor orphan girl were married to a man by her mother and brothers with her consent, and she (later) wished to leave him by miun ("refusal"), the miun must be before three judges. (In Yevamoth it is indicated that miun before two suffices.)] Neta revai (planting of the fourth year) [if he comes to redeem it for money] and [similarly] second-tithe, whose monetary value is not known [e.g., rotted fruit, which has no fixed price], and (Temple) dedications, [if one comes to redeem them] require three judges. Valuations in movables require three [i.e., If one said: "the valuation of that man is upon me" (to give to the Temple), and he had no money to give as per the monies specified in the section (on valuations), and he desired to give it in movables, three judges are required to assess those movables.] R. Yehudah said: One of them must be a Cohein, [it being written in respect to valuations (Leviticus 27:12): "as the Cohein valuates it for you."] And (valuations) in land require nine and a Cohein. [If he has no movables and he comes to give land, ten men, one of them a Cohein, must assess that land for the imposed valuation.] And the same applies for (the worth of) a man. [If he said: "The worth of that man is upon me" (to give to the Temple), in which instance the man's market value is assessed and the monies given, that assessment, likewise, requires ten men, one of them a Cohein.]
  	Capital cases require twenty-three judges. (Judgment of) the active and the passive participant in sodomy requires twenty-three, it being written (Leviticus 20:16): "And you shall kill the woman and the beast," [the active participant, which is likened to the woman. Just as the woman (is judged) by twenty-three, so is the beast in this instance], and it is written (Ibid. 15): "and the beast (in this instance, the passive participant) shall you kill" — whence we derive (twenty-three judges for) the active and the passive participant.] An ox facing stoning requires twenty-three judges, it being written (Exodus 21:29): "The ox shall be stoned, and also its owner shall die" — As the death of the owner, so is the death of the ox [i.e., Just as the owner in capital cases is judged by twenty-three, so, etc.] The death (by stoning) of the wolf, the lion, the bear, the tiger, the leopard, and the snake requires twenty-three judges. R. Eliezer says: Whoever is first to kill them merits it, [and it is not necessary to bring them to beth-din.] R. Akiva says: Their death requires twenty-three judges. [The Gemara explains that the first tanna and R. Akiva differ with respect to a snake. The first tanna requires twenty-three judges for putting a snake to death, whereas R. Akiva requires that number for wolf, lion, bear, tiger, and leopard, whereas with a snake — "Whoever comes first merits it"; for he rids the world of a scourge. The halachah is in accordance with R. Akiva.]
  	A tribe and a false prophet and a high-priest are not judged except by a beth-din of seventy-one. [("a tribe":) the majority of a tribe that served idols, it being written (Deuteronomy 17:5): "Then you shall take that man or that woman … to your gates": A man or a woman you take out to your gates (of judgment), but you do not take out a tribe to your gates, but to the Great Beth-din (of seventy-one judges.) ("a false prophet":) This is derived by identity: "thing-thing" from a rebellious elder, it being written here (in respect to a false prophet (Deuteronomy 18:20): "…who shall presume to speak a thing," and in respect to a rebellious elder (Ibid. 17:8): "If there be hidden from you a thing." Just as a rebellious elder is judged by the Great Beth-din, viz. (Ibid.): "Then you shall arise and go up to the place, etc.", so a false prophet is judged by the Great Beth-din. ("a high-priest":) it being written (Exodus 18:22): "The great thing shall they bring to you": The things of the "great one" (i.e., the high-priest) shall they bring to you (Moses)", and Moses was in place of seventy-one.] And the people are not taken out to a "permitted" war. [(Every war except the war with the seven nations and the war with Amalek is called a "permitted" war)] except by a beth-din of seventy-one, [it being written in respect to David (I Chronicles 27:34): "and after Achitofel came Benayahu ben Yehoyada": Achitofel — the counselor; Benayahu ben Yehoyada — the Sanhedrin, of which he (Benayahu) was the mufla (the "elect"), whom all followed.] Additions to the city, [Jerusalem, whose sanctity is greater than that of the rest of Eretz Yisrael] and to the azaroth (the Temple courts), [whose sanctity is greater than that of Jerusalem] are made only by a beth-din of seventy-one. [It is not permitted to originate sanctity except through a beth-din of seventy-one, it being written (Exodus 25:9): "According to all that I show you … and thus shall you do," for (subsequent) generations, viz.: Just as the tabernacle was sanctified through Moses, who was in place of the Great Sanhedrin, so, for (subsequent) generations, additions to the city and to the azaroth are made by the Great Sanhedrin.] Sanhedraoth (of twenty-three judges) are not made for the tribes except by a beth-din of seventy-one, [as we find with Moses, who established sanhedraoth, Moses being in place of seventy-one.] A "condemned city" is declared only by a beth-din of seventy-one, [it being written (Deuteronomy 17:5): "Then you shall take out that man or that women … to your gates": You take out the man or woman to your "gates," i.e., to the beth-din (of twenty-three) in your gates; but you do not take out the entire city to your gates, but to the "distinctive gate," (i.e., the Great Sanhedrin)]. And a "condemned city" is not made in a border city, [one between Eretz Yisrael and the land of the nations, it being written (Deuteronomy 13:14): "from your midst," and not from a border city. The rationale: Lest the nations hear and come and ravage Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, the city is not made "a heap forever," as indicated for a condemned city, but its inhabitants are killed alone.] And not three, but they make one or two. [i.e., One beth-din does not make three cities "condemned cities" in one place, close to one another. But they do make them in two or three places.]
  	The Great Sanhedrin was composed of seventy-one judges, and the lesser sanhedrin, of twenty-three. Whence is it derived that the Great Sanhedrin consisted of seventy-one? From (Numbers 11:16): "Gather unto Me seventy men of the elders of Israel," and Moses over them, [viz. (Ibid 17): "And they shall bear with you" — together with you], making seventy-one. R. Yehudah says: Seventy. [He expounds "with you" as "similar to you," and not that he must sit with them in judgment. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.] And whence is it derived that the lesser consisted of twenty-three? From (Ibid. 35:24-25): "And the congregation shall judge … and the congregation shall rescue." The congregation judges [i.e., Ten rule guilty], and the congregation rescues [i.e., Ten rule innocent], making twenty. [i.e., We derive from this that there must be twenty. If they are split, ten rule guilty, and ten, innocent.] And whence is it derived that a "congregation" is ten? From (Ibid. 14:27): "How long for this evil congregation" (of the spies), Yehoshua and Calev being excluded (from the twelve). And whence are the three additional derived? From (Exodus 23:2): "Do not be after many for ill," I understand that I should be with them for good. Why, then, need I be told (Ibid.): "After many to incline"? (To be taught:) Not as your inclining for good (acquittal) is your inclining for ill (conviction). Your inclining for good is with (a majority of) one; your inclining for ill requires (a majority of) two (beyond the minimum ten). And since we cannot have a split beth-din, we add another one, making twenty-three. [The verse is understood thus: "Do not be after many for ill," to convict by a majority of one over those ruling for acquittal; but "after many to incline" — with two, even for ill, when there are two more for conviction than for acquittal. Therefore, perforce, twenty-three are required. For there cannot be fewer than ten ruling for acquittal — viz.: "And the congregation shall rescue," so that conviction cannot obtain with fewer than twelve. ("and since we cannot have a split beth-din":) Beth-din cannot be even-numbered; for if (it were, and) they were split (in their decision), we would have half against half, so that "Your inclining for good is with one" could not obtain. Therefore, an additional judge is added, making twenty-three.] And how many must there be in a city so that it qualify for a sanhedrin (of twenty-three)? One hundred and twenty. [The Gemara explains: Twenty-three, the small sanhedrin; three rows of twenty-three each sitting before them, from which to add to the judges if this becomes necessary (see 4:4); ten "idlers" (i.e., ten who are idle from all work and sit constantly in the house of study; two scribes to record the words of those who rule for acquittal and those who rule for conviction; two chazanim, sextons of beth-din, to administer stripes where prescribed and to summon the litigants; two litigants; two witnesses; two who declare them zomemin ("scheming"); two who declare the zomemin, zomemin; two (charity)collectors and a third to distribute the charity (charity being collected by two and being distributed by three); a blood-letter, a scribe; and a teacher of young children — making one hundred and twenty.] R. Nechemiah says: Two hundred and thirty, corresponding to "officers of tens" [i.e., twenty-three tens — so that each judge be an officer of ten, less than that not being regarded as "authority." The halachah is not in accordance with R. Nechemiah.]
  
  
  
  	A high-priest judges and he is judged; he testifies and he is testified for; he administers chalitzah and his wife receives chalitzah. His wife is taken in yibum, but he does not perform yibum, for a widow is forbidden to him. If one of his kin died, he does not follow the litter, [lest he come to touch it in his preoccupation, and it is written (Leviticus 21:11): "And to any dead body he shall not come."] But they (the litter bearers) are concealed and he is revealed; they are revealed and he is concealed. [When the litter bearers are "concealed" from the alleyway that they left, he is "revealed," and enters it. But so long as they are "revealed" in the alleyway, he is "concealed," from it, not entering it.] And he goes out with them until the entrance of the city. [For there are alleyways in the city in which he can conceal himself, but outside the city there is no (distinguishing) sign (of his separation from the procession)]. These are the words of R. Meir. R. Yehudah says: He does not go out of the sanctuary, viz. (Leviticus 21:12): "And from the sanctuary he shall not go out." [R. Yehudah expounds: "And from the sanctuary (mikdash), he shall not go out" — at all. R. Meir expounds: "And from his sanctity (kedushatho), he shall not go out," i.e., He should take care to avoid contact (with the body). And within the city, where there are alleyways, there is a distinguishing) sign, so that he takes care. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah.] And when he consoles others, (when) it is the custom of all the people to pass by one after the other [(For all agree that he may follow the litter of one who is not his kin; for not being preoccupied, he will take care to avoid contact with the litter. And when they return from burial and stand in a file to console the mourners, who stand in their halts, and each one says: "Be consoled by Heaven")], the memunah (the "appointed one") [the adjutant high-priest, who is appointed to substitute for the high-priest if he becomes unfit on Yom Kippur] positions him in the middle between himself and the people. [For the memunah walks to the right of the high-priest, and all the people to his left, so that the high-priest is found to be in the middle.] And when he is consoled by others, all the people say to him: "We are your atonement" [i.e., You will receive atonement through us, and we are in your place for all that should come upon you], and he says to them: "Be blessed by Heaven!" And when they give him the mourner's meal, [for a mourner is forbidden to eat the first meal of his own food, and his kin and friends provide it for him], everyone sits on the ground [constricting themselves, and mourning for his suffering], and he sits [in (regard for his) dignity] on a bench.
  	A king does not judge and he is not judged. [This, only with the kings of Yisrael, who do not defer to the sages; but kings from the Davidic line judge and are judged, viz. (Jeremiah 21:12): "House of David, thus says the L rd: 'Ply justice in the morning.'"]. He does not testify and he is not testified for. He does not administer chalitzah and his wife does not receive chalitzah. He does not perform yibum and his wife is not taken in yibum. R. Yehudah says: "If he wishes to perform chalitzah or yibum, let him be remembered for the good!" They said to him: He is not heeded, [for a king may not "waive" his honor, and it is demeaning for him to perform chalitzah and have her spit in his face; and if chalitzah does not obtain with a woman, neither does yibum.] And his widow is not wedded. R. Yehudah says: A king may marry a king's widow. For thus do we find with David, who married Saul's widow, viz. (II Samuel 12:8): "And I gave you (David) the house of your master (Saul), and the wives of your master in your bosom." [The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah in this.]
  	If one of his kin dies, he does not leave the portal of his palace, [it being demeaning for a king to show a mournful countenance to the people]. R. Yehudah says: If he wishes to follow the litter, he may do so, viz. (II Samuel 3:31): "And King David walked behind the litter." They countered: He did so only to appease the people, [so that they recognize that David had not counseled Yoav to kill Avner.] And when they give him the mourner's meal, everyone sits on the ground, and he sits on the bed.
  	And he takes out (the army) to a "permitted war" [a war with peoples other than Amalek, and with (nations other than) the seven nations], by authorization of a beth-din of seventy-one. And he breaches [the fence of others] to make way for himself [to go to his vineyard or his field], and he may not be held back (from doing so). The path of the king has no limits. All of the people take of the spoil and place it before him, and he takes the prime portion. [He chooses first and takes half of all the spoil.] He may not take more than eighteen wives. [For David had six wives, and the prophet (Nathan) said to him (II Samuel 12:8): "And if these (six wives) were too few for you, I could have added to you as these and as these": "as these" — six; "and as these" — six, making a total of eighteen.] R. Yehudah says: He may take more [than eighteen], so long as they do not turn his heart astray. R. Shimon says: He may not marry even one who turns his heart astray.] If so, why is it written (Deuteronomy 17"7): "And he shall not multiply for himself wives"? Even such as Avigayil. [There are three different views on the matter: The first tanna holds that he may marry eighteen, even if they are immodest, and not more than eighteen, even if they are modest, this being the Scriptural decree. R. Yehudah holds that he may marry eighteen, even if they are immodest, but not more than eighteen of such; and he may marry as many modest, virtuous ones as he likes. He differs with the fist tanna on one count. R. Shimon holds that he may not marry even one immodest one, and not more than eighteen modest, virtuous ones. He differs from the first tanna on one count, and from R. Yehudah on both counts. The halachah is in accordance with the first tanna.] (Ibid. 16): "He shall not multiply for himself horses," but (may take) only as many as he needs for his chariot. [It is only "idle" horses (that he may not multiply), to vaunt and aggrandize himself with an abundance of horses; but for his chariot and for his horsemen to war against his foes, it is permitted.] (Ibid. 17): "And silver and gold he shall not multiply for himself overmuch," but only as much as is required for aspania [the wages of those troops who go in and out with him the entire year.] And he writes a Torah scroll for himself, [aside from the Torah scroll that every Jewish man must have, and which he keeps in his treasury. The Torah scroll that he writes for himself when he is king goes in and out with him constantly.] When he goes out to war, he takes it with him. When he comes back, it comes back with him. When he sits in judgment, it is with him. When he sits down (to eat), it is beside him, viz. (Ibid. 19): "And it shall be with him, and he shall read in it all the days of his life."
  	It is not permitted to ride on his horse, to sit on his throne, to make use of his sceptre, or to see him when his hair is being cut, when he is naked, or when he is in the bathhouse, it being written (Deuteronomy 17:15): "Place shall you place over yourself a king" — his awe must be upon you.
  
  
  
  	Monetary litigations (are presided over) by three (judges). One [of the litigants] selects for himself one [judge], and one selects for himself another, and the two [litigants together] select for themselves another, [a third judge. In this way, a true judgment is secured. For the litigants accept the verdict, saying: "They judged us fairly." For the one found liable says: "I myself selected one judge, and if he could have found something in my favor, he would have." And the third judge himself is inclined to find something in favor of both, both having selected him.] These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: The two judges select a third, [without the knowledge of the litigants, so that the third judge not be inclined to either one of them. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] Each (of the litigants) may disqualify the judge of the other. [He may say to him: "I do not wish the case to be tried by the beth-din that you chose."] These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: When is this so? When he brings proof against them [(the judges that the other selected)] that they are kin or (otherwise) unfit. But if they were kasher or expert, he cannot disqualify them. [This is the intent: But if they were kasher, i.e., neither kin nor (otherwise) unfit, even if they were "corner-sitters," they are regarded as experts, and he cannot disqualify them. The halachah: If the litigants accept someone to judge their case (whether one or many), and he rendered a decision, his ruling stands and they cannot controvert it, even if he is not "an expert for the many." And if it were found that he erred — If he erred in a ruling of the Mishnah or in something adduced in the Gemara, the case is returned and judged as per the halachah. And if it cannot be returned (as when the one who was awarded money erroneously, went abroad), the judge is exempt from payment; for even though he contributed to the (financial) loss, he did not do so intentionally. And if he erred in his judgment, in something where tannaim, amoraim, or geonim differ, the ruling being in accordance with one, and this judge ruling in accordance with that gaon whose ruling is not the accepted one — If he had not taken (money from one) and placed (it) into the hand (of the other), the case is returned. And if it cannot be returned, he pays from his pocket. And if had "taken and placed in hand," what is done is done, and he pays from his pocket. And a judge who had not been accepted by the litigants, but who arose (to judge) of himself, or one who had been appointed by the king or by some of the elders of the congregation — If he is not "an expert for the many," even if he was granted permission by the Exilarch, his ruling is no ruling, whether or not he erred, and he is not in the class of the judges, but in that of the "despots." And either of the litigants, if he wishes, may controvert his ruling and return the case to beth-din. And if he erred, and did not "take and place in hand," the case is returned. And if it cannot be returned, he pays from his pocket, as per the halachah for all who contribute to (monetary) loss. And if he "took and placed in hand," he pays from his pocket and he then takes (the money back) from the litigant he awarded it to contrary to the halachah. And "an expert to the many" who was accepted by the litigants or who was granted permission by the Exilarch — Even if he was accepted by the litigants; or if he were granted permission by the Exilarch, even if the litigants did not accept him — since he is an expert, if he erred, whether in a ruling of the Mishnah or in his judgment, and the case cannot be returned, he need not pay. And an expert who was granted permission by the Exilarch may compel the litigants to try their case before him, whether they wish to or not, both in Eretz Yisrael and outside it. And if one were granted permission by the Nassi in Eretz Yisrael, he can compel the litigants only in Eretz Yisrael. An "expert" is one who is versed in the written and the oral law and who can reason, draw comparisons, and understand one thing from another. And when he is recognized and acknowledged by the men of his generation, he is called "an expert to the many," and he may judge alone, even without having been granted permission by the Exilarch.] Each (of the litigants) may disqualify the witnesses of the other. These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: When (may he do so)? When he brings proof against them that they are kin or (otherwise) unfit. But if they were kasher, he cannot disqualify them. [The Gemara construes the difference between R. Meir and the sages as obtaining in an instance where a litigant says: "I have two pairs of witnesses in this case," and he brought the first pair, and the other litigant and one other (witness) arose and said: "They are unfit." R. Meir says that they may do so, not being considered "interested witnesses," the first litigant maintaining that he has another pair. And if he seeks (that pair) and cannot find them, it is his loss. And the rabbis hold that even though he says at first that he has two pairs of witnesses, he may retract and say: "I have only these," so that the ones who come to disqualify them are considered "interested witnesses" and their testimony is invalid. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]
  	If one said: "I trust my father" [to be a judge, even though the Torah disqualifies him from judging me, both for acquittal or for liability, viz. (Deuteronomy 24:16): "Fathers shall not be put to death by (cause of) sons"], "I trust your father," "I trust the three cattle herders" [to judge (for, as witnesses, they are kasher)] — R. Meir says: He can retract, [even after the ruling, after the judge accepted the testimony and said: "So and so, you are acquitted."] The sages say: He cannot retract. [The rabbis differ with R. Meir only (in an instance) where the verdict has been pronounced; but before it has been pronounced, the sages concur with R. Meir that he can retract. And also if they (the judges) "acquired from his hand" (by symbolic act) that he will accept the testimony or the judging of a certain man, then even before the verdict he cannot retract, for "nothing preempts acquisition (kinyan)." And this is the halachah.] If one owed his neighbor an oath, and he (the latter) said to him: "Swear to me by 'the life of your head'" [and I will give you what you claim (and, it goes without saying, "I shall waive my claim against you"), and he swore or they "acquired from his hand" (that he would swear) although he had not yet done so, he cannot retract (as per the sages. This is the halachah.)] R. Meir says: He can retract. The sages say: He cannot retract.
  	These are the ones who are invalidated [to judge and to testify]: One who games with kuvia (dice) (see Rosh Hashanah 1:8). [He is unfit to testify for he does not engage in "the habitation of the world." And one is forbidden to engage in his world in anything except Torah and lovingkindness, or in trade, craft, or work conducing to the habitation of the world.], one who lends on interest [Both the borrower and the lender are invalidated, it being ruled that both are in violation of a negative commandment], those who race pigeons [Some understand this as a form of gambling, viz.: "If your pigeon comes before my pigeon, I will give you, etc."; and some understand it as training pigeons to "abduct" other pigeons to their dove-cote, this being "theft by reason of (i.e., by violation of) 'the ways of peace,'" and not absolute theft], and those who trade in (produce of) shevi'ith (the sabbatical year), [of which it is written (Leviticus 25:6): "And the resting of the land shall be for you to eat" — and not for trade.] R. Shimon said: In the beginning they called them "the gatherers of shevi'ith" [The Gemara interprets R. Shimon thus: In the beginning they called them "the gatherers of shevi'ith." That is, those who gathered the fruits of shevi'ith for themselves were unfit to testify, just as those who traded in the fruits of shevi'ith.] With the increase of the "extorters" [those who requisitioned the king's portion, e.g., so many and so many korin of grain each year, so that they had to gather the produce of shevi'ith to fill the king's quota], they reverted to calling them "traders in shevi'ith" [i.e., they reverted to saying that "the traders" in the fruits of shevi'ith alone were unfit to testify, but those who gathered the produce of shevi'ith to give it to the king are fit to testify, since they do not gather it to store it for themselves. As to the halachah: Whoever commits a transgression punishable by judicial death penalty, kareth (cutting-off) or stripes, is unfit to testify, for one who has incurred the death penalty is called "an evildoer," viz. (Numbers 35:31): "...who is an evildoer (condemned) to die," as is one who has incurred stripes, viz. (Deuteronomy 25:2): "And it shall be, if liable to stripes is the evildoer," and it is written (Exodus 23:1): "Do not place your hand with an evildoer to be a false witness," which is expounded: "Do not make an evildoer a witness." And if he receives stripes, he reverts to his fitness, viz. (Deuteronomy 25:3): "And your brother (in receiving stripes) shall be demeaned before your eyes" — Once he has been smitten, he is as your brother. And if he took money unlawfully, even though he incurs neither the death penalty nor stripes, he is unfit to testify, e.g., a thief, a robber, and a lender on interest. And if he took money in violation of a rabbinic ordinance, he is unfit to testify by rabbinic ordinance, e.g., pigeon racers, and "forcers," who give money and take things that the owners do not wish to sell, charity collectors and tax collectors who take for themselves, and those who accept charity from gentiles in public — these and their like are unfit to testify by rabbinic ordinance. And their testimony is not invalid until they are exposed and publicized; but those who are unfit to testify by Torah law need not be thus exposed. And all who are unfit to testify, whether by Torah law or by rabbinic ordinance, if it can be ascertained that they have fully repented, and returned the money that they took unlawfully, and made a "fence" for themselves in the matter in which they sinned, so as not to repeat it, they return to their (state of) fitness. And those who game with kuvia, even though they are not guilty of theft even by rabbinic ordinance, they are unfit to testify, for they do not engage in "the habitation of the world" and have no fear of Heaven. And (they are thus unfit) only when they have no occupation but that, as per R. Yehudah (below). And this is the halachah. And when are they considered to have repented? When they break their dice and take it upon themselves not to game even gratis.] R. Yehudah said: When (are they unfit to testify)? When they have no occupation but that. But if they have an additional occupation, they are fit.
  	And these are the (invalidated) kin (vis-à-vis judging and testifying): his father, his brother, his father's brother, his mother's brother, his sister's husband, [the husband being like his wife], his mother's sister's husband, his mother's husband, his father-in-law, his brother-in-law [i.e., the husband of his wife's sister] — they, their sons, and their sons-in-law. [Only sons and daughters that his brother-in-law has from his wife's sister. But if he has sons from another wife, or sons-in-law married to daughters from another wife, they are not considered kin.] And his stepson alone [is considered kin, but not his stepson's son or his stepson's son-in-law. And he may not testify for his stepson's wife, for a woman is like her husband. And brothers, one vis-à-vis the other, whether from the father or from the mother, are first (of kin) in (i.e., vis-à-vis) first. Their sons, vis-à-vis each other are second in second. And the sons of their sons, vis-à-vis each other, are third in third. Third in first is always kasher, and it goes without saying, third in second. But second in second, and, it goes without saying, second in first, are both pasul (unfit). And just as you reckon for males, so you reckon for females. And every woman that you are pasul to, you are pasul to her husband. And every man that you are pasul to, you are pasul to his wife.] R. Yossi said: This is the Mishnah of R. Akiva, but an earlier Mishnah (reckons as invalidated kin) his uncle and his uncle's son. [The halachah is not in accordance with the earlier Mishnah.] And (also pasul are) all who are fit to inherit him [This is the conclusion of the Mishnah of R. Akiva and not of the earlier Mishnah. ("all who are fit to inherit him:") i.e., the father's kin. But the mother's kin, such as "his mother's brother" above, are kasher (to testify) for him. For his mother's brother is not fit to inherit him. He, however, is fit to inherit his mother's brother, for which reason he is pasul to testify for him.] and all who are kin to him at that time (the time of the testimony). If he were (once) kin [e.g., his son-in-law, who is fit to inherit him by reason of his (the son-in-law's) wife], and he became removed, [his wife having died before he witnessed this (matter of potential) testimony], he is kasher. R. Yehudah says: Even if his daughter died, but he had children from her, he is (considered) kin. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Akiva.]
  	The lover and the hater (are invalidated). Lover — his groomsman. [He is pasul for him all the days of the wedding.] Hater — whoever does not speak with him for three days out of hatred. They said to him: Israel is not suspect of this [to testify falsely out of hatred or love. And this is the halachah. It is only in respect to testifying that the rabbis differ. But in respect to judging they agree that he is pasul. For if he loves him, he will not find anything in his disfavor; and if he hates him, he will not try to find anything in his favor.]
  	How are the witnesses examined (to ascertain that they are telling the truth)? They would bring them in and intimidate them. [They would apprise them that the hirers of false witnesses themselves scorn them and call them wicked, viz., in respect to Navoth (I Kings 21:10): "And seat two worthless people opposite him, and let them testify (falsely)," the king's counselors themselves, who counseled hiring them, calling them "worthless."] And they would take everyone out and leave the senior (witness) there, and they would say to him: "How do you know that this one owed that one?" If he said: "He (the borrower) told me that he owes him," "That man told me that he owes him," he has said nothing. [for people are wont to say that they owe in order not to be thought rich.] (He is not accepted as a witness) until he says: "Before us he admitted to him that he owes him two hundred zuz." [i.e., Both of them were before us and his intent was to acknowledge the debt and have them witness the acknowledgement.] Then the second one is brought in and he is examined. If their stories jibe, they (beth-din) deliberate. If two say "Not liable," and one says "Liable," he (the borrower) is not liable. If two say "Liable," and one "Not liable," he is liable. If one says "Not liable," and one says "Liable" — and even if two say "Not liable" or two say "Liable," and one says "I do not know" — they add judges. [And even though if he had differed with the others, he, being in the minority, would be overruled, when he says "I do not know," it is as if he had not sat in judgment, so it is as if the judgment were with two, and we require three.]
  	When they (beth-din) finished the matter, they would bring them [the litigants] in. [For after hearing their claims, they would take them out so that they (beth-din) could deliberate and the litigants not hear who ruled liable and who not liable.] The senior judge would say: "So and so, you are not liable; so and so, you are liable." And whence is it derived that when one of the judges goes out, he should not say: "I found you not liable, but my colleagues found you liable. What can I do? They are the majority." From (Leviticus 19:16): "Do not go as a tale-bearer among your people," and (Proverbs 11:13): "He who reveals a secret is a tale-bearer."
  	Whenever he brings proof (in his favor), he can overturn the verdict. If they said to him: "Whatever proofs you have, bring them within thirty days" — If he found (proof) within thirty days, he overturns it; if not, not. R. Shimon b. Gamliel asked: "What is one to do if he did not find it within thirty days but did find it afterwards!" If they (beth-din) said to him: "Bring witnesses," and he said: "I have no witnesses"; if they said: "Bring proof" [a writ of credit], and he said: "I have no proof," and afterwards he brought proof or found witnesses, it is of no account. [For he said "I do not have," and we suspect him of forgery or of having hired false witnesses.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel said: "What is one to do if he did not know that he had witnesses and he found witnesses, or if he did not know that he had proof and he found proof!" [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.] If they said to him: "Bring witnesses," and he said: "I have no witnesses"; "Bring proof," and he said: "I have no proof," and then, seeing that he would lose the case, said: "You and you come here and testify for me," or he produced proof from his afundah [(his belt; others say: a garment worn close to the skin)], it is of no account. [In this, even R. Shimon b. Gamliel concurs. For since he knew of them and denied it, he is certainly a liar. But if one says: I have witnesses or proof across the seas, he is not heeded to delay judgment until he sends abroad; but the ruling is given according to the evidence available at that time, and when he brings witnesses or proof, the ruling is overturned and the case is heard again as per the witnesses or proof that he brought.]
  
  
  
  	Both monetary litigations and capital cases require thorough cross-examination (of the witnesses), it being written (Leviticus 24:22): "One judgment shall there be for you." [And, in respect to capital cases it is written (Deuteronomy 13:15): "And you shall inquire and you shall search out." This is the law of the Torah. But the sages prescribed that the cross-examination not be drawn out in monetary litigations so that the door not be closed to loans (unless beth-din sense deceit). "Cross-examination" (drishah uchakirah) is on the issue itself, e.g., How much was lent? When was it lent? How was it lent? Where was it lent? And there is another line of questioning called "examination" (bedikah) not on the issue itself, e.g., What was he wearing? Were his clothes black or white? Was he standing or sitting when he lent him?] What is the difference between monetary litigations and capital cases. Monetary litigations (are judged) by three; capital cases, by twenty-three. [Deliberations in] monetary cases are opened either for non-liability or for liability. Capital cases are opened for acquittal and not for indictment. Monetary judgments are decided by (a majority of) one, both for non-liability or for liability. Capital cases are decided by one for acquittal, and by two, for liability. [Rulings found to be mistaken in] monetary cases are overturned both for non-liability and for liability. Capital cases are overturned for acquittal, but not for indictment. (In) monetary litigations all can register a plea for non-liability or for liability. (In) capital cases, all can register a plea for acquittal, but not for indictment. [If one of the disciples says: "I have something to say for indictment," he is not heeded.] (In) monetary litigations the one (i.e., the judge) who argues for liability can (retract and) argue for non-liability, and the one who argues for non-liability can argue for liability. (In) capital cases, the one who argues for indictment can argue for acquittal, but the one who argues for acquittal cannot retract and argue for indictment. Monetary litigations are adjudicated in the daytime and concluded (even) at night. [viz. (Exodus 18:22): "And they shall judge the people at every time," and (Deuteronomy 21:16): "And it shall be on the day he causes his sons to inherit!" How so? The day for the beginning of the judgment; the night for its conclusion.] Capital cases are adjudicated in the daytime and concluded in the daytime, [it being written (Numbers 25:4): "And hang them up for the L rd against the sun."] Monetary cases are concluded on the day (of their adjudication) both for non-liability and for liability. Capital cases are concluded on the day (of their adjudication) for acquittal, and on the day afterwards for indictment, [viz. (Isaiah 1:21): "She (Jerusalem) that was full of justice, where righteousness would lie over (i.e., where the judges would wait until the next day, hoping to find the defendant righteous) — now (they are) murderers!" (i.e., they indict on the day of adjudication.)] Therefore, they (capital cases) are not adjudicated on the eve of a Sabbath or of a festival. [ For its conclusion would then be on the Sabbath. And it (the conclusion) cannot be left until after the Sabbath because of "affliction (i.e., delay) of judgment." And to judge (i.e., to execute) him on the Sabbath is also not possible, for the four judicial death penalties do not override the Sabbath, it being written (Exodus 35:3): "You shall not light a fire in all of your dwellings on the day of the Sabbath" — to teach that those liable to burning are not burned on the Sabbath. The same applies to the other judicial death penalties.]
  	Cases of (ritual) uncleanliness and cleanliness begin from the senior (judge). Capital cases begin from the side [i.e., from those lesser in wisdom, who sat at the side, it being written (Exodus 23:2): "Do not answer upon riv (written "rav") to deviate." That is, do not answer after the elect one in beth-din, to deviate from his words. For this reason, his words are heard only at the end.] All are kasher to adjudicate monetary litigations, [even a proselyte, if his mother were a Jewess. And a mamzer, too, is kasher to adjudicate monetary litigations.] But not all are kasher to adjudicate capital cases, but only Cohanim, Levites, and Israelites who can marry into the priesthood, [it being written (Exodus 18:22): "And let them lighten your burden and bear with you (Moses)" — they must be like you. Just as Moses our teacher was "pedigreed," so beth-din must be pedigreed.]
  	Sanhedrin sat in a semi-circle, so that they could see each other, [it being written (Songs of Songs 7:3): "Your navel is like the basin of the moon (sahar)": "Your navel is like the basin (agan)" — this is Sanhedrin, which sits in the center of the world (the Temple site) and defends (maginah - similar to "agan") the entire world. And it is like the moon in that it sits in a circle like a half moon. (The Targum of moon is "sihara.") And they do not sit in a full circle because the litigants and the witnesses must come in and speak before all of them.] And two court scribes stood before them, one on the right; the other on the left, and they wrote down the words of the acquitters and the words of the indicters. R. Yehudah says: (There were) three. One wrote the words of the acquitters; another, the words of the indicters; and a third, the words of the acquitters and the words of the indicters, [so that there be two witnesses for the acquitters and two for the indicters. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	And three rows of Torah scholars sat before them. [There were twenty-three in each row, lest the judges be split, the majority (i.e., a majority of one) indicting, and a minority acquitting, and "inclination for ill" is not with one, viz. (Exodus 23:2): "Do not be after many for ill," so that two must be added, until seventy-one, that number never being exceeded. Therefore, forty-eight (Torah scholars) must be added for the complement of seventy-one. And because it is not respectful to make a row of Torah scholars more numerous than the judges, three rows are made.] And each of them knew his place. [For they were seated in order of their wisdom, so that each one had to know his place.] If they had to ordain (one as a judge) [as when one of the judges died], they would do so from the first (row). One from the second (row) would come to the first, and one from the third would come to the second. And they would pick another one from the congregation and seat him in the third (row). He would not sit in the place of the first, but in the place fit for him, [at the end of the third row. For the least of the scholars in the rows was greater than the greatest of the congregation.]
  	How are the witnesses intimidated [not to testify falsely] in capital cases? They would bring them in and intimidate them, viz.: Can it be that you are testifying (illegally) by conjecture or through hearsay, "witness from witness" (and not from direct observation), or (even) from a reliable person? Can it be that you do not know that we are going to cross-examine you thoroughly? Know that capital cases are not like monetary litigations. In monetary litigations, [where one testifies falsely to make another financially liable], he makes financial restitution and he is forgiven; but in capital cases, his (victim's) blood and the blood of his (unborn) descendants are on his head until the end of time. For thus do we find with Cain, who killed his brother, viz. (Genesis 4:10): "The voice of your brother's bloods cries out to Me": It is not written "your brother's blood," but "your brother's bloods" — his blood and the blood of his children. (Another interpretation: "your brother's bloods" — his blood was bespattered on trees and stones). It is for this reason that man was created singly [to show that the entire world proceeded from one man] — in order to teach that if one causes a single Jewish soul to go lost, Scripture accounts it to him as if had caused an entire world to go lost; and if one sustains a single Jewish soul, Scripture accounts it to him as if he had sustained an entire world. And (man was created singly) for the fostering of peace, that one not say to his neighbor: "My father (i.e., my original ancestor) was greater than yours," and that the heretics not say: "There are many deities in heaven," [each creating man in its own image], and to declare the greatness of the Holy One Blessed be He; for man mints many coins from one die, and they are all the same, but the King of kings, the Holy One Blessed be He, mints every man from the die of the first man, and none of them is the same as his neighbor — for which reason every man must say: "For my sake was the world created!" And lest you (the witnesses) say: "What need have we of this trouble!" [to enter into this worry (by testifying) even truthfully] — Is it not already written (Leviticus 5:1): "And he is a witness, or saw, or knew — if he does not tell, then he shall bear his sin!" [so that you must testify to what you have seen.] And lest you say: "Why have this one's (the defendant's) blood on our head?" [i.e., It is better to stand in (violation of) "if he does not tell"] — it is already written (Proverbs 11:10): "In the destruction of the wicked is joy," [so that if he is wicked, there is no sin (in testifying against him) at all.]
  
  
  
  	They would examine them with seven inquiries. [After they intimidated them, they examined them with seven inquiries corresponding to seven expressions in Scripture relating to those liable to judicial death penalty, viz. (Deuteronomy 13:15): "And you shall inquire, and you shall search out, and you shall ask well" (three inquiries). "And you shall ask" (by itself, without "well") is not counted. And elsewhere it is written (Ibid. 17:4): "And it be told to you, and you hear, and you search it out well" (another two, making five). And elsewhere (Ibid. 19:18): "And the judges shall search out well" (another two, making seven)]: Which seven year period [of the Jubilee]? Which year [of that seven year period]? Which month? On which date of the month? Which day [of the week]? Which hour [of the day?] In which place? [For all of these seven inquiries can lead to hazamah (having them declared "scheming witnesses"), and it may be that there are no witnesses who can do so for (the period of) the entire day, but who may be able to do so for that hour.] R. Yossi says: [Only three inquiries are needed:] Which day? Which hour" In which place? [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yossi. But even if the witnesses said: "They killed yesterday," they are examined with seven inquiries in order to "unnerve" them into admission if their testimony is unfounded.] (In murder cases they are asked:) Do you recognize him [the victim? Perhaps he is a gentile. This is not one of the inquiries towards hazamah, but one of the general questions intended to catch the witnesses in a mutual contradiction, in which instance he (the accused) and they (the witnesses) are exempt (form punishment)]. (If they testify) that one served idolatry, (they are asked:) Which (idolatry) did he serve? [e.g., Pe'or or Mercurius], and: How did he serve it? [e.g., by sacrificing or by bowing].
  	Whoever multiplies examinations (of the witnesses) is to be praised. Once, Ben Zakkai examined (someone) on the peduncles of figs. [("Ben Zakkai":) R. Yochanan ben Zakkai. He was a disciple judging before his master at that time, for which reason he was called "Ben Zakkai." ("on the peduncles of fruits":) They (the witnesses) testified that he was killed under a fig tree, and Ben Zakkai "examined": "Were the peduncles of the figs thin or thick?"] What is the difference between "inquiries" (chakiroth) and "examinations" (bedikoth)? With chakiroth, if one (of the witnesses) says: "I do not know," their testimony is invalidated. [For they are no longer subject to hazamah through that chakirah. And so long as it is impossible to satisfy hazamah with one of the witnesses, the entire testimony is invalidated, even if there are a hundred witnesses; for the witnesses cannot be rendered zomemin until all of them are so rendered.] With bedikoth, if one says: "I do not know," and even if two of them say: "We do not know," the testimony stands. [Even if all say: "We do not know," the mitzvah of hazamah obtains. For hazamah is contingent only upon chakirah, (leaving the witnesses open) to the claim: "You were with us at that time in a different place."] Both with chakiroth and with bedikoth, if they (the witnesses) contradict each other, their testimony is invalidated. [In all instances of "their testimony is invalidated" in the Gemara, he (the one testified against) and they (the witnesses) are exempt (from liability)].
  	If one (witness) says: (The event took place) "on the second day of the month," and the other says: "on the third day of the month," their testimony stands. For (we presume that) this one [the one who said "on the second day"] knows of the intercalation of the month [i.e., He knows that the month that passed was full and that the first day of the new) month, the thirtieth day, appertained to the month that passed. This, only until half of the month (has passed). But from half of the month on, their testimony is invalidated. For it is presumed that by the time half a month has passed, everyone knows when beth-din sanctified the New Moon.], and (we presume that) the other (the one who said "on the third day") does not know of the intercalation of the month. If one says: "on the third," and the other says: "on the fifth," their testimony is invalidated. If one says: "in the second hour," and the other says: "in the third," their testimony stands. If one says: "in the third," and the other says: "in the fifth," their testimony is invalidated. R. Yehudah says: It stands, [for one might err by this amount.] If one says: "in the fifth," and the other says: "in the seventh," their testimony is invalidated. For in the fifth, the sun is in the east, and in the seventh, the sun is in the west. [From the place of the rising of the sun until the middle of the sky is called "the east," and from the middle of the sky until the place of the setting of the sun is called "the west."]
  	And then the second one is brought in and he is examined. If their words coincide, [so that they must now deliberate on the matter] they (beth-din) open with "merit." ["If you did not transgress, do not fear."] If one of the witnesses says: "I have something to say in his favor," or one of the disciples: "I have something to say against him," he is silenced. [("I have something to say in his favor":) even in his favor, and, it goes without saying that he is silenced if he (a witness) says: "I have something to say against him," viz. (Numbers 35:30): "And one witness shall not testify" — both for acquittal or for conviction. ("one of the disciples":) sitting before the judges. (If he says:) "I have something to say against him," he is silenced, it being written (Ibid.): "One shall not testify in a man to kill him" — "to kill him he does not testify," but he does testify in his favor.] If one of the disciples said: "I have something to say in his favor, he is brought up (to the judges) and placed among them, and he does not descend thence the entire day, [even if there is no substance to his words; but if there is substance to his words, he never descends thence.] If there is substance to his words, he is heeded. And even if he [the accused] says: "I have something to say in my favor," he is heeded, so long as there be substance to his words.
  	If they found in his favor, they acquitted him. And if not, they moved his judgment to the next day [so as not to judge at night]. They would pair off and minimize eating, and they would not drink wine all the day, and they would deliberate all the night. The next day, they would arise early and come to beth-din. The acquitter says: "I acquitted (yesterday), and my acquittal stands." The indicter says: "I indicted (yesterday), and my indictment stands." The indicter may (change his mind and) acquit; but the acquitter may not retract and indict. If they (the judges) erred in something, the two judicial scribes remind them (of what they said the preceding day). If they find in his favor, they acquit him. If not, they stand for a count. If twelve acquit and twelve indict, he is acquitted. If twelve indict and eleven acquit, ["inclining for ill" not obtaining with one, they add judges]; and even if eleven acquit and eleven indict, and one says: "I do not know"; and even if twenty-two acquit or indict, and one says: "I do not know," they add judges. [For the one who says "I do not know" is accounted as not being there, and capital cases, whether for acquittal or for indictment, are not adjudicated with fewer than twenty-three.] Until what number are additional twos added [if the two (most recently) added "split," one here (for acquittal); the other there (for indictment), so that there is still no inclining, neither for good by one, nor for evil by two]? Until seventy-one. If thirty-six acquit and thirty-five indict, he is acquitted. If thirty-six indict and thirty-five acquit, they debate the matter until one of the indicters accepts the words of the acquitters [so that there is inclining for good by one. The same applies if one of the acquitters accepts the words of the indicters. For the ruling is that at the time of the conclusion of the judgment even one who held for acquittal may reverse himself for indictment. As to its not being taught "until one of the acquitters accepts the words of the indicters," the tanna "pursues acquittal."]
  
  
  
  	When the verdict was reached, he was taken out to be stoned. The stoning site was outside of beth-din [far from beth-din, so that when they were conducting him there something might be found in his defense and he be exonerated], viz. (Leviticus 24:14): "Take the curser outside, etc." One man would stand at the entrance of beth-din with the scarves in his hand [to wave as a sign to return him], and another would ride on a horse (as) far from him as he could (still) see him. If someone says: "I have something to say in his defense," the first waves the scarves and the rider runs and stops (the execution). And even if he says: "I have something to say in my defense," he is returned, even four or five times, so long as there is substance in what he says. [And if there is no substance in what he says, he is returned only the first and second times, on the possibility that his fright had "stopped up" his defense and that he might regain his self-possession and formulate his claims. But he is not returned more than this. And he is provided with two Torah scholars to determine whether there is substance in his words, in which instance he is returned four or five times.] If they found something in his favor, he was acquitted. If not, he is taken out to be stoned. And a crier goes out before him, (proclaiming): "This man is taken out to be stoned because he committed this and this transgression, and so and so are his witnesses" [that he committed this and this transgression at this and this time at this and this place — this, to render them subject to hazamah.]
  	At a distance of ten cubits from the stoning site he is told: "Confess." [For when he is close to it, he might panic and not be able to confess.] For all who are to be put to death confess. For all who confess have a share in the world to come, viz., Achan, who was told by Joshua (Joshua 7:19): "My son, confer, now, glory upon the L rd, the G d of Israel, and make confession to Him [(And even though one is not executed by his own confession, the execution of Achan was dictated by the circumstances.)] …And Achan answered Joshua and said: 'In truth, I have sinned to the L rd, the G d of Israel and as thus and as thus have I done.'" [The Gemara explains that he misappropriated the spoils in the time of Moses.] And whence do we derive that his confession atoned for him? From (Ibid. 25): "And Joshua said: 'How you have sullied us! May the L rd sully you on this day!'" — you are sullied on this day, but not for the world to come. And if he does not know how to confess, he is told: "Say: 'Let my death be an atonement for all of my sins.'" R. Yehudah says: If he knows that he was falsely testified against, he says: "Let my death be an atonement for all of my transgressions except this one." This was countered: If so, all men (sentenced to death) will say this in order to acquit themselves [in the eyes of their fellows and thus come to discredit the judges and the witnesses. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	At a distance of four cubits from the stoning site, they remove his clothing, [it being written (Leviticus 24:23): "And they stoned him" — without his garment.] A man is covered in front [i.e., a small section in front (his genitals)], and a woman (is covered) in front and in back. These are the words of R. Yehudah. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.] And the sages say: A man is stoned naked (except for that one region), but a woman is not stoned naked, (i.e., she must be fully clothed)].
  	The stoning site [from which he was thrown to the ground] was two (men's) heights. If he turned over on his heart, (facing the ground), he is turned over on his back, [for lying prone is more demeaning.] If he dies from it (i.e., from the fall), the requirement (of stoning) is satisfied; and if not, the second (witness) takes the stone and casts it at his heart. If he dies from that, the requirement is satisfied. If not, he is stoned by all of Israel, viz. (Deuteronomy 17:7): "The hand of the witnesses shall be against him first to kill him, and the hand of all the people afterwards." All of those who are stoned are (afterwards) hung up. These are the words of R. Eliezer. And the sages say: Only the blasphemer [of the L rd] and the idolator are hung up, [the idolator also being a blasphemer, viz. (Numbers 15:30): "And the soul who acts with a high hand … it is the L rd whom he blasphemes." And that section speaks of idolatry.] A man is hung up facing the people, and a woman facing the wood. These are the words of R. Eliezer. The sages say: A man is hung up and a woman is not hung up. R. Eliezer countered: "Did not Shimon b. Shetach hang up women in Ashkelon?" They answered: He hung up eighty women, and two are not judged [in one beth-din] in one day. [For it is not possible to seek a defense for each of them (in one day). So that the hanging up of those women must have been dictated by the circumstances, and cannot serve as a precedent. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Eliezer.] How is he hung up (after he is executed)? A pole is sunk in the ground with a beam projecting from it, and his two hands are joined (and bound) together, and he is hung up [by his hands]. R. Yossi says: The beam is placed against the wall, and he is suspended upon it, as butchers do (with slaughtered animals). [It was not rooted in the ground, but one of its ends was on the ground, and the other inclined against the wall. The rationale of R. Yossi: The wood on which he was suspended was buried with him, and the Torah states (Deuteronomy 21:23): "But bury shall you bury him" — he who lacks only burying; to exclude that which lacks digging up, uprooting, and burying. And the (rationale of the) rabbis: Digging up is of no import. The Torah excluded only its being rooted from the beginning. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] And he is let down immediately. And if he is allowed to remain there overnight, he (the one who allows it) transgresses a negative commandment, viz. (Deuteronomy 21:23): "You shall not leave his body overnight on a tree, but bury shall you bury it on that day; for killelath G d is suspended, etc." That is, why is this one suspended? Because he "blessed" (a euphemism for "cursed" - killel) the L rd, so that the name of Heaven is desecrated (by leaving him — a reminder of the curse — hanging there.)
  	R. Meir says: When a man suffers [punishment because of his transgression], what does it (the Shechinah) say, (as it were) [i.e., How does it utter plaint and grievance over him?] "Kalani meroshi" ["My head is heavy upon me"], Kalani mizro'i" ["My arm is heavy upon me" (as one who is fatigued;) "kalani" = "I am not 'light'"] If the L rd is thus aggrieved over the blood of the wicked that is spilled, how much more so over the blood of the righteous! And not only this [i.e., not only one who leaves an executed man hanging overnight transgresses], but whoever leaves his dead one (unburied) overnight transgresses a negative commandment. If he left him overnight for his honor, to bring a casket or shrouds for him, he does not transgress. And they would not bury him (one executed by beth-din) in the crypts of his forefathers, [for an evildoer is not buried next to a righteous man], but there were two burial grounds allotted to beth-din, one for those killed by the sword or by strangulation, and the other, for those killed by stoning or burning. [For one who was liable to a very severe death is not buried next to one who was liable to a lesser one. It is a received law: two, and not four.]
  	When the flesh decays [and he has already received atonement through his death and debasement], the bones are gathered and buried in their place [in the ancestral crypts], and the kin (of the deceased) come and solicit the well-being of the judges and of the witnesses, viz.: "We have nothing in our hearts against you, for you judged a righteous judgment." And they would not mourn them (publicly), [so that their debasement be an atonement for them. Others say: Because mourning (aveiluth) obtains when the grave is closed with the top-stone, and at that time they are not mourned, for their atonement is not complete until the flesh is decayed; and since mourning was pushed off, it remains so.] But they would lament them, for "lamentation" (aninuth) is in the heart alone.
  
  
  
  	Four death penalties were relegated to beth-din: stoning, burning, decapitation, and strangulation. [Stoning is more severe than burning, and both, than decapitation; and the three of them (are more severe) than strangulation. This is of significance where one is liable to two death penalties, the ruling being that he incurs the more severe.] R. Shimon says: Burning, stoning, strangulation, and decapitation. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon.] This [(the foregoing)] is execution by stoning.
  	Execution by burning: They would steep him in refuse until his thighs [so that he not turn back and forth and the brand fall on his flesh.] They would place a hard cloth into a soft one and tie it around his throat, [the hard one to choke him; the soft one, to shield.] One would pull on one end; another, on the other, until he opened his mouth. Then he (another) would take the [leaden] brand and drop it into his mouth. It would descend to his innards and burn out (chomereth) his intestines, [as in (Eichah 2:11): "My intestines have been burned out" (chamarmaru). This is derived from the death of the sons of Aaron, viz. (Leviticus 10:6): "And let your brothers, the entire house of Israel, bewail the burning which the L rd has burned," where their bodies were not burned, viz. (Ibid. 5): "And they drew near and they carried them in their tunics." Here, too, the mitzvah of burning is satisfied even though their innards alone are burned. And this (form of burning) is preferred, it being written (Leviticus 19:18): "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself" — Choose a humane death for him.] R. Yehudah says: But if he died by their hands [i.e., by strangulation, before the dropping of the brand], they would not have performed the mitzvah of burning! Rather, [they do not choke him, but] they force his mouth open with tongs, kindle a brand, and throw it into his mouth. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.] R. Elazar b. R. Tzaddok said: But once the daughter of a priest committed adultery and they encircled her with twigs and burned her alive! They answered: That beth-din was not versed in the law. [They were Sadducees, who do not expound identities (gezeirah shavah), but who interpret the verse literally.]
  	Execution by decapitation: They would cut off his head with a sword, in the manner of (execution by) the monarchy. R. Yehudah says: This is degrading. [For he is killed standing and he falls.] Rather, his head is placed on a block and it is chopped off with a hatchet. [The baraitha explains that R. Yehudah disagrees with the rabbis by reason of (Leviticus 18:3): "And in their statutes you shall not walk." And the rabbis counter: Since death by the sword is alluded to in the Torah, viz. (Exodus 21:20): "Vengeance shall be taken," they (their statutes) are not our source. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] Execution by strangulation: They would steep him in refuse until his thighs, place a hard cloth in a soft one, and tie it around his throat; and one pulled from one end, and another from the other, until he died.]
  	These are the ones executed by stoning: [Stoning is explicitly stated in respect to some; and where it is not stated, it is written "His blood is in him," "Their blood is in them," which alludes to stoning. The halachah is derived from what is stated in respect to necromancers and soothsayers (Leviticus 20:27): "With stones shall they stone them; their blood is in them."] a man who lives with his mother, with his father's wife, with his daughter-in-law, with a male, and with a beast; a woman who brings a beast upon herself, a blasphemer, an idolator, one who gives of his seed to the Molech [This tanna holds that Molech is not idolatry, but a gentile practice, the two (idolatry and Molech) being separately adduced], Ba'al Ov and yidoni (see 7:7), one who desecrates the Sabbath, one who curses his father and his mother [This is more severe than striking them, two (sins) obtaining: shaming one's father and mother and uttering the L rd's name in vain, it being ruled that he is not liable until he curses them with the Name], one who lives with a betrothed maiden, one who turns [an individual] astray (to idolatry), one who turns [a city] astray, a witch, [viz. (Exodus 22:17): "A witch you shall not allow to live," followed by (Ibid. 18): "Anyone who lies with  beast shall be put to death." Just as there, stoning is indicated, here, too, stoning (is understood)], and a rebellious son (ben sorer umoreh). One who lives with his mother is liable on the count of his mother and on the count of his father's wife. [He is liable for two sin-offerings — kareth (cutting-off) and discreteness of sin-offering (even in one body) being stated in respect to all of the arayoth (illicit relations)]. R. Yehudah says: He is liable only on the count of his mother alone. One who lives with his father's wife is liable on the count of his father's wife and on the count of another man's wife, whether in his father's lifetime or after his death, whether she were betrothed or married. [("whether she were betrothed":) For once he betroths her, she is regarded as his wife, viz. "If a man takes a wife." From the time of "taking," she is called his wife. This "taking" is betrothal, as is derived by identity, "taking" - "taking," from the field of Efron (Genesis 23:13)]. One who lives with his daughter-in-law is liable on the count of his daughter-in-law and on the count of another man's wife, whether in his son's lifetime or after his death, whether she were betrothed or married. A man who lives with a male or with a beast, and a woman who brings a beast upon her: If the man sinned, how has the beast sinned? But because a man was "undone" by it, Scripture commands that it be stoned. Another interpretation: So that the beast not walk through the marketplace and people say: "This is the one for which that man was stoned."
  	One who blasphemes is not liable until he mentions the Name [and "blesses" the Name by the Name (i.e., "May X curse X"), it being written (Leviticus 24:16): "And he who blasphemes the Name … if he blasphemes the Name" — blaspheming the Name by the Name.] R. Yehoshua b. Karchah said: The entire day [of deliberation] they would examine the witnesses (to blaspheming) with an epithet (kinui) [A "substitute object" of a curse is called "kinui" by the sages; and, in Scripture (Job 32:22): "Ki loyadati achaneh" ("For I know now how to mince words.")] — "May Yossi smite Yossi." [I have heard that the Tetragrammaton is alluded to by "Yossi" for it (Yossi) has four letters, the gematria of which (86) is "Elokim."] When the judgment was concluded [and beth-din came to pronounce him liableb], they could not execute him [on the basis of the testimony that they heard, for they had heard from their mouths only a curse] by epithet.] But everyone is sent out, [it being demeaning to utter a "blessing of the Name" in public], and they ask the senior witness (what he heard) and say to him: "Repeat what you heard explicitly," and he does so. And the judges stand upon their feet, and they rend (their garments) and do not resew them [in a "finished" manner, with Alexandrine stitching, where the rent is not noticeable; but other stitching is permitted.], and the second witness says: "I, too, heard as he did." [and he need not repeat it explicitly], and the third says: "I, too, heard as he did." [This is in accordance with the view that just as two (witnesses) constitute one testimony, so do three.]
  	One who serves idolatry (is executed by stoning), whether he serves it [in its usual manner] or by slaughtering to it, smoking incense to it, or pouring libations to it, bowing down to it [(Though one of these four is not its usual mode of worship, he is nonetheless liable (to stoning). And with all other modes, he is not liable unless it be the usual one.)], taking it upon oneself as a god, [even by speech alone, this being likened to slaughtering, viz. (Exodus 32:8): "And they slaughtered to it and said: 'This is your god, etc.'"], and saying to it: "You are my god" [before it. This "sheds light" on what precedes. For if we learned the former alone, we would think that one were liable (for worship) only before it, but not otherwise. We, therefore, learn the latter — "before it" — implying that the former (speaks of worship) not before it, in spite of which he is liable.] But if one embraces it, kisses it, sweeps before it, sprinkles before it, washes it, anoints it, clothes it, or shods it, he transgresses a negative commandment, [there being a superfluous "and you shall not serve them" (to this end.)] If one vows in its name [e.g., "I forbid to myself all the fruits in the world in the name of that idolatry"], or if one swears in its name, he transgresses a negative commandment, [viz. (Exodus 23:13): "And the names of other gods you shall not mention." If one defecates before Ba'al Peor, this is its conventional mode of worship, [so that even if his intent were to shame it, he is liable for a sin-offering.] If one casts a stone at Markulis, this is its conventional mode of worship. [And one who removes a stone from before it is also liable, it being served in this fashion, too. ("Markolis" = "reverse of praise." "mar" = exchange, as in "bamar dishchuta," "bamar dikanta." "kolis" = praise.) And even if his intent were to stone it, he is liable for a sin-offering.]
  	One who gives of his seed to Molech is not liable until he gives him to [the priests of] Molech and passes him through fire [from one side to the other.] If he gave him to Molech but did not pass him through fire, or passed him through fire but did not give him to Molech, he is not liable — until he gives him to Molech and passes him through fire, [it being written in one place (Leviticus 18:21): "…you shall not give to pass," and, in another (Deuteronomy 18:10): "There shall not be found among you one who passes his son or his daughter through fire" — Just as there, through fire; here, too, through fire.] Ba'al Ov, a conjurer [He takes the skull of a dead person after the flesh has decayed, smokes incense to it, asks the future of it, and it answers.], one who speaks from his armpits [(And there are some who project the answers of the dead through their armpits)], and yidoni, one who speaks through his mouth — these are liable to stoning. [("yidoni":) an animal called "yidoa," whose face, arms, and legs are like those of a man. It is tied by a cord from its navel to a root in the ground, which gives it life. In hunting it, they shoot arrows at the cord until it is severed and it dies immediately. In the language of the sages it is called "the man of the mountain."] And one who inquires of them [to inform him of the future (as in the instance of Saul)] is in violation of an exhortation, [viz. (Leviticus 19:31): "Do not turn to the ovoth, etc."]
  	One who desecrates the Sabbath through an act where witting transgression is subject to kareth, and unwitting transgression to a sin-offering (is liable to stoning). One who curses his father and mother is not liable (to stoning) unless he does so by the Name, [i.e., by one of the distinct names.] If he cursed them by an epithet ["Merciful," Gracious," "Long-suffering"], R. Meir says that he is liable; and the sages, that he is not liable.
  	If one lives with a betrothed maiden, he is not liable (to stoning) unless she be a maiden (na'arah) [and not a minor, less than twelve years and one day, and not a bogereth, older than twelve years six months and one day], a virgin, [and not one who had had intercourse. And if she had had non-normative (i.e., anal) intercourse, she is still considered a virgin, so that even if ten men had such intercourse with her, all are liable to stoning], betrothed [and not wedded], and in her father's house. [For if her father had given her over to the husband's messengers, one who lives with her thereafter is not liable to stoning but to strangulation.] If two men lived with her, the first is liable to stoning, and the second to strangulation.
  	Mesith (one who turns another astray (to idolatry): This is a hedyot (a plain person) who turns a hedyot astray. [Only a hedyot who turns one astray; for a prophet who does so is liable to death by strangulation. And not necessarily one who turns a hedyot astray. For we find no distinction between one who turns a hedyot astray and one who turns a prophet astray. The exclusion, rather, applies to a populace, as with those who turn a city of Israel astray, whose death is by strangulation.] (As when) one says to another: "There is a god in such and such place. Thus does it eat; thus does it drink. Thus does it confer favor (upon those who serve it). Thus does it punish (those who do not serve it)." "Snares" are not set for all of those liable to execution by Torah law except this. If he said ("Let us serve another god") to two men, and they are his witnesses, they bring him to beth-din and stone him. If he said it to one, he (the latter) says: "I have some friends who would like this." If he were clever and could not speak before them [i.e., if he told the one he would turn astray that he could not speak before them (because of his fear of beth-din)], witnesses are placed in concealment for him behind the fence, and he (the one he would turn astray) says to him: "Tell me what you told me in private" [i.e., "There is no one with us and you can now tell me what you told me before."], the other tells him, and he responds: "How can we forsake our G d in heaven and go and serve wood and stones?" If he desists, good; but if he says: "This is our duty, and it thus becomes us," those standing behind the fence bring him to beth-din and stone him. If he says [one of the following, he is a mesith (a "seducer" to idolatry) and liable (to stoning)]: "I shall serve," I shall go and serve," "Let us go and serve," "I shall slaughter," "I shall go and slaughter," "Let us go and slaughter," "I shall offer incense," "I shall go and offer incense," "Let us go and offer incense," "I shall pour a libation," "I shall go and pour a libation," "Let us go and pour a libation," "I shall bow down," "I shall go and bow down," Let us go and bow down." Madiach (one who turns [many] astray): This is one who says: "Let us go and serve idolatry" [i.e., he is not liable until he says it in the plural.]
  	A witch who performs [an actual] deed is liable [to stoning], but not one who "fools the eyes" [i.e., one who gives the impression that an act is being performed, when nothing is being done.] R. Akiva says in the name of R. Yehoshua: Two pick cucumbers [by witchcraft before us]. One picks and is not liable [to death (by stoning)], and the other picks and is liable. [How so?] The one who performs an act [i.e., the one who actually picks them through witchcraft] is liable. The one who "fools the eyes" [i.e., who gives the impression that they are being gathered in one place, when they are not moved at all] is not liable.
  
  
  
   	Ben sorer umoreh (a rebellious son): From when does one become "a rebellious son?" From the time he brings two hairs, [when he is thirteen years and one day old; for before this time, hairs are not a sign (of maturity), but only fuzz] until he is "circled" by a beard. The lower and not the upper [i.e., this "beard" spoken of by the rabbis is the lower, that circling the penis], but the sages speak euphemistically, viz. (Deuteronomy 21:18): "If there be to a man a son…" — a son, and not a daughter; a son, and not a man. A minor is not liable, not having entered the realm of mitzvoth. [When he is "circled" by the lower beard, he is a man. And even though he is called a "son" when he is a minor, we cannot hold him liable before he brings two hairs, a minor being exempt, not having entered the realm of mitzvoth. For this reason, his liability begins thereafter. The verse is understood thus: "If there be to a man a son" — a son close to the estate of man. But when he is circled by the lower beard he is already a man.]
  	From when is he liable? When he eats half a manah (a portion) of meat, [this, when the meat is half-cooked, as the robbers eat it] and drinks half a log of Italian wine, [choice wine, that he becomes habituated to and which he drinks half-diluted.] R. Yossi says: A manah of meat and a log of wine. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yossi.] (In the following instances he does not become a ben sorer umoreh): if he ate (meat and wine) in a mitzvah repast; if he ate at the intercalation of the month [Even though they serve only bread and pulse alone, and he brought meat and wine, since he is engaged in (the performance of) a mitzvah, he will not become habituated to it.]; if he ate second-tithe in Jerusalem [Since it is in keeping with the mitzvah, it being stated in that regard (Deuteronomy 14:26): "…of cattle, flocks, wine, and strong drink," he will not become habituated to it]; if he ate carrion and treifah, abominations and reptiles, [it being written (Deuteronomy 21:20): "…not heeding our voice," and not this one, who does not even heed the voice of the L rd]; if he ate tevel (untithed food), first-tithe whose terumah had not been taken, second-tithe and hekdesh (dedicated food) which had not been redeemed; if he ate something which is a mitzvah [of the rabbis, to include the mourners' consolation meal. (For I might assume that "mitzvah repast," above, referred to Cohanim eating dedicated food or the eating of the Paschal lamb)], and something which is a transgression [to include (eating on) a communal fast, forbidden by the rabbis]; if he ate any food (against his parents' wishes), but did not eat meat; if he drank any drink, but did not drink wine — he does not become a ben sorer umoreh, until he eats meat and drinks wine, it being written (Deuteronomy 21:20): "a glutton and a guzzler." And even though there is no proof for this, there is corroboration for it in (Proverbs 23:20): "Do not be among the guzzlers of wine and the gluttons of meat for themselves."
  	If he stole from his father and ate in his father's domain] Even though he can commonly steal something from his father, since he eats it in his father's domain, he is always in fear of being seen by his father and will not persist in his stealing.]; (if he stole) from others and ate in the domain of others [(It is not common for one always to be able to steal from others, and he will not become habituated to it.)], (if he stole) from others and ate in his father's domain — he does not become a ben sorer umoreh, until he steals from his father, [from whom he can commonly steal] and eats in the domain of others, [where he is not in fear of his father, so that he definitely becomes habituated to stealing.] R. Yossi b. R. Yehudah says: (He is not liable) until he steals from his father and from his mother, [from property that her husband has no rights in, as when another gave her property as a gift on condition that her husband has no rights in it. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yossi b. R. Yehudah.]
  	If his father wanted (to have him declared a ben sorer umoreh), and his mother did not; or if his father did not want it and his mother did — he does not become a ben sorer umoreh, until both want it. R. Yehudah says: If his mother were not similar to his father [in voice, appearance, and stature], he does not become a ben sorer umoreh, [it being written (Deuteronomy 21:20): "He does not heed our voice." Since it is not written "our voices," the implication is that they both have "one" voice. And since their voices must be similar, so must their appearance and stature be similar. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.] If one of them were gidem [(if his hand were cut off)], or lame, or mute, or blind, or deaf, he does not become a ben sorer umoreh, it being written (Ibid 19): "Then his father and mother shall seize him" — and not gidmin. (Ibid.): "And they shall take him out" — and not lame. (Ibid. 20): "And they shall say" — and not mute. (Ibid.): "This, our son" [The implication is that they show him] — and not blind. (Ibid.): "He does not heed our voice" — and not deaf. [If he said to them: "I do not accept what you say," they do not hear him. And even though they see afterwards that he does not do as they commanded, still, "He does not heed our voice" implies that they say he does not heed them when they speak, hearing him say that he does not accept what they say.] He is warned before three and given stripes. [This is the intent: He is warned before two not to persist (in his behavior). And if he does not heed them, he is given stripes before a beth-din of three, as taught above (1:2): "Stripes, by three." For "And they shall chastise him" in respect to ben sorer umoreh (Deuteronomy 21:18) refers to stripes, it being written here: "ben sorer umoreh," and, elsewhere (Ibid. 25:2): "And it shall be, if bin of stripes is the wicked one."] If he reverts to his evil ways, he is judged by twenty-three, and he is not stoned until the first three are present, it being written (Ibid.): "This, our son — this one, who received stripes in your presence. [And even though this is required for "'This,' and not blind" (see above), if the only teaching were for "received stripes in your presence," it could have been written: "He, our son." Why "This, our son"? To teach both.] If he fled before his judgment were concluded and then were "encircled with the lower beard," he is not liable. [For if he were to commit his trespass now, he would not be liable to stoning.] And if he fled after his judgment had been concluded and then were "encircled with the lower beard," he is liable. [He is like "a killed man," and he is liable even after many years.]
  	A ben sorer umoreh is judged by his end. [In the end he would exhaust his father's money, seek his accustomed fare and not find it, and go out to the crossroads and rob people. The Torah said:] Let him die innocent (of bloodshed), and let him not die guilty. For the death of the wicked is of benefit to them, [for they stop sinning] and of benefit to the world, [leaving it in tranquility]. (The death of) the righteous is evil to them, [for (if they lived longer) they would have added merit], and evil to the world, [for they protected and reproved their generation.] Wine and sleep for the wicked is of benefit to them and of benefit to the world. [For so long as they eat and sleep, they do not sin and they do not harm others.] (Wine and sleep) for the righteous is detrimental to them, [for they do not study Torah], and detrimental to the world. [For when they leave off (studying Torah), punishment comes to the world.] The "scattering" of the wicked [i.e., their being kept apart, so that they cannot counsel and abet each other] is of benefit to them and of benefit to the world. (The scattering) of the righteous is evil for them and evil for the world. The gathering of the wicked is evil for them and evil for the world. (The gathering) of the righteous is of benefit to them and of benefit to the world. The tranquility of the wicked is evil for them and evil for the world. (The tranquility) of the righteous is of benefit to them and of benefit to the world.
  	One (a thief) who is found breaking in, [about whom the Torah states that he may be killed (Exodus 22:1)] is judged by his end. [For in the end he would kill the owner if he resisted him to rescue his property]. If he broke in and broke a jug — If "he has blood" (i.e., if the owner may not kill the thief), he (the thief) is liable (to pay for the jug). [As with a father who breaks in to his son's house. It is known that the father will have compassion upon his son (and will not kill him), for which reason the son is not permitted to kill him, and if the father breaks a jug, he must pay for it.] If "he has no blood," he is not liable. [With all other men who break in, if the owner kills them, "he has no blood." Therefore, if he breaks a jug, he is not liable to pay for it. For since his life is forfeit, he does not pay, a man not being subject to both death and (monetary) payment.]
  	And these are the ones who are rescued [from a transgression] by their lives, [all men having the right to kill them to save them from the transgression]: one pursuing another to kill him, [it being written in respect to (the ravishing of) a betrothed maiden (Deuteronomy 22:26): "For as a man would rise up against his neighbor and slay him, so is this thing." Slayer is hereby being likened to betrothed maiden, viz.: Just as a betrothed maiden may be saved by killing the pursuer, so a slayer may be saved (from transgression) by killing him. And betrothed maiden is derived from a verse, viz. (Ibid. 27): "The betrothed maiden cried out and no one could save her," the implication being that if one could save her, he could resort to any means (even killing, if necessary,) to do so.], (one pursuing) a male (to sodomize him [This is derived from (Ibid. 26): "And to the maiden (na'arah) you shall not do a thing." It is written "na'ar" (young man), without the heh. The same applies to all who are liable to kareth and judicial death penalties in the area of arayoth (illicit relations) — that they are rescued (from transgression) by their lives, it being written (Ibid.): "a sin of death": "sin" — kareth liability; "death" — judicial death penalty.], and (one pursuing) a betrothed maiden. But one pursuing a beast, [though this is similar to arayoth], and one who would desecrate the Sabbath or serve idolatry [though both of these deny the Deity] are not saved (from transgression) by their lives. [And, it goes without saying that the other would-be transgressors who are liable to kareth and judicial death penalties not related to arayoth, are not saved by their lives. It is not permitted to kill them at all until they commit the transgression in the presence of witnesses and become liable to judicial death penalty.]
  
  
  
  	And these are the ones who are put to death by burning: one who lives with a woman and her daughter [i.e., with a woman whose daughter he has already married — his mother-in-law] and the daughter of a Cohein, who committed adultery. [She is also put to death by burning.] Included in "a woman and her daughter" [(i.e., burning is explicitly indicated for "a woman and her daughter," viz. (Leviticus 20:14): "and if a man takes a woman and her mother … in fire shall they be burned," and all the others are derived from this)] (are) his daughter [from his "ravished one," who is not the daughter of his wife, for whom he is liable by reason of "his wife's daughter"], the daughter of his daughter or the daughter of his son [from his ravished one], his wife's daughter, [whether she be his daughter or his stepdaughter], her daughter's daughter or her son's daughter, and his mother-in-law. [Even though this is taught explicitly above and is not derived from a derashah, since there are taught in this context "the mother of his mother-in-law" and "the mother of his father-in-law," which are derived from a derashah, "his mother-in-law" is taught in passing, along with them.] And these are the ones who are put to death by the sword: a murderer, and the men of an idolatrous city. A murderer: If one struck his neighbor with stone or iron, or pressed him down in water or fire, so that he could not rise [e.g., if he held his head underwater so that he could not raise it], and he died, he is liable. If he pressed him into water or fire, but he could have escaped, he is not liable. If he incited a dog or a snake against him, he is not liable. If he caused a snake to bite him, [i.e., if he held a snake in his hand and placed its teeth against another's body], R. Yehudah rules him liable [He holds that a snake's venom is in its teeth, so that when he places its teeth against one's body, it is as if he kills him, and he is liable], and the sages rule him not liable. [They hold that the snake brings up its venom of itself, so that it is not as if the man killed him directly but only indirectly, and he is not liable. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] If one struck his neighbor, whether with a stone or with his fist, and they predicted that he would die, [(but if they predicted that he would live, even the rabbis hold that he is not liable)], and his condition improved, [whereupon they predicted that he would live], and then it worsened and he died, he is liable. R. Nechemiah says that he is not liable, for there are indications [that he did not die because of this blow.]
  	If one's intent were to kill a beast and he killed a man; a gentile and he killed a Jew; a premature child (who would not survive) and he killed one who would have survived, he is not liable. If his intent were to strike him a non lethal blow on his hips, and it went to his heart, where it was lethal, and he died, he is not liable. [For both must be satisfied: that he intend to kill and that the blow be sufficient to kill.] If his intent were to strike him a lethal blow on his heart, where it would be lethal, and it went to his hips, where it was not sufficient to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If his intent were to strike an adult, but the blow would not suffice to do so, and it went to a child, where it would suffice, and he died, he is not liable. If his intent were to strike a child, and the blow would suffice to kill him, and it went to an adult, whom it would not suffice to kill, and he died, he is not liable. But if his intent were to strike one on his hips, where the blow would suffice to kill him, and it went to his heart and he died, he is liable. If his intent were to strike an adult, whom the blow would suffice to kill, and it went to a child, who died, he is liable. R. Shimon says: Even if his intent were to kill one and he killed another, he is not liable. [This does not refer to the latter statement of the first tanna, viz.: "If his intent were to strike an adult, whom the blow would suffice to kill, and it went to a child, who died, he is liable"; for if it did, it should simply have been stated: "R. Shimon says that he is not liable." And why repeat: "Even if his intent were to kill one and he killed another, etc."? The first tanna states this explicitly. Why the "Even"? R. Shimon, rather, refers to the first statement, viz.: "If one's intent were to kill a beast and he killed a man, he is not liable," the implication being that if it were his intent to kill a man and he killed another man, he is liable. It is in this regard that R. Shimon says: "Even if his intent were to kill one and he killed another, he is not liable." The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon.]
  	If a murderer were mixed in with others, all are not liable. [e.g., If two men were standing and an arrow went out from between them and killed someone, both are not liable. And even if one of them were known for saintliness, so that it is certain that he did not shoot the arrow, still, the other is not made liable on this presumption.] R. Yehudah says: They are incarcerated. [Our Mishnah is defective. It was taught thus: "And if an ox whose judgment (for killing a man) were pronounced became intermixed with other oxen, they are all stoned." For, perforce, it is forbidden to derive benefit from all of them — even if they were a thousand — because of the one intermixed with them. Therefore, they are all stoned, so that the mitzvah of stoning be satisfied with the one liable to it.] R. Yehudah says: They are incarcerated. It is not necessary to stone them, but they are all gathered into a room and they die of hunger. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.] All those liable to judicial death penalty who became intermixed with one another are given the lesser penalty. If men sentenced to be stoned became intermixed with others sentenced to be burned, R. Shimon says: They are stoned, for burning is more severe. The sages say: They are burned, for stoning is more severe. R. Shimon said to them: "If burning were not more severe, it would not be administered to a Cohein's daughter who committed adultery." They said to him: If stoning were not more severe, it would not be administered to a blasphemer and an idolator!" If men sentenced to decapitation became intermixed with others sentenced to strangulation, R. Shimon says (they are to be decapitated) with the sword, [strangulation being more severe.] The sages say: They are to be strangled, [decapitation begin more severe].
  	If one were liable to two judicial death penalties, he is given the more severe. [i.e., If one committed a lesser (capital) transgression, and the verdict were reached on that, and then he committed a more severe (capital) transgression, I might think that since the verdict had been reached for the lesser transgression, he is a "killed man"; we are, therefore apprised otherwise.] If he committed a transgression punishable by two judicial death penalties, [e.g., If he lived with his mother-in-law, another man's wife], he is given the more severe, [i.e., burning, by reason of mother-in-law, and not strangulation by reason of another man's wife.] R. Yossi says: He is judged according to the first relationship [that he must shun, and not according to the latter, even if it is more severe. For R. Yossi holds that one prohibition does not "take" upon another, even one that is more severe upon one that is less severe. So that if he wed the daughter of a widow, who was first his mother-in-law when she was single, and then she married, he is sentenced to burning (if he lives with her). And if she were married and then she became his mother-in-law, he is sentenced to strangulation, the penalty for living with a married woman, which she was first (before she became his mother-in-law). The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yossi.]
  	If one were given stripes and repeated, [i.e., if he were given stripes twice for a transgression punishable by kareth (for all who are liable to kareth are given stripes), when he commits the same transgression a third time,] beth-din place him into a cell, [containing the space of a man's stature and not more, and they feed him first scant bread and "water of distress" until his intestines shrink] and (then) they feed him barley, which swells his intestines until his stomach bursts. If one kills someone without witnesses, [i.e., in the absence of testimony that would make him liable to the death penalty — though it is known to beth-din that it is true, that he certainly killed; but the witnesses were refuted in cross-examination or sufficient warning was lacking], they place him in a cell and feed him scant bread and "water of distress" [first, and then they feed him barley until his stomach bursts. This is the same as the first part (of the Mishnah. What is lacking there is revealed here.]
  	If one steals the kisvah [one of the ministering vessels, as in (Numbers 4:7): "kesoth hanasech"], or curses [ the L rd] in the name of idolatry, or cohabits with an Aramite woman [an idolatress], zealots slay him. [Those who are zealous for the honor of the L rd would slay him. This, if the woman is the daughter of idolators, (if it be) in the midst of the act, and in the presence of ten Jews. In the absence of one of these conditions, it is forbidden to kill him. But his punishment is stated by the prophet (Malachi 2:12): "The L rd will cut off from the man that commits this, etc." And he is given stripes four times by ordinance of the scribes: by reason of (cohabiting with) a niddah, by reason of a bondswoman, by reason of an idolatress, and by reason of a harlot.] If a Cohein officiates in a state of uncleanliness, his fellow Cohanim do not bring him to beth-din but the pirchei kehunah (the young priests) [whose beards have begun to sprout (lifroach)] take him outside of the azarah (the Temple court) and split his skull with clubs. If a zar (a non-priest) officiates in the Temple, R. Akiva says: (His death is) by strangulation, [it being written here (Numbers 18:7): "And the stranger who draws near shall be put to death," and elsewhere (Deuteronomy 13:6): "And that prophet or that dreamer of dreams shall be put to death." Just as there, by strangulation, here, too, by strangulation.] And the sages say: (His death is) at the hands of Heaven, [it being written here: "He shall be put to death," and, elsewhere (Numbers 17:28): "Everyone who draws near the tabernacle of the L rd must die." Just as there, at the hands of Heaven, here, too, at the hands of Heaven. The halachah is in accordance with the sages. Death at the hands of Heaven is less severe than kareth. For with kareth, one bears transgression after death if he did not repent adequately, whereas with death at the hands of Heaven, he bears nothing after death. Rashi writes in Shabbath (25a) that with death at the hands of Heaven, his days are shortened, but he does not go childless, whereas with kareth, both obtain: his days are cut off and he goes childless. Those liable to death at the hands of Heaven for (abuse of) the sanctuary and of sanctified objects are eleven: one who eats tevel (untithed produce), an unclean Cohein who eats clean terumah, a non-priest who eats terumah, a non-priest, an unclean (priest), and a tvul yom (one who immersed in the daytime and did not wait until sunset) who officiates, one lacking atonement, one lacking (the full complement of priestly) garments, one who did not lave his hands and feet, one who is drunk, and one with disheveled hair. Death is explicitly mentioned in respect to some, and some are derived by our rabbis (as subject to death) through the tradition by identity (gezeirah shavah) or by comparison (hekesh)].
  
  
  
  	All of Israel have a share in the world to come, viz. (Isaiah 60:12): "And your people, all righteous, forever shall inherit the land, the sprout of My plantings, the work of My hands, to be glorified." [("All of Israel have a share:") Even those who were executed by beth-din for their wickedness have a share in the world to come. The "world to come" here is the world after the resurrection, when the dead are destined to rise and to stand in their bodies and souls in eternal life, like the sun, the moon, and the stars, as stated in the Gemara in this chapter: "The dead that are destined to arise do not return to their dust." And in the world to come there is no eating or drinking even though there is a body; but the righteous sit with their crowns on their heads and bask in the Divine radiance. And because not all Jews are equal in it, but the greater (is positioned) according to his higher eminence, and the lesser according to his lower eminence — for this reason it is taught "they have a share."] And these do not have a share in the world to come: one who says that there is no resurrection according to the Torah [The Gemara states: "Why all this? It was taught: He denied the resurrection; therefore, he has no share in the resurrection." From here I derive that the "world to come" of this Mishnah is not the world where the souls abide at this time, but the world of the resurrection, as I have explained.], one who says that the Torah is not from Heaven, and an apikores (a heretic) [one who demeans Torah scholars, and, it goes without saying, one who demeans the Torah itself.] R. Akiva says: Also, one who reads in the "outer (i.e., interdicted) books" [books of heresy, such as those of Aristotle the Greek and his colleagues. Included in this is one who reads the chronicles of idolatrous kings, romantic poetry, and literature of indulgence (of the passions), which make neither for wisdom nor benefit, but only for loss of time], and one who utters as an incantation over a wound (Exodus 15:26): "All the sickness which I placed in Egypt, I will not place in you, for I am the L rd who heals you." [It is only when he spits that he has no share in the world to come, the Name of Heaven not to be mentioned over spittle.] Abba Shaul says: Also, one who pronounces the Name [the tetragrammaton] as it is written.
  	Three kings and four non-kings have no share in the world to come. Three kings: Yeravam, Achav, and Menasheh. R. Yehudah says: Menasheh has a share in the world to come, viz. (II Chronicles 33:13): "and he prayed to Him, and He was entreated of him, and He heard his supplication, and He returned him to Jerusalem to his kingdom." They countered: He was returned to his kingdom, but not to life in the world to come.] "Four non-kings": Bilam, Doeg, Achitofel, Gechazi. [("Three kings, etc.":) Even though they were great and wise, they have no share in the world to come, for their faith was not complete. And even though Bilam came from a different nation, and we learned: "All of Israel have a share in the world to come," because it is stated that the saints of the nations of the world have a share in the world to come, we are apprised that Bilam was not one of the saints of the nations of the world.]
  	The generation of the flood have no share in the world to come and do not rise to be judged, viz. (Genesis 6:3): "My spirit will not judge in man forever" — neither judgment nor spirit, [i.e., they do not stand in judgment and they do not have the spirit to live with the righteous who have a share (in the world to come)]. The generation of the Tower of Babel have no share in the world to come, viz. (Ibid. 11:8): "And the L rd scattered them from there over the face of the whole earth." "And the L rd scattered them" — in this world; (Ibid. 9): "and from there the L rd scattered them" — in respect to the world to come. The people of Sodom have no share in the world to come, viz. (Ibid. 13:13): "And the people of Sodom were extremely evil and sinful to the L rd": "evil" — in this world; "sinful" — in respect to the world to come. But they arise to be judged (at the resurrection). R. Nechemiah says: Both (the generation of the Tower of Babel and the generation of Sodom) do not arise for judgment, viz. (Psalms 1:5): "Therefore, the wicked shall not arise in judgment, nor the sinners in the congregation of the righteous": "Therefore, the wicked shall not arise in judgment" — the generation of the flood; "nor the sinners in the congregation of the righteous" — the people of Sodom. They countered: They do not arise in the congregation of the righteous (i.e., in the world to come), but they do arise in the congregation of the wicked (for judgment at the resurrection). The spies have no share in the world to come, viz. (Numbers 14:37): "And there died the men who had uttered evil report of the land in the plague before the L rd": "and there died" — in this world; "in the plague" — in respect to the world to come. The generation of the desert have no share in the world to come and they do not arise for judgment, viz. (Numbers 14:35): "In this desert shall they be consumed, and there shall they die." These are the words of R. Akiva. R. Eliezer says: Of them it is said (Psalms 50:5): "Gather unto Me My saints, who entered into My covenant through sacrifices." [They entered into a covenant with the L rd through sacrifices and peace-offerings, viz. (Exodus 24:5): "And they sacrificed peace-offerings," followed by (Ibid. 8): "And he sprinkled it upon the people, and he said: 'Behold, the blood of the covenant!'"] The congregation of Korach is not destined to ascend, viz. (Numbers 16:33): "And the earth covered them up" — in this world; "and they were lost from the midst of the congregation" — in the world to come. These are the words of R. Akiva. R. Eliezer says: Of them it is said (I Samuel 2:6): "The L rd puts to death and brings to life; He brings down to Sheol and brings up." The ten tribes are not destined to return [from the place whence they were exiled.] As to its being said that Jeremiah returned them and Yoshiyahu ben Amotz ruled over them — not all of them returned, but only part.], viz. (Deuteronomy 29:27): "And He cast them into a different land as this day" — Just as this day passes, not to return, they, too, have passed, not to return. These are the words of R. Akiva. R. Eliezer says: Just as the day darkens and brightens, so the ten tribes. Just as it is dark for them, so it is destined to be bright for them.
  	The men of a city condemned (for idolatry) have no share in the world to come, viz. (Deuteronomy 13:14): "There have gone out men of wickedness (belial) from your midst, and they have turned astray the inhabitants of their city." [("men of belial":) men who do not rise (einam olim) at the resurrection. And those who are turned astray are like those who turn astray (in this regard)]. And they are not killed (by the sword) unless the inciters (to idolatry) be from the same city, [it being written: "and they have turned astray the inhabitants of their city," and not the inhabitants of a different city], and from the same tribe, [it being written: "from your midst" — from the midst of the tribe itself], and (they are not killed by the sword) unless the majority [of the city] are incited, [it being written: "the inhabitants of their city," connoting the "habitation" of the city, i.e., the majority.], and unless men incite them. If they were incited by women or minors, or if only a minority were incited, or if the inciters were outside it, [i.e., from a different city], they are as individuals, [who served idolatry. They are executed by stoning and their property "escapes."] and they [the men of a condemned city] require two witnesses and warning for each one. [They would multiply courts, and whoever was found to have served idolatry with witnesses and warning was separated until it was determined whether they (the separated ones) were the majority. If they were, they were brought to the great beth-din, where their judgment was concluded and they were executed by the sword and their property was destroyed. And if they were found not to be the majority of the city, they were executed by stoning and their property "escaped."] This is a stringency of individuals (executed for idolatry) over a populace — that individuals (are executed) by stoning, for which reason their property escapes; and the populace (are executed) by the sword, for which reason their property is destroyed.
  	(Deuteronomy 13:16): "Smite shall you smite, etc." A donkey or camel caravan passing from place to place rescues it. [(The members of) a donkey or camel caravan who remain in a city thirty days are reckoned among the inhabitants of the city. [("they rescue it":) If the majority of the city were incited to idolatry, and a minority not, and the members of the caravan who were not incited make the minority a majority, they "rescue" the city from property loss, causing them to be judged as individuals. They can, likewise, cause the city to be judged as a condemned one if they were incited along with them to form a majority, but the tanna "pursues merit." Furthermore, it is more probable that the caravan members would tend not to be so close to the people of the city as to be incited along with them.] (Ibid.): "Lay waste it, and all that is in it, etc.": From here it is derived that the property of the righteous within it is destroyed; (the property of the righteous) outside it escapes. And (the property) of the wicked, whether in it or outside it, is destroyed.
  	As it is written (Deuteronomy 13:17): "And all of its spoil you shall gather into its square, etc." If it has no square, a square is made for it. If its square were outside it, [i.e., if the gathering place of the men of the city were outside it], it is moved inside it. (Ibid.): "And you shall burn with fire the city and all its spoil, entirely, for the L rd your G d": "its spoil," and not the spoil of Heaven — whence it was ruled: Its consecrated objects are to be redeemed [That is, they are not burned, but they require redemption like all consecrated objects.], its terumoth are to be left to spoil. [The Gemara construes this as an instance of terumah in the hand of a Cohein, in which instance it is the property of the Cohein and is subject to the interdict of a condemned city. However, the terumoth were not burned, as the rest of its spoil was, not being demeaned to this extent. For this reason they were left to spoil. And terumah in the hand of an Israelite is "the spoil of Heaven" and is given to a Cohein in a different city.] Its second-tithe and its holy writings are to be secreted. [("second-tithe":) Even though it is the property of the Israelite, to be eaten by him, since it is called "holy," it is not burned but secreted.] (Ibid.): "entirely, for the L rd your G d." R. Shimon says: The Holy One Blessed be He said: If you execute judgment against a condemned city, I shall account it to you as if you sacrificed a burnt-offering "entirely" before Me. "And it shall be a heap for ever; it shall not be built again." Even gardens and orchards (may not be planted there). ["again," connoting "completely"] R. Akiva says: "It shall not be built again": It may not be restored to its original state, [with habitations], but gardens and orchards may be planted there. [The halachah is in accordance with R. Akiva.] (Ibid. 18): "And let there adhere to your hand naught from the spoil." For so long as the wicked are in the world, wrath is in the world; when the wicked go lost from the world, wrath departs from the world.
  
  
  
  	And these are the ones who are put to death by strangulation: one who strikes his father or mother, one who steals a soul of Israel (i.e., a kidnapper), an elder who rebels against beth-din [i.e., who defies the ruling of the great beth-din in "the chamber of hewn stone" (in Jerusalem), a false prophet, one who prophesies in the name of idolatry, one who lives with a married woman, and the zomemin of the daughter of a Cohein and her consort. [Even though they come to make her liable to burning, they are sentenced only to the death penalty they intended for the one who lived with her, i.e., strangulation, the regular penalty for adulterers, it being written (Leviticus 21:9): "In fire shall she be burned" — she, and not her consort. And (the halachah for) her zomemin is derived from (Deuteronomy 19:19): "as he schemed to do to his brother" — and not to his sister. [("and her consort":) the consort of the married daughter of a Cohein; but if she were betrothed, she and her consort are executed by stoning.] If one strikes his father or mother he is not liable unless he makes a wound. This is a stringency of cursing (one's parents) over striking: If one curses them after (their) death, he is liable, [it being written (Leviticus 20:9): "His father and his mother has he cursed" — a superfluous verse to include (liability for cursing them) after (their) death]; and if he strikes them after their death, he is not liable, [for he is not liable unless he makes a wound, and there is no "wound" after death.] If one steals (i.e., kidnaps) a soul of Israel, he is not liable until he brings him into his domain, [it being written (Exodus 21:16): "…and he be found in his hand," his "hand" being his domain. Similarly (Numbers 21:26): "And he took his whole land from his hand."] . Yehudah says: Until he brings him into his domain and makes use of him, it being written (Deuteronomy 24:7): "and he makes use of him and sells him." ["use" worth a perutah. And the first tanna rules him liable for "use" of even less than a perutah. The halachah is in accordance with the first tanna.] If one steals his son, R. Yishmael b. R. Yochanan b. B'roka rules him liable. The sages rule him not liable. [The rationale of the rabbis: It is written (Exodus 21:16): "and he be found in his hand" — a superfluous verse, for it is written (Deuteronomy 24:7): "If there be found a man, etc." — to teach us: to exclude one who is already "found" (i.e., his son)]. If one steals a man who is half bondsman - half free, R. Yehudah rules him liable, and the sages, not liable. [("R. Yehudah rules him liable":) it being written (Deuteronomy 24:7): "of his brothers of the children of Israel": "of his brothers" — to exclude bondsmen; "of the children of Israel": If it were written "the children of Israel," we would exclude one who was half bondsman - half free. Now that it is written: "of the children of Israel," this is an additional exclusion; "and there is no exclusion after exclusion except for inclusion." And the rabbis hold that "of his brothers" does not exclude bondsmen, for they are his "brothers" in mitzvoth. Rather, "the children of Israel" — to exclude bondsmen; "of the children of Israel" — to exclude one who is half bondsman - half free. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]
  	An elder who rebels against beth-din (is put to death by strangulation), viz. (Deuteronomy 17:8): "If there be hidden from you a thing of judgment, etc." There were three batei-din there [in Jerusalem, concerning which it is written (Ibid.): "Then you shall arise and go up."], one at the entrance to the Temple mount, [the eastern gate, inside the Chel (a place within the fortification of the Temple), before the ezrath nashim (the women's compartment)], one at the entrance of the azarah (the Temple court) [above it, as they crossed the ezrath nashim and came to the entrance of the ezrath Yisrael], and one in the chamber of hewn stone, [built in the midst of the azarah, part in sanctified ground, part in non-sanctified.] They come to the one at the entrance to the Temple mount, [(this elder who ruled in his city and with whom the beth-din in his city differed, Scripture requiring them to come up to Jerusalem.) He and the beth-din of his city come up to this beth-din at the entrance to the Temple mount, arriving there first.], and he says: "Thus did I expound. Thus and thus did my colleagues expound. Thus did I teach. Thus and thus did my colleagues teach." If they (that beth-din) had heard it (the halachah in that matter), they tell them, and if not they come to those at the entrance of the azarah. He says: "Thus did I expound, and thus did my colleagues expound. Thus did I teach, and thus did my colleagues teach." If they had heard, they tell them. And if not, these and the others come to the great beth-din in the chamber of hewn stone, whence Torah goes out to all of Israel, viz. (Deuteronomy 17:10): "…from that place which the L rd chooses." If he returned to his city and he ruled again as he had ruled before, he is not liable. And if he ruled "to do," he is liable, it being written (Ibid. 12): "And the man who shall do willfully" — he is not liable until he rules to do. A disciple who rules to do is not liable. [A disciple who had not attained to (expertise in) ruling and the beth-din in his city differed with him — If they came to the great beth-din and inquired, and he returned to his city and ruled as at first, he is not liable, for they should not have relied upon his ruling. The Torah made liable only an expert of beth-din, as is derived from (Ibid. 8): "If there be hidden (ki yipalei) from you." Scripture speaks of an expert (muflah) of beth-din.] His severity, then, is found to be his lenity! [The severity of his transgression — ruling though he is not qualified to rule, compounded with his rebelling against beth-din — becomes his lenity, exempting him from the death penalty. For if he were an elder qualified to rule and he rebelled against beth-din, he would be put to death.]
  	A stringency of the words of the scribes over the words of the Torah: If one says that there are no tefillin, in transgression of the words of the Torah, he is not liable, [this not being "ruling." For he is told (as it were): "Go and learn!"] (But if one says that) there are five frontlets (totafoth), adding to the words of the scribes, he is liable, [this constituting a ruling. And even though this only adds to the words of the scribes, he is liable. For in the medrash of the scribes it is written: The word "letotafoth" is written three times (Exodus 13:16, Deuteronomy 6:8, and Deuteronomy 11:18), twice defective and once plene, giving a total of four sections (in the head phylactery)].
  	He (a rebellious elder) is executed neither by the beth-din of his city nor by the beth-din in Yavneh [If they inquired of the beth-din in the chamber of hewn stone, and they ruled for him, and he returned to his city and remained there many days, until the great Sanhedrin was exiled to Yavneh, and then he ruled as at first, he is not executed in Yavneh, even though the great Sanhedrin is there, and even if the Temple still stands, the great Sanhedrin not sitting in its place in the chamber of hewn stone.], but he is brought up to the great beth-din in Jerusalem and kept there until the festival, it being written (Deuteronomy 17:13): "And all the people shall hear and fear and not presume again." These are the words of R. Akiva. R. Yehudah says: His judgment is not delayed, but he is executed immediately, and it is written, and messengers are sent (to proclaim) in all places: "This man, the son of this man, was found liable to the death penalty by beth-din."
  	A false prophet — one who prophesies what he did not hear [i.e., what was not stated in prophecy to any prophet], and what was not said to him, [but to his colleague, from whom he heard it, and he came and said that it was said to him] — his death is at the hands of man. [Both of these are false prophets, and their death is by strangulation, it being written (Deuteronomy 18:20): "But the prophet who shall presume to speak a thing in My name" — this is one who prophesies what he never heard — "which I did not command him" — but which I commanded to his neighbor. This is one who prophesies what was not said to him but which was said to his neighbor — "that prophet shall be put to death"; and every death mentioned in the Torah, unqualified, is strangulation.] But if one suppresses his prophecy, or makes light of the words of a prophet, or transgresses his own prophecy, his death is at the hands of Heaven, it being written (Ibid. 19): "I shall require it of him." [It is written (Ibid. 19): "And it shall be, the man who shall not heed (lo yishma) My words." It can be read "lo yishma" (i.e., another) "will not heed," and "lo yashmia" "he will not make heard," and "lo yishmah," i.e., he himself "will not heed," so that all three are included, followed by "I shall require it of him" — at the hands of Heaven.]
  	One who prophesies in the name of idolatry, saying: "Thus did this idolatry say" (is put to death by strangulation), even if he (i.e., what he said) coincided with the halachah, to declare the unclean unclean, and the clean, clean. One who lives with a married woman, once she enters the groom's domain for marriage, [as when the father hands her over to the groom's messengers and she is still on the way to him, in which instance she is no longer regarded as being in "her father's house"], is put to death by strangulation. And the zomemin of the daughter of a Cohein and her consort (are put to death by strangulation). For all zomemin "come forward" for that death [that they would make the adjudged liable to], except the zomemin of the daughter of a Cohein and her consort [i.e., All who live (illicitly) with a woman are subject to the same death as she, except for the consort of the daughter of a Cohein, she being subject to burning, and he, to strangulation.]