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text: Mishnah Shevuot
  משנה שבועות
  The Mishna with Obadiah Bartenura by Rabbi Shraga Silverstein
  
  
  Mishnah Shevuot
  
  
  
  
  
  	Oaths are two [i.e., Two are explicitly written in the Torah, viz. (Leviticus 5:4): "Or if a soul swear, to pronounce with the lips, to do ill or to do good": "I shall eat" — to do good; "I shall not eat" — to do ill, to deprive himself. The same applies with all things to be done or not to be done in the future, "to do ill or to do good" connoting the future.], which are four. [Another two, which are not written, are to be added: having done or not done in the past, e.g., "I ate" (when he did not eat); "I did not eat" (when he did eat)]. Awarenesses of uncleanliness [(Leviticus 5:2): "Or if a soul touch any unclean thing," in respect to defiling the sanctuary and its sanctified objects] are two [Two are explicitly written (Ibid.): "And it be hidden from him, and he is unclean," the implication being that his uncleanliness is "hidden" from him, for which reason he eats sanctified flesh — one; or enters the sanctuary — two], which are four. [Another two liabilities are to be added: "hiddenness" of sanctified flesh, and "hiddenness" of the sanctuary, when he is aware that he is unclean.] The yetzioth (forbidden acts of carrying) of Shabbath are two, which are four. [Carrying from the private to the public domain is derived from (Exodus 36:6): "And Moses commanded and they passed a call through the camp, saying, etc." — Do not carry out from the private to the public domain. ("two":) one, for the man standing outside, who puts his hand inside, takes an object, and places it outside; and one for the man standing inside, who takes an object from its place and puts it outside. ("which are four":) There are to be added another two for placing inside, even though they are not written. For just as Scripture interdicted (transfer from) one domain to another by way of carrying out, so it interdicted placing within; one, for a man standing inside, stretching his hand outside, taking an object, and bringing it inside, and one for a man standing outside, taking an object from its place, and putting it down inside.] Observations of plague-spots are two [Two are explicitly written (Leviticus 13:2): "se'eth" and "bahereth"], which are four [the toldah (derivative) of se'eth and the toldah of bahereth, which are not explicitly written.]
  	Wherever there is awareness in the beginning, awareness in the end, and hiddenness in the middle, there is oleh veyored ("sliding scale") liability. [("Wherever there is awareness, etc.":) This refers to "Awarenesses of uncleanliness" (above). Since their provisions are few, they are adduced first, after which oaths are adduced, their provisions being many. And the yetzioth (of Shabbath) and observations (of plague-spots) are treated individually in their respective tractates, for which reason they are not discussed here. They are included here (above) only because they are similar to the others in being "two which are four." ("awareness in the beginning":) awareness that he has become unclean. ("awareness in the end":) After eating the sanctified food in "hiddenness" or entering the sanctuary in "hiddenness" and leaving, it becomes known to him that he ate or entered in uncleanliness. ("and hiddenness in the middle":) When he eats the sanctified food, his uncleanliness or its being sanctified food is hidden from him. Or he enters the sanctuary, and his uncleanliness or its being the sanctuary is hidden from him. ("oleh veyored liability":) "oleh" ("rising") for a rich man; "yored" ("descending") for a poor man. A rich man brings a beast sin-offering, and a poor man, a bird sin-offering; and the poorest of the poor, a tenth of an ephah (of flour), the "sinner's meal-offering" mentioned in many places.] Where there is awareness in the beginning and not at the end, the he-goat [of Yom Kippur] which is presented within [i.e., whose blood is presented within (the holy of holies)] and Yom Kippur suspend (his judgment) [protecting him from affliction] until he becomes aware [of having eaten sanctified food in a state of uncleanliness], whereupon he brings an oleh veyored offering.
  	If there were no awareness in the beginning [(i.e., If he never knew of this uncleanliness, this never becomes subject to an offering, an offering obtaining only where there was awareness in the beginning)], but there was awareness in the end, the kid presented outside [on the outer altar, with the additional Yom Kippur offerings] and Yom Kippur [itself] atone [with the kid], it being written (Numbers 29:11): "…aside from the offering of atonement." Whatever the latter atones for, the former atones for. Just as the inner (altar sacrifice, "the latter") atones only where there was awareness, so the outer (altar sacrifice, "the former") atones only where there was awareness. [It is written of the kid presented outside: "One kid of goats as a sin-offering, aside from the sin-offering of atonement." The sin-offering of atonement is the kid presented within. Scripture likens them to teach us that what one atones for, the other atones for, viz.: Just as the inner is presented only where there was awareness, (in that instance,) awareness in the beginning, as derived from (Leviticus 16:16): "…for all of their sins," the implication being: for all that would be subject to a sin-offering if there were awareness at the end; and there is no sin-offering without awareness in the beginning — so the kid presented outside does not atone unless there was awareness, (in this instance,) awareness at the end, but not in the beginning, where it would never be subject to a sin-offering. And this atonement is absolute, without "suspension" (see 1:2)].
  	And where there is no awareness, neither in the beginning nor in the end, the kids of the festivals [(Kids for sin-offerings are prescribed for the additional (mussaf) offerings of all the festivals)] and the kids of Rosh Chodesh atone, [it being written in respect to the kid of Rosh Chodesh (Numbers 28:15): "as a sin-offering to the L rd" — For a sin that only the L rd knows of, this kid atones. That is, where there is awareness neither in the beginning nor in the end. And the kids of the festivals are derived by identity from the kid of Rosh Chodesh. For "kid" could have been written in respect to all the festivals, and it is written (in respect to the festivals) "and a kid," to add to what precedes (i.e., the kid of Rosh Chodesh), to liken them, i.e., These atone for the same thing that the first atones for.] These are the words of R. Yehudah. R. Shimon says: The kids of the festivals atone (for non-awareness in the beginning and in the end), but not the Rosh Chodesh kids. And for what do the kids of Rosh Chodesh atone? For a tahor (one who is clean) eating (unwittingly) something unclean. R. Meir says: The atonement of all of the kids is the same, (all atoning for) defiling the sanctuary and its holy objects. [All of the additional kids, whether the kids of the festivals, or the kid of Rosh Chodesh, or the kid presented outside on Yom Kippur — their atonement is the same. They atone both for unawareness in the beginning and awareness in the end, unawareness neither in the beginning nor in the end, and for a tahor eating something unclean. The (only) difference is in respect to uncleanliness occurring between one (offering) and the other. But as regards the kid presented inside on Yom Kippur, all agree that it "suspends" where there is awareness in the beginning but not at the end, as stated.] R. Shimon was wont to say: The kids of Rosh Chodesh atone for a tahor eating something unclean; those of the festivals atone for unawareness neither in the beginning nor in the end; and that of Yom Kippur, for awareness in the beginning, but not in the end. [This is repeated for the sake of what follows, viz.: "They asked him, etc."] They asked him: May this be offered up for the other? [If the kid designated for Yom Kippur were lost, and atonement was made with another, and the first were found on a festival or on Rosh Chodesh, may it be used as the kid offering of the day?] He answered: They may be offered. They asked him: But if their atonement is not the same, how can one be substituted for the other? [R. Meir asks this of R. Shimon: If you grant that their atonement is the same, he can do so, for they all effect the same atonement. But, according to you, this one (the kid of Yom Kippur), which was designated to atone for unawareness in the beginning and awareness in the end — how can it be offered on the festival to atone for unawareness both in the beginning and in the end? Or on Rosh Chodesh, to atone for a tahor eating something unclean?] He answered: They all come to atone for defiling the sanctuary and its objects. [And since they are the same in this respect, even though there are differences in the type of atonement, it may be substituted.]
  	R. Shimon b. Yehudah said in his [R. Shimon's] name ["R. Shimon," unqualified, is R. Shimon b. Yochai]: The kids of Rosh Chodesh atone for a tahor eating something unclean. Over and above them are those of the festivals, which atone for a tahor eating something unclean and for unawareness in the beginning and in the end. Over and above them are those of Yom Kippur, which atone for a tahor eating something unclean, for unawareness in the beginning and in the end, and for unawareness in the beginning and awareness in the end. They asked him: May this be offered up for the other? He answered: Yes. They asked: If so, let those of Yom Kippur be offered on Rosh Chodesh; but how can those of Rosh Chodesh be offered on Yom Kippur for an atonement which is not of their kinds? (see 1:4) He answered: They all come to atone for defiling the sanctuary and its objects.
  	And for willful defiling of the sanctuary and its sanctified objects [(This is a generic teaching)], the kid presented within and Yom Kippur atone, [it being written (Leviticus 16:16): "and from their offenses for all of their sins." "offenses" (peshaim) — these are acts of rebellion.] And for the other transgressions of the Torah: light and stringent, willful and unwitting, known and unknown, positive commandment and negative commandment, krithoth and judicial death penalties, the sent-away kid atones. [The Gemara explains the entire Mishnah thus: whether light or stringent; whether he transgressed willfully or unwittingly; (Of those which he transgressed unwittingly,) whether their doubtful status was known to him or unknown to him (e.g., whether it was known or not known to him that it might be forbidden fat and he ate it). Which are the "light"? Positive and negative commandments. Which are the "stringent"? Those punishable by krithuth (cutting-off) and by judicial death penalty.]
  	Both Israelites, Cohanim, and the anointed priest (i.e., the high-priest) [are atoned for by the sent-away kid for the other transgressions (see above), there being no difference between them.] It is just that the blood of the bullock atones for the Cohanim for defiling of the sanctuary and of its sanctified objects. [i.e., Whatever the inner kid (of Yom Kippur) atones for on behalf of Israelites, i.e., suspending judgment for Israelites where there is awareness in the beginning but not at the end, and willful defiling of the sanctuary and its objects — likewise, whatever the outer kid atones for (on behalf of Israelites) — the bullock of the high-priest sacrificed on Yom Kippur atones for on behalf of the Cohanim.] R. Shimon says: Just as the blood of the kid presented within atones for Israel, so, the blood of the bullock atones for Cohanim. Just as the confession over the sent-away kid atones for Israel, so the confession over the bullock atones for the Cohanim. [i.e., You concede that the blood of the inner kid atones for Israel without confession, there being no confession over the inner kid, but over the sent-away kid — so the blood of the bullock atones for the Cohanim, without any confession, for defiling of the sanctuary and its objects, leaving the confession over the bullock (in place of the confession over the sent-away kid) to atone on behalf of the Cohanim for the other transgressions, and they have no atonement through the sent-away kid.]
  
  
  
  	Awarenesses of uncleanliness are two, which are four. If he became unclean and knew [that he was unclean, at the time of contact or afterwards], and the uncleanliness was (afterwards) hidden from him, and he remembered the sanctity, [and because of that "hiddenness" (of the uncleanliness) he ate sanctified food — one; or entered the sanctuary — two. These are the two that are written. (Leviticus 5:2): "And it be hidden from him and he is unclean" implies that the uncleanliness is hidden from him. And because he is not liable unless he is aware in the beginning that he became unclean, after which it was hidden from him, we have "awarenesses."] If the sanctity were hidden from him [i.e., the fact of its being sanctified food or the fact of its being the sanctuary, and he ate the one or entered the other], and he remembered his uncleanliness [—These are the two others, which are not written.] If both were hidden from him and he ate sanctified food unawares, and after he ate he became aware, he is liable for an oleh veyored offering. [This is not part of the number. We are just being apprised that even though when he ate the sanctified food or entered the sanctuary he remembered neither the uncleanliness nor the sanctuary, he is liable for an oleh veyored offering.] If he became unclean and knew it, and the uncleanliness was hidden from him, and he remembered the sanctuary; if the sanctuary were hidden from him, and he remembered his uncleanliness; if both were hidden from him, and he entered the sanctuary unawares, and when he left he became aware, he is liable for an oleh veyored offering.
  	(He is liable for the offering) whether he enters the azarah [the first Temple court] or its [later]addition; for no addition is made to the city and to the azaroth without authorization [(for which reason it is sanctified as the first)] of the king, the prophet, the urim vetumim, the sanhedrin of seventy-one, the two thank-offerings, and song. The beth-din go, and the two thank-offerings behind them, and all of Israel behind them. The inner is eaten, and the outer burned. And if all of these do not obtain, if one enters there (in a state of uncleanliness), he is not liable (for an oleh veyored offering). [("with a king":) it being written (Exodus 25:9): "According to all that I show you: the form of the tabernacle, and the form of all its vessels, and thus shall you do." This ("and thus shall you do") is a superfluous verse, to be expounded as relating to future generations. And in the days of Moses, he was the king and the prophet, and his brother, the high-priest. And there were also the urim vetumim and the seventy elders — and thus for future generations. ("two thank-offerings":) two breads of thanksgiving. They would carry them in a circle until the end of the sanctified bound, where the first would be eaten, and the second burned. This is derived from (the rite of) Nechemiah ben Chachalyah, viz. (Nechemiah 12:31): "Then I presented two great thanksgivings." ("song":) they would chant (Psalms 30) "I shall extol You, O L rd, for You have uplifted me." And in the second Temple, even though there was neither king nor urim vetumim, the original sanctification of the Temple by Solomon "took" for its time and for the future, and what Nechemiah did was by way of commemoration alone.] And all (additions) that were made without all these (ceremonies) — If one (who were tamei) entered there, they (beth-din or the anointed high-priest as the case may be) are not liable (for a bullock of forgetfulness.)
  	If one became unclean in the azarah [and knew that he had become unclean], and his uncleanliness became "hidden" from him, and he remembered (that it was) the sanctuary; or if the sanctuary became "hidden" to him, and he remembered his uncleanliness; or if both became hidden from him, and he bowed down [in this interval of hiddenness towards the inside, even if he did not wait], or if he waited the amount of time for bowing down, [i.e., or if he bowed down towards the outside; this, if he waited the amount of time for bowing down, that being the amount of time it takes one to recite the following verse at moderate speed (II Chronicles 7:3): "And they kneeled down with their faces to the ground upon the pavement and prostrated themselves to give thanks to the L rd. For He is good; for His lovingkindness endures forever."]; or if he left the long way, [and not the shorter way, even if he did not wait in the beginning], he is liable. And by the shorter way [when he did not bow down or wait], he is not liable. This is a positive commandment in the sanctuary [(Numbers 5:2): "And they shall send out of the camp … everyone that is unclean"] for which they [beth-din] are not liable [to offer a "bullock of forgetfulness." That is, if they erred in this and instructed him to leave by the longer way, they do not bring for this mistaken ruling a bullock for forgetfulness of the congregation (see Leviticus 4:14)].
  	And which is a positive commandment of niddah [comparable to that of the sanctuary, where the uncleanliness occurs after permitted entrance], where they [beth-din] are liable [for a bullock of forgetfulness if they erred in the ruling]? If he were cohabiting with a clean (non-niddah) woman [having "entered" permittedly], and she said to him: "I have become unclean" [now], and he withdrew immediately [with erect organ], he is liable, for his withdrawal is pleasurable to him as is his entry. [But he should wait without movement until the organ "dies" and withdraw when he has lost his erection. This is the positive commandment of niddah.]
  	R. Eliezer says (Leviticus 5:2): "…creeping thing (sheretz) … and it be hidden from him": He is liable for "hiddenness" of creeping thing, and he is not liable for hiddenness of the sanctuary. [It is written: "…or (if he touch) the carcass of an unclean creeping thing and it be hidden from him." This is a superfluous verse, for above it is written: "Or if a soul touch any unclean thing" and "sheretz" is included in "unclean thing." This is to apprise us that if he knew for a certainty that he had become unclean, but did not know if through a sheretz or though carrion (neveilah), he is not liable for an offering if he ate sanctified food; he must know through which he became unclean.] R. Akiva says: "…and it be hidden from him and he is unclean": He is liable for hiddenness of uncleanliness, but he is not liable for hiddenness of the sanctuary. R. Yishmael says: "and it be hidden" is written twice (verses 2 and 3), to make one liable for hiddenness of uncleanliness and for hiddenness of sanctuary. [R. Akiva holds that since he knew for a certainty that he had become unclean, even though the specific type of uncleanliness — sheretz or neveilah — is not known to him, he is liable. And both (R. Eliezer and R. Akiva) exempt him for hiddenness of sanctuary, and R. Yishmael holds him liable. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yishmael.]
  
  
  
  	Oaths are two, which are four: I swear that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat [These are the two which are explicitly written. Viz. (Leviticus 5:4): "to do ill or to do good," implying in the future: I shall not eat — "to do ill"; I shall eat — "to do good."]; (I swear) that I have eaten, or that I have not eaten [These are the additional two derived by the sages.] "I swear that I shall not eat," and he ate any amount, he is liable. These are the words of R. Akiva. They asked him: Where do we find that one who eats any amount is liable, that this one should be liable! He countered: And where do we find that one who speaks brings an offering [for breaking his word] that this one should speak and bring an offering! [And since it is because of breaking his word (that he is liable), this, too, is breaking his word. For when one says "I shall not eat," he means any amount.] "I swear that I shall not eat," and he ate and drank, he is liable only for one (offering). [Even though drinking is included in eating, he is liable only for one, for it is as if he eats, and eats again, in one act of forgetfulness.] "I swear that I shall not eat and that I shall not drink," and he ate and drank, he is liable for two. [This constitutes two oaths. And even though when he said "I shall not eat," drinking (too) was forbidden to him, drinking being included in eating, so that when he then said "I shall not drink," there is reason to say that one oath does not "take" on another (of the same kind), it is different here. For since he first said "I shall not eat," and then, "I shall not drink," it is made manifest that by "eat" he meant eating alone.]
  	"I swear that I shall not eat," and he ate a loaf of wheat, and a loaf of barley, and a loaf of spelt, he is liable only for one. "I swear that I shall not eat a loaf of wheat, and a loaf of barley, and a loaf of spelt," and he ate, he is liable for each one. [His repeating "loaf," "loaf," indicates that he intended a distinct oath for each. For if he intended no more than to forbid these kinds to himself and no more, he would have said "a loaf of wheat, and also of barley, and also of spelt."]
  	"I swear that I shall not drink," and he drank many (different kinds of) drinks, he is liable only for one. "I swear that I shall not drink wine, and oil, and honey," and he drank, he is liable for each one. [The Gemara construes this as an instance of one's urging him: "Come and drink with me wine, oil, and honey." (If he intended one oath,) he would have said "I swear I shall not drink with you," and no more, the oath applying to what was being urged upon him. Why "wine, oil, and honey," if not to render them distinct?]
  	"I swear that I shall not eat," and he ate things which are not fit for eating and drank things which are not fit for drinking, he is not liable. "I swear that I shall not eat," and he ate carrion and treifoth, forbidden animals and reptiles, he is liable. [For they are fit for eating; it is just that the Torah forbids them.] R. Shimon rules not liable. [For he is already besworn (by the Torah) against them. And the dispute between R. Shimon and the first tanna obtains where he includes permitted things with forbidden ones, as where he says "I swear that I shall not eat slaughtered meat and treifoth." The first tanna holds that since the oath "takes" with slaughtered meat, it also takes with treifoth, for one prohibition takes effect upon another in the instance of an inclusive prohibition. And R. Shimon holds that it does not. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon.] If one says: "I bevow my wife benefit from me if I have eaten today," and he had eaten carrion and treifoth, forbidden animals and reptiles, his wife is forbidden (to benefit from him). [For he had eaten foods. And even R. Shimon (agrees in this.) For the reason he rules not liable in the first instance is not that they are unfit for eating but because an oath does not take on something forbidden.]
  	(He is liable) both for things that relate to himself and for things that relate to others, [as follows: "I shall give to that man, etc."], both for things of substance and for things lacking substance. [Two types are implied: Things like sleeping and things devoid of benefit, e.g. "I shall throw a stone into the sea."] How so? I swear that I shall give that man or that I shall not give. That I have given or that I have not given. That I shall sleep or that I shall not sleep. That I have slept or that I have not slept. That I shall throw a rock into the sea or that I shall not throw. That I have thrown or that I have not thrown. R. Yishmael says: He is liable only for the future, it being written (Leviticus 5:4): "to do ill or to do good." R. Akiva said to him: If so (he should be liable) only for things involving ill or good. Whence do I derive (that he is also liable for) things not involving ill or good? He answered: From the amplification of the verse, [(Ibid.): "…for all that a man will pronounce."] R. Akiva: If the verse was amplified for this (i.e., all things), it was also amplified for that (i.e., to include the past). [The (rationale) of the dispute between R. Akiva and R. Yishmael: In all the Torah, R. Akiva expounds amplification and limitation, and R. Yishmael, general and particular. R. Akiva expounds: "Or if a soul swear" — amplification; "to do ill or to do good" — limitation; "for all that a man will pronounce" — reversion to amplification. Amplification - limitation - amplification — Everything is included. What is included? All past things are included (for oath liability) just as future (things are indicated.) And what is excluded? Oaths involving mitzvoth. And R. Yishmael expounds: "Or if a soul swear" — general; "to do ill or to do good" — particular; "for all that a man will pronounce" — reversion to general. General - particular - general — What is derived must accord with the nature of the particular. Just as the particular is explicitly in future state, so all must be in future state. The halachah is in accordance with R. Akiva.]
  	If one swore to refrain from (the performance of) a mitzvah, but did not do so, he is not liable. If he swore to fulfill it, but did not do so, he is not liable [by reason of an oath of pronouncement, but he is liable by reason of a vain oath.] For according to R. Yehudah b. Betheira he should be liable [by reason of an oath of pronouncement.] (For) R. Yehudah b. Betheira said: Now if with something optional, for which he is not besworn from Mount Sinai, he is liable for it — a mitzvah, for which he is besworn from Mount Sinai, does it not follow that he should be liable for it! They said to him: No, it is so with an oath for something optional, where not doing is equated with doing, [it being written "to do ill or to do good," implying something which may either be done or not done], as opposed to an oath for a mitzvah, where not doing is not equated with doing, so that if he swears to refrain from doing and does not do so, he should not be liable. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	"I swear that I shall not eat this loaf. I swear that I shall not eat it. I swear that I shall not eat it," and he ate it, he is liable only for one. [The reason that he is liable only for one is that the (second) oath does not "take" on the first. But if he first said: "I shall not eat it," and then: "I shall not eat," and he ate the whole thing, he is liable for two. For when he says: "I shall not eat it," he is not liable until he eats the whole thing, and when he then says: "I shall not eat," once he eats an olive-size of it, he is liable. Therefore, the second oath takes, and he is liable when he eats an olive-size of it. And when he then eats the whole thing, he is liable by reason of the first oath. ("I swear that I shall not eat it. I swear that I shall not eat it":) Even though the second oath, "I shall not eat it," is enough to apprise us that one oath does not "take" on the other, the third is still taught to apprise us that even though there is no liability for the latter oaths, they are nonetheless oaths, and not vain words, and if they can "find a place," they take effect. For if a sage absolves him of the first, the second takes effect and it is forbidden to him by reason of the second oath. Likewise, if he is absolved of the first two, the third takes effect. For the sage uproots the vow completely, so that it is as if he had never vowed, and the second "takes" retroactively, the first being regarded as non-existent once he has been absolved of it.] This is an oath of pronouncement, where for willful transgression one is liable to stripes, and for unwitting transgression, to an oleh veyored offering. With a vain oath, for willful transgression one is liable to stripes, and for unwitting transgression, he is not liable.
  	Which is a vain oath? Swearing to what is at variance with what is known to man: saying about a pillar of stone that it is gold; about a man, that he is a woman; about a woman, that she is a man. Swearing to the impossible: If I did not see a camel flying in the air. [i.e., Let all the fruits in the world be forbidden to me if I did not see a camel flying in the air] and if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. [i.e., in the shape of the beam of the olive press. For (if he said) as thick as the beam of the olive press, this would not be a vain oath, there being many such.] If he said to witnesses: "Come and testify for me," (and they said:) "We swear that we will not testify for you," (this is a vain oath). [This is negating a mitzvah, for they are obliged to testify, it being written(Leviticus 5:1): "If he does not tell (i.e., testify), then he shall bear his sin."] Swearing not to perform a mitzvah: not to make a succah, not to take a lulav, not to put on tefillin. This is a vain oath, where for willful transgression one is liable to stripes, and where for unwitting transgression, he is not liable.
  	"I swear that I shall eat this loaf. I swear that I shall not eat it," the first is an oath of pronouncement; the second, a vain oath. If he eats it, he is in transgression of a vain oath. If he does not eat it, he is in transgression of an oath of pronouncement. [This is the intent: If he eats it, he transgresses a vain oath alone. If he does not eat it, he transgresses an oath of pronouncement as well. For when he swears "I shall eat this loaf," he is obliged to eat it. So that when he then swears "I shall not eat it," he is swearing not to perform a mitzvah, and he receives stripes by reason of a vain oath whether he does or does not eat it. And if he does not eat it, he is liable twice: by reason of a vain oath and by reason of an oath of pronouncement.]
  	An oath of pronouncement obtains with men and with women. [Since it is to be taught (4:1): "The oath of testimony obtains with men and not with women, etc.", it is taught that an oath of pronouncement does obtain with all of these.], with non-kin and with kin, [e.g., "I shall give that man," whether non-kin or kin], whether kasher [to testify] or not, both before beth-din and not before beth-din — by his own mouth. [He must utter the oath with his own mouth, but if others beswore him: "Did you eat or did you not eat?" and he said "I did not eat," when he did, or the opposite — he is not liable if he did not answer "Amen." And if he did answer "Amen" after another beswore him, it is as if he swore himself, and he is liable.] For willful transgression, one is liable to stripes; for unwitting transgression, to an oleh veyored offering.
  	A vain oath obtains with men and with women, with non-kin and with kin [e.g., if he swore about a man, whether non-kin or kin, that he is a woman], whether kasher (to testify) or not, both before beth-din and not before beth-din — by his own mouth. For willful transgression, one is liable to stripes; for unwitting transgression, he is not liable. With both [a vain oath and an oath of pronouncement], if he is besworn by others, he is liable [if he answers "Amen."] How so? If he said: "I did not eat today," or "I did not put on tefillin today," (and another said:) "I beswear you," and he answered "Amen," he is liable.
  
  
  
  	The oath of testimony obtains with men, and not with women, [it being written (Leviticus 5:1): "and he is a witness." Scripture speaks of one who is fit to testify, and a woman is not fit to testify, it being written (Deuteronomy 19:17): "Then the two men shall stand" — men and not women. And that verse speaks of witnesses, it being written there: "two," and elsewhere (Ibid. 14): "By word of two witnesses."], with non-kin, and not with kin, [kin being unfit to testify, it being written (Ibid. 24:16): "Fathers shall not be put to death by sons" — by the testimony of sons. And the same applies to the other kin.], with those who are kasher, and not with those who are pasul ("rejected"), [such as those liable to the death penalty, those liable to stripes, and robbers, these being called "evildoers," and the Torah writing (Exodus 23:1): "Do not make an evildoer a witness."] And it obtains only with those who are fit to testify, [to exclude a king, who does not testify, and those who are unfit to testify by rabbinic ordinance, such as gamblers and pigeon racers.], before beth-din and not before beth-din by his own mouth [i.e., If he himself says "I swear that I know of no testimony for you," he is liable, whether he swore before beth-din or not before them.] And (if besworn) by others, they are not liable unless they deny (possessing testimony) in beth-din. [e.g., If one says to them: "I beswear you to come and testify for me," and they say: "We know of no testimony for you," they are not liable unless they deny it in beth-din, it being written (Leviticus 5:1): "If he does not know, he shall bear his sin" — in a place (beth-din), where if he told, it would avail. And the verse speaks of one who is besworn by others.] These are the words of R. Meir. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Meir.] The sages say: whether swearing by himself or besworn by others, they are not liable unless they deny it in beth-din.
  	And they are liable [for an oleh veyored offering] for willfulness in the oath, ["and it be hidden" not being written in this connection], and for unwittingness with willfulness in (withholding) testimony, [i.e., where they know that the oath is forbidden, but not that it makes them liable for an offering.] And they are not liable for unwittingness [if they were completely unwitting, assuming that they had no testimony for him, and then remembered. For in that instance they could not help it, and (Leviticus 5:22): "…and he swear falsely, etc." does not apply to them.] And for what are they liable for willfulness in the oath? For an oleh veyored offering.
  	The oath of testimony. How so? If he said to two: "Come and testify for me" (and they responded:) "We swear that we know no testimony for you"; or if they responded: "We know no testimony for you," (and he said:) "I beswear you," and they said: "Amen," they are liable. If he beswore them five times outside of beth-din, and they came to beth-din and admitted (that they knew testimony), they are not liable, [even if they denied it for every oath outside of beth-din. For denial outside of beth-din is not deemed denial.] If they denied it (in beth-din), they are liable for each one, [it being written (Leviticus 5:5): "And it shall be, if he be guilty for one of these" — to make him liable for each one.] If he beswore them five times before beth-din, and they denied it, they are liable only for one. R. Shimon said: Why is it [that they are liable only for one even if they kept silent and denied it at the end? Why do we not say that the denial applies to all of the oaths, to render them liable for each one?] (The answer:) Since [if they denied it in beth-din the first time], they cannot go back and admit it. [i.e., Since they already said that they know no testimony for him, they cannot go back and testify (otherwise), therefore, even though they denied it only at the end, all of the oaths were superfluous, except the first. For if their silence at the first is regarded as denial, it is no longer fit to beswear them; and if it is not regarded as denial, they are already besworn, and the subsequent oaths are "oaths upon an oath." Perforce, then, "'for one,' to make him liable for each one" speaks of oaths outside of beth-din and denial in beth-din. For oaths by which he beswears them to come and testify in beth-din are not superfluous and lend themselves to division. For if they denied it there at the first, they could be besworn again.]
  	If both denied it at the same time [i.e., in the same "speaking span"], both are liable. (If they denied it) one after the other, [i.e., after the "speaking span"], the first is liable, and the second, not. [For since the first denied it (i.e., that he could testify), the second can no longer testify, being only one.] If one of them denied and the other admitted, the denier is liable. If there were two sets of witnesses — If the first denied it and then the second denied it, they are both liable, because the testimony can obtain through both. [The Gemara asks: Why should the first set be liable if there is a second set? What loss did they cause him by their denial? And it answers that our Mishnah is speaking of an instance where the witnesses in the second set were kin through their wives, not being kasher to testify when the second set denied, and their wives were gosesoth (at the point of death). I might think that since the ruling is: "most gosesim die," it is as if they are already dead, and the first set should not be liable, for there is still a second set; we are, therefore, apprised (that this is not so) for now (at the time of the denial) they had not yet died. It is found, then, that only the first set was there at the time of the denial, for which reason they are liable.]
  	"I beswear you if you do not come and testify for me that that man owes me a pledge, and tsometh yad (lit., "a placing in the hand") [i.e., a loan, money "placed in another's hand"], and (restoration of) theft, and a lost object" [i.e., He found something that I lost] — (If they say:) "We swear that we do not know any testimony for you," they are liable only for one. (If they say:) "We swear that we do not know that that man owes you a pledge, and a tsometh yad, and theft, and a lost object," they are liable for each one. "I beswear you if you do not come and testify for me that that man owes me a pledge of wheat, barley, and spelt." "We swear that we do not know any testimony for you," they are liable only for one. "We swear that we do not know testimony for you that that man owes you wheat, and barley, and spelt, they are liable for each one. [The former apprises us of one kind (i.e., money) and distinct claims; the latter, of one claim — a pledge — and distinct kinds.]
  	"I beswear you if you do not come and testify for me that that man owes me damages (or) half-damages" [half-damages of tzroroth (stones flung from under the feet of walking animals), considered mamon (money, principal,) and not knass.]; "four and five" payment, [(beswearing them) by reason of the principal]; that he ravished or seduced my daughter, [(beswearing them) by reason of boseth ("shame") and p'gam ("injury"), which is monetary payment]; that my son struck me [a blow which did not cause a wound, in which instance there is no death penalty, in the absence of which monetary liability obtains]; and that my neighbor wounded me or that he set fire to my sheaves on Yom Kippur [This is included because even though he incurs kareth, he is still liable to pay] — they are liable (for transgression of the oath of testimony.)
  	"I beswear you if you do not come and testify for me that I am a Cohein, that I am a Levite, that I am not the son of a divorcée, that I am not the son of a chalutzah, that that man is a Cohein, that that man is a Levite, that he is not the son of a divorcée, that he is not the son of a chalutzah," [they are not liable. For the witnesses are not liable unless they deny (knowing testimony) concerning something involving a monetary claim.], "that that man ravished or seduced that man's daughter" ["his daughter" refers to "that man is a Cohein, etc." (above). Or it may refer to the daughter of the man spoken of until now. They are not liable because it is necessary that they (the witnesses) hear it from the claimant. The Gemara construes this as an instance of one's coming with power of attorney (harsha'ah). If it were a claim for other monies, they would be liable. We are here apprised that the one granted the harsha'ah is not regarded as the claimant himself here as he generally is. For since the monies being claimed were never in his (the claimant's) hand, he cannot write a harsha'ah upon them.], "that my son wounded me" [They are not liable, for if they testified, he would be liable to death and not to monetary payment], or "that my neighbor wounded me or set fire to my sheaves on Shabbath," they are not liable [For both are liable to death and not to monetary payment.]
  	"I beswear you if you do not come and testify for me that that man said he would give me two hundred zuz, and he did not," they are not liable. For they are liable only for a claim of money like a pledge, [it being written in respect to the oath of testimony (Leviticus 5:1): "sin," and, in respect to the oath over a pledge, "sin." Just as the oath over a pledge is for a claim of money owed him, so the oath of testimony must be for a claim of money owed him. And the above is not such a claim. For even if the other did say that he would give him two hundred zuz, this does not make him liable to do so.]
  	"I beswear you that when you know testimony for me you come and testify for me," they are not liable, for (in such an instance) the oath precedes the testimony, [whereas the Torah states (Leviticus 5:1): "…and he hear the voice of a curse (i.e., the oath) and he saw or knew, etc.", the witnessing preceding the oath, and not the oath preceding the witnessing.]
  	If he stood up in the house of prayer and said (to the congregation): "I beswear you that if you know testimony for me, you come and testify for me," they are not liable, until he designates them, [it being written (Leviticus 5:1): "…and he be a witness" — he must designate his witnesses.]
  	If he said to two: "I beswear you and you, if you know testimony for me, that you come and testify for me." (They:) "We swear that we do not know testimony for you" — and they do know testimony for him, one witness by way of another — or if one of them were kin or pasul (unfit to testify) — they are not liable. [For if they did testify, their testimony would avail him naught.]
  	If one sent his servant (to make his claim) or if the claimee said to them: "I beswear you that if you know testimony for him you come and testify for him," they are not liable, until they hear it from the mouth of the claimant, [it being written (Leviticus 5:1): "if he does not (lo) tell," (lamed, vav, aleph) to be expounded: If to him (lamed vav), i.e., to the claimant, he does not (lamed aleph) tell, then he shall bear his sin. But if he does not tell another, he is not liable.]
  	"I beswear you," "I command you," "I ban you" — they are liable. [This, if he says: "I command you with an oath," "I ban you with an oath."] "By heaven and earth" — they are not liable. "By Aleph-daleth," "By Yod-keh," "By Shakkai," "By Tzevakoth," "By Chanun Verachum," "By Erech Apayim Verav Chesed," and by all the (other) epithets — they are liable. One who curses [the L rd] with any one them is liable (to stoning). These are the words of R. Meir. The sages exempt him, [holding him to be liable to stoning for cursing the Name (the tetragrammaton) alone, it being written (Leviticus 24:6): "If he blasphemes the Name, he shall be put to death." And for the epithets, he is in transgression of the exhortation (Exodus 22:27): "Elokim you shall not revile." And in respect to the oath of testimony, the sages concur with R. Meir that they are liable for the epithets as well as for the Name, it being written (Leviticus 5:4): "…and he hear the voice of a curse."] If one curses his father or mother with any one of them, he is liable. These are the words of R. Meir. The sages exempt him. If one curses himself or his neighbor with any one of them, he transgresses a negative commandment. [("himself"): (Deuteronomy 4:9): "Take heed to yourself, and heed your soul exceedingly." Wherever "Take heed," "Lest," or "Do not," is written, a negative commandment is indicated. ("his neighbor":) (Leviticus 19:14): "Do not curse a deaf man" — Do not curse even the deaf man, who does not hear and is not offended by the curse. How much more so, those who hear and are offended.] "May G d smite you," "And so may G d smite you" — this is the "curse" stated in the Torah (Leviticus 5:2). "May He not smite you," "May He bless you," "May He do good to you" — R. Meir rules liable, and the sages, not liable. [If he said to the witnesses: "May G d smite you if you do not testify for me," or if he heard one reading in the (section of) the curses in the Torah (Deuteronomy 28:22): "May G d smite you," and he said to the witnesses: "And so may G d smite you if you do not testify for me"; or "May G d not smite you if you testify for me," or "May the L rd bless you if you testify for me," (or) "May He do good to you if you testify for me" — In all of these instances, R. Meir rules liable, the negative implying the affirmative, e.g., "May G d not smite you if you testify for me," implying: "May He smite you if you do not testify for me"; likewise: "May G d bless you if you testify for me," implying: "May He curse you if you do not testify for me." In all of these the halachah is not in accordance with R. Meir.]
  
  
  
  	The oath over a pledge obtains with men and with women, [Since it was taught in respect to the oath of testimony "with men and not with women, etc.", here, too, all are taught.] with non-kin and with kin [i.e., where the owner of the pledge is kin to the one with whom it is deposited], with those fit (to testify) and with those unfit, before beth-din and not before beth-din by himself. [i.e., If he swore by himself or answered "Amen" after the oath and then admitted (that he had sworn falsely), he is liable for an offering, it being written (Leviticus 5:21): "…and he denies to his neighbor" — in any event.] And (if he is besworn) by others [and does not answer "Amen," as when one says to him: "I beswear you to return my pledge to me," and he says: "I have nothing of yours"], he is not liable until he denies it in beth-din. These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: Whether by himself or by others, if he denies it, he is liable. [The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] And he is liable (for an offering) for willfulness in the oath, ["and it be hidden" not being written in this connection. (willfulness in the oath":) He remembers the pledge and he knows that denying it makes him liable to an offering.], and (he is liable) for unwittingness with willfulness in respect to the pledge [i.e., He does not know that the oath makes him liable to an offering, but he remembers that he has the pledge], and he is not liable for unwittingness (in respect to the pledge)]. And for what is he liable for willfulness in it (the oath)? A guilt-offering with silver shekels, [i.e., one which is purchased with two selaim, it being written in respect to the guilt-offering ram (Leviticus 5:15): "according to your valuation, shekels of silver."]
  	The oath over a pledge. How so? If one said to him: "Give me my pledge that you have," (and he said:) "I swear that I do not have it," or: "I do not have it," and the first said: "I beswear you," and he said: "Amen," he is liable. If he beswore him five times, whether before beth-din or not before beth-din, he is liable for each one. R. Shimon said: Why so? For he can go back and admit it [after he denies it, so that with each oath, he is denying money.]
  	If five men claimed from him: "Give us our pledge that you have," (and he said:) "I swear that I do not have it," he is liable only for one. "I swear that I have neither yours, nor yours, nor yours, he is liable for each one. R. Eliezer says: (He is not liable for each one) until he says "upon oath" at the end, [viz.: "I have neither yours, nor yours, nor yours, upon oath," so that the oath appertains to all.] R. Shimon says: Until he says "I swear" for each one. [The halachah is neither in accordance with R. Eliezer nor with R. Shimon.] "Give me my pledge, my loan, (restoration of) my theft, and my lost object that you have." "I swear that I do not have it" — he is liable only for one. "I swear that I have neither pledge, nor loan, nor theft, nor lost object" — he is liable for each one. "Give me my wheat, my barley, and my spelt that you have." "I swear that I do not have it" — he is liable only for one. "I swear that I have neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt" — he is liable for each one. R. Meir says: Even if he says "a wheat, a barley, and a spelt," he is liable for each one. [R. Meir holds that if one claims "a wheat," he means the wheat species (and not an individual grain). The same is true for barley and spelt, viz. (Exodus 9:32): "And the wheat and the barley were not smitten." So that it is as if he were claiming "wheat, barley, and spelt." The rabbis hold (that he means) one grain of wheat, of barley, and of spelt. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Meir.]
  	"You ravished or seduced my daughter," and he says: "I did not ravish or seduce." "I beswear you," and he says: "Amen," he is liable. R. Shimon says he is not liable (for an offering) for he does not pay knass (penalty payment) by his own admission. [And since if he admitted it, he would not be liable, when he denies it, too, he is not denying money.] They said to him: Even though he does not pay knass by his own admission, he pays bosheth ("shame") and p'gam ("injury") by his own admission. [Therefore, he is denying money. The (rationale of the) dispute between the rabbis and R. Shimon: R. Shimon holds that when he says: "You have ravished or seduced my daughter," he is claiming knass, whose amount is fixed, fifty (pieces of) silver, and he is not claiming bosheth and p'gam, whose amount is not fixed. For one does not leave something determinate to claim something indeterminate. Therefore, he is denying knass, and he is not liable. And the rabbis hold that he is claiming bosheth and p'gam. For one does not leave something which, if he (the other) admits it, he is liable for it, in favor of something which, if he admits it, he is not liable. Therefore, when he denies it, he is denying money, and he is liable. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon.]
  	"You stole my ox." "I did not steal it." "I beswear you." "Amen" — he is liable. "I stole it, but I did not slaughter it and I did not sell it." "I beswear you." "Amen" — he is liable. "Your ox killed my bondsman." "It did not." "I beswear you." "Amen" — he is not liable, [this being knass. For he pays thirty selaim even if he is worth only a dinar.] "You struck me and wounded me." "I did not strike and wound you." "I beswear you." "Amen" — he is liable. If his bondsman said to him: "You knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye." "I did not." "I beswear you." "Amen" — he is not liable, [this being knass. For his bondsman goes free for (loss of) one of his limbs.] This is the rule: Whoever pays by his own admission is liable; whoever does not pay by his own admission is not liable.
  
  
  
  	The oath of the judges [i.e., the oath by which the judges beswear him where there is acknowledgement of part of the claim], two silver [The claim must not be less than for two maoth of silver, a third of a dinar. For the dinar is six maoth, the weight of ninety-six medium sized se'oroth (barley-corns), so that the weight equivalent of two maoth is thirty-two se'oroth.], and the admission, the value of a p'rutah. [The admission which makes him liable to an oath must not be less than the value of a p'rutah. So that if what he denied was less than two (maoth of silver) or what he admitted, less than a p'rutah, he is not liable to a Torah mandated oath, but he is besworn a shvuath heseth (a consuetudinal oath) by rabbinical ordinance. One who is liable to a Torah mandated oath must hold an object in his hand (e.g., a Torah scroll or teffillin) when he swears; and one who is liable to a shvuath heseth does not hold an object in his hand, but the beadle of the congregation or the one who beswears him holds an object in his hand while the oath is being taken. There are only three Torah mandated oaths, and no more: (the oath for) one who admits part of the claim, (the oath administered) where one witness testifies against him and he swears in refutation of the witness, and the oath of the watchers (shomrim). All of the other oaths mentioned in the Mishnah are rabbinically prescribed, and are similar to Torah oaths in that an object is held. The only (substantive) difference between a Torah oath and those mentioned in the Mishnah is that if one is liable to a Torah oath and refuses to swear, beth-din go down to his property and exact payment in full, whereas if one is liable to a rabbinically prescribed oath and he refuses to swear, he is placed under the ban until he pays or swears. And if after thirty days of the ban he still refuses to either swear or pay, he is smitten "stripes of rebellion" (makkoth marduth), the ban is rescinded and he is "let go," and they do not go down to his property.] And if the admission is not of the "kind" of the claim, he is exempt (from an oath). How so? (If one claims:) "You owe me two silver (maoth," and he says:) "I owe you only a p'rutah," he is exempt, [the admission not being of the "kind" of the claim, the claim being "silver," and the admission copper. This, only when the claim is for the weight of two maoth of silver or more. But if he claims a coin of silver, the other had admitted a coin (of copper)!] "You owe me two silver and a p'rutah" — "I owe you only a p'rutah," he is liable, [the premise being: If the claim is for wheat and barley, and the admission for any one of them, he is liable.] "You owe me a maneh" — "I owe you nothing," he is exempt. "You owe me a maneh" — "I owe you only fifty dinars," he is liable. "You owe my father a maneh" — "I owe you only fifty dinars," he is exempt, for he is like the returner of a lost object, [who is exempt from an oath, as we learned: If one finds a lost object, he is not subject to an oath, for the public good. And this, only when the son does not claim positively that he owes his father a maneh, but only tentatively. But if he claimed it positively, and the other admitted to only fifty, he is subject to a Torah mandated oath, this not being like returning a lost object.]
  	"You owe me a litra (a pound) of gold — "I owe you only a litra of silver," he is exempt (from an oath), [the admission not being of the "kind" of the claim.] "You owe me a dinar of gold" — "I owe you only a dinar of silver," or "a pondion," or "a p'rutah," he is liable, for all are a kind of coin. "You owe me a kor of produce" — "I owe you only a lethech [a half-kor, fifteen sa'ah] of pulse," he is not liable. "You owe me a kor of fruits" — "I owe you only a lethech of pulse," he is liable, for pulse is included in "fruits." If he claimed wheat and the other admitted barley, he is exempt. R. Gamliel says that he is liable. If he claimed jugs [full of] oil, and the other admitted [empty] vessels — Admon says: Since he admitted part of the claim, he swears. [For it is like one's claiming wheat and barley, and the other admitting one of them. The halachah is in accordance with Admon, but it is not in accordance with R. Gamliel, who rules that there is liability with a claim of wheat and an admission of barley.] The sages say that the admission is not of the "kind" of the claim. R. Gamliel said: "I see (i.e., concur with) the words of Admon." If he claimed vessels and land, and the other admitted vessels and denied land, (or he admitted) land and denied vessels, he is exempt[from a Torah mandated oath. (He swears) neither for land nor for vessels, admission of land not making one subject to an oath, no oath being mandated for land.] If he admitted some land, he is exempt. If he admitted some vessels, [there being admission and denial without land], he is liable [to swear also for the land, through a gilgul shvuah (a "rolled on" oath)], unbound property "carrying along" bound property for oath liability.
  	No oath is taken on the claim of a cheresh, a shoteh (an imbecile), or a minor. [("cheresh":) as when the cheresh claims by gesturing, for the "cheresh" spoken of by the sages in all places is one that neither hears nor speaks. ("a minor":) it being written (Exodus 22:6): "If a man give to his neighbor, etc.", and the "giving" of a minor is insubstantial. And cheresh and shoteh are like minor in this regard. And it is only with a Torah oath that one does not swear on the claim of a minor, but a shvuath heseth is imposed for his claim.] And a minor is not besworn, but one is besworn for a minor and for hekdesh (dedicated property). [If one comes to exact payment from the property of a minor, he may do so only with an oath. Likewise, if one makes his property hekdesh and a bill is issued against it and the holder of the bill comes to exact payment from that property, he requires an oath.]
  	And these are things for which one is not besworn: bondsmen, bills, land, and hekdeshoth (dedicated property), [it being written (Exodus 22:8): "For every thing of violation" — general; "for an ox, for an ass, for a lamb, for a garment" — particular; "for every lost object" — reversion to the general. "General-particular-general" — the ruling follows the nature of the particular, viz.: Just as the particular is explicitly something movable and of intrinsic monetary value, so all (to impose oath liability) must be movable and of intrinsic monetary value: to exclude land, which is not movable; to exclude bondsmen, which are likened to land; to exclude bills, which, though movable, are not of intrinsic monetary value (but only corroborative documents). For all of these, one is not besworn. And one is not besworn for hekdesh, it being written (Ibid. 9): "If a man give to his neighbor" — and not (property) of hekdesh.] They are not subject to double payment (kefel), [kefel being paid only for those things which are included in that section as being of the nature of the particular] and they are not (subject to) four and five payment. [For wherever kefel does not obtain, there is no four and five payment. For the absence of kefel makes it a payment of three and four; and the Torah specifies "four and five" payment, and not "three and four."], a shomer chinam (an unpaid watcher) does not swear (for those things) [The only thing to which a shomer chinam is liable is an oath, it being written (Exodus 22:7): "Then the master of the house (the shomer chinam) shall draw near to the judges (to take an oath) that he did not send his hand, etc."; and that section speaks of a shomer chinam. And he is not besworn for bondsmen, land, and bills, it being written (Ibid. 6): "If a man give to his neighbor" — general; "money or vessels" — particular; "to watch" — reversion to the general. "General-particular-general" — The ruling follows the nature of the particular, viz.: Just as the particular is explicitly something movable and of intrinsic monetary value, so all, etc.: to exclude land, which is not movable, etc. And for all of the aforementioned he is not subject to a Torah mandated oath, but he is always liable for a shvuath heseth.], a nosei sachar (a paid watcher) does not pay (for those things). [(He does not pay) for theft and loss for which Scripture makes him liable, viz. (Ibid. 11): "If stolen it shall be stolen from him, he shall pay to its owner." But for bondsmen, land, and bills, he does not pay, it being written in respect to a shomer sachar (Ibid. 9): "If a man give to his neighbor" — general; "an ass or an ox or a lamb or any beast" — particular; "to watch" — reversion to the general, etc., as stated above. "his neighbor" is written both in respect to shomer chinam and shomer sachar, implying his neighbor, and not hekdesh. Shoel (a borrower and socher (a hirer) are not mentioned here to exclude bondsmen, land, bills, and hekdesh. For borrowing generally does not obtain with land and bills; much more so hiring, which cannot apply to bills. Likewise, borrowing and hiring do not obtain with hekdesh, which it is forbidden to borrow or to hire.] R. Shimon says: Kodshim (sanctified objects) which the owner is bound to restore (if they are lost) are subject to an oath; those which he is not bound to restore are not subject to an oath.
  	R. Meir says: There are things which are like land and which are not like land; and the sages do not concur with him. How so? (If one says:) "I gave you ten laden vines," and the other says: "They are only five," R. Meir requires an oath, and the sages say: Whatever is attached to the ground is like the ground. [Grapes awaiting harvest are the point of difference between the sages and R. Meir. According to R. Meir, grapes awaiting harvest are regarded as harvested, and according to the sages, they are not regarded as harvested. The halachah is in accordance with the sages. And this, only in respect to watchers (shomrim), but in respect to buying and selling and ona'ah (overcharging), and admitting part of the claim — in all of these they hold that what awaits harvesting is regarded as harvested. And this is the halachah.] An oath is taken only on something that can be measured or weighed. How so? (If one says:) "I gave you a house full (of produce)," or: "I gave you a pouch full (of money)," and the other says: "I don't know, but take what you put down," he is exempt (from an oath). If one says: "Until the ziz" [a beam of the upper story projecting from inside the house], and the other: "Until the window," he is liable. [The rule: One is never liable for a Torah mandated oath unless the claim is for something that can be measured, weighed, or counted, and there is admission of part of the measure, or weight, or count.]
  	If one lent his neighbor on a pledge, [the lender becomes a shomer sachar for it, whether or not the pledge were taken at the time of the loan. If the pledge were lost or stolen, and it were as much as the (amount of) the debt, the (loss of) the pledge cancels the debt and neither has a claim against the other. If the debt were more than the pledge, the borrower pays the lender the difference. If the pledge were more than the debt, the lender pays the borrower. And if it were lost by accident, in which instance a shomer sachar is not liable, the lender, too, is not liable. He swears that it was lost by accident and collects the entire debt.] — If the pledge were lost: If he said: "I lent you a sela for it, and it (the pledge) was worth a shekel [half a sela]," and the other said: "No, you lent me a sela and it was worth a sela," he is exempt (from an oath). (If one said:) "I lent you a sela for it, and it was worth a shekel," and the other said: "No, you lent me a sela for it and it was worth three dinars," he is liable. [For he admits part of the claim, a sela being four dinars.] (If one said:) "You lent me a sela for it, and it was worth two (selaim)," and the other said: "No, I lent you a sela for it, and it was worth a sela," he is exempt. (If one said:) "You lent me a sela for it, and it was worth two," and the other said: "No, I lent you a sela for it, and it was worth five dinars," he is liable. And who swears [first]? The one who held the pledge. [i.e., The lender, who held the pledge, swears that he no longer has it], lest this one (the borrower) swear, and the other (the lender) produce the pledge. [Since the borrower must swear how much his pledge was worth, and the lender must swear that he does not have the pledge, even if he pays for it, (for we are afraid that he might have "cast his gaze upon it"), beth-din beswear the lender first that he does not have it, and then they beswear the borrower as to its worth, lest the borrower swear first without being particular about its true worth, and the lender then produce the pledge and disqualify him for testimony and oath.]
  
  
  
  	All of those who are besworn by Torah mandate swear and do not pay. [The Torah did not mandate that the claimant swear and take, but that the claimee swear and not pay, it being written (Exodus 22:10): "And its master shall take it, and he shall not pay" — He who is being asked to pay takes the oath.] And these swear and take [The sages ordained that they swear and take. They are all explained later in the Mishnah:] a hired laborer, one who has been robbed, one who has been struck, one whose opposite is not trusted to take an oath, and a shopkeeper over his ledger. A hired laborer — how so? [The sages ordained that a hired laborer swear and take; for the employer is busy with his workers and may not remember. This, when he claims within the prescribed time: a day-laborer, all of the night following, and a night-laborer, all of the day following. But if he claimed after his time, the employer takes a shvuath heseth that he paid him and he is exempt. Also, if he did not hire him in the presence of witnesses, the hired laborer does not swear and take. For since he can tell him: "I never hired you," he can also tell him: "I hired you and I paid you."] If he said to him: "Give me the pay that you owe me" — If the other said: "I gave it to you," and he: "I did not receive it," he (the hired laborer) swears and takes it. [But if the laborer said to him: "You stipulated that you would give me two," and the employer: "I stipulated only one," the employer swears a Torah mandated oath that it is as he says, and he gives him only one.] R. Yehudah says: (He does not swear) unless there is partial admission. How so? As when he said: "Give me my pay, fifty dinars, that you owe me," and the other said: "You received a golden dinar (twenty-five silver dinars)." [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah, neither in the instance of a hired laborer, nor in that of one who has been robbed or beaten.]
  	One who has been robbed — how so? If they testified against him that he entered the other's house to take a pledge from him without being authorized to do so, [as when witnesses saw him enter the other's house with nothing in his hand and he left with vessels projecting from the folds of his garment] — He says: "You took my vessels"; the other says: "I did not," he (the claimant) swears and takes. [For the indications are (that he did steal). For the witnesses testify that he took a pledge without authorization. This, when he claims something which he is likely to own, but if he claims "a silver chalice," or the like, which he is not likely to own, it is not for him to swear and take (in all instances), but the claimee swears and exempts himself.] R. Yehudah says: (He does not swear) unless there is partial admission. How so? As when he said: "You took two vessels," and the other said: "I took only one."
  	One who has been struck — how so? If they testified that he went into him whole and came out with a wound, and he said: "You struck me," and the other said: "I did not," he (the claimant) swears and takes (compensation). [This, only where the wound is in a place where it could have been self-inflicted, for which reason an oath is required. But where this is not possible, and it is evident that another must have caused it, as when tooth marks appear on his back and no one else (but the accused) was there, he collects without an oath.] R. Yehudah says: (He does not swear) unless there is partial admission. How so? As when he said: "You struck me twice," and the other said: "I struck you only once."
  	One whose opposite is not trusted to take an oath — how so? (The other swears) whether (his opposite had transgressed in) an oath of testimony, or in an oath over a pledge, or even with a vain oath. [i.e., Not only where he has transgressed in an oath of testimony or in an oath over a pledge, where there is denial of money — "evil to Heaven and evil to man" — but even with a vain oath, where there is only evil to Heaven, his opposite swears and takes. An oath of pronouncement is not included, for it may be future-directed, such as "I shall eat" or "I shall not eat," where the oath is a truthful one, his intent being to fulfill it, so that even though he is overcome by his evil inclination and transgresses, this does not render him not trusted to take an oath. But an oath of pronouncement concerning the past, such as "I ate" or "I did not eat," is like a vain oath, for he swears falsely.] If one of them were a gambler, or a lender on interest, or a pigeon-flyer, or a dealer in [the fruits of] the sabbatical year (shevi'ith), his opposite swears and takes. [(If one of them were, etc.":) First those unfit by Torah law are taught, and then those who are unfit by rabbinical ordinance. ("a pigeon-flyer":) some understand this as: "If your pigeon comes in before mine, I will give you so much and so much," i.e., gambling. Others understand it as training a pigeon to fly other pigeons to one's coop, this being "theft in violation of the ways of peace." ("a dealer in shevi'ith":) It is written (Leviticus 25:6): "to eat" — and not for trade.] If both of them were suspect (i.e., not trusted to swear), the oath returns to its place. These are the words of R. Yossi. [In the Gemara, some explain this as "it returns to Sinai," i.e., to the oath of Mount Sinai, where the Holy One Blessed be He beswore Israel: "Thou shalt not steal," and He will exact payment from the one who denies it to his neighbor; but beth-din need not resort either to oath or to (enforcement of) payment. And others explain it as: "it returns to the one who is liable to it," i.e., the one who admits part; and since he is not trusted to swear, he pays.] R. Meir says: They divide.
  	And a shopkeeper over his ledger — how so? Not that he says to him: "Write in my ledger that you owe me a hundred zuz," but (we are speaking of an instance in which) he said to him (the shopkeeper): "Give my son two sa'ah of wheat," or "Give my workers change of a sela." He says: "I gave," and they say: "We did not receive," he swears and takes, and they swear and take (from the employer). [For the shopkeeper says to him: "I do not trust the workers to take an oath. You trusted them for you did not tell me to give it to them in the presence of witnesses." And the workers, likewise, say to the shopkeeper: "We do not trust you to swear." And when they both swear and take from the employer, they swear before each other, so that either the shopkeeper (will be deterred) by shame before the workers, or the workers before the shopkeeper.] Ben Naness said: How can this be done? These will utter a vain oath or those will utter a vain oath! [For, perforce, one will swear falsely, and the Name of Heaven will be desecrated.] Rather, he takes without an oath and they take without an oath. [The halachah is not in accordance with Ben Naness.]
  	If he said to the shopkeeper: "Give me fruits for a dinar," and he gave them to him, [and the fruits are piled in the public domain, with neither of them in possession] — If he said: "Give me the dinar," and the other said: "I gave it to you, and you put it in your money-bag," the customer swears, [an oath similar to that of the Torah, and he takes (the fruits). For since the shopkeeper admits that he made the sale and the fruits are outside his shop, the customer swears and takes.] If he gave him the dinar and said: "Give me the fruits," and he said: "I gave them to you and you took them home, [and these piled up fruits are mine; I put them here to sell." And the other: "These are the fruits that you sold me for a dinar," since the buyer admits the sale, and the shopkeeper denies having sold these], the shopkeeper swears an oath similar to that of the Torah and he takes (the fruits). R. Yehudah says: Whoever has possession of the fruits has the upper hand. [R. Yehudah differs with the last ruling, saying that in both cases the customer swears and takes. For since the fruits are outside the shop, it is as if they are in the customer's hand. And whoever has possession of the fruits has the upper hand, and he swears and takes.] If he said to a moneychanger: "Give me change of a dinar," and he gave it to him — If he said to him: "Give me your dinar," and he said to him: "I gave it to you and you put it in your money-bag," the customer swears. If he gave him the dinar and he said: "Give me the change," and he said: "I gave it to you and you threw it into your pouch," the moneychanger swears. R. Yehudah says: It is not the way of a moneychanger to give an issar (small coin) before he takes the dinar. [The tanna apprises us of the difference between R. Yehudah and the rabbis both in respect to the change of the moneychanger and the fruits of the shopkeeper. For if he apprised us only of the latter, I might think that it is only with fruits that the rabbis said that if he said: "I gave them to you and you took them home," the shopkeeper swears and takes, for a shopkeeper is wont to give the fruits before he takes the dinar; but with a moneychanger, who is not wont to give issarin before he takes the dinar, perhaps they would concur with R. Yehudah that the customer always swears and takes. And if he apprised us only of the former, I might think that the customer always swears and takes because the moneychanger is not wont to give issarin before he takes the dinar; but with a shopkeeper, who is wont to give the fruit before he takes the money, I might say that he concurs with the rabbis. We must, therefore, be apprised of both. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	Just as they said (Kethuvoth 9:7) that a woman who "impairs" her kethubah [i.e., who produces her kethubah and admits that she has received partial payment] exacts payment only with an oath [if her husband claims that she has received the whole], and that if one witness testifies that it has been paid, she exacts payment only with an oath, and (that if she came to claim her kethubah) from bound property or from the property of the orphans, she exacts payment only with an oath, or that if she is paid not in his (her husband's) presence, she exacts payment only with an oath [(All revert to "Just as" (above), i.e., Just as none of these exacts payment without an oath)], so the orphans exact payment only with an oath. That is, orphans who exact payment from other orphans do so only with an oath. Our Mishnah speaks of an instance where the orphans who are being asked to pay say: We do not know whether or not our father paid this debt. But if they claim: Our father told us that he never borrowed this money and had never incurred this debt, then the orphans who produce the bill against the others exact payment without an oath. For saying "I did not borrow" is tantamount to saying "I did not pay," and they cannot refute the witnesses who testify that their father did borrow this money. And we are taught that with an oath these orphans do exact payment from the others only in an instance where the creditor died in the debtor's lifetime; but if the debtor died in the creditor's lifetime, the creditor is already obliged to swear to the sons of the debtor that he received nothing. For one who exacts payment from orphans, even with a bill (of indebtedness) must swear. And one does not bequeath to his sons money for which he is obliged to swear, the sons not being able to take an oath for which their father is liable. But though this is the halachah, if a judge ruled that the orphans swear "Our father did not charge us, etc." in order to exact payment from the other orphans thereby, what is done is done.[ (What is the oath?) "We swear that father did not charge us [at the time of his death], and did not inform us [before that time, that the bill was paid], and we did not find among our father's bills (any indication) that this bill was paid." R. Yochanan b. B'roka says: Even if the son was born after the father's death, he swears and takes. [He swears that he did not find among his father's bills (any indication) that this bill was paid. This is the halachah.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel said: If there are witnesses that the father said at the time of his death: "This bill has not been paid," he (the son) takes without swearing. [The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.]
  	And these swear without a [definite] claim(against them) [but only with a tentative one, i.e., "Is it possible that you withheld something of mine?" And because all of these (that follow) are inclined to rationalize (appropriating things for themselves) in that they exert themselves with the property, the rabbis imposed an oath upon them]: partners, tenant-farmers, caretakers, [who manage one's money for him. But with a caretaker of orphans — if beth-din appoints him he swears; if the father of the orphans appoints him, he does not swear.], a woman who carries on trade in the house, [her husband having made her a shopkeeper or a caretaker for his property], and a "son of the house" [one of the brothers, who deals with the property after the father's death.] If he asks: "What are you claiming from me"? (and the other replies:) "I want you to swear to me," he is liable (to do so). If the partners or the tenant-farmers divided [and did not make him swear at the time of the division], they cannot make him swear [thereafter]. If an oath were "rolled on" to him [by them, afterwards], for something else, they can "roll" everything [including this] upon him. [And just as "rolling on" obtains with a Torah mandated oath, and with an oath similar to a Torah oath, so does it obtain with a shvuath heseth.] And shevi'ith (the sabbatical year) "releases" the oath. [Not the oaths of partners, for shevi'ith dissolves neither partnership nor its oath. It is, rather, a loan and its oath that it releases.]
  
  
  
  	There are four watchers [and their provisions are three]: an unpaid watcher, a borrower, a paid watcher, and a hirer. An unpaid watcher swears on everything [that he was not derelict], a borrower pays for everything [mentioned below, viz.: seized, died, stolen, or lost, but he does not pay if it died through working, for he did not borrow it to "keep it under wraps." (This Mishnah is explicated in Bava Metzia 7:8)]. A paid watcher and a hirer swear that (the beast was) "broken," or seized, or died (and they are exempt); and they pay for loss and theft.
  	If one said to an unpaid watcher: "Where is my ox?" And he said: "It died," when, in reality, it had been broken or seized or stolen or lost — "It was broken," when, in reality, it had died, or been seized, or stolen or lost — "It was seized," when, in reality, it had died or been broken or stolen or lost — "It was stolen," when, in reality, it had died, or been broken, or seized, or lost — "It was lost," when, in reality, it had died, or been broken or seized or stolen — "I beswear you," and he answered: "Amen," he is exempt (from an offering). [For if he had admitted (the truth), he would have paid nothing, so that there is no denial of money here. And even though he swore falsely, the Torah prescribed an offering only where there is a denial of money. Likewise a judge can impose an oath only where, if he would admit (the claim), he would be liable for payment.]
  	(If one said to an unpaid watcher:) "Where is my ox?" and he said: "I don't know what you are talking about," when, in reality, it had died or been broken or seized or stolen or lost — "I beswear you," and he answered: "Amen," he is exempt. "Where is my ox?" and he said: "It was lost." "I beswear you," and he answered: "Amen," and the witnesses testify that he ate it, he pays the principal [and not kefel.] And if he admitted it himself [before witnesses came], he pays the principal and a fifth and a guilt-offering [as with the oath over a pledge, it (the fifth and the guilt-offering) not obtaining until he confesses and repents of his evil and comes to make atonement.] "Where is my ox?" And he said: "It was stolen." "I beswear you," and he answered: "Amen," and the witnesses testify that he (himself) stole it, he pays kefel. [For if an unpaid watcher exempts himself by claiming that it was stolen and swears (to that effect) and witnesses come and testify (that he himself stole it), he pays kefel, it being written (Exodus 22:7): "If the thief not be found," i.e., If it not be found as he said, but that he himself stole  it, (Ibid. 8): "he shall pay double." But if he comes to exempt himself by claiming that it was lost, he does not pay kefel.] If he admitted it by himself, he pays the principal and a fifth and a guilt-offering, [but not kefel, one who admits to knass (penalty payment) being exempt from it.]
  	If one said to another in the market place: "Where is my ox that you stole?" and he said: "I did not steal it," and the witnesses testify that he (himself) stole it, he pays kefel. [Here, we do not have "I beswear you," for being an actual thief, he is liable to kefel (even) without an oath, it being written (Exodus 22:6): "He (a thief) shall pay double."] If he saw witnesses coming and he said: "I stole it, but I did not slaughter or sell it, he pays only the principal. [We are being apprised here that even though he admits it out of fear of the witnesses, still, the admission avails and exempts him from kefel. And since there is no kefel, he is exempt, too, from (payment for) the slaughtering, which he denied, so that if witnesses come and say that he stole and slaughtered or sold (he does not pay "four and five"), the Torah prescribing "four and five" and not "three and four." For in the absence of kefel there is a reduction of one.]
  	If one said to a borrower: "Where is my ox?" And he said: "It died," when, in reality, it had been broken or seized or stolen or lost — "It was broken," when, in reality, it had died or been seized or stolen or lost — "It was seized," when, in reality, it had died or been broken or stolen or lost — "It was stolen," when, in reality, it had died or been broken or seized or lost — "It was lost" — when, in reality, it had died or been broken or seized or stolen — "I beswear you," and he answered: "Amen," he is exempt (from an oath). [For even though he swore falsely he made himself liable to pay, so that there is no denial of money in this oath.]
  	(If one said to a borrower:) "Where is my ox?" And he said: "I don't know what you are talking about," when, in reality, it had died or been broken or seized or stolen or lost — "I beswear you," and he answered: "Amen," he is liable, [having denied money. For if he had admitted (the truth) he would have been liable.] If he said to a paid watcher or to a hirer: "Where is my ox?" And he said: "It died," when, in reality, it had been broken or seized — "It was broken," when, in reality, it had died or been seized — "It was seized," when, in reality, it had died or been broken — "It was stolen," when, in reality, it had been lost — "It was lost," when, in reality, it had been stolen — "I beswear you," and he answers: "Amen," he is exempt. [For if he had admitted the truth, he would not have paid. Likewise, with "It was stolen," when, in reality it had been lost," or vice versa, he is exempt, for he shifts from one liability to another and does not deny money with this oath.] It was lost or stolen," when, in reality, it had died or been broken or seized — "I beswear you," and he answers: "Amen," he is exempt, [for he shifts from non-liability (for payment) to liability, and loses by his oath.] This is the rule: Whoever shifts from liability to liability, from non-liability to non-liability, or from non-liability to liability is exempt (from the offering); from liability, to non-liability, he is liable. This is the rule: Whoever swears to decrease his (monetary) liability is liable (for the offering); to increase it, he is exempt.