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text: Mishnah Nedarim
  משנה נדרים
  The Mishna with Obadiah Bartenura by Rabbi Shraga Silverstein
  
  
  Mishnah Nedarim
  
  
  
  
  
  	All epithets (kinuyei) of vows are like vows. [The gemara explains that the first part of our Mishnah is lacking and that this is what is meant: All yadoth ("hands") of vows are like vows; all epithets of vows are like vows. These are yadoth of vows: If one says to his neighbor: "I am 'bevowed' from you," "I am separate from you," etc. These are epithets of vows: "Konam," "Konach," "Konas," etc. "Hands of vows": (yadoth) of vows, by which the vows are held. "Kinyei nedarim" ("epithets of vows"), as in (Bava Metzia 58b) "hamechaneh shem lechavero" ("one who calls his friend by an epithet", the "epithet" (nickname) not being the name per se.] And (epithets) of dedications are like dedications, and (epithets) of oaths are like oaths, and (epithets) of Naziritism are like Naziritism. If one says to his neighbor: "I am 'bevowed' from you," "I am separate from you," "I am distanced from you," "That I not eat from you," "That I not taste from you," he is forbidden (to do so). [If he used one of these expressions: "I am 'bevowed' from you that I not eat from you and that I not taste from you," or: "I am separate from you that I not eat from you and that I not taste from you," or: "I am distanced from you that I not eat from you and that I not taste from you," these are "yadoth" ("hands") of vows, and he is forbidden to eat and taste from him. But if he said: "I am 'bevowed' from you" alone, his words imply only that he will not speak with him. And "I am separate from you" alone implies only that he will not deal with him. And "I am distanced from you" alone implies only that he will not sit in his four cubits. But he is not forbidden to eat with him unless he specifies with each one of these expressions: "that I not eat from you and that I not taste from you."] (If one said:) "I am removed ("menudeh") from you" — R. Akiva would compress 'his lips' on this towards stringency, [not wanting to say that it forbade (as a vow), but it being apparent that he held it to do so.] "As the vows of the wicked, a vow, with Nazirite and with offering, an oath." "As the vows of the upright," he has said nothing. [If he said: "I take it upon myself as the vows of the wicked, whose vows are Nazirite and offering — an oath not to eat this loaf," if he transgressed and ate it, he must be a Nazirite for thirty days, and bring a burnt-offering, and he is liable to stripes as one transgressing a vain oath; for he mentioned in his vow "Nazirite," "offering," and "oath." As to his saying: "As the vows of the wicked," this is because it is the wicked who make vows and oaths, not the upright, the upright fearing the transgression of non-fulfillment (of vows) and taking heed not to utter oaths. Therefore, if one says: "As the vows of the upright," he has said nothing.] "As their gifts, a vow, with Nazirite and with offering." [If he said: "As the gifts of the upright, I shall be a Nazirite, and this shall be an offering if I eat this loaf," if he ate it, he is liable to Naziritism and to an offering. For the upright sometimes take a vow of Naziritism to separate themselves from what is forbidden. And they give an offering as a gift, bringing their offering to the entrance of the azarah (the Temple court) and consecrating it there, so as not to go astray through it. The expression for a gift is "This (object) is" (a gift), and the expression for a vow "I take it upon myself," for which reason the upright give gifts, but do not vow, so that they not go astray.]
  	If one says to his neighbor: "Konam," "Konach," "Konas," these are epithets of "korban" (offering). [They are gentile expressions, some referring to an offering by one (of these terms); some, by another. With each, he refers to an offering.] "Cherek," "Cherech," "Cheref" — these are epithets of "cherem" (dedication). "Nazik," "Naziach," "Paziach" — these are epithets of "Neziruth" (Naziritism). "Shevutah," "Shekukah," (and) if he vowed with "Mota" [i.e., if he swore with "Motah." "Motah" is an epithet of "Momta," which, in targum, is an oath] — these are epithets for "shevuah" (an oath).
  	If one says: "Lachullin; I shall not eat from you" [The "lamed" is voweled by a patach, the denotation being: Not chullin (mundane food) shall be what I eat from you, but consecrated food.] "Not kasher (fit)" [shall it be, but pasul (unfit), i.e., consecrated food, which is susceptible of "fitness" and "unfitness."], "Not dachi" [Not permitted, as in (Avodah Zarah 37a): "Ayal kamtza (a type of locust) dachan" ("is permitted"). And even though the terms "permitted" and "forbidden" apply also in the context of (animals which are) neveilah (carcass) and treifah (organically defective), and we rule that vows "take" only in respect to what is vowed and what is given (and not in respect to something forbidden in itself), since "permitted" can also be used in the context of consecrated food, it was taught that with unqualified vows we follow the stringent option. For since he wished the vow to "take" here, we say that (in his words) he intended what is vowed (and not what is forbidden in itself)], "Pure" [If he said: "Not pure what I eat from you"], "Unclean," "Nothar" (left-over sacrifices), "Piggul" (invalidated sacrifices), it is forbidden. [If he said: "Unclean, what I eat from you," and so, with the others, it is forbidden (to eat from him), for all of these (expressions) apply to consecrated food.] "As imra" [As the lamb of sacrifice], "As dirin" [the (Temple) wood shed or cattle shed], "As the fire-offerings," As the altar" [As the offerings upon the altar.], "As the sanctuary" [As the offerings of the sanctuary], "As Jerusalem" [As the offerings in Jerusalem. Another interpretation: As the walls of Jerusalem (he holds these walls to come from the surplus of the Temple treasury)], If he vowed with any of the altar appurtenances [such as forks, sprinkling bowls, and fire-pans. If he said: "As the forks, what I eat from you," or "As the sprinkling bowls, what I eat from you," and so, with the others], even though he did not say "Korban" ("An offering"), it is as if he had vowed with "Korban." R. Yehudah says: If one says: "Jerusalem" [without the chaf ("As")], he has said nothing. [The first tanna differs, and the halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	If one says: "An offering," "A burnt-offering," "A meal-offering," "A sin-offering," "A thank-offering," "A peace-offering" (shall be) what I eat from you, it is forbidden (to eat from him). [All of these offerings are obligatory (and a thank-offering, too, is like an obligatory one, for "Four must give thanks, etc.," so that (if we were not apprised otherwise) we might think that this is not called "vowing with respect to what is vowed."] R. Yehudah permits it. [Since he says it without a "chaf" ("As a sin-offering, etc."), it is like swearing by the life of the offering and by the life of the burnt-offering, so that neither vow nor oath obtains. The first part of the Mishnah apprises us that the first tanna differs with R. Yehudah even with respect to "Jerusalem" if he mentioned it without a chaf, holding it to be a vow. And the second part apprises us that R. Yehudah differs with the first tanna even with respect to "offering," "burnt-offering," and "meal-offering, etc." when he mentions them without a chaf, holding them not to be vows.] "The offering," "As the offering," "An offering" that I shall not eat from you — it is forbidden. [Even though all of these were already mentioned, "The offering" is necessary; for we might think that he intends thereby "By the life of the offering" (i.e., an oath), As to our learning (2:2): "'The offering that I not eat from you' — it is permitted," in that instance he says: "This offering," which connotes "By the life of the offering."] "Lekorban that I not eat from you," R. Meir forbids it. [For it is construed as "Lekorban yeheh" ("Let it be as an offering"), for which reason I shall not eat from you. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Meir.] If one says to his neighbor: "konam my mouth that speaks with you," "my hand that does with you," "my foot that walks with you," it is forbidden. [Even though vows do not "take" with something intangible, and speech is intangible, still, when he says: "Konam my mouth that speaks with you," he constrains the mouth from speaking, and the mouth is tangible. Likewise, let my hands be constrained from doing, and my feet from walking, and the like.]
  
  
  
  	And these are permitted: (Let it be as) "chullin (non-consecrated food), what I eat from you." [(This is simply a sign, viz.: Just as "Chullin, what I eat from you" does not require consultation of a sage (for absolution), so all of these mentioned in the first part of our Mishnah do not require consultation of a sage.)], "As the flesh of pig," "As idolatry," "As the hides of levuvin" [They would incise the beast around the heart while it was still alive, take out the heart, and offer it to idolatry, and it is not permitted to derive benefit from idolatrous offerings.], "As neveiloth" (carcass), "As treifoth" (organically defective animals), "As shekatzim and remasim" (forbidden animals and reptiles), "As the challah of Aaron" [the first of the Cohanim] and as his terumah [Challah is not "a thing that is vowed," challah and terumah not coming through vow and gift.] — these are permitted [For Scripture states (Numbers 30:3): "A man, if he vow a vow" — (The forsworn object does not become forbidden to him) unless he vows (to abjure it) against something which is itself vowed (and not forbidden by its very nature). As to (1:4): "A sin-offering, that I not eat from you," which is forbidden, even though it (a sin-offering) is not a thing that is vowed, there (the reason is that) it is possible to make oneself liable for a sin-offering as the result of a vow, as when one takes a Nazirite vow and becomes liable for a sin-offering.] If one says to his wife: "You are (forbidden) to me as my mother" [Even though this is not "something that is vowed," it is more stringent than all of those mentioned above, requiring absolution by the rabbis if he is an am ha'aretz (unlearned)], an opening is provided for him from "elsewhere" [i.e., an opening and a "rationale" is provided for his recantation, it not sufficing that he be asked "Do you regret it now?" or "Do you still feel the same?" (all this,) so that he not treat the matter lightly (and not become accustomed to forbidding his wife to himself.)] "Konam" that I not sleep, that I not speak, that I not walk, [he may not break his word. This, by rabbinical ordinance; for, by Torah law such a vow does not "take," vows taking only with matters of "substance"]; if one says to his wife: "Konem that I not cohabit with you," he comes under (Numbers 30:3): "He may not break his word." [The gemara asks: Is he not obliged to (cohabit with) her? How can he release himself from this obligation through his vow? This is comparable to one's forbidding his friend's fruit to his friend! And the gemara answers: (It obtains) when he says: "The pleasure of cohabiting with you is konam to me," where he forbids the pleasure to himself; and a man may not be fed what is forbidden to him.] (If he says;) "An oath" that I not sleep, that I not speak, that I not walk — it is forbidden. [It is forbidden by Torah law; for oaths "take" both with things of substance and with things lacking substance. And if he swears that he will not sleep three days in a row, day and night, he receives stripes and sleeps immediately, having sworn to do the impossible.]
  	"Korban, I shall not eat from you," "Korban if I eat from you," "Not korban if I do not eat from you" — it is permitted. [For it is like swearing by the korban (the offering), i.e., "By the life of the offering if I eat something from you."] "Shevuah (an oath), I shall not eat from you" [We do not say that he means: "By the life of the oath, as we do with "korban," for since an oath has no substance, it is not possible to say: "By the life of the oath"], "Shevuah if I eat from you" [Sometimes this connotes "I shall not eat from you." As when one importunes his friend to eat, and the other says: "I shall not eat, I shall not eat," adding: "Shevuah if I eat from you," in which instance it connotes: "I shall not eat from you," viz.: "May I be in transgression of an oath if I eat from you."], "Not shevuah if I do not eat from you" — it is forbidden. This is a stringency of oaths over vows. [We cannot understand this as referring to "Shevuah, I shall not eat from you, etc." For since we learned: "This is a stringency, etc.," the implication is that a vow obtains, but that it does not have the stringency of an oath. But "it is permitted" was taught in respect to "Korban, I shall not eat from you," which is not a vow at all. Therefore, we must understand it as referring to what we learned above (2:1): "Konam that I not sleep, that I not eat" comes under "He may not break his word," which was understood as a rabbinic ordinance, a vow not "taking" with something lacking in substance. And this is a stringency of oaths over vows; for an oath "takes" even with something lacking in substance.] And a stringency of vows over oaths: How so? (If one says:) "Konam" if I make a succah, if I take a lulav, if I wear tefillin. With vows it is forbidden; with oaths it is permitted, for there is no oath in transgression of mitzvoth. [For (with oaths) one forbids a thing to himself, so that there is no appearance of vowing to void a mitzvah; for he did not take this upon himself, but (just) forbade the object to himself. So that if he fulfills the mitzvah, it is a mitzvah being performed by means of a transgression. This is similar to one's being obligated to eat matzoh on Pesach night and finding only matzoh of tevel or of hekdesh, which it is forbidden to eat. But with all "shevuah" terminology, one forbids himself to do a thing. And since he is commanded to do the mitzvah, he can in no way release himself from this obligation. And if one said: "A korban upon me if I wear tefillin," the vow takes, and he must bring an offering if he wears tefillin.]
  	There is a vow within a vow, but there is no oath within an oath. How so? If he said: "I shall be a Nazirite if I eat; I shall be a Nazirite if I eat," he is liable for each vow. (If he said:) "I swear I shall not eat; I swear I shall not eat," and he ate, he is liable only for one. [He becomes a Nazirite for thirty days if he said: "I shall be a Nazirite," unqualified. And he brings the Nazirite offering, and again becomes a Nazirite according to the number of times that he vowed. And with an oath, he is liable only for one, receiving stripes only once. But if he gains absolution for the first oath, the second stands. And, similarly, if he gains absolution for the second oath, the third stands; and he is not permitted to eat until he is absolved of all. For we did not learn: "It is one oath," but: "He is liable only for one."]
  	Unqualified vows follow the stringent option, and their qualification, the lenient one. [Even though, when he explains himself, we follow his explanation, if he vows without qualification, we follow the stringent option; for, generally, when one vows, his intent is to forbid.] How so? If one said: "Let that thing be (forbidden) to me as salted meat," [an offering, viz. (Leviticus 2:13): "With all your offerings shall you offer salt"], "as wine libation" — if he vowed intending (the offering) of Heaven, it is forbidden; if that of idolatry, it is permitted. And if he vowed without qualification, it is forbidden. (If he said:) "Let it be to me as cherem" (dedicated property) — If as the cherem of Heaven, it is forbidden; if as the cherem of the Cohanim, it is permitted. [Even though the cherem of Cohanim is subject to mei'lah (abuse of sacred property) before it is taken by the Cohanim, so that it is like "a thing that is vowed," still, "the cherem of the Cohanim" unqualified connotes the Cohein's having taken it.] "Let it be to me as ma'aser" (the tithe) — If as the tithe of beasts, it is forbidden; and if as that of the threshing floor, it is permitted. [For it (the beast tithe) is as "something which is vowed," for he must dedicate it, and the (non-separation of the) beast tithe does not forbid the cattle shed as the (non-separation of the) grain-tithe forbids the threshing floor.] And if he vowed without qualification, it is forbidden. "Let it be to me as terumah" — If as the terumah of the lishkah (the Temple treasury for congregational sacrifices), it is forbidden; and if as that of the threshing floor, it is permitted. And if he vowed without qualification, it is forbidden. These are the words of R. Meir. R. Yehudah says: If he stated "terumah," unqualified, in Judah it is forbidden; in the Galil, it is permitted, for the men of the Galil are not familiar with the terumah of the lishkah [for they were far from Jerusalem.] "Charamim" (dedications), unqualified — in Judah they are permitted, and in the Galil, they are forbidden, for the men of the Galil are not familiar with the charamim of the Cohanim [and all of their charamim would go towards bedek habayit (Temple repair). The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah.]
  	If he vowed by "cherem," and said: "I intended the 'cherem' (net) of the sea ["metzodah" (a net), as in (Koheleth 7:26): "metzodim vacharamim"]; by "korban," and he said: "I intended the korbanoth (gifts) of kings,"; "'Atzmi' (generally, "myself") korban," [If he forbade himself as a "korban" to his friend], and he said: "I only vowed by the bone (etzem) which I had set aside for vowing" (to deceive others); "Konam, my wife from deriving benefit from me," and he said: "I intended only my first wife, whom I had divorced" — with all of these there is no consultation [A sage is not consulted (for absolution), for these vows do not "take."] And if there were consultation [i.e., if such a vow were made by an am ha'aretz, and he came (to a sage) for absolution, he is punished and treated with severity. [He is not granted absolution, and if he transgressed this vow, he is ostracized.] These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: An opening (for absolution) is opened to them from "elsewhere," and they are taught, so as not to treat vows lightly. [He is shown that the vow takes effect, and they provide him with an opening for absolution from "elsewhere," but they do not punish him and treat him with severity. And this is the halachah.]
  
  
  
  	The sages permitted four vows (without absolution): the vows of the diligent, vows of exaggeration, vows of unwittingness, vows of constraint. "The vows of the diligent": How so? If one were selling something and said: "Konam if I sell it to you for less than a sela" [i.e., This loaf is konam to me if I sell it to you for less than a sela. A sela is four dinars], and the other said: "Konam, that I shall not give you more than a shekel" [a half-sela], both acquiesce in three dinars [and they did not intend a formal vow; but the seller "vowed" in order to "spur" the buyer to pay more, and the buyer, likewise, to get the seller to accept less, for which reason it is not a real vow. And even though "the heart's thoughts are of no account," here, where it is evident that this is their intent, this being the practice of buyers and sellers, we do entertain "the heart's thoughts."] R. Eliezer b. Yaakov says: Also one who wishes to bevow his friend to eat with him. [The gemara explains that something is lacking here and that this is what is meant: If one desires that his friend eat with him, and importunes him, and bevows him, this (too) is (in the category of) "the vows of the diligent." And if one wishes his vows of the entire year not to "take," he should arise on Rosh Hashanah and] say: "Let every vow that I shall make be void." [He need not necessarily do so on Rosh Hashanah, but the same obtains whenever he wishes to do so and for whichever time period he designates] so long as he is conscious [of the condition (that the vow not "take")] at the time of the vow, [and he wishes the condition to apply. Only then is the vow void. But if he were not conscious of the condition when he vowed or immediately thereafter, the vow "takes." And it goes without saying that if he were conscious of the condition when he vowed and desired that the condition be void and that the vow "take," it "takes." The laws of oaths and of vows are similar in this regard. The halachah is in accordance with R. Eliezer b. Yaakov.]
  	"Vows of exaggeration" [hyperbole, where he himself knows that it is not so]: If he said: "Konam, if I did not see on this road as many as left Egypt," "if I did not see a serpent as (thick as) the beam of the olive press." "Vows of unwittingness": If he said: "Konam, [this loaf to me] if I have eaten or if I have drunk," and he remembered that he had eaten or drunk [and at the time of the vow he thought he had not eaten or drunk, it is no vow.] If he said "Konam, if I eat or drink (from you)," and he forgot and ate or drank, (it is no vow) [for at the time when the vow was to have "taken," the time of eating or drinking, he had forgotten the vow, so that it is permitted. This is derived from oaths, where it is written (Leviticus 5:4): "a man with an oath," it being required that he be "a man" at the time the oath is to take effect; that is, that he be conscious of the oath. And the same applies to vows.] (If he said:) "Konam, my wife from benefitting from me because she stole my purse" or "because she beat my son," and he discovered that she had not stolen it or beaten him, [these are unwitting vows, for discovering that she did not steal it cancels the vow retroactively]. If he saw people eating figs, and he said: "Let them be forbidden to you as korban," and then he found that they (the eaters) were his father and mother, and others with them — Beth Shammai say: They (his parents) are permitted, and those with them, forbidden. And Beth Hillel say: Both are permitted. [For "a vow that is partially voided is entirely voided," the vower desiring that the vow "take" as he vowed it; and since part of it was unwitting, it is entirely void.]
  	"Vows of constraint": If his friend bevowed him to eat with him, and he took ill, or his son took ill, or he were stopped by an (overflowing) river — these are vows of constraint. [For in the beginning it was not his intent that the vow "take" if he be detained perforce; and when the intent is evident, "the heart's thoughts" are entertained.]
  	One is permitted to vow to haragin, and charamin, and mochsin that something is terumah even though it is not terumah. ["haragin": robbers, who kill men and take their money. "charamin": thieves, who do not kill. We are being taught: "Not only these (i.e., haragin), but even these (i.e., charamin)." "mochsin": This refers to a self-appointed mochess (tax collector), but if he were appointed by the king, whether a king of Israel or a gentile king, and he takes a fixed amount by law of the kingdom, "The law of the kingdom is the law," and it is forbidden to evade the tax, and, it goes without saying, to vow and swear falsely to him. "that it is terumah": Even though they kill and steal, they do not eat forbidden food. Or it may be that terumah is not valued by them, being eaten only by Cohanim in a state of cleanliness, so that it is sold cheap.] (And one is permitted to vow) that it belongs to the palace even though it does not belong to the palace. Beth Shammai say: With all (expressions) one may vow, except with an oath. And Beth Hillel say: Even with an oath. Beth Shammai say: He should not open to him with an oath. [If the robber did not ask him to vow, he should not do so of his own accord.] Beth Hillel say: He may even open to him. Beth Shammai say: With what he bevows him. [If the robber asks him to vow, he should vow only with respect to what he was asked and not with respect to something else.] And Beth Hillel say: Even with respect to what he was not asked. How so? If they said to him: Say: "Konam, my wife from benefitting from me," and he said" "Konam, my wife and children from benefitting from me," Beth Shammai say: His wife is permitted and his children forbidden. And Beth Hillel say: Both are permitted. [With all of these four vows of our Mishnah, the laws of vows and oaths are alike, what is permitted with vows being permitted with oaths. And absolution is required only with "the vows of the diligent," this being an ordinance of the scribes, for which reason oaths are forbidden with them.]
  	"These plants are korban if they are not cut down," "This cloak is korban if it is not burned," [If he saw a storm coming, and fearing that his plants would be cut down, said "These shall be korban if they are not cut down"; or if he saw a fire in the city, and fearing that his cloak would be burned, said: "Let it be korban if it is not burned"], they may be redeemed [as other dedications. He redeems them and purchases a korban (an offering) at their worth. For since he did not say: "They are korban upon me," his intent was not to forbid them to himself as a korban, but to purchase a korban at their worth.] (If he said:) "These plants are korban until they are cut down," "This cloak is korban until it is burned," they have no redemption. [But dedication "takes" on the (redemption) money, and the plants revert to their status of dedication. For since he said: "until they are cut down," his meaning is: "When I redeem them, they shall revert to their status of dedication until they are cut down."]
  	If one bevows himself from those who go down to the sea, he is permitted to those who dwell on the land, [for it is not their custom to go down to the sea]. (If he bevows himself from) those who dwell on the land, he is forbidden to those who go down to the sea. For those who go down to the sea are in the class of those who dwell on the land, [being destined to return and dwell on the land.] Not as those who go from Acco to Yaffo, but to one who sets sail. [Some explain it thus: The first part of the Mishnah: "If one bevows himself from 'those who go down to the sea,' he is permitted to those who dwell on the land," which implies that he is forbidden to those who go down to the sea — this refers "not to those who go from Acco to Yaffo." For one who bevows himself from those who go down to the sea is not forbidden to them, such a small distance not qualifying as "going down to the sea." Others explain it: Not as those who go from Acco to Yaffo alone, i.e., Not only are they in the class of "those who go down to the sea" to be forbidden, and are also called "those who dwell on the land," but even one who is wont to set sail, for he is destined to return to the land.]
  	If one bevows himself from "the seers of the sun," he is forbidden to the blind, too. For he intended only "those seen by the sun." [not having said: "from the seeing."]
  	If one bevows himself from "the black of head," he is forbidden to the bald and the grey, [not having spoken of those who have hair], and he is permitted to women and children, for only men are called "the black of head." [For men sometimes conceal their heads and sometimes reveal and "blacken" them, whereby it is seen that they are men. But women always go with their heads covered, and (young) children, both male and female, go with heads uncovered and cannot be (readily) distinguished as male or female. For this reason, only grown men are called "the black of head."]
  	If one bevows himself from yilodim [connoting those who have already been born], he is permitted to noladim [connoting those who will be born.] If he bevows himself from noladim, he is forbidden (also) to yilodim. R. Meir also permits yilodim. [The gemara explains that something is missing, and that this is what is meant: If he bevows himself from noladim, he is forbidden to yilodim. R. Meir says: Also one who bevows himself from noladim is permitted to yilodim, just as one who bevows himself from yilodim is permitted to noladim.] And the sages say: This one (who made the vow) intended only those who procreate, [such as men and animals, to exclude birds and fishes, which do not procreate, but which lay eggs.]
  	If one bevows himself from those who rest on the Sabbath, he is forbidden to Israelites and forbidden to Cuthites. From garlic eaters, he is forbidden to Israelites and forbidden to Cuthites. [One of the ten ordinances of Ezra was to eat garlic on Sabbath nights, garlic increasing semen, and Sabbath night being the conjugal time of Torah scholars.] From those who go up to Jerusalem, he is forbidden to Israelites and permitted to Cuthites. [For Cuthites do not go up (to Jerusalem) for the festivals, even though this is Torah-ordained. For they hate Jerusalem and chose Mount Gerizim for themselves.]
  	"Konam, that I derive no benefit from the sons of Noah," he is permitted to Israelites, [Israelites having left the class of "the sons of Noah"], and he is forbidden to the nations of the world, [even those of the seed of Abraham]. "that I derive no benefit from the seed of Abraham," he is forbidden to Israelites [(And proselytes are also in the class of "the seed of Abraham, it being written (Genesis 17:5): "For I have made you the father of a multitude of nations.")], and he is permitted to the nations of the world [even those who are the seed of Abraham, the sons of Jacob alone being called "the seed of Abraham," it being written (Ibid. 21:12): "For in Isaac shall there be called to you seed" — "in Isaac," and not all of Isaac.] "that I derive no benefit from Israelites," he may buy for more (than its worth) and sell for less. "that Israelites derive no benefit from me," he may buy for less and sell for more if they acquiesce. [That is, he may sell it for more than its worth if his neighbor agrees to such a transaction.] "that I derive no benefit from them nor they from me," he may derive benefit from non-Jews. "Konam, that I derive no benefit from the uncircumcised" [His intent is those who do not believe in the covenant of circumcision], he is forbidden to uncircumcised Israelites and permitted to circumcised non-Jews. "Konam, that I derive no benefit from the circumcised" [those who believe in the covenant of circumcision], he is forbidden to uncircumcised Israelites [such as one whose brothers died because of circumcision], and permitted to circumcised non-Jews [such as an uncircumcised Arab or an uncircumcised Giveonite], for "uncircumcised" is an epithet for non-Jews, viz. (Jeremiah 9:26): "For all the nations are uncircumcised, and all the house of Israel are uncircumcised of heart," and (I Samuel 1:20): "Lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice, lest the daughters of the uncircumcised exult." R. Elazar b. Azaryah says: Repugnant is uncircumcision, wherewith the wicked were execrated, viz.: "For all the nations are uncircumcised." R. Yishmael says: Great is (the mitzvah of) circumcision, which was given with thirteen covenants, ["covenant" appearing thirteen times in the section of (the mitzvah of) circumcision given to Abraham.] R. Yossi says: Great is (the mitzvah of) circumcision, which overrides the stringent (mitzvah of the) Sabbath, [it being written (Leviticus 12:3): "And on the eighth day he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin" — even on the Sabbath.] R. Yehoshua b. Karchah says: Great is (the mitzvah of) circumcision, for (remissness in) which Moses, the righteous one, would not have been granted a full moment's (commutation, but would have been killed forthwith had his wife not circumcised their son.) R. Nechemiah says: Great is (the mitzvah of) circumcision, which overrides (the interdict against cutting) plague-spots. [For we expound (Leviticus 12:3): "he shall circumcise" — even at the site of a leprous lesion. And he is not in violation of the negative commandment (Deuteronomy 24:8): "Be heedful of the plague-spot of leprosy."] Rebbi says: Great is (the mitzvah of) circumcision; for with all the mitzvoth that Abraham our father performed, he was not called "perfect" until he circumcised himself, as it is written (in connection with circumcision) (Genesis 17:1): "Walk before Me and be perfect." Another (homily): Great is (the mitzvah of) circumcision, wanting which the Holy One Blessed be He would not have created His world, viz. (Jeremiah 33:25): "Thus says the L rd; If not for My covenant (of circumcision) day and night, the ordinances of heaven and earth I would not have made."
  
  
  
  	There is no difference between bevowing benefit from one's neighbor and bevowing food from him, but "the treading of the foot" [to pass through his land] or [to borrow from him] vessels not used for food [preparation, these being permitted to one who bevows himself from food, and forbidden to one who bevows himself from benefit.] If one bevows himself of food from his friend, he should not lend him a winnow, sieve, mill, or oven, [these being used in the processing of food, and, it goes without saying, a pot or a spit, which holds the food itself. The "bevowing from food" of our Mishnah is one's saying: "The enjoyment of your food upon me, konam."], but he may lend him garment, ring, cloak, ear-rings, and all things which are not used for food preparation. In a place where such things are hired out, it is forbidden. [For since it is customary to hire them out, and he (the lender) waives the rental, with that money, he (the borrower) can buy food — but he had bevowed him from (any) benefit which leads to (the procuring of) food.]
  	If one bevows benefit from one's neighbor, he may give his shekel [the half-shekel that every man in Israel gives every year for the congregational offerings. The vower may give it for him because he thereby simply performs a mitzvah.], and he may pay his debt [Some understand this as applying only to an instance where the borrower stipulated with the lender that he could repay the loan whenever he wished and not be "pressured" for it, so that now, by repaying his loan, he is not (directly) benefitting him at all. Others understand it as applying to all debts. For (by paying the debt) he merely prevents his creditor from claiming it, and preventing a claim is not considered "benefitting"], and he may return his lost object [whether the property of the returner were forbidden to the owner of the lost object, or the property of the owner of the lost object were forbidden to the returner, for he is (simply) performing a mitzvah.] In a place where one is paid for this, the benefit falls to hekdesh (the Temple). [When both bevow benefit from each other, if he (one of them) takes pay, he is found to benefit; and if he does not take it, he is found to benefit the other. Therefore, the money falls to hekdesh. And we do not say: "Let him take the benefit to the Dead Sea," for he forbade benefit to himself as hekdesh, for which reason any benefit accruing to him thereby reverts to hekdesh.]
  	And he may tithe his terumah and his ma'aseroth to his knowledge [As when he said: "All who wish to tithe (my produce) may come and do so." But he may not tell him to do so, for he thereby makes him his messenger, and he derives pleasure through the other's doing his bidding], and he may sacrifice for him the bird offerings of zavin, zavoth, and women who have given birth [A Cohein from whom an Israelite has bevowed benefit may sacrifice these offerings for him.], and he may teach him medrash [Sifra, and Sifrei, which is the medrash of the verses], halachoth ["halachoth to Moses from Sinai"], and aggadoth [the words of the sages, which they linked to the verses. The reason he is permitted to teach him all these is that one is not permitted to take pay for teaching these, and there is no "benefit," for he is (simply) performing a mitzvah.], but he may not teach him Scripture. [For it is permitted to take pay for the teaching of Scripture; for he takes it only for the teaching of the proper cantillation of the verses. Since this is not a mitzvah of the Torah, it is permitted to take pay for it, and if he does not take it, he is found to have benefitted him. And this applies only in a place where it is customary to be paid for teaching cantillation; but in a place where it is not customary to be paid, it is permitted to teach him cantillation, too.] But he may teach his sons and his daughters Scripture [Even though it is a mitzvah for the father to teach his son, so that he thereby relieves him of his obligation, this is not called "benefitting," for "mitzvoth were not given for 'benefitting.'" And it is also possible that he could find another to teach him gratis.], and he may feed his wife and his children even though he himself is obliged to feed them; but he may not feed his beast, whether clean or unclean. [For he wishes it to be fattened and he benefits thereby.] R. Eliezer says: He may feed the unclean beast, but not the clean one. They asked him: What is the difference between the unclean and the clean? He answered: The clean one — its soul goes to heaven, and its body goes to him. The unclean one — both its soul and its body go to heaven. [For it is used for working and he is not concerned about its being fattened. They replied: The unclean one, too — its soul goes to heaven, and its body is his; for if he wishes, he can sell it to a non-Jew [for food and receive more for its having been fattened], or he can feed it to the dogs.
  	If one bevows benefit from his neighbor, and he comes in to visit him, he may stand, but not sit. [Our Mishnah speaks of the property of the visitor being forbidden to the sick one, in a place where one is paid for sitting with a sick person, so that if he sits with him and does not take the customary payment, he benefits him. But standing is just for a short time and it is not customary to take payment for it.] And he may heal him, the healing of soul [i.e., his body], but not the healing of property [the healing of his beast. For one is obligated to heal his friend if he takes ill, viz. (Deuteronomy 22:2): "And you shall return it to him" — to include bodily restoration (i.e., healing), and he does a mitzvah thereby. Therefore, even though he bevowed himself of benefit from him, he may heal him with his hands (i.e., directly) when he himself takes ill. But if his beast is sick, he may not heal it with his hands because he benefits him thereby. However, he may say to him: This drug is good for it; this drug is bad for it.] And he may bathe with him in a big tub, but not in a small one. [For he benefits him by "lifting" the water upon him.] And he may sleep with him in one bed. R. Yehudah says: In the summertime, but not in the wintertime [because he warms him. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah.] And he may sit with him on one bed, and he may eat with him at one table, but not from the tamchui. [He may not eat with him from one plate, lest he leave off eating a "goodly portion" of it, so that the other, who bevowed benefit from him, eat it; or lest he move a piece close to him so that he eat it, thereby benefitting him.] But he may eat from a tamchui that returns [to the owner. Reuven may eat from a plate that he knows will be sent back to Shimon, who bevowed benefit from him, after it returns to the owner. And we are not concerned that he might leave something in the plate for Shimon to eat, thereby benefitting him.] He may not eat with him from the evus (placed) before the workers, [a large receptacle that they would fill with food and from which the workers would eat together], and he may not work with him together on the border bed. These are the words of R. Meir. [He may not harvest with him in the same row that he is harvesting, for he assists him in finishing his work quickly by providing open spaces before him, thereby benefitting him. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Meir.] The sages say: He may work at a distance from him.
  	If one bevows benefit from his friend before shevi'ith (the shemitah year), he may not go down to his field, and he may not eat from the nototh [the fruits hanging (notin) outside the orchard.] And on shevi'ith, he may not go down to his field, but he may eat from the nototh. [Even though the Torah made the fruits of shevi'ith hefker (ownerless), it did not make the land itself hefker, and we fear lest, when he is not eating the fruits, he might remain and linger in the field, and derive enjoyment from the field itself, which is not hefker.] If he bevowed "food" before shevi'ith, he may go down to his field, but he may not eat from the fruits. And on shevi'ith, he may go down and eat.
  	If one bevows benefit from his neighbor, he may not lend him (objects) and he may not borrow from him; he may not lend him (money) and he may not borrow from him. [("He may not lend him (objects)": a decree lest he borrow from him after having bevowed benefitting from him. Likewise, he may not lend (money) to him, a decree lest he borrow from him.] He may not sell to him and he may not buy from him. [He may not sell to him below cost, a decree lest he buy from him below cost and thereby benefit from him.] If a man said (to his neighbor): "Lend me your bullock," and the other said: "It is not free now," and the first: "Konam, if I ever plow my field with it (your bullock)!" If it were his practice to plow it, he is forbidden (to use the) bullock, and all others permitted. (For he intended only that he not plow it, as was his wont, but others may do so.)] If it were not his practice to plow it, he and all others are forbidden. [His intent was that neither he nor others plow it.]
  	If one bevows benefit from his neighbor, and he (the first) has nothing to eat, [The common instance is given. The same is true if he has what to eat], he (the neighbor) may go to a shopkeeper and tell him: "That man has bevowed benefit from me, and I do not know what to do," and he (the shopkeeper) can give him (food) and come and take (payment) from this one (the neighbor) [if he wishes to pay him; and he (the first) does not transgress his vow. But he cannot force him (the neighbor) to pay him, for he did not tell him: "Give him and I shall pay you." And if he did tell him, it is forbidden, because he thereby makes him his messenger.] If he (the first) had a house to build, a fence to put up, a field to harvest, he (the neighbor) may go to workers and say to them: "That man has bevowed benefit from me, and I do not know what to do." They may work for him (the first) and come and take their wage from this one (the neighbor).
  	If they were walking on the road, and he had nothing to eat, he (the neighbor) may give (food) to another as a gift, and this one (the bevower) is permitted to take it. If there is no other with them, he may place it on a rock or on a fence and say: "It is hefker for whoever wants it," and he may take it and eat it. R. Yossi forbids it. [For since he is the only one there to take it, it is like a gift. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yossi. And it is only for one who has nothing to eat that the rabbis permitted it, but not for another.]
  
  
  
  	Partners who bevowed benefit from each other are forbidden to enter the courtyard. R. Eliezer b. Yaakov says: This one enters his and that one enter his. [Partners, each of whom has a house in a courtyard, and both are partners in the court before the houses, where there is a law of division in the courtyard, i.e., when for each house there are four cubits in the courtyard in front of the house and there remain in the courtyard an additional four cubits for each one — in such an instance all agree that both are forbidden to enter the courtyard until they divide it, the law of division obtaining. R. Eliezer and the rabbis differ only with respect to a courtyard where the law of division does not obtain, the rabbis holding that each one enters his neighbor's (property), and R. Eliezer b. Yaakov holding that there is breirah (retroactive identification), and each one enters his own.] And both are forbidden to place a mill and an oven there or to raise chickens there. [R. Eliezer b. Yaakov concedes in all of these instances that partners can stop each other, it not being possible to permit this on grounds of breirah. For since it is possible for him to stop him and he does not do so, he is found to benefit him.] If one of them had bevowed benefit from his neighbor, he may not enter the courtyard. R. Eliezer b. Yaakov says: He may say to him: "I am entering what is mine, and I am not entering what is yours." And the bevower is compelled to sell his portion. [For we fear that since he sees his neighbor entering, he might forget and, likewise, enter. But when both are forbidden, this is not to be feared. And it is only when one vowed of himself not to benefit from his neighbor that we compel him to sell his portion. But if his neighbor bevowed him not to benefit from him, he is anuss ("forced"), and he is not compelled to sell, for what could he do? If this were permitted, every partner would bevow the other not to benefit from him in order to compel him to sell him his portion!]
  	If one "from the marketplace" were bevowed benefit from one of them, he may not enter the courtyard. R. Eliezer b. Yaakov says: He may say to him: "I am entering what is my friend's, and I am not entering what is yours." [This is taught to apprise us of the "power" of R. Eliezer b. Yaakov — that even one from the marketplace, who has no portion in the courtyard, is permitted to enter it on grounds of breirah. The halachah is in accordance with R. Eliezer b. Yaakov.]
  	If one were bevowed benefit from his neighbor, and he had a bath-house or an olive press rented in the city, if he had a "hand-grasp" in it, it is forbidden; if he did not have a "hand-grasp" in it, it is forbidden. [If Reuven were forbidden from benefitting Shimon's property, and Shimon had a bath-house in the city or an olive press, which he rented to others, and Reuven came to use them — we see if Shimon had left himself a place in this bath-house or wine-press which he had not rented to others, such as a pit in the bath-house, and the like. (If he had left himself a place) Reuven is forbidden from using them; if not, he is permitted.] If one said to his neighbor: "Konam, if I enter your house, or if I buy your field," if he died or sold it to another, it is permitted. (If he said: "Konam, if I enter this house, or if I buy this field," if he died or sold it to another, it is forbidden. [For since he said: "your house" or "your field," he intended it to apply only when they were his; but if he said: "this house" or "this field," he forbade them to himself forever.]
  	(If one said to his neighbor:) "I am cherem to you" [Benefitting from me is forbidden to you as cherem (dedicated property) — you may not benefit from me], the bevowed one is forbidden [even if he did not answer "Amen"; for one may forbid his friend from benefitting from him.] (If he said:) "You are cherem to me," [forbidding to himself all benefit from his neighbor], the vower is forbidden. "I am (cherem) to you, and you are (cherem) to me," they are both forbidden. And they are both permitted with what appertains to those who come up from Bavel [such as a well for those who come up for the festivals. For they would come up from Bavel to Eretz Yisrael for the festivals. The well was in the middle of the way, and all of Israel could use it, being as hefker (ownerless), and not as something jointly owned.], and they are forbidden with what appertains to that city.
  	What is "what appertains to those who come up from Bavel"? Such as: the Temple Mount, the azaroth (the Temple courts), and the well in the middle of the way. And what is "what appertains to that city"? Such as: the open place [the marketplaces in the city], the bath-house, the house of prayer, the book chest, and the books [which the city people buy to learn in.] R. Yehudah says: He can either write it over to the Nassi or write it over to any person. [The gemara explains that this is what is meant: And what is their remedy? They can write over their portion to the Nassi. That is, those who bevowed benefit from each other and are forbidden to use the open place of the city, the book chest, and the books — each one can write over his share in these to the Nassi, after which he is permitted to use them. For each of them will then be making use of the holding of the Nassi, and none of them will be benefitting from his neighbor.] What is the difference between writing it over to the Nassi and writing it over to any person? If he writes it over to the Nassi, he does not require ceding. [If they write it over to the Nassi, they need not cede it to him through (the acquisition of) another, the Nassi acquiring it because of his eminence, even though it is not ceded to him through another.] And the sages say: Both require ceding (by acquisition). The Nassi is mentioned because that (writing it over to the Nassi) is the common instance. R. Yehudah says: The men of the Galil need not write it over, for their fathers already wrote it over for them. [The men of the Galil were highly contentious, and in their anger they would bevow benefit from each other — at which their fathers arose and wrote over their shares to the Nassi, so that if their sons after them bevowed benefit from each other, they would not be forbidden to use the open place of the city, the book chest, or the books, these being the holding of the Nassi.]
  	If one bevows benefit from his neighbor, and he (the first) has nothing to eat, he (the neighbor) may give it to another as a gift, and this one (the first) is permitted to (eat it). It happened with one in Beth Choron that his father had bevowed benefit from him. [The gemara explains that something is lacking in our Mishnah and that this is what is meant: "And if the end 'sheds light' on the beginning, it is forbidden. And it also happened in Beth Choron that "one's end shed light on his beginning, etc."] He (the son) was marrying off his son and he said to his neighbor: "The courtyard and the feast are given to you as a gift, and they are given to you only so that my father may come and partake of the feast with us." [It is clear in this instance that he gave them only so that his father should come and eat, and this is forbidden. But if he said: "Here they are, and, if you will, let Father come and eat," this is permitted. And if the meal itself "sheds light," i.e., if he prepared a lot more than was needed (for the other), it being clear that he did so, so that his father come and eat, it is forbidden.] He (the other) said to him: "If they are mine, they are dedicated to Heaven." The son: "I did not give you what is mine so that you could dedicate it to Heaven!" The other: "You gave me what was yours only so that you and your father could eat and drink and be reconciled with each other, and the sin (of vows) will be on my head!" And when the sages were apprised of this, they said: Any gift "which is not," which if he (the receiver) dedicates it, is not dedicated, is not a gift.
  
  
  
  	If one bevows himself from what is cooked, [If he said: "Konam to me what is cooked"], he is permitted (to eat) what is roasted or what is shaluk. [Everything which is cooked more than required is called "shaluk" (boiled).] If he said: "Konam, that I not eat cookery," he is forbidden (to eat) "soft cookery" [which is eaten with bread], and permitted to eat "thick cookery" [which is eaten without bread]. And he is permitted (to eat) a tramita egg [cooked in hot water and kept from hardening], and a harmutzah cucumber [a cucumber baked in remetz, hot ashes, whereby it is sweetened.]
  	If one bevows himself from a kedeirah dish, [something made from flour boiled in a pot], he is forbidden only boiled dishes. If he said: "Konam my tasting what goes into the kedeirah," he is forbidden (to eat) all that is cooked in a kedeirah. [The rule: With vows, the language of the time and place is the criterion. And if there is a place where "roasted" is called "cooked," and "cooked" is called "roasted," then if one bevows himself from what is "cooked," he is forbidden (to eat) what is roasted, and the like. And if the majority use one term and the minority another, we do not say: "Follow the majority," but the possibility of a vow obtains, and wherever there is such a possibility, the stringent option is followed.]
  	(If one bevows himself) from "hakavush" ("the preserve"), he is forbidden (to eat) only vegetable preserve, [for "preserve," in general, is vegetable preserve.] (If he said:) "that I not taste kavush" [(This connotes all kinds of preserve. Likewise, "shaluk," "tzalui," "maluach," without the heh ("the") connotes all varieties of shaluk, of tzalui, and of maluach.)], he is forbidden (to eat) all kavush. from "hashaluk," he is forbidden to eat only shaluk of meat. "that I not taste shaluk," he is forbidden (to eat) all shaluk. from "hatzali," he is forbidden (to eat) only tzali of meat. These are the word of R. Yehudah. "that I not taste tzali," he is forbidden (to eat) all tzali. from "maliach," he is forbidden (to eat) only maliach of fish. "that I not taste maliach," he is forbidden to taste all maliach.
  	"that I not eat fish, fishes," [neither fish nor fishes — everything is implied], he is forbidden (to eat) them — whether big or small, whether salted or unsalted, whether raw or cooked. And he is permitted (to eat) hashed tarith and brine. [("hashed tarith":) fish which is cut up in pieces and sold. Its name is unique to it, and it is included in "fish and fishes." ("brine":) liquid exuded by salted fish.] If one bevows himself from tzachanah [a mixture of hashed fish is called "tzachanah," as in (Avodah Zarah 40a): "that boat of tzachanta"], he is forbidden (to eat) hashed tarith and permitted (to eat) brine and muries [since the fish substance itself is not absorbed in them.] If one bevows himself from hashed tarith, he is forbidden (to eat) brine and muries. [For "hashed" connotes all things in which fish matter is intermixed.]
  	If one bevows himself from milk, he is permitted (to eat) kom [whey milkcurds, the serum exuded by cheese]. R. Yossi forbids it. from  "hakom," he is permitted (to drink) milk. Abba Shaul says: If one bevows himself from "hagevinah" ("the cheese"), he is forbidden to eat it, whether salted or unsalted. [i.e., it is not to be said that "hagevinah" connotes a distinctive cheese, which is not eaten without salt. The halachah is in accordance with Abba Shaul.]
  	If one bevows himself from meat, he is permitted (to eat) meat-broth and keifeh. [Broth solidified at the bottom of the pot is called "keifeh."] R. Yehudah forbids it [since it has the flavor of meat. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.] R. Yehudah said: "Once R. Tarfon forbade to me eggs which had been cooked with it!" They said to him: "So it should be! When is it so (that it is forbidden)? When he says: 'This meat (is forbidden) to me.'" [For since he said: "This meat," he forbade it to himself and forbade its taste. But if he said: "konam meat to me," he forbade to himself only what is called "meat."] For if one bevows himself from something and it becomes intermixed with something else, if there is in it (the bevowed thing) enough to impart its flavor (to the thing it is intermixed with), it is forbidden.
  	If one bevows himself from wine, he is permitted (to eat) a dish which has the flavor of wine. [as per the rabbis to R. Yehudah (above)]. If he said: "Konam, that I not taste this wine," and it fell into a dish, if there is in it enough to impart a flavor, it is forbidden. If one bevowed himself from grapes, he is permitted (to drink) wine. (If he bevowed himself) from olives, he is permitted (to ingest) oil. If he said: "Konam these olives and grapes, that I not eat them," he is forbidden (to eat) them and what is exuded from them.
  	If one bevows himself from dates, he is permitted (to eat) date-honey. from  "sitvaniyoth" [inferior grapes left on the vines in the fall (stav). They are not fit for wine, and vinegar is made from them], he is permitted (to eat) sitvaniyoth-vinegar. R. Yehudah b. Betheira says: Any thing whose products are called by its name [and even though it has changed, it is called by the name of its source, e.g., "date-honey," "sitvaniyoth-vinegar"] — if he bevows himself from it, he is forbidden (to eat) also what comes from it. And the sages permit it. [The difference between the first tanna and the sages is that the first tanna holds that one who bevows himself from sitvaniyoth is permitted (to eat) the vinegar exuded by them, but is forbidden to eat the sitvaniyoth themselves. "And the sages permit" the sitvaniyoth themselves. For since sitvaniyoth are not eaten (as a rule), when he bevowed himself from "sitvaniyoth," his intent was the vinegar exuded by them, not the sitvaniyoth themselves. The halachah is in accordance with the sages. Another interpretation: "And the sages permit sitvaniyoth-vinegar just as they do date-honey, the sages holding that both with things fit to eat and with things not fit to eat, if one forbids a particular thing to himself, he is permitted to eat what comes out of it.]
  	If one bevows himself from wine, he is permitted to drink apple wine; from oil, he is permitted (to ingest) sesame oil; from honey, he is permitted (to eat) date-honey; from vinegar, he is permitted (to eat) sitvaniyoth-vinegar; from leeks, he is permitted (to eat) kaflototh [a kind of leek grown in Eretz Yisrael]; from greens, he is permitted (to eat) field-greens, for it ("field") is a conjunctive term. [In "field-greens," one conjoins a word ("field") to "greens" to say "field-greens," and so with all (conjunctive expressions). But on shevi'ith, since garden-greens are not found (for they do not grow without tillage), and (only) field-greens are eaten, "greens," unqualified, on shevi'ith, as opposed to the other years, is understood as field-greens.]
  	(If one bevows himself) from cabbage, he is forbidden (to eat) asparagus [a kind of cabbage. But cabbage is not called asparagus. Another interpretation: "asparagus" — the water in which asparagus is boiled.] (If he bevows himself) from asparagus, he is permitted (to eat) cabbage. from beans, he is forbidden (to eat) mikpeh [a thick dish of beans or of pudding. For even though they are inserted in the mikpeh, they are still called "beans." R. Yossi permits it. [For he holds that it is called a "mikpeh" of beans, but not "beans" alone. from mikpeh he is permitted (to eat) beans. from mikpeh, he is forbidden (to eat) garlic. [They used to put garlic into every mikpeh to give it a taste, and the garlic is the "mikpeh."] R. Yossi permits it. from ashishim, he is permitted (to eat) lentils. [ashishim are the remnants of lentils. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yossi in all three instances in our Mishnah.] "wheat, wheats that I not taste," ["wheat" connotes a baked loaf; "wheats," chewing matter], he is forbidden (to eat) them, whether flour or loaf. "beans, beans that I not taste," he is forbidden (to eat) them, whether raw or cooked. R. Yehudah says (If he says:) "Konam, that I not eat bean or wheat," he is permitted to chew them raw.
  
  
  
  	If one bevows himself from greens, he is permitted to eat cucumbers. R. Akiva forbids it. They asked R. Akiva: But doesn't a man tell his messenger: 'Buy me greens,' and he (the messenger) says: 'I found only cucumbers!'" [And if they are greens, why does he not buy them?] He replied: "Exactly! Would he say to him: 'I found only beans!' It must be then that cucumbers are included in 'greens,' and beans are not." [i.e., that proves my point. Would he say: "I found only beans!" Since he comes to ask him whether to purchase cucumbers, this indicates that it is a type of greens. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] And he is forbidden (to eat) wet Egyptian bean, and permitted (to eat it) dry.
  	If one bevows himself from grain, he is forbidden (to eat) dry Egyptian bean. [For "grain" connotes all that comes from grain, everything from which a pile is made. And this, too, comes from grain.] These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: He is forbidden (to eat) only the five species. R. Meir says: If one bevows himself from "produce," he is forbidden (to eat) only the five species. But if he bevows himself from grain, he is forbidden (to eat) all [types of beans from which a pile is made. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Meir.], and he is permitted (to eat) fruits and greens.
  	If one bevows himself from "covering," he is permitted (to cover himself with) sackcloth, tent-cloth, and chamilah (coarse stuff) [These are materials especially rough and thick, and people are not wont to cover themselves with them.] If he said: "Konam, if wool come upon me," he is permitted to cover himself with strips of wool. [For he intended only a garment of wool.] (If he said: "Konam) if flax come upon me," he is permitted to cover himself with stalks of flax. R. Yehudah says: All according to him who vows. [i.e., according to the time of the vow. If it is clear that he vowed because of the heaviness of the load, he is permitted to cover himself (with the material he is carrying). The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah.] (e.g.,) If he were carrying a load and sweating, and giving off a foul odor, and he said: "Konam if wool or flax come upon me," he is permitted to cover himself (with it as a garment), but forbidden to throw it over his back (as a load).
  	If one bevows himself from a house [not to enter a house], he is permitted [to enter] an upper story, [it not being included in "house."] These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say an upper story is included in "house." If one bevows himself from an upper story, he is permitted to enter a house.
  	If one bevows himself from a bed, he is permitted (to sleep) on a dargesh [a small bed placed in front of a big bed, by which to mount it.] These are the words of R. Meir. And the sages say: "dargesh" is included in "bed." If one bevows himself from a dargesh, he is permitted (to sleep) in a bed. If one bevows himself from a city, he is permitted to enter the t'chum (Sabbath boundary) of the city [two thousand cubits on every side roundabout], and he is forbidden to enter its ibbur (the outskirts) [the houses that project from it seventy cubits and "a remnant" (until eighty), as a woman who is pregnant (me'ubereth), whose stomach projects outwards.] But one who bevows himself from a house is forbidden from the agaf ["the closing of the door"] and inwards [as in (Nechemiah 7:3): "yagifu (Let them close) the doors and bar them." The halachah is not in accordance with R. Meir in all of our Mishnah.]
  	If one says: "Konam, these fruits upon me," (or) "They are konam by my mouth," or "They are konam to my mouth," he is forbidden their exchanges or their growths. [If he had exchanged them, what he received for them is forbidden to him. For the rabbis decreed (as forbidden) the proceeds of things from which it is forbidden to benefit. And the growths of "konam" are forbidden as are the growths of hekdesh (Temple dedications).] (If he said:) "I shall not eat," (or) "I shall not taste" [forbidding to himself only eating or tasting alone], he is permitted their exchanges or their growths — in a thing whose seed ends. But in a thing whose seed does not end [such as onions and the like], even the growths of their growths are forbidden [being like the forbidden thing itself in that its seed does not end.]
  	If one says to his wife: "Konam, the work of your hands upon me," [He forbids to himself everything that she does and prepares for him. And if she plants a tree, its growths are forbidden to him.], (or) "They are konam by my mouth," or "They are konam to my mouth," he is forbidden their exchanges or their growths. (If he said:) "I shall not eat," (or) "I shall not taste," he is permitted their exchanges or their growths — in a thing whose seed ends. But in a thing whose seed does not end, even the growths of their growths are forbidden.
  	(If one said: "What you make, I shall not eat until Pesach," (or) "What you make, I shall not wear until Pesach," [The implication is: What you make now, I shall not eat until Pesach; but after Pesach I shall eat it.], if she made it before Pesach, he may eat it or cover himself with it after Pesach. (If he said:) "What you make before Pesach, I shall not eat," (or) "What you make before Pesach, I shall not wear," [the implication being: Whatever you make from today until Pesach, I shall never eat — even after Pesach], if she made it before Pesach, he may not eat it or cover himself with it after Pesach.
  	(If one said to his wife: "I bevow) your benefitting from me until Pesach if you go to your father's house until the festival (Succoth)," [If it were after Succoth and he forbade her benefitting from him until Pesach if she went to her father's house until Succoth], if she went before Pesach, she is forbidden benefit until Pesach; (if she went) after Pesach, he is in transgression of breaking his vow. [That is, if she went after Pesach, he is in transgression of breaking his vow retroactively for what she benefitted from him before Pesach.] (If he said to her: "I bevow) your benefitting from me until the festival if you go to your father's house until Pesach," if she went before Pesach, she is forbidden to benefit from him until the festival, and she is permitted to go after Pesach.
  
  
  
  	(If one says:) "konam, that I not taste wine today," it is forbidden only until it gets dark. [For this is how men speak. When they say "today," they mean until the day is complete.] (If one says: "Konam, that I not taste wine) this week," [If it were the middle of the week, and he said: "This week"], he is forbidden the entire week and the Sabbath past. [He is also forbidden on the Sabbath day, it being included in the week that has passed.] (If one says: "Konam, that I not taste wine ) this month," he is forbidden the entire month, and Rosh Chodesh is future. [If it were the middle of the month, and he said; "This month," he is forbidden until the end of the month, and Rosh Chodesh is future. He is permitted on Rosh Chodesh, for it is counted with the month co come, even if Rosh Chodesh were on the thirtieth day of the month that passed.] (If one says: "Konam that I not taste wine) this year," he is forbidden the entire year, and Rosh Hashanah is future. [If it were the middle of the year, and he said: "This year," he is forbidden until the end of the year, and he is permitted on Rosh Hashanah, it being counted with the year to come.] (If one says: "Konam that I not taste wine) this shavua," he is forbidden the entire shavua and the shevi'ith that passed. [If it were the middle of shemitah (a seven-year period), and he said: "This shavua," he is forbidden until the end of the shemitah, and the seventh year is included in the shemitah year that has passed.] And if he says: "one day," "one week," "one month," "one year," "one shavua," he is forbidden from day to day. [If it were the middle of the day, and he said: "one day," he is forbidden until the same time the next day. Similarly, if it were the eighth day of the month, and he said: "This month," he is forbidden until the eighth day of the next month. And so with a year, and so with shemitah. Likewise, if he said: "Konam, that I not taste wine a day," unqualified, or "a week," or "a month," or "a year" — even though he did not say "one month," "one week," "one month," he is forbidden "from hour to hour." And if one says: "Konam, that I not taste wine today," even though it is permitted when it gets dark, he must ask (absolution) of a sage — a decree lest he come to permit it when he says "a day," unqualified, confusing "a day" with "today," or "this week" with "a week," unqualified. And so with all.]
  	(If he says): "until Pesach," he is forbidden until it arrives. [For in common parlance, "until" means not including.] (If he says:) "Until it be (Pesach)," he is forbidden until it has passed [for "until it be" connotes "so long as it is."] (If he says:) "until before Pesach," R. Meir says: He is forbidden until it arrives. [For a man does not place himself in an ambiguous situation, and his intent was what is clearly called "before Pesach," i.e., until it arrives.] R. Yossi says: He is forbidden until it has passed. [R. Yossi holds that a man does place himself in a situation where all possible constructions towards prohibition (e.g., "before any of the days of Pesach") are to be posited. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yossi.
  	(If he says:) "until the [wheat and barley] harvest," "until the [grape] harvest," "until the [olive] harvest," he is not forbidden until it arrives. [Since the wheat harvest and the grape harvest do not have a fixed time, as explained below, it makes no difference whether he says: "until it be" or "until it arrives." In both instances he is forbidden (only) until it arrives. For with anything that does not have a fixed time, the vower does not wish to forbid himself for an indeterminate time period, so that we say he definitely intends "until it arrives."] This is the rule: With something that has a fixed time, if he says: "until it arrives," he is forbidden until it arrives. If he says: "until it be," he is forbidden until it passes. With something that does not have a fixed time period, whether he says: "until it be" or: "until it arrives," he is forbidden only until it arrives.
  	(If he says:) "until the summer," or: "until it be summer" — until the people begin to put (figs) in the baskets. [Whether he said: "until the summer" or: "until it be summer," he is forbidden only until the people begin to put in the baskets. That is, until they cut many figs and put them in the baskets.] (If one says:) "until the summer passes," (he is forbidden) until they fold up the miktzo'oth [the mats on which the figs are dried. After they have dried, those mats are folded up and stored away for the next year.] (If he said:) "until the harvest," (he is forbidden) until the people begin to harvest wheat, but not barley. All according to the place of his vow. [If most of the produce of that place is wheat, then, until the wheat harvest; and, if barley, then, until the barley harvest.] If he were in the mountain, in the mountain; in the valley, in the valley. [If he were in the mountain at the time of the vow, until the time of the wheat or grape harvest in the mountain; if in the valley, until the time of the wheat or grape harvest in the valley.]
  	(If he says:) "until the rains" or "until the rains be" — until the second rainfall. [With either of these two formulations, he is permitted as soon as the second rainfall begins, which, in a "delayed year," is on Rosh Chodesh Kislev. Therefore, if one vowed: "until the rains," he is forbidden until Rosh Chodesh Kislev, unless the rains fell in the beginning of their time, which, in a "blessed year," is on the seventeenth of Marcheshvan, and, in a "middle year," on the twenty-third thereof. This is the halachah, and not as R. Shimon b. Gamliel says.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel says: Until the time of the rainfall arrives (even if it did not rain). (If he says:) "until the rains stop," (he is forbidden until all of Nissan has passed. These are the words of R. Meir. R. Yehudah says: until Pesach passes. (The halachah is in accordance with R. Yehudah.] (If he says:) "Konam, that I not taste wine this year" — If it is a leap year, he is forbidden in it (the year itself) and in its added portion. (If he says:) "until the beginning of Adar," (he is forbidden) until the beginning of the first Adar. (If he says:) "until the end of Adar," (he is forbidden) until the end of the first Adar. R. Yehudah says; (If he says:) "Konam, that I not drink wine until it be Pesach," he is forbidden only until the night of Pesach, his intent having been: until the time when men drink wine.
  	(If he says:) "Konam, that I shall not taste meat until it be the fast," he is forbidden only until (before) the night of the fast [of Yom Kippur, it being a mitzvah to repast on the eve of Yom Kippur.], his intent having been: until the time when men eat meat. R. Yossi, his son, says: (If he says:) "Konam, that I not eat garlic until it be Sabbath," he is forbidden only until Sabbath night, his intent having been: until the time when men eat garlic. [For Ezra instituted that they eat garlic on Sabbath nights, garlic increasing semen. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah or R. Yossi, his son, but as stated above in our Mishnah (8:3): "With something that has a fixed time, if he says: "until it arrives," he is forbidden until it arrives. If he says: "until it be," he is forbidden until it passes.]
  	If one said to his friend: "Konam, that I benefit from you unless you come and take for your son one kor of wheat, and two kegs of wine," the other can annul his vow without resorting to a sage, by saying to him: "Did you not say this only to honor me? This is my honor" [that I feed my son from my own.] Likewise, if one said to his friend: "Konam, your benefitting from me unless you come and give my son one kor of wheat and two kegs of wine" — R. Meir says: He is forbidden (to benefit from him) until he gives it. And the sages say: Here, too, he (the vower) can annul his vow without resorting to a sage, by saying to him: "I consider myself as having received it." If they implored him to marry his sister's daughter [because she is his "coeval," and (Yevamoth 62b): If one marries his sister's daughter, of him Scripture states (Isaiah 58:7): "And do not ignore your flesh … (9): Then, when you call, the L rd will answer."], and he said: "Konam, her ever benefitting from me"; and, similarly, if one divorced his wife, and he said: "Konam, my wife's ever benefitting from me," they are permitted to benefit from him, for he intended only (to bevow them from) marriage. If his friend implored him to dine with him, and he (the implored) said: "Konam, that I shall not enter your house," "that I shall not taste a drop of cold (water) of yours," he is permitted to enter his house and to drink his cold water, for he intended only (to bevow himself from) eating and drinking. [However, he is permitted even to eat and drink, since he did not utter "eating" and "drinking" explicitly. For vows demand explicit utterance, viz. (Numbers 30:3): "According to all that issues from his mouth shall he do." And this is not similar to the first part (of our Mishnah), for marriage is included in "benefits."]
  
  
  
  	R. Eliezer says: Honor of father and mother can be used as an opening (to absolve one of a vow) [i.e., saying to him: "Had you known that people would say to your parents: "Look at the growth that you have nurtured, how lightly your son treats vows (so that their honor is slighted), would you have vowed?"] And the sages forbid it, [fearing that he might lie, being ashamed to admit that he would not have vowed in consideration of their honor, so that the sage might absolve him of the vow in the absence of regret. For we are speaking of an instance where he does not regret having vowed in the first place.] R. Tzaddok said: Just as they open for him with the honor of his father and mother, let them open for him with honor of the L rd! If so, there can be no vows! [R. Eliezer is here being questioned, viz.: Just as we open with the honor of his father and mother and do not fear that he will lie, let them likewise open with the honor of the L rd, saying to him: "Had you known that you would be called evil before the L rd, would you have vowed?" And the sages who differ with R. Eliezer said to him: You do not hereby lend us support. For even R. Eliezer would agree that in such an instance he would certainly lie. For no man would be so arrogant as to say that he would not desist (from vowing) for the honor of the L rd. This is not similar to R. Shimon b. Gamliel's providing an opening for a certain man from (Proverbs 12:18): "One who blurts out (vows), as the piercings of a sword, etc." For there he speaks to him (i.e., provides an opening for him) from the verses, as we learned in our Mishnah (9:4), that he transgresses "You shall not hate," "You shall not take revenge," and "You shall not bear a grudge." But if he is confronted with "the honor of the L rd," he certainly will lie. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] And the sages concede to R. Eliezer that in a matter between himself and his father and mother [as when he bevowed his father from his possessions] honor of parents can be used as an opening for him.
  	And R. Eliezer stated further [i.e., another lenient ruling in respect to vows]: Nolad ["what is born"] can be used as an opening [for vows, i.e., something which is not common, but which might arise and come to pass after the vow has been made. And if the vower had known at the time of the vow that it would come to pass, he would not have vowed.] And the sages forbid it. [For the reason that regret can be used as an opening is that it "uproots" the vow from its very inception; but this does not obtain with something which is not common. For not expecting it to occur, he would not have desisted from vowing because of the (mere) possibility of its occurrence.] How so? If he said: "Konam, that I shall derive no benefit from that man," and he became a scribe [a Torah scholar, needed by all], or he married off his son early, and he said; "Had I known that he would become a scribe or that he would marry off his son so soon, I would not have vowed" [This, in an instance where he vowed (not to benefit) for a certain time period, and he did not expect the son to be married and to have to attend the wedding within that time period.] (or if he said:) "Konam, that I shall not enter this house," and it was made into a synagogue, (and he said:) "Had I known that it would be made into a synagogue, I would not have vowed," R. Eliezer permits it (the absolution), and the sages forbid it. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]
  	R. Meir says: There are things which are like nolad and which are not like nolad. [They seem to be like nolad, but really are not, and they can be used for openings.] And the sages do not concur with him. How so? If one said: "Konam, that I shall not marry that woman, for her father is bad," and they said to him: "He died," or "He repented." [And even though death is nolad, since he indicated at the time of his vow why he was vowing, it is as if he made his vow conditional, as if he had said: "so long as her father is alive." For this reason it is not nolad. But it is (also) not a bona fide condition, for which reason he requires absolution. In the Yerushalmi it is indicated that he does not require absolution., and Rambam rules accordingly.] If one said: Konam, that I shall not enter this house, for there is a vicious dog in it, or there is a snake in it, and they said to him: The dog died or the snake was killed — these are like nolad and not like nolad. And the sages do not concur with him.
  	And R. Meir said further: An opening is provided for one from what is written in the Torah. He is told: Had you known that you would be transgressing (Leviticus 19:18): "You shall not take revenge and you shall not bear a grudge," and (Ibid. 17): "You shall not hate your brother in your heart," and (Ibid. 18): "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself," and (Ibid. 25:36): "And your brother shall live with you" (for he might become poor and your vow would prevent you from assisting him) — (Had you known all this, would you have vowed?) — If he says: Had I known that this was so I would not have vowed, his vow is annulled [after the sages absolve him of it. And if one is bevowed benefit from his neighbor, when he is absolved of his vow, it must be absolved in his neighbor's presence, it being written (Exodus 4:19): "And the L rd said to Moses in Midyan: 'Go return, etc.'" The Holy One Blessed be He said to Moses: It is in Midyan that you made your vow. Go to Midyan and have your vow annulled. For Moses had sworn to his father-in-law that he would not leave Midyan without his permission, viz. (Ibid. 2:21): "And Moses vowed to stay with the man" — for which reason the Holy One Blessed be He required him to go to annul his vow before him.]
  	An opening is provided for a man with his wife's kethubah [i.e., with the payment of the kethubah, if he vowed to divorce her.] And it happened with one who bevowed enjoyment from his wife, and her kethubah was four hundred dinars, that he came before R. Akiva, who ruled that he must give her her kethubah, whereupon he said: "My master, my father left eight hundred dinars. My brother took four hundred, and I, four hundred. Is it not enough that she take two hundred, and I, two hundred!" R. Akiva replied: "Even if you had to sell the hair of your head, you would have to give her (the amount of) her kethubah." The man: "Had I known this, I would not have vowed in the first place!" and R. Akiva absolved him of his vow.
  	An opening may be provided with festivals and with Sabbaths. [If one vowed to fast or not to eat meat for a certain period of time, he is asked: "Had you considered the Sabbaths and festivals falling in this time period, would you have vowed?" (And this is not "opening with the honor of the L rd")]. In the beginning they said: Those days [for which an opening of regret was found are permitted, the sage having absolved him in that regard], and all the other days [for which there was no regret [remain] forbidden — until R. Akiva came and said that a vow which is partially annulled is completely annulled [even though he did not find an opening for the entire vow. For he vowed ab initio only with the understanding that the entire vow be fulfilled, so that partial regret is an opening for the whole.]
  	How so? If he said: "Konam, that I shall not benefit from all of you," if he were absolved from one of them, he is absolved from all." (If he said:) "I shall not benefit from this one and from this one" [i.e., if he forbade the first one to himself with "Konam," and he said about the second: "Let him be like the first," and about the third: "Let him be like the second," and so with all], if he is absolved of the first, he is absolved of all, [all being dependent upon the first.]; if he is absolved of the last, the last is permitted and all of the others are forbidden. If he were absolved of the middle one, those from it downwards (i.e., after it) are permitted; those from it upwards (i.e., before it) are forbidden. (If he said:) "I shall not benefit from this one, korban, and from this one, korban," an opening is required for each one. [This Mishnah is in accordance with R. Shimon, who says in respect to the oath (in denial) of (having received) a pledge, if five claimed (pledges) from him, and he denied and swore, and then confessed, he is not liable to bring an offering for each one unless he swore to each one; and here, too, he must say: "from this one, korban, and from this one, korban." But the sages say (in respect to a pledge): If he said: "Shevuah (an oath) that I owe neither you, nor you, nor you," he is liable for each one. And here, too, (in respect to vows), if he said: "not from this one, or from this one, or from this one," even if he did not state "Korban" in respect to each, each is considered a vow in itself, and this is the halachah.]
  	(If one said:) "Konam, that I shall not taste wine, for wine is bad for the stomach," and they said to him: "Isn't old wine good for the stomach?" then he is permitted (to drink) old wine. And not only is old wine alone permitted him, but all wine. [This is so only when he says: "Had I known this, I would not have vowed at all," or: "I would have permitted old wine and forbidden new wine." But if he said: "Had I known, I would have said: "All wine is forbidden to me except old wine," then only old wine is permitted to him, and all other wine, forbidden.] (If one said:) "Konam, that I shall not taste onion, for onion is bad for the heart," and they said to him: "Isn't wild onion good for the heart?" then he is permitted to eat wild onion. And not only is wild onion alone permitted him, but all onions. There was such an episode, and R. Meir permitted all onions.
  	An opening is provided for a man with his own honor and with the honor of his children [if he vowed to divorce his wife.] They say to him: "If you knew that tomorrow they would say about you: 'This is the kind of man he is — he divorces his wives,' and about your daughters: 'They are divorce-daughters!' 'What did their mother "see" to be divorced' [if there were not something indecent about her! thus casting a blemish upon his children. And we do not fear that he might be lying, that perhaps he really does not regret it, but is ashamed to say that he is not concerned for the honor of his children.] If he says: "Had I known this, I would not have vowed, he is absolved of his vow.
  	(If one said:) "Konam, that I shall not marry that ugly woman," and she were found to be beautiful — "swarthy," and she were found to be fair — "short," and she were found to be tall — he is permitted to (marry) her. Not that she was ugly and became beautiful; swarthy, and became fair; short, and became tall — but because the vow was a mistake [from the very beginning, the woman being fair at the time of the vow, and no absolution by a sage being required.] And it once happened that a man bevowed himself benefit from his sister's daughter. After she had been brought into R. Yehudah's house and beautified, R. Yishmael asked him: "My son, was it one such as she from whom you bevowed yourself?" He answered: "No," and R. Yishmael permitted her. At that time, R. Yishmael cried and said; "The daughters of Israel are beautiful, but poverty has disfigured them!" And when R. Yishmael died, the daughters of Israel raised a lament, saying: "Cry, daughters of Israel, over R. Yishmael" — as they did when Saul died, viz. (II Samuel 1:24): "O daughters of Israel, cry over Saul!" [The gemara explains that something is lacking, and that this is what is meant: "R. Yishmael says: Even if she were ugly and became beautiful; swarthy, and became fair. And it once happened that a man bevowed himself, etc." For the first tanna permits it only if the vow were mistaken from the very beginning, as when she was beautiful to begin with. And R. Yishmael holds that even if she became beautiful only after the vow, it is permitted. For since she can be beautified, she was not ugly to begin with. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yishmael.
  
  
  
  	A betrothed maiden — her father and her husband annul her vows. [A girl of twelve years and one day who has brought two (pubertal) hairs is called a maiden (na'arah) until six (additional) months. And a girl of eleven years and one day — her vows are examined. If she knows for whom she vowed and for whom she dedicated, her vow is a vow. And she, too — her father and her husband annul her vows.] If the father annulled it, but not the husband; or the husband, but not the father, it is not annulled. [Because we might think that "her father and her husband annul her vows" is to be understood as either her father or her husband, we are, therefore, taught: "If the father annulled it, but not the husband, etc.", to apprise us that both must annul it.] And it goes without saying that if one of them confirmed it, [the second cannot annul it. We are hereby apprised that even if the one who had confirmed it asked (and gained) absolution for it, (as it is ruled; "Absolution can be asked for a confirmation"), the one who asked for absolution can no longer annul it since both of them could not annul it together.]
  	If the father died, permission is not "emptied out" to the husband, [for the husband cannot annul his wife's vows until she is married to him.] If the husband died, permission is emptied out to the father [and he annuls her vows all the days of her maidenhood, it being written (Numbers 30:17): "…in her maidenhood, the house of her father." In this, the power of the father is superior to the power of the husband. In a different respect, the power of the husband is superior to the power of the father. For the husband annuls when she is a bogereth, but the father does not annul when she is a bogereth, [it being written (Ibid. 4): "…in the house of her father, in her maidenhood."]
  	If she vowed while she were betrothed, and were divorced on the same day [that her father heard (for if the day passed, he can no longer annul it)], and she were betrothed to another [on the same day], even a hundred times, her father and her last husband annul her vows [that she vowed in the presence of her first betrothed; for the betrothed can annul prior vows.] This is the rule: Anyone who did not enter "her own domain" [either by becoming a bogereth or by getting married], her husband and her last husband annul her vows.
  	The way of Torah scholars — before his daughter leaves him he says to her; "All the vows that you vowed in my house are annulled" [before she enters her husband's domain; and similarly, her betrothed tells her this before she enters his domain. For when she enters his domain, he cannot annul them, a husband not annulling prior vows. And we are apprised by our Mishnah that a husband can annul his wife's vows even without hearing them, it being taught: "And so the husband, before she enters his domain, says, etc."], and so the husband before she enters his domain, says: "All the vows that you vowed before entering my domain are annulled." For when she enters his domain, he cannot annul them.
  	A bogereth who tarried twelve months [A bogereth, whose father does not annul her vows, who was solicited for marriage, and who tarried twelve months, after which period her (prospective) husband is obliged to feed her], and a widow [who tarried] thirty days [after having been solicited for marriage, after which period her (prospective) husband feeds her] — R. Eliezer says: Since her husband is obliged to feed her, he annuls [her vows. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Eliezer.] And the sages say: The husband does not annul until she enters his domain.
  	A shomereth yavam (a woman awaiting yibum), either to one yavam or to two yavmin, R. Eliezer says: He (the yavam) can annul. [The instance is one in which the yavam makes a ma'amar in her, R. Eliezer holding that a ma'amar effects bona fide Torah acquisition. And if she is a na'arah and she has a father, her father and the yavam who had made a ma'amar in her annul her vows.] R. Yehoshua says: To one, but not to two. [For R. Yehoshua does not hold a ma'amar to effect bona fide acquisition. However, he does hold that zikkah ("linkage") obtains, and that zikkah is like marriage. And when there is only one yavam, he annuls; but if there are two, neither of them annuls, for there is no breirah (retroactive discrimination).] R. Akiva says: Neither to one nor to two. [He holds that zikkah is not like marriage and that ma'amar does not effect bona fide Torah acquisition.] R. Eliezer: Now if a woman whom he acquired for himself [i.e., his betrothed] — if he annuls her vows — a woman bequeathed to him by Heaven [i.e., his yevamah], how much more so should he annul her vows [jointly, with her father]! R Akiva to R. Eliezer: It may be so with a woman whom he acquired for himself, for others have no rights in her! [For she, too, is linked to the other yavmin.] R. Yehoshua to R. Akiva: Akiva, your words (stand to reason) for two yavmin, but what will you say for one yavam! [That is, your answer suffices for the words of R. Eliezer, who says that he annuls even where there are two yavmin. But how will you answer my: "to one, but not to two"?] R. Akiva to R. Yehoshua: The yevamah is not absolutely acquired by the yavam [to make one who lives with her liable to the death penalty], as the betrothed is absolutely acquired by her husband [touching this penalty. The halachah is in accordance with R. Akiva.]
  	If one said to his wife: "All the vows that you will vow from now until I return from that place stand," he has said nothing, [this being "standing" in error, for there are vows which he would not wish to stand.] If he said: "They are annulled," R. Eliezer says: They are annulled. [For as a rule, a man does not desire his wife's vows.] And the sages say: They are not annulled. R. Eliezer said: If he can annul vows which have taken effect [(After she vowed, she is forbidden in them (the objects of her vows) if her husband does not annul them)], should he not be able to annul vows which have not taken effect! They answered: It is written (Numbers 30:14): "Her husband shall cause it to stand and her husband shall annul it": What has reached the stage of "standing" [i.e., vows which have already taken effect] is subject to annulment; what has not reached the stage of "standing" is not subject to annulment.
  	The annulment of vows [viz. (Numbers 30:9): "And if on the day that her husband hear, he constrain her"] obtains the entire day [until it gets dark, it being written: "on the day that he hear." As to its being written (Ibid. 15): "from day to day," this is to apprise us that we are not to say: in the daytime, yes; at night, no. "from day to day" indicates that sometimes he has time to annul "from time to time" (i.e., a twenty-four hour period), as when she vowed in the beginning of the night.] There is in this a leniency and a stringency. [That is, sometimes there is only little time for annulment, and sometimes, ample time.] How so? If she vowed on Sabbath night, he can annul on Sabbath night and on the day of the Sabbath until it gets dark. If she vowed before it got dark, he can annul (only) until it gets dark. For if it got dark and he had not annulled it, he can no longer do so. ["Sabbath night" apprises us that vows may be annulled (mefirin) on the Sabbath, even not for the sake of the Sabbath. But a sage may absolve one of vows (matir) on the Sabbath only for the sake of the Sabbath. And even though he had time in the daytime, he may absolve him for the sake of the Sabbath. ("For if it got dark and he had not annulled it, etc.":) For annulment of vows obtains "from time to time" only if she had vowed in the beginning of the night. And vis-à-vis annulment (hafarah) it avails only if he says: "Mufar lach" ("It is annulled for you") as per the language of the verse. For the husband's annulment is from this time forward, as in (Genesis 17:14): "He has annulled (hefer) My covenant." And when a sage says: "Mutar lach ("It is absolved for you"); there is here neither vow nor oath," he uproots the vow from its very beginning. And if the sage used the term "hafarah," or the husband, the term "hatarah," there is neither absolution nor annulment. And if he (the husband) said: "If you did not vow, I bevow you," his words stand, and he need not say: "It stands for you." Since, even if he remained silent that entire day the vow would stand, then, with minimal speaking (on his part) it also stands. And on the Sabbath he says: "Take and eat," "Take and drink," and he does not annul as he does on a weekday, and the vow is voided of itself. And if he cannot compel her, he voids it in his heart and he need not utter it with his lips. And it is only with bitul (voiding) such as: "Take and eat," where he forces her to transgress her vow, that thinking in his heart avails, even if he did not utter it with his lips. But with hafarah (annulment), where he does not compel her to transgress her vow, he must utter it with his lips, annulment in the heart not availing.]
  
  
  
  	And these are the vows that he annuls [The gemara explains that vows and oaths are intended; for in the language of the sages oaths are included in vows.]: things which entail affliction, viz.: "If I bathe" and if "I shall no bathe,"; "If I adorn myself," and if "I shall not adorn myself." [i.e., "The pleasure of bathing is forbidden to me forever if I bathe today" — this is a vow. "Shevuah, that I shall not bathe" — this is an oath. And, similarly, "if I adorn myself," viz.: "The pleasure of adornment is forbidden to me forever if I adorn myself today." "and if "I shall not adorn myself,'" viz.: Shevuah, that I shall not adorn myself."] R. Yossi said: These are not vows of affliction. [R. Yossi differs with the first tanna only in respect to vows alone, saying that "The pleasure of bathing is forbidden to me forever if I bathe today" is not a vow of affliction; for it is possible for her not to bathe today and the pleasure of bathing not be forbidden to her forever. And a one-day abstinence from bathing is not considered affliction, for a one-day foulness is not considered foulness. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yossi. And both the father and the husband annul vows of affliction, it being written (Numbers 30:17): "between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter." The father is hereby being likened to the husband. Just as the husband annuls only vows of affliction, the father, too, annuls only vows of affliction. And Rambam rules that the father can annul all vows and oaths, even those which are not of affliction, viz. (Ibid. 30:6): "all of her vows and her bonds."]
  	And these are vows of affliction: If she said: "Konam, (that I shall not eat) the fruits of the world," he can annul it. (If she said: "Konam, that I shall not eat) the fruits of that country," he can bring her fruits from a different country. "the fruits of that shopkeeper," he cannot annul it. And if his (the husband's) livelihood came only from him (that shopkeeper) [the shopkeeper giving the husband credit until he earned and repaid him], he may annul it. These are the words of R. Yossi. [R. Yossi is consistent with his view that the husband does not annul every vow of affliction, differentiating between great affliction and moderate affliction, and between long-term and short-term affliction. And all of the mishnayoth of this chapter are according to him and are not the halachah. But the husband may annul any vow of affliction, whether a one-day vow, a one-hour vow, or a long-term vow; whether it entails great affliction or moderate affliction. Likewise, he can annul vows and oaths in things "between him and her" even though it entails no affliction, as when she swore or vowed not to paint her eyes or not to adorn herself. Likewise, if she vowed not to eat the fruits of this country, the husband can annul it, bringing them from a different country entailing exertion. These are things which are "between him and her." And what is the difference between vows and oaths which are between him and her and vows and oaths of affliction? Vows and oaths of affliction he annuls both for himself and for others, e.g., if she vowed not to eat meat or to drink wine he annuls it and she is permitted to eat and drink, even after she is widowed or divorced and married to another. And vows and oaths "between him and her," e.g., if she forbade to herself cohabitation with all men forever or painting or adorning herself forever, he annuls what pertains to him, and she cohabits with him and paints and adorns herself so long as she is his wife. And when she is widowed or divorced, she is forbidden cohabitation with any man, as well as painting and adornment; and, likewise, in similar instances.]
  	(If she said;) "konam, that I shall not benefit from people" he cannot annul it, [this not being a vow of affliction, for she can be fed by her husband, her husband not being included in "people." And this Mishnah, too, is according to R. Yossi and is not the halachah, as explained above. And not only if she says: "Konam, that I shall not benefit from people, where she forbids herself benefit from all people, can he annul it by reason of "vows of affliction" according to the sages; but even if she says: "Konam, that I shall not benefit from that man," where she forbids herself benefit only from that man alone, the husband may annul her vow by reason of "things between himself and her," it involving exertion for him if she does not benefit from that man, and the Torah having stated (Numbers 30:17): "between a man and his wife" — Everything "between a man and his wife" the husband can annul.] And she can benefit from leket, shikchah, and peah. [This is the intent: Another reason that if she says: "Konam that I shall not benefit from people," the husband cannot annul it is that she can benefit from leket, shikchah, and peah, in which instance she does not benefit from people, these being gifts for the poor, and there is no affliction here.] (If one says: "Konam,) Cohanim and Levites benefitting from me," they may take against his will. [For just as if she said: "Konam, that I shall not benefit from people," she is permitted to take the poor-gifts, here, too. If one bevows Cohanim and Levites from his possessions, they are permitted to take the gifts of the Cohanim and the Levites.] (If he said: "Konam) these Cohanim and these Levites benefitting from me," others may take it.
  	(If she said:) "Konam that I not work for the mouth of my father," or "for the mouth of your father," or "for the mouth of my brother," or "for the mouth of your brother," he cannot annul it. [i.e., If she said: "Hekdesh ("dedicated") shall be all of my work from coming to the mouth of my father"; that is, that my father not be able to benefit from my handiwork, he cannot annul it; for these are not "things between him and her." And in this all agree, that if she forbids others from benefitting from her, her husband cannot annul it.] (If she said: "Konam,) that I not work for your mouth," he need not annul it. [For she is obligated to him. And even though hekdesh dissolves obligations, the sages strengthened her obligation to her husband, the vower not being enabled to dissolve that obligation.] R. Akiva says: He should annul it, for she might earn in addition to what reverts to him [and "hekdesh" takes effect upon that addition, it not reverting to him. He must, therefore, annul it; and the annulment is of avail, the vow entailing "things between him and her," it being impossible that the addition not become intermixed with what reverts to her husband.] R. Yochanan b. Nuri says: He should annul it, lest he divorce her and she be forbidden to return to him. [And her basic handiwork requires annulment, lest he divorce her and her obligation to her husband be dissolved, at which point the vow will take effect, and she will be forbidden to return to him. The halachah is in accordance with R. Yochanan b. Nuri. (And we are speaking of an instance where she says: "Let my hands be hekdesh to their Maker," the hands being "in the world" (so that she is not vowing in respect to "something which is not in the world"), and hekdesh "takes" upon them.]
  	If his wife vowed and he thought it were his daughter; if his daughter vowed and he thought it were his wife; if she vowed Naziritism and he thought she vowed an offering; if she vowed an offering and he thought she vowed Naziritism; if she bevowed herself from figs and he thought she bevowed herself from grapes; if she bevowed herself from grapes and he thought she bevowed herself from figs — he must annul it again. [For annulment in error is not annulment. He must (in his annulment) intend the woman who vowed, it being written (Numbers 30:12): "He did not constrain her" — the annulment must be directed to the vower herself. And he must also intend the specific vow which was uttered, it being written (Ibid. 5): "…and her father hear her vow" — he must know which vow she vowed.]
  	If she said: "Konam, that I shall not taste these figs and grapes," if he caused it (the vow) to stand for figs, all of it stands. If he annulled it for figs, it is not annulled until he also annuls it for grapes. [The reason: (Numbers 30:14): "Her husband yekimmenu" ("Her husband shall cause it to stand.") "Yakim mimenu" ("He shall cause part of it to stand.") When he causes part of it to stand, he causes all of it to stand. But "yeferenu" ("He shall annul it") cannot be expounded thus, so that there is no annulment until he annuls all of it. This is an individual opinion and is not the halachah, the halachah being in accordance with the sages, who say: Causing to stand is likened to annulment, viz.: Just as with annulment, what he annulled is annulled, and what he did not annul is not annulled (it not being possible to expound "yeferenu" as partial annulment), so with causing to stand. What he caused to stand, stands; and what he did not cause to stand, does not stand. (For "yekimmenu" is also not expounded as partial confirmation, it being the way of Scripture to write it thus.) And even though re the absolution (hatarah) of a sage, we say: "If one is absolved of part of a vow he is absolved of all of it," with the annulment of the husband and the father, it is not so.] If she said: "Konam, that I shall not taste figs and that I shall not taste grapes," these are two vows.
  	(If he said:) "I knew that there were vows, but I did not know that there were annulments" [i.e., that he had the authority to annul them], he may annul them [on the day he learns that he has the authority to do so, that day being like "the day he hears it."] But (if he said:) "I did not know that it was a vow," [and that it needed annulment], R. Meir says: He may not annul it. [For since he knew that he could annul it, even though he did not know it was a vow, he should have annulled it in any event. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Meir.] The sages say: He may annul it.
  	If one's son-in-law had bevowed benefit from him, and he (the father-in-law) wished to give money to his daughter, he says to her: "Take this money as a gift, on condition that your husband has no right to it, but only in what you buy and put in your mouth." [And his condition stands, and the husband does not acquire it. And even though, by means of this gift, he "rescues" him from exertion; for his wife is fed by this money, and feeding her was his obligation — "saving from exertion" is not considered "benefitting."]
  	(Numbers 30:10): "And the vow of a widow or of a divorced woman … shall stand with her." How so? If she said: "I shall be a Nazirite after thirty days," even though she were married within thirty days, he cannot annul it. [The verse is not needed for itself (i.e., for the common instance), for if she has no husband, who shall annul it? It must refer, then, to an instance where she had been widowed for some time and the time of the vow (i.e., of its taking effect) did not arrive until after she we married. ("He cannot annul it":) even though the vow takes effect when she is married to him; for the time of vowing is the criterion (for annulment).] If she vowed while she were in her husband's domain, he annuls it for her (even if it is to take effect afterwards.) How so? If she said: "I shall be a Nazirite after thirty days," even if she were widowed or divorced within thirty days, it is annulled. If she vowed on one day, and were divorced on that day, and taken back on that day, [after which he heard of her vow], he cannot annul it [since she entered her own domain between the vow and the annulment, the husband not being empowered to annul prior vows.] This is the rule: If a woman enters her own domain for (even) one moment, he (her husband) cannot annul it (a prior vow).
  	There are nine na'aroth [not necessarily "na'aroth," (but maidens, in general)] whose vows stand: A bogereth who is an orphan [She married, and her husband died when she was a na'arah, making her "an orphan in her father's lifetime." For after she is married, her father no longer has any authority over her. And she became a bogereth after that, and vowed. Her vow stands because she is a bogereth, and also because she is "an orphan in her father's lifetime."]; a na'arah who became a bogereth, who is an orphan. [She married and her husband died. She vowed when she was a na'arah and became a bogereth afterward. And she is "an orphan in her father's lifetime," as I explained.]; a na'arah [at the time she vowed], who has not yet become a bogereth, who is an orphan ["in her father's lifetime." These three are (the category of): "an orphan in her father's lifetime."]; a bogereth whose father died. [When she vowed she was a bogereth, and her father died. She is an "orphan," literally.]; a na'arah who became a bogereth, whose father died; a na'arah, who did not become a bogereth, whose father died. [These three are (the category of) "her father died."]; a na'arah whose father died, and after her father died, she became a bogereth; a bogereth whose father is alive; a na'arah who became a bogereth, whose father is alive. [These three are (the category of) bogereth. The gemara explains that the sages taught of only three na'araoth: bogereth, an orphan, "an orphan in her father's lifetime."] R. Yehudah says: Also, if one married off his daughter as a minor, and she were widowed or divorced, and she returned to him while still a na'arah. [For upon entering the chuppah, she left the father's domain with this marriage.]
  	(If she said:) "Konam, that I shall not benefit from my father or from your father if I make something for you" (or:) "that I shall not benefit from you if I make something for my father or for your father," he can annul it. [For it is disparaging to her husband that she is forbidden benefit from her father or his father because she makes something for him, so that her vow involves "things between him and her."]
  	In the beginning they said: Three women go out and take their kethubah: One who says: "I am unclean to you" [The instance is that of the wife of a Cohein, who became forbidden to her husband by having been forced. She does not lose her kethubah. The sages believed her to forbid herself to her husband. And since she goes out with a get, she takes her kethubah, this being derived from what is written in the kethubah itself, viz.: "If you marry another, you shall take what is written to you."], "Heaven between me and you!" [The gemara explains: He does not "shoot like an arrow" (and cannot beget children); that is, things which are known to Heaven, and which she cannot state explicitly. The instance is one in which she comes with a (valid) claim, viz.: "I want a staff to lean on and a hoe to dig my grave" (i.e., a son to support me in my old age and to provide for my burial); for otherwise, she is told: "Go, you are not commanded to produce and multiply."], "I am taken from the Jews." [She forbids to herself cohabitation with all of Israel. And even though we say (Kethuvoth 71a) that if she vowed (not to cohabit) she goes out without a kethubah, for "she placed her finger between her teeth," Rashi explains (Yevamoth 112a) that since she forbids to herself cohabitation with all of Israel, she must certainly be doing so perforce, intercourse being painful for her. And the first Mishnah held that this does not even constitute "things between him and her," for he can divorce her.] But then they retracted, saying (in explanation): So that a woman not "set her eyes" on another and wrong her husband. ["The generations deteriorated," and they feared lest she lie to release herself from her husband.] But if she says: "I am unclean," she must bring proof for her words [and she is not believed without proof.] (If she says:) "Heaven between me and you," they "work by request." [They request of her not to speak thus. The Yerushalmi explains: They make a feast of reconciliation.] (If she says:) "I am taken from the Jews," he annuls what pertains to him, [her vow involving "things between him and her," which he can annul for himself], so that she cohabits with him, and she is "taken from the (other) Jews."