meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt/Halakhah/Peninei Halakhah/Peninei Halakhah, Simchat Habayit V'Birchato/English/merged.txt"}
text: Peninei Halakhah, Simchat Habayit V'Birchato
  פניני הלכה, שמחת הבית וברכתו
  merged
  
  This file contains merged sections from the following text versions:
  -Peninei Halakhah, English ed. Yeshivat Har Bracha
  -
  
  Peninei Halakhah, Simchat Habayit V'Birchato
  
  Introduction
  
  1. When the present volume, <i>Simḥat Ha-bayit U-virkhato</i>, was first published in Hebrew five years ago, it posed a dilemma that we had not faced before. On one hand, it is very much a part of the <i>Peninei Halakha</i> series in terms of its style and its general approach to Jewish law. On the other hand, it treats topics that, due to considerations of modesty, are not usually addressed in public. At the time, we decided to publish it as a stand-alone volume and not include it in Hebrew sets of <i>Peninei Halakha</i>. God willing, when there are enough English volumes of <i>Peninei Halakha</i> to release as a set, we will have to decide whether to include this volume therein. The book is titled “<i>Simḥat Ha-bayit U-virkhato</i>” (“The Joy and Blessing of the Home”) because it explains the mitzva of <i>ona</i> – marital intimacy and its attendant rights and duties – and the essence of the mitzva is <i>simḥa </i>– joy – as the Sages refer to it as “<i>simḥat ona</i>” (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 72b; <i>Avoda Zara</i> 5a). “<i>Bayit</i>”, “the home”, refers to the family, while “<i>Birkhato</i>”, “blessing”, refers to the mitzva to procreate, a mitzva that this book treats extensively. These two <i>mitzvot</i>, <i>ona </i>and procreation, are linked to one another, as one is fulfilled by means of the other.
  Originally, I thought that if I ever had the privilege to write about these issues, I would do so in my old age, with the hope that I would be less bashful about it. However, over the last few years, my wife and I have become aware of the lack of proper guidance available to engaged couples and newlyweds. The absence of proper guidance leads to needless pain and frustration precisely where there should be joy and love. Pre-wedding classes spend a great deal of time on the details of the laws of <i>nidda</i> and their precautionary distancing measures (<i>harḥakot</i>) while giving very short shrift to the mitzva of <i>ona</i>. My wife likes to illustrate the problem with the following comparison. Imagine that a young woman approaches an older woman and asks to be taught how to cook for Shabbat. The older woman agrees and teaches her how to sift flour, how to check vegetables and legumes for bugs, and how to check eggs for bloodspots. She explains that the laws of meat and milk have relevance not only to cooking but even to cutting onions. She goes over the laws concerning <i>bishul akum</i>, <i>ḥalav akum</i>, and gelatin. She concludes with advice about buying food that meets the highest kosher standards. She leaves out only one thing: how to cook tasty food that makes Shabbat enjoyable. Moreover, she mistakenly believes that keeping kosher (which, of course, is very important) automatically results in enjoying Shabbat. That the food is undercooked and bland is no problem at all for her, for she believes that our purpose in life is to suffer to sanctify God’s name. Similarly, there are pre-wedding teachers who tell brides- and grooms-to-be that keeping the laws of family purity in all their complexity results automatically in a holy home. It is true that the laws of family purity are a prerequisite for the mitzva of <i>ona</i>, but it is the intimate connection and joy associated with the mitzva of <i>ona</i> that give expression to life’s holiness.
  The problem we have described leads to a terrible disconnection between holiness and life, truth and goodness, duty and joy. This breach was meant to be mended through the general mitzva to “love your fellow as yourself” as well as the specific mitzva of <i>ona</i>. So in the winter of 5774 (2013-2014), I found the necessary courage to write about the laws of <i>ona </i>and the reasons behind them. This naturally led me to clarify the laws pertaining to procreation as well. This book was thus written first and foremost for rabbis and teachers of pre-wedding classes to brides- and grooms-to-be, though it is also for couples who want their family lives to be illuminated by the guidance, happiness, and light of the Torah.
  I freely admit that some of my teachers and friends advised me to forgo writing and publishing this material, or at least make it less explicit. Most of them were worried about the fallout for me, and a few felt that it is inappropriate to elaborate in writing about intimate topics. But there is much misunderstanding and misinformation circulating among the general public, which casts our holy Torah in a negative light, as if its goal is to minimize the joy of <i>ona.</i> Therefore, I felt it necessary to present the position of our holy Torah clearly, in accordance with the Sages and <i>poskim</i>. Doing so will protect our holy Torah from this slander, and will also protect our dear couples, men and women, from the pain and inadequacy caused by the misinformation. It is worth noting that the distortions of our Torah result from misunderstanding our Sages, <i>Zohar</i>, and kabbalists. These misunderstandings can be traced to the influence of views, espoused by classic Christianity, that consider celibacy an ideal.
  To dispel these distortions of the Torah, it seems that I have to disregard the advice of my friends and publish the material. Yet I remain concerned that what I write might be understood only partially and superficially by those who are not familiar with the world of Torah and <i>halakha</i>. My primary goal is for this book to be studied within <i>batei midrash </i>and within holy and modest Jewish homes. Through the relief and joy that will enter these homes thanks to the Torah’s guidance, the holy light of the Jewish people will burst through like the dawn. With God’s help, the book will circulate, and its ideas will spread slowly but steadily, bringing healing and joy to the whole world.
    
    
  2. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Rav Maor Cayam, who teaches in Yeshivat Har Bracha, and who was involved and supportive throughout. With his talents and diligence, he greatly expanded the scope of the sources, which helped clarify various topics and served as a basis for many of the central ideas of the book. He also worked very hard preparing the supplemental volume (<i>Harḥavot</i>), which provides further sources and explanations of the material. I would also like to thank R. Bar’el Shevach, who helped to clarify many issues.
  I am grateful to the following rabbis, who kindly agreed to review the first chapters and added their comments. Rav Yoel Katan, who was my adviser in my youth, and his wife, Dr. Hanna Katan, who is a gynecologist, are experts in the subjects of this book and contributed to it. Rav Yehoshua Shapira, head of the <i>hesder</i> yeshiva in Ramat Gan, contributed as well. He and his wife together guide couples in the paths of holiness and happiness, helping them to cope with the range of difficulties that may arise. Rav Yehuda Brandes made enlightening and edifying comments to the first chapters. He also encouraged me by reminding me what the Sages say about King Solomon: Shlomo wrote Shir Ha-shirim when he was young, Mishlei when he was middle-aged, and Kohelet when he was old (<i>Shir Ha-shirim Rabba</i> 1:10); evidently, the Sages did not feel that it was necessary to delay writing about sexual matters until one is old. I especially want to thank my brother, Rav Yisrael Melamed. In addition to his educational work, he is also a couples’ therapist and helps couples with difficulties related to fulfilling the mitzva of <i>ona</i>. His enlightening, insightful, and in-depth comments on the first four chapters were extremely helpful.
  I thank all the teachers of the yeshiva. In addition to reviewing and commenting upon these chapters, they also came with years of experience teaching students and alumni in preparation for their weddings. This experience helped clarify in depth many topics dealt with in this book. Thanks to Rav Ido Elba for his comments on the chapters dealing with the mitzva of procreation. Thanks to Rav Shmuel Ariel as well.
  Special thanks to Rav Yonadav Zar, who studied the <i>halakhot</i> in depth and copy-edited the entire book. Thanks to R. Maor Horowitz, who clarified sources and was responsible for the final editing and preparing the book for publication. Thanks to R. Netanel Rosenstein for writing the index. I am also grateful to R. Yaakov Weinberger, the yeshiva’s administrator, and his predecessors R. Yaakov Katz (Ketzaleh) and R. Dudu Sa’ada. Thanks, too, to Keren Fogel and Yohanan Lisha, who were responsible for printing and marketing the book.It is not easy to translate <i>halakha</i> with precision and clarity, and the difficulty is compounded when writing about sensitive issues. As such, Atira Ote’s initial translation went through no less than four layers of editing, by Dr. Yocheved Cohen, Rav Elli Fischer, Nechama Unterman, and Rav Maor Cayam. I am grateful to all of them for producing the work before you.
  Last but not least, I thank the residents of Har Bracha and the alumni of the yeshiva, with whom my wife and I have studied this material. Their questions and insights helped us clarify many issues addressed in the book. “I learned much from my rabbis, even more from my friends, and most of all from my students” (<i>Ta’anit</i> 7a).
  3. The relationship between God and the Jewish people is compared to that of a bride and groom (1:5-6 below). The anguish associated with the destruction of the Temple cast a shadow over the joy of marital intimacy (3:15 below). Now, though, we are experiencing the ingathering of the exiles and the rebuilding of Eretz Yisrael. Alongside this process of the ingathering of exiles and upbuilding of Eretz Yisrael, we are privileged to witness the opening of the gates of peace, happiness, and blessing before the precious couples who are building their homes with holiness.
  May it be God’s will that we merit the realization of the words of the prophet: For the sake of Zion I will not be silent, and for the sake of Jerusalem I will not be still, until her righteousness emerges resplendent, and her salvation blazes like a torch…. No longer will you be called “Azuva” (“Forsaken”) nor shall your land be called “Shemama” (“Desolate”). Rather, you shall be called “Ḥeftzi-bah” (“I-delight-in-her”) and your land “Be’ula” (“Espoused”). For the Lord delights in you, and your land shall be espoused. As a youth espouses a maiden, your sons will espouse you; as a bridegroom rejoices over his bride, so will your God rejoice over you. (Yeshayahu 62:1, 4-5)
  The mitzva of <i>ona</i> will then reach its perfect fulfillment:
  I will betroth you forever; I will betroth you with righteousness and in justice, and with goodness and mercy. And I will betroth you with faithfulness; then you shall know the Lord. On that day I will respond (<i>e’eneh</i>), declares the Lord, I will respond (<i>e’eneh</i>) to the heavens, and they shall respond (<i>ya’anu</i>) to the earth. And the earth shall respond (<i>ta’aneh</i>) with new grain and wine and oil, and they shall respond (<i>ya’anu</i>) to Jezreel. I will seed her in the land as My own; and I shall have compassion on Lo-Ruḥama (No-Compassion); and I will say to Lo-Ami (Not-My-People), “You are My people,” and he will respond, “My God.” (Hoshea 2:18-25)
  It is my sincere hope that this little book will add much joy and blessing into couples’ lives.
  Eliezer Melamed
  Sivan 5779 ​
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Importance of the Mitzva
  A complete person is one who lives in a joyful and loving marriage. A man is not complete without his wife, and a woman is not complete without her husband. The essence of their union is expressed through the mitzva of ona (marital sexual relations), through which they become completely united, in body and spirit, making their marriage whole. The mitzva must be fulfilled with passion and ecstasy, the husband trying to bring his wife as much joy and pleasure as possible, and the wife trying to bring her husband as much joy and pleasure as possible (below, 2:1-5). For this reason, the mitzva is referred to as simḥat ona, the joy of marital sexual relations. There is no greater joy in this world; it is a foretaste of the euphoria of the World to Come (below, 1:7-8).
  Through the framework of marriage, a person can achieve the ultimate fulfillment of the mitzva to “love your fellow as yourself” (Vayikra 19:18), which R. Akiva calls “a major principle of the Torah” (Sifra ad loc.). It is only between spouses that love is expressed in all aspects of life, spiritual and physical alike. Thus, when a married couple lives together lovingly, each loving the other no less than they love themselves and desiring to bring joy to the other no less than they want for themselves, they fulfill the entire Torah in a concentrated form (Arizal, Sefer Ha-likutim, Ekev).
  So powerful is the mitzva of ona that its fulfillment brings the Shekhina (Divine Presence) to dwell with the couple. As R. Akiva expounds: “If husband and wife are worthy, the Shekhina is with them; if they are not, fire consumes them” (Sota 17a).1<i class="footnote">The Hebrew word for man or husband, “<em>ish</em>,” is made up of the letters <em>alef</em> and <em>shin</em> – the word for fire, “<em>esh</em>” – plus the letter <em>yud</em>. The Hebrew word for woman or wife, “<em>isha</em>,” is made up of the letters <em>alef</em> and <em>shin</em> plus the letter <em>hei</em>. The two letters <em>yud</em> and <em>hei</em> form the name of God. Thus, if God is removed from <em>ish</em> and <em>isha</em>, only fire remains. They couple also reveals God’s holy four-letter name (<em>yud-hei-vav-hei</em>; the Tetragrammaton) thereby, for in addition to the revelation of <em>yud</em> through the man and <em>hei</em> through the woman, and the last two letters are revealed through their children – <em>vav</em> through a son and <em>hei</em> through a daughter (<em>Zohar</em><em> Ra’aya Mehemna</em> III 34b).</i> 
  Moreover, it is through this sacred mitzva that the couple can fulfill the mitzva of procreation (pru u-revu), which makes them God’s partners in the creation of a new life. As the Sages said, “There are three partners in the creation of a person: God, the father, and the mother” (Nidda 31a).
  When a marriage founders because the husband suspects the wife of infidelity, the Torah prescribes (Bamidbar 5:11-31) the “sota” procedure, which includes writing God’s name on parchment and placing it in a potion that is administered to the wife. Under normal circumstances, erasing God’s name is a grave transgression, yet God commands us to erase His sacred name in order to repair and bring peace to a marriage (Nedarim 66b). Indeed, erasing the written name of God allows His name to inhere in their marital life.
  Marriage is so paramount that the Sages say, “Any man without a wife is not considered a man” (Yevamot 63a); and “Any man without a wife lives without joy, without blessing, without goodness, without Torah, without fortification, and without peace” (ibid. 62b). A woman without a husband lacks all these as well. And since the mitzva of ona is the fundamental expression of a marriage, all of these advantages are thus directly connected to this mitzva (below, 4:8).
  Since the foundation of the relationship between husband and wife is so important, the drive associated with it is likewise exceptionally powerful. God has given people freedom of choice: when a person directs the sex drive positively, toward the proper fulfillment of the mitzva of ona, there is nothing greater; when it is channeled negatively, there is nothing worse (below, 3:1-2).
  
  Section 2
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Principles of the Mitzva of Ona
  The mitzva of ona is for the husband to couple with his wife, in an atmosphere of love and ecstasy, and to pleasure her as best he can, until her ecstasy climaxes in orgasm; he remains coupled with her until he ejaculates inside her vagina (see also below, 2:1). This is the meaning of the verse “He shall not withhold her food, her clothing, or her conjugal rights” (Shemot 21:10). Since the husband’s physical capacity is limited, the frequency of the mitzva is determined by what his physical capacity and professional responsibilities make possible. Those who are in good health and who live comfortably without having to exert themselves too much must fulfill the mitzva of ona daily. Ordinary laborers are obligated twice a week. Men whose work requires them to leave home are required to fulfill this mitzva once a week. In addition, if either spouse desires intimacy, the other spouse must be responsive (below, 2:7-8).
  This mitzva is the essence and foundation of marriage. A man who does not perform this mitzva in order to cause his wife pain is in violation of the Torah prohibition, “He shall not withhold…her conjugal rights.” If he does not perform it out of simple negligence, but does not intend to hurt his wife, he violates a rabbinic prohibition. Some say that even in such a case, he violates a Torah prohibition.2<i class="footnote">A man who does not perform the mitzva of <em>ona</em> violates a negative commandment (MT, Laws of Marriage 14:7 and 15; SA EH 76:11). If he does not intend to cause his wife pain, he does not violate a negative commandment (Rambam, <em>Sefer Ha-mitzvot</em><em>Lo Ta’aseh</em> §262; <em>Mabit</em> 3:131). However, he is in violation of a rabbinic prohibition (Rav Kook, as cited in <em>Teḥumin</em> 1, p. 9). Others maintain that even if he does not intend to cause his wife pain, he still violates a negative prohibition (<em>Responsa Maharam Alshikh</em> §50). According to R. Sa’adia Gaon (<em>Sefer Ha-mitzvot</em> §72), <em>Sefer Ha-eshkol</em> (27:20), Rashba, and <em>Ohel Mo’ed</em>, there is also a positive commandment to have marital sexual relations. R. Yeruḥam Perla explains that this is based on the preceding verse, which states that one who designates a maidservant for marriage to his son, he must provide for her “as is the practice with free maidens (<em>ke-mishpat ha-banot</em>)” (Shemot 21:9). Thus, although the verse that lists <em>she’er</em><em>kesut</em>, and <em>ona</em> is formulated in the negative (“he shall not withhold”), the prior verse describes the same duties in the positive.Others say that we can derive from an additional verse, “He will give happiness to the woman he has married” (Devarim 24:5), that a husband must bring his wife pleasure through the mitzva of ona. Although this verse refers only to his exemption from military service during their first year of marriage, we nevertheless can infer that whenever they are together, he has a mitzva to bring his wife joy and pleasure through the mitzva of ona (Smak §285; Ohel Mo’ed, Sha’ar Isur Ve-heter, derekh 11, netiv 2; and Sefer Ḥaredim 20:8). Commenting on Pesaḥim 72b, Rabbeinu Ḥananel agrees that there is a positive commandment of ona, but he derives it from yet another verse: “Return to your tents” (Devarim 5:27; see section 6 below).A corollary of this mitzva is that a husband should sleep in the same room with his wife even when she is a nidda (Eruvin 63b). We will explain below (2:2) why this mitzva is formulated as the husband’s obligation. In any case, it is a mitzva and a duty for the wife to respond to her husband with joy for the fulfillment of this mitzva.</i>
  Moreover, through the mitzva of ona, husband and wife fulfill the mitzva to “love your fellow as yourself” in its most perfect form: each of them looks out for the other’s well-being as best they can. And since the greatest pleasure that people can experience in this world is connected to the mitzva of ona, a man who deprives his wife of this joy and pleasure oppresses her, since no one but him can bring her this joy. Likewise, a woman who deprives her husband of this joy and pleasure oppresses him, for no one else can fill this void for him (2:1 below).
  Dereliction of this mitzva is the principal grounds for divorce. If a husband declares that his wife repulses him and that he has no interest in sexual relations with her and bringing her pleasure as often as duty requires, she is entitled to file for divorce and to receive the compensation specified in her ketuba (marriage contract). Even if the husband is willing to couple with her but adds, “I cannot unless we are both clothed,” he must divorce her and pay the ketuba, since he is unwilling to couple with her lovingly, with no barrier between them. Similarly, if a wife does not consent to sexual relations with her husband at the frequency specified, or is only willing if she remains clothed, he has the right to divorce her without paying her ketuba (Ketubot 48a; SA EH 76:13). Spouses who refuse to keep to the specified frequencies are called “rebellious,” for they are rebelling against the sacred duty they accepted on themselves when they married (Ketubot 63a; SA EH 77; see below ch. 2, sections 7-8, 11-12, and n. 6).
  
  Section 3
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Meaning of the Word “Ona”
  The Torah states, “He shall not withhold she’erah, kesutah, or onatah” (Shemot 21:10). Ramban (ad loc.), following one view in Ketubot (48a), interprets she’erah to refer to flesh-to-flesh contact during intimacy, kesutah to refer to the bed and bedding used by the couple during intimacy, and onatah to refer to the conjugal act itself. Rashi (ad loc.), following a different view in Ketubot (loc. cit.), interprets she’erah as “her food,” kesutah as “her clothing,” and onatah as the conjugal act. We see that all agree that the mitzva of ona is the essence of marriage, as it gives expression to the couple’s complete love for one another.
  While all agree that the husband is obligated on a Torah level to provide for his wife sexually, there is disagreement about his obligation to provide her with food and clothing. According to one view, this obligation is not stated explicitly in the Torah, but the Sages ordained so, because without these basic needs a couple cannot truly enjoy the mitzva of ona. Moreover, a key component of true love for one’s spouse is a very deep-rooted feeling of responsibility for their well-being and best interest. Thus, it is inconceivable that a husband who truly loves his wife would not make sure to feed and clothe her; if he does not do so, clearly there is no real love in their sexual relations. According to the other view, the Torah itself explicitly mandates that the husband see to his wife’s food and clothing. Even though the mitzva of ona is the most profound expression of a marriage, a wholesome relationship must, by definition, include his full responsibility for her food and clothing.3<i class="footnote">Tanna’im and Amora’im disagree concerning the meaning of the obligation in the words “<em>she’erah</em><em>kesutah</em>, and<em> onatah</em>” (Shemot 21:10). See <em>Mekhilta de-Rashbi </em>and <em>Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmael</em><em>ad loc.</em>, as well as <em>Ketubot</em> 47b and <em>y. Ketubot</em> 5:7. In any case, all agree that the mitzva of <em>ona </em>is the foundation of marriage according to the Torah, and the disagreement is about the husband’s duty to provide food for his wife. According to Rambam (MT, Laws of Marriage 12:2), Talmidei Rabbeinu Yona, Maharam of Rothenberg, and Rashba, this obligation is biblical, while <em>She’iltot</em>, Rif, Ramban, Rosh, and Ran maintain that it is rabbinic. Everyone agrees that a husband cannot possibly fulfill the mitzva of <em>ona</em> properly without making sure that his wife has food and clothing, as a complete and loving marital union includes his taking proper care of his wife and ensuring that she does not lack food or clothing. Without these, surely the couple will be unable to lovingly enjoy sexual relations together. The question is whether the Torah itself requires the husband to support his wife in order to make their pleasure complete, or the Torah commands a man to love his wife completely, and the primary expression of this love is by making her supremely content through the mitzva of <em>ona</em>. The Sages then explained that this requires him to provide her food and clothing.We should note that in the past, when making a living depended mainly on capacity for physical labor, it was difficult for women to support themselves without help from a father or husband. This is why halakha obligated men to provide their wives with food and clothing. However, this is not the essence of marriage, and it is therefore permissible to stipulate before getting married that the husband is not required to feed and clothe his wife if, for instance, the wife has her own income. In contrast, they cannot stipulate that they will get married with the understanding that the husband will not fulfill the mitzva of ona. Negating the mitzva of ona negates the entire marriage (Ramban to Bava Batra 126b; SA EH 38:5). Nevertheless, when a husband is unable to fulfill the mitzva of ona due to circumstances beyond his control, for example if he is a seris ḥama (“castrated by the sun”; i.e., impotent from birth), then the couple may base their marriage on a nonsexual emotional union (below, 6:2, n. 2). It stands to reason that a seris ḥama still has a mitzva to bring his wife physical pleasure according to his ability (below, ch. 2, n. 3).</i>
  The word ona has three meanings:1. Time or season: This mitzva is fulfilled at intervals dictated by the husband’s stamina and the demands of his job (Ramban and Ibn Ezra on Shemot 21:10).2. Torment (inui), and its opposite, responsiveness and reciprocity (hei’anut): When a man separates from his wife, he torments her. As Lavan said to Yaakov, “…if you torment (te’aneh) my daughters” (Bereishit 31:50), which the Sages interpret to mean, “If you separate from them and do not provide them with ona.” This also explains why on Yom Kippur, when we are commanded to afflict ourselves (lehitanot), we must refrain from sexual relations (Yoma 77b and Rosh ad loc.; Ketubot 47b and Tosafot and Ritva ad loc.). Similarly, the rape of a woman by a man is called inui, as we read, “Shechem the son of Ḥamor the Ḥivite, chief of the country, saw her and took her; he slept with her and tormented her (va–ye’aneha)” (Bereishit 34:2). In stark contrast to inui, the mitzva of ona is to couple with joy and pleasure, each responding to the other. Ona thus means responsiveness (hei’anut) and the prevention of torment (inui).
  Both of these interpretations have halakhic significance. First, a husband is obligated to have relations with his wife at fixed intervals that depend on his job and stamina. Second, their sexual union should be a joy-filled responsiveness that expresses their passionate love.
  3. Home: The Rishonim further wrote that the word ona is related to ma’on, a dwelling or home, meaning that the husband must provide his wife with a place to live (Menaḥem b. Saruk, as cited by Ibn Ezra and Ḥizkuni on Shemot 21:10). This interpretation also has deep significance for the mitzva of ona: when husband and wife unite sexually, the husband arrives at his domicile, his home. Similarly, when the verse instructs “Rejoice – you and your house” (Devarim 14:26), the Sages explain that this means “you and your wife.” Rabbi Yosi likewise stated: “Never in my life have I referred to my wife as ‘my wife’; rather, I refer to her as ‘my home’” (Shabbat 118b).
  The Sages refer to this mitzva as “derekh eretz,” the “way of the world,” since every man should naturally love his wife, desire to make love to her, and bring her as much joy and pleasure as he can. Likewise, every woman should naturally love her husband, yearn for him to make love to her, and bring him joy and pleasure as much as she can. God created humans to want this by nature. One who does not feel this yearning is physically or psychologically unhealthy. The goal of the mitzva is to channel, sublimate, and sanctify nature, not to negate the spontaneous feelings through which the mitzva is fulfilled (below, 2:4). The frequency of the mitzva is likewise determined by the “way of the world,” that is, by the reality of the couple’s circumstances (as explained in 2:6-7).4<i class="footnote">It is important to note how the Torah expresses the mitzva of <em>ona</em>: It is stated with regard to a case where a man decides to marry his Jewish maidservant. The Torah commands him to make sure to relate to her in the best possible way. Even if he takes a second wife from his own social class, he should not discriminate against the maidservant whom he made his wife. In the Torah’s words, “If he marries another, he must not withhold (from this one) her food, her clothing, or her conjugal rights. If he fails her in these three ways, she shall go free, without payment” (Shemot 21:10-11). From this context we can infer that a normal couple does not need to be commanded, for every reasonable person understands naturally that this is his moral obligation – “the way of the world” in the sense of “proper conduct.” The novelty here is that even though a man is doing a favor for his maidservant by marrying her, since she is now his wife, he may not deprive her of sexual pleasure. (See <em>Sefer Ha-ḥinukh</em> §46.) Similarly, the Torah tells us that when it comes to returning lost items to their owner (<em>hashavat aveida</em>), “You cannot ignore it” (Devarim 22:3). Beyond the requirement of returning the item, a person should feel that he simply cannot ignore the lost item that he saw.</i>
  
  Section 4
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Mitzva of Ona Is Independent of Procreation
  Another mitzva, the mitzva of procreation (pru u-revu) is fulfilled by means of the mitzva of ona. This, too, demonstrates the greatness of the mitzva of ona, as through it a man and woman become privileged to partner with God in creating a new human being. Nevertheless, the mitzva of ona is not dependent upon the mitzva of pru u-revu. Ona applies even when there is no chance that the sexual union will lead to pregnancy, such as when the woman is already pregnant or nursing, has reached menopause, or is infertile.
  The Sages say that the greater the joy accompanying the mitzva of ona, the finer the character of the future children (Eruvin 100b; below, 2:5). In contrast, if the couple’s sexual union lacks devotion and love, imperfections may manifest in the resulting children (Nedarim 20b, explained below in 2:13).
  Similarly, R. Yitzḥak Aboab writes: “When husband and wife love each other, have intercourse when at peace with each other, and have intent to produce worthy offspring, God grants their wish and gives them worthy children” (Menorat Ha-ma’or, ner 3, klal 6, ḥelek 2).
  The sages of the Jewish mystical tradition said that every act of marital sexual union undertaken in sanctity and love infuses the world with more life and blessing. R. Yeshayahu Horowitz writes in his classic Shnei Luḥot Ha-brit (Shlah, Sha’ar Ha-otiyot, Kedushat Ha-zivug §402):<i>Each and every act of intercourse, when undertaken in sanctity, will have a positive impact. Even if the wife does not conceive…[the husband] is not wasting seed; rather, a holy soul comes into existence as a result…. For a soul comes into being with every act of intercourse, and the offspring of others are then endowed with these souls…. This is why Avraham could sleep with Sarah even though she was barren. It was not, God forbid, a waste.</i>Zohar explains that the perfect love and devotion that infused the intimate relations of these two righteous people, Avraham and Sarah, led to the creation of souls in the supernal realms, which then descended to this world, and with which children of various families were endowed. When those children grew up, they were drawn to Avraham and Sarah, who converted them to faith in God. These are the souls referred to in the verse (Bereishit 12:5): “The souls they created in Ḥaran” (Zohar III 168a).
  Thus, even if a couple has not been blessed with children, when they lovingly and devotedly have sexual relations they become partners in bringing the souls of children into this world. To understand this, we must bear in mind that the process by which souls descend into the world is complicated by many phases and various aspects, which means that several couples can have a part in drawing a single soul into the world (see below, 8:6.)
  It is also worth adding that even after a couple has finished having children, by lovingly and joyfully having sexual relations they add life and blessing to all worlds, especially those that are connected to the deepest root of their souls. Thus, any sexual union undertaken in sanctity and passion draws greater illumination and blessing into the souls of their children.5<i class="footnote">The mitzva of <em>ona</em> is always linked to the mitzva of procreation, sometimes explicitly but more often implicitly. It is worth citing <em>Shlah</em> in full on this:Each and every act of intercourse, when undertaken in sanctity, will have a positive impact. Even if the wife does not conceive, it still has an effect on high and produces a soul. The kabbalists elaborate that this is why it is permissible for a husband to have sexual relations with his wife even when she is pregnant, nursing, menopausal, or infertile. He is not wasting his seed; rather, a holy soul comes into existence as a result…. This is why Avraham could sleep with Sarah even though she was barren. It was not, God forbid, a waste…. For a soul comes into being with every act of intercourse, and the offspring of others are then endowed with these souls. This is the meaning of conversion to Judaism…that is, through the power of the holy thoughts of Avraham during intercourse, the male souls were emanated, and the power of the holy thoughts of Sarah during intercourse emanated female souls. The verse (Bereishit 12:5) that mentions “The souls they [Avraham and Sarah] created in Ḥaran” can now be understood: they literally created them with the power of their intercourse. (Shlah, Sha’ar Ha-otiyot, Kedushat Ha-zivug §402).This is all because their sexual union was infused with passion and devotion; in the words of Zohar (III 168a), “the passionate cleaving of these two righteous people.” According to Arizal:Regarding sexual union during the months of pregnancy and nursing, a husband is certainly obligated to fulfill the mitzva of ona at these times. One should not, God forbid, take the position that, on the contrary, this seems like a waste of seed. The idea is this: We know that in the supernal world there are two types of sexual union. The first creates souls, and this not constant. The second, which is constant and unceasing, is to sustain and give life to all the worlds. (Arizal, Sha’ar Ha-mitzvot, Bereishit, p. 7)Yosef Ḥayim of Baghdad writes similarly:The phrase “which yields its fruit in season” (Tehilim 1:3)… is followed by “whose foliage never fades,” meaning that even if a man has sexual relations [with his wife] while she is pregnant and nursing, he “never fades,” [his seed] is not wasted. And whatever sexual activity he continues when his wife is old, after menopause, will find success, for if it does not create souls, it will help sustain and bring life to the worlds, as (Arizal) writes in Sha’ar Ta’amei Ha-mitzvot. (Ben Yehoyada on Ketubot 62b)Similarly, the Sages said that sexual intercourse during the last trimester is “beneficial for both the woman and the fetus, for as a result the fetus emerges healthy and energetic” (Nidda 31a).​</i>
  Another important point: A widower who has children and for whom it will be difficult to remarry a woman who is still fertile has a mitzva to marry a woman who will not bear children, for being married is the most wholesome human state. Moreover, he will thus be able to fulfill the mitzva of ona and refrain from sinful thoughts (Yevamot 61b; below, 4:8).
  
  Section 5
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Revealing the Ultimate Unity
  In order to more fully understand the sanctity of this mitzva, we must first explain that God wished to benefit humanity. He created the world incomplete, to provide people with the opportunity to perfect it and make it a better, happier place, and thereby to merit becoming God’s partner in everything good in the world and experiencing complete happiness in it.
  The greatest shortcoming in all of creation is detachment. The one God indeed created everything, but because He concealed His light, all creatures are detached from Him, and consequently from one another. Each creature looks out only for itself, thus leading to all the world’s strife, discord, conflict, and war. It is for this reason that this world is called “the world of detachment” and “the world of deception.” The unity at the root of all goes unacknowledged, thus leading to all the evil in the world. The fundamental principle of the Jewish faith is therefore belief in God’s unity, that there is one God and no other.
  This is also why the mitzva of settling in Eretz Yisrael, which links heaven and earth, is so important. The most fundamental detachment is that between heaven and earth, as expressed in the detachment between the spirit and matter, between vision and reality, between Creator and creation. Through the mitzva of settling Eretz Yisrael, it becomes revealed that God reigns over both heaven and earth, and that all earthly matters are connected to holiness. The Sages therefore say: “Anyone who lives in Eretz Yisrael is likened to one who has a God, while anyone who lives outside of Eretz Yisrael is likened to one who has no God…and who worships idols” (Ketubot 110b; see below, 3:15).
  The value of unity also underlies the extraordinary significance of the mitzva to “love your fellow as yourself” (Vayikra 19:18), which R. Akiva calls “a major principle of the Torah” (Sifra ad loc.).
  We are now in position to understand the great importance of the mitzva of sexual union between husband and wife, as it is the most perfect fulfillment of the mitzva to “love your fellow as yourself,” and it expresses the greatest possible unity, the complete union of two different individuals. The unity is achieved on two levels: it unites husband and wife, and it unites body and soul. Often, the body and the soul are in conflict. The soul longs for good, and the body is drawn to evil; the soul desires eternity, while the body focuses on the fleeting present. The mitzva of ona brings body and soul together, transforming even the evil inclination to good. Through this mitzva, the sublime ideas of faithfulness and unity combine with the greatest physical pleasure. The moral value of absolute devotion combines with the greatest joy (see Zohar I 49a; III 81a-b; Bereishit Rabba 9:7, below, 3:13; Maharal, Gevurot Hashem ch. 43).
  
  Section 6
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Importance of the Sexual Union of Husband and Wife
  The sexual union and unification of husband and wife is so marvelous that it serves as a metaphor for the supernal union of God and the Jewish people, as we read: “As a bridegroom rejoices over his bride, so will your God rejoice over you” (Yeshayahu 62:5). Similarly, R. Akiva says, “No other day was as precious as the day the Jews were given Shir Ha-shirim. For all of the Writings are holy, but Shir Ha-shirim is the holy of holies” (Tanḥuma Tetzaveh §5). We see that the love between a husband and wife is so transcendent and sublime that it is compared to and a manifestation of the sacred connection between God and His people. In fact, the relationship between husband and wife who achieve union with each other in holiness and love (below, 3:15) is an extension of the relationship between God and His people. This, in turn, influences the relationship between God and His world, bringing life, blessing, and peace to all creation.
  The Talmud tells us that the keruvim (cherubim) on top of the holy ark in the Holy of Holies were in the shape of a woman and man fulfilling the mitzva of ona. The Sages relate, “When the Jews ascended to the Temple in Jerusalem for the festivals, the kohanim would roll back the curtain so everyone could see the intertwined keruvim, and would say to them, ‘Look! The love between you and God is like the love between a male and a female’” (Yoma 54a). When Israel stopped acting in accordance with the divine will, the keruvim separated from one another and turned toward the wall (Bava Batra 99a).
  Since the essence of marriage is sacred and transcendent, during Temple times Yom Kippur was one of the two holidays on which people would occupy themselves with matchmaking (m. Ta’anit 4:8). A wedding is about a bride and a groom, two individuals who are uniting and starting a new life together. It is a mitzva to joyfully celebrate this. The Sages (Berakhot 6b) tell us that anyone who makes a groom and bride happy will merit acquiring (knowledge of) the Torah and is considered as if he had brought a thanksgiving offering and had rebuilt one of Jerusalem’s ruins (see Maharal, Tiferet Yisrael ch. 30).
  We likewise find that when Israel reached the highest expression of its union with the Holy One, when King Shlomo stabilized the Kingdom of Israel and built the Temple, he declared a weeklong celebration for all of Israel, which he later extended for an additional week. “On the eighth day he let the people go. They bade the king goodbye and went to their homes, joyful and glad of heart for all the goodness that the Lord had shown to His servant David and His people Israel” (1 Melakhim 8:66). The Sages expound: “‘And went to their homes’ – [the husbands] went and found their wives in a state of purity. ‘Joyful’ – they delighted in the radiance of the Divine Presence. ‘And glad of heart’ – each and every woman conceived a boy. ‘Over all the goodness’ – a heavenly voice proclaimed to them, ‘You are all guaranteed a place in the World to Come’” (Mo’ed Katan 9a). In other words, when the Temple was built in Jerusalem, God was as happy with His people as a groom is happy with his bride, and that general sanctity spread to each individual Israelite home. Thus, the husbands returned home to find their wives pure, so they could fulfill the mitzva of ona joyfully.
  Earlier, when Israel received the Torah, God commanded Moshe, “Go say to them: ‘Return to your tents’” (Devarim 5:27). The Sages explain this to mean that they were told to return to “the joy of ona” (Avoda Zara 5a). One who does not appreciate the value of this mitzva might think it was inappropriate to be involved in such things following the sublime experience of receiving the Torah. Nevertheless, God instructed otherwise: “Return to the joy of ona!” This makes clear that, on the contrary, it was specifically after absorbing the holiness revealed at the giving of the Torah that it was appropriate to joyfully fulfill the mitzva of ona. In fact, there is a parallel between the giving of the Torah and ona. The giving of the Torah was akin to a wedding between God and Israel, as the Sages expound on Shir Ha-shirim 3:11: “‘His wedding day’ refers to the giving of the Torah, while ‘His day of bliss’ refers to the building of the Temple” (Ta’anit 26b). The love and joy of this glorious wedding spilled over into every family in Israel.
  This runs counter to the view of many savants of the gentile world. In their opinion, physical pleasures are rooted in the material and in sin, and are entirely detached from sacred spiritual matters. However, the unique role of Israel is to reveal the true monotheistic faith, namely, that God is the Ruler of both heaven and earth. Therefore, when husband and wife achieve union in the proper way, it discloses something of the divine. This is the meaning of the rabbinical exposition on the verse “Who can count the dust of Jacob, number the dust-cloud (rova) of Israel?” (Bamidbar 23:10). The Sages explain: <i>This teaches that God sits and counts the matings (revi’oteihem) of Israel, awaiting the arrival of the drop from which a righteous person will be formed. The wicked Bilam was blinded because of this; he said, “Would the One Who is pure and holy, and Whose servants are pure and holy, look at such a thing?!” Right away, he lost vision in one eye</i>. (Nidda 31a)
  
  Section 7
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Joy of Ona
  Under normal circumstances, each person must look out for himself, for if he does not take care of himself, who else will? This sad reality can be obscured by shallow friendships and frivolous entertainment, but in moments of clarity, when a person becomes aware of his loneliness, he feels terrible sorrow. This is the existential pain that accompanies a person through life, the pall of death that casts a shadow during life. In moments of acute sobriety, the pain is even greater. Loneliness leads to egotism, to caring only for oneself. One thus becomes morally empty and is left without meaning in life, which only makes the loneliness worse.
  The solution to this can be found in the mitzva to “love your fellow as yourself.” When people understand that there is sacred value to their friendships, they become better and more moral. They truly connect to one another and assuage the pain of their loneliness. As we learned, the most complete fulfillment of “love your fellow as yourself” is in a spousal relationship, which can truly make a person complete. Through this true love, one can successfully break through egotistical boundaries, loving his spouse and looking out for her, in the same way that he loves and looks out for himself.
  The most salient manifestation of this love is the mitzva of sexual relations, in which, thanks to their great love and pleasure, each spouse is able to transcend personal boundaries. The husband reaches out to his wife, and she reaches out to him, and in their union they are redeemed from their loneliness. Then they can experience true, incomparable joy. Life pulses within them, connecting them with all living things, and ascending upwards to the Source of life.
  Accordingly, the mitzva is called simḥat ona, the joy of marital sexual relations (Pesaḥim 72b; Avoda Zara 5a). In this joy, the divine is revealed. Maharal explains: <i>Do not say that sexual union is a physical act, akin to that of all other animals. This is incorrect. It was God Who gave man and woman the ability to achieve union…for His name, Ya-h, takes part along with them (Sota 17a, cited above in 1:1). That is, God brings a couple together and makes them one, so His name is within them</i>. (Be’er Ha-gola 5:4)
  This mitzva is a foretaste of the World to Come. It is like a ray of light from higher, better realms to this dark world whose screens and barriers prevent light from reaching it. The Sages even commented that our world is like night (Ḥagiga 12b).
  All mitzvot should gladden a person greatly, for through them one connects to the Source of life and takes part in adding life to this world. Unfortunately, because of the barriers and screens that conceal the divine light and life, we barely sense this. True, we feel the satisfaction of doing the right thing, but we do not experience palpable, bodily pleasure in the performance of the mitzva itself. Accordingly, the Sages state: “This world is like an antechamber of the next world. Prepare yourself in the antechamber so that you may enter the main hall” (Avot 4:16). The next world is where we receive the bulk of the reward for doing the right thing.
  Only in the marvelous mitzva of ona can one experience the wonderful pleasure that we should sense when fulfilling any mitzva. It is in this sense that the mitzva of ona (like the mitzva of Shabbat) is a foretaste of the next world. It is a gateway through which a person gets a privileged glimpse of the next world even while still living in this one. By properly fulfilling this mitzva, one can even experience the pleasure that is a foretaste of the next world when fulfilling other mitzvot as well (Zohar II, 259a).
  In contrast, those who sin sexually – who are promiscuous, commit incest and adultery, who do not observe the laws of nidda – misdirect their passions. Instead of breaking through the barriers of egotism, creating souls, and connecting to God, they breach (portzim), in their transgressions, the good and moral framework; they are therefore called licentious (prutzim). They lose their place in this world, for they do not have the privilege of experiencing true love. They also lose their place in the next world for they do not connect to eternal, true life; instead, they inherit the abyss.
  
  Section 8
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Redemption from Slavery Was in the Merit of This Mitzva
  When our ancestors were slaves, the Egyptians wanted to prevent the men from reproducing, in order to wipe Israel out. To that end, they weighed them down with backbreaking labor from dawn to dusk and forced them to sleep in the fields instead of returning home. To the men of Israel, the situation seemed hopeless; their wives would give up on them and instead cling to their Egyptian masters. How could a husband look his wife in the eye? He was supposed to shelter her, to protect her from tyrants and oppressors, to support her and defend her honor, to be a role model for their children. Instead, he was a lowly slave under the heel of his master. In order to spare himself further humiliation, he preferred not to attempt to approach his wife. He stifled his will to live. He did not want children, because he could not provide them with a decent future. When his wife approached him, he backed away, because he was afraid that she would want to leave him soon anyway. Under such circumstances, most women would feel slighted and would try to become the second wives of their Egyptian masters. And the people of Israel would have faced extinction.
  Something else took place instead. The Sages recount: In the merit of the righteous women of that generation, Israel was redeemed from Egypt. When the women went to draw water, the Holy One arranged for small fish to enter their pitchers, so they drew up pitchers half-full of water and half-full of fish. They then set two pots on the fire, one for hot water and the other for the fish. Then they carried these to their husbands in the fields, where they bathed them, massaged them with oil, and gave them food and drink. Then they coupled with them among the sheepfolds. (Sota 11b)
  It was as if each woman said to her husband, “Although you are a contemptible slave in the eyes of the Egyptians, in my eyes you are precious and important. Just as I would greet you happily if you returned home from a respectable job, so I happily greet you now. I have come to the field to wash your feet, aching after a hard day’s work, and to massage your body, bruised from beatings, because you are my husband and my love.” A midrash relates similarly:
  While they ate and drank, the women held up mirrors and looked into them together with their husbands. She would say, “I am more beautiful than you,” and he would respond, “I am better looking than you.” This stimulated their desire, and they would procreate; the Holy One would ensure immediate conception…. “The Israelites were fertile and prolific; they multiplied and increased very greatly” (Shemot 1:7)…. And all this proliferation was thanks to the mirrors. (Tanḥuma Pekudei §9).
  “Once they became pregnant, they went home. When it was time for them to give birth, they went to the fields” (Sota 11b).
  After the Jewish people left Egypt, received the Torah, and were commanded to erect the Mishkan, every Jew donated gold, silver, copper, expensive fabrics, and precious gems for its construction. The same women who had given birth in the fields asked themselves, “Do we have anything to contribute toward the building of the Mishkan?” They went home and returned carrying the same mirrors they had used to beautify themselves. Even though they treasured these mirrors, they volunteered to donate them out of their intense passion for sanctity. But Moshe was disgusted, because he felt that the whole point of mirrors was to arouse the evil inclination. Some say that he even became angry, telling the people around him in exaggerated fashion that these women deserve to have their legs broken with sticks for their audacity in bringing these mirrors for divine service. God responded to Moshe, “You disdain these mirrors?! These mirrors produced these multitudes in Egypt! Accept them, because they are more beloved to Me than all other donations. Take them and use them to make the copper laver and its base, with which the kohanim will sanctify themselves for divine service” (Tanḥuma Pekudei §9; Rashi on Shemot 38:8).
  From this story we learn something wonderful: that there is nothing more pure and holy than unconditional, life-giving love. That is why it was specifically these mirrors that were used to make the laver from which the kohanim purified and sanctified themselves in preparation for Temple service.
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Pinnacle of Pleasure
  The mitzva of ona is for a man to bring pleasure and joy to his wife as best he can and to achieve complete sexual union with her, lovingly and with abundant joy (as explained in 1:2 above). Every man must fulfill this mitzva as frequently as his physical stamina and professional demands allow. For most, this means twice a week (as explained further in section 7 below). A woman, too, has a mitzva to couple with her husband and to enjoy him. The more she enjoys their sexual relations, the greater the mitzva. 
  Their sexual union must be very joyful and pleasurable. Accordingly, the mitzva is called simḥat ona, the joy of marital sexual union. Abstaining from it is deemed a type of torment (Pesaḥim 72b; Avoda Zara 5a; 1:3 above).
  The mitzva of ona is independent of the mitzva of procreation. It is fulfilled through marital sexual relations even when they cannot lead to pregnancy, such as when the wife is pregnant or nursing, or when she is after menopause (above, 1:4).
  The central element of this mitzva is for the husband to bring complete joy to his wife, to the point where her joy and pleasure climax in orgasm. Short of this, their sexual relations may result in frustration, for the lead-up to orgasm builds up physical and psychological tension that is blissfully released upon orgasm. If she does not experience orgasm, her tensions and frustration will generally remain.
  The wife has a mitzva to be responsive and to actively participate in the mitzva as best she can, for without her desire and efforts to increase their mutual pleasure, it is impossible to fulfill the mitzva. However, if she is so exhausted or tense that it will be difficult for her to achieve orgasm, she may choose to forgo it and suffice with sexual union that brings sweet pleasure but not complete bliss. This, too, is a fulfillment of the mitzva. Nevertheless, it is best to try to ensure that it does not happen too frequently (see below, section 12 and note 12.)
  The more a husband and wife give and receive pleasure at the set times (onot) of this mitzva, the better. This is also mandated by the mitzva of “love your fellow as yourself” (Vayikra 19:18), which entails a spouse looking out for the good of the other to the best of their ability. Since the greatest physical and emotional pleasure is that shared by husband and wife, if a man deprives his wife of this enjoyable pleasure, he is being oppressive, since there is no other man who can provide her with this joy. Likewise, a woman who deprives her husband of this enjoyable pleasure is being oppressive, since there is no one else in the world who can fill his void.
  The mitzva is also called derekh eretz, “the way of the world,” since every healthy person yearns for pleasurable sexual union, the greatest palpable physical pleasure that a person can experience in this world. It is thus clear that when the Torah commanded the mitzva of ona, it means reaching orgasm, the peak of pleasure that people yearn for. If a husband or wife does not feel that yearning, they must try to heal themselves, so that their sexual union will be joyful for both of them.1<i class="footnote">The central element of this mitzva is for the woman to reach orgasm, just as the man reaches orgasm when he ejaculates. This is what is meant by the talmudic statement “If the wife brings forth seed first, she will give birth to a male; if the husband brings forth seed first, she will give birth to a female” (<em>Nidda</em> 31a). The Sages explain that men prolong sexual relations so that their wives will “bring forth seed” – that is, achieve orgasm – first: “They hold themselves back in the womb so that their wives bring forth seed first, so that their children will be male” (<em>ibid.</em> 31b). Likewise, the Talmud explains (<em>ibid</em>. 71a) that this is what is meant by the phrase “the reward of progeny (lit. ‘fruit of the womb’)” (Tehilim 127:3). There are other interpretations of the phrase “brings forth seed,” but the interpretation given here is the primary one.If the woman’s ultimate pleasure were not the essence of the mitzva, it would be difficult to understand why the Talmud assumes that the wife of an ordinary laborer would not agree to his making a lifestyle change, even one that would improve their financial situation, if the frequency of her ona would subsequently decrease (see Ketubot 62b and section 7 below). Additionally, if a woman usually derives real pleasure from sexual intimacy but does not reach orgasm, she will remain frustrated afterwards. Where is the joy in that? And if she does not even get this lesser pleasure, then her sexual relations with her husband are joyless; how then can we refer to this mitzva as simḥat ona? Moreover, it is the husband’s duty to provide for his wife’s needs. Just as he must follow social norms when providing food and clothing, so too for ona. And since orgasm is considered the primary joy of sexual relations, it is, perforce, what the mitzva requires. Not only is it the central element of the mitzva for the husband to pleasure his wife until she has an orgasm, but the more pleasure he brings her at the set times for their sexual relations, the more commendable it is, just as when one welcomes a guest, the tastier and more diverse the offerings and the better he makes the guest feel, the greater his mitzva. Therefore, when the wife is capable of reaching multiple consecutive orgasms, it enhances the mitzva. Nevertheless, couples often to not have the stamina or the desire for more than one orgasm, in which case this enhancement of the mitzva should be reserved for special occasions.Below, in section 12, we explain that it is possible to fulfill the onot at the be-di’avad level (such as when the woman derives pleasure from intimacy but not true bliss), or under pressing circumstances when there is no pleasure. In any case, as long as the couple remains married, they may not forgo sexual relations without full, mutual consent, since sexual relations are an expression of their marital union and prevent them from sin. We have already seen (1:2) that refusing sexual union is the principal grounds for divorce.</i>
  The kabbalists said that one who does not experience sexual longing is worse than a donkey and will never be able to love God (Reishit Ḥokhma, Sha’ar Ha-ahava, end of ch. 4), for it is only through healthy human nature, itself created by God, that one can progress in one’s love for God. Anyone who is detached from the lifegiving impulse is far from faith and sanctity, and cannot act to repair the world.
  
  Section 2
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Man’s Duty and the Woman’s Mitzva
  The obligation of ona is incumbent upon the man, as the verse states, “He shall not withhold she’erah, kesutah, or onatah” (Shemot 21:10). Ramban explains that she’erah refers to flesh-to-flesh contact during intimacy, kesutah refers to the bed and bedding used by the couple during intimacy, and onatah as referring to the conjugal act itself (Ketubot 48a; see above, 1:3). If a husband does not fulfill this mitzva and thereby causes his wife pain, he is in violation of a Torah prohibition (above, 1:2). Of course, if she does not respond joyfully to her husband, the mitzva is worthless; thus, fulfillment of the mitzva depends on both of them. Nevertheless, the primary duty is the man’s, just as the mitzva to marry is incumbent upon the man, making him responsible to court his future spouse, gain her consent to marry, and then marry her.
  To understand the difference between men and women, it must be made clear that if a man does not verbally articulate his love for his wife and does not increase her pleasure by embracing and caressing her while gradually advancing toward her erogenous zones, it stands to reason that he will not manage to make her climax. One of the wonderful characteristics of women is that spirit, mind, and body are more integrated in them than they are in men. Therefore, under normal circumstances, it is only when all of these elements are brought together in love and pleasure that a woman can reach orgasm. This process is complex and takes time.
  In contrast, it is the nature of men to bifurcate different realms. A man can satisfy his physical lust even without an emotional or spiritual connection. This trait can be very valuable when he needs to ignore everything going on around him and focus his energy on a single goal. It is what enables a young man to energetically court his future wife, overcome obstacles, and persist until she agrees to marry him. This is also why it is the man who performs the act of kiddushin that effects their marriage. This trait is also valuable for a soldier in battle.
  On the other hand, after achieving his goal of getting married, men can sometimes lose interest in having a wholesome emotional relationship. They were so focused on getting married that they neglected to properly prepare themselves for all the challenges of married life. Because of this, a new husband is commanded not to serve in the army or take business trips during his first year of marriage, as the verse states: “He shall be exempt one year for the sake of his household, to give happiness to the woman he has married” (Devarim 24:5). This allows newlyweds to build a strong foundation for their married life.
  Something similar can happen during the buildup to sexual relations. A man might be very passionate beforehand, but as soon as he ejaculates, he is liable to lose interest in his wife. And since men are physiologically capable of reaching the climax of physical pleasure within minutes, without providing their wives with any joy – the mitzva of ona is incumbent upon the man, and its primary element is to bring as much joy and pleasure to his wife as he can. The Sages thus caution: “A husband may not compel his wife to fulfill the mitzva…. Any man who compels his wife to perform this mitzva will have indecent children” (Eruvin 100b).
  Thus, even though marital sexual relations are a mitzva, if their purpose is to satisfy only the man’s urges, without him trying to bring his wife pleasure, there is no mitzva. Thus, because of women’s nature, the husband has to make sure to express his love for his wife. This will give their sexual union greater depth and wholesomeness.
  Conversely, when a woman does not desire to be intimate with her husband, is not responsive to his advances, and does not experience joy with him, she actively countermands the mitzva. The mitzva is to bring her joy, so when she is not happy, the mitzva is completely undermined. If this situation persists, she will destroy their home. As we learned, if a woman claims that she finds her husband repulsive, he must divorce her, but she forfeits her ketuba (Ketubot 63b). He must divorce her because it is impossible to maintain a marriage without the joy of sexual relations, but she forfeits her ketuba because she breached the most basic essence of marriage.2<i class="footnote">According to Rambam (MT, Laws of Marriage 14:8), a <em>beit din</em> compels the husband to divorce his wife, “because she is not like a captive who is forced to have relations with someone she hates. But she leaves without any of her <em>ketuba</em>.” According to most <em>poskim</em>, even though he is halakhically required to divorce her, he is not compelled to do so (SA EH 77:2). (Perhaps we may deduce that these <em>poskim</em> are discussing a case where the wife is considered to be at fault in the divorce because after she agreed to marry him she became repulsed by him. He may therefore claim compensation for his suffering before he agrees to divorce her.)Likewise, when a man does not keep to the frequency required of him, or when he is not willing to please his wife in the accepted ways – for example, if he is not willing to have sexual relations unless he is clothed – the woman can sue for divorce, and her husband is obligated to divorce her and pay the ketuba in full (SA EH 76:13).</i>
  
  Section 3
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Man’s Mitzva
  A few hours before having sexual relations, a husband should express his love for his wife and his eager anticipation of their upcoming intimacy. Doing so will correspondingly arouse his wife, filling her with love and desire. They should both take care during these hours not to broach subjects likely to lead to an argument, or subjects that are a source of stress for either one of them, so as not to derogate from the joy of the mitzva. The Sages state that whoever raises a subject that could ruin the joy of the mitzva will have to answer for it in the future. Thus, commenting upon the verse, “For behold, He forms mountains and creates winds; He reveals his words (siḥo) to a person” (Amos 4:13), the Talmud informs us that God holds us responsible even for “excess words (siḥa) between husband and wife” (Ḥagiga 5a, following the interpretation of Raavad; Baḥ, OḤ 280:2).
  As the couple becomes intimate, it is a mitzva for the husband to tell his wife how much he loves her. He should not hold back any compliment – about her beauty, her character, and whatever else he knows will bring her joy (Zohar I 49b; Tikkunei Zohar 57:1). This does not mean he should make things up; rather, after thinking about how deeply he loves his wife, he should offer truthful compliments. One may stretch the truth a bit, however, for it is only due to our own shortcomings that we fail to see that our hyperboles are closer to the truth than we realize (see Ketubot 17a).
  Included in the mitzva are embracing, kissing, and caressing anywhere that is pleasurable, and in any way that is enjoyable. The mitzva is to proceed gradually, from areas where touch is pleasant to the erogenous zones, until finally reaching the clitoris, where touch produces the most arousal and pleasure. Every woman should know her body so that, if necessary, she can teach her husband how to bring her pleasure. Since every person is different, part of the mitzva is for the couple to openly discuss what gives them pleasure; the husband should ask his wife how he can increase her joy, and she will respond and open up to him. And having aroused her to a state of intense pleasure, they proceed to the consummation of their sexual union.
  For most couples, it is best for the husband to try to enable his wife to reach orgasm before him, for otherwise, there is concern that he will be drained of desire and unable to bring her joy as he should. It should be noted that in the past, apparently, in most circumstances, women could achieve orgasm during coitus itself, whereas nowadays, for various reasons, many women do not reach orgasm during coitus, only through manual stimulation of the clitoris. In that case, this is how to perform the mitzva, and from this they proceed to the consummation of their sexual union.
  It has always been a virtue of Torah scholars and Torah-oriented Jews that they bring joy to their wives, as is proper. For that reason, the Sages admonish fathers not to marry off their daughters to coarse ignoramuses (amei ha-aretz): “If one marries his daughter to an am ha’aretz, it is as if he has left her tied up in front of a lion. Just like a lion attacks and devours its prey with no shame, so, too, an am ha’aretz beats and penetrates his wife shamelessly” (Pesaḥim 49b). In other words, just as a lion devours its prey and begins eating while it is still alive, so an am ha’aretz penetrates his wife in order to satisfy his own urges and does not delay so that his wife can experience pleasure and joy as well.3<i class="footnote">em&gt;Zohar (I 49b) addresses the issue of compliments: “A man who wishes to be intimate with his wife must ask her permission and speak to her in a way that makes her happy. If he does not, he should not sleep with her. This is to ensure that their desire is mutual and there is no coercion…. He should show her affection and draw her toward his desire, becoming aroused with her lovingly…in order to show her that they are united and that nothing comes between them. After that, he should praise her, telling her that there is no other woman like her, and that she is the glory of the home…as it says, ‘Many women have done well, but you surpass them all’ (Mishlei 31:29).” <em>Tikkunei Zohar</em> (§21, 57a) presents this approach as well, adding that on Shabbat, additional compliments should be given on account of the sanctity of the day. Elsewhere <em>Zohar</em> (II 259b) states that “there are two aspects of intimacy – kissing and the act of intimacy itself, one above and one below. The one above is to add an abundance of spirituality above, and the one below is to add an abundance of life below, each according to what is appropriate for it.” Elsewhere <em>Tikkunei Zohar</em> (§10, 25b) points out that kissing involves four lips, corresponding to the four letters of the Tetragrammaton, and embracing involves four arms, corresponding to the four letters of the name Adonai (<em>alef-dalet-nun-yud</em>; Lord).Among the advice that R. Ḥisda gives his daughters in Shabbat 140b is the following: “[Your husband will want to] hold the pearl in one hand and the basket in the other. Show them the pearl, but not the basket, until he aches. Only then should you show it to him.” Rashi explains: “When your husband caresses you to arouse desire for intercourse, he will fondle your breasts with one hand and ‘that place’ (the vagina) with the other. Offer him your breasts, so that his passion will intensify, but do not rush to offer the place of penetration, so that his passion and affection build and he aches. Then offer it to him.” R. Elazar of Worms writes similarly: “They should embrace and kiss…. He should engage in foreplay by fondling and with all kinds of embrace, to fulfill his desire and hers” (Sefer Ha-roke’aḥ, Hilkhot Teshuva 14). Other Rishonim and Aḥaronim write similarly.The notion that some men must fulfill the mitzva by manual stimulation, even for ten minutes and beyond, is not mentioned in the halakhic literature. There are two apparent reasons for this. a) It stands to reason that during an era when people slept about ten hours each night (see Rambam, MT, Laws of Dispositions 4:4) and lived with less stress and tension, almost all women reached orgasm and the peak of joy during the conjugal act itself. Similarly, we learn that in the past all women sensed their uteruses open at the onset of menstruation, to the extent that Shulḥan Arukh mentions this as something well known (YD 183:1). Nowadays, most women do not experience this sensation (see Harḥavot). b) Since the mitzva is for a man to give his wife as much pleasure as he can, it is self-evident that if manual stimulation of the erogenous zone gives her greater pleasure, then that is the mitzva. There was no reason to write this down because the couple must naturally learn how to fulfill the mitzva. This is why it is called “derekh eretz” – the way of the world (as explained in the next section). In other words, the mitzva is for husband and wife to be open and honest with one another and for giving each other as much pleasure as they can. It can be assumed that within a relatively short time, they will become familiar with the woman’s erogenous zones and take pleasure from it. If they find that this brings the wife to orgasm, they will understand that this is what the mitzva entails for them.As we saw earlier, R. Ḥisda discussed the subject with his daughters. It is evident from this that people spoke about these matters more openly in the past. (See below, 3:12 and 3:15, where we explain that asceticism and withdrawal increased as a result of the Temple’s destruction and the prolonged exile. It is important to clarify that when Zohar and kabbalistic writings speak of the importance of kissing, embracing, and having sexual relations, their purpose is not to serve as a practical guide to fulfilling the mitzva, which is a relatively simple matter, but to teach us that such actions correspond to profound and sublime notions, and sexual relations are a readily available allegory for teaching about the sublime.)During foreplay, typically the husband will likely experience a small discharge of fluid. This is not considered a “waste of seed.” Although some are stringent about this based on Kabbala (Pri Etz Ḥayim, Sha’ar Keri’at Shema al Ha-mita ch. 11; Ben Ish Ḥai, Pekudei §13), the primary concern, according to Kabbala, is that the husband must not withdraw from sexual union until he has finished ejaculating every last drop of semen (Sha’ar Ha-kavanot, Inyan Derushei Ha-layla; Kaf Ha-ḥayim 240:6; Darkhei Tahara 22:11). Even this is technically not prohibited, as evident from the view of most Rishonim that after the first time a couple has marital sexual relations, he may withdraw while still erect (SA YD 193:1; Sho’el Ve-nishal 3:424; see Olat Yitzḥak 2:242). With regard to premature ejaculation even before intercourse, see the end of n. 10 below.</i>
  
  Section 4
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Derekh Eretz
  God created man and woman to yearn for one another naturally. This sexual attraction is a good thing; indeed it is the foundation of the mitzva of ona. The Sages declare: “The way of the world (derekh eretz) preceded the Torah” (Tanna De-vei Eliyahu Rabba 1). That is, God commanded human beings to give full expression to their natural desires within the sacred framework of marriage. If people stifled their natural desires, they would not be able to fulfill the mitzva properly, nor would they be able to fulfill other mitzvot fully.
  This means that there are moral principles that a person must grasp simply, through his heart and his conscience, as dictated by the natural morality that God implanted in all creatures and that even wild beasts follow. The Torah adds layers of fastidiousness, consistency, and sanctity upon this healthy natural foundation, but if a person does not instinctively grasp these values, he is lacking something basic.
  The Sages tell us that it is possible to learn how to fulfill the mitzva of ona from the rooster, an animal known for its prodigious mating habits and for its expertise in the art of courtship and seduction. It is no coincidence that one of the Hebrew words for rooster is “gever,” which also means “man”. The Sages go on to interpret the rooster’s actions anthropomorphically: When he flaps his wings up and down in a broad arc, he is, as it were, promising the hen that after they mate, he will buy her a long beautiful coat that reaches the ground. After he finishes mating, he bows its head and lowers its crest in a humble pose, as if to apologize for lacking the money to buy her the coat he promised. It looks like he is swearing on the life of his glorious crest that it should be cut off should he come into money yet not buy her the coat (Eruvin 100b).
  The Sages wish to teach us here that a husband should not hold back when it comes to praising and complimenting his wife for her beauty, her character, and all the good things she says and does. It is even appropriate to stretch the truth a bit, like the rooster who makes a promise that it knows it cannot keep but thereby acknowledges his love and esteem for her, saying that this is what she truly deserves. Moreover, after marital sexual relations, a man should not act like those husbands who lose interest in their wives, turn their backs, and fall asleep. Rather, he should apologize to his wife for his limitations, which do not allow him to adequately express the love and affection she deserves.
  Another principle of derekh eretz that can be learned from the natural world is that it is generally the man who must initiate intimacy, as his desire is more external and obvious, and becomes apparent relatively quickly and easily. Through his passionate arousal, his wife will respond in kind and become aroused by him. These are only general guidelines, and every couple must consummate their union however their joy is maximized (n. 4 below), yet even when one spouse is disappointed by the process of courtship and seduction, they may not abrogate the set times of ona (sections 7-8 below).
  It is also important to mention in the context of derekh eretz that sexual relations are often compared to a banquet (Nedarim 20b), to teach us that just as the table is set for a banquet with a nice tablecloth, a full complement of silverware and dishes, and glasses for both wine and other beverages, and just as a banquet has appetizers, desserts, and courses in between, so too we must invest this much and more in preparing for marital sexual relations, which are a mitzva of the Torah. We must proceed patiently and gradually so that the union is consummated in complete joy. Just as it is good for banquets to vary the menu from time to time, because even the most delicious food can get boring if served too often, so too the compliments that the husband pays his wife and the ways he brings joy and pleasure to his wife should be varied. Everything must be in accordance with her desires; some people are more adventurous when it comes to trying new items on the menu, and others prefer the familiar, set menu.
  It should go without saying that derekh eretz includes maintaining personal hygiene and removing anything unsightly or likely to be off-putting. Getting rid of things which are off-putting is obligatory, while going above and beyond is admirable. This applies equally to both women and men. R. Ḥisda instructed his daughters before they got married to avoid foods that would give them bad breath or upset their stomachs (Shabbat 140b). Proper hygiene is so important that neglecting it is considered grounds for divorce. (See SA EH 154:1-2.) There are many guidelines and laws for specific cases, but the general rule is that since people differ, both husband and wife must be attentive and sensitive to what may bother the other. This is even truer when it comes to things which are generally viewed as disgusting.
  
  Section 5
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Woman’s Mitzva
  As we saw in section 2, even though the mitzvot of marriage and ona devolve upon men, women are equal partners in the fulfillment of the mitzva. Without her responsiveness to her husband, the mitzva is emptied of all its meaning. Therefore, just as it is a mitzva for a man to express his love and desire for his wife, so too, it is a mitzva for a woman to express such feelings to her husband. Indeed, this is perfectly natural, as the Sages say: “A woman’s desire is only for her husband, as the Torah states (Bereishit 3:16), ‘Your desire shall be for your husband’” (Bereishit Rabba 20:7). This desire is sacred; through it, the love between the couple is revealed and the name of God dwells with them (above, 1:1). Moreover, the mutual desire of husband and wife serves as an allegory to express the relationship between God and Israel: “I am my beloved’s, and His desire is for me” (Shir Ha-shirim 7:11).
  As we have seen, the mitzva to “love your fellow as yourself” (Vayikra 19:18), which R. Akiva calls “a major principle of the Torah” (Sifra ad loc.), reaches its ultimate fulfillment in marriage (Arizal, Sefer Ha-likutim, Ekev). Therefore, a woman, too, must bring her husband joy through whatever she knows will give him pleasure; the more she does so, the greater her mitzva.
  The stronger the couple’s love and desire for each other, the more complete their union will be, and in this merit, their children will be even more wonderful (above, 1:4 and n. 4). Maharal writes that when a woman feels intense desire for her husband, she connects to the root of life and unity, and in this merit, she has children of the utmost refinement, who are deserving of redemption and liberty (Gevurot Hashem, ch. 43). This is what the Sages mean when they say, “In the merit of the righteous women of that generation, the Jews were redeemed from Egypt” (Sota 11b). By virtue of their desire for their husbands, and their expression of this desire through the mitzva of ona, despite all the hardships of servitude, they gave birth to the generation of redemption (above, 1:8).
  In order to increase love, wives often adorn themselves in jewelry for their husbands. Ezra the Scribe even allowed peddlers to sell perfumes and jewelry, over any objections of the townspeople, “so that the women would not become undesirable to their husbands” (Bava Kamma 82b). According to tradition, God beautified Ḥava and braided her hair so that Adam would love her more (Eruvin 18a). The main purpose of a woman’s accessories is to arouse her husband’s desire for her (Tanḥuma Vayishlaḥ §12; Shir Ha-shirim 1:2). R. Hai Gaon writes, “May a curse befall a woman who is married but does not adorn herself for her husband, and may a curse befall a woman who is not married, yet adorns herself” (Sha’arei Teshuva §84). It would seem that he is referring specifically to the type of adornments that men find arousing, and this teaches us the main purpose of perfume, jewelry, and beautiful clothing is to increase the love of husband and wife.
  When a woman does not love her husband, does not long to be with him, and does not enjoy sexual relations with him, she can drain the joy from his life. The Sages said of this: “There is no end to the goodness of a good wife, and there is no end to the badness of a bad wife” (Midrash Tehilim §59). Making a similar point, the Talmud (Yevamot 63a) relates that R. Ḥiya gave the following blessing to Rav, his disciple: “God should save you from a fate worse than death,” referring to a bad wife, as it says (Kohelet 7:26), “I find woman more bitter than death.” (See also section 12 below regarding women who have difficulty fulfilling this mitzva.)
  
  Section 6
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Women and the Virtue of Nonverbal Cues
  The Sages say, “Any woman who propositions her husband to fulfill the mitzva [of ona] will have children the like of whom did not exist even in the generation of Moshe” (Eruvin 100b). This is what our matriarch Leah did: “When Yaakov came home from the field in the evening, Leah went out to meet him and said, ‘Come to me, for I have hired you with my son’s mandrakes.’ And he lay with her that night” (Bereishit 30:16). It was on that night that Leah conceived Yissachar, whose descendants were Torah scholars and leaders, as we read: “Of the Yissacharites, men who knew how to interpret the signs of the times, to determine how Israel should act: their chiefs were 200, and all their kinsmen followed them” (2 Divrei Ha-yamim 12:33).
  The Talmud then questions this conclusion in light of the Sages’ dictum: “A woman propositions in her heart, while a man propositions verbally; this is an admirable trait in women.” If so, how could Leah have verbalized her proposition? Furthermore, how could she have been rewarded with a tribe of wise descendants? The Talmud explains that it is commendable for a woman to “make herself pleasing to him” – showing him signs of her affection and adorning herself for him to arouse his desire. That is, she propositions him “in her heart,” by means of nonverbal cues. This is what Leah did when she said, “Come to me.” She was expressing her love for Yaakov and her wish for him to come to her tent so they could sleep in the same bed and be close to one another. She did not explicitly request that they have sexual relations.
  The reason that it is improper for her to verbally proposition him is that a man’s stamina is limited, and he is not always capable of fulfilling the mitzva of ona, which requires him to be pleasantly stimulated and aroused to the point that he can have intercourse with his wife. The mitzva of ona thus depends on the man and what his physical stamina and workload permit (as explained in the next section). A woman, by contrast, can achieve orgasm every night, and even multiple times in one night. Even when she is tense, making it difficult for her to achieve orgasm, she can be responsive to her husband’s advances and take pleasure in his joy. If she were to proposition him explicitly and verbally when he is in a state that would make it difficult for him to consummate their union, he might find it humiliating. Instead of eagerly anticipating sexual relations and finding it intensely pleasurable and enjoyable, he might start dreading it, fearing that he will be unable to do his duty. Sometimes this anxiety can cause impotence. Therefore, a woman should be coy and not proposition her husband verbally. Rather, she should use nonverbal cues that come from her heart, so that when he is not sure of his ability to fulfill the mitzva, he can respond affectionately but without the humiliation of being unable to reciprocate fully.
  Additionally, when a man is so depressed and powerless that he actually feels impotent, devoid of his vitality and virility, and it seems to him that even if he wanted to, he does not possess the strength to stimulate an erection strong enough for sexual relations with his wife, then if he is fortunate, and his wife expresses her love and desire through nonverbal hints and cues, like with a warm embrace, it can revive him. It can awaken within him the desire and ability to fulfill the mitzva and consummate their union. Thus, she adds joy and light to his life (see 1:8 above).4<i class="footnote">As we learned, nonverbal cues are meant to preserve the husband’s self-respect. However, as the couple’s relationship becomes stronger and more secure, the wife should do whatever will make her husband happy. Some men prefer that their wives talk openly. Some prefer that their wives take more initiative, finding that it arouses them to pleasure their wives. When a woman knows that her husband prefers it, then this is what she should do. This is not immodest; rather, it is a mitzva, as she is doing this to bring him joy.</i>
  
  Section 7
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Times of Ona
  The mitzva of ona depends on a husband’s stamina as well as his profession, as the Sages say in the Mishna: “The ona of which the Torah speaks is daily for tayalim (see below for a definition), twice a week for laborers, once a week for donkey drivers, once in thirty days for camel drivers, and once every six months for sailors” (m. Ketubot 5:6, 61b).
  Some say that tayalim were healthy people whose jobs were easy and stress-free, for whom, therefore, the mitzva was each night. R. Shmuel bar Shilat is cited as an example. He taught schoolchildren near his home, his income was so modest that the king’s tax collectors left him alone, and his life was tranquil and secure (Rif and Rosh). Others say that tayalim were people who were so secure financially that they did not need to work at all, aside from some occasional management of their economic affairs that did not disturb their peace of mind (Rambam, Ri’az, Rabbeinu Yeruḥam, and Smag).5<i class="footnote">Even though <em>tayalim </em>have a mitzva every night, a <em>tayal</em> who wishes to act piously and ascetically can ask his wife’s permission to limit his <em>ona </em>to four or five times a week. If she consents, he may do so. This does not detract from the mitzva, as the Raavad applies to <em>tayalim</em>’s set times the Sages’ advice about how to respond to the evil inclination: “The left hand should push it away, while the right hand should draw it close” (<em>Sanhedrin</em> 107b). <em>Tur</em> records Raavad’s view as <em>halakha</em> (240, EH 25). <em>Me’il Tzedaka</em> §43 takes this approach as well. However, a laborer, whose set time of <em>ona</em> is twice a week, should not reduce his mitzva even if his wife agrees. The Talmud in <em>Ketubot</em> 62a also discusses a related issue: according to Rava, married students who study in <em>yeshivot</em> near their homes are considered <em>tayalim</em>, with a daily mitzva of <em>ona</em>. Abaye rejects Rava’s opinion on the grounds that yeshiva students need to invest heavily in their studies in terms of both time and effort, so they are not similar to <em>tayalim</em>. However, if they study Torah only part of the day without exerting great effort, they have the status of <em>tayalim</em> (see <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, EH 3:28).</i>
  Laborers who worked locally had the mitzva of ona twice a week. Laborers who did not work locally, even if they returned home every night, had the mitzva once a week, since traveling is very draining. Donkey drivers, who transported produce from villages to markets, were generally away from home six days of the week, so their mitzva was only once a week. Camel drivers, who generally transported merchandise across long distances, would usually only return home once a month, so their mitzva of ona was once a month. Sailors, who would be at sea for half a year, had the mitzva of ona once every six months (Ketubot 62a-b; SA EH 76:5). Torah scholars, whose Torah study exhausts them, had a mitzva of ona on the eves of Shabbat, Yom Tov, and Rosh Ḥodesh (SA ad loc; MA 240:3). Some of the greatest Aḥaronim write that it is better for Torah scholars to fulfill the mitzva of ona twice a week (Me’il Tzedaka §51; Pitḥei Teshuva, EH 76:3; BHL 240:1).
  A married tayal could not become a laborer without his wife’s agreement, even if his new job would improve their financial situation. Since she married him with the understanding that he was a tayal, he could not reduce the ona to which she was entitled without her consent. Similarly, a laborer whose obligation of ona was twice a week could not become a donkey driver whose obligation was once a week without his wife’s consent. Likewise, a donkey driver who wanted to become a camel driver or a camel driver who wanted to become a sailor had to ask his wife’s permission. However, a tayal who wanted to become a Torah scholar could do so due to the greatness of the mitzva of studying Torah; his wife could not protest, even though he would be reducing her ona (Ketubot 62b; SA EH 76:5; Beit Shmuel ad loc. 8).
  These rulings were formulated in an age that was very different from the one we live in today. On one hand, most men work fewer hours than in the past, doing jobs that are less physically demanding. In this sense, they are most similar to tayalim. Even those who commute to work do so by car, bus, or train and are akin to local laborers, and perhaps even tayalim, as long as their commute is not terribly exhausting. On the other hand, life has become more stressful due to the competitive labor market and increased interest in news reports, sources of information, and communications media. As a result, people sleep less, which reduces their natural desire to fulfill the mitzva.
  Therefore, it seems that the obligation of ona for most men is twice a week, perhaps a bit more frequent for younger people. Those whose work is particularly taxing, whether physically or emotionally, are obligated only once a week. In contrast, men who work in exceptionally easy professions are obligated more than twice a week, and perhaps even daily, like tayalim.
  
  Section 8
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Beyond the Set Times
  In addition to the set obligation of the mitzva of ona, which for most men is twice a week, it is a mitzva for every husband to have sexual relations with his wife when she desires him, as long as he has the strength for it, i.e., that he is capable of consummating the union.
  Thus, the Torah’s commandment of ona has two parts. First, there are set times based on what the husband’s health and workload permit; these times provide a regular expression for the couple’s bond and mutual desire. It is precisely this regularity that gives expression to the stability of their loving relationship. It is also why the Torah refers to this mitzva as “ona,” “time,” when it mentions a man’s conjugal duties (Shemot 21:10).
  Second, there is another part of the mitzva, which applies when the wife’s desire is aroused. The Torah commands the man to be responsive and to consummate their union with abundant joy. It is likewise a mitzva and a duty for the wife to be responsive to her husband, if he wishes to have sexual relations with her more often than required.6<i class="footnote">The Mishna (<em>Ketubot</em> 5:6) refers to “the <em>ona</em> that is stated in the Torah.” This means that the <em>onot</em> that the Sages established are the framework for the fulfillment of the Torah commandment. It is for this reason that the mitzva is called “<em>ona</em>,” to indicate that it has set times (<em>Pnei Yehoshua </em>on <em>Ketubot</em> 61b). Above and beyond those<em> onot</em>, Rava asserts that a man has a duty to bring his wife joy even outside the set times (<em>Pesaḥim</em> 72b). Rashi explains that this is “if he sees that she desires him.” <em>Shulḥan Arukh</em> rules accordingly (240:1). Some Aḥaronim maintain that even though both of these types of <em>ona</em> are Torah commandments, the second type is more important, since the essence of the mitzva is to respond to his wife’s yearning. (Section 8 below elaborates on this.) This is the opinion of Ḥida; <em>Ḥokhmat Adam</em> 128:19; and <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, EH 3:28. However, when the husband does not have the strength (meaning, he cannot sustain an erection), he is exempt, because the circumstances are beyond his control (<em>ones</em>).Likewise, if a man wishes to have sexual relations with his wife more often than required, she must be responsive. Since nothing comparable to sustaining an erection is required of her, she may not refuse without a compelling reason (see the beginning of n. 12 below).In both cases, even though the one who denies their spouse is violating a Torah commandment, he or she is not considered “rebellious” (“mored/et”), which would be grounds for divorce, since this is about sexual relations beyond the set times. In contrast, if one spouse avoids sexual relations at one of the times set in accordance with the husband’s health and workload, that spouse is considered rebellious and loses their ketuba rights (Responsa Rashba 1:693; Tashbetz 2:259; Ḥelkat Meḥokek 76:20; Maḥaneh Ḥayim 2:41, cited in Otzar Ha-poskim 77:1. See also MT, Laws of Marriage 15:18; Ba’er Heitev, EH 77:7; Meshiv Davar 4:35; and Igrot Moshe 4:75). Obviously, even at the set times of ona, a husband may not rape his wife if she refuses him. Rather, the only option available to him is to initiate divorce and cause her to lose her ketuba.</i>
  In light of the second component of the mitzva, a question arises regarding the first one: Why must the Torah establish set times for a couple to express their love for each other? Why not leave the frequency of the mitzva up to them? After all, according to the second component, if one spouse is in the mood, the other has a mitzva and an obligation to respond, even if this takes place daily. Conversely, if, over the course of several weeks, neither husband nor wife initiates intimacy, why must they be instructed to have sexual relations at set times?
  There are three answers to this question. First, it often happens that as the years go by, life’s demands grow. Since sexual relations are no longer new and special as at first, the couple are liable to push it off, one time because of exhaustion, another time because of a preoccupation, the next time for a headache, and the time after that an upset stomach. Even though each time they both agree to forgo the mitzva, in fact their loving relationship is weakened. Deep in their hearts, each one is hurt that the other does not yearn for more intimacy, and when one does not initiate, the other also loses interest, deepening their sense of insult and the growing distance between them. Therefore, the mitzva of ona is there to instruct them to fulfill the onot on a regular basis. Only on rare occasions, when they are especially tense, may they forgo the mitzva by mutual consent.
  Second, if the mitzva were always dependent on one spouse expressing desire, there would be concern that the spouse who is more often in the mood would become ashamed to always be the one to initiate. In contrast, when both husband and wife know that they have a mitzva to have sexual relations twice a week, they will fulfill the mitzva on a regular basis, and the need to indicate the desire for additional intimacy can be reserved for when one of them is feeling particularly amorous.
  Third, as we mentioned above (section 4), the mitzva must be done with full attentiveness, with attention to tiny detail, much like an elaborate banquet. The Sages assessed how frequently a couple can fulfill the mitzva of ona in a wholesome manner, and this is consequently the mitzva of the Torah. If the man goes too far beyond this frequency, there is concern that it will become superficial for him, something he does just to satisfy his urges, without bringing proper pleasure to his wife. The unique joy of the mitzva would wane. To avoid that, and to ensure that the mitzva can be fulfilled properly, the Sages set a fixed frequency. Nevertheless, this is a general guideline; when a woman yearns for more, it is a mitzva for her husband to be responsive if he is able. Likewise, when a man yearns for more and feels that he can properly pleasure his wife, this, too, fulfills a mitzva.7<i class="footnote">People naturally differ. Some men naturally need sexual relations more frequently than the <em>onot</em> established by the Sages for the general population, based on their physical stamina and workload. Even when his wife cannot reach orgasm more than twice a week, because to do so she would need to get more sleep and be more relaxed, the couple should make sure that twice a week they fulfill the mitzva of <em>ona</em> completely. At other times when the husband is in the mood, they can fulfill the mitzva of <em>ona</em> pleasurably but without trying for the wife to have an orgasm. See below, 3:3 and 3:5, where we discuss Raavad’s fourth reason for being intimate at set times – to prevent people from sinful thoughts. Although this is less positive than the other reasons, there is still a mitzva to have relations for this reason. (See ch. 3 n. 4, where we explain when one should minimize the manifestation of one’s urges, and when it is forbidden to minimize them.)As explained in the previous note, a wife may refuse to be intimate only when she has a compelling reason to do so. Pregnancy, nursing, or minor aches are not considered a compelling reason (below, n. 12).</i>
  
  Section 9
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Mikveh Night and the Night Before Traveling
  It is a mitzva for a man to have sexual relations with his wife on the night she immerses in the mikveh (SA EH 76:4). If he does not do so, he has neglected a mitzva of the Torah and violated the severe transgression of causing his wife pain, for it is extremely insulting for a woman to immerse and purify herself only for her husband to have no desire to be intimate with her. This night is considered a set time of ona; if their mitzva is twice a week, then this is considered their first time for that week.
  A man about to travel has a mitzva to have sexual relations with his wife the night before his departure (Yevamot 62b; SA EH 76:4), because their yearning to be together is especially strong then, as it is written: “You will know that all is well (shalom) in your tent; when you visit your wife, you will never sin” (Iyov 5:24). In fulfilling this mitzva before traveling, the husband takes leave of his wife with love, joy, and peace (shalom). They will not sin or betray each other while apart, neither in thought nor in deed. However, if the purpose of the journey is to fulfill a mitzva, and if having sexual relations will interfere with that mitzva, then ona is not obligatory (Rashi; Nimukei Yosef).8<i class="footnote">The Talmud states (<em>Yevamot </em>62b):Yehoshua b. Levi says, “A man is obligated to have sexual relations with his wife when he departs on a trip, as it says, ‘You will know that all is well in your tent.’” Is the law derived from here? Is it not derived from the verse, “Your desire shall be for your husband,” which teaches that a woman yearns for her husband when he leaves for a trip? R. Yosef answers: “This [extra verse] is not necessary except [to teach us that the obligation applies] near the expected onset of her period.” How close? Rava answers, “A span of twelve hours.” This all applies to [a husband traveling] for something voluntary, but for a mitzva, he is preoccupied.Many understand the Talmud to mean that since ona is a Torah commandment, even during the time of the month when normally the couple must refrain from sexual relations because she is near the onset of her period, before a trip it is a mitzva for them to have relations, as long as she has not seen blood (Rashi, Raavad, Rashba, Rabbeinu Yeruḥam, Raavan, and SA YD 184:10). Others have a different text of R. Yosef’s statement. Instead of “This [extra verse] is not necessary except [to teach us that the obligation applies] near the expected onset of her period,” the text reads, “This [extra verse] is not necessary except [to teach us that the obligation applies] when his wife is a nidda.” The meaning in that case would be that he should take leave of his wife with words of affection and love (Rabbeinu Tam, R. Zeraḥya Halevi, Rosh, Or Zaru’a, and Smak). Since, according to these poskim, there is no obligation to have sexual relations prior to embarking on a trip, doing so is not permitted near the expected onset of her period. Nevertheless, if she is not expecting her period, and either the husband or wife yearns for intimacy prior to a trip, clearly even these poskim would agree that it is obligatory.</i>
  The mitzva of ona applies before any trip that evokes feelings of separation and longing, which may differ from person to person. Still, minimally, it refers to a trip that involves at least one night away from home. It is also obvious that if the trip will last long enough that they will have to forgo one set ona time, then even without feelings of longing, there is a mitzva for the couple to have sexual relations on the night before departure.
  The same law applies when the wife must travel away from home. If her trip prompts feelings of longing or if it causes a set time of ona to be missed, there is a mitzva for her and her husband to have sexual relations the night before she leaves.
  When a trip is planned for the day before mikveh night, it is a mitzva to postpone the trip until after the wife immerses and they fulfill the mitzva of ona (Rema, YD 184:10).
  Some authorities maintain that there is also a mitzva for a couple to have sexual relations when one of them returns from such a trip (Zohar I 50a; Rashba; Ba’er Heitev 240:19). Certainly, if either spouse wishes to be intimate at this point, all agree that the mitzva of ona applies. It speaks well for their relationship if, after one of them has been away, they wish to be intimate with each other and joyfully fulfill this mitzva.
  
  Section 10
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Friday Night
  The Sages say that the habit of Torah scholars is to fulfill the mitzva of ona on Friday night (Ketubot 62b), and of them it is written, “That yields its fruit in its season” (Tehilim 1:3). Halakhic authorities add that it is a mitzva for Torah scholars to fulfill the mitzva of ona on the nights of Yom Tov and Rosh Ḥodesh (MA 240:3). There are several reasons for this. First, by fulfilling the mitzva of ona, the couple also fulfills the mitzva of oneg Shabbat (making Shabbat a delight), and it is likewise proper to be extra joyful on Yom Tov and Rosh Ḥodesh. Moreover, holy days are fitting times to fulfill the mitzva of ona, as we find that after the giving of the Torah and the dedication of the Temple, Israel fulfilled the mitzva of ona (1:6 above). In addition, on these days, Torah scholars study less Torah than usual, and therefore they are more available to fulfill the mitzva of ona in the most complete way.
  The mitzva to have sexual relations on Shabbat is not limited to Torah scholars. Rather, it is a mitzva for all couples, as a fulfillment of oneg Shabbat. In the words of Shulḥan Arukh: “Marital intimacy is one of the pleasures of Shabbat” (280:1).
  However, sometimes it is difficult or uncomfortable to be intimate on Friday night. People are often tired then, whether from working all week long or from Shabbat preparations, and exhaustion makes it difficult to fulfill the mitzva in the ideal way. Since the essence of the Torah commandment is for their union to be joyful, if either spouse is so tired on Friday night that they will find it difficult to truly enjoy themselves, it is preferable for them to fulfill the mitzva of ona on Saturday night or on a different night when they are not tired. Although Zohar speaks of the great value of fulfilling the mitzva of ona on Shabbat, since the essence of the mitzva is for it to be joyful, when fulfilling it on Shabbat will detract from the joy, waiting until Saturday night is preferable.9<i class="footnote">It is good to shower or bathe after sexual relations, because of Ezra’s decree (below, 3:9). See <em>Peninei Halakha: Shabbat</em>, vol. 1, 14:8 for the laws of bathing on Shabbat. When one spouse is tired on Friday night, the couple can be intimate on Shabbat day by darkening the room, as explained below in section 15. According to <em>Zohar</em> (III 81b and <em>Tikkunei Zohar</em> §21, 57a), there is great value in fulfilling the mitzva on Friday night specifically. Some couples are stringent and refrain from relations during the week, especially when the wife is likely to get pregnant, based on the kabbalistic idea that Friday night is the best time for sexual intimacy and for drawing down holy souls to this world. This is the practice of those who follow the path of ascetic sanctity (see 3:12 below, and <em>Harḥavot</em> here). Nevertheless, even according to them, it is clear that when such abstinence might cause sinful thoughts, it is preferable to have relations during the week in order to avoid such thoughts (<em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 240:2, 8). In any case, in practice, the essence of the Torah commandment of <em>ona</em> is that it be fulfilled joyfully, and we do not allow pious practices based on Kabbala to uproot the essence of the mitzva. Additionally, as we said in section 7, the mainstream approach is that Torah scholars should be intimate with their wives twice a week (see also below, 3:13-14.)</i>
  
  Section 11
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Men Who Have Difficulty Fulfilling the Mitzva
  Everything we have learned regarding the man’s duty of ona relates to healthy men, who transgress a Torah prohibition if they subtract from the set frequency for ona. If this behavior continues, it is obvious grounds for divorce, and the wife receives her ketuba payment in full (1:2 above). However, if a man’s difficulty in fulfilling the mitzva at the set times is attributable to a health problem, his only obligation is to do what the doctors deem him capable of (SA EH 76:3). Since problems often stem from specific hormone deficiencies or other medical conditions, and most of these issues are now treatable, he is obligated to consult with doctors. Occasionally, psychological or emotional problems are what cause him to forgo onot or to not make his wife as happy as he should. He must seek treatment for these issues as well. If it is a minor issue, consulting a rabbi is usually effective. If the problem is serious, he must seek the help of a God-fearing therapist who specializes in that area. If the husband neglects to deal with the problem appropriately, he negates a Torah commandment. Because he is not properly fulfilling the times of ona, his wife may file for divorce, and he must pay her ketuba in full.
  If the husband has done his best to correct the problem by consulting with doctors and therapists, yet is still unable to fulfill the mitzva of ona on a regular basis, then as long as he manages to consummate their relationship at least once every six months, thus meeting the least frequent requirement for ona, namely, the practice of sailors (section 7 above), it is not grounds for divorce and payment of the ketuba. If he cannot meet even this minimum threshold, his wife can decide how to proceed. If she is willing to live with him in this state, she is permitted to do so, and if she wants to divorce, her husband must divorce her and pay her ketuba in full (SA EH 76:11). It goes without saying that even a man who cannot fully consummate their relationship must still please his wife and gladden her with kisses, embraces, and caresses that bring her to orgasm. In general, if a husband does this, even though he cannot engage in intercourse, his wife will not want to divorce him.10<i class="footnote">One of the ten ordinances instituted by Ezra the Scribe was for men to eat garlic on Friday night to help them fulfill the mitzva of <em>ona</em>, as garlic was considered a potency-enhancing aphrodisiac (<em>Bava Kamma</em> 82a). Regarding the set times of <em>ona</em>, SA EH 76:3 states: “The obligation of someone who is unhealthy is only what they deem him capable of.” This assessment is made by experts, meaning doctors. Today, thank God, medicinal solutions have been discovered for most such conditions. For example, sometimes a man feels no desire to be intimate with his wife because his testosterone levels are abnormally low. This can be diagnosed with a simple blood test, therefore the husband must take a testosterone supplement in order to fulfill the mitzva. Sometimes difficulties stem from blood flow problems, and there are medications for this as well. Thus, a man who cannot properly fulfill the mitzva of <em>ona</em> properly must see a doctor to find a cure for his condition, and if he does not do so, he neglects a Torah commandment, just as if he does not recite <em>Shema</em> or put on <em>tefilin</em>. The same applies to a woman who feels that she cannot fulfill this mitzva joyfully, as is proper.If a man cannot fulfill even one ona every six months, his wife may file for divorce and receive payment of her ketuba in full, even if it is likely that a cure will be discovered within a few years (this emerges from Rambam, Shulḥan Arukh, and most poskim). Some say that if the doctors estimate that there is a good chance that he will become healthy in the next few years, she may not demand a divorce (Or Zaru’a; Ḥelkat Meḥokek, EH 76:18; Beit Shmuel ad loc. 17).If the couple are elderly or even just adults who have had a good relationship for years, then even if there is no chance that the husband’s condition will improve, the beit din tries to persuade the wife to remain with her husband. However, if she still insists on a divorce, her husband is required to divorce her (Responsa Maharalbaḥ §§29-30).Some ask whether it is permissible to use a vibrator to facilitate the wife’s orgasm when conventional methods are unsuccessful. The answer is that if on a regular basis the couple’s efforts do not succeed in bringing her to orgasm, it is a mitzva to use this device. As long as her husband is the one giving her pleasure, even if it is with the help of an external device, he is fulfilling the Torah’s commandment. Even if they can reach orgasm without using a vibrator, they are permitted to use it as they see fit. The more a man pleasures his wife, the greater his mitzva. However, it is forbidden for a man or woman to masturbate, whether manually or using devices, because sexual pleasure must be reserved for their lovemaking, and only thus is the mitzva fulfilled. When it is in the context of an individual’s urges, it is considered a sin (as explained below, 4:1 and 4:10 with n. 15).If a man is so sensitive that he ejaculates prematurely during foreplay, he is not considered to be wasting his seed, as we learn that several Rishonim permit anal intercourse (section 18 below). In their opinion, intercourse with other parts of the body, that is, ejaculation that occurs through embracing and touching between a man and a woman, is permitted as well. This is the opinion of Orḥot Ḥayim (Hilkhot Ketubot §7); Rabbeinu Yona (Sanhedrin 58b); Tur, EH 25:2; and Rema ad loc. Even those who forbid this would agree that when it is not intentional, such as in the case of premature ejaculation, there is no prohibition. As we learn with respect to Shabbat (Peninei Halakha: Shabbat, vol. 1, 9:5), when one does not intend to so something and it is not a foregone conclusion that it will be done, there is no transgression (Rabbi Yehuda Aszod, Yehuda Ya’aleh vol. 1, YD 238; Imrei Bina vol. 4, EH 8; Imrei Esh, YD 69). However, often a man with this tendency does not manage to bring his wife pleasure properly, so he must consult with a God-fearing specialist about how to prevent this from happening.</i>
  If one’s wife is truly willing to forgo ona, her relinquishment is valid as long as her husband has already fulfilled the mitzva of procreation. However, if he has not yet fulfilled this mitzva, he is required to fulfill all the set times of ona during which there is a chance that she will get pregnant. If he is unable to fulfill his conjugal duties, he must heed the instruction of doctors to fulfill his mitzva (SA EH 76:6).
  Even when the husband has already fulfilled the mitzva of procreation and the wife is willing to forgo ona, he should preferably not give up on this mitzva. Rather, he should get medical advice about what might allow him to fulfill ona properly, since that is the proper and healthy way to live. A person should try to fulfill all the mitzvot even when there is no absolute obligation to do so (such as wearing tzitzit or undertaking acts of kindness). Similarly, he should make every effort to fulfill this precious and holy mitzva, which is responsible for the Shekhina dwelling in the world in general and with the couple in particular.11<i class="footnote">SAH 280:2, states that if a wife is willing to forgo <em>ona</em> on Friday night, it is permissible to skip it, but adds that “even so, it is good to uphold it.” The Talmud recounts that R. Yehuda Ha-Nasi asked R. Shimon b.Ḥalafta why he did not come to visit during the holiday. He answered sorrowfully that old age had crept up on him: “The rocks seem higher; what had been close is now far; two have become three (meaning he now needed a cane to function as a third leg); and that which promoted peace in the home has ceased” (<em>Shabbat</em> 152a). Rashi explains “that which promoted peace in the home” to refer to the male sexual organ. R. Nissim Gaon says, “It refers to sexual desire, which nurtures peace between husband and wife.” See above, 1:4-6. Rav Kook writes (<em>Mitzvat Re’aya</em>, EH §1) that if an elderly man finds it difficult to have sexual relations, and his wife is willing to forgo <em>ona</em>, he must still engage in relations at least once every six months (the <em>ona</em> of sailors, which is the least frequent; see section 7 above)<em>.</em></i>
  
  Section 12
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Women Who Have Difficulty Fulfilling the Mitzva
  As we learned (section 1 above), the essence of the mitzva is for a husband to pleasure his wife and give her as much joy as he can, until she reaches orgasm. However, this is not in the hands of the husband alone; sometimes, despite his best efforts, his wife will not reach orgasm. There can be various reasons which may account for this. As we already learned (section 2), a woman’s spiritual, psychological, and physical selves are more integrated than a man’s, so when a woman is preoccupied or exhausted, or if she does not recognize the value of the mitzva, it is possible that all attempts will fail to bring her to orgasm. On the contrary, the effort may well leave her frustrated and sad, because as pleasure builds toward its climax, it produces a great physical and psychological yearning to reach orgasm and the release that accompanies it. When that has not been fulfilled, it leaves profound frustration. If a woman repeatedly experiences this frustration, she might prefer to forgo the attempt to have an orgasm altogether, in order to avoid the despondency that follows failure.
  Therefore, when a woman knows that it will be difficult for her to reach orgasm, she can forgo the attempt and still enjoy the pleasant gratification that accompanies the conjugal act itself. To that end, her husband must pleasure her gently, and she should be responsive to him and receive him lovingly. This way they can fulfill the mitzva on a be-di’avad level. As long as they usually succeed in fulfilling the mitzva le-khatḥila, wherein the wife reaches orgasm, and only occasionally rely on what is permitted be-di’avad, this is natural and normal, and they should not feel bad about it at all. But they should make every effort to ensure that this does not happen often.
  When the situation is not as good, and the wife usually does not reach orgasm, the couple must figure out the reason and find a solution. Sometimes the problem stems from exhaustion or stress, in which case they must adjust their lifestyles so that they are more balanced: reducing stress, getting more sleep, or at least making sure to get enough sleep in anticipation of intimacy. Sometimes, the problem occurs early in married life, when a couple has not yet learned how to bring the wife to orgasm, in which case they must learn how to fulfill the mitzva properly. They should not neglect the problem, since this mitzva is no less holy than the other mitzvot. Of course, if the wife knows that something specific will be more enjoyable for her, she should not be embarrassed to tell her husband.
  If, despite all efforts, a husband is unsuccessful in pleasuring his wife and bringing her to orgasm, it is a mitzva for him to consult a rabbi or specialist, or for her to consult a rabbanit or a specialist. Sometimes simple suggestions can solve the problem, in which case a rabbi or rabbanit can help. Sometimes it is necessary to delve deeper into the internal barriers to their union, and sometimes the barrier is the result of a medical condition, in which case it is necessary to consult a specialist. In any case, the couple has an obligation to treat the problem so that they can fulfill the mitzva properly.
  In the meantime, while they are trying to resolve the problems, they must make sure to keep to the regular frequency of ona. As long as the wife gains some pleasure from intercourse itself or from the associated embraces and caresses, then even though their situation is be-di’avad, they are still fulfilling the mitzva. But if the wife does not experience even this pleasure, the situation is grave. They must continue to have intercourse on a regular basis, thereby upholding the covenant of their marriage, but they are fulfilling only the bare minimum of the mitzva, as when a mitzva is fulfilled under extenuating circumstances. However, as we have said, this must not suffice for them; they are obligated to seek help and to consult with experts so that they can fulfill the mitzva le-khatḥila. For when the wife does not enjoy the mitzva, she is left feeling empty, and it is also very hurtful to her husband, as he, too, is prevented from experiencing the most profound joy. Instead of his desire to be intimate with his wife being received joyfully and leading to a wholesome and noble union, he is left lonely and miserable; his sexual desire seems like a contemptible lust that forces him to have sex with his wife in order to satisfy his urges and avoid sin.
  Nevertheless, if they made every effort but did not manage to find a remedy for their condition, they should still make sure to have sexual relations on a regular basis, fulfilling the mitzva under these extenuating circumstances. The kindness and compassion that they have for one another and their fulfillment of their moral obligations toward one another, as the Torah commands, will sanctify their marriage covenant.12<i class="footnote">There are three levels in the fulfillment of this mitzva: a) The primary mitzva, wherein the husband pleasures his wife until she reaches orgasm; b) <em>be-di’avad</em>, when the woman enjoys sexual relations but does not climax; for those who practice ascetic sanctity, when the wife is in complete agreement, this, too, is considered <em>le-khatḥila</em> (3:12 below); c) under extenuating circumstances, when the woman derives no pleasure, but she and her husband have sexual relations in order to fulfill their marital covenant and in order to prevent the husband from sinning, which is the lowest purpose for fulfilling the mitzva (3:3 below), although there is still holiness (3:5 below). As long as they are married, husband and wife may not forgo a set <em>ona</em> time unless there is full mutual consent, because the <em>onot</em> give expression to their marital union. We have already seen (1:2) that refusing intimacy is the principal grounds for divorce, for it goes against the very reason for marrying. Only if a woman has a very compelling reason may she, with rabbinic consent, forgo one of the set times of <em>ona</em> (see note 6 above). Pregnancy and nursing are not considered compelling reasons, unless a doctor has given special instructions in her particular case. It must be emphasized that one should avoid going to doctors who make light of the mitzva of <em>ona</em>, and who irresponsibly instruct their patients to refrain from intercourse, or who do not make efforts to find remedies for women whose excessive bleeding renders them prohibited to their husbands. The Sages tell us that King David was so pious that he was willing to forgo the honor due a king, sullying his hands with blood from the amniotic sac and the placenta in order to be able to render a woman pure and permitted to her husband (<em>Berakhot</em> 4a). In contrast, these doctors, whose job this is, cavalierly separate husbands and wives. Therefore, even when a couple receive medical instruction to abstain from sexual relations, the couple should consult with a respected rabbi regarding how to proceed. Sometimes it is necessary to switch doctors, and sometimes, when the doctor is God-fearing and reliable, they must consider whether it would be proper to have anal sexual relations (see section 18 below; Rema, EH 25:2). Often, affairs and betrayals begin when a couple is not having sexual relations regularly, such as while the wife is pregnant or nursing (3:7 below, and n. 4).Some women suffer from fear of intercourse (genophobia) or conditions like vaginismus and vestibulodynia, which make them unable to have sexual intercourse or make it painful, with varying degrees of pain, even if technically possible. These issues have become more common in recent times, affecting up to ten percent of women. It seems to stem, in part, from the tension between permissiveness and natural bashfulness, such that a traumatic experience, in which a woman is pressured by prevailing norms into overcoming her sense of privacy, can generate or exacerbate such problems.According to halakha, when a woman cannot have sexual relations with her husband, it is grounds for divorce, and her husband is exempt from paying her ketuba and its supplements, since the basic premise of marriage is not being fulfilled (see SA EH 117:2; Piskei Din Rabbaniyim vol. 4, p. 325). If a woman allows her husband to have sexual relations with her at the set times but suffers from them, then since he cannot be happy with her as is accepted and appropriate, he has the right to divorce her, but he must pay her ketuba (see Beit Shmuel, EH 117:9). However, this need not lead to divorce, since it is almost always possible to solve the problem so that she can reach orgasm normally. Unfortunately, many women who suffer from these conditions do not understand the severity of the problem. It seems that their physical difficulty combines with an emotional obstruction, to the extent that they think that physical intimacy is not important. To their thinking, if their husbands have a hard time with that, they must overcome their urges and not hound their wives. They do not realize that had their husbands known about this issue from the start, they probably would have called off the wedding. These wives are also oblivious to the fact that if the problem persists, the chances are that sooner or later, it will lead to divorce. In mild cases, realizing the importance of the mitzva and acknowledging the deleterious effect that the problem has on the marriage enables the woman to overcome the problem without outside intervention. In more severe cases, this awareness allows her to understand the importance of seeking treatment and gives her the courage to follow the instructions of doctors and therapists until the root of the problem is found and it is then resolved.</i>
  
  Section 13
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Flawed Sexual Union and the Resulting Children
  The Sages commend those who sanctify themselves during marital sexual relations, stating that they will merit having good children (Shevu’ot 18b). This “sanctity” entails the couple concentrating solely on their wholehearted love for one another. The greater their love, and the greater their wish for good and righteous children, the holier their sexual union, through which they merit having such children (above, 1:4 and 2:5-6; below, 3:3).
  In contrast, the less love and devotion they have toward one another, the more flawed their sexual union, and the greater the likelihood of imperfections within their children. The Talmud lists nine types of flaws in marital sexual relations as well as the resulting imperfections in children conceived through such unions: “Children of fear and rape; children of antipathy; children of ostracism; children of exchange; children of strife; children of drunkenness; children of estrangement; children of entanglement; and children of brazenness” (Nedarim 20b):13<i class="footnote">em&gt;Masekhet Kalla 1:16 states that “they are like <em>mamzerim</em>, yet they are not <em>mamzerim</em>.” The implication is that these children are considered to be born out of a type of emotional adultery. A woman’s thoughts can be just as damaging as a man’s, as is evident from <em>Tanḥuma</em> Naso §7: “If a woman has sexual relations with her husband and is thinking about a man she saw on the street while her husband is penetrating her, there is nothing more adulterous than this.” Rather, the most important thing is for husband and wife to achieve sexual union with complete love for one another, as Rambam wrote, “with mutual desire and joy” (MT, Laws of Dispositions 5:4). Likewise, the other Rishonim wrote that lack of love is what leads to the nine types of flaw (Raavad, <em>Sha’ar Ha-kedusha</em><em>Tur</em>, EH 25:1). The Vilna Gaon, discussing the importance of sanctifying oneself during marital sexual relations, writes: “This refers primarily to the children of the nine flaws, of which it is written, ‘I will remove from you those who rebel and transgress’ (Yeḥezkel 20:38), who originate in the mixed multitude and the Tree of Knowledge” (commentary on <em>Tikkunei Zohar</em>, end of §53). Rabbeinu Baḥya likewise writes, “Sanctity is purity of thought, that he does not think about another woman or anything else, only his wife” (commentary on Bereishit 30:38). In 3:3 below we will explain the two levels of sanctity during intimacy.</i>
  1. Children of fear and rape: The husband threatens his wife and coerces her into having sexual relations, or the wife forces her husband to have sexual relations with her with coercion or intimidation.
  2. Children of antipathy: The husband despises his wife and has sex with her only to satisfy his urges, or the wife despises her husband and has sex with him only to satisfy her urges.
  3. Children of ostracism: The couple has sexual relations when one of them has been excommunicated. Although a person who is excommunicated is not prohibited from having sexual relations (Shakh, YD 334:12), nevertheless, since the rest of the community must distance themselves from such people until they repair their actions, sexual intimacy with them does not have the proper devotion and joy.
  4. Children of exchange: During sexual intercourse, the husband is thinking about another woman or the wife about another man.
  5. Children of strife: The couple is in the middle of an argument and they have sexual relations before making up. Their quarrel does not permit them to forgo their ona, but they have a duty to make up before having sexual relations.
  6. Children of drunkenness: If a couple has sexual relations while one of them is drunk, their union lacks the complete focus on their love and unity.
  7. Children of estrangement: When one of the couple wants to divorce, even if they still have love for each other, their union is incomplete.
  8. Children of entanglement: A woman divorces and remarries someone else within three months (leading to confusion about paternity).
  9. Children of brazenness: When a woman demands sex from her husband in a brazen, coarse, or foul-mouthed manner, or a husband from his wife, such a union contains no love, only the satisfying of lust.
  Masekhet Kalla (1:16) introduces a tenth category, children of sleeping: When a man has sexual relations with his wife while she is sleeping, such a union lacks mutual love.
  It is said of people conceived under these nine circumstances that since their souls are drawn down to this world by means of a union devoid of love and unity, they are flawed, making it difficult for them to connect to the sacred or to overcome their evil impulses. In addition, when parents lack love and understanding, their feelings of distance and alienation negatively impact the children, who need an environment of love, friendship, stability, and emotional warmth in order to thrive.
  Of course, children conceived under these circumstances have free will like everyone else, and if they choose to do what is right, their reward will be even greater, for they will have overcome their evil impulse as well as the poor role models they witnessed at home. However, if they do not make the effort to improve themselves, their tendency toward wickedness will prevail.
  When peaceful harmony between husband and wife is compromised throughout the Jewish people, and many children are conceived from flawed unions, it causes a rift between God and the Jewish people, leading to the exile of the people from their land. The purpose of the travails of exile is to purge Israel of its sinners and rebels, born of flawed unions, and to restore and rekindle faith, leading to Israel’s ultimate redemption. As it says, “I will remove from you those who rebel and transgress against Me; I will take them out of the countries where they sojourn, but they shall not enter upon the soil of Israel. Then you shall know that I am the Lord” (Yeḥezkel 20:38; see also 20:40-44).
  
  Section 14
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Inappropriate Times for Sexual Relations
  Marital sexual relations are prohibited during times of national crisis, such as widespread famine or war. Only those who have not yet fulfilled the mitzva of procreation may be intimate during such times (Ta’anit 11a; SA 240:12; MB ad loc. 47). On mikveh night, many permit marital sexual relations even in times of crisis (SA 574:4). Others are stringent (MA). If a man’s urge is overpowering him, making him likely to sin, he may have sexual relations with his wife even when the world is in crisis (MB 240:46).
  On Yom Kippur and Tisha Be-Av, sexual relations are forbidden as one of the five activities prohibited on these major fast days. In order to ensure that they not end up sinning, husband and wife should behave on these days as they do while she is a nidda. That is, they should neither touch each other, nor sleep in the same bed (SA 615:1; MB ad loc. 1). However, during the day of Tisha Be-Av, which is not as strict, they may touch, since there is little concern that it will lead to intimacy. Still, even on the day of Tisha Be-Av, they may not touch affectionately or sleep in the same bed (Peninei Halakha: Zemanim 10:9; Peninei Halakha: Yamim Nora’im 8:7).
  A person observing the seven-day mourning period (shiva) may not have sexual relations, because the mitzva of ona must be fulfilled joyfully, while a mourner is grieving (Mo’ed Katan 15b; SA YD 383:1). However, a mourner need not observe the additional rabbinical restrictions (harḥakot) of nidda. Therefore, husband and wife may touch, and she may make his bed in his presence. Still, hugging and kissing of a sexual nature are prohibited (Rema, YD 383:1; Nehar Mitzrayim, Hilkhot Avelut §113; Shulḥan Gavo’ah 342:14). If the mourner plans to sleep in their own bed, the couple must separate their beds to avoid a situation that may lead to sexual intimacy (SA ad loc.). It would seem that a comforting hug and a polite kiss are permitted, as long as they are not sexual in nature. Upon conclusion of the shiva, the couple should resume fulfilling the mitzva of ona completely. It is even a mitzva for the wife to adorn herself for that purpose, even during the thirty-day mourning period (SA YD 381:6).14<i class="footnote">Some observed the stringency of refraining from sexual relations, bathing, and applying ointments on the eve of the minor fast days, but that was during times of terrible persecution. At such times, some say that <em>le-khatḥila</em> all the fast days should be treated like Tisha Be-Av. Nowadays, there is no place for this stringency, as explained in <em>Peninei Halakha: Zemanim</em>, ch. 7 n. 2. MA (240:3) states that according to Arizal, it is proper to refrain from sexual relations on the nights of Rosh Ha-shana, Seder night, Shavu’ot, and Shemini Atzeret (and certainly not during the daytime of those holidays). Nevertheless, if <em>mikveh</em> night falls out on one of these times, it is a mitzva to have sexual relations on those nights as well (<em>Shlah</em>). Other Aḥaronim echo this stringency. <em>Ḥokhmat Adam</em> 128:19 argues that the stringency is limited to a man who is so God-fearing that there is no concern that he might have sinful thoughts. For any man who does not fit into this category, it is best that he have sexual marital relations and avoid sinning. This is also the position of MB 240:7. <em>Darkhei Tahara</em> adds (22:24) that when there is a mitzva from the Torah to have sexual relations, such as when the wife yearns for it, the mitzva applies even on those nights.</i>
  
  Section 15
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Privacy
  Privacy (tzni’ut; lit. “hiddenness”) is an expression of the sanctity of the mitzva of ona; Rashi explains the Sages’ exhortation to sanctify oneself: “Engage in sexual relations in a private manner” (Nidda 71a). This precious mitzva is meant to express the complete unity between husband and wife, so it is forbidden to expose it before others, and it is forbidden for others to discuss it. Every couple has its own special way of being together, which encompasses a whole world. Any couple lucky enough to be madly in love feels that there is nothing else like their love in the whole world. The Kabbala likewise explains that at the moment when husband and wife achieve true unity, light and blessing spread through all the worlds. Since their union is so profound, it should be kept like a secret between them.
  Sexual intimacy must therefore take place at home or in an enclosed, private area. It is forbidden to have intercourse in public or in an open space, even if there is no one there to see it. Those who do so look like they are behaving promiscuously and habituating themselves to sinfulness, for which they deserve to be punished (Sanhedrin 46a; SA EH 25:4). 
  It is forbidden to have sexual relations in the presence of any other person, even someone who is sleeping, for they may wake up. Technically, a couple may have sexual relations in the presence of a preverbal baby; however, this, too, is inappropriate, and is therefore permitted only when there is no other option, and when the baby is sleeping. If the baby wakes up while the couple are still having intercourse, they may continue. Le-khatḥila, there should not be pets, such as dogs or cats, present.
  It is customary for the couple to be under covers during sexual intercourse, even where there is no light (see Darkhei Tahara 22:39).
  The couple must keep the time of their sexual relations private. During intercourse, they should be careful that their voices cannot be heard by others. It is also proper for the wife to be discreet about when she goes to the mikveh, so that no one will sense that she is going (Rema, YD 198:48).
  To ensure that intimacy takes place joyfully and in private, without concern that children or guests might suddenly enter the room, the couple should make sure to lock the door to their room. They should do so every night when they go to sleep, so that it is not obvious when they are fulfilling the mitzva. They should also not let one of the children sleep in their room.
  Husband and wife should not tell others about their lovemaking practices. Only when necessary, to seek guidance and obtain advice, may this information be divulged. Furthermore, a couple may not speak about their intimacy in a coarse or foul-mouthed manner, such as in the manner of those who tell dirty jokes (MT, Laws of Dispositions 5:4).
  It is likewise forbidden to talk about anyone else’s sex lives unnecessarily, and all such talk is considered nivul peh (vulgar, explicit, or foul language). It transforms vibrant discussion whose purpose is to increase blessing into repulsive, dead speech. Such talk can be compared to a decaying carcass (nevela), which is forbidden to eat. The Sages say, “Everyone knows why a bride enters the ḥuppa, but if someone speaks about it in a vulgar manner, then even if the heavenly court had sealed a decree of seventy good years on his behalf, it will all turn bad on him” (Shabbat 33a).
  Guests may have sexual relations as long as they have a closed room, there is no concern that the hosts will be aware of it, and they leave no evidence on the sheets.
  It is proper for a couple to refrain from behaving in a way that expresses their desire for one another in front of others (Rema, EH 21:5). A polite hug or kiss, in a society where this is considered acceptable, is not a breach of modesty, but if it expresses sexual desire, it is immodest, for the love between husband and wife is a very deep and personal matter. Exposing it in front of others trivializes it and cheapens it. The couple should also be sensitive to the fact that such displays of affection can cause pain and stir up jealousy among those who are not privileged to be in such a relationship.15<i class="footnote">In extreme cases, breaches of modesty are grounds for divorce. For example, the Sages say in the <em>mishna</em>, “The following women are divorced without receiving their <em>ketuba</em>…a noisy woman…. What woman is considered ‘noisy’? When she speaks in her home, her neighbors can hear her voice” (<em>m. Ketubot</em> 7:6). Rambam explains that this means they can hear her loudly demanding sex from her husband. Similarly, if a husband vows to abstain from sexual relations with his wife unless she shares details of their private life with others, she is entitled to a divorce and payment of her <em>ketuba</em><em>Ketubot</em> 72a-b).Matters of modesty and privacy are dependent upon accepted norms. Therefore, in the past, when homes were smaller and sometimes an entire family lived in one room, parents were allowed to be sexually intimate while their children (and anyone else in the room) were sleeping. Moreover, in those times, people generally slept more soundly, since they worked at hard physical labor all day. However, now that homes have several rooms, norms of privacy dictate that sexual intimacy is forbidden in a room where someone else is sleeping. See Harḥavot 13:5-6. It is worth adding that locking their bedroom door not only allows a couple to fulfill the mitzva with great joy, but it also has educational value in that it teaches the couple’s children how deep and personal their parents’ relationship is, and that it must not be disturbed. They will thus learn by example how to live accordingly, and they will merit establishing good families of their own.</i>
  
  Section 16
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Sexual Intimacy with the Lights On
  It is forbidden to have sexual relations during the day, as it is forbidden to do so in the light. This is a matter of modesty and privacy, which is a characteristic Jewish trait (Yevamot 79a). The Sages said, “The Jewish people are holy; they do not have sexual relations during the day” (Nidda 17a). Similarly, it is prohibited to have sexual relations at night where there is light (SA 240:11). This does not mean that the room must be pitch dark; rather, if moonlight comes into the room, sexual relations are permitted as long as it does not truly illuminate them. Some people are stringent when possible, closing the blinds or curtains to block out even this light (see MB 240:39).
  This prohibition is limited to the conjugal act itself, which must be private and hidden, deep and sublime, as befits this holy mitzva. There is also a concern that perhaps in the light, a man’s wife will seem less attractive to him. The basis of their love is infinite, transcending external beauty, but when they have sexual relations in the light, it becomes limited, dependent on external appearances, and no longer an expression of their endless love. The inner beauty and mystery of their lovemaking is liable to dissipate, which can have a deleterious effect on their relationship. We find a similar phenomenon in the Amida prayer: because it is so sublime and profound, it must be whispered, unlike the other prayers and blessings, which are said aloud. (See Tikkunei Zohar §10, 25a for the comparison of intimacy with the Amida.)
  In a darkened room, since it is nightlike, sexual relations are permitted even during the day. If a couple find that their lovemaking is more enjoyable during the day (for example, when they know they will be too tired at night), it is better for them to have sexual relations during the day, in a darkened room. The Talmud relates that this was the custom of King Monobaz’s household, whom the Sages praised for fulfilling the mitzva of ona joyfully (Nidda 17a). Likewise, if a man returns home in the middle of the day from the army or a long trip, he and his wife may darken their room and have sexual relations during the day, even le-khatḥila. Nevertheless, when there is no special need or advantage to having sexual relations during the day, it is best saved for the night, the time that is most suitable and affords the most privacy.
  In a time of need, when it is impossible to make the room dark, a Torah scholar may have relations with his wife during the day, provided that they cover their bodies and heads with a blanket. The Sages did not extend this permit to others even in times of need, lest they become lax in this regard (Rema 240:11). However, under pressing circumstances, when a man sees that his urges are overpowering him and he is liable to violate the prohibition of wasting seed (hotza’at zera le-vatala), he may have relations with his wife during the day, on condition that they cover their bodies and heads with a blanket (Ḥokhmat Adam 128:9; SHT 240:25).
  At night, if a couple is in a room with lights on or a lit candle, they may not have sexual relations even if they cover themselves with a blanket. Rather, they must put out the light. Even on Friday night, when it is forbidden to put out the lights, they may not have sexual relations even when completely covered by a blanket, as the Sages proscribed relations in a lit-up room (SA 240:11). If the light is coming from outside the room, then the law is the same as during the day; in times of need, a Torah scholar may be lenient and rely on the darkness provided by a blanket, and under pressing circumstances, anyone may rely on this leniency (MB ad loc. 41).16<i class="footnote">According to the vast majority of Rishonim and Aḥaronim (including Rif; Raavad; SA 240:11; MA <em>ad loc. </em>26; and AHS <em>ad loc. </em>16), sexual relations are permissible during the day in a dark room even <em>le-khatḥila</em>. Others say that it is allowed only in a time of need or under pressing circumstances (<em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 240:80; <em>Darkhei Tahara</em> 22:13).Darkhei Tahara 22:30 states that the couple must cover themselves with a blanket from head to toe, and so states Ben Ish Ḥai, Year 2, Vayera §26. However, Rabbeinu Yehonatan (commenting on Rif, Eruvin 33b) implies that it is enough to cover the head and most of the body.The conjugal act itself is prohibited in the light, but foreplay is not. We find nothing that prohibits a couple from gazing at one another’s naked bodies. The only exception is that according to some poskim (on Nedarim 20a-b), it is forbidden for the husband to gaze at his wife’s vagina (see section 19 below). On the other hand, it is forbidden to have sexual relations in the light. We can therefore conclude that the prohibition pertains only to conjugal act itself. This is the conclusion of Mishkan Yisrael, part 2, p. 79. Also, see Darkhei Tahara, ch. 22, additional material and responsa §6.At night, when there is light in the room, it is forbidden to have sexual relations even under the covers (Raavad; Smak; Ritva; SA 240:11 and EH 25:5; Eliya Rabba; MB 240:39). Although there are a few poskim who have ruled leniently in this matter (Ḥida, Petaḥ Einayim on Nidda 17b; Kaf Ha-ḥayim 240:71), here I follow the opinion of the poskim who rule stringently.</i>
  
  Section 17
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / In the Presence of Sacred Texts
  Even though the sanctity of the mitzva of ona is very great, it is still necessary to separate different realms; the mitzva of ona involves unbounded physical liberation and joy, whereas Torah must be studied with a sense of dread, awe, fear, and trembling, and a Torah scroll must be treated with seriousness and gravity (as explained below, 3:9). Therefore, marital relations are forbidden in a room in which there is a Torah scroll written with ink on parchment as it was written at Mount Sinai. If at all possible, the Torah scroll should be removed from the room. If that is not an option, a barrier must be set up between the Torah and the bed in such a way that the scroll is considered to be in a separate domain. The barrier must be at least ten tefaḥim (30 in or 76 cm) high and four amot (6 ft or 1.82 m) wide (Darkhei Tahara 22:41). The scroll must also not be visible to the couple.
  It is forbidden to have sexual relations in a room where there are tefilin, a mezuza, or any other handwritten sacred text. However, if one covers these objects with two covers, it is permitted. The regular tefilin case or mezuza cover can serve as the first cover, but the second covering must be specifically for this purpose. The tefilin must be covered with a sheet or towel or placed in an additional case. Usually, a mezuza already has two covers, at least one of which is opaque, making it permissible to have sexual relations (or change a baby’s diaper, etc.) in that room.
  As for printed Torah texts on a shelf or elsewhere in the room, their binding serves as one cover, and it is proper to cover them with an additional cover, like cloth or paper. Under pressing circumstances, when this is impossible to do so, they may have sexual relations provided that they make sure to cover themselves with a blanket, so that they are not naked in the presence of the books.17<i class="footnote">There are several uncertainties with respect to printed books. The first is whether they have the same status as manuscripts. According to most <em>poskim</em>, they have the same status as handwritten sacred texts (this is the opinion of <em>Masat Binyamin</em> §99; <em>Taz</em>, YD 271:8; MB 40:4; and the overwhelming majority of <em>poskim</em>; however, <em>Ḥavot Ya’ir</em> §187 and <em>Eliya Rabba</em> 40:2 rule leniently under pressing circumstances). The second is whether a book binding is considered the first covering. Some say that it is (<em>Birkei Yosef</em> and <em>Ḥesed La’alafim</em>), while others maintain that it is not (MA and MB 40:4). In combination with the prior uncertainty, one may be lenient (<em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 40:14; <em>Darkhei Tahara</em> 22:49; <em>Piskei Teshuvot</em> 40:3).Under pressing circumstances, the blanket covering the couple may be considered a covering for this purpose. Then, together with the binding, there are two covers, once the view that printed books do not have the same level of sanctity as manuscript books is factored in (Kaf Ha-ḥayim 40:17; Darkhei Tahara 22:57).Be-di’avad, it is permissible to have sexual relations in a room where the mezuza does not have a double covering, in accordance with the view of Ma’amar Mordechai 40:2, namely, that the requirement for two coverings applies to tefilin but not a mezuza, which is set in place and which is more than ten tefaḥim off the floor. This is the position of Responsa Zivḥei Tzedek §40 and Halakha Berura 40:9.</i>
  Some say that it is necessary to perform netilat yadayim (ritual handwashing) after relations (Shlah; Darkhei Tahara 24:3). However, in practice, there is no obligation to do this, and those who wish to go straight to sleep may do so.18<i class="footnote">The Rishonim and most Aḥaronim do not mention a requirement of <em>netilat yadayim</em>. However, SA 4:18 states that some say it is necessary to do <em>netilat yadayim </em>after sexual relations. One possible explanation is that this refers to a person who gets out of bed following relations and starts going about his business. In contrast, a person who simply goes to sleep can fulfill the obligation of <em>netilat yadayim </em>upon waking. This is the opinion of <em>Taharat</em> <em>Moshe</em> 3:17 and R. Meir Mazuz. Likewise, R. Yosef Messas writes that the custom is not to do <em>netilat yadayim </em>after relations (<em>Mayim Ḥayim</em> 2:1:3).</i>
  
  Section 18
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Anal Intercourse
  Normal sexual intercourse is vaginal, but some people desire anal intercourse, which the Talmud calls bi’a she-lo ke-darka, “abnormal intercourse.” Clearly, if anal sexual intercourse is painful for the wife or done against her wishes, it is forbidden. But what if she consents or even desires it? The Talmud records (Nedarim 20b) that the Sages ruled that it is not prohibited. On the other hand, we learn (Yevamot 34b) that the sin of Yehuda’s sons, Er and Onan, was that they penetrated Tamar anally, thereby wasting their seed. This was evil in God’s eyes (Bereishit 38:7 and 38:10), and He put them to death.
  Most Rishonim explain that when a couple engages in anal intercourse in order to avoid pregnancy, it is considered a waste of seed and is forbidden. However, if they engage in it occasionally, it is not prohibited. Some Rishonim explain that the Sages permitted anal sexual intercourse as long as the husband does not ejaculate in the anus. Rather, the couple must later engage in vaginal intercourse, culminating in ejaculation. Some halakhic authorities forbid even this.
  In practice, a man who feels a need may rely on the opinion of most poskim, who permit this on occasion, as long as his wife consents.19<i class="footnote">The Talmud (<em>Nedarim</em> 20a-b) states: “R. Yoḥanan b. Dahavai said, ‘The ministering angels told me four things. Why are people born lame? Because [their fathers] flipped over their tables (that is, had anal intercourse).’” Later in the discussion, R. Yoḥanan said, “These are the words of Yoḥanan b. Dahavai, but the Sages said that the <em>halakha</em> does not follow Yoḥanan b. Dahavai. Rather, whatever a man wishes to do with his wife, he may do.” The Talmud further recounts: “A certain woman came to R. Yehuda Ha-Nasi and said to him, ‘I set the table for my husband, and he overturned it. (I.e., I prepared for normal intercourse, and he penetrated me anally. Is this forbidden?)’ R. Yehuda Ha-Nasi replied, ‘My child, the Torah permits this. What then can I do?’” His answer implies that he was uncomfortable with this, but could not forbid it since the Torah allows it. Perhaps in this case the woman took no pleasure in it, but agreed on condition that it was not prohibited. The Talmud continues with yet another story: “A woman came to Rav and said, ‘Rabbi, I set the table for my husband, and he overturned it.’ He replied, ‘How is this any different from fish?’” Rav was invoking an opinion of the Sages cited a few lines earlier: “Whatever a man wishes to do with his wife, he may do. An analogy can be drawn to meat from the butcher. If he wishes to eat it salted, he may; if he wants to eat it roasted, he may; if he wants to eat it seethed, he may; if he wants to eat it stewed, he may. The same is true of fish delivered from the fisherman.” The implication is that according to Rav, there is no prohibition, just as a person may eat fish however he likes.This seems to contradict a talmudic passage (Yevamot 34b), which states that the sin of Er and Onan was having anal intercourse with Tamar, thereby wasting their seed. Most poskim limit this prohibition to doing this regularly to avoid conception. When done occasionally, it is permissible. This is the opinion of Tosafot (Sanhedrin 58b, s.v. “mi”); Tosafot Rid (Yevamot 12b, s.v. “tanei”); Or Zaru’a (Kuntres Ha-re’ayot on Sanhedrin 58a); Rosh (Yevamot 3:9); Rabbeinu Yeruḥam (Toldot Adam Ve-Ḥava, netiv 23, part 1); Mordechai (Shevu’ot, Hilkhot Nidda §732); Hagahot Maimoniyot (Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 23:4); Ritva (in his primary explanation as cited in Shita Mekubetzet, Nedarim 20b); and Rabbeinu Yona (Sanhedrin 58b). This is also the correct text of Rambam (MT, Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 21:9). It is also the opinion of Yam Shel Shlomo (Yevamot 3:18); Levush (240:14); Shetilei Zeitim (240:20); and Torot Emet, Yeshu’ot Yaakov, and Erekh Shai in their commentaries on SA EH 25:2.Others are stringent and maintain that anal sexual intercourse is permitted only on condition that the husband does not ejaculate there. This is the opinion of R. Avraham Min Ha-har (Nedarim ad loc.); Orḥot Ḥayim (Hilkhot Ketubot §7); Ri (in his first explanation as cited in Tosafot, Yevamot 34b s.v. “ve–lo”); Beit Yosef (EH 25:2); and AHS (EH 25:11). This is also the reading that appears in the printed editions of Rambam’s Mishneh Torah. Some are even stricter and do not permit anal penetration at all (Sefer Ḥaredim ch. 64; Shlah, Sha’ar Ha-otiyot, Kedushat Ha-zivug §§360-364). They understand the phrase “shelo ke-darka” (non-normal) to mean that the wife is on top of her husband or that the husband is behind his wife during vaginal intercourse. Even when it comes to these positions, people who do not feel a need for them are considered holy. According to these authorities, the Sages did not even speak of anal intercourse because it is forbidden. However, this interpretation is rejected by almost all poskim. Rema mentions the first two opinions and concludes, “Even though this is all permitted, anyone who sanctifies himself [by refraining from] what is permitted to him is considered holy” (EH 25:2).In practice, the halakha follows those who are lenient, as they are in the majority. Furthermore, according to most poskim the entire discussion relates to a rabbinic prohibition (because it is not truly a violation of the prohibition against wasting seed, as masturbation would be for a man). On the contrary, if this brings the husband joy and satisfaction, it has value and is a mitzva. Certainly, then, if both husband and wife enjoy it, it is a fulfillment of the mitzva of ona according to most poskim. Rav Kook wrote similarly in his explanation of the lenient opinion: “Even in this manner, when done occasionally, since the Torah permits it according to this opinion, it is considered something of a mitzva as it helps satisfy the husband, and therefore is not really a waste [of seed]” (Ezrat Kohen §35).</i>
  Some say that even vaginal intercourse should take place with the man on top of the woman, face to face (i.e., the missionary position). Some are very insistent on this. Although there is something virtuous about this, technically all possible positions are permitted, as long as both spouses desire them. If changing position enhances the pleasure of either spouse, then doing so is a fulfillment of the mitzva of simḥat ona. However, if neither spouse wants to change, it is preferable for their sexual relations to take place in the optimal manner, namely the missionary position. Even if they find a different position more enjoyable, when they are trying to conceive it is better to use the missionary position.20<i class="footnote">According to <em>Kalla Rabbati</em> 1:23, “He on the bottom and she on top – this is impudent.” Several Rishonim cite this (Raavad, <em>Sha’ar Ha-kedusha</em>; <em>Ohel Mo’ed</em>; <em>Sefer Ha-eshkol</em>; <em>Menorat Ha-ma’or</em>; and <em>Tur</em>). SA 240:5 cites it as well, as do many Aḥaronim. <em>Sefer Ḥasidim</em> §509 limits the admonition to <em>mikveh</em> night, when it is more likely that the woman will conceive. This is also the approach of <em>Birkei Yosef</em> 240:7 and <em>Da’at Torah</em> 240:5.In contrast, most Rishonim, and Rambam foremost among them, do not record the admonition at all. As Rabbeinu Yeruḥam writes, “The case in Nedarim about a woman who said that she set a table and her husband turned it over, which the Sages ruled was permitted, was referring to anal intercourse. It does not mean that she was on top and he was beneath her, because that is certainly permitted, and she would not have been upset about it” (Toldot Adam Ve-Ḥava, netiv 23, part 1). Zohar (II 259a) implies that the admonition is against positions where the husband faces his wife’s back, “For it says, ‘And he shall cling to his wife’ (Bereishit 2:24) – specifically to his wife, not behind his wife.” Ma’amar Mordechai 240:7 explains that the problem with the “impudent” position is that it seems like the woman is trying to dominate her husband, implying that if both spouses consent, it is permissible. In practice, since according to most poskim it is not forbidden to change from the missionary position, they may. Even those who are stringent view insistence on the missionary position as a pious practice, not a requirement, and some explain that the stringency applies only when there is no mutual consent. Therefore, a couple who wants to change from the missionary position may do so, and it is even a mitzva if it increases their pleasure. Nevertheless, when a couple is hoping to conceive, the pious practice is for them to defer to the stringent opinion and have sexual relations in the missionary position.</i>
  
  Section 19
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Oral Sex
  The Talmud relates that R. Yoḥanan b. Dahavai said, “The ministering angels told me four things…. Why are people born mute? Because [their fathers] kissed the vagina…. Why are people born blind? Because [their fathers] gazed at the vagina” (Nedarim 20a). However, at the conclusion of the discussion, the Talmud states that this is a solitary opinion, whereas the Sages’ opinion is that these practices are not prohibited (ibid. 20b).
  Some Rishonim are stringent, saying that cunnilingus is forbidden, as is gazing at the vagina, though there is no danger involved (Raavad). Other Rishonim say that doing so is permitted, but that it is pious to show concern for potential danger (Smak). Nevertheless, according to the vast majority of Rishonim, R. Yoḥanan b. Dahavai’s opinion is rejected, and the halakha follows the Sages, who maintain that doing so is neither prohibited nor dangerous. Some of those Rishonim even maintain that there is no less holiness in doing so (Yere’im). Many, though, think that while doing so is neither prohibited nor dangerous, a holier and more modest practice is to refrain (Rambam; Smak; Rema, EH 25:2).
  In practice, since most Rishonim are lenient, and even those who forbid it agree that the prohibition is rabbinic, it is not prohibited. However, because most Rishonim feel that modesty and holiness make it preferable to be stringent, it is proper to show concern for their opinion (Rema, EH 25:2). However, if one spouse finds it very enjoyable, and their enjoyment will be marred without it, then the joy of the mitzva of ona overrides the stringent opinions, and the couple should follow the majority of the poskim. If they wish to be stringent, they can refrain from this when there is a possibility of conception. If either spouse finds it repulsive, they should follow the stringent view.
  There are no limitations on a wife seeing or kissing her husband’s penis. Still, they should not do anything that repulses either one of them. If a specific act is particularly enjoyable for one of them, then even if the other one is not so interested in it, as long as they are not repulsed, there is an element of mitzva in it, for whatever adds to the love and joy of their intimate relations is part of the mitzva of ona as well as the mitzva to “love your fellow as yourself.”21<i class="footnote">According to most <em>poskim</em>, the <em>halakha</em> follows the Sages, who allow a husband to gaze at his wife’s vagina and perform cunnilingus, and who maintain that this poses no danger to their children. R. Yoḥanan b. Dahavai’s opinion was rejected, as R. Yoḥanan said: “Those are the words of Yoḥanan b. Dahavai, but the Sages said that the <em>halakha</em> does not follow Yoḥanan b. Dahavai. Rather, whatever a man wishes to do with his wife, he may do” (<em>Nedarim</em> 20b). Yet many hold that while there is no prohibition or danger, it is more modest and holier not to do these acts. This is the opinion of Rambam (MT, Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 21:9; <em>Peirush Ha-Mishnayot</em> on <em>Sanhedrin</em> 7:4); Me’iri (<em>Nedarim</em> 20b); <em>Kol Bo</em> (§75); and <em>Tzeda La-derekh</em><em>ma’amar</em> 3, <em>klal</em> 4, ch. 14). Along the same lines, <em>Smak</em> §285 states that it is pious to show concern for danger.Others maintain that there is no lack of sanctity in this. This opinion is explicit in Sefer Yere’im (cited by Shita Mekubetzet, Nedarim 20b), and can be inferred from Maḥzor Vitri (§528) and Sefer Ha-eshkol (Albeck edition, Hilkhot Tzni’ut 34b), which state that the halakha follows the Sages without making mention of any higher level of modesty or sanctity. Other Rishonim write extensively on the laws and customs of ona without making mention of R. Yoḥanan b. Dahavai’s admonitions. These include Igeret Ha-kodesh (which is attributed to Ramban) and Smag, Lo Ta’aseh 126. It would seem that in their opinion, there is neither prohibition nor any lack of sanctity involved.Some are stringent and maintain that gazing at the vagina and cunnilingus are forbidden but not dangerous. They write that cunnilingus violates the prohibition of bal teshaktzu (“Do not make yourselves abominable”; Vayikra 11:43). This is the approach of Raavad (Sha’ar Ha-kedusha) and Tur (240; EH 25). It is also implied in Ohel Mo’ed (Sha’ar Isur Ve-heter, derekh 11, netiv 2). SA 240:4, cites Raavad’s strict opinion, as do Beit Shmuel 25:1; Ḥokhmat Adam 128:3; Od Yosef Ḥai, Shoftim §16; Igrot Moshe, YD 2:75; and Darkhei Tahara 22:4.However, Beit Yosef, EH 25, notes that there is no prohibition according to Rambam, implying agreement with this ruling. This is why R. Karo does not mention any prohibition in SA EH 25. Rema, EH 25:2, writes, “Even though all of these acts are permissible, anyone who sanctifies himself by [refraining from] what is permitted to him is considered holy.” The Aḥaronim explain Rema to mean that it is technically permissible, and it seems that they agree with this (Atzei Arazim; Torot Emet; Ezer Mi-kodesh; Yeshu’ot Yaakov; and R. Kapah’s explanation of Rambam, MT, Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 21:15). Levush 25:2 and AHS ad loc. 11 rule this way as well. The reconciliation of Shulḥan Arukh’s two rulings is that in Oraḥ Ḥayim it states that these actions are forbidden from the perspective of sanctity and modesty; but since they are permitted technically, this issue is not raised in Even Ha-ezer. Others say that cunnilingus and gazing at the vagina are permissible but that there is danger in doing so as part of the intercourse that leads to conception. That is how Kalla Rabbati presents R. Yoḥanan b. Dahavai’s opinion: “All this is if she conceives from this intercourse.” It is also implied by Menorat Ha-ma’or Ha-kadmon, ch. 10.We can add that perhaps the stringent opinions prohibit kissing the vagina only, not the clitoris, which is the primary erogenous zone. It is also possible that the stringent opinions would apply the prohibition of gazing only to a shaved vagina, since it is then completely exposed. It is also possible that the prohibition of gazing applies only to prolonged ogling in the light, but if it is dark, or the glance is fleeting, it is not prohibited. So states Ezer Mi-kodesh (EH 25:1). R. Yosef Messas (Mayim Ḥayim, vol. 1, p. 92) suggests that the prohibition of gazing is due to the concern that the husband would find it repulsive. Nowadays, though, when there are showers in every home and people wash frequently, there is no prohibition. Perhaps we can explain that since the admonition against cunnilingus is on the grounds of bal teshaktzu, when people wash regularly, there is no concern. All of these uncertainties can be combined with the opinion of the majority of Rishonim that there is no prohibition whatsoever involved.</i>
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Depraved Lust
  The human sex drive is a powerful thing; it can be extraordinarily positive, and it can drag people down to the depths of depravity. It can lead a person to pursue another person’s spouse, to engage in forbidden sexual relations, to destroy families, and ruin lives in this world as well as the next. A person in the thrall of this powerful urge can lose all discretion and act irrationally. As the Sages commented about sin in general and this sin in particular: “A person does not commit a sin unless a spirit of foolishness enters him” (Sota 3a).
  Thus, we find people who really want to do the right thing, who marry with every intention of being faithful to their spouse, yet who give space to the evil inclination, which becomes more and more powerful. Eventually, they reach the point where they are prepared to break their wedding vows, betray their spouse, make their children miserable, throw away their money, and destroy their social standing.
  The wise author of Mishlei warns of this numerous times: “It will save you from the other woman, from the foreign woman whose talk is smooth…. Her house sinks down to death, and her course leads to the shades. All who go to her cannot return and find again the paths of life” (2:16-19). He further adjures: “My son, listen to my wisdom; incline your ear to my insight…for the lips of another woman drip honey; her mouth is smoother than oil; but in the end she is as bitter as wormwood, sharp as a two-edged sword. Her feet go down to death; her steps take hold of She’ol…. Let your fountain be blessed; find joy in the wife of your youth. She is a loving doe, a graceful mountain goat. Let her breasts satisfy you at all times; be infatuated with love of her always. Why be infatuated, my son, with another woman? Why clasp the bosom of a foreign woman?” (5:1-20). And finally: “It will keep you from an evil woman, from the smooth tongue of a forbidden woman. Do not lust for her beauty or let her captivate you with her eyes. The last loaf of bread will go for a harlot; a married woman will snare a person of honor” (6:24-26).1<i class="footnote">[Editor’s note: This section applies to husbands and wives alike, and the first two paragraphs are written in a way that makes this clear, even though the sources cited in third paragraph and in this footnote are clearly addressed to men.]The Sages said, “Satan, the evil inclination, and the Angel of Death are all one” (Bava Batra 16a). Zohar elaborates on this with vivid imagery and allegory on the methods of the evil inclination: The feminine aspect of the Angel of Death descends to the world and takes the form of a beautiful woman who lures men to sin by dressing like a prostitute. Her red hair is neatly styled. Her face is pale with a touch of ruddiness. Six precious Egyptian jewels dangle from her ears, and an assortment of expensive pendants hang from her neck. Her voice is coy and pretty. She speaks seductively, with words smooth as silk, yet sharp as a knife. Her luscious lips are rose red and sweeter than anything in the world. She is dressed in scarlet adorned with 39 jewels. It is a fool who follows her, drinks wine from her cup, and commits adultery with her. His heart is captivated by her. When she sees that he has deviated from the straight and narrow to follow her, what does she do? She leaves him asleep on her bed, removes all her clothes and jewelry, and ascends to heaven in order to inform that he has sinned through adultery. When he is condemned (by the heavenly court) to a terrible fate, she is given permission to kill him, and she descends again to this world. The fool awakens and wants to continue frolicking with her, but suddenly he sees her without her clothing and adornments, a fire blazing around her. Terror grips him. Then he realizes that she is covered with menacing eyes, holding a sharp sword, and oozing venom. She kills him and hurls him into hell (paraphrased from Zohar I 148a, Vayetze, Ḥelek Sitrei Torah).</i>
  
  Section 2
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Free Will
  Since desire and lust can bring a person so low, some gentile philosophers and theologians maintain that the way to reach spiritual heights is to stay as far as possible from lust and desire. Some rejected marriage entirely, and other support marriage solely for the purpose of procreation while admonishing men and women alike to stay as far as they can from carnal lust, as it is shameful for people to so degrade themselves.
  The Torah, however, teaches that there is nothing shameful about sexual relations between husband and wife, for this is how God created people, and something that is so basic to the very existence of the world, that brings new life into the world, cannot possibly be shameful. On the contrary, it contains an element of sanctity (Maharal, Be’er Ha-gola 5:4).
  God created us with a good impulse and an evil impulse, commanding us to choose the good: “I call heaven and earth today to witness against you this day: I have put before you life and death, blessing and curse; choose life – so that you and your offspring will live” (Devarim 30:19).
  The root of both impulses is one, and God gave us free will to direct our impulse toward good or toward evil. Consider our craving for food: it can be channeled toward gluttony, which destroy health and causes people to forget Godly ideals, or it can be directed toward refined consumption that gives a person the opportunity to thank God and increases joy and health. The stronger and more important an impulse, the greater its power, for good or evil. There is nothing stronger than the human sex drive, through which new life is born and divine unity is revealed in the world. Therefore, when this desire is directed toward evil, toward promiscuity and adultery, there is nothing worse. But when it is directed toward good, increasing love and unity between spouses, there is nothing nobler or holier.
  This is the meaning of the statement, “If husband and wife are worthy, the Shekhina is with them; if they are not, fire consumes them” (Sota 17a; see 1:1 above). When a couple expresses their natural drives within the sacred framework of marriage, the Shekhina dwells with them. However, if they direct their sexual drive toward promiscuity and adultery, God’s presence disappears. They are left only with the fire of their lust, which will never be satisfied. It will consume them in this world and the next.
  
  Section 3
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Two Levels of Sanctity in Marriage
  There are two levels in the sanctity of marriage. The basic level is when a couple upholds their marriage vows, remaining faithful and not betraying each other. The higher level is when a couple also tries to deepen their love, makes efforts to please and satisfy each other to the best of their ability, and intend to have children and raising them for a life of Torah and mitzvot. The more mindful and intentional they are, the higher they rise through the levels of sanctity.
  Raavad writes that there are four types of intention one can have for the mitzva of ona, three of which are commendable, and one which is a lesser form of intention, though the mitzva is still fulfilled. The motivations are: 1) to bring joy and satisfaction to one’s spouse through sexual intimacy; 2) to fulfill the mitzva of procreation; 3) during pregnancy, to intend for the loving and joyful sexual union to make the unborn child healthy, energetic, and good-natured (Nidda 31a; see also 1:4 above). The fourth motivation is less admirable, but it still involves fulfilling the mitzva of ona and receiving reward for it: a man has sexual relations with his wife because he senses his sexual drive overpowering him, so that he does not lust after other women (Raavad, Ba’alei Ha-nefesh, Sha’ar Ha-kedusha; Tur §240). This type of intention is the most basic level of marital sanctity, whereas the first three belong to the higher level, as we will explain.
  The basic level of sanctity is the faithful preservation of the marital covenant. Even if each spouse is more interested in satisfying their own drives than giving their spouse pleasure, as long as they do not betray one another, there is sanctity in their marriage. As the Sages said, “If husband and wife are worthy, the Shekhina is with them; if they are not, fire consumes them” (Sota 17a). Rashi explains: “‘If they are worthy’ – they walk the straight and narrow; neither he nor she commits adultery.”
  Accordingly, the marital bond between husband and wife is called “kiddushin,” which is related to the word “kadosh,” sacred. The wording of the berakha recited upon kiddushin is as follows: <i>Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who sanctified us with His mitzvot, and has commanded us concerning forbidden unions, forbidding betrothed women to us and permitting to us the women to whom we are wedded by means of ḥuppa and kiddushin. Blessed are You, Lord, Who sanctifies His people Israel by means of ḥuppa and kiddushin.</i>
  Moreover, even if someone initially got married to gratify his desires, if he adheres to the framework of a halakhic marriage, over time he will progress toward a deeper love. It stands to reason that he will undergo a crisis when his initial passion wanes, but his loyalty to halakha and his marriage vows will save him from being unfaithful. He will therefore be able to deepen his relationship with his wife, connecting to her with love and great joy, and ascending to the second level of sanctity in marriage.
  The higher level of sanctity is that of those who achieve unity through true love. In the case of a husband, the more he thinks about his wife’s well-being, the higher he ascends in this sanctity. In order for him to want to pleasure his wife, their sexual union must be enjoyable for him, too (section 14 below), though his primary goal remains bringing his wife pleasure. Should a conflict arise between his own desires and what his wife enjoys, he prioritizes her enjoyment over satisfying his desire. The same applies to the wife; the more she considers the well-being of her husband and brings him joy through her passion, the higher she ascends in sanctity.
  The two levels of marriage reflect the two meanings of the word “kadosh” (“sacred”): a) separate and distinct, and b) transcendent, eternal, and divine. When a marriage is at the basic level, the husband and wife separate themselves from all the other men and women in the world. When a marriage is at the higher level, the couple’s intimate connection reveals the spark that is divine, eternal, and transcendent.
  
  Section 4
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Between Love and Lust
  Two paths are available to couples: on the good path, the emphasis is on love; on the bad path, the emphasis is on lust. One who follows the evil impulse cares only about himself, chasing women to satisfy his desires. In contrast, one who follows his good impulse wishes to truly love his wife and bring her maximum pleasure. At the very least, he remains faithful to her. Someone who lusts and someone who loves resemble each other at first, but then the paths diverge. The lust of someone who follows his evil impulse does not last, and all his relationships fall apart, ending in disappointment. In contrast, the sacred love of someone who follows the good path grows ever stronger and deeper.
  Occasionally, a person following the path of the evil impulse appears to be willing to do anything for his partner. In order to gratify his desires, he is prepared to go to great lengths to court her, spend exorbitant amounts of money on her, buy her expensive jewelry, pay her endless compliments, and even rejoice in whatever makes her happy. However, because his primary intention is self-gratification, he is really using her. In general, despite his pronouncements and declarations, he would prefer not to marry, since he can satisfy his lusts without marriage. Even if he does agree to get married, as long as his primary objective is self-gratification, he will never truly love his wife. Rather, he will merely exploit her body, so their relationship will grow weaker and weaker.
  In extreme cases of being driven by lust, a man is even willing to rape a woman to satisfy his evil impulse. Such an act is motivated by sheer lust and completely devoid of love. On the contrary, when he comes back to his senses, he will hate his victim, just as Amnon hated Tamar after he raped her: “Amnon felt a very great loathing for her” (2 Shmuel 13:15). Lust attempts to take the place of love, but once sobriety returns, the rapist realizes that he still feels hollow and depressed. But instead of loathing himself, he projects his loathing onto the woman he raped.
  In contrast, a man who follows the path of love wants a truly loving relationship with his wife. He is very careful not to hurt her, and he tries to give her as much joy as he can. Above all, he cares about her and her well-being. As time goes on, their relationship deepens. Although they get older, the years do not wear them down. Instead, their love intensifies, and they become infinitely close. Such love is precious, sacred, and unabashed.
  
  Section 5
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Sanctity of Avoiding Sexual Transgression
  As we have learned, the basic level of sanctity in marriage is when a husband and wife form a halakhic relationship and avoid sexual transgressions (gilui arayot). Rambam lists 37 Torah prohibitions in his Laws of Sexual Prohibitions, which can be divided into five categories:
  Incest, including sexual relations between a man and his mother, daughter, sister, aunt, sister-in-law, stepdaughter, or step-granddaughter. This category includes most of the sexual prohibitions.
  Sexual relations between those who are forbidden from marrying each other: a Jew and a non-Jew; a mamzer with a non-mamzer; or a marriage involving a eunuch.
  Bestiality and male homosexuality.
  Adultery, i.e., sexual relations between a man and a married woman.
  Sexual relations between a man and a nidda.2<i class="footnote">The following is Rambam’s list of Torah commandments, as it appears at the beginning of Laws of Sexual Prohibitions, in Sefer Kedusha:Not to have sexual relations with one’s mother; 2. not to have sexual relations with one’s father’s wife; 3. not to have sexual relations with one’s sister; 4. not to have sexual relations with one’s stepsister; 5. not to have sexual relations with one’s son’s daughter; 6. not to have sexual relations with one’s daughter; 7. not to have sexual relations with one’s daughter’s daughter; 8. not to marry a woman and her daughter; 9. not to marry a woman and her son’s daughter; 10. not to marry a woman and her daughter’s daughter; 11. not to have sexual relations with one’s father’s sister; 12. not to have sexual relations with one’s mother’s sister; 13. not to have sexual relations with one’s father’s brother’s wife; 14. not to have sexual relations with one’s son’s wife; 15. not to have sexual relations with one’s brother’s wife; 16. not to have sexual relations with one’s wife’s sister; 17. for a man not to have sexual relations with an animal; 18. for a woman not to have sexual relations with an animal; 19. for a man not to have sexual relations with another man; 20. not to uncover the nakedness of one’s father; 21. not to uncover the nakedness of one’s father’s brother; 22. not to have sexual relations with a married woman; 23. not to have sexual relations with a woman while she is a nidda; 24. not to marry a non-Jew; 25. not to allow an Ammonite or Moabite to marry into the congregation of Israel; 26. not to prevent the third-generation offspring of an Egyptian convert to Judaism from marrying into the congregation of Israel; 27. not to prevent the third-generation offspring of an Edomite convert to Judaism from marrying into the congregation of Israel; 28. not to allow amamzerto marry into the congregation of Israel; 29. not to allow a eunuch to marry into the congregation of Israel; 30. not to castrate any male, even an animal or bird; 31. for a kohen gadol not to marry a widow; 32. for a kohen gadol not to have sexual relations with a widow, even outside the context of marriage; 33. for a kohen gadol to marry a virgin who had just reached adulthood; 34. for a kohen not to marry a divorcee; 35. for a kohen not to marry a zona; 36. for a kohen not to marry a ḥalala; 37. for a person not to touch affectionately someone they may not marry, even if they refrain from intercourse.</i>
  There is one other severe sexual transgression: the rape of a woman or man, and certainly of a minor. This crime usually involves an additional transgression as well, such as relations with a nidda, incest, or male homosexual relations. However, even when there are no accompanying prohibitions, the damage done to the rape victim is extremely serious, so much so that in a sense it is the same as murder. Thus, when speaking of rape, the Torah tells us, “For the case is like that of a man attacking another and murdering him” (Devarim 22:26).
  Another seventeen mitzvot in the Torah relate to the framework of marriage. These include laws pertaining to divorce, yibum (levirate marriage), ḥalitza (levirate divorce), the laws pertaining to the seduction or rape of a young virgin, and laws pertaining to a sota (a woman whose husband suspects her of adultery).3<i class="footnote">Rambam’s <em>Sefer Nashim</em> is dedicated entirely to these laws. This is his list of Torah commandments in the order he discusses them in that book. The Laws of Marriage contain four <em>mitzvot</em>: 1. To marry a woman by means of a <em>ketuba</em> and <em>kiddushin</em>; 2. not to have sexual relations with a woman without a <em>ketuba</em> and <em>kiddushin</em>; 3. not to withhold food, clothing, and conjugal rights; 4. to procreate from one’s wife. The Laws of Divorce contain two <em>mitzvot</em>: 1. That divorce is by means of a bill of divorce (<em>get</em>); 2. not to remarry one’s divorced wife if she had since married and divorced another. The Laws of Levirate Marriage and Levirate Divorce contain three <em>mitzvot</em>: 1. To perform <em>yibum</em>; 2. to perform <em>ḥalitza</em>; 3. for the levirate widow not to marry anyone else until she is no longer under her brother-in-law’s authority. The Laws of [Seduction and Rape of] a Young Virgin contain five <em>mitzvot</em>: 1. For a seducer to be fined; 2. a rapist must marry his victim; 3. for a rapist never to initiate divorce of his wife/victim; 4. for a husband who slanders his wife (<em>motzi shem ra</em>) to remain married to her forever; 5. for a husband who is <em>motzi shem ra</em> not to divorce his wife. The Laws of <em>Sota</em> contain three <em>mitzvot</em>: 1. To perform the <em>sota </em>ritual as delineated by the Torah; 2. not to place oil on her offering; 3. not to place frankincense on her offering.</i>
  We should not downplay the degree of sanctity achieved by one who successfully abides by all these rules and mitzvot, for we see that most people who are not committed to Torah and mitzvot do not manage to preserve their marital covenant. Even among the religiously observant, not everyone manages to resist temptation.
  The Sages said: “<i>One who sits passively and does not sin is rewarded as if he did a mitzva. R. Shimon bar Rabbi [Yehuda Ha-Nasi] said: It says, “But make sure that you do not partake of the blood; for the blood is the life” (Devarim 12:23). If a person is rewarded for avoiding [drinking] blood, which most people find disgusting, how great must the reward be for avoiding theft and sexual immorality, which most people crave and lust after. One who avoids these earns reward for himself, his children, and his descendants until the end of time.</i>” (m. Makkot 3:16)
  The Torah teaches, “You shall be holy, for I, the Lord your God, am holy” (Vayikra 19:2). Rashi explains, “Avoid forbidden sexual relations and sins. For wherever you find clear sexual boundaries, you also find holiness.” Accordingly, anyone who is faithful to his marriage is considered holy.
  
  Section 6
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Mitzvot as a Safeguard Against Sin
  In addition to the intrinsic value of the mitzva of ona, which gives expression to the love between husband and wife, the mitzva also serves as a shield against adultery. For this reason, unmarried people are more vulnerable to sexual temptation, and they must therefore strengthen themselves through Torah study and mitzva observance so that they save the power of their love for their true and holy match through the framework of marriage. Sometimes a person’s sex drive is so strong that it is extremely difficult to resist. In that case, the more one bolstered himself through Torah study and mitzva observance, the more he finds the strength to resist temptation.
  The Talmud (Menaḥot 44a) recounts: <i>Natan said: There is no mitzva in the Torah, not even a minor one, whose reward is not enjoyed in this world. As for reward in the next world, who knows how great it will be! Go and learn this from the mitzva of tzitzit. A certain man was very meticulous in observing the mitzva of tzitzit. He heard about a prostitute, in one of the towns by the sea, who charged 400 gold coins as her wages. He sent her 400 gold coins, and arranged a time to meet. At the appointed time, he sat at the door. Her maidservant came and told her, “The man who sent you 400 gold coins has arrived and is waiting at the door.” She replied, “Let him in,” and he entered. She had set for him seven beds, six silver and one gold. Between each bed was a silver ladder, and the uppermost was of gold. She climbed up and sat naked on the topmost bed. He, too, started to climb up in order to be naked with her. While he was climbing up, his four tzitziyot hit him in the face. He climbed down and sat on the ground. Then she, too, climbed down and sat on the ground. She exclaimed, “By Rome! I will not let you go until you tell me what flaw you saw in me!” He responded, “By the Temple service! I have never seen a woman as beautiful as you. But the Lord our God has given us a mitzva called tzitzit, in the context of which it is twice written, ‘I am the Lord your God’ (Bambidbar 15:41). This means ‘I am the One Who will exact punishment in the future, and I am the One Who will give reward in the future.’ At this moment, these fringes appeared to me as four witnesses [testifying against me].” She said to him, “I will not let you go until you tell me what your name is, what city you are from, who your rabbi is, and the name of the beit midrash in which you study Torah.” He wrote it down and gave it to her. She immediately divided all her property into three parts: one third she gave to the government (so that they would permit her to convert to Judaism), one third to the poor (to atone for her sins), and one third she kept for herself, as well as the bedspreads. She then went to R. Ḥiya’s beit midrash. She said to him, “Rabbi, tell me what I must do to convert to Judaism.” He replied, “My child, perhaps you have your eyes set on one of the students?” [He was concerned that she wanted to marry one of the students because she could not find a husband among her own people, or because she wanted his money, but did not really want to convert for the sake of heaven.] She took out the note and handed it to him. [The note contained the specifics of the incident, which demonstrated that she was both wealthy and desired by many, but that she chose this student because of his greatness of spirit. R. Ḥiya therefore agreed to convert her.] He said to her, “Go and collect what you acquired.” The same bedding that she spread out for him sinfully, she now spread out for him lawfully. This is the reward for a mitzva in this world. As for the next world, who knows how great it will be!</i>
  Therefore, we see that when the sex drive spills over into licentiousness, it is wicked. But when it is expressed within the framework of a proper marriage, it is good and holy, and is even considered a heavenly reward.
  
  Section 7
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Mental and Spiritual Health
  It is important to add that joyful fulfillment of the mitzva of ona improves one’s mental health and well-being. God created human beings with different drives, with the sex drive prominent among them. While not everyone is the same with regard to this drive – some experience it more intensely, and some less – everyone has it. Someone who does not feel it at all suffers from an emotional handicap. For most people, the sex drive is the strongest drive of all. Repressing it can distort and pervert the psyche, making it hard for that person to fulfill their purpose as a human being. This is what the Sages meant when they said, “Any man without a wife is not a man (adam), as it states (Bereishit 5:2), ‘Male and female He created them. He blessed them and called them Adam’” (Yevamot 63a). Since the sex drive is so powerful, it is difficult to resist. This is why the Torah had to give us so many mitzvot aimed at regulating and channeling it.
  Some men and women mistakenly believe that by suppressing this inclination and minimizing their onot, they will become holier and more spiritual. However, this may very well backfire, for sometimes if a person does not allow this drive to be expressed within the framework of halakha, and instead adds limitations that the Torah does not require, it can result in severe sins of sexual transgressions. Therefore, if a man naturally needs more times of ona than those set by the Sages, he should not try to suppress his needs and behave like everyone else. Similarly, if a woman senses that her husband requires more ona times, she should encourage him to add more, since that is appropriate and good for him, and allows him to retain his holiness. But, if he suppresses his needs and ignores what is right for him, his evil inclination is likely to urge him to get involved with other women or even young girls. It is known that men who commit adultery and rape minors are often undergoing an extended period of time without regular, healthy sexual relations.4<i class="footnote">Of those men who cheat on their wives and commit adultery, many start after an extended period of time in which they did not observe the times of <em>ona</em> regularly, such as during pregnancy and after birth, and when their wives canceled the set times of <em>ona</em> on account of minor health issues. Even the crimes of adultery, incest, and rape of minors can sometimes be prevented by regular sexual relations. This is another reason why it is important to observe the mitzva of <em>ona</em> in accordance with <em>halakha</em> – the set times of <em>ona</em> as well as any additional times when one spouse wishes to be intimate (see above, 2:7-8). Only if both husband and wife wholeheartedly agree to forgo one or more times of <em>ona</em>, is it not deemed sinful. Even then, they are missing out on a mitzva.At first glance, we learn something that indicates the opposite, that repression of the sex drive is what enables one to overcome it: “R. Yoḥanan said: Man has a small limb (i.e., the penis). When he starves it, it is satisfied; when he feeds it, it is hungry” (Sukka 52b). Along the same lines, Raavad asks (Sha’ar Ha-kedusha, cited by Tur, EH §25): When discussing human sexual desire, how could the Sages say (in Sota 47a) that one should draw the sexual impulse close with the right hand and push it away with the left hand? The Sages themselves established obligatory times of ona. How then can we reduce their frequency, pushing them away with our left hand? Raavad answers that the Sages’ statement refers only to the set ona for tayalim, namely, every night (see 2:7 above); in this context the Sages recommend a small reduction in frequency, by mutual consent, so that the couple does not have sexual relations every night. Rather, it is better “to stand up to one’s inclination, and not gratify every urge; he should reject it with one hand and welcome it with the other. He should not reject it completely lest his battle to overcome his impulses cause him to neglect his conjugal duties.” Raavad offers a second explanation as well: The Sages’ statement refers to someone who wants to have relations more frequently than dictated by the mitzva of ona – such a person is to welcome his desire with the right hand and reject it with the left, so that he does not gratify his every urge. As explained in Tosafot on Sukka 52b, “When he feeds it” refers to someone who indulges his sexual urges frequently, day and night. This would not leave him satisfied, but hungry for more, as he becomes addicted to the stimulation. Like a drug addict, a sex addict cannot function without a fix. Furthermore, to continue experiencing satisfaction, the addict must occasionally increase the dosage. This type of sexual intercourse is no longer an expression of love, merely an attempt to satisfy an insatiable addiction. This is what the Sages meant when they said, “When he starves it, it is satisfied; when he feeds it, it is hungry.” However, it is forbidden to “starve it” in a way that undermines the Torah commandment of ona – at the set frequency as well as any additional times when one spouse is particularly aroused.</i>
  At the higher level of sanctity, this drive is channeled into the sacred framework of marriage so that it increases love and joy. The couple can thus connect with the very root of life; when they fulfill the mitzva of ona, they draw down a divine spark and reveal it to the world. As R. Akiva said, “If husband and wife are worthy, the Shekhina is with them” (Sota 17a; see also Zohar Ra’aya Mehemna III 34a). This explains what the kabbalists meant when they wrote that one who does not feel this urge is inferior to a donkey because he lacks the ability to fully understand anything, and he can never truly love God (Reishit Ḥokhma, Sha’ar Ha-ahava, end of ch. 4).
  We have learned (1:5 above) that the foundation of the Jewish faith is discovering the world’s ultimate unity, and that the mitzva of ona, when fulfilled with an abundance of love and desire, reveals unity within the world. It is through this passion that two completely distinct individuals become one. Body and soul take part in the mitzva together. Even the evil inclination is transformed for the better and unites with the good inclination to enhance the couple’s joy and love. The result is that they are able to connect to the Source of life, refine their faith, and actively work for the perfection and redemption of the world. Something within them unites with the divine spark, from which new life is brought forth. Thus, they become God’s partners in bringing a new soul to the world (Nidda 31a).
  
  Section 8
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Purity and Impurity
  We still need to explain two halakhot, one Torah law and one rabbinic, that seem to indicate that despite the sanctity of the mitzva of ona, it has an aspect of impurity as well.
  According to the Torah, semen ejaculated by a Jew is a source of impurity (av ha-tuma). Even when a husband and wife have marital sexual relations and fulfill the Torah commandment, since he ejaculated inside her, they both become impure, as they have come into direct contact with a source of impurity (they have the status of rishon le-tuma). To purify themselves, they must immerse in a mikveh and wait until nightfall, whereupon they resume their ritually pure status and are permitted to enter the Temple, eat the meat of the sacrifices, and, if they are kohanim, eat teruma. Similarly, clothing and kelim that have come into contact with a Jewish man’s semen become ritually impure and may not be used or worn while handling sacrifices or objects that must retain their pure status. These items are purified through immersion in a mikveh. In the Torah’s words: <i>When a man has an emission of semen, he shall bathe his whole body in water and remain impure until evening. All cloth or leather on which semen falls shall be washed in water and remain impure until evening. And a woman with whom a man has sexual relations and an emission of semen, they shall bathe in water and remain impure until evening.</i> (Vayikra 15:16-18)5<i class="footnote">Sexual relations render a woman impure not because she came into contact with a man’s semen, because the contact took place internally, and such contact does not cause impurity. Rather, the Torah informs us that the sexual intercourse itself renders her impure (<em>Nidda</em> 41b-42a; MT, Laws of Other Types of Impurity 5:9). During the 72 hours after intercourse, if a woman leaks semen, she becomes impure. After that, the semen loses its identity and does not cause impurity. Dried semen does not cause impurity, and neither does the semen of a non-Jew.</i>
  Ritual impurity, tuma, is an expression of life lost. The supreme source of tuma (avi avot ha-tuma) is a corpse. The impurity of nidda also expresses death; this was a potential pregnancy that has been lost and is no longer. The impurity of semen is likewise an expression of something that could have created new life but has now been lost and has died (Kuzari 2:60-62). The Torah teaches us that even when semen is ejaculated in fulfillment of the mitzva of ona, it harbors impurity. Likewise, we find that childbirth renders a woman impure. The idea is that when any grand notion descends to this world, there is a certain aspect of death. The vision is always grander than its realization. In this case, the hopes preceding a birth are grandiose. There is a tendency to believe that the whole world will change for the better because of this birth, and that the newborn child will be absolutely perfect. In reality, after birth we return to routine life, with its aches, pains, and exhaustion. Despite the miracle of birth, the new baby will still need to contend with all the challenges of human life. Even our bodies sense this letdown, which is an aspect of post-partum depression.
  A man, too, experiences letdown after ejaculation, even though it occurs within the holy context of the mitzva of ona. Beforehand, he believed that he will soon be closer than ever to his beloved wife, and that everything will always be great. His heart fills with passion and excitement, building until its release during ejaculation. But then he falls back to the routine of this world, his passion drained. In contrast, women do not experience this fall. After orgasm, her return to this world is gentle and easy. When their sexual union is loving and joyful, her feelings of satisfaction and contentment linger for a while. Therefore, the man’s semen is impure, but not the fluids secreted by the woman during arousal.
  Perhaps the letdown that a man experiences after orgasm expresses human incompleteness. Even when one is truly in love, true unity between two people is fleeting. Even when a man truly wishes bring joy to his wife, he remains, to some degree, within himself. He fails to harness all of his passion to that love. If this were possible, there would be no more death in the world, no more post-coital tristesse, and no more post-partum depression.
  The Sages allude to this in their explanation of the impurity of childbirth: “Indeed, I was born with iniquity; with sin my mother conceived me” (Tehilim 51:7). R. Aḥa explained: Even if a person is the most devout of the devout, it is impossible for him to be completely devoid of sin. David said to God, “Master of the universe! Did my father Yishai intend to create me? He had nothing in mind but his own pleasure! We know that this is true, for after they attend to their needs (i.e., after sexual intercourse), one turns this way and one turns that way (and they fall asleep). You, however, gather in every single drop (of semen, to ensure that there are viable fetuses).” This is what David meant when he said, “Though my father and mother abandon me, the Lord will take me in” (Tehilim 27:10). (Vayikra Rabba 14:5).
  
  Section 9
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Ezra’s Ordinance
  As we mentioned above, the Torah declares semen impure. Ezra the Scribe and his court extended this, ordaining that any man who had sexual relations or otherwise ejaculated semen may not pray or study Torah until immersing in a mikveh (BK 82b according to Rosh). The reason is that Torah must be studied with “awe, fear, trembling, and trepidation,” just as we received it at Sinai, whereas semen is ejaculated “out of frivolity and arrogance” (Berakhot 22a and Rashi ad loc.). Another reason is “so that Jews are not like roosters, which mate, get right up, and go eat” (y. Berakhot 3:4), or “so that Torah scholars do not constantly cohabit with their wives, like roosters” (Berakhot 22a).
  According to all of these reasons, Ezra’s ordinance does not indicate that there is something wrong with sexual intimacy between husband and wife. Rather, they should not overindulge as does a rooster, which has nothing else to live for. Human beings have other purposes, spiritual as well as professional. If people spent all their time mating like roosters, they would not manage to fill all their other roles. The requirement of immersion creates a certain inconvenience whose purpose is to ensure that people fulfill the mitzva of ona with the appropriate frequency and not to excess.
  Additionally, immersion is meant to separate between the different realms of a person’s life. Torah must be studied with the appropriate gravitas, with a sense of fear and awe, whereas the mitzva of ona is fulfilled with a spirit of playfulness, liberation, and unbounded joy, as it is written: “Yitzḥak was being playful with Rivka his wife” (Bereishit 26:8). Rashi explains that “being playful” is a euphemism for sexual relations. This is similar to the Sages’ ordinance that men wear belts while they are speaking holy words, to separate the heart from the genitals, lest the urges emanating from the genitalia confound the head and heart and make it difficult to engage in spiritual matters with the requisite purity. Ultimately, the mind and emotions can become enslaved to the realization of lustful fantasies. Therefore, in order to fortify his spiritual world, one must study Torah with awe, fear, trembling, and trepidation, as is becoming of its sanctity and seriousness. Then, when he later returns to physicality, he will be able to direct it properly. This explains why the Sages instituted a blessing to be recited upon putting on a belt in the morning: “Who girds Israel with strength” (Ozer Yisrael bi-gevura). The strength to separate between the heart and the genitals liberates a person from being enslaved by his urges and enables him to sanctify them through the mitzva of ona.
  In practice, Ezra’s ordinance did not become widespread. Some people did not want to stop studying Torah, and since they found it inconvenient to immerse, they simply refrained from sexual relations, thereby forgoing both the mitzva of ona and the mitzva of procreation. In contrast, some others were happy to fulfill the mitzva of ona, but because of the inconvenience of immersion, they simply refrained from Torah study. Many others simply ignored the ordinance, wishing neither to detract from the mitzva of ona nor to lessen their Torah study. When the Sages saw that Ezra’s enactment was not accepted by the Jewish people, they rescinded it and permitted those who had ejaculated or had sexual relations to pray and study Torah without restriction (Berakhot 22a; MT, Laws of Reciting Shema 4:8).
  Nevertheless, some people are meticulous about immersing before studying Torah or praying, in accordance with Ezra’s ordinance. Others show their meticulousness by washing in nine kabin (approximately 11 liters) of water. Nowadays, when every home has a shower, it is good to be meticulous about this.6<i class="footnote">It seems from <em>Berakhot</em> 22a-b that relying on nine <em>kabin</em> of water is acceptable only for a healthy person who unintentionally ejaculated semen, or a sick person who had intercourse. Torah scholars are considered like sick people for these purposes. However, according to R. Hai Gaon and Rif, now that the ordinance requiring immersion has been rescinded, even according to the stringent opinion (which required immersion in a <em>mikveh</em> prior to prayer), bathing in nine <em>kabin</em> of water is sufficient. MB (88:4) adds that even though the ordinance was rescinded, some pious people still immerse following an ejaculation of semen. If this is too difficult, they bathe in nine <em>kabin</em> of water. According to R. Ḥayim Naeh’s calculation of halakhic volume, nine <em>kabin</em> is 12.44 liters, and according to the more precise calculation, it is 10.8 liters.What is the actual procedure for washing in nine kabin? The water must be poured onto the person; he should not immerse in it (Berakhot 22a). The pouring must be continuous, without pause (MB 88:4). According to Raavad, the water must also be poured manually, so that all the water touches the body. According to this view, it seems that a shower would not be acceptable. However, Sefer Ḥasidim (§828) states that a person may fulfill the obligation even with water flowing on its own, as long as the water makes contact with his whole body, including his arms. Accordingly, taking a shower would be acceptable. Kaf Ha-ḥayim 88:7 and Yaskil Avdi 5, OḤ 13, agree. This is also the opinion of almost all the poskim, as cited in Yalkut Yosef 88:1 and Piskei Teshuvot 88:42. Some insist that the water must make contact with all parts of the body (Pri Megadim, Mishbetzot Zahav 88:1). Based on this, some advise first pouring water on the soles of the feet, because otherwise the poured water will not reach there (Kaf Ha-ḥayim 88:7). Others disagree, maintaining that a ḥatzitza (barrier) does not disqualify the nine kabin, as earlier authorities do not specify that a person must lift his feet from the floor (Responsa Ma’amar Mordechai §1-2, as cited in Sha’arei Teshuva 88:1). This implies that even those who insist that there must be no ḥatzitza, and that the soles of the feet must get wet, are not careful that the water touch every single part of the body, even inside the ears. If they had meant to be that stringent, they would have needed to say so explicitly. Furthermore, nine kabin of water is a relatively small amount, too small to make contact with every single part of a person’s body. R. Ephraim Zalman Margolies implies this in Mateh Ephraim 606:10, and he writes it explicitly in Elef Le-mateh 606:3; see also Piskei Teshuvot 88:5.Ma’amar Mordechai 88:2 understands Rambam and SA to mean that the ordinance was limited to Torah scholars, who study Torah frequently. Today, though, when it is easy to follow the ordinance and it also fits in easily with our hygienic lifestyle, it is best for everyone to follow it.</i>
  
  Section 10
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Levels of Holiness and Mindfulness
  Let us review some essentials: The mitzva of ona is unique in that its sanctity is revealed in material reality. Moreover, even physical passion and desire, which are generally inclined toward the evil impulse, are transformed by it into a mitzva and sanctified. This is an especially powerful corrective; through ona we discover that no area of life is disconnected from the divine, that the Lord is God of earth as well as heaven, and that even physical urges can connect with the sacred and even strengthen it. The mitzva of ona is similar in this way to the mitzva of living in Eretz Yisrael; through both, holiness is revealed in the world (1:5 above).
  Nonetheless, since the mitzva of ona is fulfilled by means of a person’s most physical elements, where lusts and urges loom large, one is prone to being overly attracted to them, to the point that one might forget the mitzva and think only about himself instead of about his wife. This is the impurity that lurks here, the flipside of this sacred mitzva. This is not meant to discourage a person from performing the mitzva, but to encourage him to refine his intentions when fulfilling it. The Sages thus encouraged one who wishes to become holier and more pious to sanctify himself through the mitzva of ona, that is, that he should be mindful of bringing his wife as much joy as possible. Ezra the Scribe, the same person who ordained that one must immerse after sexual relations, also made two enactments to increase the love between husband and wife: that they should eat garlic, an aphrodisiac, on Friday nights, thus increasing the passion of their sexual union, and that peddlers may sell perfume and jewelry everywhere, so that wives are enticing to their husbands (Bava Kama 82a-b; 2:5 above).
  It is worth considering an extraordinary idea underlying interpersonal commandments, which transforms routine aspects of life into mitzvot. When a person prepares tasty food for himself, he does not fulfill any mitzva; he is simply tending to his needs. However, when he cooks tasty food for a guest, he fulfills a mitzva. This is even truer of a couple’s intimate relationship – when they give each other pleasure, they become imbued with the sanctity of the mitzva of ona, and the Shekhina dwells with them.
  As we explained above (section 3), there are two primary levels of holiness within marriage. The basic level of holiness is the upholding of a halakhic marriage, avoiding sexual transgressions and observing the laws of nidda. The higher level of holiness increases the couple’s love and unity, which brings out the depth of eternal life inherent in their relationship.
  Thus far, we have taken the mainstream approach, namely, that the more a couple enjoys and gives pleasure to one another, the greater their mitzva and the holier their union. However, we must note that there are two additional approaches to the holiness of ona: Rambam’s approach and the approach of ascetic sanctity. Since there is truth in each approach, it is worth studying them. This study will also allow us to explain the primary approach in a more comprehensive and balanced way.
  
  Section 11
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Rambam’s Approach
  Rambam, consistent with his worldview, sees bodily needs and pleasures as mere means to the ultimate end – spiritual service of God. Nevertheless, God created flesh-and-blood human beings, who must take very good care of their bodies, since it is the vehicle which allows them to study Torah and fulfill mitzvot. If a person does not take care of bodily needs, including the natural desire for sexual intercourse, it will cause deterioration of physical and mental health and loss of equilibrium. Such a person will be unable to concentrate on spiritual service. The purpose of the mitzva of marriage and the sexual prohibitions is to train every person to satisfy their natural desire for physical intimacy within the framework of halakha. The more careful one is to satisfy his own needs and those of his spouse without getting overwhelmed by physical lust, the more sanctified such a person becomes. This is the aim of the mitzva of ona: to satisfy natural sexual desire, each person according to their health and occupation, no more and no less.
  When a person follows this path, then even tending to one’s physical needs is considered part of divine worship: When he has sexual intercourse, his only intention should be to keep his body healthy and produce viable offspring…. One who follows this path for his entire life serves God constantly, even while doing business and even while having sexual intercourse. For his intention is always to provide for his needs so that his body is whole, in order to serve God…. This is what our Sages meant when they commanded, “All of your actions should be for the sake of heaven” (Avot 2:12). This is also what Shlomo said, in his wisdom (Mishlei 3:6): “In all your ways, know Him, and He will make your paths smooth.” (MT, Laws of Dispositions 3:2-3).
  Rambam thus disagrees with the gentile sages who praise celibacy, because he feels that it is unnatural, painful, and unhealthy. Just as we do not encourage a person to starve himself on a regular basis or to suppress his need to relieve himself, so too, we must not encourage a person to abstain from sexual relations. Even if the person’s spouse is willing, as long as abstention involves going against natural desires, they must satisfy those urges. However, since sexual relations are merely a means to an end, one should not indulge in them more than necessary. One who indulges in physical pleasures more than necessary to serve God is like an animal that always follows its natural impulses. From this perspective, “Our sense of touch is a disgrace to us” (Moreh Nevukhim II:36).
  It stands to reason that the more a person is engrossed in Torah, the less he will feel this need. This is virtuous, as long as husband and wife develop this virtue in tandem. However, when one spouse has a palpable need for sexual intimacy, no attempts should be made to suppress it, for doing so will demand a constant fight against the urges. Instead of developing spiritual virtues, that spouse will be preoccupied with doing battle against the body. Not only that, but there is concern that such a person will delude himself into thinking that he has been liberated from the burden of his urges, but ultimately the repressed urges may find unrestrained expression and lead to sexual transgression. Even if he does not end up sinning, all the effort that he exerts to restrain his urges will warp his spirit and damage his mental health. The Torah therefore gave us the mitzva of ona with all its parameters, so that husband and wife, by observing halakha, will treat each other and their own bodies properly.
  The advantage of Rambam’s approach is that one who follows it will not engage in self-delusion, will not try to be overly abstemious while imagining that he has successfully overcome his physical needs and ascended to the lofty virtues of asceticism and sanctity. But neither will he fool himself into constant indulgence of the body and the passions with the claim that he is “sanctifying the material” and “redeeming sparks of holiness.” The drawback of this approach is that it denies any intrinsic value to the body and the act of sexual intimacy.
  Realistic, critical, and intellectual individuals love Rambam’s approach because it does not pretend to sanctify what appears profane. But even the wider public has much to gain from his approach, as it recognizes human physical needs and does not attempt to deny human nature.7<i class="footnote">Rambam writes:A person must direct his heart and all his actions only to knowing God. His sitting down, getting up, and speech must all be directed to this purpose…. Likewise when eating, drinking, and having sexual relations, his intention should not be only for his own gratification, which would lead him to eat and drink only what tastes sweet, and to engage in relations for pleasure only. Rather, when he eats and drinks, he should have in mind that he is doing so in order to keep himself healthy…. Similarly, when he has sexual intercourse, his only intention should be to keep his body healthy and produce viable offspring. Therefore, he should not engage in sexual relations whenever he desires to do so, but only when he knows that he needs a sexual release for his physical well-being or to produce viable offspring…. He should be mindful of having a son; perhaps he will become a Torah scholar or a Jewish leader. Thus, one who follows this path for his entire life serves God constantly, even while doing business and even while having sexual intercourse…. (MT, Laws of Dispositions 3:2-3)As is known, young people have a more frequent need for sex – two or three times a week – but among older people, it decreases to once a week, and among the elderly, even less frequently. Of course, these are generalizations; some individuals need more, and some less.Elsewhere, Rambam writes:A man’s wife is permitted to him; therefore, whatever a man wishes to do with his wife, he may do. He may have sexual relations with her anytime, kiss any body part that he wants, and penetrate her vaginally, anally, or through another body part. Nevertheless, it is the practice of the pious to avoid acting frivolously in such matters. Rather, he should sanctify himself during sexual intercourse, as explained in Laws of Dispositions. He should not deviate from normal behavior and practice, as this is meant only for procreation…. The Sages disapprove of one who has relations frequently and constantly cohabits with his wife like a rooster. It is deeply flawed, the conduct of the unrefined. (MT, Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 21:9, 11)Thus, on one hand, Rambam praises those who minimize sexual relations, but on the other hand, he does not try to restrain natural human desire. See Harḥavot.We must, of course, add that even if asceticism suits the husband’s body and temperament, if his wife remains interested, he is still obligated to please her sexually. As Rambam writes: “The ona mandated by the Torah depends on each man’s stamina and occupation…. A wife may prevent her husband from traveling for business except locally, so that he does not withhold her ona, and he may not travel without her permission…” (MT, Laws of Marriage 14:1-2). Additionally, “A man who decreases the frequency of sexual relations is praiseworthy, as long as he does not neglect the set ona without his wife’s consent” (MT, Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 21:11). The same applies when asceticism suits the wife but not the husband; she may not neglect ona without his consent.</i>
  
  Section 12
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Ascetic Sanctity and Sublime Love
  There is another approach as well. It agrees that there is sanctity in the sexual union of husband and wife, which causes the Shekhina to dwell with them and thereby reveals divine unity in the world, unites heaven and earth, and spreads an abundance of blessing through all the worlds. However, according to this approach, these ideas are so sublime and exalted that one must take care to fulfill the mitzva of ona out of deep love and intense longing. Ideally the mitzva should be fulfilled at the most suitable time – Friday night after midnight. For on the holy Shabbat, peace is revealed in all the worlds, making it the best time for a couple to add an abundance of blessing through their sexual union (see Zohar I 50a, 112a1; III 49b).
  This approach does not minimize the value of love; rather, love is exalted and transformed into a something transcendent and yearned for. The more sublime it is, the more we yearn for it, but with a yearning that is filled with awe, respect, and refinement. The husband is like a responsible king whose every action affects the entire world, and the wife like a beautiful and noble queen, refined and sensitive, whose every good deed that she does and beautiful emotion that she feels uplifts the whole world. All the battles he fights and the heroic deeds he performs are for her; all her beauty and good deeds are for him. They are willing to give their lives to remain faithful to each other. Due to their longings and mutual respect, their spiritual union stirs them to the depths of the soul and spirit, but it need not climax in physical orgasm.
  The Talmud tells of R. Eliezer: They asked [R.Eliezer’s wife] Ima Shalom: “Why are your children so beautiful?” She said to them, “[R. Eliezer] does not talk [that is, have sexual relations] with me at the beginning of the night or the end of the night, but only at midnight. When he talks [has sexual relations] he reveals a tefaḥ and covers a tefaḥ, and it seems as though he is compelled by a demon [i.e., by fear and trepidation]. I asked him, ‘What is the reason for this?’ He answered, ‘So that I do not look at another woman, which would render my children mamzerim.’” (Nedarim 20b)
  It as if R. Eliezer was saying, “If I lose my special reverence and respect for you, there would be no difference between you and another woman. Our union would not be complete, and it would damage our children, for this is a kind of spiritual adultery and mamzerut.”
  Regarding the phrase “reveals a tefaḥ and covers a tefaḥ,” the commentators explain: “He would not thrust his penis during sexual relations, in order to minimize his pleasure” (Raavad; SA 240:8). This implies that his technique limited his own pleasure, but it is possible that it increased his wife’s pleasure. Another explanation of the phrase is that he would not expose too much of his skin or her skin. However, later poskim and kabbalists reject this explanation, as it goes against halakha as well as kabbalistic notions according to which a couple must be naked during intercourse (Kaf Ha-ḥayim 240:61).
  The advantage of this approach is that those who follow it are not swept away by their physical urges, and their longing and yearning for union preserve their love. The disadvantage is that many desires remain unrequited and they lose the opportunity for experiences that they can sanctify through the mitzva of ona. Another serious drawback is that many people who follow this path delude themselves into believing that they are becoming holy, when in reality, they are repressing their desires, which may then find expression through unseemly thoughts and sexual transgressions. The pressure can also damage their mental health and warp the spirit.
  Therefore, rabbis and educators caution young couples that even if they wish to follow this approach, they should not do so during the first years of marriage. Rather, they should behave normally and enjoy themselves naturally, in accordance with halakha. Later on, they can cautiously explore whether the ascetic approach is right for them. We must add that the destruction of the Temple and the pain of exile were key components in the formation of this approach, as we will explain below, in section 15; indeed, during the generation after the Temple’s destruction, like the post-Holocaust generation, stringencies and restrictions on the mitzva of ona proliferated.8<i class="footnote">See section 15 below, where we explain that after the destruction of the Temple, the union between husband and wife was impaired, and ascetic practices proliferated. Indeed, R. Eliezer (who, as we just saw, exemplified ascetic sanctity) lived at the time of the Temple’s destruction and, together with R. Yehoshua, helped R. Yoḥanan b. Zakkai escape from Jerusalem before the destruction (<em>Gittin</em> 56a). Nevertheless, R. Eliezer’s opinion on this matter is rejected. This explains why the Talmud says that he acted like someone who was being compelled by a demon; the phrase implies that it was an improper way to act, as there are only negative associations with the demonic. Rather, the <em>halakha</em> follows R. Yehoshua, who objected to ascetic customs (<em>Bava Batra </em>60b, cited below in section 15).</i>
  
  Section 13
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Primary Path to Holiness
  In practice, based on what we have learned from the Sages and the poskim, the primary way to fulfill the mitzva of ona is that the more love and pleasure shared by husband and wife, the more holy they become. This sanctity has an ascetic element in that the husband does not think about any woman other than his wife, and the wife does not think about any man other than her husband. This sanctity also has an element of self-discovery of the divine root of their souls, for when they unite lovingly and passionately, a spark of divine unity is revealed through them, giving life to them and to all the worlds.
  The verse states, “Speak to the whole Israelite community and say to them, ‘You shall be holy, for I, the Lord your God, am holy’” (Vayikra 19:2). Zohar explains that God chose the Jewish people and made them a unique nation, through which His divine unity is revealed in the world. Therefore, His holiness dwells with the Jews, and He guides them in a unique way. Zohar continues: <i>When is a person called “one”? When a person is male and female together, sanctified with supreme holiness, and having in mind to be sanctified through sexual union…. Then a person is whole and called “one,” with no imperfections. To this end, a man must give his wife enjoyment at that time, preparing her to share a single desire with him, wherein they both have the same thing in mind. Then when they are together, then all is one, in soul and body. In soul – they cleave to one another with a single desire; in body – as we have learned, an unmarried person is like someone who has been divided in half, so when male and female unite, they become one body. Thus they become one soul and one body, and are called one person. Then the Holy One abides in this unity and implants in [the pure souls born of their union] a spirit of holiness. They are thus called God’s children.</i> (Zohar III 81a-b).
  Nevertheless, it is well known that our abilities are limited, and the body cannot reveal all the love and truth within the marital bond. If a couple’s relationship is based primarily on physical desire, presumably it will not last. Therefore, a couple must base their relationship on a spiritual foundation as well. Doing so requires some abstinence from the physical, an asceticism that makes room for the spiritual. This abstinence is achieved primarily during nidda times, as the Torah commands.
  Furthermore, the mitzva of ona can take place only within the boundaries of one’s ability to give and receive pleasure properly. Sometimes a person pursuing his desires tries having relations in addition to the set times of ona, expecting that this will increase their enjoyment and devotion. Instead he senses love slipping away, the spirit dissipating, and desires becoming more superficial. If this happens, he must return to the set times established by the Sages for the mitzva of ona, in order to restore balance between body and soul, so that the couple’s love and joy can once again come to full expression through the mitzva of ona.9<i class="footnote">Sometimes one who has greatly overindulged this urge, and certainly if it was in a sinful manner, must undertake a counterbalancing penance (<em>teshuvat ha-mishkal</em>) and abstain from expressing this urge for a period of time. This is similar to a person who fantasized about sinning and then abstained from wine for a while to safeguard himself from sin (see <em>Berakhot</em> 63a). This is a common penitential practice. However, avoiding wine does not conflict with any Torah obligations, whereas refraining from marital intimacy does, as <em>ona</em> is a mitzva in the Torah. Therefore, the husband must still fulfill his conjugal duties; he may not abstain to try to make up for his overindulgence at his wife’s expense. On the contrary, the best way for him to correct his situation is to do his very best to give his wife enjoyment, especially at the expense of his own pleasure. This will ultimately enable him to experience tremendous joy in fulfilling the mitzva together with his wife.</i>
  
  Section 14
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Mitzva and Makhshirei Mitzva
  As we discussed above (2:4), ona is referred to as derekh eretz, which makes it clear that this mitzva must be fulfilled joyfully and pleasurably, as is the way of the world. The mitzva is not meant to repress our natural desire, but rather to express its holiness and channel it properly, so that it will last through the years. There is still room to ask: should a husband and wife increase their passion and try to maximize their own joy and pleasure, or is it enough that they are aroused to give each other pleasure?
  It would seem that we can apply an important halakhic distinction here – between mitzva and makhshirei mitzva (prerequisites or things that facilitate a mitzva). In this case, the mitzva incumbent upon the man is to bring his wife pleasure. His own enjoyment facilitates the mitzva as it increases his passion and desire to bring pleasure to his wife. According to halakha, makhshirei mitzva have the same status as the mitzva itself, as long as they are auxiliary to the fulfillment of the mitzva. In other words, when a husband gives his wife pleasure, then his enjoyment is also part of the mitzva. The more pleasure he brings her, the greater his mitzva. As a consequence, his personal pleasure is likewise considered a greater mitzva. In contrast, if he does not manage to give her pleasure, his own great pleasure is no mitzva. There is only the basic benefit that it saves him from sexual transgression (as explained above in sections 3 and 5).
  Likewise, when a wife gives her husband pleasure, she fulfills a mitzva, and her own pleasure facilitates the mitzva. The more pleasure she brings to her husband, the greater the value of her own pleasure.
  Let’s take this a step further. When a wife wants to enjoy their sexual union, and to that end she opens up to her husband and allows him to bring her great pleasure, she is enabling him to fulfill his mitzva. Thus, her pleasure facilitates the mitzva in two ways: she helps her husband fulfill his mitzva, and this, in turn, intensifies her desire to bring him pleasure. 
  Similarly, the pleasure that a husband receives from his wife facilitates the mitzva in two ways: for through his pleasure, his desire to give his wife pleasure grows, and this allows her to fulfill her mitzva to give him pleasure.
  
  Section 15
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / In Exile and in Redemption
  The general state of the Jewish people affects the joy of the mitzva of ona because the sacred bond between every Jewish husband and wife parallels the bond between God and the Jewish people. The Sages explain in the Mishna that the momentous occasions on which the Jewish people became connected to God are referred to as “His wedding day” and “His day of bliss” (Shir Ha-shirim 3:11). “‘His wedding day’ refers to the giving of the Torah, and ‘His day of bliss’ refers to the building of the Temple” (Ta’anit 26b). We also find that immediately after the Jews received the Torah at Sinai, they were commanded to return to their tents, “to the joy of ona” (Avoda Zara 5a). And directly following the dedication of the Temple, the husbands returned home, joyful and in excellent spirits, and found their wives in a state of purity. They then fulfilled the mitzva of ona with tremendous joy (Mo’ed Katan 9a; above, 1:6).
  In contrast, when the Jewish people distance themselves from God, the pleasure of this mitzva is diminished as well. As the Sages said, “Since the destruction of the Temple, sexual pleasure has been taken away and given to sinners” (Sanhedrin 75a). As a result of the distance between God and the Jewish people, rifts permeate all the worlds. The earth is not responsive to heaven and does not express holy values; heaven is not responsive to the earth and does not bestow life and blessing upon it. Global anguish permeates individual homes. As a result, men cannot be fully responsive to their wives’ desire, and women cannot be fully responsive to their husbands’ desire. Those people who have understood the profundity of the crisis and the anguish, and who have truly identified with the pain and tears of both God and the Jewish nation, have at times found it difficult to joyfully fulfill the mitzva of ona.
  The Talmud cites R. Yishmael b. Elisha as saying that from the day that the Temple was destroyed, by rights we should have decreed upon ourselves not to eat meat or drink wine, and the day that the evil (Roman) empire conquered us and imposed on us evil and harsh measures, depriving us of Torah and mitzvot and forbidding us from celebrating circumcisions, by rights we should have decreed upon ourselves not to marry or to have children. Avraham’s line would have come to an end by itself. However, R. Yishmael concluded, the Jews should be left alone; it is better that they sin unwittingly and not willfully, as they would not be able to endure such a harsh decree (Bava Batra 60b).
  The Talmud continues that after the destruction of the Second Temple, there was a proliferation in the number of Jews who abstained from eating meat or drinking wine in mourning over the cessation of the sacrifices and libations. R. Yehoshua challenged them: “So should we not eat bread, because the meal offerings have been eliminated? Should we not eat fruit, because there are no more bikkurim (first fruit offerings)? Should we not drink water, since the water libation has ceased?!” Rather, he counseled: “My children, it is impossible to avoid mourning completely, for the sentence has been decreed. But it is also impossible to mourn excessively, because we do not impose a decree on the community unless the majority can endure it” (ibid.). Thus, the Sages instituted only mourning customs that are appropriate and suitable for the community.
  Therefore, even in exile, the halakhot of the mitzva of ona did not budge, for the essence of the mitzva is that it must be fulfilled joyfully, and the greater the couple’s love and joy grows, the more virtuous they are. Furthermore, the fulfillment of this mitzva ameliorates the exile somewhat, for through it a couple establish their home as a mini-Temple, as the Shekhina dwells with them when they properly fulfill this mitzva (Sota 17a). This accords with the statement of the Sages, “Wherever the Jewish people were exiled, the Shekhina, as it were, went into exile with them” (Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmael, Bo, §14). The Sages further said that by fulfilling the mitzva of procreation, people draw the redemption closer: “The (messianic) son of David will not arrive until all the souls of the body have been finished” (Yevamot 62a), that is, until all the Jewish souls in the heavenly storehouse have been born.
  Thus, it is through our efforts to fulfill the mitzva of ona in accordance with halakha that we bring the redemption closer and arouse pining and yearning for the restoration of the special relationship between the Lover and the beloved, that is, between the Holy One and the congregation of Israel (Knesset Yisrael). As it is written: <i>For the sake of Zion I will not be silent, and for the sake of Jerusalem I will not be still, until her righteousness emerges resplendent, and her salvation blazes like a torch…. No longer will you be called “Azuva” (“Forsaken”) nor shall your land be called “Shemama” (“Desolate”). Rather, you shall be called “Ḥeftzi-bah” (“I-delight-in-her”) and your land “Be’ula” (“Espoused”). For the Lord delights in you, and your land shall be espoused. As a youth espouses a maiden, your sons will espouse you; as a bridegroom rejoices over his bride, so will your God rejoice over you.</i> (Yeshayahu 62:1, 4-5)
  But those righteous ascetics, whose hearts were so filled with anguish over the Temple’s destruction, could not make do with the mini-Temple which remained to the Jewish people. In their sorrow, they could not fulfill the mitzva of ona with the appropriate joy (see 2:14 above). Therefore, even as they scrupulously fulfilled the mitzva – aware of its value and importance, and aware that through it they were bringing the redemption closer – they reduced its frequency to the necessary minimum, just enough to uphold the sanctity of marriage and fulfill the mitzva of procreation. Occasionally, their customs are cited by the poskim.10<i class="footnote">The abstinence customs that were practiced after the destruction of the Temple and concomitant persecutions are similar to what we learned above (2:14), namely, that it is forbidden to have relations when the world is suffering greatly, such as from a famine or harsh decrees. Only those who have not yet fulfilled the mitzva of procreation may have sexual relations at such times. Along these lines, R. Tzadok Ha-Kohen explains that it is not coincidental that the Talmud’s accounts of the Temple’s destruction appear in <em>Gittin</em> (55b-58a), the tractate about divorce, as the destruction and exile are comparable to Israel’s divorce by God (<em>Kedushat Ha-Shabbat</em> 3:5). Likewise, R. Tzadok points out that the Talmud’s teachings in praise of Eretz Yisrael appear at the end of <em>Ketubot</em> (110b-112b), the tractate about marriage contracts, for settling Eretz Yisrael manifests the marriage between God and <em>Knesset Yisrael</em><em>Inyanei Halakha</em><em>Igeret Ha-kodesh</em>, p. 399 [Har Bracha edition], s.v. “ve-yizkor”).Zohar III 118a, states:For happiness exists only when Israel is in the Holy Land, for there the wife achieves union with her Husband, which is a joy to all, joy above and below. When Israel is not in the Holy Land, one is forbidden to be or appear happy, as it says, “Rejoice with Jerusalem and be glad in her, all who love her” (Yeshayahu 66:10). It is specifically with her that you may be glad.It is important to add that after the Temple was destroyed and the laws of ritual purity rendered moot, all the immersions related to the Temple were eliminated. The only circumstance where purification of the human body remains relevant is the immersion of a nidda to purify herself so she can resume sexual intimacy with her husband. Thus, to some extent, a Jewish home is a mini-Temple.</i>
  Nevertheless, as explained in the Talmud and halakhic literature, the general directive stands. The way to fulfill the mitzva of ona halakhically is with great joy. The more pleasure a husband and wife give each other in this mitzva, the more praiseworthy they are. At the same time, it is natural that despite the wish to fulfill the mitzva in the most complete way, the global pain caused by the exile of the Jews and the Shekhina clouds the joy of the mitzva. Yet the more we merit seeing the Jewish people return to their land, the more the joy of this mitzva is restored, as it is written: <i>And the Lord’s redeemed shall return, and come with shouting to Zion, crowned with joy everlasting. They shall attain joy and gladness, while sorrow and sighing flee.</i> (Yeshayahu 35:10)
  May it be God’s will that we all together merit seeing the ingathering of all exiles and the rebuilding of entire breadth and width of the land. May our eyes behold the return of God to Zion, the restoration of the Davidic dynasty to its rightful place, and the rebuilding of the Temple. Heaven and earth will unite, as will duty and desire, truth and joy, vision and reality, body and soul. “And on that day, declares the Lord, you will call Me ‘Ishi’; you will no longer call Me ‘Ba’ali’” (Hoshea 2:18). Knesset Yisrael will call the Holy One “Ishi” instead of “Ba’ali,” by the term for husband that means “man” instead of “master,” thus emphasizing love that has no element of compulsion. God’s continues, through His prophet: <i>I will betroth you forever; I will betroth you with righteousness and in justice, and with goodness and mercy. And I will betroth you with faithfulness; then you shall know the Lord. On that day I will respond (e’eneh – from the same root as ona), declares the Lord, I will respond (e’eneh) to the heavens, and they shall respond (ya’anu) to the earth. And the earth shall respond (ta’aneh) with new grain and wine and oil, and they shall respond (ya’anu) to Jezreel. I will seed her in the land as My own; and I shall have compassion on Lo-Ruḥama (No-Compassion); and I will say to Lo-Ami (Not-My-People), ‘You are My people,’ and he will respond, ‘My God.’</i>” (Hoshea 2:18-25)God will rejoice over us as a groom rejoices over his bride, and the joy of the mitzva of ona will be restored in all its glory.
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Male Masturbation and the Prohibition of “Wasting Seed”
  God created human beings with a powerful drive for love and a mutual attraction between men and women. This drive, when guided by sanctity, serves as the foundation of the marital covenant and for the closeness of husband and wife, about which the Torah says, “And he shall cling to his wife, so that they become one flesh” (Bereishit 2:24). This “clinging” begins with the mitzva of ona and culminates in the mitzva of procreation. By having children together, they unite literally in one flesh.
  Since the attraction between men and women is the foundation of life and the strongest human drive, we have been commanded to enter into the covenant with God by removing the foreskin of the penis, the organ that joins man and woman. This is brit mila, the covenant of circumcision. With the removal of the foreskin, which symbolizes misdirected desire, the sacred covenant between God and Israel extends to the marriage covenant between husband and wife. When they engage in joyful lovemaking, the Shekhina dwells with them (Sota 17a), and their union leads to an abundance of love and blessing, benevolence and delight, life and peace, spreading throughout the world (see Berakhot 6b and Yevamot 62b).
  In contrast, when this powerful impulse is corrupted, it damages the covenant. Instead of sanctifying it through the couple’s loving fulfillment of the mitzvot of ona and procreation, it is corrupted by adultery or self-gratification. This was the sin of the generation of the flood, of which the Torah says, “God saw how corrupt the earth was, for all flesh had corrupted its way on earth” (Bereishit 6:12). People continued to be drawn after their desires, committing the sins of adultery, idol worship, and theft, until the entire world was destroyed by the flood. The Sages explain that the punishment was quid pro quo: they sinned by corrupting the fiery passion that should have aroused their love in the context of marriage, using it for masturbation and adultery instead, so they were consumed by the boiling floodwaters (Sanhedrin 108a-b).
  The sin of wasting seed – male masturbation – has an aspect of the sin of adultery, which is so grave that it is one of the Ten Commandments. On the verse, “You shall not commit adultery” (Shemot 20:13), the Sages comment: “There should be no adultery in you – not even your hand or foot”; in other words, a man must not masturbate with his hands or feet (Nidda 13b). Likewise, on the verse, “He shall cling to his wife, so that they become one flesh” (Bereishit 2:24), the Sages comment: “He shall cling to his wife and not someone else’s wife. He shall cling to his wife and not another man or an animal” (y. Kiddushin 1:1). R. Tzadok Ha-Kohen explains further that a man should not ejaculate anywhere other than with his wife (Tzidkat Ha-tzadik §121). This drive for life is meant to increase the love and devotion of a married couple. One who corrupts it in order to indulge his urges harms his ability to love his wife devotedly.
  Masturbation is also antithetical to the mitzva of procreation. We know that it displeases God from the story in which Er and Onan wasted their seed to ensure that Tamar would not get pregnant. The Torah states, “But Er, Judah’s firstborn, was displeasing to the Lord, and the Lord took his life” (Bereishit 38:7), and shortly afterwards states about Onan, “What he did was displeasing to the Lord, and He took his life also” (ibid. v. 10). Therefore, coitus interruptus is forbidden. Even if a man does so when his wife cannot conceive in any case, such as when she is pregnant, nursing, or menopausal, he transgresses this prohibition (Yevamot 34b).1<i class="footnote">em&gt;Poskim disagree as to whether a couple may have relations in which the husband ejaculates somewhere other than the vagina, if they find it pleasurable (as discussed by Rema, EH 25:2; see above, ch. 2 n. 19). However, if the motive for doing so is contraceptive, even those who are normally permissive prohibit it (<em>Derisha</em>, EH 23:1). Yet even according to those who forbid, when a man ejaculates during non-vaginal intercourse or during foreplay, the prohibition is less severe than if he were to masturbate, since he is still being intimate with his wife and giving her some pleasure (<em>Sefer Ḥaredim</em> ch. 63; <em>Avnei Nezer</em>, EH 83).According to Tosafot (Sanhedrin 59b s.v “ve-ha”), the prohibition of wasting seed is an extension of the mitzva of procreation. Some say that the prohibition is derived from the biblical story of Er and Onan (Pri Megadim, Eshel Avraham 3:14; Ben Yehoyada, Nidda 13a). Others explain that the act is forbidden because of the prohibition of bal tashḥit (wasteful destruction) (R. Yaakov Ettlinger in Arukh La-ner, Nidda 13b and in Binyan Tziyon §137). Or Zaru’a 1:124 and Smak §292 include it in the prohibition of “Do not commit adultery,” based on the extrapolation of the Sages in Nidda 13b. Finally, Baḥ (3:6) sees the source of the prohibition in the verse, “Stay away from every evil thing” (Devarim 23:10), which the Sages explain to mean that “a man mustn’t entertain thoughts during the day that will cause him to become impure at night” (AZ 20b).Aḥaronim are divided regarding the severity of the prohibition. Many say that it is biblical (R. Shneur Zalman Fradkin of Lublin, Torat Ḥesed, EH 43:1-2; Pri Megadim; R. Ḥayim Palachi, Ḥayim Ve-shalom, 2:18; Ezrat Kohen §32; Igrot Moshe, EH 3:14). Others maintain that it is rabbinic (Responsa Pnei Yehoshua 2:44; Meshivat Nefesh §18; Ezer Mi-kodesh 23:2; R. Shlomo Kluger, Mei Nidda, Kuntres Aḥaron 195:7; Torot Emet, EH 23). It seems that even according to those poskim who believe that the transgression is only rabbinic, its basis is from the Torah, because it is contrary to the Torah’s goals in the mitzvot of ona and procreation. For a more extensive discussion of this topic, see R. Tzadok Ha-Kohen of Lublin, Takanat Ha-shavin §15.</i>
  
  Section 2
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Severity of the Sin
  On one hand, the Sages greatly emphasize the gravity of this sin. They go so far as to say, “Whoever wastefully ejaculates seed is liable to be put to death” (Nidda 13a). They also state that someone who wastes his seed is like a spiller of blood and an idol-worshiper (ibid). He is like a murderer because he is wasting seed that is meant to add life to the world. He is like an idol-worshiper because instead of increasing love, he is misdirecting the drive for life to self-centered lust, just as idol-worshipers misdirect the power of faith to the worship of wood and stone (see Maharal, Ḥidushei Aggadot, Nidda 13b.)
  Zohar goes even further, saying that one who violates this prohibition will not experience the Divine Presence or get eternal reward, since he is like a person who murdered his children. He has spilled a great deal of blood, since this sin becomes habitual. One can repent for all other sins in the Torah, except this one. Nevertheless, if one makes great efforts to repent, motivated by love of God, he will succeed in atoning even for this sin (Zohar I 219b, 62a). Based on Zohar, Shulḥan Arukh states, “This sin is worse than all the other sins in the Torah” (EH 23:1).2<i class="footnote">It is known that <em>Zohar</em> uses metaphors and hyperbole, as is typical in explanations of esoteric matters, in order to emphasize the inner dimensions. It states:Whoever wastes seed is considered wicked and will not experience the Shekhina, as its says, “For You are not a God Who desires wickedness; evil cannot abide with You” (Tehilim 5:5)…. Woe unto that wicked person, for he is evil and he made himself evil. As his hands have dealt, so shall it be done to him (see Yeshayahu 3:11) – This includes someone who commits adultery with his hands (i.e., masturbates), ejaculating and destroying his seed for no reason. He will be punished more harshly in the supernal world than all the other wicked people…. All other wicked souls ascend from hell after they are purged, but he will not…because he literally killed his children and spilled much blood (as one who commits this sin usually does so innumerable times)…. R. Yehuda said, “There is no sin in the world without the possibility of repentance, except for this one, and there are no wicked people who will not experience the Shekhina, except this one, for ‘evil cannot abide with You’ is applied to him.” (Zohar on Parshat Vayeḥi, I, 219b)However, powerful repentance out of love is effective even for this sin, as it is further stated:Come and see: For all of a person’s sins and all the damage he caused above, fixing it is dependent upon repentance. But when one commits the sin of spilling seed on the ground and corrupting his ways, he corrupts himself and corrupts the land. About him it is said, “The stain of your sin is before Me” (Yirmiyahu 2:22). It also says, “For You are not a God Who desires wickedness; evil cannot abide with You” (Tehilim 5:5) – unless he repents powerfully. (Zohar on Parshat No’aḥ, I, 62a)Earlier, Zohar on Parshat Bereishit (I, 56b) states: “They said of the generation of the flood that they committed every sin, but their fate was not sealed until they spilled their seed on the ground for no reason.” On Parshat Vayeshev, Zohar (I, 188a) states:Come and see: Of all the sins which make a person impure in this world, the sin that defiles man the most, in this world and the next, is spilling seed into the open, ejaculating his seed for no reason using his hands or feet. This makes him impure, as it says, “For You are not a God Who desires wickedness.” For this reason, he cannot enter past the partition and cannot see the face of the Ancient One…. Fortunate is the lot of the man who fears God and avoids the evil path. He purifies himself, doing his best to revere God…and makes an effort to have children with a worthy wife…so he can teach them to walk in the ways of God.To put this in perspective, it is important to add that just as a waster of seed is said to be like a spiller of blood, so is one who does not fulfill the mitzva of procreation (Yevamot 63b); one who does not visit the sick (Nedarim 40a); who does not accompany a guest upon his departure (Sota 46b); or who embarrasses another person in public (Bava Metzi’a 58b). A community that delays giving charity on account of a fast day is also in this category (Sanhedrin 35a). Additionally, just as someone who wastes seed is compared to an idolater, so is someone who turns a blind eye to the poor and needy (Ketubot 68a and Bava Batra 10a); someone who lives outside Eretz Yisrael (Ketubot 110b); and someone who is arrogant (Sota 4b). All these sins betray the same profound character flaw that can lead to the commission of these grave acts – murder and idol worship – even though in practice the other sins are not as grave, and one need not give up his life to avoid committing these sins, unlike bloodshed and idolatry.</i>
  On the other hand, there is no explicit Torah prohibition against wasting seed. The verse simply mentions that Er and Onan were punished by death for committing this sin. As a result, the poskim debate whether it is a rabbinic or Torah prohibition. Even according to those who maintain that the prohibition is from the Torah, it is clearly not considered one of the most severe ones, since it is punished neither by death nor by lashes (n. 1 above).
  Practical halakhic rulings reflect this as well. If a man sees that his sexual desire is overpowering him to the extent that he will give in to the temptation of adultery or have sexual relations with his wife when she is nidda, it is preferable that he masturbate and then fast to atone for the sin, rather than succumb to these graver sins (Sefer Ḥasidim §176; SA ḤM 23:1; Beit Shmuel ad loc. 1). It is also preferable to masturbate than give in to the temptation of having relations with an unmarried woman, even if she is ritually pure (Responsa Maharshag §243).3<i class="footnote">According to <em>Eliya Rabba</em> 3:15, wasting seed is the most serious of sins when a person causes it by stimulating himself. However, if he feels desire for a married woman or a <em>nidda</em>, it is better for him to masturbate rather than commit the graver sin. Rav Kook explains that wasting seed is more serious than all other sins only when the seed is actually wasted. However, if it serves a purpose, such as preventing the person from having relations with a married woman, the sin is less grave (<em>Ezrat Kohen</em> §35). Still, this seems difficult: how can it be that, on one hand, this sin is described as the gravest of all sins, yet, on the other hand, this prohibition is, at worst, a negative commandment for which the Torah prescribed no punishment? Rather, it must be that the severity of this sin is in the fact that it distances a person from God and prevents him from advancing spiritually. Nevertheless, concerning the punishment in this world and the next, it is less severe than the punishments for which the Torah prescribes death or lashes. R. Tzadok discusses this at length in <em>Takanat Ha-shavin</em> (15:11-12; 15:38). One of the things he explains is <em>Zohar</em>’s statement that someone who commits this sin does not ascend to heaven. I will explain this in the next section.</i>
  
  Section 3
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Two Aspects of the Sin
  There are two dimensions of the sin of masturbation. On the surface, it is less severe than adultery and the other sins for which the Torah prescribes punishment, because, in practice, the damage caused thereby is not as grave. However, from the interior perspective, this sin reflects the root of all evil, the ultimate self-centeredness, which most profoundly impairs a person’s faith in God and his love for other people. As we have seen, detachment is at the root of all ruin in this world (1:5-6). It begins with the distancing between the Creator and His creations, and continues with detachment among His creatures. This is why the mitzva to “love your fellow as yourself” (Vayikra 19:18) is a “major principle of the Torah” (Sifra ad loc.), for it repairs the whole world. It is only in the spousal relationship that love and unity reach their complete fulfillment, and its essence is when they unite in the mitzva of ona (above, 1:1). This is the meaning of the life-giving impulse that exists between husband and wife, through which the couple breaks the walls of egotism and connects with one another with true love. The Shekhina dwells with them, and through them, life and blessing extend forth from Source of life to all future generations.
  In contrast, when a man uses this life-giving impulse for his personal gratification, he corrupts the foundation of his life. Instead of drawing upon it to increase the love between him and his wife, he destroys it and wastes it on egotistical desires. This is why, from the interior perspective, this sin is so grave. It expresses man’s selfishness, arrogance, and lust. It detaches him from his great mission, which is to connect to God with faith, and to increase love, blessing, and life in the world.
  Therefore, one who commits this sin harms himself in this world and the next. In this world, he impairs his ability to love his wife and be truly and completely happy with her, since he spent some of his strength for something empty, strength that will be lessened when he couples with his wife. Even if he makes great efforts, a thin membrane of selfishness will separate them and impair their union. He also harms himself in the next world, because his soul cannot ascend and enjoy the radiance of the Shekhina as it should. Although in terms of punishment, his sin is mild relative to other sins, in terms of the loss of his potential to come close to God, his punishment is severe, because the damaged part of his soul detaches itself from life and cannot receive its eternal reward. It cannot be fixed until the Resurrection of the Dead.
  Moreover, standard repentance, normally effective in atoning for all sins, is not effective in bringing his soul to its proper level, because selfish lust distances a person from true life. Just as he cannot unite fully with his wife, so too he cannot properly enjoy the radiance of the Shekhina. This is meant not to cause despair, but to emphasize the need to repair this transgression through greater repentance than usual – so that he will make every effort to love God, cling to His Torah and mitzvot, increase his true love for his wife, and reclaim the life-giving impulse that he destroyed. Since God’s hand is extended to accept penitents, whoever makes a great effort to repent fully will merit much satisfaction and joy (see Orot Ha-teshuva 7:1:6 and 15:8).
  However, it is notoriously difficult to overcome this drive. According to the Sages, this is what led to Adam’s sin, as a result of which humans became mortal and the evil inclination was internalized, to the extent that there is no righteous man on earth who always does good and never commits the sin of masturbation, or at least experiences nocturnal emissions. This drive is particularly strong among teenagers. If there ever was a man who successfully saved all his desire for his wife, he would merit revealing a spark of divine unity in his life. He will have completely repaired Adam’s sin and would therefore never die. However, God made it extremely difficult for us to repair this flaw, to the extent that even righteous people fail at it. They too must become penitents, which gives them the opportunity to be involved in repairing the whole world, with all its lusts and inclinations. In our current pre-messianic times, this sin becomes rampant, because the life-giving impulse increases in anticipation of the redemption, as does the difficulty of preserving its sanctity. The righteous must overcome all obstacles, pick themselves up when they fall, and keep going, as it says: “Seven times the righteous man falls and gets up” (Mishlei 24:16). Through this, we will become worthy of redemption from the evil inclination and from the death it entails. Life will be revealed in full force until the world is repaired with the Resurrection of the Dead (Tzidkat Ha-tzadik §§109, 111).4<i class="footnote">em&gt;Tzidkat Ha-tzadik §102 explains that there are two types of people: the <em>tzadik</em> (righteous person) and the <em>ḥasid</em> (pious person). The <em>tzadik</em> does not deviate from the letter of the law and almost never sins. In contrast, the <em>ḥasid</em> goes beyond the letter of the law, but also falls victim to sins, particularly sexual ones. However, he is also more successful at repenting and correcting himself. See further §§103-106 as well as §108. In §101, R. Tzadok explains why almost no man can avoid this sin entirely. He adds in §43 that sometimes a man is faced with such great temptation that it is impossible for him to avoid sinning. He is considered compelled. Now, a person can never confidently assert this about himself, as perhaps he was capable of overcoming the temptation. Nevertheless, if a person is subject to strong physical desires, R. Tzadok (§44) advises him not to be depressed or conclude that there is something wrong with him. Rather, he should see it as a sign that he is capable of loving God and seeking truth.</i>
  
  Section 4
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Two Aspects of the Sin
  Various correctives have been proposed for the sin of wasting seed, but the first and primary corrective is, of course, the corrective of the covenant (<i>tikkun ha-brit</i>), meaning that a man connects with his wife in complete love. The Sages said that when someone has sinned with part of his body, he should use that body part to perform <i>mitzvot</i> (<i>Vayikra Rabba</i> 21:5). In this case, he should make great efforts to bring his wife pleasure during all the obligatory <i>onot</i>. When there is a conflict between what gives her pleasure and what gives him pleasure, he should set aside his desires and try to please his wife to the best of his ability.
  Additionally, he should improve his fulfillment of the mitzva to procreate, having as many children as he and his wife have the strength for. This is on condition that he not quarrel with his wife over this, for we have already learned that the first corrective is for him to please his wife as best he can. However, if through the joy of <i>ona </i>he can enhance his fulfillment of the mitzva of procreation, he will have merited a powerful correction of his sin. Making up for destroying and killing life, he increases life. Making up for sinning selfishly, he devotes himself selflessly to raising his children and educating them to keep the Torah and <i>mitzvot</i>.5<i class="footnote">According to R. Tzadok, “Everyone knows that the area in which he struggles the hardest against his evil inclination is the area in which he has the most potential to be clean and pure. Whatever he frequently sinned with has the most potential for…cleanliness and purity. This is why the Sages say (<i>Vayikra Rabba</i> 21:5) that the very same body part that he used for a sin, he should use for <i>mitzvot</i>” (<i>Tzidkat Ha-tzadik</i> §49). Specifically, “The prohibition of wasting seed is an outgrowth of the mitzva of procreation…. Therefore, by fulfilling the mitzva of procreation with the proper intention – for the sake of heaven – he can also correct transgressions in this area, and use the semen for sanctity…” (<i>ibid</i>. §124). Rav Kook writes, “Having achieved true and pure repentance, we must return to the world and to life. By doing so we restore sanctity to its rightful place, and crown the Divine Presence in the world” (<i>Orot Ha-teshuva</i> 14:30).</i>
  Another great corrective for this sin is Torah study. By studying Torah, one connects to the Source of life, contributes new life to the world, and improves it. The Talmud tells us that God created the evil inclination, but created the Torah as its antidote (<i>Kiddushin</i> 30b). In other words, the Torah rectifies the wickedness of the evil inclination and transforms it to goodness. Furthermore, we learn that the fire of hell has no power over Torah scholars (<i>Ḥagiga</i> 27a) and that the Torah protects people and saves them (<i>Sota</i> 21a). Learning the Torah diligently and toiling over its words are a special corrective for this sin, for by obliterating his superficial desires through diligent Torah study, he restores his inner vitality to its rightful place (<i>Berakhot</i> 63b; <i>Tamid</i> 32a; <i>Tzidkat Ha-tzadik</i> §§97, 106, 123).
  Teaching Torah and reaching out to bring one’s students closer to Torah can also correct this sin. After all, students are referred to as children. To counter his sin in destroying life-giving power, he infuses his students with life. Doing outreach especially rectifies this sin, for by bringing those who have lapsed back toward Torah and <i>mitzvot</i>, he restores his own lapsed life-giving power (<i>Tzidkat Ha-tzadik</i> §§116, 126).
  Giving charity to the poor is another great corrective for this sin. After all, “Charity saves from death” (Mishlei 10:2). By giving charity, he contributes new life, thus replacing the life-giving power he destroyed. This assumes that he is giving charity to honest poor people, who are unable to support themselves and who will use the money well – not for drugs, alcohol, and the like. Giving charity to people who are not honestly poor would be sinning in a way that is similar to wasting his seed, since he would be wasting his money. If a person is not properly contrite for this sin, then when he wants to give charity to the poor, heaven may place an obstacle before him by sending him the undeserving poor (<i>Tzidkat Ha-tzadik</i> §125).6<i class="footnote">We mentioned that teaching students can be a corrective. <i>Zohar</i> identifies “those who have harmed the sacred covenant” as those who did not engage in the mitzva of procreation. It goes on to relate that R. Yoḥanan was upset. Since all his children had died, he had not fulfilled the mitzva of procreation. Later, he found solace in an old man’s assertion that when someone has the privilege of teaching Torah, he is truly building the world and keeping it going. Regarding such a person it says (Yeshayahu 56:5), “I will give them, in My house and within My walls, a monument and a name, better than sons or daughters. I will give them an everlasting name which shall not perish” (<i>Zohar Ḥadash</i>, Ruth, 108b).Learning Torah and doing kindness can be correctives as well. If a person is tried by the heavenly court and the court adds an oath to the verdict, he cannot achieve forgiveness by bringing any offering. Nevertheless, if he immerses himself in intense Torah study, he can achieve forgiveness. Some say that one can also achieve it by performing many acts of kindness for others (<i>Rosh Hashana</i> 18a).</i>
  
  Section 5
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Prohibition on Things That Lead to This Sin
  A man may not touch his penis, lest it lead to an erection and masturbation. When urinating, if he is concerned about splattering in the area or on his legs, he may aim by touching the corona of the penis, which is less easily stimulated. If he is married and his wife is ritually pure, he may touch his penis to aim. However, for any other reason, even a married man may not touch himself, lest he stimulate himself, for stimulation should be reserved for increasing the love between the spouses.7<i class="footnote">Most Rishonim allow a married man to be lenient and touch his penis, if necessary, when urinating (Rif, Rambam, Rosh, and many others). <em>Shulḥan Arukh</em> records this in EH (23:4) without mentioning the stringent opinion. In OḤ as well (3:14), it presents the lenient opinion as the <em>halakha</em>, adding, “It is a pious attribute for even a married man to be careful not to do so,” which is the position of Rabbeinu Yona, <em>Or Zaru’a</em>, and <em>Tur</em>. Within the lenient opinion, there is still some disagreement. Some say that this leniency applies only when the man’s wife is with him (<em>Smak</em><em>Aguda</em>, and <em>Ohel Mo’ed</em>), while others maintain that it is always permitted, even if his wife is away or is a <em>nidda</em><em>Tosafot</em>, Me’iri, and implicit in most Rishonim). According to MA 3:14, the leniency applies only when the man’s wife is with him and is not a <em>nidda</em>. Many Aḥaronim agree with this, including <em>Birkei Yosef</em><em>Ḥayei Adam</em>, SAH, and MB <em>ad loc. </em>27. This is the position that I record above, since it is the intermediate position, taking both sides into account. It also neutralizes the major concern of those who are stringent (even though some are stringent under all circumstances). Nevertheless, many Aḥaronim adopt the most lenient position, applying the permission to a married man in all conditions (<em>Beit Shmuel</em> and <em>Bekhor Shor</em>). A married man who wishes to be lenient can rely on these Aḥaronim and touch his penis when urinating, as long as he does not stimulate himself thereby.</i>
  When necessary to prevent itchiness or discomfort, a man may touch himself through a thick cloth. This way, there is no concern of his becoming stimulated as long as he is not intending to do so (MB 3:15). Similarly, when he is wearing pants, he may adjust himself through the pants.
  A man may touch his penis in order to alleviate pain, such as to apply ointment or remove a splinter, as long as he does not cause arousal.
  The prohibition is to touch the penis; there is no prohibition to touch the testicles, as long as he does not stimulate himself thereby. Even when a man takes a shower, he should not touch his penis with his hands, lest he stimulate himself. Rather, he should wash and clean around the genital area, and the soap and water will clean the penis as well (MA 3:14; Ru’aḥ Ḥayim, EH 23:3). Some permit a man to touch his penis directly when necessary, as long as he does not cause arousal (Seder Ha-yom). A married man be lenient when necessary (see Otzar Ha-poskim 23:16:4).8<i class="footnote">The Talmud records the following dialogue:Tarfon says, “Any man who extends his hand below his navel should have it cut off.” They asked R. Tarfon, “If a person has a thorn lodged in his gut, should he not remove it?” He replied to them, “He should not.” They asked, “But his stomach will split open because of it!” He answered them, “Better for his stomach to split open than for him to descend into the pit of destruction.” (Nidda 13b)Tarfon’s intent is to prohibit touching the penis, not the testicles or the surrounding area (SA 3:15). If he is in pain, the halakha follows the Sages, who disagree with R. Tarfon (see Igrot Moshe, EH 1:56; Otzar Ha-poskim 23:13:3).Shulḥan Arukh states that a man may not ride an animal bareback, lest it cause him ejaculation (EH 23:6). However, riding with a saddle is permitted. If he uses a soft riding cloth, which, on one hand, is not as hard as a saddle, but creates a barrier between the rider and the warmth of the animal, Rambam permits, while Rashi still prohibits. SA seems to follow Rambam’s lenient view. See Otzar Ha-poskim 23:19:1. Some poskim extend this concern to shoulder rides and prohibit them (R. Ḥayim Palachi, Ru’aḥ Ḥayim 669). We are not concerned about this, for two reasons. First, shoulders are hard enough to be comparable to a saddle. Second, a person sitting on someone’s shoulders is afraid of falling, and thus not occupying himself with sexual thoughts (compare Nidda 13a). However, if someone knows that doing this is likely to stimulate him, he must avoid it.The Sages cautioned that a man should not sleep on his back, face up, lest he get an erection (SA EH 23:3). However, it seems to me that this prohibition is based on the historical reality that people used to sleep in the nude. Thus, according to Rashi, the prohibition is out of concern that one would experience an erection and be ashamed, or that he might unintentionally touch himself. However, now that it is common practice to wear underwear even while sleeping, sleeping on one’s back is not much of an issue. Another concern was that any movement of the blanket could be sexually stimulating (Rashbam, cited in Tosafot, Nidda 14a, s.v. “layit”), but this is not an issue for someone wearing underpants. See Peninei Halakha: Laws of Prayer, ch. 26 n. 3.The Sages also taught, “Do not gaze at animals or birds when they are mating. However, animal breeders may assist mating animals, because they are occupied by their work and will not have improper thoughts” (Bava Metzia 91a; SA EH 23:3). Orḥot Tzadikim (Sha’ar 26, Sha’ar Ha-teshuva) implies that the restriction is limited to people who have already sinned in this regard.</i>
  
  Section 6
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Two Prohibitions
  Two kinds of sinful thoughts are prohibited: thoughts about adultery and thoughts likely to lead to nocturnal emission. The reason for both prohibitions is the same: they harm the sacred bond between spouses and divert elsewhere the desire that should be used to increase the couple’s love and devotion, causing the Shekhina to leave them.
  The first prohibition is that a man may not think about sinning, that is, he may not imagine himself committing adultery with a woman other than his wife, and certainly he may not plan the sin in his mind. As the Torah says, “Do not follow your heart and your eyes, by which you are led astray” (Bamidbar 15:39). The Sages interpret “your heart” to refer to apostasy (idolatry or heresy) and “your eyes” to refer to sinful thoughts (Berakhot 12b). Therefore, a man may not gaze at women or their clothes in a way that is liable to lead him to sinful thoughts (SA EH 21:1). In addition to the fact that the thoughts themselves are forbidden because they damage the love between husband and wife and contaminate his thoughts with forbidden things, they are liable to lead him to actual adultery. That sin starts with lustful thoughts, whose intensification gives the sinful impulse control over the person, causing him to commit adultery. The Sages say that sinful thoughts are more serious than the sin itself (Yoma 29a). True, the punishment is more severe for committing the sin than for thinking about it. However, it is the sinful thoughts that cause a person to betray his covenant with his wife and commit adultery. These thoughts begin before and persist after the sin, thus further defiling the mind and soul.
  One of the reasons that the Sages instituted “Va-yomer” as the third paragraph of the daily recitation of Shema is to remind people to guard themselves against sinful thoughts. This paragraph contains the verse, “Do not follow your heart and your eyes, by which you are led astray,” and also records the mitzva of wearing tzitzit, for by remembering the tzitzit, a person can be saved from sin (Menaḥot 44a; above, 3:6).9<i class="footnote">The prohibition to think about committing adultery is from the Torah (Rambam, <em>Sefer Ha-mitzvot</em><em>Lo Ta’aseh</em> 47; <em>Smag</em><em>Lo Ta’aseh</em> 15; <em>Smak</em> §30; <em>Sefer Ha-ḥinukh</em> §387). The sinner does not receive lashes, though, since no action is involved (<em>Atzei Arazim</em> 21a). Rabbeinu Yona adds that this prohibition includes gazing at a woman who is forbidden to him in order to enjoy her beauty, even if he has no intention of committing adultery with her, for even if this is not his present intention, gazing at her may lead him there. This is the admonition, “Do not follow…your eyes, by which you are led astray” (<em>Igeret Ha-teshuva</em> §18). According to <em>Smak</em> (§30), this is a rabbinic prohibition to keep him away from truly sinful thoughts. Nevertheless, if this gaze stimulates him sexually, he violates the Torah prohibition of the second kind of sinful thought (<em>ibid. </em>§24).</i>
  The second prohibition is for a man to think about anything that sexually stimulates him and may cause him to have a nocturnal emission or “wet dream,” that is, to ejaculate while sleeping. The Torah says, “Stay away from every evil thing” (Devarim 23:10), which the Sages explain to mean, “A man must not entertain thoughts during the day that will cause him to become impure at night” (Avoda Zara 20b). This prohibition includes thinking about, reading, or looking at anything that arouses his urges and causes an erection, even if the man does not actually imagine himself with a woman who is forbidden to him. Even a married man, when he is away from his wife, or when she is a nidda, may not think about being intimate with her in a sexually stimulating way, as it can lead to a nocturnal emission. All his desire must be safeguarded for his wife alone.10<i class="footnote">Many <em>poskim</em> say that if a man thinks about whatever is likely to cause him a nocturnal emission, he violates a Torah prohibition. They understand the Sages’ interpretation of Devarim 23:10 to be a <em>bona fide </em>expounding of the verse (<em>Smag</em>, <em>Lo Ta’aseh</em> 126; <em>Smak</em> §24; Ran on <em>Ḥullin</em> 37b; <em>Beit Shmuel</em> 21:2). In contrast, <em>Yere’im</em> §45 understands the prohibition to be rabbinic. <em>Pri Megadim</em>, <em>Ezer Mi-kodesh</em>, and <em>Aḥiezer</em> 3:24:5 maintain that Rambam and SA left out this admonition because, in their opinion, this interpretation is an <em>asmakhta</em>. See <em>Otzar Ha-poskim</em> 23:7-8.</i>
  A nocturnal emission is called keri or tuma. The word “keri” is used because it occurs unintentionally, by chance (be-mikreh) at night (layla). Thus, it is also referred to as a “mikreh layla.” The word “tuma” is used because a nocturnal emission makes a person impure; he may neither ascend the Temple Mount nor eat taharot (food that must be eaten while one is ritually pure). To purify himself, he must immerse in a mikveh. Then, after the sun sets, he may eat taharot (see 3:8 above).
  A nocturnal emission happens due to a combination of a natural process – such as the body’s production of semen – and the waking thoughts that a man has that cause him to get an erection. Even if he successfully controls himself during the day and does not masturbate, these thoughts return in his dreams and cause a nocturnal emission. Nevertheless, even the righteous who control their thoughts during the day occasionally experience a seminal emission, because this is the way a man’s body works. It constantly produces semen; as time goes by and semen builds up, the body becomes aroused to ejaculate. This happens more frequently with younger men than older men. (The prohibition of sinful thoughts and masturbation for women is explained below, in sections 10-12.)
  
  Section 7
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Defining and Avoiding Sinful Thoughts
  Regarding both types of sinful thoughts, the prohibition is to invest thought in the objects of desire and arouse lust toward them. However, a fleeting thought that inadvertently enters and leaves a man’s mind is not included in the prohibition, since the Torah was not given to the ministering angels (Me’iri, Ḥullin 37b; Ezer Mi-kodesh 23:3). As for an improper thought which lasts a little longer and is a somewhat sinful, as he should have immediately pushed it away, there is hardly any person, even the most righteous, who is free from this. As the Sages say, “Three sins are everyday occurrences that no one successfully avoids: sinful thoughts, distraction in prayer, and traces of malicious speech” (Bava Batra 164b).11<i class="footnote">R. Menaḥem Treves writes:It is difficult to understand how a person can violate a negative prohibition simply by thinking about a prohibition, for there is a principle that bad intentions are not adjoined to actions, and sinful thoughts are only intentions. So how can it be considered a negative prohibition? Because lustful thoughts concerning women, if they cause an erection, are considered action…. Thus, the statement that no one successfully avoids sinful thoughts is referring to thoughts alone, while the statement that it violates a negative prohibition refers to thoughts accompanied by an erection. (Oraḥ Meisharim [published in 1858], s.v. “hirhur”)The latter is not something which the righteous transgress daily, but sometimes even the righteous fall prey to it, especially when they are young. This is human nature, as it says, “For there is not one righteous person on earth who does good and never sins” (Kohelet 7:20). Therefore, even righteous people need the atonement that comes with the grave (Sanhedrin 46b). According to Tzidkat Ha-tzadik §102, a person with the personality of a tzadik almost never sins this way, but someone with the personality of a ḥasid is more prone to it. At the same time, he corrects himself more and attains the status of a penitent.Improper thoughts are so prevalent among the young that Maharil was bothered:Regarding youths who have not yet married women, who don tefilin, and even those who are already married but still young – I am uncomfortable with their donning them, because they are in the thrall of their sexual drive, while tefilin require purity of body; one must not have thoughts while wearing them. (Minhagei Maharil, Hilkhot Tzitzit U-tefilin)Similarly, R. Shimon bar Tzadok writes that a young man having improper thoughts should not don tefilin (Tashbetz Katan §273). In contrast, R. Shimon b. Tzemaḥ Duran was approached by a community that had decided not to call youths up to the Torah, working on the assumption that they are never free of improper thoughts. He responded that it is permissible to call these youngsters up to the Torah, because someone impure from keri is permitted to read from the Torah (Berakhot 22a): “Even sinners are not prohibited to read from the Torah, and certainly not bachelors who cannot escape improper thoughts. They are also permitted to don tefilin and recite Shema” (Tashbetz 2:261). The only ones who were forbidden by the Sages to don tefilin were married men with their wives, lest they have sexual relations while wearing tefilin (Berakhot 26b).</i>
  The more connected a man is with his wife, and the more scrupulous he is about the laws of modesty, the less susceptible he is to improper thoughts. It would seem that to avoid such thoughts completely, he would need to get married at bar-mitzva age. However, since marriage demands a great deal of responsibility, for which one must prepare by studying Torah and learning a profession, the Sages instructed most people to postpone marriage until they were between the ages of eighteen and twenty (Avot 5:21). On the other hand, they cautioned against delaying marriage beyond that, for if he does so, he “spends his whole life thinking sinful thoughts” (Kiddushin 29b), for once one has become accustomed to these thoughts, it will be difficult for him to free himself from them, even after getting married. Still, the main reason for marrying before the age of twenty is to fulfill the mitzva of procreation (ibid.; 5:7 below). Nowadays, when life is more complex, and as trials and challenges proliferate, marrying before the age of eighteen would be very difficult. Most young people need to postpone marriage beyond the age of twenty. Nevertheless, marriage should not be delayed beyond the age of 24 (5:9 below).
  In the meantime, young men should try to protect themselves with extra modesty, avoiding sinful thoughts and relationships with young women. The more they strengthen their Torah study, the better they will be able to withstand temptation. As the Sages explain, the Torah is exceedingly effective against this urge: “The school of R. Yishmael taught: My son, if this scoundrel [the evil inclination] attacks you, drag him into the beit midrash. If it is stone, it will dissolve; if it is iron, it will shatter” (Kiddushin 30b). This is codified in halakha:
  A man may not intentionally give himself an erection or cause himself to have sinful thoughts. Rather, if an improper thought comes to him, he should divert his mind from worthless and corrupt matters to words of Torah, as Torah is “a loving doe, a graceful mountain goat” (Mishlei 5:19). (MT, Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 21:19; also cited in SA YD 23:3).12<i class="footnote">Even a youth who frequently masturbates should not rush to get married before he is mature enough, as it is common knowledge that most young men are overcome by their urges, yet the Sages did not recommend marrying before the age of eighteen. Some contend that it is forbidden to delay marriage beyond the age of twenty because of the problem of sinful thoughts. As the Talmud states, “A man who is twenty and is not married spends his whole life thinking improper thoughts” (<em>Kiddushin</em> 29b). However, this argument is easily dismissed. After all, it is common knowledge that young men think sinful thoughts and masturbate before the age of twenty more frequently than they do after the age of twenty, yet the Sages instruct men to postpone marriage until the age of twenty so that they can properly prepare themselves for the responsibility of establishing a family, both by learning Torah and by acquiring a way to earn a living. Consequently, someone who needs a few more years to prepare for marriage, as is the accepted practice today, should not get married before he is ready, even if he is overcome with sinful thoughts and masturbation. Nevertheless, he should not delay marriage beyond the age of 24, as explained in section 5:9 below. The only case in which permission to delay marriage is contingent on being able to control one’s urges is if the delay is to study Torah until significantly older than the proper time. As Rambam puts it, “If his urge overpowers him so that he cannot focus his attention, he should marry first and then study Torah” (MT, Laws of Torah Study 1:5).The reason the Sages state that a man who postpones marriage beyond the age of twenty spends all his life thinking improper thoughts is because he has delayed marriage beyond the proper time. As long as a person knows that at the proper time he will get married and love his wife as he loves himself, then even if he sins beforehand, he knows that it is only temporary and not ideal. He is still sure that when he marries, he will safeguard all his desire for his wife. But when a person’s bachelorhood lasts longer than it should, and he becomes accustomed to gratifying his urges sinfully, he surrenders to his evil inclination and no longer believes that he can overcome it. Then, even after he marries, he will not escape sinful thoughts, as they will have become a part of him (see 5:7 below). Nevertheless, as we learned above in n. 2, if he repents powerfully and out of love, he can correct himself.</i>
  
  Section 8
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Mitzva to Marry
  A man who has already fulfilled the mitzva of procreation, even one who has been privileged to have many children, if his wife dies, there is a mitzva for him to remarry a woman who can still bear children, in order to continue fulfilling the mitzva of procreation (below, 5:6). However, if it would be difficult for him to raise more children – whether because of his age, or because supporting them would be too hard, or because he is worried about acrimony between his children from his first wife and his second wife and her children – he may refrain from marrying a woman who can still bear children (see below, 5:6). However, it is still a mitzva for him to remarry a woman who cannot have children, as a person is in a state of wholeness only when married. As the Sages said, “Any man without a wife is not a man” (Yevamot 63a); and “Any man without a wife lives without joy, without blessing, without goodness, without Torah, without fortification, and without peace” (ibid. 62b). This is the Sages’ instruction: “Even if a man already has a number of children, he may not remain without a wife, as it says (Bereishit 2:18), ‘It is not good for man to be alone’” (ibid. 61b). He will thus have the privilege of continued fulfillment of the mitzva of ona and will also prevent himself from having sinful thoughts.
  Rambam likewise rules: “There is a rabbinic mitzva for a man not to remain without a wife, so that he does not come to have sinful thoughts” (MT, Laws of Marriage 15:16). This mitzva is so important that some say that the Sages’ permission to sell a Torah scroll to enable a couple to get married applies even when the bride is too old to conceive. This illustrates the importance of getting married, fulfilling the mitzva of ona, and avoiding improper thoughts (below, 5:21).13<i class="footnote">em&gt;Beit Shmuel 1:13 and AHS <em>ad loc. </em>7 state, like Rambam, that the prohibition against remaining single is on the rabbinic level. However, Ramban raises the possibility that it is from the Torah (<em>Milḥamot Hashem</em><em>Yevamot</em> 20a in the Rif pages). <em>Birkei Yosef</em> 1:15 cites Radakh of Corfu (<em>Responsa Mahardakh</em><em>bayit</em> 17:9) as saying that it is a Torah prohibition according to Rif. It must be that even according to Rambam’s view that the prohibition is rabbinic, marriage and <em>ona </em>are nevertheless Torah commandments, as he implies when he writes that a Torah scroll may be sold in order to enable a man to marry, even if the woman is no longer fertile (MT, Laws of Torah Scrolls 10:2).</i>
  If a man has aged to the point that he no longer desires a woman and no longer yearns to fulfill the mitzva of ona, he is not obligated to remarry, if he has already fulfilled the mitzva of procreation. Nevertheless, even someone whose desire has dissipated fulfills a mitzva if he marries and lives happily and lovingly with his wife – both because being married is the proper human condition, through which one fulfills most completely the interpersonal mitzvot, and because he fulfills the mitzva of ona. However, if he is worried that remarriage may be painful for him, because he might not have a loving relationship with his second wife, he is not obligated to marry, as long as there is no concern that he will have sinful thoughts. Indeed, many great rabbis did not remarry after being widowed (Ramban and Me’iri on Yevamot 62b; Ḥokhmat Adam 123:6; AHS 1:7).
  
  Section 9
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Sexual Thoughts About One’s Wife
  When a man’s wife is ritually pure and he intends to be intimate with her that night, he may think about things that stimulate his desire for her, for there is no concern that these thoughts will lead to a nocturnal emission. However, when she is ritually impure or they are apart from each other, he may not think thoughts that will stimulate his desire for her, lest he will have a nocturnal emission. Even while his wife is pure, a man should be careful not to read or watch anything likely to cause sinful thoughts, i.e., lusting for sin or thinking thoughts that impair his love for his wife.
  So that a man does not sin or think sinful thoughts, the Sages established safeguards for when his wife is a nidda: not to play or be frivolous together, not to smell the perfume on her body or clothes, not to gaze at the parts of her body that are normally covered, not to hand things to one another, not to eat alone at a table without some kind of indicator to remind them that they are prohibited to each other, not to eat from the same plate, and not to drink food that she left in her cup or on her plate. He should not sit or lie down on her bed unless she is out of town, and she should not make her husband’s bed in his presence (SA YD 195).
  So that a man does not think sinful thoughts, he may not engage in any activity that will arouse his urges, that is, that will cause him an erection or to have enduring thoughts about a specific woman. Therefore, he should stay away from places and situations where immodesty abounds and which are likely to arouse his urges. However, sometimes this is necessary to make a living, such as by attending college classes in a framework that does not conform to the halakhic parameters of modesty. In such a case, if he has the option of studying the same profession in a modest framework, he must do so. But if there is no possibility of learning the profession that is appropriate for him in a modest framework, he may study in an immodest framework, as long as he estimates that his urges will not overpower him. If he is uncertain, or in pressing circumstances, he should consult a wise rabbi.14<i class="footnote">This is based on <em>Bava Batra </em>57b, which states that if a man walks near the river where women are immodestly dressed, he is called wicked. However, if he has no alternate route, he may walk there, and of him the verse states, “He shuts his eyes against looking at evil” (Yeshayahu 33:15). Furthermore, if the alternate (modest) route is significantly longer, it is not considered a viable option, and he may take the less modest route (see <em>Avoda Zara </em>48b and <em>Tosafot</em>, s.v “ha ika”; SA YD 142:9). The <em>poskim</em> write that this case serves as a paradigm for all questions of modesty, such as if one wants to study in an immodest academic environment, or choose a profession that would require him to occasionally treat women in ways that are not modest (such as doctors in certain specialties, physical therapists, and psychologists). In all such cases, if there is a great need, for instance, if these studies or this profession will bring him more income or more personal satisfaction and fulfillment, and if he estimates that his urges will not get the better of him, as they do not get the better of many in these fields, then he may engage in them. Obviously, he must be careful not to seclude himself with women in a prohibited manner. But if the man estimates that his sexual urges will overpower him, meaning that his interactions will cause him to become erect or to think a lot about the women he meets in his studies or work (not for the purpose of marriage), he should choose a different field. In cases of doubt or pressing circumstances, he should consult a wise rabbi (see <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, EH 1:56).It must be mentioned that it is impossible to set parameters for all of these matters, because people are very different. As the Sages tell us, if someone knows that he has subdued his evil inclination and has it under control, he may be lenient in situations where others would be required to be stringent. For example, R. Gidel would instruct women how to immerse properly in the mikveh, saying that at that moment, the women resembled white geese to him (Berakhot 20a). Likewise, R. Yoḥanan knew that women leaving the mikveh wanted to gaze at him so that they would have sons as beautiful as he was. He therefore sat at the entrance of the mikveh without concern about his evil urge (ibid.). Similarly, at weddings, R. Aḥa would put the bride on his shoulders and dance with her in order to make the bride and groom happy, saying that he found this no more stimulating than carrying a wooden beam on his back (Ketubot 17a). In contrast, other Tanna’im and Amora’im were very concerned about their urges. For example, Abaye once watched a man and a woman take a long walk together and not sin; he assessed that had he been in that situation, he might have sinned. Abaye felt very bad about this until an old man reassured him that this did not indicate any inferiority. On the contrary, “The greater a person, the greater his urges” (Sukka 52a). R. Ḥiya bar Ashi, even in his old age, would pray that he not succumb to his evil urges. Once, his wife, seeking intimacy with him, disguised herself as a prostitute. He desired to sin with her, and even after she revealed that she was his wife, he fasted over it for the rest of his life, since he had intended to sin (Kiddushin 81b). Additionally, regarding the prohibition of yiḥud, R. Meir said, “Make sure that I am not secluded with my daughter,” and R. Tarfon said, “Make sure that I am not secluded with my daughter-in-law” (ibid.).Since a person can deceive himself, Rishonim and Aḥaronim write that one should not trust himself in this area unless he is particularly pious and self-aware (Ritva, Kiddushin 82a; Smak §30; Yam Shel Shlomo, Kiddushin 4:25; Pitḥei Teshuva, EH 21:3). Sefer Ha-ḥinukh is more stringent, explaining that the Amora’im who were lenient for the sake of a mitzva were angelic, “but today, we may not breach even the smallest safeguard in this area” (§188). This is the generally accepted approach. Nevertheless, within reason, in a situation where many people can control themselves, this question is left to the discretion of the individual. The more susceptible he is, the more stringent he should be.It is also important to be aware that in everything pertaining to sexual arousal, there is a big difference between younger people and older people. By nature (physically and psychologically), younger people are much more easily aroused, so they must safeguard themselves better. Similarly, an unmarried man must be more careful than a married man, since he cannot yet express his desires through the sacred covenant of marriage.</i>
  
  Section 10
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Prohibition of Masturbation for Women
  Women likewise may not stimulate themselves to reach orgasm. This is because sexual desire should be safeguarded for the enhancement of love and devotion between husband and wife, not for selfish gratification. However, for two related reasons, the prohibition for women is not as severe as the prohibitions for men. Firstly, with regard to men, ejaculation impedes the mitzva of ona, because a man’s sexual potency is limited, and when he wastes seed, it diminishes his desire to be with his wife. If the couple’s set time of ona is that day, sometimes he will not be able to have sexual relations with her even if he wants to. In contrast, a woman is not limited in this way. Even if she brings herself to orgasm, she will likely be able to have another orgasm with her husband. She will certainly be able to have sexual relations with him.
  Secondly, a man’s semen has the potential to impregnate, and masturbation wastes that potential. In contrast, the secretions that issue as a result of a woman’s masturbation cannot lead to conception; even after they have exuded, her ovum can be fertilized as before.
  Nevertheless, a woman may not stimulate herself, because that pleasure should be reserved for strengthening a couple’s relationship.
  There is another difference between men and women in this regard. A man is very easily stimulated, and any touch of his penis can be arousing. Therefore, the Sages forbade a man to touch his penis, lest it result in the wasting of seed (see section 5 above). However, with respect to women, ordinary contact with the vaginal area is not too stimulating. Therefore, the Sages state that the more frequently a woman performs bedikot (internal examinations to check for menstrual blood), more praiseworthy she is (Nidda 13a).15<i class="footnote">It is implied in the view of Rabbeinu Tam (<em>Tosafot </em>on <em>Nidda</em> 13a) that it is not prohibited for women to masturbate, which is why the Sages regarded it as praiseworthy for women to perform frequent <em>bedikot</em>. This is also implied by <em>Birkei Yosef</em>, YD 335:5. However, according to the Ramban, Rashba, Ritva, Ran, and Me’iri, women many not stimulate themselves manually, and the reason that vaginal examinations are permitted, even encouraged, is because they are not arousing. The prohibition is based on the verse relating to the flood: “All flesh had corrupted its ways on earth” (Bereishit 6:12); “all flesh” includes women, who also corrupted their ways. Furthermore, one who is drawn to gratify her improper desires is liable to sin in other ways as well. The root issue, according to all of these explanations, is that behaving this way impairs the marital covenant, for all of this desire should be directed toward strengthening the couple’s love and devotion through the <em>mitzvot</em> of <em>ona</em> and procreation. (The connection of women to the mitzva of procreation is explained in 5:3 below.) Arizal said: “Know that just as a man who wastes seed when not with a woman creates demons, so too a woman creates demons if she is not with a man. This is alluded to by the verse… ‘plague will not come near your tent’ (Tehillim 91:10). That is, the ‘plague’ – the demonic masculine (<em>samekh-mem dekhura</em>) – ‘will not come near your tent’, meaning your wife” (Arizal, <em>Sha’ar Ha-kavanot</em><em>Derushei Ha-layla</em> 7, cited in <em>Responsa Torah Lishma</em> §504). Nevertheless, it is not as severe a prohibition as masturbation is for men, so Arizal did not establish a series of fasts for women to atone for this sin.If a woman is finding it difficult to enjoy sexual relations and is advised by a God-fearing therapist to try to stimulate herself, she may do so. The reason for this is twofold. First, the purpose is to facilitate observance of the mitzva of ona. Second, in pressing circumstances the permissive opinions of Rabbeinu Tam and Birkei Yosef may be relied upon. (See also Ḥidushei Ḥatam Sofer on Nidda 13a, which seems to rule leniently regarding a married woman thinking of her husband.)</i>
  
  Section 11
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Prohibition of Improper Thoughts for Women
  Just as it is forbidden for men to entertain sinful thoughts – imagining themselves committing adultery, or (even worse) planning it – it is forbidden for women to entertain sinful thoughts, that is, to imagine themselves committing adultery or being intimate with another man, and certainly to plan such an encounter. The verse says, “Do not follow your heart and your eyes, after which you are led astray” (Bamidbar 15:39). “‘After your eyes’ refers to sinful thoughts” (Berakhot 12b). As Sefer Ha-ḥinukh points out (§387), this mitzva applies “at all times and in all places, to both men and women.” It states elsewhere: “Women, too, are forbidden to think about any man other than their husbands. All their desire and longing should be directed toward them. This is how upright Jewish women behave” (ibid. §188).
  In addition to causing a woman to have less love for her husband and contaminating her mind, thinking sinful thoughts can lead to actual adultery. This is the method of the evil inclination: first it arouses thoughts, then it draws people closer to sin, and ultimately it traps them in its net, causing them to commit adultery and thus ruin their lives. In this respect, men and women are the same.
  As we explained above (section 6), for men there is another category of sinful thoughts, namely, those that cause an erection and can lead to a nocturnal emission. A man may not even think about his wife in an arousing way while she is a nidda. For women, though, there is no such concern. Therefore, a woman may think about sexual matters, as long as these thoughts are not about sinful behavior. Likewise, she may think sexual thoughts about her husband while she is a nidda.16<i class="footnote">SA YD 352:3 states: “A man may not enshroud the corpse of a woman, but a woman may enshroud the corpse of a man.” <em>Shakh</em><em>ad loc. </em>2) explains: “Because of [sexual] thoughts; however, a woman is not as subject to [improper] thoughts.” Since this is the case of a corpse, obviously there is no concern for sinful thoughts of adultery. Rather, the concern is for thoughts that stimulate and lead to a nocturnal emission. This is stated explicitly in <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, EH 1:69 and implied in <em>Birkei Yosef</em>, YD 335:5.</i>
  
  Section 12
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Lesbianism
  A woman may not sexually arouse herself with another woman, because sexual desire must be reserved for the sacred love between husband and wife and for fulfilling the mitzvot of ona and procreation. The Torah admonishes, “You shall not copy the practices of the land of Egypt where you dwelt…nor shall you follow their laws” (Vayikra 18:3). The Sages explained (Sifra ad loc.) that the “practices of the land of Egypt” are “a man marrying a man, a woman marrying a woman, and a woman marrying two men” (MT, Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 21:8; SA EH 20:2).
  Some Tanna’im and Amora’im maintain that a woman who is intimate with another woman is considered a zona, who may not marry a kohen. The Torah restricts kohanim from marrying certain women: “They shall not marry a zona or ḥalala, nor shall they marry one divorced from her husband. For they are holy to their God” (Vayikra 21:7). However, in practice the halakha does not follow this opinion. While lesbian sex is considered promiscuous, a woman who engages in it is not considered a zona, and thus may marry a kohen. Certainly, a married woman who engages in it is not forbidden to her husband (as would be a woman who commits adultery), since this activity involves no penetration in the way that a man penetrates a woman (Yevamot 76a; Rambam ad loc.).17<i class="footnote">The Talmud in <em>Yevamot</em> 76a informs us that according to Rav Huna, “Women who rub against one another (<em>mesolelot zo ba-zo</em>) are disqualified from marrying <em>kohanim</em>.” Rashi explains “<em>mesolelot</em>” to refer to women who rub their genitals against each other, as a man and a woman do during sexual relations. He adds that they are disqualified from marrying <em>kohanim</em> because they are in the category of <em>zona</em>. (This is the opinion of Ramban and Rashba, as well as the second opinion of <em>Tosafot</em> to <em>Shabbat</em> 65a.) Some Rishonim understand Rav Huna as disqualifying such a woman only from marrying the <em>kohen gadol</em>, who must marry a virgin, and a <em>mesolelet</em>’s virginity is considered to have been compromised. (This is the opinion of Rashi to <em>Shabbat</em> 65a, as well as the first opinion of <em>Tosafot</em><em>ad loc</em>, s.v. “pesulot.”) However, the Talmud also cites Rava, who maintains that the <em>halakha</em> does not follow Rav Huna, and in practice a lesbian is permitted to marry even a <em>kohen gadol</em>. Likewise, the Yerushalmi presents it as a debate: “Regarding two women who commit lewd acts with one another, according to Beit Shammai they are disqualified, but according to Beit Hillel they are not” (<em>y. Gittin</em> 8:8). <em>Pnei Moshe</em> understands Beit Shammai to be disqualifying them from marrying <em>kohanim</em>. (In practice, we follow the opinion that if an unmarried woman has sexual relations with a Jewish man outside of marriage, she is not considered a <em>zona</em>, and she may marry a <em>kohen</em>. This is because she could have married the man. Only if a woman has relations with a man whom she is forbidden to marry, such as a non-Jew, is she disqualified from marrying a <em>kohen</em>. Similarly, if a woman has relations with a <em>ḥalal</em>, she is disqualified from marrying a <em>kohen</em>; see SA EH 6:8.)The simple understanding is that women who are sexually intimate with one another transgress a Torah prohibition. This is implied by the possibility that such behavior is enough to disqualify a woman from marrying a kohen. This seems to be the opinion of Rambam as well. However, there is no punishment by lashes for this sin because there is no specific negative commandment against it (MT, Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 21:9). This is also the opinion of Mabit (Kiryat Sefer ad loc.) and Levush, EH 20:2. In contrast, Kiryat Melekh Rav 2:26 states that there is a Torah prohibition on such activity only in the context of a long-term relationship, something resembling marriage. Prisha explains that, according to Tur, the prohibition is always rabbinic (20:11).</i>
  
  Section 13
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Male Homosexuality
  The Torah commands: “Do not lie with a male as one lies with a woman, it is a to’eva” (Vayikra 18:22). It further states: “If a man lies with a male as one lies with a woman, the two of them have done a to’eva; they shall be put to death – their blood-guilt is upon them” (ibid. 20:13). There are two ways for a man to have sexual relations with a woman: normal intercourse (“ke-darkah”), that is, vaginally; and abnormal intercourse (“she-lo ke-darkah”), i.e., anally, which is the form of intercourse between men that the Torah prohibits. The moment that penetration occurs, that is, the moment the corona of one man’s erect penis enters the other’s anus, they have both transgressed a Torah prohibition, even though the penetration was not full and there was no ejaculation. (Yevamot 55b; MT, Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 1:10; according to Taz, the Torah prohibits even penetration by part of the corona, whereas Noda Bi-Yehuda, EH 2:23 limits the Torah prohibition to penetration of the entire corona).
  This prohibition is so grave that those who transgress it are liable to be punished with death by stoning, since anywhere the Torah says “their blood-guilt is upon them,” it refers to stoning (Sanhedrin 54a; Rambam ad loc. 1:6). However, this punishment applied (while the Sanhedrin functioned) only when the sin was done intentionally and in front of two witnesses who warned them of the consequences of committing the sin. In practice, almost nobody would dare to commit capital crimes in front of witnesses warning them that if they continue, they will be put to death. Therefore, an execution by the Sanhedrin rarely took place. In fact, it was so rare that a Sanhedrin which executed one person in seven years was labeled “destructive” (m. Makkot 1:10). Thus, the main purpose of the Torah declaring a death penalty is to teach us the gravity of the sin, and to deter people from brazenly transgressing it in front of witnesses.
  The transgression of male homosexual intercourse is so serious that its stated punishment (stoning) is the most severe of all the death penalties. Other sexual transgressions punishable by stoning are: sexual relations between mother or stepmother and son, father and daughter or daughter-in-law, and bestiality by a man or woman (MT, Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 1:4). People who commit these sins deliberately but without witnesses are liable for karet (extirpation).
  In addition to the prohibited act itself, we saw above that the Torah also prohibits thinking about committing sexual sins, as the Torah says, “Do not follow your heart and your eyes, by which you are led astray” (Bamidbar 15:39). The Sages interpret “your eyes” to mean sinful thoughts (Berakhot 12b; see section 6 above). Moreover, a man who is sexually attracted to other men must make sure that his interactions with them do not lead him to waste seed, which, according to many poskim, is a Torah prohibition (as explained in n. 1). Therefore, he should not develop a friendship for the purpose of stimulating himself sexually, because by getting himself aroused he is transgressing a rabbinic prohibition (Nidda 13b). Rather, he should behave normally with his friends, acting like everyone else, and trying to avoid arousal.
  
  Section 14
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Factors in the Emergence of This Urge
  Many people think that same-sex attraction is innate and cannot be changed, and that therefore, a man with this tendency must follow it; certainly, no one should be criticized for doing so. In contrast, according to the Torah, even if a man has a strong tendency toward homosexuality, the prohibition remains in full effect, and he has an obligation to overcome his urges – just as one is required to overcome a powerful urge to commit adultery. However, the heavenly court does take into account the severity of a person’s challenge in overcoming his desires; the stronger his urge, the lighter his punishment.
  Even if we accept that this is an innate disposition, it is nevertheless clear that the social and moral climate is no less influential than the inborn tendency. In fact, in the past there were cultures in which homosexuality was extremely prevalent, so much so that the majority of men committed this sin. In contrast, among the Jews, where the social conditions encouraged regular heterosexual relationships and discouraged male homosexual relationships, this inclination was almost never expressed. Thus, according to the Mishna, “R. Yehuda says…Two single men should not sleep under one blanket, but the Sages permit it” (Kiddushin 82a). The Talmud explains that R. Yehuda was stringent out of concern that such behavior might lead to sin. We must remember that in the past, people slept in the nude; thus, the case in which R. Yehuda was stringent was that of two single men sleeping naked under the same blanket. And yet the Sages permitted it, since “Jews are not suspected of male homosexual relations.” In other words, this phenomenon was so rare that the Sages felt it unnecessary make a decree to safeguard against it. We find a similar approach regarding yiḥud (the prohibition against seclusion). The rule is that it is forbidden for a man to be alone with a woman in a secluded or locked room, lest this lead to sin; however, it is permitted for two men to be alone with each other, although some undertook to act stringently out of piety. Shulḥan Arukh rules permissively, but then adds, “Nowadays, when there are many promiscuous people, it is best to avoid being isolated with [another] man” (EH 24:1). This opinion made sense given the prevalence of homosexuality in the Islamic countries of the time. However, the great sages of Ashkenaz responded that in their countries Jews were not suspected of such behavior, and did not need to be stringent (Baḥ). Not only that, but some say that such stringency is forbidden, as it is an exhibition of religious hubris (yuhara) (Yam Shel Shlomo, Kiddushin 4:23). Nevertheless, when it comes to sleeping together under one blanket, prominent Ashkenazic authorities are divided. Some are stringent (Ḥelkat Meḥokek and Beit Shmuel), while others are lenient (Yam Shel Shlomo). In practice, until relatively recently, the custom was to be lenient (AHS 24:6).
  It is difficult to presume that basic human nature has changed. We must therefore conclude that in the past, even when people were born with a homosexual inclination, given the social contexts that were common among the Jews for so long, these tendencies were not manifest, to the extent that there was no concern that people would sin, even if they were to sleep next to their friends in the nude under the same blanket in a closed room.
  We do not know what has changed recently to convince people that sexual orientation is innate, that they are attracted solely to members of the same sex, and that they have no choice whatsoever in the matter. Is it possible that freedom – which plays a central role in our lives and confers many advantages upon us – has also allowed all sorts of inclinations to be expressed that had previously been suppressed? And once these inclinations have been released, it is more difficult to overcome them. Moreover, recent generations have witnessed the rise of feminism, which, alongside its positive aspects, can cause tension and complications in heterosexual relationships. In its most extreme forms, relationships between men and women are posited as part of a struggle for control and power. Could it be that this environment produces anxiety in men about developing relationships with women? And is it possible that this anxiety affects the dynamics of sexual attraction? There are many theories and explanations to account for the current prevalence of homosexuality. In any case, it is reasonable to assume that it too will pass, and future generations will rediscover the Torah way to deepen the marital relationship with sanctity, love, and joy. As a result, the appeal of this sin will diminish greatly.
  It is important to be aware that the pain, frustration, and embarrassment experienced by those struggling with this inclination can be so overwhelming that some young people choose to end their own lives. Therefore, it is important to guide the men and women with this inclination to discuss it with their parents, as well as with a rabbi or counselor. This is, first and foremost, so they can unburden themselves from some of their suffering, and second, so they can find the best ways to address this challenge.
  
  Section 15
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Mitzva to Marry
  The Torah’s commandments apply to all Jews. Even men and women with same-sex attraction have a mitzva to marry, to fulfill the mitzva of ona with love and happiness, and to procreate.
  In previous generations, not getting married because of sexual orientation was almost unheard of. Presumably, this could be the case in our generation as well. Despite societal changes, many people who feel same-sex attraction can overcome it enough to happily and lovingly establish a family. Likewise, it is known that many people who experience same-sex attraction are capable of feeling attracted to the opposite sex as well. Those who find this difficult must use all possible means to divert their tendencies so that they can enter into a marital relationship faithful to the law of Moshe and Israel.
  In practice, though, as long as a man deems that he cannot have a relationship with a woman, cannot commit to be faithful to her and give her the love and joy she deserves, then he is unable to get married due to circumstances beyond his control (ones). Only if he is quite certain that he is capable of committing to love his wife and to enter into a joyful physical relationship with her may he fulfill the mitzva to marry. The same is true for a woman. Only if she is quite certain that she can be properly responsive to her husband’s passion may she get married.
  A man and a woman who both have same-sex attraction may decide to marry each other, be faithful, be great friends to each other, and try to observe the mitzva of ona to the best of their abilities. They may fulfill the mitzva of marriage in this way and raise a fine family.
  The reward of those who succeed in overcoming their urges and who, out of deep moral responsibility, establish a committed, loving marital relationship and raise a family, is very great. As the Sages state, “According to the suffering is the reward” (Avot 5:23). They merit reward not only in the next world but in our world as well. This is because in order to overcome their urge, they must delve deeply into the foundations of love and morality. Doing so allows them to experience a deeper intimacy. It is reminiscent of the Sages’ statement, “Where penitents stand, even completely righteous people cannot stand” (Berakhot 34b).
  They improve the world, too. Unfortunately, many people are swept away by their physical desires and end up sinning through adultery and promiscuity. They even base their marriage solely on carnal urges. When their desire for their spouse wanes, they return to satisfying their desires by committing adultery and other abominable acts. Ultimately, they are always disappointed, since any physical relationship which lacks a moral dimension and is not sanctified will end up in deadly dreariness. In order to perfect the world, it is necessary to engage in penitential acts that restore balance. We should emphasize the spiritual value of loyalty, friendship, morality, and the sanctity of the marital covenant. This is accomplished by the very same people who do not feel a natural desire for the opposite sex, and yet enter into a covenant to be faithful to their spouse, out of a desire to accept upon themselves the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven. Thus, the Sages declare, “People who act out of love and are happy in their suffering are the subject of the verse, ‘Those who love God are like the sun rising in might’ (Shoftim 5:31)” (Shabbat 88b).18<i class="footnote">Rav Kook writes, “When he happily accepts [his situation], even though he will experience only a minimum of the pleasure expected from following the right path and serving God, and will suffer anxiety and bitterness as a result of his heroism in choosing the upright path…he succeeds in habituating himself to doing the right thing simply because it is the right thing, namely, God’s will…. Overall, the world does not give enough weight to spirituality, because so many people are submerged in materialism…but when this individual’s spirituality is added to that of the collective, his noble sanctity will water the spiritual desert. This will be the fruit of his labor, and he should be happy about it. When speaking of such people, who act out of love and are happy in their suffering, the Torah says, ‘Those who love God are like the sun rising in might’” (<em>Midot Re’aya</em><em>Brit</em> 1).</i>
  
  Section 16
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Must One Disclose Before Marriage?
  If a man feels a slight, remote attraction to members of the same sex, but in practice successfully controls himself, does he need to tell someone he is dating about his inclination? If he is certain that he desires and wishes to marry a woman, that he will be able to be happy with his wife, that he will be able to give her the pleasure that she deserves, and that he will be able to remain faithful, then he is not obligated to tell her.
  However, if his homosexual inclination is strong enough that he is uncertain that he will be able to give his wife pleasure, and even more so if he is uncertain that he will be able to stay faithful, he must disclose this to the woman he is dating. Then she can decide whether or not she trusts him to be able to lovingly and happily build a faithful home with her.
  In every case of uncertainty, a rabbi or a God-fearing specialist should be consulted. All of the above applies equally to a woman who experiences same-sex attraction.
  If a man who is a practicing homosexual marries without telling his wife about it, and when she finds out, she immediately wants to end the marriage, then in certain cases, if it is difficult to extract a get from the husband, a rabbinical court can annul the marriage without a get. This is because the marriage was entered into under false pretenses (mekaḥ ta’ut), and thus was never valid (Igrot Moshe, EH 4:113).
  
  Section 17
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Torah’s Attitude to Those Who Commit Homosexual Intercourse
  The Torah calls male sexual relations “to’eva” (Vayikra 18:22). The Sages explained the connotation of this word: “You are straying with it (to’eh ata bah)” (Nedarim 51a). In other words, the purpose of the sex drive is for husband and wife to unite in holiness and joy, and for this union to create children and sustain the world. In contrast, those who sin in this way direct their desire toward people of their own gender, thereby damaging the sanctity of marriage and the continuity of the world.
  Nonetheless, those who commit this sin should not be treated more harshly than those who commit other grave sins, such as desecrating Shabbat. Just as those who desecrate Shabbat are called up to the Torah as long as they do not sin out of spite, so too those who commit this sin should be called up to the Torah, as long as they do not sin out of spite. This is especially true if it is possible that they are careful to avoid the severe sin of homosexual intercourse itself.19<i class="footnote">If the severity of a sin is expressed by the severity of its punishment, then desecrating Shabbat and committing male homosexual acts are equally severe; both are punishable by stoning (<em>m.</em><em>Sanhedrin</em> 7:4). Homosexual intercourse is described as “<em>to’eva</em>” because it misdirects the power of life. This is the same reason that the Torah describes idol worship as “<em>to’eva</em>” (Devarim 7:26, 13:15, and 17:4). In fact, classifying a sin as “<em>to’eva</em>” does not necessarily indicate that it is punishable by death. Eating forbidden foods is also called “<em>to’eva</em>” by the Torah (Devarim 13:3), as is remarrying one’s first wife if she has since married and divorced someone else (Devarim 24:4), and yet the penalty for committing these sins is not death, but lashes (MT, Laws of <em>Sanhedrin</em> 19:4).</i>
  Moreover, many people who fall prey to this sin are not defiant in any way. Rather it pains them that their inclination compels them to sin. Only God, Master of heaven and earth – Who created all souls, knows all thoughts, and examines all hearts – understands what drives every person, and can judge them in truth and mercy in accordance with their challenges and suffering.
  It is important to stress that even if a man does not succeed in overcoming his urge, and he sins by having homosexual intercourse, he is still obligated in all the mitzvot, and he must strengthen himself as much as he can, any way that he can. Even in relation to this sin, for each and every day and every single time he succeeds in overcoming his desire and refrains from sinning, he will receive great reward.
  We must accept the Torah law which declares that homosexual sex is a grave sin. If we are presented with the opportunity to dissuade people from this sin, it is our obligation to try to do so. Nevertheless, we must also love a person who is unsuccessful in overcoming his urge, and realize that there is great value in each and every mitzva he fulfills. As long as he does not externalize his orientation and does not sin defiantly, we should draw him closer to the religious community, so that he can grow stronger in Torah study and mitzva fulfillment as best he can. We know that the value of evil is finite, while the value of good is infinite. Similarly, the gravity of sins is finite, while the value of mitzvot is infinite.
  If a man with a strong homosexual inclination has not found a woman to marry, and he still overcomes his evil inclination and refrains from sinning, he is among those whom God declares every day to be pious (Pesaḥim 113a). When he successfully binds his desires for the glory of Heaven, he demonstrates the absolute, hallowed value of Torah and mitzvot. He is improving the world greatly (as we will explain below in 7:6 with regard to infertile men). The light of his unwavering dedication to Torah illuminates the entire world, adding life and blessing to all families.
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Great Value of the Mitzva
  Procreation, being fruitful and multiplying, is a central mitzva of the Torah, and since it is the most basic goal of creation, it is the first mitzva mentioned in the Torah. At the end of the process of creation, we read, “God blessed [Adam and Ḥava] and said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and conquer it; and rule the fish of the sea, the bird of the sky, and every living thing that creeps on earth’” (Bereishit 1:28). In Parshat No’aḥ, after the flood, a similar directive is given: “God blessed Noaḥ and his sons and said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth’” (Bereishit 9:1). Finally, the admonition against murder is followed by the directive: “And you, be fruitful and multiply, abound on the earth and multiply on it” (ibid. v. 7).
  By fulfilling this mitzva, a person walks in the ways of God. Just as God created the world and sustains it, people too give birth to children, take care of them, and raise them. This makes people partners with God; as the Sages say, “There are three partners in the creation of a person: God, the father, and the mother” (Nidda 31a).
  This mitzva is the primary and fundamental goal of creation, as the Sages say in the Mishna (Gittin 41b), “The world was created only for procreation, as the verse states, ‘He did not create it to be empty; He formed it to be inhabited’ (Yeshayahu 45:18).” This teaches us that the most elemental divine instruction is to populate the world, as is clear when we place the just-quoted verse in context: <i>For thus said the Lord, the Creator of heaven, Who alone is God, Who formed the earth and made it, Who alone established it. He did not create it to be empty; He formed it to be inhabited. I am the Lord, and there is no other.</i>
  The Tanna’im state, “Whoever sustains one Jewish soul is considered by the Torah to have sustained an entire world” (Sanhedrin 37a). This is said of one who prevents a poor person from dying of starvation (Bava Batra 11a); how much greater is the virtue of parents who give birth to children, raise them, and educate them. They truly sustain an entire world.
  Given the importance of this mitzva, we understand why, according to the Sages (Shabbat 31a), the third question that a person is asked when he is being judged in the next world is, “Did you engage in procreation?” (The first question is, “Were you honest in business?” The second is, “Did you set aside time to study Torah?”)
  Eliezer said, “If someone refrains from procreation, it is as if he spills blood.” For the verse, “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed” (Bereishit 9:6), is immediately followed by, “And you, be fruitful and multiply, abound on the earth and multiply on it” (ibid. v. 7) (Yevamot 63b). Having children is so essential and fundamental that one who does not fulfill this mitzva is considered to have put his children to death before they are born. R. Yaakov said, “Anyone who does not engage in procreation is likened to one who diminishes the divine image.” For the verse, “For in His image did God make man” (Bereishit 9:6), is immediately followed by, “And you, be fruitful and multiply, abound on the earth and multiply on it” (ibid. v. 7) (Yevamot 63b). Every person is unique, and therefore every person reveals an additional aspect of the divine image. Thus, one who refrains from engaging in procreation diminishes the revelation of the divine in the world.
  Zohar Ḥadash (Ruth 50b) states: When a person leaves this world and his soul prepares to take its rightful place in the next world, several angels of destruction stand on either side and several angels of peace stand on either side. If he is deserving, the angels of peace greet him warmly and welcome him. If he is not deserving, the angels of destruction greet him, saying, “Woe to the wicked man, for he shall fare ill; as his hands have dealt, so shall it be done to him” (Yeshayahu 3:11). Who is this [wicked person]? One who did not attempt to leave a child in this world, for anyone who leaves a child in this world and teaches him Torah and good deeds, the angels of destruction and hell have no control over him.
  This is what is meant by the verses: “Sons are the provision of the Lord; the fruit of the womb, His reward. Like arrows in the hand of a warrior are sons born to a man in his youth. Happy is the man who fills his quiver with them; they shall not be put to shame when they contend with the enemies in the gate” (Tehilim 127:3-5). These [enemies] are the angels of destruction, who cannot control him. For a person should not say, “My Torah and good deeds protect me; I will not engage in procreation.” Rather, even if someone has studied Torah and performed good deeds, he still cannot enter God’s realm, and he has no share in the World to Come. (See ch. 8 below regarding solace for the childless.)
  
  Section 2
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Ḥizkiyahu and Ben Azzai
  When the mighty army of King Sennacherib of Assyria besieged Jerusalem, King Ḥizkiyahu of Yehuda fell ill, as we read: <i>In those days, Ḥizkiyahu fell dangerously ill. The prophet Yeshayahu, son of Amotz, came and said to him, “Thus said the Lord, ‘Set your affairs in order, for you are going to die; you will not live.’</i>” (Yeshayahu 38:1)
  Even years before that, Ḥizkiyahu had been aware that the Kingdom of Assyria presented a clear and present danger to his kingdom, for as a result of increasing sinfulness, Assyria had already subjugated the Kingdom of Yisrael and exiled the ten tribes from the land (2 Melakhim, ch. 17). In order to avert calamity, Ḥizkiyahu ordered the entire nation to repent and to strengthen their allegiance to Torah:
  He stuck a sword by the entrance of the beit midrash and said, “Anyone who does not study Torah will be stabbed with this sword.” They searched from Dan to Be’er Sheva and did not find a single ignoramus; from Gevat to Antipatris and did not find a single boy or girl, man or woman, who was not thoroughly versed in the laws of purity and impurity. (Sanhedrin 94b)
  It was at this difficult time, when the catastrophe Ḥizkiyahu feared was imminent, when the Assyrian army had already besieged Jerusalem, and when he himself lay ill, that the prophet came to him with the terrible message, “Set your affairs in order, for you are going to die; you will not live.” The Sages explain: “You are going to die” in this world, and “you will not live” in the next world. Ḥizkiyahu cried out in protest, “What sin have I committed that I have been sentenced to excision from this world and from the next?” The prophet replied, “You did not engage in procreation.” Ḥizkiyahu responded, “But it was made known to me through divine inspiration that my children would not be virtuous.” The prophet replied, “Why do you involve yourself in the secrets of the Merciful One? You do what you were commanded to do, and God will do what is right in His eyes.” Ḥizkiyahu then realized that he had sinned. He asked Yeshayahu for his daughter’s hand in marriage, hoping that his own merit plus the merit of Yeshayahu might help him have virtuous children. The prophet responded, “Your fate has already been sealed.” Ḥizkiyahu replied, “Son of Amotz, finish your prophecy and leave! For I learned from my father’s father (King David) that even if a sharp sword is resting upon one’s neck, one should not stop begging for mercy” (Berakhot 10a).
  Then, “Ḥizkiyahu turned his face to the wall and prayed to the Lord. ‘Please, O Lord,’ he said, ‘remember how I have walked before You sincerely and wholeheartedly, and have done what is pleasing to You.’ And Ḥizkiyahu wept profusely” (Yeshayahu 38:2-3). God heard him and commanded Yeshayahu to inform Ḥizkiyahu that He had added another fifteen years to his life. Additionally, God would save him from Assyria’s army. In fact, in the middle of the night, an angel of God struck down all of Sennacherib’s soldiers, and Jerusalem was saved. Ḥizkiyahu went on to marry Yeshayahu’s daughter, and they had a son named Menasheh. Ḥizkiyahu’s fears were realized; Menasheh, who ruled after Ḥizkiyahu, acted so wickedly in the eyes of God – worshiping idols and spilling much innocent blood – that God decreed that the First Temple would be destroyed (2 Melakhim ch. 19-21). Nevertheless, the mitzva of procreation remained in full force, for it is the foundation for the continued existence of the world. Even in the case of Ḥizkiyahu, his wicked son Menasheh carried on the Davidic dynasty, from which ultimately the Messiah, descendant of David, will be born; may he come speedily in our time.
  Although we learn of a great Tanna, Ben Azzai, who never married and did not fulfill the mitzva of procreation. The Talmud relates that Ben Azzai extrapolated from the biblical verses that if one does not engage in procreation, “it is as if he spills blood and diminishes the divine image.” The Sages said to Ben Azzai, “Some preach well and practice well; some practice well but do not preach well; and then there are those like you, who preach well but do not practice what they preach!” Ben Azzai responded, “What can I do? My soul longs for Torah. The world can be sustained by others” (Yevamot 63b). In fact, halakha accepts Ben Azzai’s position. If someone’s soul longs for Torah, and he spends his entire life studying with tremendous dedication, as a result of which he never marries, he has not sinned, as long as his sexual desire does not overcome him (MT, Laws of Marriage 15:3; SA EH 1:4). However, the language here is precise: he has not sinned, but le-khatḥila, it is not proper to behave this way (Naḥalat Tzvi; Taz ad loc. 6).
  We see that there is only one mitzva one can engage in and thereby, under pressing circumstances, abstain from the mitzva of procreation – the mitzva of Torah study. This is because Torah study itself adds life to the world. The fact is that although Ben Azzai did not engage in procreation, he delved deeply into the great importance of the mitzva and expounded upon its great value. Certainly, many children were born as a result of his teachings. In contrast, when Ḥizkiyahu wished to stipulate his performance of the mitzva on having children who would not be wicked, he was negating the sacred principle underlying the mitzva, which expresses the absolute value of life. This is why he would have been subject to terrible punishment in both this world and the next. We learn from this that life is the supreme value, and even the wicked can repent. Furthermore, even if they do not repent, the righteous can learn from their mistakes. However, when one disregards the mitzva altogether, he uproots everything and denies the value of God-given life in this world.1<i class="footnote">AHS poses the following question: The Yerushalmi states that one stops studying Torah in order to build a <em>sukka</em> and take the four species (<em>y. Shabbat</em> 1:2). It further states that if someone studies Torah without the intention of putting what he learns into practice, it would have been better had he never been born (<em>y. Berakhot</em> 1:2). In light of these statements, how can it be that Ben Azzai abstained from fulfilling the mitzva of procreation? AHS suggests that the reason must be that “he was unable to detach himself from the Torah at all, and doing so might have been life-threatening for him” (AHS, EH 1:14).The explanation seems to be that since the mitzva of procreation is contingent upon marriage, and marriage entails being attentive and emotionally available to another person so that one can form a loving relationship with a spouse. Ben Azzai knew himself and realized that his intense commitment to Torah study would not allow him to adequately satisfy the needs of his wife. Therefore, he did not marry. Other mitzvot, however, do not require emotional investment, and therefore can be fulfilled even if one’s mind is still engaged in Torah study. See Sota 49a, which states, “When Ben Azzai died, that was the end of the unceasing learners.” Someone like Ben Azzai also knew that his sex drive would not overpower him. Some poskim have written that no one can emulate Ben Azzai nowadays (Ritva and Birkei Yosef).</i>
  
  Section 3
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The General Mitzva and the Individual Obligation
  There is a Torah commandment to procreate. With every child a couple has, they fulfill a great mitzva and partner with God in the creation of another human being (Nidda 31a), thereby sustaining an entire world (m. Sanhedrin 4:5). This is the primary goal of creation, as God wanted the world to be inhabited. The Sages declare, “The world was created only for procreation, as the verse states (Yeshayahu 45:18), ‘He did not create it to be empty; He formed it to be inhabited’” (m. Gittin 4:5).
  However, if the mitzva would have no clear parameters, it would be too vague, and in many cases, due to a variety of concerns, it would not be properly carried out. Marriage is a sensitive and complex issue that depends on the ideas, emotions, hopes, and consent of husband and wife (and sometimes also on the financial and emotional support of parents). It demands responsibility and courage.
  Even after marriage, the general mitzva leaves much uncertainty. On one hand, since a tremendous mitzva is fulfilled with the birth of every child, perhaps having one child is enough, for that child alone is an entire world. And perhaps the couple should therefore postpone having that one child until they are near the age of forty, when they are economically stable and have a wealth of life experience. On the other hand, given the importance and greatness of this mitzva, perhaps each person should make a superhuman effort to have as many children as they can – marrying as young as possible and shortening a baby’s nursing period to have as many children as possible.
  The Torah therefore set basic mandatory parameters for the mitzva, in addition to expressing the general idea. The Sages provided additional parameters to give the general idea a clearer and more obligatory character. The general mitzva of the Torah is to “be fruitful and multiply,” and one fulfills the mitzva with each child born. The Torah obligation is to have a son and a daughter, just as God originally created Adam and Ḥava: “And God created man in His image, in the image of God He created him; male and female He created them. God blessed them and God said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and conquer it’” (Bereishit 1:27-28). Since the verse makes it clear that the Torah wishes us to be fruitful, multiply, and fill the earth, the Sages established an additional obligation for a couple to have additional children (sections 5-6 below). They even determined a time for the fulfillment of the Torah obligation, that is, an age by which a person must get married (sections 7-10 below).
  The general mitzva applies to men and women alike, and from a certain perspective, the woman’s reward is greater, for the more pain one experiences in fulfilling a mitzva, the greater the reward (Avot 5:23). However, there is disagreement about the individual obligation. According to the Sages, the obligation is incumbent upon a man; this is reflected in the man playing the more active role in effecting kiddushin and during sexual relations. It is also alluded in the verse, “Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and conquer it,” about which the Sages observe, “It is the nature of man to conquer, but it is not the nature of woman” (Yevamot 65b). Some explain that since pregnancy and childbirth are both painful and risky for a woman, the Torah did not impose it on women as an obligation, for “its ways are ways of pleasantness” (Meshekh Ḥokhma, Bereishit 9:7).
  Yoḥanan b. Beroka disagrees with the Sages and says that women, too, are obligated in this mitzva, as the command is addressed in the plural, to both Adam and Ḥava: “God blessed them and said to them, ‘Be (pl.) fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and conquer it’” (Bereishit 1:28).
  In practice, we rule in accordance with the Sages – the individual obligation is incumbent upon men. However, this does not diminish the rights of women; for instance, if it becomes clear that a woman’s husband is infertile, and she wishes to divorce him in order to have a child who will help her in her old age, her husband is required to grant her a divorce and pay her ketuba (Yevamot 65b; SA EH 1:13 and 154:6).2<i class="footnote">A distinction must be made between the general mitzva to procreate in order to populate the world, which is equally relevant to men and women, and the individual obligation, which is incumbent upon men, whose parameters are to have a son and daughter, and to which the Sages added an obligation to have more children (as we will explain below in sections 5-6). A general mitzva is a basic principle and goal of the Torah, albeit one that does not have obligatory parameters. Rather, it is a value and a mission. People are commanded to identify with a general mitzva and to do their very best to fulfill it. We learn of the tremendous value of the general mitzva immediately after the creation story and just after the flood story. The Sages support it with the verse, “He did not create it to be empty; He formed it to be inhabited (<em>la-shevet</em>)” (Yeshayahu 45:18). This idea is often referred to as “<em>la-shevet</em>” or “<em>shevet.</em>” This does not mean that the mitzva is considered prophetic rather than biblical. Rather, the prophet is explaining that it is the most basic foundation, for which the whole world was created, and in which human beings partner with God in physically sustaining the world (as opposed to the world’s spiritual sustenance, which is through Torah study). Therefore, it is only for the purpose of fulfilling these two <em>mitzvot</em> (procreation and Torah study) that a Torah scroll may be sold (section 21 below). For the same reason, a slave owner is obligated to free a semi-emancipated slave – to enable him to marry and have children (<em>Gittin</em> 41a). Even though there is a Torah mitzva not to free a Canaanite slave (YD 267:79), since procreation is a general mitzva, it carries great weight, and the Sages permitted the neglect of a Torah commandment in order to fulfill it – which would normally not be allowed (<em>Tosafot</em><em>Gittin</em> 41a, s.v. “lo tohu”; <em>Tosafot</em><em>Ḥagiga</em> 2b, s.v. “lo tohu”). This is the approach of R. Yosef Engel in <em>Atvan De-Oraita</em><em>klal</em> 13).The general mitzva, which is more important, applies to men and women alike, while the halakhic ruling that women are not obligated in the mitzva of procreation pertains specifically to the individual obligation of procreation. Therefore, when necessary, a Torah scroll may be sold in order to enable a woman to marry, just as it may be sold to enable a man’s marriage (MA 153:9; Eliya Rabba ad loc. 12; MB ad loc. 24; n. 21 below). According to most Rishonim (as explained below in n. 21), a Torah scroll may be sold to enable the marriage of even someone who has already fulfilled the Torah obligation of procreation. Since the general mitzva is unlimited, each and every child born fulfills this mandate, whether that child is an only child or a tenth child. This is the position of Ramban (Milḥamot Hashem on Yevamot 20a in the Rif pages) and Ha-elef Lekha Shlomo (EH 2). The general mitzva is also why a couple who have been married for ten years without children are instructed to divorce. If all that were at stake were the individual obligation, this would not be required. Therefore, if a couple has a son or a daughter, even though they have not fulfilled the individual obligation of having one boy and one girl, they are not required to divorce (6:7 and n. 8 below).Some say that the verse at the end of the creation story (Bereishit 1:28) is a blessing, while the command was given later, to Noaḥ and his sons (ibid. 9:7). This is the position of Rashi, Ramban, and Tosafot. Others maintain that the verse at the end of the creation story is itself a command. This is the straightforward reading, as the dispute between the Sages and R. Yoḥanan b. Beroka (regarding who is obligated in the mitzva) revolves around this verse. This is the position of Sefer Ha-ḥinukh, Or Ha-ḥayim, Malbim, and Netziv. It seems reasonable to say that even the first position derives the basis for the general mitzva from this verse. I explain the foundation of this mitzva accordingly, in section 1 as well as here.</i>
  The practical difference is that if a woman does not want to get married, or wants to marry someone who cannot have children, she may do so; even though she is denying herself the opportunity to fulfill a great mitzva, she is not considered a sinner, since she is not obligated to procreate. A man, however, may not remain single and may not marry an infertile woman if he has yet to fulfill the mitzva to procreate (section 8 below).
  As in the mitzvot of Torah study and prayer, here too we find that the Torah obligates men to fulfill the mitzva and makes it optional for women. As a result, those who are mandated and those who volunteer join together to fulfill the mitzva comprehensively.
  
  Section 4
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Having a Son and a Daughter
  If a man had a son and a daughter but one of them predeceased him without producing progeny, according to Rav Huna he has still fulfilled the mitzva of procreation, as he maintains that the mitzva is fulfilled with their birth. Even if a child lives for only a short time, his life has value. His soul revealed something positive in the world and even brought redemption closer, for “The (messianic) son of David will not arrive until all the souls of the body have been finished.” In contrast, R. Yoḥanan maintains that the mitzva is only fulfilled if a man’s children live after his death, because the objective of the mitzva is to ensure the continued habitation of the world (Yevamot 62a-b). Sadly, R. Yoḥanan himself buried all of his children before they had children of their own, and so he referred to himself when he spoke of a person who was not privileged to fulfill the mitzva. We rule in accordance with R. Yoḥanan. However, if someone leaves behind a son and daughter when he dies, even if they remain unmarried and too old to have children, he has still fulfilled his mitzva (SA EH 1:5).
  If someone was predeceased by his son and daughter, but had a grandchild from each, he has fulfilled his obligation through his grandchildren. What matters is for his descendants to continue after him through his son and daughter.3<i class="footnote">According to Rambam and SA EH 1:6, to fulfill the mitzva of procreation a person must have at least one grandson and one granddaughter, even if the granddaughter is his son’s child and the grandson is his daughter’s child. What matters is that he has one male grandchild and one female grandchild. In contrast, if his grandchildren are all of one gender, he has not fulfilled the mitzva, the same way that if he has children of only one gender, he has not fulfilled the mitzva. According to <em>Tosafot</em> and <em>Shiltei Giborim</em>, as long as each of his children bore him a grandchild, even of the same gender, since he has two grandchildren, one from his son and one from his daughter, he has fulfilled the mitzva.</i>
  If someone had a son and daughter, and his son has many children but his daughter passes away childless during his lifetime, he has not fulfilled his obligation, since he has offspring not from both children, but only through his son. The same applies if his daughter bears many children while his son passes away childless during his lifetime (SA EH 1:6). 
  If someone has a son and daughter, but one of them is sterile or infertile, he has not fulfilled his obligation, since he did not have a son and daughter capable of having children (y. Yevamot 6:6; SA EH 1:5). However, if his son and daughter were themselves able to have children, but one or both of them married people who were not able to, or they did not marry at all, he has still fulfilled his obligation, since the children themselves are not sterile (Ḥelkat Meḥokek ad loc. 6).
  If someone has a child who is deaf-mute or mentally incompetent, he fulfills his obligation, since the child is physically capable of having children (Rema, EH 1:6). Accordingly, someone with an autistic child fulfills the mitzva; however, someone with a Down syndrome child might not, because many children with Down syndrome (especially males) are infertile.
  If a non-Jew had children and later converted to Judaism, some say that he fulfills his obligation to procreate if his children convert as well (Rambam; SA EH 1:7; Yam Shel Shlomo). Others maintain that even if his children do not convert to Judaism, he has still fulfilled the obligation of procreation (Tosafot; Maharil; Ḥelkat Meḥokek; Beit Shmuel; Bi’ur Ha-Gra ad loc. 17).
  A Jewish man who has children with a non-Jewish woman does not fulfill the mitzva to procreate, since his children are not Jewish and are not halakhically considered of his lineage at all.4<i class="footnote">Most authorities maintain that if a man has an adulterous affair with a married woman which results in the birth of a <em>mamzer</em>, he has fulfilled the mitzva of procreation despite his sin. However, <em>Responsa Radbaz</em> 7:2 states that it is inconceivable that one fulfills a mitzva by committing a sin. (See 6:6 below for a discussion of this case.) It would seem based on this reasoning that if a couple did not observe the laws of family purity and conceived when the wife was a <em>nidda</em>, they have not fulfilled the mitzva of procreation. For this case, too, would be fulfilling a mitzva by committing a sin. However, many explain that even Radbaz would agree that the mitzva is fulfilled in the case of <em>nidda</em>. A child conceived when a woman was a <em>nidda</em> is not in the same category as a child conceived from an adulterous relationship. A <em>mamzer</em> could not possibly have been conceived without sin, since the union itself is forbidden, whereas a married couple is fundamentally permitted to one another, and the woman could have immersed in a <em>mikveh</em>, so the relationship is not inherently sinful.</i>
  
  Section 5
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Mitzva to Have Many Children
  As we have seen (section 3), people fulfill an important Torah commandment with every child they are privileged to have. Nevertheless, the Torah established an obligation for every Jewish man to have one son and one daughter. The Sages (Yevamot 62b) added a rabbinic obligation to have even more children for two reasons: a) the tremendous value of life, and b) to ensure fulfillment of the Torah commandment. Let us now expand upon these.
  The first reason is the tremendous value of life, revealed within each and every soul. The Torah states many times that an increased number of children is both a mitzva and a blessing: “God blessed [Adam and Ḥava] and God said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and conquer it’” (Bereishit 1:28); “God blessed Noaḥ and his sons and said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth’” (Bereishit 9:1); “Be fruitful and multiply, abound on the earth and multiply on it” (ibid., v. 7). Later, God told Avraham, “I will bestow My blessing upon you and make your descendants as numerous as the stars of heaven and the sands on the seashore” (ibid., 22:17). God said to Yitzḥak, “I will make your descendants as numerous as the stars of heaven” (ibid., 26:4). God promised Yaakov, “Your descendants shall be as the dust of the earth” (ibid., 28:14). One of the blessings promised to the Jewish people if they obey God is, “I will look with favor upon you, and make you fertile and multiply you” (Vayikra 26:9). Likewise, in the blessing Moshe bestowed upon them he said, “May the Lord, the God of your fathers, increase your numbers a thousandfold” (Devarim 1:11). Finally, the blessing will be fulfilled at the time of the redemption: “They will be fruitful and multiply” (Yirmiyahu 23:3), “I will multiply men and beasts upon you, and they will multiply and be fruitful” (Yeḥezkel 36:11), and “I will multiply their people like sheep” (ibid., v. 37).
  This is what Rambam means when he writes: <i>Although a man has fulfilled the mitzva of procreation (by having a son and daughter), he is rabbinically commanded not to neglect procreating as long as he has the strength, for anyone who adds a soul to the Jewish people is considered to have built a world.</i> (MT, Laws of Marriage 15:16)
  The second reason is to ensure the fulfillment of the Torah commandment. Even one who has a son and daughter cannot be sure that he will take part in the general objective of the mitzva, namely, that his son and daughter will continue his family line. Perhaps one of them will die, or will turn out to be infertile. 
  This concern is what led R. Yehoshua to advise: If one had children in his youth, he should also have children in his old age, as it states (Kohelet 11:6), “Sow your seed in the morning, and don’t hold back your hand in the evening, since you don’t know which is going to succeed, the one or the other, or if both are equally good.” R. Matna says, “The halakha accords with R. Yehoshua.” (Yevamot 62b)5<i class="footnote">There is general agreement that this rabbinic obligation is not as strict as the Torah obligation to procreate. Several Rishonim wrote that the mitzva is to populate the world in a normal way. Therefore, one who fulfilled the Torah commandment and was then widowed should marry a woman who can bear children, but he is not compelled to do so, and we do not label him a sinner if he marries a woman who cannot bear children (Ramban, <em>Milḥamot</em><em>Hashem</em> on <em>Yevamot</em> 19b in the Rif pages). This is the <em>halakha</em><em>Beit Shmuel</em>, EH 1:14). Similarly, if a man is worried that quarrels will erupt between the children of his first wife and the (potential) children of his second wife, he may marry a woman who cannot have children (<em>Terumat Ha-deshen</em> §263; Rema, EH 1:8). Likewise, if more children would create financial difficulties, a widower who has already fulfilled the Torah commandment to procreate may marry a woman who is unable to have children (AHS 1:8).The same applies to keeping the set times of ona. One who has not fulfilled the Torah obligation to procreate must keep all the times of ona when his wife can get pregnant; however, when it comes to the rabbinic obligation, if his wife agrees, they may forgo some onot (Birkei Yosef, EH 1:2; Pitḥei Teshuva ad loc. 1; AHS ad loc. 10; Rav Kook, Mitzvat Re’aya, EH §1). However, according to Beit Shmuel 1:1 and Taz 1:1 (in the first answer), a man must keep all the onot even to fulfill the rabbinic obligation.The second reason we mentioned for having many children is based on the objective of the mitzva to procreate. If one of a man’s children is infertile or predeceases him, he does not fulfill his obligation. In contrast, if someone’s children never marry (which is more common), he still fulfills his individual obligation. However, what is not fulfilled is the objective of the general mitzva, which is for one’s line to endure through his son and daughter. Netziv writes in Ha’mek She’ala 165:3-4 that according to She’iltot, since a son or daughter might die, there is a Torah obligation to have an additional son and daughter. However, Rambam maintains that we do not make the assumption that a child will predecease his parents. Therefore he wrote that the mitzva to have more children is due to the inherent value of each and every child.Rashi interprets the phrase from Kohelet, “You don’t know which is going to succeed, the one or the other,” to mean you don’t know which child will turn out to be upstanding and God-fearing nor which child will survive. We find an example in the story of Boaz. Our Sages identify him with Ivtzan, one of the judges, who had numerous wives and fathered thirty sons and thirty daughters (Shoftim 12:9), all of whom he successfully married off. Toward the end of his life, when he was close to eighty years old, his wife died. Because of his devotion to the mitzva, he did not decide that he already had enough children and grandchildren. Instead, when the opportunity came his way to continue fulfilling this mitzva, he married Ruth the Moabite. This union ultimately led to the birth of King David and the start of the Davidic dynasty (Ruth 4:18-22). We are also told that all sixty of Boaz’s earlier children predeceased him, while only Oved, the son who was born to him in his old age, outlived him. Generally, we would not advise an eighty-year-old to marry a woman of child-bearing age, since he would not be able to raise the children. Nevertheless, in the case of Ruth, his marrying her was an act of special kindness. It was a kindness to her, since she was a foreigner whom no one else was likely to marry, and it was a kindness to the family of Elimelekh and Naomi, who now had someone to carry on for them. Additionally, since Boaz was part of a large and wealthy family, the child born from Ruth would be well provided for even if he were to be orphaned. In any case, this is an example of a youngest child bringing enormous blessing. Being aware of this encourages the optimal fulfillment of the mitzva.</i>
  
  Section 6
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Two Tiers of the Rabbinic Mitzva
  As we have seen, there is a Torah commandment to have a son and a daughter, and the Sages expanded this and enacted a rabbinic mitzva to have additional children. At first glance, it would seem that there is no limit to the rabbinic mitzva, and that people must do their best to have as many children as possible. However, it seems more reasonable to posit that there are two tiers within the rabbinic mitzva. The first tier is a blanket obligation to have four to five children. The second tier is to have even more children, each couple according to its capability.
  Accordingly, ordinary couples of relatively sound mind and body are obligated to fulfill the rabbinic mitzva of having four to five children. Beyond this, they may assess whether they have the energy to continue fulfilling this important mitzva by having more children. For example, if they know that they can raise additional children and educate them in the ways of Torah, mitzvot, and derekh eretz (considerate behavior), they should continue to have as many children as they can. However, if they know that having additional children will be too stressful for them, making anger and irritability their constant companions, there are grounds for them to stop having children; even though each additional child is a mitzva, being in a bad emotional state often leads to transgression, which will likely have a negative impact on the upbringing of their children. Additionally, parents who are interested in channeling their talents in other meaningful ways may choose to do so even if this will leave them without the energy to raise additional children, as we will explain below in section 16. (Concerning permissible contraceptive methods, see sections 17-19; for the need to consult a rabbi, see section 20.)
  The basis for dividing the rabbinic mitzva into two tiers is that we find that the Sages often pattern a rabbinic mitzva on a Torah commandment, and since the Torah established an obligation to have two children, it is reasonable to posit that the rabbinic obligation is to have an additional two children. One might even suggest that the requirement is to have a total of two girls and two boys. In most cases, then, in order to fulfill the rabbinic requirement, a couple would need to have five children. Indeed, it is the norm in most religious families today to make efforts to have at least four to five children.
  Thus, although a couple fulfills a Torah commandment with each child that they have, there are three tiers of obligation within this mitzva: a) There is a Torah obligation to have a son and a daughter, and even when conditions make it challenging, the couple must make every effort to fulfill this mitzva (see below, sections 13-15, and ch. 6 sections 1-4). b) There is a rabbinic obligation to make efforts to have four to five children. c) There is a mitzva to have even more children, taking into account the parents’ energy (as we will explain below in sections 16 and 20).6<i class="footnote">Rambam writes, “Although a man has fulfilled the mitzva of procreation (by having a son and daughter), he is rabbinically commanded not to neglect procreating as long as he has the strength” (MT, Laws of Marriage 15:16). <em>Responsa</em><em>Rivash</em> (§15) and <em>Sefer Ḥaredim</em> (7:2) quote this opinion. It is unclear if one is required to make every effort to have additional children, barely taking into consideration the financial and health risks involved, or if Rambam means that one should make a reasonable effort, considering the various difficulties involved. Some Rishonim write that “Don’t hold back your hand in the evening” is a rabbinic mitzva and do not define it based on the parents’ ability or number of children (Rif, Rosh, <em>Smag</em>, and many others; nevertheless, it is clear from <em>Tosafot</em><em>Shabbat</em> 110b, s.v. “ve-hatanya”] that the rabbinic mitzva is having more than two boys and two girls).In my humble opinion, the reason that this question never arose in the past is because almost half of all children died in childhood and women were infertile for various reasons. For example, miscarriages often caused infertility, in the times before dilation and curettage (D&amp;C), and breastfeeding often had a contraceptive effect for two years. (Nowadays, it seems that it is due to the abundance and varieties of food available that women have the strength to nurse and ovulate simultaneously.) In any case, in the past, the average number of children was at most four or five. It never dawned on those who merited the blessing of many children to try to prevent pregnancy.Nowadays, with the improvement of medical care and the shortening of time spent breastfeeding, the average woman can give birth to many more children. Thus, the question arises: what are the obligations under this mitzva, and when is contraception permissible? Some are inclined to say that the obligation is to have as many children as possible, giving only minimal consideration to financial issues and physical well-being. They permit birth control only if there is physical or mental illness involved (R. Yosef Messas; Yaskil Avdi; Minḥat Yitzḥak). Others maintain that one may take finances and health into consideration (AHS; Igrot Moshe; Tzitz Eliezer). See n. 15 below. In practice, though, it seems that even those who are stringent will rule leniently if those asking describe their situation as difficult, and even those who are lenient will rule stringently if those asking describe their situation as manageable. Thus, the halakhic ruling will depend a great deal on how the couple presents the question, which in turn depends upon their worldview, their attitude toward having many children, and their perception of how difficult this would be. In such cases, both the questioners and the responders find themselves facing a difficult dilemma.In order to help these families and the rabbis they consult, it seems to me that it is necessary to divide the rabbinic obligation into two tiers, which will address most questions. It also seems that most poskim rule this way in practice, namely, that before a family has reached the average size in the religious community, rabbis are less willing to be permissive regarding birth control, but from that point on they are more willing. This formulation therefore gives systematic expression to what is already the generally accepted pesak (as explained below in n. 15).Two rationales can be brought to support this division. First, we know that the Sages often pattern rabbinic laws upon Torah laws, as the Talmud states, “Whatever the rabbis ordained, they ordained on the pattern of the Torah” (Gittin 65a et al.). For example, fasts established by the prophets are patterned after Yom Kippur, which is a biblically mandated fast (Peninei Halakha: Zemanim 7:1). R. Yosef Ottolenghi (Lu’aḥ Dinim Shel Ha-Nimukei Yosef, Yevamot §60) seems to apply this principle to procreation: “On the Torah level, the mitzva of procreation is fulfilled by having a son and a daughter, while fulfilling the rabbinic mitzva requires having two of each.” This requirement of specifically two sons and two daughters can be added to how Ha’mek She’ala understands She’iltot (165:3-4), namely, that in order to ensure the fulfillment of the Torah mitzva, one must have two sons and two daughters (n. 5 above). Statistically, the chance that out of four children two will be boys and two will be girls is 37.5%; out of five children, it is 62.5%; out of six, 78.13%; and out of seven, 87.5%. Thus, the second tier in the fulfillment of the mitzva requires four to five children, meaning, that if one does not have two boys and two girls among the first four children, it is best to have a fifth child, for in most families, the five children will include two boys and two girls. However, we do not assert on the basis of this speculative reasoning that it is obligatory to have more than five children. Even in a family with four children, the second tier obligation is patterned on the Torah with respect to number, and the risk of not fulfilling the mitzva of procreation has been greatly minimized.The second rationale is not as well defined, but carries great weight. There is a well-known principle that when we are uncertain as to how exactly to perform a specific mitzva, we should look at the prevalent practice among observant Jews. Among families that have no specific physical or mental difficulties (not counting those who enhance the mitzva by having especially large families), the typical number of children is between four and five. Likewise, some Rishonim write that the rabbinic mitzva does not require people to make every effort to have a limitless number of children; rather, it is a mitzva to populate the world in a normal way (Ha-Ma’or; Ramban, Milḥamot Hashem on Yevamot 19b in the Rif pages). Some contemporary rabbis maintain that there is a dispute about whether the rabbinic commandment is a bona fide obligation, like other rabbinic mitzvot, or is a lighter commandment (Bnei Banim 2:38; Ish U-veito, ch. 17, n. 2). Though it seems more likely that this is not a dispute, if we accept their statements, there is room in the division I propose for each view and rationale; having four to five children is obligatory, and having more is an optional mitzva.</i>
  
  Section 7
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Age of Marriage for Men
  Although at the age of thirteen a male becomes obligated to fulfill all the mitzvot, the Sages say that the ideal age for a male to get married is eighteen, and no later than twenty. This delay is because he must prepare himself for the challenges of raising a family in two areas. 
  The first is mastery of the basics of the Torah to mold his worldview and so that he knows how to act in accordance with halakha. This is what the Sages mean when they say, “Five years old is the age to begin studying Scripture; ten for Mishna; thirteen for the obligation of the commandments; fifteen for the study of Talmud; eighteen for marriage” (Avot 5:21). Elsewhere the Sages say that studying Torah should come before marriage, because if one marries first, the burden of supporting a family is likely to impede his Torah study (Kiddushin 29b). Similarly, Shulḥan Arukh rules, “A man should first learn Torah and then marry. For if he marries first, he will not be able to devote himself to Torah study, as he will have a millstone around his neck” (YD 246:2).
  The second type of preparation is learning how to earn a living. It used to be that while a young man was studying the basics of the Torah, he devoted part of his day to working with his father and thus learning a trade that could earn him a living, build a home, and save up to invest in the furtherance of his career. The idea that one must have a means of support before getting married is derived by the Sages from the order of the verses in the Torah: “Who has built a new house…planted a vineyard…betrothed a woman…” (Devarim 20:5-7). 
  The Talmud states: The Torah teaches us the proper way to go about things. First, one should build a house, then he should plant a vineyard, and only then should he get married. King Shlomo, too, wisely declared, “Put your external affairs in order; get ready what you have in the field, then build yourself a home” (Mishlei 24:27). “Put your external affairs in order” refers to the house; “get ready what you have in the field” refers to the vineyard; “then build yourself a home” refers to getting married. (Sota 44a)
  Rambam similarly writes: <i>It is the way of intelligent people to ensure that first they learn a trade with which they can support themselves, then buy a home, and afterwards they marry…. But fools marry first; then, if he can, he buys a house, and then, at the end, he will try to learn a trade or will live off charity…</i> (MT, Laws of Dispositions 5:11)
  Therefore, the Sages instruct men to postpone marriage until the age of eighteen. At the same time, they also warn against delaying marriage beyond the age of twenty, saying (Kiddushin 29b), “Until a man turns twenty, God sits and waits for him to get married. If he reaches the age of twenty and is not yet married, God says, ‘Let his bones swell up!’” In other words, he is cursed for not fulfilling the mitzva of procreation. The Sages also comment on the verse, “A time for giving birth and a time for dying” (Kohelet 3:2): “From the time of a person’s birth until he turns twenty, God awaits his marriage. If he reaches the age of twenty and has not yet married, God says to him, ‘There was a time for you to give birth, but you were not interested; now it is only a time to die’” (Kohelet Rabba 3:3).
  Furthermore, the Sages state, “If a man does not marry by the age of twenty, he spends his whole life thinking sinful thoughts” (Kiddushin 29b), for as long as a man who has not yet reached that age knows that when the time comes he will marry and love his wife as himself, then even if he sometimes entertains sinful thoughts and transgresses by masturbating, he knows that it is improper and that when he is married he will reserve all his desire for his wife. However, when bachelorhood lasts too long, he despairs of mastering his desire, surrenders to it, and gets used to gratifying himself sinfully. Then, even when he marries and is faithful to his wife, it will be difficult for him to avoid sinful thoughts, because they will have become a part of him. Only if he repents sincerely out of love will he be able to correct this (above, 4:2, n. 2).
  Some people manage to marry early, either because they had help from their parents or because they were exceptionally talented, and this is praiseworthy. As R. Ḥisda said of himself, his preeminence was not because he was more talented or more righteous than his colleagues, but because he was able to marry at sixteen and thus learn Torah in purity without sexual temptation. He added that had he gotten married at fourteen, he would have been so immune to the evil inclination that he would have been able to taunt Satan without fear of being tempted to sin (Kiddushin 29b-30a).7<i class="footnote">The basis for the obligation to get married by age twenty is the mitzva to procreate. “Until a man turns twenty, God sits and waits for him to get married. If he reaches the age of twenty and is not yet married, God says, ‘Let his bones swell up!’” Rambam likewise writes, “A man is commanded to procreate…. Once he has reached the age of twenty and has not married, he is guilty of disregarding a positive commandment” (MT, Laws of Marriage 15:2). Rosh, explaining this age limit, writes similarly, “It is inconceivable for a person to disregard the mitzva of procreation forever” (<em>Kiddushin</em> 1:42). Elsewhere he writes, “If an unmarried man past the age of twenty does not want to get married, it is proper for the <em>beit din</em> to compel him to get married in order to fulfill the mitzva of procreation” (<em>Yevamot</em> 6:16). Other Rishonim who say likewise include <em>Smag</em><em>Aseh</em> 49), Rabbeinu Yeruḥam (<em>Toldot Adam Ve-Ḥava</em><em>netiv</em> 22, <em>ḥelek</em> 2), and <em>Tur</em>. SA states, “If a man passes the age of twenty and does not want to get married, the <em>beit din</em> compels him to do so, in order to fulfill the mitzva of procreation” (EH 1:3). <em>Responsa Maharam Padua</em> §45 states that anyone who postpones marriage “transgresses a positive commandment each and every day.” Likewise, Maharit writes:The beit din compels a man to marry in order to fulfill the mitzva of procreation, even though the mitzva of procreation remains constant throughout life and one is exempt after fulfilling it, so one who is lazy about it has postponed the mitzva but not completely disregarded it. Nevertheless, because he is commanded, he is still disregarding the fulfillment of a mitzva…. [Therefore,] if a man takes an oath that he will not get married until after he turns twenty, even if he specifies that he will delay it for only a year, he has taken an oath to disregard a mitzva, and the oath therefore does not take effect. (Responsa Maharit YD §47; likewise Shiyarei Knesset Ha-gedola [YD 236, Hagahot Tur 44] and Yafeh La-lev vol. 4, EH 1:12)However, according to Rashba, one who swears that he will not get married until he is over the age of twenty is not considered to have taken an oath to disregard a positive commandment, since he can fulfill the mitzva later (Responsa Rashba 4:91). Ḥikrei Lev (EH §1) agrees, since it is possible to fulfill the mitzva at a time later than the ideal. As long as it is possible for him to keep his oath and still fulfill the mitzva, he is not considered to have sworn to disregard a mitzva. Nevertheless, Ḥikrei Lev adds, “He is punished by heaven for the time during which he disregards a positive commandment; furthermore, he could die before fulfilling the mitzva, in which case he will in fact have disregarded the positive commandment entirely.” We can also posit that Rashba’s leniency does not mean he is denying the rabbinic requirement to marry by the age of twenty. Rather, Rashba maintains that an oath that negates a rabbinic mitzva takes effect (Responsa Rashba 1:614).It is important to add that timing plays a significant role in fulfilling the mitzva of procreation, since the goal of the mitzva is to multiply and fill the world with people (Bereishit 1:28 and 9:7). Multiplying is dependent on two factors – how many children a couple would like to have, and when they begin having them. The younger that people are when they begin having children, the faster the next generation can begin to multiply. This is why the Sages prohibited getting married on Ḥol Ha-mo’ed. If it were permitted, people might delay marriage by a few months in order to get married then, and that would negatively impact procreation (Ḥagiga 8b; SA 546:1-2; Peninei Halakha: Mo’adim 10:4). The Sages also said, “Yehoshua was punished only because he prevented the Jewish people from fulfilling the mitzva of procreation for one night” (Eruvin 63b).Other critical reasons to insist on marriage by the age of twenty are the fulfillment of the mitzva of ona and the prevention of sinful thoughts, as explained in Kiddushin 29b (see above). Rambam codifies: “Likewise, it is rabbinically mandated that a man not remain single, so that he will not have sinful thoughts” (MT, Laws of Marriage 15:16). Ritva (Yevamot 61b); Hasagot Ha-Ra’avad and Nimukei Yosef (Yevamot 19b in Rif pages); Levush 1:8; and AHS 1:7 all write similarly. See 4:7-8 above.</i>
  
  Section 8
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Coercion to Marry
  Shulḥan Arukh rules, “It is a mitzva for every man to marry a woman when he is eighteen…and under no circumstances should he pass the age of twenty without a wife. If a man passes the age of twenty and does not want to get married, the beit din compels him to marry in order to fulfill the mitzva of procreation” (EH 1:3). What does this coercion involve? According to Rif and Rambam, he is beaten; according to Tosafot and Rosh, he is rebuked and sanctioned – no one is to do business with him or employ him, but he is not physically beaten or excommunicated (SA EH 154:21).
  The question arises: How can a person be compelled to fulfill this mitzva, when marriage requires desire and love? How is it conceivable that we would coerce someone to get married? Clearly a man is not forced to marry someone he does not choose to marry. Rather, the Sages wish to advance a principled position: a person should get married by the age of twenty in order to fulfill the mitzva of procreation, and in principle the beit din should compel him to do so. In reality, though, only on rare occasions is the beit din in a position to intervene. An example would be a situation in which a young man has a close relationship with a young woman, and they have agreed to get married, but he keeps delaying the marriage based on various pretexts. In such a case, the beit din would compel him to marry her (R. Ḥayim Palachi, Ru’aḥ Ḥayim, EH 1:12).
  Usually the issue of coercion arises when a man wants to marry a woman who cannot have children. For example, Rivash (who lived c. 600 years ago in Algiers) was asked about a young man who wanted to marry a rich old woman. The beit din of Tenes sought to prevent it on the grounds that he would not be able to procreate with her. Rivash responded that longstanding custom is not to compel particular matches, for such coercion can lead to much strife (Responsa Rivash §15). (The issue of a couple who has no children after ten years of marriage is addressed below, 6:7-8.)
  To summarize, according to Shulḥan Arukh, the rabbinic courts can coerce a person to fulfill the mitzva of procreation, but as we have explained, in practice this has been done only in exceptional cases, when there was blatant disregard for the mitzva. According to Rivash and Rema, even then coercion is not used (SA EH 1:3). Current practice follows the last approach.
  If a man reaches the age at which he is obligated to marry but has not found the right woman, even if there is a woman who is willing to marry him, he is not obligated to compromise, and he may continue his search for a suitable match (Yafeh La-lev, vol. 4, EH 1:13). However, if he is deluded, in search of a woman who does not exist or who would most likely not agree to marry him, he is guilty of delaying the mitzva. To help resolve these kinds of problems, the Sages instruct, “Get yourself a teacher; acquire a friend” (Avot 1:6). These mentors may give him advice, and sometimes even point out the error of his ways. The older the unmarried man, the harder he must try to fulfill the mitzva. This includes the willingness to compromise, because it would seem that what it comes down to is not compromising but adjusting to reality.
  
  Section 9
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Age of Marriage for Men (In Practice)
  Based on the Talmud, some prominent poskim write that a man may delay marriage until the age of 24 for the purpose of Torah study or if his financial situation does not allow for earlier marriage (Yam Shel Shlomo; Birkei Yosef). In the past, plain study of Tanakh, ethics, and halakha with its rationales was sufficient for a person to create a Jewish home. It was enough for someone to work a few hours a day with his father when he was young to acquire the skills necessary to earn a living by the age of eighteen. He would likely even be able to put aside some money for wedding expenses and for building a one room house.
  In modern times, life has become more complex, and preparation for married life requires more time. To successfully cope with today’s challenges, most young men must study far more Torah than was necessary in the past. To that end, the majority of them need to study in a yeshiva framework for at least a year after the age of eighteen – usually for longer. There is another sacred obligation to which young men must give time, and this is serving in the IDF in order to protect our people and our country. This mitzva, too, causes marriage to be delayed. Similarly, learning a profession suited to one’s talents generally involves academic study, which can take a few years, and begins after army service. Another complicating factor is that today’s homes are more expensive. They are larger and equipped with utilities such as water and electricity. Purchasing such homes requires working for years.
  If a man were to delay marriage until after he learned all the Torah fundamentals, finished studying a suitable profession, and bought a house, most young people today would need to marry in their thirties. Such a postponement is impossible according to halakha. After all, while the environment in which we live has become more complex, complicated, and challenging, people’s emotional and physical nature has not changed, and from that standpoint, the appropriate age for marriage is still eighteen.
  Thus, in light of today’s more complicated life, marriage may be postponed past the age of twenty, as in extenuating circumstances. Nevertheless, it may not be deferred beyond the age of 24. On one hand, young people need more time to solidify their Torah knowledge, more fully form their worldview, and take their first steps toward acquiring a profession, or at least have a practical plan in place to learn a profession and support a family. On the other hand, they must not wait too long past the ideal emotional and physical age to get married, so as not to lose the enthusiasm and passion of youth necessary for building their relationship in its initial stages. We also find that people who wait until they are older to get married have more trouble finding their life partner, and some remain single for many years. In addition to all of this, the mitzvot of marriage and parenting require a person to express himself most fully and completely. As the Sages say, “any man without a wife is not a man” (Yevamot 63a), and such a person remains without happiness, without blessing, without goodness, without Torah, without fortification, and without peace (ibid. 62b). There is a limit to how many years a person can live absent all these. Additionally, we have seen that delaying marriage more than necessary can cause a person’s sexual drive to overwhelm him, so he will be unable to avoid sinful thoughts throughout his life (Kiddushin 29b). Therefore, most people should be instructed not to postpone marriage past the age of 24. People who are able to get married earlier – without seriously compromising their Torah study, army service, or career preparation – are blessed.8<i class="footnote">The possibility of delaying marriage, <em>be-di’avad</em>, until the age of 24 is mentioned in the Talmud, which advises, “While your hand is still upon your son’s neck, marry him off” (<em>Kiddushin</em> 30a). Rashi explains: “While you still have authority over him, before he grows up and refuses your admonitions, marry him off.” The Talmud continues to explain that this time period is “from sixteen to 22, and some say from eighteen to 24.” That is, according to the second view, the Sages instruct parents to guide their sons to marry between the ages of eighteen and 24. Not before eighteen, because they are not mature and responsible enough to raise a family, and not after 24, because then it will be difficult to push them to get married. Additionally, as people get older they tend to become less flexible and open, so it becomes more difficult for them to get married, as we see with our very own eyes. The Sages assess that it is relatively easy to get married before the age of 24, and even easier before the age of 22. Based on this statement in the Talmud, Maharshal rules that for someone who wants to defer marriage in order to study Torah longer, “the latest possible age, following those who are lenient, is no later than 24” (<em>Yam Shel Shlomo</em><em>Kiddushin</em> 1:57). If this is the deadline for Torah study, it is certainly not later than that for mundane concerns. Thus, Ḥida writes, “It seems that one should not postpone marriage past the age of 24 for any non-physical reason” (<em>Birkei Yosef</em>, EH 1:9; also cited in <em>Pitḥei Teshuva</em><em>ad loc</em>. 5). This is also the position of R. Moshe Azulai (grandson of Ḥida), <em>Zikhron Moshe</em>, EH 1:3; R. Yitzḥak Isaac Shor,<em> Toldot Adam</em>, EH 1:3; and R. Yosef Ḥayim of Baghdad, <em>Rav Pe’alim</em> YD 2:30. Similarly, Rosh implies that there is a limit to how long marriage can be postponed even to allow for Torah study (<em>Kiddushin</em> 1:42). Some write that marriage may be postponed until the age of 25 (<em>Sefer Ha-Mitzvot Ha-Katzar</em><em>Aseh</em> 43; <em>Shemesh U-magen</em>, EH 2:23). For their position to be compatible with the Talmud in <em>Kiddushin</em>, it would seem that they must mean that marriage can be delayed up to but not including 25. <em>Beit Shmuel</em> 1:5 states that although according to Rosh there is a limit to how long marriage can be delayed even to allow for Torah study, according to Rambam it would seem marriage can be put off indefinitely to allow for Torah study on the condition that his sexual drive does not overpower him. Stretching this point, a similar allowance might be made for a man who is learning a profession. If he is doing so for the sake of heaven, in order to benefit the world, and if his inclination is not overpowering him, when truly necessary he may rely on Rambam’s position and postpone marriage even beyond the age of 24. (See above, ch. 4, n. 12.)Some insist that we should not take into account all the difficulties and challenges with which modern life presents us; instead we must continue to demand that all males get married before the age of twenty. However, their opinion contradicts the Torah’s teaching to act normally (Sota 44a; MT, Laws of Dispositions 5:11). These leaders impose poverty upon the majority of their followers and prevent them from using their God-given talents and abilities to contribute to the world. The same leaders also tend to deny the mitzva of the Torah to serve in the army in order to protect the people and country. (As for the claim that delaying marriage leads to sinful thoughts, see above, ch. 4, n. 12.)In contrast, others claim that a man should postpone marriage until he completes his academic studies and starts earning a respectable income, even if this will take many years, as is the practice of many young people in economically developed countries. This position is likewise contrary to halakha, which limits the postponement of marriage. Additionally, as we mentioned above, people who postpone marriage often have a difficult time finding the right person at a later point, and end up remaining single for a very long time, for the ideal age to marry from the point of view of emotional well-being is approximately twenty. As more time passes, enthusiasm wanes and it becomes more difficult to make a permanent commitment. This is one of the reasons for the breakdown of the institution of marriage and family in those countries where young people postpone marriage for too long.</i>
  
  Section 10
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Age of Marriage for Women
  As we have seen, halakha establishes eighteen to twenty as the ideal age for men to marry, with a delay until 24 under extenuating circumstances. In contrast, halakha does not establish a specific age for women to get married. The reason is that all mitzvot related to establishing and providing for a family, as well as the mitzva of Torah study, were imposed on men as an obligation, whereas for women it is a non-obligatory mitzva. A man who has not studied the basics of the Torah or cannot support his family is considered a sinner. Therefore, the Sages instruct men to wait until age eighteen to get married. In contrast, women can get married earlier, since they are not obligated to learn all the basics of the Torah and are not halakhically required to assume the burden of supporting their families. Men are obligated in the mitzva of procreation, so halakha does not allow a man to delay marriage past twenty, or in extenuating circumstances, past 24. In contrast, since women are not obligated to procreate, the Sages did not establish an age by which they must get married. Nevertheless, the Sages said that it is proper for a woman to marry as early as possible. This way, she will fulfill the mitzva of procreation without delay, and the evil inclination will not tempt her (Sanhedrin 76a).
  Since a woman fulfills a tremendously important mitzva by marrying and having children, the Torah commands parents to do their best to help their daughters marry. The Sages even instruct people to put aside approximately one-tenth of their assets to help a daughter get married (Ketubot 52b; SA EH 113:1). Nevertheless, the beit din does not get involved in compelling parents to do so (Rema, EH 70:1).
  In times of dire poverty, many families were forced to marry off their daughters while they were still girls in order to ensure their future, to make sure that they would not go hungry, and so that they would have the privilege of raising a family. Therefore, the Torah permitted a father to marry off his daughter while she was still a minor (under the age of twelve). However, when there was no existential need to marry off minors, the Sages prohibited doing so, saying, “A man may not marry off his daughter while she is still young; [rather, he must wait] until she has matured and is able to say, ‘I choose this one’” (Kiddushin 41a; SA EH 37:8).9<i class="footnote">At first glance, this <em>halakha </em>seems self-contradictory. On one hand, the Torah allows a father to marry off his daughter from the moment she is born until she reaches adulthood. With his acceptance of <em>kiddushin </em>money from the groom (who must be at least thirteen years old), she becomes a wife. On the other hand, the Sages state, “A man may not marry off his daughter while she is still young; [rather, he must wait] until she has matured and is able to say, ‘I choose this one’” (<em>Kiddushin</em> 41a). In order to understand this law, we must be aware that until recently, earning a living generally involved working at hard physical labor all day long. Therefore, women were existentially dependent on men. When times were difficult, a young woman’s parents would need to provide a large dowry so that a man would agree to marry her and commit to providing for her. If they did not do so, they had reason to fear that their daughter would remain alone, without a husband, children, or income. Sometimes, when the parents received a marriage proposal from an upright man from a good family, they would hasten to marry off their daughter to him even while she was still a minor, while they still had money for a dowry. They were afraid that if they waited until she was grown, they would be unable to find her a decent husband or provide her with a suitable dowry. Sometimes, when the parents’ financial situation was dire, the only way left for them to save their daughter from starvation and to secure her future was to marry her off young to a successful man. Therefore, the Torah permitted a father to marry off his minor daughter. This explanation is offered by <em>Tosafot</em>, stating 800 years ago, “Because each and every day the exile worsens, if a man has the ability to provide his daughter with a dowry now, he should do so, because he may not have the means to do so later, and his daughter will remain alone forever” (<em>Tosafot</em><em>Kiddushin</em> 41a, s.v. “asur”). Sometimes parents married their daughter off as a minor because their community was very small, and if the father did not accept a viable son-in-law when he was available, he might get snapped up by someone else (Rabbeinu Peretz’s glosses on <em>Smak</em> §183). Similarly, “If he does not seize the opportunity, he may not have another chance” (Rabbanei Tzarfat as cited in <em>Shita Mekubetzet</em><em>Ketubot</em> 57b). See <em>Otzar Ha-poskim</em>, EH 37:8:25-26.If a father died, the Sages ordained that in order to ensure a minor daughter’s well-being, her mother and brother could marry her off. However, since such a marriage does not have the status of a Torah marriage, if the minor wants to leave the husband they chose for her, she may say before two witnesses that she refuses to be married to him, and this dissolves their union. Based on her refusal, a certificate of repudiation (shtar mi’un) is drawn up. However, if she has not rejected him by the time she turns twelve and exhibits signs of puberty, she becomes his full-fledged wife (SA EH §155).Nevertheless, when it was not absolutely necessary to marry off a minor in order to ensure her well-being, the Sages directed that even a poor man should not marry off his minor daughter without her wholehearted consent. Only when a girl was close to puberty, if she wished to marry a particular person, then it was a mitzva for her father to marry her off to him (Kiddushin 41a; SA EH 37:8; Tiferet Yisrael, Kiddushin 2:2). If she was not interested in getting married yet, they would wait until she was. In general, the Sages said that girls should be encouraged to marry early, as soon as possible after puberty, so as to avoid delaying the fulfillment of the mitzva of procreation. Additionally, doing so would protect her from the evil inclination’s enticements to act promiscuously. As it says, “Do not degrade your daughter and make her a harlot” (Vayikra 19:29), on which Rabbi Akiva commented, “This refers to a man who delays marrying off his adult daughter” (Sanhedrin 76a).When such marriages were made due to financial necessity, then even though the bride did not choose the groom, there was no shame in it. Many such marriages were happy and resulted in a thriving family life. The relationship would evolve: At first, the husband’s attitude to his young wife would be paternal. As she grew up and developed her identity, they would become peers. As their connection deepened, she would become as a mother to him, taking care of all of his emotional needs. The Sages use this development as an allegory to describe God’s relationship with the Jewish people (Shemot Rabba 52:5). We must add that the Sages instructed the husband of a minor to refrain from sexual relations until his wife reached puberty. A man who has sexual relations with a minor, even his wife, is deemed a child molester. The Sages say that such a person prevents the arrival of the Messiah, since the girl takes no pleasure in this, nor is she able to bear children (Nidda 13b).</i>
  
  Section 11
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Age of Marriage for Women Nowadays
  Over the past several centuries, as the economic situation improved and stabilized, eliminating the need to marry off young girls to ensure their sustenance, the practice ceased to exist in most countries (AHS 37:33). Rather, marriages were generally arranged after girls reached halakhic adulthood and physical maturity, generally between the ages of thirteen and sixteen, and the final decision about whom to marry was left to them. The parents still had the very important job of helping their daughters choose a husband and of providing a dowry (approximately a tenth of their assets). However, the decision to get married was made by the girls themselves, and the kiddushin money was given to them directly.
  Nowadays, thanks to a much higher standard of living and greater opportunities for women to utilize their talents in various fields, women are marrying later. There are two reasons for this. First, because women can now use their skills in many areas, they have a concomitant obligation to learn more Torah as they train in a suitable field, so that they can contribute goodness and blessing to the world. Second, in the past, young couples lived with their extended family, so even young women could have children because the older women would help them rear the children. In contrast, now that young couples set up house on their own, it is not realistic for women to get married until they are able to take full responsibility for caring for their children.
  Nonetheless, women should not delay marriage too long. The right age for women to get married is slightly younger than the right age for men. First, girls mature earlier, as is reflected in their becoming obligated in mitzvot at the age of twelve, a year earlier than boys. Second, the mitzva to learn Torah requires less of women than of men. Third, women are not obligated to serve in the army as men are. It is true that nowadays, when it comes to supporting a family, women share the burden with men. One might think this would cause marriage to be delayed. On the contrary, it can enable earlier marriage. If a woman finishes her studies early, she can assume most of the burden of supporting the family at the beginning of the marriage, putting her husband through school where he can train in a suitable field, rather than needing to wait until he is able to support the family. 
  In conclusion, the appropriate age of marriage today for men is between twenty and 24, while for women it is approximately two years younger.
  
  Section 12
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Responsibilities of Young Adults, Parents, and Society
  The mitzva to get married poses a great challenge today for young people, their parents, and society as a whole. Young adults are expected, within a few years, to form a Torah-based worldview, acquire a profession that suits their talents, and start a family. In addition to this, men are expected to complete their army service and study as much Torah as possible.
  The primary responsibility for meeting this challenge rests with young adults themselves. They must plan carefully to avoid wasting time during these precious years. Even though we have defined the present day as “pressing circumstances,” when young men may delay marriage until 24, one who wastes time during these years is disregarding a Torah commandment. Therefore, every young man and young woman has an obligation to pave a way to integrate all these values. They must try to marry at a young age while simultaneously acquiring suitable professions, in order to support their family and contribute to the world.
  The second responsibility is that of the parents. The Sages teach that it is the parents’ responsibility to marry off their children (Kiddushin 29a-30b), as it says, “Take wives and beget sons and daughters; take wives for your sons and give your daughters to husbands, that they may bear sons and daughters” (Yirmiyahu 29:6). In other words, the mitzva of procreation does not end with the birth of the children, but continues. When children mature and reach marriageable age, the parents must encourage them to get married, and provide them with both advice and financial help. This makes the parents partners in ensuring continuity. The Sages instruct parents to set aside a tenth of their assets for the marriage of each child. It would seem that nowadays, a significant part of the parents’ support should be directed toward helping their children to successfully navigate the challenge of combining marriage, professional training, and in some cases childcare as well.10<i class="footnote">“How much must [parents spend on a daughter’s marriage]? Abaye and Rava both say: Up to a tenth of their assets” (<em>Ketubot</em> 52b). Therefore, if a father passes away without explicitly expressing his wishes about how much to spend on marrying off his daughter, a tenth of his estate should be allocated for that purpose (<em>Ketubot</em> 68a; SA EH 113:1). However, we do not enforce this (Rema, EH 70:1). Maharam Mintz writes that a father may not favor a daughter by giving her more than a son (<em>Responsa Maharam Mintz</em> 1:31). Rabbeinu Ḥananel says that he may not give a daughter more than a tenth of his assets, so as not to discriminate against the sons and deprive them of their inheritance (as cited in <em>Tosafot</em> to <em>Ketubot</em> 50b, s.v. “u-mai”). But the common practice was not to follow this (Rema, EH 113:1; <em>Taz</em><em>ad loc</em>. 1), because sometimes the reality was that if the parents did not give their daughter more, they would not be able to find her a husband.The straightforward meaning of the Talmud in Ketubot 52b is that the mitzva for parents to marry off their children is a Torah obligation. However, many believe this law has the status of divrei kabbala (prophetic writings), an intermediate status between a mitzva from the Torah and a rabbinic mitzva (Ran; Me’iri; Ritva). Others say that the mitzva is rabbinic, and the verse is simply used as a support for the rabbinic law (Leḥem Mishneh explaining MT, Laws of Marriage 20:1). Some Rishonim write that the mitzva to marry off a child is the father’s obligation, while the mother is exempt from this just as she is exempt from the obligation to procreate (Ran; Me’iri). Nevertheless, it is obvious that this is a great mitzva, just as her participation in procreation is a great mitzva, as explained above in section 3. I would humbly suggest that paying children’s tuition when they are over eighteen so that they can learn a profession can be considered part of the tenth that parents need to invest in their child’s marriage, for this, too, helps enable the children start and support a family. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to me that the directive to dedicate a tenth of one’s assets for each wedding was made at a time when most people had about five children to marry off. Accordingly, someone who has been privileged to have ten children would need to dedicate only five percent of his assets to each child. That is, unless he manages to save and invest, increasing his net worth, in which case he may be able to dedicate ten percent of the assets he holds at the time of each wedding to the child getting married.</i>
  Society as a whole also has a responsibility to create conditions conducive to young people fulfilling the mitzva of getting married in a timely fashion. To allow for this, it is necessary to make professional training as efficient as possible, to help young people find affordable housing and childcare, and to enable women to begin their studies as early as possible so that they can help support their family in the initial years of the marriage.11<i class="footnote">Not only does modern life present us with some difficulties, it also provides us with solutions. Thus, while it is true that learning a profession takes longer than it once did, at the same time it is a good long-term investment. Therefore, banks are prepared to provide student loans which need to be repaid only after the borrower starts working. There is a similar phenomenon with housing. While homes are certainly larger and more expensive than they once were, there is also a thriving long-term mortgage market which helps people to purchase them.Beyond the difficulty of juggling all these challenges simultaneously, today’s society of abundance has left many people addicted to luxuries. For many, the addiction is so serious that it prevents them from realizing any of their ideals. Instead, they are constantly preoccupied with making more money to buy a better car, fancier clothing, more expensive furniture, and a bigger house in a wealthier neighborhood. In order to do that, many people postpone marriage and neglect the mitzva of procreation. People need to overcome temptation and prioritize their ideals over fleeting pleasures. They must remember that even someone who nowadays is considered to be making do with the minimum is still living as well as someone wealthy lived 200 years ago. If people in the past could live that way happily, then it should be possible to do that today, too. Everyone can realize their ideals, and thus be privileged to live a truly meaningful life.</i>
  
  Section 13
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Permit to use Birth Control for a Year
  In the past, most women nursed their children for about two years, and nursing would almost always prevent ovulation and menstruation. Consequently, a woman could not become pregnant while nursing, and there was thus a natural gap of about two years between birth and the next pregnancy. Today, reality has changed in two ways. First, the average time spent nursing has been shortened to six months or less. There are several reasons for this: women have joined the workforce, life is more stressful, and substitutes for breast milk are available. Second, for many women, nursing does not prevent ovulation and menstruation, so they can become pregnant even while nursing.
  Thus, if a couple fulfill the mitzva of ona at its set times, many women would conceive a few months after giving birth, especially women who are not nursing at all or are nursing some of the time and supplementing with formula. The question arises: may a couple use contraception in the year following birth, to enable them to fulfill the mitzva of ona while avoiding another pregnancy?
  Some rabbis are inclined to rule stringently and do not permit birth control except if there is a great need, such as when the mother is extremely weak or very stressed. In their opinion, the mitzva of procreation requires having as many children as possible. However, the halakha follows the opinion of most poskim, who maintain that when necessary it is permissible to prevent pregnancy using halakhically acceptable methods (as explained in sections 17-19). Experience shows that from the perspective of physical and psychological health, it is best for most women to take a break of approximately nine months to a year between birth and the next pregnancy. Accordingly, it is permissible le-khatḥila for all women to use contraceptive methods during this time. Similarly, after a miscarriage, birth control may be used for several months if necessary, based on the instruction of a God-fearing doctor.12<i class="footnote">The parameters of family planning are not addressed systematically in the halakhic literature; rather, we find numerous responses given to different people in a variety of situations. This is primarily because it is a subject that has surfaced in recent times. Thanks to medical advances and improved living conditions and nutrition, the average woman can have many more children than in the past (as explained above, at the beginning of n. 6). Additionally, many feel that since the subject is very complex, a wise person should always be consulted. Accordingly, there is no need to write general parameters (as explained below, in section 20). It is also important to note that many rulings deal with contraceptive methods that raise concerns about wasting seed, and not with birth control pills and IUDs, which avoid this problem because they are akin to the talmudic sterility potion (<em>kos shel ikarim</em>); see section 17 below. Nevertheless, three general opinions emerge from these rulings. The most stringent approach maintains that contraception should not be used unless there is a great need. Only natural means like nursing should be used (including after birth). Other means of contraception may be used only in cases of physical illness or psychological fragility (<em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 3:177; <em>Mishneh Halakhot</em> 5:210). At the other extreme are those who permit the use of contraception for two years following a birth, even before the mitzva of procreation has been fulfilled. They see it as natural, and also what was done throughout history. Women generally nursed for two years (<em>Nidda</em> 9a), and the nursing had a contraceptive effect (<em>Si’aḥ Naḥum</em> §94; <em>Bnei Banim</em> 1:30). The moderate approach is that it is permissible <em>le-khatḥila</em> to use contraception for nine months to a year following a birth. This allows the mother to recuperate from the birth and to take proper care of the baby, both of which are very important. Even a woman who does not feel it is necessary may still use birth control <em>le-khatḥila</em> for this amount of time, since experience shows that it is in fact necessary. In special cases of physical or psychological fragility, contraception may be used for up to two years. It seems most rabbis rule by this approach (see <em>Nishmat Avraham</em>, EH 5:16 n. 1).</i>
  
  Section 14
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Birth Control for Two Years or More
  Prior to the fulfillment of the mitzva of procreation, contraceptives should not be used for more than a year. However, some women, because of their physical or emotional state, need a break of more than a year after giving birth. In such cases, birth control may be used for up to two years.
  A couple who has not yet fulfilled the Torah commandment of procreation may not use contraception for more than a year if using it is for financial reasons or to make studying or working easier. Some poskim are lenient in these cases too, and allow birth control for up to two years. 
  Although it is preferable to follow the majority of poskim and not be lenient, for the world was created for this mitzva and it gives people the opportunity to be God’s partners in sustaining the world (Gittin 41a-b; Nidda 31a), nevertheless, those who wish to be lenient in this regard have someone to rely upon.12 Even this leniency is limited to two years.
  It is incorrect for a woman to claim that since she is not obligated in the mitzva, she is therefore allowed to use contraception for an unlimited amount of time. Ever since the acceptance of Rabbeinu Gershom’s ordinance forbidding men to marry two women or to divorce their wives against their will, a man is completely dependent upon his wife to fulfill the mitzva of procreation. Therefore, when a woman consents to get married, she is also agreeing to be her husband’s partner in fulfilling this mitzva (Responsa Ḥatam Sofer, EH §20).
  In extenuating circumstances, such as when a woman suffers from physical or mental illness whose treatment requires contraception, it is permissible to use birth control for more than two years following a birth, even if the couple has not yet fulfilled the Torah requirement by having a son and daughter. This permit should be granted only after serious deliberation and after consultation with a God-fearing doctor.13<i class="footnote">The basis for the rulings in this section is explained in the previous note. However, R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin allows the use of contraception for up to four years to allow the mother to care for the current child. He bases this on the Talmud in <em>Ketubot</em> 60a which says that a woman is permitted to nurse her child for up to four years (<em>Responsa Bnei Banim</em> 1:30). However, one could object that this is only permissible when the prevention is through natural means, like nursing one’s baby. Then one could apply the logic that a person who is currently involved in fulfilling a mitzva (nursing) is exempt from fulfilling another mitzva (another pregnancy). However, other interventions are prohibited due to the mitzva obligation. Just as the Sages established a maximum age to get married in order to fulfill the mitzva of procreation, and anyone who delays past this age is considered a transgressor (<em>Kiddushin</em> 29b), so too there is a natural timeframe for the use of contraception, which is at most two years. This is also the generally accepted ruling.</i>
  
  Section 15
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Birth Control for Newlyweds
  Under normal circumstances, a couple may not use contraception if they have not yet had children, because the mitzva of procreation is an absolute obligation meant to be fulfilled within a certain time frame. Thus, the Sages state (Kiddushin 29b), “Until a man turns twenty, God sits and waits for him to get married. If he reaches the age of twenty and is not yet married, God says, ‘Let his bones swell up!’” because he has not started to fulfill the mitzva of procreation (MT, Laws of Marriage 15:2; section 7 above). Nevertheless, we have seen (section 9) that in our times, one may delay marriage, when necessary, until the age of 24. Those who are privileged to marry earlier may not actively avoid fulfilling the mitzva of procreation.
  Only when there are extenuating circumstances, such as when the wife suffers from physical or mental illness, is it permissible for newlyweds to use contraception even before her first pregnancy, so that she can get healthy. This permit should be granted only after serious deliberation and after consultation with a God-fearing doctor.
  Similarly, if a couple’s relationship is shaky and there is concern that they will have to divorce, they should avoid pregnancy until their relationship is stable. This permit is generally for the period of six months to a year.
  There is another reason to consider a couple’s circumstances to be pressing: when both are enrolled in particularly rigorous academic frameworks, such as medical school. If no one is available to help them, and in their estimation, getting pregnant and having a baby would mean that at least one of them would need to drop out of school and lose the opportunity to realize their aspirations and develop their talents in a profession that suits them so as to contribute to society, then since pregnancy and birth would cause them considerable and lasting harm, they may use contraception, as these are pressing circumstances. This is on condition that using contraception will not prevent them from fulfilling the mitzva of procreation by having four to five children (as explained above in section 6). The situation needs to be examined seriously by a wise rabbi.
  Let us say a young couple is in a serious relationship and are planning to get married, and they ask whether it is preferable to get married and use contraception until they finish their professional schooling, or postpone marriage. Then even though their halakhic obligation is to get married and not use birth control, nevertheless, if these are the only two options they are willing to consider, it is better that they get married and use contraception. By delaying marriage, they will be delaying the fulfillment of the mitzva of ona, and will also be prone to having sinful thoughts.14<i class="footnote">The consensus of <em>poskim</em> is that the use of contraception is prohibited before the first birth, whether because the couple wants to strengthen their relationship, are overburdened by school, or are concerned about finances. This is because when a man reaches the age of twenty, he is fully obligated to fulfill the mitzva of procreation, as explained above in section 7 and note 7, based on the writings of Rambam, Rosh, and many others. From a moral perspective as well, couplehood and parenthood are meant to come together, thus expressing their marital covenant. This is the position of <em>Be-ohala Shel Torah</em> 1:67. However, when there is concern that a couple’s relationship is unstable, they may use birth control. Experience shows that birth control in such cases is critical, so that if they must divorce, the pain and harm that it causes will be minimized. Nevertheless, this permit should not be prolonged indefinitely, hence I wrote that this is generally granted for six months to a year (<em>Responsa Bnei Banim</em> 4:15 grants half a year, which is the minimum <em>ona</em> frequency – that of sailors).Under pressing circumstances, contraception can be permitted for the completion of a particularly demanding course of study, such as medicine, since without contraception, there is a reasonable concern that one of the spouses will not be able to realize their dreams, causing significant, lifelong harm. The grounds for this permit are twofold. First, we can extrapolate from the Sages’ permission to postpone marriage until the age of twenty to allow a man to study Torah and train for a profession. Yam Shel Shlomo and Birkei Yosef comment that if truly necessary, it is permissible to delay marriage until the age of 24, as explained above in section 9 and n. 7. Beit Shmuel 1:5 states that whereas Rosh limits the postponement of marriage even when there is a good reason, Rambam implies that someone immersed in Torah study may postpone marriage longer as long as his sexual drive does not overpower him. Stretching this point, a similar allowance might be made for someone who is studying a demanding subject for the sake of heaven and in order to better the world, and he would not be able to complete his studies without relying on contraception. This is comparable to the permission given above (section 9) to postpone marriage until the age of 24 for the sake of studies and other very important pursuits. (The opinion of Responsa Rashba 4:91, that there is no Torah obligation to get married by a certain age, cannot be used here as an additional factor, because the Sages do require marriage by a specific age, as explained in n. 7.)Second, halakha does not demand that a person spend more than a fifth of his assets to fulfill a mitzva (Rema 656:1). Only if the going price for a mitzva item exceeds one fifth of his income must he spend more. Nevertheless, if it is possible to fulfill the mitzva at a later point, one might suggest that halakha does not demand that a person give up his dream, when it is worth more to him than a fifth of his assets. Furthermore, this type of sacrifice usually entails losing much more money than a fifth of one’s income. It is also important to point out the value of making a living. The Sages did not demand that camel-drivers and sailors quit their jobs even though they needed to travel for as much as six months at a time, thus reducing the chance that they would fulfill both the Torah and rabbinic obligations to procreate.However, the permit is limited to pressing circumstances and where there is no other option. It is proper to consult with a wise rabbi who understands all the different aspects of this issue in order to examine whether contraception is necessary to allow them to realize their dreams.As we have seen in section 7, the Sages prohibit delaying marriage beyond the age of twenty, for two reasons (Kiddushin 29b): First, according to the academy of Rabbi Yishmael, because it neglects the mitzva of procreation. Second, according to Rav Huna, because of sinful thoughts and, formulated positively, because of the value of marital love as expressed in the mitzva of ona. We see that even if a person avoids fulfilling the mitzva of procreation, there is nevertheless a mitzva for him to get married, both to fulfill the mitzva of ona and to avoid sinful thoughts. Thus, when a couple insist that they must either put off marriage or use contraception, it is preferable for them to marry and use birth control.</i>
  
  Section 16
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Contraception After Fulfillment of the Torah Obligation
  Some authorities rule stringently that even after a couple has fulfilled the Torah commandment of procreation by having a son and a daughter, contraception is still forbidden, because the Sages ordained a mitzva to have as many children as they can. Therefore, the use of contraception is permissible only for nine months to a year following birth, to allow the woman to recuperate and tend to her baby’s needs. Beyond that, contraception is permitted only if there is a specific health-related need. Contraception because of preoccupation with raising the children or financial constraints is forbidden.
  Nevertheless, in practice, as we learned (section 6), the rabbinic obligation can be understood to mean having four to five children, while having more children is a great mitzva but not an obligation. Therefore, until one fulfills the rabbinic obligation, it is best not to use contraception for more than a year after birth. Those who wish to be lenient, to allow more time for physical and emotional recuperation, may use contraception for two years, because for many generations, this was the duration of the natural contraception that resulted from nursing. In cases of illness, as long as the biblical obligation of having a son and a daughter has been fulfilled, contraception may be used for more than two years.
  After the rabbinic obligation of having four to five children has been fulfilled, it is permissible to use contraception for an indefinite amount of time if necessary. For example, if a couple knows that they would feel overburdened by additional children, leading to irritability and anger and making it difficult for them to educate their children properly, they may use birth control. If a couple wants to focus on their important, valuable jobs more than they want to have additional children, and they feel they will not be able to do so if they have more children, they may use birth control. If a wife wants to work at a job that will make use of her talents, and having more children will prevent her from doing so and leave her extremely frustrated, the couple may use birth control. Poor people who believe that it will be hard to raise more children without needing to accept charity may use birth control. 
  The couple should weigh all these factors together; if they disagree, they should compromise, as they are codependent partners. It is also good idea to consult with someone wise.
  Those who wish to enhance the fulfillment of the mitzva will continue to have as many children as they can, even after they already have five. Even if they use contraception for a year following each birth, it is considered enhancing the mitzva. This is the proper conduct for those who feel that without too much difficulty they can raise more children in the ways of Torah, mitzvot, and derekh eretz, and whose work is not a calling that will be harmed significantly by having more children. 
  A woman at the age of about forty who is concerned about increasing risk may use contraception from then on. This is common even among those who enhance the mitzva.15<i class="footnote">Some say that a man may not avoid having more children on the grounds that it would be difficult to educate and support them, since the rabbinic obligation is to have as many children as possible. Health issues are the only legitimate excuse not to fulfill the rabbinic mitzva (R. Yosef Messas, <em>Otzar Ha-mikhtavim</em> 3:941; <em>Yaskil Avdi</em>, EH 2:6; <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 3:26:3; <em>Ḥelkat Yaakov</em> 3:61; <em>Az Nidberu</em> 6:63; <em>Mishneh</em><em>Halakhot</em> 5:210). The basis of their view is <em>Sefer Ḥasidim </em>§519: “The righteous person who is poor should not think, ‘If I am intimate with my wife, she may get pregnant. How I will support us?’ A person who thinks this way lacks faith, for God makes a woman’s milk come in after she gives birth. <em>Mekhilta</em> states that a person who has food for today but asks what he will eat tomorrow lacks faith.” (See also n. 6 above.)On the other hand, we find that poskim permitted contraception for several reasons. For example, Rema says that if a man’s wife died and he already has many children, and he is concerned that if he marries a woman of childbearing age, quarrels will erupt between the two sets of children, he may marry a woman who is no longer fertile (Rema, EH 1:8). Terumat Ha-deshen §263 states that after a man fulfills the mitzva of procreation, he may marry a woman who cannot conceive. It is possible that Rambam feels that the mitzva for a man to marry a woman of childbearing age is only on condition that he has the energy to educate and support the children; Rambam’s formulation is “as long as he has the energy” (MT, Laws of Marriage 15:16). Along the same lines, AHS 1:8 qualifies, “if his economic position is good enough to support them.” Moreover, the Talmud relates that after R. Ḥiya’s wife had two sons and two daughters, she drank a sterility potion and did not conceive again (see the next note). From this story, many have concluded that after fulfilling the Torah obligation, a woman may take indirect action to prevent further pregnancies, even without a compelling reason to do so (Igrot Moshe, EH 4:74:1-2; Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:2; R. Elyashiv, Kovetz Teshuvot 3:174). It is possible that there is no major disagreement here. Even those who are lenient would agree that there is a mitzva to have as many children as possible, and even those who are stringent would agree that people who wish to use contraception in a way that does not violate any prohibition (as explained in the next section) may do so, though they generally instruct their students to act more piously.In practice, as I wrote in section 6 above, the mitzva has three tiers of obligation: a) the Torah commandment to have a boy and a girl; b) the rabbinic obligation to have four to five children; c) the non-obligatory mitzva to have additional children. In addition to the specific sources cited for this division in n. 6, this structure gives expression to all views – the stringent opinion in the second tier and the lenient opinion in the third. In truth, even within the second tier, some maintain that four children are sufficient even if they do not include two sons and two daughters, while others go further and have five children, or continue to have children until they have two sons and two daughters. Within the third tier (six children or more), there is variation as well. The more children a couple has, the greater their enhancement of the mitzva.At first glance, this division of the rabbinic mitzva into two tiers – the obligatory and the optional – is an innovative division for which there is barely any source in the halakhic literature. Nevertheless, it seems to me that one who scrutinizes the rulings and guidance of the poskim will find that this comports with their mainstream guidance: Early on, when a family is relatively small, they instruct the couple to be stringent and not to use contraception unless there is a great need for it. Once they have many children, poskim are lenient and allow contraception even when there is no great need for it. Thus, we see that the division of the mitzva into three tiers gives expression to what poskim have accepted. Moreover, this structure is effective as it gives the posek and the couple a rubric; until a couple have four to five children, which is the norm for most religious families, it is best for them to incline toward the opinion of the stringent poskim who rule against contraception unless there is a particular need. From that point on, they should incline toward the permissive view.As we explained above in n. 5, the rabbinic obligation is not as strict as the Torah obligation. Before the latter has been met, no ona may be skipped; after the fulfillment of the obligation, according to most poskim, a couple may forgo some onot (SA EH 76:6). Therefore, the mainstream position is that before fulfilling the Torah obligation, a couple may not use contraception for more than a year unless there is a serious need for it; after they fulfill the obligation, it is preferable not to use contraception for more than a year, but those who wish may be lenient for a period of two years.</i>
  
  Section 17
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Birth Control Methods
  Halakha prohibits the wasting of seed, so even when contraception is permitted, it is prohibited to prevent pregnancy by means of coitus interruptus (above, 4:1 and n. 1). Likewise, having sexual relations with a condom is prohibited, for the man ejaculates into the condom, thereby wasting his seed.
  However, it is permissible to prevent pregnancy indirectly, by means of two main methods: a) taking birth control pills; b) inserting an IUD (intrauterine device). 
  These are considered the most effective contraceptive methods and the most halakhically preferred, because the prevention of pregnancy takes place in the body of the woman, and indirectly, with no harm done to the sperm. Therefore, when birth control is permitted, these methods are permissible according to all opinions (as explained in section 18).
  There are two other methods which are less effective in preventing pregnancy and also less preferable halakhically: a) spermicide (foam or vaginal suppository); b) diaphragm. (In section 19, we explain how these methods work.)
  In discussing when contraception is permissible le-khatḥila, we were assuming use of the pill or an IUD. However, permission is granted only be-di’avad for a diaphragm or spermicide. Those wishing to use them must have a more compelling reason to do so (as explained in section 19).16<i class="footnote">The Talmud tells the story of R. Ḥiya’s wife, who had tremendously painful births. After having two boys and two girls, she obtained halakhic permission to drink a sterility potion which made her permanently infertile (<em>Yevamot</em> 65b). SA EH 5:12 rules that this behavior is permissible. Some say the permission is limited to a situation in which giving birth is extremely painful (<em>Baḥ</em> 5:9; <em>Yam Shel Shlomo</em><em>Yevamot</em> 6:44; AHS <em>ad loc</em>. 24). Others say the permit applies even when childbirth is not terribly painful (<em>Beit Shmuel</em> 5:14; <em>Ḥelkat Meḥokek</em><em>ad loc</em>. 6; <em>Taz ad loc</em>. 7; <em>Birkei Yosef</em><em>ad loc</em>. 14). It seems to me that if there is no pain at all, destroying the ability of the woman’s body to conceive is prohibited on grounds of destructiveness (<em>bal tashḥit</em>).As a result of Rabbeinu Gershom’s ordinance prohibiting polygamy and disallowing divorce against a woman’s will, when a woman marries, she is in effect agreeing to partner with her husband in the fulfillment of the mitzva of procreation (section 14 above). Consequently, decisions about contraception, and certainly sterilization, must be made jointly. This is the position of Ḥatam Sofer, EH §20, cited in Pitḥei Teshuva 5:11. Nevertheless, even if the wife drank the sterility potion without halakhic sanction, as long as they are married the mitzva of ona still applies to them.In any case, we see from the story of R. Ḥiya’s wife that when contraception is achieved indirectly within the woman’s body, and there is no barrier between the sperm and the uterus, there is no concern that seed is wasted. Therefore, there is no problem of wasting seed when using birth control pills or an IUD; the question is whether it is permitted despite the neglect of the mitzva to procreate. However, the poskim disagree regarding the use of spermicides or diaphragms which block the sperm from reaching the uterus. Even though most poskim are lenient, le-khatḥila it is preferable to defer to the stringent opinion. Thus, the use of these methods is be-di’avad, as explained below in section 19 and n. 19.There is general agreement that the use of a condom is forbidden. Regarding someone with AIDS, see 6:4 below.</i>
  Women who are fortunate to be able to rely on nursing for contraception are free of all the concerns and side effects accompanying the various methods of birth control. Therefore, if a woman is not afraid of becoming pregnant soon after giving birth, it is recommended that she not use contraceptives while nursing. If while nursing she does not menstruate or get pregnant, she will know that nursing works for her as a means of contraception. Then, after subsequent births, she can prevent pregnancy by nursing without any need for the pill or to have an IUD inserted. Nonetheless, if someone is worried about getting pregnant while nursing, she may use contraceptives for a period of nine months to a year after giving birth.17<i class="footnote">It can be suggested to a nursing mother to use spermicidal suppositories until her period returns. Even though we have seen that this method of birth control is <em>be-di’avad</em>, there is a good chance in this case that nursing itself is preventing pregnancy, so the use of a spermicide is less problematic. The nursing is the primary contraceptive, while the spermicide simply bolsters its effectiveness. If the woman does not get her period at all while she is nursing, then following the next birth she can rely only nursing alone. If she is still concerned, she can use a spermicide until her period returns.</i>
  
  Section 18
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Birth Control Pills and IUDs
  Birth control pills are meant to be taken orally every day. The pills contain hormones that either prevent ovulation or prevent the implantation of the egg in the uterus. It is also possible for these hormones to be delivered through a patch, which is effective for a week, or via a vaginal hormonal ring, which is effective for three weeks. There are several advantages to the hormonal methods of contraception. They are user-friendly; they can be used for just a month or for years; and prolonged use can significantly lengthen the time during which a woman is ritually pure, since she does not menstruate as long as she continues to take the hormones. Thus, if the duration of a woman’s ritually pure time is generally two to three weeks of each menstrual cycle, by taking the pill it is possible to extend this time to a month and a half or longer. The couple can also control when the woman will be a nidda and plan it based on their convenience. Nevertheless, the hormones should not be taken for extended periods of time without medical approval.
  The downside of hormonal treatments is that they often have side effects, such as moodiness, weight gain, and loss of libido. However, there are many types of birth control pills. A woman, under her doctor’s supervision, can switch to a different pill until she finds the best one for her, thus reducing the side effects. Some people are concerned that hormonal treatments are carcinogenic, but the general consensus among doctors today is that the risk is minimal and not a cause for concern. Some even claim that the hormones reduce the risk of certain diseases. One more disadvantage is that sometimes the hormones lead to breakthrough bleeding, which may render the woman a nidda. Switching to a different pill usually solves this problem.
  Nursing mothers need to take special birth control pills that do not adversely affect nursing. The problem is that these pills are more likely to lead to spotting and staining. Usually, taking an additional half pill a day stops the bleeding, but if it continues, an alternate solution must be found (see n. 17 above).
  An IUD is inserted into the uterus by a doctor and prevents the egg from implanting in the uterine lining, although exactly how it works is something of a mystery. The advantages of the IUD are that it has neither the side effects of hormones nor the medical concerns. Additionally, a woman does not need to remember to take it every day as with the pill. Therefore, many women prefer to use an IUD instead of hormonal contraception.
  The disadvantages of an IUD are that it is relatively expensive and must be inserted by a doctor. It is therefore normally used for a year or more at a time. Another major drawback is that the IUD can cause bleeding for an extended time following its insertion. Even after that, it can lengthen normal menstrual bleeding by one to three days, thereby reducing the number of days that a woman is pure. Additionally, if an IUD is inserted incorrectly, it can cause bleeding until it is replaced.18<i class="footnote">If a woman has finished her period and then sees blood that, in the doctors’ assessment, was caused by the IUD, <em>poskim</em> disagree about her status. Some are lenient. Since she is presumed to be finished with her period, then the status of this blood is that of the blood of a wound, since it was caused by the IUD (<em>Taharat Ha-bayit</em> 1:5:10; <em>Dibrot Eliyahu</em> 6:36). Others are stringent, because it may in fact be menstrual blood (<em>Shi’urei Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 187:5 toward the end). Additionally, the claim can be made that any blood that comes from the uterus causes impurity. Still others see her status as uncertain, but are prepared to be lenient if there are additional grounds to justify a leniency (<em>Be-ohala Shel Torah</em> 1:24). It would seem that this blood should be considered a stain (<em>ketem</em>), which does not render her impure if it is found on a nonwhite substrate or is less than the size of a <em>gris</em> (approximately 19mm in diameter). If the IUD is the type that secretes hormones, we cannot be lenient, as it is possible that the hormones triggered a type of menstrual bleeding.In cases in which an IUD causes a woman’s period to last longer than usual, we cannot be lenient. Even though it is clear that the IUD is responsible, it is too difficult to distinguish between menstrual blood and the blood caused by the IUD.</i>
  
  Section 19
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Spermicides and Diaphragms
  There are two contraceptive methods that are halakhically controversial. One is the use of a spermicidal foam, gel, or suppository that a woman inserts into her vagina before sexual relations. The second is the use of a diaphragm, a shallow, dome-shaped cup that a woman inserts in the vagina to block the opening of the cervix to block sperm from reaching the uterus. Spermicide is usually placed on the diaphragm in order to increase the effectiveness of the contraceptive. When a woman knows how to properly insert the diaphragm, the chances that she will conceive are very slim, but few women know how to insert it properly. In practice, among women who use either of these two contraceptive methods while regularly fulfilling the mitzva of ona, more than ten percent can expect to get pregnant over the course of a year.
  Poskim who are lenient maintain that since the woman is the one who inserts the diaphragm or spermicide, and since the couple has sexual relations without any barriers between their bodies, it is not considered a waste of seed, only a means of preventing the sperm from reaching the uterus and fertilizing the ovum. Those who are stringent maintain that using spermicide is, by definition, destroying seed.
  When there is a real need to avoid pregnancy, and for whatever reason birth control pills and an IUD are contraindicated, a couple may use these two methods. However, if spermicides and diaphragms were more effective, it would be permissible to rely on the lenient views only under extenuating circumstances. It is precisely because there is more than a ten percent chance that a woman using these methods will get pregnant within a year that they may be used if necessary (Ezrat Kohen §37). This is on condition that a couple using them have reconciled themselves that should a pregnancy occur they will accept it with good grace.19<i class="footnote">The Talmud presents a disagreement among Tanna’im: “Three women have intercourse using a <em>mokh</em> (absorbent material) – a minor, a pregnant woman, and a nursing woman…. These are the words of R. Meir. But the Sages say: Each of these women has intercourse normally, and God will have mercy, as it says (Tehillim 116:6), ‘The Lord protects the simple’” (<em>Yevamot</em> 12b). That is, it was acknowledged that getting pregnant entailed an element of danger for these women, but whereas R. Meir legitimates using a <em>mokh</em> to prevent pregnancy, the Sages disagree.According to Rabbeinu Tam, this debate concerns the insertion of a mokh into the vagina after sexual intercourse, to absorb the semen and prevent pregnancy. However, all of these Tanna’im agree that it is forbidden to have sexual intercourse if the mokh was inserted beforehand, as the husband would waste his seed by ejaculating into the mokh. This is also the ruling of Responsa R. Akiva Eger §§71-72; Ḥatam Sofer, YD §172; Binyan Tziyon §137; and Rav Pe’alim YD 4:17.In contrast, according to Yam Shel Shlomo (Yevamot 1:8), the disagreement in the Talmud concerns the insertion of a mokh before intercourse, and there is no problem of wasting seed because the couple has relations normally. The disagreement between R. Meir and the Sages is whether the three types of women must use a mokh or may use it. R. Meir believes a mokh is required, since pregnancy would be dangerous, but the Sages maintain that a mokh is not necessary since it is rare for these women to conceive naturally. This is the view of several Rishonim: Rid (Yevamot ad loc.), Rosh (Responsa Rosh 33:3), and by implication Ramban, Ra’ah, and Rashba’s student (Shita Mekubetzet, Ketubot 39a). This is also the ruling of Ḥemdat Shlomo, EH 46; Maharsham 1:58; Torat Ḥesed, EH 2:44; Ketav Sofer, EH 26; and Aḥiezer 1:23 and 3:24. Rav Kook is inclined this way as well (Ezrat Kohen §§34 and 37).It would seem that R. Tam and those who agree with his view would forbid the use of a diaphragm or spermicide, just as they forbid use of a mokh. Nevertheless, many Aḥaronim who ruled leniently about diaphragms and spermicides, whose use has become common over the past century, reason that these forms of contraception are permitted even according to R. Tam’s view. R. Tam is strict about a mokh because the couple can feel it as a barrier between them, but these contraceptive methods allow for normal sexual relations, wherein the semen enters the woman’s body without the sensation of any barrier separating them (Maharsham 1:58; Maharash Engel 6:86; Si’aḥ Naḥum §94).In any case, the mainstream position is the permissive one, which is the opinion of most Aḥaronim, and, in their interpretation, all Rishonim. Nevertheless, since some Aḥaronim prohibit the use of these contraceptive methods, it would have been proper to rule that they may be used only in extenuating circumstances, when there is a clear need to prevent pregnancy and the preferred methods of contraception are not options. However, in cases where the permit to prevent pregnancy is less apparent, it is proper to rule stringently and avoid these methods. But these contraceptives have a certain halakhic advantage over other methods, as they are less effective. Rav Kook writes that when the contraception is less reliable, it is possible that even those who are generally stringent would be lenient (Ezrat Kohen §37). Thus, permission can be granted more easily for spermicides and diaphragms, and a couple may use them if there is a real need to use these methods specifically. Of course, it is important for the couple to be aware that these methods of birth control are not fully effective, and they should be prepared to accept a pregnancy willingly should it occur. In such cases, contraception is like an “unintended” consequence (davar she-eino mitkaven), because it is neither absolute nor entirely desirable.</i>
  
  Section 20
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Asking a Rabbi
  The generally accepted instruction, as written in most responsa that deal with questions of this sort, is that a rabbi should be consulted on all questions involving contraception and birth control. Since the subject is complex and the consequences are fateful, such questions demand serious consideration. The factors on which the ruling hinges, in short, are: a) the number of children the couple already has – i.e., whether they have already fulfilled the Torah commandment or the rabbinic commandment, and to what degree; b) the man’s age – the more time that has passed since he turned twenty, the harder it is to permit the use of contraception before the fulfillment of the mitzva to procreate; c) the woman’s age – the older she is, the greater the risk that using contraception will end up preventing the couple from having the number of children they desire, or even from fulfilling the Torah commandment; d) the reasons for seeking contraception – they may include physical or mental illness, financial difficulties or psychological issues, the need for personal fulfillment, difficulty with raising children, or prevention of anger and tension; e) the method of birth control – when the le-khatḥila methods (the pill or IUD) are not an option, the need to use contraception must be weighed against the difficulty of granting permission to use the be-di’avad methods (spermicide or a diaphragm).
  Another reason to consult a rabbi is that sometimes the couple does not see the whole picture. They may think that because of the importance of the mitzva they are forbidden to use birth control, when in reality in their particular situation they should be using birth control for a year or more. In another case, their stress and financial struggles seem worse to them than they really are. If they use contraception they are likely to regret it years later, but by then it will be too late. In order to avoid these types of mistakes, it is prudent to consult a rabbi. His life experience, together with his good judgment, allows him to properly weigh the variables and values at stake and to guide the couple toward proper fulfillment of the mitzva in a manner that will benefit them in this world and the next.
  In truth, in simple cases it is unnecessary to ask a rabbi. For example, any young couple may use contraception for nine months to a year after a birth. Even so, speaking with a rabbi is still a good idea, as they might learn about other things, and they will strengthen their relationship with him. When the question is complicated, anyone who is not an expert in all the pertinent issues must ask a rabbi. Someone who has the requisite expertise can generally figure out the right thing to do. Nevertheless, people are prone to err in assessing their difficulties, evaluating the challenges facing them, and weighing them correctly against the values on the other side of the scale. The misjudgments can go in either direction. The couple may be exaggerating or minimizing the difficulties and challenges. Therefore, it is preferable for them to ask a rabbi who knows them if they want to use contraception for more than a year after a birth. When the wife has a relationship with a rabbanit who is experienced in this field, the couple may decide that the wife will consult with her.
  If the couple do not have a rabbi or rabbanit who knows them personally, they should ask a rabbi who is familiar with their value system. Nevertheless, since he does not know them personally, it will be difficult for him to assess whether they are overstating or understating the difficulties and challenges that they are facing. Therefore, his answer cannot be complete.20<i class="footnote">My rabbi and teacher, R. Mordechai Eliyahu, writes: “A person should not rule for himself on these matters, and a woman should not rely on a halakhic ruling that a friend received from a rabbi” (<em>Darkhei Tahara</em> 19:17). R. Yaakov Ariel writes similarly (<em>Be-ohala Shel Torah</em> 1:66-67). R. Moshe Feinstein explains that when he deals with this type of question, he explores the couple’s situation carefully and thoroughly, and then gives an individualized ruling, which he requests that they not publicize. He contrasts this with a certain rabbi who permitted every couple across the board to use contraception for two years following a birth (<em>Igrot Moshe</em>, EH 1:64). R. Shmuel Wosner notes that he wrote a bare minimum about these laws, because they should be dealt with orally (<em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 4:177). R. Binyamin Zilber writes similarly (<em>Az Nidberu</em> 7:81). In contrast, R. Naḥum Rabinovitch writes that it is permissible to use contraception for two years after a birth, following which a rabbi should be consulted (<em>Si’aḥ Naḥum</em> §95).In practice, it seems that a couple may decide on their own to use contraception for a year, for that is the halakha. (However, if they married late, perhaps it is preferable for them not to use contraception at all.) People who are Torah-knowledgeable and have studied the subject (elucidated in this chapter and the notes) in depth and to whom the halakha is clear, can make the decision for themselves. Nevertheless, it is still possible that they will make an error in judgment. Therefore, it is a good idea for them to consult a rabbi who knows them. Additionally, a relationship with one’s rabbi is always helpful to strengthen one’s connection to Torah and its values.It is important to note that when a couple poses this sort of question to a rabbi who does not know them, the way they formulate the question will be largely responsible for the outcome. If they overstate or understate the need for birth control, the answer given may be appropriate to the question posed, but might not be correct given the actual circumstances of the couple’s lives. Since the rabbi does not know them well, even if the question is presented with great precision, he will not be able to give them advice that is optimal given their value system and the challenges they face. Therefore, it is highly preferable to put this type of question to a rabbi who knows the couple, or minimally one who is familiar with the society in which they live and the values which guide them.</i>
  
  Section 21
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Selling a Torah Scroll for the Sake of Marriage
  Due to the supreme sanctity of a Torah scroll, the Sages say that it must not be sold, and that one who sells a Torah scroll will never see blessing from that sale (Megilla 27a). Even when the owner of a Torah scroll has barely enough to eat, he should not sell it. Even if he does not have the money to buy necessary mitzva items, such as tefilin and mezuzot, he should not sell it (SA YD 270:1). Nevertheless, there are two mitzvot that are so important that, if one has no way to fulfill them without selling a Torah scroll, he may do so and use the proceeds for these mitzvot: Torah study and marriage. Even a community may sell its Torah scroll to marry off an orphan (SA 153:6; EH 1:2).
  The unique quality of these two mitzvot is that they actualize the purpose of the Torah. Studying Torah brings the Torah’s words to life in people’s hearts, while marriage brings about the birth of children who will uphold the Torah (Megilla 27a).
  This law does not come up often nowadays, because it is uncommon for a person to be unable to marry due to extreme poverty. There are always generous Jews who will help provide the basic necessities that enable the couple to wed. Nevertheless, this law teaches us the tremendous value of the mitzvot of marriage and procreation.
  Some say that permission to sell a Torah scroll is limited to the case of someone who has not yet fulfilled the mitzva of procreation by having a son and a daughter (SA EH 1:8). According to many others, even someone who has already fulfilled the mitzva of procreation by having a son and a daughter may sell a Torah scroll in order to marry and have more children. This is the position of most Rishonim and Aḥaronim. 
  Even if selling a Torah scroll will not provide a man with enough money to marry a woman of childbearing age, but only enough to marry a woman who cannot have children, some say he may not do so (Nimukei Yosef; Ritva), but others maintain that he may, as being married will enable him to become complete, fulfill the mitzva of ona, and protect himself from sinful thoughts (Ramban; Ḥelkat Meḥokek EH 1:10).21<i class="footnote">According to Rambam, the general rule against selling a Torah scroll applies not only to one owned by a community, but even to one that is the property of an individual. In contrast, according to Rosh, an individual may sell his own Torah scroll unless he has made it available for communal use. SA 153:10 mentions both opinions. However, even Rosh would agree that it is improper for an individual to sell his Torah scroll; after all, the Sages said that one will never reap any benefit from the sale (<em>Olat Tamid</em><em>Eliya Rabba</em><em>Mishna Berura</em> 153:60). Accordingly, I state above that a Torah scroll should not be sold, without distinguishing between one owned by an individual and one owned by a community.If one is selling a Torah scroll for the sake of marriage and children, it is more complicated. Several Rishonim understand Rif to say that a Torah scroll may be sold only to enable the fulfillment of the Torah commandment to have a boy and a girl. Indeed, this is the ruling in SA EH 1:8. Most Rishonim, though, maintain that a Torah scroll may also be sold to allow a person to have additional children. This is the opinion of She’iltot, Behag, and Rosh. Ramban agrees with this and thinks that the Rif does as well. Beit Shmuel 1:16 advocates this in practice. If selling a Torah scroll will provide a man with only enough money to marry a woman who cannot have children, then according to Nimukei Yosef and Ritva, he should not sell it. According to Ramban and Maharshal, he should. Ḥelkat Meḥokek, EH 1:10 agrees that the Torah scroll may be sold in this case, to save him from sinful thoughts. Terumat Ha-deshen §263 states that avoiding sinful thoughts is more severe than populating the world (shevet). This position is also reflected in Responsa Meshivat Nefesh 1:41, Pnei Yehoshua §42, and others.Just as a Torah scroll may be sold to enable a man to marry and have children, it may also be sold to enable a woman to marry and have children. This is the case even if she already has children from a previous marriage. Although Ḥelkat Meḥokek, EH 1:1 states that we do not sell a Torah scroll to enable a woman to marry, since she is not obligated to procreate, Beit Shmuel, EH 1:2 permits the sale based on the mitzva to populate the world, a sweeping mandate that applies equally to both genders. This is the ruling of Responsa Maharam al-Ashkar §72, Knesset Ha-gedola, MA 153:9, Eliya Rabba 153:12, and MB 153:24. Additionally, a female orphan is married off before a male orphan, because she experiences the shame of poverty more acutely (Ketubot 67b; SA YD 251:8).</i>
  
  Section 22
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Blessing of the People and Inheriting Eretz Yisrael
  Great is the mitzva to procreate, for through it comes the fulfillment of God’s blessing to the people of Israel, and through it the people of Israel inherit the Holy Land. God said to our patriarch Avraham: <i>Raise your eyes and look out from where you now are, to the north and south, to the east and west, for I give all the land that you see to you and your offspring forever. I will make your offspring as the dust of the earth, so that if one can count the dust of the earth, then your offspring too can be counted.</i> (Bereishit 13:14-16)
  God also told Avraham after the binding of his son Yitzḥak: <i>I will bestow My blessing upon you and make your descendants as numerous as the stars of heaven and the sands on the seashore; and your descendants shall seize the gates of their foes.</i> (ibid., 22:17)
  Similarly, our patriarch Yitzḥak was told: <i>I will make your descendants as numerous as the stars of heaven, and give to your descendants all these lands, so that all the nations of the earth shall bless themselves by your offspring.</i> (ibid., 26:4)
  Likewise, God told our patriarch Yaakov in Beit El (before he left for Ḥaran): <i>The ground on which you are lying I will assign to you and to your offspring. Your descendants shall be as the dust of the earth; you shall spread out to the west and to the east, to the north and to the south. All the families of the earth shall bless themselves by you and your descendants.</i> (ibid., 28:13-14)
  Upon Yaakov’s return from Ḥaran, God said to him: <i>I am El Shaddai. Be fruitful and multiply. A nation, yea an assembly of nations, shall descend from you. Kings shall issue from your loins. The land that I assigned to Avraham and Yitzḥak I assign to you; and to your offspring to come will I assign the land.</i> (ibid., 35:11-12)
  Similarly, God promised Israel that if they follow in His ways they will merit an abundance of blessing, including: “I will look with favor upon you, and make you fertile and multiply you, and I will maintain My covenant with you” (Vayikra 26:9).
  When the Jewish people were poised to enter Eretz Yisrael, it was not part of the divine plan that they inherit the land on the east bank of the Jordan River. It was only following the request of the tribes of Reuven and Gad that permission for this was granted. It seems reasonable to ask, if the land on the east side of the Jordan is also part of the Eretz Yisrael, why did they not originally intend to settle it? The answer is that since the Israelites did not sufficiently procreate during their forty years of wandering in the desert, they did not have enough people to populate the east bank of the Jordan adequately. Therefore, God’s plan was that they would first populate the heartland of Israel, on the west bank of the Jordan. Once the population increased sufficiently, they would settle the east bank as well. 
  God describes this process similarly: I will not drive them out before you in a single year, lest the land become desolate and the wild animals would be too many for you. I will drive them out before you little by little, until you have increased and possess the land. I will set your borders from the Sea of Reeds to the Sea of Philistia, and from the wilderness to the Euphrates; for I will deliver the inhabitants of the land into your hands, and you will drive them out before you. (Shemot 23:29-31)
  The price for not having enough Israelites to settle the entire land was that their enemies remained, and so they experienced what the verse warned of: <i>But if you do not dispossess the inhabitants of the land, those whom you allow to remain shall be stings in your eyes and thorns in your sides, and they shall harass you in the land in which you live.</i> (Bamidbar 33:55)
  Thus, when Moshe addressed Israel before his death and instructed them to conquer Eretz Yisrael, he bestowed upon them a blessing of increase: <i>Start out and make your way to the hill country of the Amorites and to all their neighbors in the Arava, the hill country, the Shefela, the Negev, the seacoast, the land of the Canaanites, and the Lebanon, as far as the Great River, the river Euphrates…. Go, enter the land…. The Lord your God has multiplied you until you are today as numerous as the stars of the sky. May the Lord, the God of your fathers, increase your numbers a thousandfold, and bless you as He promised you [for thus you will be able to inherit fully the entire land].</i> (Devarim 1:7-11)
  The delay of the proper fulfillment of the mitzva of procreation was one of the reasons that more than 300 years passed from Israel’s entry into the land until the establishment of the Kingdom of David and the building of the Temple in Jerusalem.
  
  Section 23
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Redemption Depends upon This Mitzva
  Great is the mitzva of procreation, for through it Israel was redeemed from Egypt, as it says: “The Israelites were fertile and prolific; they multiplied and increased very greatly, so that the land was filled with them…. The more they were oppressed, the more they increased and spread out” (Shemot 1:7, 12). The Sages said that there will never be a generation of Israel with fewer than 600,000 people. It was only when Israel reached that number that they became a nation and could leave Egypt and receive the Torah (Zohar, Ra’aya Mehemna III 216b; Tiferet Yisrael ch. 29). Had they not made efforts to fulfill the mitzva, had they been even one person short, they would not have merited leaving Egypt or receiving the Torah (Devarim Rabba 7:8). That is what the Sages meant when they said, “In the merit of the righteous women of that generation, Israel was redeemed from Egypt” (Sota 11b). In reward for their efforts to ensure continuity, they raised “all this proliferation” (Tanḥuma Pekudei §9; above, 1:8).
  It is important to add that after the Holocaust, in which we lost six million of our people, it is a greater mitzva than ever to have families which are as large as possible. We must recreate what was destroyed, so that the Jewish people can realize its divine mission (see Ramban on Devarim 30:2).
  The Sages say that just as Israel was redeemed from Egypt because they procreated, so too they will be redeemed in the future because of their procreation, as it says (Yeshayahu 54:3), “For you shall spread out to the right and the left; your offspring shall dispossess nations and shall people the desolate towns” (Eliyahu Zuta 14).
  Likewise, R. Assi states, “The (messianic) son of David will not arrive until all the souls of the body have been finished, as it says (Yeshayahu 57:16), ‘For I will not always contend; I will not be angry forever. For the spirit that enwraps itself is from Me; it is I Who made souls’” (Yevamot 62a). This means that there is a storehouse of Jewish souls, and each Jew who is born reveals a spark from it. Even if a baby dies immediately after birth, its soul reveals something in this world and brings the redemption nearer. Thus, even if the Jewish people do not repent properly (God forbid), once all the souls are born, all necessary correctives will be achieved. The process of redemption will advance, and as a result the Jewish people will repent. If, instead, we wake up earlier and repent fully, God will speed up the redemption. First, every woman will have the privilege of giving birth to more children (Tosafot to Nidda 13b, s.v. “ad”). Second, every Jew who is born will reveal many sparks rather than just one (Maharsha, Nidda ad loc.). This will use up all the souls in the warehouse, so the redemption will arrive speedily.
  Thus, by fulfilling the mitzva of procreation we draw the redemption nearer, and through its blessings the redemption will be realized, as it is written: <i>I myself will gather the remnant of My flock from all the lands to which I had banished them, and I will bring them back to their pasture, where they will be fruitful and multiply.</i> (Yirmiyahu 23:3)
  Likewise, it says: <i>You, O mountains of Israel, shall yield your produce and bear your fruit for My people Israel, for their return is near. For I will care for you; I will turn to you, and you shall be tilled and sown. I will settle a large population on you – the whole House of Israel; the towns shall be resettled, and the ruined sites rebuilt. I will multiply men and beasts upon you, and they will multiply and be fruitful, and I will resettle you as you were formerly, and will make you more prosperous than you were at first. And you shall know that I am the Lord.</i> (Yeḥezkel 36:8-11)
  Similarly: <i>Thus said the Lord, God: Moreover, in this I will respond to the House of Israel and act for their sake. I will multiply their people like sheep. As Jerusalem is filled with sacrificial sheep during her festivals, so shall the ruined cities be filled with flocks of people. And they shall know that I am the Lord.</i> (ibid., vv. 37-38)
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Duty to Use Medical Technology (IVF)
  If it becomes clear, after reliable testing, that a couple’s chance to conceive naturally is very low, they are required to undergo whatever treatments are conventionally prescribed by medical practitioners in order to fulfill the mitzva of procreation by having a son and a daughter. This includes IVF (in vitro fertilization), a procedure that involves extracting the woman’s ova and the man’s sperm and putting them together in a lab so that eggs become fertilized and develop into embryos, which are then implanted in the woman’s uterus.
  In the past, poskim ruled that people are not obligated to take unnatural measures to fulfill the mitzva. However, that was at a time when methods to deal with fertility issues were not reliable, when there was no medical consensus about them, and therefore, most people were not taking advantage of treatments developed by some physicians, and, consequently, these efforts were considered unnatural. Now that these medical interventions have proven to be so successful that most infertility can be resolved, whatever is medically conventional is considered part of the obligation of this mitzva. Clearly, this obligation includes all treatments that an HMO covers for its members, and it seems to me that even treatments that are not included under regular health insurance, if they are treatments that most people who want children are willing to undergo, are required, even if they are expensive, to enable the fulfillment of the mitzva of procreation.
  Even one who has already fulfilled the Torah commandment of procreation has a rabbinic mitzva to have more children, using the tools offered by modern medicine. Nevertheless, if it demands a major effort, it is only an embellishment of the mitzva.1<i class="footnote">R. Malkiel Tannenbaum writes: “We are commanded to fulfill the mitzva of procreation in the normal human way, not through sophisticated means that are closer to prohibitions and obstacles” (<em>Divrei Malkiel</em> 4:107). The “obstacles” in question include wasting seed and the concern that a woman’s egg would be fertilized by the sperm of another man. However, given the proven success of medical treatments, it is generally agreed that they may be used for procreation, while taking precautions to ensure that the husband’s semen is not switched with that of another man. Some rule against using such methods once the Torah obligation has been met (<em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 8:251:11; R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv as cited in <em>Teḥumin</em> 22, p. 403). However, according to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, it may be permissible even for additional children (<em>Nishmat Avraham</em>, EH 23:1 s.v. “ve-katav li”p. 226; likewise R. Ḥanan Aflalo, <em>Responsa Asher Ḥanan</em> 3-4:61). However, according to R. Auerbach, this is not obligatory (<em>Minḥat Shlomo </em>3:98:8). Even when ovulation occurs prior to the mandated time for immersion in the <em>mikveh</em>, the mitzva to procreate does not obligate the couple to devise methods like taking sperm from the husband and using it to impregnate his wife while she is ovulating. However, R. Auerbach was not sure whether, where one spouse demands such a procedure, the other may refuse. Similarly, my teacher, R. Shaul Yisraeli, expresses uncertainty about this situation (<em>Ḥavat Binyamin</em> 3:108).It seems that all of this applied when use of IVF was rare and its efficacy uncertain. However, now that fertility treatments have become commonplace and successfully resolve most cases of infertility, they have become part of the normal effort that a couple must make in order to fulfill the mitzva. Just as a man cannot claim that he need not buy his wife a refrigerator and an oven because no one had them 200 years ago, so he cannot claim that he need not try to fulfill the mitzva of procreation using these procedures because a hundred years ago people did not do so. It cannot be that the Jewish people, who are commanded to procreate, fail to take advantage of treatments being used all over the world. This view is presented by R. Shlomo Daichovsky in Teḥumin 22, p. 406. He goes so far as to say that if necessary, a couple must spend very substantial amounts of money for these treatments. If there is a reason that the treatments are difficult for one spouse, a rabbi should be consulted.Some claim that the mitzva is to conceive naturally, through sexual relations, while any other method does not fulfill the mitzva. However, according to Minḥat Ḥinukh (1:13), the mitzva is to have children; how this comes about is immaterial. The opinion of Tosafot (Bava Batra 13a s.v. “kofin”) is the source for those who limit the mitzva to natural means of conception (Be-ohala Shel Torah 1:69; it is also possible to understand Mishpetei Uziel, EH 2:19 this way). This limitation is surprising. Of course, it is clear that the biblical mitzva to procreate assumes sexual relations. Nevertheless, the essence of the mitzva is for the couple to have a son and a daughter. Thus, if there is an alternative way for them to conceive, they are obligated to try it. This is not comparable to the case of a woman who is impregnated from a man’s sperm in the bath. There, poskim express uncertainty as to whether or not the father has fulfilled the mitzva of procreation (Ḥelkat Meḥokek, EH 1:8); they are inclined to rule that he has not (She’elat Ya’avetz 2:97), since this is not a normal way to conceive. However, now that people regularly conceive through IVF, husband and wife do fulfill the mitzva this way. It seems to me that the Aḥaronim who agree with Tosafot that the mitzva involves having intimate relations (Har Tzvi, EH §1; Igrot Moshe, EH 5:19) really mean that an action must be taken deliberately for the purpose of fulfilling the mitzva. If this is correct, the deliberate act of undergoing IVF qualifies, and thus the couple would fulfill the mitzva even according to those Aḥaronim.However, in my humble opinion, if a man becomes a sperm donor for pay, and his sperm is used to impregnate someone, he does not fulfill the mitzva. The normal way to fulfill the mitzva is through intimate relations between husband and wife, or at the very least through their mutual consent to IVF. In contrast, if a man does not even know whom he is impregnating, he does not fulfill the mitzva. This is implied by the manner in which the mitzva was relayed to Adam and Ḥava. God commanded them together: “Be fruitful and multiply” (in the plural). The use of the plural form implies an instruction to husband and wife as a couple. And since a man does not fulfill a mitzva through sperm donation, it is prohibited, because he is wasting his seed.</i>
  
  Section 2
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Providing Sperm for Testing or IVF
  When a couple experiences difficulty conceiving, sometimes it is necessary to conduct a semen analysis to determine whether there is male factor infertility. Other times it is necessary for the man to provide sperm for the purpose of IVF or IUI (intrauterine insemination), a procedure in which his sperm is injected into his wife’s uterus.
  To collect this sperm, the husband should have sexual relations with his wife while wearing a condom. The condom must be a special one, without any spermicide (as that would obviously interfere with the test results). It should also have a tiny hole in it, so that it is possible for some sperm to escape. That way, according to all poskim, there is no prohibition of wasting seed.
  A regular condom may be used in two circumstances: when no condom with a small hole is available, and when the sperm being collected is for IVF which is being done to prevent genetic diseases. (In this case, one does not want any sperm to reach the woman’s uterus, as this may lead to the birth of a baby with the disease.) It would seem that all poskim would agree in these cases as well.
  When having relations with a condom is impossible, for example in a case where the sample must be brought to the lab almost immediately, most poskim permit the wife to stimulate her husband manually, to enable him to ejaculate into a condom or container used for that purpose. It is possible that all would agree to this as well.
  Because of the severity of the prohibition of wasting seed, some maintain that when this is necessary to determine the reason for infertility, all possible tests must be conducted on the woman before the man may provide a sperm sample. In practice, all tests that can easily be performed on the woman should be done first. After that it is permissible to conduct the necessary tests on the man, because as long as the wife helps her husband produce the sample, it is considered part of the fulfillment of the mitzva.
  When a couple cannot have relations using a condom, and the wife cannot help her husband ejaculate because she is a nidda, according to most poskim the man may ejaculate into a container. Others do not allow it. In practice, when there is no other option, one may be lenient.2<i class="footnote">As we will discuss below (7:2), the Torah states that a man who is a <em>krut shofkha</em> (his member is cut off) may not marry a woman who is Jewish from birth (Devarim 23:2). The Talmud explains that this includes a man whose penis is punctured. In a case in which it is uncertain if the puncture extends to the ejaculatory ducts (and the reproductive system is compromised), it is necessary to perform a test to determine if, during ejaculation, semen emerges from the puncture. If it does, then the man is considered a <em>krut shofkha</em>; if it does not, he may marry. The examination is described in the Talmud as follows: “We bring hot barley bread and put it on his anus. The heat causes him to ejaculate, and we observe what happens” (<em>Yevamot</em> 76a). While today we do not understand exactly how this worked, clearly it caused a man to discharge semen without the need to touch himself directly. This is relevant to our discussion. While a <em>krut shofkha </em>is allowed to marry a convert, nevertheless in order to broaden his marriage pool to include born Jews as well, he is permitted to indirectly waste seed. How much more so should a man be permitted to indirectly waste seed in order to fulfill the mitzva of procreation (<em>Ezrat Kohen</em> §32; <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, EH 1:70).Poskim disagree regarding a case in which a man cannot ejaculate without direct stimulation. Would it be permissible for him to stimulate himself manually to provide sperm for analysis or for fertilizing his wife’s eggs? Some prohibit this, including Rav Kook (Ezrat Kohen §32), R. Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, EH 1:70 and 2:16), and R. Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 3:189). Others permit it, including R. Grodzinski (Aḥiezer 3:24:4) and R. Uziel (Mishpetei Uziel, EH 2:42). The latter explains that in the case in the Talmud, the purpose was to see if sperm would seep out of the puncture. If the man were holding himself, it would be difficult to determine this. However, had there not been a practical necessity to avoid manual stimulation, it would have been permissible in the service of procreation. This is also the approach of R. Waldenberg (Tzitz Eliezer 9:51, sha’ar 1, 2:2) and R. Daichovsky (Teḥumin 18). See below, section 4 and n. 4, where we discuss the law pertaining to a young man who has cancer and must undergo radiation treatments that may render him infertile. Before he undergoes such treatments, it is a mitzva for him to produce sperm to freeze, so that when he gets married he will be able to fulfill the mitzva of procreation.It would seem that this disagreement is based on how one understands the underlying reason for the prohibition of wasting seed. If it is prohibited because it contains an element of adultery (Or Zaru’a 1:124; Smak §292) or because it involves sinful thoughts (Baḥ 3:6), then masturbating might be prohibited even for the sake of a mitzva. However, according to the opinion of Tosafot (Sanhedrin 59b s.v. “ve-ha”) that the prohibition of wasting seed is an extension of the mitzva of procreation, clearly it is permissible to provide sperm in order to solve fertility issues. Similarly, according to those who maintain that the prohibition is derived from the story of Er and Onan, who were trying to avoid having children (Pri Megadim, Eshel Avraham 31:14; Ben Yehoyada, Nidda 13a), the prohibition would not apply to masturbating for the purpose of having children. According to those who maintain that the prohibition of wasting seed stems from the prohibition of wasteful destruction (R. Yaakov Ettlinger, Arukh La-ner, Nidda 13b and Binyan Tziyon §137), then in this case, where clearly the purpose is to be productive, there is no problem.In practice, it seems that it is permitted. First, some maintain that the whole prohibition of wasting seed is rabbinic, as explained above in ch. 4, n. 1. Furthermore, when the production of semen is for the sake of performing the mitzva of procreation, even those who are stringent would concede that the prohibition is rabbinic. When there is disagreement concerning a rabbinic law, halakha follows the lenient position. Moreover, the reasoning of those who are lenient is persuasive. Furthermore, in pressing circumstances and when extremely necessary, we rule leniently. It is also possible that if those who were stringent in the past had known that these tests had a reasonable chance of enabling a couple to fulfill the mitzva of procreation, they would have been lenient. Doctors then were fumbling around in the dark. Since a procedure was only a shot in the dark, some poskim did not permit masturbation to enable it. Now that success rates are so much higher, it is permitted even for a couple who have already fulfilled the Torah commandment. Nevertheless, testing the wife should be done first, because this involves no possible prohibitions. However, if a test is extremely difficult for the woman or very expensive, then her husband can provide semen for analysis before she undergoes it.All this refers to a case in which a man stimulates himself manually and ejaculates into a container. However, if his wife helps him ejaculate by embracing or touching him, it is possible that everyone would agree that this is permitted, since it involves no element of adultery or sinful thoughts. With respect to the problem of the ejaculation being non-procreative at the time, we know that some Rishonim (Orḥot Ḥayim, Hilkhot Ketubot §7; Rabbeinu Yona on Sanhedrin 58b; Tur, EH 25:2) permit intercourse with other parts of the body (i.e., non-vaginal and non-anal). Rambam seems to permit it as well (MT, Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 21:9). Rema rules in practice: “Even though doing all of these is permissible, anyone who sanctifies himself [by refraining from] what is permitted to him is considered holy” (EH 25:2). In our case, when the husband is producing sperm to enable fulfillment of the mitzva of pru u-revu, it is a mitzva for him to do so. This would also seem to be the opinion of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Nishmat Avraham, EH 23:2, n. 1). In my humble opinion, when his wife helps him, it is unnecessary for her to undergo all sorts of tests before her husband provides a sperm sample, though if they can be done easily, it is preferable.It is even better if the couple has relations using a condom. There is absolutely nothing wrong with this, nor is any seed being wasted, as the entire point is to fulfill the mitzva of procreation. It is better yet when the condom has a hole, so that it is possible for a drop of semen to escape and possibly impregnate the wife. However, when it is difficult to acquire such a condom, or when the objective of using the condom is to prevent the transmission of genetic diseases, it is certainly permissible to have relations with a standard condom. It would seem that all poskim would agree with this.</i>
  
  Section 3
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Genetic Diseases
  It is often asked whether a man who carries a serious genetic disease is obligated to fulfill the mitzva of procreation in light of the real risk of having a child who suffers from that disease. Poskim disagree about this; some say that he still has an obligation to have a son and a daughter, for even if they are sick, he has contributed to populating the world. Moreover, there is a good chance that the child will be completely healthy. Others say that the Torah does not command us to procreate when there is a significant risk of having a child whose life will be one of constant suffering. In practice, in cases like these, a wise person should be consulted.3<i class="footnote">R. Moshe Feinstein was asked about Marfan syndrome, a genetic disorder of the connective tissues, which damages the heart, the aorta, the eyes, and the skeleton. Those suffering from this condition may go blind, suffer from deformities and pain in the spine and the bones, or die from internal bleeding. They must often undergo surgery in order to prevent problems in the vascular system. Half of the children of those who have this disease are born with it as well. R. Feinstein rules that someone with Marfan syndrome must marry and have a son and a daughter. Even if his children do have the disease, he has still fulfilled the mitzva by having them, as they too populate the world. Furthermore, there is a fifty percent chance that each child will be healthy (<em>Igrot Moshe</em>, EH 4:73:2). We can add to this what we have seen in <em>Berakhot</em> 10a (above, 5:2). Even after King Ḥizkiyahu knew for certain that his son would be wicked, he was not allowed to refrain from procreation. It can be argued that having a sick child is not worse than having a wicked one. However, one might respond that a wicked person can repent (as did Menasheh, Ḥizkiyahu’s son), while someone suffering from an incurable disease has no such option.According to R. Waldenberg, even a carrier of a genetic disease is obligated to fulfill the mitzva of procreation. However, if a fetus is shown to have a disease that will leave it physically and mentally disabled, an abortion may be performed up until the seventh month (Tzitz Eliezer 15:43). According to Devar Yehoshua 3, EH 1, a carrier may have children, but is not obligated to. R. Auerbach concludes that “more in-depth investigation is necessary” to determine whether one is obligated to fulfill the mitzva of procreation in such a situation, adding that if his fear of having sick children is so great that he would willingly spend twenty percent of his assets on preventing it, there may be grounds to exempt him, since we know (Rema 656:1) that one need not spend more than twenty percent of one’s money on a positive mitzva (Minḥat Shlomo 3:103:1). According to R. Naḥum Rabinovitch, when there is a risk that a child will suffer greatly and will not live long, it is forbidden to have children (Si’aḥ Naḥum §96).</i>
  Nowadays, however, by God’s grace, there is a solution for most genetic illnesses, namely, it is often possible to do IVF and then, a few days later, to check the embryos for disease (pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, or PGD), and only implant disease-free embryos in the woman’s uterus. Where this option is available, the couple has an obligation to fulfill the mitzva in this way, so as not to have sick children.
  
  Section 4
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Additional Halakhic Questions
  If an unmarried young man has cancer and must undergo radiation therapy and other treatments that may permanently affect his virility, it is a mitzva for him to provide sperm prior to the treatment, so that it can be frozen and then used to impregnate his eventual wife. Even if he is too young to be contemplating marriage, once he has reached the age of thirteen he is obligated in mitzvot. To fulfill the mitzva of procreation, there is a mitzva for him to produce semen that can later be used to have children. This is not wasting seed, as it is for the sake of procreation. Even if the treatments might not render him sterile, in which case it will have been unnecessary for him to provide sperm, he still has a mitzva to do so in order to guarantee his future ability to have children and fulfill the mitzva. If he can provide sperm without touching himself, that is preferable; if not, he may stimulate himself manually.4<i class="footnote">As explained in n. 2, one may provide semen for the purpose of fulfilling the mitzva of procreation, though R. Bakshi-Doron prohibits it, maintaining that in practice, only a married man can fulfill the mitzva of procreation, since it involves having intimate relations. Since a single man cannot fulfill the mitzva, he is guilty of wasting seed if he produces a sperm sample (<em>Responsa Binyan Av</em> 2:60). Those who permit include R. Auerbach (<em>Nishmat Avraham</em> EH 23:2, n. 3), R. Ariel (<em>Be-ohala Shel Torah</em> 1:69), and R. Lior (<em>Devar Ḥevron</em> §33). Their primary rationale is that there is no prohibition of wasting seed when there is an important reason to do so. R. Daichovsky concurs, adding that the mitzva of procreation applies from the age of thirteen (<em>Teḥumin</em> 18). (I explained above, in 5:7, that even though we delay marriage to allow a young man to prepare by studying Torah and training for a job, the obligation begins at age thirteen,.) In my humble opinion, the young man is not merely allowed, but obligated to provide sperm. After all, we argued in n. 1 that the mitzva obligates a couple to have children via whichever methods are accepted. Since this is an accepted method, it is obligatory for the young man to provide sperm so that he can fulfill the mitzva of procreation later on.</i>
  If a husband or wife is HIV-positive, then every time they have sexual relations, the spouse is at risk of contracting the virus. The only way to avoid this is to use a condom, which protects the healthy spouse. Some poskim rule that the couple may not have sexual relations, since regular condom use is considered wasting seed, and the couple must therefore divorce (Minḥat Shlomo 3:103:16). Others maintain that the prohibition of condom use is for its usual purpose, namely, contraception. However, if it is being used to protect the life of the husband or wife, they may use a condom, so they can at least fulfill the mitzva of ona (Aḥiezer 3:24:5; Igrot Moshe, EH 1:63; Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:2). Halakha follows the latter opinion.
  
  Section 5
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Procreation for the Mentally or Psychologically Disabled or Ill
  Those who are mentally of psychologically ill or disabled, namely, those who cannot take responsibility for care of children, are exempt from the mitzva to procreate. We can infer from the idea that marriage can be delayed until a man’s worldview and ability to provide for a family stabilize (5:7 and 5:9 above) that one who is incapable of taking responsibility for the care of his children, even at the most basic level, is not obligated in the mitzva. 
  Even if such a person is capable of marrying, the couple should avoid having children. The easiest method is via an IUD.5<i class="footnote">R. Auerbach writes that one who is unable to raise children is exempt from the mitzva to procreate, unlike a <em>mamzer </em>and one who is half-slave and half-free, who are mentally fit. If a man with such an illness seeks help to enable him and his wife to have children, he must be told that because he cannot care for children, he is exempt due to circumstances beyond his control (<em>Minḥat Shlomo </em>3:103:2). In my humble opinion, since they are not obligated to procreate, they must use contraception, so as not to bring a child into a family that cannot care for it properly. I recommend above that they use an IUD, as it provides ongoing contraception without having to remember to do anything. If a grandparent is willing and able to take full responsibility for the child’s care and wants the couple to have a child, they are not obligated to use contraception.</i>
  
  Section 6
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / A Mamzer
  The poskim disagree about whether a man fulfills the mitzva of procreation by having a son and daughter through an adulterous sexual union that renders them mamzerim.6<i class="footnote">According to Ramban, Rashba, and Ritva, based on the Yerushalmi (<em>y</em><em>Yevamot</em> 2:6), if someone has relations with a married woman, which results in the birth of a male <em>mamzer</em>, he has fulfilled the obligation of having a son, despite the terrible sin he has committed. This is the position of Rema (EH 1:6), <em>Levush</em>, and AHS. However, according to Radbaz (7:2) this is inconceivable, as a mitzva cannot be fulfilled by committing a sin; the Yerushalmi, in his reading, is inconclusive. Radbaz learns that this is also the understanding of Rif, Rambam, and Rosh, as none of them writes that having a <em>mamzer</em> fulfills the mitzva of procreation. <em>Birkei Yosef</em> 1:12 follows this approach. <em>Minḥat Ḥinukh</em> (1:8) and<em> Pri Yitzḥak</em> (1:42) explain the logic of the position that one fulfills the mitzva by having a <em>mamzer</em>: while the sexual act is sinful, it is only a <em>hekhsher mitzva</em> (an action that facilitates a mitzva). The mitzva, in contrast, is not fulfilled until birth; therefore, it is not considered a mitzva that is fulfilled via commission of a sin. <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 4:16:4 adds that a sin negates a mitzva in a situation in which the mitzva can actually be negated. However, in this case the child exists and cannot be negated. Thus, the father has fulfilled the mitzva.Another reason that supports those who maintain that having children who are mamzerim is nevertheless a fulfillment of the mitzva can be found in the Talmud, which concludes that the halakha follows R. Yose that in the future, all mamzerim will be purified and permitted to marry any Jew (Kiddushin 72b). Some say this purification will be limited to those mamzerim who are not known as such (MT, Laws of Kings 12:3; Ran; Tosafot Ha-Rosh). Others say that even known mamzerim will be declared pure at that time (Ramban and Rashba).</i> 
  Poskim also disagree about whether a mamzer has a mitzva to marry a woman whom he is permitted to marry – a mamzeret or convert – and have a son and daughter, even though these children will also be mamzerim.
  Those who maintain that the mitzva applies to them adduce proof from the Talmud’s statement that the laws of sota apply to mamzerim. That is, if there is reason to suspect that the wife has committed adultery, we erase God’s name and give her the infused water to drink in order to make peace between the husband and wife, even though any children they go on to have will be mamzerim (Sota 26a). The implication is that mamzerim do fulfill a mitzva when they have children.
  Others say that it is preferable for a mamzer not to have children, so as to avoid increasing the number of mamzerim. Proof for this view lies in the suggestion of the Sages that a mamzer marry a slave woman in order to purify his offspring. In order to avoid passing on his mamzer status, he may marry a woman from a gentile nation who has been acquired by a Jew. After the birth of their children, he can arrange for their freedom. Their status will be that of freed slaves – Jewish and not mamzerim. This course of action is recommended even though he will not fulfill the mitzva of procreation, because the children born of this union are not considered of his halakhic lineage. We see that it is preferable for a mamzer not to fulfill the mitzva of procreation, so that he will not pass on the status of mamzer to his offspring.7<i class="footnote">Those who maintain that a <em>mamzer</em> is obligated to fulfill the mitzva of procreation include R. Yaakov Emden (<em>She’elat Ya’avetz</em> 2:97) and R. Ben-Zion Meir Ḥai Uziel. However, it seems that even they would agree that it is preferable for him to have children with a female slave, thereby purifying the children of this taint. Even though he would not fulfill the obligation of procreation because the children are not halakhically considered of his lineage, he will nevertheless fulfill the mitzva of populating the earth (<em>shevet</em>), which is a more sweeping and important mitzva.Others maintain that even though a mamzer does fulfill the mitzva of procreation by having children who are mamzerim, he should not do so le-khatḥila. Therefore, if he does not have the option of marrying a female slave (Kiddushin 69a), it is preferable for him not to fulfill the mitzva of procreation. (He may marry a convert or a female mamzer who cannot conceive, or they can use birth control.). This is the position of Netivot La-shevet, EH 1:8 and Minḥat Ḥinukh 1:22. It would also seem to accord with y. Yevamot 8:2, which records that, according to R. Yehuda, two mamzerim may not marry each other, so as not to increase the number of mamzerim (Responsa Pnei Moshe, EH 1:1).</i>
  
  Section 7
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Ten Years of Childlessness
  The Sages assume that a husband and wife who have been married for ten years and have not had children will probably not have children together, so they declare that the husband must divorce his wife, pay her ketuba, and marry someone else in order to fulfill the mitzva. Even though divorce is terribly destructive – the Sages go so far as to say, “The altar sheds tears for someone who divorces his first wife” (Gittin 90b) – nevertheless the mitzva of procreation takes priority, for through it a person achieves continuity. Also, the short-term pain of divorce is generally less hurtful than the long-term pain of remaining childless.
  True, when polygamy was practiced, the husband had the option of marrying a second wife without divorcing the first. This is what happened when Sarah was childless, as it says (Bereishit 16:3): “So Sarai, Avram’s wife, took her maid, Hagar the Egyptian – after Avram had dwelt in the land of Canaan ten years – and gave her to her husband Avram as a wife” (Yevamot 64a).
  If a couple has one child, even if ten years pass and it is no longer possible that they will have an additional child and fulfill the Torah obligation of procreation, the husband is not obligated to divorce his wife. By having even one child, they fulfill the general mitzva for which the world was created (above, 5:3 and n. 2).8<i class="footnote">According to <em>Responsa</em><em>Radbaz</em> (1:126 and 2:700), a couple must divorce if they had only one child followed by ten childless years, since the Torah obligation is to have a son and a daughter. This is also implied in <em>Responsa</em><em>Rivash</em> §15. However, most Rishonim and Aḥaronim rule that they need not divorce, as the Mishna’s formulation is, “He married a woman and remained with her for ten years and she did not give birth” (<em>Yevamot</em> 6:6). The implication is that if she did give birth, even once, they are not required to divorce. This is the position of Ramban, Rashba, <em>Me’il Tzedaka</em> §33, Rema, EH 154:10, <em>Pitḥei Teshuva</em><em>ad loc. </em>26, and AHS <em>ad loc. </em>23 and 29. Ritva and <em>Nimukei Yosef</em> imply this as well.</i>
  During the period in which a couple did not have children, if they were separated for an extended period of time or the husband or wife was sick, that time is not factored in the ten years. If the wife became pregnant but miscarried, the ten years are calculated from the time of the miscarriage (SA EH 154:10-12).
  If a couple living outside of Eretz Yisrael moved to Eretz Yisrael, the ten years are counted from their arrival in Eretz Yisrael, because it is possible that in the merit of living in Eretz Yisrael they will conceive. Similarly, if a couple living in Eretz Yisrael left for a certain period of time, the time they spend abroad is not factored into the ten years (Rashi and Ramban on Bereishit 16:3; AHS 154:25).
  If the husband believes that he is infertile, he is not obligated to divorce his wife. Nevertheless, if she wishes to get divorced in order to remarry and have children, he is obligated to grant her a divorce and pay her ketuba. However, if she wishes to stay with him, she may do so, since she does not have a personal obligation to procreate (Yevamot 64a; SA EH 154:6; above 5:3).
  It is important to emphasize that the obligation of a husband to divorce his wife after ten years does not establish that she is infertile, but simply means the chances of their conceiving a child together are slim. It is certainly possible that she will be able to have children with a different husband. Therefore, a man who has not yet had children may marry her. If after ten years she has not conceived with her new husband, he too must divorce her. After that, a man who has not yet fulfilled the mitzva of procreation may not marry her. Since she has failed to conceive with two different men, it is likely that that she is infertile (Yevamot 64a; SA EH 154:16-17).
  Everything we have said about a man being obligated to divorce his wife after ten years applies to a situation in which there is no clear medical diagnosis. However, if reliable doctors have concluded that there is no chance that the wife will conceive, then even though the couple has not yet been married for ten years, her husband may divorce her in order to fulfill the mitzva to procreate; and vice versa, if ten years have passed but reliable doctors believe that there is still a reasonable chance that the wife will conceive, her husband is not required to divorce her (see Responsa Maharashdam YD §91; Meshiv Davar 4:9; Ish U-veito 16:15, end of n. 1.)
  
  Section 8
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Permission Not to Divorce
  The Sages’ obligation for a man to divorce his wife after ten childless years can be very painful. Some men, including Torah scholars, despite their desire to fulfill the mitzva of procreation, found it very difficult to divorce their beloved wives, with whom they had entered into an eternal covenant. They sought ways to permit their marriages to continue. Indeed, there are several grounds that sometimes permit this.
  The most straightforward grounds for permission are when the husband believes himself to be the cause of their childlessness, or that there is at least a reasonable chance that he is the cause – for example, if he is sickly, or if an accident may have rendered him infertile. Even in these cases, if his wife wants a divorce in order to have a child, he is required to divorce her.
  When it is impossible to claim that the husband is infertile, other justifications are sometimes sought. Some assert that since halakha does not require a person to spend more than a fifth of his assets on the fulfillment of a positive commandment (Rema 656:1), if the ketuba payment is more than this he is not obligated to divorce her (see Bigdei Kehuna, EH §1.) However, it seems that poskim do not rely on this claim. Rather, they require the husband to divorce his wife and pay her ketuba, because the mitzva of procreation is so important that one must spend more than a fifth of his assets in order to fulfill it (Avnei Nezer EH 1:1). Moreover, the cap of one-fifth may apply only when an exorbitant price is being demanded for a mitzva. If the price demanded is the accepted price of the mitzva, one is obligated to pay it (see BHL 656, s.v “afilu”). Nonetheless, perhaps one can say that the obligation to divorce is the general rule, but if someone is especially attached to his wife, to the extent that the pain of divorce seems terrible, above and beyond the norm, and worse than losing most of his assets, he is not obligated to divorce his wife.
  When the amount of the ketuba payment is more than the husband can afford, some say that he cannot divorce his wife (Rashba; Pri Ḥadash). Many others maintain that since the divorce is halakhically required, if the husband is unable to pay the entire amount of the ketuba he pays as much as he can, and the beit din sets up a payment plan for the remaining amount. The divorce, however, is not delayed (Responsa Radbaz 1:458; Get Mekushar 119:18; Yaskil Avdi, vol. 2, Kuntres Aḥaron, EH §1; Yabi’a Omer, EH 7:2:10).
  Outside of Eretz Yisrael, some wish to rely on the few Rishonim who maintain that even after ten years there, it is unnecessary to get divorced.9<i class="footnote">According to the majority of Rishonim and Aḥaronim, even outside of Eretz Yisrael a childless couple must get divorced after ten years. This is the position of Ramban; Rashba; Ritva; <em>Yam Shel Shlomo</em><em>Bi’ur Ha-Gra</em>, EH 1:10; <em>Levush</em>, EH 154:11; AHS <em>ad loc</em>. 24-25; and many others. According to <em>Or Zaru’a</em>, Raavan, and <em>Hagahot Maimoniyot</em>, the ten years rule does not apply at all outside of Eretz Yisrael. Some Aḥaronim are willing to use this as an additional reason to be lenient, when there are other reasons as well, including: <em>Shev Yaakov</em> EH 2:1; <em>Bigdei Kehuna</em>, EH 1; <em>Noda Bi-Yehuda</em> 1, EH 1.</i>
  In practice, in each and every case, all factors are considered, and usually, by combining two or more rationales, justification is found to keep them together.
  Another claim that can be used to allow a childless couple to remain married is for the woman to refuse to accept a get. The man can then claim that Rabbeinu Gershom’s ban forbids him from divorcing her against her will. (Technically, if he insists on marrying another woman, he might be permitted to take a second wife; if he does not insist, he would simply remain married to the current wife.) However, this is be-di’avad because it is based on the wife’s refusal to uphold halakha.10<i class="footnote">If the husband wants to divorce his wife but she refuses to accept a <em>get</em>, some say that we allow him to divorce her against her will (<em>Beit Shmuel</em> 1:7). Others say that we allow him to take a second wife (<em>Yaskil Avdi</em>, EH 2:1; <em>Yabi’a Omer</em>, EH 7:2). Others say that he is neither permitted to divorce his wife nor to marry another woman. They are afraid that his intentions in taking a second wife would not be for the sake of heaven and the mitzva of procreation (<em>Ha-elef Lekha Shlomo</em>, EH §7), and he might marry a woman who cannot have children (R. Yitzḥak Elḥanan Spektor, <em>Ein Yitzḥak</em>, EH 2:57). Some do not permit marrying another woman even in a case with four uncertainties as to whether Rabbeinu Gershom’s rule of excommunication is applicable (R. Ḥayim Palachi, <em>Ḥayim Sha’al</em> 2:16). R. Goren rules this way, as do other rabbinical judges (see <em>Piskei</em> <em>Din Rabbaniyim</em> vol. 6, p. 193). In Israel, these questions are discussed and decided by a <em>beit din</em>, and in exceptional cases, permission to take a second wife is granted.</i>
  
  Section 9
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Noaḥides
  The mitzva of procreation is relevant even to Noaḥides (non-Jews), as God said to Noaḥ and his sons: “And you, be fruitful and multiply, abound on the earth and increase on it” (Bereishit 9:7). However, the specific obligations that require men to get married by the age of twenty (24 at the latest) and to have a son and a daughter (5:7-9 above) do not apply to Noaḥides (see Sanhedrin 59a).
  If a Noaḥide had a son and a daughter and later converted to Judaism, he has fulfilled the mitzva of procreation, for even when he was a non-Jew, the mitzva was relevant to him (Yevamot 62a). There is a disagreement as to whether this is the case only if his children also converted, or if it is true even if they did not (5:4 above).
  Since the mitzva for Noaḥides is a general one and is not an absolute obligation with specific parameters, a Noaḥide who has good reasons not to fulfill it – for example, if there is a reasonable concern that his children will be sick, or if there is a serious concern that he will not be able to educate his children to be decent people – he need not do so even le-khatḥila.11<i class="footnote">At first glance it seems that the Rishonim disagree as to whether Noaḥides are obligated to procreate. According to <em>She’iltot</em> (165) and <em>Tosafot</em><em>Ḥagiga</em> 2b s.v. “lo tehei”), they are obligated. This is based on <em>Yevamot</em> 62a, where there is a discussion of whether a convert who had children while he was a non-Jew has fulfilled the mitzva of procreation. According to R. Yoḥanan he has, “because they were subject to the commandment to procreate beforehand.” Rashi, Raavan, and Me’iri conclude from this that Noaḥides have a mitzva to procreate. In contrast, the straightforward reading of the Talmud in <em>Sanhedrin</em> 59b seems to indicate that Noaḥides are exempt from the mitzva. According to <em>Tosafot</em><em>Yevamot</em> 62a s.v. “bnei”), non-Jews are not obligated to procreate, but if they do have children, the children are considered of their lineage. <em>Or Zaru’a</em> and R. Avraham Min Ha-har agree (commenting on <em>Yevamot</em><em>ibid</em>.). However, it is possible to say that even in their opinion, while non-Jews are not obligated to procreate, the general mitzva is relevant to them as well. (The general mitzva is actually greater than the individual obligation, as I explained above in 5:3.) This is the position of AHS 1:5. One can argue that the relationship of non-Jews to procreation is similar to that of Jewish women. Fulfilling the mandate to procreate is a tremendous mitzva for them, but not an obligation.</i>
  Some say that Noaḥides may not waste seed. We have seen (4:1) that this is one of the sins that was punished by the flood, as we read: <i>The earth became corrupt before God; the earth was filled with lawlessness. When God saw how corrupt the earth was, for all flesh had corrupted its ways on earth, God said to Noah, “I have decided to put an end to all flesh, for the earth is filled with lawlessness because of them: I am about to destroy them with the earth.</i>” (Bereishit 6:11-13) The Sages explain that the flood waters were as hot and thick as semen, for “with hot passion they sinned, and with hot water they were punished” (Sanhedrin 108b). The waters of the deep overflowed and drowned them (R. Ḥayim Palachi, Ḥayim Ve-shalom §16; Tzofnat Pa’ane’aḥ §30).
  In contrast, some say that there is no prohibition for Noaḥides to masturbate and waste seed; since this prohibition hinges on the mitzva to procreate, which does not apply to Noaḥides, they are also not included in the prohibition to waste seed (based on Tosafot to Sanhedrin 59b, s.v. “ve-hu”; Igrot Moshe 4:116). It would seem, though, that even according to those who are lenient, such behavior is improper, for all desire should be directed toward increasing love within the framework of marriage.12<i class="footnote"><em>Sdei Ḥemed</em> (<em>Klalim</em>, <em>Ma’arekhet Zayin</em>, <em>klal</em> 20) explains that according to <em>Tosafot</em> (<em>Sanhedrin</em> 59b) there is no prohibition for non-Jews to waste seed, because they are not obligated to procreate. <em>She’iltot</em>, which maintains that non-Jews are obligated, rules that they may not waste seed. However, Ramban and Rashba (above, ch. 4 n. 15) argue that there is no connection between the obligation to procreate and the prohibition against wasting seed. Thus, we can say that Noaḥides may not waste seed just as Jewish women may not masturbate – because desire must be preserved to increase love between husband and wife.It is possible that the ruling in this case hinges on the underlying rationale of the prohibition. If the prohibition to waste seed stems from the prohibition of “Do not commit adultery” (following Or Zaru’a 1:124 and Smak §292), then perhaps Noaḥides are included, since they, too, are admonished not to commit adultery. If the prohibition to waste seed stems from the mitzva of procreation (following Tosafot), or from the prohibition of bal tashḥit (following R. Yaakov Ettlinger), then non-Jews are not included, even though wasting seed is still improper.</i>
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Castration
  The purpose of creation is to increase life in the world, as the Torah says at the end of the creation story: “God blessed them and God said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and conquer it’” (Bereishit 1:28; similarly, ibid. 1:22, 8:17, 9:1, 7). As an extension of this, the Torah prohibits castrating any male, human or animal. It says regarding sacrificial offerings, “You shall not offer to the Lord anything [with its testes] bruised or crushed or torn or cut. You must not do this in your land” (Vayikra 22:24). The Sages understand “You must not do this” to be a prohibition on damaging the reproductive organs, and “in your land” to be an extension of the prohibition to any male, animal or human. The penalty for castrating is lashes. Although the Torah uses the words “in your land,” the Sages have a tradition that the prohibition applies outside Eretz Yisrael as well (Shabbat 110b; MT, Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 16:10).
  The male reproductive system has three main components: the testicles (which produce sperm), the vas deferens or sperm ducts, and the penis. Severely damaging any one of them causes sterility and violates a Torah prohibition. Even “castrating” someone who has already been sterilized is a prohibition. Thus, if one man attacks another and crushes his testicles, rendering the victim sterile, and afterwards another person comes over and cuts off the victim’s testicles, a third performs a vasectomy, a fourth smashes his penis, and a fifth cuts it off, each one transgresses a Torah prohibition and is punished with lashes (Shabbat 111a; SA EH 5:11).
  Even drinking a potion which induces sterility is prohibited (Shabbat 111a; SA EH 5:11). We can derive this from the next verse, “For they are mutilated (moshḥatam bahem), they have a defect” (Vayikra 22:25). In other words, destroying (hashḥata) a man’s ability to have children is prohibited. However, since this type of “castration” is indirect (as it does not directly damage reproductive organs), many say that it is prohibited only rabbinically. Others maintain that the prohibition is from the Torah but does not incur lashes since it does not directly damage the reproductive organs.1<i class="footnote">Some say that drinking a sterility potion violates a Torah prohibition. This is the position of <em>Or Zaru’a </em>and <em>Ha’mek She’ala</em> 105:9. <em>Netivot La-shevet</em> understands this to be the position of Rambam and SA as well. However, according to many <em>poskim</em>, including <em>Yere’im </em>(§342), the prohibition is rabbinic. Rashba on <em>Shabbat</em> 110b agrees that the prohibition is rabbinic, since the Torah prohibits only damaging the reproductive organs themselves. This is the position of Me’iri; <em>Ḥatam Sofer</em>, EH 1:20; <em>Ḥazon Ish</em>, EH 12:7; and <em>Yabi’a Omer</em>, EH 8:14.Some say that one may castrate a man who has a history of sexual violence, in order to save women or children from rape and, in rare cases, murder (Responsa Menaḥem Meshiv 2:18). Temporary chemical castration is certainly permitted to prevent rape, even when there is no threat to life, although under normal circumstances it is forbidden rabbinically (see Yad Yehuda 5:11-12, p. 431; Responsa Asher Ḥanan 6-7:62). Chemical castration entails injecting female hormones (estrogen) into a man or giving him drugs that counteract testosterone and other androgens. This type of sterilization temporarily makes it impossible for a man to impregnate a woman and largely suppresses his sexual drive.</i>
  
  Section 2
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Prohibition of Marrying a Petzu’a Daka
  A saris (a man who is sterile because any of the three parts of his reproductive system does not function) may not marry a Jewish woman, as it says, “No one whose testes are crushed (petzu’a daka) or whose penis is cut off (kerut shofkha) shall be admitted into the congregation of the Lord” (Devarim 23:2). A saris may marry a convert or a freed slave, because the Torah prohibits marrying “into the congregation of the Lord,” meaning women who were born Jewish (m. Yevamot 76a). Even a married man who becomes a saris must divorce his wife (Otzar Ha-poskim 5:2).
  The marriage prohibition is limited to a person who became a saris due to human action, whether intentional or accidental (for example, as the result of a traffic accident). In contrast, someone whom God made infertile, who was born that way, may marry into the congregation. True, he will be unable to have children, and in most cases, he will not be able to have sexual relations with his wife. Nevertheless, if he finds a woman who agrees to marry him, they are considered a married couple in all respects.
  The law that a saris cannot marry is a divine decree whose rationale we cannot fully understand. However, it does teach us the great importance of the mitzva of procreation, which is the primary purpose of marriage – since a saris cannot have children, he may not marry into the congregation (Moreh Nevukhim III:49; Bekhor Shor; Rabbeinu Beḥaye; Ḥizkuni). Additionally, as a rule, a saris cannot fulfill the mitzva of ona, and there is concern that his wife’s sexual frustration may lead her to commit adultery. To prevent this, the Torah does not permit him to marry a Jewish-born woman (Moreh Nevukhim III:49; Raavad on Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 15:2). Another possible rationale for this commandment is that it has helped Jews stay far away from the practice of castration. In the past, kings would regularly castrate men, whom they would then assign to be ministers, officials, and guards for women, as the kings did not have to worry about their loyalty. Some men would castrate themselves, or parents would castrate young children, in order to qualify them for these royal jobs. Even today, some people undergo vasectomies and the like so that they can have sex freely without worrying about the possibility of an unwanted pregnancy. The Torah distances us from all of this by prohibiting castration. This explains why someone who is naturally sterile, whose condition is not the result of human injury or negligence, is not prohibited from marrying into the congregation (Sefer Ha-ḥinukh §559).
  
  Section 3
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Parameters of the Prohibition
  As we have learned, a saris rendered sterile by human intervention may not marry a Jewish-born woman, but may marry a convert or a freed slave (m. Yevamot 76a).2<i class="footnote">It is normally forbidden for a <em>kohen</em> to marry a convert. However, a <em>kohen</em> who is a <em>petzu’a daka</em> or <em>kerut shofkha</em> may marry a convert (<em>Yevamot</em> 76a; SA EH 5:1). According to most <em>poskim</em>, all other laws regarding a <em>kohen</em> apply to him; therefore, he may not marry a convert who is divorced, he may eat food permitted only to <em>kohanim </em><em>kodashim</em>), and he recites <em>Birkat Kohanim</em>. This is the position of Me’iri, <em>Beit Shmuel</em> 5:1, <em>Beit Meir</em>, and <em>Minḥat Ḥinukh</em> §269. However, according to <em>Ḥelkat Meḥokek</em> 5:1, none of the <em>kohen</em> laws apply to him: he may marry a divorced convert, may not eat food permitted only to <em>kohanim</em>, and does not recite <em>Birkat Kohanim</em>. Nevertheless, he may eat <em>teruma</em>, as even the slaves of a <em>kohen</em> may eat <em>teruma</em> (see AHS 5:6).</i>
  We have also seen that the prohibition does not apply to someone born sterile. If someone was rendered sterile as the result of illness, poskim disagree as to his status. According to Rosh, such a person may not marry a Jewish-born woman. Since humans play a role in the contraction of diseases, for example by eating unhealthy foods or by polluting the environment, such sterility is seen as being man-made. In contrast, according to Rambam and most Rishonim, a person who became sterile due to illness is considered to have been made sterile by God, and may thus marry into the community. The halakha follows this position (Yam Shel Shlomo; Mishkenot Yaakov; Birkei Yosef; Pitḥei Teshuva 5:7; Maharsham; AHS 5:18).
  We learn an important principle from the law that a born saris may marry: Normally, the mitzva of ona is considered the foundation of marriage. Accordingly, if someone wishes to marry on condition that he is not obligated to fulfill the mitzva of ona, the marriage does not take effect (SA EH 38:5; above ch. 1, n. 2). Nevertheless, if due to circumstances beyond his control – for instance, he is a born saris – a man cannot have sexual relations with his wife, the marriage does take effect. We therefore see that it is possible for a couple to base a marriage on their emotional connection and their commitment to be good to one another.3<i class="footnote">The mitzva of <em>ona</em> includes caressing, as well as anything which brings joy to one’s spouse, as we have seen above in 2:3. Thus, it is a mitzva for a <em>saris</em> to do whatever he can to bring his wife pleasure, including physically pleasuring her to the best of his ability. Even if we were to argue that without the possibility of sexual relations, foreplay and other affectionate behavior do not fulfill the Torah requirement of <em>ona</em>, they are still part of the obligation of “love your fellow as yourself.</i>”
  The prohibition is for a man who became a saris to marry a Jewish-born woman. However, a woman who underwent a procedure of sterilization (for example, a hysterectomy) is permitted to marry a Jewish-born man (Sefer Ha-ḥinukh §559; Otzar Ha-poskim 5:1:1). Nevertheless, a man who has not yet fulfilled the mitzva of procreation may not marry her, as doing so makes it impossible for him to fulfill his obligation to procreate (above 5:8).
  
  Section 4
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Practical Questions
  A man’s reproductive organs may be damaged several ways; to determine whether a particular injury renders him a petzu’a daka, the general rule is that if he can sire children, he is not a petzu’a daka, and he may marry a Jewish-born woman like any other Jewish man. This determination is left to reliable doctors. In the time of the Rishonim, many doctors believed that a man lacking one testicle could not have children. Based on this, most Rishonim ruled that such a man had the status of petzu’a daka. Rabbeinu Tam and several other Rishonim maintained that he can sire children (SA EH 5:7). Nowadays it is clear to doctors that such a man can father children, so clearly he is not considered a petzu’a daka.4<i class="footnote">The law of <em>petzu’a daka</em> and <em>krut shofkha</em> applies only when a man is rendered sterile. We learn this in <em>Yevamot </em>75b, which cites the view that a man with a perforation in his testes is considered a <em>petzu’a daka</em>. This is challenged with an anecdote about a man who had a perforation in his testes and still sired a child. Those who ruled stringently countered that the child was not his; rather, his wife committed adultery and bore someone else’s child. We see that it is assumed that a <em>petzu’a daka</em> is sterile and could not impregnate a woman. This is the position of Rambam; Me’iri; Raavya; <em>Yam Shel Shlomo</em><em>Yevamot</em> 8:9; and <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, EH 2:3.The Rishonim disagree as to the status of someone who had one testicle removed. According to Rabbeinu Tam (Tosafot to Yevamot 75a, s.v. “she-ein”), since he can still have children, he is not considered a petzu’a daka, and he may marry into the congregation. Many Rishonim disagree with Rabbeinu Tam and disqualify such a person. This is the opinion of SA and Rema, EH 5:7. However, the Aḥaronim agree with Rabbeinu Tam, including Yam Shel Shlomo; Ḥatam Sofer, EH §17; Divrei Ḥayim 1:11; and R. Ḥayim of Volozhin, as cited in Pitḥei Teshuva, EH 5:7. The consensus among doctors today is that someone who lost a testicle can sire children. It would seem that those Rishonim who disagreed with Rabbeinu Tam did so based on the medical knowledge available to them at that time. Perhaps in the past, due to infection, a person who lost a testicle was generally unable to have children.</i>
  Older men commonly experience swelling of the prostate gland, through which the vas deferens and the urethra pass. This makes it difficult to urinate. In some very serious cases, the prostate gland is severed to allow the excretion of urine. The problem is that severing the prostate prevents the flow of sperm through the penis during sexual relations. Instead, the sperm travels from the testicles into the bladder, and from there it is excreted together with the urine. Thus, even though his body produces viable sperm cells, the man cannot actually impregnate his wife, as he does not ejaculate sperm cells during sex. Some poskim claimed that since this person became sterile, practically speaking, as a result of human intervention, he may not marry a born Jew, and if he is already married, he must divorce his wife. 
  In practice, however, there is general agreement that he is not considered a petzu’a daka. First, severing the prostate is a procedure performed as a result of an illness. As we saw in the previous section, according to most poskim such a person is viewed as having been made sterile by God. Additionally, the doctor performs the surgery to relieve his pain, not to sterilize him. Furthermore, he is not a petzu’a daka because, in fact, his sperm ducts remain intact. It is only due to a peripheral issue that the sperm are not ejaculated during sexual relations.
  A more difficult case is that of a man who has his testicles removed to improve his chances of surviving prostate cancer (or another cancer), as the testes produce the hormones that accelerate malignant activity. Many maintain that even though technically his testicles are removed by a person, he is still considered to have been made sterile by God. As we saw above, Rambam (and most poskim) say that in a case where sterility is a consequence of illness, the man is considered to have been made sterile by God. Additionally, we might argue that even those who are stringent in that case (Rosh) would be lenient in our case; they might agree that it is only when the illness itself damages the reproductive organs that the man may not marry a born Jew, because he is considered to bear some responsibility for the illness. In contrast, if the illness does not damage the reproductive organs, but rather the doctors are forced to remove his testicles to save him from the illness, he may marry a Jewish-born woman (Ḥelkat Yo’av EH §3; R. Tzvi Pesaḥ Frank).
  The same applies to someone who has cancer and undergoes radiation therapy that completely destroys his ability to produce sperm. Even though he cannot have children, since his sterility results from treatment of an illness, it is considered an act of God and he may marry a Jewish-born woman.5<i class="footnote"><em>Poskim</em> disagree about the status of a man who becomes sterile from medically unnecessary radiation treatment (the question arose vis-à-vis victims of Nazi experimentation). Some are stringent, as human action caused the infertility (<em>Ḥelkat Yaakov</em>, EH §30). Others say that even though such sterilization is prohibited according to Torah law, since the three parts of his reproductive system are intact, he is not considered to be <em>petzu’a daka</em> or <em>krut shofkha</em> (R. Isser Yehuda Unterman, <em>Shevet Mi-Yehuda</em> 4:17). He is no worse than someone who drinks a sterility potion. Just as such a person is allowed to marry any Jewish woman (<em>Birkei Yosef</em> 5:7; AHS <em>ad loc</em>. 24), this person is allowed to as well.</i>
  When any doubt arises in such matters, halakha follows those who are lenient, for the general principle is that under pressing circumstances we rely on lenient opinions. These cases definitely qualify, as if we were to rule stringently, the man would not be allowed to marry a Jewish-born woman, and if married, he would be required to divorce. Additionally, according to many poskim, the law of saris is like the law of mamzer; under Torah law, the marriage restrictions apply when it is certain that someone is indeed a mamzer, petzu’a daka, or krut shofkha, but when there is any uncertainty as to his status, the restrictions do not apply. Therefore, in any case of uncertainty, the halakha accords with those who are lenient.6<i class="footnote">Even though someone with an uncertain status of <em>mamzer </em>is permitted to marry a Jewish-born woman according to Torah law, because of the severity of a status that is passed on from generation to generation, the Sages prohibited a <em>mamzer </em>of uncertain status and only permitted in cases of twofold uncertainty (<em>sfek sfeika</em>). However, the Sages did not apply this stringency to cases of uncertainty about the status of a <em>petzu’a daka</em> or <em>krut shofkha</em>. This is the approach of <em>Responsa R. Akiva Eiger</em> 3:63; <em>Avnei Nezer</em>, EH 17; <em>Be’er Yitzḥak</em>, EH 4; <em>Beit Yitzḥak</em>, EH 1:36; AHS 5:20; and others. R. Ovadia Yosef collects them in <em>Yabi’a Omer</em>, EH 7:8:10.Thanks to advances in medical technology, a new question has arisen nowadays. What is the status of someone whose reproductive organs are damaged, and who in the past would not have been able to father children, but nowadays can, since doctors can extract sperm from his testicles and use them to impregnate his wife? It would seem that since his status is uncertain, we should follow the lenient opinion. In the future, another question may arise. What will be the status of a man whose reproductive system is damaged and cannot produce sperm at all, if doctors can fertilize his wife’s egg using a cell produced via cloning? This may not qualify as a case of doubt, for anyone who has sustained damage to his reproductive system and does not produce sperm is considered a saris.</i>
  
  Section 5
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Prohibition on Female Sterilization
  The prohibition of sterilization applies to women as well as men, but sterilizing a woman is a rabbinic prohibition rather than a Torah one. The Torah prohibits male castration, as it says, “You shall not offer to the Lord anything [with its testes] bruised or crushed or torn or cut. You shall have no such practices in your land” (Vayikra 22:24). All these actions damage the male reproductive organs, which are external, and not the female reproductive organs, which are internal. Similarly, the prohibition of a saris to marry applies only to a man who has been sterilized, as the verse states, “No one whose testes are crushed or whose penis is cut off shall be admitted into the congregation of the Lord” (Devarim 23:2). Clearly, this refers to a man. In contrast, a woman who has been sterilized is allowed to marry freely. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the mitzva of procreation, a man who has not yet fulfilled his obligation may not marry an infertile woman.
  The rabbinic prohibition of female sterilization is limited to cases where this is done directly, either through physical trauma or surgery. However, indirect sterilization, such as by drinking an infertility potion, is permitted. Even this indirect sterilization, though, is permitted only when truly necessary to sterilize her, such as if she has extremely difficult labor, or if her children turned out poorly and she is afraid to bring more children into the world, and accepted methods of birth control are not viable options for her (above, 5:17-19). However, when there is no particular reason, infertility may not be caused even indirectly, as there is a general prohibition on wantonly destroying anything in God’s world (bal tashḥit; Devarim 20:19). Certainly, then, one may not destroy a woman’s ability to have children.
  Permission for a woman to undergo sterilization is also contingent upon her husband’s consent, because in agreeing to marry him she committed to be his full partner in the mitzva of procreation (Ḥatam Sofer, EH §20; above 5:14; see also 5:6).7<i class="footnote">The mainstream opinion is that the prohibition of female sterilization is rabbinic. This is implied by Rambam, who writes, “One who sterilizes a female, whether human or animal, is exempt” (MT, Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 16:11). In rabbinic parlance, this means that he is exempt from punishment, but the act is still rabbinically prohibited (<em>Magid Mishneh</em>; SA EH 5:11). According to <em>Taz</em> (EH 5:6), this is prohibited because it causes pain to the woman; if there is no pain, it is not prohibited. Consequently, in a situation in which sterilization is necessary, it is permitted. According to the Vilna Gaon (EH 5:25), the Torah prohibition of sterilization does apply to women, but a transgressor does not receive lashes.There are two possible explanations for the majority opinion that the Torah prohibition of sterilization applies to men and not to women. First, the Torah prohibition is limited to injuries to reproductive organs that are external, not internal. Second, a man is obligated in the mitzva of procreation, while a woman is not (even though she is performing a mitzva). Therefore, the prohibition of female sterilization is only rabbinic, and indirect sterilization is permitted.At first glance, there seems to be a disagreement about the indirect sterilization of a woman as well. According to Beit Shmuel 5:14 and most poskim, a woman may drink an infertility potion even when there is no need. In contrast, Baḥ and Yam Shel Shlomo permit drinking an infertility potion only when there is a specific need. It seems that all poskim would agree that without any need at all, such an act is forbidden, because of the prohibition on wasteful destruction. The disagreement, then, is about how great the need must be. Must it be a case of great need, or does ordinary need suffice?</i>
  In recent years, the issue has arisen of sterilizing a woman by tubal ligation, a procedure, colloquially called “getting one’s tubes tied,” in which the fallopian tubes (through which the egg travels from the ovaries to the uterus, where it can be fertilized) are cut, tied, or blocked, preventing the eggs from reaching the uterus, making pregnancy impossible. The question is whether a woman who experiences difficult pregnancies and does not want any more children may ask her doctor to sterilize her via tubal ligation. Some say that tubal ligation is like drinking a sterility potion, since the sterilization is not visible externally (Si’aḥ Naḥum §100). Additionally, this type of sterilization is not irreversible; sometimes the tubes can be surgically repaired. Even if the reversal procedure does not work, it is still possible to extract an egg from the ovary and do IVF. Others say that since ligation is an act of sterilization performed on the reproductive organs themselves, it is rabbinically prohibited. Thus, as long as it is possible for a woman to take birth control pills or have an IUD inserted, tubal ligation is prohibited (Igrot Moshe EH 4:33-34 and 4:32:1). Today there is a procedure that blocks the fallopian tubes indirectly. This is permitted even according to the stringent opinion.8<i class="footnote">We can infer from <em>Responsa Devar Yehoshua</em>, EH 3:7, that if the ligation is reversible, the procedure is not considered total sterilization. In contrast, <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, EH 4:32:1, rules stringently, since reversing the ligation requires surgical intervention. In practice, since the disagreement is about a rabbinic prohibition, under pressing circumstances, the lenient opinion may be relied upon. However, nowadays this is unnecessary, because a new method for indirectly blocking the fallopian tubes has been found. The blockage is achieved by inserting a coil into the fallopian tube. Within a few weeks, scar tissue forms around the coil, blocking the tube. Since the sterilization is indirect, it is like drinking a sterility potion, which is permitted when there is a great need. (This is based on an article by R. Yoel and Dr. Chana Katan, “<em>Ḥasima Hafikha shel Ha-ḥatzotrot</em>,” in R. Mordechai Halperin, ed., <em>Metzi’ut U-refu’a Be-Seder Nashim</em>, pp. 290-292.) Though some challenge this, claiming that this is direct, not indirect sterilization, it seems clear that the act is considered <em>grama</em> (indirect), especially considering that some maintain that even tubal ligation is not considered halakhic sterilization (<em>Si’aḥ Naḥum</em> §100).</i>
  
  Section 6
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Daniel, Ḥananya, Mishael, and Azarya
  A saris has a choice: he can sink into the pain and despair of knowing that he will not leave anyone to carry his name forward, or he can link his life to the eternally holy, thereby gaining an everlasting name, better than sons and daughters. As the prophet Yeshayahu says: <i>Let not the eunuch say, “I am a withered tree.” For thus said the Lord: “As for the eunuchs who keep My Sabbaths, who have chosen what I desire and hold fast to My covenant – I will give them, in My House and within My walls, a monument and a name better than sons or daughters. I will give them an everlasting name which shall not perish.</i>” (Yeshayahu 56:3-5)
  As long as sin exists, so will death and disease. Once the world is cured of all its sins, it will also be cured of all its illnesses. Certain sins in particular may cause infertility; one of them is dishonoring the Jewish people and the Temple. Following the miraculous recovery of King Ḥizkiyahu, emissaries of the Babylonian king visited him. Instead of drawing them closer to faith, he was arrogant and fawning, showing off all of his personal treasures as well as those of the Temple. The prophet told him, “Some of your sons, your own issue whom you will have fathered, will be taken to serve as eunuchs in the palace of the king of Babylon” (Yeshayahu 39:1-7).
  The Sages say that this harsh prophecy was fulfilled in the lives of Daniel, Ḥananya, Mishael, and Azarya, who were descendants of King Ḥizkiyahu. In childhood they were separated from their family and nation and taken to King Nebuchadnezzar’s palace to serve as attendants and advisors. In keeping with ancient practice, they were castrated (Sanhedrin 93b; Pirkei De-Rabbi Eliezer 51).9<i class="footnote">There is a disagreement about this in <em>Sanhedrin</em> 93b. “Rav says: ‘They were actual <em>sarisim</em>.’ R. Ḥanina says: ‘Idolatry was emasculated during their lifetime.’” The Talmud then explains that R. Ḥanina maintains that Daniel, Ḥananya, Mishael, and Azarya had children who predeceased them, so they needed the consolation of an everlasting name, better than sons and daughters According to <em>Pirkei De-Rabbi Eliezer</em> 51, Daniel, Ḥananya, Mishael, and Azarya were actual eunuchs, whom the king presumably had castrated to ensure their loyalty to him. <em>Otzar Midrashim</em> (Eisenstein) tells a more complicated story:“Esther summoned Hatakh” (Esther 4:5). Hatakh is Daniel. Why was he called Hatakh? Because he had cut off (Hebrew, ḥatakh) his manhood during the reign of the evil Nebuchadnezzar. Jew-haters told Nebuchadnezzar, “The Jews you brought are having illicit relations with your maidservants and the wives of the ministers!” Upon hearing this, Daniel and his friends Ḥananya, Mishael and Azarya immediately emasculated themselves. As it says: “For thus said the Lord: ‘As for the eunuchs who keep My Sabbaths …’” Nebuchadnezzar was immediately filled with rage against them and commanded that they be brought to him and killed. They said to him, “Our lord, the king! We would never do these things, for Jewish law prohibits adultery and sexual immorality. As the Torah says, ‘Do not commit adultery.”’ They showed him that they were eunuchs. Nebuchadnezzar was immediately overjoyed. (Midrash Megilla, in Otzar Midrashim, p. 60)Toward the end of his life, Daniel/Hatakh helped Esther and Mordechai save the Jewish people. Esther, like Daniel and his friends, sacrificed herself to save the Jewish people.</i> By examining their character and deeds, we can learn about the life purpose of one decreed by fate to be a saris.
  After Nebuchadnezzar brought these four youths to his city, he ordered that they be fed meat from his table and be taught the Chaldean language and culture, so that they would assimilate. However, they made great efforts to remain loyal to their faith. Since the meat was not kosher, they did not eat it; for years they survived on a variety of legumes. Had the king discovered their disobedience, they would have been put to death. But they were prepared to sacrifice their lives if it came down to it.
  During their years of exile in the king’s palace, Nebuchadnezzar’s army destroyed the Temple and exiled the Jews to Babylonia. Nevertheless, Daniel and his friends, who by then were important officials, did not lose their faith. Eventually, Babylonia was defeated, and Medea became the ruling power. Darius, King of Medea, enacted a decree that required his subjects to pray exclusively to him. However, Daniel defied the decree and continued to pray to God. When he was caught, he was thrown into the lions’ den, but was miraculously saved by God (Daniel 6).
  Although Daniel was a eunuch, he did not wallow in his grief. Rather, we are told that “Daniel, a beloved person, devoted himself to acts of kindness…. He helped brides prepare for their weddings and made them happy, accompanied the dead, gave charity to the poor, and prayed three times a day. His prayers were accepted with favor” (Avot De-Rabbi Natan 4:5).
  Let us return to the time when Babylonia reigned. The Jewish nation was in crisis. An evil kingdom ruled the world. The Temple lay in ruins. The Jewish people were exiled from their land, and it seemed that there was no hope left for the Jewish faith. Consequently, many of the exiled Jews abandoned Torah and mitzvot, as they felt that within a generation or two, assimilation was inevitable. Nebuchadnezzar decided to erect a large golden idol to symbolize the power of his kingdom and his rule. He set a time for an impressive ceremony, during which all attendees would prostrate themselves before this idol. It seems that many Jews were among those who bowed down. Ḥananya, Mishael, and Azarya, who were senior officials in Nebuchadnezzar’s palace, could have justified bowing down by claiming that it was not an idol, merely a statue to glorify the king (Rabbeinu Tam in Tosafot, Pesaḥim 53b s.v. “ma”). However, because the statue looked like an idol, they decided it was better to be thrown into a fiery furnace rather than bow down to it publicly and desecrate God’s name. A great miracle occurred; they emerged from the furnace unscathed. God’s name was sanctified in front of everyone, Jews and non-Jews. (Daniel was not present at the time, as explained in Sanhedrin 93a.)
  The Sages say that at that dark time, when the Jewish people abandoned their faith and heritage to prostrate themselves before the image, “God sought to transform the entire world into night…and blood…but He looked at Ḥananya, Mishael, and Azarya, and He was placated” (Sanhedrin 93a). In their merit, the Jewish people remembered their covenant with God, returned to their land, and rebuilt the Temple and the walls of Jerusalem.
  Instead of giving up on life, Ḥananya, Mishael, and Azarya chose to identify with God’s wishes and laws, and as a result were able to accomplish great things. As the Sages said, “Make His will into your will, so that He will make your will into His. Subordinate your will to His so that He will subordinate the will of others to yours” (Avot 2:4). While they could not participate in the covenant of brit mila, so strongly connected with continuity, they embraced the divine covenant with the Jewish people, the Torah, and Eretz Yisrael. This enabled them to reveal the inner value of life when it is connected to its divine source. Thus, they are described as “those who hold fast to My covenant” (Yeshayahu 56:4).10<i class="footnote">Shabbat, too, is mentioned as a merit of the <em>sarisim</em>, for Shabbat connects weekday life to its source and perfects it. The prophet says that the <em>sarisim</em> “keep My Sabbaths.” The use of the plural hints at two aspects of Shabbat. First, Shabbat sanctifies the previous workweek. Second, it infuses the upcoming workweek with holiness and blessing.</i>
  From the lives and deeds of Daniel, Ḥananya, Mishael, and Azarya, we can learn that sometimes it is precisely the infertile who can use their faith to connect to the essence of life. For most people, the here and now is riddled with worry about family and children, but the infertile can focus on pure unconditional faith in God. This allows them to dedicate their lives to giving expression to the covenant between God and the Jewish people. This sustains the entire world and allows the Jews to return to their land and rebuild Jerusalem and the Temple. As it says, “I will give them, in My House and within My walls, a monument and a name better than sons or daughters. I will give them an everlasting name which shall not perish” (Yeshayahu 56:5).
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Pain of Infertility and Its Causes
  The suffering of the childless is intense. The Sages say, “A person who has no children is considered to be like the dead” (Nedarim 64b). They base this on the verse, “When Raḥel saw that she had borne Yaakov no children, she became envious of her sister; and Raḥel said to Yaakov, ‘Give me children, or I shall die’” (Bereishit 30:1). By making this statement, the Sages are trying to help people understand the depth of the anguish of the childless, so that they will pray for them (Tosafot ad loc.). Even couples who already have children but long to have more can become despondent, especially when they live in a community where large families are the norm.
  The question is how we are to understand this suffering: As some kind of punishment for transgression, in which case a person must repent in order to merit having children? Or is one’s fate sealed even before he is born, in which he is blameless in his suffering?
  The answer is extremely complex. Sometimes suffering stems from sin, sometimes from fate, and sometimes from a combination of both. Sometimes repentance and prayer help, and sometimes not. It depends on countless factors, as we will now explain.
  The Sages say, “Life, children, and sustenance do not depend upon merit, but rather upon mazal” (Mo’ed Katan 28a). “Life” refers to length of life, “children” refers to the number of children, and “sustenance” refers to livelihood. These were all assumed to be determined by one’s fate at the moment of the person’s birth, and not by merit. The Talmud proves this from the fact that Rabbah and R. Ḥisda were both righteous people whose prayers were answered in a time of drought. Yet R. Ḥisda lived to be 92, while Rabbah died at forty. R. Ḥisda’s family celebrated sixty weddings, while Rabbah’s household endured sixty bereavements. R. Ḥisda’s household was so wealthy that even its dogs were fed high-quality wheat bread; Rabbah’s household was so poor that they sometimes did not even have low-quality barley bread on the table (ibid.). This accords with the Sages’ statement, “There is no reward for mitzvot in this world” (Kiddushin 39b). Reward for the mitzvot we fulfill and punishments for the sins we commit are not received in this fleeting world but rather in the eternal world of truth.
  The term “mazal” used by the Talmud is what we would call “fate.” As we know today, a person’s genetic makeup is fixed at the moment of conception, and it is a major determinant of how tall, smart, or healthy one will be and what they will look like. The Sages’ statement that life, children, and sustenance are determined by fate at the moment of birth expresses a similar idea.
  Yet this seems to be a matter of dispute among the Sages. According to R. Ḥanina, the Jewish people are subject to mazal, while according to R. Yoḥanan they are not (Shabbat 156a). However, the commentators explain that all agree that mazal has a strong influence, and all agree that the Jewish people, more than any other people, can sometimes change their mazal through prayer and good deeds. The disagreement lies in the question of whether it is common or rare for a Jew to change his mazal (see Tosafot on Shabbat ad loc.; Ritva and Ran on Mo’ed Katan 28a).
  The idea is that every person has a specific destiny to fulfill in this world, and their mazal is determined accordingly. Sometimes one’s destiny requires him to be poor and wretched; other times, it may require him to be rich and healthy. Sometimes a person’s fate is set in stone and there is no escaping it (except in very rare cases). Other times, it is not absolute, and his actions will determine whether he suffers or flourishes. Sometimes, suffering purifies people and saves them from something even worse. In such cases, it is specifically the righteous who suffer. In any case, until the world reaches moral perfection, there will be human suffering, and the way people cope with their suffering can bring moral refinement to the world.
  From a certain perspective, the pain of childlessness differs from other types of suffering. Since having children is a mitzva, righteous people make a greater effort to change their fate in this area, and sometimes the merit of the mitzva may help them alter fate. Even so, there have been righteous people who have been childless.
  After this preface, we can now address the proper way to cope with the pain of childlessness.
  
  Section 2
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Effort of Repentance, Torah, and Kindness
  It is a mitzva for every couple that has difficulty fulfilling the mitzva of procreation to avail themselves of all conventional medical methods in order to have children. While doing so, they should have faith that everything is under God’s benevolent supervision, refining and purifying them, to increase their joy in this world and the next, and to give them the privilege of improving the world.
  The Sages say that a person who is suffering should scrutinize his actions. Perhaps if he corrects his shortcomings, his suffering will end. If he scrutinizes his actions and does not find any particular sin, he should consider that perhaps he sinned by neglecting Torah study. If so, strengthening his Torah study may allow him to realize his destiny and be spared from suffering. If he determines that he has not neglected Torah study, it must be that his suffering is “suffering of love” (yisurim shel ahava), that is, suffering whose purpose is the betterment of all, the perfection and refinement of the world (Berakhot 5a).
  In any event, even when suffering results from sin or neglect of Torah study, if a person can correct it, he not only betters himself, but benefits the whole world, for the world is judged based on the deeds of the majority of its inhabitants. “If a person performs one mitzva, he is praiseworthy, for he has tipped the scales toward merit for himself and for the entire world. But if he commits even one sin, woe to him, for he has tipped the scales toward guilt for himself and the whole world” (Kiddushin 40b).
  The Sages say, “Great is repentance, for it rips up the sentence issued against a person” (Rosh Ha-shana 17b). Not only does repentance rectify the sin of the penitent himself, sometimes it can even rectify sins of previous generations. It may be that a person has been sentenced to be childless because of those sins, and by returning sincerely to God, immersing himself diligently in Torah study, and performing acts of kindness, he can cause the sentence to be torn up, and then he will have children.
  We learn a similar lesson from Ḥofni and Pinḥas, the sons of the high priest Eli, who desecrated the name of heaven in the Tabernacle in Shilo. Because their father did not object strenuously enough to their behavior, he was told, “A time is coming when I will break your power and that of your father’s house, and there shall be no elder in your house” (1 Shmuel 2:31). Indeed, for the next few generations, all of Eli’s descendants died young. As time went on and they married into other families, the only descendants who were affected were those who were named after Eli or whose souls were connected to him. Even a thousand years later, there were still descendants of Eli who carried on his legacy, and the curse affected them. The Talmud says that Rabbah and Abaye were both descendants of Eli, and were expected to die very young. However, they followed the Sages’ instructions and repented sincerely. Rabbah studied Torah diligently and was privileged to live to the age of forty. Abaye engaged in Torah study and acts of kindness, and lived to be sixty. This accords with the homiletic interpretation of the verse, “Assuredly I swear concerning the house of Eli that the iniquity of the house of Eli will never be expiated by [animal] sacrifice or [meal] offering” (ibid., 3:14). The Sages explain: “An animal sacrifice or a meal offering will not atone for the sin, but Torah and kindness will” (Rosh Ha-shana 18a).1<i class="footnote">It is worth noting that although Rabbah did not combine his Torah study with acts of kindness like Abaye did, and thus died younger, the <em>halakha</em> follows him in almost every disagreement in which he was involved (<em>Bava Batra</em> 114b). In contrast, Abaye combined his Torah study with acts of kindness, so although he lived to sixty, the <em>halakha</em> does not follow him in most of the disagreements in which he was involved (<em>Bava Metzi’a</em> 23b).</i>
  Similarly, our ancestors Avraham and Sarah gave birth to Yitzḥak in the merit of drawing people closer to Torah. Avraham reached out to the men and Sarah reached out to the women. They invited guests into their home and taught them about God, thus combining Torah study and acts of kindness. It was fitting, then, that they were entertaining guests when they received the news that they would have a child.
  Moving to Israel – the land of life – and developing it can also help the childless to conceive and bring new life to the world (see Yevamot 64a).
  
  Section 3
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Prayer of the Childless
  Prayer is so powerful that it can rip up a decree of childlessness and break through whatever is blocking conception, as it is written: “Yitzḥak pleaded with the Lord on behalf of his wife, because she was barren; and the Lord responded to his plea, and his wife Rivka conceived” (Bereishit 25:21). The Sages say that Yitzḥak and Rivka recited many prayers and had the same goal in mind. The phrase translated above, “on behalf of his wife,” is “le-nokhaḥ ishto,” which can also be translated as “facing his wife.” These words teach us that: <i>Yitzḥak prostrated himself in one corner and Rivka prostrated herself in another. He said, “Master of the universe, may all the children You give me come from this righteous woman.” She made the same request: “May all the children You give me come from this righteous man.</i>” (Bereishit Rabba 63:5)
  Yitzḥak said, “Why were the patriarchs and matriarchs infertile? Because God craves the prayers of the righteous” (Yevamot 64a). This must be elucidated: The prayers of the righteous help open the gates of blessing for the entire world. Were the righteous to enjoy the good life they deserve, they would not pray for the rest of the world, which would be left to suffer. Since God wants the best for the world, He craves the prayers of the righteous, which connect the world to its source, thus changing reality for the better. The gates of heaven open, raining down blessing on the whole world. As a result, everyone dealing with the same type of difficulty as the righteous is delivered along with them.
  Similarly, the Sages say, “When Sarah conceived, many barren women conceived as well. Many deaf people started hearing, many blind people started seeing, and many of the insane became sane” (Bereishit Rabba 53:8). This explains Sarah’s statement, “God has brought me laughter; everyone who hears will laugh with me” (Bereishit 21:6). For, to a certain extent, all were healed with her.
  There are times when it is a person’s destiny to bring a brand new soul into this world, a soul whose mission is to move the world forward. Since this soul is so new that it has never entered the world, it faces many obstacles. The angels in heaven object that the world is not worthy of advancing to another level. Therefore, the people who are meant to give birth to these souls suffer from infertility. Through their process of purification via repentance and prayer, they open the gates of heaven and are privileged to give birth to new souls.2<i class="footnote">This is why it was so difficult for Yitzḥak to be conceived. Avraham’s outstanding trait was that of <em>ḥesed</em> (kindness), while Yitzḥak’s outstanding trait was that of <em>din </em>(judgment). Up to that time, people associated with judgment were evil. Now it was necessary for a righteous soul to be born with the trait of judgment. Not only that, but these seemingly contradictory traits needed to be linked. Avraham was to have Yitzḥak as a son, which would teach that the purpose of judgment is to empower kindness. This is why there were so many obstacles and objections to Yitzḥak’s birth. When he was finally born, the gates of blessing were opened. Many barren women conceived, and many sick people were healed.The midrash (Bereishit Rabba 45:4) presents another perspective on the difficulty the righteous have in conceiving. To explain why Hagar conceived Yishmael immediately, while Sarah had to wait a long time to conceive Yitzḥak, R. Ḥanina b. Pazi offers an interesting image: “These thorns are neither planted nor tended, yet they grow rapidly of their own accord. In contrast, how much pain and toil are necessary to make wheat grow!</i>”
  
  Section 4
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Ḥanna’s Prayer
  Ḥanna, who was barren, suffered so much that on the holidays she could not bring herself to rejoice before God in the Mishkan at Shilo. While her family ate the meat of the sacrificial offerings and rejoiced, she withdrew and cried. “Her husband Elkana said to her, ‘Ḥanna, why are you crying and why aren’t you eating? Why are you so sad? Am I not more devoted to you than ten sons?’” In response, Ḥanna joined the feast. <i>After they had eaten and drunk at Shilo, Ḥanna rose. The priest Eli was sitting on the seat near the doorpost of the sanctuary of the Lord. In her wretchedness, she prayed to the Lord, weeping all the while. And she made this vow: “O Lord of Hosts, if You will look upon the suffering of Your maidservant, and will remember me and not forget Your maidservant, and if You will grant Your maidservant a male child, I will dedicate him to the Lord for all the days of his life; and no razor shall ever touch his head.</i>” (1 Shmuel 1:8-11) From the depths of her bitter pain she was able to offer a heartfelt prayer. This opened the gates of heaven and enabled the birth of the soul of Shmuel, the greatest prophet of Israel after Moshe Rabbeinu.
  The Sages say (Berakhot 31b): <i>From the day that God created His world, no one referred to God by the name Lord of Hosts (Tzeva’ot) until Ḥanna did. She said before Him, “God, Master of the universe, out of all the many hosts that You have created in Your world, is it difficult for You to grant me one son?!</i>” Appropriately, the name that Ḥanna introduced in her prayer was actualized by her son, the prophet Shmuel. He was the one who had the privilege of revealing holiness to the masses (tzeva’ot) of Israel in its land, as well as establishing generations of prophets, founding Israel’s monarchy, and planning the building of the Temple.
  There is another powerful description of Ḥanna’s prayer: <i>As she kept on praying before the Lord, Eli watched her mouth. Now Ḥanna was praying in her heart; only her lips moved, but her voice could not be heard. So Eli thought she was drunk. Eli said to her, “How long will you make a drunken spectacle of yourself? Sober up!</i>” (1 Shmuel 1:12-14) In other words, Ḥanna’s prayer was so extraordinary and innovative that even the high priest Eli initially thought that she was drunk. Ḥanna replied, “Oh no, my lord! I am a very unhappy woman. I have drunk no wine or other strong drink, but I have been pouring out my heart to the Lord. Do not take your maidservant for a worthless woman; I have only been speaking all this time out of my great anguish and distress.” “Then go in peace,” said Eli, “and may the God of Israel grant you what you have asked of Him.” (ibid., 15-17)
  Not only did Ḥanna’s prayer lead to the birth of the prophet Shmuel, but the Sages derive several laws from her prayer: supplicants must pray with intent, must form the words with their lips, and must not raise their voices (Berakhot 31a). From the depths of her pain of childlessness, Ḥanna revealed new laws and uncovered new understandings of prayer. This is an example of how the pain and distress of infertility can bring blessing to the world.
  
  Section 5
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Comfort for the Infertile
  Sometimes all the prayers, repentance, intense Torah learning, and kind acts do not solve the problem of infertility. Months pass, years go by, and the couple does not conceive. It may be that their fate is sealed and cannot be changed, because the soul which they would conceive belongs to a more perfect world whose time has not yet come. Perhaps if they would manage to change their fate, their child would be profoundly evil, because he would be incompatible with his time period. Thus, God is being kind to them by sparing them the birth of a child who would cause them great pain and send them to the grave in misery. Along these lines, the Sages state that after the destruction of the Temple and the exile of the Jewish people, the dignitaries of the other nations mocked them and said that they were infertile and could not have children in Eretz Yisrael. The Jews retorted, “When evil rules the land, it is better to be barren rather than give birth to evil children who will end up in hell, like you” (Berakhot 10a). This explains the verse, “Rejoice, O barren one, you who bore no child! Shout aloud for joy, you who did not travail! For the children of the wife forlorn shall outnumber those of the espoused, said the Lord” (Yeshayahu 54:1).
  Some writers go so far as to say that the infertile should be careful not to pray excessively. Instead, they should say that if their having children is not what God wants, then they retract their request, because sometimes heaven knows that were this couple to have children, they would be evil or undergo terrible suffering. To minimize the couple’s pain, heaven does not grant them children (Shevet Musar 24:19).
  Even so, the infertile should know that all the prayers that they recite, the good deeds that they do, and the Torah that they study are not going to waste. Even if they do not produce the hoped-for result, they may help other childless couples conceive. In any case, these practices certainly improve the world and bring it closer to the day when those children’s souls can be born.
  
  Section 6
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Value of Their Love and Joy
  A couple that has not been blessed with children face a great challenge. Will they wallow in their pain, and lose their faith and joie de vivre? Or will they overcome their pain, increase their love for each other, fulfill the mitzva of ona with extra joy, and constantly think about how to bring goodness and joy into the lives of their families and friends? Though they have not been blessed with children, there is great intrinsic value in their intimacy.
  The Sages ask why our matriarchs were barren. One of the Sages answers, “So that they would endear themselves to their husbands through their beauty.” Another explains, “So that their husbands take pleasure in them, for when a woman is pregnant, she loses her looks and is neglected by her husband.” During the ninety years that Sarah did not give birth, Avraham treated her like a bride under the wedding canopy, and all the women inquired about her (Bereishit Rabba 45:4). Thus, from one perspective, childless couples can increase and intensify the love, passion, and joy they share.
  That is the meaning behind the kabbalistic statement that each time a husband and wife unite sexually in love and passion, an abundance of life and blessing is added to this world. As Shlah states: <i>Each and every act of intercourse, when undertaken in sanctity, will have a positive impact. Even if the wife does not conceive…[the husband] is not wasting seed; rather, a holy soul comes into existence as a result…. For a soul comes into being with every act of intercourse, and the offspring of others are then endowed with these souls…. This is why Avraham could sleep with Sarah even though she was barren. It was not, God forbid, a waste.</i> (Sha’ar Ha-otiyot, Kedushat Ha-zivug §402) Shlah goes on to cite Zohar, which explains that the perfect love and devotion that infused the intimate relations of these two righteous people, Avraham and Sarah, led to the creation of souls in the supernal realms, which then descended to this world, and with which children of various families were endowed. When those children grew up, they were drawn to Avraham and Sarah, who brought them close to God. These are the souls referred to in the verse (Bereishit 12:5), “The souls they created in Ḥaran” (Zohar III 168a). Thus, when husband and wife overcome their sadness and unite with devotion and passion, they become partners in drawing down souls into the world and create sparks of souls through their sexual union.
  Furthermore, when a childless couple manages, despite their pain and suffering, to strengthen their faith, deepen their love for each other, and bring one another pleasure through the mitzva of ona, they add life and blessing to the entire world. There is a special purity in their love, which is unconditional and does not depend on the children they share. Their loving unity gives expression to divine unity, revealing it in this world. Although they cannot have children, they can reveal the intrinsic value of life, thus adding vitality and continued existence to all the worlds. As Arizal explains, there are two kinds of sexual intercourse – one serves the purpose of creating souls, while the other sustains worlds and keeps them alive (Sha’ar Ha-Mitzvot, Bereishit, p. 7). It is true that even couples who have children may experience the second type of intercourse, for example when the wife is pregnant, nursing, or menopausal. However, since this is the only type of union a childless couple have, it has a greater influence on the world. All this is assuming that the love and happiness they share indeed enable them to break through the barriers of sadness and have a positive view of the world; to rejoice in the joy of relatives and friends, contribute to the world, and be kind to others as best they can.
  
  Section 7
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Adoption
  The Sages say, “One who raises an orphaned boy or girl in his home is considered by the Torah as if he gave birth to them” (Megilla 13a). This refers not only to an orphan who has lost both parents, but also to a child whose parents are unable to meet all his basic physical and emotional needs, as the source for this assertion is a midrash that extrapolates that Moshe Rabbeinu is referred to as the son of Pharaoh’s daughter Bitya even though his biological mother, Yocheved, was alive and nursed him. Since Bitya raised him, he is regarded as her son as well.
  The Sages also say (Ketubot 50a) that one who raises an orphaned child and marries him off is considered by the Torah as one of those “who do righteous deeds at all times” (Tehilim 106:3). According to the Midrash, God has treasure houses full of rewards for the righteous. Among them is a special warehouse with rewards for those who take in orphans and raise them (Shemot Rabba 45:6).
  Some even maintain that a couple who raises an orphan actually fulfills the mitzva of procreation. This approach takes literally the Sages’ statement, “He is considered by the Torah as if he gave birth to them” (see Ḥokhmat Shlomo, EH 1:1). Even according to the poskim who maintain that the equation is not literal, from a certain perspective, this couple performs an even greater mitzva because they act voluntarily.
  Similarly, we find that even though adopted children are not technically obligated in the mitzva of honoring parents vis-à-vis their adoptive parents, Torah ethics obligate them in everything that is incumbent upon biological children. Perhaps they must do even more, since their parents adopted them voluntarily. Similarly, it is a mitzva for adopted children to mourn for their adoptive parents and recite Kaddish for them. The only difference between an adopted child and a biological one is that the latter may not perform a medical procedure on a parent if it would cause bleeding, while the former may (Peninei Halakha: Collected Essays – Mishpaḥa 1:24-25).
  Someone who would find it difficult to raise or help raise an orphan can donate money to help abandoned children, provide for their needs, and get them on their feet. In doing so he is a partner in raising them, and from a certain perspective it is as if he has given birth to them. The more significant the help he gives, the truer this is.
  People who help parents care for and educate their children are also considered parents on some level, as it says (Ruth 4:17), “The women neighbors gave him a name, saying, ‘A son is born to Naomi!’ They named him Oved; he was the father of Yishai, father of David.” The Sages explain that the reason that Oved, son of Ruth and Boaz, is also called Naomi’s son is because she was involved in caring for and educating him (Sanhedrin 19b).
  
  Section 8
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Teaching Students
  The Sages say, “One who teaches Torah to someone else’s child is considered by the Torah as if he gave birth to him.” Whereas Aharon gave birth to his sons, Moshe Rabbeinu taught them Torah, so they are called his sons as well (Sanhedrin 19b).
  Similarly, it is written in Shema, “Teach them to your children” (Devarim 6:7). The Sages interpret: “Your children” – refers to your students. We find that students are referred to as children in many other places as well, as it says, “Then the sons of the prophets at Beit El came out to Elisha” (2 Melakhim 2:3). Were they the prophets’ children? Rather, they were their students. We derive from this that students are called children…. Just as students are called children, so too teachers are called parents. Thus, we read (ibid., 2:12), “Elisha saw and cried out: ‘Father, father! Israel’s chariots and horsemen!’ Then he did not see him again.” (Sifrei)
  This notion has halakhic significance as well. If someone finds two lost objects, one belonging to his father and the other to his teacher, and he is unable to return them both, his teacher’s lost object takes precedence, “because his father brought him into this world, while his teacher, by teaching him Torah, brings him into the next world.” However, if his father is also a Torah scholar, then his father’s lost object takes precedence (Bava Metzi’a 33a).
  According to Zohar (I 187b), in the verses we saw above (7:6), the prophet Yeshayahu addresses those who are not privileged to have children: <i>For thus said the Lord: “As for the eunuchs who keep My Sabbaths, who have chosen what I desire and hold fast to My covenant – I will give them, in My House and within My walls, a monument and a name better than sons or daughters. I will give them an everlasting name which shall not perish.</i>” (Yeshayahu 56:4-5) A story is told about how R. Yoḥanan was distraught after all of his children died young and he had not fulfilled the mitzva of procreating. Then an elder comforted him by saying that his students were considered his children, and in their merit he would have a place in the next world and an everlasting name (Zohar Ḥadash, Ruth, 108b).
  Those who support Torah students are also considered their teachers, for without them, the students would be unable to learn.
  According to Sefer Ḥasidim (§367), sometimes God does not want to deplete a person’s heavenly account. Therefore, he does not get to enjoy both Torah and children in this world. It is because he is not blessed with children that he can be blessed with Torah, which will give him an everlasting name.
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Intermediate Status of the Fetus
  One of the most difficult questions in Jewish law is: under what circumstances is terminating a pregnancy justified? Let us first review the basics.
  On one hand, it is clear that one may not kill a fetus, whether directly or indirectly. Not only that, we desecrate Shabbat in order to save a fetus, even within forty days of conception, because this fetus will one day be a living human, and the Sages say, “Desecrate one Shabbat on his behalf, so that he can observe many [future] Shabbatot” (Yoma 85b). Since the fetus will be a living person in the future, the same logic applies to saving it (Behag; Rambam; Peninei Halakha: Shabbat 27:3).
  On the other hand, it is clear that as long as the fetus is in its mother’s womb, it does not have the status of a living human being. Therefore, even though someone who kills another person is liable for the death penalty, someone who kills a fetus is not. Additionally, since a fetus is not yet considered human life, it does not inherit like one who was already born, and it does not become ritually impure if its mother comes into contact with a corpse. A fetus becomes a bona fide human being only at the moment of birth (Nidda 44a-b).
  Thus, an unborn fetus has an intermediate status – it will become a person, but is not a person yet.
  We further learn that when there is a conflict between the life of the fetus and the life of the mother, the mother’s life takes precedence. As the Mishna states, “If a woman is suffering from a difficult labor, we cut up the fetus inside her and remove it limb by limb, because her life takes precedence over its life” (m. Ohalot 7:6). Even if the fetus will be born any moment, it may be killed in order to save its mother’s life. However, from the moment of birth, that is, from the moment its head or most of its body emerges, he is considered a living human being. Even if the mother’s life is clearly in danger, it is forbidden to kill the baby in order to save her, because “one life does not supersede another” (ibid.). We do not kill one person in order to save another.1<i class="footnote">The Sages ask why a we don’t kill a baby even once its head has emerged on the grounds that it is threatening its mother’s life and therefore should be considered a <em>rodef</em>, a “pursuer” who can be killed in order to save the life of his potential victim. They answer: “This case is different, for the mother is being pursued by heaven” (<em>Sanhedrin</em> 72b). That is, the baby is not to blame for the distress of childbirth, as it is a natural process created by God. Therefore, the baby is not deemed a <em>rodef</em>Rambam writes, however (MT, Laws of a Murderer and Saving Lives 1:9):We are commanded not to show compassion for a rodef. Therefore, the Sages teach that if a pregnant woman is having a dangerously difficult birth, it is permissible to destroy the fetus inside her, whether with drugs or a knife, since it is like a rodef trying to kill her. However, once its head has emerged, we do not harm him, for one life does not supersede another, and this is the nature of the world.Some wish to derive from this ruling that killing a fetus is like murder, and is permissible only to save the mother, “since it is like a rodef trying to kill her” (Igrot Moshe, ḤM 2:69). However, this cannot be derived from the Talmud. The Talmud mentions rodef only in order to make the point that it is permissible to take the life of the fetus even after parturition has begun. The implication is that before that point, there is no doubt that killing it is permissible, because it is not yet a living being. Some understand Rambam this way as well. As long as the fetus remains in the womb, it is clearly permissible to take its life in order to save the mother’s. Once parturition has begun, though, one might claim that the fetus is close to being considered human life. Therefore, Rambam needs to provide a reason for allowing the fetus to be killed. He does so by declaring the fetus a rodef (Aḥiezer 3:72).There are additional explanations for Rambam’s designating the fetus as a rodef. I will present several: Declaring the fetus a rodef means that it can be killed even in a degrading way, such as dismemberment (Responsa Ge’onei Batra’i §45). Alternatively, the rationale of rodef is introduced to make clear that the permission to abort applies to Noaḥides as well, even though Noaḥides are normally liable to be put to death for killing a fetus (see R. Akiva Eger on m. Ohalot 7:6). Others explain that Rambam uses the words “like a rodef” as a rhetorical flourish, to make the law more palatable, but this should not lead us to conclude that killing a fetus is considered murder (Seridei Esh, ḤM 162:12). Similarly, Rav Naḥum Rabinovitch writes that the law concerning a fetus is not literally like that of a rodef, for the rodef must be warned of the consequences of his action, while obviously a fetus cannot be warned. Rather, when Rambam says that the fetus is like a rodef, he means that we save the mother by any means possible (Yad Peshuta). There are other interpretations as well, all of which conclude that Rambam does not consider a fetus to be a living being. See Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:3:1, which discusses this at length.</i>
  
  Section 2
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Jews
  Although abortion is prohibited for both Jews and Noaḥides (i.e., non-Jews, who are obligated in the seven Noaḥide laws), there is a difference when it comes to punishment. A Jew who kills a fetus is not punished by a beit din for doing so, while a gentile who kills a fetus is liable for the death penalty.
  As is well known, non-Jews are obligated in seven mitzvot. A non-Jew who transgresses any of them incurs the death penalty. One of these seven is the prohibition against murder, as Noaḥ was told, upon exiting the ark: “Whoever sheds the blood of a person (ha-adam), by a person (ba-adam) shall his blood be shed, for God made people in His image” (Bereishit 9:6). R. Yishmael extrapolates that even a person who kills a fetus incurs the death penalty, as the verse can be read homiletically: “Whoever sheds the blood of a person (ha-adam) in a person (ba-adam) – his blood shall be shed.” Who is a person in a person? A fetus (Sanhedrin 57b; MT, Laws of Kings 9:4).2<i class="footnote">It can be inferred from the need for this homiletic reading that killing a fetus would not otherwise be considered murder. If the verse had simply said that it is forbidden to spill blood, we would not have known that a fetus is included in the prohibition. It is only because the Torah adds the word “<em>ba-adam</em>” (in a person) that we derive that a fetus is included. The Torah states that a Jew who strikes a woman and causes her to miscarry must compensate her financially for her loss, paying her a sum set by a <em>beit din</em>. As it says, “When men fight, and one of them pushes a pregnant woman and a miscarriage results, but no other damage ensues, the one responsible will be punished in accordance with what the woman’s husband demands of him, and will pay what the judges determine” (Shemot 21:22).</i>
  In contrast, a Jew who kills a fetus does not incur the death penalty. When the Torah later explains that a murderer is put to death, it does not hint that a fetus-killer would be included in this category. Nevertheless, it is clear that a Jew may not kill a fetus, as there is a general principle that anything forbidden to non-Jews is forbidden to Jews as well. The purpose of the Torah is to sanctify the Jewish people and to demand much of them when it comes to mitzvot, so it is inconceivable that something forbidden to non-Jews would be permissible for Jews (Sanhedrin 59a). Thus, once we know that a non-Jews may not kill a fetus, it follows that Jews may not, either. The only distinction is in the severity of the punishment: a non-Jew is put to death for killing a fetus, while a Jew is not.
  It is important to know that according to halakha, even when a beit din had the authority to apply capital punishment, only very rarely was a Torah-mandated execution carried out. It was so rare that a Sanhedrin which executed one person in seven years was labeled “destructive.” According to R. Elazar b. Azarya, even if it executed only one person in seventy years, it was considered a destructive Sanhedrin (m. Makkot 1:10). Although there are dozens of sins for which the Torah mandates capital punishment, in practice the beit din did not kill a single person in seven (or seventy) years. Thus, we see that the death penalty prescribed by the Torah, whether for Jews or non-Jews, was intended mainly as a deterrent and to express the severity of the sin and its punishment in this world and the next. It was not meant to lead to frequent executions.
  In theory, then, in the matter of abortion, the Torah was more stringent for non-Jews than for Jews. This may many gentile nations tend to devalue human life, to the extent that some are suspected of bloodshed (m. Avoda Zara 2:1). In order to make it clear that their attitude is completely wrong, the Torah makes abortion a capital crime for them. Nevertheless, it would seem that when it comes to abortion necessitated by severe illness, the law for Jews and non-Jews is the same; in any situation where Jews may terminate a pregnancy, non-Jews may, too.3<i class="footnote">As we will see, according to many <em>poskim</em>, a Jewish woman may undergo an abortion if the fetus suffers from a severe illness or if there is a concern that continuing the pregnancy will cause the mother to become gravely ill. Some say that it is forbidden for non-Jews to undergo abortions in such cases, since the prohibition of abortion is more severe for them. However, it seems that in practice, in any case in which a Jewish woman would be permitted to terminate a pregnancy, a non-Jewish woman would be permitted to do so as well. This is based on the fundamental principle that there is nothing forbidden to a non-Jew but permitted to a Jew. True, the Torah was more stringent regarding the theoretical punishment for non-Jews, but that was only in order to deter them from sinning, as emerges from the second explanation of <em>Tosafot</em> to <em>Sanhedrin </em>59a, s.v. “leika.”So far, we have been assuming that the principle mentioned above – that there can be nothing permitted to Jews but forbidden to non-Jews – is halakhically binding (Tosafot on Ḥullin 33a, s.v. “eḥad”). In contrast, some Aḥaronim write that according to Rambam, this principle is not halakhically binding. Therefore, it is possible that something is prohibited for a non-Jew but permissible for a Jew, such as eating meat from an animal that is still twitching after being slaughtered (MT, Laws of Kings 9:13; Ḥatam Sofer, YD §19; Arukh La-ner to Sanhedrin 59a).However, it seems that all opinions agree with the principle in general, as we find numerous poskim who take it into account. The Aḥaronim who seem to reject the principle mean that even though Jews are required to be stringent, there may be a leniency in some minor detail. For example, Jews must be meticulous in following all the laws of sheḥita (animal slaughter), but as a result, once the animal has been properly slaughtered, even if it is still twitching, eating its meat is not considered a transgression of ever min ha-ḥai (eating part of a living animal) for a Jew, whereas itis forbidden to a non-Jew. Therefore, there cannot be any law which is fundamentally stricter for non-Jews than for Jews, and certainly not an issue as morally and practically important as abortion. See also Rashba to Ḥullin 33a, who states that when there is a rationale, a specific detail might be more lenient for Jews. See also Sdei Ḥemed, Klalei Ha-Mem 166.Thus, the prohibition of abortion must be the same for both Jews and non-Jews, the sole difference being the punishment specified by the Torah. There is another difference between Jews and non-Jews in the requirement for meting out punishment. If a non-Jew transgresses one of his seven mitzvot, he can be executed even based on the testimony of one witness, and even if he was not warned about the punishment for his action before he transgressed. In contrast, a Jew can be executed only based on the testimony of two witnesses, and only after being warned. This does not mean that the Torah requires us to pursue every non-Jew who transgressed one of the seven Noaḥide commandments in order to execute him. Rather, when necessary for the sake of improving the world, the legal system may execute a Noaḥide sinner, even based on the testimony of one witness, and even if he has not been warned.</i>
  
  Section 3
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Abortion for a Great Need
  As we have seen, if a pregnancy endangers the mother’s life, she may abort (m. Ohalot 7:6). There are other scenarios in which the permissibility of an abortion is less clear, for example, in a case where the mother’s life is not at risk but carrying to term might lead her to go blind or deaf, or if prenatal testing shows that the fetus is ill and will live a life full of suffering. These questions have arisen in our era, now that medicine can tell us a great deal about the fetus.
  This question is a matter of dispute among leading poskim. Those who are stringent maintain that the prohibition against abortion is an offshoot of the prohibition against murder. Although we have seen that a fetus is not yet considered a living human being, it is nevertheless developing into one and can already be considered alive to an extent. Therefore, one who destroys a fetus transgresses an offshoot of the prohibition against murder. Just as it is prohibited to perform euthanasia, so it is forbidden to perform an abortion. Only in a case where the pregnancy endangers the life of the mother is it permissible to destroy a fetus (R. Unterman, No’am 6). R. Moshe Feinstein goes so far as to say that since aborting a fetus is considered like murder, only when it is almost certain that the fetus will cause its mother’s death is abortion permitted in order to save her (Igrot Moshe, ḤM 2:69).
  In contrast, many poskim maintain that the prohibition against abortion is not an offshoot of murder. Some say that abortion is forbidden because of ḥavala (the prohibition to cause bodily harm); just as it is forbidden for a person to cut off one of his limbs, so too it is forbidden to kill a fetus, which is a limb of its mother (Responsa Maharit 1:97; Amud Ha-yemini §32). Others say that abortion is forbidden because of hashḥata (wanton destruction), based on a fortiori reasoning: if it is a grave sin even to waste seed (hashḥatat zera), clearly it is forbidden to kill a fetus that has already begun to develop (Ḥavot Ya’ir §31). Others offer a conceptually similar rationale: we are commanded to be fruitful and multiply, so abortion is prohibited on the grounds that it prevents such growth and procreation (Mishpetei Uziel, ḤM 4:46). According to all of these opinions, since abortion does not constitute a form of murder – one of the most severe prohibitions – it is permissible to perform an abortion in very difficult circumstances, just as it is permissible to amputate a limb in order to preserve a patient’s overall health (Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:3:3).
  Even though it emerges from the discussions in the Talmud, Rishonim, and Aḥaronim that the prohibition of abortion is not as severe as an offshoot of murder, many poskim nevertheless rule strictly: some because of the great value of life that exists in potential within the fetus, and others because they do not rely on the opinions of doctors. Practically speaking, even though there is a tendency to rule restrictively in cases of uncertainty vis-à-vis such weighty issues, in this case it is proper to rule leniently, because forbidding abortion in such cases can cause terrible suffering, both to the parents and to the unborn child. Families sometimes break apart under such strain. Therefore, under such extremely pressing circumstances, we can rely on the lenient opinions, as their position is better grounded in the sources. This is the inclination of my teachers, the heads of Yeshivat Merkaz Ha-Rav. Still, every such case must be carefully considered by a Torah scholar who understands the halakhic issue and has obtained the expert opinion of a God-fearing doctor.4<i class="footnote">Those who adopt the stringent view reason that the prohibition of abortion for non-Jews is an offshoot of murder according to the plain meaning of the Talmud (<em>Sanhedrin </em>57b):Yishmael is quoted as saying: “[A non-Jew is put to death] even for [killing] a fetus.” Whence is this derived?… It says, “Whoever sheds the blood of a person in a person – his blood shall be shed.” Who is a person in a person? A fetus.As we saw above, there is a general principle that “nothing is permitted to a Jew but prohibited to a non-Jew” (ibid. 59a). Thus, if a non-Jew is forbidden to abort because it is a type of murder, this applies to a Jew as well (R. Unterman, No’am 6; Igrot Moshe, ḤM 2:69). As discussed in n. 1, some also extrapolate from Rambam’s characterization of the fetus as a rodef (MT, Laws of a Murderer 1:9) that it would otherwise be considered an offshoot of murder. R. Menashe Klein rules this way (Mishneh Halakhot 6:204 and 9:328). See n. 1, where we present several explanations of Rambam that are at odds with this conclusion, so this ruling cannot be used as precedent for the restrictive approach. Some ruled in accordance with the restrictive approach due to the severity of the issue, not because they deemed abortion to be murder; these include R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv and R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Nishmat Avraham, ḤM 425:1:1). Rabbi Shmuel Wosner rejects the position of Igrot Moshe that abortion is a type of murder, but only permits abortion if the mother’s life is potentially at risk (Shevet Ha-Levi 7:208 and 9:266). Others added another consideration: it is problematic to rely on doctors’ recommendations in this area, because there are many cases of false positive diagnoses of defects and abnormalities. R. Ovadia Yosef is hesitant to permit abortion for this reason, as well as because of the possible Torah transgression involved (Yabi’a Omer, EH 4:1).According to R. Moshe Feinstein, abortion is permitted only when the mother is in grave danger and will almost certainly die unless she aborts (Igrot Moshe, ḤM 2:69). However, it seems that most poskim who adopt the restrictive approach would permit an abortion if the woman’s life is at risk, even if it far from certain that she will die, as we cite in sections 5 and 12 in the name of R. Elyashiv and R. Auerbach regarding a woman whose mental health is in jeopardy. They ruled similarly about fetal reduction, as cited in section 14 and n. 13 below. Likewise, R. Yitzḥak Yaakov Weiss permitted abortion in a case where the pregnancy would have caused the mother to go blind, because the Sages say (Avoda Zara 28b) that danger to one’s eyes constitutes danger to one’s life (Minḥat Yitzḥak, Likutei Teshuvot §138).In contrast, those who are permissive maintain that the fetus is not yet considered a living human being. As evidence they cite the mishna (Nidda 5:3) that implies that a fetus does not inherit and cannot become impure, and one who kills it is not liable to the death penalty, and the mishna that permits abortion during a difficult labor (Ohalot 7:6): “If a woman is suffering from a difficult labor, we cut up the fetus inside her and remove it limb by limb, because her life takes precedence over its life. Once it has mostly emerged, we do not touch it, for we do not discard one life for the sake of another.” Thus, until birth, a fetus is not considered a living human being. Another mishna states: “If a woman is about to be executed, they do not wait for her to give birth before carrying out the sentence” (m. Arakhin 1:4). The Talmud elaborates: “R. Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel: ‘A woman who is about to be executed is struck in the abdomen so that the fetus will die before the execution, and thus she will not be degraded’” (Arakhin 7a). Rashi explains: “If some life were to remain in the fetus, it will emerge after the mother’s death, which is degrading.” The mishna continues: “If the woman is already in labor, we wait for her to give birth before executing her.” The Talmud clarifies: “Why? Because once the fetus detaches (from the uterus), it is a separate corporate entity.” We see from Shmuel’s statement that even when a woman is at the end of her pregnancy and the fetus could easily be saved after her execution, it is permissible to kill the fetus first, simply to avoid the possible degradation of the mother’s corpse. This proves that the fetus is not considered a living human being in any way, as it can be actively killed even for a relatively minor need.In practice, we find that some Aḥaronim permit abortion even in cases where the mother’s life is not in danger. In the past, most discussions of this issue were in the context of whether it was permissible to abort a mamzer. R. Yair Bacharach considers this question: On one hand, he writes that there are grounds to permit aborting a fetus known to be a mamzer. He bases this on the position of Tosafot to Nidda 44a. On the other hand, abortion might be prohibited because of hashḥata. If this is the case, perhaps the abortion of a mamzer should be prohibited in order to deter adultery and penalize sinners (Ḥavot Ya’ir §31). R. Yosef Ḥayim of Baghdad was asked whether a mamzer fetus could be aborted in the fifth month. He did not want to decide the case, but instead summarized various responsa for the inquirer. Reading between the lines, it seems that he was inclined to be lenient. He quoted Ḥavot Ya’ir, which permits when there is a great need. He also quoted Maharit, who prohibits abortion because of ḥavala, but permits it when there is a need (Responsa Maharit 1:97). Based on this, R. Yosef Ḥayim of Baghdad raised the possibility that “if having the baby will disgrace and shame the family, and constitute a desecration of God’s name, having an abortion is considered a great need” and is permissible (Rav Pe’alim, EH 1:4). R. Yaakov Emden permits the abortion of a mamzer since, in principle, a woman who committed adultery is liable to be put to death, in which case her fetus would clearly die as well. He also permits abortion when necessary for the mother’s health, even if the situation is not life-threatening (She’elat Ya’avetz 1:43).All these responsa discuss a perfectly healthy fetus that could develop into a great Torah scholar, who is considered greater than an ignorant high priest (Horayot 13a). His only disadvantage would be in not being permitted to marry a Jewish-born woman. Yet many permit aborting even such a fetus. They would certainly permit aborting a fetus which, if born, would be incapable of caring for himself and whose life would be full of pain and suffering.Several other Aḥaronim likewise permit abortion even when there is no danger to the mother’s life. For example, R. Shneur Zalman Fradkin of Lublin notes that there is disagreement about whether abortion is a Torah prohibition or a rabbinic one, but concludes that even if it is a Torah prohibition, abortion is permitted to protect the health and well-being of the mother, even if her life is not in danger (Responsa Torat Ḥesed, EH 42). R. Ben-Zion Meir Ḥai Uziel permitted an abortion for a woman who the doctors believed would become deaf if she were to carry her pregnancy to term. He considered avoiding deafness to be a great need, as losing her hearing is more degrading for her than it is for the executed woman in Arakhin 7a to lose her fetus (Mishpetei Uziel ḤM 4:46). R. Yeḥiel Yaakov Weinberg is also among those who are inclined to be lenient, since the majority of Rishonim do not believe that a fetus is considered a living human being (Seridei Esh, ḤM §162).Some say that the entire prohibition of abortion is rabbinic. R. Fradkin explains this to be the opinion of Tosafot (to Nidda 44b), Ran, and Raavad. R. Waldenberg arrives at a similar conclusion, based on several Aḥaronim (Tzitz Eliezer 8:36). They apparently maintain that the principle under which “nothing is permitted to a Jew but prohibited to a non-Jew” is upheld even when the prohibition on non-Jews is from the Torah and the prohibition on Jews is rabbinic. In any case, if the prohibition of abortion for Jews is rabbinic, then clearly in cases of great need, it can be permitted.In my opinion, it must be that the prohibition of abortion for non-Jews, like the prohibition for Jews, is not an offshoot of murder, but is forbidden as an act of injury (ḥavala, as Ḥavot Ya’ir maintains) or destruction (hashḥata, as Maharit argues). Even though the prohibition is derived from a verse dealing with murder (“Whoever sheds the blood of a person in a person”), this means that it is a safeguard against murder, but is itself an act of injury or destruction.Waldenberg deals extensively with the issue of abortion and concludes, based on several basic principles, that abortion is permissible when there is a great need (Responsa Tzitz Eliezer 7:48; 8:36; 9:51:3; 14:100-101). My rabbi and teacher R. Shaul Yisraeli writes similarly in Amud Ha-yemini §32. R. Yisraeli was once consulted about a case where there was a 25 percent chance that the fetus was abnormal. R. Yisraeli could not bring himself to permit the abortion. However, R. Zvi Yehuda Kook, who heard about the intense worry and pain of the couple involved, permitted the abortion in practice, based on what R. Yisraeli had written. My rabbi and teacher R. Avraham Shapira was inclined to agree with R. Zvi Yehuda. (At first, he told me to broadcast on my Halakha Corner radio program that if a woman is carrying a fetus suffering from Down syndrome, the couple may present the question to a rabbi known to rule permissively in such a case. Later, I heard that he himself ruled permissively.)</i>
  
  Section 4
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The First Forty Days and the Subsequent Stages of Pregnancy
  The earlier the stage of the fetus’s gestational development, the more room there is for leniency in allowing an abortion. Conversely, the more developed the fetus is, the higher the degree of life it exhibits, and even the most lenient opinions would permit abortion only in more drastic cases.
  Until forty days have passed since conception, the fetus’s organs have not yet begun to form, and it does not yet even have the status of a fetus. Consequently, if a woman aborts or miscarries her fetus within the first forty days, if she subsequently bears a son, he has the status of “firstborn,” as the earlier fetus is considered “mere water” (Yevamot 69b). Based on this, even some of those who adopt the stringent view permit abortion during the first forty days in a case of great need.5<i class="footnote">We desecrate Shabbat to save a fetus even when it is less than forty days old. This is because the fetus can develop into a human being, and, as the Sages say, “Desecrate one Shabbat on his behalf, so that he can observe many <em>Shabbatot</em>” (<em>Yoma</em> 85b; <em>Behag</em>; Rambam; <em>Peninei Halakha: Shabbat</em> 27:3; 9:1 above).Nevertheless, the Talmud states that a kohen’s daughter carrying the baby of a non-kohen (to whom she is not married) is still considered part of the kohen’s household and may therefore still eat teruma during the first forty days of pregnancy, since the fetus is considered “mere water.” However, once the fetus is older than that, it has status, and she may no longer eat teruma (Yevamot 69b).The laws that determine who is a firstborn reflect a similar principle. An oldest son, born after a previous pregnancy ended with an abortion or miscarriage within forty days of conception, has the status of a firstborn, for it is only after forty days that a fetus becomes substantial and begins to develop organs. Before this, it is insubstantial (SA YD 305:23). Doctors today know that in a normal pregnancy, the fetus’s organs have not begun to form by day forty; they only begin to take shape after day 42. It is important to note that doctors normally calculate the beginning of a pregnancy from the day the woman got her last period, though conception generally occurs at least fourteen days later, at the time of ovulation. In contrast, the forty days are counted from conception, that is, the union of the sperm and ovum. When an abortion or miscarriage takes place more than forty days after conception, but the fetus stopped developing beforehand, the status of the subsequent child hinges on the fetus’s developmental stage. If it had not yet reached the development expected by day 41, a subsequent firstborn son must have a pidyon ha-ben (redemption of the firstborn). If there is uncertainty, the son is redeemed, but without a berakha.In practice, since a fetus is considered “mere water” for the first forty days, those who are lenient and allow abortion in cases of great need would be lenient for less pressing needs in that early stage. We see this clearly in Responsa Be-ohala Shel Torah (1:115), where R. Ariel writes that an unmarried pregnant woman who finds it too difficult to give her child up for adoption may abort her pregnancy until day forty (likewise, Responsa Bnei Banim 3:38). Moreover, some poskim who tend to be restrictive about abortion in general, such as R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, are more permissive during the first forty days in cases of need (Nishmat Avraham, ḤM 425:1 n. 4, writing about Tay-Sachs). Nevertheless, some are as restrictive about abortion before the fortieth day as they are about after. In their view, the primary consideration is that the fetus is a potential human being on whose behalf we permit desecration of Shabbat (R. Unterman; Igrot Moshe, ḤM 2:69 is inclined to agree with him). See below, section 11 and n. 10.Ḥayim Ozer Grodzinski writes that non-Jews do not commit a capital crime by aborting within the first forty days of a pregnancy (implying that there is no prohibition for them to do so), while there is a rabbinic prohibition for Jews to do so (Responsa Aḥiezer 3:65, at the end). R. Weinberg writes this as well (Seridei Esh, ḤM 162:22). Torat Ḥesed, EH 42:33 agrees regarding non-Jews.</i>
  From day 41, since the fetus’s organs have begun to take shape, those who adopt the restrictive approach maintain that abortion may be performed only if the mother’s life may be in danger. Nevertheless, some of those who adopt the restrictive approach maintain that since the woman’s pregnancy is not considered discernible until three months have passed, in cases of great need, abortion can be permitted (several Aḥaronim cited by Yabi’a Omer, EH 4:1).
  In contrast, according to those who take the permissive approach, since abortion is not prohibited as a form of murder, it is permitted even after the end of the first trimester in cases of great need. However, the more developed the fetus is, the more compelling a reason is required to permit aborting it. Therefore, couples are encouraged to perform any necessary testing as early as possible, so that if an abortion is necessary it can be done as soon as possible (Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:3; Amud Ha-yemini §32).
  Once a fetus is viable, that is, that it could survive on its own if it were born, it is almost impossible to permit abortion, even according to those who take the permissive approach. However, if it is clear that the fetus would not live for more than thirty days even if it were born naturally, then in certain cases some of those who rule permissively would permit abortion.
  When pregnancy jeopardizes the mother’s life, all poskim permit abortion; even if labor has already begun, we kill the fetus to save the mother; but once the baby’s head or most of its body has emerged, we do not hurt it, for it is considered a human being, and we do not kill one person to save another (Ohalot 7:6).6<i class="footnote">There would seem to be no differentiation within the period from day forty until the fetus is viable, and indeed, thus states <em>Ḥavot Ya’ir</em> §31. However, we must acknowledge that even those who adopt the permissive approach find it more difficult to permit abortion as the pregnancy advances, because the <em>ḥavala</em> and <em>hashḥata </em>are greater. Therefore, even after forty days have passed, and even according to the permissive approach, it is necessary to expedite medical tests to the degree possible, so that if an abortion is necessary, it will be done as early as possible.According to those who adopt the permissive approach, even once the fetus has become viable, killing it is not considered murder but rather ḥavala or hashḥata. Presumably, then, for a very great need it is possible to permit its abortion. As we have seen, the Talmud (Arakhin 7a) states that if a pregnant mother is sentenced to death by beit din, they kill the fetus before executing her in order to avoid possible post-mortem degradation. Only if the woman is already in labor do we wait until she gives birth before executing her. However, in practice, even those who are more permissive regarding abortion do not generally permit it once the fetus is viable, since it is closer to being considered a human life. This is also implied by R. Waldenberg, the foremost proponent of the permissive school of thought, who states that from the end of the seventh month and onwards, one must be stringent (Tzitz Eliezer 13:102:5-6). We have also seen (beginning of n. 5) that even some who maintain that abortion is not murder still prohibit abortion unless carrying the pregnancy to term would be life-threatening (Shevet Ha-Levi 7:208). Similarly, even those who are generally lenient are stringent once the fetus is viable. (However, in Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:3 [p. 239, summary point 14], R. Waldenberg writes that the prohibition is most severe when the woman is in labor. This implies that when she is not yet in labor, it is possible to be lenient in very difficult cases even late in pregnancy, as explained above.)</i>
  
  Section 5
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Sachs
  Tay-Sachs is an incurable genetic disorder caused by the lack of the vital enzyme hexosaminidase-A (Hex-A). Those born with the disease begin to lag in their physical and intellectual development starting at about six months old. This is followed by blindness and paralysis, then death, generally by the age of four. Nowadays, testing can determine with certainty whether a fetus has Tay-Sachs. If it does, the question arises: is it permissible to abort?
  According to those who adopt the restrictive approach, the prohibition of abortion is an offshoot of the prohibition of murder, and just as it is forbidden to kill a sick person, so too it is forbidden to kill a sick fetus. Thus, it is forbidden to abort a Tay-Sachs fetus (R. Moshe Feinstein in Igrot Moshe, ḤM 2:69). R. Auerbach and R. Elyashiv rule this way as well; however, if the mother’s knowledge that she will give birth to such a sick baby leads to such a terrible emotional state that there is concern for her mental health, even these poskim permitted abortion, because mental illness can be life-threatening, and the mother’s life takes precedence over that of the fetus (Nishmat Avraham, ḤM 425, n. 18). (R. Feinstein does not permit an abortion even then; according to him, abortion is permitted only when it is almost certain that the mother will die.)
  In contrast, according to those who adopt the permissive approach, abortion is allowed even when there is no concern that the mother of the Tay-Sachs fetus will become mentally ill, for they do not view abortion as murder, but as ḥavala or hashḥata. If so, it is preferable to prevent the fetus from the terrible suffering that would be its lot; it is better for this fetus not to be born at all. It is also best to spare the mother the terrible anguish of seeing her child suffer, without being able to do anything to help (Amud Ha-yemini §32). Obviously, it is best to perform the abortion as early as possible. However, be-di’avad, R. Waldenberg permits performing this abortion until the seventh month (Tzitz Eliezer 13:102).7<i class="footnote">There is an additional rationale to allow aborting a Tay-Sachs fetus. Since the child would die by the age of four, the reason of “desecrate one Shabbat on his behalf, so that he can observe many [future] <em>Shabbatot</em>” is not applicable. (See section 1 above.)When possible, it is preferable not to perform an abortion directly using surgery, but rather to do it indirectly by having the woman take a labor-inducing drug. Some poskim maintain that even those who maintain that abortion is a Torah prohibition would agree that an indirect abortion such as this is prohibited only rabbinically, and thus can be permitted when circumstances are pressing. This is the position of R. Yehuda Ayash in Responsa Beit Yehuda, EH 14, and R. Ḥayim Palachi in Responsa Ḥayim Ve-shalom, EH 40. Chemical curettage, which involves administering a lethal drug to kill the fetus in the gestational sac, is also preferable to direct surgical termination, because using a drug might be considered indirect abortion.</i>
  As we saw (section 3 above), in practice one may rely upon those who rule permissively in cases of great necessity.
  
  Section 6
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / A Down Syndrome Fetus
  People with Down syndrome have an extra chromosome, which leads to intellectual and physical disabilities of varying severity. They have distinctive builds and facial features, and are at increased risk for certain illnesses and defects, including heart defects and duodenal atresia, infection, and leukemia. Nevertheless, due to advances in medical care, their life expectancy has increased in recent years, and they can live to age fifty and beyond. Their intellectual disabilities generally mean that they cannot live independently, but rather require assistance and support, like young children. Recently, educational methods have been developed which improve their abilities to learn and to function. Some are even able to get married and live in their own homes. (Men with Down syndrome are almost always sterile.) However, even in the best of circumstances, people with Down syndrome require the level of care and support afforded to older children. The question is: is it permissible to terminate a pregnancy when the fetus has Down syndrome?
  Those who adopt the restrictive approach maintain that just as one may not take the life of a child with Down syndrome, so too one may not destroy a fetus with Down syndrome. True, someone who kills a child commits a capital crime, while someone one who kills a fetus does not. Nevertheless, since these poskim view the prohibition against killing a fetus as an offshoot of murder, a woman carrying a Down syndrome fetus may not abort.
  Even though R. Shlomo Goren permits aborting a fetus with Tay-Sachs, because the child would suffer and die within a few years, he does not permit the abortion of a fetus with Down syndrome. Only when there is a concern that the birth will disrupt the family’s equilibrium and endanger the mental health of one of the parents would an abortion be permitted (Torat Ha-refu’a, p. 192).
  Those who adopt the more permissive approach maintain that if it would be difficult for the parents to cope with the hardships involved in raising a child with Down syndrome, and it would cause them great pain, an abortion is permitted. This is because these poskim maintain that abortion is prohibited as a form of ḥavala or hashḥata, so to prevent great suffering on the part of the child and its parents, they would permit an abortion (Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:3; 13:102:6; 14:101-102; Amud Ha-yemini §32). As we said in section 3, under pressing circumstances one may rely on the permissive opinion. However, here we are talking about a problem which does not always justify an abortion. There are families which, despite the tremendous difficulties involved, successfully meet the challenge of raising a child with Down syndrome, and sometimes even grow as a result. Therefore, greater discretion must be exercised, taking into consideration the state of this family, and an outstanding Torah scholar must be consulted.8<i class="footnote">When abortion is permitted, it is preferably performed before the end of the first trimester if possible, for some maintain that the prohibition becomes more severe beginning with the fourth month (Aḥaronim cited by <em>Yabi’a Omer</em>, EH 4:1; see section 4 above). Doctors expect that it will soon be possible to easily assess the state of the fetus within the first forty days. At that point, many <em>poskim</em> who currently rule stringently will permit the abortion of a Down syndrome fetus. However, those who are permissive allow an abortion even when the abnormality is discovered after the first trimester.</i>
  
  Section 7
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Concern About Defects in the Fetus
  Thus far we have discussed cases in which a fetus clearly suffers from a specific condition. However, sometimes all that we can know is that a fetus is at risk of being ill. For example, if the mother contracted German measles in the first month of her pregnancy, there is a fifty percent chance that the child will be born with birth defects. Additionally, sometimes an ultrasound raises a concern that a fetus might have very serious problems, but also may be perfectly healthy.
  According to those who take the restrictive view, when we know for sure that the fetus is very sick – and certainly when we are not sure – abortion is still prohibited.
  According to those who espouse the permissive approach, since abortion is prohibited as a form of ḥavala or hashḥata, not murder, it is permitted when there is a great need. Therefore, even in an uncertain case, if there is reasonable concern that the fetus has a serious condition that would condemn it to a life full of suffering, abortion is permitted (Amud Ha-yemini §32).
  This is relevant when there is no possibility of reaching a clear conclusion regarding the condition of the fetus. But usually, if the parents wait until week twenty and reevaluate the fetus’s condition, the doctors will know much more. Therefore, abortion is forbidden before that point. For example, if the mother contracts CMV (Cytomegalovirus) in her first trimester, the odds are about forty percent that the fetus will contract the virus as well. If the fetus does contract the virus, the odds are about ten percent that it will suffer abnormalities serious enough to warrant abortion according to the permissive approach. Therefore, one must wait until the twentieth week of pregnancy. If it becomes clear that the fetus suffers from serious abnormalities, termination of the pregnancy would be permissible according to the permissive approach (as explained in section 4 and n. 7). As we saw in section 3, in pressing circumstances one may rely on the permissive view, as it is better grounded in the Talmud and halakhic literature.
  
  Section 8
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Credibility of Doctors and Consultation with Rabbis
  For all questions regarding abortion, it is imperative to seek the opinion of an honest doctor who relates with reverence to the potential life of a fetus, and then to consult a rabbi who has expertise in these issues. Unfortunately, in many cases, doctors have been negligent in their care, conducted irresponsible tests, and condemned perfectly healthy fetuses to death. Sometimes this happens when test results are inconclusive, yet the doctors rush to instruct the parents to abort instead of repeating the test. Other times, a problem is discovered in the third month of the pregnancy whose specific nature cannot be determined until the fifth month (as in the case of CMV). However, because doctors make light of the serious issue of abortion, they recommend abortion in the third month instead of waiting for more accurate tests to become feasible.
  I was told about a woman who got pregnant for the first time after years of waiting. After a gynecological exam, she was told that her fetus had died, and she was sent for a D&amp;C. I need not describe her devastation. Luckily for her, while she was tearfully awaiting the procedure, a doctor passed by whom she knew from her previous treatments. Upon hearing her painful story, he suggested repeating the exam. His examination showed that the fetus was alive. She had the privilege of giving birth, and then raising a beautiful daughter.
  As a result of such cases, some poskim rule that one may not rely on the opinion of a non-religious doctor in these matters, lest he declare that a fetus has grave defects and encourage abortion without justification (such as where an abnormality or illness is uncertain, or where it is certain but tolerable). If no God-fearing doctor is available, the couple should have two doctors independently evaluate the fetus’s condition. If both determine that something is seriously wrong, then the couple should consult with a rabbi to determine whether an abortion is justified (R. Ovadia Yosef, Assia 1, p. 92).
  In practice, even though a God-fearing doctor and a hospital that follows Jewish law are preferred, one may rely on a non-religious doctor on two conditions: that the doctor relates to the fetus’s life with the utmost seriousness, and that in any case of uncertainty he will reexamine and reevaluate the situation until he arrives at the most informed conclusion possible. If it is necessary to wait several weeks for better information, he must wait rather than make a premature pronouncement.
  Although we learned (section 3) that halakha follows the permissive view, a couple must not rely solely on medical test results. Rather, they must consult a rabbi with expertise in these areas. First, so that the rabbi can verify with a doctor he trusts that the medical opinion they received is reliable and that all the appropriate tests were done. Second, because one cannot rule permissively on such a weighty question without having a serious discussion exploring all its aspects, including the severity of the fetal abnormality, the reliability of the tests, the family’s circumstances, the stage of the fetus, and the method to be used to abort. Additionally, it is very difficult for a couple to grapple with such a fateful moral choice. Consulting a responsible rabbi will ease their conscience and allow them to continue building a wonderful family.
  
  Section 9
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Desirability of Prenatal Testing
  As we have seen, some poskim prohibit abortion even when the fetus suffers from a serious illness. Many of them add that the mother should not do prenatal tests, as it would be pointless; even if the tests showed the fetus to be abnormal, these poskim would not permit abortion. Better to trust in God and His goodness rather than constantly worry about insoluble problems.
  In practice, though, women should undergo the necessary tests. True, according to the restrictive opinion, even in a case where the fetus is clearly sick, abortion is prohibited. Nevertheless, there is a permissive view as well, and in a problematic case, the couple can consult a rabbi who will advise them as to which opinion to follow. Moreover, if there is a reasonable concern that the mother’s grief would jeopardize her mental health, abortion would be permissible even according to many who take the restrictive approach, as mental illness can be life-threatening, and when there is a conflict between the life of the mother and the life of the fetus, the mother’s life takes precedence. Even if the couple follows the restrictive opinion, conducting the proper tests will allow the parents to prepare themselves emotionally in the time remaining before the birth. Therefore, it is good to do prenatal testing. My rabbi and teacher R. Avraham Shapira ruled this way in practice.
  It is still necessary to clarify which tests should be done. For example, it is known that the older the woman, the higher the odds that her fetus will suffer from Down syndrome. The question is: from what maternal age is it appropriate to test? Another question: For various reasons, some doctors recommend performing all types of tests during pregnancy. Some of them are very expensive, and many of them cause stress and worry. Is it best for a pregnant woman to have all these tests done? Or is it best for her to have a joyful, serene pregnancy, relying on God and His goodness?9<i class="footnote">The odds that a 20-year-old woman will give birth to a child with Down syndrome are 1 in 1734 (0.05%), while for a 37-year-old woman the odds rise to 1 in 234 (0.42%), and for a 45-year-old woman to 1 in 31 (3.2%).Some doctors recommend performing many tests because they want to cover themselves. If, God forbid, there are problems, the couple will not be able to blame them. This may be the reason that nowadays some doctors hesitate to take responsibility and make decisions; they are worried about being sued. Additionally, sometimes HMOs and the doctors make more money from extra tests than they do from regular ongoing care.</i>
  As a rule, tests to detect serious, common problems should be conducted, while tests to detect rare problems should not. This is consistent with people’s approach to life in general; most do not worry about minimal risks when it comes to car safety or dietary choices. A good rule of thumb to determine the importance of doing a particular test, at least in Israel today, is whether it is covered by the HMOs. When the cost of a test is covered, it means that the Ministry of Health, based on the mass amounts of data at its disposal, concluded that this test should be done. Thus, it is best to do it. In contrast, when a test is not covered by basic insurance, it indicates that it is not so important, and one need not do it. Nevertheless, if a trustworthy doctor follows this general approach yet recommends doing additional tests that he thinks are very important, it is best to accept the advice and undergo the tests.10<i class="footnote">The interests of the HMOs and the Ministry of Health are clear: the cost of caring for a sick child is hundreds of thousands of shekels, so they will fund tests to detect serious problems that are common enough that they must be considered. In contrast, tests that are covered by supplementary insurance are to detect rare problems. The damage done by the anxiety these tests cause may outweigh their benefits. Of course, this rule of thumb applies to Israel in 2019, and may not be applicable in other contexts.The test for CMV is a good example of present Israeli policy. The position of the Ministry of Health is that this test should not normally be performed, because its results are far from conclusive for the mother, and even less conclusive for the fetus. Performing this test or others like it as a matter of course would lead to great uncertainty, fear, and anxiety, which could lead to numerous unnecessary amniocenteses. Some people would presumably decide to abort because of the uncertainty. Therefore, the position of the Ministry of Health is that it is best to avoid these tests. Yet many doctors, who are either overly cautious or who fear lawsuits, encourage performing these tests in defiance of the formal guidelines.</i>
  
  Section 10
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / A Mamzer Fetus
  If a married woman had relations with another man, or was raped and became pregnant, the resulting child is a mamzer or mamzeret and may not marry a born Jew. (Although it is permissible for a male mamzer to marry a female mamzeret and they are each allowed to marry converts, the children of these unions are also mamzerim.) The question is: may a woman abort a mamzer fetus?
  R. Yair Bacharach writes that le-khatḥila she may not abort the fetus, despite the fact that Maharil writes that at the brit of a mamzer we do not recite the blessing, “preserve this child to his father and mother,” because we do not want to increase mamzerim among the Jewish people. Nevertheless, le-khatḥila, it is prohibited to harm the fetus (Responsa Ḥavot Yair §31). This implies, though, that in a case of exceptional pain and dishonor to the family, it is permissible. According to Maharit, who maintains that abortion is prohibited because of ḥavala and is permissible when there is a great need (Responsa Maharit 1:97), it seems that preventing the birth of a mamzer can be considered a great need. The eminent R. Yosef Ḥayim of Baghdad was asked whether a married woman who became pregnant from an extramarital affair could take a potion that would cause her to miscarry. He did not want to rule on the matter himself, but he copied the words of Ḥavot Ya’ir, which implies that le-khatḥila it is prohibited, and cited Maharit and She’elat Ya’avetz (1:43) as permitting an abortion in such cases (Rav Pe’alim, EH 1:4). Even though he himself did not want to decide, what he wrote suggests that he was inclined toward the lenient opinion. R. Uziel also writes that a woman may abort a mamzer (Mishpetei Uziel, ḤM 4:47).
  According to those who maintain that abortion is prohibited as an offshoot of murder, aborting a mamzer is certainly prohibited. As we said in section 3, though, the primary halakhic position is the more permissive one.
  
  Section 11
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Unplanned Pregnancy and Possible Pregnancy from Rape
  An unmarried woman with an unplanned pregnancy may not abort her perfectly healthy fetus. However, in pressing circumstances, when the pregnancy is likely to cause her psychological difficulties, abortion can be permitted within the first forty days from conception. As we saw above (section 4), according to most poskim, within the first forty days of pregnancy the organs of the fetus have not yet formed, and the more stringent laws of a fetus do not yet apply. It is best to end the pregnancy via oral medication or similar methods, so that the abortion is performed indirectly, thereby reducing the severity of the prohibition (as explained in n. 8).
  Once the fetus has reached the 41st day, even if the pregnancy is causing the woman psychological difficulties, she may not abort. Even if she knows that she will be unable to care for the child, whether because of embarrassment or finances, she still may not abort. Rather, she should give the child up for adoption. Even according to those who maintain the more permissive view on abortion, permission is granted when the fetus is sick or its life would involve continuous suffering; here, however, the fetus is healthy, so abortion is prohibited. It is well known that there are many good people who are interested in adopting babies, so the child can have a good life. Still, if the case involves a young woman whose parents and teachers think will lose her way and have trouble building a solid family, there are grounds to consult a wise Torah scholar.
  In reality, there is no need to reach the point where such a question must be posed. There is a simple solution. Any woman who is raped or seduced should go straight to a doctor and get a prescription for the “morning after pill” that prevents pregnancy when taken within three days of having sexual relations. Alternatively, if an IUD is implanted within a day of a rape, it prevents pregnancy. It would seem that all would agree that a rape victim may do either of these, since they certainly do not involve killing a fetus. Rather, they prevent a pregnancy from occurring. This is an opportunity to stress the critical importance of an open mother-daughter relationship, which will allow a daughter to turn to her mother for help if difficult situations arise.11<i class="footnote">During the first three days following sexual relations, these measures are considered contraception, not abortion. There is support for this in the Talmud, which states, “For the first three days, a person should petition [God] for mercy, so that it does not putrefy” (<em>Berakhot</em> 60a). Rashi comments: “‘So that it does not putrefy’ – namely the seed; rather it should be accepted and become an embryo.” This is reflected in the rulings that appear in <em>Nishmat Avraham</em> (ḤM, 425:1 n. 27) in the name of R. Auerbach and R. Neuwirth. In my opinion, there are stronger grounds to permit abortion during the first fourteen days than during the rest of the forty days, because the woman is not yet expecting her next period, and the pregnancy is not yet detectable.</i>
  
  Section 12
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / The Mother’s Health and Financial Considerations
  As we saw (section 1), if a pregnancy endangers the mother’s life, she may abort. 
  However, poskim disagree concerning cases in which the pregnancy is not life-threatening, but rather exacerbates a preexisting condition, like if the mother already has an aural or ocular condition that pregnancy will intensify, possibly leaving her deaf or blind. Alternatively, the pregnancy will worsen an illness that does not threaten her life, but causes terrible pain. Those who adopt the restrictive approach prohibit abortion in such cases (Igrot Moshe, ḤM 2:69; Shevet Ha-Levi 7:208 and 9:266), whereas those who adopt a more permissive approach allow it (Torat Ḥesed, EH 42:32; Mishpetei Uziel, ḤM 3:46; Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:3).
  Sometimes pregnancy can jeopardize the mother’s mental health. In such a case, some poskim rule that even those who adopt the restrictive approach would permit abortion, since mental illness can be life-threatening and cause one to become suicidal (Levushei Mordechai, ḤM §39; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach). Recently, effective medications have been developed to treat many psychiatric disorders. Therefore, if a psychiatrist says that the mother can be medicated so that she will not become suicidal, she may not abort (Nishmat Avraham, ḤM 425, n. 12).
  According to the more permissive approach, abortion can be allowed if the pregnancy would cause tremendous emotional anguish, even if there is no concern that it will lead to suicide. In practice, every question of this sort requires a couple first to consult with a God-fearing mental health professional and then to ask a wise person based on the assessment obtained.
  It is forbidden to abort for financial concerns. Even when a couple believe that their financial situation will not allow them to raise another child, they may not terminate the pregnancy. Even those who adopt the more permissive approach maintain that aborting for financial or social reasons is a grave transgression. Zohar states that one who causes a fetus’s death demolishes what God constructed, causes weeping in heaven, distances the Divine Presence from this world, and increases the world’s troubles (Zohar II 3b; Tzitz Eliezer 7:48 and the end of 9:51:3).
  
  Section 13
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / A Pregnant Cancer Patient
  If a pregnant woman has an aggressive form of cancer, she may abort, because pregnancy causes cancer to metastasize more quickly. Even if the abortion will not save her life, but only slow the spread of the disease and prolong her life by a few months, she still may undergo an abortion, because her life takes precedence over that of the fetus. Moreover, even the temporary prolonging of life is important, as we see from the fact that we desecrate Shabbat to extend the life of someone sick or dying (She’elat Yeshurun §39). It would seem that even those who adopt the restrictive approach would agree with this. Even if there are some who maintain that it is still forbidden to abort the fetus directly, they would still permit the mother to undergo conventional chemotherapy treatment, even if it will indirectly cause the death of the fetus (see Nishmat Avraham, ḤM 425:1, n. 15.)
  Nonetheless, if the woman wishes to continue her pregnancy, she may, even though it will hasten her death, and even though people are generally obligated to do whatever they can to prolong their lives. In this case, where the goal is to sustain the life of the fetus she is carrying, she may continue her pregnancy (Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:3).
  
  Section 14
  
  On the Mitzvot of Marital Intimacy and Procreation / Multifetal Pregnancies
  Sometimes, as a result of fertility treatments, a woman becomes pregnant with multiple fetuses. Carrying two fetuses is not considered especially risky, as some women have twins without medical intervention. Even carrying three fetuses is generally not considered especially risky, and triplet births occasionally take place naturally. However, if there are five or more fetuses, there is a significant risk that they will all die or be born prematurely, leading to terrible illnesses.
  The vast majority of poskim agree that it is permissible to destroy some of the fetuses so that the others will survive. (The process is euphemistically called “fetal reduction.”) Some explain that each fetus is considered a rodef relative to the others. Others say that because fetuses are not yet considered human life, one may kill some to save the rest. Accordingly, in a triplet pregnancy, only in an unusual case of heightened risk may one kill a fetus. In a quadruplet pregnancy, the situation must be carefully assessed; most of the time it will be permissible to kill one fetus, and two if necessary. In a quintuplet pregnancy, there is a consensus that taking the lives of some of the fetuses is permissible in order to ensure the survival of the rest. Each individual case demands the opinion of a God-fearing doctor and then consultation with a rabbi.
  Sometimes, in a twin or triplet pregnancy, one of the fetuses develops more slowly than the others. If the doctor feels that keeping that fetus alive will cause the loss of the other fetuses, it is permissible to take its life in order to save the others. This is both because the weaker fetus would likely not survive in any case and in order to save the remaining fetuses.12<i class="footnote">R. Waldenberg writes that if a woman is pregnant with quadruplets one fetus may be killed, because the fetuses are not yet considered human life. Since the prohibition of abortion is because of <em>ḥavala</em> or <em>hashḥata</em>, when there is a great need, it is permissible to take the life of a fetus. He adds that he heard that his colleague R. Elyashiv permitted this (<em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 20:2). R. Ḥayim David HaLevi is permissive as well (<em>Mayim Ḥayim</em> 1:61). <em>Nishmat Avraham</em>, ḤM 425:1 n. 30, records that R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach permits reducing a quadruplet pregnancy by one or two, because each fetus is considered a <em>rodef</em> relative to the others. R. Naḥum Rabinovitch writes that in a twin pregnancy where one did not develop properly, it is permissible to take the life of that fetus in order to save the other twin’s life (<em>Si’aḥ Naḥum</em> §116). However, according to R. Moshe Feinstein (<em>Igrot Moshe</em>, ḤM 2:69), it seems that reducing a pregnancy would be permitted only when the danger is almost certain.</i>