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text: Mishnah Bava Batra
  משנה בבא בתרא
  The Mishna with Obadiah Bartenura by Rabbi Shraga Silverstein
  
  
  Mishnah Bava Batra
  
  
  
  
  
  	If partners wished to make a partition in a courtyard, they build the wall in the middle. [The "courtyard" here is one for which there is no law of partition, there not being four cubits for each of the partners, for which reason we have "if they wished," i.e., It is only if they both wished it that they do so, but one cannot compel the other to do so. For in a courtyard subject to the law of partition, each one can compel his neighbor to divide. And now we are being apprised that since they wished to divide and each one appropriated the section accorded him by mutual consent, they build the wall in the middle, each providing from his section half the space of the thickness of the wall.] In a place where it was the custom to build with untrimmed stones, planed stones, laths, [half (the width) of a brick, one and a half handbreadths to a brick's three handbreadths], or bricks, they do so — all according to the custom of the land ["all," to include a place where it was the custom to make a partition with vine sprouts and tree branches. The custom of the land is followed so long as the partition is thick enough to keep each from looking into his neighbor's domain, for "gazing damage" is called damage. And the height of the wall or the partition may not be less than four cubits.] For (a partition of) untrimmed stone, each provides three handbreadths. For planed stones, each provides two and a half handbreadths. [A wall of untrimmed stones requires a handbreadth more than a wall of planed stones to allow for rough, projecting stone heads.] For laths, each provides two handbreadths. For bricks, each provides one and a half handbreadths. [A lath wall is a handbreadth thicker than a brick wall, for a lath is placed on either side, three handbreadths, and a handbreadth (is left) in the middle, where clay is placed to join them. The thickness of a brick wall is that of a whole brick, three handbreadths, no clay being required in the middle.] Therefore, if the wall fell, the space and the stones belong to both. [We are hereby being apprised that even if the stones fell into the domain of one of them, or if one of them came forward and cleared them into his domain — I might think that "the burden of the proof is upon him who would exact (payment) from his neighbor"; we are, therefore, apprised otherwise.]
  	And so with a garden, a place where the custom is to fence, he is obligated to do so. [This is the intent: And so with a garden. It is regarded as a place that it is the custom to fence, and one who took a place there is required to fence it.] But in a valley, a place where the custom is not to fence, he is not obligated to do so. [A valley is regarded as a place where the custom is not to fence, and he is not obligated to do so.] But if he (his neighbor) wishes (to fence) he moves into his (own domain) and builds and makes a border-mark on the outside [a sign that the wall is his. The sign is described in the Gemara. He coats a cubit of the top of the wall with lime on his neighbor's side, and not his own, lest his neighbor coat his side, too, and claim that the wall belongs to both. But when he coats it only on his neighbor's side and not on his own, this is a sign that the wall is his; and if his neighbor peels it, it is noticeable (as having been peeled)]. Therefore, if the wall fell, the place and the stones are his. If they both agreed to build, they build the wall in the middle and make the border-mark on the outside, [as a sign that they both built it.] Therefore, if it fell, the place and the stones belong to both.
  	If one surrounded his neighbor (with fields) from three sides, and he fenced the first, the second, and the third, he (the neighbor) is not obligated (to share the fencing expenses), [for he (the first) did not benefit him at all, his land still being open. But if he (the first) fenced the fourth side, in which instance he definitely benefits him, he (the neighbor) is obligated to pay, nominally, half the cost of reeds (i.e., of a reed fence), but not half of his (the first's expenses. For he (the neighbor) can say to him: For me, a reed partition is sufficient, and I do not want the expense of a stone fence.] R. Yossi says: If he (the first) arose and fenced the fourth (side), all is imposed upon him (the neighbor) [that is, half of the actual fencing expenses. And this is the difference between the first tanna and R. Yossi. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yossi. And it goes without saying that if the surrounded one fenced the fourth side, making it evident that he favors his neighbor's fencing, all is imposed upon him, and he pays half of his neighbor's expenses.]
  	If a courtyard wall [of partners] fell, he (i.e., each one of the partners) is required to rebuild it until (a height of) four cubits, [this sufficing to prevent "gazing damages"]. He is deemed to have given unless it is proved that he has not given. [i.e., If one claims half the expenses and the other says that he has already given his share, he is believed, unless the claimant can bring witnesses that he claimed and the other did not give. For all know that each must give his share, and the other would not have built alone (without the first having contributed), but he would have brought him to beth-din.] From four cubits and above, he (the second) is not obligated (for half the additional height). If he adjoined another wall to it, even if he did not roof it, all is imposed upon him. [i.e., If after the first built well above four cubits and the second did not wish to assist him in it, he (the second) adjoined another wall to it in order to roof it from wall to wall — even if he had not yet roofed it, all is imposed upon him, he having made it evident that he favors the additional height.]
  	He [an occupant of a courtyard who does not wish to assist the others] is compelled to build a gate-house for the courtyard, [where the gate guard can sit in the shade and keep the passersby in the public domain from looking into the courtyard], and (he is compelled to build) a door [for the courtyard gate]. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: Not all courtyards require a gate-house. [A courtyard not adjoining the public domain does not require a gate-house. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel. For even if it does not adjoin the public domain, sometimes there is a press of people and they converge upon the courtyard.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: Not all cities require a wall. [A city not close to the border of the enemy does not require a wall. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel. Even if it is not close to the border of the enemy, it requires a wall, for armed bands sometimes come there.] How long must someone be in a city to be regarded as one of its inhabitants [to share in community responsibilities]? Twelve months. [But nowadays, that there is greater movement, the customary period is thirty days.] If one bought a dwelling, he is immediately regarded as a city inhabitant.
  	The courtyard is not divided until there are four cubits to each (partner). [One partner in the courtyard cannot compel the other to divide it until each has four cubits aside from the doors, each house in the courtyard requiring four cubits before the door for unloading an ass. Aside from those four cubits, an additional four cubits are required for their other purposes before the courtyard becomes subject to partition.] And a field (is not divided) until there are nine measures to each. R. Yehudah says: Until there are nine half-measures to each. [Each speaks of his own place, and they do not differ. For a nine half-measure field in the place of R. Yehudah yielded as much as a nine measure field in the place of the rabbis.] And not a garden until there is a half-measure to each. R. Akiva says: A space to sow a quarter measure. [The halachah is that fields awaiting plowing or sowing are not subject to partition until there remains for each of the partners enough land for one day of plowing, or sowing, or the like.] Nor (do they divide) a traklin or a moran [spacious dwellings], nor a pigeon coop, nor a garment, nor a bath-house, nor an olive press, until there is enough for each. [As explained below: so that after they divide and each takes his share there remains enough for each that it be called "traklin" or "moran" (or the like), i.e., that there remain in the part the name by which the whole was called.] This is the rule: Something which retains its name when it is divided, is divided; if not, it is not divided. When is this so? When both do not wish to divide. [One cannot compel the other to divide against his will; but he can compel "god or agod," i.e.: Buy my part or sell me your part for what it is worth.] But when both wish (to divide), even with less than this (i.e., what is stipulated above) they may divide. And with The Holy Scriptures [Torah, Prophets, and Writings], even if they both wish to do so, they may not divide. [This, only with one volume; but with many separate books, they may divide if they so wish.]
  
  
  
  	One may not dig a bor [(round)] near his neighbor's bor, nor a shiach [(long and narrow)], nor a ma'arah [(roofed)], nor a water canal, nor a wash-pond [a square pit in which rain water is collected for washing clothes], unless he distances it three handbreadths from his neighbor's wall [i.e., from the wall of his hole. And the thickness of the wall of a hole is not less than three handbreadths, so that the distance from his hole to that of his neighbor is found to be six handbreadths. And one may not place one of the "damagers" alongside his neighbor's boundary unless he removes it the required distance, even if there is no wall there, lest his neighbor decide to build there and he cause damage to him.] And he coats [the walls of his hole] with lime. One distances olive-peel peat, and manure, and salt, and lime, and flint three handbreadths from his neighbor's wall. [For all of these "undermine" a wall. (The "wall" here is not that of a hole.)] One distances sowing, plowing, and urine three handbreadths from a wall. [("plowing":) Plowing even without sowing (as when one plows for trees) undermines a wall. ("urine"): It erodes bricks, which are of dried clay. Therefore, if one urinates near a brick wall, he must move back three handbreadths. With a stone wall, one handbreadth suffices; and with hard stone, such as granite, he need not move back at all.] And a mill must be removed (from a wall). [(Its "rattling" undermines the wall's foundation)] three (handbreadths) from the shechev (the lower part), which are four from the rechev (the upper part). [The rechev "rides" on the shechev, and is a handbreadth narrower.] And an oven (must be removed) three from the kilya which are four from the surface. [The kilya is the base, built of clay and stones, on which the oven is placed. It is broad below and narrow above. The upper surface of the kilya, on which the oven is set, is of the same width as the oven. This base must be removed three handbreadths from the wall, four handbreadths from its upper surface, for the heat of the stove damages the wall.]
  	One may not stand an oven inside a house unless there is a height above it [from the mouth of the oven until the ceiling] of four cubits, [so that the ceiling not catch fire.] If he stood an oven in an upper story, there must be below it a [clay] paving of three handbreadths, [so that the lower ceiling (i.e., the floor) not catch fire; and a height above it of four cubits.] And with a kirah, [upon which a pot is placed, no large fire being made within it as in a stove], one handbreadth. And if he caused damage [after having observed all of the above regulations], he pays the amount of the damage, [in spite of which he is compelled to observe these regulations, lest he cause fire damage to his neighbors and not have what to pay.] R. Shimon says: All of these regulations were stated only so that if he caused damage (after having observed them), he be exempt from paying. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon.]
  	One may not open a bakery or a paint shop under his neighbor's store room; nor a stable. In truth, with (a store room of) wine it was permitted, [the vapors rising from the bakery or the paint shop not harming the wine, heat improving (the quality) of wine in Eretz Yisrael. But in a place where it is known that heat harms wine, one may not open up such shops even under a store room of wine.] A shop in a courtyard may be protested against. [If one of the courtyard occupants wished to open a shop there, the others can stop him.] (He may be told:) "I cannot sleep because of those going in and going out." One may make vessels (in the courtyard) and go out and sell them in the marketplace. But one may not protest and say I cannot sleep: neither because of the sound of the hammer, nor the sound of the mill, nor the sound of the schoolchildren [who learn Torah. And even though it is a sound produced by others (and not by the courtyard occupant himself), one cannot protest, because of the greater glory of Torah. And if he does not teach the children Torah, but a trade or arithmetic or fractions, one can protest and say: "I cannot sleep because of the children going in and out."]
  	If one's wall were close to his neighbor's wall, [forming a right angle with it], he may not put another wall close to it unless he places it four cubits distant. [If he came to put a second wall against his neighbor's wall so that the three walls formed a kind of beth, his neighbor may stop him until he moves it four cubits away so that there be enough room between the two walls for people to walk in. For treading the ground near the wall strengthens and firms up the walls' foundations. This, only with a garden wall or a wall in the courtyard of a new city, where not many have trodden, and where the ground has not been sufficiently strengthened. But with a wall in the courtyard of an old city, he may join the walls and need not distance them. Likewise, if his neighbor's wall were shorter than four cubits, he need not distance (his wall), for a wall shorter than four cubits requires no strengthening.] And the windows — above, below, and opposite, four cubits. [If he had a window above on his wall, and his neighbor built a wall opposite his window, below it — if there were fewer than four cubits from the top of the wall that he built until the window, he may compel him to lower it, so that he not stand on top of it and look into the window. If he had a window below on his wall, he may compel him to raise the wall that he built opposite four cubits higher than the window, so that he not look into it. And opposite: He must distance the wall four cubits from the window so that he not block its light.]
  	A ladder must be distanced four cubits from a coop, so that a marten not jump (from it). [If one had a pigeon coop in his courtyard near a wall separating two courtyards, and his neighbor came to place a ladder against the wall, he must distance the ladder four cubits from the coop so that a marten not jump from the ladder to the coop and kill the pigeons.] And a wall (must be distanced) four cubits from a mazchilah, so that he can stand a ladder (there). [A mazchilah is a large gutter running along the side of a wall for the roof water to drain into. If one's wall with a mazchilah upon it runs along his neighbor's courtyard, he (his neighbor) must distance himself four cubits from it if he comes to build a wall alongside it, so that he (the other) can stand a ladder there to go up to repair the mazchilah, to clean it of the dirt and rocks that collect there and impair the flow of the water.] A coop is distanced fifty cubits from the city, [for the pigeons spoil the roof gardens]; and he may not set up a coop in his own (field) unless he has fifty cubits on all sides [so that the pigeons not spoil his neighbor's field.] R. Yehudah says: (He must have a distance of) four korin, [a beth kor on all sides. (A kor is thirty sa'ah)], a full [single] flight of a pigeon. But if one bought it (the coop) [as it is, with the land,] even if [there were around it] only [the distance of] a quarter [kav], it remains as it was, [the first having maintained it thus.]
  	If a fledgling were found within fifty cubits [of a coop], it belongs to the owner of the coop. (If it were found) beyond fifty cubits, it belongs to the finder. If it were found between two coops [within fifty cubits of each] — If it were closer to this, it belongs to him (the owner of that coop); if it were closer to that, it belongs to the other. If it were in the middle, they divide.
  	A tree is distanced twenty-five cubits from a city, [an open place before a city enhancing its appearance.] And with a carob and a sycamore, fifty cubits, [their foliage being thick]. Abba Saul says: With every fruitless tree, [which detracts from the city's appearance], fifty cubits. If the city were first, he [the city owner] cuts it down and does not compensate (the owner of the tree); and if the tree were first, he cuts it down and compensates. If it were in doubt (which came first), he cuts it down and does not compensate. [For since it must be cut down no matter which came first, after it is cut down its owner is told: "Prove that it was there first and you will be paid."]
  	A fixed goren (threshing floor) is distanced fifty cubits from the city. [A fixed goren is one which has a large pile which is winnowed with a winnowing shovel. And a goren which does not have a large pile, where the chaff need not be winnowed with a winnowing shovel but is dispersed by the wind blowing through the pile, is called a non-fixed goren.] One may not set up a fixed goren in his own (field) unless he has fifty cubits on all sides. And he distances (it) from his neighbor's plants, and from his nir so that he not harm (them). [A nir is the plowing of the summer days aimed at killing the roots of thorns and weeds. ("so that he not harm":) This is the reason (for distancing) — so that the chaff not harm his plants and his nir. For it (the chaff) moulders and spoils the nir and dries up the plants.]
  	Carcass (deposits), graveyards, and tanneries are distanced fifty cubits from the city. Tanneries are set up only in the east of the city. [For the east wind is harmful only if it comes for punishment. But under normal circumstances it is warm and blows gently and does not carry odors into the city.] R. Akiva says: He may set them up in all directions at a remove of fifty cubits, except west, [where he may not set them up at all, for the Shechinah is in the west. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Akiva.]
  	A mishrah [a place where flax is soaked, which spoils greens that are near it] is distanced from greens, and leeks (are distanced) from onions, [leeks being harmful to onions which are near them], and mustard (is distanced) from bees, [mustard spoiling honey and making it sharp]. R. Yossi permits it with mustard, [for he can tell him: "Before you tell me to remove my mustard from your bees, remove your bees from my mustard! For they come and eat my mustard flowers!" The halachah is in accordance with R. Yossi.]
  	A tree is distanced twenty-five cubits from a pit; and a carob and a sycamore, [whose roots are profuse], fifty cubits — whether from above, [i.e., whether one of them is above on a mountain incline, and the other, below], or on the side [on level ground]. If the pit were (there) first, he (the pit owner) cuts (down the tree) and compensates (its owner). [For since he was permitted to plant, not causing damage until after much time, the sages did not oblige him to cut (down his tree) without compensation because of the damage it might cause to an individual.] And if the tree came before the plant, he (the pit owner) may not cut it down. If it were not known which came first, he may not cut it down. R. Yossi says: Even if the pit came before the tree, he may not cut it down; for the one digs in his own (land), and the other plants in his own (land). [The halachah is in accordance with R. Yossi.]
  	One may not plant a tree near his neighbor's field [whether a grain field or a tree field] unless he distances himself four cubits from it, both for vines and for all trees. [(He must distance himself) enough to work an orchard, so that when he plows his trees he not be constrained to take his plow into his neighbor's field. This, in Eretz Yisrael and other lands where the plow is long. But in Bavel and other lands where the plow is short, two cubits suffice. And it is only between vines and vines, and trees and trees that two cubits suffice. But if one comes to plant a tree field near vines, even in Bavel and the like, he must distance himself four cubits.] If there were a fence between them, each can plant until the fence on either side. If roots went out into his neighbor's (field), he may go down three handbreadths, so that they not stop the plow. [The owner of the field into which the roots of his neighbor's trees intruded may cut them up to a depth of three handbreadths without any reservations.] If he were digging a bor, a shiach, or a ma'arah, (see 2:1), he cuts (the intruding roots) as he goes (i.e., digs) down, and the wood belongs to him [the owner of the field. This, if the place where he were digging were sixteen cubits or more from his neighbor's tree. But if it were less than that, the wood belongs to the owner of the tree. For up to sixteen cubits, they (the roots) are nourished (by the tree), but not beyond that.]
  	If one's tree protruded into his neighbor's field, he (the neighbor) may cut [the branches up to] the full [height of] the ox goad above the plow, [so that they not impede its movement], and with a carob and a sycamore, [whose shade is great, and harmful to the field, he cuts all that protrudes into the field] against a plummet. With a field requiring irrigation, [he cuts] all trees, [even not a carob or a sycamore] against a plummet. [shade being harmful to such a field.] Abba Shaul says: Every fruitless tree (is cut) against the plummet. [This refers to the beginning of the Mishnah, the first tanna saying that he cuts the full height of the ox goad (even with fruitless tress), except for the carob and the sycamore. And Abba Shaul says to him: All fruitless trees are cut against the plummet. The halachah is not in accordance with Abba Shaul.]
  	If a tree projects into the public domain, it is cut [i.e., its lower branches are cut] so that a camel and its rider may pass. R. Yehudah says: A camel laden with flax or with bundles of vine rods. [And it is not necessary to cut for a camel and its rider, for the rider can bend down and pass under it.] R. Shimon says: Every tree (is to be cut) against a plummet against uncleanliness [i.e., lest the branches "tent" over an olive-size of a dead body or the like and render unclean one passing beneath them. The halachah is in accordance with the first tanna alone.]
  
  
  
  	The chazakah (possession period regarded as evidence of ownership) for houses, boroth, shichin, and ma'aroth (see 2:1), dove-cotes, bath-houses, an olive-press, an irrigated field, bondsmen, and all things which produce fruit constantly — their chazakah is three years, from day to day. [If one lost his bill (of purchase), and he brought witnesses that he was in possession in each of the instances adduced in our Mishnah, he is believed to state that he is the purchaser, and he is not told: "Bring your bill of purchase." For up to three years one takes care of his bill (of purchase), but not longer than that. And the claimant is told: If you had not sold it to him, you should have protested before two (witnesses): "Know that that man is 'eating' my land in theft," and the matter would have come to his ears, and he would have been heedful with his bill (of purchase). For "Your friend has a friend, and your friend's friend has a friend." And since you did not protest, it is your loss. ("an irrigated field":) Since it is constantly superintended for purposes of irrigation, it is constantly productive. And the chazakah of something which is constantly productive is three years from day to day. ("bondsmen":) And though we rule: "Godroth (sheep, as in Numbers 32:16: 'gidroth tzon,' (i.e., sheepfolds) have no chazakah," and the same applies to all living things — it is an immediate chazakah that they do not have. That is, if the sheep or the bondsman were known to belong to one man and they entered the house of another, and the second claimed that he had bought them and was in possession of them, this is no chazakah, for they are accustomed to go from house to house. But if he held a bondsman for three years, this is a chazakah and he needs no bill of purchase.] The chazakah of a rain-fed field, [which is productive only once a year] is three years, [not requiring "from day to day."] R. Yishmael says: Three months the first (year), three months the last, and twelve months in the middle — eighteen months. [For there is produce which grows in three months, such as barley, oats, and lentils — so that one may eat three crops in eighteen months.] R. Akiva says: One month in the first, one month in the last, and twelve months in the middle — fourteen months. [Some things grow in thirty days, such as young corn and greens. Therefore, if he ate from it fourteen months, it is a chazakah.] R. Yishmael said: [(R. Yishmael holds that the eating of young corn and greens does not establish a chazakah, but only the eating of real grain and fruit.)] When is this so? [that eighteen months are needed for a rain-fed field?] With a grain field, [all of whose produce is picked in one period, for which reason three years are required.]; but with a tree field, [whose fruits are picked in different periods: grapes, in one period; olives in another; and figs, in another], if he gathered in his produce [grape-wine], harvested his olives, and gathered in his figs [i.e., If he harvested them, dried them, and brought them into his house], this is [a chazakah, as if it were] three years. [The halachah is neither in accordance with R. Akiva nor with R. Yishmael.]
  	There are three lands for chazakah: Judah, Trans-Jordan, and the Galil. [Three lands in Eretz Yisrael are separate from each other vis-à-vis chazakah, so that if one held one of these lands and the owner were in a different land, his chazakah is no chazakah, for caravans are not frequent from one to the other. And even a time which is not one of danger or war is regarded as such a time relative to them, (i.e., It is assumed that) if the owner protested, no one could apprise the holder of the land thereof. Therefore, the holder of the land should have held on to his bill(of purchase), and since he failed to do so, the loss is his.] If he (the owner) were in Judah and he (the other) held (land) in the Galil — if he were in the Galil, and he held in Judah, it is not a chazakah; but he must be with him in the same land, [e.g., both in Judah or both in Trans-Jordan, even if one were in one city, and one in another. For caravans being frequent, he should have protested; and since he did not protest, he is the loser.] R. Yehudah said: They posited three years only, in consideration of: one year for his (the owner's) being in Spain, and his (the other's) holding it, one year for their (messengers') going and apprising him (the owner), and the next year for his (the owner's) coming (and protesting). [R. Yehudah holds that the rationale for chazakah is not that one guards a bill (of purchase) for three years but not longer. For a man does not allow his land to be eaten even for one hour without protesting. Rather, the reason three years were posited is that if the owner were in Spain, etc. But if he (the owner) were with him (the holder) in the same city, then it is a chazakah immediately. And in these three lands between which caravans are not frequent, three years are a chazakah. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	Every chazakah unaccompanied by a claim [justifying one's holding (what was once) his neighbor's] is no chazakah. How so? If he said to him: "What are you doing in what is mine?" and he answered: "No one ever said anything to me," this is not a chazakah. But if he said: "You sold it to me," You gave it to me as a gift," "Your father sold it to me," "Your father gave it to me as a gift," this is a chazakah. And what comes through inheritance, [his having held it three years as his father's inheritance, it having belonged to his father on the day of his death] requires no claim [justifying his father's holding it. However, proof is required of his father's having lived there (at least) one day.] Craftsmen, partners, tenant-farmers, and caretakers have no chazakah. [Artisans, who repair vessels, have no chazakah. If they hold the vessels of others, they cannot claim to have acquired them, even if they are not the type of vessels which are wont to be lent or rented. This, when the vessel is before us in the hand of the craftsman. But if the vessel is not before us in the hand of the craftsman, but one came and claimed that he had given the craftsman a vessel to repair and asked that it be returned, and the craftsman replied that he had it, but that the other had sold it to him, the craftsman is believed with a miggo, viz. Had he wished, he would have denied ever having received it; or he could have claimed that he had returned it. Likewise, if the craftsman claimed that the other had agreed to pay him a certain amount and the other said that it was less, if the vessel is before us in the hand of the craftsman, the owner of the vessel is believed. And if not, the craftsman is believed with an oath, even if he (the owner) had given it to him with witnesses — miggo: Had he wished, he could have said: "I returned it to you." ("partners":) If two hold land in partnership, and one of them ate all of the fruits for three years, this is no chazakah. This, when there is no law of division for the land (see 1:6); but if there is, and one of them ate for three years, it is a chazakah. ("tenant-farmers":) who go down (to get a portion) of the (produce of the ) land — a half, a third, or a fourth. If they ate all of the fruits for three years, this is not a chazakah. And this, only with the tenant-farmers of fathers' houses, who are like caretakers for the children. But others, whom the owners themselves brought down (to the land) — If they ate all of the fruits for three years, it is a chazakah.] A man has no chazakah in the property of his wife. [Even if he wrote her while she were still betrothed: "I have no rights to your property nor to its produce," in which instance he does not eat the fruits by right, and then he brought proof that he ate fruits for three years, it is not a chazakah. For women tend to allow their husbands to eat the fruits of their property, whether by right or not by right.] And a woman has no chazakah in the property of her husband. [Even if he set aside land for her sustenance and she ate fruits form other lands of her husband for three years, still, it is not a chazakah. For men tend to allow their wives to eat of their property even if they have no rights to it.] And a father has no (chazakah) in the property of his son, and a son, in the property of his father. [For they are like caretakers vis-à-vis each other.] When is this so? [that it is not a chazakah] With holding, [i.e., with one's holding under protest, his neighbor claiming it to be stolen.] But one who gives a gift [(before us and says to the receiver: "Go, take hold and acquire," etc.) All of those mentioned above in the Mishnah as not having a chazakah, when they "take hold" (of the object) they are as all receivers of gifts; they do acquire, and the giver cannot retract. And a woman who gave or sold to her husband her melog property (see Yevamoth 4:3) — when the husband "takes hold" of it, he acquires it, and she cannot say: "I was just giving pleasure to my husband." For it is only with tzon-barzel property, or with land that her husband set aside for her kethubah that we say her sale is no sale and her gift is no gift in that she can say: "I was just giving pleasure to my husband." For her husband has some connection with those lands. But with melog property with which he has no essential connection whatsoever, she cannot say: "I was just giving pleasure to my husband." Likewise, a man who sold some of his property to his wife — If the money whereby she acquired it were not "secreted with her," the sale stands; the property reverts to the woman, and the husband eats fruits. And if that money were secreted with her, the sale is void. For he can say: "I 'concocted' the sale only to 'ferret out' the money secreted with her."] ("But one who gives a gift") and brothers who divide (the inheritance), [ (each, "taking hold" of his portion, cannot retract.) ] and one who "takes hold" of the property of a proselyte, [(who died without heirs, in which instance whoever is first to take hold of his property acquires it)] — If he made somewhat of a door, or of a wall, or of a breach [in it], this is a chazakah.
  	If two testified that he had eaten (from the field) three years, and they were found to be zomemim (scheming witnesses - See Deuteronomy 19:19), they pay him (the field's owner) everything. If two (testified for the first year, two for the second, and two for the third (and they were found to be zomemim), they "third" it among themselves. [Each pair gives a third, for they are three pairs for three years.] If they were three brothers, [one brother for each year], and another joining them [i.e., testifying with each of them] they constitute three testimonies [For what one (pair) testifies, the other does not, for which reason their testimony is kasher], and they constitute one testimony for [purposes of] hazamah (scheming witness), [so that if they are found to be zomemim, they "third" it among themselves. And they do not become zomemim until all (three pairs) are so found.]
  	With these things chazakah obtains [If he "held" his neighbor's field in regard to them, it is a chazakah], and with these things, chazakah does not obtain: If he kept in the courtyard a beast, an oven, a stove, a mill; if he raised chickens there or placed his fertilizer there, it is not a chazakah. [This tanna is speaking of a courtyard of partners, where they do not object to (the other's) keeping a beast or the like. For this reason, it is not a chazakah even if one held it for this purpose for three years.] But if he made a partition for his beast ten handbreadths high, and so for an oven, and so for a mill; and if he brought chickens into his (neighbor's) house, or made a place for his fertilizer three (handbreadths) deep or three (handbreadths) high, it is a chazakah. [For in such an instance one would certainly object, so that if he remained silent for three years and did not protest, it is certainly a chazakah. Maimonides explains that with a partner, who objects to the erecting of a partition, if his partner made a partition and he did not object, it is a chazakah immediately. But with one in general (i.e., not a partner), even if he made a partition and the other did not protest, it is not a chazakah until after three years.]
  	Chazakah does not obtain with a marzev [a small spout placed at the end of a roof gutter], but it does obtain with its place. [If there were a marzev there, and the owner of the courtyard came to remove it completely, so that the roof waters not spill into his courtyard, he may not do so; for the other already has a chazakah that his roof waters spill from that marzev. But if he came to turn it around, e.g., if it were positioned in the south, and he came to position it in the north, the owner of the marzev cannot stop him, for he loses nothing thereby, and he has no chazakah that it was always positioned on one side. "marzev" — the place whence the drop of rain flows. "mar" = a drop, as in (Isaiah 40:15): "Behold, nations are as a drop (mar) out of a bucket."] Chazakah does obtain with a mazchilah [a roof gutter. Being a fixed object, it has a chazakah.] Chazakah does not obtain with an Egyptian ladder. [Since it is small and not fixed, one does not object to another's placing it in his courtyard in order to go up to his (own) roof or dove-cote, for which reason it has no chazakah.] Chazakah does not obtain with an Egyptian window. [A small aperture, not large enough for a man's head to go through has no chazakah. And if the owner of the courtyard wishes to build opposite the window and block it, the owner of the window cannot tell him: "I already have a chazakah in it, and you may not block it." For the other can tell him: "I allowed it only because it caused me no damage." And even so, if he wished, he could have stopped him from making it in the first place, even if it were higher than four cubits. For he could have told him: "(I object), for you might put a bench under the window to gaze at me." And after having allowed him to make it, too, he has no chazakah.] And chazakah obtains with a Tyrian window, [an aperture through which a man's head can fit, even if it is higher than four cubits. Or an aperture made to admit light, even if it is very small. Or a window below four cubits. All of these three apertures — If one allowed them to be made, chazakah obtains with them, and he (the owner of the courtyard) can no longer build opposite them and block them. For chazakah obtains where there is (acquiescence in) damages, with the exception of (damages of) smoke, dust, and privy (i.e., a foul odor), chazakah not obtaining with these three, even after the passage of many years. But chazakah does obtain with (acquiescence in) sight damages. And three years of chazakah are not required for damages; but it obtains as soon as he (the "damager") can tell the damaged one: "You experienced the damage and did not protest."] Which is an Egyptian window? Whatever a man's head cannot fit through. R. Yehudah says: If it has a frame, [such as a lintel above and a cross-piece below], even if a man's head cannot fit through, chazakah obtains with it. A ziz [wood or stone projecting from a wall into the courtyard of one's neighbor], until a handbreadth, chazakah obtains with it. [If it is a handbreadth or more, chazakah obtains with it and the owner of the courtyard may not build against it and block the ziz, the other having a chazakah in it.] And he can protest. [If the owner wishes to insert a ziz, a handbreadth or more, the owner of the courtyard may protest against his doing so.] With less than a handbreadth chazakah does not obtain, and he cannot protest. [If it is less than a handbreadth, it is not a fixed object, for which reason chazakah does not obtain with it, so that the other may build against it and block it. And if the owner of the wall wishes to insert such a ziz to begin with, the owner of the courtyard cannot stop him.]
  	One may not open his windows to a courtyard held in partnership, [and, it goes without saying, to his neighbor's courtyard, because of "sight damage."] If one (of the partners to the courtyard) bought a house in a different courtyard [close to the first], he may not open it [i.e., he may not open an entrance in it] to the common courtyard, [for he thereby increases passage into it by the inhabitants of that house.] If he built an upper story on his house, he may not open it to the common courtyard. But if he wishes, he may build a room inside his house, [in which instance he adds nothing, but simply divides his house in two. (For even without this, he may fill up his house with dwellers if he wishes)], and he may build an upper story atop his house and open it into his house. One may not open to a common courtyard a door opposite a door, or a window opposite a window, [it being written (Numbers 24:2): "And Bilam opened up his eyes and he saw Israel dwelling according to its tribes." What did he see? He saw that their (tent-) openings were not opposite each other.] If it were small, he may not make it large. [For the other can say: "With a small opening, I could conceal myself from you; with a large one, I cannot."] If it were one, he may not make it two. [For the other can say: "With one opening I can conceal myself; with two, I cannot."] But a door may be opened opposite a door, and a window opposite a window, to a public domain. If it (the opening) were small, he may make it large. If it were one, he may make it two. [For he can tell the other: "In any event, you have to conceal yourself from those in the public domain."]
  	One may not make a cavity in the public domain: boroth, shichin, and ma'aroth (see 2:1) [even if he took upon himself all damages resulting therefrom. For people do not wish to incur damage and litigate for compensation.] R. Eliezer permits it [so long as he covers it securely], so that a stone-laden wagon can ride over it, [and we do not fear that the covering will give way with time. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Eliezer.] Small boards and large beams are not projected outwards into the public domain, [lest the passersby stumble over them]. But if one wishes, he may move back into his domain [their corresponding length] and project them. If he bought a courtyard containing boards and beams, they remain in their former status. [ We argue for the buyer and assume that the seller had moved them into his domain.]
  
  
  
  	One who sells a house has not sold the yatzia, even if it opens into it. [A yatzia is a kind of room running around the walls of the house from the outside, as in the Temple, viz. (I Kings 6:6): "…and the nethermost yatzia." Some build it in the thickness of the wall. And even if it opens into the house and is utilized therefrom, still, it is not (regarded as) sold (with it). This, if it contains four cubits; but if not, it is not regarded as distinct (from the house)]. And (he has) not (sold) the room before it, [the house, even if it opens into the house and communicates with it.] And (he has) not (sold) the roof when it has a railing ten handbreadths high, [in which instance it is distinct in itself and not "absorbed" in the house.] R. Yehudah says: If it has the configuration of a door, even if it is not ten handbreadths high, it is not sold. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	(He has) not (sold) the bor [a cavity in the ground] nor the duth [a structure of stones above the ground in the form of a bor], even if he wrote (that he is selling) him the depth and the height (of the house). [He does not acquire the bor and the duth since their use (water storage) is distinct from (that of) the house. (They are not acquired) unless he writes "from the bottom of the depths to the heights of the heavens."] And he [the seller] must buy access rights [from the buyer to the bor and the duth. For the seller sells "generously," reserving nothing for himself.] These are the words of R. Akiva. The sages say: He need not buy access rights. [They hold that the seller sells "stintingly," so that when he sold the house, he reserved for himself access rights to the bor and the duth.] And R. Akiva concedes that if he said to him: "Except these" [the bor and the duth], he need not buy access rights, [for, being a superfluous condition, it is understood to refer to access rights.] If he sold them [the bor and the duth] to another, [leaving the house for himself], R. Akiva says that he (the buyer) need not buy access rights, [for the seller sells "generously," and when he sold him the bor and the duth, he also sold access rights.] The sages say that he must buy access rights. [The halachah is in accordance with R. Akiva.]
  	One who sells a house [("house," unqualified)] has sold the door, [all fixed house appurtenances being subsumed under "house"], but not the key, [it being movable]. He has sold the mortar fixed [in the ground], but not the movable one. He has sold the itztrobel [a circular fixed wooden base on which the mill is placed], but not the keleth [the movable hopper placed around the mill to receive the ground meal, so that it not fall to the ground.] And (he has) not (sold) the oven or the stove, [for they are movable. There are versions which read: "He has sold the oven and the stove." The "oven and the stove" there are of the kind that are fixed in the ground.] If he said to him: ("I sell you) it (the house) and all that is in it," all is sold [i.e., all of these (aforementioned) household appurtenances; but other appurtenances are not sold. Even if he said: "and all that is in it," only household appurtenances, such as key, keleth, and the like, are subsumed therein.]
  	One who sells a courtyard has sold houses [opening into it], (and) boroth, shichin, and ma'aroth [in the houses] (see 2:1). [And even though one who sells a house has not sold bor, shiach, or ma'arah, they are, notwithstanding, "absorbed" in the courtyard.] But (he has) not (sold) the movables. If he said to him: "It and all that is in it," all is sold. In either case, he has not sold him the bathhouse or the olive press therein. [Even if he said: "all that is in it," he has not sold the bathhouse, etc., for they are not included in "courtyard." [R. Eliezer says: If one sells a courtyard, he has sold only the confines of the courtyard. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Eliezer.]
  	One who sells an olive press has sold the yam [the stone in which the olives are placed for grinding], the memel [the upper millstone, with which the olives are crushed], and the bethuloth [the cedar posts supporting the beams in the olive press], but he has not sold the achirin [the heavy boards placed on the sacks in which the crushed olives are placed in order to preserve them], the wheel [by which the stone is rolled to press upon the crushed olives and extract their oil], and the beam. And if he said to him: "It and all that is in it," all is sold. R. Eliezer says: One who sells an olive press has sold the beam.
  	One who sells a bathhouse has not sold the boards [on which clothes are placed], the safsalim [benches. Some read it "s'falim" (the basins), where water is placed for washing], and the vilaoth [the door curtain. Some understand it as the cloth with which one sponges himself; and others, as the cloth with which one covers his genitals when sitting in the bath.] If he said to him: "It and all that is in it," all is sold. In either case, he has not sold the reservoirs [feeding the bathhouse] or the stores of wood [for heating the bathhouse.]
  	One who sells a city has sold the houses [and, it goes without saying, the courtyards, which are its essential constituents], boroth, shichin, and ma'aroth (see 2:1), bathhouses, dove-cotes, olive presses and irrigated ground [i.e., gardens and orchards appertaining to the city]; but he has not sold movables [i.e., appurtenances such as key, keleth, and the like (see 4:3). And it goes without saying that he has not sold wheat and barley.] And if he said to him: "It and all that is in it" — even if there were in it beasts and bondsmen, all are sold. [even bondsmen and beasts, which are mobile; and, it goes without saying, wheat and barley, which is not mobile.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: One who sells a city has sold the santer [a bondsman assigned to guard the city. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.]
  	One who sells a field has sold the stones required for it [i.e., for fencing it], and the reeds in the vineyard [to which the vines are tied], which are required for it, and the produce rooted in the ground, and a reed partition [many reeds growing from one stem], smaller than a beth-rova, [in which instance it is "absorbed" in the field], and a watcher's hut [secured to the ground with lime], which (itself) is not made with lime, and the [young] ungrafted carob. [For when it matures, it strengthens and is grafted, and it assumes a distinct name and is not "absorbed" in the field.], and the [young] virgin sycamore [before its branches are cut. For when it matures, its branches are cut and many grow in their place, and it is called the "sycamore trunk."]
  
  
  
  	One who sells a boat has sold the mast, the sail, the anchor, and all of its "conductors" [the oars, by which the boat is "conducted" to its destination]. But he has not sold the sailors, the packing bags [for its cargo], or its wares. [And all those things mentioned below under "If he sold … he has not sold …" — if he made a gift of the boat or dedicated it, they are not included in the gift or the dedication. They are not like bor, duth, or wine vat (above), which are all "ground-fixed" and "absorbed" in the field relative to dedication and gift, but these are not "absorbed" at all.] And if he said: "It and all that is in it," all are sold. If he sold the wagon, he has not sold the p'radoth [the animals pulling the wagon. This, if they are not attached to it at the time of the sale. Some understand "p'radoth" as the wood pieces, separate (nifradim) from the wagon, by which the wagon is pulled. This, if they are not tied to it at the time of the sale.] If he sold the p'radoth, he has not sold the wagon. If he sold the yoke, he has not sold the team. If he sold the team, he has not sold the yoke. R. Yehudah says: The money apprises us (as to what has been sold.) How so? If he said to him: "Sell me your yoke for two hundred zuz," it is obvious that a yoke (itself) is not sold for two hundred zuz. The sages say: The money is no proof. [As to the ruling (Bava Metzia 4:3) that (with an overcharge of) a sixth the sale is valid and the overcharge is returned, and with an overcharge of more than a sixth the sale is annulled, this is when the buyer might mistakenly think that it is worth that much (more than a sixth, etc.), so that the sale is "a sale in error." But where the buyer would not make such a mistake, as in buying a yoke worth a zuz for two hundred, we say that he gave it to him as a gift and the sale is not annulled. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	One who sells an ass has not sold its gear. R. Nachum Hamadi says: He has sold its gear. [With riding gear, such as saddle and (saddle) cushion, all agree that he acquires them, even if they are not on it at the time of the sale. Where do they differ? With carrying gear, such as sack and (saddle) bags. The first tanna holds that he has not sold him the latter, and Nachum Hamadi holds that he has. The halachah is in accordance with the first tanna, viz.: he has not acquired the carrying appurtenances, even if they were not on it at the time of the sale.] R. Yehudah says: They are sometimes sold and sometimes not sold. How so? If an ass were (standing) before him with its gear on, and he said to him: "Sell me this ass" [implying: as it is, with its gear], its gear is sold. (If he said:) "Is it your ass?" [connoting: (If it is,) sell it to me, then it is as if he sells an ass itself, and] its gear is not sold, [even if it were upon it at the time of the sale. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	One who sells an ass has sold its foal. [the Gemara construes this as an instance of one's saying: "I am selling you a nursing ass." For of what avail is the milk of an ass? It must be, then, that his intent is it and its foal.] If he sold a cow, he has not sold her calf. [This, when he says: "I am selling you a nursing cow." For a cow stands (to be sold) for its milk, and this was his intent: "a cow for its milk."] If one sold ashpah [a place three or more handbreadths high or three or more handbreadths deep, used as a dung deposit],he has sold its [i.e., his animals'] dung. If he sold a bor (see 2:1), he has sold its water. [This is an individual opinion, with which the sages differ. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] If he sold a hive, he has sold the bees. If he sold a dove-cote, he has sold the doves. One who buys the "fruits" of the dove-cote [the fledglings of the entire year] from his neighbor "chases off" the first (breichah) (brood) [and leaves them to the seller. Every two births is called a "breichah." They are left with their mother so that they (the mothers) not fly off.] (One who buys) the "fruits" of a hive [the bees born in the hive during that year] takes three swarms, [the first three leaving the hive, and he places them in his hive. For the first are the best, and the quality progressively diminishes.] And, [after that] he alternates. [That is, he takes one (swarm) and leaves one to the seller to grow and combine with the host to populate the hive; and so, in succession.] (One who buys) honey-combs leaves two [for the nourishment of the bees in the rainy season.] (One who buys) olive trees to cut leaves two shoots [which are then re-planted.]
  	One who buys "two trees" [unqualified] in the midst of his neighbor's field does not acquire [any] land [around them.] R. Meir says: He does acquire land. If they grew, he [the owner of the land] may not cut them, [even though their shade harms his land. For since the owner of the trees has no land, (it is understood that) the owner of the field has "bound" his land to him for all of their requirements so long as they are there.] And what grows from the trunk [i.e., whatever is above the ground, "beholding" the sun] is his [the tree owner's. Not that he should let it grow there; for we fear that the soil might rise until part of the tree growing out of the trunk is covered with it, so that the impression is given of three trees and the buyer might say to him: "You sold me three trees and I own (their) land." (see below) But he must cut it and burn it.] And (what grows) from the roots [i.e., whatever is below the ground] is the land owner's. And if they died [i.e., if the trees dried up], he (the tree owner) has no land [on which to plant others in their place.] If he bought three (trees), he acquires the land, [it being considered a "tree-field," and he acquires the land between tree and tree, and beneath them, and to the side, the full (space) of a fruit picker and his basket, so that he can stand there with his basket and pick. This, when there is no less between tree and tree than four cubits and no more than sixteen. It is only then that he acquires the land as indicated. But if there is less between tree and tree than four cubits or more than sixteen, he does not acquire the land.] If they grew, he (the field owner) may cut them. And what grows from the trunk and from the roots is his (the tree owner's). And if they died, he (the tree owner) has land (on which to re-plant them).
  	One who sells the head of a large beast has not sold the feet. [In the Tosefta it is stated: Where is this so? Where they are not accustomed to do so. But where they are, "all is according to the custom of the land."] If he sold the feet, he has not sold the head. If he sold the windpipe [i.e., the lung, so called because of its windpipe], he has not sold the liver. If he sold the liver, he has not sold the lung. But in a small animal, if he sold the head, he has sold the legs; if he sold the legs, he has not sold the head. If he sold the windpipe, he has sold the liver; if he sold the liver, he has not sold the windpipe.
  	There are four "measures" [distinct laws] in respect to sales: If he sold him good wheat and it was found to be bad, the buyer can back out. [i.e., If it were stipulated that he be given good wheat and it was found to be bad, it is like ona'ah ("wronging," overcharging). Therefore, only the object of the ona'ah, the buyer, can back out, but not the seller, even if the price of wheat rose greatly.] (If it were stipulated that he be given) bad wheat and it was found to be good, the seller can back out. Bad and found to be bad; good and found to be good, neither can back out [even if the price rose or fell. And the buyer cannot say: "I intended good wheat — I said 'bad' only by way of (Proverbs 19:8): '"Bad, bad," the buyer says.'" And, conversely, the seller cannot say: "I intended bad wheat — I said 'good' only because it is the way of a seller to call bad good."] Shechamtith [red (-brown). The Targum of (Genesis 30:35): "And all chum" (brown) is: "And all shechum."], and it were found to be white; white, and it were found to be shechamtith — Olive wood, and it were found to be sycamore wood; sycamore, and it were found to be olive — Wine, and it were found to be vinegar; vinegar, and it were found to be wine — both can back out. [For some prefer the one, and others, the other. All such instances are a mekach tauth (a "mistaken sale") for both, and both can back out, whereas in the instance of "good, and they were found to be bad," all prefer the good. [("Wine, and it were found to be vinegar, etc.":) Some prefer wine; others, vinegar.]
  	One who sells fruits to his neighbor — If he pulled and did not measure, he acquires. [If he pulled from the public domain to an alley or in their common courtyard, he acquires. But pulling in the public domain itself does not effect acquisition. ("even if he did not measure":) As when he stipulated beforehand: "so much produce for so much money." But if he did not do so, even if he measured and pulled he does not acquire, not relying on it. For the seller can ask as much as he wishes, and the buyer can say: "I will buy it only cheap."] If he [the buyer] measured [for the seller in the public domain, even in the vessels of the buyer], and he (the buyer) did not pull, he does not acquire. [For a man's vessels do not acquire for him in the public domain. And if the buyer himself measured, even in the public domain, he acquires with lifting.] If he [the buyer] were shrewd, he rents its place [if it were in the owner's domain, and its place acquires for him. (We are speaking of heavy loads, which are not generally lifted, for which reason he acquires with pulling.)] One who buys flax from his neighbor does not acquire until he moves it from place to place. [That is, (he acquires it) with lifting. And it ("moving") is stated incidentally. For one who lifts something generally moves it from place to place.] And if it were attached to the ground, and he tore somewhat, he acquires. [The Gemara construes this as an instance of the seller's telling the buyer: "Go and improve some ground for me and acquire all that is on it." For since he hired him to do some work on his ground, when he does some work, he acquires his hire, and he also acquires whatever he wished to bequeath him with the hire. Therefore, if he tears somewhat, he acquires.]
  	If one sells wine or oil to his neighbor, and they became dearer or cheaper — If (they became dearer or cheaper) before the measure were full, it is the seller's; if after, the buyer's. [We are speaking of a measuring vessel which belongs to neither and which was lent to both. It is lent to the seller until it is filled, and, thereafter, to the buyer. Therefore, before the measure has been filled, at which stage the vessel is lent to the seller, the buyer does not acquire. And after the measure has been filled, at which point the vessel is lent to the buyer, the buyer acquires.] And if there were a middleman between them and the jug [(which was his)] broke, it broke for the middleman (i.e., he is liable) [and we do not say that he is the messenger of the buyer and that it broke for the buyer.] And he [the seller] must "drip" for him [the buyer] three drops [of what adhered to the sides of the measuring vessel after the wine or oil were poured.] If he turned over and collected, it belongs to the seller [i.e., If he turned the measuring vessel over on its side after having poured the oil or the wine and "dripped" three drops, and the exudate of the measuring vessel collected in one spot at the bottom, it belongs to the seller, the buyer having "despaired" of it.] A shopkeeper need not "drip" three drops, [being preoccupied with selling.] R. Yehudah says: He is exempt [from doing so only] near nightfall on Sabbath eve. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	If one sent his [small] son to a shopkeeper with a pondion [two issarin] in his hand [to bring oil for an issar, and to return an issar], and he measured out an issar of oil for him and gave him an issar, and he (the child) broke the flask [and spilled the oil] and lost the issar, the shopkeeper is liable [for the oil, the flask, and the issar. For the father sent his small son to the shopkeeper only to tell him that he needed oil, not to have him send the oil with his son. The Gemara asks why the shopkeeper should be liable for the flask when it is "willful loss," the father himself having sent it with his son! And it answers that (the instance is one in which) the shopkeeper took it to measure out oil for others, becoming a thief vis-à-vis the flask, so that it is regarded as being in his domain until he returns it to the owner. And even though he returned it to the child, this did not exempt him.] R. Yehudah exempts him; for it was to this end that he sent him [i.e., that the shopkeeper sent it with his son.] And the sages conceded to R. Yehudah that if the flask were in the child's hand and the shopkeeper measured into it, he is not liable [for the flask. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	The wholesaler cleans his measures once in thirty days [because of the wine and oil that congeal in them and thus reduce the measure.], and a homeowner, [who does not sell on the scale of a wholesaler], once in twelve months. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: Just the opposite. A shopkeeper cleans his measures twice a week [For a shopkeeper is not required to "drip" three drops as a wholesaler and a homeowner are (see 3:8), and (residue) remains in the vessel and sticks to it.], and he wipes his weights [i.e., he cleans the stones of his scales with which he measures wet things] once a week. And he cleans his scales for every weighing.
  	R. Shimon b. Gamliel said: When is this (the above) so? With wet (objects). But with dry, it is not necessary. And he (the seller) must lower (the balance) for him (the buyer) a handbreadth [for the weight of a litra or more, but not for less.] If he weighed it exactly, he gives him the due surplus, [a tenth of a litra for every ten litra, which is] one to ten [i.e., one in a hundred] in wet measure, and one to twenty [i.e., a half of a tenth for every twenty litra] in dry measure. In a place where the custom is to use small measure, one may not use large measure, [the buyer losing thereby, receiving only one "surplus" where he should have received many]; (where it is the custom) to use large measure, one may not use small measure. To strike off [what projects above the balance], one may not heap, [even for more money]; to heap, one may not strike off, [even for less money.]
  
  
  
  	If one sells "fruits" [unqualified] to his neighbor, [not specifying whether for eating or for sowing, and they do not sprout] — even flax seed, [which is generally sold for sowing], he is not liable for "returns," [for he can say: "I sold them for eating"; for the rule of the majority is not followed in money matters.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: With garden seeds, which are not eaten, he is responsible for returns. [The Gemara construes the entire Mishnah in accordance with R. Gamliel. It is regarded as defective and to be taught thus: "He is not liable for returns even with flax seed. But with garden seeds, which are not eaten, he is liable for returns. These are the words of R. Shimon b. Gamliel. (For R. Shimon b. Gamliel says that one is liable for garden seeds, which are not eaten.) It is a "mistaken sale," for they were certainly sold for sowing.]
  	If one sells produce to his neighbor, he [the buyer] takes upon himself a quarter of defective (produce) for each sa'ah, this being the normal (spoilage) for produce, and not more.] With figs, he take upon himself ten wormy ones to a hundred, [one out of ten]. With a wine cellar, he takes upon himself ten bad wines to a hundred. [If it is a wine cellar of large jugs, he takes upon himself ten large jugs. If, of (small) pitchers, he takes upon himself ten pitchers. This, only when he says to him: "I sell you this (wine) cellar, and for mikpeh"; that is, to put in a dish. But if he says: "I sell you a cellar of wine for mikpeh," he must give him all good wine. For mikpeh wine must be good and long-lasting, it being used only little by little. And if he said: "I am selling you wine" (unqualified), not mentioning mikpeh, he gives him "average" wine, the kind sold in a shop. And if he said: "I am selling you this cellar," without mentioning wine, even if it were all vinegar, the sale stands.] With (wine) vessels in the Sharon, he takes upon himself ten thin jugs [(which are not entirely baked, and which absorb and exude wine)] to a hundred.
  	If one sold wine to his neighbor and it turned sour, he [the seller] is not liable for returns. [For when he sold it, it was wine. This, only if it became vinegar in the buyer's vessels. For, if in the seller's vessels, he (the buyer) can say to him: "Here is your wine and here are your vessels." And the seller cannot tell him: "Why did you leave it in he vessels so long? It is your loss." For the buyer can tell him: "I told you in the beginning that I intended to use the wine only little by little."] And if it is known that his wine turns sour, [i.e., that it does not last; and the buyer told him that he did not need it for wine (i.e., for immediate drinking), but for mikpeh, to be used little by little], it is a "mistaken sale." [For he should have told him that his wine does not "hold."] And if he told him: "I am selling you spiced wine, [which generally "holds" until Shevuoth, after which it spoils, he must supply him (with wine that holds) until Shevuoth.] And [if he sold him wine purported to be] "old," [he gives him wine] from the previous year. And "very old," from three years (before).
  	If one sells a place to his neighbor to build a house for him; likewise, one who is commissioned by his neighbor to build a "wedding house" for his son, [it being customary to build a house for one's son when he marries], or a "widowhood house" for his daughter, [when her husband dies and she returns to her father's house. But in her husband's lifetime she is with her husband, it not being customary for a man to live with his in-laws], he builds (at least) four by six cubits. These are the words of R. Akiva. R. Yishmael says: This is a cattle shed! [i.e., He must build it larger.] If one wishes to make a cattle shed, he builds four cubits by six. A small house is six by eight. [The smallest of houses is six by eight, and if one sells a place to his neighbor to build a house for him, the house must be (at least) six by eight.] [If he specified] "a large house," (it must be (at least) eight by ten. A "house of state," ten by ten. Its height must be (the sum of) half its length and half its width. [This refers to all of the above, viz.: For a small house, the height is seven cubits; for a large house, nine; and for a "house of state," ten.] Confirmation of this — the (Temple) sanctuary, (which was forty in length, twenty in width, and thirty in height — half the sum of the length and the width.) R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: All according to the structure of the sanctuary. [Some understand this to mean: It is R. Shimon b. Gamliel who taught: "Its height must be … Confirmation of this, etc." Others understand it as R. Shimon b. Gamliel differing with the first tanna, expressing wonder, viz.: "Is everything to be built according to the structure of the sanctuary!" The criterion, rather, is "the custom of the land."]
  	If one owns a well inside his neighbor's house (so that he must pass through the house to reach the well), he enters at a time when men are wont to enter, [i.e., in the daytime, so that he does not constrain his neighbor to arise at night], and he leaves when men are wont to leave. And he does not bring his animal in to give it to drink from his well; but he fills up (from his well) and gives it to drink outside. And this one makes a lock for himself, [so that the house owner not steal water from his well], and that one makes a lock for himself, [at the entrance to the well, so that the other (the well owner) will not be able to draw water without the house owner's knowledge and will not come to his house unless he is there. (This, to prevent infidelity.)]
  	If one owned a garden inside his neighbor's garden, and the latter agreed to give him passage rights through his field, he enters at a time when men are wont to enter and he leaves when men are wont to leave. And he may not bring merchants therein (to buy his produce), and he may not enter therefrom into a different field. [For since he causes him considerable damage by passing through his field, we presume that he agreed (that he pass through) only for his garden needs and not for any other purpose.] And the outer may sow the path. [For since it is in the midst of his field, we presume that he did not grant him the path entirely to the point of his not being able to sow it.] If he were given a side path by mutual agreement, he may enter when he wishes and leave when he wishes and bring merchants therein. But he may not enter therefrom into a different field; and both may not sow it. [For since it is a side path, it was intended for passage alone.]
  	If a public path [i.e., one always used by the public] passed through one's field — If he took it and gave them one on the side, what he gave is given and (what he took) for himself does not revert to him. [And the public (now) has two paths, it being ruled: "A path held by the public may not be subverted."] A private path is four cubits. [i.e., If one sells his neighbor a path in the midst of his field, he must give him (at least) four cubits. A public path is sixteen cubits. The king's path has no limits. [For a king may "breach fences" before him to make a way for himself.] The path [on which one is carried] to the grave has no limits. [This is a rabbinic ordinance of respect for the dead. Not that those accompanying the body may "breach fences," as a king may, but they may pass over sown ground and need not detour to the side.] (If one sells his neighbor) a ma'amad (site), the judges of Sepphoris say: (He must give him at least an area of four kabin [i.e., thirty-three cubits and two handbreadths in width by fifty cubits in length. In the place of the ma'amad (lit., "standing"), they would execute seven standings and seven sittings when they returned from burying the dead, corresponding to the seven "Vanities" in the beginning of the book of Koheleth.]
  	If one sells a place to his neighbor to make a grave for himself; likewise, if one is commissioned by his neighbor to make a grave for him, he makes the middle of the (burial) cave four cubits [wide] by six [cubits] long, and opens into it eight graves: three on one side and three on the other [on the two sides of the length of the cave], and two opposite [the entrance of the cave], each grave four cubits long, six cubits wide,  and seven cubits high [so that between each grave on the sides there are one and a half cubits; and between the two at the end, two cubits.] R. Shimon says: He makes the middle of the grave six cubits by eight, and opens into it thirteen graves: four on one side and four on the other, three opposite (the entrance), one to the right of the entrance and one to the left. And a courtyard is made before the cave, six by six, the fullness of (i.e., large enough to contain) the litter and its buriers; and two caves are opened into it, one on each side. R. Shimon says: Four, on its four sides. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: All according to the (hardness) of the rock. [If it is hard, he is required to dig only six cubits long and four cubits wide, as per the first tanna; and if it is soft and loose, he is required to dig six by eight as per R. Shimon. The halachah is in accordance with the first tanna.]
  
  
  
  	If one says to his neighbor: "I am selling you a beth-kor of soil, if there were clefts ten handbreadths deep, or rocks ten handbreadths high, [(this, when they are four by four handbreadths wide, in which instance, they are "distinctive" places)], they are not measured together with it [and he must give him a complete beth-kor of level earth. For one does not wish to spend money on one place and have it look like two or three places. A beth-kor is 75,000 cubits. For the sanctuary courtyard was two sa'ah, and it was a hundred by fifty cubits; and a kor is thirty sa'ah. ("soil":) fit for sowing. But if he said: "beth-kor," unqualified, or "a beth-kor of ground," even if it were all rocky, the sale stands. For he could have wanted it for building a house or spreading out fruit.] And if he said to him: "as a beth-kor of soil," [connoting, as it is, whether rocky ground or (arable) soil], even if there were clefts deeper than ten handbreadths or rocks higher than ten handbreadths, they are measured with it.
  	(If one says to his neighbor:) "I am selling you a beth-kor of soil, 'rope-measure,'" [i.e., "exactly," as one measures with the rope, not more and not less] — If there were somewhat less [in that field than a full beth-kor, the sale is valid], and he [the seller] deducts [the difference.] If there were somewhat more [land than a beth-kor], he (the buyer) returns [to the seller the additional land or its value, as explained below.] If he [the seller] said [to the buyer: "I am selling you a beth-kor of soil], more or less, [for so much and so much money," not saying "rope-measure"], then even if there were a quarter less for every sa'ah or a quarter more for every sa'ah [that is, thirty quarters for a beth-kor], the sale is valid. [And since the tanna teaches: "even if there were a quarter less for every sa'ah rather than: "even if there were less than seven and a half kavin to a kor," we infer that even with a minimal sale such as: "I am selling you a beth-sa'ah of soil, more or less," if there were a quarter less or a quarter more, the sale is valid. And if he said: "beth-kor," unqualified, this, too, is considered like "more or less."] If there were more than this [a quarter to every sa'ah], he makes a reckoning [how much more it is than a beth-kor, and how much it costs relative to the price of the beth-kor]. What does he return to him? Money. And if he (the seller) wishes, he returns land. Why, then, did they say that he returns money? [For by law he should return only land, the buyer having bought only a beth-kor.] To strengthen the hand of the seller. [That he not lose (the value) of that small (piece of) land, which, in itself (i.e., as land) is worthless to him.] So that if he left over [in a beth-kor] a field of nine kavin, [so that the land is now of significance to him — as stated above (1:6), that nine kavin constitute a field — then he does not return money to him, but the seller takes his land.]; and (if he left over) in a garden, a half-measure, and, according to R. Akiva a quarter-measure, he returns the land to him. [We are apprised by our Mishnah that seven and a half kavin to a kor, which is a quarter kav to every sa'ah, is waived (by the seller); from seven and a half kavin until (and not including) nine kavin, a reckoning is to be made; and from nine kavin on, the land is to be returned.] And he returns not only the excess, but all of the quarters. [This is the intent: Where it is stated that a (monetary) reckoning is to be made or that he returns land, it is not the excess alone that he returns, but also all the additional thirty quarters to a beth-kor. For since there is "distinctive" land in toto, he waives nothing.]
  	[If one says to his neighbor these two things which contradict each other:] "I am selling you rope-measure, more or less", ["rope-measure" connoting exactness, and "more or less," approximation], [the latter phrase] "more or less" cancels [the former, "rope-measure." [And even if there were a quarter less to every sa'ah, or a quarter more, the sale stands.] (If he says: "I am selling you) more or less, rope-measure," "rope-measure" cancels "more or less." These are the words of Ben Naness. [He holds that the last expression is followed; and the rabbis differ, saying that the lesser expression (i.e., that which results in "less" for the buyer) is followed, whether it be first or last. The rabbis are in doubt as to which expression is to be followed, so (they rule) that the buyer takes in accordance with the expression which results in less for him. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] (If he says:) ["I am selling you a beth-kor of soil] within these signs and boundaries" less than a sixth, the sale stands; until a sixth, he deducts (the difference). [The intent is: If the beth-kor were lacking a sixth (and, it goes without saying, less than a sixth), the sale stands. But if there were more than a sixth, and downwards, until (but not including) a sixth, he deducts (the difference.)]
  	If one says to his neighbor: "I am selling you half a field," they "fatten" between themselves, and he (the buyer) takes his half of field. [They designate the "fat spot" in the field and the seller takes it, the buyer having the lower hand. And, corresponding to it, he gives the buyer inferior land amounting to the value of the "fat spot" taken by the seller. For when he said: "I am selling you half a field," his intent was the value of half a field. So that (for example) if it (the field) were one hundred cubits for one hundred dinars, and there were in it a "fat spot" of thirty cubits worth fifty dinars, the seller takes it and gives the buyer seventy cubits of the (relatively) inferior ground for fifty dinars. The (practical) difference — A man prefers one measure of superior soil to two measures of inferior, though the price be the same.] (If he said:) "I am selling you half in the south, they "fatten" between themselves, and he takes his half in the south. [The entire field is not assessed as (it is) in the first instance, but the value of half the field in the south is assessed, whether superior or inferior, and corresponding to the value of the half in the south, the seller gives the buyer (land of) inferior quality wherever he wishes (in that field). For the buyer has the lower hand, and his (the seller's) intent might have been: "I am selling you the value of the southern half wherever I wish in my land."] And he [the seller] takes it upon himself [to allocate] space [in the half-field that he bought] for a fence, a rut and a small rut, [both of them behind the fence on the outside, so that an animal not jump (over the fence) into the field. For if he made (just) a rut, and not a small rut, since the rut is wide, it could back off in it and jump to the other side. And if he made (just) a small rut and not a rut, since it is small, it could stand on its edge and jump. And what is (the distance) between a rut and a small rut? A handbreadth.] How large is a rut? Six handbreadths. And a small rut? Three.
  
  
  
  	There are those [kin] who inherit [other kin] and bequeath inheritance [to them at their death]; inherit, but do not bequeath; bequeath but do not inherit; neither inherit nor bequeath. These inherit and bequeath: A father (inherits) his sons, [viz. (Numbers 27:8): "A man, if he die, and he have no son, then you shall pass his inheritance to his daughter" — Where the deceased has a daughter, you pass the inheritance from the father (of the deceased), but you do not do so where he has (no sons and daughters, but only) brothers.] And sons (inherit) their fathers, [viz. (Ibid.: "A man, if he die, and he have no son," the implication being that if he does have a son, the son takes precedence.] And brothers from the father (inherit each other), [viz. (Ibid. 11): "…by their families, according to the house of their fathers."] These (the above) inherit and bequeath. A man (inherits) his mother, [viz. (Ibid. 36:8): "And every daughter who receives an inheritance from the tribes of the children of Israel." How can a daughter inherit two tribes? She can, in an instance where he father is from one tribe and her mother from a different one, the daughter (in the absence of male heirs) inheriting them. And since it is written "tribes," the tribe of the mother is being likened to the tribe of the father, i.e.: Just as with the tribe of the father the son takes precedence to the daughter, so with the tribe of the mother.] A man inherits his wife, [viz. (Ibid. 27:11): "…his flesh" — this is his wife. The verse is understood as: "And you shall give the inheritance of his wife to him." (We "diminish, and add, and expound.") I might think that she, likewise, inherits him; it is therefore, written (Ibid.): "And he shall inherit it" (lit., "her") — He inherits her, but she does not inherit him.] And the sons of sisters (inherit the deceased where there are no closer kin.) These (the above) inherit, but do not bequeath. A woman, her son; a woman her, husband; and the mother's brothers, (her son) — they bequeath, but do not inherit. And brothers from the mother — they neither inherit nor bequeath (to each other.)
  	The following is the order of inheritance: (Numbers 27:8): "A man, if he die, and he have no son, then you shall pass his inheritance to his daughter": A son takes precedence to a daughter, and all the offspring of a son take precedence to a daughter. A daughter takes precedence to brothers (of the deceased). The offspring of a daughter take precedence to brothers. Brothers (of the deceased) take precedence to the brothers of the father (of the deceased). The offspring of the brothers take precedence to the brothers of the father. This is the rule: All who take precedence in inheritance, their offspring (also) take precedence. [And if his offspring are not alive, their inheritance reverts to the father. How so? If Reuven died, Chanoch, Falu, Chetzron, and Karmi, his sons, inherit him. If one of the sons died before Reuven, leaving over a son or a daughter, or a son of a son or a daughter of a son, or a son of a daughter or a daughter of a daughter — until a hundred generations — he inherits in place of his father in the property of his father, Reuven, sharing as one of the sons of Reuven. And if Reuven has neither sons, nor sons of sons, and not even daughters of sons, then the daughters of Reuven inherit Reuven. And if Reuven has neither daughters nor sons of daughters, nor daughters of daughters until the end of all the generations, then Yaakov inherits Reuven, his son. And if Yaakov is not alive, then Shimon, Levi, Yehudah, Yosef, Binyamin, etc., Reuven's brothers, the sons of his father, inherit him. And if they are not alive, the sons of Shimon, Levi, etc. inherit Reuven. And if they have neither sons nor sons of sons, their daughters, or sons of daughters, or daughters of daughters inherit. For the male and his heirs always take precedence to the female. And if the brothers of Reuven died without children, or if he never had a brother, he is inherited by his sister, Dinah, the daughter of Yaakov, or her sons, or the sons of her sons, or her daughters or the daughters of her daughters, until the end of time. And if Reuven has neither sister nor children of sister, his inheritance reverts to his father's father, Yitzchak. And if Yitzchak is not alive, Reuven's inheritance reverts to Esav, Yitzchak's son, the brother of the father of Reuven. And if Esav is not alive, the inheritance reverts to Elifaz, the son of Esav, or his sons, or the sons of his sons, or his daughters, or the daughters of his daughters, until the end of all the generations. And if no brothers of Reuven's father nor descendants of theirs are alive, Reuven's inheritance reverts to his father's sister, or her sons, or the sons of her sons, or her daughters, in the aforementioned order. And if Reuven's father has neither brothers nor sons of brothers, nor sisters nor sons of sisters, then his inheritance reverts to Avraham, the father of the father of his father, and so on, until Adam.] And the father (of the deceased) takes precedence to all of his (the father's) offspring. [He takes precedence to the brothers of the father (i.e., the deceased) and their sons. And the brothers of the father take precedence to the sisters of the father, and the brothers of the father and the sisters of the father take precedence to the father of the father (of the deceased). And the father of the father takes precedence to the brothers of the father of the father. And the brothers of the father of the father and even the sister take precedence to the father of the father of the father, and so on, in perpetuum.]
  	The daughters of Tzelafchad took three portions in the inheritance [of Eretz Yisrael]: the portion of their father, who was one of those who left Egypt, his portion with his brothers in the property of Chefer, and his additional portion as a bechor (first-born). [This tanna holds that Eretz Yisrael was apportioned among those who left Egypt, it being written (Numbers 26:55): "According to the names of the tribes of their fathers shall they inherit." Tzelafchad and Chefer, his father, both took a portion in the land, both being among those who left Egypt. And the daughters of Tzelafchad took the portion in the land accruing to their father, the portion accruing to them from the inheritance of Chefer, his father, and the additional portion accruing to him as a bechor. And even though they had not yet inherited the land, and a bechor does not take a double portion of what is to come after death, Eretz Yisrael was regarded as (already) held.]
  	Both the son and the daughter (share) in the inheritance. But a son takes a double share in the property of the father and not in the property of the mother; and the daughters are fed from the property of the father and not from the property of the mother. [This is the intent: Both the son and the daughter are equal in the inheritance of the property of the mother as (they are) in the inheritance of the property of the father. And there is no difference between the inheritance of the property of the mother and the inheritance of the property of the father. It is just that a bechor takes a double share in the property of the father, but not in the property of the mother, etc.]
  	If one says: "This man, my son, a bechor, shall not take a double portion," or "This man, my son, shall not inherit with his brothers," he has said nothing, for he stipulates against what is written in the Torah. [And he cannot divest him of the inheritance unless he gives his property as a gift to his other sons.] If one distributed his property among his sons by his word, [one's command in the face of death being regarded as "written and transmitted in the Torah," and not requiring a kinyan (an act effecting acquisition), (this being the thrust of "by his word")] and he accorded more to one and less to another, and made the bechor equal to them [by using an expression of "gift"], his words stand. [And this is not considered stipulating against what is written in the Torah. For one has the right to give his money as a gift to whomever he wishes.] And if he said "as inheritance," [i.e., If he gave more to one and less to another as inheritance, saying: "This man, my son, shall inherit a field of a beth-kor, and that man, my son, shall inherit a field of a beth-lethech," or of his son, a bechor, that he is to inherit equally with the others, he has said nothing, having stipulated against what is written in the Torah]. If he wrote "as a gift" either in the beginning, the middle, or the end, his words stand. [in the beginning: "Let this field be given to this one and let him inherit it." in the end: "Let him inherit it and let it be given to him." in the middle: "Let him inherit this field, and let it be given to him, and let him inherit it."] If one says: "Let this man inherit me," where he has a daughter, or "Let my daughter inherit me," where he has a son, he has said nothing, having stipulated against what is written in the Torah. R. Yochanan b. B'roka says: If he says this about one who is fit to inherit him, his words stand. And if about one who is not fit to inherit him, his words do not stand. [e.g., If he said it about one son among the other sons, or about one daughter among the other daughters, his words stand, it being written (Deuteronomy 21:16): "Then it shall be, on the day that he causes his sons to inherit" — The Torah granted the father authority to cause whichever of his sons he wishes, to inherit him. And R. Yochanan concedes that with a brother, where he has a daughter, or with a daughter, where he has a son, he has said nothing. For a daughter is not fit to inherit where there is a son; or a brother, where there is a daughter. Likewise, R. Yochanan concedes that if he made the bechor equal to the other brothers, he has said nothing, it being written (Ibid.): "He shall not be able to grant primogeniture, etc." The halachah is in accordance with R. Yochanan b. B'roka.] If one writes his property over to others, passing over his children, what he did is done, but the sages do not look favorably upon it, [even if his children to not deport themselves properly, for good children might issue from them.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: If his children did not deport themselves properly (and he disinherited them thus), he is "remembered for the good." [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.]
  	If one says: "This is my son," he is believed, [to cause him to inherit and to exempt his (own) wife from yibum (levirate marriage)]. (If one says:) "This is my brother," he is not believed, [to cause him to inherit with his brothers, for they do not recognize him.] And he (the one called "my brother") takes (i.e., shares) with him (the one who calls him his brother) in his portion. [So that if there were two brothers aside form the safek (the "doubtful" one), and there were three fields for them to divide, one takes one and a half, and the other takes one and a half, and the one who calls the safek his brother gives him half the field, and the other gives him nothing, saying: "Bring proof and take."] If he [the safek] dies, the property [given to him by his brother] returns to its place, [i.e., to the one who gave it to him; but the other brothers do not inherit him.] If property fell to him [the safek] from elsewhere [in his lifetime, or if he bought property and then died], his brothers inherit with him [the one who testified about him. For he (the safek) admitted to them that he is their brother. This, when the other brothers do not absolutely deny that he is their brother, but only say that they do not recognize him. But if they do deny it, only the one who testified for him inherits him.] If one died, and a daitiki [a deathbed will ("daitiki" - "da tehei lemeikam ulemehevei" — "This shall be to establish and to confirm")] were found tied to his thigh, [in which instance it cannot be maintained that another wrote it and placed it there, even so], it is nothing, [for acquisition is effected only with transference of the writ, and "there is no writ after death."] If he invested another with it, whether one of the heirs, or one not an heir, his words stand.
  	If one writes over his property to his sons, he must write: "from today and after death," [connoting: The land itself is acquired by you from today, and you shall not eat its fruits until after (my) death. And if he does not write "from today," he gives him nothing, for there is no giving after death.] These are the words of R. Yehudah. R. Yossi says: He need not [write "from today." For since it is written in the deed: "On this and this day of the week, so and so said to us: 'Be witnesses for me, etc.'", the date indicates that the gift "began" on that day. For if this is not so, why need the date be written at all? The halachah is in accordance with R. Yossi.] If one writes over his property to his son after his death, [i.e., "from today and after death"], the father cannot sell it [without the son], for it is written over to the son, [i.e., the land itself is owned by the son], and the son cannot sell it [without the father], for it is in the father's domain [i.e., the fruits are owned by the father.] If the father sold it [without qualification], they [the fruits] are sold (to the buyer) until he [the father] dies. If the son sold it [in the father's lifetime], the buyer does not have them [the fruits] until the father dies. The father [who wrote over his property to his son "from today and after death"] tears off and feeds [the fruits] to whomever he wishes [in his lifetime. But as to what was left in the ground at the time of his death, even though it stands to be torn out, it belongs to his son, the receiver of the gift. However, if one writes over his property to another, even what is left in the ground at the time of his gift belongs to the heirs. For a man is more favorably disposed towards his son than towards another.] And what was left over, torn (from the ground) belongs to the heirs. If he left sons, grown and small, the grown ones are not clothed at the expense of the small [(The clothing expenses of the grown ones are greater than those of the small)], and the small ones are not fed at the expense of the grown ones. But they share equally. [(The food expenses of the small ones are greater than those of the grown, for they eat more often and leave over more.) Therefore, the small ones keep the grown ones from being clothed by the estate, and the grown ones keep the small ones from being fed by it, but each is clothed and fed from his own share.] If the grown sons married [and took their wedding expenses from the estate after the death of their father], the young ones may also marry [i.e., they may also take their wedding expenses from the estate.] And if the younger ones said [after the death of their father]: "We shall marry as (i.e., in the same style that) you did" [in our father's lifetime], they are not heeded, but whatever their father gave them [in his lifetime], he gave.
  	If he left over daughters [and not sons], the grown ones are not clothed at the expense of the small, and the small are not fed at the expense of the grown, but they share equally. If the grown daughters married, the young ones may also marry. And if the younger ones said: "We shall marry as you did," they are not heeded. This is a stringency of daughters over sons: Daughters are fed [as a condition of the kethubah] at the expense of the sons, whereas they [small daughters] are not fed at the expense of the [grown] daughters. [For where sons do not inherit, the daughters are not fed by condition of the kethubah, but they share equally, and each is fed from her own portion.]
  
  
  
  	If one died and left sons and daughters — When the inheritance is ample, [sufficient to feed the sons and the daughters until the daughters are grown], the sons inherit and the daughters are fed (by them). When the inheritance is scant, [i.e., insufficient for the above], the daughters are fed (from it) and the sons go soliciting at the doors. Admon says: "Because I am a male shall I lose out!" [i.e., I should not lose out; we should all be fed together.] R. Gamliel said: "I concur with Admon." [The halachah is not in accordance with Admon. And they (the sages) made a widow in respect to a daughter with scant property like a daughter in respect to brothers, viz.: Just as with a daughter in respect to brothers, the daughter is fed and the sons solicit at the doors, so with a widow in respect to a daughter. The widow is fed and the daughter solicits at the doors.]
  	If one left sons and daughters and a tumtum [one whose gender, male or female, is in doubt], the males "push him off" to the females, [saying to him: "Prove that you are a male and share" (with us in the inheritance)]. Where there is scant property, the females "push him off" to the males, [saying to him: "Prove that you are a female and be fed with us."] If one says: "If my wife bears a male, let him get one hundred," if she bore a male, he gets one hundred. [And even though we rule that "if one endows a fetus, it does not acquire," here we are speaking of a deathbed gift to one's son, a man being (more) favorably disposed towards his son (than to others)]. (If one says: "If my wife bears a female, (let her get) two hundred," if she bore a female, she gets two hundred. (If she said:) "If a male, one hundred; if a female, two hundred," if she bore a male and a female [twins], the male gets one hundred and the female, two hundred. If she bore a tumtum, it does not get anything. [This Mishnah is rejected, and the halachah is that a tumtum gets the least (amount) of the two.] If he said: "Whatever my wife bears, let him get…" (and it turns out to be a tumtum), it gets. And if there is no other heir, it inherits everything. [We might think that a tumtum is a distinct type of being and not fit to inherit; we are, therefore, apprised otherwise.]
  	If one left over sons, grown and small — If the grown ones improved the property [while it was still part of the estate, they have improved it for all (i.e., all share equally in the improvement). [This, when the property improved through the property itself, the brothers not having spent anything of their own, but having hired workers from (the proceeds of) their father's property, the property improving "of itself." But if they themselves dug and planted and spent what was theirs, then what they improved, they improved for themselves.] If they said: "See what our father left us! We shall work (the land) and eat!", they have improved it for themselves. Likewise, if a woman improved the property, she has improved it for all. If she said: "See what my husband left me! I shall work (the land) and eat!", she has improved it for herself. [The Gemara construes this as an instance of a woman's having inherited, e.g., Reuven married the daughter of Shimon, his brother, and died without children, and the daughters of Shimon, his (deceased) brother, inherit him (Reuven). It is found, then, that his (Reuven's) wife, the daughter of Shimon, his brother, inherits him with her other sisters. We might think that because of the reputation she receives as a woman who can "manage (property) and improve (it)," even if she said: "See what my husband left me, etc.!", she is willing to waive what she expended and to share the improvement with the others; we are, therefore, apprised that she has improved it for herself.]
  	If brothers were partners and one of them were awarded a royal sinecure, [it being customary for the king to appoint one man as a tax collector for all the houses of the city for a month or two], it [the entire profit] is shared by all [of the brothers, the position having come to him by virtue of their father. But if he secured it through his sharpness, his eminence, or his wisdom, then his profit is his.] If he fell ill and were healed, he is healed at his own expense. [If he fell ill accidentally, i.e., if he were not neglectful of his health, he is healed from the common fund. But if he fell ill through (excess) of cold or heat, and the like, of which it is written (Proverbs 22:5): "He who guards his soul will stay far from them," of this it is stated in the Mishnah that he is healed at his own expense.] If some of the brothers provided shushbinuth in the father's lifetime — if the shushbinuth returns, it returns to all; for shushbinuth is exacted in beth-din. ["Shushbinuth" — one's taking a meal and a gift to the chuppah (the marriage ceremony) and eating with the groom — who reciprocates when the other takes a wife. And if the father sent shushbinuth, without qualification, with one of his sons, and it returned after the father's death, it returns to all. For it is regarded as a loan, being exactable in beth-din. For one who takes shushbinuth to his neighbor can return and claim it from him in beth-din in corresponding circumstances, i.e., that the marriage of the second be as that of the first — if (marriage with) a virgin, a virgin; if a widow, a widow; if in public, in public; if in private, in private. For the second can say to the first: "I shall do with you only as you did with me."] But if one sends to his neighbor pitchers of wine or pitchers of oil [without a chuppah, or with a chuppah, but without going to eat with him], it is not exacted in beth-din, for it is (an act of) lovingkindness (alone) [i.e., It is not shushbinuth, but a gift.]
  	If one sent betrothal gifts to the house of his (prospective) father-in-law [(It was the custom of the groom the day after the betrothal to send to the house of the betrothed jewelry, confections, pitchers of wine and pitchers of oil, and sometimes the groom would go and eat there)] — If he sent there a hundred maneh and ate "the groom's feast" there, even (only) the value of a dinar, they (the betrothal gifts) are not reclaimed [if he or she died (in the interim) or if he decides to divorce her. For (it is presumed that) because of the pleasure afforded him by the groom's feast, he waived them. This, only if he ate (at least the value of) a dinar. But if he ate less than that, he is not presumed to have waived them and he reclaims them.] If he did not eat the groom's feast there, they are reclaimed. If he sent many betrothal gifts, to return with her to her husband's house, they are reclaimed. [And even if he sent few, but specified that they were to be returned with her to her husband's house, they are reclaimed. The common instance is stated, it being the custom to send many gifts to be returned with her to her husband's house; and those that were sent her to adorn herself with in her father's house were generally few.] If he sent a few, to be used in her father's house, they are not reclaimed.
  	If a sh'chiv mera (one on his deathbed) wrote over all of his property to others, leaving over some land for himself, his gift stands. If he did not leave over any land, his gift does not stand. [The same applies if he left over movables. And if he rose (from his sickbed), he cannot retract. This, if he (the recipient) acquired that gift from his hand. For a limited gift of a sh'chiv mera requires a kinyan (an act of acquisition), whether or not he recovers. And if the recipient did not acquire it from his hand, he does not acquire it even if he died. This, only when he wishes to confer the gift while alive; but if he instructed that something be given to someone after his death, a kinyan is not required, even if he reserved something for himself. And a sh'chiv mera who wished to confer a gift while alive, if he reserved nothing for himself, and he recovered, he may retract, even if it was acquired from his hand. And when he so instructs because of (what he thinks is his) impending death (as when we hear him say: "Woe unto me, for I am going to die!"), he may always retract, whether or not he reserved something for himself, and even if it were acquired from his hand. And if he died, the other acquires the gift, even without a kinyan.] If he did not write him (in the deed of gift) "sh'chiv mera" [i.e., "when he was sick in bed," or an expression connoting health, e.g., "when he was walking on his feet in the marketplace," and he left over nothing] — If he says: "I was a sh'chiv mera" [and I retract], and the other says: "You were well" [and you cannot retract], he must bring proof that he was a sh'chiv mera. [For we follow the present state. Since he is well now, he must bring proof that he was a sh'chiv mera at the time of the gift.] These are the words of R. Meir. And the sages say: [We do not follow the present state, but we say that] the burden of proof is upon him who would exact (payment) from his neighbor. [And the would-be recipient, who wishes to exact (the gift) from the giver, who now holds it — it devolves upon him to bring proof and witnesses that he was well at that time. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]
  	One who divides his property by (verbal) behest — R. Eliezer says: Whether he be in good health or close to death, bound property (i.e., land) is acquired by money, deed, and chazakah (an act of "taking hold"), and unbound property is acquired only with meshichah ("pulling"). [R. Eliezer does not hold that the words of a sh'chiv mera are "as written and transmitted," so that even if one instructs (that his property be given to another) because of his impending death, his gift is no gift without a kinyan, just as that of one in good health. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Eliezer.] They (the sages) said to him: Once, the mother of the sons of Rochel was sick, and she said: "Give my daughter my k'veinah; [(The Targum of (Isaiah 3:23): "redidim" (veils) is "k'veinata"] it is worth twelve maneh," and she died; and they acted upon her words! He (R. Eliezer) said to them: "The sons of Rochel — let their mother bury them!" [i.e., No proof is to be adduced from them, for they were wicked, and the rabbis penalized them by upholding their mother's gift to the daughter, though it was not halachically valid.] And the sages say: On Shabbath, his (the sh'chiv mera's) words stand, for he cannot write; but not on a weekday [i.e., if he divided his property on a weekday.] R. Yehoshua says: They stated it for Shabbath — a fortiori (that it obtains) for a weekday. [And this is the halachah — that both on Shabbath and on a weekday, the words of a sh'chiv mera are "as written and transmitted" and require no kinyan. And if he requests that they acquire it from his hand, they do so both on a weekday and on Shabbath so that he not become delirious.] A parallel instance: One can effect acquisition for a minor, but not for a grown person. R. Yehoshua says: They stated it for a minor — a fortiori for a grown person!
  	If the house fell upon him and his father, or upon him and his heirs, and there were (binding) upon him (the son) the kethubah of his wife and (the claims of) a creditor — The heirs of the father say: "The son died first, and then the father" [and the creditor cannot exact payment from this (the father's) property, for the son never acquired it], and the creditors say: "The father died first, and then the son" [and the property fell in that period (between their deaths) to the son, and it is "bound" for payment of his wife's kethubah and (for payment) of the creditors] — Beth Shammai say: They divide. [For they hold that a bill awaiting collection is considered collected, so that the heirs of the father and the creditors are both muchzakim ("holders"), for which reason they divide.] And Beth Hillel say: "the property remains in its status of (adverting to) the heirs, so that it is regarded as "held" by them. And it devolves upon the creditor, who desires to divest them of it to bring proof that the father died first.]
  	If the house fell upon him and his wife — The heirs of the husband say: "The wife died first and then the husband" [and the heirs of the wife get nothing, the husband having died after his wife and having inherited her], and the heirs of the wife say: "The husband died first, and then the wife" — Beth Shammai say: They divide; and Beth Hillel say: The property [tzon-barzel property (see Yevamoth 4:3)] remains in its status (chazakah). [Beth Hillel did not indicate whether in the chazakah of the heirs of the wife, whose property it was, or in that of the heirs of the husband, whose responsibility it was — for which reason it is divided.]. The kethubah [the one hundred, two hundred, and addition (as the case may be) remains] in the chazakah of the heirs of the husband. The property that comes in and goes out with her is in the chazakah of the heirs of the father (of the woman.) [The reference is to the melog property (see Yevamoth 4:3), which, when she enters, enters with her, and which, when she leaves, leaves with her, whether it depreciated or appreciated. This property is in the chazakah of the heirs of the wife. It is found, then, that the heirs of the wife take all of the melog property and half the tzon-barzel property.]
  	If the house fell upon him and his mother, [and she has no other son but this one —  The heirs of the son say: "The woman died first, and the son inherited her property, and we inherit the son"; and the heirs of the woman, from her father's household, say: "The son died first, and we inherit the woman"] — Both [Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel] agree that they divide. [For since they both come with the power of inheritance, it is doubt against doubt, and they divide. And this is not similar to (the instance of) the house falling on him and his wife. For there, there are two types of property — one in which he is the muchzak (the "holder"), and the other, in which she is the muchzak. But here, all is in the chazakah of the woman, being, as she is, a widow; and both (claimants) come by power of inheritance, to inherit everything — for which reason they divide.] R. Akiva said: Here, too, I say [that according to Beth Hillel] the property remains in its chazakah, [in the chazakah of her heirs from (the household of) her father. For in her lifetime, after her husband's death, she was linked to her father's tribe, and her money, too, in her lifetime, was in the chazakah of her father's tribe. Therefore, the heirs from her father's household inherit her. The halachah is in accordance with R. Akiva.] Ben Azzai said to him: "Over the 'differing,' we grieve, [i.e., Over the aforementioned disagreement between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel we grieve that they could not concur], and you come to divide for us the concurring!" [i.e., You say that in this, too, they disagree, differing in this from the fist tanna, who says that (in this instance) they concur.]
  
  
  
  	A plain get (bill, deed, etc.) [such as ours, which is not sewn and folded] — its witnesses (sign) on the inside [as we do]. And a folded get — (its witnesses sign) on the outside. [He writes one or two lines and folds it on the (inner) surface and sews, and one witness signs on the fold outside. And he writes another two lines or more on the inside and folds it on the surface, and a second witness signs on the fold outside, and so, a third witness. The rabbis instituted a folded get by reason of "irate Cohanim," who might write a divorce precipitously to their wives and regret it and not be permitted to take them back. A "folded get" was instituted for them, so that, not being able to write it quickly, they might calm down in the process. And just as "a folded get" was instituted for a bill of divorce, so was it instituted for other bills, the sages not differentiating in this regard.] A plain get, whose witnesses signed on the outside, and a folded get, whose witnesses signed on the inside — both are pasul (invalid), [not having been prepared as per rabbinic ordinance.] R. Chanina b. Gamliel says: A folded get whose witnesses were signed on the inside is kasher because it can be made plain. [i.e., If the sewing is undone and the get is opened, it becomes "plain."] R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: All is in accordance with the custom of the land. [The (practical) difference between the first tanna and R. Shimon b. Gamliel obtains in a place where both a plain get and a folded get are used, where one said: "Make me a folded get," and the other made a plain one, or vice versa. The first tanna holds that he is particular (that only the type he specified be used) and it (the other type) is pasul, and R. Shimon b. Gamliel holds that since the custom of the land is to use both, he is not particular.]
  	A plain get is signed by two witnesses, and a folded get by three. If a plain get were signed by one or a folded get by two, both are pasul. [This is the intent: Just as a plain get signed by one witness is pasul by Torah law, so is a folded get signed by two witnesses.] If it were written (in the get): "a hundred zuzin, which are twenty sela'in," he receives only twenty. [Even though a hundred zuzin are twenty-five sela'in, the holder of the bill (of debt) has the lower hand, it being interpreted: a hundred inferior zuzin, which are only twenty sela'in.] (If it were written:) "a hundred zuzin, which are thirty sela'in," he receives only a hundred (zuzin) [i.e., twenty-five sela'in, the bill being interpreted: a hundred zuzin, which are thirty light, inferior sela'in, which are worth twenty-five good ones.] (If it were written:) "silver zuzin, which are…", and it [the amount following] were erased, he receives no fewer than two. "silver sela'in, which are…", and it were erased, he receives no fewer than two. "darconoth, which are…", and it were erased, he receives no fewer than two. If it were written above, "a hundred" and below, "two hundred," or above, "two hundred," and below, "one hundred," all goes according to the lower, [so long as it not be written on the last line.] If so, [i.e., If it is repeated at the end of the bill: "And I have taken upon myself indebtedness for this and this amount"], why is the upper written? So that if a letter were erased from the lower, it could be derived from the upper.
  	A get ( a writ of divorce) is written for a man [and it is signed (by witnesses) and he may divorce his wife with it] even if his wife is not with him, [for she may be divorced even against her will.] And a receipt [written by a woman to her husband, stating that she has received her kethubah] (is written) for a woman even if her husband is not with her, [for it is a liability for her and an asset for her husband, and "a man may be benefited (even) when he is not present."], so long as the scribe recognizes them [i.e., so long as the scribe and the witnesses recognize the man and the woman, both for a get and a receipt. For if he does not recognize them, perhaps he will write a get for a different married woman whose husband's name is the same as his, and the woman will be divorced through a get which is not valid for her; likewise, with a receipt.] And the husband pays the (scribe's) fee. A bill (of indebtedness) is written for a borrower even if the lender is not with him; but it is not written for the lender unless the borrower is with him. And the borrower pays the fee. [Even if it is a transaction of half-loan, half-pledge, the receiver pays the entire fee to the scribe.] A bill (of sale) is written for a seller even if the buyer is not with him; but it is not written for the buyer unless the seller is with him. And the buyer pays the fee.
  	Writs of betrothal and marriage are written only with mutual consent, and the groom pays the fee. Writs of tenant-farming, [working and guarding a field for a half, a third, or a quarter (of the produce)] and land contracting, [so many and so many kor a year, whether it did or did not produce] are written only with mutual consent, and the receiver pays the fee. Writs of selection and (of) all acts of beth-din are written only with mutual consent. [("writs of selection":) One (of the litigants) selects one judge, and the other selects one, and they write: "This (litigant) selected this judge, and his claims are such and such, etc.," so that they not repeat their claims.] And both pay the fee. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: The two [litigants] write two, each (writing one) for himself, [so that their claims be well ordered. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel, but the claims of the two litigants and the judge that each selected are written in one bill.]
  	If one paid part of his debt and gave his bill (of indebtedness) to a third person [i.e., If the lender and the borrower gave the bill to a third person on whom they relied, it being bothersome to them to write a receipt], and he (the borrower) said to him (the third person): "If I have not given you (the balance) from now until this and this day, give him (the lender) his receipt" — If the time arrived and he did not give it, R. Yossi says: He should give it (the bill, to the lender). R. Yehudah says: He should not give it. [R. Yossi holds that asmachta effects acquisition, viz.: If one promises his neighbor something on condition that he do something for him in the future, and he is confident ("somech") in his heart at the time of the condition that it can be fulfilled, and when the time arrived, it could not be fulfilled, this is called "asmachta," and, according to R. Yossi, it effects acquisition. As to the halachah, asmachta does not effect acquisition, unless they acquired (authority) from his hand in a distinctive beth-din, and he relegated his rights to that beth-din, assigning it his bills and certifications and said: "If I do not come from now until thirty days, let my rights be annulled." My teachers explain that every expert beth-din, which is acquainted with the laws of asmachta is regarded as a "distinctive" beth-din in this regard; but Rambam says that only a beth-din ordained in Eretz Yisrael qualifies as "distinctive."]
  	If one's bill of indebtedness were erased [and there are witnesses who saw it being erased (i.e., losing its impression) of itself or being blurred by water], he secures for it witnesses [who know when it was written and what was written it], and they certify it [before beth-din, writing for him all that was written in that bill, viz.]: "This man, the son of this man — his bill was erased on this and this day, and this man and that man are his witnesses."] If one paid part of his debt, R. Yehudah says: He should exchange it. [i.e., He should tear up that bill and another should be written for the balance.] R. Yossi says: He should write a receipt. R. Yossi said: "This one, then, [the borrower] must guard his receipt from the mice!" [For if it is lost, the lender can claim the entire debt!] R. Yossi said to him: "It is better for him [the lender] thus" [that the borrower be required to guard his receipt, so that he hasten to repay the (entire) debt], and this one's [the lender's] power should not be weakened [by having to write another bill ( of indebtedness). For the date of his (original) debt was earlier, and now (with a new bill), it will be later, and he will be able to seize bound property only from the time of the second bill. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yossi, that a receipt is written.]
  	If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bathhouse and an olive press — If he made them for profit, the profit falls between them; if he made them for personal use, the rich brother may tell the poor one: "Get yourself bondsmen and let them bathe in the bathhouse; get yourself olives, and come and press them in the olive press." [("Get yourself bondsmen": to heat the bathhouse for you. For just as our father left it, so will it be forever. And though it was taught in the first chapter that with something for which there is no law of division, one can say: "You sell me" (your share) "or I will sell you" (my share), it is different here, for the poor brother cannot say that he will buy the other's share, having nothing with which to buy it.] If there were two men in one city called "Yosef ben Shimon," they cannot issue a bill of indebtedness against each other, [for each can claim: "This bill in your hand — I returned it to you when you paid me the money that I lent you."], and another cannot issue a bill of indebtedness against them. [For each can "shunt him off" to the other.] If among one's bills there were found a paid bill of "Yosef ben Shimon," the bills of both are (accounted) paid. What can they do? (to avoid this confusion)? They "third." [i.e., they write the name of the grandfather.] And if they were "thirded"? [i.e., if their names, their fathers' names, and their grandfathers' names were the same], they write a sign, [e.g., "the one who is red-spotted," or "long," or "short."] And if they were alike in their signs, they write "Cohein" [if one were a Cohein, and the other, an Israelite.] If one says to his son: "A bill among my bills is paid, and I do not know which one," the bills of all (his debtors) are paid. If there were found for one (borrower) two (bills, from two loans that he made of him), the larger is (considered) paid, and the smaller, not paid. [For he said "one bill" among his bills, and not two.] If one lends his neighbor through a guarantor (arev), he does not exact payment from the guarantor [first] [before claiming (payment) from the borrower first and having him declared liable in beth-din, after which — if he has nothing to pay with — he exacts from the guarantor.] And if he said: "on condition that I exact payment from whom I wish," he exacts payment form the guarantor. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: If the borrower has property, in either event, he does not exact payment from the guarantor. [Not that the first tanna says that if the borrower has property he does exact payment from the guarantor. But the Mishnah is defective, and this is what was taught: "If one lends his neighbor through a guarantor, he does not exact payment from the guarantor. And if he said: 'On condition that I exact payment from whom I wish,' he exacts payment from the guarantor. When is this so, when the borrower has no property; but if the borrower has property, he does not exact payment from the guarantor. And a kablan (one who undertakes to pay a debt for another) — Even though the borrower has property, he exacts payment from the kablan. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: Both with a guarantor and a kablan — If the borrower has property, he does not exact payment from them." The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel. ("arev" - a guarantor, one who says: "Give him (a loan) and I guarantee for him." "kablan": one who says: "Give him and I will give you.")] And, likewise, R. Shimon said: If one were a guarantor for a woman's kethubah, and her husband divorced her [and he had no property, and the guarantor has to pay for the kethubah], he (the husband) should vow to withhold benefit from her, lest they (the man and his wife) scheme against this one's property and he take back his wife. [He (the guarantor) should not pay for the kethubah until her husband vows to withhold benefit from her on public cognizance, a vow from which there is no release, so that he not be able to take her back. For we fear that he might have the intention of taking her back and eating from (the property she received for) her kethubah after having collected it from the guarantor. As to the halachah: The guarantor for a kethubah, does not commit himself and he is not bound to pay, even if the husband has no property. Why so? For he did a mitzvah, and caused her no loss. And if he guaranteed for the kethubah of his son, he does commit himself, a father "binding" himself for the sake of his son. And a kablan for a kethubah does commit himself (for payment), and the woman may claim it from him first, even if the husband has property — this, on condition that the husband first vows to withhold benefit from her on public cognizance.]
  	If one lends his neighbor on a bill (of debt), he (the creditor) collects from bound property. [Even if property commitment is not included therein, he collects from bound property; for we rule that (omission of) commitment is an error of the scribe, and it is as if it were included.] (If one lends his neighbor) through witnesses, he collects from free property. If he issues a writ of indebtedness [without other witnesses], he collects from free property [and not from bound property. For since witnesses are lacking, there is no "report" (of the debt), and (prospective) buyers (of the property) have no knowledge of it to guard themselves (from buying the property)]. If a guarantor comes forth after the signing of the bill [i.e., if after the witnesses have signed the bill, he writes: "I, so and so, son of so and so, am a guarantor"], he (the creditor) collects from the [guarantor] from the free property [alone. For since the witnesses are not signed on the guarantee, it is like a verbal loan]. Once, such a case came before R. Yishmael, and he said: He collects from the free property. Ben Naness said to him: He collects neither from the bound property nor from the free property. R. Yishmael: Why? Ben Naness: If one man were choking another in the marketplace and someone came along and said: "Let him go" (and I will pay you), he is exempt (from payment) — for he (the creditor in our instance) did not lend him on his trust (in the guarantor). But who is a guarantor who is liable? If one says: "Lend him, and I will pay you," he is liable. R. Yishmael said: If one would grow wise, let him occupy himself with monetary law, for there is no department of Torah transcending that. It is like a bubbling fount. And one who would occupy himself with monetary law, let him pay attendance upon Shimon ben Naness [("Ben Naness said to him, etc.":) Ben Naness holds that every guarantor (who comes forward) after the money has been given is not a guarantor, for he (the creditor) did not lend him on (the basis of) his trust in the guarantor. And even though R. Yishmael praised Ben Naness, the halachah is in accordance with R. Yishmael. And a guarantor after the money has been given requires a kinyan (an act effecting acquisition), lacking which he does not commit himself. And before the giving of the money, he does not require a kinyan.]