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text: Mishnah Gittin
  משנה גיטין
  The Mishna with Obadiah Bartenura by Rabbi Shraga Silverstein
  
  
  Mishnah Gittin
  
  
  
  
  
  	If one brings a get from medinath hayam (lit., "the land of the sea," i.e., abroad), he must say: "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed." [Anything outside of Eretz Yisrael is called "medinath hayam." ("He must say: 'Before me, it was written, etc.'":) Some say, because those living abroad are not learned in Torah, and they do not know that a get must be written lishmah (i.e., for the specific instance). Therefore, the messenger says: "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed," and, as a matter of course, he is asked if it were written lishmah, and he replies that it was. Others say it is because caravans are infrequent between there and here (Eretz Yisrael) so that if the husband protested that he did not write it, witnesses could not be found to corroborate the signatures of the witnesses, for which reason the rabbis believed the messenger as two, and the protest of the husband no longer availed.] R. Gamliel says: Even one who brings it from Rekem and from Cheger (which are close to Eretz Yisrael, must say: "Before me, etc.") [The Targum for (Genesis 16:14): "between Kadesh and Bared" is "between Rekam and Chagra."] R. Eliezer says: Even from Kfar Ludim [which is outside Eretz Yisrael] to Lud [which is near it, and part of Eretz Yisrael.] And the sages say: Only one who brings a get from abroad and one who takes (a get from Eretz Yisrael abroad) must say: "Before me it was written, and before me, it was signed." And one who brings it from one province to another in medinath hayam must say: "Before me, it was written, and before me, it was signed." R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: Even from one hegemony to another [with distinct jurisdiction].
  	R. Yehudah says: From Rekem until [the end of the world] eastward [is considered outside of Eretz Yisrael], and Rekem [itself is considered] as the east [of the world, and not as Eretz Yisrael]. From Ashkelon southward, and Ashkelon as the south. From Acco northwards, and Acco as the north. R. Meir says: Acco is as Eretz Yisrael in respect to gittin.
  	If one brings a get in Eretz Yisrael, he need not say: "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed." If there are "protestors" against it, [the husband protesting that it is forged], it is confirmed through its signatures. [If witnesses testify to (the authenticity of) their signatures, or if other witnesses recognize their signatures, it is valid. And nowadays, if one brings a get, whether in Eretz Yisrael or abroad, he must give it to her in the presence of two witnesses and say: "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed."] If one brings a get from abroad, he cannot say: "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed" [(as when he gave it to her when he could speak, and he did not get to say: "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed" before he became mute)]. If there are witnesses signed on it, it is confirmed through their signatures.
  	Both the gittin of women and the manumissions of bondsmen are alike in respect to taking and bringing, [vis-à-vis the saying of: "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed"]. And this is one of the ways in which the gittin of women are similar to the manumissions of bondsmen.
  	Every bill on which a Cuthite witness is signed is invalid, except the gittin of women and the manumissions of bondsmen, [which are valid if one of the witnesses is a Cuthite. But if both are Cuthites, the first tanna invalidates it, even with the gittin of women.] The get of a woman on which Cuthite witnesses were signed was once brought before R. Gamliel in Kfar Otnai, and he validated it. [R. Gamliel validated it even where both were Cuthites. And today, after the decree that Cuthites be considered like gentiles in all respects, the gittin of women are not different from other writs; even one Cuthite witness renders a writ invalid.] All writs which are adjudicated in gentile courts, [the witnesses having testified before the judge in their place of judgment], even if they are signed by gentiles, are valid. [This, where we know the judge and the witnesses not to take bribes], except for the gittin of women and the manumissions of bondsmen. [(The validity obtains) only in respect to writs of loans and sales, where the witnesses beheld the transfer of money. But writs of indebtedness and the gittin of women, and all things which are enactments of beth-din — all such things are invalid in their courts.] R. Shimon says: These, too, are valid. They were not mentioned [in the house of study as being invalid] except where they were enacted by [gentiles who were] laymen, [not judges. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon.]
  	If one says: Give this get to my wife, or this writ of manumission to my bondsman, if he wishes to retract with both, [before they reach the hand of the woman or of the bondsman], he may do so [and the messenger may not acquire the writ on their behalf; for it is a liability to them in that it deprives them of their sustenance.] These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: [He may retract] with the gittin of women, but not with the manumissions of bondsmen. [And the halachah is in accordance with the sages.] For a man is accorded benefit even not in his presence, but liability is imposed upon him only in his presence. For if he wished not to feed his bondsman, he could do so, [so that when he frees him he does not cause him to lose his sustenance]; but he is not permitted not to feed his wife, [so that when he divorces her, he causes her to lose her sustenance.] He (R. Meir) said to them: But he disqualifies his bondsman from terumah, just as he disqualifies his wife! They answered: That is because he is his acquisition. [That is, the reason the bondsman of a Cohein eats terumah is that he is his acquisition — just as the beast of a Cohein eats terumah vetch, and there is no ascendancy in this. Therefore, if he frees him, even though he disqualifies him from eating terumah, this is no liability to the bondsman.] If one says: Give this get to my wife, or (give) this writ of manumission to my bondsman, and he died, they are not to be given after his death. [For it is not a get until it reaches her hand, and when it reaches her hand, he is dead; and there is no get after death. And with the writ of manumission, too, when it reaches his (the bondsman's) hand, he (the owner) is dead and has no authority over him.] (If one says:) Give a manah to this and this man, and he dies, it is to be given after his death [even if he did not say: "this manah," for the words of a shechiv mera (one at the point of death) are as "written and given"].
  
  
  
  	If one brings a get from abroad and says: "Before me, it was written, but it was not signed before me"; "Before me, it was signed, but it was not written before me"; "Before me, all of it was written, and before me, half of it was signed" [i.e., one of the witnesses signed]; "Before me, half of it was written, and before me, all of it was signed" — it is invalid. [This, if only the last half (were written); but (if he said:) "Before me, the first half (containing the names of the man and the woman and the date) was written," it is valid. And for the first half, too, it is not necessary that he witness the writing itself; but if he heard the sound of the pen upon the paper at the time of writing, it is sufficient.] If one says: "Before me, it was written," and the other: "Before me, it was signed," it is invalid. [This, when the get is brought by one of them. For the rabbis required the messenger bringing the get to say both. But if the get were brought by both, it is valid, two who bring a get not being required to say: "Before me, it was written and before me it was signed." If two say: "Before us, it was written," and one says: "Before me, it was signed," it is invalid. [This, when the get is brought by one of them; but if it is brought by both, it is valid.] And R. Yehudah rules it valid [even if it is brought by one of them. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	If it were written in the daytime and signed in the daytime; in the night, and signed at night; at night, and signed in the daytime — it is valid. [For the day appertains to the night (preceding it), so that it (the date on the get) is not mukdam (prior, to the date of the signing)]. (If it were written) in the daytime, and signed at night, it is invalid. [For it is mukdam. The rabbis instituted a date in gittin as a decree, lest one be married to his sister's daughter, and she be adulterous, and he, pitying her, that she not be put to death by strangulation, give her an undated get, so that when they testify against her in beth-din, she could produce her get and say: "I was divorced and single at that time."] R. Shimon rules it valid, R. Shimon saying that all gittin written in the daytime and signed at night are invalid, except for the gittin of women. [For R. Shimon holds that the sages instituted a date in gittin because of fruits. For if there were no date on the get, the husband could continue selling the nichsei melog fruits of his wife after divorcing her, and when a claim were brought against him, he could say: "I sold them before the divorce." And, accordingly, R. Shimon rules that a get written in the daytime and signed at night is valid, even though it is mukdam; for he holds that once her husband determined to divorce her, even though he did not yet do so, he no longer has title to the fruits. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon.]
  	Gittin can be written with all things: with ink, with paint, with sikra [a red dye], with gum resin, with vitriol, and with all (other) things whose impression remains. They are not written with juices or with fruit-liquid, or with any (other) thing whose impression does not remain. Gittin are written on all things: on a [torn-off] olive leaf, on the horn of a cow (and he gives her the cow) [for he cannot cut the horn off after he writes it, it being written (Deuteronomy 24:1): "And he shall write her a scroll of divorce, and he shall place it in her hand" — that which lacks only writing and giving; to exclude that which lacks writing, cutting and giving]; on the hand of a bondsman, and he gives her the bondsman. R. Yossi Haglili says: Gittin are not written on things which have a spirit of life, and not on foods. [For the Torah called a get "sefer" (a scroll). Just as a scroll is characterized by not having a spirit of life and not being edible, so, all that does not have a spirit of life and is not edible. And the rabbis say: if it were written: "in a sefer," it would be as you say. But now that it is written "sefer," sefirath devarim ("relating details" of the get) is the intent. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]
  	Gittin are not written on what is attached to the ground, ["cutting" lacking]. If it were written on what was attached, torn off, signed, and given to her, it is valid. [This is what is meant: If he wrote the tofess (the entire get excluding the place of the man, the place of the woman, and the date) on something attached to the ground, and it were torn off and signed — that is, if he wrote the toref (the place of the man and the woman and the date) after it were torn off, it is valid. For since the toref was written on what was torn off, even though the tofess was written on what was attached, it is valid.] R. Yehudah rules it to be invalid, until it be both written and signed on what is detached. R. Yehudah b. Betheira says: Gittin are written neither on erased paper nor on diftera, for it lends itself to forging. And the sages permit it. [("neither on erased paper":) For he can erase what he wishes up to the (signatures of the) witnesses, and write above it what he wishes, without anything being noticed, the witnesses, too, being signed on what is erased. ("diftera":) Its erasure is not noticeable. Diftera is a skin prepared with salt and flour, but not with gall-nut. ("And the sages permit it":) with gittin only, the sages holding that the witnesses of delivery (of the get to the woman) effect the divorce, and not the witnesses of the signing. But with other writs, where the witnesses of the signing are relied upon, the sages agree that they are written neither on erased paper nor on diftera. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]
  	All are fit to write a get, even a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor. [This, on condition that an adult stands over him and tells him: "Write it on behalf of that man." But a gentile or a bondsman, even if an adult stands over him, should not write the get ab initio, for they are of independent intellect, and act on their own behalf; so that even if an adult tells them to write it for someone else, they write it on their own. And if a gentile or a bondsman writes the tofess of the get, and a knowing Israelite writes the toref — the name of the man and the woman and the date, all of these requiring lishmah (specific intent) — the get is valid. Likewise, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who, according to our Mishnah, are fit to write a get, are fit only with respect to the tofess, but, with respect to the toref, it is not valid unless written by a knowing, adult Israelite.] The woman may write her get, and the man may write his receipt (of payment of the kethubah). For the get takes effect only through its signatories. All are fit to bring the get, except a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, [who lack independent intellect], one who is blind [He is not qualified to bring the get from abroad, not being able to say: "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed." But to bring a get in Eretz Yisrael, where he need not say: "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed" — or even abroad, if the get is validated through its signatories, or to be the woman's messenger to receive her get — for all of these, a blind man is fit], and a gentile. [For he is not included in the Law of gittin and kiddushin (marriage). And in an area where he himself is not included, he cannot serve as a messenger for another.]
  	If the minor received [the get from the husband's hand], and [before he gave it to her] came of age; if he were a deaf-mute, and regained his faculties; if he were blind, and regained his sight; if he were an imbecile and regained his intellect; if he were a gentile, and became a proselyte, it is invalid. But if he possesses his faculties, and then became a deaf-mute, and then regained his faculties; if he possessed sight, and then became blind, and then regained his sight [(it is valid) even if he did not regain his sight. For since he possessed sight when he received the get, he is qualified to be a messenger, being able to say: "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed." But since we must learn later: "and then he regained his intellect," that he must be of independent intellect at the time of giving, we also learn in the beginning: "and then he regained his sight." And all who are unfit to testify by reason of transgression are not fit to bring the get, not being believed to say: "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed." And if the get were validated through its signatories, they are fit to bring it.]; if he possessed intellect, and then became an imbecile, and then regained his intellect, it is valid. This is the rule: Wherever there is da'ath (independent intellect) in the beginning and in the end, it (the get) is valid.
  	Even the women who are not believed to say that her husband died are believed to bring her get: her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her co-wife, her yevamah, and her husband's daughter. [They are not believed to say that her husband died, for they hate her and desire her undoing.] What is the difference between a get and death (in the above instance)? (In the get) the writing is the indicator. The woman herself is permitted to bring her get, so long as she says: "Before me, it was written and before me it was signed." [This, only if the husband stipulated with her when he gave her the get that she be divorced only in a certain beth-din and that she say: "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed." Beth-din take it from her after she says this, and they appoint a messenger to return it to her. But a woman who brings a get wherever she may be is divorced, even if the get is not validated through its signatories, and she need not say: "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed."]
  
  
  
  	Every get which was not written specifically for that woman is invalid. How so? If he were passing through the market and heard the voices of scribes calling [to their apprentices: When someone comes for a get, write it thus:] "This and this man divorces this and this woman, from this and this place," and he said: "That is my name, and that is the name of my wife," it is invalid as a divorce. Even more: If he wrote it to divorce his wife therewith [i.e., not only is a get not written for divorce but for practice invalid; but even one written for the sake of divorce], if he changed his mind, and one of his townsmen found it, and said: "My name is the same as yours, and my wife's name, the same as your wife's name," it is invalid as a divorce. Even more, if he had two wives with the same name, and he wrote it to divorce the elder, he may not divorce the younger with it. [Not only is it invalid if it were not written for the sake of divorce of this man, but even if one had two wives, in which instance it was written for the sake of divorce of this man, it is invalid, since it was not written for the sake of divorce of this particular woman. (elder, younger:) not necessarily.] Even more, if he said to the scribe: "Write it for me to divorce whichever wife I choose," it is invalid as a divorce. [We are hereby apprised that we do not say that it is established retroactively that when he wrote it, too, it was this wife that he intended, so that there is (a bona fide) divorce vis-à-vis both him and her.]
  	If one writes the tofess of gittin [If a scribe desires to have them ready for one who may come for a get while he is busy with other writs], he must leave blank the places for the man, the woman, and the date. [The gemara adds: also the place for: "You are permitted to all men."] (If one writes) bills of loan, he must leave blank the places for the borrower, the lender, the sum, and the date. (If one writes) bills of sale, he must leave blank the spaces for the buyer, the seller, the sum, the field, and the date — because of the ordinance. [They permitted the writing of tofsim of gittin and bills, (even) not for an actual instance because of the ordinance (for the sake) of the scribe, that they be ready for him, so long as he leaves the toref for writing lishmah (to its particular end). And the toref of other bills is decreed (as requiring lishmah) because of the toref of gittin.] R. Yehudah forbids it with all, [the tofess being subsumed in the decree because of the toref; and other bills, because of gittin.] R. Elazar permits it with all, [other bills not being subsumed in the decree because of gittin], except for the gittin of women, it being written (Deuteronomy 24:1): "And he shall write to her" — lishmah. [And the tofess is subsumed in the decree because of the toref. The halachah is in accordance with R. Elazar.]
  	If one brought a get and lost it, if he found it immediately, it is valid; if not, it is invalid. [This, only if he lost it in a place frequented by caravans, in which instance it is to be posited that it may have fallen from one of the passersby. But if it were lost in a place unfrequented by caravans, even after a long lapse of time it is valid. And even if it were lost in a place frequented by caravans, if the witnesses had clear identification, so that they could say (for example:) "There was a hole near this letter," or: "We never signed on a get with these names except this one," it is valid, even after a long lapse of time.] If he found it in a chafisah or a d'luskema, [document bags, with identifying signs], if he recognizes it, it is valid. [This ("if he recognizes it") is an independent statement, i.e.: If he found it in a chafisah or a d'luskema, even if he does not recognize the get — or if he recognizes the get, wherever he found it, it is valid.] If one brought a get and left (her husband) when he was an old man or sick, he gives it (the get) to her on the assumption that he (her husband) is alive. [And we do not apprehend that he might have died and that his embassy is voided. For we premise the continuance of the original status. But if it became known to us that he died before the get reached her, the get is void; for there is no get after death.] If the daughter of an Israelite were married to a Cohein and he went abroad, she eats terumah on the assumption that he is alive. If one sends his sin-offering from abroad, we sacrifice it on the assumption that he is alive. [And we do not apprehend that its owner died, in which instance, the offering "stands for death" (and not for sacrifice)].
  	R. Elazar b. Parta said three things before the sages, and they confirmed his words: (People) in a besieged (karkom) city [(The Targum of "siege" is "karkumin")], on a tempest-tossed boat [not having sunk], and going out to be judged [for capital offenses] are assumed to be alive. But (people) in a siege-conquered city, on a boat lost at sea, and going out to be executed are invested with the stringencies of the living and the stringencies of the dead. The daughter of an Israelite to a Cohein [(the stringencies of the dead)] and the daughter of a Cohein to an Israelite [(the stringencies of the living)] may not eat terumah.
  	If one brought a get in Eretz Israel [in which instance he need not say: "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed"], and he took ill, he may send it with another. [He may appoint the messenger himself, without resorting to beth-din (but only if he took ill)]. And if he [the husband] said to him: "Take this and this for me from her" [when you give her the get], he may not send it with another. For he does not wish what is his to be in another's hand.]
  	If one brought a get from abroad, and he took ill, beth-din appoints [a messenger] and sends him, and he (the first) says before them (beth-din): "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed." And the last messenger need not say: "Before me, it was written, and before me it was signed," but only: "I am a messenger of beth-din." [And it is taken for granted that beth-din acted in accordance with the law. And the second messenger may appoint a third — until a hundred, and all in beth-din, this being implied by "The last messenger need not say … but only: 'I am a messenger of beth-din.'"]
  	If one lent money to a Cohein, a Levite, or a pauper, to deduct the amount from their share of (the tithe), he deducts it on the assumption that they are alive; and he need not apprehend that the Cohein or the Levite died or that the pauper became wealthy. [When he separates terumah, he sells it and keeps the money for himself for his loan to the Cohein; and he keeps the first-tithe and the poor-tithe and eats it for his loan to the Levite and to the pauper (but from the first-tithe he separates terumath-ma'aser for the Cohein.) And if he is wont to give his terumoth and ma'aseroth to this Cohein, or Levite, or pauper from whom he borrowed, he need not invest them with his ma'aseroth and terumoth through another, but he takes them for himself immediately after he tithes them. But if he is wont to give his terumoth and ma'aseroth to others, he cannot keep them for his loans until he first invests another with them, and then takes them back for his loan.] If they (the Cohein, Levite, or pauper) died, he must receive permission from the heirs [who inherited land on which the creditor has a claim. He must receive their permission to collect this debt through these terumoth and ma'aseroth. For they might desire to receive their gifts and to repay the debt of their testator from elsewhere.] If he lent them before beth-din, he need not receive permission from the heirs.
  	If one set aside fruits from which to separate terumoth and ma'aseroth [i.e., if he relies upon them and eats other tevel (untithed produce) that he has, saying: Its terumah is in those fruits that I set aside for this purpose], or (if he set aside) money with which to redeem ma'aser sheni, he can proceed on the assumption that they (the set-aside fruits and moneys) are there (in his possession). If they were lost, [If he went to check and found them missing], he must be apprehensive [as to the status of the tevel produce that he had "corrected" through them. And if he had not yet eaten of it, he must tithe it; for it may be that when he said: "Its terumah is in the fruits that I set aside," they were already lost], (he must be apprehensive) for a twenty-four hour period [(retroactively) from the time of checking. When he checked and found them missing, he must suspect that they were already missing yesterday at this time. And if he had made them ma'aser within a twenty-four hour period for other produce, he must tithe it on the possibility (that they were missing.) The rabbis did not require more apprehension than this, relying on the chazakah (the original status, i.e., that they obtained)]. These are the words of R. Elazar b. Shamua. R. Yehudah says: There are three occasions on which wine [which one had set aside for the tithing of other wine] is checked [to see if it had soured (vinegar not being tithable for wine)]: when the east wind blows at the termination of the festival (Succoth), at budding time, and when water enters the boser (half-ripe grapes). [When they are "double-white" they are called "boser," and the entry of water (above) refers to water entering and accumulating within them to the point where some of it is retained. Another interpretation: They would crush grapes when they were boser and add water to prepare vinegar for dipping. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  
  
  
  	If one sent a get to his wife, and he came upon the messenger, or if he sent a messenger after him and said to him: "The get that I gave you is void," it is void. [("if he came upon the messenger":) without having pursued him to overtake him, but the messenger stopping on the way and the husband chancing upon him and voiding the get. Even so, it is void, and we do not say that he was simply taunting him and that if he really had wanted to void it, he would have pursued him.] If he reached his wife first or sent a messenger to her, telling her: "The get that I sent you is void," it is void. Once the get has reached her hand (however) he can no longer void it. [We are hereby apprised that even though we see him bent upon voiding it, we do not say that this is clear indication of its having been voided. And in an instance in which a man gives his wife a get (to take effect) at a certain time or with (the fulfillment of) a certain condition — if he says to her: "This is your get from now, (to take effect) at that time," or "if that condition is fulfilled," once the get reaches her hand, he can no longer void it, and she is divorced at that time or with the fulfillment of that condition. And if he did not say to her: "from now," then even after the get reached her hand, he can void it.]
  	In the beginning, he would convene a beth-din in a different place and void it. [He would void it not in the presence of the woman or of the messenger, but wherever he was, in the presence of three (a beth-din)]. R. Gamliel the elder instituted that they should not do so, for "the general good." [For the messenger, not aware (of the later revocation) would take it to her and she would remarry through it. And by the power of R. Gamliel's ordinance, stripes are administered to one who voids a get or protests it.] In the beginning, he would change his name and her name, the name of his city and the name of her city. [If he had two names, one here and one abroad, he would divorce her by the name in the place of the get and not take care to write both.] R. Gamliel the elder instituted that he write "this and this man and every (other) name that he has"; "this and this woman and every (other) name that she has," for "the general good." [so that her children by her second husband not be brought into disrepute, viz.: "Her husband did not divorce her; this is not his name." And if a man is known by two names, one in the place of the writing (of the get) and another in the place of the delivery, she is not divorced until both be written. But if he were known by two (different) names in one place, and only one of them were written — if it were done, it is valid, but ab initio, both should be written. And if he changed his name or her name in the get, even if he wrote afterwards: "and any other name that I have," the get is void.]
  	A widow claims payment [of her kethubah] from the property of the orphans only with an oath [that she had received nothing of it]. They (beth-din) forbore from administering the oath to her. [For because she exerted herself for the orphans she would rationalize her swearing that she had received nothing even if she had received a small amount, feeling that she had received it for her exertions and not as payment of the kethubah. Therefore, they would forbear from administering the oath to her, and she would lose her kethubah.] R. Gamliel the elder instituted that she vow to the orphans whatever (formula of vow) they desire [such as: "I bevow enjoyment of this and this food if I have derived any benefit from my kethubah"], and she collects her kethubah. [And if she remarried before the orphans bevowed her for her kethubah, in which instance her husband might nullify her vow, what do they do? They beswear her, outside of beth-din an "oath of the rabbis," transgression of which is not so severe (as that of a Torah oath), and she takes her kethubah after she is married. And if she comes to collect her kethubah before she remarries, the orphans have the option: If they wish, they administer the oath outside of beth-din, or they bevow her in beth-din. Witnesses sign on a get for "the general good." [This ("for the general good") refers to both, viz.: A widow is bevowed by the orphans for "the general good," that widows remarry and not worry about losing their kethubah; and witnesses sign on the get for "the general good." For since the witnesses to the delivery cause the get to take effect, the witnesses to the woman's having received the get being the underpinning of the divorce, there is really no need for witnesses to sign the get. But because of "the general good" — because we fear that one of the witnesses to the delivery might die, and the get be like a mere shard in her hand, (it was instituted that witnesses sign)]. Hillel instituted the prozbol for "the general good." [For because he saw the people forbearing to lend each other (in apprehension of the loan's being dissolved by the shemitah year), and (by their forbearance) transgressing (Deuteronomy 15:9): "Take heed unto yourself lest there be in your heart a thing of wickedness, etc." — he arose and instituted the prozbol. This is the text of the prozbol: "I give over to you, ploni and ploni, the judges, (all of my claims) so that I can claim whatever ploni owes me whenever I wish"].
  	If a (Canaanite) bondsman were taken captive and redeemed [by other Israelites after his master had despaired of his return] — if (he were redeemed) for servitude, he serves [the second master]; if for freedom, he does not serve [neither the first nor the second. Not the second, for he redeemed him for freedom. Not the first, [lest they not redeem him]. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: In either event, he serves [his first master, lest every bondsman cause himself to be taken captive by brigands to escape his master.] If a master made his bondsman an apotiki [po tehei kai ("Here shall it stand"), i.e., From this (the bondsman) shall you collect your debt, and not from elsewhere)], and he [his first master] freed him, justice dictates that the bondsman owes nothing [to the second, for his first master's manumission dissolved his servitude]; but because of "the general good" [lest the second find him in the marketplace and say to him: "You are my bondsman," bringing his children into disrepute], his master [the second] is compelled to free him and he [the bondsman] writes him (the second) a bill of debt for his worth [i.e., for his market value (as a bondsman); not for the amount of the debt if the debt were more than his worth.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: He [the bondsman] does not write [him a bill of debt, for he owes him nothing. But his first master, who "damaged" what was owing the second must pay him his worth. For one who damages what is owed to another is liable. (The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel)], but he (the second) frees him.
  	If one were half bondsman-half free [as when he were the bondsman of two masters, and one of them freed him], or else, when his master received half of his value from him and freed half of him for that money], he serves his master one day, and himself the other day. These are the words of Beth Hillel. Beth Shammai said to them: "You have 'amended' his master, [who loses nothing], but you have not amended him!" He cannot marry a bondswoman, for he is half-free. He cannot marry a free-woman, for he is half-bondsman. Not to marry — Was the world not created for fruitfulness and multiplication, viz. (Isaiah 45:18): "Not for naught did He create it; to be inhabited did He form it." Rather, because of "the general good" his master is compelled to free him, and he (the servant) writes a bill of debt for half of his value. [The same holds if he were the bondsman of a hundred partners and one of them freed him. All of them are compelled to free him.] And Beth Hillel reversed themselves to rule according to the words of Beth Shammai.
  	If one sold his bondsman to a gentile or (to servitude) outside Eretz Israel, he goes out free [if he escaped from the gentile, or if beth-din penalized him to redeem him from the gentiles (as stated: "He is compelled to redeem him"), and after he redeems him, he may not keep him in servitude. The sages penalized him for having removed him from mitzvoth. Likewise, if (he sold him) outside of Eretz Yisrael, he goes out free because he sent him out of Eretz Yisrael.] Captives are not to be redeemed for more than their worth, for "the general good" [so that the gentiles not be zealous to amass captives.] And captives are not to be "smuggled out" of captivity, for "the general good" [lest the captors vent their wrath on others who fall into their hands and chain them and place their feet in stocks.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: For the good of the captives, [R. Shimon b. Gamliel not being apprehensive for those who might fall into captivity, but for those who are now captive with him; but if he alone were captive, he is to be smuggled out. No fear is to be entertained for other captives if they are not already with him. The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.] (Torah) scrolls, tefillin, and mezuzoth are not to be purchased for more than their worth, for "the general good."
  	If one divorced his wife because of an evil report [rumors of infidelity], he may not take her back; because of a vow [that she made, and he said: "I do not want a vowing woman"], he may not take her back. [Even if the report were found to be false or she were absolved of the vow by a sage. (He may not take her back) lest she go and marry another and the report of infidelity be found false or she be absolved of the vow by a sage, so that she not be a "wanton vower," and the husband say: "Had I known this, even if they had given me a hundred manah, I would not have divorced her," thereby voiding the get and rendering her children mamzerim. Therefore, he is told: "Be apprised that if one divorces his wife because of an evil report or because of a vow, he may never take her back," hearing which, he divorces her categorically, and he can no longer compromise her.] R. Yehudah says: With every vow known to many, he may not take her back; not known to many, he may take her back. [R. Yehudah holds that the rabbis said: "If one divorced his wife because of an evil report or because of a vow, he may not take her back," so that the daughters of Israel not be promiscuous with arayoth (illicit connections) or with vows, for which reason he says that with every vow known to many (ten or more Israelites), there is relatively greater promiscuity, and she was penalized not to be taken back. And with what is not known to many, there is relatively less promiscuity, and she was, accordingly, not penalized.] R. Meir says: With every vow that requires the deliberation of a sage, he may not take her back. (With every vow) that does not require the probing of a sage, he may take her back. [R. Meir holds the rationale (for forbidding him to take her back) is the possibility of undermining (the get). Therefore, with a vow that he himself cannot annul, but which only a sage can absolve her of, he can undermine the get after she remarries by saying: "Had I known that a sage could have absolved you of it, I would not have divorced you." But with a get that does not require the probing of a sage, but which can be annulled by the husband himself, the sages did not need to forbid him to take her back. For he cannot compromise her by saying: "Had I known, etc.", for it was an "open" vow, which he could have annulled, and he did not.] R. Eliezer said: They forbade the one [i.e., taking her back in the instance of a vow which requires the probing of a sage] only because of the other [which does not require it. For with one that does require it, we need not fear undermining, for he cannot say: "Had I known that a sage could have absolved her of it, I would not have divorced her." For "we are witnesses" that even had he known it, he would have divorced her, a man not wanting his wife to be demeaned in beth-din before a sage, to go to his beth-din and to inquire as to her oath. But it is because of a vow that does not require a sage, which the husband himself could have annulled, that they forbade (him to take her back) in all instances, that he not say: "Had I known that I could have annulled it, I would not have divorced her."] R. Yossi b. R. Yehudah said; It happened in Tziddon that one said to his wife: "I vow to divorce you," and he divorced her, and the sages permitted him to take her back, for "the general good." [The gemara explains that something is lacking and that this is the intent: When is this so (that he may not take her back)? When she vowed. But if he vowed to divorce her, and he divorced her, he may take her back, and we do not fear any undermining. And R. Yossi b. R. Yehudah said: It also happened in Tziddon that one said to his wife: "Konam, if I do not divorce you." That is: May all the fruits in the world be forbidden to me if I do not divorce you. And he divorced her, and the sages permitted him to take her back. ("for the general good":) That is, the sages said: "One who divorces his wife because of a vow may not take her back" only for "the general good," in that we apprehend subsequent undermining. But this is possible only where she vows. Where he vows, however, the consideration of "the general good" does not obtain, and he was permitted to take her back. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yossi.]
  	If one divorced his wife on the grounds of her being an eilonith (incapable of bearing children) — R. Yehudah says: He may not take her back [lest she marry another and have children, and he say: "Had I known this, even if they had given me a hundred manah, I would not have divorced you."] The sages say: He may take her back [for we do not fear (the above) "undermining." The gemara explains: Who are "the sages"? R. Meir, who holds that a double-condition (t'nai kaful) is required; and our instance is one in which he did not double the condition, not telling her: "Be apprised that I am divorcing you on the grounds of your being an eilonith; and, if you are not an eilonith, it is not a get," in which instance (not having doubled it thus), it is a get even if she is not an eilonith.] If she married another and had children from him, and she wished to claim her kethubah, [for an eilonith has no kethubah; and now that she was found not to be an eilonith, she wishes to claim her kethubah] — she is told: "You would do better to remain silent than to speak." [For he could tell her: "Had I known that in the end I would have to pay your kethubah, I would not have divorced you," thus voiding the get and rendering her children mamzerim.]
  	If one sold himself and his children (in servitude) to a non-Jew, he is not to be redeemed, [if he is wont to do so, as when he has already done so two or three times]; but the children are redeemed after their father's death. If one sold his field to a gentile, he buys and brings bikkurim (first-fruits) from it (see Rashi), for "the general good." [Every year he must buy its first-fruits from the gentile and bring them to Jerusalem. ("for the general good":) that he not be wont to sell land in Eretz Yisrael to gentiles, and so that, if he did sell it, he would exert himself to redeem it.]
  
  
  
  	Damages are assessed relative to the best quality (of grain in the field) [Even though this is Torah-mandated, viz. (Exodus 22:4): "The best of his field and the best of his vineyard shall he pay," this tanna holds that Scripture speaks of the best of the field of the nizzak (the one damaged); and because of "the general good," the sages stated that the mazzik (the causer of the damage) should pay the best of his property, even if it is better than the best of the nizzak, so that men be careful not to cause damage.], and a creditor (claims) from the middle quality [For according to Scripture, he claims only from the lowest quality, viz. (Deuteronomy 24:12): "And the man who is indebted to you shall bring out to you the pledge outside," and a man is likely to bring out only the least valuable of his possessions; but because of "the general good" they mandated that a creditor claim from the middle quality, so that the door not be locked to loans.], and the kethubah of a woman (is claimed from) the lowest quality. [For "the closing of the door" is not to be feared in this instance. "For more than a man wants to marry, a woman wants to be married."] R. Meir says: The kethubah of a woman, too, (is claimed from) the middle quality. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Meir].
  	Payment is not exacted from bound property [nechasim meshubadim] when free property obtains, even if it (the free property) be of the lowest quality. [e.g., If a debtor sold his middle-quality property, which is bound to the creditor, the creditor cannot seize it from the buyer if free property remained with the debtor, even if it were of the lowest quality.] Only the lowest quality is exacted in payment from the property of orphans.
  	Payment is not exacted for the eating of fruits, for the enrichment of land, and for the food of one's wife and daughters from bound property, for "the general good." [If one stole a field and sold it to another, and he sowed it and it sprouted and produced fruit, and the despoiled one came and claimed it with its fruit from the buyer (reimbursing him only for his expenses), the buyer returns and claims the price of the field from bound property, it having been sold to him with a guarantee by bill of sale, this being "a loan against a note" (milveh bishtar), and (he claims) the price of the fruit from free, and not from bound property. The same applies when the buyer enriched the land by planting trees or fertilizing it, and the like. ("and for the food of one's wife and daughters":) this being a condition of the kethubah, viz.: "And you shall dwell in my house and be fed through my property; and the daughters that you have by me will dwell in my house and be fed through my property, etc." When they come to claim their food, they do so only from free property, and not from bound property. ("for 'the general good'":) For these are indeterminate things and exact allowances cannot be made for them.] And if one found a lost object [and returned it, and the owner claimed that he did not return all of it], he does not take an oath, for "the general good." [For if an oath were imposed upon him, no one would take pains to return a lost object.]
  	If orphans relied upon a householder [to conduct their affairs — even though he were not appointed an apotropos, he is deemed one ("apotropos," from the Latin: father-"pater"; children-"potos" — hence: "apotropos"-"the father of the young")], or if their father appointed an apotropos for them, he must tithe their fruits. If an apotropos were appointed by the father of the orphans, he must swear (that he did not misappropriate anything of theirs). [For if he derived no benefit, he would not be an apotropos for him, and the oath would not act as a deterrent (to his accepting the appointment)]. If beth-din appointed him, he does not swear. [For he is doing beth-din a "favor" by accepting their charge and exerting himself gratis; and if he had to swear, this would act as a deterrent.] Abba Shaul sys: "Just the opposite." [If beth-din appointed him, he must swear. For because he derived the satisfaction of gaining the reputation of an honest man, trusted by beth-din, the oath would not act as a deterrent. But if the father of the orphans appointed him, he does not swear, for he is doing him a favor by exerting himself gratis for his children, and if an oath were imposed upon him, it would act as a deterrent. The halachah is in accordance with Abba Shaul.] If one defiles [the clean produce of his neighbor] or mixes [terumah with his neighbor's chullin (mundane produce), causing him a loss by constraining him to sell it cheap to the Cohanim], or mixes [libational wine with kosher wine, so that benefit may not be derived from it] — (if he does so) unwittingly, he is not liable; if intentionally, he is liable. [By law, he should not be liable, for "Non-recognizable damage is not called 'damage,.'"; but because of "the general good," that men not go and defile their neighbor's produce under exemption from liability, (he was rendered liable).] If Cohanim invalidated in the sanctuary [offerings that they slaughtered and whose blood they sprinkled, by the thought of eating them outside of their proper time, disqualifying them (as offerings) for their owners] — (if they did so) intentionally, they are liable. [For they knew that they rendered it unfit thereby. They must reimburse the owners, who must bring other offerings. And even if it were a gift-offering, which must not be replaced, still, the owner is chagrined at his offering's not being sacrificed, for it was his desire to bring it as a gift.]
  	R. Yochanan b. Gudgeda testified that a deaf-mute whose father married her is given a divorce. [Even though she was a bona fide married woman, her father having accepted her betrothal when she was a minor, still, she is given a get, and she receives her get when she is a deaf-mute, even though her consent is lacking. For a woman can be divorced perforce, so that her consent is not required.]; and that the minor daughter of an Israelite [an orphan, whose marriage is rabbinically (and not Scripturally) sanctioned] eats terumah [rabbinically mandated terumah, this not being decreed against by reason of (the possibility of her coming to eat) Scripturally mandated terumah]; and that if she died, her husband inherits her; and that if one built a beam that he had stolen into a building, monetary reimbursement is sufficient, [for the good of the penitent; for if he were required to raze his building and return the beam itself, he would be deterred from repenting.]; and that a stolen sin-offering, which was not known to many [as being stolen] atones [and another need not be brought], for "the good of the altar," [that the Cohanim not be distressed by (the thought of) having eaten chullin (non-consecrated food) from (an animal) slaughtered in the azarah (the Temple court) and the altar be "deserted," the Cohanim refraining from performing the (sacrificial) service.]
  	There was no sikrikon [a gentile murderer] in Judah [That is, they did not adjudicate the law of sikrikon to say that one who bought the land of a Jew from a gentile murderer had to enter into judgment with the owner.] in the (time of) the slain of the war [ i.e., when the decree was sore upon Israel to be slain in the war. If one bought a field from the sikrikon at that time, his purchase stood, and he did not need to enter into judgment with the (former) Israelite owner of the land; for the Israelite, being forced (to sell his land on pain of death), fully commits himself to the sale of the land to the sikrikon. And it is ruled (Bava Kamma 47b): "If one were suspended (not to be taken down until he sold) and he sold, his sale is a sale."] But from those slain in (the time of) war on, [where there was no decree (upon Israel) to be slain, there is sikrikon. [The law of sikrikon is adjudicated, to say that one who bought (the land of an Israelite) from a sikrikon has to enter into judgment with the (former) owner, as explained in the Mishnah.] How so? If he bought (the field) from the sikrikon and then bought it from the owner, the purchase is void, [for we say that he (the former owner) acted out of fear (of the sikrikon)]. (If he bought it) from the owner and then bought it from the sikrikon, the purchase stands. If he bought it [land set aside for his wife's kethubah] from the man, and then bought it from the woman, the purchase is void, [for she can say: "I was just trying to please my husband"]. (If he bought it) from the woman and then bought it from the man, the purchase stands. This (what we learned above) is an earlier Mishnah. The beth-din after them said: If one buys from a sikrikon he gives a quarter (of the value of the field) to the owner, [for they estimated that the sikrikon, having gotten the field for nothing, lowered the price by a quarter]. When is this so? When they (the former owners) do not have enough money to buy it back; but if they have enough money to buy it back, they take precedence to all men. Rebbi convened a beth-din, which ruled that if it were in the possession of the sikrikon for twelve months, whoever came first (to purchase it) acquired it; but he had to give a quarter to the (former) owner.
  	A deaf-mute gestures and is gestured to. [Whatever he gestures or others gesture to him and he acquiesces — all of it stands.] And Ben Betheirah says: kofetz venikfatz ["remizah" (gesturing) is with the hand or the head. "k'fitzah" is turning up the lips, as in (Job 5:16): "And iniquity has turned up (kaftzah) her mouth." "K'fitzah is not as distinct as remizah.] with metaltelin (chattel) [i.e., if he sold chattel. The halachah is not in accordance with Ben Betheirah.] Peutoth [young children of seven or eight, if they are bright and conversant with buying and selling; or children of nine or ten, even if they are not that bright] — their buying is buying and their selling is selling with metaltelin [and their gift is a gift, whether they be healthy or shechiv mera (at the point of death); whether it be a large or a small gift.]
  	These things were instituted to foster peace: A Cohein reads first (in the Torah); and after him, a Levite; and after him, an Israelite [when they are equal in wisdom; but if the Israelite were greater in wisdom, he takes precedence to the Cohein and the Levite (for "a mamzer who is a Torah scholar takes precedence to a high-priest who is an ignoramus.") This is the law of the gemara; but the practice today is that a Cohein, even if he is an ignoramus, takes precedence to the greatest sage in Israel.] to foster peace. [For according to the Torah, the Cohein can allow anyone he wishes to read in the Torah before him; and "to foster peace" they instituted that he read first and not allow another to do so, so that quarreling not break out, viz.: "Why did you let him read and not the other?" And it makes no difference in this regard whether it be a Sabbath or a festival, when there are many congregants, or a Monday or Thursday — at the present time a Cohein always reads first and may not permit an Israelite to read before him, so as to avoid quarrels. And if there be no Cohein there, "the bundle is scattered," and a Levite reads next only if he is of greater eminence (than the others). Others say that (in such an instance) a Levite does not read at all. And this is the halachah.] An eruv is placed in an old house [ The inhabitants of a courtyard, who are wont to place their Sabbath eruv in the same house every week, should not place it in a different house ], to foster peace. [ For those who were wont to see the eruv in that house, now, not seeing it, might come to say that they carry without an eruv, casting suspicion upon them.] The (water) pit which is closest to the duct [coming from the river] is filled up first [and afterwards, those below it], to foster peace. Theft obtains with (what is taken from) the nets "of" (i.e., which are used to trap) animals birds and fish [even though they lack an "inside" to (legally) acquire their snare], to foster peace [and is not subject to prosecution in beth-din]. R. Yossi says: It is absolute theft [by rabbinical ordinance, and it is subject to prosecution in beth-din. In any event, R. Yossi concedes that it is not theft by Torah law to make one liable for transgression of a negative commandment. (The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yossi)]. Theft obtains with what is found by a deaf-mute, a simpleton, or a minor, to foster peace. R. Yossi says: It is absolute theft. If a pauper were menakef olives (of peah or shikchah) ["menakef" = cutting, as in (Isaiah 10:34): "Venikaf (and he will cut down) the thickets of the forest"], what falls below him is subject to theft, to foster peace. R. Yossi says: It is absolute theft. We do not protest the taking of leket, shikchah, or peah by gentile paupers, to foster peace.
  	A woman may lend her neighbor who is suspect of shevi'ith [i.e., of keeping the fruits of the sabbatical year and of secreting them from (the time of their required) removal on: a sifter, a sieve, a mill, and an oven. But she may not sieve or grind with her [to assist her, it being forbidden to directly assist transgressors in their act of transgression.] The wife of a chaver (a Torah scholar) may lend a sifter or a sieve to the wife of an ignorant man, and she may sieve and grind and sift with her, [for the majority of the ignorant tithe]; but when she puts water [on the dough], she may not touch it with her, [for when she rolls it, it becomes subject to challah, and it becomes unclean by contact with unclean vessels, the yeast having become susceptible to uncleanliness (by the addition of the water), and she helps her to roll; and it is forbidden to impart uncleanliness to challah.] And all were stated only to foster peace. [They allowed them to lend them vessels and to help them (not at the time of the transgression itself) only to foster peace.] And the hands of gentiles may be strengthened [i.e., it is permitted to wish them success (when they work their fields on the sabbatical year)]; but not the hands of Jews (who perform such labor). And they (the gentiles) are greeted [on all days, even on their festivals, even though they are thereby graced with the name of Heaven, "Shalom" (Peace) being one of the names of the Holy One Blessed be He], to foster peace.
  
  
  
  	If one says: "Receive this get for my wife," or: "Deliver this get to my wife," if he wishes to rescind it, he may do so, [for a get is a liability for a woman, and one may not impose a liability upon another without his knowledge.] If a woman said (to a messenger): "Receive my get for me," if he wishes to rescind it, he may not do so, [for since she appointed him a messenger, he is like her "hand," and she is divorced immediately when he receives the get.] Therefore, if the husband said to him: "I do not want you to receive it for her, but go and give it to her," if he wishes to rescind it, he may do so. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: Also, if she said: "Tol my get for me," if he wishes to rescind it, he may not do so." ["Tol" denotes "taking." The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.]
  	If a woman said: "Receive my get for me," she needs [to bring before us] two sets of witnesses: two who say: "Before us she told" [him to receive it], and two who say: "Before us he received it and he tore it." [This, in a time of shmad (enforced conversion), when (observance of) mitzvoth was decreed against, and they would tear the get immediately, so that it not be seen.] — even if they [those before whom she told him to receive it] were (both) the first and the last [those who saw him receive it], or one from the first set and one from the second and another joining them [i.e., complementing each one]. A betrothed maiden, she or her father receives her get. [She has a "hand," for she is of age, and her father, too, is authorized to receive it.] R. Yehudah said: Two "hands" cannot be invested as one. Rather, her father alone receives her get. And any woman who cannot guard her get cannot be divorced, [even if her father receives it, it being written (Deuteronomy 24:1): "And he shall send her from his house" — one who is sent and does not return; to exclude this one, who is sent and does return.]
  	If a minor said: "Receive my get for me," it is not a get until it reaches her hand. Therefore, if the husband wishes to rescind it, he may do so; for a minor cannot appoint a messenger. But if her father told him: "Go and receive my daughter's get," if he (the husband) wished to take it back, he may not do so. If one said: "Give a get to my wife in this and this place," and he gave it to her in a different place, it is void, [the husband being particular (about the place), not wishing to be gossiped about (in other places)]. (If he said:) "She is in this and this place," [in which instance, he simply points out where she can be found], and he gave it to her in a different place, it is valid. If a woman said: "Receive my get in this and this place," and he received it in a different place, it is void. R. Eliezer rules it to be valid, [holding that with the husband, who divorces her of his will, there is insistence (upon a particular place); but with the woman, who is divorced perforce, there is (only) the pointing out of a place. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Eliezer.]
  	(If she [the wife of a Cohein] says:) "Bring my get to me," she eats terumah until the get reaches her hand. (If she says:) "Receive my get for me," she is forbidden to eat terumah immediately. (If she says:) "Receive my get for me in that place," she eats terumah until the get reaches that place. R. Eliezer forbids it immediately [after he takes leave of her, R. Eliezer being consistent with his ruling that the get is valid when received in a different place, the woman (merely) pointing out (where he can be found), so that she is divorced as soon as he receives it. Therefore, as soon as the messenger takes leave of her, she may not eat terumah, on the possibility that he might have found the husband outside the city and received the get from him. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Eliezer.]
  	If one says: "Write a get and give it to my wife," (or) "Divorce her," (or) "Write an igereth and give it to her," they write it and give it to her, [it being written in a get, "igereth shevukin" ("a writ of divorce")]. (If he says:) "Rid her," "Provide for her," "Do with her according to the nimus," "Do with her as is right," he has said nothing. [("Rid her":) He may be referring to exemption and liability, the ridding of her debts. ("Provide for her":) Do what is required, as in: "we expend for provisions, etc." Therefore, we do not know whether he is referring to the exigencies of the get, that she not be linked to the yavam, or the exigencies of clothing and covering. ("according to the nimus":) the ordinance. We do not know whether he is referring to the ordinance of the get or the ordinance of food and clothing. The same applies to "as is right."] In the beginning they (the sages) said: If one were being taken out in chains [to be executed by the authorities], and he said: "Write a divorce to my wife," [even though he did not say "give,"] they are to write it and give it"; but then they added: Also one who goes to sea and one who goes out in a caravan [to the desert]. R. Shimon Shezuri says: Also one who is in danger [i.e., one who is ill. The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon Shezuri.]
  	If one were cast into a pit, and he cried out that whoever heard his voice should write a get to his wife, [(giving his name and the name of his city)], they are to write it and give it. If a healthy man said: "Write a get to my wife," (we assume that) he is jesting with her [since he did not say: "Give it to her."] Once, a healthy man said: "Write a get to my wife," and he went up to the roof, fell down, and died. R. Shimon b. Gamliel said: The sages said: If he fell of himself, it is a get; if the wind blew him down, it is not a get. [The gemara explains that something is missing and that this is the intent: If his "ending sheds light on his beginning," it is a get, and also, it once happened that a healthy man, etc. The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.]
  	If he said to two men: "Give a get to my wife," or to three: "Write a get and give it to my wife," they write it and give it. [("If he said to two men, etc.":) even though he did not say: "Write it and give it." They write it by themselves, and they may not tell another scribe to write it, or to witnesses to sign it; for he did not make them a beth-din to bid others to do so, but he made them witnesses. And they are both his messengers and his witnesses. And if he said to three: "Write and give a get to my wife," even though they are fit to constitute a beth-din, since he told them explicitly: "Write," he did not make them a beth-din, but witnesses.] If he said to three: "Give a get to my wife," [but he did not tell them: "Write,"], they may tell others to write it [to sign it, and to give it] because he made them a beth-din. These are the words of R. Meir. And this halachah was brought up from the prison house by R. Chanina of Ono [in the name of R. Akiva, who was incarcerated in the prison house]: I have it by tradition that if one says to three: "Give a get to my wife," they may tell others to write it, because he makes them a beth-din. R. Yossi said: We said to the messenger [i.e., to R. Yossi, the "messenger" of this halachah, to repeat it in the house of study] that we, too, had it by tradition that even if one said to the great beth-din in Jerusalem: "Give a get to my wife," they must learn to write it, [If they do not know how to write it, they must learn how to do so and write it themselves] and give it. If one said to ten: "Write a get to my wife," one writes it and two sign. (If he said:) "All of you write it," one writes and all sign. Therefore, if one of them died, the get is void.
  
  
  
  	If one were seized by kordyakos [If his mind were unhinged by a demon potent against one who drinks new wine], and he said: "Write a get to my wife," he has said nothing. If he said: "Write a get to my wife," and then he were seized by kordyakos, and then he said: "Do not write it," there is nothing in his last words. [And it is not necessary to ask him again (if he wishes to divorce her) after he came to his senses, but we rely on his first words. In any event, so long as his mind is unhinged, the get is not written.] If he became mute, and they said to him: "We shall write a get to your wife," and he nodded his head, he is "examined" [by other questions] three times. If he responds (rationally) to no (i.e., something calling for a negative response), no; and to yes, yes, the get is written and given to her, [if he nodded "yes" to the get.]
  	If they said to him [a healthy person (embarking on a journey) or a sage at the point of death: "Let us write a get to your wife [so that she not require yibum] and he said: "Write" — if they spoke to the scribe and he wrote it, and to the witnesses, and they signed it, even if they wrote it and signed it and gave it to him, and he then gave it to her, the get is void, until he tells the scribe to write and the witnesses to sign.
  	(If one said to his wife:) "This is your get if I die," "This is your get if I die from this illness," "This is your get after death," he has said nothing, [for the implication is: ("This is your get) after I die," and there is no get after death.] (If he said: "This is your get) from today if I die," "from now if I die," it is a get. (If he said:) "from today and after death," it is a get and not a get. [We do not know whether it was a condition, viz.: "from today if I die," in which instance, when he dies the condition is fulfilled and the get takes effect from the time it was given — or whether it was retraction, his "taking back" "from today," and saying: "After death, let if be a get," in which instance it is nothing, in that he did not say: "from today if I die."] If he died, she receives chalitzah, [for it might not be a get], and she is not taken in yibum, [for it might be a get, in which instance she is his (the yavam's) brother's divorcée, and kareth-interdicted to him.] (If he said:) "This is your get from today if I die from this illness," and he arose and walked in the market, and then took ill and died — we "evaluate" him. If (we see him) as having died from the first illness, it is a get; if not, it is not a get.
  	She may not be alone with him [She may not be alone with the one who gave her a get and said to her: "from today if I die," lest he cohabit with her and she require a second get, for we suspect that he might have cohabited with her for the sake of betrothal.] (She may not be alone with him) except with witnesses — even a bondsman, even a bondswoman, except her own maidservant, for she is indifferent to her presence. What is she in those days? [This does not refer to the beginning, viz.: "from today if I die," for in that instance it is certain that when he dies, she is regarded retroactively as divorced from the time the get was given, and one who lived with her (from the giving until his death) is not liable, but (it refers to) an instance in which he says to her when he gives her the get: "This is your get, and be divorced by it from the time I am in the world if I die."] R. Yehudah says: She is like a married woman in every respect, [R. Yehudah holding that the get takes effect immediately before he dies, before which time she is a married woman.] R. Yossi says: She is divorced and not divorced, [R. Yossi holding that from the time he gives her the get, every moment we entertain the possibility that it might be the moment before death, so that it is "a get in doubt." And even though he lives longer, there is no retroactive determination (breirah). Therefore, her status is a doubtful one, and one who lives with her (from the time he gives her the get) requires a suspended guilt-offering (asham talui)].
  	(If he said:) "This is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz," she is divorced, and she must give it. [She is divorced from now, from the time she receives the get, and she must give him what was stipulated. And if the get were lost or torn before she gave him the money, she does not require another get. For "saying: 'on condition' is equivalent to saying 'from right now.'"] (If he said:) "on condition that you give it to me from now within thirty days," if she gave it to him within thirty days, she is divorced; if not, she is not divorced. R. Shimon b. Gamliel said: Once, in Tziddon, a man said to his wife: "This is your get on condition that you give me my mantle," and his mantle was lost, and the sages said: "Give him its value." [The gemara explains that something is missing and that this is the intent: If he said to her: "on condition that you give me my mantle," and his mantle were lost, (we understand that) he meant this specific mantle (and she is not divorced.) R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: She gives him its value, that being all that the husband intended. And it also once happened in Tziddon that a man said to his wife … and the sages said: "Give him its value." The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.]
  	(If he said:) "This is your get on condition that you serve my father," "on condition that you nurse my son," [The gemara explains that where he did not qualify his words, not stating specifically how much time she should serve his father, he is to be understood as having stated "for one day," and the condition is fulfilled if she serves his father or nurses his son one day alone.] …How long does she nurse him? [That is, how long is the time of nursing, within which, if she nurses him for one day, the condition is fulfilled?] Two years. R. Yehudah says: Eighteen months. [But if she nursed him after two years, according to the rabbis, or after eighteen months, according to R. Yehudah, this is not nursing, and the condition has not been fulfilled. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.] — if the son died, [and she did not nurse him at all]; or if the father died, [and she did not serve him], it is a get. [For he (the husband) did not wish to taunt her, but only to gain some benefit, and it was not required. Had he known that his father or his son would die, he would not have made the condition in the first place.] (If he said:) "This is your get on condition that you serve my father for two years," "on condition that you nurse my son for two years" — if the son died, or if the father died, or if the father said: "I do not want you to serve me," without offense [i.e., even though she did not anger him, so that the forestalling (of the fulfillment of the condition) is not due to her], it is not a get [and, it goes without saying, if it were with offense.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel said: In such an instance, it is a get, [since she did not offend and was not the cause of the forestalling.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel stated a general rule: (In the instance of) any forestalling which is not due to her, it is a get. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.]
  	(If he said:) "This is your get if I do not come from now until thirty days," and he went from Yehudah to the Galil — if he reached Antipatras and he returned, his condition is voided. [The gemara explains this Mishnah as relating to an instance where he makes two conditions: 1) If I come to the Galil, it is to be a get immediately; 2) if I do not come to the Galil — if I do not return before thirty days, it is to be a get; if not, it is not to be a get. If he went and reached Antipatras, the end of the land of Judah and returned within thirty days, the get is void. For he did not reach the Galil, and he did not tarry thirty days.] (If he said:) "This is your get if I do not come from now until thirty days," and he went from the Galil to Yehudah — if he reached Kfar Otnai [which is at the end of the border of the Galil], and he returned, his condition is voided. (If he said:) "This is your get if I do not come from now until thirty days," and he went abroad — if he reached Acco [which is at the end of the border of Eretz Israel] and returned [within thirty days], his condition is voided, [for he did not go abroad and he did not tarry thirty days.] (If he said:) "This is your get if I go thirty days without seeing your face" — if he went and came, went and came [afterwards — if thirty days passed without his seeing her face, it is a get. And we do not say that since in the beginning he came and went there is reason to suspect that he might have effected a reconciliation and voided the get, for] since he was not together with her [in the time he came and went, we do not suspect that he might have effected a reconciliation, and when the condition is fulfilled and he goes thirty days without seeing her face,] it is a get. [The gemara explains that he says at the time of the condition: "It is with this understanding that I give her the get — that she be believed by me as a hundred witnesses if she says that I did not come and stay together with her and effect a reconciliation." And this is the halachah. For if he did not say this at the time of the condition, we fear that he might come and protest and say that he had effected a reconciliation.]
  	(If he said:) "This is your get if I do not come from now until twelve months," and he died within twelve months, it is not a get. [For since he did not say: "From now after twelve months it shall be a get," and he died within that time, she requires yibum.] (If he said:) "This is your get from now if I do not come from now until twelve months," and he died within twelve months, it is a get.
  	(If he said:) "If I do not come from now until twelve months, write and give a get to my wife" — if they wrote it within twelve months and gave it after twelve months, it is not a get. (If he said:) "Write and give a get to my wife if I do not come from now until twelve months" — if they wrote it within twelve months and gave it after twelve months, it is not a get. R. Yossi says: In this instance, it is a get. (If he said:) "Write it after twelve months and give it after twelve months," and he died — if the (writing of the) get preceded his death, it is a get; and if his death preceded the (writing of the) get, it is not a get. And if it is not known (which preceded which), of such an instance they said: "She is divorced and not divorced."
  
  
  
  	If one throws a get to his wife, and she is in her house or in her courtyard, she is divorced, [it being written (Deuteronomy 24:1): "And he shall place it (the get) in her hand." Since it is not written: "And in her hand shall he place it," the implication is: "And he shall place" — anywhere, whether in her courtyard, in her garden, or in her enclosure. This, on condition that she be standing by her house or by her courtyard.] If he threw it to her in his house or in his courtyard — even if it (the get) were with her in the bed, she is not divorced. (If he threw it) into her lap or into her sewing box, she is divorced, [even if she were in his house. For the space of her lap and of her sewing box acquires (objects) for her. For a man (her husband) begrudges her (for purposes of acquisition) neither the space of her lap nor of her sewing box.]
  	If he said to her: "Gather in this bill of debt," or if she found it behind him, [If the get were on his back, and he arched his back to her so that she should take it] — if she read it and it were her get, it is not a get until he says to her: "This is your get." [If he tells her "Take your get," however, it is a get. But if the get were on the ground, or on his back, or on his body, and he did not arch his back or project his body towards her so that she should take it, even if he said to her: "Take your get," it is not a get.] If he placed it in her hand while she were sleeping, and when she awoke, she read it and found it to be her get, it is not a get, until he says to her: "This is your get." If she were standing in the public domain and he threw it to her — if it were near her, she is divorced; if it were near him, she is not divorced; if it were "half and half," she is divorced and not divorced. [Whatever she can guard and he cannot guard is called "near her." Whatever she cannot guard and he can guard is called "near him." If both can guard it, or if both cannot guard it, this is called "half and half." As for the halachah, she is not divorced until the get enters her hand or her domain.]
  	The same applies to betrothal, and the same applies to a debt. If one's creditor said to him: "Throw me my debt (i.e., what you owe me), and he threw it to him — (if it landed) near the creditor, the debtor is acquitted (of his debt); near the debtor, the debtor is (i.e., remains) liable; "half and half," they divide. [The gemara explains the instance to be one where he says: "Throw me my debt within (the framework of) the law of gittin" so that the debt has the status of a get. If the debtor threw it near the creditor, and it were lost, the debtor is acquitted and he need not pay; if near the debtor, the debtor is liable, etc. But if he said to him: "Throw my debt to me and be acquitted of it," once he throws it to him, in any circumstance, he is exempt. If she were standing on top of a roof and he threw it to her, once it reaches the "atmosphere" of the roof [less than three tefachim (handbreadths) from its surface, that space being regarded as part of the roof], she is divorced. If he were above, and she below, once it left the domain of the roof [i.e., once it left the domain of the roof (on which he were standing) and entered the domain in which she were standing], (even) if it were erased or burned, she is divorced. [This, where the throwing of the get into the courtyard preceded the outbreak of the fire in the courtyard. For if the latter preceded, then ab initio the get is "going to the fire," and she is not divorced.]
  	Beth Shammai say: A man may divorce his wife with an old get [which he wrote to divorce his wife, continuing to live with her after he wrote the get. Beth Shammai hold that we do not decree against it lest people say: "Her get preceded her son," i.e., lest a year or two pass between the writing and the giving and she have children from him in the interim and then be divorced with that get — so that people, seeing the get as antedating the birth of her son, might come to think that the get were given her at the time of writing and come to cast a blemish upon the child, saying that it was born of an unmarried woman.] Beth Hillel forbid it. Which is "an old get"? A get, after the writing of which he continued living with her. [The halachah: One may not divorce his wife with an old get. And if he divorced her and went to a different country, she may remarry by it ab initio.]
  	If he wrote it in the name of "a kingdom lacking worth" [If he were in Bavel and he wrote it according to the reckoning of the years of the kingdom of Edom (Rome), which exercised no reign in the place of the writing of the get, she leaves both (husbands). Edom is called "a kingdom lacking worth," for it is without a (distinctive) script or tongue.], in the name of Madai, or in the name of Yavan (she leaves both) [for he must write it in the name of the kingdom of the land where the get is written, for the sake of shalom malchuth ("peace with the kingdom"), so that they say: "They must hold us in high regard, for they write their documents in our name."], the building of the Temple or the destruction of the Temple; if he were in the east and wrote it in the west; in the west and wrote it in the east — she leaves both [If she married by this get, she leaves both the first and the second], and she requires a get from both, and she receives neither kethubah, nor fruit, nor belaoth from either. If she took from either one of them, she returns it [The entire Mishnah is explained in Yevamoth (91b)]; and the child of either is a mamzer [The Mishnah is in accordance with R. Meir, who says: "If one alters the 'currency coined by the sages,' the child is a mamzer." This is not the halachah.]; and neither (if he is a Cohein) may make himself unclean for her; and neither has rights in the lost objects which she finds, in her handiwork, or in the annulment of her vows. If she were the daughter of an Israelite, she is disqualified from (marriage to) Cohanim (if her husbands died before she were divorced); if she were the daughter of a Levite, from ma'aser; if the daughter of a Cohein, from terumah. And the heirs of neither inherit her kethubah; and if they died, the brothers of each give chalitzah but do not perform yibum. If he (the scribe) changed his name or her name, the name of his city or the name of her city, she leaves each, and all of the above applies.
  	All the arayoth (illicit relations) about whom they said that their tzaroth (co-wives) are permitted, [the fifteen arayoth about whom the sages said that their tzaroth are permitted to marry without chalitzah (from the yavam)] — if these tzaroth went and married, and these [the arayoth] were found to be eiloniyoth (unable to bear children) [making it manifest, retroactively, that the dead man's (original) betrothal of them was mistaken, so that these were not (halachically) their tzaroth and were not exempt from yibum by the arayoth], she (the tzarah) leaves this one [the husband that she married] and (she leaves) this one [the yavam (i.e., he must give her chalitzah)], and all of the above applies. [In Yevamoth, this is stated to be in accordance with R. Akiva, who says that the child of a union interdicted by a negative commandment is a mamzer. This is not the halachah.]
  	If one wed his yevamah and her tzarah went and remarried, [the ruling being that cohabitation with the one (the yevamah) exempts the tzarah (from chalitzah)], and she [the yevamah] were found to be an eilonith, [so that her yibum is not yibum, and the tzarah should not have been exempt], she leaves this one [her husband] and this one [her original yavam], and all of the above applies.
  	If the scribe wrote a get for the man [to divorce his wife with], and a receipt for the woman [to give to her husband upon payment of her kethubah], and he [the scribe] erred [when he gave them the writs] and gave the get to the woman and the receipt to the man, and they gave it, one to the other, [and she went and married, thinking that what her husband gave her was the get, and he thinking that what his wife gave him was the receipt (Rambam reads it: "And he gave the get to the man and the receipt to the woman," and interprets it as: "And he thought he gave the get to the man and the receipt to the woman," not having done this, but the very opposite. The interpretation is forced.] — and, subsequently, the get was found to issue from the hand of the man, and the receipt from the hand of the woman, she leaves this one and this one, and all of the above applies. R. Eliezer says: If it issued forth at once [from her husband's hand before she remarried], it is not a get, [and she requires a different get], and if it issued forth after some time, [i.e., after she remarried], it is a get. It is not entirely up to him [i.e., It is not all according to the words of the first (husband), that he be believed] to void the rights of the second, [who married her, and we posit a "conspiracy" between the two, an exchange of the writs after she remarried. The halachah is in accordance with R. Eliezer.] If one wrote (a get) to divorce his wife, and changed his mind — Beth Shammai say: He disqualifies her from (marriage to) the priesthood. Beth Hillel say: Even if he gave it to her on condition, and the condition was not satisfied, he does not disqualify her from the priesthood.
  	If one divorced his wife, and she spent the night with him at an inn, [there being witnesses to their having been alone together, but not to their having cohabited], Beth Shammai say: She does not require a second get from him. Beth Hillel say: She requires a second get from him. [Beth Hillel hold that witnesses to their being alone together are (considered) witnesses to cohabitation. And since a man does not cohabit promiscuously, (we assume that) he betrothed her with this cohabitation. And Beth Shammai hold that we do not consider witnesses to their being alone witnesses to cohabitation until they actually observe her in the act.] When is this so? If she were divorced from marriage. They agree that if she were divorced from betrothal, she does not require a second get from him, for he is not that familiar with her (and is assumed not to have cohabited with her.) If one wed her with a "bald get," she leaves this one and this one, and all of the above applies. [A "bald get" is one whose folds are more numerous than its witnesses. The rabbis instituted a folded get (get mekushar) for Cohanim, who are quick to anger and who, in the heat of their anger, might write a get to their wives, and later regret it and not be able to take them back. They, therefore, instituted a get mekushar, which is difficult to write quickly, so that in the interim, their anger might cool. One or two lines are written and folded over on the smooth (unwritten) part and sewn, and one witness signs the fold on the outside. The process is repeated a second and third time. And if there is a fold without a witness signed on the outside, this is a "bald get," and it is not valid. For we assume that in the beginning there were as many witnesses as there are folds, and we suspect that the husband told all of them to sign and that one did not. If she weds with such a get, she leaves both, and all of the above applies. This Mishnah is in accordance with R. Meir, who says: "If one alters 'the currency minted by the sages' for gittin, the child is a mamzer." This is not the halachah.]
  	All may complete (the signing of) a "bald get" [even a bondsman; even one who is unfit to be a witness by reason of transgression]. These are the words of Ben Naness. R. Akiva says: Only kin who are acceptable as witnesses in other instances [i.e., who are not unfit as witnesses per se, but only by reason of being kin] (only those) may complete it, [but not a bondsman or a robber. A bondsman, because he might thereby come to be regarded as "pedigreed" (i.e., not a bondsman); a robber, because he might thereby be assumed to have repented (and to be acceptable as a witness in all instances.) But all recognize kin as such. The halachah is in accordance with Ben Naness, that all may complete it. In any event, only one unfit witness may sign thereon; the others must all be fit.] What is a "bald get" One whose folds are more numerous than its witnesses.
  
  
  
  	If one divorced his wife, saying to her: "You are permitted to all men except this one" — R. Eliezer permits it, and the sages forbid it. [The rationale of R. Eliezer (Leviticus 21:7): "And a woman divorced from her husband they (Cohanim) shall not take" — Even if she were divorced only from her husband, as when he told her: "You are divorced from me, but not permitted to other men," she is forbidden to (marry into) the priesthood. We see, then, that it is a get; so that here, where he permits her to all men except this one, she is permitted to others. The rationale of the sages: They say that what is forbidden to the priesthood is different, Scripture having prescribed additional mitzvoth for Cohanim. So that even though it is a get to forbid her to the priesthood, it is not a get to permit her to others. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] What does he do? He takes it from her and gives it to her again, telling her: "You are permitted to all men." But if he had written it ("…except this one") in the get, even though he later erased it, it is void. [And the sages forbid it only when he tells her: "You are permitted to all men except this one," but if he says to her: "This is your get on condition that you not wed that man," the rabbis concede that it is a get. For he permitted her to all men in giving her the get. It is just that he stipulated that she not wed a particular man, which is like any other condition. And the rabbis forbade him to say: "This is your get on condition that you marry that man," so that their wives not be regarded as gifts to be given to one another. And any condition that one attaches to the get before he writes it, though it not be written in the get, invalidates it. But after he places the get in her hand, he may make any condition he desires.]
  	(If he said:) You are permitted to all men except my father and your father, my brother and your brother, a bondsman and a gentile, and to all others with whom marriage does not obtain, the get is valid. (If he said:) You are permitted to all men, except a widow to a high-priest, a divorcée and a chalutzah to a regular priest, a mamzereth and a Nethinah to an Israelite, the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer and a Nathin, and to all others with whom marriage does obtain, even (marriage) in transgression, the get is void. [Since marriage obtains with those interdicted by negative commandment, but not with this one because of the stipulated interdict, it emerges that the get is not all-inclusive.]
  	The basic text of the get: "You are permitted to all men." R. Yehudah says: "And this shall be to you from me a writ of divorce, a letter of leaving, a get of dismissal (wherewith) to go and marry any man you desire." [For it must be manifest that he divorces her with this writ; and if he does not write it thus, they might come to say that he divorced her by speech alone, of which the writ is only confirmation. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah.] The basic text of a writ of manumission: "You are free." "You belong to yourself."
  	Three gittin are invalid, but if she married (through one of them) the child is kasher: a get written in his hand, but without witnesses [According to R. Meir, who says that the witnesses of the signing effect the divorce, his handwriting is equivalent to a hundred witnesses. According to R. Elazar, who says that the witnesses to the delivery effect the divorce, since it is in his handwriting, it satisfies (Deuteronomy 24:3): "And he shall write … and he shall give." And even though there are no witnesses to the delivery, it is valid according to Scripture. And the sages ruled it invalid lest a get come to be validated with the writing of the scribe alone.]; a get with witnesses but without a date [the date being a rabbinic ordinance, either because of fruits or because of the possibility of his shielding his sister's daughter (See 2:2)]; a get with a date but with only one witness. [According to one view, this refers to (a get) written in his hand, the first instance (of the Mishnah) apprising us that even without a witness the child is kasher, and this instance, that even if there were one witness, it should not be done ab initio. And according to another view, this refers to (a get) written in the scribe's hand, notwithstanding which the child is kasher, the scribe standing in place of a second witness.] These are the three gittin which, (though) invalid, if she marries (thereby) the child is kasher. R. Eliezer says: Even if there are no witnesses (signed) on it, but he gives it to her in the presence of witnesses, the get is valid and she collects (her kethubah) from bound property, for witnesses sign on a get only for "the general good" [lest the witnesses to the delivery die and the husband come and protest, saying: "I did not divorce her." The halachah is in accordance with R. Elazar.]
  	If two men sent two gittin that were identical [in their names] and they got mixed up, both are given to each woman. Therefore, if one of them were lost, the second is void, [for we do not know whose it is.] If five men wrote a common [time] in one get, viz.: ["On this day of the week] this man divorces this woman; this man, this woman, etc." and the witnesses (signed) below, they are all valid, and the get is to be given to each woman. If a separate text were written for each one, [i.e., a separate time for each one, viz.: "On this day of the week this man divorces this woman," followed by the text of the get; then: "On this day of the week this man divorces this woman," followed by the text of the get; and so with all], and the witnesses below, the get that the witnesses are read together with (i.e., the last one) is valid.
  	Two gittin written [on two pages], one beside the other, and two Hebrew witnesses, extending from under one (get) to under the other, [i.e., two Hebrews signed under one get, (their signatures extending) under the second; the name of the witness under the first get, and the name of his father under the second. Likewise, a second (Hebrew) witness under him] and two Greek witnesses [two Israelites, natives of Greece, who then signed in Greek script, which goes from left to right, so that the name of the witness is under the second get, and the name of his father under the first], the get that the witnesses are read together with is valid. [If the Hebrews are signed above, so that, Hebrew script going from right to left, the name of the witness is under the right hand get, and the name of his father under the left, the right hand get is valid. And if the Greeks are signed above, the left is valid; for the names of the witnesses are under the left. The rationale: We suspect that the latter witnesses might have adapted their script to the order employed by the first witnesses. So that if the Hebrews were signed above, from right to left, on the right hand get, when the two Greeks came to sign under them (on the left hand get), they might also have followed the order of the Hebrews, so that all four would have signed on the right hand get. Similarly, if the Greeks were signed above (on the left hand get), the Hebrews who came after them might have reversed the order of the Hebrew script and gone from left to right, so that all four would have signed on the left hand get.] One witness a Hebrew, one witness a Greek; one witness a Hebrew, one witness a Greek, extending from under one (get) to under the other — both are void. [The rationale: We suspect that the first Hebrew witness might have signed on the right hand get, from right to left, in the order of Hebrew script, and the second, Greek witness, on the left hand get, in the order of Greek script, from left to right; and that the third witness, a Hebrew, reversed the Hebrew order and also began from the left, like the Greek before him, so that he, too, is signed on the left hand get; and that the last, Greek witness, signed in his customary way, from left to right, so that he, too, is signed on the left hand get — so that there are three witnesses signed on the left hand get, and only one on the right hand get. Or, the opposite: that the second, Greek witness, reversed his script to conform to the order of the Hebrew script and began from right to left, in the manner of the first, Hebrew witness; that the third Hebrew witness, signed in his customary manner, from the right — so that all three are signed on the right hand get; and that the second Greek witness alone signed in his customary way, on the left hand get. And since we do not know on which get three were signed, and on which, only one, both are void.]
  	If he left over part of the get and wrote it on the second page [opposite it on the breadth of the scroll], and the witnesses (signed) beneath it, it is valid. If the witnesses signed on the top of the page, on the side [of the page, to the right of the get or to the left], or on the back in a plain get, [whose witnesses are signed in it (as opposed to a get mekishar - See 8:9)], it is void. If he aligned the top of one (get) with the top of another, with the witnesses in the middle, both are void, [for the signatures are read with neither get.] (If he aligned) the bottom of one with the bottom of the other, with the witnesses in the middle, the get that the witnesses are read together with [i.e., the get whose end is followed by the beginning of the signatures (and not that whose beginning is preceded by the end of the signatures)] is valid.
  	If the get were written in Hebrew, and the witnesses (signed) in Greek; (if the get were written) in Greek, and the witnesses (signed) in Hebrew; if one witness (signed) in Hebrew, and the other in Greek; if the scribe and a witness signed — it is valid. [For there are two witnesses. The Mishnah apprises us that we do not suspect that the husband did not instruct the scribe to sign, but that he charged two men to tell the scribe to write the get and two witnesses to sign, and that these, feeling that the scribe might be offended (viz.: "I am not fit to be a witness in his eyes") instructed the scribe to sign without the husband's permission. We do not entertain this suspicion.] (If he signed:) "so and so, witness," it is valid; "the son of so and so, witness," it is valid; "so and so, the son of so and so," without "witness," it is valid. And this (the last) is what the "clean-minded men of Jerusalem" did. If he wrote his family epithet and her family epithet (instead of their actual names), it is valid. A get given under coercion — (If the coercion were) by Israelites [i.e., if they coerced him by law, as in all of those instances where one is coerced to divorce his wife, or if she were forbidden to him], it is valid. [And if they coerced him unlawfully, the get is void, but it forbids her to the priesthood because of "the odor of a get."] And (if the coercion were) by gentiles, it is void. [If lawfully, it is void, but forbids her to the priesthood. If unlawfully, there is not even "the odor of a get."] And by gentiles, if he is beaten and told: "Do what the Israelites tell you," it is valid. [If one is required to give a get by law and the Israelite judges lack the power to force him to do so, he may be beaten by gentiles, who say: "Do what the Israelites tell you," and he gives the get at the behest of the Israelite judges.]
  	If her name went out in the city as betrothed, [If a report were circulated about a single girl: "This girl was betrothed to this man today" (not where there was a mere rumor, but where lamps were lit and beds were spread, and people went in and out saying: "She was betrothed today"], she is [assumed to be] betrothed. (If a report went out that) she were divorced, she is (assumed to be) divorced. [This refers to the beginning, viz.: This woman about whom a report went out that she was betrothed, which report we entertain, forbidding her to marry any man but that one — if there then went out about her a report that she were divorced, that the man who had married her had divorced her], she is (assumed to be) divorced [and is permitted to all men; for the report that we entertained in the beginning — "its receipt has come with it"]. This, so long as there be no attenuation (amathla) to it [i.e., that there not be with the report of betrothal or of divorce an amathla, a consideration which breaks the power of the report]. What is (an instance of) an amathla? "That man divorced his wife on condition"; "He threw her her (instrument of) betrothal, possibly near her (in which instance she is betrothed); possibly near him" (in which instance she is not betrothed). This is an amathla.
  	Beth Shammai say: A man should not divorce his wife unless he find her to be unchaste, viz. (Deuteronomy 24:1): "…for he has found in her a thing of nakedness." And Beth Hillel say: Even if she spoiled his meal, ["burning it" by fire or by salt, Beth Hillel expounding "a thing of nakedness," as either "nakedness" or "a thing"; that is, any foul thing, aside from nakedness.] R. Akiva says: Even if he find one more beautiful than she, viz. (Ibid.): "And it shall be, if she does not find favor in his eyes." [He expounds the verse thus: If she does not find favor (of beauty) in his eyes, or if he find nakedness in her, or a foul thing — for any one of these three, he may divorce her. The halachah is in accordance with Beth Hillel.]