meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Mishnah/Seder Nezikin/Mishnah Bava Metzia/English/The Mishna with Obadiah Bartenura by Rabbi Shraga Silverstein.txt"}
text: Mishnah Bava Metzia
  משנה בבא מציעא
  The Mishna with Obadiah Bartenura by Rabbi Shraga Silverstein
  
  
  Mishnah Bava Metzia
  
  
  
  
  
  	Two are holding a garment. The first says: "I found it"; the second: "I found it." [The Gemara construes the instance in our Mishnah as one where the first was holding the strands on one side of the garment, and the second, the strands on the other side. But if they were holding onto the garment itself, the first takes as far as his hand reaches, and the second, as far as his hand reaches. And the rest, they divide equally with an oath.] The first says: "It is all mine"; the second: "It is all mine." [i.e., I bought it, and the seller sold it to me and not to you. And the seller sold it to one of them and took the money from both of them; one, by consent, and the other, against his will. And he does not know which is which. For if he did know and he said: "I sold it to this one," one witness would obtain, in which instance a Torah oath would be imposed upon the other to refute the witness. Now that he does not know, both swear this oath specified in our Mishnah. By law, they should divide without an oath; but the sages ordained that neither of them takes anything without an oath, so that a man should not go and take hold of his neighbor's garment and say: "It is mine!" And it was necessary for the tanna to apprise us both of "I found it" — (an instance of) finding a lost object, and: "It is all mine" — (an instance of) buying and selling. For if only the first were taught, I would say that it is only in that case that the Torah imposed an oath, one being apt to rationalize to take a lost object unlawfully, viz.: "My friend will lose nothing. I will go and seize it and divide it with him." But, in the instance of buying and selling, where if he did not need it, he would not pursue the seller to buy it, the one who comes to divide with him and give half the price causes him a loss unlawfully, without a rationalization — so that I might say (unless apprised otherwise) that the rabbis did not impose an oath upon him. And if we were apprised only of buying and selling, I would say that it is only in that instance that the rabbis imposed an oath, for in that instance he might say: "My friend gave money and I, too, gave money. Now, that I need it for myself, I will take it, and let my friend go and buy another one." But in the instance of a lost object, where such (a rationalization) does not obtain, I might say not (i.e., that no oath is imposed.) We are, therefore, apprised otherwise.] The first swears that he has in it no less than a half, and the second swears that he has in it no less than a half, and they divide, [He does not swear that it is all his as per his original claim, for they will not give him all of it. And if he swears that half is his, in accordance with what he is given, he vitiates his original claim of "It is all mine." Therefore, he swears that he has in it no less than a half, which implies: It is all mine, as I said in the beginning; and, according to you, who do not believe me for the whole, I take an oath that I have (possession) in it, and that I have in it no less than a half.] If the first says: "It is all mine"; and the second: "Half of it is mine," the one who says "It is all mine" swears that he has no less than three quarters, and the one who says "Half of it is mine" swears that he has no less than one quarter. The first takes three quarters, and the second, one quarter.
  	If both were riding on a beast [We are hereby apprised that riding acquires, even if he (the rider) does not lead, the beast not moving from its place], or if one were riding and the other leading [It is only when the rider moves his feet to make the animal go that the rider is equated with the leader; but if not, the leader acquires, and not the rider.], the first says: "It is all mine," and the second says: "It is all mine," the first swears that he has in it no less than a half, and the second swears that he has in it no less than a half, and they divide. When they concede, or when there are witnesses, they divide without an oath. [If they concede, or if witnesses come, even after it has been ruled that they are to divide with an oath, they divide without an oath.]
  	If he were riding on a beast and saw a metziah (a lost object), and he said to his friend: "Give it to me" — If he (the friend) took it and said: "I acquired it" (for myself), he acquires it. [But if he the rider) said: "Acquire it for me," the rider acquires it, and the other cannot say: "I acquired it" (for myself)]. If after he gave it to him he said: "I acquired it first," he has said nothing. [For this one (the rider) who withdrew it from his hand, acquired it; and as long as it was in the hand of the one who picked it up, it was hefker (ownerless property)].
  	If he saw a metziah and fell upon it and another came and took hold of it, the latter acquires it. [This is so only when the metziah was in the public domain, for a man's four cubits do not acquire for him in the public domain. Therefore, the one who takes hold of it acquires it. But in an alleyway, which is a path for one person, or at the sides of the public domain, where there is no press of people, one's four cubits acquire for him any metziah and object of hefker close to him in that space, and no one else is permitted to seize it — a rabbinical ordinance to prevent contention.] If he saw them (men) running after a metziah, after a "broken" deer, [which cannot run and is "guarded" in the field if others do not take it, and which is like a metziah], and after birds which cannot fly, and he said: "My field has acquired (them) for me," it acquires (them) for him. [This, provided that he is standing at the side of his field and can run after them and reach them before they leave the field.] If a deer were running normally or birds flying, and he said: "My field has acquired (them) for me," he has said nothing.
  	The metziah of one's minor son and daughter (belong to him) [Whoever is dependent upon his father's "table," even if he is an adult is considered a minor, and his metziah belongs to his father to prevent eivah ("hatred"). And the metziah of a daughter, whether a minor or a na'arah (a maiden), belongs to her father, the Torah having accorded all the gains of her maidenhood to her father.], the metziah of his Canaanite bondsman and bondswoman (belong to him), [their bodies belonging to him, viz. (Leviticus 25:46): "And you shall hold them as an inheritance."], and the metziah of his wife belongs to him [(a rabbinical ordinance to prevent eivah)]. The metziah of his Hebrew bondsman and bondswoman, the metziah of his divorcée, though he has not given her her kethubah, belongs to them.
  	If one found bills of indebtedness, if they contain a lien on land [in insurance of payment of the debt], he does not return them (to the creditor), for beth-din exact payment from them (sold properties). [We fear "payment and plotting," i.e., it may be that it is a paid bill which fell from the lender and that his admitting: "I did not pay" is part of a plot between him and the creditor to extract payment from the sold properties which were bought from the debtor without security (against seizure), those properties to be divided between them.] If they do not contain a lien on land, he returns it (to the creditor), for (in that instance) beth-din do not exact payment from them. These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: In both instances he does not return it, for beth-din exact payment from them. [They exact payment even where the bill does not contain a lien on land, for this (omission of the lien) is an error of the scribe, and we fear "payment and plotting." The halachah is in accordance with the sages, And it is only in a bill where a lien is not mentioned that the sages consider it an error of the scribe and collection is made from the bound property as if the lien were written therein. But if he stated explicitly in the bill that he does not take such a lien upon himself, the sages concede that he returns it (to the creditor), for in such an instance there is no apprehension of plotting.]
  	If one found gittin (writs of divorce) of women, writs of manumission, d'yatiki [death-bed wills, (acronymic for) "da tehei lemeikam velihyoth" ("This stands to be fulfilled and to be.")], bequests, or receipts [of creditor to debtor testifying to payment of debt], he does not return them. For I say (i.e., I suspect) that they were written and he (the writer) decided against giving them.
  	If one found writs of assessment, [beth-din having assessed the property of the debtor for the creditor towards payment of the debt], writs of sustenance, [wherein the husband takes it upon himself to feed his wife's daughter. Another interpretation: (writs wherein it is stated that land of the husband is to be sold to feed his wife and daughters], writs of refusal, [wherein it is written: "Before us this and this woman refused (to remain married to) this and this man," this, in an instance of an (orphaned) minor whose mother and brothers married her off, in which instance she does not require a get], writs of selection, [one (litigant) choosing one (judge) and the other choosing one, to judge their case], and (any writ of) enactment by beth-din, he returns them (to the ones for whom they were written). If he found (bills) in a chafisah [a small leather bag], or in a dluskema [a leather bag where the elderly keep their necessaries so as not to have to search for them], or a pack of bills [three or more, folded together], or a bundle of bills [lying one atop the other, length to length], he returns them, [this being a thing that has a siman (an identifying sign). For the receptacle is a siman, the owner saying: "In such and such a receptacle did I place them." Likewise, "pack" and "bundle" are a siman.] And how many are a "bundle" of bills? Three tied together. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: If one borrowed from three, they are returned to the debtor. [If the three bills are of one debtor, who borrowed from three different men, the finder returns them to the debtor, the bills definitely having fallen from him. For if they had fallen from them (the creditors), who would have gathered them together in one place? And this, only with bills that have been certified in beth-din. But with bills that have not been certified, we fear that the three creditors might have taken them to the scribe of beth-din to have them certified and they fell from the hand of the scribe. But it is not to be feared that they fell from the scribe's hand after he certified them, for men do not leave certified bills in the hand of the scribe.] If three borrowed from one, he returns it to the creditor, [it being obvious that they fell from him. And if they were all written by the hand of one scribe, we fear that they might have fallen from the hand of the scribe and that the loan had never been made, so that they are not returned.] If he found a bill among his bills, and he does not know the nature of it [i.e., whether the debtor deposited it with him or the creditor, or whether it is partially paid and it was given to him to act as an intermediary], it remains [in his hand without being returned to either] until Eliyahu arrives. If he finds among them (his bills) a receipt [written for one of his bills], he does what is (stated) in the receipt, [and the bill is assumed to have been paid. And even though this receipt should have been in the hand of the debtor and not in that of the creditor, we assume that the debtor trusted the creditor and said: "Give it to me tomorrow," and he forgot. (This, when the creditor found the bill for which the receipt was written among torn-up bills, though it itself is not torn up)].
  
  
  
  	Which metzioth are his (the finder's) and which must he call out? These metzioth are his: If he found scattered fruits [(It may be assumed that the owner "despaired" of them, and they are hefker)], scattered money [(Since it has no distinct siman, the owner "despairs" of it, and it is hefker, and so with all of these)], small sheaves in the public domain, [where all tread upon them, so that even if it had a siman it is obscured], rounds of figs, loaves of a baker, [which have no siman, all of them being alike; but home-made loaves do have a siman.], strings of fish, pieces of meat, wool shearings that come from their provinces, [to exclude those that come from the tradesman's house, as taught below], bundles of flax, tongues of wool [dyed] purple — these are his. These are the words of R. Meir. R. Yehudah says: Whatever has a shinui (a distinguishing difference) must be called out. How so? If he found a round [of figs] and in it a shard; a loaf, and in it money. R. Shimon b. Elazar says: All anpuria vessels need not be called out. [("anpuria":) new vessels, which are not familiar to the eye, so that the owner cannot identify them as his own by visual recognition. (For sometimes a lost object is returned on the basis of such recognition, as in the instance of a Torah scholar, who does not prevaricate.) And these vessels, about which it is known that the owner cannot identify them by visual recognition, need not be returned. The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon b. Elazar. When is this so? When they are found individually. But if they are found in twos, they must be called out, for the number is a siman. And if one finds a metziah in a broad thoroughfare in a city, where the majority are gentiles, even something with a siman, he need not call it out. And in a city with a majority of Jews, he must call it out.]
  	And these must be called out: If he found fruits in a vessel, [which has a siman], or a vessel as it is [i.e., empty], money in a pouch, or a pouch as it is, piled fruits [The number or the place is a siman], piled money, three coins [or more], one atop the other, [The finder calls out: "I have found coins," and the loser comes and says: "There were such and such a number and they were lying one atop the other."], small sheaves in a private domain, home-made loaves, wool shearings taken from the tradesman's house, pitchers of wine, and pitchers of oil — these must be called out.
  	If he found behind a gappah [a wall-filling of wood or reeds] or behind a fence [of stones], tied fledglings, [tied by their wings. Since all men tie them thus, this is not a siman.], or in paths in the fields, he should not touch them. [For we assume that they were secreted there, and if they are taken, the owners will not have a siman. Therefore, they should be left there until the owners come and take them.] If he found a vessel in the rubbish heap, if it is covered, he should not touch it, [this not being a lost object about which he is exhorted (Deuteronomy 22:3): "You shall not be able to ignore it," for it is guarded.] If it is not covered, he takes it and calls it out. If he found it in a heap or in an old wall, it is his. [For he can tell the owner of the heap or of the wall that it belonged to the Emorites driven out by our ancestors. This, if it be extremely mouldy, indication of its having lain there for a very long time.] If he found it in a new wall — in the outer half, it is his; in the inner half, it is the (home) owner's. [In one of the holes of a wall close to the public domain, if he found it from half the thickness of the wall facing out, it is his. For we say that one of the men in the public domain placed it there and forgot it. And the mould upon it indicates its having been there a long time, so that the owner must certainly have despaired of it. This, only in the instance of a tongue of gold, a piece of silver, and the like. But if it were a vessel, and in it money — if the mouth of the vessel faces outwards, it is his; if inwards, it is the (home) owner's. If he rented it to others, even (if he found it) inside the house, it is his, [ it not being known whose it is, and the owner's having despaired.]
  	If he found (money) in a shop, it is his. [This, where there is no siman, the one who lost it despairing of it, the shop being frequented by many people.] Between the (shopkeeper's) chest and the shopkeeper, it is the shopkeeper's. [For the shopkeeper sits before it and always takes from it and places before it and sells, and the money that he receives he places therein, so that it must have fallen from the shopkeeper's hand.] Before the money changer, it is his (the one who finds it). [For we say that it must have fallen from those who came to change money. For the table intervenes between the money changer and the money that was found; and if it were his, it should have been found between him and the chair on which the table is mounted.] Between the chair and the money changer, it is the money changer's. If one buys fruits from his neighbor, or if his neighbor sends him fruits and he finds money in it, it is his. [This, when his neighbor is a merchant, who buys this produce or these fruits from many people, so that it is not known whose it is. And since there is no siman, the owner despairs. But if the one who sold the fruits picked them himself from his own land, the money is obviously his and must be returned to him.] If it (the money) were tied, he takes it and calls it out, [the tie or the amount being a siman.]
  	A garment, too, was subsumed in all these, [i.e., in (Deuteronomy 22:3): "every lost object of your brother."] Why was it singled out for special mention? [(Ibid.): "And thus shall you do with his garment"] To serve as a paradigm, viz.: Just as a garment is characterized by possessing simanim and claimants, so, all things that possess simanim and claimants must be called out. [A garment, in general, has a siman, and all garments have owners who claim them, their having been made by men and not coming from hefker. ("so, all things that have claimants":) to exclude something despaired of. "Yeush" ("despair") — hearing one say: "Woe is me for my loss!"]
  	And until when must he call out? Until its neighbors know (about it) [the neighbors of the place where the lost object was found, it possibly being theirs.] These are the words of R. Meir. R. Yehudah says: Three festivals. And after the last festival, seven days, so that he can go to his house three, and return three, and call out one day. [("so that he can go to his house three days":) after hearing it called out so that he can ascertain whether he has lost anything. And if he sees that he did lose something, he returns three, and calls out one day: "I have lost it, and these are its simanim." The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah. And from the time of the destruction of the Temple, they ordained that it be called out in the houses of prayer and the houses of study. And with the increase of the "ravishers," who say: "All lost objects (that are found) go to the king," they ordained that he inform his neighbors and acquaintances, and this suffices.]
  	If he named the lost object but not its simanim, it should not be returned to him. And if he is (known as) a deceiver, even if he does give its simanim, it should not be returned to him, it being written (Deuteronomy 22:2): "until you seek out your brother" — until you seek out your brother to determine whether or not he is a deceiver. Whatever (animal) works and eats [i.e., If the lost animal is one whose work is worth the cost of its food, such as an ox or an ass], let it work and eat [and let the finder not sell it. For everyone prefers his own beast, with which he is familiar and which he has trained to its will. And he (the finder) need not care for it forever, but for a hen and a large beast, twelve months; for grazing calves and foals (i.e., those which are not raised for fattening), and, likewise, for kids and lambs, three months. For fattening calves, thirty days; for small ganders and roosters, thirty days; for large ones, which eat a lot, three days. From that point on, he takes them for himself at their estimated cost, or sells them to others and holds onto the money.]; whatever does not work and eat, let it be sold, it being written (Ibid.): "Then you shall return it to him" — See how to return it to him. What is to be done with the money? R. Tarfon says: He may use it. Therefore, if it is lost, he must make restoration. [Since the rabbis permitted him to use it, even if he does not use it, it is as if he did, and he must make restoration. R. Akiva says: He may not use it. Therefore, if it is lost, he need not make restoration. [The halachah is in accordance with R. Tarfon vis-à-vis the money received for the sale of the lost object; but found money itself, as when he finds money in a pouch, or three coins one atop the other, may not be used at all.]
  	If one found books, he reads in them once in thirty days, [for they become mouldy if they remain unopened. (All of their books were in the form of scrolls)]. And if he does not know how to read, he rolls them [from beginning to end, so that air enter.] But he should not learn in them ab initio [what he never learned before, for (in that instance) he must leave them (exposed) before him.] And another should not read with him. [For one pulls (the scroll) to him, and the other, to him, and it is torn.] If he found a garment, he shakes it out once every thirty days, and he spreads it out for its need [i.e., to air it out so that it not become moth-eaten.], but not for his honor. (If he found) vessels of silver or copper, he uses them for their need, [for they become mouldy in the ground, where he must keep them, this being their "guarding." Therefore, he uses them from time to time], but not [so long as] to wear them out. (If he found) vessels of gold or glass, he may not touch them until Eliyahu comes. [Gold does not mould in the ground, and glass, too (does not). What is more, it is easily broken.] (If he found) a sack or a box, or anything else that he does not customarily carry, [i.e., something demeaning to him], he should not take it, [it being written (Deuteronomy 22:1): "And you shall ignore them" — Sometimes you are to ignore them, as in the instance of an elder whose dignity it does not befit.]
  	What is an aveidah ( a lost object)? [where it is evident that the owner is unaware if its whereabouts.] If he found an ass or a cow grazing on the road, this is not an aveidah [and he is not obliged to return it, it having been left there knowingly.] (If he found) an ass and its gear overturned, a cow running between the vineyards, [injuring its legs thereby], this is an aveidah. If he returned it and it ran away; returned it, and it ran away — even four or five times — he must keep on returning it, it being written (Deuteronomy 22:1): "Return shall you return them." [The Torah added many "returnings."] If he lost a sela (of working time in returning the aveidah), he may not tell him (the owner): "Give me a sela," [for the other can tell him: "Had you done your own work, you would have exerted yourself more. Take, then, the amount of your exertion."], but he gives him his wage as an idle worker, [i.e., the reduction in pay one would take to be idle from his regular, more difficult work, in order to do this work (of returning the aveidah)]. If there is a beth-din there, he makes a condition before beth-din. [If he does not wish to idle himself from his work, his wage being high, what does he do? If there are three men there (a beth-din), he makes a condition before them, viz.: "See, I am earning this and this amount. I do not wish to idle myself from my job and earn less. If you agree to my receiving my regular wage, I shall undertake to return this aveidah."] If there is no beth-din there, before whom shall he make a condition? His (claim) takes precedence [and he bypasses the aveidah].
  	If he found it in the stall, [ even if it is unguarded there, as when the stall is unlocked ], he need not return it. (If he found it) in the public domain, he is obliged to do so. And if it were in the graveyard, [and he were a Cohein], he may not make himself unclean for it. [For returning an aveidah is a positive commandment, viz. (Deuteronomy 22:1): "Return shall you return them to your brother," and the uncleanliness of a Cohein (involves transgression of) the positive commandment of (Leviticus 21:6): "Holy shall you be," and the negative commandment of (Ibid. 1): "For a dead body he shall not become unclean among his people." And a positive commandment does not override a negative and a positive commandment. If his father said to him: "Become unclean" (to return an aveidah), or if he said to him: "Do not return it" [and the aveidah were in a place where it is a mitzvah to return it], he should not heed him, it being written (Ibid. 19:3): "A man, his mother and his father you shall fear, and my Sabbaths you shall keep": If your father tells you to desecrate the Sabbath, do not heed him. The same is true for all of the mitzvoth.] If he unloaded and loaded (a beast), unloaded and loaded, even four or five times, he is liable (to continue doing so), it being written (Exodus 23:5): "Help shall you help." If he (the owner of the ass) went and sat down (doing nothing), telling him: "Since it is your mitzvah, if you want to unload, unload," he is exempt, it being written (Ibid.): "with him." But if he (the owner) were old or sick, he is obligated (to perform the mitzvah by himself.) It is a mitzvah of the Torah to unload [gratis], but not to load [gratis, but for pay]. R. Shimon says: Also to load [gratis. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon.] R. Yossi Haglili says: If it were bearing more than its (bearable) burden, he is not obligated, it being written (Ibid.): "under its burden" — a burden that it can bear. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yossi.]
  	His aveidah or the aveidah of his father — his lost object takes precedence, [it being written (Deuteronomy 15:4): "But there shall not be in you a poor man" — Take heed that you not be a poor man."] His aveidah and the aveidah of his teacher — his aveidah takes precedence. His father's aveidah and the aveidah of his teacher — his teacher's takes precedence [(This, if he be his prime teacher, from whom he learned the greater part of his wisdom. Likewise, wherever "teacher" is mentioned in our Mishnah as taking precedence to "father," it is his prime teacher that is meant.)], for his father brought him to this world, but his teacher, who taught him wisdom, brings him to life in the world to come. And if his father were a sage, his father's takes precedence. If his father and his teacher were carrying burdens, he sets down his teacher's first, and then, his father's. If his father and his teacher were taken captive, he redeems his teacher first, and then, his father. And if his father were a sage, he redeems his father, and then, this teacher.
  
  
  
  	If one deposited with his neighbor a beast or vessels, and they were stolen or lost, and he (the neighbor) paid, not wishing to swear [the oath of the watchers (Shemoth 22:10), whereby he could have exempted himself, if he had sworn that he had not been derelict and had not "sent forth his hand" against it], for they said that one who watches gratis (shomer chinam) swears and is exempt — If the thief were found, he pays kefel. If he slaughtered and sold it, he pays four and five. To whom does he pay? To the one it (the animal) was deposited with. [For since he paid, he acquired all of its payments. And even if he did not pay, but only said in beth-din: "I shall pay," he acquires all of its payments, whether kefel or four and five.] If he swore, not wishing to pay, if the thief were found, he pays kefel. If he slaughtered and sold it, he pays four and five. To whom does he pay? To the owner of the deposit.
  	If one hired a cow from his neighbor and lent it to another [with the owner's permission (for we rule that one watcher who gives to another without permission is liable)], and it died normally, the hirer swears [to the owner] that it died normally, [and he is exempt from payment, a hirer being exempt (from payment) for accidents (like death)], and the borrower, [who is liable for accidents] pays the hirer. R. Yossi said: If so, he (the hirer) "does business" with his neighbor's cow! Rather (payment for) the cow is returned to the owner. [The halachah is in accordance with R. Yossi.]
  	If he said to two (men): "I stole a maneh from one of you, and I do not know which one," or (if he said:) "The father of one of you deposited a maneh with me, and I do not know which," he gives one a maneh and the other a maneh, having admitted this of himself. [("If he said to two":) and they claim nothing, but he comes to satisfy the "claims of Heaven," he gives each one a maneh. But if two make a claim upon him, and he admits that he stole from one of them, each one of them swears that he stole from him, and he gives a maneh to each one, the sages penalizing him for transgressing the interdict against theft. Likewise, if two made a claim against someone, each one saying: "My father deposited a maneh with you," and he saying: "The father of one of you did so, but I do not know which," each one of them swears that his father deposited a maneh with him, and he gives each one a maneh, being guilty of dereliction. For he should have taken care to remember who deposited it with him.]
  	If two deposited with him, one a hundred; the other, two hundred [as when they deposited it at the same time, one right before the other] — the first says: "The two hundred is mine"; the second: "The two hundred is mine," he gives the first a hundred and the second a hundred, and the rest is set aside until Eliyahu comes. [For he can tell them: "You were not particular about each other, that the other might claim the two hundred — I, too, did not have to be particular to know who gave me the two hundred." So that it is as if they placed all three hundred in a bundle before him, it not devolving upon him to learn what in it belonged to the one, and what to the other.] R. Yossi said: "If so, what did the deceiver lose!" [He never will admit the truth.] Rather, the whole is set aside until Eliyahu comes.
  	Similarly, two vessels, one worth a hundred; the other, a thousand, one man saying: "The dearer is mine"; the other: "The dearer is mine" — the smaller is given to one of them, and from the larger, the value of the smaller is given to the other, and the rest is set aside until Eliyahu comes. [This is required for the rabbis, to teach us: "Not only here, but also here.", i.e., Not only in (the above instance of) one hundred and two hundred, where there is no need to break a vessel, do the rabbis say that each is given one hundred, but even in an instance of two vessels, where a loss is involved, it being necessary to break the large vessel in order to give from it the value of the smaller — so that when Eliyahu comes, the owner of the large vessel will be found to have lost, his vessel having been broken — so that it might be thought that in such an instance the rabbis would concur with R. Yossi that all is to be set aside until Eliyahu comes — we are, therefore, apprised otherwise. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] R. Yossi says: If so, what did the deceiver lose! Rather, all is to be set aside until Eliyahu comes.
  	If one deposits fruits with his neighbor, even if they undergo loss [because of mice or decay], he may not touch them [to sell them. For "a man prefers one measure of his own to nine measures of his neighbor." His measure is beloved by him because he worked for it, more (beloved) than nine measures of others that he would receive for selling it. The rabbis say: "He may not touch them," only if they undergo the normal loss indicated in our Mishnah (below): for wheat and rice, nine half-kavin to a kor, etc. But if they undergo more than the normal loss, the sages concede to R. Shimon b. Gamliel that he sells them through beth-din. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] R. Gamliel says: He sells them before beth-din, for he is like one returning a lost object to its owner.
  	If one deposited fruits with his neighbor [and the latter mixed them up with his fruits and ate of them without knowing how much, when he comes to return them,] he deducts for [the normal] loss: for wheat and rice, nine half-kavin to a kor. [The kor is thirty sa'ah; the sa'ah is six kavin.] For barley and millet, nine kavin to a kor. For spelt and flax seed, three sa'ah to a kor, all according to the amount [i.e., the same for each kor], all according to the time [that he left them with him. For each year he deducts that amount.] R. Yochanan b. Nuri said: What difference does it make to the mice? Do they not eat [the same amount] from a large measure as from a small one? [Therefore,] he deducts the loss only for one kor, [i.e., nine half-kavin for a year, whether for one kor or for ten.] R. Yehudah says: If it were a large amount [i.e., if he deposited with him a large amount, ten korim and above], he does not deduct for loss, for there is a surplus. [For in the time of threshing, when the grain is deposited, it is dry; and in the rainy season, when it is returned, it is swollen, so that too much is not lost because of the mice, the mice not eating that much from ten korim. Therefore, the swelling compensates for the eating of the mice. The halachah is neither in accordance with R. Yehudah nor with R. Yochanan b. Nuri. All of these measurements obtain in Eretz Yisrael and in the days of the tannaim. But in other lands and in these times, all is in accordance with the normal loss of seeds in those lands and times.]
  	He deducts a sixth for wine [if he deposited wine with him, and it got mixed up with his wine. (The vessels absorb a sixth.)] R. Yehudah says: A fifth. [For the earth from which the vessels were made in the locale of R. Yehudah absorbed a fifth; all according to the locale.] He deducts three logs of oil to a hundred — a log and a half for lees; a log and a half for absorption. If it were refined oil, he does not deduct for lees. If they were old vessels, he does not deduct for absorption. R. Yehudah says: Also if one sells refined oil to his neighbor all the days of the year, he (the buyer) accepts (a deduction of) one and a half to a hundred for lees. [Just as they stipulated (a deduction for) lees for the depositor, so they stipulated it for the seller, viz.: If one sells oil to his neighbor and gives him from his jugs refined oil which he constantly uses, the buyer accepts a deduction of a log and a half to each hundred for lees. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	If one deposited a jug with his neighbor and the owner did not designate a place for it [in the house of the watcher, saying: "Lend me this corner"], and he (the watcher) moved it and it were broken — If it were broken (by falling) from his hand: If (he moved it) for his need, [i.e., to use it], he is liable; for its need, [it being in a place where it was likely to be broken], he is not liable. If it were broken after he put it down, whether for his need or for its need, he is not liable. [If after using it he put it in a guarded place, whether he had moved it in the beginning for his need or for its need, he is not liable. For we say that when he returns it (to its place), it is in the domain of the owner as before, and his status is that of an unpaid watcher, who is not liable for accidents, even though he did not apprise the owner, saying: "I took it and returned it." The first part of the Mishnah is in accordance with R. Yishmael, who says that if one steals a lamb from the flock and returns it to its place, he is not liable, it not being necessary to apprise the owner. As to "and the owner does not designate a place for it," this is a "Not only" construction, i.e.: Not only when the owner designates a place for it, and he returns it to its designated place after using it for his need is he not liable even if he did not apprise the owner, having returned it to its designated place — but even when the owner does not designate a place for it, there being no special place for it, if he returns it he is not liable, having returned it to a guarded place, it not being necessary to apprise the owner.] If the owner designated a place for it, and he moved it and it were broken, whether from his hand or after having put it down — If for his need, he is liable; if for its need, he is not liable. [This latter part (of the Mishnah) is in accordance with R. Akiva, who says that if one steals a lamb from the flock and returns it to its place and it met with mishap, he is always liable unless he had apprised the owner that he had stolen and returned it. The same applies after he had used it for his need and become a thief in respect to it — Even if he puts it down in a guarded place, he is liable. As to its being stated in this latter part: "If the owner designates a place for it," this is a "Not only" construction, i.e.: Not only when he does not designate a place is he liable when he puts it down after using it for his need, not having put it down in a place designated for it; but even when he designates a place and he puts it down again in that place, he is liable, it being necessary to apprise the owner. The first part (of the Mishnah) is in accordance with R. Yishmael, and the second part, with R. Akiva. Thus is it construed in the Gemara.]
  	If one deposited money with his neighbor and he bound it [in his scarf] and slung it over his shoulder, [even though this is bona fide guarding, he is liable. For if one takes money deposited with him from place to place, the only valid guarding is in his hand, it being written (Deuteronomy 14:25): "And you shall bind the money in your hand" — Though it is bound, it must be in your hand. And in a house, it is guarded only in the ground. And in a wall, in the handbreadth close to the ceiling or the handbreadth close to the ground, thieves not being likely to search there. If he guarded them in any other way, he is considered derelict, and he is liable — unless he stipulated ab initio with the depositor that he accepts it only on condition that he not be liable for all of these "guardings."]; or if he gave it to his minor son or daughter, and "closed up" inadequately before them, he is liable, for he did not watch in the manner of the watchers. But if he watched in the manner of the watchers, he is not liable. [But if he gave it to grown ones, they swear that they guarded it in the manner of the watchers and they are not liable. And we do not say in such an instance that a watcher who gives to a watcher is liable. For it is customary for one to deposit with his wife or children what has been deposited with him. And one who deposits something with another does it with this understanding.]
  	If one deposits money with a money changer, if it is bound [and sealed or tied with a distinct knot], he may not use it. Therefore, if it is lost, he is not liable for restoration. [But if it is not sealed or tied with a distinct knot, even though it is bound, it is regarded as open and not bound at all, and he may use it.] If it is unbound, he may use it. Therefore, if it is lost, he is liable for restoration, [Even if he did not use it, he is like a hired watchman in respect to it, for he can use it, and he is liable for theft or loss. And if he uses it, it is like a loan to him, and he is liable, also, for accident.] (If he deposits it) with a homeowner, whether bound or unbound, he may not use it. Therefore, if it is lost, he is not liable for restoration. A shopkeeper is like a homeowner. These are the words of R. Meir. R. Yehudah says: A shopkeeper is like a money lender. [The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	If one "sends his hand" against a deposit, Beth Shammai say: He is "smitten" with diminution and increase [in the deposit, i.e., If one deposited with him a lamb full of wool, or pregnant, and it were shorn or gave birth after he sent his hand against it, he pays for it, its shearings, and its offspring — whereby he is smitten by its "diminution" while with him. And with "increase": If it became pregnant or wool-laden while with him, he pays it laden and pregnant, as it is now — whereby he is smitten with "increase."] And Beth Hillel say: (He pays) as at the time of being taken out from the owner's house, [if laden, laden; if "empty," "empty."] R. Akiva says: As at the time of the claim [before beth-din, it being written (Leviticus 5:24): "To whom it belongs he shall give it on the day of his guilt" — on the day he is made liable in judgment. The halachah is in accordance with Beth Hillel.] If one thinks to send his hand against a deposit [i.e., If he said before witnesses: "I shall take that man's deposit for myself"], Beth Shammai rule him liable, [it being written (Exodus 22:8): "For every d'var (lit. 'speaking') of violation" — From the time he speaks of sending his hand, he is a violator]. Beth Hillel say: He is not liable until he sends forth his hand, it being written (Exodus 22:7): "If he did not send his hand against the deposit of his neighbor." [As to "For every 'speaking' of violation," Beth Hillel expound it thus: Whence is it derived that if one told his bondsman or his messenger to send his hand against a deposit, he is liable? From: 'For every "speaking" of violation.'"] How so? [Now, Beth Hillel is being explicated. Others say: "How so?" is omitted, and an independent ruling follows.] If one inclined a jug (of wine) and took from it a revi'ith (a fourth of a log) and it broke (afterwards), he pays only a revi'ith. [For sending forth a hand does not render one liable for accidents until he pulls or lifts (the object), this effecting acquisition.] If he lifted it and took a revi'ith from it and it broke, he pays the worth of the whole. [Not necessarily "taking": for if he lifted it in order to take from it he is liable for accidents even if he took nothing from it. And if he took a revi'ith from the jug and the wine remaining in the jug turned sour thereafter, even if he did not lift the jug, he pays for all of the wine, having caused it to turn sour through his act.]
  
  
  
  	Gold acquires silver, and silver does not acquire gold. Copper acquires silver, and silver does not acquire copper. [Everything which is regarded as currency and passes readily in trade has the status of money and does not acquire its counterpart which is not regarded as currency and does not pass as readily in trade. The latter has the status of fruit, and pulling it is an act of confirmation. Therefore, when one pulls dinars of gold, the other acquires dinars of silver wherever they are, and neither of them can back out. For dinars of gold are fruits relative to dinars of silver. And silver does not acquire gold. For dinars of silver, which pass readily in trade, have the status of money relative to dinars of gold. So that if one of them pulled dinars of silver, the other does not acquire a dinar of gold until he pulls it, for money does not effect acquisition. And this is the reason, too, that copper acquires silver. For p'rutoth of copper, which are not so readily accounted currency, are fruits relative to dinars of silver, and silver does not acquire copper.] Bad [i.e., invalidated] money acquires good money, and good money does not acquire bad money. An asimon [(a metal piece) shaped as a coin, but, as yet, unstamped with a design] acquires a coin, and a coin does not acquire an asimon. Mitaltelin (movable objects) acquire a coin, but a coin does not acquire mitaltelin. This is the rule: All mitaltelin acquire each other. [If one were exchanged for the other, pulling the one effects acquisition of the other. "All" comes to include even (an exchange) of one pouch full of money for another.]
  	How so? If he (the buyer) pulled fruits from him and did not give money, he cannot back out. If he gave him money and did not pull fruits from him, he [i.e., each one] can back out. [This is an ordinance of the sages. For by Torah law money effects acquisition, as we find in respect to hekdesh (consecrated property): "And he shall give the money and it shall be his." (see Leviticus 27:19). And why did they say that pulling effects acquisition, but not money? A decree, lest the buyer leave his purchase in the house of the seller a long time, and a fire break out in the vicinity of the seller, and he fail to exert himself to rescue it. Therefore, it was placed in his (the seller's domain), to back out of the sale if he wishes. So that if it rises in value, it does so in his domain, and he may back out of the sale and gain thereby. It being considered his, he will exert himself to rescue it.] But they said: "He who exacted punishment of the men of the generation of the flood and the generation of the Tower of Babel — He is destined to exact punishment of him who does not keep his word." [Even though he may back out, (if he does so) he is cursed in beth-din and told: "He who exacted punishment of the generation of the flood, and the generation of the Tower of Babel, and the men of Sodom and Amorah, and of the Egyptians, who drowned in the sea — He is destined to exact punishment of him who does not keep his word," after which he (the seller) returns his money.] R. Shimon says: Whoever holds the money has the upper hand. [R. Shimon refers here to the words of the first tanna, viz.: "If he gave him money and did not pull fruits from him, he (either the seller or the buyer) can back out." R. Shimon comes to tell us that sometimes the one who holds the money (that is, the seller, who received the money) has the upper hand, and he can confirm the sale if he wishes, without the buyer being able to back out. As in an instance where the buyer's upper story is rented to the seller, in which instance, if the seller wishes that the sale be confirmed, the buyer cannot back out, even if he did not pull the money. For why did the rabbis say that pulling effects acquisition? A decree, lest the seller say to the buyer: "Your grain was burned in the upper story." But here, where the upper story belongs to the buyer, if a fire breaks out, he himself will exert himself and retrieve it. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon. But even if the buyer's upper story is rented to the seller, so long as he did not pull it, both buyer and seller can back out.]
  	Ona'ah ("Wronging") is four [ma'ah of] silver [of six ma'ah to a dinar, a sela being four dinars], of twenty-four [ma'ah] of silver to a sela, a sixth of the purchase. [If the purchase were for a sela, twenty-four ma'ah (of silver), ona'ah being one-sixth of the purchase, he must return the entire ona'ah, four (ma'ah of) silver.] Until when is he [who was wronged] permitted to retract? ["permitted" is stated to apprise us that even "He who exacted payment, etc." does not obtain if the purchase were retracted or the sixth returned.] Until he can show it [the purchase] to a merchant or to one of his kin. [And if he took longer, he (is regarded as having) waived his ona'ah. And the seller can always retract. For the purchase is not in his hand for him to show it to a merchant or to his kin if he were wronged. And if it were known that there had come to his hand a similar purchase, and he knew that he had erred, and he kept quiet and made no claim, he cannot go back and claim, having pardoned.] R. Tarfon taught in Lod: Ona'ah is eight (ma'ah of) silver to a sela, a third of the purchase — and the merchants of Lod rejoiced. [For they were expert in wares and they sold them dear. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Tarfon.] He said to them: "It is permitted to retract the entire day" — at which they said: "Let R. Tarfon leave us in our place" — and they reverted to the words of the sages.
  	Both the buyer and the seller can claim ona'ah. Just as a non-merchant can claim ona'ah, so can a merchant. R. Yehudah says: A merchant cannot claim ona'ah. [For he is expert (in wares) and it may be presumed that he waived any ona'ah. As to his having sold it for that price (in the first place), it is because (the opportunity for) another sale arose, and now he wishes to back out. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.] Whoever claims ona'ah has the upper hand. If he [the seller] wishes, he can tell him: "Give me my money," or "Give me the amount of he ona'ah."
  	How much may a sela lack and ona'ah not obtain? [A coin which is current, and always being ground down with usage — How much may it lack so that there be no ona'ah in one's using it?] R. Meir says: Four issarin [to a sela], which are one issar to a dinar, [one twenty-fourth of it: two ma'ah of silver being a dinar; one ma'ah, two pondyonim; a pondyon, two issarin. R. Yehudah says: Four pondyonoth, a pondyon to a dinar, [one-twelfth of it]. R. Shimon says: Eight pondyonoth, two pondyonoth to a dinar, [a sixth of it, as ona'ah in general. And this is the halachah.]
  	Until when is it permitted to retract (for coin ona'ah)? In cities, [where there are money changers], until he shows it to the money changer; in villages, [where there are no money changers], until Sabbath eve, [when he comes to spend it for (provisions for) the Sabbath meal, when he will discover if it will be accepted in payment.] If he recognized it, even after twelve months. [This is what is meant: If he (the giver of the coin) were a chasid, and wished to go beyond the letter of the law — if he recognized it as the sela he gave him, he should accept it even after twelve months.] And he has only resentment against him. [This is what is meant: If he is not a chasid and does not wish to accept it from him, he (the receiver) has only resentment against him, the receiver having caused himself the loss by not having returned it in time.] And he gives it for (redemption of) second-tithe, without apprehension, for he is a mean person. [This refers to a coin rubbed out to the point of ona'ah. He gives it for (redemption of) second-tithe and need have no apprehension of asimon (see 4:1), second-tithe being redeemed only with a coin (stamped with a design), for it is called a "coin." For one who does not take it at its worth as a coin, but only as cast silver, is regarded as a mean person.]
  	Ona'ah is four (ma'ah of) silver [for the purchase of a sela, twenty-four ma'ah of silver, whereby ona'ah is found to be a sixth, as stated above (4:3). It is restated here for the sake of (what follows, viz.:) "And the claim is two (ma'ah of) silver."] And the claim is two (ma'ah of) silver. [For there is no shvuath hadaynim (an oath imposed by the judges) on a claim less than two (ma'ah of) silver, where the one claims: "You owe me two ma'ah of silver," and the other admits to the worth of a p'rutah and denies the rest, or admits to the whole except for a p'rutah.] And the admission is the worth of a p'rutah [to render it partial admission so that he be liable for an oath]. And a woman may be betrothed with the worth of a p'rutah. And one who benefits the worth of a p'rutah of hekdesh (consecrated property) is guilty of abuse (of hekdesh). And if one finds the worth of a p'rutah, he must call it out, [but not less than that amount, it being written (Deuteronomy 22:3): "…which shall go lost from him" — to exclude a lost object which is not worth a p'rutah.] And if one steals the worth of a p'rutah from his neighbor, and swears to him, he must take it to him even to Media [if he confess that he swore falsely, in which instance he has no atonement until he returns it to the one he stole it from himself, and not to his messenger, it being written (Numbers 5:7): "and he shall give it to whom he owes it."]
  	There are five who add a fifth (to the payment of the principal): One who eats t'rumah, [a non-priest who eats t'rumah gedolah unwittingly], and t'rumath ma'aser [ma'aser from ma'aser], and t'rumath ma'aser of demai [One who buys produce from an am ha'aretz must separate t'rumath ma'aser, but not t'rumah gedolah, all being heedful to separate that], and challah, and bikkurim. (One who eats these) adds a fifth. [All of these five are reckoned as one, all being called "t'rumah," and all being subsumed in that category]. And one who redeems neta revai (the fruits of the fourth year) and his ma'aser sheni adds a fifth. [("neta revai":) This is derived: "holy" (Leviticus 19:24) — "holy" (Ibid. 27:30) from ma'aser sheni as adding a fifth. And these two, also, are reckoned as one, both being derived from one verse in respect to ma'aser. ("his ma'aser sheni":) [It is specifically from "his" ma'aser that he adds a fifth, it being written (Ibid. 31): "…a man of his ma'aser."] One who redeems his hekdesh adds a fifth. ["his hekdesh," and not that of others, it being written (Leviticus 27:19): "…he who consecrates it."] One who derives benefit the worth of a p'rutah [unwittingly] from hekdesh is liable for a me'ilah ("abuse") sacrifice and] adds a fifth. And one who steals a p'rutah's worth from his neighbor and swears (falsely) to him adds a fifth.
  	These are things in respect to which ona'ah does not obtain: bondsmen, bills, lands, and hekdeshoth (consecrated property), [it being written (Leviticus 25:14): "And if you sell a selling to your fellow, or acquire from the hand of your fellow" — to exclude lands which are not movable, and to exclude bondsmen, who are likened to land. Bills — it being written: "And if you sell a selling," something whose substance is bought and sold — to exclude bills, which serve only as corroboration. Hekdeshoth — (Ibid.): "You shall not wrong one man, his brother" — his brother, and not hekdesh.] Kefel payment does not obtain with them, it being written in respect to a watcher's claiming (falsely) that it (what had been entrusted with him) had been stolen (Exodus 22:8): "For every thing of violation" — general; "for an ox, for an ass, etc." — specific; "for every lost object" — a reversion to the general. We have here an instance of "general-specific-general," in which the ruling follows the nature of the specific, viz.: Just as the specific is explicitly something movable and of intrinsic monetary value, so all (for kefel liability) must be movable and of intrinsic monetary value: to exclude lands, which are not movable; to exclude bondsmen, which are likened to land; to exclude bills, which, although they are movable, are not of intrinsic monetary value. Hekdeshoth — Scripture states (Ibid.): "his neighbor," and not hekdesh.] And four and five payment does not obtain with them [if one stole and slaughtered or sold an ox or lamb of hekdesh, Scripture mandating "four and five" payment, and not three for a sheep and four for an ox. For since they are excluded from kefel, they are reduced by one, kefel in an instance of slaughtering or selling being included in the four and five payment.] An unpaid watcher does not swear (to absolve himself of payment for the above), and a hired watcher does not pay (for them if they were lost or stolen), [it being written (Exodus 22:9): "If a man give to his neighbor" — general; "an ass or an ox or a lamb" — specific; "or any beast to watch" — a reversion to the general. We have here an instance of "general-specific-general," in which the ruling follows the nature of the specific, viz.: Just as the specific is explicitly something movable, etc. Hekdeshoth — Scripture states (Ibid.): "his neighbor," and not hekdesh.] R. Shimon says: With kodshim (consecrated animals) for which one must make restoration, [as when he said: "It is upon me to bring a burnt-offering," and he separated it, and it sustained a blemish, and he sold it], ona'ah obtains. [For since if it died or it were stolen, he must make restoration, it is considered his and is subsumed in: "And you shall not wrong, one man, his brother."] And (with kodshim) for which one must not make restoration, [as when he said: "This is (a burnt-offering)"], ona'ah does not obtain. R. Yehudah says: Ona'ah also does not obtain with one who sells a Torah scroll, [it having no delimited value], a pearl, and a beast. [For one desires to match them. If he has a good plow-ox, he looks for one like it to team it with under the yoke. For if he teams a weak ox with a strong one, he harms the latter. And so with a fine pearl, (he desires) to set it with its mate in the gold of the yechidith (a type of ornament).] They said to him: They specified only these (the foregoing, as not subject to ona'ah). [The halachah is neither in accordance with R. Yehudah nor with R. Shimon.]
  	Just as there is ona'ah in buying and selling, so there is ona'ah in words, [it being written (Leviticus 25:17): "And you shall not wrong, one man his fellow, and you shall fear your G d." This speaks of verbal wronging, the good or evil intent of one's words not being manifest, but known only to the speaker.] One should not ask another the price of an article if he does not intend to buy it. If he were a penitent, he should not say to him: "Remember your past deeds." If he were the descendant of proselytes, he should not say to him: "Remember the deeds of your ancestors," as it is written (Exodus 22:20): "And a stranger you shall not wrong, and you shall not oppress him."
  	Produce may not be intermixed with produce [If one says to his neighbor: "I am selling you the produce of this field," he may not intermix it with the produce of another field], even new with new, and it goes without saying, new with old. [If the agreement were that he sell him old, he may not intermix it with new, for the old is dry and more readily convertible to flour than the new.] In truth, with wine they permitted intermixing hard (i.e., sharp) with soft, for it [the hard] enhances it [the soft. Therefore, if the agreement were that he give him soft, he may intermix it with hard; but if the agreement were that he give him hard, he may not intermix it with soft.] Lees of wine [from one jug] may not be intermixed with wine [from a different jug.] But he may give him its lees [i.e., from the wine itself.] If one's wine became mixed with water, he may not sell it in a shop [p'rutah by p'rutah] unless he informed him [(each buyer) that it was mixed with water], and he may not sell it to a merchant [all at once] even if he informs him, for [he takes it] only to deceive therewith [and to sell it in a shop.] In a place where it was the custom to put water into wine, they may do so. [This, only between the wine pressing seasons. For since this was the custom, there is no misrepresentation here, all wines being of this nature.]
  	A merchant may take (produce) from five threshing floors and place it into one storage bin. [For all know that it was not grown in his fields and that he bought it from many people; and they buy it from him with this understanding. (It was the custom of merchants to buy (produce) from field owners at threshing time and to place it in their bins)]. (He may take wine) from five wine vats and place it in one cask, so long as he does not contrive to mix them, [letting it out that he bought most of it from a "prime" source, and mixing it (with wine) from a different place, his neighbors thinking that it is all from the same source.] R. Yehudah says: "A shopkeeper should not hand out parched ears and nuts to children because he thereby accustoms them to come to him. The sages permit it. And he may not sell below the market price [because he thereby accustoms people to come to him and constricts his neighbor's livelihood.] The sages say: "May he be remembered for the good!" [For this brings the price down. And this is the halachah.] One may not sift (the chaff of) grisin (beans split in a mill, one into two. For their improved appearance enables him to raise the price beyond the worth of the chaff removal.] These are the words of Abba Shaul. And the sages permit it. [For the buyer can evaluate the cost of chaff removal by comparing them with others. And it is worth his while to pay more for these sifted ones to spare himself the trouble (of sifting). The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] And they concur that he should not do so (only) on the surface of the container [to enhance their appearance, without having sifted the chaff below], for he is only an "eye-stealer" [with this surface sifting.] One may "touch up" neither a man [a Canaanite bondsman awaiting sale], a beast, nor vessels.
  
  
  
  	Which (form of forbidden interest) is neshech and which is tarbith? Which is neshech? Lending a sela (four dinars) for five dinars; two sa'ah of wheat for three, (called "neshech") because he "bites" (noshech), [taking from him what he did not give him.] And which is tarbith? Increasing [profit to oneself] through produce. [And both in lending money and lending produce there is ribith (increase), for his money increases, but the latter part (of the Mishnah) treats of ribith by rabbinical ordinance, through buying and selling.] How so? If he bought wheat from him at a golden dinar [twenty-five silver dinars] to a kor (of wheat), and this was the market price [(And he is permitted to give him money now to receive from him wheat the entire year at that price according to the amount of money that he gave him even though right now he does not have wheat. As we learned (5:7): "If the market price were announced, they may transact (on that basis). And even though he (the seller) may not have (the produce), another has," and the seller can buy it now at that price)] — If he said to him: "Give me my wheat, for I wish to sell it and buy wine for it," and he (the seller) said to him: "I accept your wheat at thirty dinars (to the kor), and I will give you wine for it" — If he has no wine (this is ribith). [It is permitted if he (the seller) gave him wheat, but if he transacted to give him wine for it, and he has no wine, it is forbidden, lest the price of wine rise. And even if he transacts with him according to the current, announced market price, since he (the buyer) does not give him money, in which instance we could say that he (the seller) could buy wine (now) for the money he received; but he (the seller) came to take upon himself the price of wheat as a debt and to transfer it to the wine debt — if he has no wine, this is forbidden. For if he had wine, it would be immediately acquired by this one (the buyer), wine having been stipulated as payment for the debt, and if wine increased in price, it would have done so in his domain.]
  	If one gives a loan to his neighbor, he (the lender) may not live in his (the borrower's) courtyard free, and he (the borrower) may not rent it to him for less (than its price), this being ribith. It is permitted to add to rent [for granting time to pay], but it is not permitted to add to the sale price [for granting time to pay]. How so? If he rented him his courtyard and said to him: "If you pay me now, you can have it for ten selaim a year; and if by month, it is a sela for a month," this is permitted. If he sold him his field and said to him: "If you pay me now, you can have it for a thousand zuz; and if by harvest time, it is twelve maneh (twelve hundred zuz)," this is forbidden. [The rationale: Rent is paid only at the end (of the month). Therefore, if he takes from him a sela a month, twelve selaim (a year), this is not payment for waiting, for he was not obliged to pay him rent until the end of the month. As to his telling him: "If you pay me now, you can have it for ten selaim a year," if he does pay him early, this constitutes the renter's waiving part of the rent and reducing it. But with selling, as soon as he (the buyer) pulls the object, he is obliged to pay for it; so that when the seller says to him: "If you pay me now, you can have it for a thousand zuz," this is its price, and if he adds to it for waiting until harvest time, this constitutes "payment for waiting." ("If he sold him his field":) The same applies with movables and all wares. To sell something at more than its worth because of waiting time is forbidden and is avak ribith ("the dust of ribith") by rabbinic ordinance. In all instances of avak ribith, if the money is given, it cannot be recovered by the court, as opposed to ribith ketzutzah ("determinate ribith"), which is recovered by the court.]
  	If he sold him the field and he gave him part of the money, and he (the seller) said to him: "When you wish, bring the (rest of the) money and take what is yours," this is forbidden. [As when the seller said to the buyer: "When you bring the rest of the money, acquire it from now." It is forbidden to do this, for if the seller eats fruits (of the field) in the interim, when the other brings the money, the field is found to have been acquired by him from the day of the sale, and the seller (is found) to have eaten fruits as payment for waiting. And if the buyer eats fruits from now, perhaps he will not bring the rest of the money and the seller will return what he had received from him, so that the field will be found not to have been sold to him (the seller having said: "When you bring the rest of the money, acquire it from now," and he did not bring it), and the first payment would be (found to have been) a loan in general to the buyer, and the seller would be found to have eaten fruits in payment (for having granted a loan)]. If he gave him a loan for his field, and he (the lender) said to him: "If you do not repay me from now until three years, it is mine," it is his. [As when he (the borrower) said to him: "Acquire it from now if I do not repay you from now until three years.," For this is not an asmachta (a mere "understanding"), but a bona fide kinyan (act of acquisition), the lender taking possession of it now for this money (that he gave the borrower), and it (the field) becomes cheaper in his (the lender's) possession. And the fruits are deposited with a third person. If the borrower repays the loan within three years, the fruits are given to him. And if not, they are given to the borrower, the field having been acquired by him from the time of the loan, and that loan having been payment for the field.] And Baitos b. Zonin did so (i.e., He borrowed upon his field) by the counsel of the sages.
  	A shopkeeper is not set up (in a transaction) for half-profits, and one may not give (him) money to buy produce for half-profits unless he gives him (the shopkeeper) his wage as a worker. [One may not tell a shopkeeper: "This produce is sold in the market four sa'ah for a sela, and you sell it retail in your shop and profit a sa'ah. Take this produce and sit and sell it in your shop, and we shall share the profits." The rationale: We rule that such a transaction is half loan-half deposit. One who accepts wares for half-profits presumably accepts responsibility for accident and depreciation of half the principal. Therefore, that half, since he is liable for accident, is a loan to him, being appraised for him at the market price and yielding him half profit. It is found, then, that the shopkeeper looks after the other's half, which is deposited with him in payment for a time grant in returning the loan, for which reason it is forbidden — unless he pays the shopkeeper for looking after that half as a worker idled from his regular work, i.e., if he were a carpenter or a smith — how much he would take to be freed from this heavy work to engage in light work.] Hens are not set for half (profits) [i.e., One may not assess the value of eggs and give them to the owner of a hen to set it upon them to hatch chicks for half of the profit (the cost differential of chicks to eggs). For since the hen owner accepts responsibility for half the worth of the eggs if they are spoiled or if they (the chicks) die, half of the transaction is a loan, so that the hen owner is found to be looking after the other half in payment for a time grant (in returning the loan)]. And calves and foals are not assessed at half [i.e., "Now, they are worth this and this — Take it upon yourself to raise them for two years for half-profits, and for half-liability if they die"], unless he pays him for his work and for his food expenditure [(In the former instance,) what he pays to feed the chicks]. But small calves and foals may be accepted for half-profit [without assessment, (with the understanding) that if they die, he pays nothing, and if they live, they are divided.], and they are raised until they are a third [of their (anticipated full) height, at which point they divide.] And an ass, until it can bear a load. [This was their practice in raising them before dividing them.]
  	Assessments are made of cow and ass [(large ones that are fit for labor, all of the labor going to the receiver)], and of everything that they do and eat, for half-profits [to divide their appreciation in worth and in offspring.] Where the custom is to divide the offspring immediately [when the time arrives; for a small beast, thirty days, and for a large one, fifty], they divide; where the custom is to raise them, they do so. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: A calf is assessed together with its mother, and a foal together with its mother [and it is not necessary to provide payment for work and food for the calf (see 4:4), but only for the mother. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.] And mafrin on one's field without fear of ribith (transgression). [("mafrin":) as in parah veravah (being fruitful and multiplying). Some read it "mafriz," as in (Zechariah 2:8): "P'razoth will Jerusalem be inhabited" — That is, he "expands" upon his field. As when the renter of the field says to the owner: "You are wont to take ten kor a year for renting your field. Lend me two hundred zuz for fertilizer so that I can sow and plow the field, and I will give you twelve kor a year for rent, and I will return your money." This is permitted, these two korim being added because he receives a better field, whose rental is higher than that of an inferior field.]
  	Tzon-barzel is not accepted from a Jew, it being ribith. [Tzon-barzel is property for which the receiver assumes full responsibility. Its value is assessed for him, and so long as he does not return the money, they share the profits. And even though this is a superfluous Mishnah, it already having been taught (5:4): "A shopkeeper is not set up for half-profits" because he takes half-liability upon himself — how much more so here! Still, it is taught because of what follows, viz.:] But tzon-barzel is accepted from a gentile. And they (gentiles) are borrowed from and lent to on interest. The same applies to a ger-toshav (a gentile living in Eretz Yisrael who abides by the seven Noachide mitzvoth). A Jew may lend the money of a gentile by warrant of the gentile, but not by warrant of a Jew. [As when a Jew borrowed money from a gentile and wished to return it to him. If another Jew found him and said: "Give it to me and I will raise it (the repayment) for you as you raise it for him" — If he (the original borrower) placed him next to the gentile — even if the Jew (himself) gives it to him at the behest of the gentile, it is permitted. And if he did not place him next to the gentile, it is forbidden, for he (the Jew himself) would be lending him upon interest.]
  	Produce is not transacted for until the market price is announced. If the market price were announced, they may transact (on that basis). And even though he (the seller) may not have (the produce), another has, (and the seller can buy it now at that price). If he (the buyer) were the first to harvest [and he had a grain stack, and the market price had not yet been announced], he may transact with him [at whatever price he wishes] for the stack. [For since he has produce, there is no ribith here, the stack being acquired by him from now (i.e., the time of the transaction). And even though he did not pull it (to effect acquisition), since even if he did not have produce, it would be only avak ribith by rabbinic ordinance, when he does have it they did not decree (against it)] (He may transact with him) for the avit of grapes and for the ma'atan of olives. [An avit is  a large vessel where grapes are stored before being trodden, being warmed there for the better exuding of their wine. The (comparable) vessel for olives is called a "ma'atan."], and for the "eggs" of the potter [If he had collected earth and shaped it into "eggs" for the making of pots, he may transact with him for the pots at whichever price he wishes, though the market price had not yet been announced], and [he may transact with him] for lime [at whichever price he wishes] once they [the wood and the stones] have been steeped in the kiln [to be burned into lime]. And he may transact with him for (fertilizer) foliage all the days of the year. R. Yossi says: Foliage may not be contracted for unless he had foliage in his refuse heap. The sages permit it. [The difference between the sages and the first tanna: The first tanna says: "All the days of the year." R. Yossi differs, saying: Whether it be the rainy season or the dry season, the seller must have foliage in his heap. And the sages permit it only in the dry season. For even though he may have none, others do have, all having foliage (in the dry season), it already having turned to mould and chaff in the rainy season — but they do not permit it in the rainy season. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] And he contracts with him according to the "high" market price [i.e., "If the market price falls below the present one, give it to me at the cheaper price." ("high":) i.e., "cheap." He gives him "high," abundant produce at low cost.] R. Yehudah says: even if he did not contract with him according to the "high" market price, he may tell him: "Give it to me at this ("high") price, or return my money." [For he did not pull (to effect acquisition), and he can back out. And even "He who exacted payment, etc." does not obtain here. For he had not given his money to acquire the produce then (i.e., at the time he paid), but afterwards; and in the interim the market price had changed. It is assumed that one contracts for the lowest market price. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	A man may lend his tenant-farmers wheat-for-wheat for sowing, but not for eating. [It is permitted to lend sa'ah-for-sa'ah to a tenant-farmer only when he wishes to sow it. The rationale: In a place where it is the tenant-farmer who supplies the seed, if he has no seed for sowing the field, the owner will send him away. And if the tenant-farmer borrows from the owner and sows and returns (a sa'ah of) wheat to him when the price of wheat has risen, this is not (return on) a loan, but it is as if he (the tenant-farmer) goes down to (work) it now on the understanding that the owner takes from the seed first from the share that reverts to the tenant-farmer, and the tenant-farmer takes what is left as pay for his work, having contracted to work it on this understanding — that he take less than other tenant-farmers according to the amount of the seed, and there is no ribith here.] For R. Gamliel would lend his tenant-farmers wheat-for-wheat for sowing. Whether it (wheat) were dear (when he lent it) and it were cheap (when returned), or it were cheap (when lent) and dear (when returned), he would take from them according to the cheaper price. Not because this is the halachah, but because he wished to be strict with himself. [That is, it was necessary to adduce this Mishnah because R. Gamliel was stringent, taking (the wheat back) according to the cheaper price if the price fell. The Mishnah apprises us that this is not the halachah, but that R. Gamliel wished to be strict with himself.]
  	One may not say to his neighbor: "Lend me a kor of wheat, and I will give it back to you at harvest time,"; but he may say to him: "Lend me until my son comes," or "until I find the key." [For since he has (produce), it is legitimate, the sages having decreed (against it) only when he has none. And even if he has only one sa'ah, he may borrow several kor upon it. For with each one we say, this will be its replacement, it not being acquired by the lender, and the borrower being permitted to sell it or eat it. And when he borrows each one, he does so licitly.] And thus did Hillel say: A woman may not lend a loaf to her neighbor until she "converts" it to money, lest wheat become dearer and they come to ribith (transgression). [The halachah is not in accordance with Hillel, but with the sages, who say that one may lend and repay "plain" (i.e., without "conversion")].
  	One may say to his neighbor: "Weed with me [today] and I will weed with you [tomorrow]; dig with me, and I will dig with you." But he may not say to him: "Weed with me, and I will dig with you; dig with me, and I will weed with you. [Sometimes one (activity) is more difficult than the other, and agar natar ("reward for waiting") obtains.] All the days of the dry season are one, and all the days of the rainy season are one. [And we are not concerned about one day being longer than the other. And it is permitted to tell one: "Dig with me this day of the dry season, and I will dig with you a different day of the dry season." And so, with the rainy season.] He may not say to him: "Plow with me in the dry season, and I will plow with you in the rainy season." [For field work is more difficult in the rainy season.] R. Gamliel says: There is antecedent ribith and supervening ribith. How so? If he thought to borrow from him and he sent him a gift, thinking: "So that you lend me," this is antecedent ribith. If he borrowed from him and returned his money and sent him a gift, saying: "For the money that was 'idle' with me," this is supervening ribith. R. Shimon says: There is ribith of words: He (the borrower) should not say to him: "Know that that man is coming from that place."
  	These transgress a negative commandment: the lender, the borrower, the guarantor, and the witness. The sages say: Also the scribe. They transgress (Leviticus 25:37): "You shall not give," (Ibid. 36): "You shall not take from him." (Exodus 22:24): "Do not be to him as a creditor," (Ibid.) "You shall not impose interest upon him," and (Leviticus 19:14): "And before a blind man you shall not place a stumbling-block. And you shall fear your G d; I am the L rd." [The lender transgresses all. The borrower transgresses (Deuteronomy 23:20): "You shall not cause (the taking of) interest" — Do not cause your brother (the lender) to take interest. And he transgresses (Ibid. 21): "And you shall not cause your brother to take interest." And "Before a blind man you shall not place a stumbling-block." The guarantor and the witnesses transgress "You shall not impose interest upon him" alone.]
  
  
  
  	If one hired craftsmen and they misled one another, they have only "complaint" against each other. [("and they misled one another":) If one of the workers sent by the employer to hire his fellow misled them — as when the employer told him to hire each at four dinars a day, and he went and hired them at three, they have only "complaint" against him, for they accepted three; but they can say to him: Do you not subscribe to (Proverbs 3:27): "Do not withhold good from its (rightful) recipients?" Another interpretation: "and they misled one another": They backed out, not desiring to do the employer's work on his terms; or the employer backed out, as when he said to them in the morning, before they began working: "I don't want you."] If he hired an ass driver or a wagon driver to deliver piryafarin [slanted poles for making a litter] or flutes [for (mourning) a dead man or for a groom], or workers to raise his flax from the soaking vat, or for any other "perishable" thing, and they backed out — In a place where there is no man [i.e., where he cannot find other workers to hire, and the flax will go lost], he hires on their account [men at their wage, but not higher], or he deceives them [He tells them he will give them an additional zuz, but gives them only what he stipulated with them in the beginning.]
  	If one hired craftsmen [contractually — so much work for so much money], and they backed out [after doing part of it], they have the lower hand. [If the price of labor went up and he cannot find anyone to complete the work at what is owed the first towards its completion, he holds back from what is owing them as much as he needs for the work to be completed at the cost stipulated with the first. And if the price of labor went down, and he can find someone to complete the work for less (than what is owed the first toward its completion), he estimates what they have done and pays them as stipulated. If they did half, he gives them half pay; and they cannot say: "You have other workers to complete the job — give us all of our wage less what these take."] If the employer backs out, he has the lower hand. [He must pay them for what they have done; and if the price of labor went down, he must perforce pay them as stipulated (for the whole job) less what he must pay to complete it.] Whoever makes changes has the lower hand. [As when one gave a dyer wool to be dyed red and he dyed it black. If the improvement (in the wool) is greater than the expense, he does not give him his full wage, but only what covers the cost of wool and dyes. And if the expense is greater than the improvement, he gives him the (amount of) the improvement.] And whoever backs out has the lower hand. [This, to include one who sells his field to his neighbor for a thousand zuz, receiving two hundred in advance. If the seller backs out, the buyer has the upper hand. If he wishes, he can tell him: "Give me my money," and if he wishes, he can tell him: "Give me land for my money." And if the buyer backs out, the seller has the upper hand. If he wishes, he can tell him: "Here is your money," and if he wishes, he can tell him: "Here is land for your money."]
  	If one hired an ass to lead it on a mountain and he led it in a valley; in a valley, and he led it on a mountain — Even if this (distance) were ten mil and that ten mil, and it died, he is liable. [If he led it on top of the mountain, even if the road were smooth and straight, he is liable if it died because of the (rarefied) atmosphere, not having slipped and not having become overheated. For since he deviated (from the stipulated condition), he (the owner) can tell him: "It died only because it was not used to mountain air," or (as the case may be) "It was not used to the atmosphere of the valley." And for this reason no distinction is made between slipping and becoming overheated, as it is below.] If one rented an ass and it were blinded by a cataract [Another interpretation: and its legs became worm-eaten], or it were seized [for the king's service], he (the owner) may say to him: "Here is yours (i.e., what you hired) before you." [This, only when he said to him: "This ass," and he had hired it for (bearing) a load. But if he had hired it for riding, even if he had said: "This ass," he cannot tell him: "Here is yours before you," lest it fall under him on a bridge or throw him into a pit. Likewise, if he hired out an ass, unqualified (by "This"), even for a load, he cannot say to him: "Here is yours before you," but he must provide him with a different animal. And if he does not, he (the one who hired it) need not pay him anything for all the distance that it went with him.] If it died or (its leg) were broken, he is liable to provide him with an ass. [The owner must sell the hide and the carcass for dogs and add money to provide him with an ass, or he must hire another ass for him with the money (he received) for the carcass. For it is "this" ass that he committed himself for — or he must return his hire.] If one hired an ass to lead it on a mountain and he led it in a valley, if it slipped, he is not liable, [for it would have been more likely to slip on a mountain top, which is steep], and if it became overheated he is liable, [for a valley generates heat, being surrounded by mountains and "shut off" from air.], and if it became overheated [by climbing a mountain], he is liable, [the ascent having caused it. And he had deviated (from the stipulated condition) by leading it up a mountain.] (If he hired an ass) to lead it in a valley and he led it on a mountain, if it slipped, he is liable; if it became overheated, he is not liable. If (it became overheated) because of the ascent, he is liable.
  	If one hired a cow to plow on a mountain [(and all of the owner's plowing implements and his youths go with his animal and plow with it)], and he plowed in a valley — If the coulter broke, he is not liable. (If he hired it to plow in a valley) and he plowed on a mountain — if the coulter broke, he is liable, [for mountains, being rocky, are harder to plow than valleys.] To tread pulse, and it trod grain, he is not liable [if it slipped]. To tread grain, and it trod pulse, he is liable, for pulse is slippery.
  	If one hires an ass to carry wheat and it carried barley, [which is lighter than wheat], he is liable [for damages if he added three kabin. We do not say that since barley is lighter, he can add until the weight of a letech of wheat (the carrying weight of an ass)]. (If one hires an ass to carry) grain and it carried straw, he is liable. For "volume" is as difficult [for an animal to carry] as a burden. [Even though it does not weigh as much as wheat, its volume is the same, and volume is like weight.] To carry a letech of wheat (half a kor. A kor is thirty sa'ah], and it carried a letech of barley, he is not liable. And if he added to its burden, he is liable. How much must he add to its burden to be liable? Somchos says in the name of R. Meir: A sa'ah to a camel; three kabin to an ass. [The halachah is in accordance with Somchos. If he added less than this amount, he is not liable if the ass were injured, and he pays for the additional amount alone.]
  	All craftsmen [(contractors, who undertake to do a job in their homes)] are hired watchers. [They are liable for theft and loss (of the vessels entrusted with them). For by reason of the benefit of being able to hold them as security for payment, they become hired watchers over them.] And all of them who say: "Take what is yours [For I have already finished my work and I am not holding it as security], and [after you take it], bring money" — [From that time on,] he is an unpaid watcher. (If one says to another:) "Watch (this) for me [today], and I will watch for you" [tomorrow], he is a hired watcher. [But if he says: "Watch this for me, and I will watch that for you in its place," both (watching) at the same time, this is called "watching with the owner" (see Exodus 22:14), and he is not liable.] (If one said:) "Watch (this) for me," and the other said: "Put it down before me," he is an unpaid watcher. [But if he just said: "Put it down before you," or merely: "Put it down," he is not even an unpaid watcher, not having undertaken to watch it at all.]
  	If one lends another on a pledge, he (the lender) is a hired watcher, [whether he lent him and then took the pledge, or took the pledge and then lent him. And what is his "benefit"? The reward of a mitzvah.] R. Yehudah says: If he lent him money, he is an unpaid watcher, [R. Yehudah holding "the reward of a mitzvah" not to be relevant in this regard]; if he lent him fruits, he is a hired watcher, [for fruits tend to rot (and his "benefit" is anticipating fresh fruit in return). The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.] Abba Shaul says: One is permitted to rent out [to others] a poor man's pledge [entrusted with him], to set [its rental fee] and progressively [deduct from the poor man's) debt.], for it is as if he returns a lost object (to the poor man). [And this, only with a pledge whose rental is high and its depreciation (through use) low, such as hoe or spade, and the like. And this is the halachah.]
  	If one carries a jug from place to place and it breaks, whether he is an unpaid watcher or a hired watcher, he must swear. [Presumably, he swears that he was not derelict, and he is not liable.] R. Eliezer says: This one and that one swear. And I wonder if this one and that one can swear. [That is, I, too, heard from my teachers, like R. Meir, that each one swears. But I wonder in respect to both. How can they exempt themselves with an oath? How can a hired watcher exempt himself with an oath that he was not derelict? Even without being derelict he is also liable. For this (the breaking of the jug) is not an (outright) accident, but comparable to theft and loss, which are close to dereliction and accident. What is more, if it broke in a place which was not on a slant, how could even an unpaid watcher swear that he was not derelict? He certainly was! And R. Meir holds that this oath is not prescribed by law, but is a rabbinic ordinance. For if one carrying a jug from place to place were not absolved of payment by such an oath, no one would carry a jug for his neighbor from place to place. Therefore, they ordained that he swear that he did not deliberately break it, and he exempts himself.]
  
  
  
  	If one hires workers and he tells them to rise early and work till late, in a place where it is not customary to do so, he may not compel them. [Even if he paid them more than other workers, he may not tell them: "I am paying you more on the understanding that you rise early and work late"; for they can tell him: "You are paying us more on the understanding that we are good workers."] Where it is customary to feed them, they are fed. Where it is customary to provide them with seasoning, they are thus provided — all according to the custom of the land. ["all" — to include places where the workers are accustomed to eat and drink in the morning in the employer's house before going out to work. If the employer tells them: "Go out first to work in the field, and I will bring you your food there," they can tell him: "No, we will eat now in the house before going out to work in the field," this being the custom of the land. The Gemara explains that the Mishnah is defective and is to be understood thus: "And if he stipulates to feed them, they receive much food." That is, since he does not have to stipulate this, it being the custom of the land to feed them, and he did stipulate it, the intent is that they are to be fed more than the customary fare. And] once, R. Yochanan b. Mattia said to his son: "Go and hire workers for us." He went and stipulated that they would be fed; and when he came to his father, he said to him: "My son, even if you made for them a meal like that of King Solomon in his time [(i.e., in the time of his reign, for he was both king and non-king)], you would not fulfill your obligation towards them, for they are the children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. [And the meal of Abraham was larger than that of Solomon. That of Abraham — three bullocks for three men. That of Solomon — (I Kings 4:20): "Judah and Israel, numerous, as the sands on the shore of the sea."] But go and tell them before they start working, [there being only "words" at this point; for once they start working you cannot retract]: 'On condition that you have no claim upon me but for a loaf and pulse alone.'" R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: There was no need to say this, for it is "all according to the custom of the land."
  	And these [workers] eat [from what they are occupied with] by Torah law: one who is occupied with what is rooted in the ground, at the end of their work [i.e., when they tear it out, viz. Deuteronomy 23:25): "But into your vessel, you shall not place them" — When you are placing them into the owner's vessels you may eat; that is, when they are being torn out.], and [one who is occupied] with what is torn from the ground [may eat that thing] until its labor is completed [for tithing, if it is subject to tithing, or until its labor is completed for challah, if it is subject to challah], (this,) with a thing that grows in the ground. And these do not eat: one who works in what is rooted to the ground, not at the end of the work, and (one who works) in what is torn from the ground after its work has been completed (for tithing or challah), and (one who works) in what does not grow in the ground. [viz. (Deuteronomy 25:4): "You shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing. Its not being written: "You shall not thresh with muzzling" implies that the muzzler is to be likened to the muzzled, and the muzzled to the muzzler, viz.: Just as the muzzled, the ox, eats what is "torn" (from the ground, i.e., the "threshing"), when it works, so the muzzler, the man, eats of what is "torn" when he is working in it; and just as the muzzler, etc. And just as "threshing" is characterized as something which grows in the ground and whose labor is not completed for tithing, and at the end of the work the laborer may eat of it — so, all things which grow in the ground and whose labor has not been completed for tithing may be eaten by the laborer at the end of the work: to exclude a laborer engaged in milking, whipping (milk), or processing cheese, which (products) do not grow in the ground; to exclude a laborer engaged in the separation of dates and figs which are stuck together, their labor having been completed for tithing; and to exclude a laborer engaged in "weeding" garlic and onions, removing the small ones, which will never mature, from the others, to provide more growing space for the large ones, this not being the end of the work. A laborer does not eat all of these and their like.]
  	If one worked with his hands but not with his feet; with his feet but not with his hands; even with his shoulder, he eats. R. Yossi b. R. Yehudah says: (He does not eat) until he works with his hands and his feet. [Just as an ox, with his hands (forelegs) and feet (hind legs), so a man, with his hands and his feet, the muzzler being likened to the muzzled. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yossi b. R. Yehudah.]
  	If he were working in figs, he may not eat grapes; in grapes, he may not eat figs. But he may hold back until he reaches the place of the choicest (fruits) and eat (there). And all of these (instances of workers being permitted to eat) were stated (as obtaining) only at the time of working. But by way of "restoring a lost object" to the owners, [i.e., so that he not stop working to eat] they ruled: Workers may eat in going from furrow to furrow. [When they finish one furrow and go to begin another, (they may eat). Even though that time is not "the time of working," the owner prefers that they eat then.], and (they may eat) in returning from the wine press (to pick up another load of grapes). And an ass [may eat from the load on its back while walking] until it is unloaded.
  	A worker may eat a gourd, even if it is worth a dinar; a date, (i.e., dates) even a dinar. R. Eliezer Chisna says: A worker may not eat more than his wage, [it being written (Deuteronomy 23:25): "as your soul" — as (the wages) of his hire, for which he gives his soul, to climb an embankment and to "hang" in a tree.] The sages permit it, but a man (i.e., the worker) is taught not to be a glutton and close the door before him [by way of "good advice." And the first tanna differs with the sages, saying that he is not so advised. The halachah is in accordance with the sages. ("and close the door before him"): i.e., and cause people not to hire him.]
  One (i.e., a worker) may stipulate [(to take money instead of eating] for himself, for his grown son and daughter, for his grown bondsman and bondswoman, and for his wife, because they have "knowledge," [and they know and waive it]. But he may not stipulate thus for his minor son and daughter, his minor bondsman and bondswoman, and his beast, for they lack "knowledge."
  	If one hires workers to work in his neta revai [(fruits of a tree of the fourth year, which may be eaten only in Jerusalem, or which he may redeem to bring the money to Jerusalem)], they may not eat. If he did not apprise them (that they were neta revai), he redeems them and allows them to eat. If his cakes of figs came loose [and he hired workers to re-form them], or his jugs were opened [and he hired workers to close them], they may not eat thereof, [for their (the fruits') work was completed and they became subject to ma'aser and are tevel (forbidden untithed produce).] If he did not apprise them, he must tithe it and allow them to eat.
  	Watchers of fruits eat by the law of the land, [this having become the practice], but not by Torah law. [("watchers of fruits":) watchers of pressing vats and (fruit) piles; but watchers of gardens and orchards eat neither by the law of the land nor by Torah law, for a watcher is not like a worker.] There are four watchers: an unpaid watcher, a borrower, a paid watcher, and a hirer. An unpaid watcher swears on everything [i.e., on all things for which other watchers are stated to be liable. He swears that this and this occurred to him, and he is exempt.] A borrower pays for everything [theft, loss, and accident]. A paid watcher and a hirer swear that (a beast was) "broken," or seized, or died (and they are exempt), and they pay for loss and theft. [All are derived from verses in Mishpatim. The first section (Exodus 22:6): "If a man give to his neighbor, etc." speaks of an unpaid watcher, who is not liable for theft and loss. The second (Ibid. 9): "If a man give to his neighbor an ass or an ox or a lamb," speaks of a hired watcher, who is liable for theft and loss, it being written in that regard (Ibid. 11): "And if stolen it will be stolen from him, he shall pay to its owner." This tells me only of theft. Whence do I derive (liability for) loss? From: "If stolen it will be stolen" — in any event (i.e., any manner of loss. What is more, it follows a fortiori, viz.: Now, if he is liable for theft, which is close to being an accident, how much more so for loss, which is close to being dereliction! And a hirer, since the entire benefit is not his, is regarded as a hired watcher. A borrower is spoken of in the third section, viz. (Ibid 13): "And if a man borrow from his neighbor, and it be broken or die, its owner not being with it, pay shall he pay."]
  	One wolf is not an oness (an unavoidable "accident") [and a hired watcher and a hirer are liable for it, it being written (Shemoth 22:12): "For the torn beast, he shall not pay" — There is a torn beast for which he pays, and a torn beast for which he does not pay.] R. Yehudah says: In a wolf pack, even one wolf is an oness, [being likely to attack a man.] Two dogs are not an oness. Yadua Habavli says in the name of R. Meir: From one side, they are not an oness; from two sides, they are an oness. [The halacha is neither in accordance with R. Yehudah nor with Yadua Habavli.] One armed robber is an oness. A lion, a bear, a tiger, a leopard, and a snake are an oness. When is this so? When they come of themselves; but if they (the watchers) go to a place where wild animals or armed robbers are found, it is not an oness.
  	If it died naturally, this is an oness. If he afflicted it [by not feeding it, or by leaving it out in the sun in the summertime, or in the cold in the wintertime], and it died, this is not an oness. If it [overpowered him and] went up to a high peak and fell off, this is an oness. If he took it up to a high peak and it fell off and died, this is not an oness. An unpaid watcher may make a condition to exempt himself from an oath; a borrower, to exempt himself from paying; a paid watcher and a hirer, to exempt themselves from an oath and from paying. [And this is not considered making a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. For he tells him: "I consent to be your watcher only on this and this condition"; and one does not become a watcher until he pulls the beast (to effect acquisition). And this one, when he pulled the beast, had already stipulated that he (the owner) could not impose an oath upon him. He bound himself to be subject only to some of the laws of watchers; and he is liable only for these.]
  	If one makes a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah, his condition is void. [This entire Mishnah is in accordance with R. Meir, who holds that if one makes a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah, even in respect to money matters, his condition is void. This is not the halachah. But, in monetary matters, even if one makes a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah, his condition stands.] And every condition preceded by an act is void. [If he prefaced the intended act to the desired condition, e.g., "This is yours, if you do this and this," (the condition is void). For it is not like the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuven, viz. (Numbers 32:29): "If they pass over … then you shall give, etc." where the condition precedes the act.] And whatever (condition) can be fulfilled at the end, if he stipulates it in the beginning, [the condition being prefaced to the act], the condition stands. [But if it is not possible to fulfill the condition, the condition is void and the act stands. For (in positing this impossible condition), he is only hyperbolizing, not really intending the condition, but only desiring to taunt and goad his neighbor with words.]
  
  
  
  	If one borrowed a cow and borrowed its owner with it, [i.e., If the owner of the cow were with the borrower to do his work — whether he were borrowed or hired by him; whether to work with the cow or to do some other work]; or if he borrowed or hired the owner and then borrowed the cow, and it died, he is not liable, it being written (Exodus 22:14): "If its owner were with him, he shall not pay" [the implication being: If the owner of the ox were with him, with the borrower, being lent to or hired by him to do his work, at the time he lent him his cow, he shall not pay.] But if he borrowed the cow and then borrowed or hired the owner, and it died, he is liable, it being written (Exodus 22:13): "If its owner were not with him, pay shall he pay." [If he (the owner of the animal) were with him (the borrower) at the time of the accident, but not at the time of the borrowing, he (the borrower) is liable, it not being "borrowing with the owner" to exempt him unless he were with him at the time of the borrowing. The verse is to be understood as follows: "If its owner were not with him (the borrower)" at the time of the borrowing, even if he were with him at the time of breaking or death, "pay shall he pay."]
  	If one borrowed a cow: If he borrowed it for half a day and hired it for half a day; if he borrowed it for this day and hired it for the next day; if he hired one and borrowed one, and it died — The lender says: The borrowed one died; on the day it was borrowed for, it died; in the time (i.e., the part of the day) that it was borrowed for, it died [and you are liable for the accident], and the other says: I do not know [i.e., perhaps the hired one died, and I am not liable for accidents], he is liable. [This Mishnah cannot be understood as it stands, for the ruling is that if one says: "You owe me a manah and the other says: "I do not know," he swears a consuetudinal oath (shvuath heseth) that he does not know, and he is not liable. Therefore, the Gemara construes the instance as one in which he says to him: "I gave you two cows, one day to be borrowed; the other day, to be hired, and both died in the borrowing time" — and the other says: "One died in the borrowing time; the other, I do not know" — he admits part (of the claim) and is liable for an oath (that he does not owe the other part), and since he cannot swear, (not knowing), he pays. This is comparable to one's saying: "You owe me a hundred," and the other's saying: "I know (that I owe you) fifty, and I do not know (if I owe you another) fifty," in which instance he is liable for an oath, and, not being able to swear, he pays.] If the hirer says: The hired one died; on the day it was hired for, it died; in the time (i.e., the part of the day) that it was hired for, it died — and the other says: I do not know, he is not liable. If one says: The borrowed one (died), and the other: The hired one (died), the hirer swears that the hired one died. [This, too, cannot be understood as it stands, for the ruling is that if one claims wheat and the other admits barley, he is not liable — even for barley. And here, too, what was admitted was not claimed, and what was claimed was not admitted. What place is there, then, for this oath! The Gemara, therefore, construes this as an instance of an oath through gilgul ("rolling"), the one saying to the other: "Swear to me the oath of the watchers, for which you are liable, that it died a natural death," and since he takes this oath, he also takes the other, through gilgul, that the hired one died.] If one says I do not know, and the other says I do not know, they divide. [This Mishnah is in accordance with Somchos, who says: Money whose status (i.e., ownership) is in doubt is divided. This is not the halachah. The halachah is that the burden of the proof is upon him who would extract (money) from his neighbor. The claimee swears that he does not know, and he is exempt.]
  	If one borrowed a cow and he [the lender] sent it to him [the borrower] with his [the lender's] son, or bondsman, or messenger, or with the son, or bondsman, or messenger of the borrower, and it died [on the way], he [the borrower] is not liable. [ Some understand this "messenger" of the borrower to be his hired laborer or retainer, who lives in his house, but not that he made him a messenger in the presence of witnesses; for if he had done so, the borrower would be liable for accidents as soon as it (the cow) were given him. And others say that even if he made him a messenger in the presence of witnesses, he would not thereby become liable for accidents. For he would (only) be saying, in effect: "He is a reliable person; if you wish to send it with him, send it."] If the borrower said to him: Send it to me with my son; with my bondsman; with my messenger — or: with your son; with your bondsman; with your messenger — Or if the lender said to him: I am sending it with my son; with my bondsman; with my messenger — or: with your son; with your bondsman; with your messenger — and the borrower said: "Send," and he sent it and it died, he is liable. And the same applies when he returns it. [("with your bondsman":) This "bondsman" is a Hebrew bondsman. For if it were a Canaanite bondsman, "the hand of the bondsman is as the hand of his master," and it would be as if it had not left the domain of the master, as if the master himself were bringing it; and the borrower would not be liable if it met with an accident on the road. ("And the same applies when he returns it":) If the borrower sent it with his son, with his bondsman, or with his messenger — or with the son, the bondsman, or the messenger of the lender, it does not leave the domain of the borrower until it reaches the lender; and if it met with an accident on the road, he (the borrower) is liable. If the lender said to him: Send it to me, or if the borrower said: I am sending it, etc., and the lender said: "Send," and he sent it, and it met with an accident on the road, he is not liable. In our Mishnah, it is only when he returns it within the borrowing period that he is liable for accidents; but if he returns it thereafter, his status is that of a paid watcher (having benefitted from it) and not that of a borrower. And if he sends it (then) with his son, or his bondsman, or his messenger — whether his own or those of the borrower, and it met with accident on the road, he is not liable.]
  	If one exchanged a cow for an ass and it (the cow) gave birth; likewise, if one sold his bondswoman, and she gave birth — this one says: (She gave birth) "before I sold her"; the other: (She gave birth) "after I bought her," they divide. [For a Canaanite bondsman is acquired by money, so that when he gave the money, the bondswoman was acquired by him wherever she was. And it is not known whether he gave the money before she gave birth and the child is his (the buyer's) or after she gave birth, and the child is the (original) owner's. But a cow is not acquired by money, but by pulling. So that if he pulled it, he would know whether it had or had not given birth. This accounts for "If one exchanged, etc." For through chalifin ("exchange"), when he pulls the one (in this instance, the ass), he acquires the other (the cow) wherever it is — for which reason it is not known whether it had or had not given birth. ("they divide":) Our Mishnah is in accordance with Somchos (who holds that "money in a state of doubt is divided."). The halachah is not in accordance with him.] If one had two bondsmen: one big; the other small; likewise, two fields: one big, the other, small — The buyer says: "I bought the big one." The other says: "I do not know" — He gets the big one. If the seller says: "I sold the small one," and the other: "I do not know," he has only the small one. If one says: "A big one"; and the other: "A small one," the seller swears that he sold a small one. [i.e., This one (the buyer) says: (I gave you) money for a big bondsman; and the other (the seller): (You gave me) money for a small one. For, if a bondsman per se, the ruling is that oaths are not taken over bondsmen. What is more, what was claimed was not admitted, and what was admitted was not claimed, so that there would be no place for an oath.] If one says: "I do not know," and the other: "I do not know," they divide.
  	If one sold his olive trees [to be cut for] (fire-) wood [and he left them in the ground], and they produced less than a revi'ith to a sa'ah [i.e., inferior olives, a sa'ah of which does not produce a revi'ith of oil], they belong to the owner of the trees. [For people are not particular about less than a revi'ith. The "revi'ith" here is aside from his expenses in harvesting and pressing. Our Mishnah speaks of one who sells his olive trees without specifying when they are to be cut. But if he (the seller) told him to cut them immediately, even less than a revi'ith belongs to the owner of the land. And if he told him to cut it when he wished, even more than a revi'ith belongs to the owner of the trees.] If they produced a revi'ith to a sa'ah, and one said: "My trees produced it," and the other: "My land produced it," they divide. If a river flooded his olive trees and transplanted them in his neighbor's field, and this one said: "My trees produced it," and the other: "My land produced it," they divide. [The Gemara construes this as an instance of the river washing away the trees along with their surrounding earth clumps. Since they can grow through them, they are not subject to the laws of arlah (forbidden fruits of the first three years). The first three years, they divide. For even though the other's land produces it, still, if not for the earth clumps, he would not be able to eat of it because of arlah. But after three years, it all belongs to the owner of the land, for he can say to him: "If I myself had planted then, could I not eat after three years!"]
  	If one rents a house to his neighbor in the rainy season [without specifying for how much time], he may not evict him from Succoth until Pesach. And, in the dry season, thirty days. [That is, if he wishes to evict him before Pesach, he must apprise him of that (for) thirty days of the dry season, i.e., from the fifteenth of Elul, from which there are thirty days until Succoth, which is the beginning of the rainy season. And if he did not apprise him from the fifteenth of Elul, he cannot evict him until Pesach (whereby we understand that if one rents a house in the dry season without specifying time of rental, he must apprise the tenant (at least) thirty days before he evicts him.] And in the cities, [where all are desirous of living, and houses are not readily available for rental, he must apprise him before evicting him], both in the dry season and in the rainy season, (at least) one year (before). [ And just as the owner must pre-apprise, so must the tenant. In the villages, thirty days, and in the cities, twelve months. And if he fails to do so, he may not leave, but must pay his rent.] For shops (the apprisal period) both in villages and in cities is twelve months. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: (The apprisal period) for bakers' and dyers' shops is three years. [For they give credit for extended periods. The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.]
  	If one rents a house to his neighbor, the owner must provide door, door bolt, [(which is stuck in the threshold post)], lock, and everything which requires the work of a craftsman. But the tenant must provide anything which does not require the work of a craftsman. Animal dung belongs to the owner. [This, when it comes from other beasts; for, if from those of the tenant, it belongs to the tenant.] Only what comes from oven and stove [ash-fertilizer] belongs to the tenant.
  	If one rents his house to his neighbor for a year, if the year were intercalated, it was intercalated for (the benefit of) the tenant. [(And he does not pay for an additional month, for the intercalation is included in the year.)] If he rented it to him by the month, and the year were intercalated, it was intercalated for the owner. Once, in Sepphoris, a man rented a bath-house from his neighbor for twelve (dinars of) gold for a year, for a golden dinar a month. When the case came before R. Shimon b. Gamliel and R. Yossi, they said: Let them divide the intercalated month. [The Gemara points up a contradiction, the first part of the Mishnah stating that all reverts to the tenant or to the owner and the case-ruling being that they divide! They resolve it thus: The Mishnah is defective. This is what was taught: And if he said to him: (I rent it to you) for twelve (dinars of) gold for a year, for a golden dinar a month, they divide. For we do not know whether to follow the first formulation or the last, and it once happened in Sepphoris, etc. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel and R. Yossi, but we follow the lesser (monthly) formulation. For land (unless known otherwise) is presumptively the (original) owner's, for which reason it all reverts to the owner, whether the first or the last formulation is the lesser.]
  	If one rented a house to his neighbor and it collapsed, he must provide a (different) house for him. If it were small, he may not make it large. If it were large, he may not make it small. If it were one, he may not make it two. If it were two, he may not make it one. He may not make fewer windows or more, unless by mutual agreement.
  
  
  
  	If one accepts a field from his neighbor [in arisuth (tenant-farming), to give (to the owner) a half, a third, or a fourth (of the yield), or in chachiruth (rental), for so many and so many korin a year], in a place where the custom is to cut (the grain), he cuts it; to uproot, he uproots; to plow after it, [after the cutting or the uprooting, in order to overturn roots of bad grasses in it and kill them], he plows after it — all according to the custom of the land. Just as they divide the grain, so they divide the straw and the stubble. Just as they divide the wine, so they divide the shoots and the (vine) staves. And both supply the staves. [This is the reason (for what precedes), i.e., Why is it that they divide the staves? Because both supply the new staves each year.]
  	If one received a field from his neighbor, and it were beth hashlachin [dry land, lacking sufficient rain (and, therefore, irrigated)] or a tree-field, [and "beloved" of the tenant-farmer by virtue of the tree, being enabled to share in the fruits without exertion] — If the well [from which the field were irrigated] dried up, or the tree were cut, this does not reduce his rental [if he received the field on rental, so many and so many korin a year; for in the beginning he did not indicate that he was adding to the rental because of the well or the field.] If he (the renter) said to him (the owner): Rent me this beth hashlachin field, or this tree-field — If the well dried up or the tree were cut, his rental is reduced, [the renter having indicated that he was adding to the rental because of the well].
  	If one received a field from his neighbor [for a half, a third, or a quarter of the yield], and he let it lie fallow [neither plowing nor sowing it], its yield-potential is assessed, and he (the renter) gives it (that yield) to him (the owner). For thus does he write to him: "If I let it lie fallow and do not work it, I will pay according to its potential" [i.e., according to what it would yield if it were properly plowed and seeded.]
  	If one received a field from his neighbor and did not wish to weed it [i.e., to remove bad grass, which weakens the soil and impedes the growth of the grain], and he (the renter) said to him: "What difference does it make to you [if my share is less because the grasses reduce the ears]? I will give you the rental" [so many and so many korin, that I agreed to], he is not heeded, because he (the owner) can tell him: "Tomorrow you may leave it, and it will raise (bad) grasses for me."
  	If one received a field from his neighbor [for half, a third, or a quarter of the yield, as a tenant-farmer], and it did not yield [i.e., it yielded very little; and the tenant-farmer came to him to (inform him that he would) stop working it, it not being worth his effort] — If there is enough in it (the field) to cover the winnowing shovel (leha'amid kri) [close to two sa'ah], he must work it [perforce]. R. Yehudah said: What kind of measurement is kri? [The kri measurement is not appropriate for both a large and a small field, for the cultivation of the one is not comparable to that of the other.] Rather, (the criterion is) if there is enough (to equal) the dropping (of seed). [If the measure of the yield equals that of the sowing, he must cultivate it. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	If one received a field from his neighbor [in rental — so many and so many korin], and it were eaten by locusts or blasted — If it were "a plague of the land" [i.e., if most of the fields of that land were locust-eaten or blasted], he deducts from his rental. If it were not "a plague of the land," he does not deduct from his rental, [for he (the owner) says to him: "It's your hard luck."] R. Yehudah says: If he received it from him for (payment in) money, in either event, [even if it were a plague of the land], he does not deduct, [for the "decree" did not go forth against money.]
  	If one received a field from his neighbor [in rental] for ten [i.e., for such and such] kor of wheat for a year, and it were blasted, he gives him [the stipulated ten kor] from its midst [i.e., from this blasted wheat, and the other cannot claim good wheat.] If the wheat were prime, he (the renter) cannot tell him (the owner): "I will buy some (for you) from the market," but he must give him from its midst.
  	If one received a field from his neighbor [in rental] to sow it with barley [i.e., for so much barley or wheat or money], he may not sow it with wheat; (If he received it to sow it with) wheat, he may sow it with barley, [for wheat weakens the soil more than barley.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel forbids it. [For it is harmful to the soil to sow it with one kind (of seed) one year, and with a different kind another. As to the halachah, all is according to the soil and the place. If the stipulation were for something that weakens the soil a little, he cannot change it and sow something that weakens it a lot. If the reverse, it is permitted.] (If he received it to sow it) with grain, he may not sow it with pulse; with pulse, he may sow it with grain. R. Shimon b. Gamliel forbids it.
  	If one received a field from his neighbor for few years, [less than seven], he may not sow it with flax, [for flax seed greatly weakens the soil, and its roots remain in the ground for seven years], and he has no (cutting privileges) in the trunk of a sycamore, [a wild fig tree, whose branches are cut for beams.] If he received it from him for seven years, the first year he may sow it with flax, and he has (cutting privileges) in the trunk of a sycamore. [The sycamore is a wild fig tree whose branches are cut for beams. When cut, they grow again, but in fewer than seven years, they cannot be made into beams. Therefore, if he received it for fewer than seven years, he may not cut it for beams, not having received it for this purpose. For in a few years they cannot grow back (to be suitable) for beams. But if he received it for seven years, the first year he may sow it with flax, and he may cut the sycamore that is in it.]
  	If one received a field from his neighbor for one seven-year period for seven hundred zuz, the shemitah year (in which the field must lie fallow) is included. If he received it from him for seven years for seven hundred zuz, the shemitah year is not included (and he has it for another "productive" year).
  	A hired day-laborer claims (his wages) the entire night. A hired night-laborer claims the entire day. [("A hired day-laborer claims the entire night":) after that day, it being written (Leviticus 19:13): "There shall not abide the wages of a hired man with you until the morning." This cannot be speaking of a hired night-laborer, for hire is paid only at the end (of the working period), it being written (Ibid. 25:53): "As a hired man, year by year," which is expounded: The hire for this year is paid (only) at the beginning of the next year, whence we derive that he (the employer) is not indebted to the day-laborer until sunset. And (Deuteronomy 24:15): "the sun shall not go down upon it" must, perforce, apply to a hired night-laborer, the employer not being indebted to him until morning.] A hired hour-laborer claims the entire day and the entire night. [This is what is intended: A hired day hour-laborer claims the entire day; a hired night hour-laborer claims the entire night.] A hired week-laborer, a hired month-laborer, a hired year-laborer, a hired shemitah-laborer — if his hire ended in the day [i.e., in the morning or during the day], he claims the entire day, [and when the sun sets, the employer transgresses: "There shall not abide, etc."]. If his hire ended at night, he claims the entire night and the entire day. [For since his work continued into dark, he is like a hired night-laborer, and he (the employer) does not transgress in the morning until the next day at sunset.]
  	Both the hire of a man, the hire of a beast, and the hire of vessels are subsumed in (Deuteronomy 24:15): "In his (or its) day shall you give his (or its) hire," and in (Leviticus 19:13): "There shall not abide the work of what is hired with you until morning" [ — everything whose work is with you, even beast and vessels.] When is this so? (that he transgresses) When he claims (his wage). If he does not claim, he does not transgress, [it being written: "with you" (i.e., when the "abiding" is) by your will, and against his.] If he "diverted" him [from himself] to a shopkeeper, [saying: "Give this worker fruit for a dinar and I will pay"], or to a money changer, [telling him: "Give him a dinar in currency"], he does not transgress, [it being written: "with you," and not if he is diverted to a shopkeeper.] A hired laborer (who claims his wage) in his (appointed) time, swears and takes. [Because the employer is busy with his workers and sometimes thinks that he has given when he has not, they "took" the oath from him and imposed it on the laborer.] If the time has passed, he does not swear and take. [Even though the employer is busy with his workers, when the time of indebtedness arrives, it "weighs" upon him and he remembers, and the employer is not suspect of transgressing "There shall not abide."] If there are witnesses that he claimed (and was not paid), he swears and takes. A ger-toshav [someone (a non-Jew) who took it upon himself not to serve idolatry, and who eats carrion] is subsumed in "In his day shall you give his wage," but not in "There shall not abide the wages of a hired man with you until the morning," [the verse beginning "Do not oppress your fellow" — your fellow (Jew), and not a ger-toshav.]
  	If one gave a loan to his neighbor, [and the time came and he did not repay him], he may not take a pledge from him [forcibly, even in the marketplace], except through [a messenger of] beth-din; and he [the messenger of beth-din (and, it goes without saying, the creditor himself)] may not enter his house to take his pledge, it being written (Deuteronomy 24:11): "Outside shall you stand." If he had two vessels, [his debt being against both, and both standing in pledge], he takes one and returns one [when the other needs it. He returns it, and keeps the other with him, viz.:] He returns the pillow at night and the plow in the daytime. And if he (the debtor) dies, he (the creditor) does not return (the pledge) to his heirs, [there being no mitzvah to return it, it being written (Ibid. 13): "Return shall you return to him the pledge" — to him, and not to his heirs.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: Even to him (the debtor) himself, he returns it only until thirty days [the time of beth-din], and from the thirtieth day on it is sold in beth-din. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.] A pledge is not taken from a widow, whether she be poor or rich, it being written (Deuteronomy 24:17): "And you shall not take as a pledge the garment of a widow." [Because there is one who holds that it is a poor widow from whom a pledge is not taken, for since you must return it to her, and she comes and goes with you, you give her a bad name with her neighbors — but with a rich one, to whom this does not apply, we might think that a pledge is taken; we must, therefore, be apprised to the contrary, viz.: "You shall not take the pledge of a widow" subsumes both a poor and a rich widow.] If one takes a mill as a pledge, he transgresses a negative commandment, and he is liable (individually) for two implements, viz. (Ibid. 6): "One shall not take as a pledge the nether millstone nor the upper millstone." And it is not only nether and upper millstone that were interdicted, but all things which are used for food processing, viz. (Ibid.): "for it is a soul that he takes as a pledge."
  
  
  
  	A house and an upper story belonging to two, [the house belonging to one, and the upper story, to another], which fell — both divide the wood, the stones, and the soil, [it not being recognizable which stones belong to the upper and which to the lower], and we gauge which stones would have been broken. [If the house buckled at its foundation and collapsed, it may be assumed that the lower stones broke; and if the top part of the wall fell outwards, (it may be assumed that) the upper stones were broken, having fallen from a height, and that the lower are intact. As to "both divide," above, this speaks of an instance where the wall fell at night, and the stones were immediately cleared, so that it could not be established whether it fell by buckling and the lower stones broke, or whether it fell by a blow and the upper stones broke.] If one of them recognized some of his stones [and they were intact,], he takes them, and they are deducted from the account, (the other taking whole stones against them.) [("he takes them":) as when the other admits to some of them, and about the others he says: "I do not know," for since he admits to some, he is subject to a Torah oath — but he cannot swear, (not knowing); and whoever is subject to an oath but cannot swear pays. But if he said about all of them: "I do not know," he swears that he does not know and shares equally with his fellow.]
  	A house and an upper story belonging to two — If the upper story were "reduced" [If one rented to another the upper story of his house, saying to him: "I am renting you the upper story of this house," and the upper story were reduced four by four handbreadths, so that if the other wishes to use the upper story, he must do so part above and part below], and the owner of the house did not want to repair it, the upper story dweller goes down and lives below [entirely] until he repairs it for him. [For the landlord bound his house to the upper story, and we do not compel the tenant to live part above and part below.] R. Yossi says: "The lower supplies the ceiling beams, and the upper, the [clay] paving, [which is placed on the ceiling beams. R. Yossi holds that the paving is a "hole-evener," for which the upper story dweller must provide. And the rabbis hold that the paving is a ceiling straightener, for which the lower story dweller must provide. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]
  	A house and an upper story belonging to two, [the house to one and the upper story to the other], which fell — If the owner of the upper story told the owner of the house to build [the wall and the lower ceiling, which he is obliged to build], and he refused, the owner of the upper story builds the house and lives in it until he (the other) pays him his expenses. [He builds the house and the lower ceiling and dwells in it until he recovers his expenses, and then he vacates it and builds his upper story.] R. Yehudah says: This one, too, lives in his neighbor's (dwelling), and he must pay him! [i.e., If so, when the expenses are returned to the upper story dweller, he is found to have lived all of these days in his neighbor's dwelling. And even though the other (the house owner) loses nothing thereby, for he would not have built in any event, still, the upper story dweller benefits; for if not for this house, he would not have a place to live. And R. Yehudah holds that if one benefits from another and the other loses nothing thereby, the first is (nonetheless) liable.] Rather, the upper story dweller builds the house and the upper story, and he roofs in the upper story and dwells in the house until he recovers his expenses. [He dwells in the lower house, and he is not regarded as one benefitting from another, for his upper story is ready for him to live in. And the other (the house owner) loses nothing thereby, for he would not have built it in any event.]
  	Likewise with an olive-pressing house built into a rock, and a garden on top, [the house belonging to one, and the garden to the other] — If it (the roof of the house) were "reduced" four by four hand-breadths, so that it cannot be sown as before], the owner of the garden goes down and sows below (in the house) until he makes a vaulted roof for his house, [on which the garden owner can place soil and sow.] If one's wall or tree fell into the public domain and caused damage, he is not liable to pay. [For what could he have done? He was taken unawares.] If they [beth-din] gave him time [thirty days] to cut down the tree or tear down the wall, and they fell within that time, he is not liable; if after that time, he is liable.
  	If one's wall adjoined his neighbor's garden and it fell (into it), and he (the garden owner) said to him: "Clear out your stones," and the other said to him: "They are yours!" — he is not heeded. [If the garden owner does not wish it, he does not acquire them, and the wall owner must clear them out.] If after he (the garden owner) took it upon himself (to clear them out), the other said to him: "Here are your expenses, and I will take what is mine" (i.e., the stones), he is not heeded. If one hired a laborer to work with him in straw and stubble [to gather his own or that of hefker (ownerless property)], and he said to him: "Give me my wage," and he answered: "Take what you have worked with as your wage," he is not heeded. [Even though what is worth money is always regarded as money, this is not so with a hired laborer, it being written in that regard (Leviticus 19:13): "There shall not abide the wages of a hired man," the implication being that what was stipulated must be given.] If he (the worker) accepted it, and then he said to him: "Take your wage and I will take what is mine," he is not heeded. If one takes out dung to the public domain, the other must be ready to carry it out (to the field) for fertilizer, and he may not allow it to remain there.] Clay is not steeped in the public domain, and bricks are not glazed (there), but clay is kneaded in the public domain [to be placed immediately into the building], but not bricks. If one builds in the public domain, he who brings stones brings, and he who builds, builds. [He receives them immediately from the one who brings them and he builds.], and if he causes damage (thereby), he pays for the damage. R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: He may even ready (his materials) [in the public domain] every thirty days, [and he is not liable for damages. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.]
  	Two gardens [of two men, close to each other], one atop the other, [one on high ground; the other, on lower ground], and greens in the middle [on a slant] — R. Meir says: (The greens belong) to the upper, [it being his soil, and (the greens) being nourished thereby.] R. Yehudah says: (They belong) to the lower, [partaking, as they do, of his "atmosphere."] R. Meir said: If the upper wished to take away his soil, there would be no greens here. R. Yehudah said: If the lower wished to "fill up" his garden, there would be no greens here. R. Meir said: Since both can prevent [these greens from being here; the upper, by taking away his soil, and the lower, by filling up his garden], we see from where these greens live [i.e., whence they are nourished and grow, and they are given to him (to the owner of that land)]. R. Shimon said: Wherever the upper can stretch forth his hand and take, it belongs to him, [as per R. Meir, viz.: "since it lives from his soil"]; and the rest belongs to the lower, [the upper (owner) himself rendering it hefker (ownerless) to the lower, it being demeaning to him to ask permission to enter his neighbor's domain in order to take it. The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon.]