meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt/Halakhah/Peninei Halakhah/Peninei Halakhah, Shabbat/English/merged.txt"}
text: Peninei Halakhah, Shabbat
  פניני הלכה, שבת
  merged
  
  This file contains merged sections from the following text versions:
  -Peninei Halakhah, English ed. Yeshivat Har Bracha
  -
  
  Peninei Halakhah, Shabbat
  
  Introduction
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Introduction / The Completion of Creation
  It took six days for God to create the heavens, the earth, and all within them. At first glance, an additional day seems unnecessary. Nevertheless, God created the seventh day and designated it for rest and cessation of labor. As a result, the world contains rest, blessing, and holiness. Thus we read: The heaven and the earth were finished, and all their array. On the seventh day God finished the work that He had been doing, and He ceased on the seventh day from all the work that He had done. And God blessed the seventh day and declared it holy, because on it God ceased from all the work of creation that He had done. (Bereishit 2:1-3) 
  The Sages ask: Does God really get tired? Is it not already stated: “The Lord is God from of old, Creator of the earth from end to end. He never grows faint or weary” (Yeshayahu 40:28)? Not only that, but He actually gives the weary strength, as it is written: “He gives strength to the weary” (ibid. 29). Why then does it say: “He rested on the seventh day” (Shemot 20:11)? It is as though God declared that He created His world in six days and rested on the seventh. (Mekhilta Yitro)Why did God dictate that even He must rest on the seventh day? In order to create rest, satisfaction, tranquility, and calm for the world. As long as God was busy creating the world, the world was constantly expanding; when He rested on the seventh day, rest was given to the world (Bereishit Rabba 10:9).
  Nonstop work, without rest, expresses a tremendous yearning for perfection and an unending sense of a void that can never be filled. Despite all of our work, toil, and travail, we are unable to achieve satisfaction and peace of mind, because perfection remains so far away, and our shortcomings extend indefinitely. There is so much emptiness to fill and so many problems to fix that we can never stop working. This is how people would be living if the world had been created in six days without Shabbat. But with the creation of Shabbat, the world was blessed with rest (Maharal, Tiferet Yisrael ch. 40).
  One is able to rest when he knows that his actions are valuable. He derives satisfaction from his labor, knowing that his work is not for naught. This allows him to gather his strength and ready himself for the next stage, when he will resume working. However, if one does not appreciate the value of his work, he will not be blessed with peace of mind even if he stops working. This was true at the beginning of the world as well. Although the heaven and earth, continents and oceans, trees and grasses, luminaries and the deep, fish, birds, and animals were already created, and even though man – created in the divine image – already walked therein, the world was still devoid of meaning, and thus there was no rest. With the creation of the seventh day for rest and cessation of labor, the ability to absorb the inner worth of the world and all actions taken in it was created as well.
  To a certain extent, all of mankind has internalized the idea that the creation of the seventh day gives meaning to work and creation, thus allowing everyone to enjoy rest and draw satisfaction from labor. To benefit from this it is not necessary to rest specifically on Shabbat. But the true and absolute value of creation and work, their divine aspect, can be internalized only by resting on Shabbat, the day that God designated for rest. This is a privilege granted to Israel alone. Furthermore, Jews cannot find rest through any finite human value: “Our place of rest is only through God” (R. Kook’s Orot, Zeronim, “Tzima’on Le-El Ḥai”).
  Without that rest, which expresses the value and purpose of the world, there is no point in its existence. Thus the Sages state: “This can be compared to a king who built, sculpted, and decorated a marriage canopy. What was missing? A bride to enter it! Similarly, what was the world missing? Shabbat” (Bereishit Rabba 10:9). Of what use to the king are all the rooms in the palace and their beautiful furnishings if he does not have a bride to enjoy them with? The bride brings blessing to the palace, because the delight she provides for the king leads him to be benevolent toward the entire kingdom. The Sages further state (ibid.): “This can be compared to a king who made a signet ring for himself. What was lacking? The seal! Similarly, what was the world lacking? Shabbat.” The seal is what gives a signet ring meaning and identity. Similarly, Shabbat with its sanctity supplies meaning to the world (Maharal op. cit.).
  
  Section 2
  
  Introduction / Shabbat and the Jewish People
  The Sages ask: Why does the Torah’s description of the end of the sixth day of creation conclude with “And there was evening and there was morning, the sixth day” (Bereishit 1:31), with the definite article? They explain that the Torah alludes the sixth of Sivan, when the Torah was given to Israel. “God set a condition with Creation: ‘If Israel accepts the Torah, you will continue to exist, but if not, then I will return you to being formless and void” (Shabbat 88a). Immediately after the completion of the sixth weekday was the creation of Shabbat, the expression of God’s kingship. It is upon this sixth day that, in the future, God would give the Torah to Israel (ibid. 86b).
  Until Jews made their appearance in the world, Shabbat was alone, with no one present to reveal its holiness and blessedness. The Sages express this as follows: Shabbat said before: “Master of the Universe, everybody has a partner except for me. The six days of creation pair off; only I have no partner.” God replied: “The people of Israel are your partner.” When the Jews stood before Sinai, God said to them: “Remember what I told Shabbat: ‘The people of Israel are your partner.’” This is the meaning of the commandment “Commemorate the day of Shabbat to sanctify it (Shemot 20:8).” (Bereishit Rabba 11:8) 
  It is true that even before the Jewish people accepted the Torah, Shabbat was already sanctified and blessed, since that is when God stopped His work. Moreover, Shabbat is the heart and soul of the world. However, the blessing that Shabbat bestowed then was limited to ensuring the world’s existence. All the imperfections endemic to the world remained, without the possibility of repair. Therefore God stipulated with His world that should the Jews refuse the Torah, the world would revert to chaos. What would be the point of its existence if it, with all its pain, were to continue without the possibility of progressing and advancing toward a more perfect state?
  
  Section 3
  
  Introduction / The Link Between the Exodus and Shabbat
  During the first two millennia after creation, humans learned how to sustain themselves; to find food, clothing, and shelter; and to organize a society that could cope successfully with the challenges of their surroundings. Yet apart from a select few who clung to monotheistic faith and morality, the entire world operated based on need and brute strength, without any idealistic goals. This situation continued until the Patriarchs Avraham, Yitzḥak, and Yaakov appeared on the scene, called God’s name, and dedicated their lives to improving the world through truth and kindness. They rejected paganism, which sanctified forces of nature and denied morality. Based on their intuitions, the Patriarchs kept mitzvot and observed Shabbat (Bereishit Rabba 79:7). Nevertheless, because they still had not received the Torah, they could not sustain their ideals within the world. On the contrary, the very wickedness they fought rose up against them; Egypt, then the most powerful of all nations, subjugated and enslaved the Israelites, forcing them to do backbreaking labor in order to sustain the Egyptian economy and provide the Egyptians with all their wants and needs. This showed the Israelites how wicked human nature could be and how badly the world needs the faith heralded by their ancestors. The Israelites had a tradition, recorded on scrolls, that God would redeem them from Egypt. Each Shabbat they would enjoy reading these scrolls (see Shemot Rabba 5:18). This belief preserved their identity, and they steadily increased in number until they became a nation. Then the God of their ancestors revealed Himself to them, took them out of Egypt, redeemed them, and gave them the Torah and Shabbat.
  The Israelites were not redeemed from merely Egyptian slavery when, after the Exodus, they accepted the Torah and Shabbat. They were also freed from their enslavement to nature and the struggle for survival. They were freed from the view that man’s sole purpose is to accumulate as much money and wealth as possible, even if it means controlling and enslaving others to that end.
  Jews observe Shabbat and thus always remember that God created and sustains the world. Man’s purpose is to cleave to God and His attributes and to free himself from the bonds of slavery to the evil inclination and the struggle for survival. Even if due to the exigencies of circumstances and lack of choice one must work hard to support himself – even if one has been sold into slavery – he still rests on Shabbat. By doing so, he demonstrates that he is not entirely enslaved; his spirit remains free and connected to its divine roots: Observe Shabbat day and keep it holy, as the Lord your God has commanded you. Six days you shall labor and do all your work, but the seventh day is Shabbat of the Lord your God; you shall not do any melakha – you, your son or your daughter, your male or female slave, your ox or your ass, or any of you cattle, or the stranger in your settlements, so that your male and female slave may rest as you do. Remember that you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and the Lord your God freed you from there with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm. Therefore the Lord your God has commanded you to observe the day of Shabbat. (Devarim 5:12-15) 
  God intentionally created the world incomplete so that people would have the opportunity to participate in repairing and improving it. It is impossible to fix the world without recognizing that its source is God and man’s destiny is to walk in His ways, as explained in the Torah. This is the purpose of the Jewish people – to reveal the word of God in the world: “I created this nation for My sake; they will tell My praise” (Yeshayahu 43:21). Therefore, the Sages stated that the heavens and earth were created in the merit of the Jews (Vayikra Rabba 36:4). Through Shabbat, a blessed and sacred time, the Jewish people can fulfill their destiny. This is why the Torah was given on Shabbat (Shabbat 86b) and why Shabbat is a time especially conducive to Torah study.
  
  Section 4
  
  Introduction / The Uniqueness of Israel and Shabbat
  Shabbat reveals the special connection between God and Israel, as is stated: Nevertheless, you must keep My Shabbatot, for it is a sign between Me and you throughout the ages, that you may know that I the Lord have consecrated you. You shall keep Shabbat, for it is holy for you…. The Israelite people shall keep Shabbat, observing Shabbat throughout the ages as a covenant for all time; it shall be a sign for all time between Me and the people of Israel that in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day He ceased from work and was refreshed. (Shemot 31:13-17) 
  The Sages report that “God said to Moshe: ‘I have a wonderful gift in my treasury, and its name is Shabbat. I wish to give it to Israel. Go and inform them”’ (Beitza 16a). They further state: “All the mitzvot that God gave to Israel were given publicly, except for Shabbat, which was given in private, as it says: ‘it shall be a sign for all time between Me and the people of Israel’” (ibid.). They then raise a question: Isn’t the mitzva of Shabbat found in the Ten Commandments, which were given very publicly? They respond that the true, inner meaning of Shabbat, which reveals the divine nature of the world, is something that cannot be revealed publicly. It is something special that is linked to the special connection between God and the Jews. In their words: “God gives people a neshama yeteira [lit. “expanded soul”] before Shabbat, and after Shabbat he withdraws it from them” (ibid.). By means of this neshama yeteira, the Jews are able to grasp the godly significance of the world and their special role within it.
  This explains the Sages’ statement: “A non-Jew who observes Shabbat is deserving of the death penalty” (San. 58b). They further state: In human society, if a king and a noblewoman are sitting and talking with each other, wouldn’t one who interrupts them be deserving of death? Similarly, Shabbat is something shared by the Jews and God, as [Scripture] states: “between Me and the people of Israel.” Therefore a non-Jew who insinuates himself between them before undertaking circumcision deserves death. (Devarim Rabba 1:21; see Harḥavot 25:1) 
  In order to express the Jews’ great love for Shabbat, which is like that of a royal bride at the side of her groom, there is a Jewish custom to go outside before sundown on Friday to greet Shabbat, just as one goes out to greet an honored guest. The Gemara tells us that R. Ḥanina would put on his best clothes and greet Shabbat with the declaration: “Let us go and greet the Shabbat queen.” R. Yannai would wear his fancy clothes and greet Shabbat by declaring: “Welcome, O bride; welcome, O bride.” This inspired R. Shlomo Alkabetz’s magnificent poem Lekha Dodi: “Go, my beloved (Israel) to greet the bride; let us greet Shabbat.”
  
  Section 5
  
  Introduction / The Six Days of Creation and Shabbat
  The six weekdays and Shabbat are interconnected. Just as every person has a body and a soul, so too the week has a body and a soul: weekdays are its body and Shabbat is its soul. Just as a wholesome person’s body and soul work together harmoniously – the body receiving spiritual illumination from the soul and providing it with the means to express itself – so, too, a wholesome week integrates Shabbat with the days of the week. During the week we prepare for Shabbat and give concrete expression to the ideas behind Shabbat, while on Shabbat we draw the spiritual strength that takes us through the week.
  On the one hand, we relate to Shabbat as the weekend. All week we prepare for its culmination – Shabbat – which in turn elevates the actions undertaken during the six weekdays and imbues them with meaning. On the other hand, Shabbat is also the anchor and beginning of the next week. From Shabbat we draw spiritual strength for the upcoming week so that we are able to realize, through our activities, the spiritual values that we absorb on Shabbat. Thus, the life of a Jew is not a uniform continuum that moves toward erosion and entropy. On the contrary, it is a life of constant elevation.
  These two aspects can be explained as follows: from the perspective of the world, the creation of the six weekdays preceded Shabbat, while from the perspective of man, created on the sixth day, Shabbat preceded the following six days (see Shabbat 69b).
  The Sages offer another perspective on the relationship between Shabbat and weekdays: Shabbat is in the middle of the week, with three days preceding it and three days following it. On Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday we prepare for the upcoming Shabbat, and on Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday the influence of the outgoing Shabbat is still felt (Pesaḥim 106a; see below 2:10-11; 8:7).
  Since Shabbat is linked to the six weekdays, it is clear that the greater one’s actions during the week, the greater the heights he will achieve on Shabbat. Similarly, the greater the heights he attains on Shabbat, the more he will be able to infuse the ensuing week with sanctity and meaning.
  Maharal explains that the idea of Shabbat is hinted at in the number of days of the week. Everything physical has six sides: up, down, front, back, right, and left. The number seven expresses inner essence. Similarly, the physical world was created in six days, and on the seventh day Shabbat, the sacred essence of the world, was created (Tiferet Yisrael ch. 40).
  
  Section 6
  
  Introduction / Blessing and Holiness
  Shabbat is a repository of blessing and holiness, as it is stated: “And God blessed the seventh day and hallowed it, because on it God ceased from all the work of creation that He had done” (Bereishit 2:3). Similarly we read: “For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth and sea, and all that is in them, and He rested on the seventh day. Therefore the Lord blessed Shabbat day and hallowed it” (Shemot 20:11).
  The word “kadosh” (holy) applies to the absolute, to that which is beyond time and place. “Kadosh” means separate and transcendent, for anything that belongs to the realm of the absolute is separate and distinct from all the finite things in the world. The word “blessing” (berakha) indicates increase and growth. The greater kedusha an item has, the greater source of blessing it can be. The holiest of all is God, the world’s creator, Who is, was, and will be. His light and power are infinite, and He is the source of blessing for all creatures. For this reason, He is called “the Holy One, blessed be He” (Ha-Kadosh Barukh Hu), for He is holy (transcendent) and blessed (bestows blessing).
  God sanctified Shabbat and blessed it. He sanctified it by distinguishing it from other days, for on it the inner essence of the world is revealed. He blessed it, in that He bestows blessing on all the other days and on all worlds through it. Thus Zohar states: “The six weekdays all draw blessing from the seventh day” (II, 63b). It further states: “All the blessings from above and below depend on the seventh day, because all the supernal six days draw blessing from it” (ibid. 88a).
  By God’s cessation of all work on the seventh day, it became the most sanctified and essential of all the days; through it God bestows blessing on the six days and on the world as a whole. So too the Jews, by ceasing all work on the seventh day and connecting to the holy source of blessing, understand the great value of every different type of work done in order to build up the world, and thus they draw down blessing upon themselves. This is as the Sages state: “The verse ‘The blessing of the Lord will enrich’ (Mishlei 10:22) refers to the Shabbat blessing” (y. Berakhot 2:7). They also state that by honoring Shabbat one merits wealth, because Shabbat is the source of blessing (Shabbat 119a).
  
  Section 7
  
  Introduction / Manna on Shabbat
  During the forty years that our ancestors wandered in the desert, God provided them with food from heaven. This food was known as man (manna), and through it God taught Israel how they should relate to food and to livelihood. “I will rain down bread for you from the sky, and the people shall go out and gather each day that day’s portion – that I may thus test them, to see whether they will follow My instruction or not” (Shemot 16:4). The test was that they were commanded to gather enough each day for the needs of that day, and not to leave any over for the next day. This was a great challenge, as man’s chief worry in this world is his food and means of livelihood. Because of this existential concern – the fear of death by starvation, of not having clothing and shelter, of being at the mercy of the elements – man has developed a powerful impulse to eat as much as possible and to pursue unlimited accumulation of money and assets. Thus one becomes enslaved to his work and his impulses. God wished to instill in the Israelites, during their desert sojourn, the proper attitude toward livelihood – knowledge that man’s purpose in life is to cling to God and His Torah. Food and money are only a means to this end, as we read: “He subjected you to the hardship of hunger and then gave you manna to eat, which neither you nor your fathers had ever known, in order to teach you that man does not live by bread alone, rather man lives by the word of the Lord” (Devarim 8:3). Therefore they were commanded to gather enough food for one day, and to rely on God to send more the next day. One who failed this test and gathered extra would find when he came to his tent that he had exactly what he needed to eat – “an omer (a biblical measure) per capita.” Some people could not overcome their fear; they saved some of their allotted manna for the next day, but it turned foul and maggoty overnight.
  When Friday came, however, there was a surprise: On the sixth day they gathered double the amount of food, two omers each; and when all the chieftains of the community came and told Moshe, he said to them, “This is what the Lord meant: Tomorrow is the day of rest, the Lord’s holy Shabbat. Bake what you would bake and boil what you would boil; and all that is left put aside to be kept until morning.” So they put it aside until morning, as Moshe had ordered; and it did not turn foul, and there were no maggots in it. Then Moshe said, “Eat it today, for today is the Lord’s Shabbat; you will not find it today in the field. Six days you shall gather it; on the seventh day, Shabbat, there will be none.” Yet some of the people went out on the seventh day to gather, but they found nothing. And the Lord said to Moshe, “How long will you refuse to obey My commandments and My teachings? Note that the Lord has given you Shabbat; therefore He gives you two days’ food on the sixth day. Let everyone remain where he is: let no man leave his place on the seventh day.” (Shemot 16:22-29) 
  The Sages stated that the blessing of Shabbat was reflected in the double portion of manna that fell (Bereishit Rabba 11:2). One might be inclined to ask what kind of blessing this was, since, in fact, the amount of manna that the people received on Shabbat was the same as that of the rest of the week; it simply fell a day early. The answer is that on the seventh day they did not have to worry, because their Shabbat food had already been prepared on Friday. This can be compared to one who had to work hard every day. One day he managed to finish two days’ worth of work. The next day he felt a sense of great relief because he did not need to work, and he was free to think about things beyond his immediate needs. Sometimes, because of these musings, he was later able to accomplish more at work. This is the blessing of Shabbat. We are commanded to stop working and stop worrying about money, and through this freedom and liberation we cling to God and His Torah. Doing so will allow blessing to flow from the Source of life, providing us with a comfortable livelihood during the six weekdays.
  
  Section 8
  
  Introduction / Zakhor and Shamor
  Two mitzvot constitute the basic elements of Shabbat: Zakhor (“commemorate”) and Shamor (“observe”). “Shamor” is a negative commandment to refrain from all labor. For six days, one must take care of his needs and productively engage the world, but on Shabbat we are enjoined to desist from all labor. By doing so, we clear space in our soul, which we are commanded to fill with the positive mitzva of Zakhor, whose content consists of commemorating the holiness of Shabbat and using it to connect with the fundamentals of faith.
  These two mitzvot are so intimately linked that they are united at their root. They split into two complementary mitzvot only upon entering the human realm. This is the meaning of the Sages’ dictum: “Zakhor and Shamor were stated simultaneously, something that the human mouth cannot articulate and the human ear cannot hear” (Shev. 20b). We see this in the Torah itself: the Decalogue as reported in Shemot (20:8) introduces Shabbat with the word “zakhor,” whereas when the Ten Commandments are repeated in Devarim (5:12), it is replaced with “shamor.”
  Zakhor is a positive commandment, rooted in love and the divine attribute of ḥesed (kindness). In contrast, Shamor is a negative commandment, rooted in the divine attribute of din (judgment), which sets boundaries so that man may turn away from wickedness. Positive mitzvot are at a higher level, as they enable people to come closer to God. However, the punishment for transgressing a negative mitzva is more severe, because it causes more serious damage, both to the sinner and to the world at large (Ramban, Shemot 20:7).
  Zakhor is closely linked to the creation of the world and the first Shabbat, as the Torah states: Commemorate (“zakhor”) the day of Shabbat to sanctify it…. For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth and sea, and all that is in them, and He rested on the seventh day. Therefore the Lord blessed Shabbat day and hallowed it. (Shemot 20:8-11) The mitzva of Shamor is more closely linked to the Exodus from Egypt: Observe (“shamor”) the day of Shabbat to sanctify it…for you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and the Lord your God freed you from there with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm; therefore the Lord your God has commanded you to keep the day of Shabbat.” (Devarim 5:12-15) As a lofty spiritual principle, Shabbat was embedded in the world at its very creation. However, it was only after Israel survived the iron furnace of the Egyptian enslavement that they could understand how terrible it is to be subjugated to the material and how necessary it is to stop working in order to absorb the spiritual concept of Shabbat.
  The two commandments – Zakhor and Shamor – are hinted at in the word “Shabbat.” Its simple meaning is related to the shevita, cessation of work, associated with Shamor. However, its deeper meaning is related to teshuva, “repentance” or “return,” for on Shabbat we return to the foundations of faith associated with Zakhor.
  
  Section 9
  
  Introduction / Foundations of Faith
  With the commandment to “Commemorate the day of Shabbat to sanctify it” (Shemot 20:8), we are enjoined to recall the foundations of faith. This is why the mitzva of Shabbat is the fourth of the Ten Commandments. First we are commanded to believe in God and know Him, as it states: “I am the Lord your God Who brought you out of the land of Egypt, the house of bondage” (Shemot 20:2). Following this we are commanded not to worship foreign gods: “You shall have no other gods besides Me. You shall not make for yourself a sculptured image, or any likeness… You shall not bow down to them or serve them” (ibid. 3-5). The third commandment is to honor His name and not to swear falsely. The fourth commandment is about Shabbat, the day that expresses the foundations of our faith in the world (Ramban, Shemot 20:7). Zohar states that all the principles and secrets of faith are linked to Shabbat (II 92:1; III 94:2, 288:2).
  We recall two fundamentals of faith on Shabbat. The first is the creation of the world. Shabbat attests that the Creator made the world in six days and rested on the seventh. Ever since then, He continues to give the world life and sustain it. The second fundamental is that God took His people out of Egypt. By doing so, He made clear to all that in addition to having created the world, He also supervises and manages it, punishing the wicked and rewarding the righteous. He chose Israel to be His people, through which His providence is made manifest in the world.
  The Sages tell us that the mitzva of Zakhor entails invoking Shabbat throughout the week, by preparing for it. Similarly, the Levites in the Temple would preface the singing of the daily psalm with the formula: “Today is the first/second/etc. day of before Shabbat.” This tells us that the weekdays are not days in their own right, but rather draw their meaning and value from Shabbat. It is indeed a fact that in Hebrew, the holy tongue, days are numbered in relation to Shabbat – the first day, the second day, etc. This contrasts with other languages, such as English and French, in which each day has its own name – generally named for some ancient deity – and has no connection to Shabbat (Ramban, Shemot 20:7).
  The primary way in which we fulfill the mitzva of Zakhor is through kiddush, in which we invoke the central themes of Shabbat in brief. The Sages instituted that kiddush be recited over a cup of wine and shortly before a meal, so that Shabbat would be mentioned at a time of joy and pleasure, as Scripture states: “Call Shabbat ‘delight’” (Yeshayahu 58:13; see below 6:3 and 6:10).
  Although we fulfill the basic obligation of Zakhor through kiddush, the mitzva in principle is to sanctify the entire day. The Torah states “Commemorate the day of Shabbat to sanctify it,” implying that the entire day should be set aside for holy matters – Torah study and attending lectures by Torah scholars (Ramban, Shemot 20:7; see below 5:1-5).
  
  Section 10
  
  Introduction / Cessation from Crafting the Mishkan
  During the six weekdays, one must take care of his needs and productively engage the world. Most of his abilities and energies are directed toward working his fields, providing food, shelter, and clothing, and other productive activities. As much as one may enjoy his work, it contains an aspect of enslavement. Ongoing necessities ensnare one in the chains of this world, causing him to forget about faith and the soul. Desisting from all work on Shabbat allows us to rise above the mundane pressures of the here and now, and reach for the world of freedom and rest, a world where the soul can express itself. This is the meaning of the Sages’ dictum that Shabbat is like the World to Come (see Berakhot 57b).
  In order to fully appreciate the virtues of Shabbat, on Shabbat a Jew must look at the positive in the world, as it is written: “A psalm. A song; for the day of Shabbat. It is good to praise the Lord, to sing hymns to Your name, O Most high. To proclaim Your kindness at daybreak, and Your faithfulness each night” (Tehilim 92:1-3). On Shabbat one must focus on divine providence, which directs everything toward the good. One must also lovingly accept reality as it is, without feeling any pressure or desire to change it. Even if we are missing something that we did not have time to prepare before Shabbat, or even if something upsetting happened, we should accept this with equanimity and enjoy being with God. By doing so, blessing and sanctity will spread to everything that we do during the weekdays.
  One might have thought that only secular activities would be prohibited on Shabbat, but actually the Torah prohibits any type of activity necessary for the construction of the Mishkan (the Tabernacle erected by the Israelites in the desert). Moreover, the 39 melakhot (types of labor forbidden on Shabbat) are derived from the work done for the Mishkan, and all forms of labor that were involved in assembling the Mishkan are prohibited on Shabbat. Thus, juxtaposed to the descriptions of the work done in the Mishkan we read: “Nevertheless, you must keep My Shabbatot” (Shemot 31:13), which teaches us that although erecting the Mishkan is a great mitzva, one must desist even from it on Shabbat. For even crafting the Mishkan needs to be connected to its inner divine essence. If this were not the case, all the difficulties in putting up the Mishkan would likely cause us to forget its ultimate purpose, and the Mishkan would be left like a body without a soul, unable to fulfill its purpose of revealing the word of God to the world. Sometimes it is specifically those whose work is linked to the holy who need to be particularly careful about this, because due to their awareness of the value of the holy they are likely to invest their all in building a framework for it, to the point that they forget its inner essence.
  Even though there is a big difference in status between the Mishkan and the rest of the world, in reality the whole world is meant to be a Mishkan, that is, a place where the Shekhina (Divine Presence) can dwell. Consequently, all of man’s labor must be connected to the crafting of the Mishkan. Of course, in the Mishkan divine idea is expressed in an obvious and concentrated manner, while in the rest of the world this happens in hidden and manifold ways. Therefore one must orient all his actions toward the greater glory of God – in the field or in the factory, while engaged in scientific research or in business, all in order to improve the world and perfect it, until it reaches its ultimate purpose of becoming a Mishkan for the Shekhina. The money one makes must also be dedicated to living a godly life, using to establish a family that will serve as a Mishkan for developing positive character traits and inculcating godly ideals. This can all be accomplished using the power of the holiness of Shabbat, when we abstain from such labor, and from which all labor draws its inner meaning.
  It is also important to be aware that man’s purpose in life is not to work hard. If Adam had not sinned, we would still be living in the Garden of Eden, working there joyfully and achieving satisfaction, without worries or stress. Since the sin, though, we earn a livelihood only by the sweat of our brow. This exertion helps us to correct the sin, but it is also liable to root us in the material world, far from the ideal goals of faith, freedom, and joy. This is why Shabbat, which connects us to higher ideals, is so important. Shabbat thus provides a deeper meaning to the six weekdays so that they are not merely focused on immediate survival, but rather on perfecting the world and moving it closer to redemption, when it will once again be a Garden of Eden and a Mishkan for the Shekhina.1<i class="footnote">Though the melakhot involved in constructing the Mishkan and Temple are forbidden on Shabbat, one may nevertheless offer sacrifices and conduct a brit mila (ritual circumcision) on Shabbat (Shabbat 133a). Since these mitzvot express the inner and singular connection between God and Israel, they are consistent with the idea of Shabbat and do not constitute its desecration. The construction of the Mishkan, however, draws this inner connection outward, which is forbidden on Shabbat because Shabbat is entirely inward.</i>
  
  Section 11
  
  Introduction / Shabbat Is the Equivalent of All the Mitzvot because It Expresses Faith
  Shabbat is endowed with an amazing capacity. It allows Jews to ascend to a level that is akin to the World to Come, transcend the barriers and masks that this world places between man and his Source of life, absorb the light of faith and Torah, and fully connect with all the mitzvot in the Torah.
  The Sages state: <i>We find attestation that Shabbat is the equivalent of all the mitzvot in the Torah in the Torah, Nevi’im (Prophets), and Ketuvim (the Writings). In the Torah, as it states: “The Lord said to Moshe, ‘How long will you refuse to obey My commandments and My teachings? Note that the Lord has given you Shabbat…’” (Shemot 16:28-29)</i>. (y. Nedarim 3:9)This was after they desecrated Shabbat by attempting to gather manna. We thus see that desecrating Shabbat is akin to violating the entire Torah and all the mitzvot.
  The Yerushalmi continues: <i>In the Nevi’im, as it states: “Moreover, I gave them My Shabbatot to serve as a sign between Me and them, that they might know that it is I the Lord Who sanctifies them. But the House of Israel rebelled against Me in the wilderness; they did not follow My laws and they rejected My rules – by the pursuit of which a man shall live – and they grossly desecrated My Shabbatot…. I warned their children in the wilderness…. ‘Follow my laws…and hallow My Shabbatot, that they may be a sign between Me and you, that you may know that I am the Lord your God. But the children rebelled against Me…’” (Yeḥezkel 20:12-22).In the Ketuvim, as it states: “You came down on Mount Sinai and spoke to them from heaven; You gave them right rules and true teachings, good laws and commandments. You made known to them Your holy Shabbat, and You ordained for them laws, commandments, and the Torah through Moshe, Your servant” (Neĥemia 9:13-14; see also below 22:2, and the rest of Yeĥezkel 20).</i>
  The Sages further declare: “Anyone who observes Shabbat properly, even if he worships foreign deities like the generation of Enosh (when paganism first emerged), is forgiven” (Shabbat 118b). By virtue of observing Shabbat properly, one’s faith is reinforced, and intentional sins are treated as unintentional and are forgiven. The Sages also said: “Anyone who observes Shabbat is distanced from sin” (Mekhilta Beshalaḥ).
  
  Section 12
  
  Introduction / The Temple Was Destroyed on Account of Shabbat Desecration
  Before the destruction of the First Temple, God sent the prophet Yirmiyahu to tell the nation and the Kingdom of Judah that their future was dependent on their Shabbat observance: Thus said the Lord to me: Go and stand in the People’s Gate, by which the kings of Judah enter and by which they go forth, and in all the gates of Jerusalem, and say to them: ‘Hear the word of the Lord, O kings of Judah, and all Judah, and all the inhabitants of Jerusalem who enter by these gates! Thus said the Lord: Guard yourselves against carrying burdens on the day of Shabbat and against bringing them through the gates of Jerusalem. Nor shall you carry out burdens from your houses on the day of Shabbat, nor do any work. Rather, you shall hallow the day of Shabbat, as I commanded your fathers.’” But they would not listen or turn their ear; they stiffened their necks and would not pay heed or accept discipline. “If you obey Me” – declares the Lord – “and do not bring in burdens through the gates of this city on the day of Shabbat, and you hallow the day of Shabbat and do no work on it, then through the gates of this city shall enter kings and nobles who sit upon the throne of David, riding on chariots and horses – they, their noblemen, the men of Judah, and the inhabitants of Jerusalem. And this city shall be inhabited for all time. And people shall come from the towns of Judah and from the environs of Jerusalem, and from the land of Benjamin, and from the Shephelah, and from the hill country, and from the Negev, bringing burnt offerings and sacrifices, meal offerings and frankincense, and bringing offerings of thanksgiving to the Temple of the Lord. But if you do not obey My command to hallow the day of Shabbat and to carry in no burdens through the gates of Jerusalem on the Shabbat day, then I will set fire to its gates; it shall consume the palaces of Jerusalem, and it shall not be extinguished.” (Yirmiyahu 17:19-27)
  The Sages similarly state: “Jerusalem was destroyed because they desecrated Shabbat within it, as it is written: ‘They have closed their eyes to My Shabbat. I am profaned in their midst’ (Yeḥezkel 22:26)” (Shabbat 119b). Later on it states: “And I sought a man among them to repair the wall or to stand in the breach before Me on behalf of this land, that I might not destroy it; but I found none’” (ibid. 30).
  
  Section 13
  
  Introduction / Redemption Is Dependent upon Shabbat Observance
  We see from Yeshayahu that the ultimate redemption depends upon doing what is right and just and observing Shabbat, as it says:<i>Thus said the Lord: Observe what is right and do what is just; for soon My salvation shall come, and my deliverance shall be revealed. Happy is the man who does this, the man who holds fast to it: who keeps from profaning Shabbat and stays his hand from doing any evil. Let not the foreigner who has attached himself to the Lord say: “The Lord will separate me from His people [and I will not be privileged to experience all the good that is reserved for Israel at the time of their redemption]”; And let not the eunuch say: “Yea, I am a withered tree [for I have no children and no future].” For thus said the Lord: “As for the eunuchs who keep My Shabbatot, who have chosen what I desire and hold fast to My covenant: I will give them, in My house and within My walls, a monument and a memorial, better than sons or daughters. I will give them an everlasting name, which shall not perish.” And to the foreigners who attach themselves to the Lord to serve Him, to love the name of the Lord, to be His servants – all who keep from profaning Shabbat and hold fast to My covenant: “I will bring them to My sacred mount and let them rejoice in My house of prayer. Their burnt offerings and sacrifices shall be welcome on My altar; for My house shall be called a house of prayer for all peoples.” The word of the Lord God, Who gathers the dispersed of Israel: “I will gather still more to those already gathered.” (Yeshayahu 56:1-8)</i>The Sages comment on these verses: “If the Jewish people keep two Shabbatot properly, they will immediately be redeemed, as it says: ‘As for the eunuchs who keep My Shabbatot…I will bring them to My sacred mount’” (Shabbat 118b).
  At first glance, this dictum raises a question: why do the Sages state that if the Jewish people observe two Shabbatot they will immediately be redeemed? Don’t these verses imply that the redemption is also dependent upon justice and righteousness? The answer seems to be that if the Jews keep two Shabbatot properly, they will also be just and righteous, because keeping Shabbat liberates one from his enslavement to money and wealth and refines his faith. This leads to the desire to pursue justice and righteousness throughout the week. This accords with another statement of the Sages: “The Jewish people will be redeemed only in the merit of Shabbat, as it is written: ‘You shall triumph by stillness (be-shuva) and quiet’ (Yeshayahu 30:15)” (Vayikra Rabba 3:1). In truth, we can achieve redemption by practicing justice and righteousness, because by doing so we are released from the bonds anchoring us to the material world and its impulses. Thus we perfect the six weekdays, allowing us to observe Shabbat properly and to increase our faith and closeness to God, through which we will merit redemption (See BB 10a and Devarim Rabba 5:7).
  The Sages further state that by virtue of keeping Shabbat we merit living in Eretz Yisrael, as God said to Avraham: “If your children accept Shabbat, they will enter the land; if not, they will not enter” (Bereishit Rabba 46:9). And entering the land is the beginning of redemption.
  
  Section 14
  
  Introduction / The Severity of the Sin of Shabbat Desecration
  Having learned of the tremendous value of Shabbat, we can understand why its desecration is such a severe sin. The Torah prescribes its harshest punishment for it: if one intentionally desecrates Shabbat in front of witnesses who forewarned him, he is liable for death by stoning. If no witnesses were present, but the violation is intentional, he is subject to karet (extirpation), as it is written: “You shall keep Shabbat, for it is holy for you. He who profanes it shall be put to death; whoever does work on it shall be cut off (ve-nikhreta) from among his people” (Shemot 31:14). In actuality, almost no one was ever put to death, as it was rare for all the conditions that would mandate the death penalty to be met. Thus, the Sages state that a court that put one person to death every seven years is considered murderous, and R. Elazar b. Azaria maintains that if it killed one person in seventy years it was considered murderous (m. Makkot 1:10).
  Nevertheless, the fact remains that one of the only two cases in the Torah where one was actually put to death is indeed connected to public Shabbat desecration: When the Israelites were in the wilderness, they found a man gathering wood on the day of Shabbat. Those who found him gathering wood brought him before Moshe, Aharon, and the whole community. He was placed in custody, for it had not been specified what should be done to him. Then the Lord said to Moshe, “The man shall be put to death; the whole community shall pelt him with stones outside the camp.” So the whole community took him outside the camp and stoned him to death – as the Lord had commanded Moshe. (Bamidbar 15:32-36)The Torah seems to be using this story to teach us how seriously the public desecrator of Shabbat damages the values of the nation and its faith.
  Yet it remains difficult to understand how the wood gatherer dared to publicly desecrate Shabbat. A midrash suggests that when God decreed, in the wake of the sin of the spies, that the desert generation would not enter the Land of Israel, some thought that mitzva observance was no longer obligatory. The wood gatherer wished to teach them that everyone must continue to keep the mitzvot. Motivated by exceptional religious fervor, he decided to publicly desecrate Shabbat, so that the nation would be forced to put him to death. This would show everyone how serious the transgression was (quoted in Tosafot, BB 119b). Some maintain that the wood gatherer was Tzelofḥad, who merited daughters who loved the Land of Israel and inherited it.
  The severity of Shabbat desecration can also be seen in Zohar, which states that during Shabbat, the fires of Hell stop consuming the wicked, with the exception of those wicked who never observed Shabbat (Zohar II 151:1). However, one who repented – and certainly one who was already punished for his sin, like the wood gatherer – is forgiven and not punished in Hell.
  
  Section 15
  
  Introduction / One Who Desecrates Shabbat Disaffiliates Himself from the Jewish People
  We have seen that the desecration of Shabbat is exceedingly grave; one who publicly desecrates Shabbat, like the idolater, is viewed as having disaffiliated from the Jewish people and is treated as a non-Jew. As Rambam writes: Both Shabbat and idolatry are the equivalent of all the remaining mitzvot of the Torah. Shabbat is the eternal sign between God and us. Thus, one who transgresses other mitzvot is grouped with wicked Jews, but one who publicly desecrates Shabbat is like an idolater; both are like non-Jews in all matters. (MT 30:15) 2<i class="footnote">Editor’s note: Here and henceforth, references to MT are to the Laws of Shabbat, unless otherwise indicated.</i>In other words, in general one who violates one of the Torah’s many prohibitions is not considered an apostate; he is treated as a Jew who sinned. But those who worship idols or publicly desecrate Shabbat, even if they are not motivated by spite (“lehakhis”), and even if they observe all the other mitzvot, are subject to rabbinic sanction. As long as they have not repented, they are viewed as having completely apostatized, and halakha treats them as non-Jews for all purposes (Eruvin 69b; m. Ḥullin 5:1). This means that their offerings are not accepted in the Temple (MT, Laws of Sacrificial Procedure 3:4), they do not count for a minyan (prayer quorum) (MB 55:46), and wine that they touched may not be drunk. There is no mitzva to treat them with the kindness due to every Jew (Ahavat Ḥesed I 3:3).
  However, in modern times, a number of halakhic authorities have ruled that as long as a Shabbat desecrator is not acting defiantly, he should not be treated as an idolater. In the past, when all Jews kept Shabbat, one who publicly desecrated it (even if not spitefully) was considered disaffiliated from the Jewish people. But in recent times when, much to our chagrin, many Jews do not keep Shabbat, only one who publicly desecrates Shabbat out of spite or to harm Israel’s Torah is considered like an idolater. In contrast, one who desecrates Shabbat for his own convenience is not equated with one who decides to alienate himself from his Jewish heritage (Melamed Le-ho’il, OḤ 29; Binyan Tziyon Ha-ḥadashot §23; see Peninei Halakha: Prayer 2:8). Therefore, in practice, if such a person wishes to join a minyan, he may be counted, and it is a mitzva to be as kind to him as to any other Jew. Nevertheless, even today there are many authorities who maintain that a public Shabbat desecrator should be treated as a non-Jew. Therefore, even one who finds it difficult to observe Shabbat because of his education and habits should at a minimum try to light Shabbat candles before sundown Friday, make kiddush, and observe whatever he can. He thus demonstrates that Shabbat is important to him, and that he wishes to connect with his heritage. In such a case, even according to those who rule stringently he would not be considered an idolater.
  It must be noted that in any case a Jew cannot completely disconnect from Judaism. Even if he worships idols, intentionally desecrates Shabbat, and commits every sin in the Torah, he remains a Jew, and his soul possesses the sanctity of a Jew. Yet he is exceedingly wicked, and his punishment is greater than that of other sinners, who did not disaffiliate from the Jewish people (Zohar II 151:2). This is why the Sages established that, on the one hand, we distance ourselves from serious sinners, while on the other hand, when possible, we try to encourage their repentance.
  
  Section 16
  
  Introduction / Shabbat, Peace, and Unity
  On Shabbat we connect with the Source of our life and thereby reveal that all creation has one root. Consequently, the world becomes more peaceful. The most profound opposition in the world is the dichotomy between the spiritual and the physical, between body and soul. When examined using “mundane eyes,” they appear to be fighting and interfering with one another. But on Shabbat it is revealed that the body and the soul complement one another, for the soul brings life and blessing to the body, while the body provides the soul with a way to express itself. Therefore, on Shabbat we are commanded to enjoy ourselves both physically and spiritually, through Torah study and prayer and through festive meals and sleep (see 2:5 below).
  Other forces in the world also find peace on Shabbat. During the week it seems that everyone competes and fights over money, honor, and adulation, and one person’s gain is another person’s loss. This leads to a world of dispute, in which the wicked, those who hate Israel, succeed. But on Shabbat it is revealed that everything strives toward unity; the forces that seem divisive are actually complementary, and can even cross-fertilize each other. Together they all long for God, their life Source. The wicked clinging to evil, who seem successful when viewed with mundane eyes, in fact are only there to inspire the righteous, and when they complete their job they disappear from the world. This is the praise sung by the seventh day: A psalm. A song; for the day of Shabbat: <i>A psalm. A song; for the day of Shabbat: It is good to praise the Lord, to sing hymns to Your name, O Most High; to proclaim Your kindness at daybreak, and Your faithfulness each night. With a ten-stringed harp and with a psaltery, with voice and lyre together. For you have gladdened me by Your deeds, O Lord; I shout for joy at Your handiwork. How great are your works, O Lord, how very subtle Your designs! A brutish man cannot know, and a fool cannot understand this: though the wicked sprout like grass, though all evildoers blossom, it is only that they may be destroyed forever. But you are exalted, O Lord, for all time. Surely, Your enemies, O Lord, surely, Your enemies perish, and all evildoers are scattered. You raise my horn high like that of a wild ox; I am soaked in freshening oil. I shall see the defeat of my watchful foes. Hear of the downfall of the wicked who beset me. The righteous bloom like a date-palm; they thrive like a cedar in Lebanon. Planted in the house of the Lord, they flourish in the courts of our God. In old age they still produce fruit; they are full of sap and freshness, proclaiming that the Lord is upright, my Rock, in whom there is no wrong. (Tehilim 92)</i>
  True peace thus has two components. The first is that peace gives every force and aspiration its unique and appropriate place, thus enabling each of them to achieve a refinement that shows that none of them are evil or at odds with the others. The second is that even pure evil has a purpose: to inspire the forces of good. Once good has been awakened, evil concludes its mission and disappears. There is no need to feel pain about the existence of evil, for it too has a destiny to fulfill within God’s plan.
  Zohar states: The world continues to exist only on account of peace. When God created the world, it could not exist until He infused it with peace. What is this peace? It is Shabbat, which brings peace between the celestial and terrestrial realms. Only then could the world exist. (III 176:2)Zohar further states that one must be very careful not to infringe on the sanctity of Shabbat through arguments. One who is sad must try to overcome this mood on Shabbat. If one is at odds with his wife or someone else, Shabbat is the time for reconciliation (Tikkunei Zohar 57:1).
  The lighting of the Shabbat candles symbolizes this peacefulness. When one’s home is dark, even if it is organized, he stumbles around in the dark to find his things. He bumps into things and trips over them, until he is left feeling that all his furniture and possessions have ganged up against him. But when he lights a candle, he sees that everything is in its place, ready to help him. This alludes to our position in the world. As long as we are distant from God and divine ideals, we are stumbling around in the dark, and the whole world seems at odds and divided, with the wicked dominating. But once we merit the light of Shabbat, which reveals perfect faith, we see how everyone’s different abilities complement each other, and evil goes up in smoke (see below 4:1).
  Zohar states that with the revelation of perfect faith in the one and only God, which Shabbat expresses, joy is multiplied in all the worlds, and there is peace in the upper and nether realms. Every Jew is granted a neshama yeteira and supreme enjoyment. Even the wicked who are condemned to Hell get a break from punishment on Shabbat, if they honored Shabbat while they were alive (See Zohar I 48:1; II 88:2, 151:1, 205:1; III 94:2, 176:2, 273:1).
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Preparing for Shabbat / Shabbat Preparations
  The six weekdays and Shabbat are interconnected. Just as one has a body and a soul, so, too, the week has a body (the work days) and a soul (Shabbat). Just as a wholesome person’s body and soul work together harmoniously – the body receives spiritual inspiration from the soul and in turn serves as the vehicle for the soul’s expression – so, too, an ideal week is one in which Shabbat and the weekdays are closely linked. During the week we prepare for Shabbat, thus elevating and sanctifying the weekdays, which draw their value from Shabbat.
  The Sages recount that Shammai would always eat in honor of Shabbat. When he saw a fine animal he would say: “This is for Shabbat.” If he found an even better one, he would eat the first one and leave the better one for Shabbat (Beitza 16a). In other words, all week he would eat lower quality food, always saving the best for Shabbat. In this way, whenever he ate he honored Shabbat and considered how he could honor and sanctify it. Hillel possessed a different trait. All his actions were undertaken for the greater glory of God. He would make a point of honoring and sanctifying the weekdays as well as Shabbat, thus fulfilling the mandate to “Bless God every day” (Tehilim 68:20). Therefore, when good food came his way during the week he would eat it, trusting that just as God made sure he had good food during the week, He would make sure that he would have even better food for the holy Shabbat. Thus Hillel honored and valued each day (Rashi ad loc.; Ramban, Shemot 20:8).
  According to halakhic authorities, even Hillel agreed that for most people it is preferable to act like Shammai and designate the best food for Shabbat. However, Hillel’s trust in God was exceptional, so he was certain that God would provide him with better food for Shabbat. One who does not possess this degree of faith must follow Shammai and honor Shabbat by designating the best food for Shabbat (MB 250:2).
  Nowadays, this law is almost irrelevant. There is such a vast selection of food in contemporary supermarkets at all times that there is no reason to think that if one eats a particular food during the week, he will not be able to find food as good for Shabbat. Therefore, today one must simply plan his shopping such that the foods for Shabbat will be the best.
  While shopping for Shabbat, it is most proper to articulate that “this shopping is to honor the holy Shabbat,” thus fulfilling the commandment of Zakhor (Ramban op. cit.). It is also good to taste the food being prepared for Shabbat in order to season it correctly and enhance the pleasure of Shabbat (MA 250:1 in the name of Arizal; MB 250:2).
  
  Section 2
  
  Preparing for Shabbat / Friday
  Although there is a certain amount of preparation for Shabbat that should go on all week, the primary time to prepare is on Friday, as is stated: “But on the sixth day, they prepare what they have brought in” (Shemot 16:5). Just as in the desert first thing Friday morning the Jews gathered the manna that had fallen the previous night, so too it is a mitzva to be industrious and to prepare for Shabbat on Friday morning (SA 250:1).1<i class="footnote">Editor’s note: Here and henceforth, references to SA and Rema are to Oraḥ Ḥayim, unless otherwise indicated.</i> It is an admirable custom for women to wake up early on Friday, bake challah bread for Shabbat, and perform the mitzva of hafrashat ḥalla (Rema 242:1).
  Even though there is a mitzva to shop early Friday, one should not do so before Shaḥarit. Similarly, if one normally studies Torah after praying, he should keep this routine and then immediately purchase food and prepare for Shabbat. One may go shopping before Shaḥarit only if there is a real concern that if he waits there will not be food for Shabbat left in the store (MB 250:1).
  Aḥaronim have written that it is preferable to buy food for Shabbat on Friday than Thursday, since it is more apparent on Friday that the purchases are being made to honor Shabbat. There is also another reason: in the past, when there was no refrigeration, there was no way to keep food fresh. Therefore, to make sure that Shabbat food would be of superior quality, one had to shop and cook on Friday. However, if there are foods that might not be available on Friday or whose preparations are very time-consuming, they should be purchased on Thursday; this was true then and is certainly true now (MB 250:2).
  If one is faced with two possibilities – cooking all the food on Friday and being exhausted Friday night, or cooking on Thursday, refrigerating the food, and entering Shabbat calmly – he should finish cooking on Thursday and leave some small things to be done on Friday. This is because the primary mitzva is to honor and enjoy Shabbat, so it is important that he enter it in an alert and relaxed state of mind.
  There are families where there is so much tension involved in trying to get everything done before Shabbat that Friday becomes an aggravating day, full of arguments and anxiety. As it were, there are satanic forces at work, trying to foment anger and disagreement and prevent Israel from welcoming Shabbat properly and peacefully. The Talmud tells of a couple who would have horrible fights each week before Shabbat. R. Meir was visiting their neighborhood, and for three weeks he visited them on Friday, until he made peace between them. He then heard the voice of a prosecuting angel lamenting: “Woe is me, for R. Meir has chased me out of this home” (Gittin 52a). In order to avoid giving this angel an opening, one must organize Shabbat preparations so well that he welcomes Shabbat joyfully and peacefully (this is also implied by Ezra’s takana [ordinance]; see below, section 4).
  There is a holy custom to finish all Shabbat preparations by midday on Friday and then to rest and study Torah in the afternoon. All who follow this custom are privileged to welcome Shabbat joyfully and peacefully and become truly aware of the neshama yeteira given them on Shabbat.
  
  Section 3
  
  Preparing for Shabbat / Buying Food for Shabbat
  It is a mitzva to make Shabbat enjoyable through superior food and beverages, depending on one’s means. Spending generously and preparing many tasty foods is praiseworthy (MT 30:7) and a fulfillment of the verse: “Call Shabbat ‘delight’” (Yeshayahu 58:13). The Sages state that whoever fulfills the mitzva of oneg Shabbat (making Shabbat a delight) merits great things: he receives a limitless portion; his heart’s desires are fulfilled; he is saved from the birth-pangs of the Messiah, from the pre-messianic wars, and from hell; and he becomes wealthy (Shabbat 118-119a). This is because life and blessing depend upon the connection between the material and spiritual realms. One is alive if his soul inhabits his body; when one dies, his soul departs his body. When one’s material existence is linked to higher realms, it is invigorated and blessed at its root; when it is distanced from the source of its vitality, from faith and spiritual values, its life is diminished, it deteriorates, and it is cursed. What makes Shabbat special is that it has increased sanctity expressed in both body and soul – through Torah, prayer, and festive meals. This unifies the spiritual and material, the body and the soul. Life is strengthened, and blessing flows to the world. Therefore the Sages state that whoever properly enjoys Shabbat merits many blessings and is saved from evil (see also below, 7:1).
  One must spend as much as he can on Shabbat food, taking into account his weekday habits. In other words, he need not buy the most expensive foods in the market to honor Shabbat, but he must buy better food than what he and his family normally eat on a weekday. The specifics vary from family to family. It seems reasonable to suggest that one should spend twice as much on food for Shabbat as on food for a weekday. Those who go above and beyond spend even more, and they receive great reward for this.
  One who is struggling financially and is unable to buy superior food for Shabbat should cut back on his food expenditures during the week, so that at the very least he will be able to buy something special, like small fish, in honor of Shabbat (Shabbat 118b). There are many people who waste money on luxuries, but when they have expenses connected with mitzvot they suddenly become thrifty and stingy. In fact, it is appropriate for one to cut back on luxuries and indulge in mitzvot. The Sages state that one’s annual earnings are allotted by God on Rosh Ha-shana (Beitza 16a), and that one must take care not to waste money on frivolous purchases, because he may exceed his allowance and be left penniless. This allotment, however, excludes money spent on Shabbat and Yom Tov and on his children’s Torah study. If he spends less on these, it is deducted from what was allotted to him; if he spends more on them, his allotment is increased (Taz 242:1).
  One who does not have money available to buy food for Shabbat should borrow money in order to make Shabbat enjoyable. He should not worry that something will happen to prevent him from repaying the loan. God assures the Jewish people: “My children, borrow money and sanctify the day. Trust Me, for I will repay it” (Beitza 15b). This is on condition that one does not rely on a miracle, but rather has a business or a regular salary or savings upon which he can rely. The Sages have such a person in mind when they state that one should not worry that he might not succeed in repaying the debt; if he acts properly, works diligently, and is not a spendthrift, God will help him repay.
  But one who does not know how he will repay his debt must not borrow money to make Shabbat enjoyable, because he may become a wicked person who does not repay his debts.2<i class="footnote">This is implied by Tosafot, Beitza 15b and stated explicitly by Eshel Avraham – Buczacz, second edition, §242. According to AHS, one should take out a loan only when he has a business and can repay it. Hagahot Asheri states that one should take a collateral-based loan so that there is no concern that the borrower will fit the description: “The wicked man borrows and does not repay” (Tehilim 37:21), for, if he is unable to repay, the collateral will be the payment. This is also the opinion of Eliya Rabba and SAH 242:3. However, the Vilna Gaon maintains that one who takes a loan to buy Shabbat necessities may rely on a miracle. It is possible that this is a ramification of the disagreement between R. Yishmael and R. Shimon b. Yoḥai in Berakhot 35b about whether one must act in accordance with the laws of nature, or whether one may rely upon a miracle. See Harḥavot.</i> He also should not ask for charity. Rather, he should eat simple food on Shabbat, following R. Akiva’s recommendation: “Make your Shabbat like a weekday, and do not rely on others” (Pesaḥim 112a). As a reward for not becoming a burden to others, one will become rich (m. Pe’ah 8:9). However, a poor person who has already been forced to accept charity to meet his various needs should also accept charity in order to make Shabbat enjoyable (MB 242:1).
  
  Section 4
  
  Preparing for Shabbat / Honoring Shabbat via Clothing
  It is a mitzva to honor Shabbat, as it is written: “Call Shabbat ‘delight,’ the Lord’s holy [day] ‘honored’” (Yeshayahu 58:13). Part of honoring Shabbat is making sure that one does not dress on Shabbat as he would during the week (Shabbat 113a). Rather, Shabbat clothes should be nicer and clean. Some authorities write in the name of Arizal that it is best not to wear anything on Shabbat that one has worn during the week (MA 262:2). This means that one’s outer garments should be special for Shabbat and Yom Tov, and one’s undergarments should be freshly laundered. Some buy special shoes for Shabbat as well (see SSK ch. 42 n. 206). One who is spending Shabbat alone should still dress up, because the clothes are not meant to honor the people who see them, but to honor Shabbat (MB 262:6).
  One who unexpectedly finds himself somewhere for Shabbat and does not have Shabbat clothes available, or a poor person who owns only one garment, should do his best to make his clothing look nicer before Shabbat. Thus we read in the Yerushalmi that R. Simlai publicly taught that everyone should have two sets of clothing, one for weekdays and one for Shabbat. His students cried, saying: “We are poor and we have only one garment.” He said to them: “Nevertheless, you must beautify it before Shabbat” (y. Pe’ah 8:7). Thus soldiers must wear their dress uniforms on Shabbat, and if that is not possible they must clean their clothes and make them look as best they can.
  One of the ten ordinances instituted by Ezra the Scribe is that clothing be washed on Thursday (BK 82a). There are two reasons for this ordinance: first, one should not wear dirty clothes on Shabbat. Second, since laundering was hard work, it was ordained to be done on Thursday, so that people would have time to cook and to clean the house on Friday. Nowadays, however, when washing is done by machine, one may do laundry on Friday because it is not too burdensome and it does not disrupt Shabbat preparations. Nevertheless, it is preferable that Shabbat clothing be washed on Thursday, in accordance with Ezra’s ordinance.
  We can generalize from Ezra’s ordinance that one should be careful not to turn Friday into a day full of hard and aggravating work. Rather, Friday should be left relatively free, so that people can prepare for Shabbat in a relaxed and calm way (as explained in section 2 above).
  
  Section 5
  
  Preparing for Shabbat / Honoring Shabbat by Preparing One’s Self and One’s Home
  Just as one must prepare nice, clean clothing for Shabbat, so too, one must prepare one’s body for Shabbat. This is part of the mitzva of honoring Shabbat. Thus, the Sages state that it is a mitzva to take a hot bath or shower before Shabbat (Shabbat 25b), because hot water cleans better. One who uses cold or lukewarm water does not fulfill the mitzva (SA 260:1). In the past, when it was difficult to lug water inside in order to wash, the mitzva was limited to washing one’s face, hands, feet, and hair. Those who went above and beyond washed their entire bodies in hot water. But nowadays, when we have showers and electric water boilers, it is a mitzva to wash one’s whole body with hot water. If one normally washes his whole body for a social event, certainly going to greet the Shabbat Queen deserves the same care.
  One should not shower or bathe too close to Shabbat, so as to avoid the possibility of unknowingly desecrating Shabbat by turning off the bathroom light or turning off the switch that controls the hot water heater (a common feature in Israeli homes) after Shabbat has already begun. The positive of washing close to Shabbat is outweighed by the risk of desecrating Shabbat.
  It is a mitzva for one who needs a haircut to get it on Friday. One who shaves regularly should shave before Shabbat. Similarly, it is a mitzva to cut one’s nails in honor of Shabbat. It is preferable to shave and cut one’s fingernails after midday, because then it is clear that it is being done as part of Shabbat preparations; nevertheless, one may prepare even before midday. One who knows that he will be busy on Friday should cut his hair and nails on Thursday (SA 260:1; AHS 260:6).
  The home must also be prepared for Shabbat. It should be cleaned, the table should be set with a nice tablecloth, and the chairs should be neatly arranged around it. One should take care that throughout Shabbat, even between meals, the house and table look nice (SA 262:1). It is also proper to set the table with nice dishes, glasses, and silverware.
  Often people think that holiness is expressed only in spiritual activities like Torah study and prayer, while physical needs like eating, sleeping, and beautifying and caring for the body oppose and impede spiritual progress. They think that one should afflict his body, the root of the evil impulse. But then Shabbat arrives and teaches us that it is possible to sanctify the physical. Holiness can be expressed through enjoyable food, nice clothing, and a clean house. Furthermore, perfection is attained specifically when holiness is revealed in all aspects of existence, the spiritual and the physical. Therefore we greet one another with “Shabbat Shalom,” because Shabbat brings peace between the material and the spiritual, and as a result there is peace between husband and wife as well as among people in general (see above, 1:15).
  Thus, the Sages inform us: Two ministering angels accompany one home from the synagogue on Friday night, one good and one wicked. If he arrives home and the candles are lit, the table is set, and the bed is made, the good angel says: “May it be His will that it be this way next Shabbat as well,” and the wicked angel is forced to respond, “Amen.” If this is not the case, the wicked angel says: “May it be His will that it be this way next Shabbat as well,” and the good angel is forced to respond, “Amen.” (Shabbat 119b) 
  On Shabbat holiness can come to its full expression, in the material and spiritual realms alike. This is why, with the house clean and the table set, even the wicked angel is forced to respond “Amen.” Nevertheless, even if the house is not properly clean, the table not properly set, and the Shabbat food ruined, one must be very careful not to fight or become enraged. Honoring Shabbat requires that the household be at peace, as is stated: “Better a meal of vegetable where there is love than a fattened ox where there is hate” (Mishlei 15:17), and “Better a dry crust with peace than a house full of feasting with strife” (ibid. 17:1). Sefer Ḥasidim elaborates on the former verse: “Better a meal of vegetable” – on Shabbat, “where there is love” – with his wife and children. “Than a fattened ox where there is hate” – one should not say “I will buy delicacies for Shabbat” knowing full well that he will argue with his wife, parents, or other guests…. This is as it says: “Honor it” (Yeshayahu 58:13) – honor Shabbat by not arguing. (§863) 
  
  Section 6
  
  Preparing for Shabbat / The Mitzva to Take Part in Shabbat Preparations
  The Torah states: “On the sixth day, they shall prepare what they have brought in” (Shemot 16:5). It is inferred from here that there is a mitzva to prepare for Shabbat on Friday. Even a rich and dignified person who has servants who take care of all his needs during the week, and who does not lift a finger around the house, must try to do something himself to honor Shabbat. He should not say: “Should I toil at these simple labors that are beneath my dignity?” Rather he must be aware that it is an honor for him to honor the holy Shabbat by preparing for it. Even if one diligently studies Torah and has others who prepare Shabbat for him, he is commanded to participate personally in some type of Shabbat preparation (SA 250:1; Rema 251:2).
  The Talmud tells of great rabbis and respected leaders throughout the generations who personally participated in Shabbat preparations. Rava would salt fish before Shabbat, and R. Ḥisda would chop vegetables. Rabba and R. Yosef would chop wood to fire the oven. R. Abahu and R. Zeira would light the cooking fire. R. Huna and R. Papa would prepare candles for Shabbat, and R. Naḥman would clean the house and replace the weekday furniture with the Shabbat furniture (Shabbat 119a).
  This is not the place to expand upon the status of each one of the great leaders that we just mentioned, but we must note that we are speaking of extremely well-respected people, the most honored of their generation. They were Torah scholars and community leaders. For example, Rabba and R. Yosef headed the prestigious Babylonian yeshivot of Sura and Pumbedita, and at that time the heads of these yeshivot, together with the Exilarch, constituted the leadership of the entire Jewish world. In the areas under their jurisdiction, no one was appointed to any public office without their agreement, and no ordinance was passed or decision reached regarding tax collection without their approval. Yet these leaders, despite their dignified positions and greatness, would chop wood in honor of Shabbat. R. Huna, R. Ḥisda, R. Papa, and Rava all served as rashei yeshiva in Babylonia, and R. Abahu was the leader of the Jewish community in Eretz Yisrael.
  The Sages state that there are three things one must say in his home as it gets dark on Friday: (1) “Has the produce been tithed?” If it has not, he must do so; (2) “Has an eruv ḥatzerot been set up?” If it has not, he must do so. (3) “Remember to light the candle on time” (Shabbat 34a). Today, when we generally buy our produce already tithed, and there are community representatives in charge of the eruv, we no longer need to ask about the first two. But each person still needs to make sure that his home is ready for Shabbat: that the timers controlling lights and the heat/air conditioning are set, that the refrigerator light is off, and that the food is on the plata (a warming tray with no temperature controls), and, with the new type of refrigerator, that it has been set to “Shabbat” mode (see below, 17:8-9). It is also proper on Friday to separate the attached plastic containers of some dairy products (below, 15:14), and to open bottles that have metal caps (15:13). It is good to open those cans and packages that will be used to store food for a few days or longer (15:11-12).
  
  Section 7
  
  Preparing for Shabbat / The Prohibition of Eating a Large Meal on Friday
  On Friday one is meant to be preparing for Shabbat. The Sages forbade sitting down to an unusually large meal on Friday, because doing so would spoil one’s appetite for Friday night dinner (SA 249:2). It also would be disrespectful toward Shabbat, since it would make it seem like Shabbat meals and weekday meals are no different from one another (Pri Megadim ad loc.). Furthermore, it is possible that dealing with a large meal would get in the way of necessary Shabbat preparations (MA ad loc., quoting Rabbeinu Ḥananel). Even a se’udat mitzva (a ceremonial festive meal associated with a mitzva) such as a siyum masekhet (a celebration upon completing a unit of Torah study) may not be planned for Friday. However, before midday one may have a regular meal to celebrate a siyum.
  The Talmud tells of a family that lived in Jerusalem and hosted elaborate meals on Fridays. Because of this sin, they first became impoverished and then died out (Gittin 38b).
  When there is a se’udat mitzva that must take place at a specific time, such as a brit on the eighth day or a pidyon ha-ben (redemption of the firstborn) on the thirtieth, it may be held on Friday. Since the Torah designates a time for them, it is a mitzva to serve a big meal, and this does not detract from the honor of Shabbat. Nevertheless, it is proper to hold these celebrations before midday, both so as not to disrupt Shabbat preparations and so as not to spoil people’s appetites for the Friday night meal (SA 249:3; MB ad loc. 13 and 695:10; BHL s.v. “mutar”).3<i class="footnote">According to MA 249:3, a man may perform Kiddushin (betrothal, the first stage of a Jewish marriage ceremony) on Friday, to ensure that no one preempts him. In this opinion, one may also perform nisu’in (the second stage of a Jewish marriage ceremony) on Friday, in order to expedite the fulfillment of the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply. Following this approach, one may hold a wedding on Friday with both Kiddushin and nisu’in. Authorities who agree with this include the Vilna Gaon and Ben Ish Ḥai (Year 2, Lekh Lekha 21). However, many disagree and maintain that one may not have a wedding feast on Friday unless it is impossible to hold it on another day (Eliya Rabba, Even Ha-ozer, and AHS). Nowadays, when the wedding date is set far in advance and the couple can choose the time, it is clear that a wedding and its feast should not be planned for Friday. This is also the opinion stated in Ḥazon Ovadia, pp. 32-34. According to MB, the law does permit a Friday wedding, but it is preferable to choose a different day if possible. It should be noted that this discussion is not relevant to the earlier, well-accepted custom, primarily among the poor, to hold a wedding on Friday afternoon so that the wedding feast is also served as the Friday night meal, thus reducing expenses.</i>
  It is specifically eating a large meal that the Sages prohibit, but technically one may eat a regular meal anytime on Friday. Nevertheless, the Sages recommend not eating a meal with bread in the three hours before Shabbat, so that at the onset of Shabbat one will be hungry. One may partake of a snack of cake or fruit before Shabbat starts, as long as it does not diminish his appetite.
  There were pious individuals who set very high standards for themselves and did not eat at all on Friday; they felt that if they ate they would reduce their appetite for the Shabbat meal. However, one who finds fasting difficult should not do so, as we are not supposed to enter Shabbat while suffering (SA 249:2-3; MB ad loc. 18). In any case, each person should plan his meals on Friday such that he will begin Shabbat hungry and will enjoy the Friday night meal.
  
  Section 8
  
  Preparing for Shabbat / The Prohibition of Doing Melakha on Friday
  The Sages prohibit working on Friday afternoon, informing us that work undertaken then will not be blessed with success. The prohibition goes into effect at Minḥa ketana, which is two and a half (seasonal) hours before sunset (Rashi). There is a more stringent opinion that maintains that the prohibition goes into effect earlier, with the onset of Minḥa gedola, which is one half of a seasonal hour after midday (Maharam). Since this is a rabbinic prohibition, one may rely on the more lenient opinion and work until the later time (SA 251:1; MB ad loc. 3). Even if one has finished all his Shabbat preparations, he may not work during this time, because it is disrespectful toward Shabbat for one to work on something unconnected to Shabbat so close to Shabbat (see Harḥavot).
  The Sages specifically forbade regular work during those hours, but permitted ad hoc work. Therefore at this time one may not engage in carpentry, tailoring, electrical work, large gardening projects, computer work, writing a Torah scroll or mezuza, or editing books for pay, because these are all forms of regular work. An expert may, however, do something quick, like set a trap to catch animals, soak dye-producing materials in water, or set a computer to carry out a complex operation, all of which are ad hoc types of work. Similarly, one may water the lawn, clean a room, sew buttons, do the laundry in a machine, or write Torah thoughts by hand or on the computer, as these tasks do not require expertise. One may even do these jobs for pay, though he may not do them for pay every Friday afternoon, even if they involve only unskilled labor, because the combination of the pay and the frequency makes it the equivalent of a regular job (see Rema 251:1; BHL s.v. “igeret”; SSK 42:38-39 and n. 133).
  One may engage in regular work, including paid work, on Friday afternoon if it is clear that this work is done in the service of Shabbat. For example, one may give haircuts then because it is obvious to all that people are getting their hair cut in honor of Shabbat. It is permissible for a driver to take people places before Shabbat because this too is considered part of Shabbat preparation. An electrician may perform repairs necessary for Shabbat for pay. However, a tailor may not sew clothing then, even if the clothing will be worn on Shabbat, since it is not apparent that it is being done for Shabbat, as it is possible that the garment is meant for a different time. If, however, he is working for free, he may sew clothing to be worn on Shabbat, whether for himself or for a friend. Accordingly, a non-professional may certainly sew or fix clothing for free in honor of Shabbat (SA 251:2; MB ad loc. 7; BHL s.v. “le-taken”).
  There are two additional cases in which the Sages allow people to undertake regular work on Friday afternoon. A poor person who does not have enough money to buy Shabbat necessities may continue to work then (MB 251:5), and anyone may work then in order to avoid damage or loss. Thus, a craftsman may finish his work if there is a possibility that if he does not finish it he will lose customers (BHL 251:2 s.v. “ve-eino”). Similarly, one may do on Friday afternoon everything that one may do on Ḥol Ha-mo’ed (MB ad loc. 5).
  According to many authorities, commerce is not included in the prohibition of work, so stores may remain open late on Friday. Nevertheless, stores should be closed at least half an hour before Shabbat begins, in order to leave time to wash and get dressed for Shabbat. Nowadays we are customarily more stringent and close shops a few hours before Shabbat. Only stores that sell Shabbat necessities stay open late (MB 251:1, 4; BHL s.v. “ha-oseh,” “ve-eino”).
  Those who are going away for Shabbat must plan their trip so that they will arrive at their destination at least half an hour before the start of Shabbat. This way they will be able to organize things for Shabbat when they arrive. If they are taking a long trip, they must take into account possible delays on the way. R. Mordechai Eliyahu advised allowing for double the normal travel time, so if a trip normally takes two hours, one should leave home four hours before Shabbat.
  
  Section 9
  
  Preparing for Shabbat / Tasks that Begin before Shabbat and Continue into Shabbat
  One may begin tasks on Friday that will automatically complete on Shabbat. For example, on Friday one may place a pot with uncooked food on the plata so that it will continue to cook on Shabbat, as long as from the onset of Shabbat until the food is fully cooked one neither touches the pot nor adjusts its temperature (below, 10:16). Similarly, one may place cloth into a vat of dye so that it will absorb the color during Shabbat. This is because the prohibitions on Shabbat are only relevant to actions performed on Shabbat, and not to activities that take place automatically during Shabbat. According to Beit Shammai, just as one is commanded to rest his animals on Shabbat, so too he is commanded to rest all his tools and appliances on Shabbat. However, the halakha follows the opinion of Beit Hillel, and Shabbat prohibitions do not apply to one’s inanimate possessions. Therefore one may use a tool for a task on Friday that will complete automatically on Shabbat (SA 252:1).
  Thus, one may set a timer on Friday to turn lights on and off during Shabbat as needed (below, 17:6). Similarly, one may set up irrigation and sprinklers before Shabbat, even though one may not water the lawn on Shabbat (below, 19:4); as long as the watering is set before Shabbat, it is not prohibited. This is also the case when it comes to industrial machines that work nonstop. As long as there is no concern that a Jew will need to turn them on or fix them on Shabbat, it is not necessary to turn them off before Shabbat (Heikhal Yitzḥak §19).
  However, when it comes to leaving on machines that are very noisy, like grinding mills, there are differing opinions. Some are stringent and maintain that one may not leave them on during Shabbat because it is not respectful toward Shabbat. Others feel that since they were turned on before Shabbat and no melakha is being done on Shabbat, it is not prohibited. The latter opinion is followed in SA 252:5. Rema, in contrast, writes that ideally one should be stringent and not begin an activity that will produce noise during Shabbat; however, if this will lead to a loss, or if there is some other pressing need, one may be lenient in this regard (see 22:19 below about the prohibition to listen to the radio or watch television on Shabbat).4<i class="footnote">em&gt;Shabbat 18a records a dispute between Rabba and R. Yosef. According to Rabba, a <em>melakha</em> that produces noise (using a mill, for example) is forbidden because it dishonors Shabbat. This is the position of Rabbeinu Ḥananel, <em>Tosafot</em>, Rosh, and <em>Smag</em>. According to R. Yosef, though, it is permitted. This is the position of Rif, Rambam, R. Tam, and SA 252:5. Rema says that <em>le-khatḥila </em>one should be stringent, but if a loss is involved he may be lenient. Based on this, Aḥaronim write that according to SA one may turn on a washing machine close to Shabbat even though it is noisy, while Rema prohibits this. But in a time of need, such as when a soldier arrives from the army on Friday with his clothes needing to be washed, and he has to return to the base immediately after Shabbat, even Rema would agree that one may put them in the wash on Friday afternoon (see <em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 3:18 and SSK 42:43). It is possible that one may use the newer washing machines, which make almost no noise, <em>le-khatḥila</em> even according to Rema.</i>
  
  Section 10
  
  Preparing for Shabbat / Taking a Boat Trip That Will Continue into Shabbat
  The prohibitions of Shabbat apply only on Shabbat. Accordingly, at first glance it would seem permissible to go on a dangerous trip on Friday, keep traveling until a minute before Shabbat, and then when Shabbat begins, decide that one is in a dangerous place. Since danger to life supersedes Shabbat, in order to save himself from danger he would have no choice but to continue traveling to the nearest inhabited area. It is true that if one finds himself in a dangerous place on Shabbat, he may desecrate Shabbat in order to save himself. But a Jew may not put himself in a situation that will require him to desecrate Shabbat. The Sages tell us that starting from Wednesday a Jew must plan things in a way that will not cause him to desecrate Shabbat.
  Therefore, from Wednesday onward the Sages forbade people from setting sail on a boat for recreational purposes, and this prohibition applies even when the crew members are non-Jews (Shabbat 19a). There are several reasons for this: first, there is the concern that a dangerous situation will arise and the Jew will have to engage in prohibited activities to help steer the boat (Ha-ma’or). Second, even if there is no chance that the sailors will request his help, if half of the passengers are Jewish then the sailors are working for them on Shabbat, and it is rabbinically prohibited for a Jew to benefit from work that a non-Jew undertook on his behalf on Shabbat (Ramban). Furthermore, even when most of the passengers are non-Jews, if the boat is traveling in shallow water where fewer than ten tefaḥim (handbreadths; each tefaḥ is 7.6 cm) separate the boat from the ocean floor, the Jews are violating the prohibition of being outside teḥum Shabbat (Rabbeinu Ḥananel; see ch. 30 below for the definition). Even if the boat will be sailing in deep water or will be anchored on Shabbat in the middle of the ocean, there may still be a prohibition: since many who travel on boats suffer from seasickness in the first days, the voyage negates the mitzva of oneg Shabbat (Rif).
  But in a situation where none of these reasons are relevant – where the sailors and the majority of the passengers are non-Jewish, there is no chance they will ask Jews for help, they are sailing in deep water, and the boat is large and stable so seasickness is unlikely and he will be able to enjoy Shabbat – in such a case one may set sail, even one minute before Shabbat begins, and even if the trip is recreational.5<i class="footnote">In halakhic literature, the example cited of a type of sailing that would not negate enjoyment of Shabbat is sailing on a river, which is assumed to be wave free. However, in today’s modern, large boats, there is almost no fear of seasickness, and the fact is that people sail in them for pleasure. Only those who are super-sensitive are likely to get seasick.It should also be noted that the Rishonim disagree whether the prohibition of setting sail is in force three days before Shabbat, i.e., from Wednesday (starting on Tuesday at night, which is the start of the halakhic day), or if it applies from Thursday (with Shabbat being included as one of the last three days of the week). See Beit Yosef §248 and MB 248:4. The answer to this question depends on the reason for the prohibition. If the fear is that one will desecrate Shabbat either by performing a melakha himself or by having a non-Jewish sailor do it for him, or alternatively if the concern is for teḥum Shabbat, these prohibitions all go into effect from Wednesday through Friday since these three days are referred to as “before Shabbat” (Gittin 77a). During this period he must not do anything that will lead him to desecrate Shabbat later on. However, if the concern is for oneg Shabbat, that is relevant only from Thursday; several of the Rishonim who mention this concern (including Rosh) specify that the prohibition of setting sail goes into effect on Thursday, because by the journey’s third day the passenger is already used to the water and can still enjoy Shabbat. See Menuḥat Ahava, 1:1:2.It is also important to note that the condition that most of the passengers be non-Jews is relevant only to a boat whose departure depends upon a certain number of places having been reserved. However, if the boat has a set schedule and does not depend on the number of passengers, then even if by chance most of the passengers are Jews, one may set sail during the three days before Shabbat, since the non-Jewish sailors would sail even if there were no Jews aboard (SSK 30:66).</i>
  On the first three days of the week, one may set sail for recreational purposes even if it is possible that when Shabbat arrives one may be faced with the necessity of transgressing. This is because on those days, one is not required to limit his actions for fear of desecrating Shabbat or negating the mitzva of oneg Shabbat (but if it is clear that he will definitely need to desecrate Shabbat, then according to Ha-ma’or, Rivash, and Shulḥan Arukh [248:4] one may set out at the beginning of the week, whereas according to Mahari b. Lev and Radbaz it is forbidden. See n. 7).
  
  Section 11
  
  Preparing for Shabbat / Sailing for the Sake of a Mitzva and Traveling on a Boat Owned by Jews
  The aforementioned prohibition on setting sail within three days of Shabbat in order to avoid its desecration or the negation of the mitzva of oneg Shabbat is limited to cases where the trip is not undertaken in service of a mitzva. If, however, the trip is for the sake of a mitzva, and the boat belongs to non-Jews, then one may set sail even on Friday. Some maintain that this permission is contingent upon the owner of the boat agreeing that he will drop anchor on Shabbat; if he is unwilling to agree to this stipulation, it is forbidden to set sail. However, most authorities maintain that even if the non-Jew did not commit to drop anchor, one may still set sail with him for the sake of a mitzva.6<i class="footnote">. Shabbat 19a records a disagreement. According to R. Yehuda Ha-nasi, one must stipulate with the non-Jewish owner that he will drop anchor on Shabbat; according to R. Yehuda’s father, R. Shimon b. Gamliel, this is unnecessary. The Rishonim disagree whom the halakha follows. Rambam and SA follow R. Yehuda Ha-nasi, while Rabbeinu Ḥananel and Tur follow R. Shimon b. Gamliel. Furthermore, the Aḥaronim disagree about R. Yehuda Ha-nasi’s position in a case where the non-Jew refuses to accept the stipulation. According to MA, if the non-Jew says that he will continue sailing on Shabbat, one may not board the boat within three days of Shabbat even for the sake of a mitzva. Only if there is a possibility that the boat will drop anchor on Shabbat may he board. However, Eliya Rabba and SAH maintain that R. Yehuda Ha-nasi’s position is that the Jew must request that the non-Jew drop anchor, but may set sail with him even if he refuses. MB 248:2 and SHT ad loc. 1 state that most Aḥaronim adopt the latter position.What qualifies as a mitzva for these purposes? Studying Torah, collecting charity, and the like. Rema writes that some maintain that traveling for the sake of one’s livelihood is also considered a mitzva mission, even if one has enough to survive and is traveling to earn more. Those who choose to be lenient in this case have an opinion to rely on. However, according to MB 248:36, where there is no custom to be lenient, one should not be lenient le-khatḥila, since many authorities feel that it is only for the sake of an uncontestable mitzva that one may set sail before Shabbat. Moving to Eretz Yisrael is definitely considered a mitzva. However, the status of one traveling to visit Eretz Yisrael is disputed. Pri Megadim maintains that this too is a mitzva, whereas MA maintains that it is not.</i>
  On Shabbat itself one may not set sail, even if the boat belongs to a non-Jew and one is on a mitzva mission. The Sages forbade sailing on Shabbat out of the concern that one might come to fashion a raft (Beitza 36b; SA 339:2). If the boat is scheduled to set sail on Shabbat, one may board it before Shabbat starts and remain on it until departure time. Some are lenient, allowing one to accept Shabbat while on the boat and then return home until the departure time; one should not object if people choose to follow this practice (SA and Rema 248:3).
  So far we have been discussing boats that belong to non-Jews. If the boat belongs to Jews who are Shabbat desecrators, there is disagreement about the proper practice. Some maintain that on the first three days of the week one may set sail in these boats, because during this time one does not have an obligation to take into account what will happen on Shabbat (Tzitz Eliezer 5:7). However, in practice one may not support Shabbat desecration, and even at the beginning of the week one may not set sail on a boat owned by Jews who desecrate Shabbat (R. Menachem Mendel Schneerson; Minḥat Yitzḥak 3:39; Yeḥaveh Da’at 6:16).7<i class="footnote">In the case of a Jewish-owned boat that is setting sail for over a week, if it is safe for them to drop anchor at sea and stay still on Shabbat, they must do so. R. Menachem Mendel Schneerson writes that he consulted with experts and was told that it is not dangerous to drop anchor at sea for 25 hours. He is quoted in Minḥat Yitzḥak 3:39 and Yeḥaveh Da’at 6:16. However, there have been experts who felt that this would be dangerous, and that one would have to continue sailing on Shabbat. If they are correct and it is not possible to drop anchor at a port on Shabbat, Tzitz Eliezer 5:7 declares that for a mitzva one may set sail even during the three days preceding Shabbat. If it is not for a mitzva, then one may set sail only during the first three days of the week. His position is based on the opinions of Ha-Ma’or and Rivash, who maintain that even if there is no mitzva involved and it is clear that one will be forced to desecrate Shabbat due to danger to life, one may set sail during the first three days of the week because one does not have to take into account then what will happen on Shabbat. During the three days preceding Shabbat, one may set sail only for a mitzva mission, since at that point he is required to take Shabbat into account, though involvement in a mitzva exempts him from this concern. This is the decision of SA 248:4. See Igrot Moshe OḤ 1:39. However, it seems that one can in fact drop anchor at sea, in which case one must refrain from aiding transgressors. Furthermore, according to Radbaz and Mahari b. Lev, if it is certain that the Jewish owners will desecrate Shabbat, it is rabbinically forbidden to set sail even during the first three days of the week and even for the sake of a mitzva. Some believe that one must follow their view and be stringent (Minḥat Yitzḥak 3:39). See the next section.</i>
  
  Section 12
  
  Preparing for Shabbat / Traveling by Plane or Train on Friday
  One may not board a train or plane on Friday if it will be traveling on Shabbat. This is the case even when the driver or pilot is not Jewish. There are several reasons for this: (1) It violates teḥum Shabbat – it is rabbinically prohibited to leave a populated area on Shabbat and travel for more than 2,000 amot (which is the distance of a mil, the equivalent of about half a mile, or 912 m). If one travels farther than twelve mil, some authorities view it as a transgression of a Torah prohibition (see below, 30:1). Thus one who boards a plane or train for an intercity trip is causing himself to transgress. (2) One will not be able to fulfill the mitzva of oneg Shabbat. Traveling by plane or train is wearying, and generally the seats are very crowded and it is difficult to enjoy Shabbat. (3) The Sages prohibited driving in an animal-drawn wagon that is driven by a non-Jew, out of concern that the Jew would pluck a branch in order to help prod the animal. Even when this concern does not exist, the prohibition stands. (4) Taking such a trip belittles Shabbat; it is very much a weekday activity (uvdin de-ḥol). Ḥatam Sofer, basing himself on Ramban, writes that anyone who does not properly rest on Shabbat and treats Shabbat the same way that he treats a weekday, negates the Torah commandment to rest on Shabbat (6:97; see below, 22:1. Also, see below 30:11 for how the laws of teḥum Shabbat pertain to one whose plane landed or whose boat dropped anchor on Shabbat).8<i class="footnote">See She’arim Metzuyanim Ba-halakha 74:1 and 74:4; Tzitz Eliezer 1:21 (regarding a plane); Yalkut Yosef 248:3-5. The status of one who wishes to travel for the sake of a mitzva is subject to dispute. According to Ha-ma’or, Responsa Rivash §17, Tashbetz 1:21, and SA 248:4, one may join a caravan even if it is clear that it will inevitably lead to the desecration of Shabbat, since he is setting out on a weekday for the sake of a mitzva. This is the ruling of Tzitz Eliezer 5:7 and Yabi’a Omer YD 5:23:1. However, according to Responsa Radbaz 4:77 and Mahari b. Lev, one may do so only if the desecration of Shabbat is possible but not definite. If he will definitely transgress a Torah prohibition, he may not set out. This is the opinion of MB 248:26 and Minḥat Yitzḥak 2:106, based on Ḥatam Sofer 6:97. (This dispute is connected to the disagreement mentioned above in n. 7 as to whether the law follows R. Yehuda Ha-nasi or R. Shimon b. Gamliel. One may assume that those who follow R. Shimon b. Gamliel would follow Ha-ma’or here, while those who follow R. Yehuda Ha-nasi can be understood to follow either Ha-ma’or or Radbaz.)Halakhic principles would seem to dictate that we should rule leniently, in accordance with Ha-ma’or and those who concur, since even according to Radbaz the prohibition to set out on Friday is rabbinic in nature (so states Tosefet Shabbat §105). Moreover, it is not clear that one would violate a Torah prohibition by riding in a train or airplane on Shabbat (see Harḥavot). Thus even according to Radbaz there is room to rule leniently. Nevertheless, it seems that in practice we should be stringent nowadays according to all opinions, even Ha-ma’or, since it is stated in Shibolei Ha-leket (Shabbat §111) that the basis for the Sages’ leniency, according to Ha-ma’or, is necessity, for otherwise it would be very difficult to set sail or travel by caravan. Nowadays, however, every flight and train ride, even to the most far-flung places, can begin and end during the weekdays. Therefore, one has no permission to set out knowing that he will have to desecrate Shabbat. It is also possible that setting sail or traveling were only permitted on rare occasions, as temporary measures. But nowadays, when flights and travel are common, there is no such license (a similar ruling appears in Meshaneh Halakhot 3:37; see Harḥavot).</i>
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Shabbat Times / Shabbat times
  In the Torah, night precedes day for all matters. This is derived from the description of the world’s creation, about which the Torah states: “And there was evening and there was morning, day one” (Bereishit 1:5). This tells us that each 24-hour day begins at night, and thus Shabbat, the seventh day, begins at night. An important concept is enfolded within this Jewish outlook – night and darkness precede day and light. First questions and dilemmas arise and one is mired in darkness and uncertainty, but from this answers emerge and light shines upon him. This is also true of our history. At first we were enslaved to Pharaoh in Egypt, but from there were freed, received the Torah, and entered Eretz Yisrael. This is how it always is for the Jewish people – darkness and troubles are followed by light and redemption. First we must deal with our problems, but from within them we are elevated and refined. In contrast, when it comes to the nations of the world, day precedes night. Nation after nation ascends the stage of history, makes a vast noise, and shakes up the world. But when difficulties arise and problems begin, the night draws nearer, and finally the nation declines and disappears. It happened to the Babylonians, the Persians, the Greeks, and the Romans. The secret of Jewish immortality is connected to the fact that for us, the night precedes the day.
  Since the night precedes the day, the seventh day begins at the beginning of the night. But the Sages were uncertain as to exactly when night begins. Is it when the sun sets and is no longer visible to us, or is it when it becomes dark and three medium-sized stars can be seen in the sky? In other words, are day and night defined by sun or by light? In Eretz Yisrael, about twenty minutes separate sunset and the emergence of the stars, though this interval fluctuates based on the time of year and the particular locale’s elevation above sea level, as explained in n. 1 below.
  Another unique feature of Judaism is that not every question has an absolute answer. Doubt and uncertainty occasionally play a role, and the present halakha is an example of this. The time between sunset (shki’at ha-ḥama, or “shki’a”) and the emergence of stars (tzeit ha-kokhavim, or “tzeit”) is classified as a time when it is uncertain whether it is day or night and is called “bein ha-shmashot.”
  In practice, for all Torah laws, including Shabbat, we follow the well-known principle: “Safek de-Oraita le-ḥumra,” that is, we rule strictly when in doubt about Torah law. Therefore, Shabbat begins at shki’a and ends at tzeit.1<i class="footnote">The topic of bein ha-shmashot is discussed in Shabbat 34b-35b. There it emerges that in R. Yehuda’s opinion, bein ha-shmashot extends from shki’a until the reddish tint disappears from the west and is replaced by a silvery hue; R. Yossi disagrees and maintains that bein ha-shmashot is very short, like the blink of an eye, occurring after the end of R. Yehuda’s bein ha-shmashot. In terms of practice, R. Yoḥanan maintains that we follow the stringencies of both (ibid. 35a), which means that bein ha-shmashot begins with shki’a and concludes after the time suggested by R. Yossi. The Sages provide us with an indicator for the end of bein ha-shmashot according to R. Yossi: the emergence of three stars. This perforce means three medium-sized stars, as large stars can be seen even during the day and small ones are visible only at night (ibid. 35b). The Talmud goes on to explain that according to Rabba (whom the Rif and Rosh follow in their ruling), bein ha-shmashot begins at shki’a and lasts for the time it takes to walk three quarters of a mil (roughly equivalent to a kilometer). Rashi, the Vilna Gaon, and many others say that the time of bein ha-shmashot according to R. Yossi is immediately after the time of R. Yehuda, so no more time needs to be added. In contrast, Ramban and Rosh maintain that it is a bit later and one must add half a minute. Others say that it is even later and one must add a few minutes (Raavan). See Ha-zemanim Ba-halakha 40:8-16.Shki’a refers to the time when the sun disappears from sight entirely (Responsa Maharam al-Ashkar §96). It would seem that nearby hills that hide the sun are not taken into consideration; rather the horizon is determinant. However, it is possible one should take into account distant mountains that span the entire horizon. See Peninei Halakha: Prayer ch. 11 n. 7 regarding hanetz ha-ḥama (sunrise). In terms of tzeit, several uncertainties arise, for different times have been suggested for the appearance of three middle-sized stars. The uncertainty is rooted in the question of who must be able to see these three stars. Is it those with perfect or impeccable vision who know about star charts and know where the first stars appear in each season, or is it determined by the average person on the street? It would seem that people with impeccable sight can see three stars once the sun sinks more than 4.8 degrees below the horizon. Regular people can see three stars when the sun is 6.2 degrees below the horizon. One should also know that there are three factors that impact the interval between shki’a and tzeit: 1) The season; in the spring and fall, the sun sets along a line that is perpendicular to the horizon, and therefore the interval is shorter, while in the winter and summer it sets on a line that intersects the horizon diagonally, so the interval is longer. 2) Elevation; the higher the elevation of a place, the longer the sun is visible (and thus the later shki’a is). Tzeit, however, will be at the same time regardless of elevation. Therefore, in higher places, the time separating shki’a and tzeit is shorter. 3) Latitude; the closer one is to the equator, the shorter bein ha-shmashot is. As one approaches the poles, it lengthens. There are places where it can last for hours and even days.In practice, in Eretz Yisrael at sea level the time of bein ha-shmashot based on those with good vision (4.8 degrees) in the middle of spring and fall is about 19 minutes, and at the height of the summer it is about 21 minutes. Based on people with regular vision (6.2 degrees), in the middle of spring and fall bein ha-shmashot is 25 minutes, and at the height of the summer it is nearly 30 minutes. In Jerusalem, whose highest hills are about 830m above sea level, shki’a is about five minutes later, so bein ha-shmashot is about five minutes shorter. Thus, in Jerusalem, bein ha-shmashot based on those with good vision in the middle of the spring and fall is about 14 minutes, and at the height of summer it is 16:22 minutes. Basing it on people with normal vision, in spring and fall bein ha-shmashot is about twenty and a half  minutes, and at the height of summer is about 24 minutes. (One who explores this issue will come to understand how these calculations work out with the traditional time for bein ha-shmashot as equal to the time it takes to walk three quarters of a mil. All this is explained at length in Harḥavot and briefly in Peninei Halakha: Prayer ch. 25 n. 3 in the context of the time for the nighttime recitation of Shema.)Everything written here so far follows the approach of the Ge’onim. However, Rabbeinu Tam has a different approach. He maintains that after shki’a, the day continues for the time it takes to walk 3.25 mil, or approximately 58.5 minutes. Bein ha-shmashot begins only after that, and lasts for the length of time it takes to walk three quarters of a mil, or approximately 13.5 minutes. This is followed by night. Although many follow this approach, including SA 261:2, it is still very puzzling, because in fact we see three medium-sized stars much earlier than R. Tam’s reckoning of tzeit (see BHL ad loc.). In fact, in Eretz Yisrael and its environs, the custom has always followed the Ge’onim. Some explain that Rabbeinu Tam’s approach was based on his location. He lived in France, which is further north, and there bein ha-shmashot lasts longer. In any event, common practice is not to take R. Tam’s opinion into account (Tzitz Eliezer 17:62; Shemesh U-magen 1:5; Ha-zemanim Ba-halakha chs. 43-45, 48, 50). Some write that ideally one should be stringent like Rabbeinu Tam and assume that Shabbat ends 72 minutes after shki’a (Yabi’a Omer 2:21). See Harḥavot.</i>
  
  Section 2
  
  Shabbat Times / The Mitzva of Tosefet Shabbat
  The inherent sanctity of Shabbat is present only from the beginning of the seventh day, when Shabbat starts. However, the Torah commands that we extend the sanctity of Shabbat into the mundane week. That is, we are meant to accept the holiness of Shabbat upon ourselves a bit before the start of the seventh day. The same applies to the end of Shabbat: it ends at the end of the seventh day, but we are commanded to extend this holiness a little longer after Shabbat (SA 261:2; Bi’ur Halakha states that most authorities consider this extension to be a Torah law).
  This extension of Shabbat, called tosefet Shabbat, demonstrates that Shabbat is very dear to us. We go out to greet it before its arrival, and we prolong its stay by accompanying it upon departure. It is like an honored guest whom we go out to greet and whom we escort when it is time to take leave.
  We have already learned that the status of the time between shki’a and tzeit is uncertain, and thus one must be stringent then. Therefore, in order to fulfill the mitzva of tosefet Shabbat we need to accept Shabbat a bit before shki’a. Women customarily accept Shabbat when they light the Shabbat candles. In Jerusalem the custom is to light candles forty minutes before shki’a, in Haifa thirty minutes before, and in Tel Aviv and most other Israeli cities twenty minutes before. Men who recite the Minḥa prayers close to shki’a are accustomed to accept Shabbat later, but they too must be careful to accept Shabbat a few minutes before shki’a in order to add to the holy from the mundane.
  One who wishes to accept Shabbat even earlier is commendable, as long as it is within a seasonal hour and a quarter before shki’a. According to many poskim, one may not accept Shabbat earlier than this (SA 263:4; MB ad loc. 18).2<i class="footnote">. Many maintain that one may accept Shabbat only from plag ha-minḥa, which is one and a quarter seasonal hours before the end of the day. One may then light the candles with a berakha, pray the Shabbat prayers (following the opinion of R. Yehuda), and make kiddush (Tosafot, Rosh, and Talmidei Rabbeinu Yona to Berakhot 27a; SA 267:2; Rema 261:2). Others maintain that one may accept Shabbat even earlier, as long as it is clear that the candles are being lit to honor Shabbat (Rabbeinu Asher of Lunel; Pri Ḥadash; Pri Megadim. R. Avraham b. Azriel maintains that one may accept it two hours early). However, poskim disagree regarding what is considered the end of the day for plag ha-minḥa purposes. Terumat Ha-deshen calculates it from tzeit, while the Vilna Gaon calculates from shki’a. We follow the opinion that the calculation is done from shki’a. This is because, first, that is the dominant position, and second, there is an opinion that one may accept Shabbat earlier than plag ha-minḥa. See Peninei Halakha: Prayer ch. 24 n. 9 and Peninei Halakha: Zemanim ch. 13 n. 14.</i>
  Shabbat concludes with the appearance of three medium-sized stars, but the Sages were worried that people might make a mistake and think that three large stars were medium-sized. Therefore, to be on the safe side, they said that one should wait until the appearance of three small stars grouped together (SA 293:2). Nowadays we do not need to look at the stars. Rather we can rely on clocks and calendars, where the times listed for the end of Shabbat already incorporate tosefet Shabbat.3<i class="footnote">As we saw in n. 1 above, the longest time between shki’a and tzeit in Eretz Yisrael is just under 30 minutes (at the height of the summer in low-lying areas). Calendars nowadays generally record the end of Shabbat as 35 minutes after shki’a, so that there is always tosefet Shabbat.</i>
  This mitzva teaches us that there is a connection between the weekdays and Shabbat, which is why we can add from the mundane to the sacred. We can also see, based on this, the inner striving of the mundane to be connected to the sacred.
  
  Section 3
  
  Shabbat Times / How to Accept Tosefet Shabbat
  One can accept tosefet Shabbat verbally by saying “I hereby accept upon myself the sanctity of Shabbat.” Some maintain that one can even accept tosefet Shabbat mentally (MB 261:21). Once one has accepted Shabbat, he must be careful not to do any melakha (as will be explained in the next section).
  As mentioned, women customarily accept Shabbat when reciting the berakha over lighting Shabbat candles. Since they invoke Shabbat, they intend to accept it upon themselves, thus fulfilling the mitzva of tosefet Shabbat. According to most authorities, a woman may light candles conditionally, having in mind that she is not accepting Shabbat with the lighting. In such a case she may do melakha or drive to shul after lighting. Nevertheless, it is preferable that she accept Shabbat when she lights, since some maintain that one may not light conditionally, in which case once she lights Shabbat candles she has accepted Shabbat and may not do melakha. Furthermore, if she does not accept Shabbat when she lights candles, there is concern that she will forget tosefet Shabbat altogether (SA 263:10; SSK 43:24; Yalkut Yosef 263:44).
  At one time, men customarily accepted Shabbat during prayer with the recitation of “Bo’i kalla, Shabbat ha-malka” (“Enter O bride, O Shabbat queen”) in the liturgical poem Lekha Dodi. However, nowadays in many shuls they do not finish Lekha Dodi before shki’a. Accordingly, in order to fulfill the mitzva of tosefet Shabbat, the gabbai should announce after Minḥa: “Bo’i kalla, Shabbat ha-malka,” at which point everyone should accept Shabbat. If the gabbai does not make this announcement, then each individual should say to himself “Bo’i kalla, Shabbat ha-malka” or “Hineni mekabel al atzmi kedushat Shabbat” (“I hereby accept upon myself the sanctity of Shabbat”). Additionally, if one is afraid that the ḥazan will not complete the repetition of the Minḥa Amida before shki’a, he may whisper the declaration to himself during the repetition, to ensure that he not lose the opportunity to fulfill the mitzva of tosefet Shabbat.4<i class="footnote">In a locale where there is only one synagogue, the congregation’s acceptance of Shabbat obligates the entire community. However, in practice this does not come up often, because generally we do not accept Shabbat as a community very early, and if it is just a few minutes before shki’a everyone is obligated to accept Shabbat anyway to fulfill the mitzva of tosefet Shabbat. Nevertheless, if the entire community accepted Shabbat, some say that this acceptance is more binding than an individual’s acceptance, and in such a case even for a mitzva or great necessity one would still be prohibited from transgressing anything, even rabbinic prohibitions (MB 261:18, 28). Others maintain that anything permitted after an individual accepts Shabbat (as we explain below in ch. 4 n. 5) is also permitted after the community accepts Shabbat (quoted by BHL 261:4, s.v. “ein me’arvin”). See Harḥavot, which explains that in a case of great necessity one may rely on the lenient opinion. In any case, even after the community has accepted Shabbat, as well as during bein ha-shmashot, one may ask a non-Jew to do melakha on behalf of a Jew for the sake of a mitzva or a great need (SA 342:1; MB ad loc. 7; MB 261:18, 28).</i>
  
  Section 4
  
  Shabbat Times / Laws Pertaining to One Who Accepts Shabbat upon Himself
  From the time one accepts tosefet Shabbat, he must refrain from all melakhot forbidden by Torah law. Rabbinically prohibited actions are also forbidden at this point, unless the melakha to be done is for a mitzva, for a Shabbat need, or for some other great need, because in such situations the Sages did not intend for their prohibitions to apply. For example, if one forgot to tithe produce and wishes to eat it on Shabbat, he may tithe it even if he has already accepted Shabbat, because tithing produce on Shabbat is only prohibited rabbinically.
  One who has already accepted tosefet Shabbat may ask a fellow Jew who has yet to accept Shabbat to do melakha on his behalf. Women generally light candles and accept Shabbat at the time listed on calendars. Men, in contrast, go to shul to pray the weekday Minḥa (which usually begins shortly after candle lighting), and only then accept Shabbat. In the intervening period, a woman may ask her husband to do melakhot such as turning on a light or adjusting the oven, even though she has already accepted Shabbat (SA 263:17; MB ad loc. 64). Similarly, on Saturday night one who has not yet made havdala may ask one who has to do melakha for him.5<i class="footnote">To complete this discussion, we must add three laws. 1) The general rule that one may transgress rabbinic prohibitions during tosefet Shabbat for a mitzva or a great need does not apply to rabbinic prohibitions whose transgression is likely to lead one to a violation of Torah law. For example, one would not be allowed to do a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah or to carry objects in the public domain by moving them less than four tefaḥim at a time. This is explained in MB 342:1. 2) Although the general rule is that one who has accepted Shabbat may not transgress a rabbinic prohibition unless there is a mitzva involved or a great need, the rule does not apply to asking a non-Jew to do melakha for him. This is permitted even if it is not for a mitzva or great need, as explained in MB 261:18. 3) Technically, if one has not accepted Shabbat, the rabbinic Shabbat prohibitions do not take effect until the end of bein ha-shmashot. The body of the text does not mention this because it is almost irrelevant in practice. If one is part of a local Jewish community, he may assume that the majority of the community will accept Shabbat before shki’a, and all melakhot would then be prohibited for this person as well (except for asking a non-Jew to do melakha, which is permitted during bein ha-shmashot, as explained above). If he lives in a locale where there are no Jews, there is still a mitzva of tosefet Shabbat before shki’a, and transgressing rabbinic laws will still be prohibited except for a mitzva, for Shabbat, or for a great need, when he may be lenient, as we have learned.A woman who has good reason to travel by car after lighting candles, such as to go to the Kotel, to shul, or to see her family, may get into a car if the driver has not accepted Shabbat yet. However, she must make sure not to open or shut the car door herself if this would make the light inside the car go on or off (see Harḥavot).</i>
  
  Section 5
  
  Shabbat Times / May One Pray Minĥa after Accepting Shabbat?
  There are shuls where the weekday Minḥa on Friday is finished after shki’a, so that if the participants wait to accept Shabbat until after Minḥa, Shabbat in fact has already begun, and they are unable to fulfill the mitzva of tosefet Shabbat. Thus the question arises: may one accept Shabbat but then pray the weekday Minḥa?
  According to some authorities, one who has accepted Shabbat may no longer pray the weekday Minḥa, because one may not pray a weekday Minḥa after Shabbat has begun (and one may not pray Shabbat Minḥa, because that is to be said only on Saturday). Therefore, in their opinion, one who mistakenly accepted Shabbat before praying Minḥa has lost the opportunity to pray Minḥa, and during Ma’ariv he should pray the Amida twice. The first time serves as the regular Ma’ariv of Shabbat and the second time is to compensate for the Minḥa that he missed (SA 263:15; MB ad loc. 60). This applies to women as well, and thus a woman may not pray Minḥa after she has lit candles – how can she pray a weekday Minḥa after she has accepted Shabbat? If she wishes to compensate for missing Minḥa, she should pray the Amida twice at Ma’ariv (MB ad loc. 43). The only alternative is to pray Minḥa earlier, while it is still day, and to accept Shabbat afterward. Where Minḥa is prayed after shki’a, one must pray Minḥa earlier on his own so that he will be able to add tosefet Shabbat. For the mitzva of tosefet Shabbat is a Torah law, while praying with a minyan is a rabbinic requirement (SSK 46:5).
  Several authorities maintain, however, that even after one has accepted Shabbat, he may still pray the weekday Minḥa. They reason that tosefet Shabbat only requires that one not transgress any Torah prohibitions of Shabbat, but does not extend to the realm of prayer; thus, one may still pray the weekday Minḥa. Just as in the service of a mitzva one may do things that are rabbinically prohibited during tosefet Shabbat, so too he may pray the weekday Minḥa then. Only one who accepted Shabbat with the congregation may not pray the weekday Minḥa. Therefore, if one has still not prayed Minḥa and it is very close to shki’a, he should accept Shabbat verbally and then pray the weekday Minḥa (Tzitz Eliezer 13:42; Minḥat Yitzḥak 9:20). Still others maintain that in such a case one must be careful to accept Shabbat only mentally. On the one hand, one may accept Shabbat this way; on the other hand, since it was only in his head, he may still pray the weekday Minḥa (Yabi’a Omer 7:34).
  The widespread custom is that if shki’a is approaching and one has still not prayed Minḥa, he accepts tosefet Shabbat – whether verbally or mentally – and then prays the weekday Minḥa. Be-di’avad, women too may pray Minḥa after lighting candles. If one knows that the minyan is going to pray Minḥa late, he should preferably fulfill his obligation in conformity with all opinions by praying Minḥa on his own and accepting Shabbat before shki’a. If he is sure that he will be able to accept Shabbat during the repetition of the Amida, it is best that he pray with the minyan and accept tosefet Shabbat during the repetition.6<i class="footnote">Following the first opinion, if one comes to shul close to shki’a and knows that if he begins to pray the weekday Minḥa he will not finish his silent Amida before shki’a, he should preferably accept Shabbat and later pray the Amida of Ma’ariv twice. This is the opinion of MB 263:43, SSK, and R. Mazuz. A woman who does not have time to pray Minḥa and then light the candles should light the candles and not pray. If she prays Minḥa regularly, she may pray the Amida of Ma’ariv twice, with the second recitation being compensatory. See Peninei Halakha: Women’s Prayer 13:6. Following the second opinion, if one comes to shul close to shki’a, he should accept tosefet Shabbat and pray the weekday Minḥa. One may pray the weekday Minḥa even after accepting tosefet Shabbat, as tosefet Shabbat only causes melakhot to be prohibited but does not affect prayer. This is the position of Tzitz Eliezer, following Zera Emet and other Aḥaronim. Minḥat Yitzḥak 9:20 agrees and adds another reason: even on Shabbat itself one may pray the weekday prayer, but in order to shorten the service the Sages formulated an abbreviated version. Therefore, when necessary, one may pray the weekday Minḥa even after accepting tosefet Shabbat. Piskei Teshuvot §263 records this approach as that of many Aḥaronim.Some follow the second opinion but maintain that one must accept tosefet Shabbat only mentally but not verbally. In other words, he decides to refrain from melakha from here on, thus fulfilling the mitzva of tosefet Shabbat, but since he has not verbalized this acceptance he may still pray the weekday Minḥa. R. Ovadia Yosef writes this in Yabi’a Omer 7:34, p. 97 and Livyat Ḥen §6; see also Menuḥat Ahava 1:5:6.An additional dispute among the Aḥaronim concerns the questionable status of one who responds with the congregation to the ḥazan’s declaration of “Barkhu.” According to Yeḥaveh Da’at 6:18, one may not respond to Barkhu and still maintain that he has not accepted Shabbat. Thus one who responded may no longer pray the weekday Minḥa. On the other hand, Igrot Moshe OḤ 3:37 maintains that if one thinks to himself that he is not accepting Shabbat, he may respond to Barkhu and still pray the weekday Minḥa afterward; however, based on SA 263:15, he should make sure to pray outside of shul.</i>
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Lighting Shabbat Candles / The Mitzva of Lighting Shabbat Candles1<i class="footnote">Editor’s note: The term ner originally referred to an oil lamp. Nowadays, it has become common to speak of “Shabbat candles.” We have adopted this term because of the generic usage, but unless otherwise noted these laws apply to any source of illumination that is acceptable for use as nerot Shabbat.</i>
  There is a rabbinic mitzva to light a candle to honor Shabbat. There are three reasons for this: 1) to honor Shabbat, as a banquet without light is of no significance; 2) for oneg Shabbat, because one who cannot see his food does not enjoy it; 3) to bring shalom bayit (peace in the home), because one who cannot see his furniture and belongings trips over them and gets angry and irritable. It is so important to have light at the Shabbat table that the Sages stated that one who does not have enough money to buy a candle should go door to door begging for charity in order to buy it (SA 263:2).
  One who has only a bit of money should first buy bread so he does not fast on Shabbat. After that, if he still has money left, he should buy a candle, and only then, if he can, should he buy wine for kiddush. This is because one may make kiddush over bread if necessary, and the light allows him to honor and enjoy Shabbat. It is more important to light a candle to honor Shabbat than to beautify kiddush with wine (Shabbat 23b; SA 263:1-2).
  The Shabbat candles give profound expression to the essence of Shabbat. One mired in darkness cannot find what he is looking for; he stumbles over his furniture; his whole home seems chaotic to him. But the moment he lights the Shabbat candles, peace comes to his home. He understands that his furniture is there to serve him, and his belongings are all where they belong. Thus he is able to enjoy Shabbat at his festive meal. Similarly, when we look at the world superficially, it seems full of strife and war, hopelessly divided and conflicted. Each side thinks that only when it succeeds in getting rid of the opposition will it be able to rest, and thus the conflicts endlessly continue. But if one thinks a little more deeply and examines divine providence, the darkness disappears and the divine light is revealed. He realizes that the opposing sides actually complement one another, and there is a hand directing and leading the world toward perfection. Out of all the troubles and afflictions, redemption and comfort will emerge (see above, 1:15).
  The Shabbat candles, which bring peace to the home by adding light, thus allude to the repair of the world that comes about by increasing the light of Torah and faith. This is the goal of Shabbat – to add the light of faith and Torah to the world. It seems that this is the reason for the great love that all Jews have for the mitzva of Shabbat candles: It alludes to the overarching goal of the Jewish people – to make peace by adding light.
  With this in mind, one can understand the Sages’ statement that one who is meticulous about lighting Shabbat candles will be privileged to have children who are Torah scholars (Shabbat 23b). For by occupying oneself with the light of Shabbat, one merits having a child who adds the light of Torah to the world. Accordingly, after lighting the Shabbat candles, many women customarily pray that their sons become Torah scholars.
  The Sages state in God’s name: “The glory of Shabbat is its candles. If one observes [the mitzva of] Shabbat candles, I will show you the candles of Zion…. It will not be necessary for you to use the light of the sun to see; rather I will provide illumination for you with My glory…. In the future, the nations will walk by your light…. Why do you deserve all of this? Because of the candles you light for Shabbat” (Yalkut Shimoni, Beha’alotekha).
  
  Section 2
  
  Lighting Shabbat Candles / Where to Light and Who Must Light
  It is a mitzva to have light in every room that will be used Friday night, so that people will not trip. However, the primary mitzva is to light the candles where the meal will be eaten, since by eating the meal by their light, they increase the honor and pleasure of Shabbat. Therefore, the berakha is recited over these candles (Rema 263:10; MB ad loc. 2). If the other rooms have light thanks to electric lights in the home or streetlights shining in, there is no need to light candles there as well.
  The candles must remain lit until the end of the Friday night meal. Ideally one should make sure that light remains until people go to sleep (SSK 43:17). Today, when one can easily leave on electric lights, ideally one should make sure that there is light in the house all night, so that one who wakes up during the night does not trip.
  The mitzva to light candles applies to all Jews, men and women, single and married, since everyone is obligated to honor and enjoy Shabbat. However, within the family the wife takes precedence for this mitzva, because she is the ba’alat ha-bayit (mistress of the household) and responsible for running it. Therefore she has the privilege of fulfilling this mitzva, which is designed to ensure peace in the home. She exempts all other members of her household with her lighting. But if the wife is running late and it is getting close to shki’a, it is better that her husband or one of the children light the candles so that she does not risk desecrating Shabbat by lighting the candles herself (SA 263:2; MB 262:11).
  The precedence of women over men with regard to candle lighting indicates that shalom bayit is primarily dependent on women, and the light of Torah and faith permeates the home due to the wife. Through her special inner awareness she knows how to illuminate the path of faith for her husband and children, and she directs them toward diligent Torah study. This accords with the words of the Sages: “The promise [of future reward] for women is greater than that of men,” because they send their children to study Torah in school, encourage their husbands to study long hours in the beit midrash, and wait for them to come home (Berakhot 17a). Nevertheless, when the wife is unable to light the candles, the husband should do so, for when necessary he too can bring peace to the home and introduce an atmosphere of faith and Torah to it.
  One whose wife is away for any reason while he remains at home must light the candles with a berakha. Even if he has an adult daughter, the mitzva to light the candles devolves upon him, because he is the head of household. If he wishes, though, he may ask his daughter to light for him and the rest of the household (SSK ch. 43 n. 46).
  Some have the custom that all the girls in the household who are old enough to understand the mitzva light candles with a berakha along with their mother. This is custom of Chabad. However, most poskim maintain that only the mother of the family should light, and that is the custom of all other Jewish communities. It is proper for every woman to follow her family custom.2<i class="footnote">em&gt;Prima facie, it would seem preferable that within the Chabad custom each girl should light in a different room (as explained below in section 6, and in <em>Harḥavot</em> 4:2, 3-4). Indeed, this is stated in AHS 263:7. However, the actual custom of Lubavitcher <em>ḥasidim </em>is that everyone lights in the dining room. The Lubavitcher Rebbe encouraged this custom strongly, so that every girl, even if she grows distant from Torah and <em>mitzvot</em>, would always have memories of lighting Shabbat candles. In practice, in most households only the mother lights candles with a <em>berakha</em>. Some even maintain that this practice might constitute a <em>berakha</em> in vain (<em>berakha le-vatala</em>), since once the mother makes the <em>berakha</em> she exempts all household members and certainly obviates the need for anyone else to light in the dining room (SA 263:10 and <em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 2:32).</i>
  
  Section 3
  
  Lighting Shabbat Candles / What May One Light With, and How Many Candles
  The second chapter of Tractate Shabbat has an extensive discussion about what materials may be used for lighting Shabbat candles. The general principle is that the wick needs to be soft and absorbent so that it will draw the oil nicely, and the oil must be of a type that is drawn nicely into the wick. If these conditions are not met, the flame will jump around the wick and the light will dim. There is concern that one seeing such light will try to fix it, thus transgressing the prohibition of lighting a fire on Shabbat.
  The Sages said that of all of the acceptable oils, olive oil is the best because it is easily drawn into the wick and its light is clear and pure (SA 264:6). Today most women light paraffin or “wax” candles, whose light is stronger and more stable.
  The extensive discussion about what materials may be used to light candles alludes to the way to achieve shalom bayit. Just as the wick has to be made of a soft and absorbent material and the oil must be light and easily drawn, so too a couple needs to unite humbly. Just as when we light the wick, fire and light are produced jointly by the wick and fuel, so too a couple, through the fire of faith and light of Torah, can become one, developing and illuminating together. Without a spiritual destination love withers, just as everything physical atrophies. But when there is a shared spiritual goal that lights the fire of their lives, their love becomes stronger and stronger.
  The law requires that only one candle be lit, thus providing light in the home. However the custom is to light two candles, one corresponding to Zakhor and the other to Shamor. Some women customarily light one candle for each member of the household; others light seven candles, corresponding to the seven days of the week; still others light ten, corresponding to the Ten Commandments. All these customs apply when a woman is in her own home, but if she is a visitor in someone else’s home, the custom is that she lights just two candles (SSK 43:3).
  In the past, when homes were normally candlelit, adding more candles beautified Shabbat by increasing light in the home. Now that electric light is common, adding candles does not increase beauty, and it is sufficient to light just the two candles corresponding to Zakhor and Shamor.
  If a woman forgets to light candles one week, it is customary for her to add an extra candle every week as a penalty (Rema 263:1). However, this only applies if there was no light at all as a result of her omission. If there was electric light, even though she did not light it to honor Shabbat, since in fact they did not miss out on oneg Shabbat, she is not obligated to add a candle every week for the rest of her life (See Darkhei Moshe, ad loc.; BHL s.v. “she-shakheḥa”; Yalkut Yosef 263, n. 42).
  
  Section 4
  
  Lighting Shabbat Candles / The Berakha Recited upon Lighting
  There are two customs as to when the berakha over the candles is recited. Some say it prior to lighting, as the rule for all mitzvot is to recite the berakha before performing the mitzva. Thus, they first say “Barukh ata Hashem Elokeinu Melekh ha-olam, asher kideshanu be-mitzvotav ve-tzivanu lehadlik ner shel Shabbat” (“Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to light Shabbat candles”) and then light. This is the ruling of Shulḥan Arukh and the custom of some Sephardic women (SA 263:5; Yabi’a Omer 2:16).
  Others recite the berakha after lighting because according to several poskim women accept Shabbat by invoking it in the berakha, and therefore one who recites the berakha before lighting will not subsequently be allowed to light (Behag). To be sure, according to most poskim as long as a woman has in mind that she is not accepting Shabbat when reciting the berakha she may light the candles afterward. Nevertheless, women did not want to light the candles after reciting the berakha and invoking Shabbat. For this reason, the widespread custom in most communities is that women first light the candles and afterward recite the berakha, thereby accepting Shabbat. Many Aḥaronim affirmed and reinforced this custom. Nevertheless, in order to follow the general rule of reciting a berakha before doing a mitzva, women customarily cover their eyes while reciting the berakha and only then open their eyes and enjoy the light of the candles. This is the custom of all Ashkenazim (Rema 263:5) and some Sephardim (Maḥzik Berakha [Ḥida] 263:4, Ben Ish Ḥai, Year Two, No’aḥ 8). This was also the custom in Morocco, Iraq, and elsewhere. In practice, every woman should follow the custom of her mother’s family.
  When a single man or a widower lights candles, he should make the berakha before lighting. This is because the custom of men is to accept Shabbat verbally after the Minḥa prayers, not at the time of candle lighting (SSK 43:30).
  
  Section 5
  
  Lighting Shabbat Candles / Fulfilling the Obligation via Electric Lights
  If necessary, one may fulfill the mitzva by switching on an incandescent light bulb. A bulb is similar to a candle as the glowing metal filament is the equivalent of a wick and the electricity is the equivalent of the oil or paraffin. However, some maintain that one does not fulfill the obligation with an incandescent bulb, because in a candle the fuel is adjacent to the wick, which is not the case with an electric bulb. Nevertheless, the vast majority of poskim maintain that one may fulfill one’s obligation by lighting an incandescent bulb, since there is a halakhic consensus that electric light is considered fire and igniting an electric light on Shabbat violates the Torah prohibition against lighting a fire on Shabbat. Nevertheless, it is preferable to use a candle for the mitzva so that one fulfills the requirement according to all opinions. Additionally, by lighting a candle it is more apparent that this is a special lighting in honor of Shabbat.
  It is preferable le-khatḥila to turn off electric lights before lighting the candles and to turn them back on in honor of Shabbat when lighting the candles. In this way, the mitzva is beautified greatly, through the candles and the electric lights. Moreover, if electric lights are on when she lights the candles, it is not apparent that she is lighting candles to fulfill a mitzva, since there was light already. Therefore, it is good to turn off the electric lights several minutes before candle lighting, and when she comes to light the candles, she should first turn on the electric lights and then immediately light the Shabbat candles. When reciting the berakha, she should have the electrical lights in mind as well. All this is ideal, but technically even if the electric lights are on, she may light the candles with a berakha. We are not concerned that this is a berakha in vain, because lighting the additional candles to fulfill the mitzva provides additional light in honor of Shabbat (see the next section for the laws pertaining to one staying in a hotel).3<i class="footnote">In case of need, most <em>poskim</em> maintain that one may recite a <em>berakha</em> on lighting an electric light (<em>Beit Yitzḥak</em> YD 1:120 and 2:31; <em>Har Tzvi</em> OḤ §143; <em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 5:24; SSK 43:4, 5; see also <em>She’arim Ha-metzuyanim Ba-halakha</em> 75:7 and <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 2:17). Some are stringent because they are concerned about power outages, but in fact it is more common for a candle to go out than for the electricity to fail. <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:18:12 states that one should not recite a <em>berakha</em> on a bulb, whether incandescent or fluorescent, because the electricity is not adjacent to the bulb in the same way that oil is to a wick; however, if the bulb is battery-operated, one may recite the <em>berakha</em>. Most <em>poskim</em> are not concerned about this. However, when it comes to a fluorescent or neon bulb, following the rationale of <em>Beit Yitzḥak</em> would mean that one does not recite a <em>berakha</em> since it has no wick-like filament. Nevertheless, according to R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, one may recite the <em>berakha</em> on a fluorescent light just like on an incandescent light (<em>Shvut Yitzḥak</em>, Laws of Shabbat Candles ch. 3). In practice, because of the uncertainty, one should not recite a <em>berakha</em> over a fluorescent bulb but may do so over an incandescent light, as I wrote in section 6 regarding lighting in a hotel. Regarding what I wrote that it is good to light the electric lights together with the candles to honor Shabbat, this is also the position of SSK 43:34 and n. 171 and <em>Menuḥat Ahava </em>1:4:6. However, many people are not careful to do so, and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 263:8 states that one need not be careful about this.</i>
  
  Section 6
  
  Lighting Shabbat Candles / What Procedure Should Be Followed When Two Families Dine Together
  When a family hosts another family for Shabbat, some maintain that only the hostess should light candles with a berakha, whereas the guest should light without a berakha since it is not clear whether there is a need for her to light. This is the opinion of Shulḥan Arukh and the custom in some Sephardic communities. However, the opinion of Rema and most poskim is that the guest may indeed recite a berakha when she lights her candles, because each extra candle contributes additional light. This is the custom of Ashkenazim and some Sephardim, such as those from Morocco.
  In practice, nowadays this issue need not arise, because every home has several rooms, and it is common to give guests their own room. Everyone agrees that if a guest lights there, she may recite the berakha. Similarly, when the kitchen and dining room are separate rooms, the guest may light with a berakha in the kitchen while the hostess lights in the dining room. To be sure, the primary place to light candles is where the meals will be eaten, but there is a mitzva to have some light in other rooms as well. Therefore, when two families spend Shabbat together, it is recommended that the hostess light in the principal place, namely at or near the table, and the guests light in additional places like the kitchen or bedrooms (See MB 263:38, and section 2 above).
  Similarly, if the hosts arranged a separate apartment for their guests, it is best for the guest to light candles with a berakha in the guest apartment. In order to be able to enjoy the light of these candles, she should make sure to light candles that will last until they return from their Shabbat meal. If she lights regular candles, she should make sure to stay near them until it begins to get dark. Alternatively, a family member can go look at the candles before the meal. For if nobody looks at the candles on Shabbat itself, they do not fulfill their purpose of honoring Shabbat, and consequently her lighting and her berakha were in vain.
  In a hotel where everyone dines together, it is best that one woman light with a berakha in the dining room while the rest of the women light in their bedrooms (SSK 45:9). However, most hotels forbid lighting candles in bedrooms because it is a fire hazard, and so they set up a table in the hotel dining room with candles for all the women to light. Following the custom of Ashkenazim and some Sephardim, all the women may light with a berakha. However, according to the custom of many Sephardic Jews, only the first woman to light should do so with a berakha, and the rest should light without reciting a berakha.
  There is another possible solution. One woman may light in the dining room while the rest fulfill the mitzva with a berakha by lighting an incandescent bulb in their bedroom; as we learned in the previous section, the vast majority of poskim maintain that one may fulfill the mitzva using an electric light. Even for those who follow the Rema, it is preferable to light an electric light in one’s room than to light in a way that some maintain should not be accompanied by a berakha. Furthermore, lighting an electric light in the room serves more of a purpose than lighting many candles in the dining room.
  However, if the lights in the room are all fluorescent, one may not make a berakha upon lighting them since they do not have a filament similar to the wick of a candle (see above n.3). In such a case, it is proper that everyone light in the dining room. According to most Sephardim, the first woman should light with a berakha and the rest without one. Those who wish to go above and beyond should bring a lamp with an incandescent bulb and plug it into a timer (“Shabbos clock”). Thus, they may light with a berakha even in the hotel room.4<i class="footnote">Some Sephardic <em>poskim </em>rule that if several women are lighting in the same place, each one may recite the <em>berakha</em>. This is recorded by <em>Yafeh La-lev</em> 263:10; <em>Gedulot Elisha</em> §18; <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> §56. <em>Shemesh U-magen </em>2:38 notes that this is the Moroccan custom. On the other hand, some Ashkenazic <em>poskim </em>maintain that <em>le-khatḥila</em> one should take into account the opinion of SA (<em>Olat Shabbat</em><em>Shlah</em>; SAH). Therefore, even those who follow Ashkenazic customs should preferably light by turning on incandescent bulbs in their room. One should be careful to arrange for the light to be turned off by a timer later on, because if it does not, they may have trouble sleeping and will not enjoy Shabbat.AHS 263:6 states that if a few women are lighting simultaneously, even the stringent opinion would allow them all to make a berakha. Therefore, in his opinion, it is preferable that all the women light in the hotel together so that they all may recite the berakha according to all opinions. Another option is that one woman recites the berakha aloud and the others respond “Amen.”</i>
  
  Section 7
  
  Lighting Shabbat Candles / The Status of Married or Single People Spending Shabbat Away from Home
  The mitzva of lighting candles has two components. The first is connected to the place – there should be light in the place where one is eating, to make Shabbat enjoyable. Similarly, there must be light in other places that are in use Friday night. The second component is connected to the person – there is a mitzva for the person to light candles to honor Shabbat. Accordingly, even if there was a candle already lit on the table before Shabbat, it must be blown out and relit with a berakha in honor of Shabbat. When a mother lights candles, she fulfills this requirement for the whole family.
  As long as one of these components is present, one lights and recites the berakha. When neither component is present, one does not light Shabbat candles.
  Therefore, a married or single man spending Shabbat with another family need not light Shabbat candles. As far as having light at the meal, the hostess will be lighting there. From the personal perspective, the person is secondary to the members of the household, and fulfills his obligation with his hostess’s lighting just as the rest of the household does.
  If one is eating with his hosts but sleeping elsewhere, it is more complicated. If he is single and lights candles each week in his apartment because of his personal obligation, then he should light candles with a berakha where he is sleeping. But if he lives with his parents, or if he is married and his wife is lighting elsewhere, he is not obligated to light candles. This is because according to some opinions, the candles his mother or wife lights at home can fulfill his personal obligation. Even if that is not the case, it is possible that the lighting of his hostess exempts him. In terms of the obligation to have light in the place where he is staying, presumably there are electric lights there. Nevertheless, it is a good idea for him to give his hosts a small amount of money (a shekel or a dollar) in order to participate actively in their candle lighting.
  If one is eating alone in a room on Friday night, even if he is married or a single who lives with his parents, there is a mitzva for him to light candles with a berakha, because there should be light in the place where he is eating. Similarly, soldiers – whether married or single – should make sure that someone lights candles with a berakha in the dining room of the army base. They should also try to make sure that there will be some light in the rooms where they are sleeping.
  Custom dictates that women who are away for Shabbat have in mind not to fulfill their obligation with the lighting of their hostess, even though technically they may do so. They then light the candles themselves to fulfill the mitzva. As we learned in the previous section, there is a debate about where they may light and recite the berakha5<i class="footnote">As I wrote above, the mitzva to light candles has two components. The first is related to place – there must be light in the place where one is eating and where one is sleeping, to enable the enjoyment of Shabbat. The second is a personal obligation to honor Shabbat with the lighting of candles (Rema 263:4). As long as one of the components is present, one must light with a <em>berakha</em>. There are three rules regarding one who is not at home:If one is relying on his hosts for meals and does not have his own room, if he wishes he may light Shabbat candles. He may intend not to fulfill his obligation with his hostess’s lighting, and then he will be obligated to light because of his personal obligation (as we learned in section 6, according to most poskim one may light with a berakha next to someone else’s candles, though some maintain that one may recite the berakha only when lighting in a different room). The custom is that women, who light candles every week, do not fulfill their obligations through the hostess, while men, who do not regularly light candles each week, fulfill their obligations through her.An older and independent single, widower, or divorcé who lights each week in his home, has the option as a guest to rely on the hostess’s lighting. Even though the hosts have provided him with his own room, SAH 263:9 states that as long as the hosts also have use of the room, the room is considered secondary to the home, and the guest is considered to be reliant on their hospitality. If the room is set aside for his use only and he eats with the hosts, and even more so if he is sleeping in a different apartment and just eating with them, it is trickier. It would seem that he should light in his room with a berakha, because of both the requirement to light at the place – he should light there so he does not trip – and the personal requirement. On the other hand, one might argue that if there is a little light in the room, either from the bathroom light or from street lights, then as far as the place is concerned he is not obligated. And from the perspective of his personal obligation, it is possible that he fulfills it via the lighting of the hostess at the table where they will eat. It would seem that one who wishes to be lenient has an opinion to rely on, but it is preferable that he light in his room with a berakha, or at least give his hosts a small contribution so that he can be considered a partner in their lighting.The status of a married person is different. When we spoke of singles, we stated that if one does not want to fulfill his obligation through his hostess’s lighting, he need not do so. However, there is disagreement among the poskim in the case of a husband who wishes to light candles at home but whose wife is already lighting. Some maintain that he may light with a berakha in a different room (Eshel Avraham [Buczacz]; Pri Megadim, Eshel Avraham 263:6). However, most poskim maintain that he may not light with a berakha (SAH; Ḥesed La-alafim 263:7; BHL 263:6, s.v. “baḥurim”). If the husband is away from home, then according to most poskim he should light with a berakha. This is the opinion of Mordechai; SA 263:6; Pri Megadim; SAH 263:9; Ḥayei Adam; BHL 263:6, s.v. “baḥurim”; and many others. Others maintain that since his wife is lighting with a berakha, even if he must light on account of being in a different location, he should not make a berakha. This is the position of Derekh Ha-ḥayim, and would seem to be the position of Leket Yosher as well. Some poskim maintain that if one’s wife is in the same city, he may not recite a berakha; but if she is in a different city, he does recite a berakha (Tzitz Eliezer 14:23 citing Tashbetz Katan, Orḥot Ḥayim; Shulḥan Atzei Shitim). The bottom line would seem to be that if he is eating and sleeping in a room of his own, even if he is in the same city as his wife, he lights with a berakha according to the opinion of the vast majority of poskim. But when it is not clear that he is obligated, such as when he is eating Friday night with a family, then even if he has a separate apartment in which to sleep, he does not need to light as long as there is light from the bathroom or street lights to make sure he does not bump into things. That takes care of the place component of the need to light. In terms of his personal obligation, some say that his wife’s lighting exempts him, and it is also possible that his hostess’s lighting exempts him. He should ask the hostess to have in mind to fulfill his obligation as well, and it is even better if he makes a small monetary contribution for this purpose. If he wishes to light with a berakha, he may do so. It would seem that children living with their parents and spending Shabbat away from home have the same status as a married man. See Peninei Halakha: Zemanim 13:11 regarding Ḥanuka candles.</i>
  
  Section 8
  
  Lighting Shabbat Candles / Those Who Live in Dormitories and Those Who Are Ill
  Boys learning in yeshiva, who live in a dormitory most of the time, are considered independent as far as candle lighting is concerned, and have a personal obligation to light candles to honor Shabbat. This is the case even if they are still financially dependent on their parents who take care of all their needs. Since the students eat together in a dining room, they have the status of one large family, that is, one of them must light candles in the dining room on everyone’s behalf. Additionally, they should make sure that there is a little light in their dorm rooms when they go to sleep. It may be enough for this purpose to rely on the hall lights or a street light. And even though they may light candles in each room with a berakha if they wish, it is unnecessary since they fulfill their obligation with the lighting in the dining room. This is the widespread custom in yeshivot.
  In contrast, in a women’s dormitory, there are often many girls who want the opportunity to fulfill the mitzva of lighting candles with a berakha. Accordingly, in addition to the candles that one of them lights in the dining room, they may each light in their own room with a berakha. But in many places, there are concerns about fire and candles may not be lit in the rooms, in which case everyone fulfills her obligation with the candles lit by one of them in the dining room (it is good if the other girls also light electric bulbs in their rooms to fulfill the mitzva; see section 5).6<i class="footnote">This is the position of SSK 45:5, 11. However, <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 263:15-16 states that they should light in each room. In any case, the primary purpose of the candle lighting is to provide light for the meal, and thus the primary place for lighting is the dining room. Since the students are like one big family, one person may light for everyone.</i>
  People in the hospital fulfill their candle lighting obligation with the candles lit in the dining room. A married woman in the hospital who is accustomed to light candles every Shabbat may light with a berakha in her room. If there is a hospital rule against lighting in the rooms because it would be a fire hazard, she may light in the dining room, and if necessary even in the hallway (in terms of the berakha, see section 6 above).
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Torah Study and Prayer on Shabbat / Studying Torah on Shabbat
  It is a mitzva to study a great deal of Torah on Shabbat. The Sages stated: “Shabbat and Yom Tov were given solely to study Torah on them” (y. Shabbat 15c). The Sages also stated: The Torah said to God: “Master of the Universe, when the Jews enter the land, this one will run to his vineyard and that one to his field; what will become of me?” God responded “I have a partner with whom I will pair you. Its name is Shabbat, on which they do not work, and thus can engross themselves in you.” (Tur §290)The Sages also stated: God said to Israel: “My children, did I not write to you in My Torah ‘Let not this book of the Torah cease from your mouths, but recite it day and night’ (Yehoshua 1:8)? Even though you labor for six days, you shall dedicate Shabbat to Torah alone.” Based on this, the Sages advise people to always rise early and study on Shabbat, go to the synagogue and to the beit midrash, read the Torah and haftara, and then go home to eat and drink, thus fulfilling the verse: “Go, eat your bread in gladness, and drink your wine in joy” (Kohelet 9:7). (Tanna De-vei Eliyahu Rabba 1) 
  The Sages tell us that we must divide our time on Shabbat. Half of it should be spent studying Torah in the beit midrash, and half should be spent enjoying Shabbat through food, drink, and sleep (Pesaḥim 68b). Some maintain that it is only on Yom Tov that the division is meant to be even, but that on Shabbat, which is designated for Torah study, one must dedicate more than half of one’s time to Torah study (Baḥ, based on Rambam). However, most poskim maintain that on Shabbat too one should divide the time evenly, with half one’s time spent on Torah and half on physical pleasures. It would seem then that the obligation is to dedicate about 12.5 hours to Torah study, since Shabbat with its tosefet lasts approximately 25 hours. However, in practice, it would seem that we can be lenient and leave out of the calculation the seven hours one needs to sleep each night. There are then 18 hours remaining. Of these, one should dedicate nine hours to Torah and nine hours to enjoying Shabbat with food, drink, and the pleasure of extra sleep. Although Torah study is the primary spiritual component of Shabbat, according to a number of poskim one may be lenient and include in these nine hours of Torah the time spent in prayer, on condition that the prayer service is not too drawn out. We see then that in practice one must dedicate at least six hours to Torah study every Shabbat. Adding this to three hours of prayer, we reach a total of nine hours.
  While an even split between spiritual and physical pleasures is the general rule, the specifics of one’s situation can alter the balance somewhat. Torah scholars, who tend toward the ascetic during the week while they diligently study should add a bit more physical pleasure, whereas working men who are not able to study properly during the week should add a bit more Torah study (y. Shabbat 15c; Pesikta Rabbati, end of ch. 23; Beit Yosef 288:1). Similarly, Rema writes: Working men who do not study Torah all week should study more Torah on Shabbat than scholars, who study Torah all week. Torah scholars should indulge themselves a bit with the pleasure of eating and drinking, since they take pleasure in their learning all week. (290:2) 
  The logic behind this is that Shabbat is meant to help people reach absolute perfection both spiritually and physically. People who work all week need to perfect themselves through more Torah study, while Torah scholars who weaken their bodies all week while they diligently study Torah need to perfect themselves in the physical realm. In any case, both groups must seriously endeavor to enjoy Shabbat spiritually and physically, as the combination of the two makes each more productive. Thus man reaches perfection, and merits a deep and true oneg Shabbat.1<i class="footnote">“It was taught: R. Eliezer says: ‘On a holiday one has only two options. He can either eat and drink, or sit and study.’ R. Yehoshua says: ‘Split it up, half for eating and drinking, and half for the <em>beit midrash</em>…. Split it up, half for God and half for you.’ Rabba says: ‘All agree that on Shabbat there must be a “for you” component. Why? Because the verse states that one should call Shabbat a delight’” (<em>Pesaḥim</em> 68b). We see they disagree about Yom Tov, with R. Eliezer maintaining that it may be dedicated entirely to God. However, when it comes to Shabbat, R. Eliezer concedes to R. Yehoshua that one must also eat and drink. Most <em>poskim</em> maintain that one should split up Shabbat, half for God and half for oneself (<em>Or Zaru’a</em>; <em>Smag</em>; Rabbeinu Yeruḥam; <em>Ha-itim</em>; <em>Ha-manhig</em>; <em>Yam Shel Shlomo</em>). However, it would seem that Rambam maintains that on Shabbat one should dedicate more than half one’s time to Torah and prayer (MT 30:10). This is also the opinion of <em>Baḥ</em> 242:1, which states that the Gemara’s statement, “We also require ‘for you,’” implies that the “for you” requirement is almost an afterthought, with the primary requirement being “for God.”The Yerushalmi quotes one opinion that Shabbat was given for eating and drinking and another opinion that it was given for studying Torah. The final analysis: “How is this possible? Set aside part of the time for studying Torah and part for eating and drinking” (y. Shabbat 15:3). According to Pesikta, however, there was never a disagreement. Rather, “the ones who maintain that Shabbat was given for physical pleasure refer to Torah scholars who study Torah intensively all week long, and who indulge themselves on Shabbat. The ones who maintain that Shabbat was given for Torah study refer to the workers who work all week and are able to learn on Shabbat.” This Pesikta is cited as law by Shibolei Ha-leket, Tanya Rabbati, Me’iri, and Beit Yosef 288:1. The poskim imply that this does not mean that on Shabbat, Torah scholars should only eat and drink, nor that working men should only study Torah. Rather, when one is splitting his time, a scholar should tend a little more heavily toward material pleasures, while working men should tend a little more heavily toward Torah study. Thus state Rema 290:2, Maharikash, Shlah, SAH 290:5, and many others. This approach allows us to resolve the seeming contradiction between those quoting the Pesikta and those quoting the Bavli and Yerushalmi, which seem to maintain that the division should be half and half.The poskim disagree regarding the status of prayer. Olat Shabbat 242:1 states that time spent in prayer is considered “for you” time, while R. Yaakov Weil, as quoted in Darkhei Moshe 529:2; Yam Shel Shlomo, Beitza 2:4; and MA 527:22 classify it as “for God” time. It would also seem that Torah scholars who do not exhaust and deprive themselves in study all week must make sure that at least half their time is “for God.”</i>
  
  Section 2
  
  Torah Study and Prayer on Shabbat / What to Study on Shabbat
  Torah study on Shabbat should be a joy and a pleasure. Therefore, some poskim advise against studying difficult and complicated subjects, because when one does not understand what he is studying he becomes tense and aggravated. Therefore, it is proper to review on Shabbat material that one already knows well or study clear and comprehensible material, everyone at their own level. Even Torah scholars should study easy material that does not require exertion on Shabbat (Or Zaru’a; Ya’avetz). Others maintain that, on the contrary, it is particularly appropriate for erudite individuals to delve into difficult passages (Maḥzik Berakha 290:6). It seems that there is no disagreement. Rather, it depends on the individual: one who enjoys raising difficulties and resolving them should study difficult passages, while one who likes understanding things clearly and straightforwardly should study material that is easier to grasp.
  One should mainly study material that instructs one how to live life properly, as the Torah states: “Study them and observe them faithfully” (Devarim 5:1). Similarly, the poskim write that one who has limited time to spend studying Torah should devote it to learning halakha. He should also study matters of faith and morals so as to elevate his thoughts and improve his ways (MB 290:6; Derisha, Shakh, and Taz on YD §246; SAH, Talmud Torah 2:9). If this is the case even during the week, then on Shabbat one should certainly study Torah that will provide direction in life. For Shabbat is the inner essence of the week and is meant to illuminate and guide us during the six workdays. Each person needs to discern for himself what type of study, in addition to halakha, he finds most enlightening, be it theology, Tanakh, moralistic tracts, or Ḥasidut. Torah scholars who spend all week studying different areas of the Torah do not need these directives. They should learn whatever they want to learn.
  It is good to come up with novel Torah ideas (ḥidushim) on Shabbat. Zohar (III 173:1) states that on Saturday night, after the neshama yeteira returns to heaven, God asks what ḥidushim each Jew innovated that Shabbat with the help of his neshama yeteira (Shlah, Masekhet Shabbat, Ner Mitzva §53). This does not refer to ḥidushim that require toil and pain, but those that make people happy and contain novel understandings of life. One who cannot create novel insights should learn something new (Maḥzik Berakha 290:5; Kaf Ha-ḥayim ad loc. 5).
  One who has children should study Torah with them on Shabbat. This gives him a double mitzva. It is a mitzva for a father to teach his son Torah, as it says: “Teach them to your children” (Devarim 11:19). And the Sages state: “If one teaches his son Torah it is as if he has taught his son and his son’s son through all the generations, as it is written: ‘Make them known to your children and your children’s children’ (Devarim 4:9)” (Kiddushin 30:1). By teaching his son, he ensures that the Torah will continue to be transmitted from generation to generation until the end of time. The Sages further say that a grandfather who is privileged to teach his grandson Torah is akin to one who accepted the Torah at Mount Sinai, as the Torah states: “Make them known to your children and your children’s children,” which is immediately followed by “the day you stood before the Lord your God at Ḥorev” (Devarim 4:9-10). Since the Torah was given on Shabbat, it is a particularly appropriate time to transmit the Torah.
  
  Section 3
  
  Torah Study and Prayer on Shabbat / Sleeping on Shabbat
  Included in the mitzva of oneg Shabbat is sleeping soundly, as the popular proverb has it: “Sleeping on Shabbat is a pleasure.” But it is not proper for one to sleep on Shabbat in order to work Saturday night. Doing this subordinates Shabbat to the weekday. One should not even sleep on Shabbat in order to study Torah Saturday night, because by doing so he loses precious, holy time on Shabbat, during which Torah study is weightier than learning done during the week (Ben Ish Ḥai, Year 2, Introduction to Shemot, states, based on kabbalistic interpretations, that Torah study on Shabbat is a thousand times more powerful than Torah study during the week. See below, 22:15).
  Similarly, it is not proper for one to work extra hours on Thursday and Friday and plan to make up for his lost sleep on Shabbat. On the contrary, it is a mitzva to spend the weekdays preparing for Shabbat. One should prepare food for Shabbat, clean the house, do the laundry, and bathe. Certainly included in Shabbat preparation is making the effort to begin Shabbat in a well-rested state rather than an exhausted one. This allows one to focus on study and prayer and to properly enjoy the Shabbat meals. Only if one worked extra hours on Thursday and Friday due to factors out of his control that left him no other choice may he catch up on sleep over Shabbat, but one may not plan things that way. The saying: “Sleep on Shabbat is a pleasure” means that if one generally sleeps seven hours a night, he should sleep for eight hours on Shabbat, so he will be better rested and refreshed. But it does not mean that Shabbat should, God forbid, become the weekdays’ servant, by serving as a time when people can make up for sleep missed during the week.
  In terms of afternoon naps for men, there are various customs. Rambam (MT 30:10) records that pious people would wake up early on Shabbat morning, pray Shaḥarit and Musaf, return home for the second meal, study in the beit midrash until late afternoon, pray Minḥa, and eat se’uda shlishit (the third meal, “shaleshudis”) until the end of Shabbat. However, some poskim write that one who is accustomed to sleep in the afternoon does not have to skip his nap, because sleep is included in oneg Shabbat (Tur §290). Of course, one must be careful that he not sleep so much that he is unable to dedicate time to study. For we have already learned (section1) that on Shabbat at least six hours must be dedicated to Torah study. So, if one sleeps longer on Shabbat afternoon, he must learn more Torah on Friday night after the Shabbat meal or earlier on Shabbat morning.
  One must be careful not to eat too much at the meals, because overeating makes people very sleepy and is not truly pleasurable. Though one enjoys the taste of the food while eating, afterward one feels heavy, exhausted, and often also depressed, because all the body’s resources must be mobilized to digest the excessive quantity of food. After eating like this one has no energy to focus on studying or on having deep, beautiful conversation with family members. Therefore one must be very careful not to overeat, so the meal and its delicacies add energy and liveliness to one’s Torah study. One who nevertheless becomes tired after eating should sleep for a bit and then arise energetically to study Torah.
  
  Section 4
  
  Torah Study and Prayer on Shabbat / The Shabbat Sermon
  It has long been customary for rabbis to deliver important derashot (sermons or homilies) on Shabbat, in which they deal with halakhic and theological matters. These would be attended by the entire community. This important practice has its foundation in God’s instruction to Moshe: God said to Moshe: “Gather together large groups and publicly teach them the laws of Shabbat. Thus, future leaders will learn from you to convene groups every Shabbat and assemble in the batei midrash to teach and instruct Israel about what the Torah permits and forbids. Thus My great name will be glorified among My children.” Based on this, the Sages averred: Moshe instituted that Israel discuss matters pertaining to the day – the laws of Pesaḥ on Pesaḥ, the laws of Shavu’ot on Shavu’ot, the laws of Sukkot on Sukkot. Moshe said to Israel: “If you follow this system God will consider it as if you enthroned Him in His world, as it is stated: ‘You are My witnesses, declares the Lord’ (Yeshayahu 43:10).” (Yalkut Shimoni, Vayak’hel §408) 
  One may not schedule a meal during the drasha (SA 290:2). According to the Sages, doing so is one of the reasons that wealthy people become impoverished. We are told that there was a family in Jerusalem who regularly scheduled meals during the drasha, and on account of this sin they were wiped out (Gittin 38b).
  Zeira recounts that originally he thought that people who ran to hear the drasha were desecrating Shabbat by not walking there unhurriedly. But, after he heard R. Yehoshua b. Levi say, “One should always run to hear words of Torah, even on Shabbat,” he too would run to the drasha (Berakhot 6b). Because the drasha was meant to address the entire community, it was difficult to calibrate it to meet everyone’s needs. There were some who already knew everything that the rabbi was about to teach, while others could not understand a thing he was saying. This is why the Sages stated: “The reward for the drasha is for running to attend it” (ibid.). For the fact that people are running and gathering to hear the drasha already honors the Torah. The Shekhina rests upon them, which allows them to strengthen their faith and their connection to Torah and mitzvot. In any case, one who does not attend the drasha should study Torah during the time it is delivered. Under no circumstances should he schedule his meal then or plan to take a walk (MB 290:7).
  The primary goal of the drasha is to teach the community practical halakha and to guide the audience in the ways of God, as the Sages state: “to teach and instruct Israel about what the Torah permits and forbids” (Yalkut Shimoni loc. cit.). Once, R. Abahu and R. Ḥiya happened to be in the same place on Shabbat. R. Abahu held forth on matters of aggada while R. Ḥiya taught of halakha. Most of the listeners left R. Ḥiya’s drasha and went to listen to R. Abahu. R. Ḥiya was upset about this because R. Abahu had deviated from the primary purpose of the drasha, which was to offer halakhic instruction. Although R. Abahu tried to appease R. Ḥiya, he refused to be placated (Sota 40a). We can assume that R. Abahu felt that the community was at a low point and needed to be encouraged in their faith through aggada, while R. Ḥiya felt the community had the strength to hear a halakhic discourse.
  The bottom line is that everything depends on the community and what areas it must improve. Generally, a mixture of halakha and the reasons behind it, together with some theology and moral instruction, is called for. Indeed, this was the custom of many leading Torah scholars (see Tur §290; Baḥ; MA; SAH 290:3; MB ad loc. 6).
  It is incumbent upon the community leaders to strengthen communal Torah study on Shabbat and to schedule many varied classes for men and women, old and young, on halakhic and aggadic topics, in Tanakh and in Talmud, so that everybody can participate. Included in this is the need to encourage and schedule a central drasha for the entire community, to give honor to Torah and reinforce its status.
  
  Section 5
  
  Torah Study and Prayer on Shabbat / Women and Torah Study on Shabbat
  There is a fundamental difference between men’s and women’s obligation to study Torah. Men, even after they have learned all of halakha and the fundamentals of faith, are still obligated to set aside time to study Torah and to review and deepen what they have learned. The directive, “Let not this Book of the Torah cease from your lips; study it day and night” (Yehoshua 1:8) is directed at them. Although all week when they are busy at work they fulfill their obligation to study Torah with one chapter of any Torah text studied during the day and another at night (Menaḥot 99b), on Shabbat men must fulfill the verse according to its straightforward meaning, as the Sages said: “You should dedicate Shabbat to Torah alone” (Tanna De-vei Eliyahu §1; above section 1).
  Women are not obligated to set aside time for Torah study, but they are obligated to know what the Torah says about how to live life, so that Torah will illuminate and guide their paths in the realms of halakha as well as theology and morals. A woman who can accomplish this with a minimal amount of study need do no more, while one who needs to study a great deal in order to achieve this must do so. This depends on the woman’s disposition and also varies by era. There were times when a small amount of learning was sufficient for most women; but nowadays, when life is more complicated and general wisdom has proliferated, women must study more halakha, theology, and works of moral instruction (Peninei Halakha: Collected Essays I 1:16).
  Since women are not obligated to set aside time to study Torah every day and every night, they are also not obligated to dedicate half of Shabbat to learning. However, since Torah makes both men and women happy, there is a mitzva for women to study Torah on Shabbat because it is included in spiritual oneg Shabbat. Additionally, women are obligated to study halakha and theology. As Shabbat is both a holy day and the day on which the Torah was given, it is a fitting time for Torah study and an appropriate time for women to set aside to study halakha and theology. Nevertheless, since according to the letter of the law they are not obligated to set aside time to study Torah, in the years when they are busy with childcare they do not have to set aside time to learn on Shabbat. However, women who are not busy taking care of children should study a great deal on Shabbat, in a joyful and relaxed manner. Even women who are busy around the house should try to set aside some time to study Torah on Shabbat. Participating in Torah classes is recommended, since women also need the Torah’s guidance. At the time of the Sages, there were women who attended the Shabbat drasha; sometimes the derashot were long and the women came home late.2<i class="footnote">We derive this from the fact that women too are prohibited from studying Torah on Tisha Be-Av (SA 554:1), for women also feel happy when they learn. Consequently, it is considered <em>oneg Shabbat</em>. See <em>Sha’agat Aryeh</em> §69. We also know that women are obligated to study <em>halakha</em> and theology and therefore they recite <em>Birkhot Ha-Torah</em> (SA 47:14; Rema YD 246:6). Shabbat <em>derashot </em>are meant to be for women as well, as stated in <em>Tanya</em><em>Rabbati</em> §18: “It is a mitzva to congregate in synagogues to deliver <em>derashot</em> to women about timely topics.” For we learned in a <em>midrash</em><em>Yalkut Shimoni</em>, Vayak’hel §408) that the Shabbat discourse is modeled on the mitzva of <em>Hak’hel</em>, which is obligatory upon women as well. See section 15 below, where we derive the mitzva to visit one’s rabbi on Shabbat from the actions of the Shunamite woman. The story told in <em>y. Sota</em> 1:4 also makes clear that women attended Shabbat discourses. We read there that R. Meir was accustomed to preach on Friday nights at the synagogue of Ḥamat. Once he spoke at great length, and one of the women who always attended his discourses returned home late. By the time she arrived home, the Shabbat candles had already gone out, and her husband was angry. He locked her out and swore that she could not re-enter the house until she spat in the face of R. Meir who had spoken for too long. R. Meir became aware of the situation. He decided to act as though he had a disease in his eye. He claimed that the cure for his eye was to have an expert healer spit in it. The woman’s neighbors reported this to her, and advised her that this was her chance to spit at R. Meir and return home. She came before R. Meir. R. Meir asked her: “Do you know how to heal through spitting?” Taken aback, she admitted that she did not know how. R. Meir told her: “If you are not an expert, you must spit in my eye seven times to effect a cure.” After she did so, R. Meir said to her: “Go tell your husband, ‘You told me to spit once, and I spit seven times.’” Later, his students remonstrated: “Why didn’t you tell us what happened? We would have brought the husband here and beat him until he agreed to take back what he said, and to make peace with his wife.” R. Meir responded: “If God allowed His holy name to be erased in order to bring peace between a man and his wife, then certainly Meir can forgo his dignity.”</i>
  It is wonderful if a couple enjoys studying Torah together. Through their joint learning they merit the presence of the divine, and invite Torah to serve as their guide for life. But a couple who have trouble learning together should not feel bad about it, because sometimes the great love that they share may make it difficult for them to concentrate on learning together.
  
  Section 6
  
  Torah Study and Prayer on Shabbat / Reading the Torah on Shabbat
  An ordinance tracing back to Moshe mandates that Jews read from holy Torah scrolls written in ink on parchment every Shabbat, Monday, and Thursday (BK 82a). Due to the holiness and exaltedness of Shabbat, the Sages instituted that seven people should be called up to read from it, corresponding to the seven days of the week (Megilla 21a). In talmudic times, it took communities in Eretz Yisrael three years to cycle through the entire Torah, while in Babylonia it was completed annually. The current custom throughout the Jewish world is to complete the Torah each year on Simḥat Torah. This is done by reading the weekly parsha each Shabbat. Each of the seven people called up to the Torah reads part of the parsha (referred to as an aliya); together they complete the entire parsha. If one Shabbat a congregation is unable to read the parsha, the next week it must read two parshiyot and make up for the one missed (Rema 135:2).3<i class="footnote">Each person who reads from the Torah scroll recites two <em>berakhot</em>, one before the reading and one afterward. See <em>Peninei Halakha: Prayer</em> ch. 22 and <em>Collected Essays I</em> ch. 4. Each person who is called up introduces the first <em>berakha</em> with “<em>Barkhu</em>.” The Ge’onim explain that if for reasons beyond one’s control he missed the “<em>Barkhu</em>” normally recited before the <em>berakhot</em> introducing the <em>Shema</em>, he can compensate by hearing “<em>Barkhu</em>” seven times from the seven people called up on Shabbat to read from the Torah (<em>Shibolei Ha-leket</em> §77).</i>
  If a congregation wishes to call up more than seven people to read, they may do so as long as each person reads a minimum of three verses. Some maintain that nowadays one should not add to the seven because that involves reciting additional berakhot – more than were instituted by the Sages. It used to be that the first person called up would recite a berakha before reading and the last person called up would recite a berakha after reading, but all the people called up in the middle would not recite berakhot. Later on it was instituted that everyone called up should recite a berakha before and after their aliya. This was due to concern that people who arrived or left in the middle of the Torah reading would not realize that a berakha was recited at the beginning and end of the parsha. Accordingly, nowadays each person who is called up recites two berakhot. Thus it is improper to add additional aliyot, which would involve the recitation of even more berakhot, beyond those instituted by the Sages. Furthermore, it is also important not to burden the congregation by extending the prayer service. Therefore, ideally a congregation should not add to the seven aliyot. However, in a time of need and to avoid offending someone deeply, one may do so (SA 282:1-2; MB ad loc. 4-5).
  Technically, an aliya may be given to a minor who is old enough to know to Whom berakhot are addressed. This is on condition that the majority of the seven people called up are adults. There are Sephardim who follow this position (SA 282:2; Yeḥaveh Da’at 4:23). The Ashkenazic custom, and that of some Sephardim as well, is not to call up a minor to the Torah. There are some Sephardim who follow the position of Arizal and call up a minor for the seventh aliya but for no others (see MB 282:12; Kaf Ha-ḥayim ad loc. 22). The Yemenite custom is to call up a minor for the sixth aliya.
  
  Section 7
  
  Torah Study and Prayer on Shabbat / The Haftara
  The Sages instituted that in addition to the Torah reading, there should also be a public reading from the Prophets on a topic related either to the Torah reading or to the time of year. One berakha is made before this reading, and four afterward. This reading is called the haftara, meaning “conclusion,” for with it the Torah reading concludes.
  The haftara was instituted following an imperial decree that Jews may not read from the Torah, on penalty of death. However, since the decree did not apply to reading from the Prophets, the Sages of that time instituted that congregations read from the Prophets instead of the Torah. They further instituted that the reading from the Prophets be modeled on the Torah reading, with berakhot before and after, and with seven aliyot. After the decree was rescinded and Torah reading resumed, the Sages ordained that congregations continue reading from the Prophets each week, but now special berakhot were established for it. Since while the decree was in place they had had seven people reading from the Prophets, each reading a minimum of three verses, they instituted that the maftir (the person who reads the haftara) should read a minimum of 21 verses. However, if the selected passage from the Prophets is shorter than 21 verses, we conclude the reading when the subject is finished, even if it is fewer than 21 verses (SA 284:1; MB ad loc. 2).
  In order to demonstrate that the haftara is not as important as the Torah reading, it was ordained that the maftir should read a few verses from the Torah scroll first, and only then read from the Prophets. Strictly speaking, the seventh oleh may read the haftara, but the custom is to follow the opinion that the maftir should not be one of the seven olim. Therefore, after the seven olim finish reading the parsha, Half-Kaddish is recited, thus concluding the Torah reading. Then the maftir is called up to read a few verses from the Torah scroll, and he then goes on to read the haftara from the Prophets.
  Some maintain that just as the Torah is read from a parchment scroll, so too the haftara must be read from a parchment scroll (Levush). However, many Aḥaronim maintain that the haftara may be read from a printed volume. It is better to read it from a volume that has the entire text of the biblical book from which the haftara is excerpted, but if this is not available one may read from a book that has only the verses of the haftara, as is the case with many of our printed ḥumashim (MA; Eliya Rabba; MB 284:1).
  Some have a custom that the entire congregation reads the haftara together; however, it is more correct that the person who is called up for maftir or the ḥazan reads it alone, while the congregation listens to his reading. One who wishes to read along in an undertone may do so as long as he does not disturb the person sitting next to him (MB 284:11; BHL ad loc.).
  
  Section 8
  
  Torah Study and Prayer on Shabbat / Torah Reading at Minĥa on Shabbat
  In addition to ordaining the reading of the parsha on Shabbat morning, Ezra the Scribe also instituted that the Torah be read at Minḥa. Three people are called up at Minḥa and the beginning of the next parsha is read. This section is read on Monday and Thursday mornings as well, in preparation for and introduction to the next week’s reading.
  The Sages state that this ordinance was on account of “yoshvei keranot” (idlers; lit. “those who sit on corners”) (BK 82a). Some explain this term to refer to merchants and artisans who sat in their stores and did not attend Shaḥarit services during the week. Since they did not hear the Torah reading of Monday and Thursday mornings, they would have been unprepared for the upcoming parsha. To ensure that they would hear the introductory reading at least once, Ezra instituted that it be read at Minḥa on Shabbat, when everyone is able to attend (Rashi; Rosh).
  Others explain that Ezra was worried that people would get drunk at Shabbat lunch, and then they would be in no state to learn Torah. Ezra therefore instituted that there be a Torah reading at Minḥa so that out of respect for the reading everyone would congregate in the synagogue. Thus they would neither get drunk nor waste time. Along the same lines, King David said to God: “Master of the Universe, this nation is not like other nations. When other nations have a festive meal they drink and get drunk and act silly. We are not like this, however. Although we eat and drink, we come to pray, as is stated: ‘As for me, may my prayer come to You, O Lord, at a favorable moment; O God, in Your abundant faithfulness, answer me with Your sure deliverance’” (Tehilim 69:14). This is why we recite this verse before reading the Torah at Minḥa (Shibolei Ha-leket).4<i class="footnote">em&gt;Baḥ explains that Ezra mandated Torah reading at <em>Minḥa</em> on Shabbat but not on Yom Tov because Shabbat is a propitious time (<em>et ratzon</em>) as well as the day on which the Torah was given. Therefore, another Shabbat reading was added. This reading helps facilitate God’s acceptance of the <em>Minḥa</em> prayer, as is stated: “As for me, may my prayer come to You, O Lord, at a favorable moment (<em>et ratzon</em>)” (Tehilim 69:14). Furthermore, following the first explanation above, the goal of this Torah reading is to prepare people for the next week’s reading. On Yom Tov this is not necessary. According to the second explanation, since there are over fifty <em>Shabbatot</em> in a year, we are worried that a norm will develop in which people get drunk. Ezra’s ordinance comes to prevent this. In contrast, there are far fewer holidays; since Shabbat sets the tone for holy days, we are not so worried about people getting drunk and acting out on Yom Tov. Additionally, there is more of a mitzva to drink wine and to be happy on Yom Tov than on Shabbat. Therefore, the Sages did not wish to infringe upon this mitzva, even though obviously it is inappropriate to get drunk.</i>
  
  Section 9
  
  Torah Study and Prayer on Shabbat / Shnayim Mikra Ve-eĥad Targum
  In addition to the communal Torah reading in shul, the Sages also mandated that each week every man should read shnayim mikra ve-eḥad targum (lit. “twice Scripture, once translation”), that is, the parsha twice and the Aramaic translation once. He who does so is granted a longer life (Berakhot 8a). When this reading was instituted, most Jews spoke Aramaic; if they read the Aramaic translation of Onkelos the proselyte, they understood the parsha.
  In the course of time the Jews were exiled to various places where other languages were spoken and the Jewish masses no longer knew Aramaic. The question arose: may one read the parsha with a translation into one’s native language or with Rashi’s commentary, instead of the Aramaic translation?
  Most poskim maintain that other translations are not as good as Onkelos, which was composed in the tannaitic period and has its roots at Sinai. Thus one does not fulfill his obligation by reading the other ones. In contrast, there is general agreement that one may study Rashi’s commentary in lieu of Onkelos’s translation because Rashi explains the difficult passages in the Torah as the targum does, often in even greater detail. However, there are verses that Rashi does not comment upon. Those verses must be read three times (MB 285:5).
  There are some who enhance the mitzva and read the parsha twice, and then read both targum and Rashi. Rashi has the advantages of being more expansive and of quoting from the Sages, while targum has the advantage of being rooted in Sinai. Therefore, the kabbalists write that even for those who do not understand Aramaic there is value in reading Onkelos (SA 285:2).
  The time frame for these readings begins with Minḥa of the prior Shabbat, when the beginning of the upcoming parsha is read. It continues throughout the week until Shabbat lunch. We are told that R. Yehuda Ha-nasi instructed his children not to eat lunch on Shabbat before they had completed shnayim mikra ve-eḥad targum. One who already ate lunch should complete his reading by Minḥa, when the beginning of the next parsha is read. If one was unable to finish even by then, he should finish by the end of Tuesday, since the first three days of the week are connected to the previous Shabbat. If one did not finish by then, he must make sure to finish before Simḥat Torah, when we celebrate finishing the Torah reading for the year (SA 285:4).
  
  Section 10
  
  Torah Study and Prayer on Shabbat / Different Customs Relating to Shnayim Mikra Ve-eĥad Targum
  Some customarily read shnayim mikra ve-eḥad targum on Friday and try to do the entire reading without stopping (Arizal; Shlah; Kaf Ha-ḥayim 285:3; Tur). Others follow the custom of reading one aliya each day of the week, so that on Shabbat they complete the entire parsha (Vilna Gaon; MB 285:8). In any case, anyone who completes shnayim mikra ve-eḥad targum at any point during the week has fulfilled the obligation.
  Ideally one reads the Torah text twice, followed by targum. There are two customs as to how to do this. According to Arizal’s custom, one reads each verse twice and then its translation once. Following the custom of Shlah and the Vilna Gaon, one reads each parshiya (a section that in the Torah scroll is offset by spaces) twice and then its Aramaic translation. Both customs are acceptable (MB 285:2; Kaf Ha-ḥayim ad loc. 3).
  Be-di’avad, the order is not critical. If one reads the verse, then targum, and then repeats the verse – he fulfills his obligation (Levush; AHS 285:3). Similarly if he reads the parsha out of order from end to beginning, he fulfills his obligation. The main objective is to read all the verses twice and the translation once. One teaching parsha to children need not read the verses twice and then the targum, because it is clear that while teaching he reads each verse twice and explains it (SA 285:6).
  If one did not manage to complete shnayim mikra ve-eḥad targum before the Shabbat morning Torah reading, in principle he may do so during the Torah reading (SA 285:5). However, some say this is not proper. Therefore it is preferable that he read it quietly together with the Torah reader who is reading it aloud, and that he count this as one reading for the purpose of shnayim mikra (MB 285:14). If he heard the Torah reading but did not quietly read along with it, the Aḥaronim disagree whether this counts as one reading (ibid. 2).
  One who learns the parsha with Rashi may, if it is easier for him, read an entire parshiya and then go back through it verse by verse with Rashi. However, he must read verses with no comments by Rashi an additional time, so that he reads them a total of three times. If he wishes, he can read the text twice with Rashi’s commentary, and then during the Torah reading he may read the parsha quietly together with the Torah reader, which will complete the third time for those verses upon which there are no comments by Rashi.
  Women are exempt from the obligations of Torah reading and shnayim mikra ve-eḥad targum. Nevertheless, if they wish to participate in the Torah reading and study parsha, they are doing a mitzva (Peninei Halakha: Women’s Prayer 2:10).
  
  Section 11
  
  Torah Study and Prayer on Shabbat / Shabbat Prayers
  The Amida on Shabbat is made up of seven berakhot. The formulation of the first and last three berakhot is identical to their weekday versions, but in place of the thirteen berakhot in the middle we recite one special berakha relating to the sanctity of Shabbat. In it we beseech God to find our rest pleasing and to sanctify us with His commandments. We conclude this berakha with “Blessed are You, O Lord, Who sanctifies Shabbat” (“mekadesh ha-Shabbat”). The introduction to this Shabbat berakha was formulated differently by the Sages for each of the prayer services of Shabbat. At Ma’ariv it is “Ata Kidashta” (“You have sanctified”), “Yismaḥ Moshe” (“Moshe rejoiced”) at Shaḥarit, and Ata Eḥad (“You are one”) at Minḥa. One who got confused and recited the wrong berakha – for example, he used the Minḥa formulation during Ma’ariv – has fulfilled his obligation, since the central berakhot of all three prayers share common themes and formulations (SA 268:6; MB ad loc. 14).
  Technically, on Shabbat one could say all of the berakhot one usually says during the weekday, and simply add a special berakha for Shabbat. Nevertheless, the Sages wished to honor Shabbat and to avoid burdening the people with lengthy prayers (Berakhot 21a). Furthermore, it is not appropriate to make requests on Shabbat, since they might cause one sorrow (Tanḥuma; Rashi; Rambam). Therefore the Sages reduced Shabbat’s middle berakhot from thirteen to one. However, if one mistakenly started to say the berakhot from the weekday Amida, and then remembered in the middle of one of the berakhot, he should finish the berakha and then shift to the Shabbat formulation. Since the weekday berakha is still relevant, and he has already begun it, it is proper that he finish it (SA 268:2). If he made a mistake and did not say the berakha about Shabbat, as long as he has not finished the Amida he can go back to the Shabbat berakha and continue from there until the end of the Amida. However, if he already finished the Amida, even if he has not yet stepped backward, he must repeat the Amida from the beginning (ibid. 5).
  The Sages also established an additional prayer service on Shabbat – Musaf – corresponding to the extra sacrifices that were offered on Shabbat during Temple times. In this Amida too, the first three and last three berakhot are the same as those of every Amida, but in the middle there is a special berakha about the Musaf sacrifice and the sanctity of Shabbat.5<i class="footnote">If during <em>Musaf</em> one mistakenly began to recite the weekday <em>berakhot</em>, and then remembered that he must pray <em>Musaf</em>, even though some maintain that he should finish the <em>berakha</em>, he should not do so. Rather, he should stop immediately, because those <em>berakhot</em> are not relevant to <em>Musaf</em> (SA 265:2; MB <em>ad</em> <em>loc.</em> 5).If while praying the Amida he began to say the word “ata” with the intention of continuing with the berakha of “Ata Ḥonen” but then remembered that it was Shabbat, what should he do? If he was praying the Amida of Ma’ariv or Minḥa on Shabbat day, whose Shabbat berakhot also begin with the word “ata,” he should continue with the correct Shabbat formulation. But if he was praying Shaḥarit, since he intended to begin a weekday berakha and indeed did so, he should finish the berakha of Ata Ḥonen. Nevertheless, even in Shaḥarit if he recited “ata” absentmindedly, he should correct himself and continue with the correct berakha, Yismaḥ Moshe, since in theory if he were to continue during Shaḥarit with Ata Kidashta of Ma’ariv or Ata Eḥad of Minḥa he would fulfill his obligation (SA 265:3; MB ad loc. 6; Ben Ish Ḥai, Year 2, Toldot 10).</i>
  
  Section 12
  
  Torah Study and Prayer on Shabbat / Va-yekhulu
  In the Amida of Ma’ariv on Friday night we recite the “Va-yekhulu” passage, the three verses that recount the first Shabbat of creation: The heaven and the earth were finished (va-yekhulu), and all their array. On the seventh day God finished the work that He had been doing, and He ceased on the seventh day from all the work that He had done. And God blessed the seventh day and declared it holy, because on it God ceased from all the work of creation that He had done. (Bereishit 2:1-3)
  The Sages tell us that one who recites Va-yekhulu on Friday night becomes like God’s partner in the world’s creation (Shabbat 119b). The purpose of creation is for God to be revealed to the world, and bless it as a result. This is the primary idea of Shabbat. When a Jew attests to the creation of the world and the sanctity of Shabbat by reciting Va-yekhulu, he realizes the purpose of creation and increases blessing in the world.
  The Sages add (ibid.) that one who recites Va-yekhulu on Friday night is escorted home by two ministering angels, who rest their hands upon his head and say: “Your guilt shall depart and your sin be purged” (Yeshayahu 6:7). Shabbat is also connected to teshuva – repentance or return. This is expressed in the phonetic similarity of “Shabbat” and “teshuva.” Indeed, on Shabbat we remember the Creator of the world, and we return to all the positive strivings of our souls. One who recites Va-yekhulu on Friday night gives expression to the deep significance of Shabbat. By doing so he merits true repentance and the forgiveness of his sins.
  In addition to reciting Va-yekhulu silently in the Amida of Ma’ariv, after the conclusion of the Amida the congregation repeats Va-yekhulu out loud while standing (SA 268:7). The reason for this is that when Yom Tov coincides with Shabbat, the Ma’ariv service follows the Yom Tov formulation. The sanctity of Shabbat is then mentioned only briefly, and Va-yekhulu is not recited in the Amida. In order to avoid skipping Va-yekhulu on those Shabbatot, the Sages instituted the recitation of Va-yekhulu after the Amida each week. Some suggest an additional reason for its recitation – it is a public testimonial to the creation of the world.6<i class="footnote">Some maintain that following this reasoning, if one’s recitation of the <em>Amida</em> lagged behind the congregation’s so that he did not reach <em>Va-yekhulu</em> with them, he should not recite <em>Va-yekhulu</em> on his own, since Jewish courts do not accept testimony from a single individual. Rather, he should seek a friend to recite it together with him. If he does recite it alone, he should read it as one would read from a Torah scroll, with the cantillation marks (<em>Taz</em> 268:5). There is even an opinion that one should try to speed up his prayer in order to complete the <em>Amida</em> with the congregation so that he will be able to recite <em>Va-yekhulu</em> with a <em>minyan</em>. This is preferable, because in its recitation there is an element of <em>Kiddush Hashem</em> (sanctification of God’s name), and the command to sanctify God’s name applies in the presence of a <em>minyan</em><em>Pri Megadim</em>; BHL). If one finishing the silent <em>Amida</em> has already said the <em>Yehi Ratzon</em> prayer that precedes the paragraph of <em>Elokai Netzor</em>, he may recite <em>Va-yekhulu</em> with the congregation and then complete the silent <em>Amida</em>. All these customs are an enhancement of the mitzva; fundamentally, one who has not completed his <em>Amida</em> is not obligated to say <em>Va-yekhulu</em> at all. This is because it was established to ensure that <em>Va-yekhulu</em> would be included in the prayer service even on Yom Tov, and in order to give people who were not familiar with the prayer the opportunity to say it (SA 268:7). In any event, even if one is uncomfortable bothering his friend to recite <em>Va-yekhulu</em> together with him, he should still recite it on his own. This way, together with his later recitation of <em>kiddush</em>, he will have recited <em>Va-yekhulu</em> a total of three times (see MB 268:19; <em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 38:10).</i>
  Va-yekhulu is recited yet again in kiddush. We often find that something important is repeated three times.
  
  Section 13
  
  Torah Study and Prayer on Shabbat / A Concise Recap of the Amida
  The Sages ordained that the ḥazan recite the berakha known as “Me’ein Sheva” on Friday night. This berakha is like a ḥazan’s repetition, as it is a synopsis of the seven berakhot of the Shabbat Amida. The reason for this is that synagogues were (sometimes) built in the fields, and it was dangerous to return home from them at night. The Sages were worried that if one was late or slow and finished his recitation of the Amida after the rest of the congregation, he would have to walk home alone, thus endangering himself. Therefore, they instituted that the ḥazan say this berakha in order to extend the service. This would allow those who fell behind to finish their Amida and return home with the rest of the congregation.
  Even though for over a thousand years now synagogues have not been built in the fields, the ordinance stands, and in every synagogue the ḥazan recites this berakha after the Amida. However, if a minyan is convened in a private home, such as for a bridegroom or a mourner, it is not recited, since the ordinance was made only for a synagogue (SA 268:10).
  Some say, however, that the talmudic Sages had an additional, esoteric rationale: on Shabbat, it is necessary to include something akin to a ḥazan’s repetition even at Ma’ariv. Consequently, the ordinance is not limited to a synagogue, but is relevant anywhere there is a minyan (Ben Ish Ḥai; Kaf Ha-ḥayim 268:50). This is the custom of those who regularly follow kabbalistic practices. But the rest of the poskim follow the first approach and maintain that Me’ein Sheva is not recited in a place that does not have a regular minyan. Only in the holy city of Jerusalem do they say Me’ein Sheva even at an impromptu minyan, because the entire city is considered a synagogue.7<i class="footnote">. If a <em>minyan</em> meets regularly at a specific location for several days, then according to <em>Eliya Rabba</em> and MB 268:24, as long as a Torah scroll is present at the <em>minyan</em>, <em>Me’ein Sheva </em>is recited. However, if there is no Torah scroll present, this <em>berakha</em> is not recited. In contrast, according to <em>Igrot Moshe</em> OḤ 4:69 (3), the key variable is not the presence of a Torah scroll but the regularity of the <em>minyan</em>. If it meets in the same place every Friday night, it is considered a regular <em>minyan</em> and <em>Me’ein Sheva</em> is recited. This is also implied in other Aḥaronim, including SAH 268:15, which nowhere mentions the presence of a Torah scroll as a prerequisite for determining the status of a <em>minyan</em>. It would seem that in any case of doubt, either because there is a disagreement about the law or because one is in doubt about the status of the <em>minyan</em>, one may take into account the opinion of the kabbalists and recite the <em>berakha</em>. Therefore, in summer camps where a Torah scroll is present, even if there is no permanent synagogue there, it is recited. In a hotel, if there is either a dedicated synagogue or a Torah scroll, it is recited. If there are neither, it is not recited. When it comes to Jerusalem, <em>Har Tzvi</em> (OḤ 1:152) states that anywhere there is a <em>minyan</em>, <em>Me’ein Sheva</em> is recited. <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> states this as well (267:20).</i>
  This berakha is the provenance of the ḥazan. Therefore, in a place where the congregation recites the stanza beginning with the words “Magen avot” aloud, the ḥazan must repeat it by himself (MB 268:22).
  The Aḥaronim disagree whether the ḥazan must bow at the beginning of Me’ein Sheva. Some say that since this berakha is in lieu of the ḥazan’s repetition, it follows the same rules, and he must bow at its beginning just as he bows at the beginning of the Amida. Others maintain that it is not the same as the ḥazan’s repetition, and thus it is unnecessary for him to bow at the beginning. Everyone should follow his custom.8<i class="footnote">The Ge’onim dispute whether one who has not prayed the <em>Amida</em> can fulfill his obligation by hearing the <em>ḥazan</em> recite <em>Me’ein Sheva</em>. According to R. Natronai Gaon he can, even though one who knows how to pray the <em>Amida</em> cannot fulfill his obligation with the <em>ḥazan</em>’s repetition. Since <em>Ma’ariv</em> was not originally obligatory, the Sages were more lenient about it. However, according to R. Moshe Gaon, only one who made a mistake and prayed a weekday <em>Amida</em> can fulfill his obligation by listening to <em>Me’ein Sheva</em>. According to R. Amram Gaon, one can never fulfill one’s <em>Amida</em> obligation by hearing <em>Me’ein Sheva</em>. At the root of their disagreement is the question of whether <em>Me’ein Sheva</em> can be considered the <em>ḥazan</em>’s repetition of the <em>Amida</em>. SA rules that if one heard the <em>berakha </em>from the <em>ḥazan</em> and intended to fulfill his obligation thereby, he has done so (268:13). MB states that if one made a mistake and prayed the wrong <em>Amida</em>, and has not yet heard <em>Me’ein Sheva</em>, it is better that he pray the <em>Amida</em> himself since there is an opinion that his obligation cannot be fulfilled through hearing <em>Me’ein Sheva </em>(268:28; see <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 267:18).</i>
  
  Section 14
  
  Torah Study and Prayer on Shabbat / Kabbalat Shabbat and Other Additions to the Prayers
  More than 400 years ago, kabbalists in Tzefat began to usher in Shabbat with the recitation of psalms and liturgical poems. Since Jews desire to give expression to their neshama yeteira, this custom was accepted throughout the Jewish world; this is the origin of the Kabbalat Shabbat service. At that time R. Shlomo Alkabetz was alive, and he composed the wonderful poem Lekha Dodi, which is used today to welcome Shabbat in all synagogues.
  Arizal would go out to the fields to greet Shabbat, facing the west where the sun was setting. The Sages tell us (BB 25a) that the primary revelation of the Shekhina (Divine Presence) is in the west. This custom of turning westward when reciting the last stanza of Lekha Dodi and saying “bo’i kalla” (“welcome, bride”) became accepted in synagogues. Following this logic, even if the entrance to the synagogue faces a different direction, those praying within still face west. However, some are accustomed to turn to the entrance to the synagogue even if it does not face west, thereby expressing that Shabbat is like a guest coming through the doorway.9<i class="footnote">. Some Sephardim customarily face west when reciting <em>Mizmor Le-David</em> and <em>Lekha Dodi</em>. Yemenites do not turn in any direction during prayer. All Ashkenazim and some Sephardim turn only at the end of <em>Lekha Dodi</em>, when they reach the stanza “<em>Bo’i ve-shalom</em>.” It is improper that in the same synagogue some face west beginning with <em>Mizmor Le-David</em> while others turn only upon reaching“<em>Bo’i ve-shalom</em>,” because it violates <em>lo titgodedu </em>(the prohibition on factional disunity). However, it is permissible for some people to sit and some to stand then, because there are always those who are standing and those who are sitting.</i>
  There is an early custom, dating to the period of the Rishonim, to recite the second chapter of Mishna Shabbat (beginning with the words, and thus entitled, “Ba-meh Madlikin”) (SA 270:1). This is because near the end of the chapter there is a statement of the Sages that one must say three things in his home Friday as night falls: “Did you tithe? Did you make an eruv? Light candles!” The custom to read this chapter, though, is not universal. Some have a custom to read the section from the Zohar called “Ke-gavna.”
  There is a custom dating to the period of the Rishonim to add psalms to the Pesukei De-zimra section that introduces Shaḥarit. They chose psalms that mention the creation of the world and the giving of the Torah, since Shabbat is a remembrance of the creation of the world, and the Torah was given on Shabbat. Before Yishtabaḥ, the berakha that concludes Pesukei De-zimra, we add the prayer of Nishmat Kol Ḥai. It mentions the Exodus from Egypt, one of the things of which Shabbat reminds us (Tur §281; Levush).10<i class="footnote">At first glance this custom is puzzling. For we know that on account of the honor due to Shabbat, the Sages did not want to burden people with saying the thirteen middle <em>berakhot</em> found in the weekday <em>Amida </em>(<em>Berakhot </em>21a). How then could they make the prayer service longer by adding additional psalms? We are forced to say that their primary concern was not to burden people with requests about weekday issues, since they might cause sorrow (as explained in <em>Tanḥuma</em> Va-yera §1; <em>Maḥzor Vitri</em> §140; Rambam, <em>Pe’er Ha-dor </em>§130, as quoted in <em>Harḥavot</em> 5:11:1). But it is desirable and good to praise God profusely. Another possibility is that they wished to shorten the <em>Amida</em> in order to leave people with plenty of time to study Torah and enjoy Shabbat. For this is the purpose of Shabbat – for people to engage with Torah in a pleasurable way. However, when Torah study diminished, they added those psalms that incorporate an element of Torah study. (Rashi makes a similar point in <em>Sefer Ha-pardes</em> §174 about the liturgical poems added on holidays. He suggests that even though these additions could be halakhically problematic, they are justified by the principle “There is a time to do for God, and to go against the Torah,” since the poems take the place of the <em>drasha.</em>)</i>
  Women are exempt from praying in a minyan and from reciting the rabbinic additions to the prayers, but must recite Birkhot Ha-shaḥar (the morning berakhot) and the Amida of Shaḥarit and Minḥa. If they pray only one Amida in a day, they have fulfilled their obligation. When circumstances are not ideal, women can fulfill their obligation with the recitation of just Birkhot Ha-shaḥar (Peninei Halakha: Women’s Prayer 2:5). If a woman is able, it is preferable for her to attend the synagogue on Shabbat (ibid. 20:2).
  
  Section 15
  
  Torah Study and Prayer on Shabbat / The Custom of Wishing One’s Rabbi “Shabbat Shalom”
  “R. Yitzḥak stated: One must visit his rabbi on the three pilgrimage festivals” (RH 16b). This is in order to strengthen his connection to the rabbi, as a result of which he will strengthen his commitment to Torah and mitzvot. It is very fitting on the holy days to strengthen one’s connection with those who are bearers of Torah. Indeed, it is an age-old custom to do so, as we see from the words of the Shunamite woman’s husband. When he saw his wife setting off to see Elisha the Prophet on a weekday, he asked: “Why are you going to him today? It is neither New Moon nor Shabbat” (2 Melakhim 4:23). This implies that on Rosh Ḥodesh and Shabbat she did go to see the prophet (the current equivalent of whom would be the rabbi).
  The Rishonim explain that the precise parameters of this mitzva depend upon geography. If one lives far away from his rabbi, he must visit him at a minimum on the three festivals, as R. Yitzḥak stated. One who lives nearer by should visit him at least once a month. One who lives very close must visit him every Shabbat (based on Rabbeinu Ḥananel and Ritva; see BHL 301:4 s.v. “lehakbil”). Based on this, the custom nowadays is to go over to the local rabbi at the end of prayers and wish him “Shabbat Shalom.” It would seem that those who go to hear the rabbi’s drasha are also counted among those who go to visit him. 
  Zvi Yehuda Kook explained that even though women are not obligated to study all of the details and minutiae of Torah, their general attitude toward Torah and those who study it is better than that of men. It is a fact that before the Torah was given at Sinai, God commanded Moshe to address the women first and only afterward the men, as it is written, “Thus shall you say to the house of Yaakov and declare to the children of Israel” (Shemot 19:3). “The house of Jacob” refers to the women, while “the house of Israel” refers to the men (Mekhilta). 
  It is not by chance then that the mitzva of visiting one’s rabbi on Shabbat and holidays is derived from the actions of the Shunamite woman. For, it would seem that the general attitude of women toward Torah is deeper than that of the men. The men occupy themselves more with the details of the laws and commandments of the Torah, while women connect more with the overall spirit of the Torah (Peninei Halakha: Women’s Prayer ch. 3 and 7:2).
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Laws of Kiddush / Zakhor and Shamor
  As we have seen above (1:8), there are two crucial mitzvot that form the backbone of Shabbat: Zakhor and Shamor. Shamor instructs us to refrain from all labor. In this way we clear space in our soul, which we are commanded to fill with positive content. This positive content is included in Zakhor, which instructs us to remember the holiness of Shabbat and use it to connect with the foundations of our faith. For six days we are active in the outside world; on Shabbat we return to our inner world, to our soul, and remind ourselves once again of the fundamentals of faith.
  The first fundamental that we recall during kiddush is the creation of the world, and the second is the Exodus from Egypt. There are some who concede that God created the world but do not believe that even following creation, God remains responsible for the ongoing existence of the world, which He supervises and manages. At the time of the Exodus, God’s divine providence was very clearly revealed, in a way that made it clear that God reveals Himself to the world by way of the Jewish people. This is the significance of the second foundational belief that we mention in kiddush.
  These two foundational beliefs are mentioned in the Torah’s two versions of the Ten Commandments. In Shemot we are commanded to remember the creation of the world: “Commemorate the day of Shabbat to sanctify it…. For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth and sea, and all that is in them, and He rested on the seventh day. Therefore the Lord blessed Shabbat day and hallowed it” (Shemot 20:8, 11). However, the mitzva is formulated with the word “shamor” in Devarim, and there the Exodus from Egypt is mentioned: “Observe the day of Shabbat to sanctify it…for you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and the Lord your God freed you from there with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm; therefore the Lord your God has commanded you to keep the day of Shabbat” (Devarim 5:12, 15). In truth, there is a connection between Shabbat and the Exodus from Egypt, for they both reveal the divine soul, which brings about our freedom from enslavement – whether to Egypt or to work.
  We fulfill the essence of Zakhor when we recite kiddush over wine, thereby sanctifying the whole day, as it is written: “Commemorate the day of Shabbat to sanctify it” (Shemot 20:8) – the entire day should be sanctified and set aside for reviewing foundational beliefs and studying Torah while eating pleasurable meals and sleeping soundly. Even during the week there is a mitzva to remember Shabbat and sanctify it, meaning it should be honored more than other days. One should prepare for it by making food, laundering, bathing, and cleaning one’s home (See Ramban, Shemot 20:7; above 2:1-6).
  Both men and women are obligated in the mitzvot of Shabbat. Although women are generally exempt from time-bound positive commandments, and Zakhor is such a mitzva, women are nevertheless obligated because Zakhor and Shamor were proclaimed together; they are intertwined. Just as women are obligated in the mitzvot derived from Shamor – the negative commandments, so too they are obligated in the mitzvot derived from Zakhor – the positive commandments.
  Therefore, men and women are equally obligated in Shabbat mitzvot, and a woman may recite kiddush for a man and exempt him from his obligation. But minors who have not yet reached bat or bar mitzva cannot exempt adults, because even children who are old enough to understand what Shabbat is about are still only obligated rabbinically in kiddush, whereas adults have a Torah obligation (SA 271:2).
  
  Section 2
  
  Laws of Kiddush / Fulfilling the Mitzva of Zakhor
  One fulfills the Torah obligation of Zakhor by invoking the sanctity of Shabbat and specifying that it commemorates the creation of the world and the Exodus from Egypt. However, the Sages wished for everyone to fulfill this mitzva using a precise and perfect text, so the Men of the Great Assembly formulated a berakha that declares the sanctity of Shabbat. To ensure that kiddush would be both dignified and pleasurable, they mandated that it be recited over a cup of wine prior to a meal. Some maintain that the Torah requires that kiddush be recited over enjoyable food or drink.1<i class="footnote">“Our Rabbis taught: ‘Commemorate the day of Shabbat to sanctify it’ (Shemot 20:8) means one should commemorate it over wine” (<em>Pesaḥim</em> 106a). According to Rambam (MT 29:6), Rabbeinu Tam, <em>Smag</em>, Rashba, and the vast majority of <em>poskim</em>, the mitzva to make <em>kiddush</em> over wine is rabbinic, and the verse is merely a support. However, according to Rashi and the Ran (commenting on Rif, <em>Shabbat</em> 10a), the mitzva to make <em>kiddush</em> over wine or bread is of Torah origin. The intent of the Torah is that one should remember Shabbat by means of something connected to Shabbat, which we are commanded to sanctify with food and drink. Raavan maintains that the Torah commandment is specifically wine.</i> It is customary to recite the additional verses of Va-yekhulu (Bereishit 2:1-3) before kiddush (see above 5:12).
  Many poskim maintain that Zakhor obligates us to mark the end of Shabbat as well as its beginning. With the onset of Shabbat, there is a mitzva to invoke its sanctity and essence, while when it ends there is a mitzva to identify the difference between the sacred Shabbat and the mundane weekdays. Therefore, according to many poskim, havdala, recited at the end of Shabbat, is a Torah obligation. Like kiddush, this Torah obligation can be fulfilled with words alone, while the Sages ordained that it be said over a cup of wine (Rambam; MB 296:1; see below 8:1).
  The Sages mandated that kiddush be recited on Shabbat day as well, to honor the day and differentiate it from weekdays. By beginning the meal with kiddush, we make it clear that this is a special and important meal; thus we are reminded of the sanctity of Shabbat. However, since this is not the primary fulfillment of Zakhor, the Sages did not formulate a special berakha in honor of Shabbat. Rather the berakha on wine (Ha-gafen) is recited over a cup of wine. The custom is to say a few Shabbat-related verses beforehand. This kiddush is referred to as “Kidusha Raba” (“The Great Kiddush”), which is a type of euphemism, as in fact it is the Friday night kiddush that is the important one (MB 289:3).
  Even though the meal eaten on Shabbat day is considered more important than the nighttime meal (as explained below, 7:4), the mitzva of Zakhor is nevertheless fulfilled though the kiddush at night, because the mitzva is to mark Shabbat as it begins. Thus, after one finishes praying, he should hasten to make kiddush (SA 271:1, 3). One who was unable to make kiddush Friday night has not lost out on the mitzva. Rather, he should make kiddush in the morning before eating his first meal. He should recite the Friday night kiddush but leave out the verses of Va-yekhulu, since they are specifically connected to the evening (SA and Rema 271:8). If he did not make kiddush before his meal in the morning, there is still a mitzva to make kiddush as long as the sun has not set. He should make sure to eat afterward (as will be explained below, section 10).
  Since according to Torah law one can verbally fulfill the obligation of Zakhor, some maintain that with the recitation of the middle berakha of the Amida at Ma’ariv (which invokes Shabbat), one has already fulfilled this obligation (MA). However, others question this, for two reasons. First, people do not generally intend to fulfill the mitzva of Zakhor with this prayer, and we maintain that mitzvot require intent (SA 60:4). Second, it is possible that one must mention in kiddush that Shabbat is a commemoration of the Egyptian Exodus. In the Amida, the Exodus is not juxtaposed with the sanctity of Shabbat. Therefore, in practice, we fulfill the Torah commandment in accordance with the Sages’ directives by making kiddush over wine (MB 271:2; BHL ad loc.). Furthermore, we have already seen that some authorities maintain that fulfilling the Torah obligation requires wine (see n. 1).
  
  Section 3
  
  Laws of Kiddush / Kiddush over Wine
  The Sages instituted the recitation of kiddush over wine because it is the most dignified beverage, as it provides both nourishment and good cheer. They similarly instituted that a berakha be recited over a cup of wine at other joyful mitzvot, such as betrothal, weddings (when seven blessings – Sheva Berakhot – are recited), and brit mila. The special status of wine is also expressed in the fact that a special berakha was instituted for it. Before drinking most beverages, we recite the general berakha of She-hakol, and after finishing the drink we recite the short berakha aḥarona, Borei Nefashot. When it comes to wine, however, we recite Ha-gafen before drinking and Al Ha-gefen afterward. Another law gives expression to the special status of wine. Although its berakha is different from that of other drinks, reciting Ha-gafen over wine exempts the person drinking from making berakhot over any other drinks.
  Ideally, in order to glorify the mitzva, kiddush should be made over a fine wine, one the person making kiddush really enjoys. If wine is unavailable, one should make kiddush over bread on Friday night and over an alcoholic beverage such as beer or vodka on Shabbat day. If no such drink is available, he may make kiddush over bread during the day as well.2<i class="footnote">The <em>poskim</em> disagree about whether one may make <em>kiddush</em> over <em>ḥamar medina</em><em>Ḥamar medina</em>, the “wine of the country,” is a respectable alcoholic beverage like liquor (see 8:4 below). According to Ri, when wine is unavailable one may make <em>kiddush</em> on <em>ḥamar medina</em>, while according to Rambam one should not. Similarly, there is a disagreement about using bread. Most <em>poskim</em> maintain that in the absence of wine one may make <em>kiddush</em> over bread, since, as the backbone of the meal, it is connected to the <em>mitzvot</em> of Shabbat. However, according to Rabbeinu Tam, even if there is no wine, one may not make <em>kiddush</em> over bread. The ruling of SA 272:9 (based on Rosh) is that one who has no wine should make <em>kiddush</em> on Friday night over bread, following the majority of <em>poskim</em>. However, on Shabbat morning, it is preferable to make <em>kiddush</em> over beer. Since there is no special <em>berakha</em> for the daytime <em>kiddush</em>, if one makes <em>kiddush</em> over bread it will not be clear that he is making <em>kiddush</em> at all, since he may well eat bread every day. Therefore it is better to use beer, and to recite “<em>ha-motzi</em>” over the bread afterward. In Europe, where wine was very expensive, many were lenient and made <em>kiddush</em> by day over beer. Only for the Torah-based <em>kiddush</em> of Friday night did they insist upon using wine (MB 272:29). Nowadays, however, when wine is readily available, one must make <em>kiddush</em> on wine both by night and by day. If one does make <em>kiddush</em> over bread, he must eat one olive’s bulk (<em>kezayit</em>) as part of <em>kiddush</em> and another <em>kezayit</em> as part of the meal (SSK 54:21).</i>
  The recitation of kiddush over wine has profound significance. Generally, holiness comes to expression in the spiritual world in a somber and serious fashion, while in the material world, the evil inclinations toward lust, arrogance, and mockery are more evident. Therefore, gentile spiritual leaders often distance themselves from joy and jubilation, as they are likely to entice one toward despicable physical desires. This is not the case for Jews. We sanctify Shabbat with wine to express the holiness of Shabbat, which reveals itself in both the spiritual and material worlds. Joy and jubilation, when properly directed, can be our true partners in revealing holiness in the world. This is the point of Shabbat – to reveal holiness through Torah study as well as festive meals, through prayer as well as kiddush over wine. This accords with the statement of the Sages: “One who recites kiddush over wine on Friday night is granted long life in this world and in the World to Come” (Pirkei De-Rabbi Eliezer 19).
  
  Section 4
  
  Laws of Kiddush / Acceptable Kiddush Wines
  The laws of acceptable kiddush wines are derived from the laws governing which wines could be used on the altar in Temple times. Any wine that was deemed unacceptable because of its repulsiveness is also pasul (ritually unfit) for kiddush. For example, wine that was left exposed for several hours in a cup or an open bottle may not be used for kiddush. Similarly, wine that smells bad is unacceptable (SA 272:1; MB ad loc. 3).
  However, wines acceptable only be-di’avad for use on the altar are acceptable for kiddush even le-khatḥila. For example, a very sweet wine, made from overripe grapes overexposed to sunlight, is acceptable on the altar be-di’avad but acceptable for kiddush even le-khatḥila. Similarly, using grape juice on the altar was deemed acceptable be-di’avad but may be used for kiddush le-khatḥila. Nevertheless, it is most preferable to make kiddush on good alcoholic wine that makes one glad (SA 272:2; MB ad loc. 5).
  Some wines have been rendered unfit for the altar because they have been mixed with other liquids, but are still acceptable for kiddush. For example, wine mixed with water is pasul for the altar, but not for kiddush. On the contrary, it is good to dilute the wine a bit to make it tastier, and to dull its strength. Nowadays, however, wines do not need to be watered down, because they are not strong to begin with (SA and Rema 272:5).
  Some maintain that if wine is so watered down that there is more water than wine, it is not considered wine, the berakha recited over it is not Ha-gafen, and it is unacceptable for kiddush. Others are more lenient and permit its use as long as it still tastes like wine. Local Israeli rabbinates make sure to only certify wines in which wine content is the majority, thus satisfying all opinions.3<i class="footnote">. There is a dispute in the Gemara about the degree to which wine could be watered down and still retain its classification as wine. Some maintain that if the wine is one quarter of the mixture, it is still considered wine. This is how <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 204:31 understands SA. According to Rema, as long as the wine is more than one seventh of the mixture, it is considered wine (204:5). However, SA points out that our wines are not as strong as their wines, and thus the applicable proportions are different. <em>Pri Megadim </em>and other Aḥaronim explained that only if the majority of the liquid is wine is it considered wine. Sephardim and many Ashkenazim follow this opinion. Other <em>poskim</em> maintain that as long as the liquid tastes like wine and is more than one seventh wine, it is deemed to be wine. This was the ruling followed by the <em>Badatz</em> of the <em>Eda Ḥaredit</em> (<em>Piskei Teshuvot</em> 204:8), which was opposed by several leading <em>poskim</em> (<em>Ḥazon Ovadia</em> 6:2). Thus, the Israeli Chief Rabbinate gives supervision to a wine only when the majority of the liquid is wine.</i>
  Wine that was cooked (“mevushal”) or had sugar or honey added to it was rendered unacceptable for Temple libations because it had been altered from its original form. Some maintain that just as these wines were unacceptable for libations, so too they are unacceptable for kiddush (Rambam). But the majority of poskim maintain that these wines are acceptable for kiddush because cooking them or adding sugar to them is meant to improve them, and this is the accepted practice. Even if one has unadulterated wine but prefers the taste of the cooked or sweetened wine, it is preferable to make kiddush over the wine he prefers (SA and Rema 272:8). Many choice sweet wines have no sugar added, but rather are sweet because of the type of grape used to make them. Everyone agrees that these wines are acceptable for kiddush use.4<i class="footnote">According to Rambam (MT 29:14), wine that has been cooked or has had sugar or the like added to it is unfit for <em>kiddush</em> use. This is also the opinion of a number of the Ge’onim. But <em>Tosafot</em>, Rosh, Ran, Ramban, and Rashba maintain that it may be used, and SA also inclines this way. Rema and MB 272:23 state that if the cooked or sweetened wine is tastier, it is preferable to make <em>kiddush</em> over it. Some take the more stringent opinion into account and therefore prefer to make <em>kiddush</em> over wine that has not been cooked or sweetened (<em>Kitzur </em>SA 77:6; <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 272:44).Nowadays most wines are pasteurized, meaning they are cooked at low temperatures (80-85º C, 176-185º F) in order to get rid of bacteria. It is unclear whether pasteurization is considered cooking or not, with ramifications for two issues: 1) May one use it for kiddush even according to those who prohibit mevushal wine? 2) If an idol-worshiping non-Jew touches this wine, what is its status? If it is considered mevushal, then this touch would not prohibit it, since the prohibition of yein nesekh (wine touched by an idol-worshiping non-Jew) does not apply to mevushal wine. Igrot Moshe YD 3:31 states that such wine is considered mevushal (as does Yalkut Yosef 272:10). However, Minḥat Shlomo 1:25 states that it is considered mevushal only if its taste, smell, or appearance undergoes a change; rather, pasteurization to eliminate bacteria does not give the wine the status of mevushal. In practice, one may make kiddush over pasteurized wine even le-khatḥila. In terms of the touch of a non-Jew, be-di’avad one may be lenient, because the prohibition of drinking wine touched by a non-Jew is rabbinic, and in a case of an uncertainty regarding a rabbinic law one may be lenient. One may certainly be lenient in the case of wine touched by a Shabbat-desecrating Jew. Moreover, if such a Jew regularly makes kiddush, many of those who are stringent accede to the lenient opinion, even if the wine has not been pasteurized (see above 1:14).</i>
  Some maintain that only red wine is acceptable for kiddush use, while white wine is unfit (Ramban). However, most poskim maintain that white wine may be used, and this is the position of Shulḥan Arukh (272:4). If one has two wines available to him – an inferior red and a superior white – and he wishes to conform to all the positions, he should mix the white wine with a little of the red, which will leave him with tasty red wine (it is preferable to pour the white wine into the red, as explained below, 12:10).
  
  Section 5
  
  Laws of Kiddush / The Required Amount of Wine
  In order to fulfill the mitzva of kiddush there must be enough wine in the cup to be considered significant, so that the berakha is recited over something. This amount is the volume of an egg and a half (one fourth [revi’it] of a log, commonly referred to simply as a revi’it), which is the minimum amount that must be present in any cup being used to fulfill a mitzva (kos shel berakha). If less than this amount is used, the mitzva has not been fulfilled (Shabbat 76b; Pesaḥim 107a, 108b; MA 271:32).
  For many years it was assumed that the egg and a half that Rambam mentions was the equivalent of 86 ml, based on the opinion of R. Ḥayim Naeh. However, more precise calculations show that the amount is really 75 ml. Some are stringent and maintain that the eggs nowadays are only half the size that they once were, so that the amount of wine in the cup must be doubled to 150 ml. (Ḥazon Ish). In practice, the bottom line is that one may make kiddush over 75 ml of wine, but many Ashkenazim are stringent le-khatḥila to use 150 ml.5<i class="footnote">. See <em>Peninei Halakha:</em> <em>Berakhot </em>10:11 or <em>Harḥavot</em> here. In brief, a mistake was made when R. Ḥayim Naeh calculated the amount according to Rambam. The measurement of a dirhem (drachma) in use in Rambam’s age was a bit smaller than the Turkish dirhem that R. Naeh used in his calculation. Accordingly, Rambam and those who follow him maintain that an egg and a half (which corresponds to a <em>revi’it</em>) is 75 ml. Thus writes R. Beinish (<em>Midot Ve-shi’urei Torah</em> 30:5; 16:6); R. Ovadia Yosef agrees. (Early Ashkenazic custom was to consider an egg’s bulk to be 46 ml and a <em>revi’it</em> to be 69.) However, <em>Noda Bi-Yehuda</em> states that eggs are only half the size they once were. <em>Ḥazon Ish</em> adopts this approach, calculating accordingly that an egg and a half is about 150 ml. MB states that when the mitzva concerned is rooted in the Torah, such as <em>kiddush</em> on Friday night, it is preferable to be stringent and follow <em>Noda Bi-Yehuda</em>. However for rabbinic <em>mitzvot</em> such as the four cups at the Seder and the requirement to make a <em>berakha aḥarona</em>, one need not follow the double <em>shi’ur</em> even <em>le-khatḥila</em>. This is also explained in <em>Peninei Halakha: Pesaḥ</em> 16:8; 16:23 and n. 20 <em>ad loc</em>.</i>
  After making kiddush, one must drink a “melo lugmav” – the amount of wine that could fill the drinker’s cheek if he puffed it out – considered the smallest amount that has a relaxing effect on the drinker. This corresponds to the majority of a revi’it, or at least 38 ml, but one with a bigger mouth must drink more. For most people this amount will be between 50 and 55 ml, but nobody, even a giant, must drink more than a revi’it.
  If the person making kiddush is unable to drink a melo lugmav, one of the listeners can do so instead. Be-di’avad, if a cheek full is drunk collectively, all have fulfilled their obligation, even though no individual drank a cheek full (Pesaḥim 107a; SA 271:14; MB ad loc. 73).6<i class="footnote">If the person making <em>kiddush</em> drinks less than a <em>melo lugmav</em>, and everyone collectively drinks less than a <em>melo lugmav</em>, they have not fulfilled the mitzva as instituted. According to MA 271:32, they did not fulfill it at all, and the one who made <em>kiddush</em> must continue to drink until he reaches a cheek full. If he had already become distracted, he must make another <em>berakha</em> over the wine. If he got up and went somewhere else, he must make <em>kiddush</em> again. However, according to some <em>poskim</em>, even though he did not fulfill the mitzva of <em>kiddush </em>properly, he nevertheless fulfilled it <em>be-di’avad</em>, since he did make <em>kiddush</em> over a cup of wine. This is the opinion of <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 271:82 and <em>Or</em> <em>Le-Tziyon</em>, 2:20:7. See SSK 48:9 and n. 57. Since one is in doubt about the law, one who did not drink a <em>melo lugmav</em> may not say <em>kiddush</em> again, but should try to hear <em>kiddush</em> recited by someone else.</i>
  
  Section 6
  
  Laws of Kiddush / The Laws of Kos Shel Berakha
  The Sages ordained that a number of berakhot be recited over a kos (goblet) of wine, such as the berakha over betrothal, marriage, Birkat Ha-mazon (Grace after Meals), kiddush, and havdala. Since these berakhot are made over a kos to glorify God, it is proper that the kos be pretty and elegant. The Sages established the following rules about it.
  The kos must be whole, without defects or breaks on the rim or the base. If the kos is not whole, but no other kos is available, one may still use it be-di’avad. However, if it is cracked to the point that the wine leaks out, leaving less than a revi’it, it may not be used.
  If there are several available cups, one should pick out the nicest one to use for the berakha. Many use a silver goblet for kiddush. If the only kos available is a plastic disposable one, it may be used be-di’avad.7<i class="footnote">. According to <em>Igrot Moshe</em> OḤ 3:39, a disposable cup is not considered dignified. It is therefore intrinsically inferior and should not be used for <em>kiddush</em>. However, if there is no other cup available, it is possible that one can be lenient. <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> states that a cup that is meant to be thrown out after one use is not considered a <em>kli</em> (utensil) at all, and therefore may not be used for <em>kiddush</em> or <em>netilat yadayim</em> (ritual hand-washing). If there is no alternative, one should resolve to use the cup multiple times. This gives it the status of a <em>kli</em> (10:23). In contrast, <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 12:23 and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 271:41 state that disposable cups may be used for <em>kiddush</em> and <em>netilat yadayim</em> because they are fundamentally reusable. The only reason that people prefer to throw them out rather than wash them is because the cups are cheap. Moreover, they are considered dignified, as people use them when honoring important people. SSK 47:11 also agrees that one may be lenient <em>be-di’avad</em>. One who does not even have a disposable cup available may make <em>kiddush</em> over the wine in the bottle.</i>
  The kos must be totally clean. If it was drunk from or otherwise got dirty, it must be washed inside and out (SA 183:1). Be-di’avad, if it is difficult to wash the kos, one may wipe it out and clean it using a napkin (MB ad loc. 1).
  Although a kos that holds a revi’it is sufficient, if a larger cup is used, there is a mitzva to fill it up all the way since it is more dignified for the berakha to be made over a full cup. Some are accustomed to fill the kos to overflowing, to the point that whoever is making kiddush will probably spill wine on his hand. It would seem preferable to fill the kos close to the top but not to overflowing, so that the wine does not spill. This is what the Sages meant when they spoke of a full kos (Taz 183:4; SAH 4; MB 183:9; proof of this is the explanation given of Beit Hillel’s opinion in Berakhot 52b).
  If one drank from the wine while it was in the kos or directly from the wine bottle, the wine remaining in the kos or bottle is called pagum (defective) and considered unfit for sacramental purposes. When necessary, one can fix pagum wine by adding non-defective wine to it. Once the additional wine is added, all the wine is considered new. If the wine is strong, one can fix it by adding water instead. Be-di’avad, if there is no way to fix the wine, one may make kiddush on pagum wine (SA 182:3-7).8<i class="footnote">. Drinking wine directly from a cup renders it <em>pagum</em>, but pouring wine from a bottle or a cup does not. Most <em>poskim</em> say that the way to fix <em>pagum</em> wine is to pour a little non-<em>pagum</em> wine into the <em>pagum</em> wine. However, Maharam of Rothenburg maintains that one can fix the <em>pagum</em> wine only if he pours it into a larger quantity of non-<em>pagum</em> wine. Ideally, this opinion should be taken into consideration, but if one does so without modification, according to most <em>poskim</em> he has now made all the wine <em>pagum</em>. Therefore, he should first pour a little wine from the bottle into the <em>kos</em> that contains the <em>pagum</em> wine. That fixes the wine according to the majority of <em>poskim</em>. Afterward one should pour the contents of the cup into the bottle, thus fixing it according to Maharam as well (see MB 182:27; SHT 23-24). It seems that in a place where it would be considered impolite to pour wine back into the bottle, it is best to follow the majority of <em>poskim</em> and simply fix the wine by adding a bit more to what is in the cup.</i>
  The Sages stated that one should first take the kos in both hands in order to show how dear it is. Then, when making kiddush, one should hold the kos in the right hand, which is the more important one. He should hold the kos with all his fingers so that they cradle the cup. He should lift the kos a tefaḥ above the table, so that it is visible to all. He should look at the kos so that he is not distracted. If he needs to, he should look in a prayer book, but it is best to place it adjacent to the kos so that he sees both. After he drinks from the wine he should give some to his wife so that the blessing spreads to both of them (SA 183:4).9<i class="footnote">“There are ten things said about a <em>kos shel berakha</em>: it must be rinsed and washed, undiluted and full; it requires crowning and wrapping; it must be taken up with both hands and placed in the right hand; it must be raised a <em>tefaḥ </em>from the surface; and he lays his eyes upon it. Some add that he must send it around to the members of his household (i.e., his wife). R. Yoḥanan said: ‘We only know of four: rinsing, washing, undiluted, and full’” (<em>Berakhot</em> 51a). Rambam quotes only the four rules mentioned by R. Yoḥanan. However, this is problematic since R. Yoḥanan himself raises the question as to whether the left hand can assist the right, which evidently means that he considers it a relevant issue as well, even though it is not one of the four things explicitly attributed to him. The Ge’onim record all ten criteria as law, while Rosh leaves out only crowning and wrapping. Talmidei Rabbeinu Yona record five as binding – the first four in the list, plus taking the <em>kos</em> in the right hand. The rest are not obligatory. The Vilna Ga’on explains that the four things mentioned by R. Yoḥanan are mandatory while the rest of the list are a non-obligatory mitzva (183:7). This is also the ruling of MB 183:20. Therefore, if one holds the cup in his left hand, he fulfills his obligation. It would seem that <em>be-di’avad</em>, even if he does not hold the cup at all, but simply has it in front of him while he makes <em>kiddush</em>, he fulfills his obligation (MB 182:15). There are varying customs for left-handed individuals. The mainstream <em>poskim</em> maintain that he should take the cup in his left hand, which is his stronger hand (MB 183:20). However, according to Kabbala, he should use his right hand; many follow this opinion (<em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 183:29, <em>Piskei Teshuvot</em> 183:10).There is further debate about the ideal way to hold the cup. Shlah, quoted by MB 183:15, states that based on Kabbala one should rest the cup in the palm of the right hand, with the fingers standing erect around the cup. Kaf Ha-ḥayim states that he should first straighten his fingers and then place the cup at the middle of their length. MA 183:6 states that it is possible to understand the kabbalists as saying that one should place his fingers around the cup the way he normally does. See Peninei Halakha: Berakhot ch. 5 n. 22 and Harḥavot here.</i>
  
  Section 7
  
  Laws of Kiddush / Distributing Wine to All Present
  In order to fulfill the mitzva of kiddush, a melo lugmav of wine must be drunk by the person making kiddush or a member of his audience (as explained in section 5 of this chapter). The rest of the listeners thus fulfill their obligation in kiddush even if they do not partake of the wine. Ideally, each listener should drink from the kiddush wine (SA 271:14).
  If the person who made kiddush drank directly from the kos, he should not then pour from this kos into cups for the listeners, since the wine is now pagum (as we learned in section 6). However, as long as family members are drinking directly from the kiddush cup they are not considered drinking pagum wine, because their drinking is considered an extension of the original drinking. It is only when the wine is poured into a different cup that it is considered pagum (SHT 271:89; MB 182:24).
  Thus, one who wishes to pour the kiddush wine into the cups of his audience should first add a little wine from the bottle to the kos. This fixes the cup’s wine, and it may then be poured for the other people present (SA 182:6; MB 271:82; SHT 271:89). Another solution is for the person making kiddush to pour a melo lugmav from the kiddush cup into his own cup, and drink the wine from there. This way the wine in the kiddush cup is not pagum, and he may pour from it into the cups of the listeners. It is often necessary to add wine to the kiddush cup so that everyone who listened to kiddush can have a taste.
  There is another method: Before making kiddush, a little wine can be poured into the cups of all present. After hearing kiddush they can drink this wine. In this case, the person making kiddush need not pour wine for them from his kos at all, since the wine before them at the time of kiddush is considered kiddush wine. There are two advantages to this: 1) The audience’s time lag between making the berakha and drinking the wine is shortened. 2) There is no issue of pagum at all. This is particularly suitable for a large audience and for guests who may feel uncomfortable drinking wine poured from the cup that the person making kiddush drank from (SA 271:16-17; MB 83). If the listeners do not have a revi’it of wine in their cups, they should not drink until after the person making kiddush drinks (SSK ch. 48 n. 74).
  Even if the listeners do not plan to drink from the wine, they should still remain silent until the one making kiddush has drunk a melo lugmav. Be-di’avad, if they spoke before he drank, they have still fulfilled their obligation (SSK 48:6). If they wish to drink the wine, they should remain silent until after drinking.10<i class="footnote">If one heard <em>kiddush</em> or <em>havdala</em> but did not hear the <em>berakha</em> of <em>Ha-gafen</em>, he has fulfilled his obligation, because only the person making <em>kiddush</em> must have wine in front of him. Those listening fulfill their obligation even if they did not hear the <em>berakha</em> over the wine (SSK 47:40). However, if they wish to drink from the wine, they must recite <em>Ha-gafen</em> themselves.If, after hearing <em>kiddush</em> but before drinking, one of the listeners spoke about something unrelated to <em>kiddush</em> or the meal, than he must recite <em>Ha-gafen</em> himself before he drinks (<em>Beit Yosef</em>; MA; <em>Taz</em>; MB 167:43; SSK 48:6). However, according to Rema and <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, if the one who made <em>kiddush</em> has already drunk from the wine, then the listener does not need to make another <em>berakha</em>. There is a disagreement among the <em>poskim</em> in the case where the person who made <em>kiddush</em> spoke before drinking, and those listening did not speak. In practice, since whenever we are in doubt about a <em>berakha</em> we are lenient, the listeners in this case drink but must not make a new <em>berakha</em>. See <em>Harḥavot</em> and <em>Peninei Halakha: Berakhot</em> 3:4 and n. 4.</i>
  
  Section 8
  
  Laws of Kiddush / Kiddush Customs and Covering the Challah
  There is a widespread custom to stand during the Friday night kiddush because it attests to the creation of the world, and witnesses must stand when giving testimony. The Arizal, basing himself on mystical considerations, also recommends standing; this is the custom of Sephardim and Ashkenazic Ḥasidim (SA 271:10; Kaf Ha-ḥayim 62). However, most Ashkenazic Jews sit during kiddush since it is supposed to be recited where one will be eating (see section 10 below), and meals are eaten sitting down. Additionally, sitting down together makes the audience and the person making kiddush into a clearly-defined group. There are some Ashkenazim who try to get the best of both worlds by standing during the recitation of Va-yekhulu and sitting down for the rest of kiddush (MB 271:46; SSK 47:28).
  All agree that it is preferable to sit for kiddush during the day, and this is the common practice. Nevertheless, some are accustomed to stand, and this is not prohibited.
  Even though a woman may make kiddush like a man, it is customary for the man to make kiddush for his family. When multiple families are eating together it is preferable that one person make kiddush for everyone, based on the principle that “In a multitude of people, the King is glorified” (SA 167:11).
  It is customary to cover the challah during kiddush. Since bread is considered the more important food, normally if we have both wine and bread in front of us and we plan to eat from both, we recite the berakha on the bread first. But when making kiddush, the berakha on the wine must be made first. In order to avoid giving “incorrect” precedence to the wine, we cover the challah. Similarly, if there are mezonot (grain-based foods over which the berakha of Mezonot is recited), they should be covered during kiddush, as mezonot also normally take precedence over wine. When one is organizing a kiddush for the congregation after services, anyone intending to drink from the kiddush wine must cover any pastries in front of him. One who does not intend to drink from the wine after kiddush need not do so (See SSK ch. 47 n. 125). Based on this explanation, it is not necessary to have the challah on the table when one is making kiddush. If they are on the table, however, they must be covered.
  Others provide an additional reason for covering the challah. The two Shabbat challahs allude to the manna that fell during desert times. The manna was covered above and below by layers of dew. To parallel this, the challah is placed above the tablecloth and covered. Accordingly, some people are careful to put the covered challah on the table before kiddush, as a reminder of the manna. Some leave the challah covered until after the recitation of “ha-motzi.” Some even cover the challah at se’uda shlishit for this reason (MB 271:41; AHS 271:22).
  
  Section 9
  
  Laws of Kiddush / The Prohibition of Eating and Drinking before Kiddush
  Once Shabbat has begun, it is a mitzva to fulfill the Torah mandate of Zakhor as soon as possible by making kiddush. The Sages ordained that nothing should be eaten before kiddush. One may not even drink water before kiddush, but one may rinse his mouth out or swallow medicine (SA 271:4; MB 271:13; SSK 52:3).11<i class="footnote">. This all pertains to one who has wine or bread to use for <em>kiddush</em>, but one who has neither bread nor wine on Friday night may eat even without making <em>kiddush</em>. He should recite <em>kiddush</em> in order to fulfill the Torah mandate of <em>Zakhor</em> and simply omit the concluding <em>berakha</em> of “<em>Mekadesh Ha-Shabbat</em>.” If he expects that wine will arrive before midnight, he should wait and make <em>kiddush</em> then. But if it is difficult for him to wait, he may eat and then make <em>kiddush </em>later on, when the wine arrives, and then eat a <em>kezayit</em> of bread or <em>mezonot</em> (MB 289:10).</i>
  This prohibition goes into effect from the moment Shabbat begins. Therefore, a woman who lights candles and accepts Shabbat may not drink until she hears kiddush. Similarly, a man who has accepted tosefet Shabbat may not eat or drink until he hears kiddush. Even one who has not fulfilled the mitzva of tosefet Shabbat may not eat after shki’a, because Shabbat begins then whether or not one consciously accepts it (MB 271:11; see SSK 43:46).
  On Shabbat day as well, after Shaḥarit it is forbidden to eat or drink until one hears kiddush.
  Some wish to eat and drink before Shaḥarit, but, as is generally known, this is forbidden. The Sages tell us: “If one eats and drinks, and only afterward prays, Scripture says of him: ‘You have cast Me behind your back [Hebrew “gavekha”]’ (1 Melakhim 14:9). Do not read gavekha (your back), but rather ge’ekha (your pride). God says: ‘After this one has exalted himself, he comes and accepts the kingdom of heaven?!’” (Berakhot 10b). However one may drink water before praying because there is no pride in drinking water. The poskim also teach that if one needs to he may also drink coffee or tea; and if he must, he may even sweeten it with a bit of sugar (SA 89:3-4).
  If one is sick and must eat before praying, or is so hungry that he knows he will not be able to focus on his prayers if he does not eat something before praying, he may eat a little (see Peninei Halakha: Prayer 12:6-7). Although some maintain that he should make kiddush before eating, in practice we do not make kiddush before prayer, because the custom follows the opinion that it is only after Shaḥarit that the obligation of kiddush comes into effect.12<i class="footnote">. According to BHL §289, one who eats before praying must make <em>kiddush</em> then, since his eating counts as a type of meal that obligates him in <em>kiddush</em>. This is also the position of <em>Igrot Moshe</em> OḤ 2:28 and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 289:5. But if he only drinks before praying, he does not need to make <em>kiddush</em>. In contrast, <em>Responsa</em> <em>Keren Le-David</em> §84, <em>Ḥelkat Yaakov</em> 4:32, and other Aḥaronim state that even if one eats he does not need to make <em>kiddush</em>, because the obligation to make <em>kiddush</em> goes into effect only after praying. This is because <em>kiddush</em> was ordained for when one is having his meal, as the verse states: “Call Shabbat ‘delight.’” However, one who eats before prayer is doing so because of a lack of choice, for his health and not for delight, so <em>kiddush</em> is not relevant then. This is indeed the custom.</i>
  A woman who generally prays Shaḥarit may drink before praying, and, if need be, even eat (as may a man), for as long as she has not prayed, she is not yet obligated in kiddush. But a woman who generally only prays Birkhot Ha-shaḥar is obligated in kiddush immediately upon awakening. If she wishes to eat or drink, she should first say Birkhot Ha-shaḥar and then make kiddush and eat and drink. In a case of necessity, such as if she does not know how to make kiddush and is very thirsty, she may drink, and – if really necessary – even eat (Peninei Halakha: Women’s Prayer 22:10).13<i class="footnote">According to Ramban, women are obligated to pray <em>Shaḥarit</em> and <em>Minḥa</em>, while Rambam maintains that they are obligated in only one prayer daily. MA understands Rambam’s position to be that there is no need for a woman to recite the <em>Amida</em>, but rather any prayer that she recites fulfills her obligation. Accordingly, if she recites <em>Birkhot Ha-shaḥar</em> she has fulfilled her obligation, as those <em>berakhot</em> are considered prayers (as explained in MB 106:4 and <em>Peninei Halakha</em>: <em>Women’s Prayer</em> 2:2-5). The point at which the <em>kiddush</em> obligation goes into effect is dependent on each woman’s personal habits. If she generally prays the<em> Amida</em>, then the laws pertaining to her are the same as those pertaining to a man. If she needs to eat or drink before praying, she does not need to make <em>kiddush</em>. Even if she is accustomed to praying the<em> Amida</em> on Shabbat only, she may say <em>Birkhot Ha-shaḥar</em> while intending not to fulfill her prayer obligation, and then eat and drink before praying without making <em>kiddush</em> first. This is the ruling of SSK 52:13 and n. 44.However, if a woman does not generally pray the Amida, she is obligated in kiddush from the moment she wakes up on Shabbat. In a difficult situation such as if she does not know how to make kiddush, she may be lenient, since according to Maharam Ḥalawa a woman is exempt from kiddush during the day. Additionally, Raavad and those following his approach maintain that it is not prohibited to eat before the daytime kiddush. Furthermore, some understand Rambam’s view to permit drinking water before kiddush, even though it is generally forbidden to eat and drink before kiddush. Therefore, in a case of necessity a woman may drink before kiddush, and if necessary she may even eat. Minḥat Yitzḥak 4:28:3 takes this approach, as do SSK 52:13 and Yalkut Yosef 289:6.Igrot Moshe OḤ 4:101:2 puts forth the novel position that there is a special law pertaining to a married woman. Since she needs to eat with her husband, her obligation in kiddush follows his. Thus as long as he has not yet finished his prayers, she may still eat and drink, as she is not yet obligated in kiddush. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach discusses the opinion of Igrot Moshe and concludes: “This requires further clarification” (SSK, loc. cit. n. 46). In cases of necessity, one may rely on Igrot Moshe. Similarly, if a husband went to an early minyan, and upon his return home wants to make kiddush and eat with his wife, then even though she plans to attend the synagogue later for Shaḥarit, she may make kiddush with him, since the proper halakhic family dynamics dictate that a wife eat with her husband. She should be careful, though, to say Birkhot Ha-shaḥar and Birkhot Ha-Torah first, as I wrote in Peninei Halakha: Women’s Prayer 22:10.</i>
  If minors are old enough to be taught, ideally they should be trained not to eat before kiddush, but if they are hungry or thirsty one may feed them before kiddush (SSK 52:18; Yalkut Yosef 271:17).
  
  Section 10
  
  Laws of Kiddush / Reciting Kiddush at the Place of the Meal
  The Sages ordained that kiddush be made at the place of the meal (“be-makom se’uda”), for Scripture states: “Call Shabbat ‘delight’” (Yeshayahu 58:13), teaching us that specifically where one delights in Shabbat with bread or pastries he must proclaim Shabbat, i.e., make kiddush. This allows us to reveal the special nature of Shabbat, whose meals are a direct continuation of the mitzva of Zakhor. The proclamation of holiness and the delight with meals complement each other. If one did not eat where he made kiddush, he did not fulfill the mitzva, and he must make kiddush again where he eats. This law applies equally to kiddush by day and by night.
  There were some Torah giants who were personally stringent, and insisted on eating their actual Shabbat meal where they made kiddush. This was the custom of the Vilna Gaon. However, the law requires only that one eat a kezayit of bread or mezonot where one makes kiddush. This is sufficient to fulfill the obligation of kiddush. Afterward, one may eat the meal elsewhere. According to the Ge’onim, if there is no mezonot food where one is making kiddush, he may drink a revi’it of wine instead, since wine is also nutritious and filling. If necessary, one may rely upon them. However, at night when the obligation of kiddush is of Torah origin, the person making kiddush should be careful to drink a revi’it in addition to the melo lugmav that he must drink to fulfill the obligation of kiddush. The rest of the listeners need only drink a revi’it (SA 273:5; MB 273:25, 27; SHT 29).
  However, if one heard kiddush at the synagogue but only drank a bit of juice and had less than a kezayit of mezonot, he has not fulfilled his obligation of kiddush. Not only that, but he has transgressed the rabbinic prohibition against eating and drinking before kiddush; for since he did not fulfill his obligation, it turns out that he ate and drank before kiddush.
  The Rishonim discuss three different parameters for how far away one may go and still be considered eating “at the place of the meal”:1) Anywhere within the same room is acceptable, even if one place is not visible to another in the same room (Rambam; Tosafot; Rosh).2) As long as the person making kiddush can see the place where the meal will be eaten, even if that place is in a different home or yard, it is acceptable (R. Sar Shalom).3) If, while making kiddush, the person had in mind to move to another room in the same building, it is acceptable (R. Nissim Gaon).
  Ideally, one should make kiddush at the actual place of the meal. When this is difficult, one may make kiddush anywhere that two of the three criteria mentioned above are met. For example, if one needs to eat in a different room, it is preferable that he have that in mind during kiddush, and that he make kiddush from a vantage point where he can see the place where he is planning to eat. If there is really no choice, one can rely on any one of the three criteria being met (SA 273:1; MB and SHT ad loc.).
  Ideally, one should not wait between making kiddush and eating. Similarly, one should not go somewhere after kiddush before eating, even if he intends to return and eat where he made kiddush. Be-di’avad, if he waited for a short time or left briefly, his kiddush still counts. However, if he waited more than 72 minutes and intended to separate kiddush and the meal, then he has “lost” his kiddush and he must make it again (Rema 273:3; MB ad loc. 12; BHL s.v. “le-altar”; Kaf Ha-ḥayim ad loc. 29; Tzitz Eliezer 11:26; Yalkut Yosef 273:15; SSK 54, nn. 46-47).
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Shabbat Meals and Melaveh Malka / The Mitzva of Se’udot Shabbat (Festive Shabbat Meals)
  The Sages state: “One who eats three festive meals on Shabbat is spared from three misfortunes: the birth-pangs of the Messiah, condemnation to hell, and Armageddon” (Shabbat 118a). The Sages also state: “Whoever delights in Shabbat is spared from imperial subjugation” (ibid. 118b). Informing these statements is the idea that without Shabbat we would become totally subjugated to the material burden of this world. We would work nonstop in order to sustain our bodies and provide them with pleasure; we would forget our divine souls and find it difficult to elevate ourselves toward divine ideals. Our spiritual inclinations would be suppressed and silenced, and we would consequently sink into all the world’s faults and perversions, which are the cause of all calamity. But when one is privileged to connect to Shabbat with all his being, spiritual and material, through Torah study and prayer as well as rest and pleasure, he transcends the world’s flaws and reaches the eternally good world. Thus he is automatically saved from the calamities of this world.
  This coarse material world is full of barriers that prevent the divine light from being revealed, and the soul from actualizing itself. But one who enjoys Shabbat through Torah, prayer, and good food connects his body with its spiritual roots. The physical becomes a vehicle of expression for the soul and for the sanctity of Shabbat. Then the limitations and impediments of this material world cease to exist, and the heart is made whole. This fulfills the words of the Sages: “Whoever enjoys Shabbat is given everything his heart desires” (Shabbat 118b).
  By cleaning our houses and eating festive meals in honor of Shabbat, we link the material world to its spiritual roots, and draw down blessing upon it. This is the meaning of the statement of the Sages: “One who honors Shabbat merits wealth” (Shabbat 119a). They similarly state: “Whoever makes Shabbat enjoyable receives boundless territory” (ibid. 118a), as the biblical text states:If you refrain from trampling the Shabbat, from pursuing your affairs on My holy day; if you call Shabbat “delight,” the Lord’s holy [day] “honored”…. Then you will seek the Lord’s delight. I will set you astride the heights of the earth, and let you enjoy the heritage of your father Yaakov – for the mouth of the Lord has spoken. (Yeshayahu 58:13-14)Yaakov’s heritage is boundless.
  At first glance it would seem very easy to enjoy Shabbat with good food. Why then did the Sages talk at such length about the great reward for doing this? Doesn’t everyone like to eat and enjoy? What must be kept in mind is that the mitzva is to take pleasure in Shabbat – not in the palate or the gut. In other words, we must enjoy the meals while recognizing that they serve to express the sanctity of Shabbat. The meals should leave one with a greater desire to learn more Torah and do more mitzvot. If one is privileged to enjoy Shabbat, and joins the pleasure of the body with the exaltation of the soul, he merits holiness and blessing both in this world and in the World to Come.
  Though Shabbat and Yom Tov are similar, there is also a difference between them. The mitzva of Shabbat is oneg (pleasure, delight) while the mitzva of Yom Tov is simḥa (joy). The difference is that simḥa is conspicuous and visible to others. Thus it is a mitzva on Yom Tov to eat meat and to drink more wine than usual. However, oneg is more internal, subtle, and refined. Thus the mitzva of eating on Shabbat is also more refined. One who does not really enjoy meat and wine can enjoy other foods instead. Perhaps this is why fish is a typical Shabbat food; its taste is refined and subtle.1<i class="footnote">The element of <em>oneg</em> that pertains to Shabbat is explained in Yeshayahu 58:13, <em>Shabbat</em> 118a, and <em>Pesaḥim</em> 68b. Me’ iri and Rashba discuss it as well (<em>Berakhot</em> 49b). However, concerning Yom Tov, the verse states “You shall rejoice in your festival (<em>ve-samaḥta be-ḥagekha</em>)” (Devarim 16:14). This is explained in <em>Pesaḥim</em> 109a and MT, Laws of Yom Tov 6:17-18 as referring to eating meat and drinking wine. <em>Ḥatam Sofer</em> OḤ 168 states that the difference between them is that if one eats meat on Yom Tov, even if he does not really have an appetite, as long as he enjoyed the meat, he has fulfilled the mitzva of <em>simḥa</em>, whereas on Shabbat if he does not have an appetite, he has not fulfilled the mitzva of <em>oneg</em>. Additionally, one who finds fasting pleasurable can fast and still fulfill the obligation of <em>oneg</em> Shabbat, but not of <em>simḥat</em><em>Yom Tov</em> (SA 288:2). The difference between them is also expressed in the law that the public nature of the <em>simḥa</em> of Yom Tov cancels mourning while the more private <em>oneg</em> of Shabbat does not (<em>She’iltot</em>, Ḥayei Sarah §15). Some contend that there is a mitzva of <em>simḥa</em> on Shabbat as well as on Yom Tov (<em>Abudraham</em> based on <em>Sifrei</em>). See <em>Harḥavot</em></i>
  
  Section 2
  
  Shabbat Meals and Melaveh Malka / The Parameters of the Mitzva
  There are two mitzvot pertaining to the Shabbat meal. One is oneg, the mitzva to delight in Shabbat, as it is written: “Call Shabbat ‘delight’ (oneg)” (Yeshayahu 58:13). Oneg is fulfilled primarily through the meals, but snacks and a Shabbat nap are parts of it as well. The second mitzva is to partake of three meals. The Sages saw this hinted at in various verses (Shabbat 117b).2<i class="footnote">. According to <em>Sefer Ha-ḥinukh</em> §297, the mitzva of <em>oneg</em> Shabbat is rabbinic since its source is Yeshayahu 58:13, and <em>mitzvot</em> derived from the Prophets are similar in status to rabbinic <em>mitzvot</em>. However, according to Rambam it is a Torah law derived from “But on the seventh day there shall be a Shabbat of complete rest, a sacred occasion (<em>mikra kodesh</em>)” (Vayikra 23:3). Implied by the term “<em>mikra kodesh</em>” is honoring Shabbat with good food and clean clothes (MB 242:1). The question of whether fasting on Shabbat is a Torah prohibition or a rabbinic one hinges on this disagreement. See BHL 288:1.The mitzva of eating three meals, according to almost all <em>poskim</em>, is rabbinic. According to <em>Shabbat</em> 117b it is hinted at in the verse in Shemot 16:25 where the word “day” appears three times: “Then Moses said, ‘Eat it today, for today is a Shabbat of the Lord; you will not find it today on the plain.’” However, there is an opinion that this is an actual derivation from the verse and thus the mitzva would be of Torah origin (<em>Yere’im</em> §92; <em>Levush</em>). AHS 291:1 states that even if this mitzva is not literally from the Torah, it must have been instituted by Moshe as a Sinaitic tradition. See SSK ch. 54 n. 109.</i>
  The first meal is held on Friday night, the second on Shabbat morning before midday, and the third on Shabbat afternoon from half a seasonal hour after midday until shki’a. If one eats the third meal prior to this, he has not fulfilled his obligation (SA 291:2). One who did not eat dinner on Friday night should eat three meals on Shabbat day. If one was unable to eat the second meal before midday, he should eat two meals afterward, for some maintain that the timing of the meals is not critical, and be-di’avad one may rely upon them (Behag; Rema 291:1).
  Bread is the staple of the meal because it is the most important food. It is a mitzva to prepare other good foods that people delight in. In the time of the Sages, people enjoyed a dish made of spinach, large fish, and heads of garlic, so it was a mitzva to prepare these for Shabbat (Shabbat 118b; MB 242:1). Since most people enjoy meat, wine, and delicacies (meaning tasty fruits), poskim write that we should have plenty of them (SA 250:2). One who does not enjoy meat and wine should prepare foods he does enjoy for Shabbat.
  The Aḥaronim write, based on Kabbala, that there is a mitzva to eat fish at each of the three meals. Several reasons are given for this: fish symbolize blessing, they hint at deep matters since they are creatures of the deep, and ayin ha-ra (the evil eye) has no power over them. However, one who does not enjoy fish is not required to eat it (MA 242:1).
  Even though eating sparingly is generally a positive character trait, on Shabbat it is a mitzva to eat heartily. It is not considered gluttonous since it is for a mitzva (Shabbat 117b; SA 274:2; MB 6). However, one should not overeat, because overeating leads to exhaustion and depression. As for those who stuff themselves, fill up, become tired, fall asleep, and do not study Torah, they do not get any credit for the mitzva. They are not making Shabbat enjoyable, they are only pleasing their gullets (Shlah, Masekhet Shabbat, Ner Mitzva §37; see above 5:3).
  One may not fast on Shabbat, even for just an hour. Even one who does not intend to fast but in fact has not eaten anything by midday on Shabbat morning has transgressed this prohibition (SA and Rema 288:1). He also is obviously not eating the second meal at its ideal time.
  One who is ill and has no appetite need not eat very much, since the eating is meant to be pleasurable. One who does not enjoy eating need not eat much but should try to eat a little more than a keveitza (egg’s bulk) of bread. If even this is difficult for him, he should eat at least a kezayit. If even this amount pains him, he should not eat at all (SA 288:2; 291:1).3<i class="footnote">Although as long as one eats a <em>kezayit</em> of <em>mezonot</em> at <em>kiddush</em> (or a <em>revi’it</em> of wine according to some), he fulfills the requirement of making <em>kiddush</em> in the place of a meal, this is because <em>kiddush</em> need not be made where one of the three Shabbat meals will be eaten. Rather the obligation is that it be made where one experiences <em>oneg</em>. Eating a <em>kezayit</em> is enough to meet this requirement. But in order to have one’s eating be considered one of the three required Shabbat meals, he must eat a set meal. The smallest amount for this is more than a <em>keveitza</em>, although <em>be-di’avad</em> a <em>kezayit</em> will do (MB 291:2; SSK ch. 54 n. 4; see <em>Menuḥat Ahava </em>1:8:2).</i>
  
  Section 3
  
  Shabbat Meals and Melaveh Malka / Leĥem Mishneh (Two Loaves) and Cutting the Bread
  There is a mitzva to use two loaves of bread on Shabbat, to commemorate the double portion of manna that fell on Fridays when the Jews were in the desert and that was referred to as leḥem mishneh (Shabbat 117b). Actually, there are many double aspects to Shabbat. Its mitzvot are two-fold – Zakhor and Shamor; its sacrifices are double – two perfect lambs; its punishment is double, and so is its reward. The bread that we use is doubled to express that the day is doubly great (based on Yalkut Shimoni, Beshalaḥ §261).
  The person breaking bread should hold both of the challahs in his hands while reciting the berakha, but it is sufficient if he cuts only one. By holding both challahs during the berakha, he has already fulfilled the mitzva of leḥem mishneh (Rambam, Rashi, SA 274:1). However, others maintain that one should cut both challahs (Shlah, Vilna Gaon). Those who wish to follow this custom should make sure to use small challahs so that they can finish them during the meal. The widespread custom is to cut only one loaf.
  There are many customs as to how to arrange the challahs for the berakha. Some put one loaf on top of the other and cut the bottom one (SA 274:1). Others cut the top challah (Arizal). Others cut the bottom challah at night and the top challah during the day (Rema ad loc.) Those who cut the bottom challah should draw it closer to themselves when reciting the berakha (MB 274:5). Some follow Arizal’s custom of having twelve small loaves on the table at every meal (Kaf Ha-ḥayim 263:2).
  Ideally, the challahs should be completely whole. Accordingly, one should not remove the sticker often found on the loaves of bread (in Israel) until after the berakha, since doing so may peel away a bit of the crust, thus rendering the challah not quite whole. If there are no whole loaves available, one should use the ones that are closest to whole. If necessary, he may use frozen bread for leḥem mishneh (SSK 55:12). If there are no complete uncut challahs but there are two whole loaves of pre-sliced bread, be-di’avad one can make “ha-motzi” on them. This is because some maintain that since they are whole loaves, and their package serves to preserve them as one unit, they are considered whole (Meshiv Davar §21). If there are no loaves available but only slices, one should make the berakha over two slices (SSK 55:17).
  At se’uda shlishit as well, one is obligated to use two loaves in order to give expression to the double nature of Shabbat (SA 291:4). If he does not have two loaves, he should make “ha-motzi” over one whole loaf. For when the manna fell, our ancestors in the desert were left with only one loaf for se’uda shlishit (Rema ad loc.).
  
  Section 4
  
  Shabbat Meals and Melaveh Malka / The Importance of the Shabbat Day Meal
  The daytime meal is more important than the Friday night meal, so the best foods should be saved for this second meal. Regarding kiddush, however, Friday night is more important, because we are meant to sanctify the day as close as possible to its onset. It is with regard to honoring Shabbat that the daytime takes precedence over the nighttime (Pesaḥim 105b; SA 271:3).
  Some maintain that one who honors the Friday night meal more than the daytime meal should fear punishment, because he has disrespected the day’s meal (Rashi, Gittin 38b). Therefore, some make a point of not eating fish on Friday night, to avoid a situation in which the meal by night might seem more important than the meal by day (Yam Shel Shlomo, ad loc.).
  Others maintain that if it turns out that the Friday night meal is better because hot, fresh food can be served then, it does not reflect any disrespect. Therefore, one may prepare foods for Friday night that need to be served hot – such as fish, soup, or other foods that would go bad if they sat overnight – even if this means that the Friday night meal will be better than the daytime meal. But when dealing with foods that can be served either by night or by day, such as wine and fruits, one should make sure to give precedence to the day’s meal. For many people this is not a problem, because even though on Friday night they have hot, fresh food, they still prefer the foods that are generally served by day, such as cholent and kugel, whose unique flavor results from leaving them on the warming tray for a long time (AHS 271:9).
  In practice, one who prefers the foods served during the day is certainly honoring the daytime meal. But one who does not prefer them must make a point of serving foods he especially loves by day, to show that it is the more important meal. He need not cut back on the Friday night meal in order to do so.
  Some say that one should ideally eat a meal with bread immediately after making kiddush, and not have foods that are mezonot or other foods then, because the primary mitzva of enjoying Shabbat is fulfilled through eating a meal. If one eats various foods beforehand, he might have no appetite for the Shabbat meal. Nevertheless, there is no prohibition involved, because enjoying Shabbat following kiddush is also considered honoring the day. What is important is to not spoil one’s appetite for the second Shabbat meal, which will be celebrated with bread (Darkhei Moshe 249:4; BHL ad loc. 2 s.v. “mutar;” AHS ad loc. 12-13).
  Some eat a light, dairy meal for the second Shabbat meal so that they will be alert, energetic, and able to learn Torah all day. They then have the main meat meal near evening at se’uda shlishit (See MT 30:10). It would seem that they too fulfill the mitzva, because the key is for the important meal to be eaten on Shabbat day.
  
  Section 5
  
  Shabbat Meals and Melaveh Malka / Se’uda Shlishit
  If one does not have bread for se’uda shlishit or finds it difficult to eat bread, be-di’avad he may fulfill his obligation by eating mezonot. Although one may not use mezonot for the first and second meals (SA 274:4), when it comes to se’uda shlishit, some maintain that the primary purpose of the meal is to increase one’s delight, not to reach satiety, so one is not obligated to eat bread specifically. Therefore, be-di’avad one fulfills the obligation with mezonot. If he does not have mezonot either, or cannot eat them, he should eat meat or fish. If one has no meat or fish, he should eat fruit, preferably cooked, since cooked fruit is considered more akin to a proper meal (SA 291:5).
  Ideally one should plan his eating so that he will have an appetite for se’uda shlishit. If it turns out that he is eating se’uda shlishit not long after lunch, he should eat less at lunch so that he will have an appetite for se’uda shlishit. If one was not careful about this and as a result is full when it is time for se’uda shlishit, he may eat a bit more than a keveitza of bread and thereby fulfill his obligation. Be-di’avad, he may even eat only a kezayit of bread. If a kezayit of bread or other foods is still too much and would cause him grief, he has lost this mitzva opportunity (SA 291:1; MB ad loc. 2).
  According to Rambam, one must make a berakha over wine during se’uda shlishit. Some understand this to mean that just as one makes kiddush before lunch, similarly he must make kiddush before se’uda shlishit (Tur). However, in practice the mitzva of kiddush is once by night and once by day, and there is no mitzva to make kiddush over wine at se’uda shlishit (SA 291:4). Others say that Rambam is merely ruling that there is a mitzva to drink wine at se’uda shlishit in order to make Shabbat more delightful. Indeed, several Aḥaronim write that it is best to beautify the mitzva by having wine at se’uda shlishit.
  Se’uda shlishit must begin before shki’a. As long as one recited “ha-motzi” before shki’a and began the meal, he may continue to eat even well after tzeit. However, if one was not eating bread but mezonot, fruits, or vegetables, or if he was drinking, then once shki’a arrives he must stop, because these foods do not render this a proper meal; since the time for havdala has already arrived, one may not eat or drink (SA 299:1; MB ad loc. 2; AHS ad loc. 3-5; below 8:8).
  One who did not manage to begin se’uda shlishit before shki’a may start eating up to 13.5 minutes after shki’a (and may continue eating well beyond nightfall). But later than that, he should not eat se’uda shlishit.4<i class="footnote">13.5 minutes is the time that <em>bein ha-shmashot</em> extends according to the Ge’onim, while according to Rabbeinu Tam it is still day (see above, ch. 3, end of n. 1). Therefore, one may be lenient and start <em>se’uda shlishit</em> then. This is the position recorded in <em>Igrot Moshe</em> OḤ 4:62 and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 291:20. (See MB 299:1 and SHT <em>ad loc.</em>2. SSK 56:4 states that one may not begin eating during this time.)</i>
  If a bride, a groom, and a minyan, were present at se’uda shlishit, Sheva Berakhot are recited at the conclusion of the meal. The person who leads the zimun, the bride, and the groom all drink from the wine after Birkat Ha-mazon even if it is past tzeit and they have not yet made havdala, because drinking this wine is a continuation of their meal (See below 8:8 where we record that some are accustomed to drink wine from the kos shel berakha even without a bride and groom present).
  
  Section 6
  
  Shabbat Meals and Melaveh Malka / Birkat Ha-mazon
  The Sages instituted a special passage to be inserted into Birkat Ha-mazon on Shabbat: “Retzei Ve-haḥalitzenu” (“Favor and strengthen us”). In it we ask that our Shabbat rest and our fulfillment of Shabbat mitzvot find favor with God, and that God allow us to keep Shabbat with no sorrow or anguish. Since this is a petition, the Sages ordained that it be recited during the third berakha, which is also petitionary. In order to return us to the topic of this berakha, the added prayer ends with a request about Jerusalem and the redemption. We then return to the paragraph of “U-venei Yerushalayim.”
  One who forgot to recite Retzei but remembered before beginning the next berakha (Ha-tov Ve-hametiv) must add the following prayer: “Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who lovingly gave Shabbatot for rest to His people Israel to serve as a sign and a covenant. Blessed are You, Lord, Who sanctifies Shabbat.” One then continues with Ha-tov Ve-hametiv. If he realized that he forgot Retzei after he had already begun Ha-tov Ve-hametiv, he must repeat Birkat Ha-mazon from the beginning. For the Sages required that Shabbat be mentioned in Birkat Ha-mazon. Thus if he did not mention Shabbat, he did not fulfill his obligation (SA 188:6).5<i class="footnote">. According to <em>Ḥayei Adam</em> 47:18, even if one began the <em>berakha</em> following <em>Retzei </em>and said “Blessed are you, O God, King of the universe” with the intention of continuing “<em>Ha-tov Ve-hametiv</em>,” he may correct himself and continue with “Who gave <em>Shabbatot</em>…” However, according to most Aḥaronim, even if he only said the first word of the <em>berakha</em>, he is already required to repeat <em>Birkat Ha-mazon</em>, since this shows that he has forgotten about the special Shabbat request. In practice, the ruling in BHL inclines toward stringency and requires that he repeat. <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 1, Ḥukat 20 states similarly. However, <em>Kaf Ha-</em> <em>ḥayim</em> 188:28 and <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 6:28 side with <em>Ḥayei Adam</em>.</i>
  All of this pertains to the first two Shabbat meals, when all agree that one is required to eat bread and therefore required to recite Birkat Ha-mazon. However, if one forgot to mention Shabbat in Birkat Ha-mazon at se’uda shlishit he does not repeat it, since be-di’avad that meal can consist of mezonot, so he is not obligated to recite Birkat Ha-mazon. Therefore, if he forgot Retzei, he does not repeat Birkat Ha-mazon. This is also the case regarding the insertion of Ya’aleh Ve-yavo on Rosh Ḥodesh or Ḥol Ha-mo’ed: Since one is not obligated to eat bread then, he does not repeat Birkat Ha-mazon (SA 188:8).6<i class="footnote">. However, according to <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 1, Ḥukat 20 and 22, if one recited <em>Birkat Ha-mazon</em> before <em>tzeit</em> and forgot <em>Retzei</em>, he must repeat <em>Birkat Ha-mazon</em> even at <em>se’uda shlishit</em>. This is because on a mystical plane there is no difference between <em>se’uda shlishit</em> and the rest of the Shabbat meals. In practice, I recorded the opinion of SA and most <em>poskim</em> that one does not repeat.</i>
  If one began to eat se’uda shlishit before shki’a and finished after tzeit, he says Retzei, since we follow the starting time of the meal. If Rosh Ḥodesh falls out on Saturday night, there is a serious doubt as to what he should mention in Birkat Ha-mazon. In order to avoid this situation, it is best to avoid eating bread after tzeit. That way it is certain that he should recite Retzei only.7<i class="footnote">If one continued eating bread after <em>tzeit</em>, then it would seem that he should recite <em>Retzei</em> based on when the meal began; in contrast, he should recite <em>Ya’aleh Ve-yavo </em>based on when the meal ended. <em>Poskim</em> disagree about what to do in this case: many feel that if one ate bread after <em>tzeit</em>, he must recite <em>Ya’aleh Ve-yavo</em> but not <em>Retzei</em>. Thus state MB 188:33 and <em>Yaskil Avdi</em>, OḤ 7:27. But according to <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 1, Ḥukat 22 and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 291:18, since he did not make <em>havdala</em> and he began the meal on Shabbat, he should recite <em>Retzei</em> and not <em>Ya’aleh Ve-yavo</em>. According to <em>Taz</em> 188:7, if he recites <em>Birkat Ha-mazon</em> after <em>tzeit</em> he should mention both Shabbat and <em>Rosh Ḥodesh</em>. This is also the opinion of <em>Magen Giborim</em> and <em>Bigdei Yesha</em>. (Therefore, <em>le-khatḥila</em> one should recite <em>Birkat Ha-mazon</em> before <em>tzeit</em>.)</i>
  
  Section 7
  
  Shabbat Meals and Melaveh Malka / The Significance of Melaveh Malka
  The Sages state that it is a mitzva to set the table on Saturday night for the melaveh malka (lit. “accompanying the queen”) meal, with which we honor Shabbat at its departure (Shabbat 119b). When one must say goodbye to a dear and beloved guest whom he does not want to leave, he escorts him a distance in order to spend just a bit more time with him. So too, we must escort Shabbat at its departure. Despite the fact that it is over, we continue to savor and delight in its holiness.
  On Shabbat we are blessed with additional holiness in all areas of life, material and spiritual, as expressed through prayer and meals. Our goal is to extend the light of Shabbat to the weekdays. Arizal explains that by saying Vi-yhi No’am (Tehilim 90:17–91:16) in Ma’ariv on Saturday night, we extend the additional spiritual holiness of Shabbat to the weekdays, and ask that God’s grace rest upon all our endeavors. Through melaveh malka we extend the light of holiness to our eating all week.
  We have a tradition that there is a bone in the human body called the luz. This bone did not benefit when Adam ate from the Tree of Knowledge; therefore, even though death was decreed upon mankind as a result of the sin, this bone does not rot. At the time of the resurrection of the dead, each individual’s revival will begin from the luz. This bone, we are told, is nourished only by melaveh malka (Kaf Ha-ḥayim 300:1-2; Vayikra Rabba 18:1).
  Those who are especially devout prepare special food for melaveh malka. The Talmud (Shabbat 119b) recounts that R. Abahu’s household was accustomed to slaughter a calf on Saturday night to serve at the melaveh malka. R. Abahu would eat one of its kidneys. When R. Abahu’s son grew up, he asked why it was necessary to slaughter an entire calf each Saturday night. He suggested that it made more sense to leave over a kidney from the calf that had been slaughtered on Friday, and eat that on Saturday night. The family listened to him and saved  some of Friday’s meat for Saturday night. A lion came along and devoured the veal that was meant for Saturday night. Thus they gained nothing. The Gemara tells us this story to teach us that it is proper to make the extra effort and prepare special food for melaveh malka rather than just eat Shabbat leftovers.
  
  Section 8
  
  Shabbat Meals and Melaveh Malka / The Laws Pertaining to Melaveh Malka
  Since the melaveh malka is meant to extend the Shabbat experience to the weekdays, it is comparable to the other Shabbat meals. Thus it is appropriate to put a tablecloth on the table and set it nicely. It is also appropriate to remain in Shabbat clothes until melaveh malka is finished. Just as Shabbat meals are equally relevant to men and women, so is melaveh malka (SSK 63:1-3).
  Ideally one should have bread for melaveh malka, as one does at all the Shabbat meals, and one should make a special dish in honor of the meal. One who is not very hungry should try to eat at least a kezayit of bread along with something else. If he does not wish to eat bread, he may eat either mezonot, a cooked or fried food, or, minimally fruit, similar to se’uda shlishit (section 5 above).
  One who does not have enough food for three Shabbat meals as well as melaveh malka should give precedence to the Shabbat meals. He can fulfill the obligation of melaveh malka with a kezayit of bread (SHT 300:9).
  Ideally one should eat melaveh malka fairly soon after Shabbat ends. One who is not hungry then should try to eat within four hours of nightfall, or minimally before midnight. If he was not able to eat before midnight, he may still eat at any point during the night (Yeḥaveh Da’at 4:25; SSK 63:5).
  Some maintain that one who continued se’uda shlishit past the end of Shabbat is exempt from melaveh malka. However, the custom is that even in such a case, one still eats melaveh malka later on (Kaf Ha-ḥayim 300:11).
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Havdala and Saturday Night / The Basic Principles of Havdala
  It is a mitzva to conclude Shabbat with havdala, in which we give verbal expression to the difference between the sanctity of Shabbat and the ordinary weekdays. The laws pertaining to havdala are similar to those pertaining to kiddush. Just as one must mention the sanctity of Shabbat on Friday night both during prayer and over a cup of wine, so too, at the conclusion of Shabbat one must recite havdala both during prayer and over a cup of wine.
  It is true that originally, when the Men of the Great Assembly formulated havdala, they designed it for prayer alone. This was because it was at the time of the building of the Second Temple, and the Jews were poor. Therefore, the Sages did not wish to burden them with an additional expense by requiring wine for havdala. However, later on when the Jews’ financial situation improved and they could afford it, the Sages ordained that havdala be recited over a cup of wine. There was a period of time when people made havdala only on a cup of wine, not during prayer. Eventually it was decided that havdala would be done both during prayer and over a cup of wine. Women, who do not generally pray Ma’ariv, fulfill their obligation by hearing havdala over a cup of wine. Similarly, if one forgot to add the havdala insertion in the Amida, he does not repeat the prayer. Rather, he fulfills the obligation by hearing havdala over a cup of wine (SA 294:1).
  The havdala in prayer is recited during the fourth berakha of the Amida since this is the first berakha that relates to everyday matters. Additionally, the theme of this berakha is knowledge, without which one cannot distinguish between the sacred and the profane. Therefore, it is logical to integrate havdala into the berakha in which we request wisdom and knowledge (Berakhot 33a).
  According to many poskim, the obligation of havdala is by Torah law. These poskim understand the mitzva of Zakhor to include both kiddush and havdala; that is, marking Shabbat’s onset by invoking its sanctity and its exit by distinguishing the sacred from the profane. The requirement to recite kiddush and havdala over a cup of wine is rabbinic (Rambam). Others maintain that the Torah commandment of Zakhor is limited to invoking the sanctity of Shabbat at its onset, but the Sages expanded the mitzva by ordaining the recitation of havdala at its end (Rosh).
  Women are obligated in havdala like men. Even though it is a time-dependent positive mitzva, from which women are generally exempt, since it is linked to the mitzva of kiddush, women are obligated to recite havdala just as they are obligated in kiddush (as explained above in 6:1). Nevertheless, there is an opinion that since havdala is time-dependent, women are exempt from it (Orḥot Ḥayim). In deference to this, le-khatḥila women generally do not make havdala for themselves, but rather hear it from a man. However, if there is no man present, a woman must make havdala for herself, reciting all four berakhot of havdala. Even if there is a man present, if he has already fulfilled his havdala obligation, it is proper that the woman make havdala for herself (MB 296:36). Only if she does not know how to make the berakhot herself can a man who already fulfilled his obligation make havdala for her.1<i class="footnote">According to Rambam, <em>She’iltot</em><em>Smag</em><em>Ḥinukh</em>, and most <em>poskim</em><em>havdala</em> is a Torah obligation, included in the mitzva of <em>Zakhor</em>. Just as women are obligated by Torah law in <em>kiddush</em>, so too they are obligated by Torah law in <em>havdala</em>. Even according to Rosh and those Rishonim who maintain that <em>havdala</em> is a rabbinic obligation, many explain that the Sages modeled it after <em>kiddush</em>. Accordingly, just as women are obligated in <em>kiddush</em>, so too they are obligated in <em>havdala</em>. This is the opinion of Me’ iri, <em>Nimukei Yosef</em> quoting Ritva, and <em>Magid Mishneh</em>. However, <em>Orḥot Ḥayim</em> states that the rabbinic requirement of <em>havdala</em> is not connected to the mitzva of <em>Zakhor</em>, and therefore women are exempt, since it is a time-dependent positive commandment. Rema takes this opinion into account and writes that therefore women should not make <em>havdala</em> for themselves, but rather should listen to a man make <em>havdala</em> (296:8). However, <em>Baḥ</em>, MA, and other Aḥaronim state that a woman who wants to make <em>havdala</em> may do so, since according to most <em>poskim</em> a woman may perform and recite <em>berakhot</em> on time-dependent positive <em>mitzvot</em> from which she is exempt. This is also the position of Rema 589:6. Even though according to SA women do not make a <em>berakha</em> before performing a mitzva from which they are exempt, nevertheless, since the decisive majority of <em>poskim</em> feel that women are obligated in <em>havdala</em> (quite possibly by Torah law), they may make <em>havdala</em> for themselves and not worry that they might be guilty of making a <em>berakha le-vatala</em> (a blessing in vain). Furthermore, a man who has already fulfilled his obligation may, if necessary, make <em>havdala</em> for them. BHL implies that women should not make a <em>berakha</em> over the candle since this <em>berakha</em> is not really a part of <em>havdala</em>. This is the ruling in SSK 58:16 as well. However, many Aḥaronim find this surprising, and maintain that the <em>berakha</em> over the candle is considered part of <em>havdala</em> and that women who are making <em>havdala</em> should recite all four <em>berakhot</em>. Indeed, this is the position of <em>Igrot Moshe</em><em>ḤM</em> 2:47:2, <em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 4:27, and <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 14:43.</i>
  
  Section 2
  
  Havdala and Saturday Night / Havdala over Wine
  The procedure for making havdala over wine is as follows. It is customary to begin with a series of verses from the Prophets and Writings to serve as good omens and start the week off on a positive note. This is followed by four berakhot – Ha-gafen over the wine, “besamim” over the fragrance (see below), “borei me’orei ha-esh” (“Creator of firelight”) over fire, and finally “ha-mavdil bein kodesh le-ḥol” (“Who distinguishes sacred from profane”).
  Two of these berakhot, Ha-gafen and Ha-mavdil, are essential; one who has not recited them has not fulfilled the mitzva of making havdala over wine.2<i class="footnote">One who heard the <em>berakha </em>of <em>Ha-mavdil </em>but did not hear the <em>berakha</em> of <em>Ha-gafen</em> has fulfilled the mitzva of <em>havdala</em>. This is because only the person reciting <em>havdala</em> must make the <em>berakha</em> over the wine, whereas those who are listening fulfill their obligation <em>be-di’avad</em> even if they do not hear that <em>berakha</em> (SSK 47:40, n. 187).</i> The Sages ordained that two additional berakhot are recited: one on a pleasant aroma, and one over fire. The former helps to soothe the soul’s pain upon the departure of the neshama yeteira at the end of Shabbat. The latter was instituted to commemorate the end of the first Shabbat, when God gave Adam the insight to rub two stones together and make a fire. One who does not have a fragrance or candle may make havdala without them. If, later on that night, a fragrance becomes available, he should recite the berakha and smell it. If he sees a candle or fire, he should recite ha-esh. Ideally, of course, one should prepare a fragrance and a candle for havdala so that all four berakhot can be recited in the order instituted by the Sages (SA 297:1; 298:1).
  The berakhot proceed from the most physical to the most sublime of the senses. First we recite the berakha over wine. Taste is an extremely physical sense, activated only when food actually touches the mouth. Next we advance to the sense of smell, which requires proximity but not physical contact. The next berakha is over light. The sense of sight is even more subtle, as one can perceive something even at a great distance. Finally, the berakha of Ha-mavdil pertains to the ability to discern, a function of intelligence. The apex of this ability is discernment between the sacred and the profane (Rashbatz quoted in Kaf Ha-ḥayim 296:3).
  
  Section 3
  
  Havdala and Saturday Night / Customs Related to Havdala
  Since the Sages ordained that havdala be recited over wine, the cup should be held during havdala. It is held in the right hand, as it is the more important one. This preference for the right hand is true for all berakhot: Whenever a berakha is made over something, the object should be held in the right hand. Accordingly, when making the berakha over fragrance, the person making havdala should hold the fragrance in his right hand. During that time, many rest the cup of wine on a plate. Later, when they reach the berakha of Ha-mavdil, they pick up the cup once again. Some beautify the mitzva by holding the cup even while making the berakhot on the fragrance and the candle. Since the right hand has to be free to pick up the fragrance and to look at the candle’s flame, they pick up the cup in their left hand. When they reach Ha-mavdil they return the cup to their right hand (SA 296:6; MB ad loc.).
  Some have the custom to sit for havdala, since by sitting the listeners establish that they wish to fulfill their obligation with this recitation of havdala (SA 296:6). Others customarily stand, demonstrating respect for Shabbat as it departs (Rema). In that case, in order to make it clear that everyone intends to fulfill their obligation by listening to havdala, they must gather round the person making havdala. Be-di’avad, if one stood at a distance but listened intently to the havdala, he has fulfilled his obligation.
  As is the case with any kos shel berakha (a cup of wine linked to the performance of a mitzva), one should ensure that the cup is clean both inside and out. Many make a point of using a fancy goblet for havdala. The cup must hold a revi’it (roughly 75 ml and 150 ml according to Ḥazon Ish; see 6:5 above). If the cup has a larger capacity, it is a mitzva to fill it with wine, since it is appropriate to honor the berakha with a full cup. Although in most cases of kos shel berakha (e.g., for kiddush or at a wedding) it is preferable not to fill the cup all the way to the point of spilling over, many have the custom to fill the havdala cup to the point that it overflows a bit, as this is a symbol of blessing (Rema 296:1, and see 6:6 above for the rest of the laws concerning a kos shel berakha).
  Ideally, the person making havdala should drink the entire revi’it of wine in the cup so that he can recite a berakha aḥarona over the wine. Nevertheless, to fulfill the mitzva of havdala it is sufficient to drink a melo lugmav (see above, 6:5, and n. 6 ad loc. regarding a case where one did not drink a cheek full; also see Peninei Halakha: Berakhot 10:10).
  The audience must remain silent until the person making havdala finishes drinking a melo lugmav; since it is a mitzva to make havdala over a cup of wine, havdala is completed only when the person making havdala drinks a melo lugmav. Be-di’avad, if a listener speaks before the person making havdala drank from the cup, he has still fulfilled his obligation (SSK 60:39 and 48:6; see above, ch. 6 n. 10).
  
  Section 4
  
  Havdala and Saturday Night / Using Beverages Other Than Wine
  Ideally one should make havdala over wine, which is the most dignified beverage, as it nourishes and gladdens, so when it is enjoyed in the service of a mitzva, it has the unique capability to reveal the inner goodness of the Jewish people. The Sages state that one who makes havdala over wine on Saturday night will be blessed with children (Shev. 18b).
  However, if there is no wine available, one may use ḥamar medina (lit. “the wine of the country”), a dignified beverage that people in that locale drink as one would drink wine (SA 296:2). For example, in many places people commonly drink beer. In such places, since beer is important for them, they may make havdala over it, replacing Ha-gafen with She-hakol.
  If one has wine but prefers ḥamar medina, some say that he may not make havdala on ḥamar medina (Rabbeinu Ḥananel; Rashbam), while others maintain one may nevertheless use ḥamar medina (Rambam; Smag). In practice, it is proper for even one who prefers beer to recite havdala over wine, as long as he also likes wine. However, if he wants to, he may make havdala on ḥamar medina.
  Vodka and arak are also considered ḥamar medina, but because they are so strong it is difficult to drink a melo lugmav (c. 50-55 ml) of them. One who is able to drink a melo lugmav of them may recite havdala over them.
  The poskim disagree about whether a beverage must be alcoholic to be considered ḥamar medina. The lenient poskim maintain that any beverage that one would serve to important guests, and which people sometimes sit around drinking with friends, is considered a dignified beverage and may be used for havdala. Thus, one may make havdala on coffee, tea, or malt beer, as well as fresh-squeezed apple juice or orange juice. However, one should not make havdala over flavored beverages or other soft drinks, like grapefruit juice or Coca Cola, because they are not dignified beverages, merely drinks that quench one’s thirst. Some rule leniently even regarding these beverages, since one would serve them to important guests.
  The stringent poskim maintain that only alcoholic beverages are considered ḥamar medina, because these are the beverages that people drink at collegial parties. Other drinks, however, are not so dignified and should not be used for havdala. According to this, one may make havdala on beer and other alcoholic beverages, but not on coffee, malt beer, or fruit juice.
  In practice, one should be stringent and make havdala over alcoholic beverages only. Only if these are unavailable, then be-di’avad one may make havdala on dignified non-alcoholic beverages.3<i class="footnote">There are many different positions on this question. <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 8:16 writes, based on a number of Aḥaronim, that one may make <em>havdala</em> on black coffee and the like. SSK 60:6-7 is also inclined to be lenient regarding coffee, but writes that one should not make <em>havdala</em> over soft drinks. R. Mordechai Eliyahu and R. Dov Lior are lenient and allow <em>havdala</em> to be made over soft drinks as well (<em>Ha-morim Ba-keshet</em>, p. 14). This is also the opinion of R. Naḥum Rabinovitch (<em>Melumdei Milḥama</em>, p. 206). In contrast, R. Ovadia Yosef (<em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 3:19) mentions opinions of stringent Aḥaronim who insist that <em>havdala</em> may be recited only over alcoholic beverages. He rules stringently in practice because this could involve a <em>berakha le-vatala</em>.Since there are differing opinions, one should not make <em>havdala</em> over a non-alcoholic beverage. However, it seems that under extenuating circumstances, when one is unable to attain wine or alcoholic drinks, he may rely on the lenient opinions. After all, there are Rishonim who maintain that one may recite the <em>berakha </em>of <em>Ha-mavdil</em> without any beverage at all. Maharam of Rothenburg quotes this position in the name of R. Simḥa. <em>Tur</em> states that this position is also found in <em>Pirkei De-Rabbi Eliezer</em>. Furthermore, it would seem to be the position of Rif and Rosh, who maintain that in a case where one must do <em>melakha</em> before making <em>havdala</em> over a cup of wine, he should say the <em>berakha</em> of <em>Ha-mavdil</em>, including God’s name, even without a cup of wine, and do what he needs to do. Later on he should make <em>havdala</em> over wine. Even though the <em>halakha </em>does not follow this opinion, we nevertheless see that some say one may recite <em>ha-mavdil </em>without wine. Therefore, in a case of necessity one may rely on those who permit making <em>havdala</em> over a dignified non-alcoholic beverage.</i>
  
  Section 5
  
  Havdala and Saturday Night / Besamim (Fragrance)
  The Sages enacted the recitation of a berakha on smelling fragrance on Saturday night, because after Shabbat our spirits are despondent over the departure of the neshama yeteira. In order to revive them, we smell fragrance, which, according to the Sages, brings joy to the soul. Even one who does not feel pain at the departure of Shabbat will come to appreciate Shabbat’s greatness and realize that he should feel sorrow at its end, and that he should revive his soul with something aromatic.
  One makes a berakha over fragrance following Shabbat, but not following Yom Tov, because on Yom Tov we are not granted a neshama yeteira. Additionally, when Yom Tov begins on Saturday night, one does not make the berakha over fragrance, because the joy of Yom Tov and its foods serve to comfort the soul (SA 491:1 and MB).
  Similarly, one does not make the berakha over fragrance after Yom Kippur. Since we fast on Yom Kippur, there is no neshama yeteira, and there is not much sorrow at the conclusion of Yom Kippur (SA 624:3).
  All those listening to havdala must smell the fragrance; therefore the person reciting havdala should wait until all listeners have smelled the fragrance, and only afterward continue with the berakha over fire. If the person making havdala continues to the next berakha before some listeners have a chance to smell the fragrance, they should listen to the next berakhot, and smell the fragrance afterward. One unable to smell does not make the berakha over the fragrance (SA 297:5; MB 13; SSK 61:8).
  As people are generally aware, the Sages instituted different berakhot for different types of fragrance. If the fragrance comes from a tree or shrub, the berakha is “borei atzei vesamim” (“Who creates fragrant trees”). If it comes from an herb, one recites “borei isvei vesamim” (“Who creates fragrant herbs”). If the fragrance is from a fruit, one recites “ha-noten rei’aḥ tov ba-peirot” (“Who gives fruit a good scent”). If the source of the fragrance is inorganic or from an animal, one recites “borei minei vesamim” (“Who creates types of fragrance”). However, when it comes to havdala, the Ashkenazic custom is to always say “borei minei vesamim,” since most people are not experts on different types of fragrances and their respective berakhot, and if one mistakenly recites “borei isvei vesamim” over something from a tree, or “borei atzei vesamim” over an herb, he has not fulfilled his obligation. Therefore, the custom is to recite “borei minei vesamim” because, be-di’avad, it covers all fragrances. The Sephardic custom, in contrast, is to recite the berakha appropriate for the specific type of fragrance. For example, when using myrtle or rosemary, one recites “borei atzei vesamim” (MB 216:39; 297:1; Kaf Ha-ḥayim 297:31; Peninei Halakha: Berakhot 14:1, 5).
  A berakha is recited over fragrances whose purpose is to give off a pleasing scent. However, no berakha is recited over fragrances whose purpose is to get rid of a bad smell, such as restroom air fresheners or deodorants (Peninei Halakha: Berakhot 14:3).
  Regarding synthetic fragrances, some say that no berakha is recited, because the substance does not naturally smell good; the pleasing aroma is created by an artificial process. In practice, it seems proper that one who wishes to recite “borei minei vesamim” over it may do so, since ultimately the chemical properties that enabled the manufacture of this pleasing scent were created by God and it thus warrants a berakha (Peninei Halakha: Berakhot 14:2-3 and n. 3).
  Some enhance the smelling of besamim by using the etrog that they used on Sukkot; since it was used for a mitzva, it is fitting to make a berakha on it at havdala. Cloves are stuck into the etrog to enhance its smell and preserve it (based on Rema 297:4). Since the resulting scent is the product of two types of fragrance (fruit and tree), according to all customs one recites “borei minei vesamim” over it (MB 216:39).
  
  Section 6
  
  Havdala and Saturday Night / The Candle
  The Sages instituted making a berakha over a candle on Saturday night, to commemorate God’s granting Adam the insight to strike two stones together to produce fire.
  Ideally, one makes the berakha over an avuka (lit., “torch”), that is, a braided candle that has at least two wicks. Since its flame has two sources, its light is great. If one does not have a braided candle, he may light two matches, which can also be considered an avuka. Be-di’avad, if there is no alternative, one may recite the berakha over a candle with only one wick (SA 298:2).
  The candle must be bright enough that even without an electric light, one could use it to distinguish between different coins. The custom is to ensure this by looking at the lines in one’s palm and at the base of the fingernails; this is considered a good omen (SA 298:3-4).
  Those who hear havdala also need to see the candlelight. One who is standing far away should move closer so that he may benefit from the light – close enough for him to see the lines in his palm and the base of his fingernails. One who heard havdala but did not see the flame has fulfilled his obligation of havdala but has not fulfilled the mitzva to thank God for fire. It is a mitzva for him to light a candle and recite the berakha of “borei me’orei ha-esh” (MB 297:13; 298:13). If he saw the flame but was not close enough to make out the lines on his palm, he should not make the berakha again, since some maintain that he fulfilled his obligation by seeing the candle (Orḥot Ḥayim quoted by Beit Yosef 298:4; Kaf Ha-ḥayim 298:22).
  Those who beautify the mitzva turn off the electric light when reciting the berakha over the candle, so that the benefit they derive from the candlelight is evident, and so that even those who are standing far away will be able to see the lines of their palms by its light (see SSK 61:33).
  One may make the berakha only over a candle that was lit to provide light, not over a candle lit to honor someone or something. For example, one does not make the berakha over a yahrzeit candle or over the candles placed in front of the ḥazan in in the synagogue, because those are candles that are lit for honor, not to provide light (MB 298:30).
  Some Aḥaronim made the berakha of Me’orei Ha-esh over an electric light bulb, since electricity has the status of fire. However, many maintain that one should not make the berakha over an electric bulb because it is not considered fire; fire requires oxygen, and there is no oxygen in electric bulbs, only a heated metal filament. Furthermore, even if an electric light bulb can be considered fire, one should not make the berakha over fire covered by glass. Since this berakha was established to remind us of the fire that Adam produced on Saturday night, it must be similar to that fire – open, without a glass cover.4<i class="footnote">Some leading Aḥaronim made the <em>berakha</em> on Saturday night over an electric bulb. They wanted to dispel the mistaken notion that electricity is not fire and may be activated on Shabbat. It was thus the custom of R. Ḥayim of Brisk, R. Ḥayim Ozer Grodzinski, and the Rogatchover Gaon to make <em>havdala </em>on electric light. However, most <em>poskim</em> maintain that one should not make the <em>berakha</em> over an electric light, since it does not burn with the aid of oxygen like fire does. Additionally, a light bulb has a glass cover, and according to SA 298:15 one does not make the <em>berakha</em> over a candle inside of glass, and BHL states that this is the opinion of many <em>poskim</em>, because a covered fire is not similar to the fire produced by Adam. This is also the explanation of <em>Har Tzvi</em>, OḤ 2:114 and <em>Yabi’a Omer</em>, OḤ 1:17-18. All agree that the <em>berakha </em>may not be recited over a fluorescent bulb, because its light is from gas, not a filament (SSK 61:32).</i>
  
  Section 7
  
  Havdala and Saturday Night / The Latest Time to Make Havdala
  If one did not make havdala over a kos on Saturday night, whether due to circumstances beyond his control such as a soldier on a mission, forgetfulness, or even on purpose, according to the majority of Rishonim (Rambam, Tosafot, Rosh), he may make havdala until the end of Tuesday, since the first three days of the week are linked to the previous Shabbat.
  Others maintain that a missed havdala can be made up on Sunday only (Ge’onim), and there is one who maintains that even this only applies if one has not eaten anything since the end of Shabbat (Behag). There are some who defer to this opinion and make havdala on a kos only until Sunday, and only on condition that nothing was eaten on Saturday night (Ben Ish Ḥai; Kaf Ha-ḥayim 299:26).
  In practice, however, most poskim maintain that one who did not make havdala Saturday night, even if he has eaten, should make havdala over wine with the berakha by the end of Tuesday (SA and Rema 299:6; MB 19). This applies to the berakhot of Ha-gafen and Ha-mavdil, but the berakhot over fragrances and fire are made only on Saturday night. For it is only on Saturday night that we need to revive the soul with the smell of the fragrances, and the berakha over fire was instituted specifically to remember the fire that Adam discovered on Saturday night. Neither of those is relevant on Sunday.
  
  Section 8
  
  Havdala and Saturday Night / The Prohibition of Eating and Doing Melakha before Havdala
  Just as there is a mitzva to extend the sanctity of Shabbat into Friday, there is a mitzva to extend it into Saturday night. Therefore, one must be careful not to perform any melakha until several minutes after tzeit. After that, according to Torah law one may resume melakha even without making havdala, but the Sages enacted that one may only do melakha after reciting havdala in the berakha of Ata Ḥonen in the Amida or by reciting the phrase “barukh ha-mavdil bein kodesh le-ḥol” (“blessed is the One Who distinguishes between the sacred and the mundane”). Before this recitation, one may not even perform melakhot that are rabbinically prohibited (SA 299:10).
  Because of the importance of reciting havdala over a cup of wine, the Sages prohibited eating and drinking after shki’a until one makes havdala over wine. However, one may drink water then, as it is not deemed significant (SA 299:1). Other Aḥaronim maintain one may not even drink water (Kaf Ha-ḥayim 299:6).5<i class="footnote">. If one has no access to either wine or <em>ḥamar medina</em> for <em>havdala</em>, but knows that he will have access by midday the next day, many <em>poskim</em> maintain that he may not eat or drink until he makes <em>havdala</em> over wine on Sunday (Rosh). If he is weak and finds it difficult to fast, he may be lenient and rely on those who maintain that since he does not have wine for <em>havdala</em>, he may eat on Saturday night (SA 296:3; MB 21).</i>
  Thus, one may only do melakha after making havdala verbally, and one may only eat or drink after making havdala over wine.
  Most poskim maintain that when making a zimun at se’uda shlishit over a cup of wine, the leader of the zimun drinks from the wine after Birkat Ha-mazon. Although it is already after tzeit, drinking the wine is deemed a continuation of the meal. Just as one who began se’uda shlishit may continue eating even after shki’a and tzeit, so too one may drink the wine from the zimun (SA 299:4).
  Others maintain that since people do not always insist on making a zimun over a cup of wine, the wine is not considered a direct continuation of se’uda shlishit, and therefore one may not drink it before havdala (MA, MB 299:14). Those who follow this opinion save the cup of wine from the zimun until after Ma’ariv, when they make havdala over it. If newlyweds are present at se’uda shlishit, since Sheva Berakhot are recited over the cup of wine, one also makes the berakha over the wine then. The person leading the zimun drinks from it, as do the bride and groom.6<i class="footnote">SA 299:4 rules that one should drink from the wine used for <em>Birkat Ha-mazon</em>, even after <em>tzeit</em> on Saturday night. Rema and MB 299:14 state that this is specifically when one usually uses wine for the <em>zimun</em>, following the opinions of <em>Tosafot</em> and Rosh. But for those who follow Rif and Rambam, who maintain that it is not necessary to do a <em>zimun</em> over a <em>kos</em>, it is forbidden to drink from the cup before <em>havdala</em> (see <em>Peninei Halakha: Berakhot</em> 5:13). If one concluded the <em>berakha</em> during <em>bein ha-shmashot</em>, when it is unclear whether it is day or night, he may drink the wine. Some maintain that even if there is no obligation to use wine for a <em>zimun</em>, one who wishes to do so fulfills a mitzva and may therefore drink the wine even before <em>havdala</em>. In practice, there are many who do not drink from the wine used for the <em>zimun</em> at <em>se’uda shlishit</em>, while many Sephardim do. In any event, regarding <em>Sheva Berakhot</em>, the vast majority of <em>poskim</em> maintain that one makes the <em>berakha</em> over the wine and drinks it. See <em>Igrot Moshe</em> OḤ 4:69; <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 3:113; SSK 59:17; and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 291:19.</i>
  Once Shabbat has ended, one may make havdala over wine even before praying Ma’ariv (MA 489:7; MB 18). When he later prays, he should recite Ata Ḥonantanu. The one reciting havdala must remember not to drink a revi’it of wine, though. If he does so, he is considered under its influence and may not pray until the wine wears off (Peninei Halakha: Prayer 5:11).
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  The Principles of the Melakhot / The Torah’s Commandment
  Cessation from all melakha1<i class="footnote">Editor’s note: Though earlier in this volume we translated “<em>melakha</em>” as “work” for simplicity’s sake, now that the technical parameters of <em>melakha</em> will be addressed, we have retained the Hebrew term that connotes the halakhic concept.</i> on Shabbat is a positive commandment, as the Torah states: “Six days you shall do your work, but on the seventh day you shall cease” (Shemot 23:12). One who performs melakha on Shabbat not only neglects this positive commandment, but also violates a negative one, as it states: “But the seventh day is Shabbat of the Lord your God; you shall not do any melakha” (Shemot 20:9). If one was warned by witnesses not to desecrate Shabbat, yet did so anyway, he is subject to the punishment of stoning. If he desecrated Shabbat intentionally, but was not warned by witnesses, he is subject to karet (extirpation), as is written: “You shall keep Shabbat, for it is holy for you. Those who profane it shall be put to death, for whoever does melakha on it shall be extirpated (nikhreta) from among his people” (Shemot 31:14). If he desecrates Shabbat unintentionally, he is liable to bring a sin offering (MT 1:1; above 1:14).
  Although it is a mitzva to desist from all melakha, the Torah mentions four melakhot explicitly: Ḥoresh, Kotzer, Mav’ir, and Hotza’ah. Ḥoresh and Kotzer are mentioned in Shemot 34:21: “For six days, work, but on the seventh day, cease. At the plowing (ḥarish) and reaping (katzir), cease.” This teaches that even activities upon which human life depends, through which man produces food, are forbidden on Shabbat (Ibn Ezra and Ramban ad loc.). Kindling a fire is also mentioned explicitly: “You shall kindle no fire (teva’aru) throughout your settlements on Shabbat” (Shemot 35:3). The Sages state that this melakha is singled out to teach us that one is subject to punishment for each individual melakha he performs on Shabbat. Thus, if one performs two melakhot unintentionally, he is obligated to bring two sin offerings (Shabbat 70a, following R. Natan; see also below 16:1). The melakha of Hotza’ah is mentioned explicitly as well: “Let everyone remain where he is; let no man leave (yetzei) his place on the seventh day” (Shemot 16:29). Hotza’ah is singled out to make it clear that even though it seems to be an insignificant activity – one merely moves an object but does not change it in any way – it is nevertheless considered a melakha (see below 21:1).
  When the Torah prohibits doing melakha, it means creative work, like the melakhot performed when erecting the Mishkan (Tabernacle). Activities that do not create anything new, even if they are physically strenuous, are not prohibited. For example, carrying a needle from a reshut ha-yaḥid (private domain) to a reshut ha-rabim (public domain) is considered a melakha, while moving chairs and tables within the same domain is not (below 21:1); reheating cooked food on Shabbat is not a melakha, whereas cooking raw food on Shabbat is (below 10:2); attaching a window to its hinges is considered a melakha even if it is easy to do, whereas opening and shutting a window is not a melakha (below 15:3); reattaching a broken table leg is considered a melakha, but lengthening a table by adding a leaf designated for such use is not (below 15:7).
  We derive a fundamental principle from the Mishkan. Just as the Mishkan was built with intent and planning – “to work with every skilled craft (melekhet maḥshevet)” (Shemot 35:33), so too on Shabbat, the Torah prohibits only melekhet maḥshevet. One who performs a melakha with a shinui (in an irregular manner), unintentionally, lo le-tzorekh gufah (for a different purpose; see below), non-constructively, or without meaning for it to last – has not transgressed a Torah prohibition. In all of these cases, he has not performed melekhet maḥshevet. Nevertheless, most of the above cases are rabbinically prohibited (see sections 3-8 below). The Sages state in the Mishna: “The laws of Shabbat are like mountains hanging by a hair, with few scriptural sources and numerous laws” (m. Ḥagiga 1:8). Indeed, countless laws of Shabbat are based on the melakhot of the Mishkan.
  There are numerous further discussions about the shi’urim (measures) that constitute a transgression of a melakha. For example, when it comes to melakhot that relate to food preparation, if one makes a quantity of food the size of a dried fig, he is liable (if the transgression was unintentional, he is liable to bring a sin offering; if intentional, the punishment is death). If the quantity was less than that, even though he has transgressed a Torah prohibition, he is exempt from punishment. In contrast, when it comes to Ḥoresh, Zore’a, Kotzer, and Boneh, even the smallest act renders one liable. In order to keep our subject matter manageable, we will limit our discussion of what one may and may not do to matters of practical relevance.
  
  Section 2
  
  The Principles of the Melakhot / The 39 Melakhot That Were Performed in the Mishkan, and Their Derivatives
  The melakhot that are prohibited on Shabbat are those that were performed in erecting the Mishkan. Almost immediately following the section dealing with erecting the Mishkan, the Torah states: “Nevertheless, you must keep My Shabbatot” (Shemot 31:13). This teaches us that even though the melakha of the Mishkan was a great mitzva, it had to stop for Shabbat as well. Thus the Sages state: “One is liable only for a melakha similar to one that was done in the Mishkan” (Shabbat 49b). Similarly the Torah states: “You shall keep My Shabbatot and venerate My Mikdash (sanctuary); I am the Lord” (Vayikra 19:30). Rashi explains: “Even though I have commanded you to build the Mikdash, nevertheless you must keep My Shabbat, for the building of the Mikdash does not override Shabbat observance.”
  The implication is that the primary purpose of humanity, created in God’s image, is to be a partner with God in improving the world. The primary way to improve the world is by erecting the Mishkan, where the Shekhina dwells. Light spreads from the Mishkan throughout the world, revealing that the whole world deserves to be a receptacle for the Shekhina. For the Shekhina dwells wherever one works for the sake of heaven, with honesty and kindness, in order to increase goodness in the world – it is there that the holiness of the Mishkan spreads. Thus, the essence of melakha in this world is to build an abode for the Shekhina. Yet, despite its value, we are commanded to desist from melakha on Shabbat. Just as God created the world in six days and rested on the seventh, thus imbuing the six days of creation with deep meaning, so too we are commanded to rest on Shabbat. By doing so, we are able to reveal the deeper value of all melakhot (see above 1:10).
  Moshe Rabbeinu was told at Sinai that there are 39 melakhot (Shabbat 70a). These are: 1. <i>Zore’a</i> (sowing) 2. <i>Ĥoresh</i> (plowing) 3. <i>Kotzer</i> (reaping) 4. <i>Me’amer</i> (gathering) 5. <i>Dash</i> (threshing) 6. <i>Zoreh</i> (winnowing) 7. <i>Borer</i> (separating) 8. <i>Toĥen</i> (grinding) 9. <i>Meraked</i> (sifting) 10. <i>Lash</i> (kneading) 11. <i>Ofeh</i> (cooking/baking) 12. <i>Gozez Tzemer</i> (shearing wool) 13. <i>Melaben</i> (laundering) 14. <i>Menapetz</i> (combing wool) 15. <i>Tzove’a</i> (dyeing) 16. <i>Toveh</i> (spinning) 17. <i>Meisekh</i> (warping) 18. <i>Oseh Shtei Batei Nirin</i> (making two loops) 19. <i>Oreg Shnei Ĥutin</i> (weaving two threads) 20. <i>Potze’a Shnei Ĥutin</i> (separating two threads) 21. <i>Kosheir</i> (tying a knot) 22. <i>Matir</i> (untying a knot) 23. <i>Tofer Shtei Tefirot</i> (sewing two stitches) 24. <i>Kore’a al Menat Litfor Shtei Tefirot</i> (tearing in order to sew two stitches) 25. <i>Tzad Tzvi</i> (trapping) 26. <i>Shoĥet</i> (slaughtering) 27. <i>Mafshit</i> (skinning) 28. <i>Mole’aĥ/Me’abed</i> (tanning) 29. <i>Mesartet</i> (marking) 30. <i>Memaĥek</i> (smoothing) 31. <i>Meĥatekh</i> (cutting) 32. <i>Kotev Shtei Otiyot</i> (writing two letters) 33. <i>Moĥek al Menat Likhtov Shtei Otiyot</i> (erasing two letters in order to overwrite them) 34. <i>Boneh</i> (building) 35. <i>Soter</i> (demolishing) 36. <i>Mekhabeh</i> (extinguishing a fire) 37. <i>Mav’ir</i> (lighting a fire) 38. <i>Makeh Be-fatish</i> (applying the finishing touch) 39. <i>Motzi Me-reshut Li-reshut</i> (carrying from one domain to another)(Shabbat 73b)
  These 39 activities are called avot melakha (primary categories of melakha), or simply avot, as are activities that are very similar to them. Activities that are largely, but not entirely, similar to avot are called toladot. In practice there is no difference between an av melakha and a tolada. They both are prohibited by the Torah, and they carry the same punishment. It is simply a semantic distinction: A melakha that is very similar to an activity that was performed while erecting the Mishkan is called an av, while one that is not as similar is called a tolada (Rambam, Peirush Ha-Mishnayot on m. Shabbat 7:2).
  The halakhic significance of the division of the forbidden activities on Shabbat into 39 categories relates to the realm of punishment. If one unknowingly performs all 39 melakhot, he is required to bring 39 sin offerings. If he performs five different melakhot, he is required to bring five sin offerings. However, if he performs several melakhot that are all part of the same av melakha and its toladot, he is only liable to bring one sin offering (MT 7:7-9).
  
  Section 3
  
  The Principles of the Melakhot / The Rabbinic Prohibition of Performing Melakha with a Shinui or Together with Another Person
  As we saw (section 1), the Torah prohibits doing melakha on Shabbat in a normal manner as the craftsmen did in the Mishkan, as it is written: “to work with every melekhet maḥshevet” (Shemot 35:33). However, if one performs the activity ki-le’aḥar yad (backhandedly), that is, with a shinui, he has not transgressed a Torah prohibition and he is therefore not subject to the punishment that the Torah prescribed for a Shabbat desecrator. Accordingly, it would seem that one may perform all the melakhot on Shabbat with a shinui. However, the Sages instituted a safeguard around the Torah and prohibited performing melakhot even with a shinui. For example, if one removes an object from a private domain to a public one in a normal manner – by carrying it in his hand or under his arm – he has transgressed a Torah commandment. However, if he carries it with a shinui – for example, with his leg, in his mouth, or on his elbow, ear, or hair – he has transgressed a rabbinic prohibition only (Shabbat 92a). Similarly, if one normally writes with his right hand only, and uses that hand to write on Shabbat, he has transgressed a Torah prohibition, whereas if he writes with his left hand, he has transgressed a rabbinic prohibition only (Shabbat 103a; below 18:2). One who cuts his nails with a pair of scissors transgresses a Torah prohibition, while if he trims them with his fingers or teeth he transgresses a rabbinic prohibition only (Shabbat 94b; below 14:2).
  If two people acted in concert to perform one melakha that either one of them could have done on his own (such as holding a pen together and writing), neither person has transgressed a Torah prohibition, for it is written: “If any person from among the populace unknowingly incurs guilt by doing any of the things that by God’s commandments ought not to be done, and he realizes his guilt” (Vayikra 4:27). The Sages explain that “doing any of the things” refers only to doing the entire deed by oneself, not to doing only a part of it (Shabbat 92b). When two people perform a melakha jointly, each one is doing only part of the action. However, if they performed a melakha that neither one could have done on his own, such as moving heavy furniture from one domain to another, then they have each transgressed a Torah prohibition. If one of them is able to lift the furniture by himself but the other is unable to do so, the one who is able to carry it on his own has transgressed a Torah prohibition, while the one who helped but would not have been able to carry it on his own has transgressed a rabbinic prohibition only (MT 1:16).2<i class="footnote">Some maintain that if two people performed a <em>melakha</em> together, they are exempt from bringing a sin offering, but they are nevertheless guilty of transgressing a Torah prohibition (<em>Mekor Ḥayim</em><em>Be’er Yitzḥak</em>, OḤ 14). However, most <em>poskim</em> maintain that it is a rabbinic prohibition (<em>Avnei Nezer</em>, YD 393:9-10; <em>Yabi’a Omer</em>, OḤ 5:32:7. Also see SSK ch. 1 n. 86).</i>
  The practical difference between a Torah prohibition and a rabbinic prohibition is that when in doubt about a Torah prohibition one must be stringent, while when in doubt about a rabbinic prohibition one may be lenient. Furthermore, in cases of need, when one is uncertain whether he may perform a certain action, he may perform it with a shinui. By doing so, the doubt now relates to a rabbinic prohibition, and therefore one may be lenient. (See sections 11-12 below, about the case of a shvut di-shvut [double rabbinic prohibition] when a mitzva is at stake or under pressing circumstances.)
  
  Section 4
  
  The Principles of the Melakhot / The Principles Underlying Rabbinic Enactments and Decrees Regarding Shabbat
  The Sages instituted numerous enactments concerning Shabbat in order to erect a protective fence around the Torah. They prohibited taking medication lest one grind up ingredients to produce them (below 28:4); they prohibited riding on animals and using trees so that none would come to break off a branch (below 19:7; 20:1); they prohibited setting aside terumot (priestly gifts) and ma’aser (tithes) because this resembles allocating the teruma and making the fruits usable (below 22:5); they prohibited playing musical instruments so that people would not come to fix their instruments (below 22:17); and they prohibited asking a non-Jew to do melakha for Jews (below 25:1). They also ruled that one may not benefit from a melakha that was performed on Shabbat in a forbidden manner (below 26:1).
  The Sages also enacted other ordinances whose purpose is to preserve the spirit of Shabbat as a day of rest and holiness. They ordained that on Shabbat, one should not speak of mundane business matters, nor inspect one’s fields or factories. They established that one should not prepare for the upcoming weekdays on Shabbat (below 22:9-10; 22:15). They instituted that one should not walk quickly on Shabbat, as one does during the week (22:7), and that one refrain from measuring things in the way that one does during the week (22:6). They further decreed that all objects that have not been designated for Shabbat use are considered muktzeh and may not be moved. This is to prevent one from spending his time on Shabbat organizing his home or garage, thus rendering Shabbat like a weekday (below 23:1).
  The rabbinic prohibitions of doing melakha with a shinui or together with another person are also based on these same two reasons: to ensure that people not mistakenly violate the melakha in the normal fashion and to preserve the spirit of Shabbat.
  The Sages did not add prohibitions to those of the Torah on their own. The Torah itself commands us to institute safeguards, in the verse: “You shall keep My injunctions (u-shmartem et mishmarti)” (Vayikra 18:30), upon which the Sages comment: “Make a safeguard for My injunctions” (asu mishmeret le-mishmarti) (Yevamot 21a). The Torah also instructs the Sages to enact ordinances for the Jews in order to give expression to the Torah’s goals, as is written: “Ask your father, he will inform you; your elders, they will tell you” (Devarim 32:7). Furthermore, we are commanded to obey these ordinances, as is written: “You must not deviate from the verdict that they tell to you, either to the right or to the left” (ibid. 17:11; see Shabbat 23a). The reason for this is that the written Torah is eternal; it is meant only to delineate general principles. In order for us to be able to observe the Torah in practice, the Sages were commanded to establish a framework for its mitzvot by instituting safeguards and decrees based on the principles laid down in the written Torah.
  So it is with regard to Shabbat. We are prohibited from doing melakha so that we rest and stop working, as it is written: “but on the seventh day, cease” (Shemot 34:21), and “You shall not do any melakha – you, your son or your daughter, your male or female slave, your ox or your ass, or any of you cattle, or the stranger in your settlements, so that your male and female slave may rest as you do.” (Devarim 5:14). If one were allowed to do all his work with a shinui, he would never “cease from labor,” and if he were allowed to move muktzeh items, he would never rest. In order to prevent this scenario, the Sages prohibited performing melakhot with a shinui and moving muktzeh items (See Ramban to Vayikra 23:24; MT 21:1 and 24:12).
  The mandate to enact decrees was given to the Beit Din Ha-gadol (the high Jewish court that functioned in earlier times; the Sanhedrin), which was made up of 71 sages and held court near the Mishkan or Temple. This court was established by Moshe and continued to function until after the destruction of the Second Temple. All its members were ordained in an unbroken chain that stretched back to Moshe. The entire Jewish people is bound by the ordinances of this Beit Din, as the Torah states: “You shall act in accordance with what they tell you from the place that God shall choose, and scrupulously carry out whatever they instruct; you shall act in accordance with the Torah they instruct you and the sentence handed to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they tell you either to the right or to the left” (Devarim 17:10-11).
  
  Section 5
  
  The Principles of the Melakhot / Davar She-eino Mitkaven and Psik Reisha
  If one wishes to engage in a permissible activity, but in the course of doing so might also perform a prohibited action, he may undertake the permitted action on two conditions: that he does not intend to perform the action, and that the permitted action will not inevitably result on the prohibited action. Thus, one may drag a bed or couch on the ground on Shabbat even though the legs will probably create furrows in the ground (an act of Ḥoresh), since the furrows are made unintentionally and it is not certain that furrows will be created at all. Similarly, one may walk on the grass even if grass will likely be uprooted, because he does not intend for this to happen, and it will not necessarily happen at all. This type of situation is called davar she-eino mitkaven (an unintended act).
  However, if it is clear that by dragging the bench a furrow will definitely be made in the ground, then one may not drag the bench (below 19:2). Similarly, if it is clear that by walking in a particular area, grass will definitely be uprooted, one may not walk there (below 19:8). As long as it is clear that during the performance of a permitted action, a prohibited one will definitely be performed, one cannot maintain that he did not intend for it to happen. Rather, it is as if he intentionally performed the prohibited action. However, it is only a Torah prohibition if one is interested in the result of the forbidden action; if he is not interested in the result, the prohibition is rabbinic.
  The Sages tell further us that one may not close the door to his home when there is a deer inside (Shabbat 106b). He cannot claim that he wished only to close the door but not to trap the deer, since it is clear that by closing the door he has trapped the deer. Thus, it is as if he intentionally trapped it. This scenario is akin to one who cuts off the head of a bird so a child can play with it claiming that he did not intend to kill the bird but only cut off its head. This claim is insubstantial; it is clear that he meant to kill the bird, an act that is prohibited by the Torah. About this paradigmatic example the Talmud asks rhetorically: “psik reisha ve-lo yamut?” – “Its head is detached – will it not die?” (Shabbat 75a; MT 1:5-6; Kesef Mishneh ad loc.). This principle has thus come to be known as “psik reisha.”
  These principles are not exclusive to Shabbat. Rather, regarding all Torah prohibitions, the rule is that davar she-eino mitkaven is permitted, while psik reisha is forbidden.3<i class="footnote">In R. Yehuda’s opinion, <em>davar she-eino mitkaven</em> is rabbinically prohibited, which means that even if it is not certain that a <em>melakha</em> will be performed, and the person’s intent is to perform a permitted action, it is still forbidden if the person would benefit from the unintentional <em>melakha</em>. In R. Shimon’s opinion, since he intends to perform a permitted action, and it is not certain that a <em>melakha</em> will accompany this action, it is permitted (<em>Beitza</em> 23a). In the Gemara, Rav follows the opinion of R. Yehuda while Shmuel follows R. Shimon. Abaye states in Rabba’s name that the <em>halakha </em>follows R. Shimon, and a <em>davar she-eino mitkaven</em> is permitted (<em>Shabbat</em> 22a), even in the case of a Torah prohibition (<em>Shabbat</em> 46b). This principle – that we follow R. Shimon’s opinion – applies to all Torah prohibitions. This is also the opinion of <em>Tosafot</em> (<em>Shabbat </em>75a, s.v. “mitasek”), Rashba, Rosh 14:9, and Ran. However<em>, She’iltot</em> maintains that the <em>halakha</em> follows R. Shimon only in the case of Shabbat, because on Shabbat only <em>melekhet maḥshevet</em> is prohibited by Torah law (quoted in <em>Tosafot</em> to <em>Shabbat </em>110b, s.v. “Talmud”).When it is almost certain that the prohibited action will take place, some still permit performing the permitted action because the forbidden result still falls under the category of <em>davar she-eino mitkaven</em> (Me’ iri, Ritva, Rivash); others maintain that in such a case it is rabbinically prohibited (<em>Terumat Ha-deshen</em> §64, Maharsha quoted in BHL 277:1, s.v. “shema”). If it is clear that the prohibited action will occur barring unforeseen circumstances, all agrees that it is forbidden by Torah law.Psik reisha on a rabbinic prohibition is forbidden according to most poskim. Thus one may not drag a bench that would definitely make a furrow, even though the furrow is being made with a shinui, which means the prohibition is intrinsically rabbinic (MA 314:5, and also implied by Tosafot, Ramban, Ritva, Rosh, and SA 337:1; this is also the opinion of Eliya Rabba, Tosefet Shabbat, Gra, SAH 337:1 and 3, Ḥayei Adam 30:2, R. Akiva Eger, Ben Ish Ḥai, Year 2, Va’era 6, MB 314:11 and 316:18, and SHT ad loc. 21). However, some rule leniently in such a case (Terumat Ha-deshen, Me’ iri, Maharsham). Their opinion is sometimes taken into account when there are other reasons to be permissive as well (see Yabi’a Omer 4:34; Menuḥat Ahava 2:1:6).Psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei – where the unintentional result is not desired: According to Arukh and several other Rishonim, davar she-eino mitkaven includes performing a permitted action that will inevitably result in a melakha, if one is unhappy with (or indifferent about) the result of the melakha. However, we do not entertain this possibility in the case of cutting off a bird’s head. Even if he claims that he is not pleased with the bird’s death, either we do not believe him, or we regard his outlook as null given how most people think. But when the result is really unwanted, according to Arukh it is considered a davar she-eino mitkaven and is permitted. The vast majority of poskim maintain that such an act is still rabbinically prohibited, but Arukh’s position can be used to justify ruling leniently when there are additional reasons to be lenient as well.Psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei on a rabbinic prohibition: In such a case, there is a difference of opinion among the poskim, and as a result, we are lenient in times of need (MB 316:5, 321:57; see Yabi’a Omer 5:27:1, which maintains that the majority of poskim permit this). In any case, this is an example of shvut di-shvut, and we are lenient in such a case for the sake of a mitzva or a great need (see sections 11-12 below). Psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei in a case of a double rabbinic prohibition is permitted le-khatḥila according to most poskim (Pri Megadim, Eshel Avraham 316:7; Dagul Mei-rvava §340; below 18:3:2; however, it seems that MB 340:17 is stringent).Safek psik reisha: May one shut the door to his house when he is unsure if there is a deer inside? May one open a refrigerator when he is unsure whether the refrigerator light was disabled before Shabbat? Some poskim permit such actions, categorizing them as davar she-eino mitkaven (Taz 316:3); others forbid them, as the safek concerns an already-existing situation, and one must be stringent in the case of a safek de-Oraita (R. Akiva Eger). However, when necessary we are lenient. If the prohibition is rabbinic, one may certainly be lenient, as we are with rabbinic prohibitions in cases of uncertainty (see BHL 316:3, s.v. “ve-lakhen”).There are certain actions whose permitted or forbidden nature is determined solely by the intention of the person performing the action. If he intends to perform a forbidden action it is forbidden, while if he intends to perform a permitted action it is permitted. See below 15:10 for the case of aromatic branches, and see Harḥavot 9:5:9 regarding filling a hot pot with cold water.</i>
  
  Section 6
  
  The Principles of the Melakhot / Melakha She-eina Tzerikha Le-gufah
  As we have learned, there is a special principle that applies on Shabbat prohibiting only melekhet maḥshevet, a melakha done intentionally and thoughtfully. In this context, a disagreement arose among the Tanna’im concerning a case in which one intends to perform a certain act, but not for the sake of the object (le-gufo) upon which the melakha is performed. For example, extinguishing a fire le-gufo means extinguishing a fire in order to produce coals or so that the wick ignites more readily the next time. In both cases, the extinguishing itself achieves the desired effect. In contrast, if one extinguishes a candle in order to save oil, or because the light disturbs him, he has not done the melakha because he wants to extinguish the fire, but rather because he does not want the flame to continue burning. Thus, the melakha is she-lo le-tzorekh gufah (not for its own sake). R. Shimon maintains that since this melakha was not undertaken for its own sake, it is only prohibited rabbinically. According to R. Yehuda, however, even when one’s goal is not the melakha itself, since in fact he intended to put out the flame, he performed the melakha and transgressed a Torah prohibition (Shabbat 31b; 93b; below 16:5).
  Another case: One who digs a hole in order to lay the foundation of a house has performed the melakha of Boneh, and one who digs a hole to plant a tree has performed the melakha of Ḥoresh. Yet if one digs a hole because he needs the dirt, he has performed the melakha by digging, but not for the sake of the digging itself. In R. Shimon’s opinion, since his intention was to remove dirt and not to dig a hole, he has transgressed a rabbinic prohibition but not a Torah prohibition; according to R. Yehuda, since he did intend to dig, he has transgressed a Torah prohibition.
  Although all agree that one may not perform a melakha even if it is she-eina le-tzorekh gufah, there is an important ramification of this difference of opinion. If melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah is forbidden rabbinically, then there are instances when it would be permitted, whereas if it is prohibited by Torah law, there would be no grounds for leniency.
  The vast majority of poskim rule that a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah is rabbinically prohibited (R. Hai Gaon, Rabbeinu Ḥananel, Ramban, Rashba, and Rosh). However, since some are stringent (Rambam, MT 1:7), and since the only difference between this action and an action that is prohibited by Torah law is the intent that informs it, melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah is considered more serious than other rabbinic prohibitions.4<i class="footnote">SA 316:8 and 334:27 cite the opinion of most <em>poskim</em> anonymously, and then cite Rambam’s opinion by name, indicating that the ruling is in accordance with the majority of the <em>poskim</em> (MB 334:85 and <em>Yabi’a Omer</em>, 4:23:1 rule similarly). However, we are more stringent when it comes to a <em>melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah</em> than with other rabbinic prohibitions, since the performance of such an action is identical to the performance of a Torah prohibition. The only difference is in one’s intention (<em>Tosafot</em>, <em>Shabbat</em> 46b, s.v. “de-khol”; SHT 278:4).The difference between <em>psik reisha</em> and <em>melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah</em> is that in the former, the person is interested in the prohibited result, and therefore it is forbidden by Torah law, while in the case of a <em>melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah</em> he is not interested in the forbidden result. This is why according to most <em>poskim</em>, a <em>melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah</em> is only rabbinically prohibited. Therefore, in all cases of <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em>, the prohibition is only rabbinic. However, if one cuts off the head of a bird, he cannot claim that he is unhappy with the bird’s death, as that would be disingenuous. This is the position of <em>Tosafot</em> (<em>Shabbat</em> 103a, s.v. “be-ar’a”) and Rambam (as quoted in the commentary of Rabbeinu Peraḥya on <em>Shabbat</em> 42a). One can further explain that in the case of <em>psik reisha</em> the permitted activity is secondary to the forbidden one and therefore nullified, while a <em>melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah</em> there is not nullified. Therefore, R. Shimon rules that the prohibition is rabbinic. One can further explain that a <em>melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah</em> consists entirely of one action, so when performed for permitted ends, his objectives cancel the intention to do something prohibited. However, a <em>psik reisha</em> produces two distinct results, so one’s intent to achieve the permitted result does not cancel out the prohibited second result. See <em>Harḥavot</em> 9:6:6.</i>
  
  Section 7
  
  The Principles of the Melakhot / Kilkul
  The Torah only prohibits melakhot whose purposes are constructive, like the “melekhet maḥshevet” of the Mishkan. Accordingly, one who performs a melakha in a destructive or ruinous manner (derekh kilkul) has not transgressed a Torah prohibition, but only a rabbinic prohibition. This is the meaning of the Sages’ statement: “All who destroy are exempt” (m. Shabbat 13:3). Whenever the term patur (exempt) is used in Masekhet Shabbat it means that one who performs the action is exempt from the punishment mentioned in the Torah, but the act remains forbidden rabbinically (Shabbat 3a).
  Thus, one who tears in order to sew transgresses a Torah prohibition, whereas one who tears without the intention of sewing transgresses a rabbinic prohibition (below 13:11); one who dismantles a house or tool in order to refurbish it transgresses a Torah prohibition, while one who dismantles something without intending to rebuild it transgresses a rabbinic prohibition (below 15:1); one who erases letters in order to write others in their place transgresses a Torah prohibition, while one who erases without intent to write transgresses a rabbinic prohibition (below 18:1).
  One who lights a fire in order to cook, to supply heat or light, or because he needs the ash, transgresses a Torah prohibition, while one who lights a fire to destroy something transgresses a rabbinic prohibition (Shabbat 106a; MT 12:1; below 16:1); one who kills an animal for its meat or skins transgresses a Torah prohibition, while one who kills an animal simply to be destructive transgresses a rabbinic prohibition. So one who steps on ants or kills mosquitoes transgresses a rabbinic prohibition, as there is nothing constructive about this action (below 20:8).5<i class="footnote">According to Rambam, one who takes revenge on another person and injures him has transgressed a Torah prohibition; since he has placated his evil inclination with this act, it is deemed a productive activity. However, Raavad maintains that since this action is not really productive, the prohibition is only rabbinic (MT 11:1; MB 316:30). See <em>Harḥavot</em> 20:9:2 regarding the destructive act of causing a wound.</i>
  
  Section 8
  
  The Principles of the Melakhot / Kiyum
  The Torah prohibits melakha on Shabbat only when the result is lasting (mitkayem). If it is not lasting, there is no Torah prohibition. Therefore, one who writes with a pencil or pen on paper transgresses a Torah prohibition, since this writing will last for a long time. However, if one writes with fruit juice whose color fades quickly, or on a leaf that will soon dry out and crumble, then the prohibition is rabbinic. Similarly, writing in sand or in the condensation on a window is rabbinically prohibited since it does not last (below 18:2, 4).
  Along the same lines, one who ties a durable knot that will hold for an extended period of time transgresses a Torah prohibition, while one who ties a temporary knot that will not last long transgresses a rabbinic prohibition. A very loose knot that is easily undone and has absolutely no permanence, like a single knot or the knot of a tie, is not prohibited at all, since it is easily untied (below 13:13). The same applies to the melakha of Boneh: if one affixes a hook to the wall in a permanent way, he transgresses a Torah prohibition, while one who affixes it temporarily transgresses a rabbinic prohibition (below 15:3).
  
  Section 9
  
  The Principles of the Melakhot / Grama
  The Sages learn from the verse, “You shall not do any melakha” (Shemot 20:10), that the Torah prohibits the actual performance of a melakha, but if the melakha is done automatically, even if a person caused it to be done, it is considered grama (causation), and it is not prohibited by the Torah. In cases of great necessity, one may use grama to achieve the result of a melakha. For example, if a fire is spreading, one may surround the fire with containers filled with water so that when the fire reaches them, the containers will burst open and the water inside them will pour out, putting out the fire (Shabbat 120b; SA 334:22). All agree that grama is permitted only in exceptional circumstances: to avoid loss, in service of a mitzva, or for some other great need. Barring these circumstances, one may not cause melakha to be done on Shabbat (Rema 334:22).
  There are some melakhot whose normal matter of performance is through grama, and so one who performs them, even though grama, is liable. For example, Zoreh (winnowing) is a Torah prohibition even though the separation of grain from chaff is accomplished by the wind; tossing the mixture in the air is merely a grama, yet this is the normal way of performing the melakha (see BK 60a). Similarly, one who places a pot on the fire transgresses a Torah prohibition even though he is only causing the food to be cooked by the fire, since that is the normal way people cook. In other words, grama is relevant only when the melakha is performed in an unusual manner. In such a case, if the melakha is performed via an indirect action, there is no Torah prohibition, and one may use this method in cases of great necessity.
  In general, if an action looks like the result of direct human action, it is attributed to the person performing it, and it is prohibited by Torah law. When it is not obvious that his deeds are causing the action, but only that he is indirectly causing the melakha to be done, this is considered grama. For example, if one removes a dam that had been holding back water and the water that is released performs a melakha, if that melakha takes place close at hand it is called ko’aḥ rishon (firsthand force), and the person who performed the initial action is held completely responsible for the melakha. But if the melakha happens at a distance, it is called ko’aḥ sheni (secondhand force), and is considered grama. Along the same lines, if the melakha is done immediately after the causative action, it is considered a direct action and is prohibited by Torah law, while if the person’s initiative leads to a melakha being performed only after some time has passed, it is considered grama. 
  Regardless, if the normal way to perform the melakha – even during weekdays – is by causation, where the initial action is separated from its eventual result by a physical distance or a period of time, this is not considered grama, as this is how the melakha is normally performed. Rather, this is direct melakha and it is prohibited by Torah law. Grama always refers to causing melakha to be performed in an unusual way.6<i class="footnote">Some <em>poskim</em> permit <em>grama</em> even <em>le-khatḥila</em> on Shabbat (<em>Taz</em> 514:10 and Vilna Gaon 314). Many others permit it only in case of loss, for the sake of a mitzva, in a case of great need, or for the needs of the ill (Rabbeinu Yoel; <em>Mordechai</em>; Rema 334:22; MA). On Yom Tov, though, many permit <em>grama</em> even <em>le-khatḥila</em> (<em>Ma’amar Mordechai</em>; SHT 514:31).The parameters of <em>grama</em> are explained in <em>San</em>. 77b. If one ties up another person and then drowns him by unleashing water that had been restrained by a dam, he is guilty of murder. However, this is only true if the water killed him with <em>ko’aḥ rishon</em>; if it is a case of <em>ko’aḥ sheni</em>, the crime is merely <em>grama</em>. Similarly, in <em>Ḥullin</em> 16a we read that if one unleashes water whose flow turns a wheel attached to a knife that is poised at an animal’s throat, thus slaughtering the animal, the <em>sheḥita</em> (ritual slaughter) is kosher as long as it is a case of <em>ko’aḥ</em> <em>rishon</em>. This is because the removal of the dam is considered the act of slaughter. However, if the water that turned the wheel was a result of <em>ko’aḥ</em> <em>sheni</em>, the <em>sheḥita</em> was accomplished by <em>grama</em>, and the animal’s meat is deemed <em>neveila</em> (not properly slaughtered) and thus forbidden to eat. Rashi explains that when the <em>melakha </em>is slightly removed from the initial action, it is considered <em>ko’aḥ</em> <em>sheni</em>. Ramah maintains that water that flows directly is <em>ko’aḥ</em> <em>rishon</em>, while water that was delayed on the way to performing the <em>melakha </em>because of an obstacle in its path is <em>ko’aḥ</em> <em>sheni</em>. Similarly, water that flows immediately from where it had been dammed up is considered a result of <em>ko’aḥ</em> <em>rishon</em>, while any later flow is considered <em>ko’aḥ</em> <em>sheni</em>. In <em>Sanhedrin</em>, further explanations are offered. If one throws a stone into the air, and the stone falls straight down and causes damage, this is considered indirect damage; the stone fell on its own, due to the force of gravity, rather than the action of the thrower. But if the stone moved sideways as it fell, he is considered responsible; even though it fell because of gravity, nevertheless the fact that it did not fall straight down demonstrates the impact of his action.</i>
  
  Section 10
  
  The Principles of the Melakhot / Children, Non-Jews, and Animals
  In addition to the prohibition of doing melakha on Shabbat, we are also enjoined to allow our entire household to rest – children, servants, and animals – as is written: “You shall not do any melakha – you, your son or your daughter, your male or female slave, your ox or your ass, or any of your cattle, or the stranger in your settlements – so that your male and female slave may rest as you do” (Devarim 5:14).
  Thus we see that in addition to the rabbinic obligation to educate children toward mitzva observance, there is also a Torah obligation to make sure that no melakha is done on Shabbat by a child (below, ch. 24).
  Similarly, the Torah prohibits allowing one’s non-Jewish servant do melakha. In order to understand the significance of this, we must first explain that according to the Torah, a non-Jewish servant who is acquired by a Jew must undergo conversion, after which he must keep all of the mitzvot except for time-bound positive ones. Should his master decide to free him, he becomes a normal Jew, obligated in all of the commandments including time-bound positive ones. Therefore, even while he is a servant, since he has undergone conversion he is obligated by Torah law to keep Shabbat. The Torah further requires the master to supervise his servant and make sure that he does not work on Shabbat.
  If a servant has not undergone conversion, he is not obligated to keep Shabbat. He may do melakha for his own benefit, but not on a Jew’s behalf. The Torah decrees that just as the Jew must rest, he must also not request that his servant perform melakha for him on Shabbat, as the Torah states: “That the son of your servant and the stranger may be refreshed” (Shemot 23:12). The Sages explain that this refers to a servant who has not undergone conversion.7<i class="footnote">em&gt;Yevamot 48b; SA 304:1; MB <em>ad loc</em>. 1, 15. There is a disagreement regarding the status of a <em>ger toshav</em>, a non-Jew who takes upon himself the seven Noahide commandments. Rashi and <em>Tosafot</em><em>Yevamot</em> 48b, citing the verse, “on the seventh day you shall cease from labor, in order that…your bondman and the stranger (<em>ger</em>) may be refreshed” (Shemot 23:12), maintain that even though the <em>ger</em> mentioned here is a non-Jew and thus may work on Shabbat, it is forbidden by Torah law for a Jew to ask a <em>ger</em><em>toshav</em> to do <em>melakha</em> for him on Shabbat. However, according to Rosh <em>ad loc</em>. and Rambam (MT 20:14), the Torah prohibition is relevant only if the non-Jew has been hired by the Jew to work or if he is the Jew’s servant. However, a <em>ger toshav</em> who is not in his employ is like any other non-Jew. Thus, according to Torah law, one may ask him to do <em>melakha</em>, but rabbinic law forbids it. (<em>Smag</em><em>Lo Ta’aseh</em> 75 is the lone voice that maintains that one may not ask a non-Jew to do <em>melakha</em> on Shabbat according to Torah law. <em>Beit Yosef</em> quotes this at the end of §245.)</i>
  The Sages also forbade a Jew to ask a non-Jew to do melakha for him on Shabbat, with occasional exceptions in cases of rabbinic prohibitions (below, sections 11-12 and ch. 25).
  The Torah also prohibits having melakha done by one’s animals (below, ch. 20). However, one’s inanimate possessions do not need to “rest” on Shabbat. Therefore, a Jew may lend items to a non-Jew for doing melakha on Shabbat, as long as it will not appear as if the non-Jew is acting on the Jew’s behalf (Shabbat 19a, following Beit Hillel; SA 246:1-3).
  
  Section 11
  
  The Principles of the Melakhot / Shvut Di-shvut for the Sake of a Mitzva or Great Necessity
  The prohibition of asking a non-Jew to do melakha on Shabbat, like other rabbinic prohibitions, is called a shvut. There is a disagreement among the poskim whether the Sages permit transgressing such a prohibition in order to enable the performance of a mitzva. For example, if the lights go out on Friday night, and it will be impossible to enjoy the Shabbat meal or to learn Torah, may one ask a non-Jew to turn on the lights?
  According to Itur, whenever a mitzva is involved, the Sages permit asking a non-Jew to perform melakha. However, according to Rambam and most poskim, one may not ask a non-Jew to do a melakha that is forbidden by Torah law, even for the sake of a mitzva. They agree that one may ask a non-Jew to perform a rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzva. In other words, the Sages did not permit transgressing a shvut even to enable the performance of a mitzva, but they did permit transgressing a shvut di-shvut. It can be helpful to think of a shvut as half a Torah prohibition and a shvut di-shvut as a quarter of a Torah prohibition, since it is prohibited only by combining two rabbinic safeguards.
  In practice, one may engage in a shvut di-shvut for the sake of a mitzva. Thus, if a brit must be performed on Shabbat, and there is no mila knife at the location, one may ask a non-Jew to bring the knife through a karmelit (where carrying on Shabbat is rabbinically forbidden), because this action is a shvut di-shvut for the sake of a mitzva. The prohibition of asking a non-Jew to do melakha is rabbinic, and the prohibition to carry in a karmelit is also rabbinic. However, one may not ask a non-Jew to carry the knife through a reshut ha-rabim, because one may not violate a normal shvut even for the sake of a mitzva. There is another solution for the problem of transporting the mila knife. The non-Jew may be asked to carry the knife with a shinui, thus creating a case of shvut di-shvut, since the prohibition of asking the non-Jew to do melakha is rabbinic, and the prohibition of carrying with a shinui is also rabbinic (see below, 24:4).
  According to most poskim, for the sake of a mitzva even a Jew may violate a shvut di-shvut. For example, if one needs to bring a knife through a karmelit to perform a brit and no non-Jew is available to do so, a Jew may carry the knife with a shinui so that the action becomes a shvut di-shvut. To be sure, some are stringent and forbid this; but in practice, if it is necessary to enable the performance of a mitzva, even a Jew may perform a shvut di-shvut.
  Just as a shvut di-shvut is permitted for the sake of a mitzva, it is also permitted in a case of minor illness (SA 307:5) and in order to avoid a substantial monetary loss (MB 307:22). 
  Shvut di-shvut may not be incorporated into one’s normal Shabbat routine.8<i class="footnote"><em>Eruvin</em> 67b states that one may tell a non-Jew to bring hot water for a <em>brit</em> through an area without an <em>eruv</em>. There are three opinions as to why this is permitted. According to <em>Itur</em> (quoted by Ran at the end of <em>Shabbat</em>, ch. 19) the non-Jew is asked to carry in the public domain. This is prohibited by Torah law for a Jew, but is permitted here because violating a <em>shvut</em> is permitted for the sake of a mitzva. However, according to Rambam (MT 6:9-10), the non-Jew is asked to carry in a <em>karmelit</em>, which is only rabbinically prohibited even for a Jew. Thus we see that a <em>shvut di-shvut</em> is permitted for the sake of a mitzva or for the sake of one who is slightly ill. According to <em>Tosafot</em> (BK 80b) the leniency in the case of a <em>shvut di-shvut</em> is only in the case of a <em>brit</em> because it is a particularly important mitzva (and violating a single <em>shvut</em> is permitted for the supremely important mitzva of settling the Land of Israel), but the leniency of <em>shvut di-shvut</em> is not relevant when it comes to other <em>mitzvot</em>.In practice, SA 307:5 rules according to Rambam and allows one to transgress a <em>shvut di-shvut</em> in the case of a minor illness, a great need, or for the sake of a mitzva. MA explains that “a great need” refers to a great monetary loss.Nevertheless, some poskim rule stringently, maintaining that one may not ask a non-Jew to perform a Torah prohibition with a shinui (see Be’er Yitzḥak §14). But in practice, when it is necessary we are lenient. (See MA ad loc.; MB 340:3; SSK ch. 30 n. 49, following R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach. The latter adds that according to Eshel Avraham 307:5, even if the non-Jew then performs the melakha in the normal fashion, the Jew may still benefit from it, since he requested that the non-Jew do it with a shinui.)Some prohibit a Jew from transgressing a shvut di-shvut even for the sake of a mitzva. They maintain that the entire leniency discussed (Eruvin 67b) is relevant only to asking a non-Jew to perform a melakha, because this does not require that a Jew take direct action (Pri Megadim, Eshel Avraham 307:7; Maharam Schick, OḤ §121). However, most poskim rule leniently even for a Jew in the case of shvut di-shvut (Ha-elef Lekha Shlomo §146; Maharam Brisk 2:64-66; Livyat Ḥen §35). Since the prohibition is rabbinic, the law follows those who are lenient.It is important to emphasize that one should not make regular use of the leniency of shvut di-shvut. It should be used only occasionally, in cases of true necessity.</i>
  
  Section 12
  
  The Principles of the Melakhot / Shvut for an Important Mitzva or for the Public Good
  As we have seen, according to most poskim one may not violate a shvut even for the sake of a mitzva, while according to Itur one may do so. The halakha follows the majority. However, when the mitzva in question has a communal nature, one may rely on Itur in certain cases. Such cases include a situation in which the local eruv has become invalid, and if it is not fixed, many will violate the prohibition of carrying. In such a case one may ask a non-Jew to fix the eruv, even if doing so involves performing melakha that is prohibited by Torah law (MB 276:25).
  Some say that even though one may, under pressing circumstances and for the public good, violate the shvut of telling a non-Jew to perform a melakha, a Jew still may not perform a rabbinically prohibited melakha for the sake of a public mitzva. Others maintain that if it is truly necessary – in a case of great need as well as a communal mitzva – then a Jew may transgress a shvut. For example, in the case above in which the eruv is down, if there is no non-Jew available to fix it and, if it is left as is, many people will carry on Shabbat, a Jew may fix the eruv, using a tie knot if possible (see 29:8 below). This is the custom in practice.9<i class="footnote">. <em>Behag</em>, Rashba, and Rabbeinu Yehonatan agree with <em>Itur</em>. Rema 276:2 attempts to find some justification for the actions of those who ask a non-Jew to light a candle for them to illuminate the Friday night meal (an action that is prohibited by Torah law), by assuming that they are relying on <em>Itur</em>, which permits transgressing the <em>shvut</em> of asking a non-Jew to do <em>melakha</em> if it is for the sake of a mitzva. However, this is not Rema’s ruling in practice, as AHS explains in 276:13, and as we see from MB 276:24. But in the case of a communal need, according to many <em>poskim</em> one may rely on <em>Itur</em>. Thus <em>Ḥayei Adam</em> 62:11 cites <em>Panim Me’irot</em> 1:30, which states that one may ask a non-Jew to fix the <em>eruv</em> even if doing so entails transgressing a Torah prohibition, in order to avoid mass Shabbat desecration. This is quoted as the <em>halakha</em> in MB 276:25, and this is the custom in practice. Similarly, if the electricity goes off in the synagogue on Friday night in the middle of prayers, one may ask a non-Jew to turn the lights back on for the good of the community. If there are two non-Jews present, it is preferable to ask one of them to ask his friend to perform the <em>melakha</em>, because some maintain that such a case is considered a <em>shvut di-shvut</em> (see MB 307:24). If one offers the non-Jew something to eat so that when he turns on the light he himself will benefit, then this is permitted even <em>le-khatḥila</em>. (Also see below 25:4.)Even though we rely on <em>Itur</em> when it is necessary for the good of the community and permit the <em>shvut</em> of asking a non-Jew to do <em>melakha</em> for us, we do not permit a Jew to perform a rabbinic <em>melakha</em> directly (MB 276:21). However, in a time of great need, when there is no non-Jew available, and it is for the sake of a communal mitzva, some allow a Jew to transgress a <em>shvut</em> directly. This is recorded in <em>Responsa Mahari Ashkenazi</em> §13; <em>Panim Me’irot</em> 1:30; <em>Sho’el U-meshiv</em> 2:1:89. SSK 17:34 rules leniently in the case of a Jew fixing an <em>eruv</em> by using a tie knot, an act that is only rabbinically prohibited. (By fixing the <em>eruv</em>, one forms a <em>meḥitza</em> [wall] that permits carrying, and forming such a wall is rabbinically prohibited; see below 15:4; 29:8.)If there is the possibility of an exceedingly great loss, the poskim permit telling a non-Jew to perform a Torah prohibition to prevent a Jew from desecrating Shabbat himself (MB 307:69). There are also situations in which they allow a Jew himself to transgress a rabbinic prohibition in order to avoid a great loss, such as carrying money with a shinui (Rema 301:33; SA 334:2). In contrast, when it comes to putting out a fire and everything connected to it, they are stringent, out of concern that leniency in such a case would encourage people to actually put out fire on Shabbat (see below, 16:5:1).If masses are at risk of injury, one may extinguish a burning coal in a public thoroughfare (SA 334:27; below 16:8). One may also kill an animal whose bite causes great pain (SA 316:10; below 20:10).</i>
  The Sages further permitted violating a shvut in order to preserve kevod ha-briyot (human dignity). For example, if one uses the bathroom but has nothing with which to wipe himself, it would be extremely embarrassing if he were to simply refrain from wiping. Because of this, the Sages allow one who finds himself in such a situation to use a muktzeh item or to tear toilet paper with a shinui, both of which are normally rabbinic prohibitions (SA 312:1; MB 12; below 13:11).
  There is one special mitzva for which everyone agrees that one may violate a shvut le-khatḥila, even when there is no great need. This is the mitzva of settling the Land of Israel, and the leniency exists on account of its tremendous importance. If a Jew has the opportunity to buy a house in Israel from a non-Jew on Shabbat, he may ask the non-Jew to write up the contract on Shabbat and make sure that it is registered by the courts, as well as show the non-Jew where his money is and allow him to take the money that is coming to him. He may do so even in order to buy a small room of four square amot (one ama is 45.6 cm). Buying property from a non-Jew in Eretz Yisrael constitutes a fulfillment of the mitzva of settling the land and benefits the entire Jewish people (Ramban on Shabbat 130b; Rivash §387; SA 306:11; MB ad loc. 45-47).10<i class="footnote">Explaining the special permission granted to desecrate Shabbat in order to buy a home in the Land of Israel (permission that is not granted for other <em>mitzvot</em>), Ramban writes: “It is a mitzva that benefits all Jews, that the Holy Land not be desolate” (<em>Shabbat</em> 130b). Rivash §387 expresses similar sentiments. The Sages state that the mitzva of settling the Land is equivalent to all the other <em>mitzvot</em> (<em>Sifrei</em>, Re’eh §53), and this permission gives expression to this idea within a halakhic framework. To be sure, according to <em>Itur</em>, one may transgress a <em>shvut</em> <em>le-khatḥila</em> for the sake of other <em>mitzvot</em> as well, but most <em>poskim</em> limit this leniency to settling the Land, even when there is no public good riding upon it. See <em>Eliya Rabba</em> 306:22, which maintains that even the act of acquisition may be undertaken on Shabbat. However, one may not carry money, since the Jew can simply show the non-Jew where the money is, and the non-Jew can then take it for himself.</i>
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Introduction
  It takes a great deal of effort to prepare food. Animals eat their food raw, in its natural state, but this is insufficient for man, whose nature is far more refined and complex. Man must produce his own food. First he must prepare the ground. He must remove the stones, and then plow, plant, weed, and prune. Yet even after the wheat has ripened, it is still not fit to be eaten. In order to obtain the edible kernels, he must thresh and winnow. Even then, the grains remain inedible until they are cooked. To make bread, he must go further: He must grind the kernels, remove the chaff, sift the flour, knead the dough, and bake it.
  Had Adam not sinned, food preparation would have been effortless and simple. Man would have gone into the field, plucked delicious baked goods and rich foods off the trees, and eaten them (see Kiddushin 82a.). If he felt like it, he could work a bit in the field and season his food to taste. The Sages inform us that in the future, after we have rectified Adam’s sin, we will return to this state (Shabbat 30b). Delicious baked goods and pretty clothes will grow on trees in Eretz Yisrael. But in the meantime, man must toil and struggle in order to produce even a single loaf of bread. This accords with God’s statement to Adam after the sin: “The land is cursed on your account. In sorrow you will eat from it all the days of your life. It will bring forth thorns and thistles for you, and you will eat the plants of the field. By the sweat of your brow you will eat bread until you return to the ground” (Bereishit 3:17-19).
  The sin caused all of nature to deteriorate, and what grows from the earth is often insufficiently pure and evolved to consume in its natural state. Man must perform many steps to turn the earth’s produce into edible food. But on Shabbat we ascend to a level that approaches the World to Come; we connect to a level beyond sin, beyond the need to work in order to improve the world. This enables us to understand the inner significance of all melakhot. With this knowledge we can improve the world.
  There are eleven melakhot connected to growing food: sowing (Zore’a), plowing (Ḥoresh), reaping (Kotzer), gathering (Me’amer), threshing (Dash), winnowing (Zoreh), separating (Borer), grinding (Toḥen), sifting (Meraked), kneading (Lash), and cooking/baking (Bishul/Ofeh). Three additional melakhot are necessary to produce animal-based foods: trapping (Tzad), slaughtering (Shoḥet), and skinning (Mafshit). We will begin with the melakha of Bishul, as it is most relevant to us today.
  
  Section 2
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / General Principles of Bishul
  Bishul is the melakha that prepares or improves food, whether through seething, baking, or roasting. What defines this melakha is that food is prepared by means of fire’s heat. The food is softened by the heat, and the tastes within it merge to create a new taste, which is intense and contains a variety of flavors.
  Cooking initially softens food, and most foods remain soft after being cooked. However, there are some foods that harden in the course of cooking, like eggs. Similarly, the process of roasting softens the food at first, but eventually makes it tougher.
  Torah law prohibits cooking, and this prohibition even includes foods that can be eaten raw, if cooking improves them in some way. For example, although one can certainly drink cold water, nevertheless, since cooking improves the water, doing so is prohibited by Torah law. Cooking foods that are not improved by this process is not prohibited by Torah law, but it is still prohibited rabbinically (MT 9:3; SHT 318:114).
  One who cooks using fire or something that was heated by fire (toldot ha-esh) transgresses a Torah prohibition. Therefore, if one heats a frying pan on the fire, then turns off the fire and fries an egg in the hot frying pan, he has transgressed a Torah prohibition. This is the case even though the pan was no longer on the fire during the actual frying (SA 318:3; MB ad loc. 17; concerning cooking in the sun, see section 25 below).
  Any accepted form of cooking is prohibited by Torah law. Therefore, one who cooks in a microwave transgresses a Torah prohibition, because nowadays this is one of the normal ways of cooking (Igrot Moshe, OḤ 3:52).
  Before we explain the laws of Bishul in detail, we will preface them by saying that there are three types of prohibitions relevant to Bishul: 1. <i>Bishul</i> by Torah law; 2. Rabbinic enactments that forbid doing anything that might cause someone to turn up a flame (<i>laĥatot ba-geĥalim</i>, literally, “to stir the coals”); 3. Rabbinic enactments that forbid doing anything that resembles cooking. To determine whether one may do a particular action, he must examine it from these three perspectives. To elaborate:
  1. One must clarify if this action is forbidden because it qualifies as <i>Bishul</i>. Any action that leads to food’s transformation from a raw state to a cooked state is prohibited by Torah law. (This prohibition and those deriving from it will be explained in sections 3-13 below.)
  2. From the perspective of the Torah prohibition of <i>Bishul</i>, one may leave food on the fire when Shabbat begins, with the intention that it will continue cooking on Shabbat. However, the Sages prohibit doing so when it may be necessary to adjust the heat, due to the concern that one may forget it is Shabbat and turn up the flame, thus transgressing the Torah prohibitions of <i>Mav’ir</i> and <i>Bishul</i>. But if the fire is covered, as it is in the case of a <i>plata </i>(warming tray), one may place food on it, because there is no chance that he will forget it is Shabbat and turn up the flame.
  3. Even if a food is fully cooked, and thus there is no concern that one will turn up the flame, the Sages still forbid doing anything that looks like cooking. Therefore, one may not put fully-cooked cold food directly on the fire. However, one may put such food far from the heat source, in such a way that it does not look like cooking. (As we will explain in sections 18-21, there is disagreement whether placing food on a <i>plata</i> looks like cooking and is thus forbidden.)
  
  Section 3
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Cooking Is Prohibited, Reheating Cooked Food Is Permitted
  A fundamental rule of the laws of Shabbat is that one may not create a new entity. During the other six days of the week, we emulate God, in whose image we were created, by busying ourselves with creating and developing. We take the raw materials of the world and develop and improve them, thus continuing the work of creation. Just as the Creator ceased creating on Shabbat, so too, we are commanded to emulate God’s attributes by establishing Shabbat as a day of holiness and rest. It is a day when we desist from creating new things, and thus enable ourselves to contemplate the world as God created it and increase our faith.
  This principle is the principle behind Bishul as well. Cooking is forbidden because it changes a food from raw to cooked, thus giving it a new identity. But if the food is already cooked, there is no prohibition of reheating it, as reheating does not create a fundamentally new substance. Even when the reheating improves the taste, it is still not prohibited, following the accepted principle: ein bishul aḥar bishul (there is no prohibition of cooking something that has already been cooked). Therefore, the following question is critical to the laws of Bishul: When is a food deemed cooked? If it is considered cooked, then one may reheat it on Shabbat, and if it is not considered cooked, one may not do so.
  Some of the greatest Rishonim disagree on this question. Some maintain that if the food can be eaten in a pinch, Bishul no longer pertains to it. However, in practice, it is agreed that a food is considered cooked only when it is fully cooked and one could serve it to guests without feeling compelled to apologize. Before that point, even if one could technically eat it in a pinch, it is not considered cooked (SA 318:4). Therefore, in practice, it is important to determine whether a food is mevushal kol tzorkho (fully cooked). As long as it is not mevushal kol tzorkho, any action undertaken to raise its temperature and speed up the cooking process is prohibited by Torah law.
  For example, the heat of a plata is often uneven; there are hotter and cooler places on its surface. One may not move a food that is not yet fully cooked from its current place to a hotter place on the plata. Similarly, one may not put a towel over the food to contain the plata’s heat more effectively. Furthermore, if one removes the cover of a pot in order to check if the food is fully cooked, and it becomes clear that it is not, it is now forbidden to replace the cover, because doing so will make the food cook faster.
  However, if the food is fully cooked, one may move it to a hotter place, and if he took off the cover he may replace it. Furthermore, one may cover the pot with a towel to preserve its heat. One may do so even if it improves the food’s taste, as it does with cholent. Similarly, one may remove fully-cooked meat from the freezer and heat it (in a way that does not resemble cooking; see section 18). For it is an accepted principle that after a food is classified as cooked, it is no longer prohibited to reheat it. (All of this refers to solid foods; liquids involve additional issues that we will expand upon in sections 5-6.)
  Cholent is considered fully cooked even if the bones in it are not soft, and one may cover it to preserve its heat. However, if one is accustomed to eat the bones, then as long as they are not yet cooked the food is not deemed fully cooked, and one may not cover it and preserve the heat.1<i class="footnote">According to Rambam, <em>Teruma</em>, <em>Smag</em>, <em>Smak</em>, <em>Hagahot Maimoniyot</em>, <em>Or Zaru’a</em>, Riva, and <em>Tur</em>, as long as the food is not fully cooked, cooking it is prohibited by Torah law. According to Ramban, Rabbeinu Yona, Rashba, Rosh, and Me’iri, once a food has reached the state of <em>ma’akhal ben Derusa’i</em> (see n. 14), the principle of <em>ein bishul aḥar bishul</em> applies. The bottom line is that, according to SA 318:4, only once a food is fully cooked does the principle apply. BHL 318:4 s.v. “afilu” states that those who prohibit the further cooking of a dish that has reached the state of <em>ma’akhal ben Derusa’i</em> maintain that it is a Torah prohibition. However, <em>Eglei Tal</em>,<em> Ha-ofeh</em> 7:16 maintains that most of those who forbid this see it as a rabbinic prohibition. <em>Be-di’avad</em>, if one cooked something on Shabbat that had reached the state of <em>ma’akhal ben Derusa’i</em> before Shabbat, it may be eaten on Shabbat. This is because when it comes to the question of benefiting from the result of a <em>melakha</em>, one may rely on the lenient opinion (below 26:5).Cholent with chicken bones: According to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, if chicken bones in a cholent are not fully cooked, the whole cholent is considered not fully cooked, since most people eat the chicken bones that were softened by extended cooking. Therefore, even those who do not eat the bones must be stringent and not take any action that will heat cholent that contains partially cooked bones (<em>Minḥat Shlomo </em>§6; SSK 1:20). In contrast, R. Moshe Feinstein maintains that since most people do not eat these bones, one need not take them into account; as long as the cholent as a whole is fully cooked, one no longer has to worry about <em>Bishul</em>. Only in the case of an individual who generally eats the bones would the cholent be considered not fully cooked when the bones are not fully cooked (<em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 4:76-77; <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 318:78). Nowadays, since most people do not eat the bones, the cholent is normally considered cooked even if the bones are not.</i>
  
  Section 4
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Yad Soledet Bo
  A fundamental issue in the laws of Shabbat is establishing the temperature of yad soledet bo (the temperature at which the hand recoils). The Sages state that this is the minimum temperature that is still capable of cooking food. However, it is uncertain precisely what this term refers to. Does it refer to a level of heat that the hand can only stand to touch for a few seconds? If so, this would be approximately 71° Celsius. Alternatively, does it refer to a level of heat that becomes unpleasant for one’s hand after a few minutes? If so, this would be approximately 45°C.
  According to many poskim, since the matter remains in doubt, one must be stringent. Heat of 45°C must be considered capable of cooking. Thus, one may not put raw food into a pot that has reached a temperature of 45°C or higher. Similarly, one may not place raw food near enough to a fire that it could reach 45°C or higher (SSK 1:1).
  This definition is also important for how the laws of Bishul apply to water. One may not raise the temperature of water from below yad soledet bo to yad soledet bo or higher. However, if the water has already reached yad soledet bo, it is considered cooked, and one may continue to heat it further, because of ein bishul aḥar bishul. Cold water may be left near the plata as long as the water is in a place where it would not reach yad soledet bo even if it remained there for an entire day.
  Thus, in practice, one must be careful not to heat water to between 45°C and 71°C; since we do not know the precise temperature of yad soledet bo, any heating in that range may be considered Bishul. But one may heat outside of this range. For example, if water has been heated to 71°C, one may then put the water in a place where it will get hotter, because of ein bishul aḥar bishul. Similarly, one may put cold water in a place where it will heat up, as long as the water does not exceed 44°C, because this kind of heating does not qualify as Bishul.
  There is another important position that defines yad soledet bo. This position maintains that food or drink that most people would be able to consume all at once cannot be considered yad soledet bo. However, if most people would be unable to eat or drink it all at once, that is a sign that it is yad soledet bo. Thus, it would be considered cooked, and one may heat it further (Ben Ish Ḥai, Year 2, Bo 5; Maharsham 1:187; Yabi’a Omer 3:24, 4-6). In a case of necessity, one may rely on this position.2<i class="footnote">. <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 4:74:3 states that the temperature of <em>yad soledet bo </em>is somewhere between 43°C and 71°C. According to <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:30:12, it is between 40°C and 80°C, based on the notion that at 40°C a baby’s belly is scalded. This measurement is mentioned in SA 318:14. At the other extreme, some people drink tea that is as hot as 80°C. SSK states, based on a proof suggested by R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, that the lowest possible temperature for <em>yad soledet bo</em> is 45°C. Even though most <em>poskim</em> feel that one should be stringent and take into account both versions of <em>yad soledet bo</em> (that the hand cannot bear to remain on the heat source, or that it is merely unpleasant for the hand to remain), it is not necessary to follow the extremes within these positions. This is why I wrote that between 45°C and 71°C constitutes the doubtful range. Furthermore, if necessary one may rely on the position that uses the criterion of whether the food can be eaten or drunk all at once. There are some who are stringent and refrain from heating water even if it is already <em>yad soledet bo</em>. See SSK ch. 1 nn. 17 and 110. In contrast, Ashkenazic custom is that if the hot water started out at <em>yad soledet bo</em> and later cooled down, as long as it is still a little warm one may bring it back to a boil. (See the continuation of this discussion in sections 5-6.)</i>
  To create a safeguard, the Sages prohibited leaving water in a place where it could potentially reach yad soledet bo, even if one is standing there watching and waiting to remove the water before it reaches that point. They were concerned that the person watching might get distracted and forget to remove the water before it reaches yad soledet bo, thus making him guilty of cooking on Shabbat. However, if there is no possibility that the water will reach yad soledet bo even if it remains there for an extended period of time, one may place the water there (SA 318:14).3<i class="footnote">According to Rashi and Rambam, one may place water in a place where it could become <em>yad soledet</em> <em>bo </em>on condition that someone is watching it to ensure that this will not happen. However, <em>Tosafot</em>, Rosh, Rashba, and most <em>poskim</em> maintain that this is forbidden, and this is the ruling of SA 318:14. In contrast, if one wishes to heat a cold liquid that had previously been cooked, like soup, one may be lenient and place it where it could reach <em>yad soledet bo</em> as long as someone is watching it and waiting to remove it before it reaches that temperature. This is permitted because (as we will explain in the next paragraph) according to Rambam, Rashba, and Ran, the principle of <em>ein bishul aḥar</em> <em>bishul</em> holds even for a liquid. This situation is considered a twofold doubt: first, perhaps the law really follows the lenient position of Rashi and Rambam; second, perhaps <em>ein bishul aḥar bishul</em> applies to liquids as well. R. Ovadia Yosef writes in <em>Livyat Ḥen</em> §51 that one may be lenient as a result of this twofold doubt. It is true that some are stringent in this case (SSK 1:13; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:10:5; and <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 1:18) and are willing to endorse leniency only in a case of great need. Nevertheless, the primary position is to be lenient. This is because even according to those who are stringent and maintain that <em>ein</em> <em>bishul aḥar bishul</em> does not apply to liquids, if one forgot to remove the liquid before it reached <em>yad soledet bo</em> he will only have transgressed a rabbinic prohibition, since he did not intend to boil the soup but only to heat it a bit.</i>
  
  Section 5
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Cooking Liquids According to the Sephardic Custom
  We have already learned that there is no prohibition of cooking something that has already been cooked. Therefore, one may reheat cooked food on Shabbat. For example, one may remove cooked fish or fried schnitzel from the refrigerator and reheat them to yad soledet bo, as long as it does not resemble cooking (see section 18).
  But there is a fundamental disagreement among the Rishonim whether this principle applies to liquids like soups and sauces. For this purpose, a liquid is something that, if left in a bowl, would spread out evenly. If it retains its shape, it is considered a solid. According to Rambam, Rashba, and Ran, the principle of ein bishul aḥar bishul applies to cooked soup as well. Therefore, based on their opinion, one may take soup from the refrigerator on Shabbat and heat it, as long as it does not look like he is cooking (section 18 below).
  However, according to Rashi, Rosh, Smag, and Smak, the principle of ein bishul aḥar bishul applies only to solid food, and one may reheat them on Shabbat. Liquids, on the other hand, even if they had been fully cooked, may not be reheated once they have cooled off, and doing so is considered Bishul. This is because when it comes to solid foods, the primary purpose of cooking them is to create the cooked or baked taste. Once bread is baked, the difference between eating it hot or cold is insignificant. The same is true of fish and potatoes; it makes little difference whether they are served hot or cold. Therefore, from the moment that these foods acquire a cooked or baked taste, their cooking is considered complete. Accordingly, even if they have cooled off, one may reheat them, because cooking no longer affects them significantly. But for liquids, their temperature is an integral part of defining them as cooked. There is a fundamental difference between cold soup and hot soup, and the same is true of tea and coffee as well. Therefore, for liquids, we say yesh bishul aḥar bishul (there is a prohibition of cooking something that has already been cooked). Thus if a liquid has cooled down, one who reheats it to yad soledet bo transgresses the Torah prohibition of cooking.
  Shulḥan Arukh rules in accordance with the stringent opinion (318:4), and Sephardim follow this ruling. Thus, for Sephardim, if a cooked liquid has cooled down to below yad soledet bo, it is no longer considered cooked, and it is prohibited by Torah law to reheat it past yad soledet bo. Therefore, Sephardim may not take soup out of the refrigerator and heat it. Similarly, if they remove soup from the plata, and it cools off to below yad soledet bo, they may not replace it on the plata. If it is known with certainty that the liquid is still yad soledet bo, it may be replaced (as long as it meets the conditions explained below in section 19). If one had situated it near the edge of the plata (which tends to be cooler), he may move it to the center and thus heat it more effectively.
  If most of the food in a cold pot is solid, but the pot also has liquid sauce or gravy, one may not heat the pot. This is because by doing so one will also be heating up the liquid, which would constitute Bishul. The way around this is to remove the solid food and heat it by itself. One does not need to worry about the little moisture remaining upon it. Similarly, one may reheat cold food like meat or fish, even if there is a bit of wetness on them, because that liquid is not important and is batel (rendered insignificant) with respect to the solid food.4<i class="footnote">From the language of SA 318:15 it would seem that if a food contains some liquid, even though it is mostly dry, one may not heat it because of the prohibition of cooking liquids. This also seems to be the understanding of MB 318:32 and 318:39, and SHT 60. It is also found in <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:30:13 in the note, and in R. Messas’s <em>Responsa</em><em>Tevu’ot Shemesh</em>, OḤ 5. Opposing this position is <em>Pri Megadim</em><em>Mishbetzot Zahav</em> 253:13, which is lenient and follows the position that we consider the majority of the dish, since when there is only a little gravy, further cooking will be <em>mitztamek ve-ra lo</em> (detrimental to it). Additionally, according to Rabbeinu Yeruḥam, in such a case one may even cook a liquid. This is also the opinion of <em>Minḥat Kohen</em> and others cited by <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 6:48. (However, <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 318:55 states that one who chooses to be stringent should be commended, and in R. Ovadia’s book <em>Ma’or Yisrael</em>, p. 17 it seems that he permits reheating only if the sauce is thick.) In contrast, some are stringent and feel that according to SAH, anything that is <em>tofe’aḥ al menat le-hatfi’aḥ</em> (wet enough to make something else wet) is considered a liquid, and heating it is forbidden. (See <em>Ketzot Ha-shulḥan </em>124, <em>Badei Ha-shulḥan</em> 37; <em>Shabbat Ke-halakha</em>, pp. 141-144.) The <em>halakha</em> follows the middle position, as explained above. It should be noted that the custom in North Africa was either to be lenient in accordance with Rambam, Rashba, and Ran, maintaining that <em>ein bishul aḥar bishul</em> applies even to liquids, or minimally to follow the Ashkenazic custom that if the food is still a bit warm, one may warm it up, as cited in the next paragraph below (<em>Tashbetz</em><em>Shemesh U-magen</em> 1:8).</i>
  If food is congealed but will liquefy when reheated, like mushroom gravy, it is considered a solid food, and one may heat it (MB 318:100; Kaf Ha-ḥayim §158). However, according to Ashkenazic practice, le-khatḥila one should not heat it because some maintain that le-khatḥila one should not take an action that will cause food to change from liquid to solid or the reverse, because this is like producing something new (see 12:12 below). However, if the gravy is secondary to the solid food, then even Ashkenazic custom would permit le-khatḥila heating the food together with the congealed sauce or gravy, which will liquefy.
  
  Section 6
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / The Yemenite and Ashkenazic Customs Regarding Cooking Liquids
  As we have seen, according to Rambam, Rosh, and Ran the principle of ein bishul aḥar bishul applies to liquids as well as solids. Thus as long as the liquids were fully cooked, even if they have now cooled off, one may reheat them to yad soledet bo.
  There are many Yemenite Jews who consistently follow Rambam’s rulings throughout halakha. Therefore, if they serve soup Friday night and then put it in the refrigerator, they may remove the soup from the refrigerator on Shabbat day and reheat it. This is the law for sauces and all other liquids as well.
  Ashkenazim follow Rema, whose opinion is a kind of compromise between the previous two. If a liquid has cooled off to the point that one normally would therefore not consume it, then one may not reheat it to yad soledet bo. But if it is still warm, one may reheat it to yad soledet bo. This is because Rema fundamentally accepts the position of Rambam that ein bishul aḥar bishul applies to liquids as well. However, in his opinion, if a liquid has cooled down entirely, it is rabbinically forbidden to reheat it.5<i class="footnote">This is explained in <em>Nishmat Adam</em> 20:8; <em>Ḥazon Ish</em>, OḤ 37:13; and <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 4:74:2. The rationale is either that it resembles cooking, or that we are afraid that people might come to actually cook. Some maintain that according to Rema, if the soup has cooled down entirely, it would be prohibited by Torah law to reheat it (see MA 253:37; <em>Tehila Le-David</em> §33). The logic behind this is that as long as it is still warm and can still be eaten as a hot food, it is still considered cooked. However, if it has cooled down entirely and can no longer be considered warm, then its original cooking has been nullified, and the prohibition of cooking applies to the food once more. (One could suggest that as long as it remains warm, it is considered a <em>ma’akhal ben Derusa’i</em>. See <em>Eglei Tal</em> 14 and <em>Shabbat Ke-halakha</em>, pp. 136, 182.)</i>
  When one who follows the position of Shulḥan Arukh or Rema is a guest at the home of a Yemenite who follows Rambam, he may eat soup that his host heated on Shabbat. Since the host is following halakha based on the accepted practice of his community, any Jew may eat his food le-khatḥila (see MB 318:2.).
  However, one who follows the Shulḥan Arukh or Rema may not ask one who follows Rambam to heat soup for him. Since his own community forbids reheating soup, he may not ask his friend to do it for him. But if he invites his friend to eat with him, his friend may follow his own custom and heat soup for himself. In such a case, the host may eat from it as well.
  
  Section 7
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Kli Rishon, Kli Sheni, Kli Shlishi
  Cooking is normally done by putting food into a vessel that is on a fire. The question arises: If one has a pot that is not on a fire or on a plata, but that contains a liquid that is yad soledet bo or hotter, may one place uncooked food into this hot liquid?
  In halakha, only certain types of vessels are considered capable of cooking, while others are not considered capable of cooking. In order to elaborate on this idea, we must first define several terms. A kli rishon is a pot or pan that has been heated on the fire. A kli sheni is a pot or pan into which water or food from a kli rishon has been poured. There is a halakhic difference between a kli rishon and a kli sheni. Since a kli rishon was on the fire, the walls of the pot became heated from the fire directly. Therefore, it retains its heat for a long time, and can cook raw food that is placed in it. In contrast, the walls of a kli sheni were not heated directly by fire, so the water or food placed in it cools down quickly. Thus, a kli sheni is not capable of cooking raw food that is placed in it (Tosafot, Shabbat 40b, s.v. “shema mina”).
  However, there are some foods, including certain types of fish, that are unique in that they cook quickly and easily. These foods, known in halakhic literature as kalei ha-bishul (easily cooked), can become cooked even in a kli sheni. Thus, cooking kalei ha-bishul is prohibited by Torah law even in a kli sheni. In addition, even irui (pouring water over them) from a kli sheni is forbidden. Since kalei ha-bishul are so easy to cook, even this can cook them and render them edible (MB 318:36).
  In principle, it would seem that only a few foods truly qualify as kalei ha-bishul. Nevertheless, some prominent poskim were concerned that we do not know how to differentiate between kalei ha-bishul and regular foods. According to them, only if we know explicitly that a particular food is not included in kalei ha-bishul, like water or oil, may it then be heated in a kli sheni (MB 318:42; SSK 1:59). Additionally, according to some prominent poskim, it is rabbinically prohibited for food that was not cooked before Shabbat to be placed in a kli sheni on Shabbat, because this resembles cooking (MA; MB 318:34). Therefore, in practice one should not place food that has not already been cooked into a kli sheni, but irui from a kli sheni onto an uncooked food is only prohibited when one knows for certain that a specific food is among kalei ha-bishul.
  Therefore, one may prepare an instant soup mix by pouring water from a kli sheni into the dry mix. However, one may not prepare instant mashed potatoes this way, because doing so violates the prohibition of Lash (see 12:7 below).There is a third type of vessel known as a kli shlishi. If one pours hot water or hot food from the pot in which it was cooked into another vessel, and from that vessel into a third one, that final container is a kli shlishi. The poskim agree that a kli shlishi is unable to cook anything.6<i class="footnote">In truth, some Aḥaronim were inclined to be stringent and avoid putting anything raw and easily cooked into a <em>kli shlishi</em> that is <em>yad soledet bo</em>. Thus states <em>Shevitat Ha-Shabbat</em>, <em>Mevashel</em> 23, based on <em>Yere’im</em>. This is also the position of Ḥazon Ish regarding <em>kalei ha-bishul</em> (<em>Ḥazon</em> <em>Ish</em>, OḤ 52:19). He maintains that as long as the water is hot, no matter how many times removed the vessel is from the original <em>kli rishon</em>, <em>kalei ha-bishul</em> become cooked. AHS 318:28 states this specifically with regard to tea. According to <em>Ḥayei Adam</em> 20:4, any vessel whose contents are so hot that they would burn someone is capable of cooking. However, according to most <em>poskim</em>, the principle that <em>Bishul</em> does not apply in a <em>kli shlishi </em>is absolute, and any kind of raw food may be introduced into a <em>kli shlishi</em>. MB 318:47 records this based on <em>Pri Megadim</em>. The accepted explanation is that this was the Sages’ assumption – cooking is inconceivable in a <em>kli shlishi</em>. Further, it seems to me that cooking in a vessel that people do not generally use for cooking would not be prohibited by Torah law, since the Torah prohibition applies only to cooking in the usual manner. Since one normally does not cook in a <em>kli sheni</em>, there is no Torah prohibition of putting raw food into a <em>kli sheni</em>. However, foods that cook easily are often cooked in a <em>kli sheni </em>or even by <em>irui</em> from a <em>kli sheni</em>. Therefore, if one places these foods in a <em>kli sheni </em>or pours water on them from a <em>kli sheni</em>, he transgresses a Torah prohibition. However, not even <em>kalei ha-bishul </em>are generally cooked in a <em>kli shlishi</em>, so there is never a Torah prohibition involved. And since in the vast majority of cases one cannot cook in a <em>kli shlishi</em>, the Sages did not prohibit cooking in one in any case.MA, MB 318:34, and <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> §70 state that the <em>halakha</em> follows the first opinion presented in <em>Tosafot</em>, <em>Shabbat</em> 39a. This opinion states that even though a <em>kli sheni </em>does not cook, one may not place raw food into such a vessel because it resembles cooking. One may, however, add spices, since that does not resemble cooking. This is also the position of <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:30:5. In contrast, R. Ovadia Yosef, basing himself on a number of Rishonim and Aḥaronim, writes that the <em>halakha</em> follows the second opinion in <em>Tosafot</em>, according to which there is never a concern of resembling cooking in a <em>kli sheni</em> (<em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 6:22).Some maintain that since we do not know what foods are considered kalei ha-bishul, we must be stringent and refrain from putting any foods into a kli sheni except those that we know are not kalei bishul (Yere’im; Smag). Others maintain that only specific foods that are known to be kalei ha-bishul are a concern (Ran; Tur). Rema 318:5 states that the custom is to be stringent, as do MA 318:18; SAH 318:12; Ḥayei Adam 20:4; MB 318:42; SSK 1:59. SA 318:5 cites both opinions and seems inclined to be lenient. This was the inclination of a number of poskim – that one need be stringent only with foods that are known to cook easily (Ḥazon Ish, OḤ 52:18; Or Le-Tziyon 2:30:3). Yalkut Yosef 318:47 also records this as the position of Rambam and Maharam ibn Ḥabib.To simplify the matter, I wrote to be consistently stringent in the case of a kli sheni, and consistently lenient in the case of a kli shlishi. Even though it is agreed that one may not pour from a kli sheni onto kalei ha-bishul, nevertheless we have seen that according to most poskim, most foods are not kalei ha-bishul. Moreover, even those who are stringent consider the prohibition rabbinic, since one does not intend to cook. Additionally, pouring will only cook the outer layer of the food, which is less than the amount required to transgress a Torah prohibition, and according to Rashbam this is not considered cooking at all. Therefore, one should only be stringent and refrain from pouring from a kli sheni in the case of foods that are known to be kalei ha-bishul.</i>
  
  Section 8
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Preparing Tea on Shabbat
  One who wishes to prepare tea using a tea bag must do so in a kli shlishi. This means that he must first pour the hot water into a cup (which becomes a kli sheni). Then, from this cup, he must pour the water into another cup, which becomes a kli shlishi. He may then place a tea bag in the water.
  At first glance, it would seem that one should be allowed to do this even in a kli sheni, since the rule is that a kli sheni cannot cook. However, as we established, even a kli sheni can cook kalei ha-bishul, and some are concerned that tea leaves fall into this category. Additionally, others believe that there is a rabbinic prohibition on placing uncooked food into a kli sheni because it resembles cooking (MA; MB 318:34). Therefore, one who wishes to prepare tea must do so in a kli shlishi.
  Some are even more stringent. They maintain that since we see that a tea bag releases color and flavor into the water even in a kli shlishi, this is an indication that tea cooks very easily, and therefore one may not put it even in a kli shlishi (AHS; Ḥazon Ish). However, according to the majority of poskim, the rule that a kli shlishi does not cook is absolute, and one may always put uncooked food in a kli shlishi. Additionally, just because a tea bag releases color and taste in a kli shlishi does not prove that it has been cooked. The fact is that even if you put a tea bag in water that is only 40°C and not hot enough to cook at all, the bag will still release color and taste. Therefore, one may put a tea bag into hot water in a kli shlishi.
  If one prepared tea essence before Shabbat, one may pour it into hot water in a kli sheni. This is because the essence is not considered kalei ha-bishul, so pouring it into the cup does not resemble an act of cooking.
  Those who are especially meticulous, and avoid coloring foods le-khatḥila (see 12:10 below), should pour the essence into a kli shlishi and pour water onto it from a kli sheni. In this manner, the essence does not play an active role in coloring the water. All agree that in such a case there is no issue of coloring.
  If the tea essence gets used up on Shabbat, and only tea leaves remain with no liquid, one may prepare new essence by pouring hot water from the urn into a cup, which becomes a kli sheni, and from there pouring the water onto the tea leaves. This is not considered cooking, because the tea leaves were already cooked before Shabbat.7<i class="footnote">As we learned at the end of the previous note, one should not place tea leaves in a <em>kli sheni</em>, out of concern that it resembles cooking. Similarly, we must take into account the possibility that tea leaves are <em>kalei ha-bishul</em>, which may not be placed in a <em>kli sheni</em>. Even pouring onto them from a <em>kli sheni </em>is prohibited. But if the leaves are inside a tea bag, one may pour onto them from a <em>kli sheni</em>. This is because pouring only cooks the outer layer, so the leaves inside the bag will not be affected (<em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:30:3; <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 318:41).As I wrote above, if the liquid of the tea essence prepared before Shabbat is running out, one should pour hot water from a <em>kli sheni </em>onto the cooked tea leaves. Since the leaves were already cooked before Shabbat, there is no longer a prohibition of cooking them. Pouring water directly from the urn into the container of the essence is prohibited, since the liquid of the essence has already cooled down, and many <em>poskim</em> maintain that one may not heat them to <em>yad soledet bo</em> in such a case (see section 5 above; MB 318:39). Furthermore, perhaps the tea leaves did not cook entirely before Shabbat, in which case pouring the water on them will complete their cooking. But <em>irui</em> from a <em>kli sheni </em>is certainly not cooking in this case. Even if we are concerned that the leaves are considered <em>kalei ha-bishul</em>, since they were already cooked before Shabbat there is no concern that pouring from a <em>kli sheni </em>will continue to cook them. One also does not need to worry about cooking the cold water left with the leaves, because water is definitely not included in <em>kalei ha-bishul</em>.</i>
  
  Section 9
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Pouring Hot Liquids into a Damp Cup
  Halakha is unique in its precision and its focus on even the tiniest details. This precision elevates all our activities and gives them spiritual meaning and value.
  It should come as no surprise, then, that the Torah prohibition of cooking applies not only to large quantities of food, but even to the smallest drops of water. 
  Because of this, some maintain that one may not pour hot water from an urn into a cup that has droplets of cold water inside, because the hot water will cook the cold water. Therefore, one must thoroughly dry out the cup, and only afterward may one pour hot water into it (Igrot Moshe, OḤ 1:93; Minḥat Yitzḥak 9:30; SSK 1:52).
  In contrast, many poskim maintain that it is unnecessary to dry the cup, because this pouring is not a normal way of cooking. Also it is doubtful whether in fact the drops will cook. Even if they do, the person does not intend for them to cook, nor does he know if they have cooked. His intent when he pours the water has nothing to do with these droplets. The halakha follows this approach (Tzitz Eliezer 13:40; Shevet Ha-Levi 7:42; Yabi’a Omer 4:33).8<i class="footnote">It is true that during Temple times, in order to be liable for a sin offering for cooking on Shabbat, one must have unknowingly cooked a quantity of water that would be at least enough to rinse a small limb (MT 9:1). Nevertheless, cooking even one drop is still prohibited by Torah law. This is at the heart of the opinion of those who are stringent in our case. Even though the droplets of moisture are in a <em>kli sheni</em>, nevertheless the hot water was poured from a <em>kli rishon</em>, and the consensus is that this cooks the outer layer of the food.On the other hand, there are many reasons to be lenient in this case. Since these drops are not being cooked in the normal way, the prohibition is rabbinic. Since one does not benefit from the results of this cooking, it is considered a <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em>, which some permit in the case of a rabbinic prohibition. Furthermore, this might not even be a <em>psik reisha</em>, since the poured water might not reach the drops directly (see above ch. 9 n. 2). Additionally, according to <em>Ḥakham Tzvi</em> §86, since the reason <em>halakha</em> forbids <em>ḥatzi shi’ur</em> (violating a prohibition below the threshold of punishment) is that the person has subjectively deemed it important, when he does not intend the prohibited result there is no violation even if it is a <em>psik reisha</em>. <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 13:40 states similarly that these drops have no importance. Moreover, we can add to the equation the position of Rashbam that <em>irui</em> from a <em>kli rishon</em> does not cook. Also, if the moisture in the cup is from hot water that has cooled down, some permit this, applying the principle of <em>ein bishul aḥar bishul</em> here (see sections 5-6 above). In practice, since even those who prohibit this admit that it is a rabbinic prohibition (since the one pouring the water is not interested in cooking the drops), the <em>halakha</em> follows those who are lenient. Based on most of the reasons presented here, there is no need to dry off a spoon that one wants to use to remove food from a <em>kli rishon</em> (<em>Shevitat Ha-Shabbat</em>, Introduction to <em>Mevashel</em> 19; <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 13:40).Some are concerned about allowing the use of an electric urn that has a tube running down the side that displays how much water is inside. The fear is that as the water in the urn is used up, some of the water from the tube enters the urn; if this water was cold it will be cooked by the hot water in the urn. But many are lenient about this. First, the person does not intend for this to happen. Additionally, it may be that the water in the tube was already yad soledet bo. Even if this is not the case, it might have been cooked to yad soledet bo before Shabbat. Then, according to those who maintain that ein bishul aḥar bishul applies to liquids (see sections 5-6), one may reheat it on Shabbat (Az Nidberu 9:14; Yeḥaveh Da’at 6:21).</i>
  
  Section 10
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Davar Gush
  As we stated in section 7, a kli rishon can cook anything, a kli sheni can cook only kalei ha-bishul, and a kli shlishi cannot cook at all. However, the poskim disagree regarding the status of a davar gush (hot, solid food).
  Some maintain that the general rules of vessels apply in this case as well, and once a davar gush is moved to a kli shlishi it cannot cook anything that is placed upon it. This is the opinion of the majority of poskim (Rema; Vilna Gaon; Pri Megadim; Ḥatam Sofer; Nishmat Adam).
  However, some poskim are stringent and rule that the aforementioned principles apply only to liquids or soft foods that come into complete contact with the walls of a pot. Such foods can no longer cook if they are transferred from a kli rishon to a kli sheni and from a kli sheni to a kli shlishi. But chunks of solid food – pieces of meat, kugel, potatoes, or clumpy rice – retain their heat even when transferred from vessel to vessel, as the walls of the new vessels do not have a strong cooling effect on solid food. Therefore, as long as these foods remain at a temperature of yad soledet bo or hotter, they are able to cook, no matter how many vessel transfers they have undergone (MA; MB 318:45).
  In practice, since this relates to a Torah prohibition, it is appropriate to be stringent. However, if one is in doubt about whether cooking would be involved, one may be lenient even le-khatḥila. Therefore, if one can touch the piece of food and it is doubtful whether it is yad soledet bo, there is no need to worry that it will cook (see section 4 above). Even if it is clear that it is still yad soledet bo, one may put previously-cooked cold gravy on it, since some maintain that ein bishul aḥar bishul applies to liquids as well (see section 5 above). Similarly, one may salt the food, since salt can only be cooked in a kli rishon that is on the fire (MB 318:71). Additionally, one may place pickles or raw vegetables on a hot piece of kugel or meat, because one does not intend to cook them.
  In contrast, one may not sprinkle raw spices like paprika and pepper on a hot piece of meat or kugel, as there is a benefit to the spices cooking – it enables their taste to be absorbed more effectively into the food. Therefore, before adding spices to a hot dish, one should wait until it has cooled off enough that one can touch it.9<i class="footnote">Regarding the laws of <em>kashrut</em>, some are stringent in the case of a <em>davar gush</em> if it is still <em>yad soledet bo</em>. This is the approach of <em>Isur Ve-heter</em>, Maharshal, <em>Shakh</em><em>Pri Ḥadash</em>, and <em>Pri Megadim</em>. Opposing them are Rema, Vilna Gaon, and Ḥatam Sofer, based on <em>Tosafot</em> and Ran, who insist that a <em>davar gush</em> is no different from other foods. Others maintain that we are stringent for <em>kashrut</em> purposes because a <em>davar gush</em> can absorb tastes; but for Shabbat purposes, since a <em>davar gush</em> cannot cook, there is no prohibition. This is the approach of <em>Minḥat Yaakov</em> 61:45; <em>Pri Megadim</em><em>Mishbetzot Zahav</em>, YD 97:14. Furthermore, <em>Igrot Moshe</em> OḤ 4:74, <em>Bishul</em> 5; R. Ovadia Yosef, <em>Halikhot Olam</em>, 4:12; and <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:30:16 state that one may be lenient. However, MA 318:45 is stringent concerning Shabbat as well as <em>kashrut</em>, as are MB 318:118 and SSK 1:64. Since this disagreement relates to a Torah prohibition, it is proper to defer to those who are stringent, but in practice one need be stringent only regarding spices. In a case where there is an additional doubt, one may be lenient on the basis of the principle of twofold doubt. Similarly, one may be lenient regarding putting butter on a very hot solid, as the <em>Igrot Moshe</em> states, since butter is pasteurized, and pasteurizing is the equivalent of cooking. (SSK ch. 1 n. 198 disagrees, however.)</i>
  
  Section 11
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Cooking after Baking
  As we established in section 3, one may reheat fully cooked food on Shabbat, because the prohibition of Bishul applies when one changes the status of food from raw to cooked. However, once a food is cooked, one may reheat it. We must still clarify, though, whether one may change a food’s status from cooked to roasted, or from baked to cooked, etc. For example, may one take a piece of meat that was roasted before Shabbat and add it to the cholent pot? On the one hand, the meat is no longer raw, as it has already been roasted; on the other hand, adding it to the pot will change its status from roasted to cooked.
  According to Raavya, Mordechai, and most Rishonim, this is permitted. Since the heat of the fire has already transformed the raw food to cooked, baked, or roasted, there is no longer a prohibition of Bishul. Further changing the status from roasted to cooked or vice versa is not considered Bishul but merely adding flavor, and this is not prohibited. This is the halakha according to some Sephardic poskim (Yeḥaveh Da’at 2:44; Menuḥat Ahava 2:10:26).
  However, according to R. Eliezer of Metz, although one may reheat cooked, baked, or roasted food, one may not change a food’s status from roasted to cooked, because that is considered cooking it anew (Yere’im §274). Therefore one may not take baked bread and put it in a pot of food, because this would effectively change the bread from baked to cooked. Even if the hot food is in a kli sheni, one must take into account the possibility that bread is included in kalei ha-bishul and can become cooked even in a kli sheni. Thus the Ashkenazic custom is to be stringent (Rema 318:5). Some Sephardic poskim as well maintain that le-khatḥila one should be stringent (Ben Ish Ḥai, Year 2, Bo 6; Menuḥat Ahava 2:30:6).
  However, even those whose practice is to be stringent agree that if be-di’avad one cooked something that had been baked, or baked something that had been cooked, one may still eat the food, since be-di’avad one may rely on the lenient opinion (MB 318:46).
  Following the custom of most Jewish communities who are stringent in this regard, one who wishes to dip a cookie in tea or coffee must make certain that the teacup or coffee cup is a kli shlishi, since a kli shlishi definitely does not cook. One who wishes to dip bread in a bowl of soup may do so, as the ladle used to serve the soup can be considered a kli sheni and the bowl can be considered a kli shlishi (MB 318:45).10<i class="footnote">Those who do not allow dipping bread into hot soup in a <em>kli sheni </em>follow two stringencies: a) They prohibit cooking after baking; b) they defer to the opinion that many foods are considered <em>kalei ha-bishul</em> and thus can become cooked in a <em>kli sheni</em>. Nevertheless, when serving soup using a ladle, according to Maharil, <em>Pri Ḥadash</em>, and others, the ladle is considered a <em>kli sheni</em>. Accordingly, the soup bowl is a <em>kli shlishi</em>, and in a <em>kli shlishi</em> there is definitely no prohibition. While <em>Taz</em> and <em>Shakh</em> maintain that the ladle is a <em>kli rishon</em> and MB 318:87 follows this approach, nevertheless this is a case of a twofold doubt, and thus one may be lenient (MB 318:45) as long as the ladle does not remain in the <em>kli rishon</em> long enough to reach the same heat as the vessel itself. Soup nuts may be added to a <em>kli sheni </em>even <em>le-khatḥila</em>, since they are deep fried and are considered cooked rather than baked (SSK 1:70). Furthermore, this further cooking is not desired, as people do not want the soup nuts to get soggy.According to those who maintain that <em>ein bishul aḥar afiya</em> (there is no prohibition of cooking something that has already been baked), one may definitely toast challah. Additionally, MA 318:17, <em>Maḥatzit Ha-shekel</em>, and <em>Ḥayei Adam</em> (<em>Zikhru Torat Moshe</em> 24:7) would permit this even for those who are stringent about <em>bishul aḥar afiya</em>, since they maintain that baking and roasting are the same. In contrast, some are stringent because they maintain that roasting is different from baking (<em>Pri Megadim</em>, <em>Mishbetzot Zahav</em> 318:7; SSK 1:71; <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 318:78; <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:30:6; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> vol. 2 ch. 10 n. 154). There is even one opinion that expresses concern that this is considered <em>Makeh Be-fatish </em>(applying the finishing touch) (<em>Rav Pe’alim</em>, OḤ 2:52). In practice, the lenient position (that roasting and baking are the same) seems the more reasonable one, since if one continues to bake food it dries out, and essentially becomes toasted. Nevertheless, one who chooses to be stringent is commendable. This is the case when it comes to completely toasting the bread, but even those who are stringent would allow warming up bread – even to the point that the surface crisps – because doing so does not make a significant change to the baked state. <em>Rav Pe’alim</em> indeed states this in OḤ 2:52, and <em>Nishmat Shabbat</em> 318:26 states similarly.</i>
  
  Section 12
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Megis (Stirring or Mixing)
  Stirring food in a pot helps it cook better and more evenly, and therefore one who stirs food that is not fully cooked on Shabbat transgresses a Torah prohibition. The act of stirring is known in rabbinic literature as megis. Even if the food is no longer on the fire, as long as it is not fully cooked and it is yad soledet bo, it is forbidden by Torah law to stir it. In light of this, the Sages forbade removing food from a pot that contains food that is not yet fully cooked, even after the pot is removed from the plata, because the resultant movement in the pot would constitute stirring. Only when the food has cooled down and is no longer yad soledet bo may one remove the food he wants.
  However, once the food has finished cooking and is ready to be eaten, there is no longer a problem of Bishul, and one may remove whatever he wants from the pot (SA 318:18). This is the custom of many Sephardim. In any case, one should not stir the food while it is still on the fire, because this resembles cooking (Yalkut Yosef 318:43).
  The custom of Ashkenazim and some Sephardim is to be more stringent. As long as the food is still on the plata, even if it is fully cooked, le-khatḥila they do not remove any food. Rather, first they remove the pot from the plata and only then remove what they want. If they wish to return the pot to the plata afterward, they must be careful to follow the principles for returning food to the plata (section 19 below).
  In cases of necessity, even those who are usually stringent are lenient, and allow fully cooked food to be removed from a pot on the fire. For example, if a pot is resting on an uncovered fire, so that if it is removed from the fire it will be forbidden to replace it (see section 19), one may remove food from the pot while it is still on the fire. This is because technically once the food is fully cooked there is no longer a prohibition of megis (Ḥazon Ish 37:15; SSK 1:38). Everyone agrees that if a pot or metal urn is filled with boiling water before Shabbat and then left on the plata during Shabbat, one may remove water from it on Shabbat (SSK 1:39).11<i class="footnote">Those who are stringent defer to <em>Kol Bo</em>, which maintains that as long as the pot is resting on a heat source, whether flame or <em>plata</em>, stirring is forbidden by Torah law. Even though this position is problematic, and most <em>poskim</em> disagree with it, <em>le-khatḥila</em> we defer to it. This is the approach of <em>Rav Pe’alim</em> 3:45 and <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:30:15. (Perhaps they defer to this opinion because the activity of stirring resembles cooking.)</i>
  
  Section 13
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Adding Water to Food on the Plata to Prevent It from Burning
  If the water in the cholent pot evaporates and one is concerned that the cholent will burn, one may not add cold water to the pot, because the water will become cooked. But if there is an urn on the plata, one may pour hot water from it into the pot. If the urn has a spigot designed to let the water out, one may remove the cholent pot from the plata and pour the hot water into it by means of this spigot. If the pot is designated for meat and the urn is designated for pareve, one should first uncover the pot for approximately ten seconds, so that the pot’s steam will dissipate. One may then move the pot under the spigot, since only minimal steam will be released. If it is difficult to pour directly from the urn into the pot, one may pour the hot water into a cup and then pour it from there into the pot. This is because as long as the water is yad soledet bo, according to the vast majority of poskim the prohibition of Bishul does not apply. This is the practice of the Ashkenazic, Yemenite, and North African communities (MB 253:84; Yalkut Shemesh §88; SSK 1:17).
  Others maintain that one may not add hot water to a pot on the plata, because the primary issue is not how hot the water is, but the status of the water. While the water is still in the urn, it is considered a kli rishon. When one pours out the water, its status changes from a kli rishon (which has the ability to cook food) to irui from a kli rishon (which does not have the ability to cook). Then when the water reaches the pot, it is recooked, and can once again be considered a kli rishon. There are some Sephardim who follow this opinion (Yeḥaveh Da’at 4:22). If Sephardim wish to be lenient in accordance with the opinion of most poskim, they have an opinion to rely upon (Or Le-Tziyon 2:17:8; see Menuḥat Ahava 1:3:15).12<i class="footnote"><em>Poskim</em> disagree about how to understand SA 253:4. According to MA 253:16, <em>Eliya Rabba</em>, <em>Pri Megadim</em>, and <em>Eglei Tal</em>, SA is lenient, maintaining that as long as the water is still <em>yad soledet</em> <em>bo</em> one may add it to the pot. In contrast, some maintain that SA is stringent, following the position of some Rishonim (the second explanation brought by Rabbeinu Yona and Rabbeinu Yeruḥam) that since poured water is no longer considered a <em>kli rishon</em>, and can cook only the outer layer of food, one may not turn the water back into a <em>kli rishon</em>. Thus states <em>Lev Ḥayim</em> 1:99, and <em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 4:22 and <em>Aseh Lekha Rav</em> 6:28 conclude likewise. A practical suggestion for those who follow this position is to fill a bag with water, seal it well, and place it in the pot. If they see that the food is drying out, they can poke a hole in the bag and the hot water will spill into the pot.This entire stringency is only relevant for those who maintain that <em>ein bishul aḥar bishul</em> does not apply to liquids (see sections 5-6 above). But for those who maintain that <em>ein bishul aḥar bishul</em> applies to liquids as well, there is certainly no prohibition. This is the custom of Yemenite Jews. Ashkenazic custom maintains that as long as water is still warm, one may heat it to <em>yad soledet bo</em>. SSK 1:17 is lenient, and this is also the North African custom, as explained in <em>Yalkut</em> <em>Shemesh</em> §88.At first glance, it would seem that if the pot is used for meat, there is a problem with placing it under the urn’s spigot to pour hot water into it, because steam will rise from the meat pot and the urn will absorb the meat flavor. Later, if the urn’s water is used to make coffee, this will constitute a transgression of the prohibition of mixing meat and milk. But the fact is that this meat-flavored steam is nullified by the much greater quantity of water in the urn (assuming that there is at least sixty times more water than the steam). In addition, this is a case where the reabsorbed flavor is twice removed from the original food and has not yet become part of a prohibited mixture (noten ta’am bar noten ta’am, or nat bar nat, de-heteira), and we are lenient in such cases. Furthermore, according to Baḥ and R. Akiva Eger, if the steam can dissipate into the air, the urn does not necessarily absorb the flavor even if it is directly above the pot. Nevertheless, in order to minimize contact between the steam and the urn, one should remove the pot’s cover for about ten seconds before moving it under the urn. One should also take care not to bring the pot too close to the urn. However, even if one did not take these precautions, the urn does not become a meat vessel as a result (see Harḥavot).</i>
  
  Section 14
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Introduction to Hashhaya
  Earlier we learned about Bishul, which is prohibited by Torah law. Now we will examine two rabbinic enactments: 1) On Friday afternoon, one may not leave on the fire foods that are not yet cooked. 2) On Shabbat, one may not do things that resemble cooking. We will begin by detailing the first enactment.
  As a rule, the prohibitions relating to Shabbat begin when Shabbat begins. Therefore, by Torah law one may put a pot on the fire before Shabbat even though it will continue to cook on Shabbat. But the Sages were worried that one would be so anxious for his food to be properly cooked by Friday night that he would turn up the flame on Shabbat, thus transgressing the prohibitions of Mav’ir and Bishul. The Sages went even further and decreed that if one’s food needed more time to cook and he decided to leave it on the open fire, it may not be eaten on Shabbat.
  In the past, cooking was done in a kira, a mini-oven that was heated by burning coals on its floor. The Sages were concerned that one would stoke the coals to accelerate the cooking process. Today, since we cook on gas flames, electric burners, or ovens, the equivalent concern is that someone will turn up the flame or raise the temperature, thus similarly transgressing the prohibitions of Mav’ir and Bishul.
  Even if one were to leave the burners or oven on their highest temperature, rendering it impossible to turn up the fire, this is still forbidden; the Sages did not differentiate in this enactment. Furthermore, one might turn down the flame and raise it again later. Additionally, anytime one leaves uncooked food on an open fire, there is a concern that he will transgress Bishul in some way, such as by stirring the food or by covering it to preserve the heat.13<i class="footnote">em&gt;Har Tzvi, OḤ 1:136 and <em>Yaskil Avdi</em>, OḤ 7:28:8 permit leaving food that has not been adequately cooked on electric heat sources or in ovens if their heat cannot be raised. <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:17:3 permits leaving food on a flame that cannot be raised. R. Qafiḥ (commenting on MT 3:2, 12) even permits leaving it on a flame that can be raised, since such a flame does not sputter the way that coals do, so there is no concern that one will adjust it. <em>Gidulei Tziyon</em> 9:11 also allows leaving food on electric heat sources for this reason. This is quoted as the <em>halakha</em> by <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 7:16:3. However, the conventional ruling is that one may not leave food on an uncovered fire or electrical heating source. This is the approach of <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 4:74, <em>bishul</em> 25; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, cited in <em>Shvut Yitzḥak</em> vol. 2 ch. 8; SSK 1:72; <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 6:32; <em>Hilkhot Shabbat Be-Shabbat</em> 1:5:16. <em>Be-di’avad</em> if one followed those who are lenient, the food may be eaten (see MB 318:2).</i>
  There are two situations where there is no concern that one will raise the temperature, and, therefore, one may leave the food on the open fire or in the oven: 1) When the food is ready to eat, it can be left on the fire because there is no reason for anyone to raise the heat. 2) If the food is not yet fully cooked, it can be left on the fire if the fire is contained. In the time of the Sages, this meant that the coals had been cleared out of the oven (garuf) or covered with ash (katum) to lessen their heat. Today we accomplish this by covering the flame, which is why a plata may be used in this situation – its “flame” is naturally covered. In the upcoming sections we will continue explaining these two permitted cases. 
  1) When the food is ready to eat, it can be left on the fire because there is no reason for anyone to raise the heat.
  2) If the food is not yet fully cooked, it can be left on the fire if the fire is contained. In the time of the Sages, this meant that the coals had been cleared out of the oven (garuf) or covered with ash (katum) to lessen their heat. Today we accomplish this by covering the flame, which is why a plata may be used in this situation – its “flame” is naturally covered. In the upcoming sections we will continue explaining these two permitted cases.
  
  Section 15
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Food That Is Already Cooked
  One may leave food on an open fire on Friday afternoon if there would be no reason for anyone to raise the flame under the food. Poskim disagree what constitutes “no reason.” According to Rif and Rambam, if the food is fully cooked, and further cooking will be detrimental to it, then one may do so. But if additional cooking will improve the flavor of the food, then one may not leave it on the fire, since there is motivation to turn up the flame.
  In contrast, the Ge’onim and Tosafot maintain that if the food has reached the point where it could be considered a ma’akhal ben Derusa’i, we are no longer concerned that one would desecrate Shabbat to turn up the flame. Only if the food is totally inedible are we worried that, due to concern that the food will not be ready for Friday night dinner, one might turn up the flame.
  The bottom line is that one may leave food on an open flame if it can be eaten in a pinch, as this is the opinion of the majority of Rishonim as well as the custom of most Jewish communities. However, le-khatḥila one should take into account the stringent opinion and refrain from leaving food on an open fire if continued cooking will improve its flavor. This problem can be avoided by covering the flame, as we will now explain.14<i class="footnote">Tanna’im disagree about this (<em>Shabbat</em> 36b). The majority of Sages maintain that only food that is fully cooked and that further cooking will damage may be left on an open fire. This is the ruling of Rif and Rambam. However, according to Ḥananya, one may leave food that has reached the state of <em>ma’akhal ben Derusa’i</em> on the fire as well. This is the ruling of the Ge’onim, <em>Tosafot</em>, and many Rishonim. SA 253:1 presents the stringent opinion as the primary one, and the lenient position as the secondary one. Rema, based on Rosh, writes that the custom is to be lenient even though <em>le-khatḥila</em> it is preferable to be stringent. BHL s.v. “ve-nahagu” reaches this conclusion as well. Some Sephardic communities are customarily lenient (<em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 253:1). Nowadays, since it is easy to cover the flame with a <em>blekh</em>, one can satisfy all opinions, as explained in the next paragraph. <em>Ma’akhal ben Derusa’i</em> is named for a robber who was on the run from the law, and became accustomed to making do with minimally cooked food so that he could eat quickly and then continue to flee. Rambam understood that this refers to half-cooked food, while Rashi maintains that it refers to food that is a third cooked. MB 253:38 states that in extenuating circumstances, one can be lenient once the food is a third cooked. (Although SA 254:1 explains that one may leave a pot with raw meat on an open flame because it cooks slowly, nowadays since we cook with gas whose flame is extremely hot, this is no longer permitted, as explained in <em>Harḥavot</em>.)It is important to note that the rabbinic rules pertaining to the concern that one will raise the flame relate specifically to cooking food; when using heaters or radiators to heat the house this is not an issue. (However, in the case of a wood-burning stove, one must make certain that the fire has indeed taken hold before Shabbat begins, as explained in SA §255.)</i>
  
  Section 16
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / When the Flame Is Covered
  As we have learned, if food is not adequately cooked (whichever definition of “adequately,” as defined in the previous section, is adopted), one may not leave it on the fire before Shabbat begins, because one may come to turn up the flame on Shabbat. However, one may do so if the flame is covered. Covering the flame, thus reducing its heat, serves as a reminder not to raise the flame later. Furthermore, were one to forget and go to turn up the flame, he would see that the fire is covered and remember that this is forbidden, and thus refrain from proceeding. Therefore one may leave foods that are not adequately cooked on an electric plata, since its heating elements are covered.
  One may also cover the fire by placing a blekh (metal sheet) over the burners and leaving adequately cooked foods on it, since covering the fire is a clear indication and reminder that it is Shabbat, effectively preventing one from forgetting and turning up the flame. Ideally, it is also recommended to cover the knobs that control the flames of the burners.15<i class="footnote">In the times of the Sages, foods were cooked and heated in a stove that contained coals. The Sages decreed that if the coals were removed or covered with ash, it was permitted to leave food there even if it was not yet edible. Nowadays, since we do not cook on coals but rather on gas or electric burners, there is nothing truly similar to removing the coals. Nevertheless, the process of covering the fire with ash can be replicated simply by covering the flame. The purpose of covering the coals was to reduce their heat without putting them out entirely, so that one could still cook with them. The Sages were not worried that one would forget it was Shabbat and feed the fire, because the fact that the coals were covered would remind him that it was Shabbat and this is forbidden. Covering a gas flame with a <em>blekh</em> serves the same purpose; it reminds people that it is Shabbat, so there is no concern that they will raise the flame. Therefore, it is not necessary to cover the knobs on the stove. Indeed, SSK ch. 1 n. 218 (based on MB 253:14) states this, as do <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:17:2; <em>Shvut Yitzḥak</em> vol. 2, p. 21 in the name of R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv; and R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach as cited in <em>Me’or Ha-Shabbat</em> vol. 2, p. 628. This is also recorded by <em>Igrot Moshe</em> OḤ 1:93, which states the key is to cover the flame, even though <em>le-khatḥila</em> one should cover the knobs as well. <em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 3:49 maintains that the primary requirement is to cover the knobs in order to prevent the possibility of raising the flame, but requires covering the fire as well. <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 1:3:1 states that it is sufficient either to cover the fire or to cover the knobs. See n. 13 above, which mentions an even more lenient position, but we do not follow this.</i>
  Although one may put foods on a blekh or plata even if they are not fully cooked, le-khatḥila it is better that all the foods be fully cooked before Shabbat begins. As long as they are not fully cooked, any action that will make them cook faster is prohibited by Torah law. For example, if one removed the cover on a pot containing food that is not fully cooked, one may not replace the cover. Similarly, one may not move the pot to a hotter place on the plata (as explained in section 3). Therefore, it is preferable to leave only fully cooked foods on a plata (SSK 1:72).
  
  Section 17
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Hashhaya in an Electric Oven and Cooking Using a Timer
  If one wishes to leave food that is not fully cooked in an electric oven on Friday afternoon, he must do something to remind himself of Shabbat, to ensure that he will not turn up the heat on Shabbat. One option is to place a metal strip or thick aluminum foil between the pot or pan and the heating element. Since this reduces the heat reaching the food, he will remember that it is Shabbat and not raise the oven temperature. Alternatively, he may cover the oven knobs.16<i class="footnote">. In the time of the Mishna, ovens were very hot, and there was no permissible way to leave inadequately cooked food in them. Since a <em>kira</em> was not quite so hot, the Sages allowed it to be used on condition that the coals were either removed or covered (<em>Shabbat</em> 38b). The ovens that people have in their homes today, whether large or small, are not as hot as the ovens of old, so the laws of today’s ovens correspond to those of the <em>kira</em> (Rema 253:1; MB 253:28). However, the concern that one might “stoke the coals,” that is, raise the flame of the oven, still exists. To neutralize this concern, the Mishna suggests that one cover the coals with ashes in a way that will reduce their heat. In an electric oven, this is accomplished by placing a sheet of heavy foil or metal over the heating element, separating between it and the pot. This is the suggestion of <em>Shvut Yitzḥak</em> 2:7:3 in the name of R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv. <em>Az Nidberu</em> 8:16 and <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:17:4 maintain that it is sufficient to place something between the bottom of the oven and the pot, and one may rely upon them (taking into account the lenient position presented above in n. 13). The second option is to cover the knobs. Even though this is not the same as covering the coals, nevertheless in practice it will remind people not to turn up the flame. (In our case one can more easily rely on covering the knobs, since in any case the fire is covered.) This also seems to be the opinion of <em>Har Tzvi</em>, OḤ 1:136; <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 10:26:1; <em>Shemesh U-magen</em> 2:62; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 1:3:7; and R. Yitzḥak Halperin. <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 2:15 permits using the oven if the knobs are taped in such a way that it is impossible to move them. We have already seen in n. 13 that some are even more lenient since we are not concerned that the fire will go out, but their opinion is not followed in practice.</i>
  There is an additional problem with using an oven. If the oven has a thermostat, some maintain that one may not open the door of the oven because this may result in the heat cycling on (below 17: 8, and n. 8). In order to allow oven use according to all opinions, many ovens have a special setting for Shabbat. This setting bypasses the thermostat and guarantees that the oven maintains a constant low temperature unaffected by opening the oven door.
  One may use an electric urn, but it is preferable to make sure the water boils before Shabbat. One should use an urn that does not have a thermostat. If it does have a thermostat, one should try to remove water only when the heating element is on (see below, ch. 17 n. 8). One may not use a device that automatically fills with cold water to replace the hot water that is removed, since that cold water is then cooked (section 24 below).17<i class="footnote">. The water must be boiled before Shabbat for two reasons. First, some say that an urn is considered an uncovered fire, and one may not leave water on an open fire to cook on Shabbat (SSK 1:46; <em>Hilkhot Shabbat Be-Shabbat</em> 1:5:26; <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 2:32). However, if it is impossible to raise the heat, then according to <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 5:91 and <em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 5:30 this is permitted. If one covers the knob that controls the heat, then many maintain that there is no problem of <em>hashhaya</em>, as explained above in n. 16. Even when one can turn up the heat, some are lenient, as mentioned in n. 13. Second, if one removes water from the urn before it is boiled up, he causes the remaining water to cook more quickly (<em>Hilkhot Shabbat Be-Shabbat</em>, <em>loc. cit</em>.; <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> ch. 2 n. 39). If the urn’s spigot is at the very bottom, one may not use it. This is because when the water runs out, one might add cold water to prevent the heating element from burning out, as MB 318:68 mentions. <em>Ḥut </em><em>Shani</em> 26:5 and <em>Avnei Yashfeh</em> 5:50 forbid using an urn even if the spigot is higher up, out of concern that the water might still get used up if one tilts the urn or if water evaporates on its own. But the rest of the <em>poskim</em> we mentioned do not feel it necessary to worry about this.</i>
  In principle, as long as one covers the oven knobs, he may leave raw food in the oven before Shabbat begins, and set a timer to turn on the oven an hour before the meal, so that the food will be ready in time. Similarly, one may put flour and water and other ingredients into a bread machine if its knobs are covered, and set the timer to turn on the machine, so that the bread will be kneaded and baked on Shabbat morning and finished in time for lunch. Indeed, some permit this in practice. Others prohibit it absolutely, fearing that it would lead to people actually cooking on Shabbat.18<i class="footnote"><em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 2:6 and <em>Minḥat Yitzhak</em> 4:26 forbid leaving fully cooked food on a <em>plata</em> before Shabbat when the <em>plata</em> has not yet turned on, because one may come to place food that is not fully cooked on the <em>plata </em>on Shabbat, and thus violate a Torah prohibition. In contrast, <em>Melamed Le-ho’il</em> §58 and SSK 1:32 permit placing fully cooked food on a <em>plata</em> before Shabbat if the <em>plata</em> is off; but they forbid putting on food that is not fully cooked, lest one place such food on the <em>plata</em> on Shabbat. Those who permit putting food that is not fully cooked on a <em>plata</em> that is off on Friday include R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (<em>Minḥat Shlomo</em> 2:34); <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:30:18; and R. Ovadia Yosef (<em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 10:26, where he mentions other Aḥaronim who rule similarly). The same law would apply to a bread machine as well. See <em>Harḥavot</em>.</i>
  
  Section 18
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Hanaĥa
  Now that we have learned the laws of hashhaya, leaving food on a heat source before Shabbat, we will now explore the laws of hanaḥa: placing food on Shabbat somewhere that it will be warmed up. As we saw in section 3, the rule of thumb is that one may not cook on Shabbat, but one may reheat food due to the principle of ein bishul aḥar bishul. Therefore, one may remove fully cooked food from the refrigerator, such as cold chicken and kugel, and reheat them. The poskim disagree regarding reheating a liquid (as explained above in sections 5-6). However, the Sages prohibited reheating even cooked foods if one does so in a manner that resembles cooking, because he may forget that it is Shabbat and end up raising the flame and transgressing a Torah prohibition. Therefore, one may not reheat a fully cooked food over an open fire, since this is the way one normally cooks.
  But one may reheat food if the method used is clearly not the normal way of cooking. Therefore, one may put a pot with cooked food on top of another pot, or on an urn that is on the fire, because this is not the normal way of cooking.
  Poskim disagree, however, about placing food on a plata or a blekh.
  According to many, one may not place even fully cooked food on these, because putting food on a heat source resembles cooking. However, if one places a pot or plate upside down on the plata or blekh, he may place food on them, because this is not a normal way to cook, as normally one would not place an obstruction between the heat source and the food. In practice, one may even rely upon a cover that lifts the food up only minimally (like the top from a metal coffee can) to serve as an obstruction between the plata and the food. However, aluminum foil, which does not lift the food up at all, is not acceptable. Those who are stringent maintain that one may not place even fully cooked food on an aluminum foil-covered plata or blekh.
  In contrast, there are others who are lenient and maintain that since people do not normally cook upon a plata or a blekh but only over an open flame, when one places food on a blekh or plata it does not look like he is cooking, and therefore he may place cooked food directly on them on Shabbat. There are others who are lenient when it comes to a plata since it is especially designed for warming and not cooking, but are stringent regarding a blekh since it is hotter and can serve as a cooking surface.19<i class="footnote">Included among the stringent are: R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (cited in SSK 1:30 and nn. 63 and 83); <em>Or Le-Tziyon </em>2:17:1; <em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 1:91; and R. Meir Mazuz (cited in <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:10:28). In the same vein, <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 1:93 is stringent about a <em>blekh </em>or <em>plata </em>that get so hot that one can cook on them; <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 253:11 states similarly regarding a <em>blekh</em>. In their opinion, a <em>plata</em> is essentially a <em>kira</em> whose flame is covered. One may not put food directly on a <em>plata</em>, because even though the cover eliminates the concern that one will turn up the flame, there still remains the concern that it resembles cooking when one places things upon it. <em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 37:9, 11 is more stringent about leaving food on a <em>plata</em> or returning it to one, because, in its opinion, a <em>plata</em> is not considered covered since it itself is a heat source without a cover. This is also the opinion of R. Mordechai Eliyahu regarding a <em>plata</em>. SA 253:1 forbids leaving fully cooked food on the coals because of the prohibition of insulating; in R. Eliyahu’s opinion, when the bottom of a pot is resting on something that generates heat, this is considered insulating (<em>hatmana</em>) and is forbidden. In order to use a <em>plata</em> in a permitted fashion, one must put an additional metal piece on it that will create some space between the pot and the <em>plata</em>. (<em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:17:1 rejects this reasoning, because SA was stringent only when speaking of a pot that was sinking into coals, but not regarding food that is placed on a flat and stable heat source.) R. Qafiḥ, in his commentary to MT 3:12, is stringent regarding returning pots to a <em>plata</em> or <em>blekh</em>, but not regarding leaving them on before Shabbat.<em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 2:45, based on several Aḥaronim, takes a lenient position, as does <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:10:28. <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 8:26:5 inclines toward this and states that it is also the opinion of R. Frank. According to them, placing something on the <em>plata</em> does not resemble cooking, and the <em>plata</em> is comparable to a covered <em>kira</em> with an additional cover. Some are lenient only for a <em>plata</em>, where there is no concern of resembling cooking, because it is designed for reheating and not for cooking. Thus, the laws pertinent to a <em>plata</em> are not those of a <em>kira</em> but those of the sides of a bonfire, which were occasionally used to cook in the time of the Talmud (<em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 4:74, <em>Bishul</em> §35; R. Lior).I wrote above that one who follows the stringent position may create an obstruction between the food and the plata or blekh by using an upside-down plate. This is suggested by SSK 1:44, n. 126, based on MB 253:81. (In contrast, Ḥazon Ish maintains that one may place food on the plata or blekh only if he places it on top of a pot with food in it; however, one may not put it on an empty pot that is on the plata, because that would be like stacking one blekh on another over the fire – it does not help, because it still looks like cooking.) It would seem that using the metal cover of a coffee can does not look like cooking, and moreover one may take into account the lenient position.</i>
  In practice, since many poskim are stringent, it is preferable to be stringent and refrain from placing a pot with cooked food directly onto the plata or blekh. However, those who wish to be lenient may, since the law is rabbinic, and many important poskim have offered compelling reasoning in support of their lenient position. One who has a set family custom on the matter should follow his custom.
  One may put fully cooked food on a heat source that is not normally used for cooking, such as a radiator, even if the radiator is very hot, since it does not resemble cooking (Igrot Moshe, OḤ 4:74, Bishul §34). Similarly, one may put fully cooked food on top of a kerosene or gas heater that is meant to heat the home as long as something separates the fire from the food and one does not warm up food or water there during the week. But if it is used during the week for heating food and water, then the laws pertaining to it are the same as those for a gas flame. Thus according to most poskim, one must put an upside-down pot on it, and only then may one reheat the food. Following the more lenient position, it is enough to put a blekh on the heater and place the food upon it.
  
  Section 19
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Haĥzara
  Sometimes one removes a pot from the plata on Shabbat in order to remove food, and then wishes to return it to the plata. May one take this action, known as haḥzara? Once again there is disagreement among the poskim.
  According to those who are lenient and allow placing food on a plata or blekh on Shabbat (maintaining that this does not resemble cooking, as explained in the previous section), one may certainly return a pot to the plata if it had already been there on Shabbat, as long as the food is fully cooked and the fire is covered. (If the food is not fully cooked, one violates the Torah prohibition of cooking. As long as the fire is covered, there is no concern that he will turn up the flame.)
  Those who are concerned that placing cooked foods on the plata on Shabbat resembles cooking, and thus forbid doing so, view returning food to the plata differently. Since the food was already on the plata before Shabbat, returning it does not resemble cooking. Therefore, as long as it is clear that one is simply returning the pot to the plata, and not placing it there for the first time on Shabbat, he may do so. In order to make it clear that this is haḥzara and not initial placement, three conditions must be met, le-khatḥila: 1) the pot must not be placed on the floor; 2) the person removing it must have in mind that he will return the pot to the plata; 3) the person must keep hold of the pot until he returns it to the plata. Be-di’avad, if there is a great need to return the pot to the plata because that is the only way there will be hot food at the meal, then even if these three conditions are not met, one may return the food to the plata. This is because the food is still, in fact, being returned to the plata, and not being placed there for the first time.20<i class="footnote">The laws of <em>haḥzara</em> apply specifically to a <em>kira</em>, and the leniency is on condition that when one returns the pot, he places it on top of the <em>kira</em> and not inside it. (If he wishes to place food there on Shabbat, there must be some additional separation between the <em>kira</em> and the pot.) For those who maintain that placing a pot on the <em>plata</em> is forbidden because it resembles cooking, <em>haḥzara</em> may still be permitted, since this would be the equivalent of placing an item on a <em>kira</em> and not inside it. However, one must ensure that certain conditions are met. SA 253:2 mentions only the first condition, that the pot is not placed on the ground. Some maintain that placing the pot on the counter is the equivalent of putting it on the ground, since the counter is attached to the ground (<em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:17:6; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 1:3:5). Others maintain that the counter is different from the ground, because it is normal to briefly place a pot on the counter and then return it to the stove (<em>Az Nidberu</em> 8:17). The custom is to be lenient. One who wishes to be stringent should place the pot on a towel instead of directly on the counter (see SSK, ch. 1 n. 61).Two additional conditions are mentioned by Rema. If one places the pot on a bench, according to Rema, as long as he keeps hold of the pot he may replace it. But if he places it on the ground, it does not help to keep hold of it; he must hold it so that only part is on the ground and part remains in the air (<em>Shvut Yitzḥak</em> vol. 2, p. 161, based on Maharam Schick §117). According to <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 4:74, <em>Bishul</em> §33, if one keeps hold of the pot, that is enough to render <em>haḥzara</em> permissible, even if it was placed on the ground. In any case, <em>be-di’avad</em> if one did not meet this condition, Rema is more lenient. According to SA, the first condition is absolute; if one placed the pot on the ground, he may not return it. According to Rema, however, <em>be-di’avad</em> he may return it even if it was placed on the ground. I did not record SA’s opinion in the main text because some maintain that it is always permitted to heat cooked food on a <em>plata</em> or <em>blekh</em>. Therefore, even those who are stringent can be lenient here and follow Rema. All of this of course assumes that there is no problem of actually cooking when one returns the pot to the heat source. Regarding liquids, see sections 5-6 above. According to SA, one may return liquids to the <em>plata </em>only if they have not cooled to below <em>yad soledet bo</em>, while according to Rema 318:16, as long as they retain some warmth this is permitted. However, some are more stringent and maintain that one may not return a pot to the <em>plata</em> itself because a <em>plata</em> is considered the equivalent of a <em>kira</em> whose coals have not been covered. This is the opinion of <em>Ḥazon Ish</em>, OḤ 37:9, 10 and R. Qafiḥ. However, since this law is rabbinic and the vast majority of <em>poskim</em> are lenient, I did not present this opinion in the main text.</i>
  
  Section 20
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Hanaĥa and Haĥzara on a Plata
  As we learned in the previous section, if food was placed on a plata before Shabbat, even those who are stringent permit removing this food from the plata and replacing it. Therefore, if food was placed on the periphery of the plata before Shabbat, one may move it to the center to allow it to heat more effectively on Shabbat, since it was already on the plata and this is not considered a new placement. Of course, this only applies to food that is fully cooked. If the food is not fully cooked, any action that raises the temperature of the food will cook it, and is thus prohibited by Torah law.
  Similarly, one who uses two platas may move a pot from one to the other on Shabbat, as long as the food in the pot is fully cooked and still hot. If one placed a pot of fully cooked food on a blekh before Shabbat, and the fire underneath it goes out on Shabbat, he may move the pot to a second blekh or plata. As long as the food is still hot, it is clear that it was on the plata before Shabbat, and moving it to a different plata is thus considered haḥzara and not initial placement.21<i class="footnote">. Some are stringent, however, maintaining that since the fire underneath it went out, it is as if the pot is resting on the ground. Thus, if one wishes to move it to a different <em>plata</em>, it is considered a new placement, and is prohibited unless he places an overturned plate underneath the pot. This is the opinion of SSK 1:27. However, n. 79 there cites R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach’s rationale for leniency. <em>Igrot Moshe</em> takes the latter approach as well in OḤ 4:74, <em>Bishul</em> §38, and this is also the opinion of R. Shmuel Wosner and R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv as cited in <em>Otzrot Shabbat</em> 70:89-90. This whole discussion is only relevant for the stringent approach, which does not allow placing cold food on the <em>plata</em>, as explained in section 18 and n. 19. But for those who are lenient and maintain that one may put fully cooked cold food on a <em>plata</em> (<em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> and <em>Igrot Moshe</em>), one may certainly be lenient in this case.</i>
  When one wishes to heat numerous foods for Shabbat, one may place two layers of pots on the plata. Friday night’s food may be placed in the lower level of pots and removed when needed for the meal. The pots that were on top of them may then be placed on the plata, as long as the food in them is fully cooked. This is not considered a new placement as long as they are yad soledet bo and the person’s intention was always to place them directly on the plata once there was room to do so.22<i class="footnote">However, some are stringent and maintain that since the pots on the top level were not resting on the <em>plata</em>, moving them directly to the <em>plata </em>would be considered a new placement, which is forbidden according to the stringent opinion described in section 18. This is the approach of SSK 1:44, <em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 37:11, and <em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 1:91. (Ḥazon Ish also maintains that one may not place these pots on top of an empty pot, as explained in <em>Az Nidberu</em> 3:14.) In SSK n. 125 is mentioned the rationale of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach to be lenient and rely on the position of Ran. Since we saw in section 18 that some maintain that <em>le-khatḥila</em> one may place fully cooked cold food on the <em>plata</em>, in this case even those who are usually stringent may be lenient <em>le-khatḥila</em>.There is another case where the poskim disagree about haḥzara: If there is a large pot on a plata or blekh whose heat source is covered, may one pour its contents into a smaller pot, and then place the smaller pot on the plata? According to MA 253:20 this is forbidden, while according to SHT 253:47 this is permitted. Therefore SSK ch. 1 n. 49 and Brit Olam, dinei hashhaya ve-hatmana §17, state that le-khatḥila one should be stringent, but if necessary one may be lenient. It seems reasonable to be lenient in this case even le-khatḥila, since we can also invoke the opinion allowing one to place things on the plata le-khatḥila (see section 18 above). Regarding liquids, as explained in n. 12, some maintain that according to SA 253:4 it is forbidden because of the possible prohibition of cooking. But Rema and other poskim maintain that even according to SA, in times of necessity it is permitted.</i>
  If one wishes to warm up fully cooked food, and there is an open fire, one may cover the fire with a blekh, set a plate on it (following the position of most poskim, quoted above in section 18), and place the food upon the plate. Even if this covering changes the shape of the flame, it is not prohibited since the strength of the fire remains unaffected (SSK ch. 1 n. 66).
  
  Section 21
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Returning Foods to the Oven
  If a pot containing food was in a hot oven, and the pot was removed from the oven so that food could be removed from it, it may not be returned to the oven. There are two reasons for this. First, since there is nothing reducing the temperature of the oven, there is a concern that when one returns food to the oven, he will forget that it is Shabbat, and turn up the temperature. Second, this action resembles cooking. One possible solution to both these problems is to place the food within a four-sided metal box inside the oven. In such a situation we are not worried that one will raise the oven’s temperature, nor does it resemble cooking when he returns the food to it, since normally people do not cook food in a box. It would seem that one may also be lenient if one puts a pan or overturned plate on the bottom of the oven, and then inserts the food. Additionally, one should cover the oven knobs.23<i class="footnote">. One may not return a cooked food to the oven for two reasons: lest he stoke the coals (increase the flame), and because it resembles cooking. So state SSK 1:19 and <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 3:28. However, if one places a box inside the oven and replaces the food inside the box, according to <em>Igrot Moshe </em>OḤ 4:74, <em>Bishul</em> 27, it is permitted, because once one takes action to minimize the heat, there is no fear that he will forget about Shabbat and increase the heat. It also no longer resembles cooking. <em>Hilkhot Shabbat Be-Shabbat</em> 1:5:25, p. 237 states similarly in the name of R. Elyashiv. <em>Shabbat Ke-halakha</em> 1:9:36 permits if one returns the food on top of an inverted pan, thereby minimizing the heat (the equivalent of covering the coals) and demonstrating that he is not cooking. According to AHS 253:17, nowadays there is never a concern that returning food to an oven resembles cooking. Earlier sources explain that people used to cook in an oven and heat food on top of it. Therefore, when anyone placed food into an oven, it resembled cooking. But today’s ovens are built in such a way that one cannot heat food on top of them, and thus even heating food (without cooking) is accomplished by placing food inside the oven. Therefore, putting food in the oven does not necessarily indicate that one is cooking. <em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 3:48 and <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 1:3:8 state this as well. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to take some action that corresponds to covering the coals to remind people not to turn up the flame. According to <em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em>, one does this by placing a pan as a barrier between the heating element at the bottom of the oven and the food, while according to <em>Menuḥat Ahava </em>this can be accomplished by covering the knobs. <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 253:8 permits returning the food even without an upside-down pan or covered knobs, because in its opinion, heating elements that are not visible are considered covered, and there is no concern that one will adjust the flame. All this is on the condition that one meets the requirements necessary to permit <em>haḥzara</em>.</i>
  In order to return food to an oven, one must meet the conditions necessary to permit haḥzara outlined above (section 19). In other words, since food was in the oven, and the person taking it out intended to return it, this does not resemble cooking. However, one may not place cold food in a hot oven, since that does resemble cooking.
  If the oven is controlled by a timer, one may place fully cooked food in the cold oven, so that it will heat when the oven goes on. This does not resemble cooking, since the oven is off. In order to avoid the concern that one might raise the temperature, the knobs must be covered or the food must be placed on an upside-down pan. However, some poskim forbid this because they maintain that even though the oven is off, putting food in it to heat resembles cooking. However, in practice, since the law is rabbinic, one may rely on the lenient opinion.24<i class="footnote">R. Levi Yitzhak Halperin, in his book <em>Kashrut Ve-Shabbat Ba-mitbaḥ Ha-moderni</em>, permits this because when the oven is off, placing food inside it does not resemble cooking. In order to prevent the possibility of raising the temperature, the knobs should be covered or removed. It is also preferable <em>le-khatḥila</em> to set the oven at a temperature lower than is generally used for cooking. This is cited in <em>Peninei Hora’ah</em>, p. 113 and is the ruling of R. Lior. <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 10:26 is even more lenient, in a sense. <em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 38:2 prohibits this, as do <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 4:26:10; SSK 1:32; <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 2:68; <em>Hilkhot Shabbat Be-Shabbat</em> vol. 1, p. 251; and <em>Shvut Yitzḥak</em> 2:9:1-2. Also see <em>Harḥavot</em> on section 17.</i>
  Some people have a plata with a compartment that is set up on top of it, into which pots can be placed. Food that was removed from such a plata may be returned to the compartment. This does not resemble cooking because no one cooks in such a compartment, and its sole purpose is to keep foods on the plata warm (SSK 1:79). Those who place fully cooked cold food on the plata (as explained in section 18) may put food on this kind of plata as well. Those who are stringent may place the food on an inverted plate. Placing things into the compartment is not considered hatmana (see below), because the prohibition of hatmana is relevant only when the pot is in full contact with what surrounds it, while in this case not all the sides of the pot touch the compartment.
  
  Section 22
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Principles of Hatmana
  Because lighting a fire on Shabbat is prohibited, it is difficult to keep food warm. Nowadays we have electric platas that solve this problem, but in the times of the Sages this was a great challenge. One way to accomplish this was to place the pot of cooked food in the oven (as explained above in sections 14-16). Another way was through hatmana (insulation): enveloping the pot in wool or a different material to preserve its heat.
  However, there are two rabbinic prohibitions that limit hatmana. The first applies before Shabbat, and the second on Shabbat itself. The first prohibition is that one may not insulate using a material that itself generates heat, such as hay or olive dregs. This prohibition goes into effect even before Shabbat begins, as the Sages were worried that if people insulated foods on Friday using these materials, they might mistakenly conclude that it was permissible to insulate foods on Friday using coals, and they would end up stoking the coals. Therefore, the Sages forbade insulating foods before Shabbat using heat-generating materials. However, one may insulate food using materials that do not generate heat, such as clothing, towels, blankets, and the like, as long as one does this before Shabbat. The second rabbinic prohibition is that one may not insulate warm food on Shabbat itself, even when the material used does not generate additional heat. This is due to the concern that if insulating on Shabbat were permitted, some people would first heat the food on the fire and then insulate it, thus violating the prohibitions of Mav’ir and Bishul (SA 257:1-3).
  
  
  
  One may fill a thermos with hot water on Shabbat, because placing something hot into a utensil is not considered hatmana. Similarly, one may place a bag of rice or other cooked foods in a cholent pot while keeping it separate from the cholent, because hatmana does not apply to insulating one food within another.25<i class="footnote">This is the opinion of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (SSK ch. 42 n. 242); <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:18:3; and R. Ovadia Yosef (<em>Halikhot Olam</em> 4, <em>Parshat Bo </em>13). In contrast, SSK 42:63; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 1:3:27; and <em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 3:47 are stringent. Nevertheless, the rationale of those who are lenient is convincing, and when in doubt about a rabbinic rule we are lenient. There is another reason to be lenient regarding filling a thermos with hot water: the prohibition of <em>hatmana</em> does not apply to a <em>kli sheni </em>(SSK 1:83).</i>
  
  Section 23
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Hatmana with a Plata and a Slow Cooker
  One may not wrap pots on the plata in towels or blankets even before Shabbat. Although the towels or blanket do not generate heat, nevertheless since the pot is on the plata and the plata generates heat, this is considered insulating with something that generates heat, which is forbidden even before Shabbat.
  The prohibition of hatmana applies only when the pot is wrapped on all sides, but if it is not surrounded there is no prohibition. Therefore, one may wrap most of the pot on the plata with a towel or blanket, because as long as the pot is not entirely covered, there is no prohibition of hatmana. One may do this even on Shabbat (Rema). Similarly, one may place a pan on top of a pot and drape a towel over the pan; as long as the towel does not touch the sides of the pot, it is not considered hatmana (SA 257:8). One must take care not to place a damp towel on the pot, because drying using heat transgresses the prohibition of laundering (below 13:3).26<i class="footnote">. SA 253:1; 257:8 lists two stringencies pertaining to <em>hatmana</em>:1) If an item that does not generate additional heat, such as an item of clothing, is resting on something that generates heat, like a <em>plata</em>, this is considered insulating with a heat-generating item.2) Insulating with an item that generates heat is prohibited even if the pot is only partially covered (as in the case of insulating with coals). Therefore, according to this opinion, one may not cover a pot that is on the plata with a towel even if the cover is only on top or on one side, and even if it is placed there before Shabbat, since this is considered insulating with a heat-generating item. This is also the opinion of Menuḥat Ahava 1:3:19-20.In contrast, Yabi’a Omer 6:33 is lenient and allows one to fully wrap a pot on the plata with blankets before Shabbat. This is because according to Ramban, as long as there is space between the heat source and the pot, it is not considered insulating with a heat-generating source. In R. Ovadia’s opinion, since there is space between the plata’s heating element and the metal sheet that comes into contact with the bottom of the pot, there is no hatmana here. This is also the opinion of R. Messas (Shemesh U-magen, OḤ 3:50).Rema has an intermediate position. If there is a heat source below the pot, even if the covers above do not generate heat, they are considered as if they do generate heat. However, if the pot is not surrounded on all sides, it is permitted; the prohibition of hatmana applies only if the pot is completely wrapped. This is the practice of Ashkenazim, as recorded in SSK 1:77. Or Le-Tziyon 2:17:10 is lenient in accordance with the Sephardic custom and Yabi’a Omer, but adds that it is preferable not to cover the pot entirely (like the Ashkenazic custom) and that when possible, it is preferable to be stringent like SA. In the main text I follow Rema’s intermediate position.</i>
  Some prohibit using a slow cooker (a pot made of ceramic or porcelain, surrounded by a metal housing that contains a heating element (“Crock-Pot”) because of hatmana, since the pot is surrounded by the heating element. If the food inside is uncooked, they maintain that there is an additional prohibition, as this constitutes leaving a pot on an uncovered fire. In contrast, others feel there is no prohibition of hatmana in this case, since the top of the pot is visible. In order to avoid the issue of hashhaya, if the food is not fully cooked, one must cover the knobs that control the temperature. This is the halakha in practice.27<i class="footnote">Those who do not allow slow cookers to be used on Shabbat maintain that if most of the pot is surrounded, and certainly when all of the pot is surrounded and only the top is not, it is still considered <em>hatmana</em> with heat-generating material. Therefore one may not use a slow cooker on Shabbat, even if it is activated on Friday afternoon. This is the opinion of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (<em>Minḥat Shlomo</em> 2:34:5) and <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> ch. 2 n. 149, in the name of R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv. According to them, a slow cooker could only be used if one inserts something to lift the pot and distance it from the heating element. There is also the problem of <em>hashhaya.</em> Since slow cookers have temperature controls, there is a concern that one might turn up the temperature. To avoid this problem, one must either cover the heating element to lessen the heat or make sure that the food is already completely cooked when Shabbat begins. Those who are permissive feel that since the pot is not entirely covered, it is not considered <em>hatmana</em> (based on Rema 253:1 and MB <em>ad loc. </em>48). If the food is not fully cooked, one should cover the knobs (see section 17 above). This is also the opinion of R. Ovadia Yosef in <em>Ḥazon Ovadia</em>, <em>Shabbat</em> vol. 1, p. 64 and <em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 9:52. Since this is a rabbinic law, the <em>halakha</em> follows those who are lenient. Additionally, the lenient position is compelling. See <em>Harḥavot</em>.</i>
  
  Section 24
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Electric Boilers
  One may not benefit from water that was heated in a forbidden fashion on Shabbat. But if the water was heated in a permissible fashion, one may benefit from it on Shabbat. Seemingly, then, if a boiler was on before Shabbat, one could use the hot water produced by it even on Shabbat. However, there is a problem. Today’s electric boilers are built in such a way that whenever the hot water is turned on, cold water flows into the boiler tank to replace it. If the heating elements in the boiler are working and heating, then turning on the hot water tap on Shabbat causes cold water to enter the boiler and become cooked. Therefore one may not turn on the hot water on Shabbat when the boiler is on.
  If the electric boiler was turned off before Shabbat, then the question whether the hot water may be used depends on whether the cold water that will flow into the boiler will become cooked. If the hot water coming out is scalding, it would be forbidden to turn on the hot water tap, because the replacement cold water would become cooked. But if the hot water is cool enough to touch, even just barely, then even if it is yad soledet bo it can be used on Shabbat, because the remaining water in the boiler cannot cook the incoming cold water (as explained in the note). When it is unclear whether the hot water is hot enough to cook the incoming water, one may turn on the faucet, as this is only forbidden if it is clear that the cold water entering the boiler will become cooked. If it is initially unclear how hot the water is, but when the faucet is turned on it becomes clear that it is extremely hot, cold water should be added to reduce the water’s temperature to below yad soledet bo.28<i class="footnote">Although some maintain that <em>yad soledet bo</em> is the temperature at which it is unpleasant to touch something for an extended period of time, a temperature of approximately 45°C (see section 4 above), in this case one only needs to be stringent when the water coming out of the boiler is over 80°C and cannot be touched at all. This is because our boilers are built in such a way that the hottest water is at the top of the boiler while the water at the bottom is not as hot. (The cold water enters the boiler through the lower part.) There is a significant difference between their temperatures. If one is able to touch the hot water that comes out of the top part of the boiler, it is almost certain that the water at the bottom of the boiler is not <em>yad soledet bo</em>, and certainly is not capable of cooking the cold water that will enter the boiler.When in doubt, one may turn on the hot water tap and check if the water is <em>yad soledet bo</em>. Even if it turns out that the water is burning hot, this is not prohibited. This is because when he turned on the water there was a doubt, and this is a case of <em>davar she-eino mitkaven</em>. This is certainly the case according to <em>Taz</em>, and perhaps also according to R. Akiva Eger, because one might use so much water that the remaining water will not be able to cook anything (see above 9:2 and <em>Harḥavot</em> here). In addition, the flow of cold water into the boiler is caused indirectly, and without the intention to heat it (see SSK ch. 1 n. 132). One may even use the water without being considered benefiting from a <em>melakha</em>. Since one did not know if the water is burning hot, it was permissible for him to turn on the hot water tap. Once the burning hot water is already flowing, one may add a great deal of cold water to it so that it will no longer be <em>yad soledet bo</em> (because if it is <em>yad soledet bo</em>, then the cold water that is being added to the burning water will cook). Once the hot water is released, it is preferable to wash as many dishes as possible, so that the hot water will come out of the boiler and the remaining water in the boiler will be unable to heat the cold water flowing in. If one needs only a little hot water, some say that it is still forbidden to turn off the hot water tap until all the hot water comes out. This is to make sure that the cold water flowing in will not cook (<em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:10:13). Others permit the tap to be closed, because the cooking is done via <em>grama</em>, and we are not stringent when a loss is involved (<em>Otzrot Shabbat</em> ch. 1, p. 61 in the name of <em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em>; see SSK 1, the end of n. 131). The <em>halakha</em> follows those who are lenient. This is because in addition to their reasoning, it is almost always still doubtful whether the water remaining in the boiler would in fact be able to cook the incoming water; even if it could, it would be a <em>davar she-eino mitkaven</em>, which makes the prohibition rabbinic; additionally, the action is performed via <em>grama</em>.It would seem that the following applies in a time of need, such as a cold day when it is difficult to wash the dishes using cold water, and one needs to wash a large number of dishes and use a large quantity of hot water. Even if it is clear that the water in the boiler is very hot, he may still use it, by first opening the cold water tap and then the hot water tap. This way, the cold water coming into contact with the hot water will not cook. Since it is clear that one will use a lot of hot water, it is also clear that the remaining water in the boiler will not be able to cook the cold water that will flow in as a result.</i>
  One may also set the electric boiler on a timer that will turn it on for 15 minutes every few hours. This way, the water will heat somewhat, but will not reach yad soledet bo. One can then use the lukewarm water on Shabbat without worrying.
  
  Section 25
  
  Bishul (Cooking) / Solar Boilers
  The Torah prohibition of cooking refers to cooking using the heat of a fire (esh) or using something that was itself heated by fire (toldot ha-esh). In contrast, one may cook using the heat of the sun (ḥama). Therefore, one may leave an egg in a place where the sun is beating down hard enough to cook it. However, it is rabbinically prohibited to cook using something that was itself heated up by the sun (toldot ha-ḥama). This is due to the concern that if one cooks in such a pan, he may mistakenly come to cook in a pan heated by fire, and will thus transgress a Torah prohibition (SA 318:3; MB 17).
  In practice, then, one may only cook in the heat of the sun itself, but cooking using toldot ha-ḥama is rabbinically forbidden. Thus the question of a solar boiler (“dud shemesh”) is dependent on how we categorize it. Is the water in a solar boiler considered heated by the sun itself, or by toldot ha-ḥama?
  According to several poskim, one may not use water that comes from a solar boiler, because the water is heated up with the help of receptors and black pipes, which are toldot ha-ḥama, and removing water from its tank causes the cold water that enters it to cook (Minḥat Yitzḥak 4:44; Az Nidberu 1:34). Another reason to prohibit this is that since many solar-powered boilers have the option of being powered by electricity by flipping a simple switch, there is a concern that if people use solar-heated water, they might also come to use electrically heated water. Therefore, it is better to avoid using hot water from the solar boiler (SSK 1:51 in the name of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach).
  Others maintain that one may use hot water from the solar heater, because it is considered heated by the sun itself. The receptors simply help to focus the sunlight and aid in its absorption. If so, there is no problem of cold water flowing into the boiler as hot water flows out, because one may cook this water on Shabbat in the sun’s rays (Har Zvi, OḤ 188; Tzitz Eliezer 7:19; R. Qafiḥ; Yabi’a Omer 4:34; Or Le-Tziyon 2:30:2).29<i class="footnote">. One does not need to take into account that the cold water that will flow into the boiler will be heated by contact with the hot water that was heated through <em>toldot ha-ḥama</em>, because there is no certainty that the water entering the boiler will be heated to <em>yad soledet bo</em>. The incoming cold water can only be heated in this way if the tank is completely filled with very hot water. But if the water at the bottom of the tank is still not very hot, it will not have the ability to heat the cold water; it will only be heated up by the receptors, i.e., directly by the sun. When one is in doubt about how the cold water will be heated, it is a <em>davar she-eino mitkaven</em>. And even when it is certain, there is room to be lenient since this case is a <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em> in the case of a double rabbinic prohibition, for which we are lenient. The two rabbinic factors are: 1) cooking using <em>toldot ha-ḥama</em> is a rabbinic prohibition, and 2) the entry of the cold water is done via <em>grama</em>. (See <em>Harḥavot</em> here, 24:2 and 25:1.) The unintentional result here is undesired, because it would be better for the person if the water is heated by the receptors rather than by the water in the tank; the latter case would cool down the hot water in the tank.</i>
  In practice, since this disagreement is on a rabbinic level and we are generally lenient in such disputes, one may be lenient and use hot water from a solar boiler on Shabbat. Those who wish to be stringent should be commended. However, when it comes to bathing babies, one should not be stringent.
  Today there is an additional type of boiler, mainly used in very tall buildings. In this boiler, the hot water in the receptors remains in a closed system of pipes that descend to the water tank, and the cold water is heated upon contact with these pipes. Thus, the cold water is heated via toldot ha-ḥama. Hot water from this kind of boiler may not be used on Shabbat, because turning on the hot water tap causes the cold water flowing in to become cooked by toldot ha-ḥama. But on Friday night one may use hot water that was heated before Shabbat, as explained in the note.30<i class="footnote">In a normal system, when one turns on the hot water tap, first all of the cold water in the pipe that descends from the tank on the roof comes out of the faucet. In contrast, in this new system, the hot water stays in the apartment’s tank and reaches the faucet immediately, saving time and water. Additionally, less scale accumulates in it. However, since the cold water is heated by the pipes that pass through the tank, it is cooked through <em>toldot ha-ḥama</em>, which is rabbinically prohibited. One cannot maintain that this is a <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em> in a rabbinic prohibition, because it is to his advantage for the cold water to enter the tank and heat up. On the other hand, on Friday night it is not to his advantage for cold water to enter the tank, because it will cool down the tank’s hot water; and since there is no sun then to heat the water flowing through the pipes, the water in the tank will remain cold through the night. Therefore, on Friday night one may use the hot water from the tank. However, during the day it is beneficial to him for the cold water to enter the tank, because the sun will quickly heat the water in the pipes descending from the receptors on the roof. In a case of necessity, it may be that even during the day one may use the hot water, because of the combination of two rationales: 1) Perhaps we can consider the action <em>grama</em> (see <em>Har Tzvi</em> §188; <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 7:19). 2) According to a minority of <em>poskim</em>, <em>psik reisha</em> is not forbidden if the prohibition involved is rabbinic (above 9:2 and <em>Harḥavot</em> 9:5:4).</i>
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Borer (Separating) / Four Melakhot Related to Borer
  There are four melakhot that deal with separating okhel (food) from psolet (waste): Dash (threshing), Zoreh (winnowing), Borer (separating), and Meraked (sifting).
  The melakha of Dash involves detaching food matter from its husk. The melakha is named for the act of detaching kernels of grain from their stalks and chaff. After the grain was harvested and gathered, its stalks were beaten with flails in order to separate the kernels of grain from them. When there was an abundance of grain, threshing was done by having an animal walk on the stalks over a hard surface. To make the threshing more efficient, a wide board with blades or stones attached to it would be attached to the animal. The animal would pull this board over the stalks, and this would separate the kernels from the stalks. (The details of this melakha will be explained below in sections 17-18.)
  After threshing, some straw and chaff would remain mixed in with the kernels. In order to remove this, they would winnow the grain in the wind, that is, they would toss the mixture in the air with a dedicated instrument, and the wind would blow away the lighter chaff and straw while the heavier kernels would fall back to the ground. This is the melakha of Zoreh.
  The remaining pile would still contain stones and clumps of earth, which would be removed by hand. This is the melakha of Borer.
  After this, the wheat would be ground into flour. But because the outer layer of a wheat kernel, called the bran, is coarse, the grinding process would result in a mixture of flour and coarse particles of bran. In order to separate the flour from the bran, the flour would be sifted with a sieve. The finer flour would filter through the sieve while the bran remains on its surface. This is the melakha of Meraked.
  Borer is done by hand, whereas Meraked is done with an implement. In Borer, the psolet is removed from the okhel, while in Meraked the psolet is left in the sieve as the flour passes through. Thus we see that there are multiple ways to separate okhel from psolet. All of these activities, when performed in their normal manner, are prohibited by Torah law. If they are done with a shinui they are rabbinically prohibited, and if they are performed as part of the normal eating process (ke-derekh akhila), they are permitted. All this will be explained below.
  The proliferation of melakhot that deal with separating psolet from okhel shows us how central acts of selection and differentiation are in our lives. The world in general is confused and mixed up, and the ability to separate the good parts from the bad allows man to develop and improve the world. These melakhot also allude to man’s spiritual work, because the world is confused and mixed up morally as well, and our job is to distinguish between good and evil. If it were totally clear that good was on one side and evil on the other, it would be easy to always choose the good. The problem is that things are not so clear; even within the good there is evil, and even within the evil there is good. Evil things can sometimes be good in a different place and context. The great challenge that God presented to mankind is to choose the good from the evil, to put everything in its proper place, and thus repair the world.
  All this applies throughout the week, when we must engage in the complicated work of separating the bad from the good, which demands that we engage directly with the world’s waste and refuse. But on Shabbat we must focus on the inner goodness of existence, enjoy it, and connect with the foundations of faith. When we draw on the sanctity and faith that we absorb on Shabbat, we gain the ability to distinguish between good and evil all week, and to engage in the work of refinement that is required to repair the world.
  
  Section 2
  
  Borer (Separating) / Derekh Akhila and Derekh Melakha
  The most important principle in the laws of Borer is the distinction between one who performs Borer in the manner of the melakha and one who is preparing food for immediate consumption. When okhel is separated from psolet in the manner of the melakha (derekh melakha), it is prohibited by Torah law, whereas one may take okhel from psolet as part of the act of eating (derekh akhila) even le-khatḥila.
  For example, if peanuts are mixed together with shells, one does not need to eat the nuts with the shells. Rather, one may remove the nuts from the shells and eat them. This is not considered Borer; it is simply the way one eats, derekh akhila. This is not limited to one peanut either. One may remove a large quantity of peanuts from amongst the shells, place them in a bowl, and bring them to the table to eat, as this is the normal way to eat peanuts. One may also separate food for other people to eat. Therefore, one may remove many peanuts from their shells even in order to serve them to a friend.
  There are three conditions that must be met in order for an act of separating to be deemed permissible as derekh akhila, rather than prohibited as derekh melakha: 1) One must pick out the okhel and not the psolet, because this is the way one normally eats. However, if one removes the psolet from the okhel, this is considered derekh melakha (see n. 10). 2) One must take the food with his hand the way one does when eating, and not with an implement designed for straining or separating (see section 7). 3) The preparation must take place just before consumption. If the separating is done long before the eating, this is considered derekh melakha (see section 6).
  When these three conditions are met, it is clear that the act of separation is merely one of food preparation. But if even one condition is not met, then the actions are considered derekh melakha and violate a Torah prohibition.1<i class="footnote">The three conditions are based on <em>Shabbat</em> 74a, according to the understanding of Rabbeinu Ḥananel. This is also the opinion of Rambam, Ramban, Ran, and many others, and it is how SA 319:1, 4 rules as well, as explained in MB’s introduction to §319. In practice, all Aḥaronim agree with this approach. However, some Rishonim disagree with two of the conditions: <em>Tosafot</em> on <em>Shabbat</em> understand Rashi to mean that one may separate for immediate consumption even with a sifter or strainer. Similarly, Rabbeinu Asher of Lunel maintains that if one wishes to eat immediately, he may separate the <em>psolet</em> from the <em>okhel</em> even using a utensil designed for that purpose. This is also recorded in his nephew’s work, <em>Sefer Ha-hashlama</em>.According to Rid and several other Rishonim, one may remove <em>psolet</em> from <em>okhel</em> for immediate consumption (<em>Birkei Yosef</em> mentions these opinions in <em>Shiyurei Berakha</em>.) Although the <em>halakha</em> does not follow them, these opinions can be combined with other mitigating factors to support leniency (BHL 319:4, s.v. “mi-tokh”). See <em>Harḥavot</em>.</i>
  Let us return to the case of peanuts mixed together with shells. One may take the peanuts from the mixture and eat them only when all three conditions are met: 1) He removes the okhel (peanuts) from the psolet (shells); 2) he does so with his hands; 3) he does so for proximate consumption.
  However, if one removes the shells from the mixture to prepare the peanuts for eating, since he is removing the psolet from the okhel, this is considered derekh melakha, and he has transgressed a Torah prohibition. Similarly, if he removes the peanuts in order to eat them much later, this is considered derekh melakha since it is not for proximate consumption, and he has transgressed a Torah prohibition. Additionally, if a gadget were devised to help separate peanuts from their shells, it would be forbidden to use it on Shabbat even for the purpose of immediately eating the nuts.
  
  Section 3
  
  Borer (Separating) / Two Types of Food Mixed Together
  Separating a mixture of two types of food also constitutes a violation of Borer. Even if both foods are edible, since they are different types and one is interested in having each type separately, each is considered psolet in relation to the other. By separating them, one thereby improves them and thus transgresses the prohibition of Borer (SA 319:3; BHL s.v. “le’ekhol”).
  Thus, if almonds and walnuts are mixed together, but one only wants the walnuts, the almonds are considered psolet for him. He may remove the walnuts from the mixture to eat immediately, because that is derekh akhila. But if he takes out the almonds, this is considered derekh melakha and he transgresses a Torah prohibition. If he wishes to serve guests almonds and walnuts separately, then they are both considered okhel, and he may separate them from each other to serve immediately. However, one may not separate them and then only serve them later (BHL 319:3 s.v. “hayu lefanav”).
  If two foods taste different, they are considered discrete types. Therefore, if roasted meat is mixed with cooked meat, or pieces of chicken are mixed with pieces of turkey, they are treated as two different types of foods, and one may not separate them. In contrast, when all the pieces of meat are of the same type but merely different sizes, there is no prohibition on separating the big pieces from the little ones (Rema 319:3 based on Terumat Ha-deshen).2<i class="footnote">However, according to <em>Taz</em><em>Ḥayei Adam</em>, and <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, separating large and small pieces of the same type of food is also forbidden. Nevertheless, most <em>poskim</em>, including MA, <em>Pri Ḥadash</em>, Ḥida, and MB §15, are lenient.</i>
  
  Section 4
  
  Borer (Separating) / The Prohibition Applies Only to Mixtures
  The prohibition of Borer applies only when there are two items mixed together; if the items are not mixed, but simply next to each other, it is not forbidden to separate them. For example, if walnuts and peanuts are mixed together and one wishes to eat the walnuts immediately, he may take the walnuts out of the mixture, but he may not remove the peanuts. In contrast, if they are next to each other, he may remove all of the peanuts in order to serve the walnuts. Since they are not mixed together, Borer does not apply.
  Borer does apply to pieces of different kinds of fish that are mixed together. Following the rules established above, one may remove the pieces one wishes to eat immediately, but one may not remove the pieces one does not wish to eat. Even if the pieces are large, if they are mixed together and it takes effort to find the type he wants, Borer applies, as the pieces he does not want are considered psolet for him. However, if all the pieces of the type of fish he wants are at the bottom of a serving dish, he may remove the top pieces to get to the bottom ones. Since they are arranged such that one type of food is on top and the other is below, separating them is not considered Borer (Rema 319:3; BHL s.v. “le’ekhol miyad”; see SSK ch. 3 n. 7).
  Does Borer apply to a mixture of plums and peaches? If there are only a few pieces of fruit, since they are large, they are not considered mixed together, and one may separate them in any way he desires. But if there are many fruits, they are considered mixed, and the laws of Borer apply. Thus, one may not separate them through derekh melakha, but he may take the fruit that he wishes to eat immediately, as that is derekh akhila.
  If a pot of soup contains small pieces of chicken or vegetables, since the pieces are small and it is difficult to remove them, the prohibition of Borer applies. This means that one may remove the pieces from the soup and eat them immediately, but he may not remove them from the soup in order to eat the soup without them. In addition, he may not remove them in order to eat them later. But if there are large pieces of meat in the soup, since it is not difficult to search for them and remove them, they are not considered mixed with the soup, and thus Borer does not apply. Therefore, one may remove the pieces from the soup in order to eat the soup by itself, or to eat them later. This is also the case with matza balls in clear soup, as they are not considered mixed with the soup.3<i class="footnote">Common human perception determines whether something is considered <em>Borer</em>, and as the component parts get bigger, a larger quantity of them is needed for them to be considered a mixture. See SSK ch. 3 n. 7 in the name of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach. See also <em>Shevitat Ha-Shabbat</em><em>Borer</em><em>Be’er Reḥovot</em> §22 and §25; <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 319:41; and <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:7:37. On a related topic, several <em>poskim</em> maintain that <em>Borer</em> applies to bottles if they look like they are mixed together. For example, if a box contains both empty and full bottles, one may not remove the empty ones to discard them (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, <em>Shulḥan Shlomo</em> 319:4:2; <em>Ayil</em><em>Meshulash</em> ch. 19 n. 91 in the name of R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv). However, <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:7:27 is inclined to be lenient. In practice, it all depends on the quantity of bottles. Similarly, if many pieces of different types of cake remain after a party, they are considered mixed, and one may not sort them by type.</i>
  
  Section 5
  
  Borer (Separating) / Removing Psolet from Okhel
  As we have seen, it is considered derekh akhila to remove okhel from psolet in order to eat it immediately. However, removing psolet from the okhel is a transgression of Borer.4<i class="footnote">. If one intended to remove <em>okhel</em> and accidentally removed <em>psolet</em>, he has not transgressed a Torah prohibition, since he did not intend to perform this action. Since the <em>psolet</em> is already in his hand, he may simply put it down, separating it from the mixture (SSK ch. 3 n. 11). Others maintain that it is proper to return the <em>psolet</em> to the mixture so as not to benefit from the mistake (<em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:7:9).</i>
  Even when the psolet is minimal and it is easier to remove it from the mixture than to remove the okhel, removing the psolet is still considered Borer. For example, if an eggshell falls into egg salad, one may not remove the shell on its own, because one may not remove psolet from okhel. Rather, one may only remove it together with a little bit of egg. Since the egg removed with the shell is edible, it has value. Since the action is considered separating one form of okhel from another, one may do so. Similarly, if a lemon seed falls into a salad, one may not remove the seed on its own, but only together with a bit of salad. (See section 15 below regarding removing a bug from food).5<i class="footnote">According to MB (BHL 319:4, s.v. “mi-tokh”), if one takes a little <em>okhel</em> together with the <em>psolet</em>, he may remove them together. Since he is removing some <em>okhel</em> as well, it is not considered removing <em>psolet</em> from <em>okhel</em>. This is also the ruling of <em>Shevitat Ha-Shabbat</em> (<em>Borer</em>, <em>Be’er Reḥovot</em> §20). However, according to <em>Ḥazon Ish</em> OḤ §53 and 54:3, if one’s intention is indeed to remove the <em>psolet</em>, the small amount of <em>okhel</em> removed with it does not help. Based on all the Aḥaronim who permit removing a bug with a bit of liquid (quoted below in n. 18), it would seem that the <em>halakha</em> does not follow <em>Ḥazon Ish</em>.</i>
  If a bunch of grapes contains some good grapes and some rotten ones, one may not remove the rotten grapes. Rather, when he wishes to eat, he should pick out and eat the good grapes.
  If one who does not like onions is served a salad with pieces of onions in it, he may not remove the onions from the salad because they are considered psolet for him. If he wishes to eat the salad he should eat the parts he likes and leave over the pieces of onion. If there is someone present who is willing to eat his onions, he may take them out for his friend to eat immediately, because then the pieces of onion are considered okhel (SSK 3:23-24).
  If one who does not like mushrooms is served soup with mushrooms in it, he may not remove the mushrooms from the soup. He also may not remove one mushroom at a time by spooning a little soup together with each one; since he will need to remove many mushrooms, it is obvious that he is really only interested in removing them. This is considered removing psolet from okhel, thus violating the prohibition of Borer (see n. 18 below). But if his friend likes mushrooms and is prepared to eat them immediately, he may remove the mushrooms from his bowl and put them into his friend’s bowl.
  
  Section 6
  
  Borer (Separating) / Immediate Use
  As we saw (section 2), the prohibition of Borer only applies when it is done through derekh melakha. Separating okhel from psolet in order to eat it immediately is not considered Borer because it is derekh akhila. Therefore, one who wants to shell nuts for his family and serve them immediately may do so. But if he intends to serve them later, it is prohibited by Torah law, because that is derekh melakha. Similarly, if one has a mixture of watermelon seeds and sunflower seeds but wishes to eat only the sunflower seeds, he may not remove the sunflower seeds to eat later on. If he does so, he has transgressed the Torah prohibition of Borer. However, if he wishes to eat them immediately, he may remove all the sunflower seeds he wishes to eat.
  One who is preparing a meal may separate enough food for the entire household, including guests. For example, if peanuts and almonds are mixed together and one wishes to serve just almonds, he may take out the almonds and place them on a serving bowl before the meal in order to serve them at the end of the meal. Even if the meal lasts for three hours, since the separation is done near the beginning of the meal and it is normal to prepare all the foods to be served at a meal in advance, removing the almonds is considered derekh akhila and not derekh melakha.
  The key is that the okhel must be removed shortly before the meal, i.e., during the normal preparation time for the meal. However, if he does so prior to the normal preparation time, he transgresses the prohibition of Borer. The precise definition of “the normal preparation time” depends on the number of people and the size of the meal. A meal for five demands less preparation time than a meal for thirty, and a meal with one course demands less preparation time than a three-course meal.
  If one does not know exactly when the meal will begin, one may separate the okhel for the meal from the psolet a little early in order to ensure that the meal begins on time. However, one should take care not to do it earlier than is necessary to ensure that the meal will be ready on time.6<i class="footnote">. This is implied by Rema 319:1 and MB <em>ad loc. </em>4-6. <em>Igrot Moshe</em> OḤ 4:74, <em>Borer</em> 13 states accordingly, as do SSK 3:69 and <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:7:6. <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Beshalaḥ 1 is lenient and permits <em>Borer</em> up to an hour before a meal.</i>
  If one intended to separate okhel from psolet for the needs of an upcoming meal but ultimately finds that he prepared enough for an additional meal has not transgressed, as long as he did not intentionally and deceptively overprepare (SAH 319:3; MB 5).7<i class="footnote">One who separates <em>okhel</em> from <em>psolet</em> in order to eat it later transgresses a Torah prohibition. Even if he ends up eating it immediately, he has still transgressed the prohibition. According to <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Beshalaḥ 3, if one separated food with the intention of eating it immediately but then changed his mind, he has transgressed a rabbinic prohibition. SHT 319:5 presents a similar idea in the name of <em>Pri Megadim</em>. In contrast, if circumstances beyond his control prevented him from eating it immediately, he has not transgressed the prohibition (<em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:7:31).If one has a mixture of good and rotten fruits and wants to prepare a fruit bowl for his guests, he may separate an entire bowl full of good fruits if this is the accepted way of serving fruit to guests, even if he knows that they will eat only a few fruits. Since presenting a full bowl is a way of honoring one’s guests, the host reaps immediate benefit even from fruit that is left uneaten (Ben Ish Ḥai, Year 2, Beshalaḥ 3; SSK 3:44 and n. 129).</i>
  
  Section 7
  
  Borer (Separating) / By Hand and Not with an Implement
  As we saw earlier (section 2), one may remove okhel from psolet in the normal way of eating if three conditions are met. One of the conditions is that the separating is done by hand and not with an implement designed for separating. For example, one may not use a strainer to separate seeds that are mixed together with their shells, even if he wishes to eat them immediately.
  Spoons and forks are not considered implements designed for separating. Rather, they assist the hand in grasping food. Therefore, one may use a spoon or a fork to remove okhel from psolet. For example, if a dish contains different types of food, one may use a fork to remove the type he wants, put it on his plate, and immediately eat it.
  One may not remove olive pits with a device specifically designed for this purpose, as it is an implement designed for separating (SSK 3:59).
  People often place grains of rice in salt shakers to prevent the salt from clumping. Although the holes of a salt shaker are small and only let the salt through (while blocking the rice), they nevertheless may be used on Shabbat, as their purpose is not to separate but to dispense salt. The proof of this is that people use salt shakers even when they do not contain grains of rice (see section 8 regarding a peeler, section 13 regarding a slotted spoon and Borer with a ladle, n. 15 regarding olives, and section 14 regarding a teapot).
  
  Section 8
  
  Borer (Separating) / Removing Peels and Pits
  One may remove peels from fruit in order to eat them. Even though removing the peel is similar to removing psolet from okhel, it is not forbidden because this is the normal way to eat a fruit that has a peel. Therefore, one may peel garlic, onions, nuts, eggs, grapefruits, bananas, oranges, etc. for immediate consumption. However, one may not peel them to eat later on, because that is derekh melakha (Rema 321:19). For immediate consumption, one may remove a peel with a knife because it is a utensil designed to help one’s hand through derekh akhila and not derekh melakha (see Igrot Moshe OḤ 1:124).8<i class="footnote">. <em>Beit Yosef</em> and Rema 321:19 quote <em>Smag</em>, Rabbeinu Yeruḥam, <em>Smak</em>, <em>Terumat Ha-deshen</em>, and <em>Hagahot Maimoniyot</em>, all of whom maintain that one may not peel garlic and onions for later because of <em>Borer</em> (though one may do so for immediate use, as that is <em>derekh akhila</em>). However, it seems from some Rishonim (Rabbeinu Ḥananel, <em>Arukh</em>, and Me’iri) that <em>Borer</em> does not apply to a case where the <em>psolet </em>and <em>okhel</em> are attached to each other. There is a dispute about what this means: <em>Tal Orot</em> explains that <em>Borer</em> does not apply at all to cases where the peel is fully attached to a fruit or vegetable, as with an orange. In contrast, in cases such as onions or garlic, where the peel is more loosely attached, <em>Borer</em> does apply (cited in <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 319:57-58). Others explain that these Rishonim mean that when <em>psolet</em> and <em>okhel</em> are found side by side, whether joined completely or more loosely attached (like onion and garlic), <em>Borer</em> does not apply, because <em>Borer</em> is relevant only when <em>psolet</em> and <em>okhel</em> are mixed together (summarized in <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:7:39-41). In practice, since this is a case of uncertainty about Torah law, the vast majority of <em>poskim</em> rule stringently. This is the explicit ruling of <em>Beit Yosef</em> and Rema 321:19, and is the position of MA and MB 321:83 as well. Therefore, one may peel garlic and onions for immediate use only. However, where there are additional uncertainties, the lenient view is taken into consideration.</i>
  When one who is eating a plum reaches the pit, he may throw it out and continue eating. One who is eating apricots or dates may open them (and check them for bugs), throw out the pit, and eat them, because this is the normal way of eating these fruits (MB 321:84).
  One who is cutting up a melon for immediate use may throw out all the seeds, because removing them is comparable to removing the peel of a fruit. Similarly, one may remove the peel of a melon or watermelon immediately before eating it. One may also remove the stem of a fruit before eating it (SSK 3:18 and 3:37-39; compare to section 10 below, which explains that one may remove watermelon seeds before eating watermelon).
  The poskim disagree whether removing the edible peel of fruits or vegetables, like those of apples, pears, cucumbers, and carrots, presents a problem of Borer. Some say that since the peel can be eaten, there is no issue of Borer, but rather it is like cutting a fruit in two. Thus, one may peel them even to eat later on, and may even use a peeler to do so. Others maintain that since one does not want the peel, it is considered psolet for him, and the rules of Borer apply to it. Accordingly, a peeler is considered an implement designed for separating, and therefore it absolutely may not be used. However, one who wishes to be lenient has support for doing so.9<i class="footnote">There are three opinions on this matter:1) MA 321:30 and MB 321:84 forbid peeling apples for later. This implies that the rules of Borer pertain to the removal of a peel. This is also the opinion of Igrot Moshe OḤ 4:74, Borer 8. Similarly, Responsa Maḥazeh Eliyahu §51 forbids using a peeler, as does Ayil Meshulash, p. 104.2) SSK 3:34, nn. 88 and 90, presents as the first and primary opinion that if most people regularly eat the peel of a given fruit or vegetable, it may be peeled even with a peeler, and even for later consumption (this also seems to be the opinion of Pri Megadim as cited in SHT ad loc. 97).3) Some maintain that even if a peel is only eaten in distressing circumstances and only together with its fruit, Borer does not apply, since the peel is part of the fruit. We may combine this view with the opinion of Rabbeinu Ḥananel and others who maintain that Borer does not apply to removing peels (as explained in the previous note) as well as the opinion of those who maintain that one may perform Borer even with a utensil if it is for immediate use (as explained in n. 1 above). This is also the position of Menuḥat Ahava 2:7:13. Yalkut Yosef 319:58, 61 states that those who are lenient have an opinion to rely on. (We might suggest that even those who prohibit this do so rabbinically, which might be inferred from the laws of separating leaves that are edible but not usually eaten, as explained in MB 319:7.) She’arim Metzuyanim Ba-halakha §80, Kuntres Aḥaron 24 permits using a peeler on the grounds that it is comparable to a knife, rather than an implement specifically used for separating. It would seem that le-khatḥila one may rely on the second opinion, and there are grounds to be lenient in accordance with the third opinion as well.</i> One may still peel these fruits with a knife for immediate consumption.
  
  Section 9
  
  Borer (Separating) / Bones in Fish and Meat
  When eating fish with bones, one may remove the bones in the course of eating. In other words, one may begin eating the fish, and when he gets to the bones that are in his way, he may remove them with his hand or a fork and continue eating. The same applies to eating meat with bones. For a small child, one may remove the bones from fish or meat before the child starts to eat, as this is the normal way of feeding children.
  Some, however, are stringent and maintain that removing bones from fish or meat is prohibited because it is removing psolet from okhel. In their opinion, one must remove the food from the bones. But the primary position is the lenient one, namely, that as one eats he may remove the bones from the fish or meat, as this is the normal way to eat them.10<i class="footnote">The stringent opinion: According to <em>Ma’amar Mordechai</em> 319:7 and <em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 54:3, one may not remove the bones. Rather, one must take the food and leave the bones on the plate. To do this, one may hold the bone with one hand or a knife, and remove the food with the other hand or a fork. Even though one hand is holding the bone, this is not considered removing <em>psolet</em> from <em>okhel</em>, because the other hand is actively taking the food. One may also put the food in his mouth and remove the bones from there. If a bone has a little fish or meat on it, he may remove it from the larger piece of fish or meat, eat what is stuck to it, and then throw it out. But if there is no food on it, one may not remove the bone.In contrast, many maintain that one may remove the bones from fish or meat for immediate consumption. There are three bases for this permissive ruling:The first basis – and the primary one – is that this is the normal way of eating fish and meat. This is the approach of BHL 319:4, s.v. “mi-tokh”; Ben Ish Ḥai, Year 2, Beshalaḥ 10; and Yalkut Yosef 319:37 (based on R. Yaakov ibn Ḥabib and Tzemaḥ Tzedek).The second basis is that even if removing the psolet first is not the way that a particular food is eaten, nevertheless, the closer the removal of the psolet is to the time of eating, the more authorities permit it on the grounds that it can be considered derekh akhila. First, as we saw in n. 1, according to Rid and several other Rishonim one may remove psolet from okhel for immediate consumption. Even though SA 319:4 rules that this is forbidden, the permissive opinion may be combined with other mitigating factors to support leniency. Second, even following the ruling of SA, there is still a disagreement about whether the prohibition of removing psolet from okhel applies when the food is being prepared for absolutely immediate consumption. In such a case, Mahari Abulafia permits while Maharit Tzahalon forbids. BHL 319:4 s.v. “ha-borer” states that this is a disagreement among the Rishonim. According to those who are lenient, even if removing the bones first is not the normal way to eat fish, one may still remove them because any time close to consumption is considered derekh akhila. Third, Shevitat Ha-Shabbat (Borer, Be’er Reḥovot 3) states that according to all Rishonim, if one starts eating and reaches a bone, he may remove it, as this is not derekh melakha but derekh akhila.The third factor is that Rabbeinu Hananel and other Rishonim maintain that Borer does not apply when the psolet is attached (see n. 8 above). BHL derives something similar from Yam Shel Shlomo (See Menuḥat Ahava 7:14-15). This opinion can be combined with the other mitigating factors to support leniency.In practice, BHL attempts to find justification for those who remove bones from fish before serving it. Some are lenient only when it is for absolutely immediate consumption, and BHL agrees with this le-khatḥila. Shevet Ha-Levi 1:83 and Menuḥat Ahava 7:15 also present this approach. Igrot Moshe OḤ 4:74, Borer 7, is lenient if it would be difficult to eat the food otherwise (SSK 3:12-14 records both of these opinions). In the main text, I write that one may remove the bones as he eats, in order to comply with all the opinions that Shevitat Ha-Shabbat quotes as part of the second factor. Nevertheless, one who wants to feed fish to a small child may indeed remove the bones beforehand, since, as we have seen, this is the opinion of the vast majority of poskim.</i>
  In contrast, if dried bones that have no meat on them are mixed into food, they are considered the same as all other psolet, and may not be removed from the food. Rather, one should eat the food and leave the bones on the plate (BHL 319:4, end of s.v. “mi-tokh”; Ben Ish Ḥai, Year 2, Beshalaḥ 11).
  
  Section 10
  
  Borer (Separating) / Removing Watermelon Seeds and Rotten Fruit
  While cutting a watermelon, one may remove the seeds by shaking out each slice. Any seeds that remain may be removed by hand or with a knife, because that is the normal way to eat watermelon. This is on condition that it is done for immediate consumption. Le-khatḥila one should remove the seeds with some type of shinui (Ben Ish Ḥai, Year 2, Beshalaḥ 7). Some are stringent and require that one place the piece of watermelon into one’s mouth and remove the seeds from there (Ḥazon Ish 54:1), but in practice most poskim maintain that the seeds may be removed before the watermelon is placed into the mouth, because that is the normal way of eating. 11<i class="footnote"><i>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</i> 319:47 and <i>Yalkut Yosef</i> 319:63 are lenient, following <i>Ben Ish Ḥai</i>. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> OḤ 4:74, Borer 7 is lenient when one does not have another option and for feeding a baby. SSK 3:17 cites both opinions and adds that one who is lenient and removes the seeds before eating has an opinion on which to rely. In n. 34, SSK states that R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach is lenient because this is the way in which the watermelon is eaten. He points out that this case is less problematic than removing bones from fish. This is because it is possible to remove a bone together with some fish, put the combination into one’s mouth, eat the fish, and throw out the bone. In contrast, this cannot be done with watermelon seeds. The many <i>poskim</i> who permit removing fish bones before eating the fish would certainly be lenient regarding removing watermelon seeds before eating the watermelon.</i>
  If a fruit bowl contains a mix of good fruit and fruit that has begun to rot, one may remove all of the fruit that one wishes to eat or to serve guests at the upcoming meal (MB 319:7). 
  If he does not intend to eat all the good fruit now, but is worried that the rotten fruit will cause the good fruit in the bowl to rot, he can spread out all the fruits so that they are no longer touching one another, but he may not separate the good fruit and bad fruit into separate piles.
  When dealing with a partially rotten fruit, the point where the rotten part touches the good part is considered a mixture. Therefore, cutting off the rotten bit is forbidden, because that would constitute removing psolet from okhel. The solution is to cut out some of the good part together with the rotten part.
  
  Section 11
  
  Borer (Separating) / Straining Liquids
  Straining liquids can also involve a Torah prohibition, depending on the state of the liquid. If a liquid has psolet in it that makes it undrinkable, and straining makes it drinkable, then straining it is prohibited by Torah law. If the liquid is drinkable even without straining, one may strain it with a strainer even if this improves the drink slightly. The improvement does not fundamentally change it, and thus this is not prohibited.
  In an intermediate case, where the drink is cloudy and most people would not drink it without straining it unless they had no choice, one may not strain the drink using a strainer. There is a disagreement about whether one may strain it with a piece of cloth, which is an unusual way of straining. Most Rishonim allow this, while Rambam prohibits it. Aḥaronim write that one should be stringent and follow Rambam (SA 319:10; MB 42).
  Therefore, lees that are mixed with wine may not be strained to separate out the wine, since it is otherwise undrinkable. Doing so is prohibited by Torah law (SA 319:9; MB 32). If the wine is drinkable but so cloudy that most people generally would not drink it, one may not strain it with a strainer, and it is preferable not to do so with a cloth either. However, wine that is drinkable may be strained to improve its clarity. Since one could drink it even beforehand, straining it is not considered a melakha.
  Accordingly, since most people are used to drinking orange juice with pulp and do not strain it, one may remove the pulp with a strainer on Shabbat.12<i class="footnote">Nevertheless, one may not strain the liquid from cooked vegetables because they are considered two different types of food, and if one wishes to eat only one of them, the other is considered <em>psolet</em> for him. In contrast, orange juice with bits of pulp is just one type of food, and therefore separating the pulp from the juice is not considered <em>Borer</em> (see R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in SSK 3:53-54, 57 and n. 173; this approach is also found in <em>Igrot Moshe</em> OḤ 4:74, <em>Borer</em> 3).</i>
  Similarly, one may turn on a filtered tap or pour water from a vessel with a built-in filter (such as a Brita pitcher). Since the water is drinkable even before it is strained, straining it is not considered a melakha.
  
  Section 12
  
  Borer (Separating) / Separating Broth from Pieces of Food in Soup
  One may not separate the broth from the vegetables or noodles mixed into a soup. Although the broth, the vegetables, and the noodles are all edible, it is still forbidden to separate two types of foods (as we have seen in section 3). However, one may separate them in the normal course of eating, as long as the three conditions for derekh akhila delineated in section 2 are met (okhel from psolet, not with a specialized implement, and for immediate consumption).
  Therefore, if one wants to eat the broth immediately but not the vegetables (rendering them psolet for him), he may tip the soup pot and pour off the broth into a bowl. Although the broth is being removed from the mixture, it is not prohibited because the okhel is being removed from the psolet. However, one may not do this with the help of a strainer or even a utensil that is not specifically designed for separating (such as a fork or spoon) or a pot cover (by bringing it close to the bowl and opening it slightly, allowing only the broth to pass though). In contrast, one may use a ladle and fill it only with broth. Since using a ladle is the normal way of removing soup, it is not considered straining with a utensil.13<i class="footnote">. If one removes <em>okhel</em> from <em>psolet</em> for immediate consumption using an implement that is designed specially to separate (such as a strainer), he transgresses a Torah prohibition. If he separates using of an implement that is not designed specifically for straining (such as a fork or a pot cover), it is only rabbinically prohibited, since it is an unusual way of separating. SSK ch. 3 n. 177 rules that it may be prohibited to hold a spoon or ladle against the side of a pot to collect only vegetables, as this is straining with the help of an implement. For this reason, <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:7:34 forbids gradually filling up a ladle with soup in such a way that only liquid will fill it. <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 3:75-76 quotes lenient opinions on this matter. <em>Nishmat Shabbat</em> §144 does so as well. It seems that in practice one may be lenient since there is no prohibition on removing <em>okhel</em> from <em>psolet</em> in the normal way for fairly immediate consumption, and this position is reflected in the main text. Regardless, this is a case of doubt about a rabbinic law, where we typically rule leniently.</i>
  If one wants to eat only the vegetables and noodles, he may not tip the pot to pour out the broth. This is considered removing psolet from okhel, which is forbidden even if his objective is to eat the vegetables and noodles immediately. In contrast, one may lift the ladle out of the soup while holding it close to the side of the pot, in such a way that it will fill with only vegetables and noodles, because he is merely taking the food that he wants and not performing an act of separation. Once the ladle is out of the pot, one may not pour broth from the ladle back into the pot, because that would indeed be removing psolet from okhel.
  If the vegetables and noodles fell to the bottom of the pot and there is clear broth above them, that broth is not considered mixed with them. Therefore, even one who wishes to eat the vegetables may remove the broth on top with a ladle or tilt the pot and pour off the broth. However, after pouring off this top layer of broth, one may not continue tipping the pot to remove the soup that is mixed with vegetables and noodles.14<i class="footnote"><em>Shabbat</em> 139b and SA 319:14 explain that one may gently pour wine from one bottle to another. To avoid <em>Borer</em>, one must take care to stop pouring when the flow of wine stops, before the drops of wine percolating through the lees start to come out. In this case there is a disagreement about whether one may pour out those last drops of wine for immediate consumption. Most <em>poskim</em> permit this; since he wants the wine that he is pouring off, this is considered removing <em>okhel</em> from <em>psolet</em>, which is permitted for immediate consumption (MA; MB 319:55; <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 319:45). However according to R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi (in vol. 1 of his <em>siddur</em>) and <em>Eglei Tal</em>, what is left in the receptacle in his hands is the result of <em>Borer</em>, meaning that he has removed <em>psolet</em> from <em>okhel</em>, which is forbidden even for immediate consumption. In sum, according to most <em>poskim</em>, soup mixed with vegetables and noodles may be spilled off in order to eat the soup immediately. Although some prohibit this, maintaining that it is considered removing <em>psolet</em> from <em>okhel</em>, the <em>halakha</em> follows the majority of <em>poskim</em> who maintain that it is considered removing <em>okhel</em> from <em>psolet</em>. We may add to this the factor that some <em>poskim</em> permit removing <em>psolet</em> from <em>okhel</em> if it is for immediate consumption (Rid and <em>Tur</em>), as explained above in n. 1. Furthermore, some maintain that there is no prohibition of <em>Borer</em> for liquids unless the separating is performed with an implement that is specially designed for the purpose (<em>Responsa Maharitatz Yeshanot</em> §203). But one may not spill off the soup in order to eat the vegetables, since according to the majority of <em>poskim</em> that qualifies as removing <em>psolet</em> from <em>okhel</em>.</i>
  
  Section 13
  
  Borer (Separating) / Additional Laws of Separating Liquids from Solids
  Since pickles are large, they are not considered mixed with the brine in which they are pickled. Thus, when opening a jar of pickles, one may pour out the brine. In contrast, since canned peas and corn are small, they are considered mixed with the liquid in which they are canned. Thus, one may not pour out the water from these cans. Similarly, one may not pour off the oil or water from a can of tuna. If one wishes to serve the tuna without the liquid, he may use a spoon to remove the tuna from the container and move it to another plate. This way he is removing the okhel from the psolet for immediate consumption.
  It is uncertain whether canned olives are considered mixed with their brine or not. Since this is a case of doubt that relates to a Torah prohibition, we must be stringent. Therefore, one may not spill out the brine, and one may not use an implement designed to remove the olives. But one may use a fork or spoon to remove the olives from the brine in order to eat them immediately.15<i class="footnote">It is clear that pickles, on account of their size, are not considered mixed with the liquid. This is the opinion of SSK 3:23; <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 319:48; and <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 3:25. The status of olives is questionable. If we consider them mixed with the liquid, then using a special implement to remove them is transgressing a Torah prohibition. On the other hand, if we say that on account of their size they are not considered mixed with the liquid, one may remove them even with the help of a special implement. However, since this is a case of uncertainty about a Torah law, one should be stringent. SSK 3:20 rules that one may not spill off water that gathers on top of leben (a Middle Eastern dairy product similar to yogurt), on the grounds that it is removing <em>psolet</em> from <em>okhel</em>. However, many are lenient because leben is relatively solid, and thus the liquid is not considered mixed with it (<em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 319:47; <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 3:28).In the main text, I write that one may remove tuna from the oil or water in which it is canned with a spoon (but not a fork), even if it will be eaten soon at the upcoming meal. Since one is not immediately putting the food into his mouth, using a fork is considered <em>Borer</em> with the help of a utensil. If he does wish to eat the tuna straight from the can, then he may use a fork, holding the forkful of food over the can for a bit so the liquid will drip off, since this is truly <em>derekh akhila</em>.</i>
  We have already seen (section 4) that if soup contains large chunks of meat or vegetables, they are not considered mixed with the broth, on account of their size. Thus one may take them out even if he wishes to eat them only later on. Similarly, one may remove the chunks using a slotted spoon, just as one may remove the chunks with a fork, since the prohibition of Borer does not apply in this case at all. In contrast, if the soup contains small pieces of meat or vegetables, it is considered a mixture. Therefore, one who wishes to remove the pieces for immediate consumption should remove them together with some soup using a regular spoon or ladle and not a slotted spoon, since doing so separates the pieces from the broth using an implement that facilitates separation. If there is no other implement handy, one may use the slotted spoon on two conditions: that he does not intend to separate the meat or vegetables, and that he does not keep the spoon over the pot in order to allow the soup to drain out (see Harḥavot 11:13:5 and SSK 3:58).
  One may spill soup mixed with remnants of food into a sink that has a strainer in it to protect the drain from getting clogged. Although the strainer will stop the food remnants from going down the drain, this is not prohibited. This is because Borer is applicable only when separating okhel from psolet; when one intends to use neither the liquid nor the food remnants, all of it is considered psolet (SSK 12:17).
  
  Section 14
  
  Borer (Separating) / Teapots and Tea Bags
  A teapot is used to cook tea leaves and prepare liquid essence of tea from them. At the mouth of the teapot is a strainer that prevents the tea leaves from pouring freely into the cup. When the tea leaves sink to the bottom of the teapot and there is clear tea essence above them, one may certainly pour the clear essence into a cup. But when the tea leaves and the water are mixed, some say that one may not pour the essence through the mouth of the teapot because the strainer separates the liquid essence from the tea leaves. Others permit this. Since it is easy to add hot water (from a kli sheni) to the teapot, ensuring that a large volume of liquid is not mixed with the essence, it is preferable to do this and thus avoid risking a possible prohibition of Borer. When it is impossible to add water, be-di’avad pouring out the essence through the strainer is permitted.16<i class="footnote">Some are stringent and do not pour through the strainer at all, even if the water on top is not mixed with the tea leaves that have sunk to the bottom. This is the approach of <em>Siddur</em><em>Beit Menuḥa</em><em>Ben Ish </em><em>Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Beshalaḥ 18; <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 319:113; and <em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 1:84. In contrast, some are lenient even when the tea leaves are mixed with the water. This is the approach of<em> Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 2:51 and <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:7:43. The reason is that people are not truly bothered by tea leaves, and would be willing to drink tea with leaves mixed in, figuring that at worst their teeth will strain them out. Thus, this tea can be considered a liquid that most people can drink without straining (SA 319:10 and section 11 above). In the main text I follow the intermediate position, which is the opinion of <em>Ḥazon Ish</em>, OḤ §53, s.v. “min ha-amur” and <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:31:11. SSK 3:62 mentions the intermediate and lenient positions. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach’s rationale for leniency is mentioned in n. 140 there: that it may be permitted to separate with a utensil for immediate consumption. <em>Shulḥan Shlomo</em> 319:34:2 adds that if a few tea leaves are able to pass through the strainer, then there is no concern that this case is <em>Borer</em></i>
  One may make tea by putting a tea bag into hot water (in a kli shlishi, as explained above in 10:8). However, when lifting the tea bag from the water, it is proper to take care not to hold it over the cup to allow the tea bag to drip the last few drops into it. This is because some maintain that the tea bag, which keeps the tea leaves from getting loose, is considered a utensil for straining, in which case holding it up would be considered separating the tea essence from the leaves using a utensil (see section 7). Instead, one should remove the tea bag from the cup and immediately put it in the garbage or into another cup. Some are stringent and lift the tea bag using a spoon, thus removing some tea along with the tea bag (see SSK 3:64).
  
  Section 15
  
  Borer (Separating) / Removing Insects from Food, and Additional Laws
  If an insect falls into a cup of tea and is floating on top, some permit removing it on its own. Others are stringent and maintain that removing the bug on its own is Borer, because it is considered psolet that is being removed from okhel. It is proper to be stringent and remove the bug with a spoon in such a way that some liquid is removed with it. Alternatively, one can tilt the cup and pour off some tea together with the bug.17<i class="footnote">. Thus states <em>Taz</em> 506:3; MB 319:61; <em>Ben Ish </em><em>Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Beshalaḥ 13; and additional Aḥaronim. R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi writes in his <em>siddur</em> writes that removing a bug might obligate a person to bring a sin offering (that is, it violates a Torah prohibition). In contrast, some are lenient and allow the bug to be removed by hand, either because a bug floating on top of water is not considered mixed (Mahari Ḥagiz) or because the prohibition of <em>Borer</em> for liquids only applies to using a strainer, and not to separating by hand (<em>Responsa Maharitatz Yeshanot</em> §203). <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:7 n. 106 and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 319:28 cite them at length, but nevertheless add that in practice it is preferable to remove the bug together with a little liquid using a spoon.</i>
  This also applies if a bug fell into soup or food. One may remove it with some of the food using a spoon. However, if multiple bugs fell into the soup or food, one may not remove them with a bit of food. This is because it is clear that what one actually intends is to remove the psolet, and therefore the okhel in the spoon is secondary to the bug. Since one is separating psolet from okhel, he is transgressing the prohibition of Borer. The way to get around this problem is to remove a large amount of food together with each bug, such as by using a cup, so that the majority of what is being removed is okhel. Then it is considered separating okhel from okhel, which is permitted.18<i class="footnote">. See SSK ch. 3 n. 41 and ch. 5 n. 24 and <em>Shulḥan Shlomo</em> 319:43, which cite the following in the name of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach: One may not remove multiple bugs mixed into soup, even if one removes them together with a bit of soup. This is because even when it is just one bug, R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi in his <em>siddur</em> says one might violate a Torah prohibition. To be sure, many Aḥaronim maintain that the prohibition of <em>Borer</em> is not relevant here because the bug is floating on top and is not mixed in with the food. But if there are many bugs, then it is considered a mixture of <em>okhel</em> and <em>psolet</em>; thus, one who removes the bugs, even just using a spoon, is clearly focused on removing the <em>psolet</em>. That is all according to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach. It is reasonable that if one removes a lot of food with each bug, then this is not considered removing <em>psolet</em> from <em>okhel</em> but rather removing <em>psolet</em> together with <em>okhel</em>.</i>
  One may rinse off fruits that have dirt on their peels for immediate consumption. However, one may not soak the fruit in water so that the dirt separates and sinks to the bottom.19<i class="footnote"><em>Shabbat</em> 140a states that one may not soak cresses in order to remove the <em>psolet</em> stuck to them. This is recorded in SA 319:8. MB <em>ad loc</em>. 28-29 extends this law to other fruits and vegetables as well. According to BHL, this is prohibited by Torah law, while according to <em>Pri Megadim</em> (<em>Mishbetzot Zahav</em> 5) it is rabbinic, since it involves a <em>shinui</em>. As a result of this, some prohibit washing off fruits (<em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> §38, which adds that minimally one should wash them with a <em>shinui</em>). Others prohibit washing many pieces of fruit (see <em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 1:52; <em>Az Nidberu</em> 1:15 and 8:6-7). However, most <em>poskim</em> maintain that there is no prohibition on washing fruit, either because there is no prohibition of <em>Borer</em> here at all, or because this is the normal way to eat. If the second reason is correct, then one may wash the fruit only for fairly immediate consumption. This is indeed the approach of <em>Ketzot Ha-shulḥan</em> §125, <em>Badei Ha-shulḥan</em> §16; <em>Igrot Moshe</em> OḤ 1:125; <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 6:37; SSK 3:22; <em>Livyat Ḥen</em> §52; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:7:20.</i>
  
  Section 16
  
  Borer (Separating) / Utensils, Games, Silverware, and Books
  Just as the prohibition of Borer applies to food, it applies to other items as well, such as books, utensils, and clothing (Taz; MB 319:15). All the above rules for Borer with food apply to other mixtures as well. In other words, one may remove from a mix something he wishes to use immediately, because this is not derekh melakha but the normal way this item is used. However, one may not remove the item in order to use it later. Similarly, one may not sort a mix, and all the more so one may not remove the items he does not want.
  For example, if children mixed together pieces from different games, they may not be separated. But if the children wish to play with one of the games now, they may remove the desired pieces from the mix. This sorting is not considered derekh melakha but derekh misḥak (the normal way of playing), because a game normally begins with taking out its pieces.
  There is also a problem of Borer with mixed-up silverware. Although the pieces are large and the difference between the different types of silverware is apparent, nevertheless, when there are many pieces, they are considered mixed. Therefore, one may not sort silverware and place each type separately. However, when washing the silverware, one may dry each utensil separately and place it in the proper compartment, because this does not involve selecting the utensil from the mixture in order to sort it. Rather, one is taking each piece randomly in order to dry it, and once it is in his hand he may place it in the appropriate compartment.20<i class="footnote"><em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 5:31 states, based on several Aḥaronim, that since pieces of silverware are large and the differences between the types are readily apparent, they are not considered mixed, and thus the prohibition of <em>Borer</em> does not apply to them. However, most <em>poskim</em> maintain that <em>Borer</em> does apply to a mixture of silverware. Since this is a case of doubt about a Torah law, one should be stringent. This is the approach of SSK 3:85, <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:7:27, and many others. We should note that one may wash and dry dishes on Shabbat only if it is possible that they will be used again on Shabbat; if they will not be used until after Shabbat, this is prohibited (SA 323:6; MB 29; below 22:15).</i>
  Before a meal, one may take the mixed-up silverware and put the appropriate pieces next to each plate. The reason is that this is not a normal way of sorting, but rather the normal way one prepares for a meal. This permission is on condition that it is done close to the time of the meal.
  Borer can also apply to books. For example, if many different ḥumashim are mixed in a pile, and a synagogue attendant wishes to distribute the appropriate ḥumashim to worshipers, he may not remove the ḥumashim that are not being used from the pile. Similarly, he may not remove the appropriate ḥumashim from the pile long before the service. Rather, close to the time of services one may remove the appropriate ḥumashim from the pile, because this is not derekh borer but rather the normal way to take books to use.
  Books on a shelf are not considered mixed. Therefore, one may remove books he wishes to learn from, even if he will not actually use the books until hours later. One who used many books may return them to the bookcase on Shabbat for the sake of neatness. In the course of returning them, he may put each book in its proper place (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in SSK 3, nn. 220 and 239).
  
  Section 17
  
  Borer (Separating) / The Melakha of Dash
  The melakha of Dash involves separating the grain kernels from their stalks. This is generally done with the help of a tool or an animal (as explained in section 1). Thus, one who goes through husks by hand to separate the kernels has not transgressed a Torah prohibition, as he is not performing Dash in the usual fashion with a tool. However, the Sages forbid this because he is still separating the wheat kernels from the stalks. This is all on condition that he rubs the stalks off of the kernel with his hands, without a shinui. If he wishes to eat unprocessed wheat, he may rub the stalks with a shinui; for example, by using his fingertips rather than the palm of his hand.21<i class="footnote">According to Rif, Rambam, Rosh, and Ramban, the permission granted in <em>Beitza</em> 13b to rub wheat stalks manually with a <em>shinui</em> refers to Shabbat, while on Yom Tov one may do so even without a <em>shinui</em>. According to Rashi and <em>Tosafot</em>, the permission to rub the stalks by hand with a <em>shinui</em> refers to Yom Tov, while on Shabbat even with a <em>shinui</em> one would be transgressing a rabbinic prohibition. The <em>halakha</em> is in accordance with those who are lenient, since this is the opinion of most <em>poskim</em>. In addition, this is a case of doubt about a rabbinic mitzva, where we are generally lenient. This is also the ruling of SA 319:6. See Rema 510:1. </i>
  The prohibition of Dash is not limited to grains. Rather, any action that separates food from its natural setting is a violation of Dash. Therefore, one may not remove legumes like peas or beans from their pods. Doing so in the way that it is done commercially for huge amounts of produce is a Torah prohibition, while doing this by hand is a rabbinic transgression. However, one may do this by hand with a shinui. If the pods are green and edible, then one may remove the legumes without a shinui, because the prohibition of Dash applies only when the shell is inedible (MB 319:21).
  There is a tolada of Dash called Mefarek, which involves removing one thing from within another thing, and it constitutes a Torah prohibition as well. This includes squeezing grapes and olives (as will be explained below, 12:8) and milking an animal (as explained below, 20:4). Similarly, if one is interested in the liquid absorbed in a piece of clothing, one may not squeeze it out. The Rishonim disagree how egregious this action is. According to Rambam and Ramban, squeezing out clothing to extract the liquid absorbed in it is prohibited rabbinically, while according to Rabbeinu Tam and Rosh it is prohibited by Torah law (as explained in Harḥavot).
  While a woman may nurse her child, it is prohibited by Torah law for her to express milk into a container because of the tolada of Mefarek (SA 328:34-35). If a woman’s breasts are engorged and she is suffering as a result, she may express milk in such a way that it goes to waste, either into the sink or into a vessel that contains something that will ruin the milk. This is because when the milk goes to waste, the prohibition involved is only rabbinic, and the Sages are lenient where pain is caused (SA 330:8). One may also attach an electric breast pump to a timer and then pump milk when the machine turns on (see below, 28:7).
  
  Section 18
  
  Borer (Separating) / Cracking Walnuts, Almonds, and Peanuts
  One may crack nuts on Shabbat, even though this constitutes removing food from its casing. This is not considered Dash because Dash is a melakha that is done commercially in the field or factory at the end of the harvesting process. Examples of this include removing kernels of grain from stalks in order to sell them or bring them to a mill, or removing peas and beans from their pods in order to sell them to the masses. In contrast, Dash does not apply to a fruit that is normally removed from its outer layer before eating. Since nuts are normally cracked right before eating, doing so is not considered Dash.
  Similarly, one may shell peanuts and slide off their thin, papery covering on Shabbat. Although nowadays the vast majority of nuts are shelled in the factory, nevertheless, since nuts are sold in their shells as well, cracking them in order to eat them is still not considered Dash.
  Almonds have an outer green hull and an internal hard shell. Generally almonds are sold with the outer hull already removed and the hard shell still intact. One may remove the hard shell in order to eat the almonds. But if the green hulls were left on the almonds, one may not remove them because of Dash (Rema 319:6; MB ad loc. 24). In contrast, one may remove the hull of a single almond and eat it, and then remove the hull from another one and eat it. Since one is shelling and eating only one almond at a time, this is not the normal, commercial way that Dash is performed, but rather derekh akhila (Kalkelet Shabbat).22<i class="footnote"><em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 1:81 is stringent regarding shelling multiple almonds. <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:6:3 rules similarly regarding almonds and peanuts. SSK ch. 3 n. 104 is lenient regarding shelling multiple almonds in order to eat them, maintaining that since they are generally sold with the hard shells, the removal of the latter is not <em>derekh melakha</em> but <em>derekh akhila</em>. <em>Az Nidberu</em> 12:7 rules similarly regarding peanuts. Since this is a case of doubt about a rabbinic law (since the peeling is done by hand and not with a utensil), the <em>halakha</em> follows those who are lenient, as does the custom here. One may also remove a peanut’s thin, reddish-brown peel. This is the approach of <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:31:7 and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 319:59. One who wishes to act in accordance with all the opinions should shell and eat the almonds and peanuts one at a time. This is because according to <em>Tzemaḥ Tzedek</em> and <em>Kalkelet Shabbat</em>, when done this way there is no prohibition of <em>Dash</em> at all. See <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em>, n. 16. In any situation where one is in doubt about whether removing a shell raises a problem of <em>Dash</em>, it is preferable to avoid the problem by shelling the units of food one by one and eating them. Similarly, when shelling with a <em>shinui</em>, such as with one’s fingertips, there is no prohibition of <em>Dash</em>.</i>
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Food Preparation / Toĥen
  Many items naturally exist as organic wholes, but people have learned to break them down and grind them in order to create new and wonderful things. By grinding wheat and other grains, we make flour, which in turn can be used to bake bread, cake, pasta, and the like. Cayenne pepper is made by grinding hot peppers, and coffee is made by grinding coffee beans. By grinding certain healing plants, medicines are made; by grinding other plants, dyes are prepared. Since grinding is a creative activity, it is included in the melakhot prohibited on Shabbat. Grinding metal and crumbling a block of dirt or clay are forbidden as well.
  Generally, grinding an object turns it into flour or powder, but the prohibition of Toḥen can also apply to breaking something down into small pieces. For example, one who chops trees into small bits of wood so that they will easily catch fire transgresses the prohibition of Toḥen (Shabbat 74b).
  If one wishes to grind hot peppers or the like to prepare food on Shabbat, he may do so as long as he incorporates two shinuyim (changes) into the process. Traditionally, grinding required two utensils: the mortar upon which the material to be ground was placed, and the pestle that was used to crush and grind this material. Grinding with these two utensils is prohibited by Torah law. Grinding using one of them is rabbinically prohibited. For Shabbat use, however, one may grind food as long as two shinuyim are made. For example, the handle of a knife can be used instead of a pestle, and a plate can be used instead of a mortar (SA 321:7). Although the Sages generally forbid food preparation involving melakha even when it is performed with two shinuyim, here they permit it since the action is considered derekh akhila rather than derekh melakha.
  The prohibition of Toḥen applies to natural items like plants, fruits, and metals, but does not apply to foods that have already been ground and then recombined. Therefore, bread, matza, cookies, chocolate, or hardened sugar may be made into crumbs (Rema 321:12). Similarly, one may crumble tobacco powder that has hardened. Furthermore, a sick person who has difficulty swallowing pills may crush them, since their components were already ground before they were made into a pill. In such a case there is no problem of Toḥen (SSK 33:4). Some maintain that one may crush the pills only for immediate use, and le-khatḥila this opinion should be followed (Ḥayei Adam 17:4). In any case, even when one may grind or crush something, one may not use utensils explicitly designed for these purposes, like a grater.
  One who scrapes off clay or mud that has hardened naturally from a surface and crumbles the dirt in order to use it transgresses a Torah prohibition. If he does not need the dirt, he is transgressing rabbinically. Therefore, if mud or clay has dried on clothes or shoes, it may not be removed if doing so will definitely make it crumble. Only if it is uncertain whether the mud will crumble may it be removed. Even if it is clear that it will crumble, if necessary it may be removed with a shinui. For example, one may remove the mud on his clothing by using the back of his hand, or he may use one shoe to rub the mud off of the other one.1<i class="footnote">em&gt;Kol Bo maintains that removing mud from clothes by scraping it off is not prohibited since one has no interest in causing the mud to crumble. Besides, mud is considered already ground (and not an organic whole). However, Rabbeinu Peretz forbids this. SA 302:7 cites him as “<em>yesh omrim</em>” (there are those who maintain). Although some are lenient in practice (Ḥida; <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 302:17, 321:22), most Aḥaronim defer to Rabbeinu Peretz’s opinion (SAH 302:17; <em>Ḥayei Adam</em>; MB <em>ad loc</em>. 36; <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Mishpatim 6; <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em><em>ad loc</em>. 49). In any case, when it is uncertain that the mud will in fact crumble, even those who prohibit would agree that it is a <em>davar she-eino mitkaven</em> and is therefore permitted (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in SSK ch. 15 n. 103). It would seem that when dealing with mud and clay, as long as it will not crumble, removing it is not considered <em>Toḥen</em>. If it is clear that it will crumble but there is a great need to remove it, even those who forbid doing so would permit removing it if it is done with a <em>shinui</em>, because then the action becomes a <em>shvut di-shvut</em> (see BHL 302:6 s.v. “o”).</i>
  
  Section 2
  
  Food Preparation / Chopping Vegetables and Mashing Bananas and Avocados
  The Rishonim disagree whether the prohibition of Toḥen applies to chopping vegetables finely for salad. Some maintain that since cutting the vegetables into small pieces serves a purpose, the prohibition applies. However, according to the majority of Rishonim, this is prohibited only if the vegetables are otherwise inedible, such as when one chops vegetables in order to cook them. In contrast, if the vegetables are edible raw, there is no problem with chopping them. In practice, since this disagreement concerns a Torah law, one should defer to the stringent opinion. Thus one may not cut vegetables finely for a salad (SA 321:12). However, if the salad is being prepared right before the meal, even the stringent opinion permits it. In this case, the cutting is not derekh melakha but derekh akhila, as one may eat finely-cut food on Shabbat (Rashba; Beit Yosef; Rema 321:12). Le-khatḥila it is preferable, even when preparing salad for the upcoming meal, not to cut the pieces especially finely (Beit Yosef; MB ad loc. 45).2<i class="footnote">. There are three opinions as to what constitutes <em>Toḥen</em>:a) According to Rabbeinu Ḥananel and Rosh, Toḥen is relevant only to making flour.b) According to most Rishonim, if cutting something into pieces makes it edible, one may not do so; but if it is edible as is, one may cut it. This is the position of Rid, Ritva, Ra’ah, and Ramban, and it is similar to Rambam’s position as well.c) Any time one cuts vegetables into small pieces, it is included in the prohibition of Toḥen. This is the opinion of Rashi, Or Zaru’a, and Yere’im. SA 321:12 defers to the opinion of those who are stringent. However, he adds, based on Rashba, that if the food is intended to be eaten immediately, one may cut it. Although almost all poskim agree that one may do so for immediate use, some cast doubt upon this leniency (Shiltei Giborim). Therefore, Aḥaronim write that le-khatḥila it is preferable not to cut salad especially finely (Beit Yosef; MB 321:45).</i>
  May one mash foods like bananas and avocados? Some are stringent and forbid doing so with a fork, including for immediate consumption. Even the stringent opinion permits mashing these foods with a spoon, because that is considered a shinui. However, the lenient position allows mashing bananas and avocados even with a fork for immediate consumption, and the halakha follows this position. Thus one may mash a banana or avocado with a fork for immediate consumption. As we have already seen, the prohibition of Toḥen is not relevant to food being prepared for immediate consumption, as long as the mashing is not done with a special utensil designed for this purpose.3<i class="footnote">. There are several reasons for this permission:a) According to most poskim, the prohibition of Toḥen does not apply to fruits or vegetables that are edible (as we saw in the previous note).b) Even though SA 321:12 rules in accordance with those who are stringent, nevertheless, when the food is being prepared for immediate consumption, there is no prohibition (Rashba; Beit Yosef; Rema).c) Even if the prohibition of Toḥen were applicable, according to Igrot Moshe 4:74, Toḥen2, since these foods remain a solid mass even after being mashed, Toḥen does not apply here at all.d) Mashing with a fork already constitutes a shinui, as this is not the normal way to grind (Or Le-Tziyon 1:28). Yeḥaveh Da’at 5:27 and Menuḥat Ahava 2:8:12 permit this in practice. However, Ḥazon Ish OḤ §57 is stringent, and does not allow it even when the food being prepared will be consumed immediately. He also maintains that mashing is considered a type of Toḥen since it breaks down the structure of the fruit. He adds that if the mashing is done to feed the food to a baby, then it is prohibited based on MA 321:14, because it renders the food edible. SSK 6:1 and Hilkhot Shabbat Be-Shabbat 1:12:15 also state that one should be stringent. But they allow mashing with a spoon, as this definitely constitutes a shinui. Similarly, if the foods are very soft, then even those who are normally stringent allow mashing them with a fork. But in practice the primary position is the lenient one, as this is the position of practically all Rishonim.</i>
  One may use a meat knife to cut a roast into slices, even for later consumption. A knife may be used to slice hard cheese as well. Similarly, one may mash hard-boiled eggs with a fork. Even when it is permissible to cut something or crumble it, one may not do so with a utensil that is designed for this purpose, like a grater (SA 321:9-10). However, one may use a utensil that is designed for cutting things into large pieces. Therefore, one may use a cheese knife or an egg slicer, since its blades are far apart from one another. Similarly, one may slice a loaf of bread as well (SSK 6:3).4<i class="footnote">As explained in <em>Terumat Ha-deshen</em> §56, the permission to slice meat, cheese, and eggs is based on two principles:a) The prohibition of Toḥen fundamentally pertains to foods that grow in the ground.b) Most poskim maintain that the prohibition is limited to foods that cannot be eaten as is. Although it is true that some elderly people are unable to eat tough meat, nevertheless since most people are able to eat it, it is considered edible. However, one may not use a utensil that is specifically designed for grinding. According to MB 321:36 the prohibition is rabbinic, while according to Nishmat Adam 17:2 it is prohibited by Torah law.</i>
  
  Section 3
  
  Food Preparation / Lash
  The melakha of Lash refers to the act of kneading, forming dough out of flour and water. However, it also includes mixing any liquid with flour to form dough. Even if the liquid used is viscous, like honey or mayonnaise, it is still forbidden to mix it with flour. As long as one binds the flour and forms dough, this is considered Lash. Along the same lines, if one mixes water with dried earth in order to make bricks or spackle to plug holes in a wall, he transgresses Lash.
  One may not perform even a single component of the kneading process. Therefore, one may not pour water onto flour. Additionally, after dough has been formed, one may not shape it.5<i class="footnote">. Everyone agrees that one who actually forms dough is transgressing a Torah prohibition, but the Tanna’im disagree whether adding water to flour is a Torah prohibition. According to R. Yehuda Ha-Nasi, one who adds water to flour is transgressing a Torah prohibition because he has taken the first step in the process of making dough; according to R. Yossi Be-Rabbi Yehuda, since one has not mixed the water and flour together, he has only transgressed a rabbinic prohibition (<em>Shabbat</em> 18a, 155b). Most <em>poskim</em>, including Rabbeinu Ḥananel, Rif, Rambam, Rosh, Ba’al Ha-Ma’or, Ramban, <em>Or Zaru’a</em>, <em>Roke’aḥ</em>, Rabbeinu Yeruḥam, and Me’iri maintain that the <em>halakha</em> follows R. Yossi Be-Rabbi Yehuda. However, according to <em>Sefer Ha-Teruma</em>, <em>Yere’im</em>, <em>Smag</em>, and <em>Smak</em>, the <em>halakha</em> follows R. Yehuda Ha-Nasi. (<em>Le-khatḥila</em> one should not wash his hands over dirt nor urinate into dirt, because R. Yossi Be-Rabbi Yehuda agrees that those actions are forbidden. In a time of need one may be lenient, as this is a case of a <em>psik reisha</em> <em>de-lo niḥa lei</em> involving a rabbinic prohibition. See MB 321:57.)There are some materials, such as ash, that are incapable of forming dough. If they are mixed with water they do form a type of mass, but it is not stable and it crumbles once it dries. There are three opinions regarding such materials:a) One may be more lenient regarding them. He may pour water on the ash, but mixing the two together is rabbinically prohibited (Rambam; Rid; Ritva; and implied by Rif and Rashi).b) One must be more stringent with them. Since they cannot really form a mass, one is liable as soon as water is poured on them, as even R. Yossi Be-Rabbi Yehuda would agree (following Abaye in Shabbat 18a; according to BHL 324:3 s.v. “ein” this is the ruling of Tosafot, Rosh, Raavad, Rashba, and Ran; it would also seem to be the opinion of Sefer Ha-Teruma and all who follow R. Yehuda Ha-Nasi’s ruling).c) They are the same as any other material that is subject to Lash. The Tanna’im disagree regarding the status of the prohibition of pouring water on them, but agree that mixing them is prohibited by Torah law (following the opinion of R. Yosef; Ḥazon Ish 56:3 maintains that this is the opinion of most of the poskim mentioned in BHL).</i>
  Lash involves forming something new with characteristics that differ from those of its component parts. Flour on its own and water on its own cannot rise and cannot be baked. Only after they are mixed together can they be made into bread and cookies. Similarly, dried earth or spackle on their own and water on its own cannot be used for building. Only after they are mixed together can they be used to form bricks or to plug holes in the wall.
  The Torah prohibition on Lash is limited to a thick mixture. Rabbinically, it is also prohibited to make a loose mixture (as will be explained in the next section). However, if the quantity of the solid added to the liquid is so minimal that it dissolves, the liquid retains its form, and no type of mixture results, then there is no prohibition of Lash. Therefore, one may add coffee or sugar to water, as the granules do not form a mass in the water. In addition, one may prepare infant formula by mixing the powder with water since the mixture does not form a mass; rather, the liquid retains its form, and can be drunk from a bottle. Thus there is no problem of Lash.6<i class="footnote">If the mixture is likely to solidify and harden on its own, then when one adds the water he is already transgressing the Torah prohibition of <em>Lash</em>. This is because the essence of the <em>melakha</em> is joining discrete particles into one solid mass. Thus the Sages state that adding water to flax seeds is considered <em>Lash</em>, because the water causes the seeds to secrete a substance that causes them to stick to one another (<em>Zevaḥim</em> 94b). Similarly, it is prohibited by Torah law to put cement, water, and aggregate together to form concrete; although the mixture starts out loose and pourable, the concrete will subsequently solidify on its own (see <em>Ketzot Ha-shulḥan</em> 130:3). Therefore, one may not make gelatin desserts, as explained below in section 7.</i> (One should prepare coffee in a kli shlishi to avoid violating the melakha of Bishul; see above, 10:7.)
  
  Section 4
  
  Food Preparation / Preparing a Loose Mixture with a Shinui
  As we have seen, the Torah prohibition of Lash applies to forming a thick mixture. This means that many discrete particles become one solid mass that will not flow or spread out if left on a plate or bowl. In contrast, it is not forbidden by Torah law to form a loose mixture that can be poured from utensil to utensil and that spreads outward if left on a plate or bowl. This is because making such a mixture does not involve kneading, but only stirring. However, since one might mistakenly assume that if one may make a loose batter he may also make a thick dough, the Sages created a fence around the Torah and forbade forming a loose mixture. But one may make such a mixture with a shinui that serves as a reminder that there is a prohibition involved, ensuring that no one will end up making a thick mixture.
  The shinui may be in the order the ingredients are added to the mixing bowl. If normally the dry ingredients are added first, followed by the wet ingredients, the wet ingredients should be added first, followed by the dry ingredients. If normally the wet ingredients would be added first followed by the dry ingredients, that order should be reversed. When following this procedure, one must make sure to add the liquid all at once so that a thick mixture will not be formed in the process of making a loose one.
  Some maintain that it is unnecessary to incorporate an additional shinui during the stirring stage, as long as the mixture is not stirred as vigorously as one does during the week. Others are more stringent and require a shinui during the stirring as well. For example, instead of stirring the batter using a circular motion, one may stir in straight lines, from side to side, or perpendicularly. Alternatively, one might mix the batter with one’s finger, by shaking the bowl, or by pouring the batter from bowl to bowl. Le-khatḥila it is proper to comply with all the poskim and change both the order the ingredients are added and the way the batter is stirred.
  When the ingredients are not usually added in any particular order, the dry ingredients should be added first, followed by the wet ingredients. Additionally, the way the mixing is done should be changed.7<i class="footnote">According to <em>Derisha</em>, a number of Rishonim maintain that changing the order of the ingredients is sufficient. However, <em>Terumat Ha-deshen</em> §53 maintains that one must also change the manner of stirring. SA 321:14 rules that one need not change the manner of stirring (<em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:9:43; <em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 58:5 s.v. “u-mashma” seems inclined to rule this way as well). However, according to MB 321:57 and <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Mishpatim 18, it is preferable to change the manner of stirring as well as the order of the ingredients.When the ingredients are not usually added in any set order, one should begin with the dry ingredients, according to <em>Terumat Ha-deshen</em>, <em>Eliya Rabba</em>, <em>Tosefet Shabbat</em>, and <em>Ḥok Yaakov</em>. However, according to <em>Taz</em>, since in such a case it is impossible to change the order of the ingredients, making such a mixture is simply prohibited. This disagreement is cited by MB 321:57. Since this is a rabbinic law, one may rely on those who are lenient (SSK 8:9; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:9:39).</i>
  One may add liquid to a thick mixture to make it thinner, since this is the opposite of kneading. Kneading leads to discrete units coalescing, while adding water weakens the cohesiveness of the component parts (BHL 321:15, s.v. “yakhol”).
  According to this, water may be added to raw tahini, since that makes it more liquid. However, some prohibit doing so, since during the process there is a stage in which the mixture becomes a bit harder (SSK 8:31). Nevertheless, halakha in practice follows those who are lenient, since the eventual result is a loose mixture. Additionally, since the sesame seeds in the tahini were ground and mixed before Shabbat, according to many the prohibition of Lash no longer applies (SA 321:15). In order to avoid any doubt, it is proper to mix with a shinui.
  
  Section 5
  
  Food Preparation / Preparing a Thick Mixture with a Shinui
  The poskim disagree whether one may make a thick mixture on Shabbat using a shinui when the food is intended to be eaten on Shabbat. Some forbid this, arguing that the Sages permitted kneading with a shinui only in the case of a loose mixture, where the prohibition is only rabbinic. In contrast, a thick mixture may not be made even using a shinui, as it involves a Torah prohibition (Rambam). Others maintain that in order to make food for Shabbat, even thick mixtures may be made with a shinui (Tosafot).
  In practice, at a time of need, when it is a case of great necessity, one may rely on those who are lenient and prepare a thick mixture using a shinui. For example, when the only readily available baby food was a thick porridge prepared by adding water or milk to a dry mix of oatmeal or other grain, it was permitted to prepare this porridge with a shinui. Similarly, in times when there was no food available for animals other than a thick mixture of bran and water, it was permitted to make such a mixture with a shinui.
  The shinui is relevant both to the order in which the ingredients are added and to the manner of stirring. If there is a set order for the ingredients, it should be reversed. If there is no set order, the dry ingredients should be added first, followed by the wet ingredients. As for the manner of stirring, the spoon may be moved back and forth in a straight line or perpendicularly rather than with a circular motion. If this is not recognizable as a shinui, the spoon should be completely removed from the mixture after each stirring motion.8<i class="footnote">. In <em>Shabbat</em> 156a we find that R. Yossi Be-Rabbi Yehuda permits making a thick dough of <em>mursan</em> (coarse bran) using a <em>shinui</em>. The law is dependent on two issues:a) Whom we follow in the disagreement between R. Yehuda Ha-Nasi and R. Yossi Be-Rabbi Yehuda (mentioned above in n. 5). If the halakha follows R. Yehuda Ha-Nasi, then the act of joining the two ingredients is forbidden by Torah law. If this is the case, then changing the order in which the ingredients are combined is not enough to permit an action that is otherwise prohibited by Torah law (Terumat Ha-deshen53). However, if the halakha follows R. Yossi Be-Rabbi Yehuda, then the joining of the materials is only prohibited rabbinically (and according to Tosafot it is permitted), so changing the order is a sufficient shinui.b) Whether the Sages permit making thick dough using a shinui. According to Rambam and those who agree with him, mursan is incapable of forming a proper dough, so mixing it is only prohibited rabbinically. Accordingly, the entire permission granted by R. Yossi Be-Rabbi Yehuda is limited to rabbinically prohibited kneading. (This is also the opinion of Rid and Ritva. SA quotes Rambam.) On the other hand, many Rishonim feel that mursan can be made into dough and doing so is thus prohibited by Torah law. Accordingly, R. Yossi Be-Rabbi Yehuda permits this kind of kneading with a shinui. (This disagreement is summarized in BHL 324:3 s.v. “ein.”) In times of necessity, one may be lenient. This is because according to most poskim, the halakha regarding adding water follows R. Yossi Be-Rabbi Yehuda; since even those who are stringent agree that mixing with a shinui is only a rabbinic prohibition, the halakha follows those who are lenient. It can also be inferred from Taz and BHL that most poskim are lenient.</i>
  However, in practice, it is very rare for a leniency to be necessary here, since as a general rule there is no pressing need to prepare a thick mixture on Shabbat. Nevertheless, the lenient opinion is very important, because there are cases in which it is unclear whether a specific type of mixture would be prohibited because of Lash. In such cases, one can follow the lenient opinion and knead with a shinui. It is preferable to do so for fairly immediate consumption (when Rashba is lenient).
  In cases where practically all poskim agree that Lash applies to a particular type of mixture, one may not form it even with a shinui. For example, one may not mix sesame seeds or nuts with honey. Similarly, one may not mix butter, cocoa, and sugar together, since they form a thick mixture. Such mixtures are prohibited even if done with a shinui and for immediate consumption.9<i class="footnote">One can be lenient if a <em>shinui</em> is used, as long as there is also a substantive doubt about whether <em>Lash</em> applies to the mixture under consideration. However, if only a small number of authorities maintain there is no prohibition of <em>Lash</em>, their opinion is not enough to allow forming a thick mixture, even with a <em>shinui</em>. Let us mention two lenient positions that should not be taken into account since only a few authorities follow them:a) It would seem that Rashba 4:75 allows forming a thick mixture for immediate consumption, and a few Aḥaronim take this position into account in ruling leniently (see Livyat Ḥen67). On the other hand, many did not accept Rashba’s position, and some maintain that even Rashba was stringent in this case. Alternatively, it is possible that Rashba is lenient only when the mixing is done in the course of eating. This means that two foods on one’s plate may be mixed together and consumed (even then it is doubtful whether one may be lenient; see SSK ch. 8 n. 10).b) Some maintain that just as Toḥen pertains only to produce but not to meat and eggs, so too Lash applies only to produce (Maharshak; see Tzitz Eliezer 11:36). However, according to the majority of poskim, Lash does apply to other things besides produce, as Igrot Moshe states in OḤ 4:74, Lash8.</i>
  
  Section 6
  
  Food Preparation / Foods that Are Not Subject to Lash
  There is no prohibition of Lash for food that has been mashed. Since it has already been mashed and softened, the act of kneading does not fundamentally change it. Therefore, one may mix a dish of meat, potatoes, and barley that have fallen apart, and one may even add water to the mixture to form one mass. One may also add gravy to mashed potatoes and mix them together. Since the potatoes are already mashed, there is no prohibition of Lash (Responsa Rambam as quoted in Beit Yosef 321:19).10<i class="footnote">Some permit stirring vigorously in the normal way (<em>Taz</em>), but many prohibit vigorous stirring (<em>Baḥ</em>, MA, <em>Eliya Rabba</em>, MB 321:77). <em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 58:9 maintains that if a food has dried out completely, like rice does after some time, it may not be mixed with liquids. In practice, in such a case one should mix with the <em>shinui</em> of stirring perpendicularly.</i>
  If a mixture was made before Shabbat but some liquid gradually separated from it, it may be mixed again on Shabbat since there is no prohibition of Lash for something that has already been mixed. Since all permit this, it is unnecessary to use a shinui, but one should still stir more slowly than on a weekday. For example, if oil has risen to the top of an eggplant salad, it may be mixed back in with the eggplant. Similarly, if peanut butter separated and there is oil floating on top, it may be mixed back in.
  Many poskim seemingly allow adding ingredients to a mixture that had been prepared before Shabbat. However, some are stringent. Therefore, the ingredients may be added with a shinui. For example, hot sauce may be added to hummus as long as it is mixed with a shinui. Similarly, if an eggplant spread was prepared before Shabbat and mashed in its juice, mayonnaise may be added to it on Shabbat with a shinui (see SA 321:15-16). We have already seen (in the previous section) that the shinui can involve moving the spoon back and forth in straight lines or perpendicularly when stirring. If this is not a recognizable change, the spoon should be removed from the mixture entirely after the completion of each stirring motion.
  One may mix cake crumbs with soft cheese or milk, since the crumbs were already kneaded when they were made into cake, and thus the prohibition of Lash no longer applies. However, some are stringent and maintain that once the baked item has been crumbled, the original act of kneading has been nullified. Therefore, one should mix the crumbs with a shinui, and do so only for immediate consumption.
  Another important principle is that Lash involves taking dry, discrete materials and binding them together. However, if the dry ingredients spread throughout the liquid to which they are added, this is not considered Lash. Therefore, one may add herbs to soft cheese, since the herbal leaves spread out and do not clump together. Similarly, one may mix granola into soft cheese, since the granola bits do not join together and become one mass, but rather adhere to the cheese. One may also mix strawberries or bananas with cream, since the pieces do not bind and become one. One may add sugar or cocoa to soft cheese, because the aim is not to bind the granules of sugar with the cocoa but rather to flavor the cheese.
  The Aḥaronim debate whether one may mix two viscous foods like soft cheese and honey. Some maintain that since they form a new thick mixture, it is considered Lash (SSK 8:16). Others maintain that the prohibition of Lash exists only when mixing dry ingredients with wet ones, while one may mix two wet ingredients together (Igrot Moshe, OḤ 4:74). In practice, one may mix the two foods with a shinui.
  
  Section 7
  
  Food Preparation / Assorted Laws
  One may not make pudding if the mixture is thick enough that it cannot be poured. However, pudding that is loose and pourable may be made using a shinui. As we saw above in section 4, one should begin with the dry ingredients and then add the wet ones, and one should mix with a shinui (Igrot Moshe, OḤ 4:74, Lash §7). Let us reiterate that this shinui may be stirring with a back-and-forth or perpendicular motion instead of the normal circular motion. If this is not recognizable as a shinui, the spoon should be removed from the mixture after completing each stirring motion.
  One may not prepare a gelatin dessert by mixing powder and water together. Although the mixture starts out loose, ultimately it hardens. Thus one who mixes water with gelatin powder is transgressing the melakha of Lash (see n. 6 above).
  One may not prepare instant mashed potatoes, since adding water to reconstitute the mashed potatoes forms a thick mixture. However, one may prepare instant couscous by pouring water onto it from a kli sheni and stirring it with a shinui.11<i class="footnote">. The <em>poskim</em> disagree whether one may form a mixture using matza meal. Many prohibit doing so, maintaining that the matza meal has been processed to such an extent that its original pre-matza kneading is no longer relevant (<em>Taz</em>; MB 321:57). Others are inclined to be lenient (AHS <em>ad loc.</em> 20; Maharsham). Since the issue is in doubt, a <em>shinui</em> should be incorporated. Preparing couscous is less problematic, since one could argue that the individual grains do not really stick together; in any case, in order to avoid any doubt, a <em>shinui </em>should be incorporated when making this as well.</i>
  Everybody agrees that vegetables that are not cut finely may be mixed with oil or mayonnaise. Since the pieces are not tiny, they do not form a mixture. However, if the pieces are finely cut, the poskim disagree whether one may mix them with mayonnaise. Some maintain that one may do so as long as the vegetables do not form a solid mass (Maharshal). Others maintain that if they adhere to each other, even if they do not form a solid mass, it is prohibited (Taz). One who wishes may be lenient, but he should mix the vegetables with a shinui, and prepare the salad shortly before the meal (MB 321:68; see section 5, nn. 8-9).
  Preparing egg salad is also subject to dispute. On the one hand, there are reasons to be lenient: All the ingredients (eggs, onion, and mayonnaise) are already edible, and it does not become a homogeneous mixture like dough. On the other hand, it does generally form a thick mixture. In practice, one may prepare egg salad. The eggs may be mashed with a fork, as long as the mixing is done with a shinui and the preparation is done for fairly immediate consumption.
  The same procedure should be followed when making tuna salad with eggs and mayonnaise and when making chopped liver with eggs. Although the mixture they form is homogeneous, one may mix them with a shinui for fairly immediate consumption.12<i class="footnote">SSK 8:28 permits making egg salad using a <em>shinui</em> even when it becomes a thick mixture (as it permits mashing eggs and cooked potatoes with a fork), and adds in n. 92 that this is the widespread custom. It suggests a number of reasons for this leniency. For starters, the egg is cooked and ready to eat, and the salad is not really one homogeneous mixture. Furthermore, if the egg salad is being prepared for a meal, only a small amount is being prepared, which counts as a <em>shinui</em>. We should add that as we saw above in n. 9, according to Rashba one may form a mixture when preparing the dish for immediate consumption. Further, some maintain that <em>Lash</em> applies only to foods that grow in the ground. On the other hand, some consider egg salad comparable to vegetables, and are stringent if they form a mixture (<em>Hilkhot Shabbat</em> <em>Be-Shabbat</em> 13:31). As we saw in section 5, when in doubt one may mix with a <em>shinui</em>. This has an additional advantage, as it is likely that if one mixes with a <em>shinui</em>, the mixture will not become integrated into a solid mass.</i>
  
  Section 8
  
  Food Preparation / Squeezing Fruits
  Juicing – that is, squeezing fruits in order to release their juice – is a violation of the prohibition of Mefarek, a tolada of the melakha of Dash. While Dash involves separating wheat kernels from their husks, Mefarek involves separating juice from its fruit. It is prohibited by Torah law to squeeze olives to produce oil or to squeeze grapes to produce wine. Wine and oil are important liquids, and the majority of olives and grapes are grown in order to produce these liquids. In contrast, the prohibition of juicing other fruits, which are not grown primarily for their juice, is rabbinic.13<i class="footnote">. In the past, some fruits were normally not juiced. <em>Shabbat</em> 144b permits juicing such fruit: “One may squeeze plums, quinces, and sorb apples.” Although according to a few Rishonim (<em>Smak</em> and Rabbeinu Yeruḥam) one may never juice any fruit, and a few Aḥaronim defer to their opinion (<em>Ḥayei Adam</em> 14:3; <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Yitro 3), the majority of Rishonim and Aḥaronim allow those fruit to be juiced (SA 320:1; BHL s.v. “mutar”). However, today there are no fruits that are not juiced. Therefore, one may not squeeze any fruit in order to release its juice.According to Ran, the Torah prohibition of juicing applies only to olives and grapes, because squeezing them creates important beverages – oil and wine. This is also implied by Rambam, and many Aḥaronim rule this way as well, including AHS 320:10. However, Rashi, Rashba, and Ritva maintain that it is prohibited by Torah law to juice any fruit, if the majority of that fruit’s crop is used to make juice.One may not wring out clothing that has absorbed liquid if one wishes to use the liquid, because of the prohibition of Dash. There is a disagreement whether this is prohibited rabbinically or by Torah law. If the wringing out will also clean the garment, then the Torah prohibition of laundering comes into play. (See above 11:17 and in Harḥavot; below 13:5 and Harḥavot.)</i>
  One may not juice a fruit for the purpose of extracting its juice in order to drink it. However, if the purpose is to add flavor to food, one may juice fruit directly into food, since in such a case the squeezing is never viewed as producing a discrete quantity of liquid. The juice that is considered part of one food is simply transferred to another food. Therefore, one may squeeze grapes into food, a lemon into a vegetable salad, or an orange into grated carrots. Similarly, a lemon may be squeezed onto fried fish, even though the juice is not absorbed by the fish. Since it is meant to flavor the fish, it is secondary to it and considered a part of it (SA 320:4; SSK ch. 5 n. 15).
  If one wishes to squeeze a lemon in order to make lemonade, he should not squeeze it into an empty pitcher or into water. Rather, he should squeeze the lemon into the sugar in such a way that all the juice is absorbed by the sugar. This way, he is transferring the juice from one food to another, which is permitted.14<i class="footnote">. However, SA 320:6 maintains that one may squeeze lemons into an empty pitcher; since people do not drink pure lemon juice, it has no importance. Thus, a lemon is categorized as a fruit that is never squeezed for its juice; as we saw in the previous note, according to most <em>poskim</em>, such fruits may be squeezed for their juice. In contrast, according to <em>Ḥayei Adam</em> 14:4, one may not squeeze a lemon even into sugar, since one intends to turn the lemon into a drink. Most <em>poskim</em>, however, maintain that one may squeeze a lemon into sugar (Ḥida; <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Yitro 5; and MB 320:22).</i>
  One may squeeze out excess oil from fried foods, or excess liquid from pickled foods, in order to improve their taste. Similarly, these excess liquids may be squeezed into other food. However, if one wants the liquid that is being extracted, then squeezing these foods is prohibited (SA 320:7).
  One may cut a grapefruit and eat it with a spoon, even though in the process juice will flow from it. Since most of the liquid remains in the grapefruit, it is not prohibited. One may also cut up fruit for fruit salad, even though cutting the fruit will cause a bit of juice to flow out. This is not prohibited because one does not intend to separate the juice from the fruit, and most of the juice remains inside the fruit. If there is some juice remaining when one has finished eating the fruit salad or grapefruit, one may drink the juice.15<i class="footnote">Even though it is clear that cutting a grapefruit or orange will release juice, one may cut them because this is a case of an unintended <em>psik reisha</em> in a double rabbinic prohibition:a) The squeezing is not being done in the normal fashion.b) The prohibition of squeezing grapefruit and oranges, according to many, is only rabbinic. Many poskim have written this, including SSK ch. 5 n. 49. In Shabbat 143b, R. Yehuda maintains that if the juice left afterward on the plate flows out by itself from fruit designated for eating, one may drink this juice. If it flowed from olives and grapes, then even if they were set aside to be eaten, one may not drink the juice. (Since squeezing out the juice is a Torah prohibition, the Sages prohibited even juice that flowed out on its own.) This is the ruling of SA 320:1. Generally, when preparing fruit salad, even if grapes are used, most of the juice is from other fruits. Even if juice does flow out of the grapes, it mixes with the other fruits and their juice. Therefore, one may drink the juice that remains. (Orḥot Shabbat 4 n. 44 states something similar to this.) The poskim disagree whether one may suck the juice out of a fruit held between the teeth. In practice, regarding grapes we are stringent, as squeezing them is a Torah prohibition (Rema 320:1). However, once a grape is actually in one’s mouth, there is no problem of squeezing (MB ad loc. 12).</i>
  
  Section 9
  
  Food Preparation / Pickling and Salting Foods
  The Sages forbade pickling cucumbers (or olives and the like) in brine or vinegar, because pickling is comparable to cooking. Similarly, the Sages forbade salting foods if doing so fundamentally changes them, as is the case with radishes, onions, garlic, turnips, and cucumbers. Salt helps sweat these vegetables, extracting their bitterness, changing their textures, and improving their taste. Thus, salting is comparable to the melakha of Me’abed (below 18:6), and its impact on foods is similar to that of cooking (SA 321:2-6; MB ad loc. 15).
  One may salt an individual piece of a vegetable and then eat it, because this does not resemble pickling. Many also permit salting multiple pieces at once, as long as the pieces will be eaten soon (SA 321:4). However, the custom is to be stringent and eat each piece immediately after salting it. This is because if one waits to eat a salted piece until after additional pieces have been salted, it may look like he is pickling food (MB 321:20; Kaf Ha-ḥayim ad loc. 26).
  Salting multiple pieces together is permissible if one adds oil as well. This is because the oil reduces the saltiness, making it clear that one is not pickling, but rather flavoring his food (MB 321:14). Similarly, one may add salt to a cucumber and radish salad being prepared for the upcoming meal. This is because preparing the salad also involves adding oil and spices that weaken the salt, making it clear that one is not pickling (Taz 321:1; MB ad loc. 14). One may also add as much salt as one wishes to vegetables that are not normally pickled, such as tomatoes (SSK 11:2).
  The Sages also prohibited things that resemble pickling. Therefore, one may not prepare large quantities of salt water or other pickling agents on Shabbat. However, one may prepare a limited quantity of such mixtures – enough for dipping foods during the meal. Concentrated salt water (i.e., a mixture that is at least two-thirds salt) may not be prepared even in small quantities, since it resembles preparing brine to pickle fish (SA 321:2).
  
  Section 10
  
  Food Preparation / Coloring Food
  There is an accepted principle that the prohibition of dyeing does not pertain to food. Therefore, one may add turmeric to a dish, even though it will color the food yellow. Similarly, one may dip bread in wine even though it will turn the bread red (SA 320:19). This is because the Torah prohibition is limited to long-lasting dyeing (like that of clothing or walls). Rabbinically, short-term coloring is prohibited as well. However, the short-term coloring of food is not included in this prohibition. This is because the primary concern with food is its taste, not its color; furthermore, people do not normally color most foods.
  Some are stringent and avoid coloring drinks, as the change made to them is more obvious. Additionally, it is somewhat more common to color liquids than solids, since liquids are sometimes used for dyeing clothing and walls. Therefore, even though drinks are made for drinking, and not for their appearance, it is rabbinically forbidden to color them (Ben Ish Ḥai, Year 2, Pekudei 3-4). However, according to most poskim there is no prohibition of coloring even drinks. This is the halakha in practice (Darkhei Moshe 320:2). However, if possible, le-khatḥila it is preferable to defer to those who prohibit coloring drinks. Therefore, when mixing red and white wines, it is preferable not to pour the red into the white, as this will color the drink. Rather, one should pour the white wine into the red, because then the change in color is not obvious when the white wine becomes part of the red. Similarly, when preparing juice from concentrate, it is preferable to put the concentrate into the cup or pitcher first, and then add the water. This way the water is immediately blended with the concentrate, and the coloring is not obvious. Similarly, when preparing tea using liquid essence, it is preferable to put the essence in first and add the water to it (SHT 318:64-65; see above 10:8, which explains that one should pour the water from a kli sheni).16<i class="footnote">Most <em>poskim</em> maintain that the prohibition of dyeing does not apply to food and drink (SA 320:9; <em>Darkhei Moshe</em><em>ad loc.</em> 2; <em>Ḥakham Tzvi</em> §92; <em>Mateh Yehuda</em> 318:2; and many others). However, some are stringent. For example, <em>Nishmat Adam</em> 24:3 is concerned that it may even be prohibited by Torah law if the goal of the dyeing is to sell the food. BHL 320:19 rejects this. Nevertheless, there is a rabbinic prohibition of preparing on Shabbat for weekdays, and therefore one may not dye food in order to sell it (see MB 320:56). Others maintain that while it is true that the prohibition of dyeing does not apply to foods, there is a rabbinic prohibition to color drinks (<em>Rav Pe’alim</em>, OḤ 3:11 and <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Pekudei 3-4; <em>Ha-elef Lekha Shlomo</em> §336; <em>Lev Ḥayim</em> 3:78). Although this is a rabbinic law, and most <em>poskim</em> are lenient (see <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 2:20), <em>le-khatḥila</em> it is preferable to be stringent. Even those who are stringent allow mixing a clear drink into a colored one (<em>Ḥesed La-alafim</em> 320:6; SHT 318:65). If the intent is to color, then it is reasonable to be stringent even when it comes to food (<em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Pekudei 3; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 3:13:8 and nn. 26, 30; SSK 11:39). See <em>Harḥavot</em></i>
  
  Section 11
  
  Food Preparation / Writing, Building, and Spreading
  One may not write letters or draw pictures on a cake using candies or frosting. Though this is not prohibited by Torah law since the letters are not long lasting, it is rabbinically prohibited.
  If a cake has letters or pictures on it, one may not cut through the letters, but only between them. If the letters are formed in the cake or cookie itself, as is typically found on tea biscuits, they may be cut, as these letters are insignificant (below 18:3).
  If it is necessary to open a package of food that has writing on it, one should try to do so without tearing the letters. However, if there is no way around this, he may open the bag even if he will tear letters (as explained below in 18:3).
  One may not churn milk into butter on Shabbat. Many believe this is prohibited by Torah law as a tolada of Boneh, because it involves changing the food from a liquid to a solid (Shabbat 95a; MT 10:13). One also may not shape food into impressive designs, as this is a type of building (MA 340:17; Ḥayei Adam 39:1).
  One may spread food on bread or crackers, as the prohibition of spreading (Memare’aḥ) does not apply to foods. One also may change the appearance of the spread to make it look more appealing, smoothing it as desired. Thus, one may put hummus on a serving plate and spread it into a circle for aesthetic reasons since the food is already ready to eat, and smoothing it does not improve it in any way. Some are stringent and do not permit smoothing foods to make them look more appealing. One who chooses to be stringent should be commended (Rema 321:19).
  
  Section 12
  
  Food Preparation / Ice and Water
  The Sages forbade crushing snow, hail, or ice in order to turn them into water, because this resembles a melakha (see the next paragraph). However, one may add ice cubes to water even though they will melt. Since he is not actively melting the ice, it is not prohibited (Shabbat 51b). One may chip away at a chunk of ice in order to put some into a cup or container, even though bits of ice may melt during the process, as it is not his purpose to turn the ice into water. Similarly, one may walk on snow even though as one walks a little snow will melt, because this is not his intention (SA 320:9-12).
  A few poskim (Sefer Ha-Teruma and Rosh) maintain that one may not crush ice and turn it into water because turning a solid into a liquid is considered producing something new. According to this, heating congealed gravy or the like is also prohibited, since heating the gravy will liquefy it. However, according to the majority of poskim, the prohibition of crushing snow is not because something new is being formed, but because crushing snow is similar to squeezing fruit in that both actions are done with one’s hands. According to them, one may liquefy congealed gravy indirectly by warming it (Rambam, Ramban, Rashba, Smag, Smak). The Sephardic custom is to be lenient in this regard. The Ashkenazic custom is to be stringent le-khatḥila and refrain from liquefying congealed food by heating it. When necessary, even Ashkenazim may be lenient (SA 318:16).
  This is the law for making ice as well; Sephardic tradition allows it, while some Ashkenazim are stringent le-khatḥila. However, when necessary, such as on a hot day, even Ashkenazim may make ice (SSK 10:4). Some Ashkenazic poskim are lenient even le-khatḥila and allow making ice even if it is not a hot day. This is because ice does not have a sustained existence as a solid. It starts melting immediately upon being removed from the freezer, so making ice is not really creating anything new (Tzitz Eliezer 6:34; 8:12).
  One may add spices to foods even though they create a new smell in the foods. Although one may not cause clothing to smell nice by creating a new smell, there is no comparable prohibition for foods (SA 511:4; MB ad loc. 24).
  According to many poskim, one may not whip an egg or make whipped cream, because it looks like one is preparing them for cooking (Shabbat 109a following Rashi; MB 321:68). Others are lenient (see Livyat Ḥen §66).
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Introduction
  Clothing is very important, as it covers the body and protects it from heat and cold. Adam and Eve originally had no need for clothing, but after they sinned they developed an awareness of their nakedness and thus clothing became necessary. As long as Adam and Eve were pure, the physical world did not exert too strong a pull on them, and they were able to appropriately emphasize the spiritual aspect of their existence. For them, the body served as a practical tool for revealing the essence of the soul. But after they sinned, the body was weakened and the evil inclination was strengthened. The “lower” functions of the body exerted a disproportionately strong pull, while the soul was neglected and man’s divine destiny was forgotten. This is the source of shame. A person’s dignity can be attributed primarily to his creation in God’s image. This dignity is revealed through his soul, and expresses itself via Torah study and the performance of mitzvot and good deeds. When one forgets his destiny and lets his physical desires control him, he loses this dignity. Clothes that cover us externally serve to modify our attraction to the physical world, and help repair the damage caused by the sin of Adam and Eve. Covering the body allows the soul to reach greater expression. We can then perfect the body and give it full expression, with holiness and joy, guiding it toward Torah and mitzvot. Therefore, a person’s clothing is his dignity.
  Like every other good thing, clothing can be used correctly or incorrectly. Those who wear modest and pleasant clothes enjoy the true respect that results from emphasizing the spiritual. Those who wear immodest clothes emphasize the body and arouse the evil inclination. Instead of using clothes to emphasize the soul, they use them to further hide and conceal it. There is nothing more shameful than this.
  The sin of Adam and Eve led to an additional change as well. Man was expelled from the Garden of Eden into this harsh world. The ability of the body to take care of itself was diminished. Thus clothing became necessary to protect the body from the cold during the winter and from the sun’s rays during the summer. In the wake of the sin the body was doubly damaged: It could no longer serve as the complete instrument of the soul without clothing, and it could not even protect itself from the elements.
  Since clothing is a unique means of correction for man’s sin, clothes are not found in nature; rather, man must work and perform many activities in order to make them for himself. There are 13 melakhot involved in making cloth garments, and seven more in making leather garments.
  As we have seen, the 39 melakhot are the same melakhot that were performed in building the Mishkan. The sources of the melakhot connected with clothing are the melakhot that were involved in making curtains for the Mishkan, which were meant both to honor and conceal the divine glory.
  
  Section 2
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing
  There are 13 melakhot involved in making clothes (m. Shabbat 7:2):
  1) Gozez Tzemer (shearing wool; the laws pertaining to this activity will be explained below in 14:1): If plants are used to make the clothing, then one may not pick the plants on account of the prohibition of harvesting (below 19:6).
  2) Melaben (laundering): This includes removing debris and oil from the wool (as explained below in sections 3-8).
  3) Menapetz (combing wool): Combing through wool makes it easier to form the wool into threads. One who beats the sinews of an animal to make threads from them violates a tolada of this melakha.
  4) Tzove’a (dyeing): This involves infusing wool with dye in order to make colored thread and clothing from it (below 18:5).
  5) Toveh (spinning): This is forming threads from raw wool. Similarly, one who makes thread from raw materials like flax violates this melakha.
  Now we arrive at the melakhot that pertain to turning individual threads into one weave. As a rule, cloth is made from threads that run lengthwise (the “warp”) and threads that run widthwise (the “weft”). The warp threads form the foundation of the cloth, while the weft threads are interwoven perpendicular to them. In the past, hand-operated looms were used for weaving. This process involved a few more melakhot:
  6) Meisekh (warping): This involves setting up the warp threads on the loom.
  7) Oseh Shtei Batei Nirin (making two loops): In order to integrate the weft threads with the warp threads, one must first prepare the loom. Vertical cords (“heddles”) containing loops are suspended from two frames (“shafts” or “harnesses”). First the odd-numbered warp threads are threaded through the heddles of one harness and between the heddles of the other. Then the process is repeated with the even-numbered warp threads. This allows the weft threads to slip under and over those of the warp. Some say that the prohibition is to form two loops to hold the warp threads (Tosafot Rid on Shabbat 73a). Others maintain that only one who places two warp threads into these loops transgresses this melakha (Rashi, ad loc.).
  8) Oreg Shnei Ḥutin (weaving two threads): This is when one combines the weft threads with the warp threads, actually creating the weave.
  9) Potze’a Shnei Ḥutin (separating two threads): This is fixing the material by removing threads when there is a tear or imperfection in the weave. The melakha of Potze’a includes the prohibition of unraveling the hem of a woven item of clothing or a bandage.
  The general rubric of weaving also prohibits weaving a basket, net, or strainer, as well as weaving (“roping”) a rope bed. Each of these items is made with a crosshatch design, whether of thread, rope, or wicker (MT 9:16).
  Nowadays weaving is done with more advanced machines that perform all the above melakhot at once. One who turns on such a machine on Shabbat transgresses all of these melakhot simultaneously.
  Other melakhot connected to creating an item of clothing are:
  10) Kosheir (tying a knot)
  11) Matir (untying a knot): This is explained below in sections 13-15.
  12) Tofer Shtei Tefirot (sewing two stitches)
  13) Kore’a al Menat Litfor Shtei Tefirot (tearing in order to sew two stitches): This is explained below in sections 10-12.
  The melakhot connected with tanning leather are also connected to making clothes, since leather is used not only to create parchment, but also to make clothes and shoes. These melakhot are Tzad (trapping), Shoḥet (slaughtering; below 20:6-9), Mafshit (skinning), Me’abed (tanning), Memaḥek (smoothing), Mesartet (marking; below 18:6), and Meḥatekh (cutting; below 15:10).
  
  Section 3
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Libun and Kibus
  The melakha of Libun is cleaning wool or linen and whitening it before making it into clothes. Kibus, which refers to washing clothes, is a tolada of this melakha (MT 9:10-11).
  There are three stages of Kibus: soaking, scrubbing, and wringing. Since in each stage some of the dirt in the clothing is removed, each stage is prohibited by Torah law. We will now describe these stages in detail.
  First, Kibus is done by soaking an item of clothing in water. Soaking causes stains on the clothing to become lighter, and some of the dirt absorbed in the clothing is removed and transferred to the water. Therefore, it is prohibited by Torah law to soak dirty clothes in water. For example, one may not leave dirty baby clothes in water, even though he intends to do the primary washing after Shabbat, since the soaking begins the cleaning process.
  The second stage is scrubbing the clothing while it is still wet. This is the main phase of Kibus, because through the scrubbing, the dirt that is stuck to the clothing is removed, disappearing into the water.
  The third stage is wringing out the clothing and removing the water it absorbed. When the water is wrung out of clothing, the filth that was transferred to the water is removed as well. Since a little bit of dirt comes out with each wringing, it is prohibited by Torah law. Even if clothing got wet in the rain, one may not dry it by wringing it out, since this will definitely clean it somewhat as well. To ensure that one will not end up wringing anything out, the Sages forbade picking up clothing that is soaking wet. Despite this, one may continue wearing clothes that got wet in the rain. This permission even extends to a case where one had taken off the wet clothes; if he has nothing else to wear, he may put them back on. However, one may not move them around for no reason (SA 301:45-46).
  Sometimes there is a fourth stage – drying the clothes with heat. After wringing out the wet clothes, they are often placed on or near a heat source to dry. This evaporates the remaining moisture together with any remaining dirt, leaving the clothing clean and bright. This used to be part of the way that raw wool was processed. After it was sheared and washed, it was whitened in an oven. This action is called Libun and is prohibited by Torah law. Therefore, one may not place a wet coat or a wet towel next to a heater if the temperature will reach yad soledet bo (SA 301:46; see above 10:4).
  It is important to realize that it is not just laundering an entire garment that is forbidden. Even removing a single stain is prohibited by Torah law. This prohibition applies whether the stain is removed with water, spit, or any other cleaning agent, including kerosene or benzene. Similarly, if a greasy substance fell onto a garment on Shabbat, one may not spread talcum powder on it to prevent staining (SSK 15:27).
  The Sages also prohibited things that might cause others to think that one violated a Torah prohibition and washed clothing on Shabbat. Therefore, clothes that got wet on Shabbat may not be hung on a clothesline or the like. Rather, they should be hung somewhere that people do not generally hang clothing after it is laundered, such as over a chair or on a hanger. Nevertheless, clothes that were hung to dry before Shabbat may be left on the line over Shabbat (SA 301:45).1<i class="footnote">If a “dry clean-only” suit gets wet, it may be hung out on a clothesline, since no one will think that it was washed on Shabbat. Similarly, a hand towel that gets wet from normal use may be hung in its normal place. One may also hang out a plastic tablecloth, since it may be rinsed with water on Shabbat, as explained below in section 5. The general rule is that one may perform any action that will not lead people to suspect that he washed clothing on Shabbat. See SSK 15:13; <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 302:79-82; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:12:23.</i>
  
  Section 4
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Soaking Clothes in Liquid
  As we saw above, the first stage in washing clothes is soaking them in water, since this soaking gets rid of some of the dirt. Even wetting a small part of an item of clothing is forbidden, because wetting cloth with water or another cleansing liquid is considered Kibus.
  The Rishonim disagree whether the prohibition of soaking clothes in water applies even to clothing that is not dirty. According to many Rishonim, it is only forbidden to wet clothing if it is dirty; but if the clothing is clean, one may wet it. Others maintain that one may never wet clothing, because any wetting accomplishes some minimal cleaning. In practice, since this is a disagreement pertaining to a Torah law, many Aḥaronim follow the stringent position, maintaining that even clean clothing may not be wetted.2<i class="footnote">em&gt;Zevaḥim 94b states: “‘Soaking an item of clothing constitutes washing it.’ Rava is being consistent, as he also states: ‘One who threw a scarf into water is liable.’” According to <em>Sefer Ha-Teruma</em><em>Or Zaru’a</em>, Rosh, <em>Smag</em>, and <em>Smak</em>, the prohibition applies only if the item of clothing is dirty. This would seem to be Rambam’s position as well. Rosh writes that even if the item of clothing is blackened because of hard usage, as long as there is no stain, one may soak it. However, if one soaks it for the purpose of cleaning it, then even those who would otherwise permit this concede that it is forbidden (MB 302:46). According to Rashbam, <em>Yere’im</em>, and <em>Tur</em>, it is always prohibited by Torah law to wet an item of clothing (this is implied by SA 302:9 as well). Many Aḥaronim rule stringently, since this is a doubt about a Torah law, as we see in BHL 302:9 s.v. “she-yesh” and <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 302:74. In my humble opinion, if the item of clothing is fresh from the wash and completely clean, even those who are stringent would concede that the prohibition is only rabbinic. Thus one may wash such clothing if truly necessary, in accordance with the opinion of most Rishonim (see BHL 302:10 s.v. “de-lo”).</i>
  However, one may wet clothing or any cloth item if this will make it dirty rather than clean. For example, one may use a towel to dry one’s hands, because the water from one’s hands does not clean the towel. On the contrary, it dirties it slightly. Some make a point of first air-drying their hands slightly and only afterward using the towel, so that the towel will absorb less water. In any case, the halakha is that one may wet a cloth in a way that dirties the cloth. This is true even if the towel is already dirty, as long as one’s intention is to dry his hands, not to remove stains (SA and Rema 320:10; BHL s.v. “de-lo”).
  
  Section 5
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Cleaning Off the Table and Washing Dishes
  If a little water spills on the table, one may use a towel to clean it, as wetting the towel in this case dirties it rather than cleans it. Similarly, if a little wine or juice spilled on the table, one may wipe it up with a towel or cloth. Although the cloth will absorb some of the color of the wine or juice, and one may not dye on Shabbat, this is permitted because one’s intent is to clean the table, not dye the cloth. Also, the dyeing is ineffective; it merely dirties the cloth.3<i class="footnote">. MB 302:55 states, based on <em>Yere’im</em> and SA 320:20, that if a colored drink spilled on a tablecloth and one wishes to clean it up, he should not drag the colored liquid over the tablecloth, because doing so will color additional parts of it. However, MB 302:59 adds that some are lenient because this coloring dirties the tablecloth. This is the opinion of Radbaz 4:131, <em>Ḥakham Tzvi</em>, <em>Eliya Rabba</em>, and others. On the other hand, <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Tetzaveh 6 is stringent. Nevertheless, in a time of need one may be lenient, since even according to those who are stringent this is a case of <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em> as well as a double rabbinic prohibition (the coloring is done through a destructive action as well as a <em>shinui</em>). When such a combination of factors exists, we are lenient in cases of necessity. <em>Livyat Ḥen</em> §92 states something along these lines.</i>
  If a lot of water spills on the table or floor, it is rabbinically prohibited to soak it all up with a towel. This is due to the concern that once the towel absorbs a large quantity of water, one will wring it out, thus transgressing a Torah prohibition.4<i class="footnote">We saw in section 3 that wringing is a stage of washing and is prohibited by Torah law. According to most <em>poskim</em>, the prohibition applies only to wringing out water, as is implied by SA 320:18. However, Ramban maintains that wringing out wine is prohibited as well, because wine can have a cleaning effect. <em>Taz</em> 320:12 maintains that there is no prohibition on wringing out red wine, in contrast to white wine. It is important to note that our discussion has only dealt with how wringing pertains to the prohibition of laundering. However, there is another possible issue here – the Torah prohibition of <em>Dash</em>, which applies to squeezing grapes and olives. Thus, if one squeezes liquid out of a towel, he may be transgressing the <em>melakha</em> of <em>Dash</em>. If one wants the squeezed-out liquid, Rishonim disagree whether this is prohibited rabbinically or by Torah law. In contrast, if one does not want the liquid, all agree that the prohibition is only rabbinic (as explained in 11:17 and in <em>Harḥavot</em>). If so, in our case, when one does not want the liquid he is wringing out of the towel, the prohibition would only be rabbinic. Furthermore, one may pick up the saturated towel, as we do not build fences around rabbinic prohibitions.</i> There are a few solutions to this problem: 1) Multiple towels may be used, so that each one absorbs only a little water. Thus, there is no concern about wringing them out. 2) A cloth that is not generally wrung out may be used, even if it absorbs a large quantity of water (MB 301:172). Thus, one may use a napkin or paper towel, since they are not wrung out but thrown away immediately. 3) If it is not possible to utilize either of the first two solutions, two people may work together to mop up the liquid. First, they should place a towel on the water; then they can pick it up and put it in a bucket or elsewhere. The rabbinic prohibition to pick up clothes saturated with water was limited to one person; two people may do so because if one of them forgets and starts to wring the clothing, his friend will remind him that it is Shabbat (SSK ch. 15 n. 55). (This does not follow the stringent opinion requiring ten people, as explained in Harḥavot. See below 15:9 regarding permissible ways to clean the floor.)
  One may not use an ordinary sponge or scouring pad to wash dishes because it absorbs water and is then wrung out in the course of washing the dishes and afterward. However, one may use a plastic sponge if the fibers are not tightly packed and are not absorbent, and they cannot be wrung out. We will discuss the use of wipes below (14:6).
  If a dishrag falls into the sink, one may turn on the water even though the rag will get wet, because this is not considered cleaning or washing. If there is a wet rag in the sink, some allow picking it up and removing it. Since people are not insistent on using only dry rags, there is no concern that one might wring it out (Orḥot Shabbat 13:48). On the other hand, in practice, people are accustomed to wring it out. Therefore if one wishes to remove the rag from the sink, it is proper to use a fork or knife to do so. This shinui will serve as a reminder to him that it is Shabbat, ensuring that he will not wring out the rag.
  
  Section 6
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Removing Mud from Leather Clothing and Shoes
  Leather clothes are different from normal clothes. Normal clothes made from threads of wool or linen and the like may not be soaked, because this cleans them. However, a leather item may be soaked in water. Only true washing, meaning vigorous scrubbing, is prohibited by the Torah for leather. The reason for this distinction is that unlike cloth garments, which absorb the water that permeates the threads and removes the dirt and stains, leather does not absorb water readily; since water does not permeate it, the water cannot remove the dirt absorbed in the leather. Although soaking leather in water might remove the dirt that is stuck on its surface, the dirt that is absorbed within it will not be removed. The only way to remove absorbed dirt from leather is by washing it – scrubbing it vigorously by rubbing the two sides together or by using a brush or the like. This constitutes the Torah prohibition of Kibus.
  Accordingly, if something disgusting fell on a leather item, it may be rinsed off, because rinsing leather removes only what is on the surface. However, one may not rub the dirty spot, because that will remove the absorbed dirt.5<i class="footnote">Generally, a leather garment is soft, and the consensus is that scrubbing it vigorously on Shabbat is prohibited by Torah law. Gently scrubbing it while it is submerged in water is forbidden as well (MB 302:41; BHL s.v. “aval”; it is unclear whether this is prohibited rabbinically or by Torah law). Some maintain that very gentle scrubbing is permitted (as explained by <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 5:10). In the case of hard leather, BHL <em>ad loc.</em> provides a summary of the different positions. According to Rashi and Ran, there is no prohibition of <em>Kibus</em> at all, as hard leather is like wood. According to Rif, Rambam, and Rosh, vigorous scrubbing is rabbinically prohibited. According to <em>She’iltot</em>, vigorous scrubbing is prohibited by Torah law. In practice one should be stringent, as most <em>poskim</em> maintain that this activity is prohibited, whether rabbinically or by Torah law.</i>
  It is rabbinically forbidden to wring out a wet leather item. Wringing out cloth garments is forbidden by Torah law because the water is easily wrung out of them; since the wringing removes the dirt together with the water, this is considered a method of cleaning them. But leather garments are not normally wrung out during washing; it is difficult to do, and it is not a particularly good way to clean them. Therefore, wringing them out is only rabbinically prohibited (BHL 302:9, s.v. “asur”).
  If leather shoes get dusty, one may remove the dust with one’s hand or a rag, because the dust is not absorbed into them, but merely sits on the surface. However, one may not polish them with a brush or rag in order to shine them (on account of Memaḥek, below 18:6; see AHS 327:4; SSK 15:40).
  If clay or mud is stuck on a shoe or piece of clothing, removing it and crumbling it is transgressing a rabbinic prohibition pertaining to Toḥen. But if it is uncertain whether its removal will cause it to crumble to dust, it may be removed. When necessary, even if it is clear that it will crumble to dust, one may remove it with a shinui. For example, mud on a shoe can be removed by rubbing the shoes together, and clay on clothing can be removed by hitting it with the back of one’s hand (above 12:1 and n. 1).
  
  Section 7
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Nylon, Plastic, and Polyester Tablecloths and Clothing
  The prohibition of Kibus applies to clothes and pieces of cloth that absorb dirt. However, wooden furniture and plastic items, which do not absorb dirt, may be cleaned with water to remove dirt that is stuck to them. Based on this, it would seem at first glance that one may clean plastic or nylon tablecloths. Since they are made from one piece of nonabsorbent material, they do not absorb dirt; thus Kibus would not be relevant to them. Indeed, R. Ben-Zion Abba Shaul rules this way in practice (Or Le-Tziyon 2:24:6). However, most poskim maintain that since these tablecloths function the same way as when they are made of cloth, one should be stringent and avoid vigorously scrubbing them as one does when washing clothing. However, since they do not absorb water, one may rinse them and even gently rub them (Igrot Moshe, YD 2:76; Tzitz Eliezer 5:10; Yalkut Yosef 302:22).
  Another question arises regarding clothing, a tablecloth, or pantyhose made from synthetic material such as polyester. Everyone agrees that they may not be scrubbed or wrung out, because this would involve cleaning them in the way one normally washes clothing. The question is whether one may rinse them off or soak them in water. Some maintain that since the synthetic material itself does not absorb dirt or water, one may rinse clothing made of such material and even soak it. Soaking would only be forbidden if the clothing was made of natural fibers as well (SSK 15:7-8). Others maintain that even clothing that is fully synthetic may not be soaked; since dirt is absorbed between the threads, when the clothing is soaked or rinsed part of the dirt dissolves and disappears (Or Le-Tziyon 2:24:6). It would seem in practice that one may not soak clothing made from synthetics.
  One may clean contact lenses, both hard and soft. The law is more lenient in the case of contact lenses, compared to nylon tablecloths, which may only be lightly scrubbed, because not only are they non-absorbent, they are also not considered clothing, and therefore scrubbing them does not resemble Kibus (see Harḥavot). Similarly, one may clean a pacifier or the nipple of a baby bottle, or scrub it to remove stuck-on dirt. Since they are made out of rubber, Kibus does not apply; and since they do not look like clothing, scrubbing them does not resemble Kibus.
  
  Section 8
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Removing Stains and Dust
  As we saw above (section 3), Kibus is generally accomplished using water or other cleaning agents. However, even when one does not use water, one may not remove stains from clothing via scrubbing the way one does when washing. One may, however, remove a stain using a shinui. There are two types of stains: mild stains and serious stains. Mild stains may be removed using a minor shinui. When necessary, serious stains may be removed using a major shinui. Let us explain.
  A mild stain is one that would not prevent the clothing’s owner from wearing it in public. The Sages forbid removing such a stain by scrubbing it in the way one normally would when hand-washing it. However, one may remove this kind of stain by scrubbing it in an unusual way. Therefore, one may try to remove the stain by scratching it with a nail or a knife. After taking a brief break of a few seconds’ duration, he may scrape at it again. This is because as long as he stops between attempts, this does not resemble scrubbing clothing to wash it. Similarly, one may remove the stain with one rub of a dry rag or handkerchief. If necessary, after pausing for a few seconds one may rub the stain with the rag a second time. As long as the scrubbing is not constant, it is not considered the normal way to wash clothing.
  If the stain is so severe that one would not wear the stained clothing publicly, the stain may not be removed by scraping it or rubbing it with a rag, because that is exactly how one would remove such a stain during the week. There are even Rishonim who maintain that doing so is prohibited by Torah law. If, however, a major shinui is used, the poskim disagree whether there is still a rabbinic prohibition to remove the stain. If necessary, we rely on the opinion of those who are lenient. Therefore, at a time of need, such a stain may be removed with a major shinui. For example, one could rub the stained clothing that he is wearing against a door, closet, or bed. Alternatively, if he is wearing the stained clothing, he may rub or scrape away the stain by taking the sleeve with the stain and using the other unstained sleeve to rub or scrape it off in a way that does not resemble normal scrubbing. If the stain is thick, most of it may be removed by scraping it with a nail or a knife, or by rubbing it with a rag, as long as the entire stain is not removed this way. The rest must be removed with a major shinui.
  One whose clothing gets dusty may not remove the dust in the normal fashion by shaking out the clothing, hitting it, or rubbing it. However, one may flick the clothing with one’s finger, as this is a major shinui. When a couch is dusty, however, one may beat it to remove the dust. Since a couch is not considered clothing in which one is embarrassed to be seen, beating the dust out is not considered Kibus. However, one may not scrub the couch in the way one normally cleans it.
  If something unwanted is resting on a garment but not attached to it in any way, it may be removed. Therefore, one may remove a feather, cotton, a thread, or the like from clothing (Rema 302:1; SSK 15:33).6<i class="footnote">There are two pertinent halakhic discussions that inform this ruling. The first is found in <em>Shabbat</em> 141a: “R. Kahana said: ‘As for the clay on one’s clothing, one may rub it off from the inside but not from the outside.’” The prohibition is rabbinic because rubbing and scrubbing resemble washing. <em>Shabbat</em> 140a adds that one may not scrub a scarf in order to make it brighter. This is also the ruling of SA 302:5, 7. Aḥaronim disagree regarding a stain that needs to be scraped multiple times with a knife or a nail in order to remove all of it. <em>Taz</em> 302:6 maintains that scraping is not similar to <em>Kibus</em> and is permitted, while MB 302:36 and BHL 302:7 s.v. “de-havei” maintain that it is prohibited. This is the standard ruling. But if one pauses between each scrape, it is permitted, as this does not resemble <em>Kibus</em>The second halakhic discussion involves a disagreement whether one may shake dust from a new black cloak, if the owner would not wear it outside in such a state. According to <em>Tosafot</em>, Rabbeinu Tam, Rosh, <em>Magid Mishneh</em> in the name of Rashba, Ran, <em>Mordechai</em>, and Raavad, one may shake the dust from the cloak, as there is no Torah prohibition of <em>Kibus</em> without a cleaning agent – water or a different substance. According to <em>Behag</em>, Rabbeinu Ḥananel, Rashi, <em>Or Zaru’a</em><em>Yere’im</em><em>Sefer Ha-Teruma</em>, and <em>Shibolei Ha-leket</em>, it is prohibited by Torah law. Since the dust disturbs the owner so much that he will not go outside wearing the clothing until it is cleaned, cleaning it is considered an act of <em>Kibus.</em> Since the normal way to remove dust from clothing is to shake it out, this is prohibited by Torah law. The same law applies to a stain that is so severe that one would not wear the garment outside. Removing the stain in the normal fashion would be prohibited by Torah law, according to the stringent position (see SHT 302:41 and BHL 302:1 s.v. “alei”). Indeed, the Gemara (<em>Shabbat</em> 147a) limits the prohibition on shaking to a new black item of clothing about which the owner is particular, and many rule this way in practice, including SAH 302:1 and <em>Ketzot Ha-shulḥan</em> §116, <em>Badei Ha-shulḥan</em> §3. However, BHL <em>loc. cit.</em> clarifies that everybody is assumed to be particular about a new black item of clothing; however, if the owner is particular about a different type of clothing, then even if it is not new and black, according to the stringent view it is forbidden by Torah law to clean such clothing. In practice, the position of SA 302:1 follows most Rishonim, who are lenient. This is the position of <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 302:10 as well, except that in its opinion it is preferable to remove the dust with a <em>shinui</em>. Rema 302:1 writes that it is preferable to be stringent. According to <em>Eliya Rabba</em>, the <em>halakha</em> demands being stringent since many Rishonim are stringent, and furthermore it is a case of a doubt about a Torah law. This is also the opinion of MB 302:6; <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Vayeḥi 8; and SSK 15:26-30. However, <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:24:1 states that while it would be proper to defer to those who are stringent, since human dignity (<em>kevod ha-briyot</em>) is at stake here one can be lenient and remove dust or a stain using a <em>shinui</em>, which downgrades the disagreement to the level of a rabbinic prohibition. Accordingly, one may remove the dust from clothing using a <em>shinui</em>, such as flicking with one’s finger.Let us return to the case of a stain that the owner is particular about. During the week, one would remove it by scraping. Therefore, according to the stringent position, this is prohibited by Torah law. Since this is a case of uncertainty about a matter of Torah law, we are stringent (see BHL loc. cit. citing Behag; SSK 15:27). However, if one uses a major shinui, such as rubbing the stained clothing that he is wearing against the door, then even those who are stringent would agree that the prohibition is now only rabbinic. According to those who are lenient, since this act of rubbing is not a normal act of Kibus, it is permitted. One may rely upon this ruling since it is the majority opinion, the disagreement concerns a rabbinic law, and it pertains to kevod ha-briyot. If one removes only part of the stain by scraping or wiping it once, which is not the normal way of cleaning a stain, he may afterward remove the rest of the stain using a major shinui.</i>
  
  Section 9
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Folding a Talit on Shabbat, and Additional Laws
  The Sages forbade folding an item of clothing on Shabbat because folding helps it maintain its shape, ensures that it sits right on the body, and prevents wrinkling. Therefore, when one folds clothes it looks like one is fixing a kli (see below ch. 15). Only if one has a new white garment that he can fold by himself, and he plans to wear it on Shabbat because he has no other appropriate clothing, he may fold it on Shabbat (Shabbat 113a). Based on this, some prohibit folding a talit after prayer services; since it will not be worn again that Shabbat, folding it constitutes preparing on Shabbat for the weekday. Additionally, if the talit is not new, one may not fold it because this act of folding is more significant than folding a new item (Ḥayei Adam 44:24). Some who are meticulous follow this position.
  In contrast, according to a minority position in the Rishonim (Orḥot Ḥayim), the type of folding that the Sages prohibited no longer exists. In the past, a clothes press operated by two people would be used to make the folds in clothing permanent. This is why the Sages only permitted folding a new white talit when the act is done by only one person. However, the type of folding we do nowadays is not so significant, and it does not look like “fixing” anything. Therefore, one may fold a talit along its original creases after services. Moreover, this is not considered preparing on Shabbat for the weekday. Just as a couch may be arranged on Shabbat even if no one is planning to sit on it, because its disarray detracts from the honor of Shabbat, so too a talit may be folded in order to honor Shabbat. Furthermore, doing so honors the talit as well; as an item used to fulfill a mitzva, it should not be left in an unfolded mess. Some prominent Aḥaronim follow this position and maintain that a talit may be folded normally on Shabbat. (See Kaf Ha-ḥayim 302:32 in the name of Yafeh La-lev; AHS 302:12; Or Le-Tziyon 2:24:3.)
  The middle position, which most poskim follow, is that a talit may be folded on Shabbat as long as it is not folded along the lines of the original creases. The prohibition of folding clothes on Shabbat applies only when they are folded according to set folds; as long as the folding does not follow the ironed-in folds exactly, it is not similar to the melakha of Metaken Maneh and is not prohibited. This is the halakha (SA 302:3; MB 302:18; Ben Ish Ḥai, Year 2, Vayeḥi 13; SSK 15:49; Yeḥaveh Da’at 2:40). It should be noted that in practice, today’s talitot are ironed in a way that makes them difficult to fold exactly as they were at the start. Therefore, one may fold his talit in the regular fashion after prayer services, since he is not folding on its ironed-in folds.
  A hat that got misshapen may be reshaped or straightened out on Shabbat. This is because it is a very simple thing to do, and is not considered fixing a kli (SSK 15:50).
  The poskim disagree whether one may fold paper into forms such as boats or airplanes, or to fold napkins into special shapes. One who is lenient has grounds for his leniency, and one who is stringent should be commended (as explained below in 15:7).
  
  Section 10
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Tofer
  The melakha of Tofer (sewing) refers to binding together curtains or material in a manner similar to the way the curtains were sewn for the Mishkan. The difference between Tofer and Boneh is that the former refers to joining soft objects together, while the latter refers to joining hard objects together.
  One who sews two stitches in a way that the stitches will last transgresses the Torah prohibition of Tofer. If the stitches will only last temporarily, he transgresses a rabbinic prohibition (Shabbat 74b; MB 340:27).
  Similarly, one may not tighten a thread that is starting to unravel. If this tightening will last, it is prohibited by Torah law; if it is temporary, the prohibition is rabbinic (Shabbat 75a; SA 340:6). Similarly, if a button comes loose, one may not pull its thread to tighten it (SSK 15:71).
  One may join two parts of a garment together using buttons and buttonholes, zippers,7<i class="footnote">One may not fix a broken zipper, because this would constitute fixing a <em>kli</em>. If it is not completely broken, and can be fixed by simply moving it up and down, this is permitted (SSK 15:78).</i> snaps, or Velcro. One may do so even if he intends to leave them closed for an extended period of time. These connections are made to open and shut, so the prohibitions of sewing and tearing do not apply to opening and shutting them, just as the prohibitions of building and destroying are not relevant to opening and shutting windows or doors (see below 15:3).
  One may pull on a drawstring to tighten a hood or jacket, because this is not sewing but normal use of the clothing. Additionally, using the drawstring is different from sewing since it is generally threaded very loosely through its casing. One may also pull closed a drawstring that is threaded through loops at the waist (see SA 340:7).
  One may connect two parts of an item of clothing with a safety pin, since this does not resemble sewing. Some are stringent about this, but the halakha follows the lenient position. One who is stringent and refrains from using a safety pin that he plans to leave in for an extended period of time should be commended. In contrast, a brooch may be attached to clothing, even for an extended period, because it does not connect two pieces of cloth.
  Just as sewing is prohibited by Torah law, so is attaching one thing to another, which is a tolada of Tofer. Therefore, one may not attach papers or pieces of cloth to one another. If the attachment is long lasting, it is prohibited by Torah law, while if it is temporary the prohibition is rabbinic (see SHT 303:68).
  Similarly, it is forbidden by Torah law to staple papers together. Since the staple connects the papers with two holes, this is like sewing two stitches. But one may hold papers together with a paper clip, since this is an external connector and does not really join them together at all.
  
  Section 11
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Kore’a
  Fixing an item of clothing sometimes requires that it be torn in order to be re-sewn. This tearing constitutes the melakha of Kore’a. Tearing in order to sew is a violation of a Torah prohibition. In the Mishkan, worms would sometimes chew holes in the curtains. Mending the hole as is would leave the curtain rumpled. Therefore, the curtain needed to be torn apart and re-sewn.
  Purposeful, constructive (“le-to’elet”) tearing is prohibited by Torah law. One example of this is taking down a hem in order to lengthen an item of clothing. Non-purposeful, destructive tearing is prohibited rabbinically.
  Tearing plastic bags or plastic tablecloths from a roll in order to use them is prohibited by Torah law. Similarly, tearing toilet paper in order to use it is prohibited by Torah law. Some maintain that tearing along the perforations is also a transgression of the melakha of Meḥatekh. Tearing toilet paper with a shinui is a rabbinic transgression. At a time of need, such as in order to avoid serious embarrassment, the Sages permit violating their ordinances. Therefore, one who finds himself in a situation where he cannot wipe himself without tearing toilet paper may tear it in order to preserve his dignity. He should do so with a shinui, such as using his elbows to pull the paper from the roll. He should be careful not to tear along the perforations (SA 312:1; MB ad loc. 12; SSK 23:19; Orḥot Shabbat 11:40).
  If a book has some uncut pages, it is forbidden by Torah law to cut them on Shabbat. If the pages were cut properly, but they became stuck together by a stray bit of glue, they may be separated; this is because they were stuck together accidentally, with no intent of permanent attachment (MA 340:18; MB ad loc. 45). One may not pull apart tissues that were not cut properly and thus are still partially joined together at some points.
  Just as attaching papers or pieces of cloth is a tolada of Tofer, separating these attached items is a tolada of Kore’a. Therefore, one may not separate pages that were stapled together. Similarly, one may not tear out a page from a writing pad.
  One may tear open a bag containing food, just as one may peel an orange in order to eat it. This is because the tearing or peeling is not for the sake of the bag or the peel, but in order to eat what is inside. Similarly, one may open the top of a bag of sugar that is glued shut. Some are stringent and do not allow this, but the lenient position is the primary one (below 15:12).
  If one did not manage to remove the manufacturer’s tags from a new item of clothing before Shabbat, he may cut the plastic thread connecting it to the garment on Shabbat; the tags are only loosely attached to the clothing and thus are not considered sewn to it.8<i class="footnote">According to BHL 314:8 s.v. “ḥotalot,” there is no prohibition here of tearing a thread, since it is only tearing in order to sew that is prohibited by Torah law. While the Sages prohibited even tearing that is not for the purpose of sewing, they did not prohibit tearing a thread that is impossible to sew. Nevertheless, one may not tear a thread that is attached to the edge of a garment, because doing so is considered applying the finishing touch on the clothing, a violation of <em>Makeh Be-fatish</em>. This follows the stringency found in <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 3:16:8, in contrast to the leniency found in <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> ch. 11 n. 26.If a dry cleaner stapled a tag to a garment in such a way that the tag is not visible, then it should not be removed. If it is visible, and people normally would not go out with it visible, at a time of necessity one may rely on those who maintain that this is an impermanent type of sewing, and remove it. (See Rema 317:3; MB <em>ad loc. </em>21; <em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 6:24.)Opening a letter: The poskim disagree whether one may open a sealed letter on Shabbat when there is a chance that its contents are relevant to Shabbat. According to Pri Ḥadash, Ḥayei Adam, and MB 340:41, this is forbidden because of Kore’a. However, according to Maharil, Taz, and MA, this is permitted because its seal was meant to be temporary. In a time of need, one may open such a letter as long as he makes a point of ripping it open and thus destroying the envelope (Ḥazon Ish and Yeḥaveh Da’at 6:24).</i>
  
  Section 12
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Diapers, Adhesive Bandages, and Sticky Notes
  Diapers may be used on Shabbat just as they are used during the week. At first glance, one might think otherwise. Using a disposable diaper involves fastening tapes and then separating them. We saw earlier that one may not attach papers together on account of Tofer, and one may not separate them on account of Kore’a. However, since diapers are typically fastened using Velcro tapes that can be opened and closed multiple times, fastening them is comparable to buttoning and unbuttoning buttons, which is permitted. (One also does not need to worry about separating the Velcro when preparing the diaper for use, as explained in the note below.)
  Even diapers that use adhesive tape (rather than Velcro) may be used. Since this tape is made for temporary use, many poskim maintain that just as there is no prohibition of Tofer when sewing something that will be used only for a short period of time, so too one may fasten a diaper. It is also possible that even those who prohibit sewing or attaching items for a short period of time would be lenient in the case of diapers, because the tape in a diaper is meant to be reusable, so that the diaper can be adjusted as needed. Therefore, fastening them should not be considered sewing, and detaching them should not be considered tearing. Rather, fastening them is comparable to joining items together using buttons or Velcro. However, one should be careful in one regard. During the week, when dirty diapers are thrown away, they are usually taped up using the tabs, in order to confine the contents. Since this taping is likely to last a long time, it is proper to refrain from doing so on Shabbat.9<i class="footnote">When the diaper is closed using Velcro there is no problem at all, because Velcro is comparable to buttons. However, there are still diapers that are fastened with adhesive tapes, as was once standard. The law regarding diapers with these tapes hinges on a disagreement among Rishonim whether sewing and tearing is comparable to tying and untying. There is a principle in the laws of <em>Kosheir</em> that one may tie a knot if the knot will remain for a short time only, and one may untie such a knot as well. Some maintain that this permission pertains only to a knot that is designed to last under 24 hours, while others extend it to a knot that will last under a week (Rema 317:1). In a time of need, we follow this lenient position (BHL 317:4 s.v. “she-einam”). If it is a knot that will last until the item’s owner or buyer comes to retrieve it, <em>Levush</em> 317:3 explains that even if it ends up staying tied for more than a week, the knot is considered impermanent. Thus one may tie and untie it. This is the accepted ruling (see below, n. 10).According to Rabbeinu Yoel, Raavya, Rashbam, and others, this rule applies to sewing and tearing as well, and there is no prohibition of sewing when it will only last a short period of time. However, according to Rabbeinu Peretz and <em>Mordechai</em>, such sewing is rabbinically forbidden. R. Yosef Karo is stringent in SA 340:7, though it would seem that he is lenient in <em>Beit Yosef</em> 317:3. <em>Tehila Le-David</em> 340:6 resolves the discrepancy by explaining that R. Karo is stringent regarding<em> Tofer</em> but lenient regarding <em>Kore’a</em>; he also believes that this is the position of Rema. Others maintain that Rema is lenient regarding <em>Tofer</em> as well as <em>Kore’a</em> (SSK). Accordingly, following those who are lenient, one may fasten the tapes of a diaper and undo them, because this attaching is done for the short term, while for those who are stringent this is prohibited. <em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 6:24 states, based on a number of Aḥaronim, that the <em>halakha</em> follows those who are lenient, and therefore one may use diapers with adhesive tapes. Another strong rationale for being lenient is that since the tapes are made so that they can be opened and closed multiple times, fastening them is not considered sewing. Rather, they are similar to buttons or Velcro, which may be used to connect and disconnect parts of an item of clothing (<em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 11:36).As far as opening the tapes initially so that one can then fasten the diaper, based on Levush and those who rule like him (as explained in n. 10), one may open them even though more than a week has gone by since they were taped shut in the factory. Additionally, the taping done in the factory is not considered attaching because the intention is not to connect two items, but rather to prevent the adhesive from drying out (SSK 35 n. 67; some are stringent and make sure to open the tapes before Shabbat).After removing a dirty diaper, it is proper to avoid sealing it with the tapes, because this seal is intended to be permanent. Even so, I only wrote “it is proper” in the main text, because if we consider the tapes comparable to a button, there is no prohibition involved. Additionally, according to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (cited in SSK 35 n. 67), since one only cares that it stays closed while it is in his garbage pail, this is considered a short-term seal.</i>
  Adhesive bandages (“Band-Aids”) may be used when needed, because sticking something onto the body is not considered sewing. If necessary, an adhesive bandage can also be used to hold a cloth bandage in place, because this is meant to last only a short time. (The laws pertaining to adhesive bandages and cloth bandages are explained below in 28:9.)
  One may use sticky notes to mark one’s place in a book. Since they are repositionable and designed to be used dozens of times, using them is comparable to fastening and unfastening buttons or Velcro, where Tofer and Kore’a are not concerns.
  
  Section 13
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Kosheir and Matir
  The melakha of Kosheir refers to binding things together by tying them, while Matir refers to separating things by undoing this connection. Unlike Tofer, which refers to joining together soft things and uniting them, and unlike Boneh, which refers to joining together hard things and uniting them, Kosheir refers to connecting things without actually joining and integrating them together as one.
  As we have seen (9:2), all the melakhot that are forbidden on Shabbat have their roots in a melakha that was necessary to erect the Mishkan. This is true of Kosheir and Matir as well. It was necessary to tie the threads of the curtains that were cut during the weaving into knots. Additionally, it was necessary to tie knots in order to prepare nets for trapping snails. These snails provided tekhelet for dyeing the threads of the curtains. If a net was missing a strand, it was sometimes necessary to undo the knots from a different net and remove a strand from it (Shabbat 74b). (In y. Shabbat 15:1, Amora’im disagree whether tying the curtains of the Mishkan to the tent pegs was prohibited by Torah law.)
  There are four types of knots: 1) A strong and durable knot that is not meant to ever be undone. Tying such a knot is prohibited by Torah law. Examples of this type of knot include the knots of tefilin and the knots of tzitzit. One should be careful to avoid tightening tzitzit knots on Shabbat. 2) A knot that has an element of permanence, like a knot that one plans to leave intact for a week. Tying such a knot is rabbinically prohibited. Similarly, a professional knot tied by a craftsman, even if it is meant to last less than a week, has an element of permanence, and the Sages prohibited tying it on Shabbat. 3) A temporary knot, which is meant to last for less than a week and is not a professional knot. One may tie such a knot on Shabbat. 4) Knots that are so weak that they are not even categorized as knots. Examples include a single knot and a bow knot (the type used to tie shoelaces). One may use such knots to tie things together even for an extended period of time.
  The laws of untying knots are parallel to those of tying them. If tying a certain kind of knot is prohibited by Torah law, untying it is prohibited by Torah law as well; if tying it is rabbinically prohibited, so is untying it. If one may tie it, one may untie it as well. A knot that one may untie in principle but that in practice is difficult to undo, may be cut. However, one should not do so in front of an ignorant person, who may come to permit things that are prohibited (MB 317:7).10<i class="footnote">The Mishna (<em>Shabbat</em> 111b) and Gemara (112a) describe three types of knots. The first type, which includes a camel driver’s knot and a sailor’s knot, is prohibited by Torah law. The second type of knot is rabbinically prohibited, and the third type is permitted. There are two positions among Rishonim regarding the definitions of these types of knots. The first position, advanced by Rashi, Rosh, <em>Sefer Ha-Teruma</em>, <em>Smag</em>, <em>Smak</em>, <em>Roke’aḥ</em>, <em>Or Zaru’a</em>, and others, maintains that a permanent knot is prohibited by Torah law. If it is meant to last for an intermediate amount of time, it is rabbinically prohibited; and if it is meant to last for a short period of time it is permitted. An intermediate amount of time, according to <em>Mordechai</em> and <em>Tur</em>, refers to a week or less. <em>Kol Bo</em> and <em>Hagahot Maimoniyot</em> insist that an intermediate amount of time is 24 hours, while less than that is a short period of time. A permanent knot, according to most <em>poskim</em> (including <em>Shibolei Ha-leket</em>, <em>Yere’im</em>, Rivash, <em>Taz</em>, SAH, and MB) is one that is intended to last forever. Virtually all <em>poskim</em> agree with this. (Rabbeinu Yeruḥam maintains that half a year is enough to be considered permanent, while Rabbeinu Peretz says that even eight days counts as permanent; see <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 3:14:4.)The second position, advanced by Rabbeinu Ḥananel, Rif, Rambam, Rivash, and SA 317:1, maintains that if a knot requires a craftsman to tie it and is permanent, it is prohibited by Torah law. If it is a craftsman’s knot but it is not permanent, or if it is permanent but can be done by a layman, it is rabbinically prohibited. If it is a layman’s knot and is impermanent, then even if one plans to leave it for an extended period of time it is permitted. This is how the second position is understood according to most Aḥaronim (<em>Pri Megadim</em>; <em>Maḥatzit Ha-shekel</em>; BHL s.v. “she-eino”). However, according to <em>Shiltei Giborim</em> and <em>Tehila Le-David</em> 317:1, if the knot is meant for an intermediate amount of time, even though it is not a craftsman’s knot, Rif and Rambam would agree that it is rabbinically forbidden.The bottom line is that, since these are both important positions, it is proper to follow both of them even in a case of doubt about a rabbinic law. Therefore, I included both positions in the main text. However, if necessary, as long as the doubt is about a rabbinic law, one may be lenient. When there is an additional reason to be lenient, then one may be lenient even if it is not a time of need, and only those who are particularly meticulous would still be stringent.There are two cases that are points of contention separating the two positions:a) A craftsman’s knot that is made to last only a short period of time (either less than 24 hours or less than a week). According to Rif and Rambam, this is prohibited rabbinically; while according to Rashi and Rosh, it is permitted. However, since we try to follow both positions, we are stringent in this case.b) A layman’s knot that will last for an intermediate amount of time. According to Rashi and Rosh, this is rabbinically prohibited; while according to Rif and Rambam (following the way that most understand them), it is permitted. Since in any case some maintain that up to a week is considered short term according to Rashi and Rosh, a layman’s knot meant to last less than a week can be permitted. However, if it is meant to last a week or longer it should not be permitted, as this is the opinion of most poskim. After all, according to Rashi and Rosh it is certainly forbidden, and some maintain that even according to Rif and Rambam it is forbidden (Shiltei Giborim; Tehila Le-David).Based on the understanding of Levush 317:3, there is another leniency for knots. If a craftsman tied a layman’s knot intending for it to be temporary, but it was left for an extended period of time, it may be untied. For example, let us say that a shoemaker repairs a pair of shoes and ties them together to keep them paired until the owner comes to retrieve them, but the owner does not come for an extended period of time. Although the knot actually lasts an intermediate amount of time, according to Levush one may untie it. Taz and SAH, though, are stringent. It seems that SA 317:3 and MB ad loc. 21 would agree with Levush. This is because the temporary nature of the knot is absolutely clear. It is only because the owners did not come to reclaim the shoes that it has not yet been untied. It is not even being used to carry around the shoes. Besides, the whole disagreement between Taz and SAH on one hand and Levush on the other is relevant only to the position of Rashi and Rosh. In contrast, Rif and Rambam maintain that when a layman’s knot is made to last an intermediate amount of time, there is no prohibition of tying or untying it. The accepted ruling follows Levush, as SSK ch. 9 n. 60 states.In practice, although the principles of Kosheir and Matir are well defined, uncertainties have arisen regarding many knots that are common nowadays. These include questions about whether certain knots should be considered craftsmen’s knots or laymen’s knots, and whether certain types of knots are considered knots at all, as explained in the next paragraph in the main text. In each case, the halakha is based on consideration of all opinions and uncertainties.</i>
  
  Section 14
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Prohibited Knots
  One may not tie a double knot even if he plans to untie the knot on the same day. Since this is a strong knot that can remain intact for an extended period, it may be that it is comparable to the knot of a craftsman (Shiltei Giborim). According to some Rishonim (Rif and Rambam), tying such a knot for the short term is rabbinically forbidden. All this refers to a tight double knot, which one might use to tie his shoes or to close a garbage bag. But a woman may tie a head scarf this way, since the scarf is not pulled tight. Those who are especially meticulous are stringent and do not use a double knot to tie their head scarves.
  If it happens that one’s shoes were tied with a double knot and this causes him anguish, he may undo the knot.11<i class="footnote">According to Rashi and Rosh, any knot tied for a short period of time may be tied and untied. Accordingly, even a double knot that is generally tied for the short term may be untied. However, according to Rif and Rambam, who maintain that it is rabbinically prohibited to tie a craftsman’s knot for a short period of time, there is disagreement regarding a double knot. <em>Shiltei Giborim</em> states that we must take into account the possibility that a craftsman’s knot is defined by its strength; since a double knot is a strong knot, it should be prohibited as well. This is the position of Rema 317:1; <em>Pri </em><em>Ḥadash</em><em>Rav Pe’alim</em>, OḤ 2:44. In contrast, AHS 317:3 and <em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 52:17 maintain that this constitutes a stringency, as a craftsman’s knot requires professionalism, while a double knot does not. Since many <em>poskim</em> who follow Rif and Rambam forbid a double knot, <em>le-khatḥila</em> one should avoid it. However, at a time of need, if one’s shoes were tied with a double knot he may undo them. According to Rashi and Rosh, one may do so because they were tied for only a short time; even according to Rif and Rambam, some are permissive. Furthermore, even according to those who prohibit this, the prohibition is rabbinic, so at a time of need one may rely on those who are lenient. All of this applies to a tight double knot, but untying the knot of a head scarf that is not pulled tight is not prohibited. (This is the approach of SSK ch. 15 n. 175; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 3:14:5; see <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> ch. 10 n. 16. However, <em>Rav Pe’alim</em><em>loc. cit.</em> and <em>Kitzur </em>SA 80:45 are stringent.)</i>
  One may not tie off the end of a thread even with a single knot, the way one does when sewing or when tying the end of a tzitzit string. Since this knot is strong, it might be considered a craftsman’s knot. According to some poskim, if it is meant to be temporary it is rabbinically prohibited, while if it is meant to be permanent it is prohibited by Torah law (Smag; Rema 317:1). Similarly, one may not use a tight knot to tie a plastic bag with food in it, but one may use a bow knot or tie the bag handles together with one tie.
  
  Section 15
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Bow Knots and Single Knots
  A bow knot is not considered a knot because one pull undoes the whole thing. Even if one bow is tied on top of another, it is not considered a knot because both bows can be undone with one yank (SA 317:5; MB ad loc. 29). A single knot is not considered a knot either, since it does not last. Since bow knots and single knots are not considered knots, one may tie them even if one intends to keep them intact for a long time.
  Some maintain that a single knot with a bow on top of it (which is how many people tie their shoes) retains the status of a single knot. Accordingly, it is not considered a knot, and may be tied without any worries. Others are stringent and maintain that since the two knots together are stronger than one, it should be considered a regular “layman’s knot.” Accordingly, one may tie it if one intends that it last for less than a week. However, if it is meant to last for a week or more, one may not tie it. It is appropriate to follow this position le-khatḥila. However, one may tie a gartel around a Torah scroll using a single knot with a bow on top of it, even if it is intended to remain that way for many months.
  A single knot followed by a bow followed by a single knot, which people use when they wish to tie their shoes more tightly, is considered a regular knot. If it is meant to last less than a week, one may do so; if it is meant for a week or more, one may not do so. Some are meticulous and completely avoid tying such knots on Shabbat.12<i class="footnote">. According to <em>Agur</em>, Rema 317:5, <em>Levush</em>, and the Vilna Gaon, a knot with a bow on top is not considered a knot at all, and may be tied even for an extended period of time. According to <em>Mordechai</em>, <em>Taz</em>, and MA, it is considered a layman’s knot, which, according to Rashi and Rosh, should not be tied for an intermediate amount of time. Many take this position into account and write that one may not leave one’s shoes tied for more than one day (MB 317:29; SSK 15:56). But it would seem that this is excessively stringent. In practice, one may tie such a knot with the intent to leave it intact for up to a week, because this is a case of a rabbinic rule with multiple doubts: a) If the <em>halakha</em> follows Rif and Rambam, since this is a layman’s knot that is not meant to be permanent, there is no prohibition according to the majority of <em>poskim</em>; b) according to Rema, it is not considered a knot at all, and may be tied even for an extended period of time; c) according to <em>Mordechai</em> and <em>Tur</em>, up to a week is considered short term. Therefore, even Rashi and Rosh would agree that there is no prohibition on tying this knot (and BHL 317:4 s.v. “she-einam” agrees that at a time of need one can be lenient). Even for those who are stringent, it is only a rabbinic prohibition. Therefore it is sufficient that we are stringent in avoiding tying a knot with a bow on top for more than a week.Regarding a Torah scroll, the custom is to be lenient and tie a knot with a bow on top, even for an intermediate amount of time. While some <em>poskim</em> are stringent even in this case if the knot is meant to last more than a day or a week (<em>Minḥat Shabbat</em> 80:155; SSK 15:56; <em>Brit Olam</em>, <em>Ha-kosheir U-matir</em> §4; <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 10:28), nevertheless, the lenient position is correct because this is another case of a rabbinic rule with multiple doubts: a) For those who follow Rif and Rambam here, there is no prohibition at all; b) even according to Rashi and Rosh, there is a disagreement whether there is a prohibition, and Rema maintains that this is not considered a knot at all; c) even according to those who are stringent, the prohibition is rabbinic. Rif, Rambam, and <em>Tur</em> rule that for the sake of a mitzva, the Sages permitted tying a knot that is rabbinically prohibited (SA 317:1; MB <em>ad loc.</em> 13). This is also the position of <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 7:29.Regarding a single knot followed by a bow followed by a single knot, the rule is the same as for a regular knot. Some are inclined to be stringent and consider it the equivalent of a double knot, which one may not tie even for a single day. However, many are lenient even regarding a double knot, and there is even more reason to be lenient here, where one good yank can undo the whole thing. Therefore, it should be considered a regular knot, and it may be tied for less than a week (see SSK 10:14-15 and Harḥavot 13:13:5).</i>
  If one ties and unties his necktie each time he wears it during the week, he may tie it on Shabbat as well. If one ties his necktie and leaves the knot intact for an extended period of time, he may not tie it on Shabbat. In a case of necessity, he may be lenient and tie it on Shabbat, as long as he intends to undo the knot on Saturday night.13<i class="footnote">It is impossible to transgress a Torah prohibition with a necktie, because it certainly is not a craftsman’s knot and it is not meant to last forever. However, it would seem that if a necktie is tied for an intermediate amount of time, one transgresses a rabbinic prohibition according to Rashi and Rosh. Even though one yank can undo it, since it looks like a knot and can last for an extended period of time, it is considered a type of knot. However, <em>be-di’avad</em> it would seem that even one who usually ties his necktie for an intermediate amount of time may be lenient, as long as he plans to untie it on Saturday night. According to Rif and Rambam, since it is not a craftsman’s knot and is not intended to last forever, it is not prohibited at all. Even according to Rashi and Rosh, it may be that since one intends to undo it on Saturday night (as many people always do anyway) this is considered short term and is not forbidden (see SSK 15:62).</i>
  
  Section 16
  
  Melakhot Pertaining to Clothing / Miscellaneous Laws
  One who twists fibers together to form a rope transgresses the prohibition of Kosheir, and one who pulls apart the strands of a rope transgresses Matir (MT 10:8).14<i class="footnote">R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach was stringent and forbade closing a bag of food with a twist tie for more than 24 hours; since the twist tie will remain in its position, it is considered a knot (SSK ch. 15 n. 174). This is also cited in the name of R. Elyashiv in <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 10:30. However, it would seem that this should not be considered <em>Kosheir</em>; since it is not the act of twisting that keeps it in its position but the strength of the twist tie itself; twisting it is comparable to opening and closing a button, which is permitted. Indeed, a similar approach appears in <em>Rivevot Ephraim</em> 3:552; <em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 7:55; and <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em><em>loc. cit.</em> in the name of R. Nissim Karelitz. In any case, since one does not intend to leave the twist tie closed forever and it is not a craftsman’s knot, there is certainly no Torah prohibition; and when there is a doubt about a rabbinic mitzva, we are lenient.</i>
  One may not string pearls on Shabbat, because one may come to tie a knot at the end of the string. Similarly, if a pearl necklace snaps, one should not restring the pearls, because one may come to tie the string in a knot (MB 317:20). However, children may string beads that come in children’s craft sets and are not meant to last, since the knots of such necklaces are not permanent (SSK 16:22).
  Some maintain that one may not insert shoelaces into new shoes because this makes the shoe wearable, thus transgressing the prohibition of fixing a kli (Ketzot Ha-shulḥan §146, Badei Ha-shulḥan §3). Others maintain that one may not insert new laces even into old shoes (MB 317:18; SSK 15:64). Still others maintain that nowadays one may insert laces into new shoes, because the eyelets in modern shoes are wide, so inserting shoelaces in is easy and is not considered a melakha (Yabi’a Omer 9:108:162). In order to comply with all the positions, it is proper to insert the laces in an unusual way. For example, one can either skip some of the eyelets or lace only the top ones. This will ensure that on Saturday night he will need to re-lace the shoes in the normal way and therefore has not fixed a kli on Shabbat (SSK 15:64).
  One may thread a belt through the belt loops of a new pair of pants, since the belt is not meant to remain there forever. Similarly, one may insert a pillow into a pillowcase. However, one may not insert a tie or strap into a new dress or pair of pants if it is meant to remain there permanently, because doing so is fixing the item of clothing by making it wearable (MB 317:16; SSK 15:66).
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Personal Grooming / Gozez (Shearing)
  The melakha of Gozez (shearing) is the removal of things that grow on the body, such as hair, nails, warts, loose skin, and the like. In contrast, one who actually cuts skin and draws blood transgresses the prohibition of Ḥovel (see below 20:9.) For the Mishkan, lamb’s wool was sheared and then made into thread that was used to make the curtains. Similarly, hair was sheared from taḥash skins so that the skins would be smooth and thus fit for use as curtains in the Mishkan. We see that sometimes shearing is done in order to use material that is attached to a body, as is the case when sheep’s wool is needed to make thread, and sometimes it is done to remove something unwanted, as is the case when removing unwanted hairs to improve animal skins (Rivash; BHL 340:1 s.v. “ve-ḥayav”).
  Unlike the melakha of Kotzer, where the prohibition applies only if one cuts off a plant from its life source (below 19:6), here the prohibition applies to shearing wool from the skin of a dead animal as well, because even after an animal’s death there is still a purpose to shearing its wool. Therefore, one should be careful not to pull out threads from a fur coat or a leather carpet (MB 340:5). If doing so serves a purpose, the prohibition is by Torah law; if there is no purpose, the prohibition is rabbinic.
  Included in the melakha of Gozez is plucking feathers from a chicken. However, one may pluck feathers from a cooked chicken. This is because after a chicken is cooked it is considered food, and the prohibition of shearing does not apply to food (R. Eliyahu David Rabinowitz-Teomim [Aderet], Oveir Oraḥ §366; Har Tzvi, Tal Harim, Gozez 3).
  
  Section 2
  
  Personal Grooming / Gozez and Ĥovel of Human Beings
  Just as one may not shear an animal’s wool, so too one may not remove anything growing from the human body, such as hairs, nails, loose skin, and warts. One who removes them in the usual fashion transgresses a Torah prohibition, while one who removes them with a shinui transgresses a rabbinic prohibition.
  Therefore, one who cuts his nails using a nail scissors or clippers transgresses a Torah prohibition, while one who pulls them off with his teeth transgresses a rabbinic prohibition (MT 9:8). One should make every effort to stop biting his nails entirely; apart from being impolite, a habitual nail biter is likely to bite his nails on Shabbat as well, thus violating Shabbat.
  Similarly, one may not remove warts. If the wart is wet, cutting it with an instrument is a Torah prohibition, while removing it with a shinui, via teeth or hands, is a rabbinic transgression. If the wart is dried out and liable to fall off on its own, then even removing it with an instrument is only a rabbinic transgression (ibid.; SA 340:2; MB ad loc. 6).
  One may not scrape the body to remove skin that has begun to peel. One may not even use one’s teeth to remove the skin from his chapped lips. However, one may remove dandruff, since it is only very loosely attached to the skin, and it falls out readily.
  If a nail was torn off most of the way and is now painful, it may be removed using one’s hands or one’s teeth. Since most of it has already been torn off, it is viewed as if it has already fallen off, and the prohibition on finishing the job is only rabbinic. The Sages permit removing the nail with a shinui if it is causing pain (Shabbat 94b; SA 328:31; Ḥayei Adam 21:4).
  One may not scratch a cut in a way that will make it bleed, because doing so constitutes Ḥovel (see below 20:9). Even though one who scratches is not interested in drawing blood, it is still rabbinically prohibited (MB 316:30). Similarly, one may not brush his teeth if it is almost certain that his gums will bleed. One also may not knowingly suck the blood out of his gums after brushing them to the point that they bleed, as this constitutes Ḥovel (MB 328:147; section 7 below).
  One may remove a splinter lodged in a person’s flesh as long as one is careful not to draw blood. If the splinter is painful, one may remove it even it will certainly cause bleeding. This is because drawing blood in this situation is rabbinically prohibited, and the Sages did not extend their prohibition to cases that entail such pain (MB 328:88).
  One may remove a scab from a wound that has dried and will not bleed upon the scab’s removal. This does not qualify as Gozez since scabs do not grow from the body, but rather are just dried blood from a wound (SA 328:22).
  
  Section 3
  
  Personal Grooming / Brushing and Braiding Hair
  One may not brush or comb one’s hair on Shabbat, because when doing so hairs are pulled out. This is actually a beneficial phenomenon. Every day a person sheds dozens of hairs naturally. People would rather that hairs with weak roots be pulled out during brushing rather than fall out on their own in the course of the day, thus making their hair unkempt and their clothes unsightly. In any event, since one may not brush his hair on Shabbat, brushes are considered muktzeh and may not be moved on Shabbat (SA 303:27).
  Nevertheless, one who wishes to make one’s hair neater may use a special brush with soft or widely spaced bristles, so that there is a reasonable chance that it will not pull out hair. Then, even if he does happen to pull out hair, he does not violate a melakha. This is because his intention is not to pull out hair, hair will not necessarily be pulled out, and the brush is not muktzeh. In order to make sure it does not look like he is using a prohibited brush, it is advisable to designate a brush for use specifically on Shabbat (see SSK 14:50).1<i class="footnote">One commits <em>Gozez</em> whether shearing because he wants the wool or because he wants to beautify the body by removing unsightly growth from it. The latter is similar to shearing the <em>taḥash</em> skins in order to make them into curtains for the <em>Mishkan</em>. Since it is generally in one’s interest for some hairs to fall out while he is brushing his hair, doing so is prohibited by Torah law (Rivash §39; SHT 303:72). However, according to MT, Laws of Nazirism 5:14, a nazirite who brushes his hair is not subject to lashes. Radbaz explains that even though it is in the interest of the nazirite for some hairs to fall out, the prohibition is only rabbinic because the hairs have weak roots and thus are likely to fall out in any case. <em>Eglei Tal</em><em>Gozez</em> 15 suggests this as well. <em>Kesef Mishneh</em> explains that according to Rambam the prohibition is rabbinic because one does not intend for his hair to fall out; he is primarily concerned with arranging his hair, not pulling it out. Additionally, it is not certain that any hair will be pulled out at all.</i>
  One may gently rub one’s hair or beard, and one may use one’s fingers to arrange them and to remove anything stuck in them, as long as one is careful not to pull out hairs. Even if these actions might cause hairs to be removed, one may do so, as this is unintentional. One who generally tugs at his beard in a way that causes hair to be pulled out must refrain from doing so on Shabbat.
  The Sages forbade braiding hair on Shabbat, because making a braid resembles the melakha of Boneh. Similarly, one may not undo a braid, because this resembles melakha of Soter. One may gather hair into a ponytail, as this does not create a structure. Similarly, one may part one’s hair using one’s hands, but one may not use a brush or comb to do so, as this will pull out hairs (SA 303:26; MB ad loc. 84).
  Braiding a wig is also forbidden because it resembles weaving – the melakha of Oreg – while one may not undo a braid because this constitutes “undoing a weave” – the melakha of Potze’a (MB 303:82; SHT ad loc. 71). It is proper to refrain from combing a wig, but one may do so using a soft brush that will not pull out hairs (SSK 14:52). If a wig has become so tangled that it cannot be worn outside, then one may not style it even using one’s hands, as it constitutes Makeh Be-fatish (Ketzot Ha-shulḥan 143, Badei Ha-shulḥan 6).
  It is rabbinically prohibited to curl one’s hair, which includes men curling their sidelocks (peyot), because this is similar to Boneh. Straightening hair or sidelocks is prohibited because of Soter. But if the sidelocks were already curled, they may be twirled even though this may tighten the curls, because no new structure is formed (Tiferet Yisrael on Shabbat ch. 10, Yakhin 35; see Ketzot Ha-shulḥan 146, Badei Ha-shulḥan 21).
  One may not use hair spray or oil to keep one’s hair in place, because this is similar to Boneh (Rivash as cited in BHL 303:27 s.v. “laḥof”). One may not use these substances on wigs either (SSK 14:56). However, women may spray perfume on their hair or bodies (MB 128:23; SSK 14:56-57).
  
  Section 4
  
  Personal Grooming / Applying Makeup
  One of the 39 melakhot forbidden on Shabbat is Tzove’a (dyeing). By Torah law, it is limited to long-lasting paints or dyes applied to surfaces that will retain them for an extended period (see below 18:5). The Sages, however, prohibited even color that will not last for a long period, and even if it is applied to a surface that will not retain the color. One example of this is the prohibition on the use of makeup, which colors one’s skin for a short time. Accordingly, one may not use eye shadow, blush, lipstick, or clear lip gloss that provides a shine. Similarly, one may not use even clear nail polish, because the shine it provides is considered color. While this prohibition pertains to applying makeup, removing makeup with water or cotton is permissible. Cotton balls soaked in water should not be used, because of the prohibition of Seḥita.
  It is also forbidden to apply foundation, a cosmetic used to even out one’s complexion. This prohibition is more severe than the prohibition on using other types of makeup, because in addition to transgressing the rabbinic prohibition of Tzove’a, one might also transgress the Torah prohibition of Memare’aḥ (see the next section) if one is using cream foundation.
  One may use powder, however, whether white or colored, because powder has no adhesive agent. It is only when the material used for coloring adheres to the skin that there is a prohibition of Tzove’a; in contrast, if it just stays on the surface of the face and does not adhere to it, one may apply it (Igrot Moshe OḤ 1:114; Yeḥaveh Da’at 4:28). Some are stringent even in such cases (Maharam Brisk 1:23; Beit Yisrael §56). However, since this disagreement pertains to a rabbinic prohibition, the halakha is in accordance with those who are lenient.
  The prohibition on wearing makeup is one of the most difficult to follow. For a woman who is used to putting on makeup every day, it is not easy to refrain from doing so on Shabbat, especially since it is precisely Shabbat when everyone tries to look their best. However, if we explore the issue more deeply, perhaps we can suggest that this, on the contrary, relates to the main idea of Shabbat, a day of holiness and rest. Shabbat is when we take a break from the tension that we experience throughout the week. We work so hard to present ourselves to others as more beautiful than we naturally are, in an attempt to meet society’s cruel and superficial standards of beauty. In contrast, Shabbat helps us truly relax by strengthening our faith and belief in divine providence. We can achieve this spiritual relaxation when we attain an internal acceptance of existence as it is, and an appreciation of our natural beauty, which we highlight with clothing and jewelry. This is oneg Shabbat.
  Nevertheless, before Shabbat, one may, and even should, put on makeup. The Sages state: “One who labors before Shabbat will eat on Shabbat” (AZ 3a). During the week, it is our mission to fix the world, improve it, and prepare it for Shabbat. This allows us to absorb the divine light more completely. However, if we are unable to prepare ourselves fully for Shabbat – for example, we know that makeup applied on Friday will not last through the whole of Shabbat – once Shabbat arrives we must calmly and joyfully accept existence as it is. This very acceptance is what will allow us to continue to fix and improve the world during the week.
  
  Section 5
  
  Personal Grooming / Applying Oils, Perfumes, Creams, and Lotions
  One may apply oil to the hands or body on Shabbat in the manner that people normally anoint themselves for pleasure. Similarly, a woman may rub her hair or body with perfumed oil. It is true that the Sages forbade perfuming a garment, because scenting clothing involves Molid (producing something new that did not previously exist), which is similar to performing a melakha (Beitza 23a; Beit Yosef and Rema 511:4). However, there is no prohibition on applying perfume to the body or hair, because the scent is completely secondary to the body, and therefore it is not considered producing something new.2<i class="footnote">. Some forbid making the body smell good, on account of <em>Molid</em> (<em>Taz</em> 511:8; MA 511:11; <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Tetzaveh 11). At the opposite extreme, some maintain that one may infuse a garment with scent (<em>Rishon Le-Tziyon</em>, based on Rif, Rambam, and Rosh). However, most <em>poskim</em> maintain that while one may not make clothing smell good, one may make the body smell good (MB 128:23; <em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 1:31; SSK 14:36).</i>
  Although one may rub his body with oil, he may not apply cream because of the prohibition of Memare’aḥ, which is a tolada of Memaḥek (see below 18:6). Memaḥek refers to smoothing rough surfaces such as leather or wood, while Memare’aḥ involves evenly applying a substance to an object in order to make it smooth.
  Therefore, one may not apply any type of cream or ointment to the skin, because in doing so one smoothes the cream onto the skin. Some object that this should not be prohibited, since the cream is meant to be absorbed by the body rather than to remain on the surface of the skin. However, this is incorrect, since even when one wants the cream to be absorbed, he also wants some of it to remain on the skin’s surface to make it smooth. Hence the prohibition of Memare’aḥ applies. In contrast, if the cream is watery, such that if it is left on a surface it will spread out, there is no prohibition of Memare’aḥ, and one may apply it to the body.3<i class="footnote">If one would like all the cream to be absorbed into the body and none to remain on the skin, then there is no prohibition of <em>Memare’aḥ</em> (MA 316:24; MB <em>ad loc.</em> 49). Therefore, if one is sick enough that he may receive medical treatment on Shabbat, and he requires a cream, it may be spread on the skin and rubbed in until it is absorbed entirely by the body (<em>Da’at Torah</em> 328:26; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in SSK ch. 33 n. 64). However, those who use cosmetic cream for pleasure or beauty do not want it to be entirely absorbed. Rather, they want some to stay on the surface of the skin, making it smooth and beautiful. Therefore, it is prohibited by Torah law to apply that cream.</i>
  Liquid insect repellent may be used on Shabbat, but if it is a solid, one may not spread it on the body because of the prohibition of Memare’aḥ.
  One who is experiencing mild discomfort may not apply medicinal oil. Furthermore, a healthy person may not apply medicinal oil for pleasure, since the Sages prohibited the use of medicines on Shabbat. However, if one is truly suffering, he may use medicinal oil. If this oil is also used by healthy people, then since it will not be apparent that it is being used medicinally, even one who is experiencing discomfort may apply it (SA 327:1; below 28:4-5). The laws pertaining to massage, both professional and amateur, will be explained below (28:13).
  
  Section 6
  
  Personal Grooming / Bar Soap, Liquid Soap, and Wipes
  While one may use liquid soap to wash one’s hands, the general practice is to be stringent about bar soap or thick liquid soap. There are two reasons for this. First, using bar soap or thick liquid soap resembles Memaḥek, since using a bar of soap smooths its surface and thick liquid soap is spread on the hands or body. Second, when one uses these kinds of soap it looks like he is producing something new, since the soap changes from solid to liquid. Although according to many poskim this use is not technically prohibited, because the person using the soap does not intend to smooth it and because the small amount of soap that is used is dissolved in the water, so it does not seem like anything new is being created, nevertheless, since there is some resemblance to Memare’aḥ and Molid, the common custom is to be stringent and avoid using bar soap or thick liquid soap. Those who are lenient have an opinion to rely upon.
  If a thick liquid soap spreads out upon being left on a surface, it is considered liquid, and all would agree that one may use it on Shabbat. If it is uncertain whether a substance is considered thick or liquid, one may be lenient.4<i class="footnote">. MB 326:30 is stringent, based on <em>Tiferet Yisrael</em>, and maintains that one should not use this kind of soap because of <em>Memare’aḥ</em>. This is also the opinion of <em>Ma’aseh Ish</em>, p. 109, and R. Shmuel Laniado, <em>Shulḥan Ha-melekh</em>. <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em> Year 2, Yitro 15 is stringent on account of <em>Molid</em>. However, several <em>poskim</em> are lenient, including <em>Paḥad Yitzḥak</em>, <em>Ginat Veradim</em>, and <em>Pe’ulat Tzadik</em>. <em>Ketzot Ha-shulḥan</em> agrees (138, <em>Badei Ha-shulḥan</em> 31). <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 4:27 elaborates on this approach, adding that Rambam presents it in a responsum. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, cited in SSK ch. 14 n. 49, states that technically one may use this kind of soap. Rather, it is an example of “things that are permitted but custom forbids,” and in such cases one should follow the custom. In practice, both SSK 14:18 and <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:35:5 forbid using it. R. Ovadia Yosef writes in <em>Halikhot Olam</em> vol. 4, p. 108, that it is proper to be stringent, and that this is the custom. However, it would seem that under pressing circumstances one may rely on those who are lenient, and even more so if one is uncertain whether his soap is considered thick or liquid. If there are cracks in bar soap and one wishes to smooth them out, this is prohibited according to all opinions.</i>
  One may use wet wipes to clean a baby, to clean one’s body in general, or to clean a table and the like. Some are stringent because they maintain that there is a problem of Seḥita, since when using a wipe, one presses on it and squeezes out some moisture, which would help in cleaning. Nevertheless, the lenient opinion is the primary one, because the purpose of a wipe is to use the moisture on the surface of the wipe to clean more effectively. The purpose is not to squeeze out the moisture inside the wipe in order to wet the dirty area. If that were one’s goal, he would simply wash the area with water. As long as the wipe remains damp, he has no interest in the moisture that has not been squeezed out and separated from it, and thus no transgression has taken place. Even if, by chance, a couple of drops were squeezed out, since one did not intend for this to happen, he has not transgressed.5<i class="footnote">Those who are stringent include <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 13:46 and <em>Ḥut </em><em>Shani</em> vol. 2, p. 209. <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 10:25 and <em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 8:59 and 10:58 incline this way as well. Opposing them are <em>Har Tzvi</em> 1:190 and <em>Va-ya’an Yosef</em> OḤ §163, which rule leniently. Many others have also permitted this, including <em>Igrot Moshe</em> OḤ 2:70; SSK 14:37 and n. 99 based on R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach; <em>Rivevot Ephraim</em> 6:194:3; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> vol. 2 ch. 12 n. 20; and <em>Be-mar’eh Ha-bazak</em> 3:48. See <em>Harḥavot</em>.</i>
  As we have seen (above 13:11), if one went to the bathroom and has no way to wipe himself other than to tear toilet paper, he may do so with a shinui such as using his elbows to pull the paper from the roll. This is because the Sages permitted transgressing a rabbinic prohibition to avoid great embarrassment. One may also, when necessary, wet toilet paper so it will clean more effectively, as long as one does not intend to squeeze out water from the toilet paper but only to make use of the moisture.
  
  Section 7
  
  Personal Grooming / Brushing Teeth and Toothpaste
  One may brush one’s teeth on Shabbat to clean them and to treat bad breath. Similarly, mouthwash may be used to freshen one’s breath. However, it is proper to refrain from using toothpaste, the same way we refrain from using bar soap or thick liquid soap. While it is true that some forbid brushing teeth on Shabbat, either due to the concern of Seḥita, because the gums might bleed, or because the bristles of the toothbrush might break, nevertheless, the primary halakhic position is that one may brush one’s teeth with a toothbrush le-khatḥila. It is only in a case where it is almost certain that the gums will bleed that this is prohibited.6<i class="footnote">Those who prohibit include <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 3:48 and <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 17:29. SSK states in 14:39 that the custom is to be stringent. The logic of those who forbid brushing is that it causes bleeding and can break the bristles of the toothbrush. Both claims are incorrect. Since it is rare for either thing to happen, they would be cases of <em>davar she-eino mitkaven</em> and thus brushing is permitted. Some also raise the problem of <em>Seḥita</em>, as water may be squeezed out of the bristles during the brushing. In response, those who permit explain that such squeezing is a <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em> in a case of a double rabbinic prohibition. First, wringing out hair and the like is only rabbinically prohibited; second, it is done in a backhanded way. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach maintains that it is to one’s advantage (<em>niḥa lei</em>) for the water to be squeezed out, because this improves the cleaning. However, generally the bristles of a toothbrush are neither very long nor very tightly packed, so usually no <em>Seḥita</em> occurs at all. If one rinses his mouth with mouthwash before brushing, then R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach would agree that it is a <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em>. Those who permit tooth brushing in practice are <em>Seridei Esh</em> 2:28; <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 1:112; <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:35:6; and R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (<em>Shulḥan Shlomo</em> 320:28:2). <em>Ketzot Ha-shulḥan</em> and <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 4:27-30 permit using toothpaste as well.</i>
  One may wash off the toothbrush with water after brushing, as one normally does, even if one does not intend to use the toothbrush again on Shabbat. This is not considered preparing for the weekday on Shabbat, because it is simply a matter of routine and is not considered a significant chore. Furthermore, removing the residue from the brush also serves a purpose on Shabbat, as leaving it dirty would be disgusting (see MB 667:6; below 22:16).
  One may clean one’s teeth with a toothpick (SA 322:4). If there is no toothpick available, a match may be used. While it is true that matches are muktzeh, they are kelim she-melakhtam le-isur, and one may handle them in order to use them for a permitted activity (below, 23:7). Of course, one must remember that one may not sharpen the match for this purpose, as sharpening it would violate a Torah prohibition.
  One may use denture adhesive powder to attach false teeth to the gums, as this is meant for the short term (Har Tzvi; Tzitz Eliezer 15:25; Yalkut Yosef 314:17; as opposed to SSK 14:40, who is stringent).
  
  Section 8
  
  Personal Grooming / Bathing on Shabbat
  The Sages forbade bathing the body in hot water on Shabbat. This is because some people were so eager to bathe in hot water that they would heat the water on Shabbat, thus transgressing both Hav’ara and Bishul. When they were admonished, they would claim that the water had been heated before Shabbat. Therefore, the Sages forbade bathing one’s body on Shabbat, even in water heated before Shabbat. However, one may wash less than half of the body in hot water. As long as one refrains from washing most of the body, there is no concern that one will succumb and heat the water on Shabbat for the lessened pleasure of bathing less than half of the body. Even when washing each limb individually, one still may not wash the majority of one’s body with hot water (Shabbat 40a; SA 326:1).
  We have seen that one may use hot water already available in the boiler as long as this usage does not cause additional water to be cooked (above 10:24). We have also seen that many permit using water that was heated on Shabbat with solar power (10:25). According to this approach, one may use this water to wash the hands, face, and less than half of the body. However, one still may not use this water to wash most of the body on account of the rabbinic enactment.
  The prohibition on washing the body is specifically limited to hot water. One may wash the whole body in cold or lukewarm water whose temperature is lower than body temperature. One may even turn on the hot water tap so that the water will not be cold, as long as this does not cause the cold water entering the boiler to be cooked (as explained above 10:24-25).
  It is also important to note that the prohibition of washing the body in hot water is limited to normal circumstances. One who suffers greatly if he must go a whole day without bathing in hot water may wash his whole body in water that was heated on Friday or by a solar boiler (R. Akiva Eger; BHL 326:1).
  One who bathes on Shabbat must take care not to wring out his hair with his hands while washing or drying off, in order to avoid the prohibition of Seḥita. He may, however, towel his hair dry. Since he is not interested in the water that is wrung from the hair and absorbed by the towel, there is no prohibition. A woman who always combs or brushes her hair after bathing must be careful not to wash her hair on Shabbat, in order to avoid the prohibition of Gozez (see section 3 above).
  The Sages further cautioned that if one washes in a river, spring, or sea in an area where there is no eruv, he should shake the water off himself when he gets out and thus avoid carrying the water the distance of four amot. He does not have to be totally dry; it is sufficient to remove the excess water that drips from his body. In contrast, there is no rabbinic decree against walking in reshut ha-rabim when wet from rain. This is because rain does not get one as wet as bathing, and even if there is enough rainwater on one’s body that it could be considered carrying, the Sages were not stringent, since the rain falls on him against his will (Shabbat 141a; Beit Yosef and SA 326:7; Taz ad loc. 2).
  
  Section 9
  
  Personal Grooming / Swimming and Immersion in a Mikveh
  The Sages prohibited swimming on Shabbat, because one might come to build or mend a raft. One who lifts his feet from the ground and floats in the water is considered swimming. However, if he does not lift his feet, then he is considered bathing, which is permitted (Beitza 36b; Shabbat 40b; SA 339:2). Technically, one may swim in a pool located in a fenced-off area and where the water is confined by the walls of the pool, as in such a case we are not concerned that one might build a raft or carry water outside the eruv. Nevertheless, since nowadays swimming has become one of the most common weekday leisure activities, it is prohibited as a weekday activity (uvdin de-ḥol). Furthermore, there is a concern that after swimming, people will wring out their bathing suits. Moreover, it is improper for one to waste free time on Shabbat with leisure activities instead of dedicating it to Torah study.7<i class="footnote">. Even though technically one may wash one’s whole body in cold water, the Ashkenazic custom is to be stringent out of concern that one might wring out his hair upon leaving the water, that one might carry water four <em>amot</em> in a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em>, or that one might come to swim (<em>Terumat Ha-deshen</em> §255; <em>Maharil</em> <em>Ḥadashot</em> §139; MA 326:8; MB <em>ad loc</em>. 21). However, even those who are stringent regarding Shabbat agree that on Yom Tov one may bathe the entire body in cool or cold water. One who does so must be careful not to wring out his hair with his hands. He must dry off with a towel instead (SSK 14:11). Some write that even when using a towel, one must be careful to be gentle in drying off (<em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Pekudei 8). I did not include the Ashkenazic custom prohibiting bathing in cold water in the main text, because it rarely arises, and it applies only to those few individuals who normally bathe for pleasure in cold water. In contrast, if there is an element of anguish involved, we are lenient about washing in either cold or hot water. Nevertheless, it is clear that Ashkenazic custom forbids swimming in a pool. While it is true that Sephardic custom follows the letter of the law and permits both bathing in cold water and swimming in an enclosed pool in a <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em>, nevertheless, it seems that swimming in a pool should be prohibited even for Sephardim. This is because people generally swim in swimsuits, and there is a serious concern that they might wring them out. Furthermore, in the past the entire leniency of swimming in a pool was relevant only to uncommon cases of individuals who had a small pool in their yard and would float around in it for a short while. In contrast, pools built today are meant to be used for extended periods. Because swimming in a pool is a normal leisure activity, it is considered a weekday activity. If swimming on Shabbat were permitted, people would waste time that they could use for Torah learning, and they would miss out on that key aspect of Shabbat. <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 326:11 (in vol. 4, p. 69) states similarly. See also the laws regarding running and exercising, below 22:7-8.</i>
  One may immerse in a mikveh on Shabbat to remove impurity. Even though the Sages prohibit immersing implements (tevilat kelim) on Shabbat, this is because it resembles fixing the implement, since as a result of the immersion the implement may be used. A person, however, may immerse on Shabbat to purify himself since he may anyway bathe in cold water and thus it does not resemble an act of fixing or improving something (Beitza 18a; SA 326:8). While it is true that, for several reasons, the Ashkenazic custom is to avoid bathing in cold water on Shabbat, when it is done for the purpose of a mitzva, the custom is not to be stringent (Rema, YD 197:2). Therefore, men who are accustomed to immerse as an act of piety may do so on Shabbat as well.
  The poskim disagree whether the rabbinic ban on bathing on Shabbat applies to immersion in a mikveh. Some maintain that the Sages did not include immersion for the sake of a mitzva in their decree, and thus one may immerse in hot water as long as it was heated in a permissible fashion (Korban Netanel). Others maintain that the enactment applies to this immersion as well, and thus one may not even immerse in hot water on Shabbat (Noda Bi-Yehuda). Many are customarily lenient and immerse in hot water. Those who wish to be stringent should make sure that the water is lukewarm, lower than body temperature, as most poskim agree that one may bathe on Shabbat. Thus, one may certainly immerse for the sake of a mitzva.8<i class="footnote"><em>Terumat Ha-deshen</em> §255 rules that according to the Ashkenazic custom, which does not allow bathing in cold water, a woman who could have immersed before Shabbat may not immerse on Shabbat. Accordingly, the Vilna Gaon writes that a man who had a nocturnal emission may not immerse on Shabbat. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of Ashkenazic <em>poskim</em> permit any immersion on Shabbat. Rema YD 197:2, AHS <em>ad loc</em>. 8, and <em>Taharat Yisrael</em> 14 rule accordingly with regard to women’s immersion. Those who permit men’s immersion include <em>Olat Shabbat</em> 326:15; <em>Eliya Rabba</em> <em>ad loc</em>. 5; <em>Tosefet Shabbat</em> 12; and <em>Igrot Moshe</em> OḤ 4:74.The Sages did not prohibit immersion in hot water on Shabbat, according to Korban Netanel, Shabbat 2:100 and Ḥesed Le-Avraham §30 (as cited in SHT 326:5). Many Aḥaronim attest to the practice of women immersing on Friday night in hot water (Divrei Ḥayim 2:26; R. Yehuda Ayash in Responsa Bnei Yehuda 2:32; Responsa Divrei Yosef §64). In contrast, others maintain that immersion in hot water is included in the rabbinic prohibition (Noda Bi-Yehuda, 2: 24; Ḥakham Tzvi §11; Beit Meir, beginning of §326; Ḥayei Adam 70:1; and R. Akiva Eger 1:17). SHT 326:5 states that one may be lenient only under pressing circumstance. However, in practice many are lenient and permit women to immerse in hot water. Thus state Orḥot Shabbat 2:21, n. 30; Menuḥat Ahava 2:10, n. 173; and Badei Ha-shulḥan 197:17. Livyat Ḥen §79 states (following Ḥakham Tzvi) that le-khatḥila a woman should immerse during bein ha-shmashot (dusk), since rabbinic prohibitions on Shabbat do not apply to mitzvot that are undertaken during bein ha-shmashot. If she is unable to immerse during bein ha-shmashot, she may immerse in hot water on Shabbat. It seems to me that those who wish to be stringent should preferably immerse in lukewarm water, since there are three opinions regarding the nature of the prohibition of washing in hot water (mentioned in the previous section):1) According to Beit Me’ir and R. Akiva Eger, even water that has been heated slightly to remove its chill is prohibited.2) According to Ḥakham Tzvi §11, Ḥatam Sofer OḤ §146, and Tehila Le-David 326:3, the prohibition applies to lukewarm water, but water that has been heated merely to remove its chill is permitted.3) According to Noda Bi-Yehuda 2:24, Ḥayei Adam 70:1, Zera Emet 1:71, and AHS 326:3, the prohibition pertains only to hot water, but lukewarm water is permitted.Thus, even according to the opinion that one may not immerse in hot water, according to Noda Bi-Yehuda and those who follow his approach one may immerse in lukewarm water. If the heat of the water is slightly cooler than body temperature, it may be that Ḥakham Tzvi and those who follow his approach would agree that this is not forbidden. Therefore, one who wishes to be stringent should heat the water to body temperature or lower. The subsequent immersion thereby complies with the overwhelming majority of poskim, and at the same time does not cause suffering.</i>
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Boneh and Soter / The Principles of Boneh, Soter, and Makeh Be-fatish
  The melakha of Boneh (building) is the melakha through which the Mishkan was constructed. The melakha includes leveling the ground in preparation for erecting the Mishkan upon it and so that people can walk easily in its courtyard. It also includes putting up the walls of the Mishkan, its roofing, and its courtyard gate.
  Building anything on the ground or in a house, or adding anything onto a pre-existing structure, is a transgression of a Torah prohibition. Therefore, if one fills in a small hole in a wall or a yard, adds cement or plaster to a wall, or adds water to freshly poured concrete to strengthen it (a process known as curing), he has transgressed a Torah prohibition (Shabbat 102b; 73b).
  Any activity that is forbidden on account of Boneh may not be undone, on account of the melakha of Soter (demolishing), assuming that there is a purpose to the demolition. If the act of undoing is destructive, it is rabbinically prohibited. Examples of purposeful demolition include destroying something in order to rebuild it more effectively, digging a hole in the ground in order to lay foundations, or drilling a hole in a wall in order to insert a screw (Shabbat 31b; MT 10:15).
  At times, demolition may be purposeful in itself. In such cases, even if there is no intention to build, one still transgresses Boneh. Examples of this include removing extra cement that is stuck on the floor or wall, digging a hole in order to hide things in it, or creating a hole in a wall in order to conceal things there (Shabbat 102b).
  An additional melakha connected to building is Makeh Be-fatish (applying the finishing touch). For example, after completing the construction of a house, sometimes there are stones protruding from the wall. They are then often hammered down to make the wall’s surface uniform. Similarly, after completing the manufacture of a metal tool, there are sometimes rough edges remaining that are smoothed out using a hammer. Both of these actions are prohibited on account of Makeh Be-fatish. Toladot of this melakha include fixing broken tools, improving tools whose manufacture is complete, and installing a window to allow air to circulate and light to enter (MT 10:16). There are different opinions in the Gemara regarding whether certain construction-related activities are prohibited on account of Boneh or on account of Makeh Be-fatish (Shabbat 102b). We will not explore these types of disagreements, since the primary purpose of this work is to teach people what is permitted and prohibited rabbinically and by Torah law.
  Making cheese on Shabbat is prohibited by Torah law because it causes component parts to solidify and coalesce, in the manner of construction (MT 7:6). Making snowballs or snowmen is also prohibited; but since these do not last, the prohibition is rabbinic.
  
  Section 2
  
  Boneh and Soter / Boneh on the Ground, and Safeguards against it
  As we have seen, Boneh includes the prohibition of leveling the ground, whether in order to make it easier to walk on, enable chairs and benches to be placed upon it, or to build upon it. Therefore, one who levels a mound of earth or fills in a hole transgresses a Torah prohibition.
  If a yard was flooded by rain, one may not spread sand or gravel over it in order to cover the mud. Since those materials are normally left in the ground, this is considered leveling the ground, a violation of Boneh. However, one may spread straw that is designated for animal food over the mud, since he does not intend to leave it there. This is on condition that the straw is spread with a shinui, such as using the back of a shovel to distribute it. Otherwise, the act of spreading looks like a weekday activity (Eruvin 104a; SA 313:10).
  One may cover excrement or saliva with sand, since one who does this does not intend to improve the yard, but only to cover the filth (Beitza 8b; MB 313:55). Similarly, if oil spilled on the sidewalk or the floor, one may cover it with sand to prevent people from slipping. This is on condition that the sand was designated for this purpose and thus is not muktzeh (below 23:3). One may similarly spread salt on ice in order to prevent people from slipping (SSK 25:10).
  One may not sweep the yard lest he level indentations and thereby transgress a Torah prohibition. However, if the yard is floored with tiles or pavement, he may sweep it.1<i class="footnote">Rif maintains that one may sweep the unfloored ground because one will not necessarily level the ground, and thus if one does so it is unintentional, a <em>davar she-eino mitkaven</em>. Rambam permits sweeping an area that is floored. However, if it is unfloored, he is concerned that one might intend to level the ground. Rosh maintains that even a floored area may not be swept because one may come to sweep an unfloored area and level the ground. SA 337:2 rules in accordance with Rambam, while Rema follows Rosh. However, BHL s.v. “ve-yesh” states that in a place where all homes have flooring, Rosh’s prohibition does not apply. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach adds that a paved area outside a house, even if it is not covered by a roof, is considered part of the house, and even the Rema would permit sweeping such an area (SSK ch. 23 n. 10). See below, ch. 23 n. 14 and <em>Harḥavot</em> 23:14:6 regarding why there is no problem of <em>muktzeh</em> when sweeping dust from the floor.</i>
  One who has clay stuck to his shoes should not try to rub it off against the ground, because he may end up leveling the ground (SA 302:6). Some are not worried about this possibility, and permit rubbing off the clay (Rema, Taz). One who so wishes may be lenient, but it is preferable to be stringent. In contrast, one may rub off the clay against a grate, tiles, or stones even le-khatḥila (MB 302:28).
  One should not rub saliva that is on the ground into the dirt with one’s shoes, to avoid leveling the ground. If one finds the saliva disgusting, he may step on it in the natural course of his walking, as long as his intention is not to spread it and level the ground (SA 316:11).
  One may not play marbles on the ground lest he level the ground so that the marbles roll smoothly. Similarly, one may not play any game on the ground that requires completely flat ground, lest he end up leveling it. Even if the ground is paved, one may not play there, as there is a concern that one might then end up playing on unpaved ground (SA 338:5 and MB ad loc. 20; MB 308:158). However, one may play on the floor inside one’s home; since all homes today have flooring, we are not worried that, as a result of playing there, anyone will end up playing outside on unpaved ground (SSK 16:5).
  Children may play in a sandbox containing fine, dry sand, for as long as the sand is dry, the sand will pour back into any indentations made. However, if the sand is wet enough to make holes in it, one may not to play with it (MB 308:143). Wetting the sand is also forbidden, as it constitutes Lash (MB 321:50). If the sand has not been designated for play it is muktzeh, and thus playing with it is forbidden (SA 308:38; MB ad loc. 144).
  
  Section 3
  
  Boneh and Soter / Attaching Things to a House or the Ground
  Permanently affixing something useful to a house or the ground violates the Torah prohibition of Boneh. Removing such fixtures violates the Torah prohibition of Soter. This is the case even if the attachment is not tight and the objects can easily be detached and reattached, as is the case with hinged or sliding windows or doors. Since these are permanently attached to the house, they become part of it, and installing them or removing them is a transgression of a Torah prohibition. Therefore, even if a room is hot, one may not remove a window from the wall or from its frame (Shabbat 122b; SA 308:9; MB ad loc. 39). Similarly, one may not attach or detach a filter that is screwed onto a faucet, rubber pipes attached to the sink, or light bulbs screwed into their sockets, since their attachment to the house is permanent. Similarly, pounding a nail into the wall or gluing a hook to the wall violates a Torah prohibition, since these additions are permanent (Shabbat 103a; MB 314:8).
  One may similarly not attach curtain hooks to a curtain track or the curtains themselves to the hooks on the track. Fastening a curtain rod to brackets that protrude from the wall is also prohibited. Even though all these attachments are loose, since the items are being attached to the building, these actions are prohibited by Torah law. If the rod is not truly attached to the brackets, but rather simply rests upon or inside them and can move back and forth easily, then the rod may be placed on the brackets. In such a case, one may also thread the loops at the top of the curtain through the rod.
  If the object being attached to the house or the ground will not last long, the prohibition is rabbinic. For example, it is only rabbinically forbidden to attach a vacuum hook to a wall, since its suction cup will not keep the hook anchored for long.
  When something may not be attached to the ground or a house, it is also forbidden to tighten its existing attachment. Therefore, one may not tighten the loose screws of a sink, door handle, or closet handle.
  In contrast, objects that are not really attached and do not become part of the house may be put up or taken down. For example, one may hang a picture on a nail, because the picture is not considered part of the wall. If a window breaks and cold wind is blowing through the house, the broken window may be covered with cloth to keep out the wind. This is because the cloth does not become part of the wall, but is placed there only temporarily (MB 313:3 and 315:7; SSK 23:41 and 23:44). Similarly, one may stick papers to a refrigerator using magnets, because the magnets are not considered part of the refrigerator. For the same reason, one may hang a colander over the lip of the sink. Inserting a plug in a socket or removing it is also not considered Boneh or Soter, because the plug is not considered part of the house.2<i class="footnote">. Some are stringent in the case of a plug that is plugged or unplugged only infrequently, such as a refrigerator plug (<em>Ḥut S</em><em>hani</em> 36:1). However, it would seem that all plugs should be treated in the same way, since plugs in general are plugged and unplugged frequently. Furthermore, their primary connection is to the electrical appliance, and thus they are not considered part of the wall. (See SSK 13:33, n. 112; <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 8:17; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 1:24:20.) However, because a plug is <em>muktzeh</em>, it should be grasped using a <em>shinui</em>.</i>
  It is self-evident that one may open and close doors, windows, and faucets. This is the case even when the door is not usually opened, or when the faucet in question is the water main, which is rarely shut off. Since they remain attached to the building and this type of opening or closing is the way they are normally used, it is not considered Boneh or Soter. Similarly, one may open and close a porch’s sliding roof that is attached with hinges or that slides on a track, as it is considered the same as a window (Rema 626:3).
  It is prohibited by Torah law to use a nail or a screw to reattach a door handle that has fallen off. Reattaching it without a nail or a screw in a way that joins the handles of both sides of the door to each other is rabbinically prohibited, since the attachment is only temporary. In contrast, one may insert one of the two handles into the door without using nails or screws. This is not considered an attachment at all, since the handle is just resting there with nothing to support it. However, there is still a concern that one might forget that it is Shabbat and decide to reattach it properly with nails. Therefore, the door handle should be replaced awkwardly, tilted upward or downward, so there is no concern that anyone will tighten the connection. A handle that has begun to come loose from its attachment to the corresponding handle may not be pushed back into place.3<i class="footnote">If the handle had already fallen off multiple times before Shabbat, and everyone is accustomed to using the door with only one of the two handles attached, one may push that one handle back into its normal place, with no awkwardness (<em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> vol. 3 ch. 23 n. 71). The permissive rationale of attaching it awkwardly is cited in <em>Ḥut S</em><em>hani</em> 36:4:7. When it is impossible to insert even one handle, one may open the door with the help of a screwdriver or the like (SSK 23:37). Water tanks, septic tanks, and electrical or telephone junction panels boxes are considered part of the building, and thus it is rabbinically prohibited to place a permanent cover on such a structure or to open such a cover. If the tank’s cover has a handle, one may open and close it on Shabbat (<em>Shabbat</em> 126b; SA 308:10; MB <em>ad loc</em>. 42; SSK ch. 23 n. 146).</i>
  
  Section 4
  
  Boneh and Soter / Making a Tent (Ohel)
  Making an ohel is a tolada of Boneh. In contrast to the melakha of Boneh, which involves attaching different components, such as stone, wood, cement, and metal, to construct a house or implement, making an ohel does not involve the attachment of various components but the erection of something that separates between different areas. The roof of a tent serves as a barrier between the sky and those who are inside the tent, protecting them from the elements. Therefore, pitching a tent on Shabbat using sheets or other things that are not considered construction materials is prohibited by Torah law if the tent is stable and will last for a long time (at least eight days). This is the case even if one tied no knots and used no screws or nails, but only loops and pegs. Even if he only made a roof or a wall, or even simply added a tefaḥ to an existing roof or wall, he has transgressed a Torah prohibition (Pri Megadim, Mishbetzot Zahav 315:8; MB ad loc. 1; SHT ad loc. 6).
  The Torah prohibition is limited to a permanent, durable ohel. The Sages further forbid making a temporary ohel. Therefore, one may not spread a curtain or netting over a bed, whether for privacy or for protection against insects.
  Since the critical part of an ohel is the roof, one may not make any sort of temporary roof to protect a person beneath it, even if it is only a tefaḥ wide. But one may put up a temporary meḥitza. For example, one may erect a meḥitza between men and women attending a Torah lecture. However, one may not erect a meḥitza that serves to render something halakhically permitted (meḥitza ha-materet) even on a temporary basis. For example, if a sukka has only two walls, a third wall may not be erected, even if it is temporary, since erecting this meḥitza renders the sukka kosher. Similarly, one may not erect a temporary meḥitza in order to close a gap in an eruv, because this renders the eruv kosher (SA 315:1; below 29:8).
  The rabbinic prohibition of making a temporary ohel is limited to the case of a new ohel, but one may make a temporary addition to a pre-existing ohel. Therefore, one who wishes to spread an awning in his garden on Shabbat to protect himself from the sun should make sure to spread it at least a tefaḥ before Shabbat. He may then extend it fully on Shabbat. Similarly, if the beginning of a permanent roof is already in place, one may put up an awning to serve as a temporary continuation of the roof. One may also take down whatever was temporarily added on Shabbat (SA 315:2; MB ad loc. 38).
  Even if no one had actually begun to spread out the awning before Shabbat, but it contains a pull-string that is designed for extending it, this string is considered the beginning of the extension, and thus one may complete the extension of the awning on Shabbat (MB 315:37).
  A porch’s sliding roof that is attached with hinges or that slides on a track may be opened and closed on Shabbat. This is because it is not considered an ohel, but rather is comparable to opening and closing a door (Rema 626:3). Similarly, one may open a patio umbrella that is permanently affixed in the yard.
  The hinged hood or canopy of a baby carriage or stroller may be opened and closed on Shabbat. Furthermore, since it may be opened, it is considered the beginning of an ohel, and one may add to it as well. Thus, if one wishes to protect more of the carriage by extending the hood using a cloth diaper or a plastic sheet, he may do so (SSK 24:13).
  
  Section 5
  
  Boneh and Soter / Additional Laws Pertaining Ohel
  As we have seen, making even a temporary ohel is rabbinically prohibited. Included in this prohibition is placing a wide board or a sheet across vertical supports to protect oneself from the elements. However, when the supports are not permanent, this can be permitted if the ohel is erected in a manner that differs significantly from the normal way of doing it. The Sages forbade putting up a temporary ohel in the usual order – first putting up the walls or supports, and only then putting up the roof. However, if the order is reversed, the Sages permit one to put up a temporary ohel. Thus, if the roof is first held up in the air and then walls or supports are placed underneath it, this would be permitted. Usually a second person is necessary in order to erect a tent in this way (Shabbat 43b; SA 311:6; Bi’ur Ha-Gra ad loc.).
  These rules apply to children’s games as well. Children who are of an age where they can understand the laws of Shabbat may not spread blankets over chairs in order to create a tent in which to play, but they may hold the blanket in the air and then place chairs underneath it. Similarly, they may not use interlocking toy bricks (like Lego) to build a house or garage whose inside area is a square tefaḥ or more, but they may hold the roof up and then attach the walls from underneath.
  Just as one may not put up a temporary ohel, one may not take one down. Just as one may put up a temporary ohel if he changes the order of construction, so too he may take one down if he changes the order. The walls must be removed first, and only afterward the roof (SSK 24:22).
  Even if there is no intention to erect an ohel in order to take shelter under it, nevertheless, if in actuality one makes something in the form of an ohel and the space underneath serves a purpose, it may not be erected in that form. For example, one may not take two barrels of wine and place a third one across the top. Since it is necessary to have airflow between the barrels so that the wine will not get overheated and spoil, this structure is considered a temporary ohel: the two barrels are considered walls, and the barrel atop them is considered a roof. However, the Sages permit doing so if the order is reversed; one person may hold up the top barrel while someone else slips the other two barrels underneath.
  One may place a tabletop on legs as long as each leg is less than a tefaḥ wide. In such a case, the legs are not considered meḥitzot, and one may set the legs first and then place the tabletop on top of them. If each of the legs is a tefaḥ wide, they are considered meḥitzot. If one wishes to set up such a table, he must hold the tabletop in the air and then have someone else slip the legs underneath it.4<i class="footnote">According to Rabbeinu Tam, Rosh, <em>Smak</em>, and <em>Hagahot Maimoniyot</em>, if the <em>meḥitzot </em>(that is, legs that are more than a <em>tefaḥ </em>wide) were set up before Shabbat, it is not forbidden to place the tabletop on them. If the legs were set up on Shabbat, then one may not place the tabletop on them even if the space underneath is not being used. However, according to Rashba, Ran, and <em>Magid Mishneh</em>, even when the legs are narrower than a <em>tefaḥ</em>, if the space underneath is needed then one may not place the tabletop on them. According to <em>Tosafot</em> (as quoted by Rashba) and Tur, two conditions must be met in order for the placement to be prohibited: 1) the <em>meḥitzot</em> must be put into place on Shabbat; and 2) the space underneath must serve a purpose. Since this law is rabbinic, SA 315:3 follows this lenient position. Therefore, if the legs are less than a <em>tefaḥ</em> wide, even if the space underneath it is used, for example, as a place for people to put their feet, one may set the table up in the usual way. Some, however, beautify Shabbat by changing the order of the setup even in this case, as explained in <em>Harḥavot</em></i> In contrast, when opening a folding crib, one may place the board and mattress normally, as there are no walls beneath them and there is no purpose served by the space underneath them.
  One may open a baby carriage or stroller, a folding table, a folding chair, a cot, or a playpen on Shabbat because the entire structure is already completed and connected before Shabbat. The only part that is done on Shabbat is opening it (SA 315:5).
  One may not cover a very large barrel (whose diameter is close to a meter), as this resembles making an ohel if a tefaḥ of open space remains (Shabbat 139b; SA 315:13). However, if the cover of the barrel has a handle on it, then it is clear that this is simply the cover of a receptacle and not the roof of a tent, and thus one may place it on top of the barrel (SSK ch. 24 n. 72). One may overturn a large pot and use it to cover food and protect it from the sun or insects, because overturning a pot is not considered making an ohel. Similarly, one may overturn a recliner or couch even though space is created underneath it, because overturning furniture is not considered making an ohel (BHL 315:5, s.v. “kisei”).
  Many maintain that it is rabbinically forbidden to put on a hat with a hard brim a tefaḥ wide, because doing so is considered making a temporary ohel. This is despite the fact that one may use a hand fan to shield himself from the sun and hold a talit horizontally over one who is called up to the Torah in honor of his marriage. Nevertheless, a hat that remains on one’s head without moving is more similar to a temporary ohel (Shabbat 138b; Rabbeinu Ḥananel; Rambam; SA 301:40). The custom, though, is to be lenient and to allow one to wear a black hat, since it is worn primarily for the sake of honor and not to provide shade. It is also possible that the brims of today’s hats are not considered hard (MB 301:151). Alternatively, perhaps the custom relies on Rashi, who maintains that a hat is never comparable to an ohel; the only concern is that if one’s hat is blown off, people might chase after it and end up carrying it.
  The universal custom is to forbid using an umbrella on Shabbat because it resembles an ohel (see BHL 315:8, s.v. “tefaḥ”; SSK 24:15).
  
  Section 6
  
  Boneh and Soter / Permitted and Prohibited Implements
  Just as Boneh and Soter apply to building or demolishing a house, the ground, or an ohel, they also apply to building or demolishing an implement.5<i class="footnote">em&gt;Beitza 22a states that “Beit Shammai maintains that <em>Boneh</em> and <em>Soter</em> apply to <em>kelim</em>, while Beit Hillel maintains that <em>Boneh</em> and <em>Soter</em> do not apply to <em>kelim</em>.” The <em>halakha</em> follows Beit Hillel, as Rava rules in <em>Shabbat</em> 122b. However, we find in <em>Shabbat</em> 102b that according to Rav, one may not insert the wooden handle into the metal blade of a scythe as it constitutes <em>Boneh</em><em>Tosafot</em><em>ad loc.</em> (s.v. “hai”) explain that in a case of bona fide assembly, <em>Boneh </em>and <em>Soter </em>apply to implements as well. The statement that <em>Boneh</em> does not apply to implements refers to loose attachments, as I wrote in the main text. This is also the opinion of <em>Smag</em>, Rosh, and Tur. Ramban, Rashba, and Ritva (on <em>Shabbat</em> 102b) maintain that one may not build an implement in its entirety because of <em>Boneh</em>, but adding onto an implement is prohibited because of <em>Makeh Be-fatish</em>. Rashi <em>Shabbat</em> 74b and <em>Yere’im</em> maintain that even creating an implement is prohibited on account of <em>Makeh Be-fatish</em>, not <em>Boneh</em>. The practical significance of this halakhic disagreement is when it comes to <em>Soter</em>. If the prohibition is on account of <em>Makeh Be-fatish</em>, then undoing one’s actions is not prohibited by Torah law, as <em>Soter</em> is defined as undoing an act of <em>Boneh</em>. Therefore, if undoing what was done to an implement is necessary for Shabbat, according to Ramban and those who follow his approach one may do so, while according to Rashi and those who follow his approach it would even be permitted to take the entire implement apart. However, according to <em>Tosafot</em> and Rosh, this would be forbidden even for a Shabbat need. Only when dealing with a low-quality implement (such as a <em>mustekei</em> – a barrel made of an inferior material) would it be permissible to take it apart for a Shabbat need, as explained below in section 11. SA 314:1 rules in accordance with <em>Tosafot</em> and Rosh. However, in 314:7, in the context of asking a non-Jew to break a vessel for a Shabbat need, it is lenient in accordance with Rashi and those who follow him. The justification for this leniency is that two mitigating factors are involved: asking a non-Jew to do <em>melakha</em> on Shabbat (which is only a rabbinic prohibition) and a Shabbat need (for example, if the fruits in the vessel are otherwise inaccessible). See <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 3:23:32. Rambam (MT 10:13) follows <em>Tosafot</em>, maintaining that <em>Boneh</em> applies to implements. On the other hand, he permits breaking a barrel to get to the food inside it, even if the barrel is not considered a <em>mustekei</em> (MT 23:2). See <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 314:5.</i> Therefore, one may not insert the handle of a hammer into the hammer head or a broom handle into the broom shaft. A permanent insertion is prohibited by Torah law, while a temporary insertion is forbidden rabbinically. Similarly, it is prohibited by Torah law to put together a bed or chair using nails, screws, or glue, since such attachments are full and permanent. Fixing a chair leg or table leg that has fallen off is also forbidden, as is attaching or removing a rubber chair tip or table tip (a rubber protector that goes underneath a chair leg or table leg).
  If there is a possibility that people will forget it is Shabbat and end up fixing the implement, the Sages forbid moving it. For example, if a leg falls off a chair or table, one may not move the item and prop it up on another piece of furniture, because someone might see it and decide to repair it. However, if the implement would be complicated to fix, or if it had already been used in this manner before Shabbat, there is no concern that he will forget and repair it on Shabbat, so it may be moved (SA 313:8; Rema 308:16; MB ad loc. 69; SSK 20:44).
  One may use implements on Shabbat whose normal usage involves screwing or unscrewing. Thus, one may screw a lid on a jar, salt shaker, or pressure cooker, put on jewelry whose ends screw together, or look through binoculars that are focused by turning a knob. Since this is the normal way of using these devices, screwing and unscrewing them is not considered a melakha. However, one may not unscrew something if it unusual to do so. For example, one may not unscrew the knob of a pot cover (SHT 313:32; MA states that the prohibition is by Torah law, while Taz maintains that it is rabbinic).
  Most poskim allow adjusting the height of a lectern (“shtender”) by loosening a knob and tightening it at the desired height, as this is the normal usage and the lectern remains usable at every stage of the adjustment (Orḥot Shabbat 8:9 citing R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv; Yalkut Yosef 314:2).
  One may adjust a baby carriage or stroller with hinges or latches from an upright position to a horizontal one and vice versa. However, if doing so involves removing screws that hold the seat in position and then screwing them back in, it is forbidden because it entails making a strong attachment that is adjusted only infrequently (SSK 28:50).
  
  Section 7
  
  Boneh and Soter / Permissible Assembly and Disassembly of Implements
  There is a difference between attaching things to a house and attaching things to an implement. One may not add anything to (or remove anything from) a house even if it is attached loosely, since the house is considered permanent. For example, one may not install a window on its hinges or remove it from its hinges. Although it is attached loosely and it is easy to make or break this attachment, it is forbidden because the window is part of the house. Note that if a wardrobe or free-standing closet has a volume of forty se’ah (three cubic amot, or just over ten cubic feet) it has the same status as a house. Thus, one may not connect anything to a large wardrobe, even loosely (Rema 314:1).
  In contrast, devices, which are less permanent, may be assembled using temporary attachments that do not require craftsmanship or strength. Therefore, one may assemble and disassemble a portable cot of the type travelers use, which can be assembled and disassembled daily, and which is loosely attached (Shabbat 47a-b; SA 313:6). Similarly, one may remove the door of an implement that is easily assembled and disassembled and that turns easily on its hinges. Technically, one should be permitted to place this door on its hinges as well. However if the hinge is attached to the implement with nails or screws, the Sages forbid it out of concern lest one tighten the attachment and thereby transgress a Torah prohibition. Only if nothing can be tightened, such as if the hinge is part of the implement, may the door then be attached to the implement (Shabbat 122b; SA 308:9).
  The general principle here is that if an implement is normally assembled with a firm attachment, the Sages forbid even attaching it loosely. They were concerned that one might forget and attach it firmly, thus transgressing a Torah prohibition. However, if an implement is assembled with temporary and easy attachments, there is no reason to fear that one will attach it firmly and thus transgress a Torah prohibition, and it may be assembled and disassembled. Therefore, one may extend a table by adding a leaf designed for this purpose, and one may remove a leaf as well, since the leaves are clearly temporary. Similarly, the feeding tray on a child’s high chair, which is constantly attached and detached, may be used freely on Shabbat, since the attachment is loose.
  Based on this, many maintain that the prohibitions of Boneh and Soter do not apply to building with interlocking toy bricks (like Lego) and the like, since the pieces are attached to each other temporarily and are designed to be disassembled (Tzitz Eliezer 13:31; Yeḥaveh Da’at 2:55; but SSK 16:19 is stringent).
  Some Aḥaronim maintain that it is rabbinically forbidden to make paper airplanes or boats or to fold napkins into special shapes because this resembles Boneh (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in SSK 11:41; 16:21). Others permit this on the basis that the prohibition of Boneh does not apply to things that are temporary and will soon be disassembled (Rivevot Ephraim 1:223:8 quoting R. Moshe Feinstein). One who is lenient has an opinion to rely on, and one who is stringent is commendable. Children may be lenient even le-khatḥila (see Harḥavot).
  
  Section 8
  
  Boneh and Soter / Fixing Broken Implements
  Some items are sturdily assembled initially but loosen over time. If people are used to using these items in their loosened state, it is not prohibited to assemble or disassemble them. As noted, assembling implements loosely is not considered Boneh. Furthermore, since people are used to using them this way, we are not concerned that they will end up fixing them with nails or glue (see Rema 308:16; SA 313:6).
  Thus, if a wheel falls off a baby’s crib and people are comfortable using the crib after replacing the wheel loosely, it may be replaced. Similarly, rubber chair tips and table tips may be replaced if they are only loosely attached. This is also the case if the leg of a child’s doll has come off: if the leg is attached to the doll tightly, it may not be snapped back into place, but if it is connected loosely, it may be replaced.
  If a temple fell off a pair of glasses, it may not be screwed back into place, since generally it is screwed on tightly. One may not even attach it loosely, because one may forget and tighten it, thus transgressing a Torah prohibition. However, if the screw is lost, there is no longer a concern that anyone will tighten it. Thus, one may reattach the temple using a safety pin, as this is a weak attachment that is permitted for implements (Shulḥan Shlomo 314:11:2).
  If a lens fell out of the glasses’ frame and replacing it requires screwing it back in, it may not be replaced at all, even if the screw is left loose. This is because we are concerned that later on one will forget and tighten it. But if there is no screw, but rather the frame has expanded a bit so that the lens sometimes falls out, then the lens may be replaced in the frame. We are not concerned that one will permanently reattach it, as that would require expertise (Menuḥat Ahava 3:23:35; Orḥot Shabbat 8:49-50).
  One may not straighten a spoon, knife, or glasses temple on Shabbat by hand, because this is considered Makeh Be-fatish (MA 340:11; MB 509:1, 7; see Harḥavot).
  The prohibition of Boneh does not apply to compressing a spring on a toy car so that the car will move forward. One may do so as long as the car does not make noise or light up (see SSK 16:14).
  One may inflate an air mattress, air pillow, or rubber ball that had been previously inflated. Since this is permissible, it may be done in the usual fashion, using a manual pump. However, one may not inflate these items for the first time on Shabbat, because many poskim maintain that inflating them for the first time makes them into viable implements for the first time, which is prohibited. One may not blow up a balloon even if it had previously been inflated, lest one tie a knot at the bottom. However, if the balloon is sealed with a valve instead of a knot, and it had previously been inflated, it may be inflated on Shabbat (SSK 15:89; 16:7; 34:24).
  
  Section 9
  
  Boneh and Soter / Cleaning the Floor and Making Repairs
  If the floor is dirty, and leaving it in such a state dishonors Shabbat, one may sweep the floor. A yard, though, may not be swept, because one may end up leveling the ground and thus transgressing Boneh (see section 2 above, n. 1).
  In contrast, one may not wash the floor, since leaving the floor unwashed does not dishonor Shabbat as leaving it unswept does, and there is concern that one who washed an area with a hard floor will end up washing a dirt floor as well, which would involve leveling the ground and thus transgressing Boneh (SA 337:3; MB ad loc. 3). However, if water spilled on the floor, one may remove the water using a squeegee (SSK 23:7).
  If a particular spot on the floor has become especially filthy, for example, if juice spilled on it, one may pour a bit of water on it and then either wipe it away with a squeegee or soak it up with something that would not normally be wrung out (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in SSK ch. 23 n. 30; Yalkut Yosef 337:2). If the entire floor is filthy, one who is lenient and pours water on it and wipes it away with a squeegee has an opinion upon which to rely (Or Le-Tziyon 43:8).
  If clumps of grass are blocking a drainage pipe, causing water to back up onto the roof and leak into the house, the Sages permit stepping on the clump to break up and remove the blockage. Normally, even fixing something with a shinui is rabbinically prohibited, but in this case, where otherwise a loss will be incurred, the Sages permit (Ketubot 60a; SA 336:9).
  Based on this, some prohibit unclogging a sink using a plunger. They maintain that the Sages permit removing blockages only if a shinui is used, but using a plunger to break up a blockage is the normal way to deal with this problem. Thus it is forbidden by Torah law, and even in a time of need one may not be lenient (Yabi’a Omer 5:33; R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv). In contrast, others permit this, maintaining that a blockage that can be broken up using a plunger is not a total blockage, and thus breaking it up is not considered a true repair. Furthermore, the improvement that is made is not to the pipe itself. Rather, one is simply dislodging the sludge that clogged it (Minḥat Yitzḥak 5:75; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in SSK 12:18; Menuḥat Ahava 3:24:29). In practice, in a case of need, it is proper for two people to hold the plunger and unclog the drain together. This way, even according to the stringent opinion, the prohibition would only be rabbinic; and when in doubt about a rabbinic mitzva, the halakha follows the lenient position. (See above 9:3 and n. 1.)
  All agree that one may not remove a blockage using professional equipment like a plumber’s snake. It is also forbidden by Torah law to take apart the pipe under the sink in order to empty it of sludge and then reassemble it.
  One may remove garbage that accumulates in the sink strainer. It is not necessary to do this with a shinui, because this action does not fix anything; one is simply removing filth (SA 308:34; SSK 12:17; below 22:12).
  One may not oil a door’s squeaky hinge or a baby carriage’s wheel, as this is considered a repair (SSK 23:43; 28:53). If pantyhose start to tear (or “run”), one may not put nail polish or soap at the tip of the run to prevent further ripping, because this reinforces the hose (SSK 15:77).
  
  Section 10
  
  Boneh and Soter / Meĥatekh
  The melakha of Meḥatekh is instrumental in transforming raw material into houses, implements, clothing, etc. For example, if one wishes to make leather clothing, he must first cut the leather to the right size. If one wishes to build a house, he must cut the stones, metal, and panels to the right size. If one wishes to install a window, he must cut the glass to the right size. The general principle is that one who cuts something to a specific size on Shabbat transgresses the Torah prohibition of Meḥatekh. Similarly, it is forbidden by Torah law to cut off the soft part of feathers in order to make pillows and blankets, since one must cut precisely between the hard and soft sections (Shabbat 74b). This is the distinction between Meḥatekh and Kore’a: the primary purpose of Kore’a is to separate two distinct parts, whereas the primary purpose of Meḥatekh is to cut with precision in order to create something new.
  The melakha of Meḥatekh does not apply to foods. Therefore one may cut a cake into equal-sized pieces. Similarly, one may cut grooves into an orange in order to peel it. Pills and suppositories used by sick people are also considered food for this purpose, and may be cut where scored (SSK 33:4).
  Items that animals would consume are considered food and thus not subject to Meḥatekh. Therefore, one may use a knife to cut straw or hay to use as a toothpick. However, one may not fashion a toothpick from hard wood. Since it is inedible to animals, cutting it to size constitutes Meḥatekh: if by means of a tool, one violates a Torah prohibition, and if by hand, which is considered a shinui, a rabbinic prohibition (Beitza 33a-b; MT 11:7; SA 322:4; MB 322:13, 18).
  One may take fragrant branches of hard wood that were harvested before Shabbat and trim or rub them so that their aroma spreads. One may also break them into smaller pieces so that more people can smell them. Even though the branches are hard and animals would not eat them, one may break them, since the size of the pieces does not matter. One may only do so on condition that they are broken by hand. If he uses a tool, we are concerned that he will forget and fashion a toothpick, thus transgressing Torah law (Beitza, loc. cit.; SA 322:5; MB ad loc. 17-18; Rema 336:8).
  
  Section 11
  
  Boneh and Soter / Opening Cans
  One may open cans on Shabbat in order to eat the food inside them. Since cans are disposable and meant for single use, they are not considered true receptacles and are more akin to shells that are broken to get at the nut within.
  Similarly, we read in the Mishna: “One may break a barrel in order to eat the dried figs inside it, as long as he does not intend to create a receptacle” (Shabbat 146a). Many explain that this mishna refers to a mustekei, an inferior sort of barrel meant for a single use. Because the barrel was unimportant, it was secondary to the food inside it, just as a nutshell is secondary to the nut inside it. Thus, one may break the barrel in order to eat its figs. They would not break the barrel in a way that scatters the figs; rather they would break off the top, and the figs would remain within for several days, until they were all eaten. The Sages did make one condition: “As long as he does not intend to create a receptacle.” If one makes a neat opening and plans to reuse the barrel to store other things, then he is truly creating a receptacle when he opens it, and is thus transgressing (SA 314:1).
  The same applies to cans. One may open them on Shabbat if one plans to eat their contents, even if it will take several days to finish the food. Once the food is finished, the can is thrown out; therefore it is considered unimportant and may be opened on Shabbat. However, one who intends to reuse the can for other items may not open the can on Shabbat, since he is creating an opening and rendering it usable, which amounts to creating a receptacle.
  Some are stringent and do not open cans on Shabbat even when they intend to throw them out. Since the can is in fact capable of storing additional items, creating an opening for it essentially makes it into a receptacle (Ḥazon Ish 51:11). However, in practice the halakha follows the lenient position. Since we are dealing with cans and containers that are designed to be disposable, it is not forbidden to open them. Those who wish to be stringent should open cans before Shabbat. If they need to open a can on Shabbat, they should immediately empty it of its contents.6<i class="footnote">Along the same lines as the dispensation quoted in the <em>mishna</em> above, a <em>beraita</em> cites R. Shimon b. Gamliel as stating: “One may bring a barrel of wine and chop off the top with a sword” (<em>Shabbat</em> 146a). This is because the person does not intend to make a neat opening. He simply wants to get to the wine. This is the ruling of SA 314:1 and 314:6. However, Rishonim disagree regarding the type of barrel to which the dispensation applies. <em>Tosafot</em> and Rosh understand that the dispensation refers to a <em>mustekei</em> barrel, which broke and was then put back together using tar. In contrast, Ran maintains that even a high-quality barrel may be broken in order to reach the food inside it. This would also seem to be the opinion of Rambam (MT 23:2). SA 314:1 is stringent like <em>Tosafot</em> and Rosh. In any event, even according to the more stringent opinion, today’s cans would not be considered better than the <em>mustekei </em>barrels of the Talmud, which were meant to be used only once. For example, the <em>mustekei</em> barrel that was broken open could not be reused. In order to store dried figs or wine in the barrel, its top would have to be reattached.<em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 51:11 is concerned that a can becomes a receptacle upon being opened. If so, opening it is not breaking it but rather creating a receptacle (<em>kli</em>), because it can now be used repeatedly. However, many maintain that the can was already a <em>kli</em> prior to being opened, as in fact it preserved the food within it (<em>Tehila Le-David</em> 314:12). Opening it thus destroys it, as it can no longer be used. Even if, 60 years ago, many people used cans to store nails and the like, today almost no one does this (<em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 1:24). Those who are lenient here include R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (SSK 9:3 and <em>Shulḥan Shlomo</em> 314:5); <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 4:82; R. Ovadia Yosef (<em>Halikhot Olam</em> vol. 4, p. 250); and R. Mordechai Eliyahu. However, in order to avoid the problem raised by <em>Ḥazon Ish</em> that one might be creating a receptacle, some suggest puncturing the bottom of a can before opening it. Then, when it is opened, it does not become a receptacle because there is a hole in the bottom (SSK 9:3). On the other hand, many who follow <em>Ḥazon Ish</em> feel that one may not even make this first hole (<em>Minḥat Ish</em> 17:3). Additionally, those who feel one may open a can should not make the hole because it is a destructive act, which is rabbinically forbidden. Moreover, sometimes puncturing the can may cause a violation of <em>Borer</em>. Thus, it is preferable to open a can in the normal way. One who wishes to comply with the stringent opinion as well should open cans before Shabbat, or at least empty them out immediately after opening them.</i>
  
  Section 12
  
  Boneh and Soter / Opening Bags and Wrappers
  Many dairy products are sold in plastic containers. One may peel the cover of such a plastic container. Similarly, packages of wafers and chocolate bars may be opened. Since the wrapper is meant to be disposable, it is secondary to the food inside it, just as an orange peel is secondary to the orange and may be removed in order to eat the orange.
  One may make a hole in the top of a bag of milk or juice in order to pour out the liquid, open the top of a bag of sugar that is glued shut, and rip open bags of candies or other foods.
  Similarly, we find that the Sages permitted cutting open ḥotalot (palm leaves used to protect unripe dates) on Shabbat. They permitted this because these leaves lacked importance, as they were considered entirely secondary to the dates inside them, similar to an orange peel. (Shabbat 146a; Kol Bo; SA 314:8).
  Some are stringent and do not open bags or packages if the food will remain inside for a while, as is the case with a bag of sugar. They maintain that one who makes a neat opening is not ruining the bag, but rather is creating a receptacle (Ḥazon Ish 51:10). According to this approach, the only way to open such bags is to tear them apart entirely and transfer their contents to a different container.
  In practice the halakha follows the lenient position, because these bags have no importance and are thrown out after the food they contain is finished. Therefore, one may open them in whatever way enables easy removal of their contents, and he may use them until the food inside is used up.7<i class="footnote">. The dispensation to tear <em>ḥotalot</em> (<em>Shabbat</em> 146a) is not limited, so even if the opening allows the dates to be removed easily, there is no prohibition. Even in the case of a <em>mustekei</em> barrel (<em>Shabbat</em> 146a; <em>Beitza</em> 33b), one may make an opening through which the contents can be removed over the course of a few days, on condition that there is no possibility that it is a neat opening, which would allow the barrel to be used repeatedly. Therefore, the <em>mishna</em> in <em>Shabbat</em> allows making an opening in the top of a barrel even if it is made to pour out wine. Only if the hole is made in the side of the barrel, where it is clear that the opening is meant to be used multiple times, is it forbidden (<em>Shabbat</em> 146a). Indeed, this is the ruling of SA 314:6. The reasoning behind all these permissive rulings is that since we are dealing with packaging that is meant to be used only once, the container is secondary to the food within it. Thus, it is comparable to the peel of a fruit, which may be cut up and removed with no limitations. Even when the package is large and it will take days to finish up what is inside, as is the case with a milk carton or a bag of sugar, there is no prohibition, as the Sages permitted opening a wine barrel or <em>ḥotalot</em> even though they were not immediately emptied out. (This is also implied in <em>m. Kelim</em> 16:5, according to the explanation of Rash.) It is only if a neat hole is made in the package, in order to allow multiple uses after the current contents of the package are finished, that there is a prohibition. In contrast, when dealing with containers of milk, packages of sugar, and the like, it would never dawn on anyone to reuse them, so there is no issue of <em>Boneh</em> or <em>Kore’a</em> when opening them. Those who are stringent maintain that the dispensation to make an opening is limited to something that is not part of the packaging itself but only adheres to it, like the lid of a barrel; but if one makes a neat opening in the package itself to pour the milk or measure out the sugar, it is like making a receptacle. However, the prohibition is only rabbinic, since the opening only serves for the contents’ removal, not their reinsertion (<em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 51:10; see <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 12:6). They are also concerned about <em>Kore’a</em> when opening a bag of sugar, since many maintain that tearing is prohibited if it serves a constructive purpose. However, we have already seen that the law pertaining to a package of food is the same as that of <em>ḥotalot</em>, where the prohibition of <em>Kore’a</em> is completely irrelevant. Some of the lenient opinions concede that ideally one should comply with the stringent position and open packages before Shabbat. If it is necessary to open a bag of milk on Shabbat, <em>le-khatḥila</em> it is better to make a smaller opening than one normally would during the week or to tear the plastic with one’s teeth, so that it is clear that one does not mean to make a neat opening. This way, even some of the stringent opinions would concede that it is permissible.</i>
  It should also be mentioned that when opening these bags, one should try not to tear any letters. However, if necessary, one may open the bag even if it is clear that doing so will tear letters (as explained below, 18:3).
  Similarly, one may open packages that contain items that are necessary for Shabbat, such as tissues and diapers. It is proper to open them more messily than one would during the week. Those who follow the stringent opinion would need to destroy the packaging so that it can no longer hold its original contents. The halakha is in accordance with those who are lenient.8<i class="footnote">The law of opening packages of clothing and the like is the same as that of packages of food (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, <em>Shulḥan Shlomo</em> 314:7:6). Just as one may use packages of food until their contents have been finished, so too when opening packages of tissues or diapers he may use the packages until their contents have been finished. Those who are stringent require destroying the packaging entirely (<em>Minḥat Ish</em> 17:22; <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 12:23). According to <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 314 n. 22, one should not rip the wrapping paper off a book or picture, because those who are lenient only permit tearing a package when the item is needed for Shabbat, and that is not the case here. It would seem in practice that one may do so if there is a need. However, MB 340:41 and BHL s.v. “ha-niyar” prohibit opening a letter even if there is a great need. On the other hand, Maharil, MA 519:4, and <em>Taz</em> <em>ad loc</em>. 5 permit it. Since the prohibition is rabbinic and there is a need, one may be lenient.</i>
  
  Section 13
  
  Boneh and Soter / Opening Bottles
  Poskim disagree about whether one may open a wine bottle that has a metal screw cap. Some prohibit opening it, maintaining that before the bottle is opened, the cap is simply a cover, but after it is opened and separated from the little metal rim that is left behind on the bottle, it becomes an implement, because it has become a screw cap that aids in opening and closing the bottle (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach).
  However, most poskim are not concerned about opening such a cap. They maintain that even before it is opened it is already considered a bottle cap. Opening it does not create a new entity. Separating the metal rim from the cap is comparable to cracking open a nutshell in order to eat the nut. Additionally, the one who opens the bottle has no intention of making an implement; he just wants to open the bottle. Even though it happens to be that a screw cap is created, there is no prohibition.
  Although one who wishes may be lenient may do so, and there are many who are lenient in practice, le-khatḥila it is preferable to defer to the stringent opinion and open such a bottle before Shabbat. An additional solution is to keep around old bottle caps and then immediately throw out the new cap after opening a bottle on Shabbat. Since in this case there is no intention to use the bottle cap that was opened on Shabbat, even those who are stringent would concede that one may open it.
  If no old bottle cap is available and a bottle was not opened before Shabbat, another solution for those who are stringent is to puncture the bottle cap before opening it. This effectively ruins the bottle cap so that after it is opened it is not considered an implement (SSK 9:18). According to those who are lenient, it is preferable to open the cap without puncturing it.
  Even most of those who are stringent regarding a metal bottle cap maintain that a plastic cap may be opened, as this is considered a bottle cap even before it is opened. Thus, opening a plastic bottle cap does not make it an implement (SSK 9:21). This is the custom. One may also use a corkscrew to remove a cork on Shabbat.9<i class="footnote">The stringent opinion of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach regarding the removal of metal bottle caps is quoted in <em>Shulḥan Shlomo</em> (314:9:4-5). It is also recorded in SSK 9:18 and <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 12:17. <em>Responsa</em> <em>Devar Yehoshua</em> 2:45 disagrees with R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, based on <em>Magid Mishneh</em> 12:2, which explains that as long as one does not intend to create an implement, we do not consider it a <em>psik reisha</em>. Therefore, one may pour a large quantity of cold water into a very hot kettle. Since he does not intend to temper the kettle and thus apply one of the final stages of the metal forging process, it is not prohibited even though in fact he is doing so. MA 318:36, <em>Bi’ur Ha-Gra</em> 314:11, and MB 318:80 follow this position. Here too, one’s intention is to open the bottle, not to produce a bottle cap. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach disagrees with this position, maintaining that even though one’s primary intention is to open the bottle, he also wishes to produce a bottle cap. However, many believe that the bottle cap was considered functional even before the bottle is opened, but could not be used in practice because it was attached to the bottle by the metal rim. This is the approach of<em> Tzitz Eliezer</em> 14:45:1, <em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 2:42, and <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:27:8; R. Mordechai Eliyahu ruled this way as well. If one intends to throw away the bottle cap, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach agrees that one may open the bottle (as explained by <em>Devar Yehoshua</em> <em>ad loc.</em>). If one needs the cap, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach allows him to puncture it and then open it, because by doing so he renders it less functional as a bottle cap. However, according to those who are lenient, since it is not necessary to puncture the cap, it is questionable whether one may do so. If it is considered an implement even before it is opened, it is rabbinically prohibited to destroy it. If it is comparable to a <em>mustekei</em>, it might be permitted to destroy it (even if it is not necessary). Those who take into account the opinion of R. Auerbach and his followers do so in an attempt to avoid a possible Torah prohibition.According to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, one may remove the ring that remains on a metal or plastic bottle cap, since the cap is already functional without it. Others forbid this on account of <em>Makeh Be-fatish</em>. R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv maintains that this is forbidden because of <em>Meḥatekh</em> (<em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 12:19-20). It would seem that even those who prohibit this would agree that the prohibition is rabbinic.</i>
  
  Section 14
  
  Boneh and Soter / Opening Soda Cans and Separating Attached Plastic Containers
  Some forbid opening a pop-top can on Shabbat. They are concerned that this action may constitute Boneh, because it creates a neat opening that allows one to drink. They are also concerned that one may be transgressing Meḥatekh, because the tab is pre-scored and produces a very precise opening.
  However, many permit this, maintaining that because the can is meant to be disposable, opening the top does not create a receptacle. Rather, it is comparable to breaking a barrel in order to remove the wine inside it. Meḥatekh is also not an issue, because that applies only when material must be cut to an exact size. Since it does not matter where a cut is made on the can, and the only goal is to create an opening for drinking, the can may be opened in the most convenient way possible – by lifting the tab.
  One may be lenient if he wishes. If one wishes to be stringent, he should not drink from the opening formed by popping the top, but rather should pour the drink from the can into his cup. This makes it clear that he is not interested in the neat opening of the can. If one wishes to be more stringent, he should be careful to lift the tab only slightly, less than he would on a weekday. This way the act of cutting is not completed, and the opening is not as good as it is usually.10<i class="footnote">. <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 11:43 and 12:5 cite R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv as forbidding opening a pop-top can in the normal manner and R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach as permitting this. R. Meir Mazuz and <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 3:24:5 permit this on condition that one pours the drink into the cup. This approach is also recorded in <em>Eshmera Shabbat</em> 1:1:17. <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:27:6 permits this on condition that the pop top is not opened entirely, so that the can will not be easily usable. Accordingly, even those who are stringent would concede that a complete <em>melakha</em> was not performed. <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 314:23 states in the name of R. Ovadia Yosef that technically one may open a pop top, but it is proper to be stringent and not open it entirely.</i>
  There is another case that is subject to debate. Many dairy products (yogurts, puddings, and the like) come in containers that are loosely connected to each other. May one separate them by applying light pressure to that connection?
  Some maintain that breaking the containers apart along score lines that are made for this purpose is a violation of the Torah prohibition of Meḥatekh. They are also concerned that this might be Makeh Be-fatish, since separating the containers makes them usable.
  Others are lenient, maintaining that cutting is forbidden only when it is precise, and here the goal is simply to separate the containers from one another. No one cares exactly how precise the cut is. Furthermore, it is not Makeh Be-fatish, since the containers were completely ready for use even beforehand. Separating them simply removes an external impediment.
  In practice, one who wishes to be lenient has an opinion to rely upon, and one who chooses to be stringent should be commended. It is proper to separate such containers before Shabbat.11<i class="footnote">Included among the permissive <em>poskim</em> are: R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (<em>Shulḥan Shlomo</em> 314:13:3); <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:27, n. 7; <em>Halikhot Olam</em> vol. 4, p. 254; and <em>Binyan Shabbat</em> 11:3. Included among the stringent <em>poskim</em> are: R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (quoted in <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> ch. 12 n. 22); <em>Ḥut</em><em> Shani</em> vol. 1, pp. 128-129; R. Mordechai Eliyahu; and <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 3:16:14. Even though some state that this is a Torah prohibition, it seems that Rambam (MT Laws of Yom Tov 4:8) maintains that if there is a prohibition at all, it is only rabbinic. Therefore, I wrote in the main text that one who wishes to be lenient has an opinion to rely upon.There is a debate about tearing open small sugar packets that are often perforated to facilitate tearing them. According to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, one may tear along the dotted lines, because no one cares exactly where the cut is; the point of the perforation is to make it easier to tear open. R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, however, maintains that the prohibition of Meḥatekh applies because one is cutting precisely. Therefore, the packet must be torn at a different place (Orḥot Shabbat 11:41).</i>
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Mav’ir and Mekhabeh / The Melakha of Hav’ara
  The Torah states: “But the seventh day is Shabbat of the Lord your God; you shall not do any melakha” (Shemot 20:9). The Sages explain that the intent of this verse is to forbid all 39 melakhot that were instrumental in erecting the Mishkan. One of these melakhot is Hav’ara (kindling a fire), which was necessary to prepare dyes for the Mishkan’s curtains. Nevertheless, the Torah explicitly mentions the prohibition of Hav’ara: “You shall kindle no fire throughout your settlements on Shabbat” (Shemot 35:3). The Sages ask why it was necessary for the Torah to single out Hav’ara. R. Natan explains that the Torah was using one melakha to serve as an example, to teach us that while all 39 prohibited melakhot are derived from one verse (“You shall not do any melakha”), nevertheless each and every melakha is an independent prohibition. Therefore, if one unknowingly performs multiple melakhot, he must bring a sin offering for each one of them (Shabbat 70a).
  The awesome power of fire allows man to rule over the forces of nature and harness them in his service. Through the use of fire, people created metal tools, improved food, and later created powerful machines. Perhaps this is why Hav’ara was chosen out of all the melakhot to express man’s tremendous ability to improve the world. However, on Shabbat every Jew must rest and rise above all creative activity. We must remember our Creator who took us out of Egypt, and we must enjoy Shabbat via Torah study and festive meals.
  At first glance, there is a basic question about the melakha of Hav’ara. We have a ruling: “All destructive acts are exempt [by Torah law, but liable rabbinically]” (Shabbat 105b). Therefore, if one tore an item of clothing or broke a utensil, he is not obligated to bring a sin offering. To be sure, he transgresses rabbinically, but not by Torah law. In light of this, and given that burning an item generally ruins it, why is lighting a fire on Shabbat considered a transgression of a Torah prohibition? The answer is that any time the positive elements provided by the fire (heating or lighting one’s home) outweigh the loss of the burned item, it is classified as a constructive rather than a destructive act (MT 12:1; see Kesef Mishneh).
  
  Section 2
  
  Mav’ir and Mekhabeh / The Laws of Hav’ara
  One who lights a fire of any size that meets some need violates a Torah prohibition. It makes no difference whether he starts the fire by rubbing stones together, using a magnifying glass to focus the sun’s rays on straw, lighting a match, or turning on the electricity. It also does not matter if the fire is fueled by oil, kerosene, or electricity. Anytime one intends to start a fire and succeeds in doing so, he transgresses a Torah prohibition.
  However, one who merely causes sparks to be released does not violate Torah law. Furthermore, if the sparks were released unintentionally, there is no prohibition at all. Therefore, one may wear woolen or synthetic clothes, even though sometimes sparks are released when putting them on or taking them off. Since these sparks are released unintentionally and to no purpose, there is no prohibition (SSK 15:76; Yeḥaveh Da’at 2:46).
  Just as it is prohibited by Torah law to kindle a new fire, it is also prohibited by Torah law to increase a pre-existing flame. The law on Yom Tov is different; while one may not kindle a new fire then either, one may turn up an existing flame. On Shabbat, however, one may not even raise a flame. For example, one may not increase the flame on a gas burner by turning the knob controlling the gas flow. Likewise, one may not increase the flow of kerosene to a heater in order to raise the flame or add oil to a burning lamp on Shabbat (Beitza 22a).
  Similarly, one may not stoke coals, since this intensifies the fire (Kereitot 20a). Likewise, one may not open the door of a wood-fired oven because doing so allows air to enter the oven and fan the embers, thus increasing the fire (MB 259:21). If the oven door is already open, or there is a fire in an enclosed area (such as a fireplace), one may not open a window or door facing the fire, because a strong wind may enter and fan the flames. If there is no breeze, one may open the door or window (SA 277:2).
  While an oil lamp is on a table, one must try to avoid shaking the table, because the oil may move closer to the wick and increase the flame, a violation of Hav’ara. However, if it is a wax candle on the table, or if the oil lamp has a floating wick, he does not need to worry that shaking the table will cause the flame to increase (MB 277:18).
  
  Section 3
  
  Mav’ir and Mekhabeh / Reading by Candlelight
  The Sages ordained that one may not read by the light of an oil lamp on Shabbat, lest the flame become dim and the reader absent-mindedly tip the lamp so that more oil reaches the wick, thus transgressing the Torah prohibition of Hav’ara. To be sure, the Sages also ordained the kindling of Shabbat lamps, but this serves a different purpose. Shabbat candles are meant to provide light for the meal, not for careful examination of texts, and to allow one to walk around in his home without bumping into furniture. In contrast, the Sages forbade doing things that require careful examination by lamplight, out of concern that in such a case one might end up tipping the lamp in order to see better. One who wishes to study by the light of an oil lamp should ask a friend to keep him company, to ensure that he will not tilt it. Alternatively, he may learn together with a friend so that they can look out for each other (Shabbat 11a; SA 275:1-3).
  Many poskim maintain that a lone individual may read by the light of a wax or paraffin candle because there is no concern that he will tilt the candle. Unlike an oil lamp, where the point of tilting is to move oil up the wick to the flame, the wax in a candle is attached to the wick and already close to the flame, so tilting would serve no purpose. Similarly, there is no concern that one might come to adjust the wick, since candles burn well on their own, and there is no need to adjust them at all once they are lit (MB 275:4; Kaf Ha-ḥayim 275:11).
  An individual may study by the light of an electric lamp, even if only one of two bulbs in the lamp is turned on, and even when the intensity of the light can be adjusted by means of a dimmer; the ordinance regarding oil lamps was because of concern that if the light grew dim, one might tilt the lamp to restore the light. There was no concern that one might light an additional lamp or add oil to an existing one. Since electric lights do not grow dim, we are not concerned that one might turn on an additional light or turn up an existing one. Nevertheless, le-khatḥila it is advisable to cover the dimmer knob with a note that says “Shabbat” so that no one will accidentally adjust the light (SSK 13:37; Yeḥaveh Da’at 6:20).
  
  Section 4
  
  Mav’ir and Mekhabeh / Shabbat Candles
  While a candle is burning at home, one must be careful not to open a window or door facing it, as the wind may blow out the flame. Even if the wind outside is currently too weak to put out a candle, one still may not open a window, since it might happen that at the very moment when the window is opened, the wind will become stronger and blow out the candle. If this happens, it would mean that the act of opening the window blew out the candle. When there is no wind whatsoever, some permit opening the window, while others forbid it. In a case of necessity, such as when it is hot inside the room, one may follow the lenient position, and the window may be opened (MB 277:3).
  One may open a window or door if even a strong wind would be unable to extinguish the candle; for example, if the candle is at a great distance from the window or door, or if the window is at such an angle that very little wind comes through it. Even if the wind is likely to affect the flame and cause it to flicker, as long as it is not powerful enough to blow it out, one may open the door or window (SA 277:1; Menuḥat Ahava 3:26 n. 6).
  If Shabbat candles were lit in front of an open window and then the wind started blowing, the window may be closed in order to protect the flame. By closing the window, one is not acting directly on the flame itself; one is merely preventing the wind from blowing it out (Rema 277:1).
  Similarly, one may close a door in a place where a fire is burning (such as a room with a fireplace), even if the wind coming in is blowing on the coals and fanning the flame, and closing the door will weaken the fire. Closing the door is not considered an act of extinguishing, since it merely prevents more wind from entering and feeding the flame (SA 277:2). In contrast, if the fire is fueled by gas or kerosene, one may not turn down the flow of the fuel. This truly qualifies as extinguishing, since one is acting directly on the fuel itself (SA 265:1).1<i class="footnote">em&gt;Beitza 22a states: “One who adds oil to a lamp is liable on account of <em>Mav’ir</em>, and one who takes some away is liable on account of <em>Mekhabeh</em>.” According to <em>Tosafot</em>, the reason one is liable for removing oil is that when he does this, the flame is immediately weakened. In contrast, if adding or removing oil has an effect only after a while, this is considered <em>grama</em>; one is not extinguishing a flame but only causing a flame to be extinguished indirectly. However, according to Rosh (<em>Beitza</em> 2:17), even if adding or removing oil does not have an immediate impact, since ultimately it will cause the lamp to stay lit for a longer or shorter amount of time, it is considered <em>Mav’ir</em> and <em>Mekhabeh</em> by Torah law. In his opinion, <em>grama</em> only applies in a case where the action is not done directly to the item in question. An example of this would be filling pitchers with water that will burst when a fire reaches them, thereby releasing the water and extinguishing the fire. However, in our case, one is acting on the fuel itself, directly changing the amount of time the fire will stay lit. It follows that if one adds kerosene to an oven or oil to a lamp, and the strength of the fire immediately increases, all agree that he has transgressed a Torah prohibition. However, if the fire does not show the effect of his actions immediately, but will ultimately stay lit for longer, according to Rosh this is prohibited by Torah law, whereas according to <em>Tosafot</em> the prohibition is rabbinic.</i>
  
  Section 5
  
  Mav’ir and Mekhabeh / The Melakha of Mekhabeh and the Meaning of Melakha She-eina Tzerikha Le-gufah
  Extinguishing a fire in order to produce charcoal is one of the 39 melakhot prohibited on Shabbat. In the Mishkan they would turn wood into charcoal by setting fire to wood and then extinguishing it. They would then use this charcoal to build a steady and long-lasting fire for preparing the dyes used to color the curtains in the Mishkan. Similarly, if one extinguishes the flame of a candle so that its wick will light more easily later on, he transgresses a Torah prohibition.
  What about one who extinguishes a fire not because he wants the charcoal, but because he wants to conserve fuel, or because the light produced by the flame is bothering him? In other words, he is not essentially interested in putting out the fire; he simply does not want the candle to keep burning. The Tanna’im disagree about this. According to R. Shimon, since this is a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah (a melakha that is not needed for its own sake) it is only prohibited rabbinically. However, according to R. Yehuda, even if one’s objective is not the performance of the melakha itself, since he does in fact intend to extinguish the flame, he has performed a melakha and violated Torah law (Shabbat 31b and 93b).
  Practically speaking, Rambam maintains that a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah is prohibited by Torah law (MT 1:7), while according to most Rishonim it is rabbinically prohibited (R. Hai Gaon, Rabbeinu Ḥananel, Ha-ma’or, Ramban, and others; see also SA 334:27 and MB ad loc. 85). Since the only difference between a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah and a regular melakha is the intention behind it, performing a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah is considered more severe than violating a standard rabbinic prohibition. (See above 9:6.)
  
  Section 6
  
  Mav’ir and Mekhabeh / Fire that Causes Property Damage
  If a fire breaks out on Shabbat, the first question that must be addressed is whether it presents a danger to human life. If it does, there is a mitzva to do whatever is necessary to extinguish it. However, if it is clear that there is no danger to human life, then even if the fire may cause extensive property damage, as is the case when an entire house goes up in flames, one may not put it out, because monetary loss does not override Shabbat.
  Furthermore, the Sages prohibited moving items from a burning house to the street or courtyard even when there is an eruv. Their concern was that people might be so panicked about saving their property that they may either put out the fire or carry objects from a private domain to a public domain, thereby violating the melakha of Hotza’ah. Only food, clothing, and receptacles/implements needed for that Shabbat may be removed from a burning home (assuming it is within the eruv). If there is a large receptacle in the home, one may fill it with food even if it is more than will be needed for that Shabbat, as long as it can be carried out of the home in one trip. The same principle applies to clothing: as long as one is wearing them as he leaves the house, he may save many items of clothing, even more than are necessary for that Shabbat. This prohibition only applies to moving things into a shared courtyard; but one may salvage any quantity of food and non-muktzeh objects into a private yard where an eruv is not required, or into another apartment in the same building where there is an eruv (SA 334:11, MB ad loc. 28).2<i class="footnote">According to Rambam and those who follow his approach, who maintain that performing a <em>melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah</em> is prohibited by Torah law, it is clear that there is no way to permit putting out a fire to save one’s possessions. It is also obvious why the Sages ordained that one may not save more than what is necessary for Shabbat. However, according to most <em>poskim</em>, who maintain that a <em>melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah</em> is only rabbinically prohibited, why does this rabbinic prohibition apply even in a case where following it would lead to a massive loss? After all, the Sages permitted stamping on the grass clogging up a pipe in order to prevent a loss (<em>Ketubot</em> 60a; SA 336:9). Even though many maintain that fixing the pipe would be prohibited by Torah law, the Sages permitted fixing it with a <em>shinui</em> to prevent a loss (<em>Livyat Ḥen</em> §103). Similarly, they were lenient in allowing one to carry valuable possessions into a public thoroughfare with a <em>shinui</em> to prevent their possible theft (Rema 301:33). Some even permit moving <em>muktzeh</em> objects in order to save possessions from fire or theft (SA 334:2). So why didn’t the Sages allow one to put out a fire in order to save all of his possessions?It would seem that the answer is that, as Ran writes (on Rif, 61a, s.v. “u-vimkom”), a <em>melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah</em> is more severe than other rabbinic prohibitions. Ran suggests that since performing a <em>melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah</em> looks the same as performing an act prohibited by Torah law, and only the intent differs, the Sages were concerned that people would be unable to distinguish between the two and would end up being lenient even with Torah prohibitions. Therefore, the Sages forbade putting out a fire even in the case of a <em>melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah</em>. A similar approach appears in <em>Ḥayei Adam</em> 46:1 and BHL §278 at the end of s.v. “mutar.” (A parallel idea appears in the laws of <em>bein ha-shmashot</em>, as explained in MB 342:1.) It also may be that because having a fire in one’s home can make one extremely distressed, one who is worried about his possessions might perform several <em>melakhot</em> in his distressed state. Because of this, the Sages felt a need to reinforce the observance of the <em>melakhot</em> and did not permit even rabbinic transgressions. They allowed rescuing possessions only under very limited circumstances, so as to eliminate the concern that it would cause people to transgress other prohibitions as well.R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, cited in SSK ch. 41 n. 8, wonders why we do not seem to be concerned about the emotional state of the homeowner and his family, who might lose their minds upon seeing their home and possessions going up in flames. In fact, it is possible for one to die or to go insane as a result of this kind of trauma. Elsewhere in SSK (ch. 32 n. 83), R. Auerbach points out that some allow the transgression of Torah prohibitions to protect one’s mental and emotional health. In practice it would seem that when there is a real possibility of a family member experiencing psychological trauma, the fire may be extinguished, but when there is no such concern, even if tremendous suffering is involved, one may not extinguish the fire.</i>
  Just as a homeowner may save items that he needs for Shabbat, he may also tell his neighbors that they can take whatever they need. Each neighbor can then take food for himself for Shabbat and put on as many items of clothing as he can. After Shabbat, the custom of the pious is to return the salvaged clothing and items to the original owner (SA 334:9; SSK 41:3-13).
  The poskim disagree about whether one may salvage money and valuables that are not necessary for Shabbat from a burning building. One who is lenient has an opinion on which to rely. However, this is all on condition that he not transgress a Torah prohibition. If, in order to salvage his money, he would need to carry it from a private domain to a public domain, thus violating Torah law, he may not do so. However, he may carry the money out with a shinui, as this is only rabbinically prohibited (SA 334:2; Taz; see MB ad loc. 4-5, SHT ad loc. 3, and BHL s.v. “ve-yesh”).
  Residents of neighboring buildings may remove everything they own from their homes. As long as the fire has not yet spread to their homes, we can assume that they are not so panicked, and so we are not worried that they will end up putting out the fire (SA 334:1).
  Although a Jew may not extinguish the fire, he may hint to a non-Jew to do so. For example, he may say: “Whoever extinguishes this fire will not lose out.” Or he could call to the non-Jew urgently and tell him that a fire has broken out and that it is forbidden for a Jew to put it out. The non-Jew will then figure out on his own that the Jew wants him to put out the fire, and perhaps will even pay him for doing so (SA 334:26).
  Similarly, one may indirectly cause the fire to go out, since according to Torah law it is only acting directly that is forbidden. Normally the Sages forbid causing melakha to be done indirectly, but in a case of loss, grama is permitted. Therefore, if one side of a cabinet catches fire, one may cover the other side with wet rags so that the fire will go out when it reaches them. Similarly, one may place bags full of water on a spot where the fire has not yet reached, so that they will burst open and extinguish the fire when it reaches them (SA 334:22). One may also pour water on a spot that is not burning, as long as it is far enough away from the fire that the water will only reach the fire and begin extinguishing it after a while (See SA 334:24; SSK 41:16).
  
  Section 7
  
  Mav’ir and Mekhabeh / Putting Out a Fire When There Is Danger to Human Life
  In a situation where human life might be endangered by a fire, it is a mitzva for anyone who can put it out to do so as soon as possible, since danger to human life overrides Shabbat. Even if the danger is uncertain, it is still a mitzva to put out the fire. For example, if a fire breaks out in a large building, even if it seems that all the residents managed to get out, one must put out the fire as long as there is a possibility that someone may still be inside. Even if the odds are that anyone left inside has already died, since there is still a chance that a rescue is possible, everything must be done to put out the fire (SA 329:3; below 27:1).
  Everything necessary must be done as efficiently as possible on all fronts: Those able to rescue people from the fire should try to do so, and those able to extinguish or control the fire should try to do so with whatever means are at their disposal. At the same time, others should call the fire department. If an observer is uncertain whether the fire department has been called already, even if it seems likely that they have been, he too must call to make sure that they come, because the possibility of saving lives overrides Shabbat. At such a time one must not ask a rabbi what to do, but rather move as quickly as possible to help.
  In practice, nowadays we treat any large fire that breaks out in a residential building as a life-threatening one that must be extinguished even on Shabbat. For example, if a fire breaks out in an apartment building, there is a concern that it may spread to additional apartments and there may not be time to evacuate the residents. Besides, when there is a large fire there is no time to check if there are apartments with babies or disabled people who cannot make their way out on their own. Additionally, some homes contain explosive gas canisters that endanger people outside the building, especially considering that fires often attract large numbers of gawkers. Sometimes it takes longer to clear people out of the area than to put out the fire. If the fire is near other homes, it might spread and endanger those residents. Sometimes a fire breaks out in a storage area containing chemicals whose poisonous fumes may endanger area residents.
  R. Shlomo Goren ruled that if anti-Israel terrorists start a fire that will damage property, it may be extinguished on Shabbat even if there is no danger to life, because if we do not put it out, the terrorists will feel they have succeeded and will be motivated to undertake similar attacks that could endanger lives (this is based on SA 329:6 and R. Goren’s expansion of the category of a “border town,” which may be defended against even property damage on Shabbat, to all cities in Israel, where low-grade conflict can break out; see below 27:12).
  
  Section 8
  
  Mav’ir and Mekhabeh / Putting Out a Fire to Prevent People from Being Injured
  As we have seen (section 5), one who puts out a fire only transgresses rabbinically, according to most poskim. Only one who extinguishes a fire in order to produce charcoal is doing so le-tzorekh gufo. When one puts out a fire in order to prevent damage from occurring, he is not interested in the act of extinguishing, but in creating a situation in which the fire is gone. Accordingly, this is considered a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah.
  Therefore, even though the Sages insisted that one may not put out a fire in order to salvage property, they permitted extinguishing a fire that has the potential to cause mass injury. For example, if there is a burning ember in a public domain, where many people are liable to be harmed by it, one may remove it even though it is muktzeh. If it is impossible to move it, the Sages permitted extinguishing it in order to prevent harm to the public, even though there is no danger to human life. However, in Israel, one may not call the fire department, because their travel involves Torah prohibitions, and one may not violate Torah law in order to prevent possible harm that does not involve potential loss of life. In the Diaspora, where firefighters are non-Jews, one may call the fire department, as this only involves the violation of a rabbinic prohibition (SA 334:27; see below 27:16).
  To summarize, we have discussed three situations in which one may put out a fire directly or indirectly:
  1) In a situation of danger to human life, it is a mitzva to do everything possible to save lives.
  2) In a situation where there is a danger of harm to the public, one may put out the fire (as the Sages did not apply rabbinic rules in such a case), but one still may not violate Torah prohibitions to do so.
  3) In a situation where there is financial loss but no threat of physical harm to humans, one may not extinguish the fire. Nevertheless, one may do so via grama. One may also hint to a non-Jew to put out the fire.
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Turning on Electric Lights and Appliances
  It is prohibited by Torah law to turn on an electric light bulb or activate an electric heating element, because when the bulb is turned on or a heating element activated, the filament incandesces (see above, 4:5 and n. 3, regarding fluorescent bulbs), and this is a form of Hav’ara prohibited by the Torah. While it is true that in the past, people did not generally produce heat or light by heating metal, we nevertheless find that heating metal for any purpose was prohibited by Torah law. Thus Rambam writes that if one heats metal with the intention of tempering it afterward by plunging it into cold water, he transgresses the Torah prohibition of Mav’ir (MT 12:1). Clearly, then, heating metal is forbidden by Torah law if it accomplishes some purpose. Extinguishing a light bulb or heating element is only rabbinically prohibited. It is different from a normal act of Mekhabeh, whose purpose is to create charcoal (as explained above 16:5). In contrast, turning off an electrical appliance creates nothing, so its prohibition is rabbinic.
  The Torah forbids performing prohibited melakhot by means of electrical appliances. Thus, activating an electric flour mill on Shabbat constitutes a violation of Toḥen, operating an electric mixer on Shabbat violates Lash, and so forth for all melakhot. Although the person is not manually grinding or kneading, since he presses the button or flips the switch to turn the appliance on, all melakhot performed by the appliance are viewed as melakhot performed by him (Oraḥ Mishpat §70; Aḥiezer 3:60).
  Just as one may not turn on an electrical appliance by pressing a button, so too one may not activate something by remote control. Even though there is no direct contact between the finger pressing a button on the remote control and the appliance, since this is the normal way to turn on such appliances, it is forbidden just as manual activation is forbidden.
  
  Section 2
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Is Using Electricity a Torah Prohibition or a Rabbinic Prohibition?
  One may not activate electrical appliances and devices such as telephones, microphones, alarms, doorbells, fans, air conditioners, and computers on Shabbat. Even if these appliances do not contain an incandescent filament or heating element and do not perform any of the 39 melakhot, it is still forbidden to use them on Shabbat. Aḥaronim disagree, however, whether the prohibition is by Torah law or rabbinic.
  Some maintain that using any electrical appliance violates the Torah prohibition of Mav’ir. They maintain that electricity has the same status as fire since, like fire, it has energy and power that can be harnessed. Rav Kook favors this position, arguing that the key aspect of fire is not its appearance, but rather its power to illuminate, heat, and provide power. Indeed, the Sages state that there are different types of fire (Yoma 21b), including some that do not burn and destroy. One example of this is the fire that Moshe saw at the burning bush (Rav Kook, Oraḥ Mishpat §71). R. Uziel agrees with this approach, adding that turning on electricity is also prohibited as a form of Metaken Mana since activating an electrical appliance renders it useful (Mishpetei Uziel, OḤ 2:36:2). Ḥazon Ish (OḤ 50:9) maintains that turning on an electrical appliance is prohibited on account of Boneh, because completing a circuit creates a kli: when electricity flows through a device, an electrical wire within comes to life and activates the device. Thus, one who completes a circuit builds an implement, and one who breaks a circuit demolishes it.
  Many others maintain, however, that using electrical appliances that do not contain an incandescent filament and do not perform one of the 39 melakhot is only prohibited rabbinically, as it is considered a weekday activity. Additionally, some maintain that turning on appliances is prohibited because it is creating a new entity on Shabbat (Molid), as it creates a new electrical current in the wires (Beit Yitzḥak). No Torah prohibition is involved, because there is no “fire” in appliances without an incandescent filament. There is no problem of Boneh, because an electrical circuit cannot be considered a kli, that is, an implement or receptacle. This is the opinion of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Minḥat Shlomo 1:9-12) and R. Eliezer Waldenberg (Tzitz Eliezer 1:20:10).
  In practice, le-khatḥila we defer to the opinion that using electricity is a Torah prohibition. In times of need, when there are additional reasons to be lenient, we rely upon those who believe that using electricity is only a rabbinic violation.1<i class="footnote">According to Rav Kook, using electricity is prohibited on account of <em>Mav’ir</em>. Therefore, one may not speak into a microphone, as this increases the electric current. His responsa on the subject are not so well known, since <em>Responsa</em> <em>Oraḥ Mishpat</em>, in which they appear (§70-71) was printed in 1979, thirty years after the main debates among contemporary Aḥaronim. At the time, Ḥazon Ish was inclined to say that use of electricity is prohibited by Torah law on account of <em>Boneh</em>, but many disagreed with him, including R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and R. Eliezer Waldenberg. Nevertheless, other Aḥaronim share Rav Kook’s opinion that the prohibition on electricity is due to <em>Mav’ir</em>. These include <em>Mishpetei Uziel</em>, OḤ 2:36:2; <em>Yaskil Avdi</em> 5:38; <em>Brit Olam</em>, <em>Ha-mav’ir Ve-hamekhabeh</em> 1; R. Yosef Messas’s <em>Responsa</em> <em>Mayim Ḥayim</em>, OḤ §134. Also see the entry on “<em>ḥashmal</em>” in the <em>Encyclopedia Talmudit</em>, which focuses on the opinions that disagree with Ḥazon Ish and maintain that the prohibition is rabbinic. One should be aware that according to Ḥazon Ish, if an appliance is already on, increasing the current to amplify the power of the appliance is not prohibited by Torah law. However, according to Rav Kook, who believes using electricity is prohibited because of <em>Mav’ir</em>, increasing the current is prohibited by Torah law as well.Many contemporary authorities accept the opinion of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach that there is no Torah prohibition involved in using electricity. However, <em>le-khatḥila</em> they still take into account the opinion that maintains it is prohibited by Torah law (see <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 1:20; <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 2:112; and many additional works). <em>Igrot Moshe</em> (OḤ 3:42, 3:55, and 4:84) maintains that the status of the prohibition is unclear. In practice, although many state that in principle the prohibition on using electricity is rabbinic, in fact they relate to the prohibition of turning on electrical appliances as if it were prohibited by Torah law. Thus, even in cases of uncertainty and cases where electricity is required for the sake of a mitzva, to avoid substantial loss, or to help someone who is bothered by a minor illness, they are not lenient and prohibit using electricity via a non-Jew or when activated with a <em>shinui</em>, despite the fact that each of these scenarios would constitute a <em>shvut di-shvut</em> (see above 9:11). Only in cases of true necessity do they take into account the opinion that the prohibition is rabbinic. Therefore, the only way these appliances can be used on Shabbat is if they are turned on before Shabbat. In times of true necessity they can be used through <em>grama</em> (above 9:9), meaning that one’s actions will not directly or immediately cause the appliance to turn on. Examples of the permitted use of electricity on Shabbat include wearing a hearing aid (section 3 below) and adjusting the setting on a timer (as explained below in n. 6). For appliances that appear to work normally but have a built-in <em>grama</em> mechanism, see section 18 below. Regarding the use of computers, see below 18:1 and <em>Harḥavot</em>.</i>
  
  Section 3
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Electrical Appliances That Produce Sound (Telephones and Microphones)
  As we have seen, the prohibition on using electrical appliances on Shabbat includes microphones and telephones.
  Even if a phone is in use before Shabbat, or if a microphone is turned on before Shabbat, one may not speak on the phone or use a microphone on Shabbat, because doing so increases the electric current running through it and violates a Torah or rabbinic prohibition. In addition, the Sages banned hashma’at kol (producing sound) with an object specifically designed for this purpose. Many maintain that one who speaks into a microphone transgresses this prohibition (based on Rema 338:1). Furthermore, using a microphone resembles a weekday activity. It also may seem to belittle Shabbat, as those who hear the amplified sound are likely to think that the microphone was activated on Shabbat (Igrot Moshe, OḤ 3:55).2<i class="footnote">.If a Jew in the United States who does not observe Shabbat calls a Jewish friend in Israel when Shabbat is over in Israel but while it is still Shabbat in the U.S., the latter may not speak with him, because he is benefiting from his friend’s Shabbat desecration. However, a Jew in Israel may speak with a non-Jew who calls him when it is Shabbat in the U.S., since a non-Jew is not obligated to keep Shabbat (SSK 31:27).</i>
  Nevertheless, one who is hard of hearing may use an electric hearing aid that rests on or inside the ear on Shabbat as long as it is turned on before Shabbat and he does not adjust the volume on Shabbat. When he wants to go to sleep, he should remove the device without shutting it off. In the morning, he may put it back in without turning it on. Although we stated that one may not use a microphone or telephone because speaking into it increases the electric current, this prohibition applies only when someone speaks directly into them. However, when speaking normally, the activation of the device in the wearer’s ear is secondary and therefore a form of grama, which is permitted when truly necessary. Furthermore, there is no problem of producing sound on Shabbat or belittling Shabbat since the sound is heard only by the wearer.3<i class="footnote">. There is no problem of <em>hashma’at kol</em> since the sound is only heard by the wearer of the device. The only problem is the electrical operations of the hearing aid. Indeed, some prohibit the use of hearing aids (<em>Dovev Meisharim</em>, <em>Levushei Yom Tov</em> §15; R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv cited in <em>Orḥot</em> <em>Shabbat</em> 26:23). However, in practice many have permitted the hearing-impaired to use hearing aids, including <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 4:85. Those who maintain that turning on an electrical appliance without an incandescent filament is rabbinically prohibited because it creates a new flow of electricity in the wires do not view increasing the current as a new creative act. At worst, it might be deemed a weekday activity, in which case one may be lenient in the case of a great need. Similarly, for those who believe that turning on an appliance is prohibited on account of <em>Boneh</em> or because it is creating a <em>kli</em>, there is no problem here; since the hearing aid is already on, increasing the current creates nothing new. Based on these rationales, the following authorities permit the use of a hearing aid: R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach; <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 6:6; SSK 34:28; <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 1:19:19; <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 2:17. See <em>Encyclopedia Talmudit</em> vol. 18, pp. 731-732. It is true that Rav Kook in <em>Oraḥ</em> <em>Mishpat</em> §71 prohibits speaking into a microphone, because the speech causes electric current to flow. He explains that this cannot be considered <em>grama</em> since the result is direct and immediate. It seems, though, that since the sound waves resulting from normal speech are only converted to electric current once they reach the hearing aid, this can be considered <em>ko’aḥ</em> <em>sheni </em>(“secondary power”), a form of <em>grama</em>, as explained in <em>San.</em> 77b and <em>Ḥullin</em> 16a. <em>Grama</em> is permitted under pressing circumstances, as explained in <em>Shabbat</em> 120a, SA 334:20, and Rema <em>ad loc.</em>; see above, 9:9.</i>
  Just as one may not turn on a microphone before Shabbat with the intention of using it on Shabbat, so is leaving on an intercom over Shabbat to hear the voices of people coming to visit, or to hear what is going on in the children’s room. To be sure, if one simply speaks normally in the room and not directly into the intercom, the prohibition is less severe since it is then a case of grama. It is nevertheless prohibited, because it is a weekday activity, it belittles Shabbat, and it produces sound with an object designed for that purpose. However, if the intercom was accidentally left on over Shabbat, as long as one does not intend to use it he may speak in a normal fashion in the room with the intercom.4<i class="footnote">One who uses a microphone fully intends to speak into it, and this is the normal way to amplify a voice, so it is not considered <em>grama</em>. In contrast, if one simply speaks normally in a room that has a baby monitor and thereby projects his voice over the intercom, since this is not the normal way to converse and his mouth is far from the intercom, it is considered <em>ko’aḥ sheni </em>and thus <em>grama</em>, as in the case of a hearing aid (though this requires further study; see <em>Harḥavot</em>). However, since the sound can be heard in the room with the receiver, it is a weekday activity and belittles Shabbat. It might also be considered <em>hashma’at kol</em> (Rema 338:1; <em>Oraḥ Mishpat</em> §71; also see Rema 252:5). In contrast, if the intercom was left on accidentally, then since one who speaks in that room is using it only via <em>grama</em>, and he is not interested in making his voice heard, this is a case of <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em> in the case of a rabbinic prohibition, where one may be lenient in a case of need. In pressing circumstances, such as when one is sick, one may be lenient and leave an intercom on. See <em>Terumat</em> <em>Ha</em>–<em>goren</em> §79. <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> (vol. 5, pp. 403-405) permits this even <em>le-khatḥila</em>. One should only rely on this leniency under pressing circumstances.</i>
  
  Section 4
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Elevators
  One may not operate an elevator on Shabbat. Pressing the elevator buttons involves Torah prohibitions or, minimally, rabbinic prohibitions. However, some “Shabbat elevators” are set to operate automatically, meaning that they are set before Shabbat to stop on every floor or every other floor, at which point the doors open on their own for a predetermined amount of time and then close on their own. The elevator then continues on its way. There is a difference of opinion among the poskim regarding these elevators.
  Some prohibit using a Shabbat elevator, maintaining that using it is a weekday activity. Additionally, entering the elevator causes its motor to use more electricity when the elevator goes up and down (Ḥelkat Yaakov, OḤ §144; Minḥat Yitzḥak 3:60; Ḥut Shani vol. 1, p. 206; R. Shmuel Wosner).
  Others maintain that one may go up in a Shabbat elevator but not down. This is because when the elevator goes down, the extra weight helps produce electricity. Thus one who rides the elevator has a hand in generating electricity (R. Levi Yitzḥak Halperin, Ma’aliyot Be-Shabbat).
  A third opinion maintains that a Shabbat elevator may be used. Since the settings are in place before Shabbat, and no action needs to be taken on Shabbat to make the elevator work, there is no prohibition. The fact that the elevator has a system that determines the weight of the passenger, which in turn tells the motor how much power to use, and even makes use of the additional weight to produce electricity, is of no interest to the rider. As long as the elevator goes up and down according to its settings, the passenger does not care about the elevator’s electricity-conserving mechanisms. Therefore, the actions caused indirectly by his entry into the elevator are not attributable to him at all (it is a psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei via grama; this is the position of R. Yosef Eliyahu Henkin; R. Isser Yehuda Unterman; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in SSK 23:58; Prof. Ze’ev Lev in Teḥumin 2; and R. Yisrael Rosen in Teḥumin 5.)
  In practice, the lenient position is the primary one, while those who are stringent are commendable. In a case of need, even those who are normally stringent may be lenient. Those who are lenient must be careful not to enter or exit the Shabbat elevator when the door is about to close, so as to avoid causing it to reopen. Even for those who are lenient, it is better if the automatic system is programmed under the supervision of an organization that specializes in halakha and technology, as this can help ensure that entering the elevator does not turn on a light or the like and minimize the prohibitions involved according to the stringent view.5<i class="footnote">The lenient position is the primary one, as its reasoning is compelling. Furthermore, it does not seem reasonable to view entering an elevator as worse than <em>grama</em> (as this is not a direct action but <em>ko’aḥ sheni</em>). Some are lenient even <em>le-khatḥila</em> in a case of <em>grama</em><em>Taz</em> 514:7). To be sure, most <em>poskim</em> permit <em>grama</em> only in cases of need (SA 334:22), but here the <em>grama</em> is combined with a <em>psik reisha</em>, so it is permitted even <em>le-khatḥila</em><em>Minḥat Shlomo</em> 1:10:6; see above 9:9 and <em>Harḥavot</em>). In any case, even according to those who do not allow entering a Shabbat elevator, the prohibition is rabbinic, since one who enters the elevator does not intend to do a <em>melakha</em>. Since the <em>poskim</em> disagree, the law follows the principle that we are lenient in cases of doubt about a rabbinic rule.</i>
  
  Section 5
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Using Electricity that Was Produced on Shabbat
  Power supply is a vital need of the State of Israel all week, including Shabbat. Interrupting or impairing the supply can endanger human life. Hospitals are full of devices that depend on the supply of power, and even in private homes there are people who are dangerously ill who rely on electrical devices to stay alive. Police officers and security forces use electrical equipment, and without electricity they would be unable to respond properly to emergencies. On cold days, many homes are heated using electricity. If the electricity were to be withheld on Shabbat, babies and sick people would likely be at risk. Very hot days can also pose a certain risk for those who are ill and require air conditioning. In addition, since nowadays we store food for an extended amount of time in refrigerators and freezers, this food may spoil if the electricity is cut off. In a large population, some would likely contract food poisoning, which can be life-threatening.
  Therefore, it is necessary for the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) – whose employees are predominantly Jewish – to supply electricity nonstop, even on Shabbat. If there is some impairment to the supply of electricity in a particular location, whatever is needed to fix it must be done. Since technicians may fix the grid on Shabbat, everyone may benefit from the electricity that is subsequently generated, even though it was restored on Shabbat. The only exception is if a power outage takes place in a small area where it is known for certain that there is no risk to human life involved, in which case the repair may not be made on Shabbat. If it was nevertheless repaired by Jews on Shabbat, one may not benefit from the electricity until an hour after Shabbat. (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, quoted in SSK ch. 32 n. 182; below, 26:6).
  Much to our dismay, it is known that IEC workers perform activities on Shabbat that are not essential to guaranteeing the electricity supply, but that are for the purpose of saving money. Furthermore, if there were greater awareness of Shabbat observance, it would be possible to automate the entire electricity-generating system and eliminate the need for human intervention without extra expenses. It would only be necessary to have a few workers in the power stations, monitoring the system and troubleshooting emergencies. However, since in fact the IEC does not try to avoid performing melakha on Shabbat, several leading rabbis ruled that one should not use its electricity on Shabbat (but rather use a local generator) to avoid benefiting from Shabbat desecration or supporting it in any way. (See Ḥazon Ish, OḤ 38:4.)
  In practice, though, this electricity may be used on Shabbat, even in Israel. It is true that the IEC could take measures before Shabbat to avoid some of the Shabbat violations. Nevertheless, when its technicians do what is necessary to guarantee the electricity supply, they are not desecrating Shabbat, since electricity is necessary for people to live. Because of this, everyone may benefit from the electricity. Since the consumers do not benefit from the melakhot performed by the IEC technicians for the sole purpose of saving money, and from their perspective it would be better if the procedures were automated, they may benefit from the electricity on Shabbat (see Ha-ḥashmal Ba-halakha vol. 2 ch. 1; Menuḥat Ahava 1:24:1). We have recently learned of efforts to automate the grid and prevent Shabbat desecration.
  
  Section 6
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Timers
  Shabbat prohibitions become forbidden at the onset of Shabbat, but before Shabbat begins, one may take actions whose effects will continue into Shabbat. A prominent example of this is using a timer (“Shabbos clock”). Such timers are connected to the power supply and to an appliance, and its settings control the flow of electricity, determining when the device will turn on and off. This is how, nowadays, we can set electric lights to go on and off over the course of Shabbat. One may leave on lights before Shabbat and set the timer to turn them off at bedtime, on again at lunch time, and off again for the afternoon before turning on again for se’uda shlishit. Similarly, one can use a timer to turn on an electric oven or fan, setting it so that the appliance will go on and off at the desired times.
  If one sets a timer to turn off the lights at 11 PM, but then decides that he would like to study Torah until midnight, some say that he may not delay the time that the lights will be extinguished by adjusting the timer’s settings, as in their opinion, the timer is an integral part of the lighting system, and the Sages forbade taking any action that effects a change in the duration of the lights’ operation. This can be inferred from the talmudic case of attaching an oil-filled container to an oil lamp, which the Sages forbid out of concern that one might remove some of the oil on Shabbat (Shabbat 29b; Beitza 22:1).
  Others, including R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, offer a different perspective. They maintain that delaying the time the lights will go out is comparable to the case of one who is sitting in a room with a lit oil lamp. If the wind starts to blow though his window, threatening to extinguish the light, everyone agrees that he may close the window, even though this allows the lamp to burn longer. Since he is not doing anything to the lamp itself, but merely preventing the wind from blowing it out, there is no prohibition. Similarly, one who extends the settings of a timer is not doing anything to the light itself or to the electrical appliance, but merely preventing the timer from turning them off. Assuming that this action is permitted, the switches on the timer are not muktzeh, and they may be adjusted.
  Since the rationale of those who are lenient is compelling and also accords with the widespread practice, one may rely on their opinion even le-khatḥila. Therefore, one may take action to extend the current state of affairs. If the electricity is off, one may extend the time that it will remain off and have the lights go on later. If the electricity is on, he may lengthen the time that it will remain on, and have the lights go out later. Similarly, if the lights are off, one can move the light switch to the off position, so that when the timer eventually restores the power, those lights will not go back on (SSK 13:26-33).6<i class="footnote">. Some maintain that making any change to the settings of an electric timer is prohibited by Torah law (<em>Yaskil</em> <em>Avdi</em> 7:23), while others maintain that only certain kinds of changes are prohibited by Torah law (<em>Igrot Moshe</em>, YD 3:47:4; <em>Az Nidberu</em> 3:25 and 8:32). If this opinion is correct, then the problem of <em>muktzeh</em> also comes into play. Nevertheless, the logic of those who are lenient is very compelling, as explained in <em>Harḥavot</em>. First, the stringent position is based on the opinion of Rosh and those who follow him, with which many disagree (above ch. 16 n. 1). Second, it would seem that even Rosh would permit in this case, as the action of adjusting the timer is not done directly to the lights. Indeed, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach writes thus in <em>Minḥat Shlomo</em> §13, as does R. Ovadia Yosef in <em>Yabi’a Omer</em>, OḤ 3:18.It should be added that when the lights are off, one may increase the time they will remain off, even if they will go on in the interim period. In other words, if the lights are off during the night, and are set to go back on at 10 AM and turn off again at noon, one may adjust the timer so that the lights will go off at 11 AM. The principle is that while the lights are off, one may cause them to be off for a longer period of time. This is true whether the current state is being extended, or whether the future state is being extended following a period when the lights will be on. Similarly, while the lights are on, one may cause them to be on for a longer period of time, even if in the interim they will turn off for a certain amount of time (SSK 13:30).</i>
  However, one may not change the timer so that lights or appliances will go on or off earlier. For example, if the timer was set so that the lights would go off at midnight, but it turns out that people want to go to sleep earlier, one may not adjust the timer’s settings to make the lights go off earlier. Although he is not turning them off directly because his actions will not have any effect until later, nevertheless indirectly causing lights to go off is rabbinically forbidden. Similarly, if the timer was set to turn the lights on at 10 AM, it may not be adjusted to make the lights come on earlier, as indirectly causing lights to go on is rabbinically prohibited.7<i class="footnote">This applies under normal circumstances. However, in cases of need, those who are lenient allow causing a timer to turn the lights on earlier. According to most <em>poskim</em>, using a timer is considered <em>grama</em>, which some permit even <em>le-khatḥila</em> (<em>Taz</em>), and most permit in times of need (as explained above 9:9). This is the position of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach as cited in SSK 13:29, and of R. Ovadia Yosef in <em>Yabi’a Omer</em>, OḤ 3:18. Therefore, when one is sick (even if he is not dangerously ill), if the lights are disturbing his sleep and the timer is set to turn off the lights in a couple of hours, the settings may be changed so that the lights will go out in half an hour instead. An additional reason to be lenient is that turning off lights is only a rabbinic prohibition (above, section 1). In a case of dire necessity, one may make the lights turn on earlier for the sake of a mitzva, such as if the lack of light would cause one to waste much time that would have been spent learning Torah. In deference to the stringent position, however, it is proper to use a <em>shinui</em> when making the adjustment.</i>
  
  Section 7
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Thermostat Controls
  The laws of thermostat controls are the same as those of an electric timer. Some poskim maintain that one may not adjust a thermostat. According to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and others, one may change the setting if it will lead to the extension of the current state.
  For example, if one set the thermostat of an electric oil-filled radiator to medium before Shabbat, but on Shabbat realizes that it is hotter than he had expected, he may lower the setting of the thermostat once it has switched the radiator off. Thus, he ensures that the radiator will remain off for a longer period of time, and the heating element will work for a shorter period of time. However, one may not lower the thermostat while the radiator is on, because this changes the current state by causing the heating element to cycle off sooner.
  If, during the course of Shabbat, one wants a radiator to stay on for longer, he must wait until the radiator has cycled on, and the temperature of the radiator has reached at least yad soledet bo (at least 71 degrees Celsius). Then he may turn up the thermostat so that the radiator will stay on for longer. However, if he does this when the temperature is below yad soledet bo, he transgresses Bishul, because he is causing the oil inside the radiator to heat up. Once the radiator has cycled off, it is not permissible under any circumstances to turn up the thermostat, because this will change the current state and may lead to the radiator turning on immediately.
  The same rules apply to air conditioners and refrigerators that have manual thermostats. When the compressor has cycled on, one may turn down the temperature, which will keep the refrigerator or air conditioner on longer. When the compressor has cycled off, one may turn up the temperature, which will keep the machine off longer (Minḥat Shlomo §10; SSK 23:24).
  Of course, all of this assumes that there is no display recording the temperature. However, if the thermostat is adjusted by pressing buttons to change the temperature, and this is shown in an electronic display (as is the case with many air conditioners), then it is prohibited, both on account of Kotev, and because each press of a button makes direct use of electricity.
  
  Section 8
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Opening a Refrigerator or Oven, and Entering an Air-Conditioned Room
  If opening the door of a refrigerator causes an electrical event to occur, one may not open the door on Shabbat. Most refrigerators have an electric light inside that goes on automatically when the refrigerator door is opened. Thus, if the light has not been removed before Shabbat, one may not open the refrigerator on Shabbat. There are also refrigerators where a fan turns on or off whenever the door is opened. These refrigerators and any with similar electrical mechanisms may not be opened on Shabbat.
  In contrast, if it has been ensured that opening the refrigerator will not turn anything on or off, one may open the door on Shabbat. Indeed, some permit opening a refrigerator when the compressor has cycled on but prohibit opening the refrigerator when the compressor is off, as opening the door causes warm air to enter the refrigerator. Since the compressor is activated by an internal thermostat, opening the refrigerator may cause the compressor to go on immediately, or at least sooner than it would have otherwise.
  However, in practice one may open the refrigerator even when the compressor is off. There are a number of reasons for this. First, it is unintentional: The person opening the door does not intend to turn on the compressor. Second, it is uncertain whether opening the door will cause the compressor to turn on, as it is possible that the compressor was about to cycle on anyway. Third, even if opening the door does cause the compressor to cycle on, this was only done indirectly, via grama, as opening the door does not itself turn on the compressor. It simply causes warm air to enter, which may in turn affect the compressor. Accordingly, one does not need to worry about a case where there is uncertainty regarding grama combined with lack of intent.
  For the same reason, one may drink cold water from a water cooler without checking whether or not the compressor has cycled on. One may also enter a room that has a working air conditioner that is controlled by a thermostat, even though opening the door may cause the air conditioner to cycle on. First, it is not certain that opening the door will cause the air conditioner to cycle on. Even if it does cycle on, this was accomplished via grama. Similarly, one may open a door or window in a room that has a thermostat-regulated heater or air conditioner. This is because the person opening the door or window does not intend to affect the machine, it is not certain that opening the door or window will in fact do so, and if the machine is affected it will have been accomplished through grama.
  However, many are stringent regarding an oven that is controlled by a thermostat and will not open such an oven when the heating element has cycled off. Since it is a small appliance, opening the door is more likely to cause it to cycle on. To avoid this problem, some ovens have a Shabbat setting in which the oven produces a steady heat and does not respond to a thermostat. When the oven is on this setting, all agree that it may be opened and shut at will.8<i class="footnote">As explained in 9:9 above, some permit <em>grama </em>even <em>le-khatḥila</em>, while most only permit it in cases of need. Here, even if the act of opening the oven door will definitely turn on the heating element, since he does not intend to turn it on, it is simply a <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em>, which is permitted even under normal circumstances. This point is even more relevant if it is possible that the oven would have cycled on even if left alone. In that case, opening the door accomplishes nothing. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach writes this regarding a refrigerator (<em>Minḥat Shlomo</em> 1:10), as do R. Ovadia Yosef (<em>Yabi’a Omer</em>, OḤ 1:21) and R. Eliezer Waldenberg (<em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 8:12). However, many recommend being stringent and opening the refrigerator only when the compressor is already on; only then is it impossible for opening the door to cause the compressor to turn on, as it is already on. Even though the influx of warm air will lead the compressor to stay on for longer, this is not prohibited (<em>Responsa</em> <em>Har Tzvi</em>, OḤ 1:151; <em>Ḥelkat Yaakov</em> 3:179). Nevertheless, the bottom line is that one may open a refrigerator without checking whether or not the compressor is on.The law regarding opening a refrigerator is more lenient than the law regarding opening an electric oven. There are two reasons for this distinction. First, an oven is small, and thus opening the door is likely to cause it to cycle on. There is a slight possibility that this would not be considered <em>grama</em>, but rather a direct action. In contrast, a refrigerator is large, and it is unlikely that opening the door will affect it immediately. If this were to happen, it would definitely be considered <em>grama</em>. Second, according to many <em>poskim</em>, turning on the refrigerator’s compressor is only a rabbinic prohibition, since there is no heating element (above, n. 1). In contrast, turning on the oven’s heating element is prohibited by Torah law according to all opinions. Reflecting this distinction, SSK 1:35 is stringent about opening the door of an electric oven, while when it comes to a refrigerator he records the lenient position as well. In contrast, <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 4:74, <em>Bishul</em> 28 is lenient even in the case of an electric oven with a thermostat. He maintains that one may open the door even when the oven has cycled off, because it is an uncertain <em>psik reisha </em>in the case of a rabbinic prohibition (as it is performed via <em>grama</em>), and such a combination is permitted. Regarding opening the door of a room that has a radiator or air conditioner, almost no one is stringent. Since there is a relatively large distance between the door and the air conditioner or radiator, even those who are stringent would agree that this is considered <em>grama</em>. See above 10:17.</i>
  
  Section 9
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / When the Refrigerator Light Bulb was not Disconnected
  If one did not remove or disable the light bulb of a refrigerator before Shabbat, he may not open or close the door on Shabbat, as this will turn the light on or off. If one needs the food in the refrigerator for Shabbat, he may seek the help of a nearby non-Jew. In order to avoid the prohibition of benefiting from a melakha performed by a non-Jew, one should offer him food from the refrigerator, at which point he will open the door for his own benefit. Once the non-Jew has opened the refrigerator for himself, the Jew may take whatever he needs out of the refrigerator as well. Although generally one may not ask a non-Jew to perform a melakha on Shabbat, here one is not asking him to perform a melakha. Rather, one is asking him to open the refrigerator, which also happens to turn on the light. Afterward, in order to continue opening and closing the refrigerator permissibly, one may ask the non-Jew to remove the bulb, because turning off electric lights is only prohibited rabbinically, and one may ask a non-Jew to transgress a rabbinic prohibition for the sake of Shabbat (above 9:11; below 25:2, 5).
  If no non-Jew is available, and the food is truly needed, then when the compressor has cycled off, the refrigerator may be unplugged using a shinui, such as by prying the plug out of the socket using a thin piece of wood or plastic. Since the plug is muktzeh, it may not be moved in the normal fashion (below 23:14).9<i class="footnote">. SSK 10:14 permits one to pull the plug using a <em>shinui</em>, but only if it often plugged and unplugged. If this is not the case, he is concerned that unplugging it might qualify as <em>Soter</em>. In 15:3 above I write that even if a particular appliance is not plugged and unplugged regularly, the law follows the majority of plugs (which are plugged and unplugged regularly), and we do not distinguish between types of plug. Therefore, there is no problem of <em>Boneh</em> or <em>Soter</em>. <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 1:24:20 is not concerned about this and allows one to remove the plug with a <em>shinui</em>. In any case, as long as a <em>shinui</em> is used, then even concerns of <em>Boneh</em> and <em>Soter</em> amount to a doubt about a rabbinic law, and when necessary one may be lenient. However, it is still forbidden to plug the appliance back in. See <em>Harḥavot</em> for what to do in a case of dire necessity.Nowadays, most refrigerators have near-constant electrical activity, and pulling the plug puts an immediately stop to this activity, resulting in an act of <em>Mekhabeh</em>. Nevertheless, as long as one pulls the plug with a <em>shinui</em>, since the prohibition of turning off electricity is rabbinic, it is a <em>shvut di-shvut</em>, which is permitted for the sake of a mitzva, as explained above in 9:11.Asking a minor: In cases of necessity, when the food is needed to feed a minor, one may ask the child to open the refrigerator. Since he has no intention of turning the light on, his act of opening the door is only prohibited rabbinically, and several Rishonim maintain that one may instruct a minor to transgress a rabbinic prohibition for his own needs. Some extend this leniency to cases of great need, and when necessary one may rely on them, as explained below 24:5 and in Harḥavot here.</i>
  In a case where one is uncertain whether or not the bulb was removed, many poskim maintain that one may open the refrigerator. First, he does not intend to turn on the light, but only to open the refrigerator. If the light does go on, it is a case of psik reisha – he is performing a permitted action, and a second prohibited action takes place collaterally – which is normally prohibited. However, since the prohibited action might not occur, this is a case of an uncertain (safek) psik reisha, which is not prohibited. Although some are stringent in such cases, the lenient position is the primary one.
  If the refrigerator was opened and the light went on, food that is needed may be removed. The refrigerator should not be closed. Rather, a towel or some other object should be positioned in a way that prevents the refrigerator from closing and turning off the light. This way, the refrigerator can also be reopened.10<i class="footnote">The status of a <em>safek psik reisha</em> is subject to dispute. <em>Taz</em> permits it, while R. Akiva Eger forbids it. The <em>poskim</em> tend to be lenient in times of necessity, especially when it is a <em>psik reisha</em> <em>de-lo niḥa lei</em>, in which case it is a case of doubt about a rabbinic law, as explained in BHL 316:3 s.v. “ve-lakhen.” SSK 10:15 applies this rule to the case of a refrigerator, as does <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 1:24:20. See above, 9:5 and n. 2 and <em>Harḥavot</em> 9:5:8. If the refrigerator has been opened and the light is already on, and one is desperate to close the refrigerator door so that the food will not spoil, he should push the door in the opposite direction and then let it swing shut on its own. This way it is closed via <em>grama</em>. As <em>San</em>. 77b explains, if one throws a rock upward, and it then falls straight down, such an action is considered <em>grama</em> )<em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> ch. 29 n. 38).</i>
  
  Section 10
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Dishwashers
  A dishwasher may not be activated on Shabbat. This is because one may not use electricity, and additionally because the dishwasher heats water to wash the dishes. This heating is a transgression of Bishul.
  One who always clears off dirty dishes from the table and places them directly in the dishwasher may do so on Shabbat as well. Then after Shabbat he can run the dishwasher. However, if he does not generally do this, then he may not do so on Shabbat, as it would amount to preparing on Shabbat for the weekdays, which is forbidden.
  One may not even turn on a dishwasher via a timer, because the dishwasher is designed so that it will not go on unless the door is closed. This means that the person who closes the door to the dishwasher after the dishes have been loaded causes it to turn on (SSK 12:37). However, in times of need, when there will be a great need to wash many dishes on Shabbat and it would be extremely difficult to wash them by hand, one may set the dishwasher with a timer. This is because causing it to turn on by closing the door is considered grama. Since an action performed via grama is not a true melakha, in times of need it is permitted (above 9:9; Responsa Me-rosh Tzurim §30).
  If one can disable the system that makes the dishwasher’s activation dependent on closing the door, so that the dishwasher will go on at the set time even if the door is not shut, then even in ordinary circumstances one may load the dirty dishes and have the dishwasher wash them during Shabbat (R. Yeḥiel Faust, Le-ohavai Yesh 1).
  
  Section 11
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Automatic Doors
  One may not approach a door that automatically opens when it senses someone near it. One who does so is viewed as directly triggering the electricity that opens the door. It is immaterial whether the system works through floor sensors, an electric eye, a motion detector, or the like. As we have seen (section 2), according to many, including Rav Kook, turning on an electrical appliance is prohibited by Torah law.
  One who finds himself in a hotel or hospital with automatic doors must find an alternative way to enter that does not involve using electricity. If a non-Jew approaches the door in order to enter, a Jew may follow him in (below 25:1-2). But if the person approaching the door is a Jew who does not observe Shabbat, a Shabbat observer may not follow him in, because the Shabbat observer may not benefit from the Shabbat desecration of a fellow Jew. Furthermore, when an observant Jew takes advantage of Shabbat desecration and benefits from it, it is considered a desecration of God’s name. Even though some are lenient in this case, it is proper to be stringent. Only under pressing circumstances, when there is no alternative, may one rely on those who are lenient.11<i class="footnote">Some are lenient and allow an observant Jew to follow a non-observant Jew through an automatic door, maintaining that this is not considered benefiting from <em>melakha</em> performed on Shabbat, since opening the door is merely removing an obstacle (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in SSK 18:63). Furthermore, if the person who opens the door is considered an unintentional transgressor, in times of necessity one may rely on the opinion of R. Meir that one may benefit from <em>melakha</em> performed by such a person on Shabbat (MB 318:7). In contrast, there are reasons to be stringent. First, many maintain that opening such a door is considered a <em>melakha</em> performed on Shabbat (<em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 2:77). Second, the scenario of an observant Jew waiting for a non-observant Jew in order to benefit from his Shabbat desecration constitutes a desecration of God’s name. Therefore, one may be lenient only under pressing circumstances.</i>
  Doctors and nurses may enter a hospital through an automatic door, as their work entails saving lives. Others may then follow them through the door. Ideally, the hospital administration should try to minimize the need for Shabbat desecration and arrange alternative entrances for visitors and staff to enter without activating any electrical devices.
  Some say that if one unintentionally came too close to an automatic door, thus causing it to open, he must remain in place, because moving away will cause the door to close. They maintain that he should wait until a non-Jew arrives and ask the non-Jew to stand near him, at which point he can leave. Afterward, when the non-Jew leaves as well, the non-Jew will be the one who causes the door to close. However, if remaining in place causes the Jew anguish, he may simply leave, as he is just walking normally and does not care if the door is open or closed. His act of leaving is a psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei brought about via grama, which is not forbidden. Even if the person who mistakenly caused the automatic door to open did in fact want to enter, in a time of need he may still enter, since the melakha was unintentional. In contrast, if he intended for the door to open but forgot, and only later remembered, that it is forbidden, he should not enter, because one may not benefit from a melakha that was unknowingly  (albeit intentionally) performed on Shabbat (SA 318:1; see n. 11 above and 26:4 below).
  
  Section 12
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / When Entering a Room Causes the Lights to Turn On
  One may not enter a room where doing so automatically turns on the lights or air conditioning. While one might claim that he did not intend to turn on the lights or air conditioning by entering the room, the fact is that everyone knows how the system works in such places.
  This problem is common in hotel rooms and bathrooms. One who stays in such a hotel must make sure that the system is switched off before Shabbat. If he did not take care of this in advance and is outside his room when Shabbat begins, he may ask a non-Jew to open the door for him. He should further ask the non-Jew to stay for a bit so that the non-Jew will benefit from the lights or air conditioning, since he is then viewed as having turned them on for his own sake, and the Jew may then benefit from them (below, 25:2).
  What if the hotel guest is inside such a room when Shabbat begins, and he knows that if he leaves he will cause the lights or air conditioning to shut off? If he can easily stay inside until after Shabbat, or if a non-Jew is due to come shortly to disable the system, it is preferable to wait inside. However, if doing so causes him anguish, he may leave the room or bathroom because the purpose of this system is to save the hotel money by conserving electricity. The hotel guest does not care about that, so it is a case of psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei regarding a rabbinic prohibition (since all agree that the prohibition of turning off the lights or air conditioning is rabbinic). When necessary, in such a case, one may be lenient (above, ch. 9 n. 2).
  However, as we saw earlier, once the guest has left his room he will not be able to return to it, because doing so will turn on the lights and air conditioning. The only way for him to re-enter would be with the help of a non-Jew. Therefore, the proper course of action in this case is to ask a non-Jew to disable the system. Then the guest will be able to enter and exit the room as needed.12<i class="footnote">The claim that one may enter a room where the lights and air conditioning will automatically turn on since one is not interested in this happening is not legitimate. Part of the reason the system was put into place to begin with was to make one’s life easier by relieving him of the need to turn on the lights and air conditioning every time he enters the room. Just because he does not want it to happen on account of a Shabbat prohibition does not make this a <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em>. See <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 26:28, n. 41 and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> vol. 3, pp. 55-56.</i>
  
  Section 13
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Intercoms, Security Monitors, and Doorbells at Building Entrances
  Some buildings use closed-circuit television (CCTV), in which surveillance cameras transmit images to monitors. A non-Jewish security guard stationed at the entrance keeps an eye on the people who come and go by watching the monitors. When people whom the guard recognizes as residents of the building or their guests arrive at the front door, he pushes an electric button that unlocks the door, allowing them to enter. Since this system is beneficial to the Jewish residents and guests of the building, a Jew may not stand where his image will be captured on the monitor. Similarly, if a Jew wishes to enter the building, he may not press the intercom button to request that the guard unlock the door for him, since using electricity is prohibited.13<i class="footnote">. In addition to causing electrical activity, one who stands in a place where his image will be captured on the monitor transgresses <em>Kotev </em>as well (on the rabbinic level, since the image is not permanent). See <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 15:35 and 26:27. However, when one has no interest in this happening, he may walk where there are cameras or sensors installed, even though his movements cause electrical activity, as explained in the next section.</i>
  Therefore, one should make certain that the place where the guard sits is not far from the front door. Then, when a Jew wishes to enter, he can knock on the door while standing out of camera range, so that the guard can see him and unlock the door for him. If the non-Jew elects to open it using the electric release button, the Jew may still enter, since it is also possible for the non-Jew to open the door manually. If the non-Jew prefers to use the door release button, he is doing so for his own convenience, and not for the benefit of the Jew.
  If there is a non-Jew entering the building at the same time as the Jew, even if the non-Jew makes use of the electricity, the Jew can follow him in, since the non-Jew is doing this for his own benefit. If it is a non-observant Jew who makes use of the electricity in order to enter, one may not follow him in, since he may not benefit from melakha done by a fellow Jew on Shabbat. Additionally, this constitutes a desecration of God’s name. Although some are lenient in this regard, it is proper to be stringent. Only under pressing circumstances, when there is no alternative, may one rely on those who are lenient (as explained above, ch. 11 n. 11).
  If one wishes to enter a building, but no one inside the building hears him knocking and calling out, may he ring an electric doorbell to gain admission? Some maintain that under pressing circumstances one may ring the bell using a shinui, while others forbid this. Under pressing circumstances, when there is no other solution, one who wishes to may rely on the lenient opinion provided that this leniency is not used regularly, as doing so regularly belittles Shabbat.14<i class="footnote">According to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and those who follow him in stating that using electricity is prohibited rabbinically, ringing the bell with a <em>shinui</em> renders his action a <em>shvut di-shvut</em>, and under pressing circumstances he may be lenient. However, for those who maintain that using electricity is prohibited by Torah law, even with a <em>shinui</em> it is still only a single <em>shvut</em>, which remains forbidden. Since according to all opinions, ringing the bell with a <em>shinui</em> renders the prohibition rabbinic, there is a rabbinic doubt about whether this is a case of <em>shvut di-shvut</em> or not. Accordingly, one who wishes may be lenient. As I have written above (ch. 9 n. 7), the entire leniency of <em>shvut di-shvut</em> may be utilized only rarely, under pressing circumstances.If one accidentally presses a doorbell, he should stop pressing as soon as he realizes what he has done, because this act of stopping is not considered an action. If a light will turn on when he stops ringing the bell, some prohibit this (SSK 23:56). Others permit it, insisting that letting go of the bell is not considered an action. (See Kedushat Ha-Shabbat vol. 2, p. 27.) Under pressing circumstances, one may be lenient.</i>
  
  Section 14
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Motion Detectors in Public Domains and in the Home
  One may walk where security cameras record images of passersby. Since the pedestrian has no interest in being videoed, he is not held responsible for his image being recorded, and there is no prohibition. Similarly, one may pass through a metal detector, since one who goes through is not interested in its electrical activity. One may also walk on a street where there are motion detectors that detect the movements of passersby. Even if a security system turns a light on when it senses movement, one may walk past it, because he is innocently walking through and is not interested in turning on the light. However, if it is not difficult, it is preferable to use an alternate route, since indirectly causing an electric light to go on is not properly respectful of Shabbat.
  A private home might have a security system in which the burglar alarm has been disarmed, but the sensors continue working. Consequently, whenever one passes by certain places, LED security lights go on, or images are recorded. Some forbid walking around in such a house on Shabbat since doing so will cause electrical activity. They maintain that if one wishes to walk there, he must either disable the entire system or cover all the sensors so they will not detect a person’s movements. (See R. Mordechai Eliyahu, She’elot U-teshuvot Ha-Rav Ha-Rashi, 5750-5753, p. 174.)
  Others permit walking there. This is because one simply wishes to walk, and has no interest in triggering sensors or having his image captured; the only reason he does not deactivate them is because it is so difficult to do (Si’aḥ Naḥum §25). This is the primary position. Nevertheless, if possible, it is preferable to disable the sensors.
  One must disable a light that automatically turns on when one approaches the entrance to one’s house, because he benefits from the light in this case. Even if he does not benefit, it is not properly respectful to Shabbat to cause the light to go on. In a case of need, when the system is activated and there is no other way to enter the house, one can crawl through in such a way that the light might not turn on. Even if it is almost certain that the light will still turn on, turning it on by crawling constitutes a shinui. Additionally, he should keep his eyes closed so that he will not benefit from the light when it goes on.
  
  Section 15
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Security Systems
  When a home security system is necessary for protection against thieves, there are two possible ways to set it up in a halakhically acceptable fashion. The best way is to use a timer. One may set the timer to arm the system during the hours when people are in bed or out of the house and disarm the system during the hours when people are awake and going in and out of the house. The problem with this is that if schedules change, the system needs to be changed, and if doing this involves using electricity, it is absolutely forbidden on Shabbat. If the system has an external timer, one may extend the current state, as explained above (section 6; under pressing circumstances one may also shorten the time, as explained in n. 7).
  The second possibility is to use a special key that works via grama. Such a key disarms the security system when turned in one direction and arms it when turned in the other direction. To avoid transgression, the key must not cause any immediate electrical activity. Rather, it activates a mechanism that will eventually activate or disconnect electricity powering the alarm. Even though performing melakha through grama is normally prohibited le-khatḥila, when the only alternative will result in loss, one may be lenient.15<i class="footnote">. Within this second possibility, there are two permissible options. The first is to set it up so that when the system is shut off via <em>grama</em>, all the sensors stop working, and when it is re-armed the sensors resume working. The advantage of this option is that while people are home, no sensors are activated. The disadvantage is that every turn of the key causes the electrical system to turn on or off. The second option is to arrange that the sensors are always working, while the key simply serves to connect and disconnect the alarm system. The disadvantage of this option is that every movement in the house activates the sensors (see the previous section). The advantage is that turning the key does not cause any recognizable electrical activity. Even when the system is armed, if no thief enters, the alarm will not go off.</i>
  Another question regarding security systems relates to monitoring services. In many cases, if a burglar alarms for a home or a car is triggered, the system signals a central monitoring station. Operators at the station see the signal and contact the owner to find out what happened. If the owner does not answer, the operators dispatch security personnel to apprehend the thieves. May one maintain a security system that involves such a service?
  Some are stringent and require the owner to demand that the monitoring service refrain from desecrating Shabbat on his behalf. This approach would require the service to use non-Jewish security personnel on Shabbat. Others permit using a monitoring service even if it is staffed by Jews, maintaining that every theft nowadays involves an element of danger to human life. Therefore one may hire a service that employs and sends out Jewish security personnel on Shabbat. In practice, it is proper to use a company that tries to use non-Jewish security personnel on Shabbat. If that is not an option, one may use a company that is not particular in this regard. If the alarm goes off and the service calls to find out if a dispatch is necessary, even if the personnel are non-Jews, one should answer the phone, in order to prevent them from making an unnecessary trip.16<i class="footnote"><em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 23:208 maintains that one may not hire a security service that is under Jewish ownership or hires Jewish workers. In contrast, R. Shaul Yisraeli (<em>Amud Ha-yemini</em> §17) maintains that police may take action against thieves on Shabbat because it prevents danger to human life. <em>Be-mar’eh Ha-bazak</em> 4:43 applies this approach to monitoring services as well. Nowadays, there is an additional reason to be lenient. Thieves in Israel are often connected with terrorists. Just as the Sages allowed people in border towns to defend themselves on Shabbat against robbers of straw and hay (SA 329:6), so, too, people who live anywhere in Israel may defend themselves against the thievery of terrorists (below 27:12). In practice, one should give preference to a monitoring service that tries to hire non-Jewish guards. Nevertheless, this is not absolutely necessary, because the primary position is that preventing theft involves preserving lives as well. Not only that, but one may answer the phone when the monitoring service calls to check if there was a break-in. This is similar to the case of ambulances, which we discuss in 27:10 below. All false alarms cause danger to human life. See <em>Harḥavot</em>.Connecting a synagogue ark to an alarm system and disconnecting it when the Torah scrolls are taken out to be read must be done by means of grama, that is, using a key that activates or deactivates the system only a few minutes after the key is turned. In Teḥumin 1, Rav Dasberg proposed an excellent solution that does not even require grama. See Harḥavot.</i>
  
  Section 16
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Turning Off an Alarm That Went Off on Shabbat
  If an alarm goes off on Shabbat because one touched one’s car or entered one’s house carelessly, what should be done? If the alarm goes off during the day and will stop relatively soon, one may not take any action to turn it off. However, what if it will continue to make noise for an extended period during the day or for even a short period at night? If the alarm disturbs people and causes them anguish because it prevents them from sleeping, sets them on edge, and ruins their enjoyment of Shabbat, one may turn it off, as long as one does so via a shvut di-shvut (above 9:11). This is because turning off the alarm is only prohibited rabbinically (see section 1 above), so if one turns it off with a shinui such as by pressing the appropriate button on the remote control with a spoon or the back of his finger, then the action taken is considered a shvut di-shvut. Even if turning off the alarm will make a light go on temporarily, since he does not need this light, it is considered a psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei (above 9:5).
  It is true that some forbid this, only allowing one to be lenient if a non-Jew is available to turn off the alarm. For one who follows this position, if his non-observant Jewish neighbors threaten to call the police (which will lead to additional Shabbat desecration), he should tell the neighbors where the remote control is. Then the neighbors can choose to turn the alarm off themselves rather than call the police (Melakhim Omnayikh 10:6).
  However, in practice, since this is a case of great necessity for the sake of a mitzva, one may turn off the alarm via a shvut di-shvut (see Be-ohalah shel Torah, OḤ §23; R. Dov Lior in R. Moshe Harari’s Kedushat Ha-Shabbat vol. 1, p. 303).
  
  Section 17
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Alarm Clocks, Watches, and Digital Photo Frames
  If an electric alarm clock goes off on Shabbat, one may not turn it off, because doing so involves the use of electricity. If the noise is disturbing, the clock may be wrapped in blankets and moved where it will not be heard. If there is no way to minimize the noise, and the ringing is so loud that it is difficult to rest, one may turn off the alarm using a shinui. This follows the principle that a shvut di-shvut is permitted for the sake of a mitzva (as explained in the previous section).
  Before the alarm actually goes off, one may press a button to deactivate it. Similarly, one may move an analog clock’s hands in order to delay the time that the alarm will go off. However, one may change the time to an earlier time only for the sake of a mitzva or when there is a great need (above, 6:7). One may not change the time if it involves typing words or digits or any other use of electricity.
  One may wear an electronic watch that displays the time. Even if there is a computer inside, one may wear it, since its primary purpose – displaying the time – is permitted (below, 22:8). However, if one knows that he is likely to end up using the computer, he may not wear this watch on Shabbat. Of course, one may not wear a watch that requires him to press a button to see the time, as it is muktzeh.
  One may not wear a watch that measures the room temperature and displays it, because the movements of the wearer cause the watch to work. The claim that one is not interested in this feature is patently false; if this were the case such watches would not be made, and if they were made, no one would buy them. However, if the watch detects the temperature but does not display it unless one presses the appropriate button, one may wear the watch. The reason is that the measurement is done via grama, and it is a case of a psik reisha where the person is indifferent toward the result (see above, ch. 9 n. 3).17<i class="footnote">. See SSK 28:20, 22 and <em>Yeḥaveh Da’at </em>2:49<em>, </em>which state that if one need not press an electric button to see the time, one may wear it on Shabbat, and even if it has a calculator built in, it is not considered a base for a forbidden object (<em>basis le-davar ha-asur</em>; <em>Tzitz Eliezer </em>6:6; <em>Orḥot Shabbat </em>19:43). Regarding a thermometer and the like, the relevant principle is the one described above in section 14, namely, that causing the activation of sensors that have no present purpose is permitted, but is forbidden if they have a present purpose. Regarding the adjustment of an alarm clock to an earlier or later time, see SSK 28:33; <em>Orḥot Shabbat </em>8:90-91.</i>
  Some are stringent and avoid wearing a solar-powered watch or an automatic quartz watch that is powered by movement. They are concerned that whenever the wearer moves his hand or enters a well-lit place, he causes the watch to recharge. Others are lenient on condition that the watch would be able to function for a few days without being charged, so that the charging that takes place on Shabbat is not really necessary. One who wishes may be lenient, and one who is stringent should be commended.18<i class="footnote">Those who are lenient maintain that when there is no need to charge the battery, doing so is considered <em>mitasek</em>, as he is moving his arm for entirely different purposes, and the clock is recharged incidentally and without any purpose. This is even more lenient than a <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em>; in a <em>psik reisha</em>, one plans to do a particular activity, but in the present case, moving one’s arm is not even an intentional activity. Moreover, there are some who maintain that a <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em> is permitted if the activity is rabbinically prohibited, and certainly according to those who maintain that electricity is a rabbinic prohibition, in which case the present example is a rabbinic prohibition on a rabbinic prohibition, as explained above (9:2). Moreover, it is possible that his movements will not generate electricity because the internal battery is already full. Thus, wearing it is a <em>davar she-eino mitkaven</em> that does not reach the level of a <em>psik reisha</em>. See SSK 28:28. However, when the battery needs to be full for Shabbat or even Sunday, he wants it to recharge, and it is therefore forbidden. According to those who maintain that electricity is forbidden by Torah law, one should be concerned that this is a violation of Torah law. According to those who maintain that electricity is forbidden by rabbinic law or on account of <em>Boneh</em>, there are grounds to say that even if the watch cannot continue for much longer on its own, one may still wear it, as carrying the watch or exposing it to light merely adds to the current, which is not forbidden, especially when it is done unintentionally. However, if the watch has already stopped, it is forbidden for anyone to activate it, as stated with regard to winding up the spring of a watch in SA 338:15 and MB <em>ad loc</em>. 15 (see also <em>Ḥelkat Yaakov </em>1:75; <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 6:35:8; <em>Tzitz Eliezer </em>9:20). See <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 26:50.</i>
  A digital photo frame, which stays on all week and cycles through a slideshow of family pictures or scenic views, does not need to be turned off before Shabbat. This is because everyone knows that it is automatic and is on nonstop throughout the week.
  
  Section 18
  
  Electricity and Electrical Appliances / Grama Solutions to Halakhic Problems on Shabbat
  Several organizations specialize in halakha and technology, devoting themselves to engineering electrical appliances to turn on via grama so that they may be used in cases of need. One such method is called “removing an impediment” (hasarat ha-mone’a). A second method uses a type of scanner that performs a scan every few seconds and turns an appliance on if it determines that a switch has been flipped. Thus, flipping the switch does not turn on the appliance but only causes it to be turned on indirectly. A third method is based on the principle that one may extend the present state: the appliance is set to turn on for one second every few seconds. When the switch is flipped, the next time the appliance turns on, it will not turn off after a second but will remain activated.
  Others maintain that one may not use any of these clever stratagems. If an appliance is set to be activated electronically, causing its activation is not considered grama but the normal way of activating it.
  In practice, it would seem that if one’s action causes an appliance to turn on within a short time, like it would be turned on during the week, then even if the appliance has been programmed to turn on in a grama-like way, one may not turn it on. The internal workings of the machine are not important; if it turns on in a way that looks normal, then that is not considered grama. Therefore, elevators and automatic doors may not be turned on via grama; since the goal is for them to function in their normal way soon after being turned on, it would not be considered grama. Similarly, one may not travel using a “kalno’it” (an electrical wheelchair or gold cart specially designed for use by the sick, disabled, and elderly on Shabbat), since it operates in the way that one would operate a similar device during the week.
  In contrast, when one’s action causes an appliance to turn on only with a significant delay, then if it is brought about indirectly – whether by hasarat ha-mone’a, scanning, or extending the present state – it is considered grama, and such a system may be used when needed. This is the practice regarding arming a security system: if turning a key will cause the system to work via grama, and it will only actually arm itself ten minutes after the key is turned, it is considered grama, and one may do so in cases of great need.19<i class="footnote">R. Levi Yitzḥak Halperin, the head of the Institute for Science and Halakha, maintains that in case of need, one may activate devices by “impeding an impediment.” For example, consider a device that is in working order, but a beam of light hitting a particular spot prevents the device from working. When one blocks the light beam, the device begins to work again. Thus, blocking the beam “impedes an impediment” and is considered a <em>grama</em>. According to R. Halperin, technically this is even less severe than <em>grama</em>, but many disagree with him.The Zomet Institute has developed three strategies: 1) <em>Grama</em> by means of a scanner that performs a scan every few seconds. When it detects that a switch has been moved, it activates the device. 2) Extending a state: every few seconds, the device is activated for a second before turning off. If the switch is moved, then the device will not turn off after a second, and the “on” state is thus extended. 3) The device operates constantly at a certain level of power consumption. Flipping the switch merely increases the electrical current. This relies on the numerous <em>poskim</em> who maintain that electricity is forbidden on account of <em>Molid</em>, and consequently adding to the current is not forbidden. Moreover, according to Ḥazon Ish, the prohibition of electricity is based on <em>Boneh</em>, and if the electrical current already exists, it is not prohibited to add to the current. Based on this, they permitted use of a <em>kalno’it</em>. However, according to Rav Kook and those who agree with him, as described above in section 2, increasing a current is forbidden by Torah law. In general, the Zomet Institute relies on the rulings of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, R. Yehoshua Neuwirth, and R. Ovadia Yosef, as detailed in several essays that have appeared in <em>Teḥumin </em>(the journal of contemporary halakhic issues published by the Zomet Institute).Some say that since these devices were developed for this purpose, the leniency of grama does not apply to them at all. Rather, operating them has the same status as operating normal electrical devices. Moreover, these devices breach the walls that safeguard Shabbat. This is the position of Tzitz Eliezer 21:13; Orḥot Shabbat 29:27; Shvut Yitzḥak, Grama 15:15 in the name of R. Elyashiv; Ḥut Shani vol. 1, p. 206; Binyan Av 4:17. It is also implied in Responsa Aḥiezer 3:60. Certainly all of the reasons to be stringent apply to the kalno’it: according to Rav Kook and those who agree with him (above, section 2), increasing a current is forbidden by Torah law, and according to the remaining poskim, since it moves just as it would move during the week, one may not operate it on Shabbat. They also forbid the kalno’it because it breaches the walls safeguarding Shabbat and belittles its honor.The proper approach seems to be the one we learned in 9:9 above. That is, a precondition for grama is that the action is done in a way that differs from the normal way of performing the melakha. As long as people perceive the device to be operating normally, it should not be permitted. Therefore, only if the delay is obvious and of significant duration does the device operate in a manner that sufficiently differs from the normal mode of operation on a weekday. Once the mode of operation is considered different, if the activation takes place via grama, that is, by means of a scanner, the removal of an impediment, or the extension of the present state, will it be permissible in a case of need, as is the rule in cases of grama. See Harḥavot.</i>
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Kotev, Moĥek, and Tzove’a / Kotev and Moĥek
  Kotev is the melakha of expressing ideas precisely using letters, numbers, or meaningful pictures in a manner that allows the idea to last a long time. In the Mishkan, letters were written on the posts that formed its walls so that the order, position, and orientation of each post would always be clear. Sometimes mistakes would be made, so there was a need to erase the letters and replace them with the correct ones. This is the melakha of Moḥek, erasing in order to write other letters (Shabbat 103a; Rashi on Shabbat 73a).
  At first glance, Kotev seems to be a trivial and insubstantial melakha that should not have been included on the list of serious melakhot prohibited on Shabbat. However, in truth, writing is the basis for human activity. No matter how smart one was or how good a memory one had, he would still have had difficulty remembering exactly where to place each individual post in the Mishkan. This is the case with all complex matters: if one does not write them down, he will not remember them precisely and he will lose the ability to reconstruct the knowledge he has accumulated and the achievements he has already attained. Through writing, mankind was able to develop scientifically and improve human life.
  In order to ensure that information is precise, sometimes it is necessary to erase a mistake in order to replace it with accurate information. Even if a piece of paper has a stain on it and one erases it so he can write letters instead, he transgresses Moḥek, as his erasure prepares the writing surface (SA 340:3).
  Sometimes erasing is considered a melakha even if one does not plan to write in the place of the erasure; for example, if there is an extra letter in a Torah scroll which must be erased in order to render the Torah kosher (Shabbat 104b; BHL 340:3, s.v. “ha-moḥek”).
  Using a rubber stamp is also considered Kotev. It makes no difference whether the stamp is held with the right or left hand, because the stamp can be easily used with either hand. Similarly, using a printer, photocopier, or fax machine is prohibited by Torah law on Shabbat, since doing so commits meaningful symbols or letters to writing (see MA, OḤ 32:57; Taz, YD 271:8; Igrot Moshe, OḤ 4:40:10).
  One may not type letters or characters on a computer or save them to a computer’s memory. It is also forbidden to take photographs, or to record voices or sounds. However, since these actions do not produce stable forms or letters, many maintain that the prohibition is rabbinic.1<i class="footnote">R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv and R. Mordechai Eliyahu maintain that typing on a computer is prohibited by Torah law. This would also be the position of those who maintain that using electricity is prohibited by Torah law, as explained above in 17:2. See <em>Harḥavot</em> here and there.</i>
  
  Section 2
  
  Kotev, Moĥek, and Tzove’a / Defining the Prohibition of Writing and Exploring Leniencies for Life-Threatening Situations
  It is critically important to define each melakha precisely and establish what is rabbinically prohibited and what is prohibited by Torah law, and moreover these determinations have practical consequences. For example, when writing is necessary in a hospital or in the army in order to save lives, le-khatḥila one should minimize the prohibitions one violates and write in a manner that is only rabbinically prohibited. We shall first clarify what is prohibited by Torah law and what is rabbinically prohibited, and then detail how one should write in cases where there is danger to human life.
  The Torah prohibition of Kotev refers to writing normally with the right hand, though one who writes irregularly with the left hand violates a rabbinic prohibition. A lefty who writes with his left hand violates Torah law, and if he uses his right hand he violates rabbinic law. One who is ambidextrous violates Torah law by writing with either hand (Shabbat 103a).
  If one holds the pen with a shinui – in his mouth, with his foot, or with the back of his hand – he violates a rabbinic prohibition (MT 11:14).
  The Torah prohibition of Kotev also refers to writing that lasts for a significant amount of time. Therefore, if one writes with a pencil or pen on paper, he violates Torah law. However, if he writes using fruit juice, which will quickly fade, or with a regular pen but on a leaf that will dry out and crumble, he violates a rabbinic prohibition.
  According to the vast majority of poskim, the Torah prohibition of Kotev applies to all languages (MT 11:10; BHL 306:11). A few poskim maintain that the Torah prohibition applies only to letters that may appear in a Torah scroll, but writing in any other script, in a foreign language, or in cursive Hebrew, constitutes a rabbinic transgression (Or Zaru’a).
  If writing is necessary to save lives, and it is clear that a slight delay will not cause any further danger, the prohibition should be minimized by writing with a shinui, using the left hand. If one is ambidextrous, he should grasp the writing utensil with the back of his hand or between his little finger and ring finger. Ideally, a medical professional should buy a “Shabbat pen” whose ink disappears within a few days and with which writing is only rabbinically forbidden. If something must be typed on a computer, a shinui should be used if possible, such as typing with the knuckles, with a teaspoon, or the like. It is also preferable to write in cursive rather than in block letters.
  To summarize, if one must write because of a life-threatening situation, it is preferable to use a Shabbat pen, since everyone agrees this is only rabbinically prohibited. Even with a Shabbat pen, it is proper to write using a shinui if possible. When a Shabbat pen is not available, one may write or type as needed, but in cursive and using a shinui when possible.
  
  Section 3
  
  Kotev, Moĥek, and Tzove’a / Incidental Writing and Erasing
  One may not cut through letters that are written on a cake in frosting, candy, or the like. Similarly, if a cake is decorated with a meaningful picture, like a tree or a house, one may not cut through the picture. Even though one’s intention in cutting the cake is to eat it, since the letters or pictures have meaning and it is very clear that they are being “erased” when the cake is cut, it is rabbinically prohibited (Mordechai; Rema 340:3). However, one may cut between the letters. Even though this separates a word into its component parts, one does not violate Moḥek as long as each letter remains whole. Therefore, if a cake that one plans to serve on Shabbat is being decorated, it should be done in such a way that one will be able to cut between the letters and pictures. Afterward, the slices of cake may be eaten even though eating them will destroy the letters. Since one is engaged in the process of eating, it is not considered Moḥek.
  When letters or pictures appear on cookies as a result of having been stamped into the cookie dough, as with petits beurres cookies, there is no prohibition against cutting or breaking them. Since these letters have no significance, erasing them incidentally is not prohibited (MB 340:15).
  Some maintain that it is rabbinically prohibited to read a book that has letters stamped or written on the edges of the pages (such as a library stamp) because when one opens the book the letters break apart, and when it is closed they are reconstructed (Levush; MA). In practice, if no other book is available, one may read such a book, because many maintain that bringing the different parts of a letter together is not considered Kotev, nor is separating them considered Moḥek. Additionally, since a book is meant to be opened and closed repeatedly, this is not considered even short-term Kotev and Moḥek, and thus involves no prohibition (Rema 340:3; Taz; MB ad loc. 17).
  Some rule that if opening a package of food will definitely tear letters or pictures, it may not be opened on Shabbat. They permit opening the package only if it is possible that the letters or pictures will not be torn in the process (based on Taz). Others maintain that one may open such a package, since all parts of the letters actually remain, but have simply been separated from each other (based on Rema). Le-khatḥila it is proper to be stringent, but when there is no way to open a package without tearing letters, one may be lenient. One who opens the package has no interest in “erasing” the letters, and the action is not constructive but destructive.
  One may wear shoes whose soles are stamped with letters or pictures, even though walking in these shoes may leave impressions of these letters or pictures on mud or similar surfaces.2<i class="footnote">According to Rema (<em>Responsa Rema</em> §119), tearing a letter is not considered erasing, since all parts of the letter remain but have simply been separated from one another. However, according to <em>Taz</em> 340:2, it is considered erasing and is prohibited. Based on this, SSK 9:13 prohibits opening packages if this will involve tearing letters. However, even within <em>Taz</em>’s approach, one may be lenient <em>be-di’avad</em>; as we have seen (ch. 9 n. 2), a <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em> in a case of a double rabbinic prohibition is permitted. This case is considered a <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em> as well, since one has no interest in the letters. All he is interested in is opening the package. There are two factors that render the entire prohibition rabbinic. First, one is not erasing to enable writing in that space. Second, the erasing is done with a <em>shinui</em> (or destructively). This is, in fact, the position of <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:27:7 and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 314:19. For the same reasons, one may walk in shoes that will leave impressions of letters or pictures on the ground. Here, too, there are two factors that render the prohibitions rabbinic. First, the “writing” will disappear fairly quickly. Second, this is not the normal way to write. Furthermore, since one has no interest in leaving impressions of letters in the ground, it is permitted.Based on this, it would seem at first glance that one should also be allowed to cut a cake with writing on it, as this is a <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em> in the case of a double rabbinic prohibition as well. Furthermore, according to Rema, it is not an act of erasure but of separation. Indeed, <em>Taz</em> is inclined to rule this way in 340:2. <em>Dagul Me-revava</em> and a number of other Aḥaronim also rule this way (cited in <em>Livyat Ḥen</em> §119). Nevertheless, many <em>poskim</em> are stringent. The reason for this would seem to be that the letters on a cake are noticeable and significant, and it is very clear that they are being erased when the cake is cut. This is what I wrote in the main text. One may cut between the letters because most <em>poskim</em> maintain that separating letters is not considered <em>Moḥek</em><em>Ma’amar Mordechai</em><em>Avnei Nezer</em>; SSK ch. 9 n. 51). In times of necessity, if it is very important to eat the cake and it cannot be cut without cutting through the letters, one may rely on those who are lenient. The status of a book with lettering on the edge is more complicated, as explained in <em>Harḥavot</em></i>
  One who wrote on himself with a pen may still wash his hands and dry them in the usual way, since ink generally does not come off as a result of washing and drying one’s hands one time. However, if he would like the letters to come off, he must be careful to wash and dry his hands gently, so that he does not assist in the removal of the letters.
  
  Section 4
  
  Kotev, Moĥek, and Tzove’a / Temporary Writing, Word Games, and Jigsaw Puzzles
  As we have seen, temporary writing is rabbinically prohibited. Erasing something when one does not plan to write something else in its place is rabbinically prohibited as well. Therefore, one may not write in the condensation on a window or erase such writing. Similarly, one may not form letters in the sand or erase them (MB 340:20-21).
  One may not mark a page using his fingernail to remind oneself that the page contains something notable or something that needs to be corrected. Since he is creating a lasting mark, it is rabbinically prohibited (MB 340:25; Kaf Ha-ḥayim ad loc. 51). However, one may dog-ear the page, because there his goal is not to “engrave” a mark in the paper. Rather, the fold itself is the mark.
  Some allow a sick person to use a thermometer strip. They maintain that it is not really writing since the numbers are already imprinted on the strip, and the temperature only makes them visible for a short time, after which they disappear (Yeḥaveh Da’at 4:29). Others forbid this, considering it temporary writing (SSK 40:2). Since the issue is rabbinic, one may be lenient in times of need (Tzitz Eliezer 14:30; below 28:11).
  Similarly, le-khatḥila one should not perform any medical tests that cause colors to appear, but in times of need, one may be lenient (ibid.).
  Colorful blocks may be put next to each other to form a letter, and thread may be laid down in the shape of a letter. This is because the blocks or thread already exist; one is simply arranging them. Similarly, he may juxtapose two cards that together form a picture, letter, or word. This is because all the forms already exist; they are simply being brought together.
  This applies when the different parts do not connect to each other or to a board. However, if they do connect, most contemporary poskim maintain that it is rabbinically forbidden to put them together and that therefore one may not pin parts of letters to a board to form a whole letter, on account of Kotev. Similarly, one may not assemble a jigsaw puzzle, since creating meaningful pictures also constitutes Kotev. Others permit these activities, maintaining that they are not considered writing since all the writing already exists, and the activity merely brings the letters or puzzle pieces into proximity. However, even according to the lenient position, one may not complete a jigsaw puzzle in order to preserve it as a portrait.
  In practice, those who wish may be lenient and allow their children to engage in these activities, but it is proper for adults to be stringent, as most poskim are stringent here. More generally, it is important to realize that Shabbat is meant to be dedicated to Torah, and some therefore say that adults may not play games on Shabbat at all (below 22:13, 24:7; and Harḥavot).3<i class="footnote">SSK 16:24 rules stringently but states in n. 66 that one does not have to stop a child from playing games on Shabbat, relying on those who are lenient. This is the opinion of the majority of <em>poskim</em><em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:42:6 permits little girls to play games but not little boys, so they do not grow accustomed to wasting time that could be used for Torah study. He insists, however, that for adults, games are <em>muktzeh</em>. See <em>Harḥavot</em></i>
  One may use a multiple-dial combination lock on Shabbat, because turning the discs to align the numbers is not considered writing. The numbers are already there; one is merely realigning them temporarily to form the correct combination and open the lock (Tzitz Eliezer 13:44).
  
  Section 5
  
  Kotev, Moĥek, and Tzove’a / Dyeing
  Tzove’a is a melakha with the objective of making something more beautiful. In the Mishkan, the woolen threads of the curtains were dyed indigo, royal purple, and scarlet. Even though the melakha of Kotev can be described as “dyeing” a page with letters, there is a difference between Kotev and Tzove’a. The goal of writing is to express an idea. Even when the “writing” is a picture of a house or a tree, the goal is still to express an idea, and that is how one transgresses Kotev. In contrast, the goal of dyeing is not to express an idea, but to beautify an item. Therefore, one who creates a meaningful image on paper or on a wall transgresses Kotev, and if he then colors it to beautify it he transgresses Tzove’a (y. Shabbat 7:2).
  Therefore, it is prohibited by Torah law to paint, color, or dye walls, cabinets, utensils, fabric, or clothing on Shabbat. The specific color is irrelevant; any color that beautifies is prohibited by Torah law. Even if the paint is colorless and merely adds glaze or shine, it is prohibited, because shine is considered color. It is prohibited by Torah law to paint a wall even if it was previously painted with the same or a different color.
  It is also prohibited by Torah law to polish shoes. Even if the polish is neutral or colorless, it is prohibited by Torah law, because it makes the shoes shine. If the polish is a cream that is spread on the shoes, then one who applies it also transgresses Memare’aḥ (section 6 below). If the polish improves the leather, then one transgresses Me’abed as well (MB 327:12, 16; see section 6 below). Even if the polish was applied before Shabbat, one may not buff the shoes on Shabbat to make them shine, because shine is considered color. However, if there is dust on the shoes, one may gently remove it with a rag (SSK 15:40).
  The Torah prohibition of Tzove’a is limited to permanent dyes. If the color will come off by itself within a short time, the prohibition is rabbinic (MT 9:13).
  If one’s hands become stained with fruit, blood, or any other substance, le-khatḥila he should first wash his hands and only afterward dry them with a towel, to avoid “dyeing” the towel. Similarly, if juice spills on a tablecloth, the one who wipes it off should be careful not to drag the juice along the cloth as that will dye the tablecloth. Even though such “dyeing” dirties the tablecloth rather than beautifying it, those who are stringent maintain that since it is normal to dye such a cloth, it is rabbinically prohibited (SA 320:20). In times of need one may be lenient, since many poskim say that adding color in a way that dirties the object is not prohibited (MB 320:59; Kaf Ha-ḥayim ad loc. 122).
  Since bandages or tissues are not normally dyed, they may be used to clean up blood or other colored substances. Since the color added dirties material that is not normally dyed, there is no prohibition (SAH §302, Kuntres Aḥaron).
  Everyone agrees that there is no issue of staining the hands or mouth when eating strawberries or other brightly colored foods, because this is not the normal way to color skin, and any such coloring is actually dirtying the skin (MB 320:58). However, one may not put on makeup, as we explained earlier (14:4).
  If a toilet has an automatic toilet bowl cleaner that colors the water with every flush, poskim disagree whether one may flush the toilet on Shabbat. Some maintain that since people are interested in the water being colored, it is rabbinically prohibited even though the color is present only briefly. Others maintain that since the primary goal is to clean the toilet, and the color is just incidental, one may flush the toilet. In practice, it is preferable to use a clear toilet bowl cleaner. However, if one finds himself in a place where the cleaning material is colored, he may flush the toilet. Those who wish to be lenient and use a colored toilet bowl cleaner have an opinion to rely upon.4<i class="footnote">This disagreement hinges on several issues: 1) Is it forbidden to color water? According to <em>Pri Megadim</em> and MB 320:56, it is forbidden. However, since in this case the dye is not long-lasting, the prohibition is rabbinic. This is the opinion of most <em>poskim</em>. Others maintain that it is permitted, either because the color does not become absorbed anywhere specific (<em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 1:29), or because water is a liquid, and <em>Tzove’a</em> does not apply to liquids (<em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 14:47). 2) Even if <em>Tzove’a</em> applies to water, some maintain that since the dyeing is done indirectly – flushing the toilet involves lifting the flush valve, which is considered removing an impediment to the water going down through the cleaner – it is a case of <em>grama</em>. If this is correct, then this is a <em>psik reisha</em> in a case of a double rabbinic prohibition (<em>Halikhot Olam</em> vol. 4, p. 286). Others maintain that this is not considered <em>grama</em>, and is therefore prohibited (<em>Shulḥan Shlomo</em> 320:31:3). 3) There is also a disagreement regarding the facts of the case. What is the purpose of the cleaning material – cleaning or coloring?In practice, those who are stringent include <em>Shulḥan Shlomo</em><em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 3:13:4 and n. 9, and <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 15:64. The latter adds that if one forgot to remove the container of the toilet bowl cleaner before Shabbat, he should do so on Shabbat with his foot, because it is <em>muktzeh</em>. Those who are lenient include <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em><em>Or Le-Tziyon</em>, and <em>Halikhot Olam</em>. If one knows that he cares about the color of the water, he should be stringent.</i>
  
  Section 6
  
  Kotev, Moĥek, and Tzove’a / Mafshit, Me’abed, Memaĥek, and Mesartet
  There are four melakhot that relate to preparing animal skins for writing: Mafshit, Me’abed, Memaḥek, and Mesartet (as explained below). When parchment was the standard writing surface, everyday things were written on it. Nowadays, however, only Torah scrolls, tefilin, and mezuzot are written on parchment. Additionally, nowadays, animal skins are used to make leather clothing, shoes, satchels, and upholstery. In the Mishkan, skins were prepared to be used as curtains as well. Mesartet was performed not only on skins, but on wood as well – to designate a place on the boards for writing.
  Mafshit refers to removing the skin from an animal that was slaughtered. This skin has two layers. The outer layer, or klaf, is the material upon which Torah scrolls, tefilin, and mezuzot are written. The inner layer, or dokhsostos, may only be used for mezuzot. One who separates the two layers transgresses a tolada of Mafshit. Although one may not remove an animal’s skin, one may skin a cooked chicken, because the prohibition of Mafshit does not apply to edible meat.
  Me’abed refers to placing the skin in salt, lime, or other substances that draw out the skin’s juices and acids. This allows the skin to last for hundreds of years. Any action that prepares skins for use is included in this melakha. Therefore, one may not to stomp on skins to harden them, use one’s hands to soften them, or spread oil on them to make them soft and pliant (MT 11:6). We explained above the laws of Me’abed as they pertain to food (12:9).
  Memaḥek refers to smoothing the skins by removing hairs and irregularities. This melakha also includes smoothing any rough surface, such as wood or stone, by means of sandpaper or a file (Shabbat 75b). It is also forbidden to scour silver items with a material that smooths their surface (SA 323:9). One may not scour metal with steel wool or sharpen knives (MB 323:40).
  The melakha of Memaḥek has a tolada called Memare’aḥ, which refers both to spreading a substance evenly upon an object and to spreading a substance on an object in order to smooth out the object. Therefore, one who spreads ointment on a poultice transgresses Torah law (Shabbat 75b; see below 28:8). It is also forbidden to spread lotions and creams on one’s body, as explained above (14:5). Similarly, one may not polish shoes by spreading cream on them. Even without a cream, one may not rub leather shoes in order to shine them (see AHS 327:4; SSK 15:40). As we explained above (12:11), according to most poskim, the prohibition of Memaḥek does not apply to foods.
  Mesartet refers to scoring a line to facilitate writing in a straight line. This melakha also includes drawing a straight line on leather, wood, or stone in order to mark where to cut these materials. However, one may use a knife to draw lines on a cake or to score an orange, to help one cut with precision. Since the prohibition of Meḥatekh does not apply to food (as explained above in 15:10), Mesartet does not apply to food either (MB 322:12, 18; SSK 11:15).
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Agricultural Melakhot (Ĥoresh, Zore’a, Kotzer, and Me’amer) / Ĥoresh
  The melakha of Ḥoresh refers to preparing ground for sowing or planting, by making furrows or holes in the soil in order to plant seeds or seedlings. Plowing also loosens and softens the soil, making it easier for roots to spread out and absorb nutrients.
  Thus, one who levels the surface of the ground violates Ḥoresh, because doing so softens the soil and makes it easier to prepare for sowing and planting. Making even a small hole is a transgression of Ḥoresh because a seed can be planted in it. Similarly, clearing rocks from a field, fertilizing it, and weeding are all toladot of Ḥoresh, since these actions improve the soil and make it easier to sow and plant. Anyone who undertakes any activity in order to improve the ground prior to sowing or planting violates Torah law (Shabbat 103a; y. Shabbat 7:2). 
  Even if he does not intend to sow or plant there, he has still violated Ḥoresh, since in fact he has improved the land for sowing or planting (Eglei Tal, Ḥoresh 16).
  One may not make a hole in the dirt of a flowerpot or even stake something into the dirt of a flowerpot, thereby making a hole in which one can plant, as these violate the melakha of Ḥoresh (MB 498:91; see n. 4 below).
  The Sages prohibited sweeping the ground in the yard, out of concern that one would end up leveling the ground, thus transgressing a Torah prohibition. If it is arable land, he violates Ḥoresh. If it is land that serves simply as a yard, he transgresses Boneh. However, one may sweep a part of the yard that has a hard, paved floor.1<i class="footnote">See above 15:2 and n. 1 for the laws about sweeping floors. In practice, one may sweep all paved floors in the home and all paved areas outside. See below 23:14 and n. 14 on why doing so presents no problem of <em>muktzeh</em></i>
  One may not kick dirt and sand, or move it around with one’s foot, because this both loosens soil and levels the ground. Saliva that is on the ground should not be rubbed into the dirt with one’s shoes, to avoid leveling the ground. However, if one finds the saliva disgusting, he may step on it in the natural course of his walking, as long as his intention is not to spread it and level the ground (SA 316:11).
  One who has mud stuck to his shoes should not try to rub it off against the ground, because he may end up leveling the ground (SA 302:6). Some are not concerned about this possibility, and allow rubbing off the mud (Rema, Taz). One who wishes may be lenient, but le-khatḥila it is preferable to be stringent. In contrast one may rub off the mud against a grate, tiles, or stones even le-khatḥila (MB 302:28; also see above 15:2).
  
  Section 2
  
  Agricultural Melakhot (Ĥoresh, Zore’a, Kotzer, and Me’amer) / Dragging Objects and Pushing a Baby Carriage
  One may drag a bed, chair, or bench on the ground, since it is not certain that doing so will make a furrow. Even if the item could easily be lifted off the ground, thus avoiding the possibility of creating a furrow, it may still be dragged on the ground. As long as the person dragging the item does not intend to make a furrow, and there is no certainty that one will be formed, this is permitted, as it is considered a davar she-eino mitkaven (SA 337:1). However, if it is certain that a furrow will be made, one may not drag the item, as it constitutes Ḥoresh. Even if one does not intend to plant there, making the land cultivatable is in fact an act of Ḥoresh (via the principle of psik reisha; see above 9:5).2<i class="footnote">em&gt;Davar she-eino mitkaven refers to a case where it is not certain that a <em>melakha</em> will be performed. It is permitted in accordance with the opinion of R. Shimon in <em>Shabbat</em> 22a. However, if it is certain that a <em>melakha</em> will be performed, it is considered a <em>psik reisha</em>, which R. Shimon agrees is prohibited (<em>Shabbat</em> 103a; MT 1:5-6). According to most <em>poskim</em><em>psik reisha</em> is prohibited even when the <em>melakha</em> performed is rabbinic. Their proof for this is derived from the prohibition on dragging. Even though the furrow is made with a <em>shinui </em>and not by an instrument normally used to plow, it is still prohibited (<em>Shabbat</em> 46b). Others maintain that making a furrow by dragging a heavy object over the ground is prohibited by Torah law, because it is not considered a <em>shinui</em>. Rather, it is extremely similar to the classic way of plowing. This is the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam and R. Avraham ben Ha-Rambam. See <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:1:6. If a furrow would actually be detrimental to the yard, it would seem that one may drag items, as the action would be considered a <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em> in a case of a double rabbinic prohibition (according to many), since the furrow is made in a way that is irregular as well as destructive. See above, ch. 9 n. 2.</i>
  In an area with an eruv, one may push a baby carriage or stroller even if it is clear that the wheels will make grooves in the dirt. This is because the wheels do not dig in and loosen the earth as a plow does. Rather, they pack down the earth, which actually does not effectively prepare it for sowing or planting. One may even pivot in the dirt with the carriage, because even then it is not certain that earth will be turned over and prepared for planting (SSK 28:48; Yeḥaveh Da’at 2:52).
  
  Section 3
  
  Agricultural Melakhot (Ĥoresh, Zore’a, Kotzer, and Me’amer) / Zore’a
  The melakha of Zore’a refers to causing plants or trees to grow by, for example, planting seeds or saplings or by grafting trees. All actions that improve the growth of branches or fruit are forbidden by Torah law as well. Thus, pruning and weeding are forbidden, because these actions promote plant growth. Similarly, one may not water plants or fertilize the soil surrounding them. It is also forbidden to apply dressings (such as tar or paint) to a tree’s wounds in order to heal it (Shabbat 73b; MT 7:3, 8:2).3<i class="footnote">. If one plants a seed on Shabbat but removes the seed from the ground before it takes root, then according to Rashash, he has not violated Torah law, because the prohibition takes place only when the seed takes root. According to <em>Minḥat Ḥinukh</em> and <em>Eglei Tal</em>, <em>Zore’a</em> 8, simply placing the seeds is already a Torah prohibition.</i>
  One may not leave an avocado pit in a dish of water so that it will take root and begin to grow. Likewise, one may not put a branch in water so that it will take root and start growing.
  Included in the prohibition is germinating seeds in water so that the sprouts can then either be eaten or transferred to soil. It is also forbidden to soak seeds in water to soften them, preparing them to take root and grow (SA 336:11).4<i class="footnote">According to <em>Nishmat Adam</em> 11:1 and AHS 336:30, planting seeds even in a planter that does not have holes is prohibited by Torah law. In contrast, according to Mahari Ḥagiz and <em>Eglei Tal</em>, <em>Zore’a</em> 9, the prohibition is rabbinic, since normally people do not plant using such a flowerpot. The reason that soaking seeds is prohibited by Torah law is because that is the way it is generally done (see <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> vol. 2 ch. 3 n. 33). Recently, people have begun growing seeds and plants hydroponically, using water and a combination of chemicals to substitute for the nutrients normally found in soil. It would seem that all would agree that one who plants seeds hydroponically violates Torah law, since nowadays this is a normal way of planting, similar to the case of planting in dirt on a roof (<em>Responsa Rosh</em> 2:4).</i> However, one may soak barley to soften it before feeding it to animals. This is because one does not desire for the barley to grow; besides, the barley is removed from the water and fed to the animals before the roots emerge (MB 336:51).
  One should not toss seeds onto damp ground. Since they could start growing, one who tossed them would be guilty of planting on Shabbat. However, one may throw seeds somewhere they probably will not grow. Therefore, one may throw seeds in a place where people walk regularly, or in front of animals who will eat them within a day or two (SA 336:4).
  One may not open or close the windows or doors of a greenhouse in order to encourage the growth of the plants inside. However, if there is a houseplant in the room, one may still open the shades and the windows for one’s own sake, even though the sunlight and air that enter will indirectly help the potted plant grow. Since he did not open the shades and windows for this purpose, and the benefit to the plant is remote, it is not prohibited (as it is a psik reisha in a case of a double rabbinic prohibition, since the melakha is done both with a shinui and via grama; Har Tzvi, OḤ §133 and Yeḥaveh Da’at 5:29).
  
  Section 4
  
  Agricultural Melakhot (Ĥoresh, Zore’a, Kotzer, and Me’amer) / Irrigation
  One may not water plants, as it helps them grow and thus constitutes Zore’a. However, one may open irrigation pipes or turn on sprinklers before Shabbat even if they will water plants during Shabbat. Similarly, one may program a computer before Shabbat to activate sprinklers on Shabbat, as on Shabbat no action will be done by a Jew. One who opened irrigation pipes before Shabbat may close them on Shabbat, as this involves no melakha (see above 2:9).
  One who eats in a yard must be careful not to wash his hands over plants or their roots (SA 336:3). If the plants are small and their roots are short, the prohibition applies only in the immediate vicinity of the plants, but if the plants are large, the prohibition applies to the entire garden bed around them.
  One may pour water on the ground if there are no plants or roots nearby. Even though it is possible that eventually the water will reach roots or that wild flowers will subsequently grow there, this is not prohibited since one does not intend this to happen (Kaf Ha-ḥayim 336:27).
  One may not pour water on his own soil if it is suitable for planting. Since this softens the ground, preparing it for planting, it is considered Ḥoresh (MB 336:26; SHT ad loc. 18).
  
  Section 5
  
  Agricultural Melakhot (Ĥoresh, Zore’a, Kotzer, and Me’amer) / Using a Sink Whose Water Drains into the Yard
  If a sink’s drainpipe empties onto soil where plants grow, it may not be used on Shabbat by anyone who has an interest in the plants being watered. It goes without saying that one may not use this sink on Shabbat if it was intentionally set up to water the plants.
  Nevertheless, many poskim maintain that one who does not care about watering the plants may use such a sink on Shabbat – for example, if the plants do not belong to him and he has no interest in their growth. In a time of need, one may rely on these poskim. To be sure, one who pours water directly onto plants violates a prohibition, even if he does not intend to water them, because he is helping them grow. In contrast, here the water is poured indirectly and is therefore a case of grama and permitted (SSK 12:19). If the water from the sink reaches plants that have already been adequately watered, whether through heavy rains or water that drained from the sink before Shabbat, then even one who is interested in the plants growing may use the sink on Shabbat, since he is not helping them at all.
  Rain sometimes falls on Sukkot, and in order to prevent one’s sukka from getting wet one might extend a sliding roof over it. When the rain stops, he will want to retract the roof, but he knows that if he does so, water that accumulated on the rooftop will spill onto the nearby plants. May he retract the roof anyway on Shabbat and Yom Tov? It depends: If the rain was hard enough and long enough to saturate the ground, one may retract the roof, because the extra water serves no purpose. However, if there was only a little rain, the roof may not be retracted, because this will water the plants and violate Zore’a.5<i class="footnote">This is the approach of <em>Ḥut </em><em>Shani</em><em>melekhet Zore’a</em>) and <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> ch. 18 n. 10; see <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 336:29. Concerning the sink, I followed the position of those who are lenient and maintain that as long as one is not interested in watering the plants, one may use the sink. However, some are stringent and maintain that even if one is not interested in watering the plants, one may not spill water in the sink. This is the position of <em>Az Nidberu</em> 4:17 and R. Levi Yitzḥak Halperin (<em>Ma’aseh U-grama Ba-halakha</em> 4:2:5). According to them, the water that flows into the yard via the drainpipe is not viewed as arriving there through <em>grama</em> and <em>ko’aḥ sheni</em>, but rather it is as if the person is pouring it directly. However, in practice, when necessary one may rely on those who are lenient, as I write in the main text in the name of SSK. A <em>psik resiha de-lo niḥa lei</em> is only rabbinically prohibited (and according to <em>Arukh</em> it is permitted), so when it is unclear whether it is also <em>grama</em> and permitted, the <em>halakha</em> follows the lenient position. Indeed, <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 336, <em>Zore’a</em> 9 and <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:3:8 say as much. If the water that flows from the sink reaches plants that have no need of water – whether because there was heavy rainfall and the ground is saturated, or a large amount of water flowed from the sink before Shabbat – watering these plants is not prohibited on account of <em>Zore’a</em><em>Petaḥ Ha-devir</em> as quoted by <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 336:29). It would seem that in such a case, even those who are otherwise stringent would be lenient.</i>
  
  Section 6
  
  Agricultural Melakhot (Ĥoresh, Zore’a, Kotzer, and Me’amer) / Kotzer
  Kotzer refers to cutting something off from its source of growth, and it includes harvesting grain, picking grapes, dates, olives, or figs, and pulling off any other fruit or branch from a tree. Cutting down trees to use for heating or building is included in this prohibition as well. It is also forbidden to pull grass out of a crevice in a wall or to remove fungi from bucket handles (Shabbat 73b and 107b). Taking an avocado pit or a branch out of water is forbidden as well, if it has started growing roots.
  According to Torah law, there is no prohibition on picking fruits, branches, or leaves from a tree that has completely dried out. Since the tree is not absorbing nourishment from the soil, one who pulls off a part of it is not detaching it from the source of its growth. However, since this resembles harvesting, the Sages forbade it. (See SA 336:12.)
  In contrast, if a branch was cut off a tree before Shabbat, since it is clear that the branch has already been detached from its source of nourishment, the prohibition of Kotzer no longer applies to it, and one may pull off its fruits on Shabbat. If it is a fragrant branch, one may pick twigs or leaves from it in order to smell them (Rema 336:8).
  
  Section 7
  
  Agricultural Melakhot (Ĥoresh, Zore’a, Kotzer, and Me’amer) / Using a Tree
  As a precaution, the Sages prohibited using a tree on Shabbat, out of concern that one may end up breaking off a branch or leaf. Therefore, one may not climb or lean against a tree6<i class="footnote">The prohibition of leaning against a tree applies only when one puts all his weight on it. In contrast, a healthy person may lean a bit on a strong tree, since leaning on it slightly is not considered using the tree. This is on condition that the tree is strong enough that it will not move. Furthermore, a weak person may not lean even slightly on the tree, since due to his weakness he may end up shifting all his weight onto the tree and thus violate the prohibition of using it (MB 336:63).One who unknowingly climbed a tree may descend even though he will be using the tree again, because remaining in the tree would also be considered using it. However, if he purposely climbed a tree on Shabbat, the Sages mandated as a penalty that he may not descend until Shabbat is over (SA 336:1). If he can get down by simply jumping, without using the tree, he should do so (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in SSK ch. 26 n. 45).</i> and may not place items on trees or remove items from them. If the wind blows an item of clothing into a tree on Shabbat, one may not remove it. Similarly, one may not recover a ball that fell into a tree nor shake the tree so that the ball will fall out (SA 336:1; MB ad loc. 3). One should take care not to place things on a tree before Shabbat if they will be needed on Shabbat (MB 336:12). However, one may touch a tree if he is not using or moving it (Rema 336:13).
  Not only is using a tree prohibited, it is also prohibited to use items resting directly on a tree. For example, one may not use a swing that is attached to a tree, even if only one side is attached. One may not remove an item of clothing from a clothesline that is tied to a tree. Similarly, one may not climb a ladder that is resting against a tree, and one may not remove things from a basket hanging from a tree.
  However, if a peg was driven into a tree and a swing was hung from the peg, one may use the swing. This is because only the peg is considered resting on the tree, while the swing is resting on the peg. Since the swing is two steps removed from the tree, this was not included in the rabbinic prohibition. 
  Similarly, one may remove an item of clothing from a clothesline that is tied to a peg stuck into a tree, because the clothesline is two steps removed from the tree. If before Shabbat one rested a ladder against a peg embedded in a tree, one may climb the ladder on Shabbat, because the ladder is two steps removed from the tree. If before Shabbat items were placed in a basket hanging from a hook stuck in a tree, one may put items into it and remove them on Shabbat, because this too is two steps removed from the tree. However, on Shabbat one may not rest the ladder against the peg or hang the basket on the hook, because that would be making use of an item resting directly on a tree (SA 336:13; MB ad loc. 63).
  Regarding the roots of an old tree that protrude above the ground, if they protrude less than three tefaḥim from the ground (about 23 cm), then they are considered equivalent to the ground, and one may sit upon them. However, if the roots protrude above this height, they are considered equivalent to a tree, and one may not sit upon them (SA 336:2).
  
  Section 8
  
  Agricultural Melakhot (Ĥoresh, Zore’a, Kotzer, and Me’amer) / Additional Laws
  The Sages’ enactment against using trees applies to shrubs and vines that have hard branches or yield hard fruit, like pumpkins. However, the enactment does not include soft weeds, bushes, or branches. Therefore, one may sit on a lawn on Shabbat, even if it moves the grass slightly.
  One may not smell an edible fruit while it is attached to its tree, lest one end up plucking the fruit in order to eat it. However, one may smell fragrant flowers where they grow. This is because he has no reason to pick them, as they can be smelled while still attached to the ground. If tree branches themselves are fragrant, one may not grasp them and move them closer to smell them, because one may not move them, just as one may not move a tree. If the branches are soft and pliant, as are myrtle branches, one may grasp them and move them closer to smell them. One must, of course, be careful not to pluck the branches.7<i class="footnote">Some say that the prohibition on using a tree includes moving soft grass or weeds (<em>Baḥ</em> and <em>Taz</em>). Alternatively, some prohibit moving grass on account of <em>muktzeh</em> (MA to SA 311:6; <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 336:62). However, most are permissive, as Rema writes in 336:1 and SA implies in 336:10 and 312:6. This approach is also followed by MB 312:19; 336:15, 48 and <em>Livyat Ḥen</em> 104:6. The grass is not <em>muktzeh</em> because they maintain that <em>muktzeh</em> does not apply to anything attached to the ground.</i>
  One may walk on a lawn even though walking on it may uproot some grass. This is because he does not intend to do this, and it is not necessarily going to happen. But if the grass is high and it is certain that walking on it will cause some of it to be torn up, one may not walk on it (SA 336:3; BHL ad loc.).
  Not only did the Sages prohibit using a tree, they also prohibited riding on an animal, lest the rider break a branch to use as a riding crop to direct the animal. The Sages also prohibited extracting honey from honeycombs, because this resembles picking produce (SA 321:13).
  One may bring his animals to a grassy area so that they may graze. This is not considered Kotzer because the animals are eating for themselves. We are not commanded to ensure that animals keep Shabbat; we simply must ensure that they do not perform melakhot on our behalf (Shabbat 122a; SA 324:13).
  
  Section 9
  
  Agricultural Melakhot (Ĥoresh, Zore’a, Kotzer, and Me’amer) / Flowers and Branches in a Vase
  Flowers, branches, or stems that were picked before Shabbat for their beauty or fragrance, are not muktzeh on Shabbat. Therefore, a vase containing branches that are used for their beauty or fragrance may be moved. Similarly, they may be removed from the water for viewing or smelling. There is no problem of Kotzer, since there are no roots. One may also return stems to the water if they do not have flowers, or if they have fully-developed flowers. There is no problem of Zore’a, since the water will not cause any further growth but will only preserve their freshness so they do not wither.
  However, one may not place in water any stems with flowers that are budding or that have not yet fully opened, because placing them in the water causes further growth. Nevertheless, one may remove them from the water. This is not considered Kotzer, because they have not put down roots in the water. Once removed, though, one may not replace them. Therefore, if one receives a bouquet of flowers as a gift on Shabbat and it contains flowers that have not yet fully opened, one may not place them in water, as this will cause the flowers to grow and open. Rather, one should put the bouquet in a vase that does not contain water.8<i class="footnote">Rema 336:11. According to Maharikash, one may put flowers in water as well, since even if they open it is not considered new growth. His opinion is not accepted. SHT 336:48 even states that a Torah prohibition may be involved. It is generally agreed that one who removed branches from water may put them back. Aḥaronim disagree, however, whether one may put them in water to begin with. <em>Tosefet Shabbat</em> and <em>Ḥayei Adam</em> prohibit doing so, while SAH and <em>Pri Megadim</em> permit it, as is quoted by MB 336:54. SHT <em>ad loc</em>. 48 states that one may be lenient, as the law in question is rabbinic. This is on condition that he prepared a container of water before Shabbat. However, on Shabbat, one may not fill a container with water in which to place the branches. This is because it involves exerting effort for the sake of the branches, which is prohibited, as explained in <em>Sukka</em> 42a in the context of a <em>lulav</em><em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 2:53 is lenient, based on Rashba, and allows one to fill a container with water on Shabbat. The reason is that while we are stringent regarding a <em>lulav</em> because it is <em>muktzeh</em>, this stringency does not apply to other branches. As SA 321:11 states: “One may water a detached plant to prevent it from withering.” This is also the position of <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> vol. 2 ch. 3 n. 18. It would seem that one may rely on the lenient position, since this is a dispute regarding a rabbinic prohibition.</i>
  
  Section 10
  
  Agricultural Melakhot (Ĥoresh, Zore’a, Kotzer, and Me’amer) / A Flowerpot
  Just as one may not break off a branch or leaf from a plant growing in soil, so too one may not break off anything from a potted plant. If the flowerpot has holes in the bottom, it is considered connected to the ground. Thus one who plucks anything from it transgresses Kotzer by Torah law. If the flower pot does not have holes in the bottom, it is not considered connected to the ground, as this is not the way plants normally grow. Thus one who plucks anything from it transgresses only rabbinically (SA 336:7; MB ad loc. 42). Similarly, one may not water potted plants (MB 336:41; see n. 4 above).
  One may not move a potted plant from its place on Shabbat, because it is muktzeh. It is considered a kli she-melakhto le-isur (see ch. 23) since watering its contents or picking them is prohibited. However, one may move it if he needs the space it occupies (below 23:8). If the potted plant is frequently moved from place to place for aesthetic reasons or so that it can be smelled, it is not muktzeh, since its primary use is a permissible one.
  Sometimes moving a potted plant is prohibited on account of Zore’a or Kotzer. For example, if the flowerpot has a hole in the bottom the size of a small root and it is resting on the ground, the hole allows the plant to draw sustenance from the ground, and thus it is considered connected to the ground. Thus, one may not move the pot from the ground and place it on a hard plastic surface, because that would violate Kotzer. Conversely, if the plant is on a hard plastic saucer, it may not be moved from there and placed on the ground, because that would violate Zore’a. Thus, if one needs to move the flower pot to use the space it is occupying, he must be careful to move it together with the saucer underneath it.9<i class="footnote">This law is explained in SA 336:7-8. If a flower pot has a hole in the bottom, one may not lift it from the ground and place it on pegs. Even if it is only removed for a short period of time, and even if there is no object coming between it and the ground, it has nevertheless been distanced from its life source. Similarly, one may not remove the flower pot from the pegs and return it to the ground (SA 336:8 and MB <em>ad loc</em>.)There are many opinions about how big the hole must be. The standard ruling is about 2-2.5 cm. There is disagreement whether floor tiles are viewed as separating the hole from the ground. <em>Brit Olam</em> and <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:4:7 maintain that they do. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach says that floor tiles only separate the hole from the ground when they are on the second floor or higher. Ḥazon Ish maintains that ceramic tiles do not separate, but marble tiles do. If a flower pot is on a plastic saucer, it is equivalent to a flower pot that does not have holes. (See <em>Orḥot Shabbat </em>18:18 and <em>Harḥavot</em>.) Thus, as long as the flower pot has a saucer underneath it, it may be moved from place to place.</i>
  If a flower pot tipped over and some of its dirt spilled out, one may not put the dirt back in the pot, because doing so helps the plant grow and thus transgresses both Ḥoresh and Zore’a. Additionally, soil is muktzeh and may not be moved. Even if no dirt spilled, but the flowerpot’s fall exposed the roots of the plant and they will be covered back up if the plant is restored to a standing state, one may not do so even using one’s foot (such that muktzeh is not an issue), because covering the roots violates both Ḥoresh and Zore’a. (One may open a window in a room containing a plant, as explained above at the end of section 3.)
  
  Section 11
  
  Agricultural Melakhot (Ĥoresh, Zore’a, Kotzer, and Me’amer) / Me’amer
  Me’amer refers to gathering harvested grain into sheaves or piles. Similarly, one who gathers picked fruit and places them in boxes or piles transgresses Me’amer, as does one who gathers cut branches or reeds to use as fuel.
  This melakha, as a rule, relates to objects that grow in the ground and are still located in the area where they grew. This is because the harvest is generally gathered where it grows. However, some types of produce are gathered in two stages. For such produce, both stages are prohibited by Torah law, even if the second stage does not take place in the field. This is the case, for example, when producing a pressed fig cake. The first stage in this process involves gathering figs from the field, which is prohibited on Shabbat on account of Me’amer. The second stage involves pressing them together to produce a cake. Doing this even at home is prohibited by Torah law as a tolada of Me’amer, since this is the standard way to form these cakes (SA 340:10; MB ad loc. 38; see Menuḥat Ahava 2:5:2).
  Gathering fruit scattered in a yard is not prohibited by Torah law, because they are not located where they grew, yet the Sages nevertheless prohibited gathering them because it resembles a weekday activity. However, one may collect a few pieces of fruit and eat them. If the fruit fell in one place and did not scatter very much, one may collect them and put them in a basket. If they fell into gravel or dirt, even if they are all in one place, one may not gather them and place them in a basket, because doing so resembles Borer. However, one may pick them up one at a time and eat them (SA 335:5).
  One may collect fruit that is scattered inside one’s home, because gathering items inside does not resemble Me’amer (MB 340:37).10<i class="footnote">However, some prohibit gathering fruit even inside, maintaining that it requires just as much effort in one’s home as in the yard (<em>Az Nidberu</em> 14:17; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:5:6). MB 340:37 implies that this is permitted inside. <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:43:7 also permits, maintaining that fruit inside is viewed as having already been gathered, and thus <em>Me’amer</em> is irrelevant. Even those who are stringent regarding gathering inside would still allow throwing candies or almonds at a groom in the synagogue. Even though children will collect them and put them into bags, it is an effortless expression of happiness and not a weekday activity (<em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 2:5:7).</i>
  Although according to Torah law, Me’amer applies only to things that grow in the ground, the Sages forbade collecting salt from salt mines. Since this salt looks like it grows from the ground, collecting it resembles Me’amer (SA 340:9). Based on this, several Aḥaronim rule that one may not gather eggs that were laid before Shabbat (Ketzot Ha-shulḥan; however, Shevet Ha-Levi 4:39 is lenient). Eggs that were laid on Shabbat are muktzeh, and therefore one may not pick up even one egg.
  Me’amer does not apply to items that have undergone major transformations. Thus, one may gather cooked fruits together. Similarly, gathering clothing made from natural fibers is not a problem, since they have been transformed from their original state (AHS 340:3).
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Animals / Rest for Animals
  Just as a Jew is commanded to rest on Shabbat, so too, he is commanded to allow his animals to rest. There are two commandments that address this issue, one positive (aseh), as the Torah states (Shemot 23:12): “Six days you shall do your work, but on the seventh day you shall cease, so that your ox and your donkey may rest, and the son of your maidservant and the stranger may be refreshed.” And one negative (lo ta’aseh), as the Torah states (Shemot 20:10): “But the seventh day is a Shabbat of the Lord your God; you shall not do any melakha – you, your son or daughter, your male or female slave, or your beast, or the stranger who is within your settlements.” The mitzva of allowing animals to rest is not one of the 39 melakhot but a mitzva in its own right; its violation is not punishable by death or lashes (Shabbat 154a; MT 20:1-2).
  Even though the Torah in those verses mentions beasts, oxen, and donkeys, the prohibition applies to all animals, including birds and fish (MB 305:1). Therefore, one may not release carrier pigeons on Shabbat, and one may not use trained dolphins to pull a boat. The Torah specifies the ox and the donkey because they are the beasts of burden most commonly used for plowing and carrying heavy loads.
  One who causes an animal carrying a load to move from one place to another on Shabbat, whether by striking, pulling, or ordering it, transgresses Torah law. This prohibition is referred to as Meḥamer. Even if the animal belongs to a non-Jew or is ownerless, one may not cause it to walk with a burden. If one causes his own animal to do so, then in addition to transgressing the lo ta’aseh against doing work, he has also violated the aseh of allowing animals to rest (SA 266:1-2; MB ad loc. 7-8). The latter commandment applies on Yom Kippur as well (there is disagreement about whether it applies on Yom Tov; see MB 246:19).
  A Jew may not rent his animal to a non-Jew who will use it to do work like plowing or carrying burdens in the public domain on Shabbat. If a Jew rents out an animal with the understanding that it will be returned before Shabbat, but it is not, he should declare the animal ownerless before Shabbat to avoid violating Torah law (SA 246:3). If a Jew and a non-Jew are co-owners of an animal, the Jew may not permit the non-Jew to work the animal on Shabbat. However, if when they first bought the animal they specified that the non-Jew would be the sole owner on Shabbat, while the Jew would be the sole owner on a different day of the week, then the non-Jew may work the animal on Shabbat, because on Shabbat it is his alone (SA 246:5).
  A Jew may allow a non-Jew to ride his horse or other animal on Shabbat, in accordance with the principle that “a living being carries itself” (he-ḥai nosei et atzmo). Therefore, the non-Jew who rides the animal is not considered a burden (nor are the clothes he wears, as they are secondary to his body). However, the Sages enacted that a Jew may not use an animal at all. He may not lean on it, place an object on it, or sit in a wagon hitched to it, even if a non-Jew is driving the wagon for his own purposes (SA 305:18). The reason for this enactment is to avoid burdening the animal on Shabbat (y. Beitza 5:2). Another reason is that while riding an animal, one may come to break off a tree branch in order to goad the animal, thus transgressing Kotzer (Beitza 36b).
  A Jew may not take another Jew’s animal outside of teḥum Shabbat. This teḥum is based on the teḥum of the animal’s owner (see below, 30:3). If the owner entrusted the animal to a shepherd, whether Jew or non-Jew, the teḥum is based on that of the shepherd (SA 397:3-5). The prohibition is only for the animal to leave the teḥum at the initiative of its owner; it is not prohibited for the animal to leave of its own volition or for a non-Jewish shepherd to take it outside the teḥum (Rema 305:23; MB ad loc. 79).
  
  Section 2
  
  Animals / Animals and Carrying
  As we have seen, one must allow animals to rest on Shabbat. This includes making sure that one’s animal does not enter a semipublic (karmelit) or public domain with a burden on its back. However, not everything an animal carries is defined as a burden. Just as one may enter a different domain wearing his clothes because they are secondary to his body, so too a donkey suffering from the cold may be taken outside wearing a pack saddle that is meant to warm it. Other animals, though, which do not suffer from the cold, may not be taken outside with a saddle (SA 305:7). Similarly, a dog that is wrapped in an article of clothing may not be taken outside. Since it does not truly need this, the clothing is considered a burden. If one is not taking the dog outside, one may dress it, as there is no prohibition to carry in a private domain.
  One may take out an animal that is wearing a bandage to protect an injury or a sheep that is wearing a cover designed to keep its wool from getting dirty. This is on condition that they are tightly bound to the animal, with no possibility that they will fall off, thus ensuring that no one will end up carrying them in a semipublic or public domain (SA 305:6). One may not take out an animal with a muzzle that is meant to prevent the animal from grazing in other people’s fields. This is because the muzzle is not worn for the animal’s sake, but for the sake of the fields’ owners (SA 305:11).
  One may not lead an animal with a bell around its neck, as doing so generates sound, and it is rabbinically prohibited to generate sound with an object specifically designed for this purpose, such as a musical instrument. However, if the bell is silenced and makes no sound, the animal may be led around in a private domain but not a public domain. If the animal were to be led around in a public domain, it would seem like it was being taken to market for sale (Shabbat 53a and 54b; MB 305:42-43). The bell itself is not considered a burden as it is secondary to the animal’s halter.
  One may take out a horse wearing a bridle or a donkey wearing a halter since these items are used to direct the animals and to prevent them from running away. However, a donkey may not be taken out wearing a bridle, as this would be an excessive precaution, far more than is necessary to ensure that the donkey will not run away. The general principle is that anything normally used to ensure that an animal will not run away is not considered a burden, but anything excessive is considered a burden (SA 305:1; MB ad loc. 8).
  A dog may be allowed out in a public domain wearing its collar, because that is the normal way for it to go out since it allows one to restrain the dog if necessary by grabbing its collar or attaching a leash to it (SA 305:5; MB ad loc. 12). The person holding the leash is not considered carrying the leash, since it is secondary to the dog’s body. However, he must take care to grasp the leash within a tefaḥ of its end. He also must make sure that the leash does not droop to within a tefaḥ of the ground at any point. If either of these things happens, it looks like he is carrying the leash. If the leash is too long, he may wrap it around the dog’s neck so it is less likely to droop (SA 305:16).
  A blind person may enter a public domain with a seeing-eye dog, even though he is holding the harness attached to the dog. Since the harness is always attached to the dog, it is secondary to its body, and there is no problem of carrying. (Although Orḥot Shabbat 31:17 is stringent, it seems reasonable to permit, as explained in Harḥavot; this is also the position of Mikveh Ha-mayim 4:39; Menuḥat Ahava 3:27:49; and Yalkut Yosef 305:59.)
  A dog may be taken out into a public domain wearing dog tags connected to its collar or ear and on which is engraved the name of the dog’s owner. The tags make it clear that the dog has an owner, and thus people are more likely to leave it alone.1<i class="footnote">AHS 305:5 forbids taking out a dog wearing dog tags as a sign for people to leave it alone. He brings a proof from the rule that forbids taking out roosters wearing strings as a similar sign to people (SA 305:17). However, SSK ch. 27 n. 34 cites R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach as permitting it, since this sign is for the dog’s benefit and protection. In contrast, if the goal is simply to avoid paying a fine, the dog tags are prohibited. It would also seem that if the sign is permanently attached to the animal’s collar, then it is secondary to the collar and is not considered a burden, as explained in <em>Tosafot</em>, <em>Shabbat</em> 54b, s.v. “mishum”; MA 305:6; and <em>Eliya Rabba</em>.According to Rashi and Ran, one may take out a dog or other animal with a collar whose purpose is solely decorative, on condition that doing so is the common practice. <em>Tosafot</em> and Rabbeinu Yeruḥam maintain that if the collar does not serve a protective purpose, it is forbidden. <em>Baḥ</em> rules stringently (MA 305:1; MB <em>ad loc. </em>12).</i>
  
  Section 3
  
  Animals / Feeding Animals
  An animal may be led to graze in a grassy area, and it does not constitute Kotzer since the animal is eating for its own sake. We are not commanded to make sure that animals keep Shabbat, only that they do not labor for our benefit (Shabbat 122:1; SA 324:13).
  One may provide food and water to animals in his possession that depend on him, like cows, chickens, and cats. Food and water may also be provided to animals belonging to another Jew. However, one may not feed or water self-sufficient animals like bees and doves. Even though feeding them is not a melakha, the Sages prohibited it because it is seen as requiring excessive effort (SA 324:11; BHL s.v. “ve-yonei”).
  One may put food out for hungry animals like stray dogs and cats. As we know, God shows mercy to all His creatures, as it is written: “His mercy is upon all His works” (Tehilim 145:9). It is proper to emulate His ways (AHS 324:2-3; see MB ad loc. 31).
  Animals are muktzeh. Therefore, they may not be picked up, nor may their limbs be lifted up. However, when it is necessary for their well-being (for example, in order to get them to their food), one may take hold of them and move their limbs to prevent them from suffering (tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim), as long as one does not lift them off the ground (SA 308:39-40; MB ad loc. 151).
  If animals have difficulty eating unless the food is placed directly in their mouths, one may feed them in this way as long as he does not force-feed them. Force-feeding refers to shoving the food so far down their throats that they are unable to spit it up. This requires excessive effort (Shabbat 155b; SA 324:9-10).
  One may ask a non-Jew to feed geese that have been force-fed for so long that they are unable to eat otherwise and would suffer hunger and pain if they were not fed on Shabbat. In such a case, one may ask a non-Jew to feed them one time on Shabbat. If there is no non-Jew available, the poskim disagree whether a Jew may feed them to minimize their suffering (MB 324:27). It is better not to force-feed geese at all, as doing so causes them pain and entails multiple prohibitions (see BHL ad loc.; SSK 27:26).
  One may cut up food for animals if they would not be able to readily eat it otherwise. This includes cutting up pumpkins that are fed to animals and tough carcasses that are fed to dogs and that they have trouble eating. However, one may not cut up any food for them that they could eat by themselves. Even if cutting makes it easier for them to eat, it is excessive effort and thus forbidden on Shabbat (SA 324:3-8).
  
  Section 4
  
  Animals / Milking on Shabbat
  Torah law forbids milking a cow or any other animal on Shabbat, as doing so separates the milk from the cow’s body and constitutes Mefarek (separating something from its source), a tolada of Dash. Just as one may not separate grain from its husk, so too, one may not separate milk from its source (Shabbat 95a).
  The problem is that if a dairy cow, which produces great quantities of milk, is not milked on Shabbat, it suffers greatly. Therefore, the Sages permitted asking a non-Jew to milk a cow on Shabbat. Even though, generally speaking, it is rabbinically prohibited to ask a non-Jew to do melakha for us on Shabbat, here they suspended the prohibition in order to avoid tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim. It is true that this milk is muktzeh on Shabbat. However, after Shabbat a Jew may drink or sell it (SA 305:20).
  If there is no non-Jew available, a Jew may milk the cow, as long as the milk goes to waste. For example, it may be milked directly onto the ground, or into a bucket that contains an agent that will ruin the milk. This is because milking to make use of the milk is prohibited by Torah law, whereas milking for another reason, in which the milk goes to waste, is only rabbinically prohibited. A Torah prohibition may not be transgressed in order to prevent animals’ suffering, but the Sages suspended their own enactment.2<i class="footnote">Even though according to Ramban, milking is only prohibited rabbinically, <em>halakha</em> follows the opinion of Rif, Rambam, and Rashi that milking is prohibited by Torah law. On account of the animals’ suffering, the Sages permitted asking a non-Jew to milk on Shabbat (most <em>poskim</em> maintain that <em>tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim</em> is Torah law; see <em>Peninei Halakha: Collected Essays</em><em> Likutim III</em> 10:6.) If no non-Jew is available, a Jew may milk the cows, but in such a way that the milk will go to waste, since according to Rabbeinu Tam (cited in <em>Tosafot</em><em>Ketubot</em> 6a) one may milk wastefully on Shabbat. Even though Ri (cited <em>ad loc.</em>) maintains that one may not milk in such a manner, in order to prevent animal suffering we permit it (SSK 27:49; <em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 56:4).</i>
  Nowadays, dairy farming has been modernized, and milking is automated. A cup is placed on the teat and connected to a pump via a tube. If there is a non-Jew available, one may ask him to turn on the machine and place the cups on the cow on Shabbat, because otherwise the cows would suffer. If no non-Jew is available, common practice is for a Jew to use a timer or a delay mechanism that is set before Shabbat to turn on the machine. On Shabbat, before the machine turns on, the cups are attached to the cow’s teats, and then the machine turns on and automatically pumps out the milk. Thus, the Jew has not performed any melakha directly, for when he attached the cups, the machine was not on. Even though placing the cups on the teats causes a melakha to take place, this is not prohibited by Torah law. The Torah only forbids direct action, as it states: “You shall not do any melakha” (Shemot 20:10). The Sages forbade indirectly causing a melakha to be performed. Here, to prevent the cows from becoming painfully engorged, the Sages permitted acting via grama. After Shabbat, a Jew may benefit from this milk.
  If the cups must be attached to the teats while the machine is operating, then doing so in order to save the milk violates Torah law. Therefore, the milk should spill directly onto the ground, making the action rabbinically prohibited and thus permissible to prevent tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim (SSK 27:50; for the laws relevant to a woman who is engorged, see above 11:17).
  
  Section 5
  
  Animals / Carrying Pets and Sick Animals
  As we will see later on (23:5), anything that has no practical use on Shabbat is muktzeh and may not be carried. Animals are included in this category and thus may not be carried on Shabbat. If, in order to prevent them from being hurt, it is necessary to move them, the Sages permitted pulling them but not picking them up (SA 308:39-40). 
  At first glance, this would seem to pertain to house pets like cats and dogs, and indeed, this is the position of Yalkut Yosef (vol. 2, p. 383) and Orḥot Shabbat (19:124). 
  However, it seems more reasonable to assume that muktzeh pertains only to animals with which one does not normally play. Pets whose owners play with them and pick them up all week long would not be muktzeh, and their owners may thus touch them and pick them up on Shabbat. Similarly, seeing-eye dogs are not muktzeh (Igrot Moshe, OḤ 5:22:21; Shulḥan Shlomo 308:74). Although some are stringent, muktzeh is a rabbinic prohibition so the halakha follows those who are lenient.3<i class="footnote">em&gt;Maharaḥ Or Zaru’a §81 permits carrying pet birds in their cage, maintaining that they are not <em>muktzeh</em>, albeit while noting that Rosh disagrees and maintains that all animals are <em>muktzeh</em>. Indeed, this is the opinion of the majority of <em>poskim</em> according to MB 308:146 and SSK 27:27 (<em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 5:26 states that if one wishes to move birds in order to prevent their suffering, such as if the sun is beating down on them, one may rely on <em>Maharaḥ Or Zaru’a</em>). However, all these discussions relate to birds, which are not commonly carried. In contrast, today people keep house pets and carry them around all week. For this reason, <em>Igrot Moshe</em> states that birds are <em>muktzeh</em> (OḤ 4:16) and succinctly that pets are not (OḤ 5:22:21). This is also the position of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in <em>Shulḥan Shlomo</em> 308:74. Others are stringent (<em>Yalkut Yosef</em> vol. 2, p. 383; <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 19:124). As I have written above, the <em>halakha</em> follows those who are lenient. Bird cages and aquariums, which are not normally carried, are <em>muktzeh</em>. If one normally moves them around during the week for decorative purposes, then according to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach they are not <em>muktzeh</em><em>Shulḥan Shlomo</em> 308:74:2).</i>
  A fish that jumped out of an aquarium and will presumably stay alive if it is returned may be put back even though it is muktzeh. This is because, when necessary, and when there is no other solution, one may move a muktzeh object to prevent tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim. Even though some are stringent in this case, one may rely on the lenient approach (See SA 305:19; MB ad loc. 70; SSK 27:28).
  If a fish in an aquarium dies, and it is possible that if it is left in the aquarium other fish will catch whatever terminal disease it had, then even though the dead fish is muktzeh, it may be removed from the tank to save the remaining fish. If there is a dog or cat in the vicinity, the fish should be fed to them (see SSK 27:29).
  
  Section 6
  
  Animals / The Melakha of Tzad
  Trapping animals was one of the melakhot performed for the Mishkan. They would trap teḥashim to make curtains from their skins and the ḥilazon to produce tekhelet to dye the curtains (Shabbat 73a; Rashi ad loc.; Shabbat 75a).
  The Torah prohibition of Tzad is limited to those animals – beasts, birds, or fish – that are normally trapped or hunted for a purpose, whether to eat their meat, use their skins, or enjoy their beauty (as is the case with parrots). In contrast, one who traps species that are not normally hunted, such as flies and other insects, violates rabbinic law (Shabbat 106b; SA 316:3).
  The prohibition of Tzad does not apply to tame animals that do not run away from their owners, such as cows, donkeys, and dogs. Since in any case they stay with their owners, there is no such thing as trapping them (Rema 316:12; MB ad loc. 59). Nevertheless, carrying these animals is prohibited, as they are muktzeh. When necessary they may be grabbed and dragged into their pen or kennel, as long as they are not picked up (SA 308:40; see section 3 above).
  If an animal is partially tame in that it runs away when a human tries to grab it but returns to its cage at night, its trapping is rabbinically prohibited (Rema 316:12: MB ad loc. 57, 59). When necessary, in order to avoid monetary loss or tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim, one may rely on those who are lenient and trap a partially tame animal. (See SA ad loc.; SSK 27:36.)
  The Torah prohibition refers to completely trapping an animal; that is, holding it in hand, with ropes, or in a cage such that one can do with it as he pleases. Similarly, one who shepherds an animal into an area small enough that he can chase and catch it in one motion, he violates Torah law. In contrast, if one herds an animal into a large area where he would still need to chase it down in order to capture it, he does not violate Torah law, as the animal is not well and truly trapped. However, this is rabbinically prohibited, because the animal can now be more easily trapped. If he subsequently captures it, even though doing so is easier than usual, he is still violates Torah law, as this is the Tzad that the Torah forbids (Shabbat 106b; SA 316:1).
  Hunting with the aid of a dog is forbidden. However, if one commands the dog with his voice and does not actually touch it, the prohibition is rabbinic. If he takes any action to help with the capture, he violates Torah law (Rema 316:2; MB ad loc. 10).
  A mouse trap may be put out on Friday, since no action is taken on Shabbat. However, it is rabbinically prohibited to put out a trap on Shabbat. This is not prohibited by Torah law, as it is not certain that the trap will succeed in catching anything (MB 316:18).
  An animal may be freed from a trap on Shabbat. While there is a prohibition to trap an animal, there is no prohibition to free an animal from a trap on Shabbat (MB 316:25).
  One who wishes to feed a caged animal or bird whose nature is to try to escape must take care not to open the cage even briefly. If he mistakenly opened the cage, then if the cage is so small that confining the animal or bird to it would be considered Tzad by Torah law, then the cage may not be closed even be-di’avad. If the cage is large enough that confining the animal or bird to it would only be rabbinically prohibited, be-di’avad one may close it, since the animal or bird was inside when Shabbat began (Pri Megadim; BHL 316:6 s.v. “ve-halakh”).
  
  Section 7
  
  Animals / Unintentional Trapping
  Just as one may not chase an animal in order to trap it, so too one may not exploit the opportunity to catch an animal that got stuck in a confined space. Therefore, if a deer enters a house, the door may not be closed behind it. If a bird flies in through a window, the window may not be shut behind it (Shabbat 106b; SA 316:5). If one wishes to close the door or window in order to protect against thieves or the cold, the animal must first be chased out of the house.
  If the household members are having trouble chasing out the animal or bird because it is hiding and eluding pursuit, if necessary the door or window may be closed. This is because the person doing so does not intend to trap the animal or bird, but only to protect the house from thieves or the cold. Besides, even after the door or window is closed, the animal is not truly trapped, because capturing it is still an effort.
  Similarly, if a window screen has flies on it, and one wishes to close the window beyond it in order to prevent the heat or cold from entering, he must first chase away the flies so that they are not trapped between the window and the screen. If it is difficult to do so, the window may be closed even while they are still there, since one does not intend to trap the flies, only to protect against the heat or cold. Besides, the flies are not truly trapped; even if he wants to catch them, he would have to make an effort to do so.
  Similarly, one who wants to close a small box that has flies in it should chase them away before closing it. If it is difficult to chase them all away, he should leave something between the cover and the box in order to create an escape hatch for the flies. If necessary, the box may be closed even though a fly will be trapped inside it, since his intention is not to trap the fly, but only to close the box. Besides, the fly is not truly trapped; even if he wants to catch it, when he opens the box it may very well escape.4<i class="footnote">In order to explain this <em>halakha</em>, we must first point out that in all the cases mentioned here, the trapping involved is only rabbinically prohibited, for the following reasons:1) The area is large enough that the animals are not truly trapped there. (If the box is very small, then <em>Sefer Ha-Teruma</em> maintains that the flies are considered trapped, while <em>Tur</em> maintains that they are not trapped since they can escape when the box is opened.)2) Flies and the like are not species that are hunted. Thus doing so is only rabbinically prohibited3) Since the goal is to close the house or box and not to trap anything, this is a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah, which according to most poskim is only rabbinically prohibited.In all the cases mentioned above, the intention is not to trap but simply to close the window. As a result, these are examples of psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei in cases of a double rabbinic prohibition. It is generally agreed that in such instances, one can be lenient when necessary. In cases of true necessity, we are lenient for a psik reisha even if there is only one rabbinic prohibition (as explained above in ch. 9 n. 2; see MB 316:15, SHT ad loc. 18, and the upcoming footnote). Accordingly, Ḥayei Adam 30:2 and MB 316:5 state that if a bird flies into a house and is located in an area large enough that trapping the bird would only be rabbinically prohibited, one may close a window or door on account of the cold. Additionally, one may bring into consideration the following opinion of Rashba (Shabbat 107a) based on the Yerushalmi. Even though the Sages state: “If a deer enters a house and one locks it in, he is liable” (Shabbat 106b), nevertheless Rashba writes that as long as his intention in closing the door is to protect the house, it is not prohibited. Even though we do not follow this Rashba, we can combine his opinion with other mitigating factors to support leniency. See Harḥavot.</i>
  
  Section 8
  
  Animals / Slaughtering (Shoĥet)
  Shoḥet refers to the melakha of taking the life of a living being. For the Mishkan, they slaughtered teḥashim and goats in order to use their skins for the curtains (Shabbat 73a, 75a).
  It is not only slaughtering that is prohibited. Rather, killing a living being in any fashion is forbidden by Torah law. It does not matter whether death is brought about by striking, strangling, or any other method. One who kills a tiny ant violates Torah law, as does one who removes a fish from water, since this kills the fish. Similarly, one who reaches his hand into an animal’s womb and aborts its fetus on Shabbat violates Torah law (Shabbat 107b).
  The Torah prohibition applies when the animal is killed for its corpse, i.e., to make use of its meat, skin, or blood. In contrast, one who kills destructively, such as stamping on ants because he wants them dead, transgresses rabbinically.
  If one is walking and comes across ants, he should jump over them in order to avoid killing them and violating a rabbinic prohibition. If there is a colony of ants in his path and it is impossible to step there without killing ants, he should walk around them. If he is in a place where he cannot pass without walking on them, he may continue walking, since he does not intend to kill them. It is preferable that he walk on the sides of his feet and do his best to avoid killing ants.
  Similarly, if there are insects in a toilet and there is a reasonable chance that flushing the toilet will kill them, it is preferable, when possible, to wait until they fly or crawl away. However, if they do not emerge, or if one must flush for the sake of human dignity, he may do so.
  If ants are in a sink and can be blown out of the way, that is best. If it is difficult to do so, dishes or hands may still be washed, even though this will probably drown the ants. Since the one washing is not interested in killing them, and he needs the water, it is not prohibited.5<i class="footnote">Even if it is clear that the ants or other insects will be killed, it is a <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em> in a case of a double rabbinic prohibition, as the act is destructive and is being done with a <em>shinui</em>. We saw above (ch. 9 n. 2) that when necessary we are lenient in such cases. Even if one insists that the killing here is not done with a <em>shinui</em>, it is still a case of <em>psik reisha de-lo niḥa lei</em> applying to a rabbinic prohibition. In cases of true necessity, we are lenient even in such a case (MB 316:5; SHT 321:68, 337:10). Some maintain that we may be lenient in such a case even <em>le-khatḥila</em> (<em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 2:46). If one walks on the sides of his feet, then the killing is definitely done with a <em>shinui</em>. Besides, it is possible that this will not kill them. Even though <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 3:18:10 and <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 14:27 are stringent, the primary position is the lenient one, as is recorded in <em>Minḥat Ish</em> 19:9. For a toilet infested with gnats, <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 10:27 offers additional factors to permit flushing: human dignity, <em>grama</em>, <em>melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah</em>, and maybe even <em>mitasek</em>. <em>Shevet Ha</em>–<em>Levi</em> 6:94 is in agreement.Killing lice: <em>Shabbat</em> 12a records a disagreement about killing lice on Shabbat. The conclusion reached there is that killing them involves no prohibition, as they spontaneously generate from inanimate matter. Now, however, since we know that lice do reproduce, it is forbidden to kill them. <em>Halakha</em> is determined in accordance with current knowledge. See <em>Harḥavot</em>.</i>
  
  Section 9
  
  Animals / Wounding (Ĥovel)
  Just as it is prohibited by Torah law to kill any living being, it is also prohibited by Torah law to cause a loss of blood. After all, “blood is life” (Devarim 12:23). Additionally, with the release of a little blood, there is a localized loss of life. This prohibition applies even when the blood does not exit the body, but simply hemorrhages from blood vessels and accumulates under the skin. This too is viewed as a localized loss of life (SA 316:8; BHL s.v. “ve-haḥovel).6<i class="footnote">Rashi maintains that <em>Ḥovel</em> is a <em>tolada</em> of <em>Shoḥet</em>. Several other Rishonim (such as Ran) discuss the issue but do not make it clear whether <em>Ḥovel</em> is a <em>tolada</em> of <em>Shoḥet</em> or part of the <em>av melakha</em>. Rambam maintains that <em>Ḥovel</em> is liable because of <em>Mefarek</em>, a <em>tolada </em>of <em>Dash</em></i>
  Accordingly, if one strikes another person on Shabbat with intent to injure and causes a hemorrhage or hematoma, he is not only guilty of an interpersonal transgression but also desecrates Shabbat. This is also true of one who angrily strikes an animal and causes a hemorrhage or hematoma. In addition to violating tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim, he transgresses the prohibition of Ḥovel.
  One may not do a blood test on Shabbat. Since the goal is to use the blood, taking it is prohibited by Torah law. In cases of danger to life, of course, it is permitted. It is also forbidden to scratch or pick at a scab if doing so will cause it to bleed, or to brush one’s teeth in a way that will cause the gums to bleed (as explained in 14:2).
  A Jew may administer a shot to one who is ill, even if not dangerously so, as long as the injection is into flesh, since this will not necessarily cause the sick person to bleed. In contrast, if the shot or infusion is done into a vein, it is prohibited for a Jew to administer it to one who is not dangerously ill, since there will definitely be at least a little blood. However, a non-Jew may be asked to give this injection. If the sick person is dangerously ill, even a Jew may give the injection (below 28:7).
  
  Section 10
  
  Animals / Trapping and Killing Snakes, Scorpions, Mosquitoes, and Other Pests
  Danger to life overrides Shabbat. Therefore, animals likely to endanger human life may be killed even on Shabbat, like poisonous snakes and scorpions. Even if one is unsure whether a particular animal is poisonous, he may kill it. Similarly, a dangerous dog or rabid animal may be killed.
  It is prohibited on Shabbat to kill animals whose bites hurt a great deal but are not life-threatening. This applies to snakes and scorpions that are definitely not poisonous. It is only forbidden to kill them the way one would kill them during the week, so one may kill them in the course of walking; one walks in their direction and in the course of walking steps on them and kills them. The reason for this dispensation is that killing an animal in a destructive manner, when one does not have any use for the cadaver, is only prohibited rabbinically. Thus, in order to avoid great suffering, the Sages permitted killing such animals in the course of walking. However, it is prohibited to kill them directly, out of concern that people will conclude that one may kill animals even when there is no concern that they will cause harm. If such animals are chasing a person, they may be killed even without a shinui.
  Even if they are not chasing anyone, a receptacle may be placed over them in order to neutralize the threat. This does not need to be done with a shinui, because the person’s goal is not to trap them, only to prevent them from stinging or biting (SA 316:7; MB ad loc. 27).
  Animals whose stings are not so painful, such as mosquitoes and fleas, may not be killed in any manner on Shabbat. If the mosquito or flea is clinging to one’s skin and cannot be removed without being grabbed, the Sages permitted grabbing it in order to remove it. This is on condition that he not kill it or even squeeze it, which might kill it. Even though grabbing an animal without intending to use it is rabbinically prohibited, the Sages were lenient here since the goal is to avoid suffering (SA 316:9). If one wishes to grab a flea and remove it from under his clothing rather than from his skin need not be dissuaded from doing so (MB 316:37; SHT ad loc. 63).
  If there are mosquitoes or other pests in a room, one may spray insecticide to repel them as long as he does not spray the bugs directly and leaves open a window through which they can escape. This way he will not necessarily kill any of them. However, one may not spray them directly or to spray in a place where they have no means of escape, because then he will definitely kill them and transgress a prohibition (Yabi’a Omer 3:20; see SSK 25:6).
  One may apply liquid mosquito repellent on Shabbat, but not an ointment (see above, 14:5).
  One may place tablets into a plug-in device that contains a heating element that causes the tablets to heat up and release a mosquito-repellent vapor. It is proper to place the tablets at a short distance from the heating element so that they do not reach the temperature of yad soledet bo, which might present a problem of Bishul (Ha-ḥashmal Ba-halakha vol. 2, p. 364; above 10:4). However, if one is uncertain whether the tablets will reach yad soledet bo, he may place them.
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Hotza’ah / The Melakha of Hotza’ah
  The melakha of Hotza’ah consists of transporting an object from a private domain (reshut ha-yaḥid) to a public domain (reshut ha-rabim) or vice versa, or transporting an object more than four amot in a public domain.
  During the six weekdays, man’s role is to perform melakhot in order to improve and develop the world; to craft tools and instruments, build houses, and cultivate crops for food and textiles. The highest purpose of each and every melakha is to build the Mishkan and Mikdash, in which God’s presence can dwell. Despite the tremendous value of work, the Torah commands us to refrain from all melakha on Shabbat in order to explore the foundations of faith and to study Torah. In this way, the work that we do all week long is imbued with deeper significance. It has the power to bring the world closer to perfection and establish within it a Mikdash for the Lord, God of Israel.
  The novelty of Hotza’ah is that an act that does not physically alter an object can still be considered a melakha. Even changing its location in some substantive way is considered a melakha. Location is thus of paramount importance. There is nothing in the world that does not have a location, a place. When an item is in its place, it has a purpose; when it is not, it is unimportant. For example, in a place with no water, water is very valuable, while in a place with plenty of water, its value declines. Furthermore, nothing can exist without a place to be. This explains why God is referred to as Makom (Place) – because He ensures the world’s continued existence and provides a place for it to be. When the Sages discussed each type of place, they used the word “reshut” (property, authority, domain), since every object exists by the authority of the place where it rests.
  We find in the Torah that the donations for the Mishkan were collected from each individual’s private domain (reshut ha-yaḥid) and were brought to the public domain (reshut ha-rabim) where the Mishkan was built. This was considered a melakha, as the verse states explicitly: “Moshe then ordered that the proclamation be made throughout the encampment: ‘Let no man or woman make further effort (melakha) on behalf of the donations for the sanctuary!’ And the people stopped bringing” (Shemot 36:6).
  According to Torah law, there are three types of domains: a private domain (reshut ha-yaḥid), a public domain (reshut ha-rabim), and an exempt area (mekom petur). The Sages decreed that most places defined by Torah law as a mekom petur would have the status of a public domain. Such a rabbinically defined public domain is called a karmelit.
  
  Section 2
  
  Hotza’ah / Private and Public Domains
  A reshut ha-yaḥid is an area enclosed by walls, which render it a single place, and one may carry objects in this enclosed area. Even a large area surrounded by walls is considered one place, and there is no fundamental difference whether an object is located on its east or west side.
  The classic example of a reshut ha-yaḥid is a house, though an area may be considered a reshut ha-yaḥid even without a roof. As long as it is enclosed by a barrier ten tefaḥim high (76 cm), it is a reshut ha-yaḥid. A pit that is ten tefaḥim deep is also considered a reshut ha-yaḥid, as is a rock or hill that is ten tefaḥim high. Even if there are no walls surrounding the rock or hill, the fact that they are raised ten tefaḥim from the ground puts them in the same category as something walled. We treat them as if they have walls that extend upward beyond the top of the rock or hill. To be defined as a reshut ha-yaḥid, an area must be at least four tefaḥim wide (about 30 cm). Lacking this width, the area is not significant enough to be deemed a reshut ha-yaḥid, only a mekom petur. It should be noted that a sharp incline is considered a wall as well.1<i class="footnote">If the slope surrounding a hill is steep enough (it declines ten <em>tefaḥim</em> vertically within four <em>amot</em> [ 182.4 cm] horizontally), it is considered a wall, which makes everything atop the slope into a <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em>. The Sages refer to such a hill as a <em>tel ha-mitlaket</em> (MB 345:5; there is disagreement about whether the slope itself is considered a part of the <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em>, as explained in BHL 352:2 s.v. “be-inyan”). The same rule applies to a valley that is surrounded by a slope of such steepness.The Sages ordained that if a place surrounded by walls is larger than <em>beit satayim</em>, even though according to Torah law it is still a <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em>, one may carry within it only if its walls were made for residential purposes. If they are natural walls, one must put up a new wall that is wider than ten <em>amot</em> and at a distance of less than ten <em>amot</em> from the natural wall, so that people have participated in the surrounding wall. Then one may carry in the entire area (SA 358:8; MB <em>ad loc</em>. 62). <em>Beit satayim</em> is the size of the courtyard of the <em>Mishkan</em>, the dimensions of which were 50 <em>amot</em> by 100 <em>amot</em> (5,000 square <em>amot</em>). That translates into 1039.68 square meters, or a little more than a dunam (about a quarter of an acre).The exact size of a tefaḥ is the width of the hand across the knuckles that connect the four fingers (excluding the thumb) to the palm, or approximately 7.6 cm (see below ch. 29 n. 1). Accordingly, three tefaḥim are 22.8 cm. I rounded it off to 23 in the text of this chapter (sections 3 and 7) to make it easier to remember. Four tefaḥim are 30.4 cm, and I rounded it off to 30. Similarly, 16 amot are 7.296 m, which I round off to 7.3.</i>
  A reshut ha-rabim is an area that serves public needs such as streets, squares, markets, and intercity roads. To qualify as a reshut ha-rabim, an area must be at least 16 amot wide, and unroofed. Some add an additional condition: every day it must be traversed by 600,000 people, equivalent to the number of Israelites during our ancestors’ travels in the desert, according to the Torah (see section 8 below). In principle, all prohibitions on carrying are connected to reshut ha-rabim. Formulated in the negative, there is no Torah prohibition on carrying where there is no reshut ha-rabim. Within a reshut ha-rabim, one may not carry an object more than four amot (see sections 3-4 below), and one may not transport an object from a reshut ha-yaḥid to a reshut ha-rabim and vice versa.
  
  Section 3
  
  Hotza’ah / Mekom Petur and Karmelit
  The third type of domain is a mekom petur (an exempt area). According to Torah law, this includes fields, deserts, oceans, lakes, and other places not enclosed by walls (and thus not deemed reshut ha-yaḥid) and also not used by the masses on a regular basis (and thus are not deemed reshut ha-rabim). Since these are undefined places, they have no significance as a location. An object in a mekom petur is not located in a place that establishes a connection with it. Therefore, Torah law permits carrying an object from a mekom petur to a reshut ha-yaḥid or a reshut ha-rabim, and vice versa. Similarly, one may carry objects within a mekom petur for as long and far as he wishes.
  However, since a mekom petur is in some ways similar to a reshut ha-rabim – as the masses may make use of both types of areas – the Sages safeguarded the Torah and declared that any open area that is not a reshut ha-yaḥid shall be called a karmelit and have a status akin to that of a reshut ha-rabim. Thus it is prohibited to carry an object more than four amot in a karmelit, and one may not carry anything from a karmelit to a reshut ha-yaḥid or reshut ha-rabim, and vice versa.
  The only places that are still called a mekom petur are those that are not fit for significant use, such as rocks that are higher than three tefaḥim (about 23 cm) and also less than four tefaḥim wide (about 30 cm). One may carry something from a mekom petur into a reshut ha-yaḥid or reshut ha-rabim, and vice versa. Such a mekom petur was not included in the decree because it is fundamentally different from the other domains. Since it is over three tefaḥim high, it is distinct from the ground, and since it is less than four tefaḥim wide, it is not big enough to be significant. Therefore, no one will make the mistake of thinking that if one may carry in an insignificant mekom petur, one may also carry in a larger and more significant place.2<i class="footnote">A <em>mekom petur</em> can be within a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em>. The <em>poskim</em> disagree whether a <em>mekom petur </em>can be within a <em>karmelit</em>. Some say that since a <em>karmelit</em> started out as a <em>mekom petur</em> but the Sages categorized it as a <em>karmelit</em>, any <em>mekom petur</em> within it is subsumed by its <em>karmelit</em> status, and is treated as a <em>karmelit</em> (Ran, <em>Hagahot Maimoniyot</em>, <em>Tur</em>, and <em>Beit Yosef</em> quoting Rambam). Others maintain that since a <em>karmelit</em> has the status of <em>reshut ha-rabim</em>, if there is an area within it that is more than three <em>tefaḥim</em> high and less than four <em>tefaḥim</em> wide, that area is a <em>mekom petur</em> (Rashi, <em>Magid Mishneh</em> quoting Rashba, Me’iri, and Rabbeinu Yeruḥam). But, within a <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em>, all agree there cannot be a <em>mekom petur</em>, because the fence that surrounds the <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em> makes everything within it part of the <em>reshut ha-yaḥid </em>(Rema 345:19; BHL s.v. “Ran” and “ve-yesh ḥolkim”).A <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> extends only to the height of ten <em>tefaḥim</em>. If one takes an object in hand and walks on a tightrope or beam that is set up above a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em>, he is not transgressing the prohibition of carrying, because the space above ten <em>tefaḥim</em> is considered a <em>mekom petur</em>. However, there is a disagreement regarding the law relating to a table that is over ten <em>tefaḥim</em> high and four <em>tefaḥim</em> wide that is standing in a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> or a <em>karmelit</em>. According to SA 345:16, since there are no walls to turn it into a <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em>, it is considered a <em>karmelit</em>, while according to MB 345:66 and the Vilna Gaon (based on a number of Rishonim), it is defined as a <em>mekom petur</em> because there is no such thing as a <em>karmelit</em> or a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> above ten <em>tefaḥim</em>. SHT <em>ad loc</em>. 68 states that R. Yosef Karo recanted (R. Elimelech Lange, <em>Hilkhot Eruvin</em>, p. 20).</i>
  
  Section 4
  
  Hotza’ah / The Reason Behind the Prohibition of Carrying Four Amot in a Reshut Ha-Rabim
  As we have seen, one may not transport objects from one domain to another. Within a private domain, even in a large house with many rooms, one may move objects around freely, because the entire reshut ha-yaḥid is considered one domain. Moving items within it is not considered transporting them from one domain to another. In contrast, in a reshut ha-rabim, one may move an object within his four amot. Since a reshut ha-rabim is communal, each individual may make use of only the four amot he occupies. Four amot is enough space for one to lie down with arms and legs outstretched. If one moves an item outside his four amot, he has moved it from his space to the communal reshut ha-rabim. This is prohibited by Torah law.
  From a spiritual perspective, it should be noted that all the confusion and corruption in the world stems from division and dissension. Nations fight one another, people compete with each other, and ideological movements struggle with one another. Thus, tremendous amounts of energy are wasted on strife and contention. Even an individual is often torn between his seemingly contradictory desires. The way to rectify these tensions is to reveal the unity underlying all existence. With belief that one God created the entire world, we can understand that all the different desires in the world are directed toward one goal. Only by following the Torah’s directions can we harmonize them, and thus improve and perfect the world. Now we can understand why the commandment to “Love your neighbor as yourself” is considered a major Torah principle: it bridges the world’s fissures and helps us reveal its fundamental unity.
  We are now in a position to understand why objects may be carried in a reshut ha-yaḥid. In a sense, a reshut ha-yaḥid is a perfected place. The walls that enclose it give it a unity of purpose. Thus all its rooms and the areas within it are considered in one place, within which items may be carried. In contrast, a reshut ha-rabim has yet to be perfected. It still expresses the different interests of many different people, and the objects found within it are not yet considered in one place. This is why carrying anything more than four amot in a reshut ha-rabim is considered a melakha.
  As for a karmelit, on the one hand it is not set aside for public use and does not obviously express different interests. Thus, according to Torah law it is the same as a mekom petur, and carrying in it is not prohibited. On the other hand, since a karmelit is used in a variety of ways by a variety of people, it has something in common with a reshut ha-rabim. Therefore, the Sages decided that a karmelit should be treated like a reshut ha-rabim, and carrying in it is prohibited.
  If a reshut ha-rabim is enclosed by a wall or fence, and it has gates that are closed at night, its fundamental unity and common denominator is thus revealed, and it is perfected like a reshut ha-yaḥid. One may thus carry throughout. A karmelit can be perfected even without being enclosed by a fence or wall. A tzurat ha-petaḥ alone suffices to make it the equivalent of a reshut ha-yaḥid in which items may be carried (as explained below, 29:2).
  
  Section 5
  
  Hotza’ah / The Prohibitions of Carrying on Shabbat
  We have seen that the prohibition of Hotza’ah applies to carrying objects from a reshut ha-yaḥid to a reshut ha-rabim or karmelit (which rabbinically is considered a reshut ha-rabim), and vice versa. We have also seen that it is prohibited for one to carry an object four amot within a reshut ha-rabim or a karmelit. Now let us see more precisely how this Torah prohibition is defined.
  The melakha of Hotza’ah has three stages: 1) picking up an object in one domain (akira, [lit. “uprooting”]); 2) transporting it to a different domain (ha’avara); 3) putting it down in that domain (hanaḥa).
  Even if one accomplishes all three of these with one action, for example, by throwing an object from a reshut ha-yaḥid to a reshut ha-rabim, or throwing it four amot within a reshut ha-rabim, he has violated Hotza’ah. Similarly, if one is holding an object or has one in his pocket as he walks from a reshut ha-yaḥid to a reshut ha-rabim, he violates Hotza’ah. When he begins to walk, he “uproots” the object; when he walks from one domain to the other, he transports it to a different domain; and when he stops walking in the second domain, he is putting it down.3<i class="footnote">. One may not carry while walking nonstop from a <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em> through a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> into another <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em>. Some say that this is prohibited by Torah law (<em>Tosafot</em>, <em>Eruvin</em> 33a, s.v. “de-ha”). However, many maintain that as long as one did not stop walking while in the <em>reshut ha-rabim</em>, the prohibition is only rabbinic, because as long as he is walking he has not performed a <em>hanaḥa</em> in the <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> (Rashba and Ritva, <em>Eruvin</em> 33a; <em>Taz</em> 346:2). Indeed, practical <em>halakha </em>follows this position (SAH 347:9; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in SSK ch. 30 n. 134). Therefore, where there is uncertainty about the validity of the local <em>eruv</em>, one may carry while walking nonstop from a <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em> to another <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em> via a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em>. As long as he does not stop, his carrying involves an uncertainty about a doubly rabbinic law: first, most <em>poskim</em> maintain that what we call a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> is in fact a rabbinic <em>karmelit</em>; second, walking nonstop from a <em>reshut ha-yaḥid </em>into another <em>reshut ha-yaḥid </em>via <em>reshut ha-rabim </em>is also prohibited rabbinically.</i>
  In order to transgress a Torah prohibition, one person must complete all three stages. Thus, if one picks up an item in a reshut ha-yaḥid and extends his arm with the item into a reshut ha-rabim, he has not transgressed by Torah law unless he puts down the item in the reshut ha-rabim. If someone else, standing in the reshut ha-rabim, removes the item from his hand, the item has been transported from a reshut ha-yaḥid to a reshut ha-rabim, but neither person has performed an entire melakha by Torah law, since the first person performed akira and ha’avara while the second person performed hanaḥa.
  The Sages nevertheless prohibited transporting objects in this way, lest people circumvent the Torah prohibition, grow accustomed to taking it lightly, and ultimately transgress Torah law by performing all three stages (SA 347:1).
  It is important to be aware that, according to Torah law, the prohibition on Hotza’ah applies only when it is performed in the usual fashion. For example, if one takes an item in his hand, slips it in his pocket, or puts it in his backpack, he is carrying normally and is thus transgressing Torah law. In contrast, if he uses a shinui, such as carrying a handkerchief in his shoe or on his head, he has not violated Torah law. Nevertheless, the Sages prohibited carrying with a shinui lest people end up carrying without a shinui.
  In sum, the Torah prohibition of Hotza’ah is limited to the performance of the entire melakha by one individual in the way it is normally done during the week. Additionally, the Sages prohibited any action that causes the same result as the melakha, even if it is done with a shinui or undertaken by more than one person. If the goal is accomplished – transferring the item to the desired place – the action is prohibited. It is important to note that even in a karmelit, the Sages prohibited carrying an item with a shinui or by more than one person.4<i class="footnote">The distinction between a rabbinic and a Torah prohibition lies in the severity of the punishment. One who knowingly violates Shabbat by Torah law is punished with <em>karet</em> (extirpation); if the violation is unknowing, he is liable to bring a sin offering. If he does the <em>melakha</em> with a <em>shinui</em>, which means the prohibition is rabbinic, then if he did so knowingly, he is given rabbinically-ordained lashes; if it is unknowing, there is no punishment. An additional difference is that when it comes to a Torah prohibition, we are only lenient if danger to life is involved; in contrast, when a prohibition is rabbinic, there are certain times of necessity when we may be lenient even if there is no danger to life. For example, one who is sick may violate certain rabbinic prohibitions (below 28:2). Additionally, one who stands to lose a great deal of money may disregard certain rabbinic prohibitions in order to salvage his money by, for example, carrying money with a <em>shinui</em> from a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> to a <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em> (Rema 301:33; MB 266:17). The Sages also permitted violating rabbinic prohibitions in order to save <em>tefilin</em>, as explained in SA 301:42. See also the next section.</i>
  
  Section 6
  
  Hotza’ah / Carrying Less than Four Amot in a Reshut Ha-Rabim
  We have seen in the previous sections that the prohibition of Hotza’ah includes transporting an object more than four amot in a public domain, since one’s personal space within the public domain is defined as four amot. If he transports an object further, he is deemed to have moved it to a different domain and transgressed Torah law. But within a square of four amot by four amot one may carry. Therefore, only one who carries something a distance greater than the diagonal of a four-amot square (2.58 m) has violated a Torah prohibition, because only then is it clear that he carried outside the permissible area.
  By Torah law, one who wants to transport an object within a reshut ha-rabim may carry it a bit less than four amot, stand still in order to establish a new location for the object, then walk again for less than four amot. He can continue in this way – starting and stopping – until he has transported the object wherever he wants it. However, the Sages forbade this lest one end up carrying more than four amot and thus violate Torah law. Even in a karmelit, which is considered a reshut ha-rabim only rabbinically, they forbade carrying an object less than four amot out of concern that one might come to carry more than four amot in a reshut ha-rabim.5<i class="footnote">. According to many <em>poskim</em> (Raavad, <em>Ha-Ma’or</em>, Rosh, and others), if many people are there, it is permitted <em>le-khatḥila </em>for each one to carry an item fewer than four <em>amot</em> and pass it to the next person, who will also carry it less than four <em>amot</em>. Using this method, they can transport the object across great distances. <em>Pri Megadim</em> allows this even when there are only two people involved, as long as each one carries the item less than four <em>amot</em> before passing it back to the other person. In contrast, some Rishonim prohibit doing this even with many people (Ramban). These positions are cited by SA 349:3 and BHL s.v. “va-ḥavero.” The Sages permitted carrying <em>tefilin</em> on Shabbat in this manner, if it is necessary in order to keep them safe (SA 301:42).</i>
  However, one who stands to lose his money, such as one who is traveling with a large sum of money when Shabbat begins and has no safe place to hide it, and no non-Jew is available to guard the money or transport it to his home, then in order to prevent his suffering a financial loss the Sages permit the Jew to carry his backpack in the manner discussed in the previous paragraph – starting and stopping, and making sure to walk less than four amot each time (paḥot paḥot mi-daled amot). He may continue this way until he reaches a place where he can safely leave the money. This permission applies even in a reshut ha-rabim. In a karmelit, one may generally carry this way for the sake of a mitzva (SA 266:7, 8; BHL 349:5).6<i class="footnote">If the person who did not make it home before the start of Shabbat was walking nonstop from before Shabbat began, there is another possible solution. He can run until he arrives at his home. Since the <em>akira</em> of the object was done before Shabbat began, in any case he will not violate Torah law. In order to save his money, the Sages allowed him to run to his house, even though this involves transporting an item to a different <em>reshut</em> (<em>ha’avara</em>) and setting it down there (<em>hanaḥa</em>), which are normally prohibited. They ruled that he should run, to ensure that he does not make the mistake of stopping (<em>Shabbat</em> 153b: “He should run, not go gently [i.e., walk]. Why? Since there is nothing to remind him, he may end up performing <em>akira</em> and <em>hanaḥa</em>”). If possible, upon arrival in the <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em>, he should take off his backpack with a <em>shinui</em>, so as to minimize the prohibition as much as possible (SA 266:11).</i>
  
  Section 7
  
  Hotza’ah / Carrying in a Mekom Petur
  As we have seen (section 3), a mekom petur is an area within a reshut ha-rabim like a stone taller than three tefaḥim (about 23 cm) but less than four tefaḥim wide (about 30 cm). Since a mekom petur is not deemed significant, one may transport an object from a reshut ha-rabim or a reshut ha-yaḥid and place it on a mekom petur, and vice versa.
  According to Torah law one may move an object from a reshut ha-yaḥid to a reshut ha-rabim by first removing it from the reshut ha-yaḥid and placing it on the mekom petur and then picking it up from the mekom petur and placing it in the reshut ha-rabim. However, the Sages forbade this lest people make light of Hotza’ah that is prohibited by Torah law as well.
  Poskim disagree about whether one may use a mekom petur to transfer an item from a reshut ha-yaḥid to a karmelit or vice versa. Some maintain that it is rabbinically prohibited to transfer items by means of a mekom petur even to a karmelit. Even though all the prohibitions of carrying in a karmelit are rabbinic, the Sages did not differentiate here (Ha-Ma’or, Raavad, and Rosh). Others maintain that only when there is a concern that people will end up violating Torah law by carrying from a reshut ha-yaḥid to a reshut ha-rabim or vice versa is it forbidden to transfer items via a mekom petur, but one may transfer them from a reshut ha-yaḥid to a karmelit in this fashion (Rif and Rambam).
  In practice, at times of necessity one may rely on those who are lenient and carry from a reshut ha-yaḥid or a karmelit and vice versa via a mekom petur. This is important for soldiers who are stuck in a place with no eruv on Shabbat. If they want to move something from their tent (which is a reshut ha-yaḥid) to the common area of the encampment (which is a karmelit), they should leave their tent and keep moving until they find a mekom petur on which to place the item. Afterward, they can take it from the mekom petur and put it down in the common area, and vice versa. This should also be the procedure for transferring items from one tent to the next via the common area. The item should be removed from the tent, left on a mekom petur in the common area, and then taken wherever it needs to go.7<i class="footnote">This is the most practical solution for soldiers in the Israeli army. The best <em>mekom petur</em> is a rock or a pole that is higher than ten <em>tefaḥim</em> (76 cm) and narrower than four <em>tefaḥim</em> (about 30 cm). However, if this pole or rock is lower than ten <em>tefaḥim</em>, as we saw in n. 2, the <em>poskim</em> disagree about whether it is deemed a <em>mekom petur</em>. Some say that there is no such thing as a <em>mekom petur</em> within a <em>karmelit</em>, while others maintain that it can exist. In times of necessity, soldiers in the army may be lenient (<em>Meshiv Milḥama</em> §5 and §60). Sometimes the only way to arrange a <em>mekom petur</em> is by using a bench that is narrower than four <em>tefaḥim</em> . The problem is that another doubt arises in this case, because Me’iri states that a finished product (<em>kli</em>) cannot be considered a <em>mekom petur</em> (SHT 345:15). But in times of necessity when there is no other solution, a <em>kli</em> that is lower than ten <em>tefaḥim</em> in a <em>karmelit</em> can be considered a <em>mekom petur</em> (<em>Sho’el U-meshiv</em> 4:3:2; <em>Hilkhot Eruvin</em> ch. 1 n. 16).A person’s shoulder: According to Rashba and <em>Tosafot</em>, another person’s body can be considered a <em>mekom petur</em>, on condition that it is higher than ten <em>tefaḥim</em>; a person’s shoulder generally fits this condition. Others say that a person’s body cannot be considered a place, and therefore cannot be a <em>mekom petur </em>(see MB 347:10). In times of necessity when there is no other solution, one may rely upon the lenient position.</i>
  
  Section 8
  
  Hotza’ah / Reshut Ha-rabim as Defined by Torah Law
  The most pressing practical question when dealing with issues of Hotza’ah on Shabbat is whether streets in cities and towns are considered a reshut ha-rabim or karmelit. If streets today are considered a reshut ha-rabim, then it is very difficult to do what is necessary to transform them into a reshut ha-yaḥid. This transformation involves surrounding the entire city with a fence, installing doors in every entranceway, and ensuring that they are all closed at night. Barring this, it would be prohibited to carry in our cities and towns.
  In contrast, if streets today are defined as a karmelit (i.e., only rabbinically are they treated as a reshut ha-rabim), then it is relatively easy to transform them into a reshut ha-yaḥid where carrying would be permitted. This transformation involves surrounding the city with a tzurat ha-petaḥ (halakhic doorway), by erecting poles and extending strings between them to form a sort of doorway between every pole (below 29:2-3).
  Let us preface our discussion by recalling that the prohibitions of Shabbat are derived from the types of labor performed for the Mishkan. When the Torah commands us to refrain from melakha on Shabbat, it means refraining from Mishkan work, in which the Jews were involved in the desert. If so, then the definition of reshut ha-rabim should also be derived from the Israelites’ desert existence. Since the main thoroughfare in the Israelite camp was sixteen amot wide (7.30 m) in order to enable the passage of the two wagons that transported the different parts of the Mishkan, it follows that only a street equally wide is deemed a reshut ha-rabim. However, Rishonim disagree whether, in order to qualify an area as a reshut ha-rabim, there is also a minimum requirement for the number of people who make use of the street.
  Some maintain that any street or marketplace that is open to the public and is sixteen amot wide is considered a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law. It makes no difference how many people pass through each day. According to this opinion, the eruvin that we construct nowadays (namely, the type known as tzurat ha-petaḥ) are ineffective, because our cities have streets wider than sixteen amot. Furthermore, according to this position, as long as a city has streets that are sixteen amot wide, a tzurat ha-petaḥ is not effective for the smaller streets either; the existence of a reshut ha-rabim within an area encompassed by a tzurat ha-petaḥ invalidates it. This is the opinion of Rambam, Rabbeinu Tam, Ramban, Rashba, and many others.
  Others maintain that since the camp of the Israelites in the desert consisted of 600,000 men, all of whom needed to walk to the Mishkan in order to help build it and to hear the Torah taught by our teacher Moshe, the Kohanim, and the Levi’im, it follows that a reshut ha-rabim is defined as a road or marketplace that is at least sixteen amot wide, and through which 600,000 people pass daily. If fewer people traverse it daily, it is considered a karmelit. This is the opinion of Behag, Rashi, Smag, Rosh, and many others. Within this position, there is an additional debate. Some maintain that an area still qualifies as a reshut ha-rabim even if it is not used by 600,000 daily, but only frequently or even just occasionally. For in the desert, not all the men traveled on the path to the Mishkan every day. In practice, only in megacities such as New York City and Mexico City are there streets traversed by 600,000 people every day. Even most big cities do not have that many people passing through daily. Thus according to this opinion, most streets are not considered a reshut ha-rabim but rather a karmelit. Therefore, carrying there on Shabbat can be permitted with an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaḥ type. According to this opinion, today the streets considered a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law are mainly intercity highways. Since these roads are meant to serve everybody, and their use is not limited to people of one city alone, they are considered reshut ha-rabim even if fewer than 600,000 people pass through each day.8<i class="footnote">BHL 345:7 lists twelve Rishonim who are lenient and twelve who are stringent. According to the simple reading of SA, one should be stringent. Based on this, a number of Aḥaronim write that <em>le-khatḥila</em> Sephardim must be stringent and not rely on an <em>eruv</em> of the <em>tzurat ha-petaḥ</em> type (<em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 345:4; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 3:27:10, 59). In contrast, some Aḥaronim (MA, AHS) argue that R. Yosef Karo did not reach a decision, since SA in multiple places seems to follow the lenient position (303:18; 325:2). In the introduction to the second volume of <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 1:1:1-2, R. Ben-Zion Abba Shaul explains that R. Karo is stringent in a case of doubt about a Torah law and lenient in a case of doubt about a rabbinic law. Based on this principle, R. Abba Shaul resolves the apparent contradictions in SA. MA and <em>Taz</em> observe that most <em>poskim</em> tend to be lenient here. Therefore, they continue, one may rely on an <em>eruv</em> of the <em>tzurat ha-petaḥ</em> type to permit carrying in our cities. Many Ashkenazim follow this. Other Aḥaronim write that even though we cannot dissuade those who are lenient, nevertheless it is proper for a one who wishes to act virtuously in the eyes of his Creator to be stringent, since this is a doubt about a Torah law. MB 345:23 states similarly.Regarding the lenient position, some questions have been raised. First, if, indeed, it is necessary to have 600,000 use an area in order for it to be deemed a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em>, how is it possible that this criterion is nowhere mentioned in the Gemara? Second, the Sages decreed that we should not blow the shofar on Rosh Ha-shana if it falls on Shabbat and that we should not shake the <em>lulav</em> on the first day of Sukkot if it falls on Shabbat out of concern that people would carry the shofar or <em>lulav</em> in the public domain (RH 29b). In the time of the Sages, there were no streets with 600,000 people passing through. If a place with fewer than that many people is not considered a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em>, no one could have been carrying in a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> by Torah law. If this is the case, why did they make their decree? Third, if there is no such thing as a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> by Torah law today, why did they decree (section 14 below) that women not go out with their jewelry, out of concern that they would carry it?A possible answer is that the reason that the Sages decreed not to blow the shofar or go out with jewelry on Shabbat is that even according to the lenient position, intercity roads are considered reshut ha-rabim regardless of how many people use them, as explained in BHL 345:7 toward the end of s.v. “she-ein.” In the time of the Sages, traveling on intercity roads was common since the cities were small. People would travel from city to city and from village to city on the same roads. The reason for the difference between intracity roads and intercity ones is that the roads outside a city belong to the entire world. Therefore, even if less than 600,000 people traverse an intercity road daily, it still belongs to the public and is considered a reshut ha-rabim. In contrast, a road within a city or adjacent to it belongs to the city residents and is not a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law. In such a case, only if 600,000 people traverse it daily is it considered a public road rather than belonging to the city’s residents. Based on this, we can understand why the Sages said that if the gates of Jerusalem had not been locked at night, it would have been a reshut ha-rabim (Eruvin 6b), even though presumably fewer than 600,000 people passed through daily. Since Jerusalem served the entire Jewish people, its streets belonged to all the pilgrims, and thus were comparable to intercity roads. Therefore, had the city not been walled, and had the gates not been locked each night, it would have been deemed a reshut ha-rabim. See more in the next note.</i>
  
  Section 9
  
  Hotza’ah / In Practice
  In practice, most observant Jews follow the lenient position and carry in cities, relying on an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaḥ type. This leads to an interesting question: given that half of the poskim are stringent, believing that an eruv of the tzurat ha–petaḥ type is not sufficient in cities with streets wider than sixteen amot (and that it is irrelevant how many people pass through), how is it that most observant Jews follow the lenient position? After all, it is a case of doubt pertaining to a Torah law, where we are normally stringent.
  The simple answer is that in rare cases, when dealing with an issue in which it is very difficult to be stringent, sometimes the custom takes hold to rely on a lenient opinion even though there is a possible Torah violation at stake. Furthermore, it truly is difficult to follow the stringent position here, as that would mean that no one could go out on Shabbat with anything in his pockets, even tissues and the like, which are sometimes necessary. Additionally, families would not be able to visit one another, because one may not push a stroller in a reshut ha-rabim, and there would be no way to bring diapers, bottles, and so on. Since there is no alternative, and given that half of the poskim are lenient, we can rely on the lenient position in this case.
  We should add that the poskim are not really evenly divided in this case. As we will see, some poskim ruled that there are additional requirements that must be met in order for an area to be considered a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law. If we take these requirements into account, it turns out that according to most poskim, today’s streets would not qualify as a reshut ha-rabim. Therefore, an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaḥ type is sufficient. First, according to some poskim, an area is considered a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law only when the street bisects the entire city in a straight line. If it is slightly crooked, it is no longer a reshut ha-rabim. Most cities do not have a main street that is completely straight, and thus we may rely on an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaḥ type. Second, some poskim feel that since our streets are laid out such that every street is intersected by another street, all the streets are considered enclosed by a wall on three sides. Accordingly, they do not qualify as a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law, and an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaḥ type is sufficient (AHS and Ḥazon Ish). There are additional reasons to be lenient, as explained in the notes.
  When we combine all these opinions, it turns out that according to the majority of poskim, today’s streets are considered a karmelit, and carrying in them can be permitted with an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaḥ type.
  Nevertheless, according to many, since a Torah prohibition may be at stake, le-khatḥila it is proper not to rely on an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaḥ type in a place where there are streets wider than sixteen amot.9<i class="footnote">There are four, maybe five reasons that our streets are not considered <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> by Torah law.1) As we have seen, according to half the <em>poskim</em>, if 600,000 people do not traverse an area daily, it is not a public domain. Very few places meet this condition. Even though some maintain that even a street that occasionally has that many passersby is considered a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> (AHS 345:26; <em>Beit Ephraim</em>, OḤ 26; <em>Hilkhot Eruvin</em>, p. 25 based on the Rishonim’s expression “600,000 found there”), such a street is uncommon as well.2) According to Rashi and others, a street is only considered a reshut ha-rabim if it bisects the city in an absolutely straight line. Generally, this is not the case. (However, Igrot Moshe, OḤ 1:148 rejects this reasoning.)3) Some (Beit Ephraim, OḤ 26; AHS 345:19-22; Ḥazon Ish, OḤ 107:5-8) state that given the way our streets are laid out, where each street is intersected by another street, all the streets can be considered enclosed by a wall on three sides. For according to Torah law, a wall only needs to be mostly closed. Since buildings line most streets, closing off most of the area, a street is already enclosed by two walls. Since another street intersects it, and this second street also has buildings that are close enough together to be considered a wall, the intersecting street provides the third wall. It turns out that every city street is enclosed by three walls, and thus by Torah law is not deemed a reshut ha-rabim. It is only rabbinically that an enclosure requires four walls and that a wall must be completely closed. Since this is a doubt about a rabbinic law, we can be lenient.4) One can present a reasonable argument that it is the Sages who decided that an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaḥ type is not sufficient to permit carrying in a reshut ha-rabim; by the original Torah law, a tzurat ha-petaḥ is considered a true wall. Thus the entire debate is on the rabbinic level, and when there is a doubt about a rabbinic rule, we are lenient. (BHL presents this in 364:2 as the opinion of Rambam. Even though difficulties have been raised with it, Or Le-Tziyon 1:30 suggests that Rosh as well maintains that a tzurat ha-petaḥ is considered a wall by Torah law, in which case the debate is on the rabbinic level.)5) Perhaps we may also say that since part of the State of Israel is surrounded by walls on three sides (albeit very distant ones), according to Tosafot they are considered legitimate walls by Torah law, so once again we are faced with a doubt about a rabbinic law (see Harḥavot 29:4:3).Thus we see that the poskim are not truly evenly divided in this case. Rather, according to most poskim, our streets are not defined as a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law. Additionally, it is a sfek sfeika (in fact, there are four uncertainties). According to the rules of halakhic jurisprudence, in such a case the law follows the lenient position.Some big cities contain streets where 600,000 people indeed pass through every day – not by foot but by car or bus. At first glance, it would seem that carrying in such cities cannot be permitted with an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaḥ type. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suggest that these intracity highways are not considered reshut ha-rabim. For since they are closed to pedestrians, they are not really open to the public. Besides, each car is considered a reshut ha-yaḥid (Yeshu’ot Malko, OḤ 26). Following this reasoning, all would agree that most streets today are not public domains according to Torah law, because once we disqualify the part of a street used by cars, the street is no longer sixteen amot wide. Some disagree with this approach (AHS 345:26; Igrot Moshe, OḤ 1:139).Other objections have been raised to our eruvin. First, if a city contains non-Jews or Jews who desecrate Shabbat, the Sages decreed that they cannot be included in the halakhic partnership on which an eruv is based, and thus it cannot work. See below 29:7 for solutions to this problem. Second, there are often large gardens in cities, larger than beit satayim (see n. 1). These areas disqualify the eruv because they are not designed for walking in. However, in practice, if one may walk in these gardens and there are paths running through them, they do not disqualify the eruv. If the gardens are enclosed by a fence, they also do not disqualify the eruv. Third, Rambam maintains that an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaḥ type is not effective if the distance between the poles is greater than ten amot (4.56 m). However, since most poskim disagree with him, and the law is rabbinic, we do not take his position into account. (This is according to the anonymous position cited in SA 362:10.)Even in an area enclosed by an eruv, some people try to avoid relying on it. For example, when they need to bring a baby or anything else from one house to another via the street, they walk nonstop until they reach their destination. Since there is no hanaḥa in the reshut ha-rabim, according to many this is not considered carrying by Torah law (as explained in n. 3). Doing this adds another rabbinic element to the equation, and it seems that one may thus be lenient even le-khatḥila.</i>
  
  Section 10
  
  Hotza’ah / Wearing Clothes Is Not Considered Carrying
  One may put on his clothes, shoes, and hat, and then enter a reshut ha-rabim, because clothes are secondary to one’s body. As long as one is wearing them, they do not have independent status but are viewed as part of his body. Thus, he is not viewed as carrying them.
  Even clothes that are designed to be worn under specific conditions are considered secondary to the body. Therefore, one may wear a plastic raincoat over a coat or galoshes over shoes, since these are examples of normal rain gear. One may also wear two pairs of socks or two shirts, one on top of the other, since in the winter some people do this regularly. Therefore, if one wishes to bring his friend a shirt via a reshut ha-rabim, he can wear it over his own shirt and walk to his friend’s home, even during the summer. However, if he just picks up the shirt or carries it over his shoulder and then enters a reshut ha-rabim, he violates Torah law.10<i class="footnote">. According to SA 301:36, any item of clothing may be worn outside, even if it is worn in an unusual way. For example, one may wear two belts, one on top of the other. Since each belt is put on in the normal way of dressing – it is permitted. However, Rema maintains that this is only considered the normal way of dressing if there are people who sometimes dress that way. Accordingly, one may wear two shirts, one on top of the other, or similarly layer two pairs of socks. In contrast, since no one wears two belts in the manner described above, one may not go outside dressed this way on Shabbat.</i>
  If a woman wants to carry a blanket or tablecloth through the public domain, she may wrap herself in it the way she would wrap herself in a shawl. Even though these items are not themselves clothes, as long as they are worn in the same fashion as clothes, one may enter a different domain with them. Similarly, one who is going to immerse in a mikveh can wrap himself in a towel and walk through a reshut ha-rabim, and one who wants to carry a kerchief may wrap it around his neck like a scarf, and go out (MB 301:133; SSK 18:48). The underlying principle is that one may wear any item in the normal manner of dressing (SA 301:35-36).
  The Sages ordained that one should not enter a reshut ha-rabim wearing an item of clothing that is likely to fall off, out of concern that he will end up carrying it four amot in the reshut ha-rabim.11<i class="footnote">. AHS 301:53 maintains that if there is an item of clothing that is technically permissible to wear in a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> but was rabbinically prohibited (out of concern that one might carry it four <em>amot</em> if it were to fall off, if people were to make fun of it, or if he were to need to remove it to go to the bathroom), that prohibition is applicable only in a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> by Torah law. The only type of item that the Sages prohibited one to wear even in a <em>karmelit</em> is women’s jewelry (see section 14 below).</i> In contrast, one may go outside wearing a yarmulke, even if it is not held very firmly in place. Even if it were to fall off, we are not concerned that he would carry it four amot, since a man may not walk four amot without a head-covering. Therefore, if it falls off, we can assume that immediately after picking it up he will replace it (SA 301:7; MB ad loc. 153).
  Some maintain that one should not wear gloves in an area without an eruv. After all, if it becomes warm, he might take them off, put them in his pocket, and walk four amot, thus violating Torah law. Le-khatḥila, it is proper to be stringent, but the custom is to be lenient (SA 301:37; see BHL ad loc.).
  The poskim disagree about the status of a plastic cover that is made to protect a man’s hat from the rain. Some forbid wearing this cover, arguing that it is not worn in the same way as clothing, and its sole purpose is to protect the hat. Others permit wearing it, maintaining that it is indeed worn in the same way as clothing. One who wishes may be lenient.12<i class="footnote"><em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 1:108-110 prohibits going out wearing a plastic hat cover. This is based on SA 301:13-14, which states that items designed to protect clothing are not considered clothing, and thus one may not go out wearing them. Since plastic hat covers are meant to protect hats and not people’s bodies, they are not clothing. They are also not decorative, so they may not be worn on Shabbat. This is also the opinion of <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 3:26. There is also a concern that once the rain stops, one might remove the hat cover and carry it four <em>amot</em>. However, according to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, a plastic cover that was made especially for a hat and that is not removed when the rain stops can be considered an item of clothing, and one may walk in a<em> reshut ha-rabim</em> wearing it (SSK ch. 18 n. 46). This is also the position of <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 10:23 and <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 5:24. This debate constitutes uncertainty about a rabbinic law, for even those who prohibit agree that it cannot be a Torah prohibition, as this is not the normal way to carry. This is also a <em>melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah</em>. Moreover, according to many <em>poskim</em>, nowadays there is no public domain as defined by Torah law. Accordingly, one may be lenient.</i>
  
  Section 11
  
  Hotza’ah / Items Deemed Secondary to Clothing
  Any items that are normally attached to clothing, such as buttons and pockets, are considered part of the clothing and secondary to the person’s body. Thus there is no prohibition of carrying them. Even though carrying buttons or pouches would be a violation of Hotza’ah, the buttons and pockets that are normally attached to clothing are part of the garment and secondary to it. Manufacturer’s tags are also considered part of the clothing and secondary to it. One may also wear a coat with a hood, even when the hood is not actually being worn but is hanging down behind the person; even though he has no intention of putting it on, the hood is still considered part of the coat. Items attached to clothing for decorative purposes, like buttons on the cuffs of a suit or feathers attached to a hat or another garment, are also considered part of the garment.
  Sometimes, extra buttons are sewn into a garment in a hidden area, to be used as replacements in case one loses a button. These buttons are not used to fasten or decorate the garment. Some maintain that since these buttons are not in current use yet are significant, one may not go out with them to a reshut ha-rabim (Ḥayei Adam 56:3). According to most poskim, however, one may go out with them. Since it is standard for these buttons to be attached to an item of clothing, they are considered a part of it and secondary to it. The same debate pertains to a ripped hanging loop, which is sewn into a coat or jacket to allow it to be easily hung up. Normally, the loop is attached and functional like a regular button. However, if one side of the loop rips, it is not in current use. The strict position would say that that it remains significant, and thus one may not go out with such a coat to a reshut ha-rabim. The lenient position would respond that regardless whether one intends to fix the loop, it is not considered significant, and remains secondary to the coat. Thus, one may wear the coat in a reshut ha-rabim. Since the disagreement here relates to a rabbinic prohibition, the halakha follows the lenient position.13<i class="footnote">The law of extra buttons is the same as that of a ripped belt loop or buttonhole. According to <em>Ḥayei Adam</em> 56:3, if one intends to fix and reattach it, he renders it significant. Since it currently cannot be used for the button or belt, wearing it outside is considered carrying it. The law would similarly apply to one wearing unfit<em> tzitzit</em> outside, which is a transgression (SA 301:30). This is also the status of a hanging loop that has ripped on one side. Since one can no longer hang the item of clothing from it, one may not wear it in a public domain. This is the position of MB 301:150, and SSK 18:33, 42, and 44 follows it as well. Some suggest that one should resolve not to fix the loop, but rather to throw it away and attach a new one. This way the torn loop is not significant for him, and reverts to being secondary to the clothing. Thus one may wear the clothing in a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em>. Many <em>poskim</em>, though, maintain that these loops are not significant and are always considered secondary to the clothing. They are only considered significant if they are made out of gold, and it would be forbidden to wear them outside if they are not functional. This is the position of SAH 301:47, AHS <em>ad loc</em>. 107, <em>Tehila Le-David</em> §32, and other <em>poskim</em> as quoted in <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 3:27:27. In any case, it would seem that even those who prohibit would concede that the prohibition is only rabbinic, since this is not the normal way of carrying, and it is a <em>melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah</em>. Thus, this constitutes an uncertainty about a rabbinic law. (However, further analysis is required before comparing our case to that of unfit <em>tzitzit</em>, which is discussed in SA 301:30. There, one can say that wearing <em>tzitzit</em> on clothing is the normal way to carry them. Furthermore, the act of carrying there is <em>le-tzorekh gufah</em>; it is for the sake of the <em>tzitzit </em>itself, as the mitzva requires the <em>tzitzit</em> to be attached to the clothing that one then wears outside. Even if the <em>tzitzit</em> are disqualified, the person wishes to bring them home in order to fix them, so he is carrying them in the normal fashion. All this is not true of our case, in which the person walks around in the clothing without giving a thought to the extra buttons or torn loop. Thus this is not <em>le-tzorekh gufah</em>, nor is anyone accustomed to carrying buttons or loops in this fashion.)</i>
  
  Section 12
  
  Hotza’ah / Glasses and Bandages
  Just as one may walk in a reshut ha-rabim while wearing clothes because they are deemed secondary to his body, so too one may enter a reshut ha-rabim with other items that serve him, as they too are considered secondary to his body (SA 301:22). For example, one who is hard of hearing may enter a reshut ha-rabim wearing a hearing aid (above 17:3). Similarly, one who is nearsighted may go out wearing glasses, because the glasses are secondary to the body. However, one may not wear sunglasses in a reshut ha-rabim, because there is a concern that when he reaches a shady area he will take them off, put them in his pocket, and carry them. If one needs to wear sunglasses because his eyes are sensitive, and he does not remove them even in the shade, then he may wear them in a reshut ha-rabim. If one has clip-on sunglasses that can simply be flipped up when necessary without being removed from the glasses, he may wear them in a reshut ha-rabim, since there is no concern that one will end up removing and carrying them (see SSK 18:18; Yalkut Yosef 301:35).
  If one is wearing an adhesive or cloth bandage to help heal or protect a cut, it is considered serving his body and may be worn in a reshut ha-rabim. Similarly, one with a wounded arm may go out wearing a sling. One whose ear hurts may go out with cotton in it. Bite plates and orthodontic retainers may also be worn. All of these serve the body and are secondary to it (SA 301:28; MB ad loc. 108; SSK 34:29).
  
  Section 13
  
  Hotza’ah / Canes, Seeing-Eye Dogs, and Wheelchairs
  If one is partially disabled and needs a cane to walk, he may walk in a reshut ha-rabim with a cane because the cane has the same status as his shoes – indispensable for walking. However, if he can walk without a cane, even if only with great difficulty, he may not enter a reshut ha-rabim with a cane (SA 301:17).
  A blind person, who normally uses a white cane to help him get around, may not use it on Shabbat if he can manage without it; in such a case, the cane is considered a burden and may not be used where there is no eruv (SA 301:18). If he cannot manage without it, for example, if he needs to navigate an unfamiliar neighborhood, he may go out with his cane (AHS 301:72).14<i class="footnote">. Nowadays the blind are taught to use a white cane, and so they feel unable to manage without one even in familiar areas. Thus it may be permissible for them to enter a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> with a cane even in a familiar area.</i>
  A blind person may enter the public domain with a seeing-eye dog. Even though he is holding onto the harness attached to the dog, this is not prohibited. Since the harness is always attached to the dog, it is secondary to its body, and there is no problem of carrying (Igrot Moshe, OḤ 1:45; Menuḥat Ahava 3:27:49; see SSK ch. 18 n. 62 and above 20:2).
  One who is wheelchair-bound and propels the wheelchair manually may go out in the public domain with the wheelchair, as the wheelchair is considered comparable to his shoes (SA 30:16-17; Igrot Moshe, OḤ 4:90). However, if the disabled person is unable to propel himself, he may not be pushed, just as a baby who cannot walk may not be carried in the public domain or a karmelit (MB 308:153). For the sake of a mitzva, though, a non-Jew may be asked to push someone in a wheelchair. This is classified as a shvut di-shvut, which is permissible for a great need and for the sake of a mitzva (above 9:11).15<i class="footnote">Some question the permissibility of a disabled person propelling himself in a wheelchair on Shabbat (<em>Har Tzvi</em>, OḤ 1:170; SSK 34:27). The concern is that even if the disabled person is able to propel the wheelchair himself, it might still not be considered secondary to him. However, the primary position is the lenient one. See <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 301:56; <em>Piskei Teshuva </em>301:9.Many maintain that one may only ask a non-Jew to push a disabled person in a wheelchair in a karmelit, because, according to them, the chair is not secondary to the person, and thus pushing it is prohibited by Torah law. Thus in a reshut ha-rabim there is only one shvut involved (Ḥelkat Yaakov 1:66; Minḥat Yitzhak 2:114:6; Nishmat Avraham 301:16, n. 1). Nevertheless, there is room to say that a disabled person’s wheelchair is secondary to him. Accordingly, since “a living being carries itself,” moving him is only rabbinically prohibited. This case is comparable to that of a bedridden person, about whom the Talmud states that carrying him in a reshut ha-rabim is only rabbinically prohibited (Shabbat 93b). Thus, one may ask a non-Jew to push the disabled person even in a reshut ha-rabim. This is the position of Rabbi Peretz (Otzar Piskei Eruvin §38). It can also be argued that the status of the disabled is similar to that of the ill, for whom the Sages permitted transgressing the rabbinic prohibition of having melakha performed by a non-Jew.</i>
  
  Section 14
  
  Hotza’ah / Jewelry
  As we have seen, the prohibition of Hotza’ah does not apply to items that are secondary to the body. Therefore, one may go out in a reshut ha-rabim wearing all types of clothing. Following this line of reasoning, it would seem that jewelry, which is used to beautify a person, should be considered secondary to the body as long as it is worn on the body or clothes, and should not present a problem of Hotza’ah.
  Nevertheless, the Sages were concerned that a woman might want to show her friend her jewelry and thus remove it, hold it, forget about Shabbat, and walk four amot in the public domain, thus violating Torah law. Therefore, the Sages prohibited wearing all jewelry that one might want to show someone else. This includes earrings, bracelets, rings, necklaces, and headbands.
  However, since the time of the Rishonim, women customarily go out wearing jewelry on Shabbat. The poskim disagree regarding why this has been the case. Some say that while it is true that technically it is rabbinically prohibited, the rabbis did not try to prevent the practice when it became widespread, because they came to the conclusion that even if they were to protest, the women would not change their ways. Therefore, the rabbis preferred not to publicize the prohibition, as it is better that people transgress unknowingly rather than knowingly.
  Other poskim try to provide some justification for the practice, explaining that the reason for the rabbinic prohibition was the concern that people would end up carrying four amot in reshut ha-rabim and thus violate Torah law. Nowadays, however, when according to many there is virtually nowhere that meets the criteria of a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law, even if one does end up carrying jewelry, it will not be a Torah transgression. We do not extend the prohibition on going out with jewelry into areas considered reshut ha-rabim rabbinically, as there is a principle that we do not enact a rabbinic safeguard around a rabbinic safeguard.
  Others say that since jewelry is more common now, we do not need to worry that a woman will remove her jewelry in the street to show her friends. Therefore, even in an area that is a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law, one may wear jewelry on Shabbat.
  Since the entire issue is rabbinic, one may rely on the lenient opinions. Indeed, women customarily go out wearing jewelry even where there is no eruv.16<i class="footnote">According to Rif and Rambam, in any area other than a <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em>, a woman may not wear jewelry that she might remove. This is also the primary position cited in SA 103:18. Accordingly, there is no way to permit going out today wearing jewelry (Rosh and Ran). If so, the reason we do not object to this practice is because it is preferable that people transgress unknowingly rather than knowingly. Ramban and Rashba take this a step further and maintain that one should not wear jewelry even in a courtyard where there is an <em>eruv</em>, because one might forget and wear it in a <em>reshut ha-rabim</em>. In contrast, based on <em>Tosafot</em>, <em>Shabbat</em> 64b, <em>Sefer Ha-Teruma</em> maintains that nowadays, when there are no public domains that meet the Torah’s criteria, there is no prohibition against wearing jewelry. (However, as I explained in n. 8, all would agree that intercity highways are <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> even today. Thus we must ask why those Rishonim were not concerned about this. It would seem that in the times of the Rishonim, women were not accustomed to travel between cities, while in the earlier times of the Sages they had been accustomed to do so. Therefore, the Sages decreed that women may not go out wearing jewelry, but later the Rishonim were less concerned.) R. Shimshon writes in the name of Rabbeinu Sar Shalom that since it has become much more common than it used to be for women to wear jewelry, women are no longer accustomed to removing jewelry to show one another in <em>reshut ha-rabim</em>; therefore a woman may go out nowadays wearing jewelry. This is the common practice. Nevertheless, some maintain that <em>le-khatḥila</em> it is still preferable to be stringent and not wear jewelry in an area without an <em>eruv</em>.It should be noted that there were specific types of jewelry that the Sages prohibited wearing on Shabbat. This was because women customarily immersed in wells and streams to purify themselves after menstruation, and the Sages were concerned that prior to immersion they might remove their jewelry and carry it four <em>amot</em> to the immersion place. However, <em>Orḥot Ḥayim</em> points out (<em>Hilkhot Shabbat</em> §261) that nowadays immersion is done in a <em>mikveh</em>, which is in a <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em>, so the concern no longer applies. This can justify the current practice of wearing jewelry on Shabbat (SSK ch. 18 n. 55).</i>
  
  Section 15
  
  Hotza’ah / Watches, Keys, Identity Cards, and Medications
  The poskim disagree about the status of a watch. Some maintain that only if it is decorative like jewelry may it be worn in the public domain. The test for whether it can be considered decorative is what the owner does if the watch stops. If he would take it off, it indicates that the watch is not jewelry and is used only to tell time. Since that use is not for the sake of his body, wearing the watch in the public domain is considered carrying and is prohibited on Shabbat. In contrast, if the owner leaves it on even when it has stopped because it is decorative (for example, if it is made of gold), then it is deemed jewelry and may be worn in the public domain.
  Many poskim maintain that since a watch is worn on the body as is clothing – a person without a watch feels as if he is not fully dressed, and the normal use of a watch is while it is on the body – it follows that the watch is secondary to the body. Thus it is considered like an item of clothing or jewelry, which may be worn on Shabbat in a reshut ha-rabim. The primary opinion is the lenient one, but one who chooses to be stringent should be commended.17<i class="footnote">. SSK 18:27 follows the first opinion but adds that those who are lenient have grounds for their leniency. <em>Yaskil Avdi</em> 7:19 and <em>Le-horot Natan</em> 4:26 state similarly. It seems that <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 1:67 is stringent even when a watch is made of gold. In contrast, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach is lenient, as cited in SSK ch. 18 n. 113. Similarly, <em>Igrot Moshe</em> states that the primary ruling permits wearing a watch (OḤ 1:111). This is also the opinion of <em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 3:23 and <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 3:27:33. In an area enclosed by an <em>eruv</em>, even those who are normally stringent and do not rely on an <em>eruv</em> of the <em>tzurat ha-petaḥ </em>type for streets wider than sixteen <em>amot</em> are lenient to allow wearing a watch there.</i>
  A serious problem arises for people who live in or visit an area without an eruv. What can they do when they leave the house and need to take a key with them? The solution is to use the key as a belt buckle. This means one should take a shoelace and thread it through the key, tie it with a bow knot, and put it on as a belt, so that the key will serve as a buckle. In this way one may wear the key in the public domain (SSK 18:49-50; see n. 10 above).
  There are places where people must carry an identity card or passport on their person at all times. If someone there must go out on Shabbat for a great need or for the sake of a mitzva, he should carry the passport or identity card with a shinui. For example, he may place it under his hat, or inside his shirt where it is held up by his belt. In this way, one does Hotza’ah via a shvut di-shvut, which he may do for a great need or for the sake of a mitzva (above 9:11).
  Similarly, if a doctor has ordered a patient not to leave the house without carrying a certain medication, the patient may go out for a great need or for the sake of a mitzva, as long as he carries the medicine with a shinui. One who must rely on this leniency should try not to come to a stop in the reshut ha-rabim until he reaches the reshut ha-yaḥid that is his final destination (SSK 40:7; n. 3 above).18<i class="footnote">First, everyone agrees that the <em>shinui</em> renders the prohibition rabbinic in this case. Second, for those who maintain that there is no <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> today, this becomes a <em>shvut di-shvut</em>. Third, <em>Maharash Engel</em> 3:43 explains that this act of carrying is a <em>melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah</em>, because the person does not need the identity card for its own sake (<em>le-gufah</em>), but only to protect himself. However, it is difficult to claim that one who must carry medication does not need the medicine for its own sake (see <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 13:34). According to those who maintain that there are areas that qualify as <em>reshut ha-rabim</em> even nowadays, there is less room for leniency. Thus, it is proper when carrying medication to avoid stopping in <em>reshut ha-rabim</em>, as explained above in n. 3 (see <em>Nishmat Avraham</em> 301:2, n. 1). <em>Le-khatḥila</em>, one should not stop when carrying an identity card either.</i>
  In a place without an eruv, if life-and-death security concerns demand that people carry a gun and a cell phone, these items may be taken along on normal Shabbat activities. The phone should be carried with a shinui, but the gun should be carried normally, as carrying it with a shinui could be dangerous. One may not go out on Shabbat with a gun or a walkie-talkie just for an outing. This rule will be explained in detail later on (27:17).
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / The Mitzva to Preserve Shabbat as a Day of Rest
  The Torah commands us to refrain from melakha on Shabbat: “But the seventh day is Shabbat of the Lord your God; you shall not do any melakha” (Shemot 20:9), that is, any of the 39 types of melakha done while erecting the Mishkan, as explained to Moshe at Sinai (see above, 9:1-2). The Sages added safeguards (“fences”) so that no one would do anything that might then lead to the violation of a Torah prohibition (see above, 9:3-4). There is an additional commandment in the Torah to rest on Shabbat: “Six days you shall do your work, but on the seventh day you shall cease” (Shemot 23:12). The point here is that in addition to avoiding melakha on Shabbat, we are also meant to cease and rest from toils and troubles. Thus one should not open his store or move heavy objects in preparation for the workweek. Even though these are not included in the 39 prohibited categories of melakha, nevertheless acting in these ways negates the mitzva of resting on Shabbat (Ramban, Vayikra 23:24; see MT 21:1 and the next section below).
  Continuing with this line of thought, we find the prophets enjoining us to preserve the holy and sanctified atmosphere of Shabbat, a day on which one must avoid mundane activities. One who is careful to follow this merits great rewards, as Yeshayahu proclaims: If you refrain from trampling the Shabbat, from pursuing your affairs on My holy day; if you call Shabbat “delight,” the Lord’s holy [day] “honored,” and if you honor it, and not go in your own way, nor look to your affairs, nor speak of them – then you will seek the Lord’s delight. I will set you astride the heights of the earth, and let you enjoy the heritage of your father Yaakov – for the mouth of the Lord has spoken. (Yeshayahu 58:13-14)The Sages derive many guidelines about Shabbat from this verse, and the common denominator is that one should not behave on Shabbat as one does during the week. The Gemara elaborates: “Honor it” – your Shabbat clothes should not be like your weekday clothes…. “Not go in your own way” – the way you walk on Shabbat should not be like the way you walk on weekdays. “Nor look to your affairs” – it is forbidden to look after your own affairs on Shabbat, but one may look after the affairs of heaven [i.e., religious matters]. “Nor speak of them” – your speech on Shabbat should not be like your speech on weekdays. Speaking [about mundane matters] is forbidden, but thinking about them is permitted. (Shabbat 113a).These directives have a higher status than general rabbinic enactments since they are rooted in the Torah’s commandment to rest and are elaborated upon by the prophets.
  We have already explained the mitzvot connected to honoring and delighting in Shabbat (chs. 2, 4, 5, 7). Honor (kavod) is expressed by wearing special Shabbat clothes, showering, cleaning the house, and lighting candles. Delight (oneg) is expressed by making Shabbat enjoyable through meals, sleep, and Torah study. In this chapter, we will explain the mitzvot and the rabbinic safeguards meant to protect Shabbat’s atmosphere as a holy day of rest. These mitzvot are at the root of everything that the Sages through the ages forbade as a weekday activity. Any activity that is unquestionably mundane is prohibited on Shabbat. This includes ball-playing for adults, swimming, working out, and bike-riding. To protect the spirit of Shabbat, the Sages also introduced the prohibition of muktzeh (as explained in the next chapter) and ordained that one may not play musical instruments (sections 17-19 below).
  Even though the mitzvot to preserve Shabbat’s spirit and avoid weekday activity (uvdin de-ḥol) are of a higher status than the safeguards of the Sages, nevertheless the halakha is stricter in demanding adherence to the safeguards, such as the prohibition to do melakha with a shinui or to ask a non-Jew to do a melakha, which are forbidden even for the sake of a mitzva (as explained above 9:3-4, 11), whereas the prohibitions connected to preserving the spirit of Shabbat may be disregarded in the service of a mitzva (as explained below). There are some prohibitions that are comprised of both of these elements: if prohibited solely to preserve the spirit of Shabbat, it might have been permitted for the sake of a mitzva, but since the Sages decreed that it is prohibited, it remains prohibited even for the sake of a mitzva.
  
  Section 2
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Business
  One may not engage in commerce on Shabbat. One who opens his store, buying and selling on Shabbat just as he does on weekdays, negates a Torah commandment. This prohibition applies even if he is careful to avoid transgressing any of the 39 melakhot. The Torah commands that Shabbat be a “shabbaton” (Shemot 31:15), a complete cessation. One who does business in his store is not resting (Ramban, Vayikra 23:24; Ritva; Ḥatam Sofer). Neḥemia faced this problem when he arrived in Jerusalem and found that people were holding a market day on Shabbat. He recounts: Tyrians (merchants) who lived there brought fish and all sorts of wares and sold them on Shabbat to the Judahites in Jerusalem. I censured the nobles of Judah, saying to them, “What evil thing is this that you are doing, profaning Shabbat day! This is just what your ancestors did, and for it God brought all this misfortune on this city; and now you give cause for further wrath against Israel by profaning Shabbat!” (Neḥemia 13:15-18)As a result, the merchants began selling their goods outside the city walls on Shabbat. In response, Neḥemia ordered that the gates of the city be closed over Shabbat. “Once or twice the merchants and the vendors of all sorts of wares spent the night outside Jerusalem, but I warned them, saying, ‘What do you mean by spending the night alongside the wall? If you do so again, I will lay hands upon you!’ From then on, they did not come on Shabbat” (ibid. 19-21).The Torah prohibition on commerce applies to one who regularly does business on Shabbat. However, one who buys or sells on Shabbat occasionally still transgresses the words of the prophets, as Yeshayahu said: “if you honor it, and not go in your own way, nor look to your affairs, nor speak of them” (58:13), and the Sages explained this to mean that one should not deal in mundane matters on Shabbat (Shabbat 113a).
  It should be noted that those verses do not record a prohibition on buying and selling for the sake of a mitzva. Nevertheless, as a safeguard, the Sages prohibited all business dealings, even in service of a mitzva, out of concern lest one write (Rashi and Tosafot, Beitza 37a; MB 306:11). The only exception to this prohibition is the mitzva of settling the land of Israel, for which one may purchase land from a non-Jew on Shabbat. The non-Jew should write the contract and take the money on his own (SA 306:11; Eliya Rabba ad loc. 22; Mor U-ketzi’a; as opposed to MA ad loc. 19; see above 9:12).
  Some are stringent and do not sell aliyot on Shabbat, because of the prohibition of doing business on Shabbat. However, many are customarily lenient, and they have grounds for their leniency. This is because, in this case, there is no acquisition (kinyan) or payment on Shabbat, and the assumption of the obligation to pay for the aliyot is deemed to be for the sake of a mitzva (MB 306:33; Yeḥaveh Da’at 2:41). However, if the synagogue’s income from this practice is minimal, it is improper to be lenient and waste the congregation’s time.
  
  Section 3
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Obtaining Products from Stores
  One who finds himself short of food on Shabbat for the Shabbat meals, whether on account of poor planning or the arrival of unexpected guests, may approach the owner of a store and ask him for food from his store, with the unspoken understanding that the customer will pay for the food after Shabbat. Payment is not mentioned explicitly. Rather, the customer should request the item from the owner in the same way that he would borrow the food from a neighbor. He should not use the words “buy,” “sell,” or “pay.” He may assure the store owner that later, whether Saturday night or afterward, they will discuss what was taken and settle up. Even though the store owner understands from this assurance that the customer intends to pay him, as long as payment has not been explicitly mentioned (but only hinted at), this is not forbidden.
  The store owner and customer should both be careful not to mention the price of a product, nor should they measure it or weigh it out as one would do during the week to determine its price. However, they may fill up a container (not a measuring cup) and agree that the container will be measured on Sunday, with the understanding that the price will be determined based on the amount it holds. One may use a measuring cup to transport food but not to measure out the exact amount to be poured into the customer’s container, because then it is clear that the intention is to measure. For example, one may ask a store owner for five oranges or five bottles because that is the normal way to describe the required quantity. This terminology is not used exclusively for a sale. If this customer has received items from the store owner in the past, the owner may not refer to the accumulating tab nor calculate its updated amount (SA 323:1-4; MB ad loc. 20; SSK 29:18-25).
  If the store owner does not trust the customer to remember to pay him after Shabbat, he may ask him to leave an article of clothing or an object, but he should not refer to it as “collateral,” “security deposit,” or the like (Rema 307:11).
  One who takes food from a store on Shabbat should not carry it out in a large box, as one would normally do during the week, so that witnesses do not think that he is transporting the food for commercial purposes. Rather, he should hold the items in his hands or place them on his shoulders, as one would normally do when bringing food to a meal. Even if this means he will have to make multiple trips in order to bring all the necessary food, this extra walking is preferable to giving the appearance of doing business. However, if one’s guests are waiting for the meal, then he should hurry and bring all the food at once, even if it means carrying the food as he would during the week. Additionally, if he is walking in a place where there is no chance that anyone will suspect him of doing business, he may carry the food in the normal way in order to minimize the walking (“yesh omrim” in SA 323:5; MB ad loc. 25; Rema 510:8).
  If a store or hotel owner would like to make food available on Shabbat for his customers, before Shabbat he may sell different-colored cards or tickets that entitle their bearers to various items. For example, a yellow card presented to a waiter will entitle a guest to Friday night dinner; a green card to lunch on Shabbat day; a red card to a drink; a blue card to cake, etc. If there are not enough different colors for the different options, the names of the options may be written on the cards. However, the prices may not be written on the cards because this would make the cards the equivalent of monetary contracts, which may not be read on Shabbat (MB 307:50 and 323:20; SSK 29:26).
  
  Section 4
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Lending, Borrowing, and Giving Gifts
  Just as one may not buy and sell on Shabbat, one may not lend anything or repay a loan. Since these activities often involve writing contracts, there is a concern that engaging in them may lead one to write. Therefore, one who needs to borrow food, clothing, or chairs for Shabbat should formulate his request in a way that makes it clear that he is borrowing the objects as one would borrow from a friend, not as one would borrow money from a bank, as it is unusual keep a written record when borrowing from a friend. Since English does not distinguish between these two types of borrowing (unlike Hebrew, which has “hashala” to refer to borrowing objects and “halva’ah” to refer to monetary lending), one should simply say “Give me” or “Can I have.” If the owner of the item is concerned that the borrower will forget to return it, he may request that the borrower leave something with him, but he should not refer to it as a deposit or collateral, as he would during the week (Shabbat 148a; Rema 307:11). If the borrower mistakenly asked for a loan, the owner may give it to him while clarifying that he may use it temporarily though one may not make a loan on Shabbat (Shulḥan Shlomo 307:15:2).
  According to many poskim, one may not give or receive presents on Shabbat because by doing so one transfers ownership of the gift, which resembles commerce (MA 306:15; Birkei Yosef ad loc. 7; MB ad loc. 33). Others maintain that one may give a gift on Shabbat because nobody writes contracts for gifts (Beit Meir based on Rif and Rambam). In practice, we are stringent le-khatḥila and avoid giving gifts on Shabbat, but if it is necessary to fulfill a mitzva, everyone agrees that one may give a gift (SA 658:3-4). Therefore, one may give a gift of utensils or food for a Shabbat meal (MB 306:33). One may also give prizes to children for participating in Torah study, as this is for the sake of a mitzva – to encourage the children to study Torah.
  It is proper for one who wants to give a bar mitzva present on Shabbat to perform the act of acquisition (kinyan) before Shabbat. That is, he should request someone else to take the gift, lifting it up (hagbaha) in order to acquire it on behalf of the bar mitzva boy. Thus, the gift is transferred to the boy’s ownership before Shabbat. On Shabbat it may be presented to him, as it already belonged to him prior to Shabbat. If hagbaha was not done, the gift can be left with the boy (who should have in mind not to acquire it) for the duration of Shabbat, and after Shabbat he may officially acquire it (SSK 29:31). Some are lenient and give gifts to a groom on Shabbat, as there is an element of mitzva involved in bringing him happiness (Eliya Rabba; Ḥatam Sofer). In a time of need, one may rely upon them (Seridei Esh 2:26).
  One may not use a lottery or other random selection mechanism on Shabbat in order to decide who will receive each portion of food. Since everyone wants the biggest and tastiest portion, there is a concern that people will end up measuring and weighing the portions or speaking about their price. Moreover, it contains an element of gambling. Members of a household may use a lottery, but only as long as the portions are of equal value (Shabbat 148b-149a; SA 322:6; see below 22:8). One may draw lots to determine who will have the privilege of getting an aliya or saying Kaddish, because there is nothing to measure or calculate (MB 322:24).
  
  Section 5
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Court Activity, Weddings, Teruma and Ma’aser
  The Sages forbade rabbinical courts to sit in judgment or mete out punishment on Shabbat. Similarly, they prohibited betrothals, marriages, divorce, yibum (levirate marriage), or ḥalitza (levirate divorce) out of concern that people would end up writing (Beitza 37a). It is similarly prohibited to redeem a firstborn son on Shabbat, because the redemption (pidyon ha-ben) involves a transfer of money, which resembles commerce. If the 31st day after birth coincides with Shabbat, the redemption is done the following day, Sunday. It is also forbidden to vow, consecrate, or dedicate items or their value to the Temple on Shabbat, as this transfers ownership of the objects to God, as it were, and resembles commerce. However, one may pledge to give charity, because such a commitment involves no act of acquisition. If one did buy, sell, or perform any of these actions on Shabbat, the transaction is effective (m. Beitza 36b; SA 339:4).
  Teruma, ma’aser and ḥalla may not be set aside on Shabbat, because setting them aside resembles dedicating them to God. Additionally, it looks like one is fixing or improving the produce (Beitza 36b; MT 23:14). If one made a mistake and unknowingly set them aside, the remaining produce may be eaten on Shabbat. In contrast, if he did this knowingly, although the action is effective and the remaining produce may be eaten, no Jew may eat it until after Shabbat (m. Terumot 2:3; MB 339:25).
  One who is concerned that he will not have time to separate teruma and ma’aser before Shabbat may recite the formula for the separation before Shabbat (but without the berakha). By doing so, he has begun the process of separation. Then, after Shabbat begins, he may tithe in the normal fashion and recite the berakha. This procedure may also be followed if one is concerned that he will not have time to set aside ḥalla.
  Only the owner of the produce may separate teruma and ma’aser on Shabbat by means of the procedure described in the previous paragraph; it is not effective for anyone else. If a guest is concerned that his host may forget to tithe, he may ask the host before Shabbat to appoint him a shali’aḥ (proxy) to tithe on his behalf. The guest may then recite the formulation before Shabbat and perform the actual tithing on Shabbat (m. Demai 7:1, 5; MT, Laws of Tithes 9:7-9).1<i class="footnote">When I wrote above that only the owner of the produce or his <em>shali’aḥ</em> may tithe on Shabbat by means of this procedure, this applies to cases where the produce definitely has not been tithed yet (<em>tevel</em>). However, if it is uncertain whether the produce was tithed (<em>demai</em>), someone else can tithe this way as well (<em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 22:65-70). The formula recited before Shabbat is the usual one, but all the words should be changed to the future tense, e.g., “What I will tithe” (<em>Ḥazon Ish</em><em>Demai</em>, 9:13:15 as quoted in <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 22:62 and n. 86). <em>Be-di’avad</em>, if one simply says, “Whatever I separate tomorrow should be considered <em>teruma </em>and <em>ma’aser</em>,” he has fulfilled his obligation, as he has begun the process of separation before Shabbat (see SSK 11:23). After the tithes are actually set aside, he may not move them, as they are <em>muktzeh</em></i>
  
  Section 6
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Immersing and Measuring on Shabbat
  As is well known, a Jew who bought or received an eating utensil or receptacle from a non-Jew may not use it for food until it has been immersed in a mikveh. If one did not immerse it before Shabbat, some maintain that doing so on Shabbat is forbidden because it looks like one is fixing the implement (tikun kli). After all, before its immersion, one may not use it, while afterward, one may (Rosh). Others maintain that if one needs to eat from it, he may immerse it on Shabbat with a berakha. Accordingly, immersion is not considered fixing, because if be-di’avad the kli was used for food without having been immersed, the food retains its kosher status (Rif). If there is a trustworthy non-Jew in the vicinity, it is proper to give the kli to him as a gift, and then request his permission to use it. In this way, a Jew may use the kli for food even though it has not been immersed (SA 323:7). After Shabbat, it is proper to ask the non-Jew to give it back to him as a gift; he should then immerse it with a berakha.2<i class="footnote">According to <em>Beit Yosef</em>, in a time of need one may immerse <em>kelim </em>on Shabbat. Rambam too is lenient, following Rif; and SA 323:7 implies this as well. Maharam ibn Ḥabib writes in <em>Responsa</em><em>Kol Gadol</em> §15 that the immersion should be done with a <em>berakha</em><em>Livyat Ḥen</em> §§72, 75). Others (<em>Zivḥei Tzedek</em>, AHS) maintain that we see from SA YD 120:16 that R. Yosef Karo retracted, and the only solution is to have a non-Jew acquire the <em>kli </em>(so that it is not owned by a Jew). Rema in <em>Darkhei Moshe</em> is stringent, as is <em>Sha’agat Aryeh</em> §56. <em>Be-di’avad</em>, if a <em>kli </em>was immersed on Shabbat, it may be used (MA; MB 323:33). BHL has a thorough analysis of this issue. If the <em>kli </em>still belongs to a non-Jew but is in the possession of a Jew, it should be immersed without a <em>berakha</em>. Therefore, it is proper to ask the non-Jew to return the item to him as a gift so he may immerse it with a <em>berakha</em><em>Taz</em>; MB 323:35).</i>
  All agree that one may immerse on Shabbat to purify himself from tum’a. Even those who maintain that kelim may not be immersed because it resembles fixing them agree that when it comes to people, since one may bathe, and since the immersion will not necessarily be seen as an act of purification, one may also immerse to purify himself (see above 14:9). In contrast, one converting to Judaism may not immerse on Shabbat as part of the conversion process because his immersion is transformative; he becomes a new person, a process that certainly qualifies as a tikun. Additionally, immersion for conversion requires the presence of a rabbinic court; just as a court does not meet on Shabbat for judgment, it also does not meet to supervise immersion (Yevamot 46b). If a court transgressed and did supervise an immersion on Shabbat, the immersion is valid, and the person is Jewish (SA YD 268:4).
  One may not measure anything on Shabbat, because measuring is a weekday activity (SA 306:7; MB ad loc. 34). Therefore, one may not weigh himself or measure his height on Shabbat (SSK 14:42). Similarly, one may not measure the dimensions of furniture or a room.
  One may measure and weigh for the sake of a mitzva. Therefore, one may check whether a mikveh has sufficient water (forty se’ah). One may also measure out medicine for sick people and take their temperature (SA 306:7; SSK 40:2). Since a baby has the same halakhic status as a sick person, when necessary one may measure out the amount of food that a baby needs. Similarly, when necessary one may measure if a baby has gained weight after eating (using a non-electric scale; SSK 37:5).
  
  Section 7
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Walking, Running, and Jumping
  The world we live in is full of shortcomings. To perfect it, we rush around all week long, working and exerting ourselves in a variety of ways. However, on Shabbat, which is like the World to Come, we are commanded to cease all work and act as if everything has already been perfected, with no further need to rush around. We are meant simply to delight in the holiness of Shabbat and take a faith-filled look at the perfect inner essence of the world as God created it. There is a mitzva to express this spiritual perspective by walking at a leisurely pace on Shabbat. Thus the Sages expound: “‘Not go in your own way’ – the way you walk on Shabbat should not be like the way you walk on weekdays” (Shabbat 113a).
  Therefore, running is prohibited on Shabbat, as is striding. This prohibition applies to one who is going somewhere for his own sake, in which case he should walk at a leisurely pace to honor Shabbat. However, if one is going to attend a Torah class or to pray, it is a mitzva for him to run (Berakhot 6b; SA 301:1), because running for the sake of a mitzva does not detract from the honor due Shabbat. On the contrary, it expresses the spirit of Shabbat, which allows us to rest from the troubles of this world. This peacefulness in turn encourages us to serve God.
  One may run and jump if one benefits greatly from it. For example, one may run in order to get out of the rain, and one may jump over a puddle to avoid dirtying his shoes. One may also run in order to watch something enjoyable (Shabbat 113b; SA 301:2-3). Children and teens who enjoy running may participate in games that involve running, since this type of running is pleasurable rather than burdensome (SA 301:2). Also, adults may jump for pleasure as part of playing with small children.
  
  Section 8
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Working Out and Riding a Bicycle
  One may not run for exercise on Shabbat, because it is burdensome rather than pleasurable. Even though people who work out enjoy it, this enjoyment derives from their awareness that they are taking care of their health and physical fitness, not from the exercise itself. Even one who is very fit, runs every day, and enjoys it may not run on Shabbat, because it is a weekday activity. It will appear to others that he is belittling Shabbat and treating it like a weekday. However, one who enjoys exercise may jump or work out for pleasure inside his home on condition that he does not overexert himself, does not follow a regimen, and does not use special equipment, any of which would be deemed a weekday activity. One may not play ball for the same reason; even children may not play with a ball that adults use for sports, because it is a weekday activity.3<i class="footnote">. According to <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:36:12, exercise is forbidden only when undertaken in order to sweat to improve health, but one may run for callisthenic exercise just as youths may run for pleasure (based on Rambam, and as opposed to Rashi; see BHL 328:42). However, in practice, it would seem that exercise is, in some way, a weekday activity, as we can see from <em>t. Shabbat</em> 17:16, which states: “One may not run on Shabbat for exercise; but walking in the usual fashion, even all day long, is no problem.” Even though youths who enjoy running may run, this is because they enjoy the running itself; but when the pleasure is derived from improving one’s health, it is prohibited. This is made explicit in SA 301:1-2; <em>Taz</em> <em>ad loc.</em> 1; AHS<em> ad loc.</em> 44. It is also the position of <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 6:4 and SSK 34:22. One who enjoys the exercise itself may exercise (<em>Melamed Le-ho’il</em>, OḤ 53; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in SSK ch. 16 n. 106) on condition that he does not do so in an organized and professional way, which would qualify it as a weekday activity. It would also seem that an adult who enjoys running may not run outside, because it seems to belittle Shabbat and is consequently deemed a weekday activity. See <em>Harḥavot</em>.</i>
  One may walk on Shabbat for one’s health, on condition that he walks regularly and not more briskly or more intensively than usual. Although one may not address medical needs on Shabbat, since it is not discernible that his walking has a medical purpose, and many people take walks, he may walk for health and fitness on Shabbat (MB 301:7). One may also do gentle stretches in order to loosen up.
  The later poskim agree that one may not ride a bicycle on Shabbat. Some maintain that the reason for this prohibition is a concern that one will travel outside the teḥum, while others say that the concern is that the bicycle will break and he will end up fixing it. In fact, the main reason is that it is a weekday activity, since people ride bicycles primarily to travel to work or to exercise.4<i class="footnote">However, <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em> permits riding a bicycle. It explains that we need not be concerned that people will mistakenly conclude that one may ride in vehicles drawn by humans or animals. Furthermore, we do not have the right to enact new decrees (<em>Responsa Rav Pe’alim</em> 1:25). Nevertheless, almost all <em>poskim</em> are stringent, for the reasons mentioned above (<em>Ketzot Ha-shulḥan</em> §110, <em>Badei Ha-shulḥan </em>§16; <em>Yaskil Avdi</em> 3:19; <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 7:30; <em>She’elat Yaakov</em> §45; <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 404:8; SSK 16:18). <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:42:1 adds that though it is technically possible to permit, since the widespread practice is to forbid bike riding, it is forbidden.Those who maintain that riding a bicycle is a weekday activity can find support in Beitza 25b: “The Rabbis taught: The blind do not go out [on Yom Tov] with their canes, nor do we go out with a chair.” Rashi explains that since canes were considered weekday items, going out with them would belittle Yom Tov. He adds that the chair in question is a sedan chair (litter) carried by people. The Gemara specifies that the prohibition on carrying the chair applies when people lift it up on their shoulders (as opposed to holding it lower down). Rashi explains that when a chair is carried on the shoulders it looks like a weekday activity, it is more public, and it indicates that the chair is being carried further.</i>
  
  Section 9
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Walking for Non-Shabbat Purposes
  Even when one takes a relaxed walk, he may not walk to his fields or factory in order to plan out his workweek. Doing so is included in the category of “your affairs,” which may not be addressed on Shabbat, as it is stated: “if you honor it, and not go in your own way, nor look to your affairs” (Yeshayahu 58:13). However, if it is not obvious that his intention is to plan his work, there is no prohibition. Therefore, one may take a Shabbat walk as long as onlookers cannot tell that he is looking over his fields. It is pious to avoid thinking about business on Shabbat altogether (see SA 306:8).
  Similarly, one who is building a house should not check the progress on Shabbat, because it is obvious that he is planning his work, and one who intends to renovate or expand his home may not examine other projects if it is clear that he is planning the renovations. So too, one considering buying an apartment may not check out apartments for sale on Shabbat. In contrast, one considering buying an apartment may walk to a street where new apartments are being built even though his intention is to look them over, as long as it looks like he is just out for a walk and he does not stop and scrutinize them; this way, he does not look like he is planning his purchase. If one is planning to buy an electrical appliance, he may window-shop at appliance stores while walking on the street. However, he should not look at prices (SSK 29:10). In addition, it is pious to avoid thinking about these matters at all on Shabbat.
  Toward the end of Shabbat, one may not walk to the edge of the teḥum in order to hire workers as soon after Shabbat as possible. Similarly, one may not go to his field, store, or factory at that time so that he can begin work immediately after Shabbat. Since it is clear that he is going there on Shabbat in order to work afterward, in effect he is dealing with his weekday affairs on Shabbat. However, if it is not clear that this is the reason he is going there, as is the case, for example, if many people take walks there, then he may walk there on Shabbat even if he intends to hire workers or begin his work immediately afterward. This is because the prohibition only applies when it is clear that he is going for a mundane purpose (SA 306:1; MB ad loc. 1; BHL s.v. “she-me’ayen; SA 307:9; MB ad loc. 40).5<i class="footnote">The prohibition on walking to the edge of the <em>teḥum</em> on Shabbat applies when going to do something that cannot be done permissibly on Shabbat. However, if his objective is to collect already-picked fruits that are outside the <em>teḥum</em>, or to visit relatives who live outside the <em>teḥum</em>, the walking is permitted, as there is no essential prohibition involved (after all, if there were an <em>eruv</em>, he would be permitted to undertake these activities even on Shabbat). In contrast, one may not walk to the edge of the <em>teḥum</em> on Shabbat with the goal of picking fruits or collecting <em>muktzeh </em>fruits after Shabbat, because the act is fundamentally prohibited (there is no way to undertake these activities permissibly on Shabbat). A similar principle governs the prohibition of speech, as described in the next section. One may speak about an activity if it can be done on Shabbat in a permissible way, such as if there were an <em>eruv</em>. So, one may speak on Shabbat of plans to visit an area the next day in order to collect fruit from there (<em>Shabbat</em> 150b; SA 307:8; MB <em>ad loc.</em> 35. SAH, <em>ad loc.</em> 16 explains the basis of the permission. <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> ch. 22 n. 7 suggests additional reasons for it).</i>
  
  Section 10
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Talking about Work and Business
  It is a mitzva to honor Shabbat in the way one speaks, as it is written: “and if you honor it, and not go in your own way, nor look to your affairs, nor speak of them” (Yeshayahu 58:13). The Sages elaborate: “‘Nor speak of them’ – your speech on Shabbat should not be like your speech on weekdays” (Shabbat 113a). This means that one should not speak on Shabbat about things that one may not do on Shabbat. Therefore, one should not say, “Tomorrow I will travel by car,” “I will write a letter,” or “I will buy an item.” Clearly, then, it is also prohibited for one to ask someone else to travel the next day on his behalf, write a letter for him, or buy something for him (SA 307:1). This prohibition applies to things that one intends to do in the future. However, one may speak about what he has already done, as long as he does not intend to provide useful information to the listener on how best to perform the melakha.
  The prohibition applies to talking about actions prohibited on Shabbat. In contrast, one may think about them. Thus the Sages expound: “Speaking [about mundane matters] is forbidden, but thinking about them is permitted” (Shabbat 113a). Speech that merely alludes to a melakha is considered “thinking” and is thus permitted. For example, while one may not say, “Tomorrow I will phone so-and-so,” one may say, “Tomorrow I will speak with so-and-so,” even though it is clear that he will do so by phone. Similarly, one may not say, “Tomorrow I will drive to Jerusalem,” since traveling by motor vehicle is prohibited on Shabbat, but one may say, “Tomorrow I will go to Jerusalem,” since one can “go” by walking, and even though Jerusalem is outside the teḥum, theoretically one could build an eruv to Jerusalem and it would be permitted to walk there on Shabbat. Since walking to Jerusalem is not fundamentally prohibited, one may talk about “going” there. Even if the listener realizes that the speaker means that he is planning to travel by car or bus and that the listener may join him if he wishes, the statement is still considered only a hint and is permitted.
  Similarly, if one plans to travel by cab after Shabbat, on Shabbat he may ask his friend who is a cabdriver, “Do you think you will be able to come over after Shabbat?” Since he has not asked his friend to come with his cab in order to drive him, then even though his friend understands that this is what is meant, it is not prohibited. However, he may not say to his cabdriver friend, “Come over after Shabbat, please,” because an allusion in the imperative form is prohibited. Following the same principle, one who wishes to hire a worker on Sunday may say to him on Shabbat, “I hope to see you on Sunday,” but he may not say, “Please come on Sunday” (Shabbat 150a; SA 307:7).
  One may not speak about monetary transactions that have business implications, while one may talk about them if they have no practical import. Therefore, one may not speak about wages owed to workers, but one may speak about wages already paid. Similarly, one may not tell another how much a house sold for if the listener is interested in buying a similar house, while one may pass on this information to someone who is not interested in buying a home. Likewise, one may report on how much yield a field produced the previous year, what the government’s budget is, and the like. This is because the people involved in these conversations have no plans to act on these discussions during the week (SA 307:6).6<i class="footnote">If there is a great need to speak on Shabbat about business matters (for example, if one encounters a person with whom he will not be able to meet on a weekday, and if he does not speak with him he will suffer a great loss), he may talk about business matters as long as he uses a <em>shinui</em> when choosing his words. For example, he should speak of a hundred challahs rather than a hundred dollars (<em>Eshel Avraham </em>[Buczacz] §307). As with any rabbinic prohibition on Shabbat, using a <em>shinui</em> reduces it to a <em>shvut di-shvut</em>, and is permitted in order to prevent a great loss (<em>She’arim Metzuyanim Ba-halakha</em> 90:3 and <em>Kuntres Aḥaron</em></i>
  It is preferable to minimize trivial conversations on Shabbat. One who enjoys such conversations may engage in them a bit more than usual, as they are part of his physical enjoyment of Shabbat. However, he should not indulge himself excessively, just as he should not eat or sleep excessively, as these indulgences will take away from the time he needs to set aside for Torah study on Shabbat. We have already seen that a minimum of six hours must be dedicated to Torah study on Shabbat (SA and Rema 307:1; MB ad loc. 4; see above 5:1).
  
  Section 11
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Walking and Talking for the Sake of a Mitzva
  One may speak about activities that are prohibited on Shabbat if it is for the sake of a mitzva. In such a case, one may also examine sites where melakha must be done or make financial calculations for the sake of a mitzva. It is written: “and if you honor it, and not go in your own way, nor look to your affairs, nor speak of them” (Yeshayahu 58:13), and the Sages expound: “‘Nor look to your affairs’ – it is forbidden to look after your own affairs on Shabbat, but one may look after the affairs of heaven (‘ḥeftzei shamayim,’ i.e., religious matters)” (Shabbat 113a). Therefore, if necessary, one may walk to inspect a synagogue construction site. If something is needed for an upcoming wedding or funeral, one may walk to the edge of the teḥum so that one can deal with these matters immediately after Shabbat. Near the end of Shabbat, one may also start walking to a location from which people will be picked up after Shabbat in order to comfort mourners (Shabbat 151a; SA 306:3; SSK 29:13).
  Similarly, in cases of necessity, one may speak about mundane matters that relate to mitzva needs. This includes calculating the costs of a wedding meal or a brit mila, as each of these is a se’udat mitzva (a festive meal associated with a mitzva). One may plan the hiring of a band for a wedding or deal with the bride’s dress. However, one may not actually close a deal, because business deals are prohibited even for the sake of a mitzva. It is altogether prohibited to discuss hiring a photographer for a wedding, or the purchase of wedding outfits for family members of the bride and groom, since these do not qualify as mitzva needs.
  One may take up a collection in which everybody pledges to give a certain amount of money to charity or to a synagogue. Parents may calculate the sum needed for their children’s education, whether religious, secular, or vocational. Those involved in education may discuss school or class budgets. A principal may offer a job to a teacher and mention a salary figure, though it is forbidden to reach an agreement on wages. One may discuss communal needs such as paving roads or levying taxes, as the needs of the community are deemed mitzva needs (Shabbat 150a; SA 306:6). In all these cases, it is proper to be lenient only when there is a specific need. If the matter will be addressed in any case, it is proper not to speak of mundane matters or walk in order to inspect them, even for the sake of a mitzva (MB 307:1).
  If necessary, one may announce that an object has been found on Shabbat, even if the item in question is muktzeh (such as a purse), in order to facilitate the fulfillment (after Shabbat) of the mitzva of returning a lost item (SA 306:12). In an area where it is difficult to locate matza for Pesaḥ or a lulav and etrog for Sukkot, one may announce on Shabbat where they are available for sale (MB 306:55).
  
  Section 12
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Permitted and Forbidden Reading Material
  One may not read contracts and financial documents on Shabbat, such as loan and purchase contracts, bank statements, phone and electric bills, and prices on flyers or in shop windows. Reading them is considered dealing with mundane affairs (ḥeftzei ḥol), which is forbidden on Shabbat (Rosh). Furthermore, there is a concern that as a result of reading them one will end up writing or erasing (Rambam).
  According to Rambam, one may read only sacred words on Shabbat; all other reading material is forbidden, even to study the sciences, so that Shabbat is not treated as a weekday and situations that might lead to writing are avoided. However, in practice, we follow the majority of poskim (Rashi, Ri, Rosh), who limit the prohibition to reading financial and business material. In order to ensure that no one will end up reading these materials, the Sages also prohibited reading secular material that has no value. In contrast, secular material that has value may be read on Shabbat. This includes material on physical fitness, proper nutrition, and ingredient lists on food packaging. One may also study the sciences and other branches of knowledge.
  One may not read run-of-the-mill secular material and stories if they have no value. However, one who enjoys reading them may do so occasionally, as the Sages did not forbid reading for pleasure on Shabbat. In contrast, one should not read gripping novels that cause sadness or anxiety on Shabbat (MB 306:38 and 307:3). It would seem that one may read depressing stories from Jewish history and rabbinic biographies, since they are valuable as Torah and are morally edifying. Nevertheless, it is preferable to study pleasant things, which are more appropriate for Shabbat.
  In principle, one may read the newspaper for informative content. One who enjoys reading news, stories, and analysis may do so, but one may not read sad and worrying content on Shabbat. One may read general financial articles as long as they do not give practical advice, but one may not read articles that give practical business and investment advice. It is also forbidden to read advertisements for products that one may wish to buy in the future.
  Even though technically one may read parts of the newspaper, many maintain that it is proper to avoid reading it on Shabbat because it is full of advertisements and disturbing news, and it is difficult to distinguish between what one may and may not read. Additionally, reading a newspaper negates the main purpose of Shabbat, which is Torah study. Therefore, one may read its informative content and non-disturbing news, but only while in the bathroom.7<i class="footnote">According to Rambam, only Torah material may be read on Shabbat. All other reading materials are forbidden out of concern that people will end up writing. In contrast, Rashi, Ri, Rosh, Ramban, and Rashba maintain that the original prohibition was limited to reading material dealing with business or other things that are forbidden on Shabbat. The Sages extended this prohibition to include stories or material with no value, to make it less likely that people will read the previously prohibited material. The majority of <em>poskim</em> follow this lenient approach (<em>Baḥ</em> 307:5; SAH 307:21-22; MB 307:52; SSK 29:48-49). The Gemara forbids reading captions under pictures, and this includes mundane stories as well (<em>Shabbat</em> 149a; SA 307:15). According to <em>Ma’amar Mordechai</em> and SAH, even one who enjoys them may not read them, but according to MA 301:4, <em>Birkei Yosef</em>, <em>Pri Megadim</em>, and Maharsham, he may read occasionally. Disturbing material, no matter how gripping, should not be read (see MB 307:3).<em>She’elat Ya’avetz</em> 1:162 states that while technically one may read newspapers, in practice it is proper to forbid it lest people end up reading prohibited material. MB 307:63 states similarly, while <em>Shvut Yaakov</em> 3:13 is permissive. See SSK 29:48 and <em>Harḥavot</em>.</i>
  One may read (and place) ads in leaflets distributed in synagogues, as long as they are advertising products that fulfill mitzva needs, such as Torah books or homes in Israel (to potential customers from abroad). If these products are being sold cheaply and advertising might encourage readers to fulfill the mitzva, one may even publish the price (see MB 306:55, 307:1, and 323:20).
  One may not read a guest list or menu of a Shabbat meal as it resembles reading a contract. In addition, there is a concern that the host may wish to correct the list by writing or erasing (Shabbat 149:1; SA 307:12-13). In contrast, for the sake of a mitzva, such as the meal accompanying a brit mila, or in order to avoid greatly insulting someone, a waiter may read the list, as there is no concern that he will change it. However, the host or head waiter may not read the list, because they might end up correcting it (MB 307:47; SHT ad loc. 54).
  The gabbai may read the notebook or cards that contain the list of people to be called up to the Torah, since this is for the sake of a mitzva. We are not worried that he will end up writing or erasing, since he is standing in the middle of a group of people. If he forgets and wants to write, others will remind him that it is Shabbat. The gabbai may also call people to the Torah from a list he has been given by a family that is celebrating a special occasion in the synagogue. If they wish to change the list, the gabbai should not review it without at least one other person reviewing it with him who can remind him that it is Shabbat, lest he forget.
  
  Section 13
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Games on Shabbat
  Poskim disagree whether one may play games on Shabbat. Some say that since Shabbat is meant for Torah study, one may not play games, as that would be wasting time that could be used to study Torah. Accordingly, one may not play checkers, chess, backgammon, billiards, or any ball game, whether the games are played inside on the floor or outside on a paved area. And since one may not play these games, they are considered muktzeh as well (R. Aharon Sasson, cited in Birkei Yosef 338:1; Petaḥ Ha-devir ad loc. 4).
  Others maintain that there is no prohibition on playing games on Shabbat, as long as nobody is playing for money (Rema 338:5; Ma’amar Mordechai). Indeed, some rabbis would play chess on Shabbat, as it is a game that requires thought and sharpens the mind (Shiltei Giborim).8<i class="footnote">Ḥida is inclined to forbid playing chess (<em>Birkei Yosef</em> 338:1). He suggests that the rabbis who played chess on Shabbat were suffering from depression. In order to take their minds off their worries, they played chess, after which they were able to return to their Torah study. However, barring this situation, one should not play on Shabbat. The Sages tell us that there was a place named Tur Shimon that was destroyed even though the people there respected Shabbat. Some say the reason was that they played ball there on Shabbat (<em>y. Ta’anit</em> 4:5). R. Elazar of Worms explains that by playing games they were wasting time during which they would have been learning Torah (<em>Roke’aḥ</em> §55). Based on this, some conclude that one may not play ball on Shabbat, and that therefore balls are <em>muktzeh</em><em>Shibolei Ha-leket</em><em>Beit Yosef</em>, and SA 308:45). Others are permissive and maintain that one may play ball in a paved yard (<em>Tosafot</em>, Rema). Nevertheless, one may not play on an unpaved surface, out of concern that people will end up leveling the ground (above 15:2). As for the punishment of Tur Shimon, that was because they were playing ball in the public domain (Vilna Gaon), or because they were taking away too much time from their Torah study.</i>
  In practice, it is appropriate for adults to be stringent and not play ball games, chess, and the like, both because it is prohibited according to some poskim and because one should not to get used to neglecting Torah study on Shabbat. Those who wish to be lenient have an opinion on which to rely (see SA 308:45; MA 338:5; MB ad loc. 21; Kaf Ha-ḥayim ad loc. 39). Children should also be trained to study Torah on Shabbat, but almost all poskim agree that one should not prevent them from playing games on Shabbat (as explained below in 24:7).
  In contrast, sports that are a big deal, like soccer, basketball, baseball, and football, may not be played on Shabbat, because of the prohibition on weekday activities. It goes without saying that one may not play them on the court or field designated for them. Children may not play these sports either, because it is a weekday activity (below 24:9).
  
  Section 14
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Payment for Work Done on Shabbat (Sekhar Shabbat)
  The Sages prohibited accepting payment for work done on Shabbat, because this is included in the prohibition on commerce. Even if the “work” is intrinsically permissible on Shabbat (such as guard duty or waiting tables), one may not accept payment for it on Shabbat (BM 58a; SA 306:4). It is also forbidden to accept rent money for anything, whether real estate or objects, that had been rented out on Shabbat (MB 246:3). Even be-di’avad, one may not benefit from money paid for any service rendered on Shabbat (SA 245:6; MB 243:16).
  In contrast, payment for work done on Shabbat may be subsumed within weekday payment. For example, an agreement may stipulate that a worker will do guard duty or wait tables for a few hours after Shabbat as well as on Shabbat itself. Even though, in reality, most of the hours were on Shabbat and the payment is primarily for those hours, as long as an agreement was reached before the work started that the employee would also work on Saturday night, the compensation covers the hours worked during the week as well as those on Shabbat. Thus, the Shabbat payment is subsumed within the weekday payment. However, if an agreement was not reached before the work started, then even if the employee did work after Shabbat as well, each workday stands on its own, the payment for Shabbat work cannot be subsumed within the payment for weekday work, and the worker thus may not accept the payment (Ḥayei Adam 60:8; MB 306:21; SSK 28:64-68).
  Along the same lines, one may rent out a room for Shabbat, as long as the rental period includes time either on Friday before Shabbat begins or on Saturday night after Shabbat ends. A cab driver can rent out his cab to a non-Jew for Shabbat, as long as the rental period either begins before Shabbat or extends after Shabbat, so that the Shabbat payment can be subsumed within the weekday payment. One may also collect interest on one’s bank account, since the calculations are based on the calendar day and not the times that Shabbat starts and ends. Accordingly, whatever is earned over Shabbat can be seen as subsumed within the weekday earnings of Friday morning and afternoon and Saturday night.
  One who immerses in a mikveh on Shabbat may pay the mikveh fee after Shabbat. There are two reasons for this. First, it is for the sake of a mitzva, and second, the payment is not for the immersion itself, but for the cleaning and heating of the mikveh, which started before Shabbat.9<i class="footnote">If Shabbat is followed by Yom Tov or vice versa, there is an entire calendar day that is sanctified, and yet one is receiving interest then. At first glance this would seem to be forbidden (<em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 9:59; <em>Be-tzel Ha-ḥokhma</em> 3:38). Nevertheless, this too is permissible because interest is not actually paid daily, but rather all the days are calculated together. Accordingly, the interest in this case can be subsumed within the times before and after the holy days (see <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 1:10:30 with n. 69, and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> vol. 2, p. 133). Similarly, MB 306:20 cites an opinion that payment for Shabbat work is subsumed within payment for weekday work even if an agreement was not reached before the work started if it is likely that the work under the agreement will continue during the week.A waiter may not work on Shabbat with the understanding that his employer will in turn work for him in a different capacity, because working for someone is considered payment. However, one may do guard duty on Shabbat for a friend and arrange for this friend to cover his assigned guard duty elsewhere, because guard duty that prevents loss is not considered payment (SA 307:10). Similarly, one may babysit a family on Shabbat with the understanding that the second person will babysit for the first person’s family at some point in the future (SSK 28:59). If it is one’s turn to set up the dining hall and serve the food on Shabbat, he may switch his Shabbat slot for a different slot. Since there is no monetary compensation involved, swapping is not considered payment (SSK 28:61).As written above, one who immerses in a mikveh on Shabbat may pay after Shabbat because the payment is for the cleaning and heating done before Shabbat begins (Noda Bi-Yehuda, Mahadura Tinyana, OḤ 26; SSK 28:72). One can also be lenient and rent an apartment for Shabbat only, since it can be argued that the rent also covers the cleaning that takes place before Shabbat (SSK 28:70). It is important to know that in a time of need, when a large loss is at stake, one may accept payment for work done on Shabbat (Rema 244:6; BHL s.v. “de-bimkom”).</i>
  One may give a gift on Saturday night to someone who worked voluntarily over Shabbat. Examples include one who set up the synagogue and one who served as a waiter at a Shabbat meal. Since there is no obligation to compensate him at all, whatever is given is not considered payment (Pri Megadim; MB 306:15).
  The poskim disagree about whether one may accept payment for serving as a ḥazan or for other mitzva-related jobs undertaken on Shabbat. Some say that even when a job involves a mitzva, one may not accept payment for it. If this is correct, a ḥazan may not be paid for leading the services on Shabbat. Others maintain that one may be paid for a mitzva-related job on Shabbat, but that nothing good will come of this income. In practice, it is proper to stipulate that any payment will also include work performed during the week. For example, a ḥazan will be paid for practicing before he leads the Shabbat services, or for an additional prayer service that he will lead during the week. This way the Shabbat payment can be subsumed within the weekday payment (SA and Rema 306:5).
  A doctor who is on call to provide medical care during Shabbat is entitled to demand payment after Shabbat. The reason is that if he cannot assume that he will be paid, he might refuse to provide care in the future (MB 306:24; Minḥat Shabbat 90:19; SSK 28:75).
  
  Section 15
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Preparing on Shabbat for Weekdays, and Cleaning Up the House and Table
  Shabbat is meant to bring holiness and rest into our lives. Making efforts on Shabbat to prepare for the week belittles its honor, and therefore the Sages forbade doing so.
  Thus, one may not make the beds on Shabbat in preparation for going to sleep on Saturday night. However, one may make the beds on Shabbat so that the bedroom will look nice on Shabbat. Similarly, one may clear off a table so that one’s home will look nice on Shabbat. For the same reason, if se’uda shlishit is finished well before the end of Shabbat, one may clear the table and put the dishes in the sink. However, if se’uda shlishit finishes only a few minutes before the end of Shabbat, or if people are not planning to remain in the room where it was served, so that clearing off the table is not for Shabbat’s sake but for the week’s sake, one may not clear off the table. One who does so is expending effort on Shabbat to prepare for afterward (m. Shabbat 113a; MB 302:19).
  One may wash dishes if they will be used again at some point on Shabbat. If many dishes were used, and only one cup is needed for later Shabbat use but there are no more clean cups, one may wash all the cups, since he could use any of them. Similarly, if he needs one plate but none are clean, he may wash all the plates and use one of them. However, if he does not intend to use any of them during Shabbat, he may not wash any of them (Shabbat 118a; SA 323:6; MB 323:26).
  One who never leaves dirty dishes in the sink even during the week, and who feels that a pile of dirty dishes left in the sink for hours belittles the honor of Shabbat, may wash the dishes even if they will not be used again during Shabbat, so that his home will be clean in honor of Shabbat. However, even in this case, he may not wash the pots, since they are muktzeh and require burdensome work (Responsa Maharshag, OḤ 1:61; Tzitz Eliezer 14:37). (We have already seen in 13:4-5 how to clean off a table that water or juice spilled on, and in 15:9 how to clean the floor.)
  One may not fold a talit so that it will be unwrinkled for next Shabbat. However, one may fold it so that it will not be left out on Shabbat in a disrespectful way (see above 13:9).
  One may not prepare on Shabbat for weekdays even when a mitzva is involved. For example, one may not roll a Torah scroll to the passage that will be read during the upcoming week or the next Shabbat (MB 667:5). If necessary, one may roll the Torah scroll to the next reading and then study a few verses from it, so that the rolling will serve a purpose on Shabbat as well (AHS 667:2). One may bring a book to the synagogue if it is needed after Shabbat, as long as one studies a bit from it on Shabbat as well.
  On Shabbat one may study for a test in a Torah subject that is scheduled for the upcoming week, since studying these topics is itself a mitzva. However, it is proper not to study on Shabbat for tests in secular subjects. First, Shabbat must be dedicated to Torah study. Second, the student’s primary goal in studying is to succeed on his test, not to become more knowledgeable. In a time of need one may be lenient, since there is intrinsic value to secular studies. In contrast, one may not study a foreign language on Shabbat, because such study has no intrinsic value. It is also prohibited to study for a test in a subject that normally involves writing exercises, because (as we saw) one may read on Shabbat only when there is no concern that one might end up writing or erasing.
  One should not say on Shabbat, “I will go to sleep now, so that I will have energy after Shabbat.” This belittles Shabbat, since he is using it to prepare for weekdays. However, if he does not verbalize this but only thinks it, it is not forbidden, since sleeping on Shabbat is a pleasure (Sefer Ḥasidim; MB 290:4; see above 5:3).
  When Yom Tov follows Shabbat, one may not prepare on Shabbat for Yom Tov. Be-di’avad, if one prepared something on Shabbat for afterward, he may benefit from his actions.
  
  Section 16
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / When Preparation on Shabbat for the Weekday Is Permitted
  The prohibition of preparing on Shabbat for the weekday is limited to activities that require effort. However, easy, effortless activities that people routinely undertake are permitted. This is true even if the activities are useful for the weekday, as doing them does not belittle Shabbat. For example, after shaking the lulav on the first day of Sukkot, one may put it back in water, even though this is done to keep it fresh for the next day (Sukka 42a; SA 654:1). One who is studying Torah may insert a bookmark, even though this will not be helpful until he continues his studies during the week. One who took a siddur to the synagogue may bring it home (where there is an eruv), even if he will not be using it again on that Shabbat.
  Similarly, one may put leftover food in the refrigerator as usual. Dishes may be left soaking in water as usual to prevent food remnants getting stuck to them. One leaving the house on Shabbat afternoon may take a key and sweater with him for use after Shabbat, though he should not state explicitly that he is doing so for after Shabbat (see SA 416:2; SSK 28:89).
  In a time of need, in order to avoid serious inconvenience, one may do simple things on Shabbat in preparation for the weekday even if they are not part of the normal routine, but only on condition that it is not obvious that he is doing them for the weekday, so as not to belittle Shabbat. For example, if one is going to a place where it is difficult to find wine for havdala, he may bring wine with him on Shabbat, on condition that he brings it while there is still plenty of daylight left, so that it will not be obvious that he is bringing the wine for after Shabbat. If he drinks some of the wine at se’uda shlishit, he may even bring wine le-khatḥila (see Ḥayei Adam 153:6; MB 667:5).
  In a time of need, in order to prevent a loss, the Sages permitted doing things on Shabbat even when it is obvious that they are for the weekday. Examples include bringing in items from outside and that would likely be damaged by rain, and putting food into the freezer if it would likely spoil if left out (SA 308:4; MB 321:21).10<i class="footnote">If slaughtered meat is left unsalted for three days, it can no longer be rendered kosher through salting. However, if the meat is soaked in water before the three days end, the window for salting is extended. According to MA 321:7, one may not soak unsalted meat whose time is running out and soak it on Shabbat to make sure that it will be permissible to cook after Shabbat, because it is forbidden to deal with something on Shabbat in order to prevent loss after Shabbat. However, MB 321:21 adds that under pressing circumstances, one may rely on <em>Eliya Rabba</em> and <em>Noda Bi-Yehuda</em>, which permit it. This is also the opinion of SSK 28:91 and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> vol. 2, p. 218.</i>
  
  Section 17
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Playing Musical Instruments and Producing Sound
  The Sages prohibited playing instruments on Shabbat and Yom Tov, lest the instrument break and the player fix it, thus violating Torah law (MT 23:4). In contrast, in the Temple, rabbinic Shabbat prohibitions (shvut) did not apply; therefore, even on Shabbat and holidays, the Levites would accompany offerings with flutes, harps, lyres, trumpets, and cymbals (Beitza 11b).
  Included in the prohibition of playing musical instruments is the prohibition of blowing a shofar. Even on Rosh Ha-shana, once the mitzva of shofar has been fulfilled in the optimal and most beautiful fashion, we do not blow further. Children under the age of bar mitzva may blow the shofar all day on Rosh Ha-shana so that they can learn how to do it (Rema 596:1; MB 3-5).
  One may produce sound that is not musical in nature. Thus, one may clap his hands to wake someone up, knock on a door with his hands or an instrument so that the people inside will hear and open up, or tap a glass or bottle with a spoon to quiet a crowd. One may also snap in order to wake someone up or to make a baby laugh (SA 338:1).
  The poskim disagree whether one may use a door knocker or mechanical bell. Some forbid it on the grounds that it resembles a musical instrument too closely (Rema). Others permit it since one is not trying to make music (SA 338:1). If during the week an electric doorbell is used, then on Shabbat a mechanical doorbell or knocker may be used (MB 338:7).11<i class="footnote"><em>Eruvin</em> 104a records a disagreement about this issue. According to Ula, one may not produce sound on Shabbat even without intent to make music. Therefore, one may not knock on the door so that the people inside will hear him. Rava maintains that only producing sound with the goal of creating music is prohibited. The Yerushalmi tells the story of R. Ila’i, who returned home on Friday night and called out to the members of his household to let him in. They did not hear him. Since he was personally stringent not to knock, he slept outside (<em>y. Beitza </em>5:2). Indeed, Rabbeinu Ḥananel and the Vilna Gaon rule in accordance with Ula’s strict approach. In any case, even according to them, knocking with a <em>shinui</em> is permitted (BHL 338:1 s.v. “aval”). However, based on the subsequent discussion in the Gemara, Rif and Rambam (MT 23:4) conclude that the law is in accordance with the lenient approach of Rava. Rosh is inclined to follow this as well. Almost all the <em>poskim</em> follow the lenient approach, including SA 338:1, MB <em>ad loc</em>. 2-3, and SSK 28:41. However, regarding a door knocker, an instrument designed to produce sound, Maharil is stringent. <em>Beit Yosef</em> suggests that Maharil’s stringency is due to the concern that the person knocking may in fact intend to produce music. Rema 338:1 is stringent, following Maharil. According to BHL 338:1 s.v. “ho’il,” this is the position of SA as well. However, <em>Livyat Ḥen</em> §110 and <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:39:1 argue that according to SA, one may use a door knocker. If the knocker is meant to be used only on Shabbat, then Rema permits it as well (MB 338:7; <em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 9:76). Therefore, one may use a mechanical doorbell on Shabbat if an electric one is used during the week (SSK 23:55 with n. 159).A <em>ḥazan</em> may not use a tuning fork to help him determine the pitch for his singing, because it is included in the prohibition on musical instruments (MB 338:4). While some are permissive, since a tuning fork produces a sound that is uniform and relatively quiet, and it is being used for the sake of a mitzva, it is proper to be stringent, because that is the opinion of almost all the <em>poskim</em>. If one wishes to rely on those who are lenient, it is not necessary to object (AHS 338:8; see <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 3:22).</i>
  One may place a decorative crown with bells on a Torah scroll even though the bells produce sound. Since they are decorative and honor the Torah, it is for the sake of a mitzva, and since the person carrying the Torah does not intend to make noise, it is not forbidden (Shakh and MA, as opposed to Taz).
  Some forbid opening a door that has bells or chimes attached to it, since they are considered musical instruments (Taz and Eliya Rabba). Others permit it, because those entering do not intend to make noise, they just want to open the door (MA). Le-khatḥila, it is proper for homeowners to remove bells from the door before Shabbat; if they did not do so, the door may still be used (see MB 338:6).
  One may whistle on Shabbat because it is considered a type of music made with the mouth, not with an instrument. Some even permit using one’s fingers to improve the whistle (AHS 338:7; see below in 24:7 about toys that make noise).
  
  Section 18
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Clapping and Dancing
  The Sages’ prohibition of playing instruments includes dancing, clapping, and slapping one’s thigh with one’s hands to accompany singing out of concern lest one play an instrument and fix it (Beitza 36b). However, one may clap with a shinui, such as using the back of one’s hand; by using a shinui, he is reminded that it is Shabbat and will not end up fixing an instrument (y. Beitza 5:2). It would seem that very muted dancing, in which one’s feet never leave the ground at the same time, is not included in the prohibited dancing (ibid.).
  The prohibition applies specifically while singing, because there is a concern then that it will lead to playing instruments. In contrast, if there is no singing, one may jump a bit for his enjoyment. Similarly, one may clap or to bang on a table in order to wake someone up.
  In practice, many observant Jews dance, clap, and bang on a table when they sing on Shabbat. The poskim disagree about the legitimacy of this practice, as follows.
  One approach, that of many poskim, is that this practice is mistaken. The only reason that the Sages did not object is that the prohibition is not stated explicitly in the Torah, so it is better that people transgress unknowingly rather than knowingly (Beitza 30a). However, if there is any possibility that people can be convinced to accept the proper halakha, we must teach them not to clap or dance on Shabbat, in accordance with the rabbinic enactment (Rif; Rambam; Rema 339:3). Nevertheless, on Simḥat Torah, when there is a special mitzva to rejoice and honor the Torah, even those who are normally stringent dance and clap (Maharik in the name of R. Hai Gaon). However, for other celebrations with a mitzva component, such as weddings, they are not lenient (MB 339:8).
  A second approach defends the leniency. After all, the reason behind the prohibition is a concern that people will end up fixing a musical instrument. Nowadays, when those who play an instrument do not know how to fix it, the enactment no longer applies, and one may dance and clap on Shabbat (Tosafot, Beitza 30a, s.v. “tenan”). Some do not accept this, maintaining that all the players know how to tune their instrument (tightening guitar strings, harp strings, or the top of a drum), which is considered fixing an instrument. However, there is a different reason to be lenient. Some maintain that the rabbinic enactment was specifically relevant to the times of the Sages, when people would take out instruments whenever there was dancing and clapping. Nowadays, when many people sing, dance, and clap without instruments, the enactment no longer applies (AHS 339:9).
  A third approach notes that the great Ḥasidic masters of recent centuries focused on the value of music and dance to awaken people’s hearts to cling to God joyfully. Such dancing and clapping are considered true mitzva needs. Accordingly, just as there is a leniency for Simḥat Torah, there should be a leniency for every Shabbat (Devar Yehoshua 2:42:4).
  It would seem that even those who are lenient should not drum on the table on Shabbat. Such drumming is very similar to that of an actual drum, which all agree is forbidden, even for the sake of a mitzva. Furthermore, the concern that people will take out a drum is a serious one today, when many are used to bringing drums, darbukas, and the like when they sing. In contrast, when people are singing during prayer, a leader may drum with his hand on the bima. One leading the songs at the Shabbat table may also be lenient.12<i class="footnote">As we said above, on Simḥat Torah all customarily clap and dance based on the opinion of R. Hai Gaon as cited by Maharik and <em>Beit Yosef</em> 339:3. However, the <em>poskim</em> do not apply this leniency to other mitzva situations (SA 339:3). Rema is inclined to follow this as well, commenting that the reason we do not object to those who clap and dance on Shabbat is that it is better that people transgress unknowingly rather than knowingly. However, Rema cites as an alternative the lenient approach of <em>Tosafot</em>, namely, that nowadays there is no reason to be concerned that people will end up fixing a musical instrument. <em>Yam Shel Shlomo</em><em>Beitza</em> 5:6) seems to state that technically one may rely on <em>Tosafot</em> when it is in the service of a mitzva. This opinion is quoted in <em>Eliya Rabba</em> 339:1 and MB <em>ad loc</em>. 10. (See SHT 339:6-7.) Based on the logic of this approach, Ḥasidim are customarily lenient (<em>Devar Yehoshua</em> 2:42:4; <em>Minḥat Elazar</em> 1:29). Sephardim may rely on this reasoning as well for the sake of a mitzva (see <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:43:9 and <em>Harḥavot</em>.) However, the leniency pertains to dancing and clapping – both of which are done with the body – and not to drumming on something else (<em>Eliya Rabba</em> 339:1; MB <em>ad</em><em>loc</em>. 10; <em>Avnei Yashfe</em> 2:35:1). The reasoning is straightforward. Drumming on a table is similar to playing a drum, which is a musical instrument. Nevertheless, when it comes to a <em>gabbai</em> leading the congregation in song, there are two reasons to be lenient and allow him to drum with his hand on the <em>bima</em>. First, this is more clearly for the sake of a mitzva, and we already saw that R. Hai Gaon and Maharik are lenient for the sake of Simḥat Torah (see SHT 339:7). Second, since the <em>gabbai</em> is in the middle of the congregation, we are not worried that he might bring instruments that will need to be fixed. Perhaps this is also one of the reasons for the leniency on Simḥat Torah<em>.</em> The logic is similar to that of the permission for two people to read by candlelight (<em>Shabbat</em> 12b), or for even one person to read by candlelight as long as his friend is there to make sure he will not unknowingly do anything that would affect the flame (SA 275:3). This also explains why <em>Sha’arei De’a</em> (YD 282) allows putting a crown with bells on a Torah scroll (as opposed to <em>Taz</em>; see <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 3:22). Perhaps we can extend the leniency to leading the singing at the Shabbat table, and allow one to drum with his hand on the table. Nevertheless, it is not proper for the rest of the participants to drum. Besides, their drumming is not always for the sake of the mitzva, as often these additional drummers actually make it harder to sing because they are out of sync with the song.</i>
  
  Section 19
  
  The Spirit of Shabbat / Music and Films on Electronic Devices
  There is a clear consensus among poskim that one may not listen to the radio or watch television on Shabbat. Even if the radio or television is turned on before Shabbat so that no melakha is performed on Shabbat, it is forbidden, and for several reasons. First, if there are Jews who work at the station, one may not derive enjoyment from Shabbat desecration. Second, even if all the station’s workers are non-Jewish, one may not listen to or watch broadcasts because it belittles and detracts from the honor of Shabbat. We already saw (2:9) that some maintain that one may not leave a flour mill running before Shabbat if it will continue to run on Shabbat, because the noise of the grinding detracts from the honor of Shabbat. Listening to the radio and watching television are much more serious. While the mill makes noise that no one wants to hear, one who turns on the radio or television before Shabbat indeed wishes to listen or watch on the holy Shabbat. All would agree that this infringes upon Shabbat’s honor. Third, it is a weekday activity. Just as the prophets and Sages forbade many things that are reminiscent of weekdays, so that our behavior on Shabbat would be different from that of the workweek, so too we should prohibit listening to the radio and watching television on Shabbat. Fourth, there is a concern that the radio or television might malfunction, and the listeners or viewers might try to fix it on Shabbat. One might want to raise or lower the volume or adjust the device in some other way (see above 17:2). A similar concern led to the ban on using musical instruments, and the same ban should apply. 
  For all these reasons, one may not listen to radio or watch television on Shabbat, even when they are turned on before Shabbat. For the same reasons, it is also forbidden to set a timer to turn on a recording device or video or audio player (see Yesodei Yeshurun vol. 3, pp. 50-55; Tzitz Eliezer 3:16; SSK 42:43; Yabi’a Omer 1:20; Yalkut Yosef 318:34-38).
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Muktzeh / The Basis of the Prohibition
  The Sages prohibited moving things that are not fitting for Shabbat and that one puts out of his mind (maktzeh mi-da’ato). There are two fundamental reasons for this prohibition: 1) to preserve the atmosphere of Shabbat as a day of holiness and rest. The idea of rest applies to one’s hands as well; they should not move objects or be involved with activities that are not connected to Shabbat; 2) to set up a safeguard so that one will not come to do melakha on Shabbat. We will begin by explaining the first reason.
  In addition to the melakhot that are prohibited on Shabbat, the Torah commands us to rest and relax on Shabbat, as it states: “but on the seventh day you shall cease, so that your ox and your donkey may rest, and the son of your maidservant and the stranger may be refreshed” (Shemot 23:12). Similarly, we read: “Six days shall work be done, but on the seventh day there shall be a Shabbat of complete rest, holy to the Lord” (Shemot 31:15). In order to fulfill the Torah commandment to rest and relax on Shabbat, the Sages established several ordinances meant to protect the spirit of Shabbat as a day of sanctity and rest. One of them is the prohibition of muktzeh. If moving items unnecessary for Shabbat were permitted, people might well spend all of Shabbat cleaning and arranging their homes and belongings, thus negating the mitzva to rest. Additionally, the prophets instructed the people that the atmosphere of Shabbat should be different from that of the weekday – one should walk and talk differently. Following this line of thought, the Sages decreed that people should not handle objects and implements on Shabbat in the same way as during the week. This way Shabbat is truly felt by all, including those whose weekday activities do not normally involve any forbidden melakhot. We see that the prohibition of muktzeh is rooted in the words of the Torah and the prophets, while its precise parameters and details are rabbinic (AHS 308:4-5; above, 22:1).
  As we said, the second reason is so that one will not end up doing melakha on Shabbat. As with all mitzvot, the Sages instituted safeguards in order to distance people from sin. The prohibition of muktzeh makes it less likely that people will carry objects in the public domain or use muktzeh items to perform melakha (Rambam and Raavad, MT 24:12-13).1<i class="footnote">AHS 308:4-5 suggests that the prohibitions of <em>muktzeh</em> date back to the time of our teacher Moshe. Additionally, the Gemara mentions that in the days of Kings David and Shlomo, the prohibition of <em>muktzeh maḥmat gufo</em> was already in effect (<em>Shabbat</em> 30b). During the time of Neḥemia, the Sages saw that Shabbat desecration was widespread, and they decreed that all implements (<em>kelim</em>) would be considered <em>muktzeh</em>. There were only three <em>kelim</em>, considered necessary for eating, exempted from the prohibition. When the situation improved and people were once again careful about Shabbat laws, the Sages once again permitted the movement of most <em>kelim</em>, though a small number remained banned (<em>Shabbat</em> 123b; SAH 308:17; sections 7-9 below). Rashi and <em>She’iltot</em> maintain that the prohibition of <em>muktzeh</em> is by Torah law, since Rabba’s statement that one must prepare before Shabbat what he needs for Shabbat is based on the verse: “But on the sixth day, they shall prepare what they have brought in” (Shemot 16:5). The implication of the verse is that anything that has not been prepared is <em>muktzeh</em><em>Pesaḥim</em> 47b; <em>Beitza</em> 2b). However, almost all Rishonim maintain that Rabba changed his mind and would agree that the prohibition of <em>muktzeh</em> is rabbinic. This is the opinion of <em>Tosafot</em>, Rambam, Ramban, and Rashba. One interpretation of Rashi is that only the most serious types of <em>muktzeh</em> are prohibited by Torah law, while the rest are rabbinic (<em>Pnei Yehoshu’a</em><em>Beitza</em> 2b). Alternatively, Ḥatam Sofer explains that Rashi means that <em>muktzeh</em> is prohibited by Torah law only in the case of food items, as we are commanded to prepare food for Shabbat; in contrast, all other <em>muktzeh</em> prohibitions are rabbinic (OḤ 79). In any case, as we wrote in 22:1 based on Ramban, all the laws connected to the spirit of Shabbat are rooted in the Torah, while the Sages established the details of their observance. This is also implied by Rambam. See <em>Harḥavot</em> there.</i>
  The prohibition of muktzeh synchronizes the mind and the hands. Any item that one knows is not fit for use on Shabbat will not be touched by his hands either.
  
  Section 2
  
  Muktzeh / Principles of Muktzeh
  As a rule, the Sages forbade moving things on Shabbat that are not fitting for use on Shabbat and that one puts out of his mind (section 10 below). There are several types of muktzeh: 1) Muktzeh maḥmat gufo (inherently muktzeh) – items that are not fitting for any use on Shabbat, such as rocks, trees, sand, animals, and inedible food (as explained below, section 3). 2) Muktzeh maḥmat ḥesron kis (muktzeh because of monetary loss) – valuable objects that one takes care not to handle except for their sole designated use, out of concern that they will be ruined. Since they have no use on Shabbat, one puts them out of his mind (section 4 below). 3) Basis le-davar ha-asur (a base for a forbidden object) – refers to a case where one places a muktzeh item on an object that is not itself muktzeh; since he intends for it to remain there on Shabbat, he puts the “base” out of his mind as well, and it too becomes muktzeh (sections 5-6 below). 4) Kelim she-melakhtam le-isur (implements whose usage is forbidden) – have a special status. Since they are designed to perform forbidden activities, one puts them out of his mind. On the other hand, sometimes they are used for permitted purposes. Therefore, one may not move them for their own sake (e.g., to protect them, le-tzorekh atzmam), but one may move them to use them permissibly (le-tzorekh gufam) or because one needs the space they occupy (le-tzorekh mekomam) (sections 7-9 below).
  If a muktzeh item is painfully unpleasant, like a chamber pot (graf shel re’i), the Sages permitted removing it (section 12 below).
  The prohibition is to move a muktzeh object manually, but one may touch a muktzeh item without moving it. Therefore, one may spread a cover over a computer, telephone, or other muktzeh items on Shabbat. One may also move muktzeh “from the side” (min ha-tzad). For example, if one needs to pick up an object or food, and in so doing a muktzeh item that is next to the object or food will be moved indirectly, as long as he does not touch the muktzeh item with his hands, it is not prohibited. However, if the muktzeh item needs to be moved for its own protection, one may not move it even min ha-tzad. As long as he is using his hands, even if they have no direct contact with the muktzeh item (for example, if he is using a broom), it is prohibited. However, one may use any other part of the body (be-gufo); for example, one may move an object that is muktzeh using his foot or elbow (section 14 below).
  Sometimes it is unclear whether or not a particular item is muktzeh because we lack facts about the situation. For example, if one found fruit under a tree and it is uncertain whether they fell before Shabbat (and are permitted) or on Shabbat (and are muktzeh), we are stringent and consider it muktzeh (Beitza 24b; SA 325:5). In contrast, if there is a halakhic disagreement about whether an item is muktzeh, the law follows the lenient position (Beit Yosef 279:4; SHT 309:24).
  
  Section 3
  
  Muktzeh / Muktzeh Maĥmat Gufo
  Any item that is unfit for any use on Shabbat is muktzeh maḥmat gufo. This means that it is inherently muktzeh; because it is of no use on Shabbat, it is put out of one’s mind, muktzeh. This category includes rocks, animals, coins, straw, dust, trees, leaves, all types of waste, and corpses.
  This type of muktzeh may not be moved even if one wants to use the item for a permissible purpose. For example, one may not pick up a rock to use as a door stopper or nutcracker. If one wants to prevent the rock from becoming muktzeh, he must either mentally designate it for the desired purpose before Shabbat or use it for that purpose at least once during the week (SA 308:20, 22).
  Sand is muktzeh and may not be used to cover up something disgusting. If the sand has been put in a particular place specifically for this purpose, it is not muktzeh (SA 308:38). Similarly, sand in a sandbox for children is not muktzeh (above, 15:2).
  Food that may not currently be eaten, but that one intends to make permissible after Shabbat – such as food from which teruma and ma’aser or ḥalla have not yet been separated – are muktzeh on Shabbat (MT 25:19). However, non-kosher meat that one intends to give to a non-Jew or feed to a dog is not muktzeh (SA 324:7).
  Foods that can be eaten under pressing circumstances are not muktzeh. However, if they are not edible at all without being cooked or baked – such as flour, potatoes, beans, raw meat, and raw fish – they are muktzeh. Even though animals can eat them, they are still muktzeh, since normally animals are not given food meant for people.
  In pressing circumstances, such as if a freezer has stopped working and the meat and fish inside are likely to spoil, we rely on the opinion that since a dog would eat these foods raw, they are not muktzeh. Accordingly, one may move them into a working freezer.2<i class="footnote">SA 308:31-32 explains that raw meat is not <em>muktzeh</em> since some people eat meat that way. In contrast, raw fish that people generally do not eat is <em>muktzeh</em>. According to MA and others, raw meat that is soft (such as chicken) is not <em>muktzeh</em>, but raw meat that is hard and inedible is <em>muktzeh</em>. According to <em>Taz</em><em>ad loc</em>. 20), if fish is edible by dogs, then even if in practice we do not feed such fish to dogs, it is not <em>muktzeh</em>. See MB and BHL, which incline toward the position of SA. It would seem that nowadays, when there are people who feed dogs meat and fish that people would eat as well, under pressing circumstances one may rely on <em>Taz</em>. This is the opinion of <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> vol. 2, p. 359 and <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 19:108.</i>
  Animals are muktzeh since they serve no purpose on Shabbat. In a time of need, one may take hold of them and drag them in order to feed or protect them, but one may not pick them up (above 20:3). House pets, which are normally played with and picked up, are not muktzeh (above 20:5).
  Food scraps that dogs or cats can eat are not muktzeh. Even if one does not own a cat or dog, there are cats and dogs in town that would be happy to have them. Similarly, bones are not muktzeh, since dogs and cats eat them. However, food scraps that neither man nor animal will eat – such as the nutshells, husks, and fish bones – are muktzeh. Additionally, if food scraps would be eaten by some animals but not by any found locally, they are muktzeh (SA 308:29). Apricot pits that children play with and that were extracted on Shabbat are not muktzeh (see SSK ch. 16 n. 33).
  
  Section 4
  
  Muktzeh / Muktzeh Maĥmat Ĥesron Kis
  Valuable items that have no use on Shabbat and that people always take care not to move except for the specific purpose for which they are designed (to ensure the items do not get damaged or lost) are muktzeh maḥmat ḥesron kis. For example, knives designed for ritual slaughter or for leatherworking are muktzeh. Even if one wants to cut his food with them, he may not pick them up (Shabbat 123b, 157a; SA 308:1).
  Included in this category of muktzeh are: musical instruments, smartphones, radios, tape recorders, expensive or fragile music players, cameras, and mixers. These may not be used even for a permissible purpose, for example, as a paperweight. Similarly, one may not wrap himself in an expensive piece of fabric that has been set aside for sewing. In contrast, a valuable or fragile item that is frequently used on Shabbat, such as a gold watch, eyeglasses, or a magnifying glass for reading, is not muktzeh.
  Other examples of muktzeh maḥmat ḥesron kis are paper money, important business documents, identity cards, credit cards, stamps, bus tickets, parchment to be used by a scribe, and stationery paper that is not used for any other purpose (SSK 20:20).
  Wall clocks and valuable pictures, which people are careful not to move so as to avoid possible damage, are included in this category of muktzeh (MB 308:168). Also included are large free-standing closets that people are careful not to move without a good reason, for fear that they will fall apart (MB 308:8). The prohibition here is limited to moving the entire closet; one may open its doors and drawers, as they are meant to be used regularly.
  Cups, plates, and clothes that are meant to be sold are muktzeh maḥmat ḥesron kis, since sellers usually insist that no one use them. If a seller does not insist upon this, his wares are not muktzeh. People who sell food generally do not insist that no one eat from their merchandise, and therefore the food in stores and warehouses is not muktzeh (Beit Yosef and Rema 308:1; MB ad loc. 6-7; SA 310:2; MB ad loc. 4).
  
  Section 5
  
  Muktzeh / Basis Le-davar Ha-asur and Conscious Placement
  If a muktzeh item was placed atop a non-muktzeh item with the intention that it stay there all of Shabbat, then the permitted item becomes muktzeh, as it serves as a basis (base) for a forbidden object. For example, if one placed money on a table, then even though the table is not in itself muktzeh, since he placed muktzeh money on it, the table becomes muktzeh because it is now a basis le-davar ha-asur. In other words, the decision to place money on the table implies consent not to use the table on Shabbat, making the table muktzeh just like the money on it. Even if the money were to fall off during Shabbat, it would not matter; since the table was muktzeh during bein ha-shmashot, it remains muktzeh all of Shabbat (SA 310:7). In contrast, if one did not intend for the money to stay on the table over Shabbat but simply left it there by mistake, then the table does not become muktzeh, since he did not decide to make it a basis for something muktzeh. Nevertheless, le-khatḥila one should still not move the table while the muktzeh item is on it. Rather, he should tilt the table so that the money falls off and then move the table wherever he wants. However, if the muktzeh item would be damaged if it slid offupon falling to the floor, then one may move the table along with the muktzeh item to a place where the latter can safely be slid off without being damaged. For example, if the muktzeh item is a smartphone, which would likely break if dropped, one may move the table elsewhere. Similarly, if the muktzeh item is a stone, and next to the table are fragile glass items that would likely break if the stone were to fall on them, one may move the table elsewhere (Shabbat 142b; SA 309:4; SA 277:3; section 14 below).
  The same applies to a laptop left on top of a book, valuable candlesticks left on a tray, valuable knives left in a case, raw potatoes left in a drawer, or a tzedaka box left on the bima. If these items were intentionally placed there, then whatever they are resting upon becomes a basis le-davar ha-asur and is muktzeh. If they were forgotten there, the base does not become muktzeh.
  Sometimes, during the week, one wishes to place something muktzeh in a closet, but because there is no space he puts it on top of clothing in the closet. There is a disagreement whether such a placement renders the clothing muktzeh. Some say that since ultimately the muktzeh was consciously placed atop the clothing, the clothing becomes a basis (Taz). Others maintain that since the person did not intend for the muktzeh to be there specifically, but it simply ended up there, the item of clothing does not become a basis (MA). In practice, when necessary one may be lenient (MB 309:18).3<i class="footnote">. If one intended to place the <em>muktzeh</em> item on a permitted item for only part of Shabbat, according to Rabbeinu Tam it does not become a <em>basis</em>, while according to Rashi it does. SA 309:4 is inclined to be stringent, but in times of necessity one may be lenient (MB <em>ad loc.</em> 21). There is a similar disagreement about the law if the <em>muktzeh</em> item was placed atop an item in the middle of Shabbat (by the owner or with his consent). According to <em>Tosafot</em>, as long as the <em>muktzeh</em> item is there, the base is <em>muktzeh</em>; according to <em>Or Zaru’a</em>, however, it is not <em>muktzeh</em>. According to Rashba and Ran, if one’s intention is that the <em>muktzeh</em> remain there until Shabbat is over, then as long as the <em>muktzeh</em> item is there, the base is <em>muktzeh </em>as well. MB 266:26 follows those who are lenient. See BHL 310:7 s.v. “mateh.”The base becomes a prohibited <em>basis</em> only when it serves the <em>muktzeh</em> upon it; but when the <em>muktzeh</em> item serves the base, it does not become prohibited. Therefore, if one places a rock on a barrel to weigh down its cover and prevent it from opening, or if he places pieces of <em>muktzeh</em> wool on a pot to keep it warm, the barrel or pot does not become <em>muktzeh</em> (SA 259:1; MB <em>ad loc.</em> 9).</i>
  If one finds money or other muktzeh items in his pocket, he may assume they were forgotten there, so his clothes do not become a basis. However, in order that he not continue to carry around muktzeh in his pocket, he should try to shake it out. If he is embarrassed to do so in public, or if he is worried that the muktzeh item will get lost, he may continue to wear this item of clothing until he reaches a place where he can shake out the muktzeh without fear of losing it or embarrassing himself.4<i class="footnote">If one intended to leave money in his pocket but decided on Shabbat that he would like to wear the clothing, what is the status of the clothing? If the garment itself is one of the sides of the pocket, as is generally the case with a shirt pocket, then the garment becomes a <em>basis</em> and may not be moved. In contrast, if the pocket is part of a separate lining sewn onto the clothing, as is the case with most pants pockets, the clothing does not become a <em>basis</em>, because the pocket is secondary to the whole garment. Thus, the pants may be moved. However, when possible, one should first shake the <em>muktzeh</em> item out of the pocket, taking care not to put one’s hand in the pocket or touch it from outside in order to shake the <em>muktzeh</em> item out. This is because the pocket itself is <em>muktzeh</em> (Rema 310:7; MB <em>ad loc.</em> 29-30; see SSK ch. 20 n. 275). If a money pouch is tied to an item of clothing, since the pouch is not sewn on, it is not secondary to the clothing, and thus the clothing becomes a <em>basis</em>.</i>
  
  Section 6
  
  Muktzeh / More on Basis Le-davar Ha-asur
  If an assortment of items have been placed on a tray or table, some muktzeh and some not, the muktzeh status of the tray depends upon which items one considers to be more important. If the muktzeh items are more important, then the tray becomes a basis. If the non-muktzeh items are more important, the tray does not become a basis and is not muktzeh (SA 310:8). For example, let us say the Shabbat candles and the challahs are on the table. If the candlesticks are made of clay, the challahs are more important, and the table may be moved. However, if the candlesticks are silver (which makes them muktzeh maḥmat ḥesron kis), they are more important than the challahs; the table becomes a basis and may not be moved.5<i class="footnote">Some are lenient even if the candlesticks are silver because, in their opinion, candlesticks are merely <em>kelim she-melakhtam le-isur</em> (R. Akiva Eger). One should not rely on this opinion, because silver candlesticks are very expensive and therefore are <em>muktzeh maḥmat ḥesron kis</em> (<em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 44:13; <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> vol. 2, p. 334; <em>Piskei Teshuvot</em> 279:1). Also see SSK 20:61 with n. 242.There is a dispute about the status of the <em>basis </em>of a <em>kli she-melakhto le-isur</em>. Some maintain that the base of a <em>kli she-melakhto le-isur</em> assumes the same status as the <em>kli</em> itself. Therefore, one may move it <em>le</em>–<em>tzorekh</em> <em>gufo</em> or <em>le</em>–<em>tzorekh</em> <em>mekomo </em>(<em>Tehila Le-David</em> 308:1). Others maintain that since a <em>kli she-melakhto le-isur</em> is not completely <em>muktzeh</em>, it does not render the base supporting it a <em>basis</em> at all (<em>Yeshu’ot Yaakov</em>; see SSK 20:50). Since <em>muktzeh</em> is a rabbinic law, the <em>halakha</em> follows the more lenient position.If a desk or table has a drawer that contains muktzeh items of significance, then if the drawer can be completely removed from the table, the desk becomes a basis for the drawer and may not be moved (similar to the case in the previous note of a money pouch tied to clothing). If the drawer cannot be removed from the desk, then it is secondary to it (as a pants pocket is secondary to the pants), and the muktzeh items in the drawer do not render the desk muktzeh. In any case, the drawer itself is muktzeh because it is a basis (MB 310:31).</i>
  If one left a muktzeh item on top of something belonging to his friend, he has not rendered it a basis; as a general rule, one cannot render someone else’s possession forbidden without permission. However, if he acted at his friend’s behest or he knows that his friend wished it to be done, then he has rendered it a basis (Rema 309:4; MB ad loc. 27).
  Even when the basis is much more expensive than the muktzeh item placed upon it, it still takes on its muktzeh status, since it serves as its base. However, when the muktzeh item is of no importance compared to the basis on which it was placed, the basis does not become muktzeh. Therefore, if one left small change on a table or bones on a plate, since the muktzeh item is negligible vis-à-vis the table or plate, they do not become a basis. Similarly, if the main function of the basis is not to be a basis – for example, if the door of a closet or refrigerator is attached to drawers that contain muktzeh objects – since the main function of the door is to open the closet or refrigerator and not to be a basis for what is in the drawers, the door does not become a basis (MB 310:31, 277:7; SSK 20:77).
  A table that has become a basis may not be moved, but it may be used for eating or studying, as long as it is not moved. One may also expand the table or shorten it, as long as he does not use his hands to move the part of the table that has the muktzeh item on it. If the table has drawers, they may be used as well, as long as the table itself is not moved (Tehila Le-David 310:7; SSK 20:61).
  
  Section 7
  
  Muktzeh / Kelim She-melakhtam Le-isur
  Kelim she-melakhtam le-isur are objects normally used for activities that are prohibited on Shabbat. Some examples are hammers, scissors, needles, pliers, and phone books. Since they are designed for things that are prohibited on Shabbat, they are muktzeh. Nevertheless, since they can be used for permissible activities as well, one does not put them out of his mind completely over Shabbat. Therefore, the Sages established an intermediate category for such items. On the one hand, they are muktzeh, and one may not move them even if they were left in a place where they are likely to be damaged or stolen. On the other hand, one may move them in two cases: le-tzorekh gufam or le-tzorekh mekomam (SA 308:3).
  Le-tzorekh gufo (pl. “gufam”) means using the kli she-melakhto le-isur to do something permissible, like using a hammer to crack nuts, scissors to open a milk bag, a needle to remove a thorn, pliers to open and shut a faucet whose handle is missing, and a telephone book to look up an address. If the same goal can be attained without using a kli she-melakhto le-isur, it should not be used (MB 308:12).
  Le-tzorekh mekomo (pl. “mekomam”) means moving the kli she-melakhto le-isur to use the space it occupies. Thus, if such an object was left on the table one wishes to eat at, the bed he wishes to lie in, or a chair he wishes to sit upon, he may move it. Similarly, if such an item was left on the floor in a spot where people will likely trip over it, one may move it. If the door of a washing machine was left open and is getting in the way, it may be closed. If a kli she-melakhto le-isur makes it difficult to open or close a window, it may be moved.
  Once the kli she-melakhto le-isur has been picked up, whether le-tzorekh gufo or le-tzorekh mekomo, one may move it to where it will be safe (SA 308:3; section 15 below).6<i class="footnote">. Even though one may not move a <em>kli she-melakhto le-isur</em> to prevent it from being damaged or stolen, one may use a halakhic loophole (<em>ha’arama</em>) to accomplish this goal indirectly. In other words, one may pick up the <em>kli</em> initially <em>le-tzorekh gufo</em> or <em>le-tzorekh mekomo</em> and then put it down where it is protected from the elements and from theft (MB 308:16; <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> vol. 2, p. 412).</i>
  Other examples of kelim she-melakhtam le-isur are: pens, pencils, pencil sharpeners, paintbrushes, lined paper, accounting forms, sandpaper, carbon paper, candles, matches, nails, and cigarettes.7<i class="footnote">. In contrast, any item that is not a <em>kli</em> but is used for an activity prohibited on Shabbat, such as firewood, kerosene, bar soap, thick liquid soap, laundry detergent, and shoe polish – is considered <em>muktzeh maḥmat gufo</em>, and thus may not be moved even <em>le-tzorekh gufo</em> or <em>le-tzorekh mekomo</em> (MB 308:34; <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 19:7).</i>
  Some kelim she-melakhtam le-isur, such as an artist’s knives or a diamond cutter’s tools, are considered muktzeh maḥmat ḥesron kis, since their owners are careful not to use them for other purposes. The laws pertaining to them are stricter – they may not be moved even le-tzorekh gufam or le-tzorekh mekomam (see section 4 above).
  Electrical appliances such as fans, washing machines, refrigerators, and other appliances with no incandescent filament are considered kelim she-melakhtam le-isur. Electrical appliances with a heating element or incandescent filament, such as light bulbs, heaters, radiators, and warming trays (platas) that were on during bein ha-shmashot on Friday (when Shabbat started) are considered muktzeh maḥmat gufam and may not be moved during Shabbat even le-tzorekh gufam or le-tzorekh mekomam. In contrast, if they were off throughout bein ha-shmashot, they are considered kelim she-melakhtam le-isur and may be moved le-tzorekh gufam or le-tzorekh mekomam.8<i class="footnote">An incandescent filament that was on throughout <em>bein ha-shmashot</em> has the same status as a flame that was lit throughout <em>bein ha-shmashot</em> – it is absolutely <em>muktzeh</em>, as explained in SA 279:1. However, some maintain that an incandescent filament differs from a flame, because flames are not normally moved, whereas devices with incandescent filaments are normally moved. Therefore, according to them, the status of the appliance is that of a <em>kli she-melakhto le-isur</em> (<em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 41:16; <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 3:50). Nevertheless, according to most <em>poskim</em> an incandescent filament has the same status as a flame, and the entire appliance is considered secondary and a <em>basis</em> to the filament and thus completely <em>muktzeh</em> (SSK 20:15*; <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 3:43; <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> vol. 2, pp. 425-426; <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 19:181-184). See <em>Harḥavot</em>.</i>
  
  Section 8
  
  Muktzeh / Kelim with Both Permitted and Prohibited Uses
  The status of kelim used for both permissible and forbidden activities is determined by the majority of their use (Pri Megadim; MB 308:10). Therefore, a pocket knife with scissors is not muktzeh, because most of its blades can be used as cutlery for eating and are not muktzeh, and it is only the scissors that are used primarily for a forbidden activity. Similarly, a wristwatch with a built-in calculator is not muktzeh, because its primary use – telling time – is permitted on Shabbat. In contrast, a cell phone (that is not a smart phone) that displays the time is a keli she-melakhto le-isur, since its main use – as a telephone – is prohibited on Shabbat. Therefore, it may not be moved for its own sake, but it may be moved le-tzorekh gufo – in order to see what time it is (however, he should not carry it around in his pocket for that purpose). It may also be moved le-tzorekh mekomo. Thus, if one wants to use the place where the phone is resting, it may be moved. Similarly, if the phone’s alarm goes off, and the owner wants to move it so the ringing will not disturb his rest, he may do so.
  A pot is a kli she-melakhto le-isur, since its primary purpose is for cooking. Nevertheless, when there is food in it, the pot is secondary to the food, and therefore may be moved. Once the food has been removed from the pot, one may remove the pot from the table, even if one does not need the space it is occupying. The reason is that the food waste at the bottom of the pot renders it disgusting, and a disgusting item (graf shel re’i) may be moved (MB 308:20; BHL s.v. “kli”; see section 12 below). Even if an oven is used to store baking pans and baked goods, since its primary purpose is baking, it is a kli she-melakhto le-isur. Nevertheless, one may open its door to remove food, since this is moving it le-tzorekh mekomo. If one wishes to put food in the oven and keep it there on Shabbat, he may open the door and close it, because this is le-tzorekh gufo (SSK 20:79).
  Tefilin are considered a kli she-melakhto le-isur, since one may not wear them on Shabbat and Yom Tov (SA 31:1). Therefore, they may be moved only le-tzorekh gufam or le-tzorekh mekomam. Le-tzorekh gufam would apply if one wishes to put the tefilin on, in the hope that they will protect him from danger. Le-tzorekh mekomam would apply if they are sitting in their bag together with a talit, and one wishes to remove the tefilin in order to get to the talit on Shabbat (Taz; MA). Under pressing circumstances, if the tefilin are in danger of being damaged, they may be moved (MB 31:2; BHL ad loc.).
  A flower pot is a kli she-melakhto le-isur, since it is associated with several melakhot – planting, watering, and picking. Thus, it may be moved le-tzorekh gufo – to decorate the table – or le-tzorekh mekomo – to use the place where the flower pot is sitting (see above 19:10).
  
  Section 9
  
  Muktzeh / Kelim She-melakhtam Le-heter, Food, and Books
  Kelim that are used for permitted purposes (kelim she-melakhtam le-heter), a category that includes tables, chairs, beds, pillows, thermoses, clocks, and brooms, may be moved for any reason, though one may not move them for no reason at all. In Neḥemia’s time, when people failed to observe Shabbat, the Sages decreed that no kelim should be moved at all. When meticulous observance was restored, they permitted moving kelim she-melakhtam le-heter but left the decree in place for moving them for no reason. The idea was for people to pay attention to what they do with their hands on Shabbat. Making sure not to move kelim without a reason keeps people aware of Shabbat and makes it more likely that they will not end up transgressing any Shabbat prohibitions. Furthermore, on Shabbat one aspires to inner peace and restfulness. This includes one’s hands as well – they should be at rest, not busy moving and carrying things unnecessarily.
  In contrast, no decree ever limited the movement of food, books, clothes, or jewelry. Because they make Shabbat enjoyable, one may move them even without a reason.
  The poskim disagree regarding kelim that are used very frequently, such as cutlery, plates, and cups. According to some, these kelim possess the same halakhic status as food and may thus be moved for no reason. Others maintain that they have the same status as kelim she-melakhtam le-heter, which may not be moved without a reason. Since muktzeh is itself a rabbinic law, the lenient position is the primary one. Le-khatḥila, though, since many poskim are inclined to be stringent, it is preferable to take their opinion into account and to avoid moving cutlery and dishes for no reason.9<i class="footnote">According to a <em>beraita </em>in <em>Shabbat</em> 123b, in the time of Neḥemia, when many failed to keep Shabbat, the Sages decreed that all <em>kelim</em> are considered <em>muktzeh</em> (except for three; see below). Once the people returned to meticulous observance, the Sages again permitted moving <em>kelim </em>in a three-step process. Rava explains that the Sages permitted moving a <em>kli she-melakhto le-isur</em> only <em>le-tzorekh gufo </em>and <em>le-tzorekh mekomo</em>, but <em>kelim she-melakhtam le-heter</em> could be moved even in order to prevent their being damaged. According to most Rishonim, this permission to move <em>kelim</em> used for permissible things is limited to situations where there is a reason to move them (such as “from the sun to the shade” to protect them), but one may not move them unnecessarily. This is the opinion of Ran and <em>Magid Mishneh</em> (which derives this position from Rambam), and Rashba is inclined to be stringent as well. <em>Tur</em> and SA 308:4 rule accordingly. However, according to Ra’ah and Ritva, when the Sages permitted moving <em>kelim</em> from the sun to the shade, they also permitted moving them for no reason at all. Aḥaronim recommend being stringent here, following SA.In contrast, all agree that food and books were never decreed <em>muktzeh</em> at all and may be moved even for no reason. This is also the case regarding clothing and jewelry (<em>Ketzot Ha-shulḥan</em> §105, <em>Badei Ha-shulḥan</em> §7 as cited in SSK 20:83).There is a disagreement about kelim that are regularly used during meals. The first position is that of Rambam (MT 25:1-3), Shlah, Ḥayei Adam 66:3, and Ben Ish Ḥai, Year 2, Miketz 1. According to them, as stated in the Mishna (Shabbat 123b), three kelim were not included in the decree of muktzeh because they were necessary for eating. These three are: a tool for cutting pressed-fig cakes, a spoon to remove scum from the surface of soup, and a small knife left on the table to cut bread and meat. However, other kelim used for eating may not be moved without a reason. The second approach is that of Tosafot (Shabbat 123b, s.v. “miktzo’a”), Rosh, Shiltei Giborim, Tehila Le-David 308:4, Ḥesed La-alafim, and MB 308:23. According to them, the three kelim mentioned in the mishna are only examples of kelim used frequently at meals. In fact, all tableware – cutlery, cups, and plates – have the same status and are not muktzeh at all. R. Ovadia Yosef rules stringently, even forbidding a nervous person from fidgeting with such items in order to calm his nerves (Yalkut Yosef vol. 2, pp. 452-457). Some who are generally stringent about kelim are lenient in this last case. This is the implication of AHS 308:15. SSK 20:83 agrees: “It is permitted for one to move an item if he finds pleasure in occupying himself with it, even if there is no practical purpose.” Orḥot Shabbat ch. 19 n. 108 records a similar ruling in the name of Ḥazon Ish. mia man sis for it, and therefore, is absolutely muktza (SSK 20:15*; Minhat Yitzhak 43: Yalkut</i>
  
  Section 10
  
  Muktzeh / An Item that was Muktzeh Throughout Bein Ha-shmashot
  If an item was muktzeh throughout bein ha-shmashot on Friday, it remains muktzeh throughout Shabbat, even if the reason it was considered muktzeh no longer applies. Therefore, if one left money on a table before Shabbat, the table becomes muktzeh as a basis le-davar ha-asur. Even if the money falls off the table at some point on Shabbat, the table remains muktzeh, since it was muktzeh during bein ha-shmashot (SA 310:7; section 5 above). Similarly, if an oil lamp or a candle was lit before Shabbat, it may not be moved on Shabbat even after it has burned out, and its leftover oil or wax may not be used. Since it was muktzeh during bein ha-shmashot, it is muktzeh for the whole day (SA 279:1; MB ad loc. 1). So too, if a valuable item that was muktzeh maḥmat ḥesron kis broke into usable pieces during Shabbat, the pieces remain muktzeh, since the item was muktzeh during bein ha-shmashot (MB 308:35 following MA 308:19).
  Nothing is muktzeh unless it meets two conditions: 1) The object was not fit for use during bein ha-shmashot on Friday. 2) One has put the idea of using it out of his mind. The Talmud’s classic example is figs and grapes that were left to dry on the muktzeh (an open space in a back yard). During the drying process, they are inedible because they are fermenting, so one puts them out of his mind. Even if the drying process is completed on Shabbat and they become edible, since they were muktzeh at bein ha-shmashot, they remain muktzeh for all of Shabbat. However, if only one of these conditions is met, the item is not muktzeh for all of Shabbat. For example, one may have left wheat on the ground to take root, and has put it out of his mind. Since in fact the wheat was still edible during bein ha-shmashot, it does not become muktzeh, and may be picked up on Shabbat and eaten (SA 310:2).
  Similarly, if one knows that an item that was unusable during bein ha-shmashot will become usable on Shabbat, he does not truly put it out of his mind. Therefore, it does not become muktzeh. For example, if a pot is on the plata when Shabbat starts, even if the food is inedible at that point, nevertheless since one knows that it will be ready to eat later, he does not put it out of his mind. Similarly, if damp clothes were hung out to dry before Shabbat, even though they are not wearable during bein ha-shmashot, as long as the climate is such that they will definitely dry over the course of Shabbat, one does not put them out of his mind. Therefore, one may move them once they are dry (Levushei Serad; SSK 22:11).10<i class="footnote">Why are a cooking pot and a burning lamp treated differently? A pot does not become <em>muktzeh</em>, because one does not especially want the food to cook during <em>bein ha-shmashot</em>. He would be happy if it had finished cooking beforehand. In contrast, a lamp remains <em>muktzeh</em> throughout Shabbat because one does want it to give off light during <em>bein ha-shmashot</em>. Since he puts the lamp out of his mind during that time, it stays <em>muktzeh</em> all of Shabbat (SA 279:1). Interestingly, if one has in mind to use the leftover oil after the lamp burns out, then since it is clear that the candle will go out, the remaining oil is not <em>muktzeh</em> (SA 279:4). However, according to Rema, once the lamp became <em>muktzeh</em> during <em>bein ha-shmashot</em>, it may not be moved all day, and one’s intentions are irrelevant.MB 308:63 states that clothes that were wet during <em>bein ha-shmashot</em> are <em>muktzeh</em> for all of Shabbat. Many explain that he is referring to a case where it is not certain that they will dry over the course of Shabbat. In contrast, if it is clear that they will dry, MB would agree that they are not <em>muktzeh</em> (<em>Minḥat Shlomo</em> 1:10:2, n. 4; <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 1:81). Alternatively, some explain that the clothes remain <em>muktzeh</em> because there is a concern that people will end up wringing out the clothes to dry them, which is prohibited on Shabbat (<em>Az Nidberu</em> 1:5). In any case, in practice if it is clear that the clothes will dry on Shabbat, they may be moved (<em>Livyat Ḥen</em> §37; <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> ch. 19 n. 563 in the name of <em>Ḥazon Ish</em>). See <em>Harḥavot</em>.If pieces of fruit were still attached to their tree during bein ha-shmashot, and then fell off during Shabbat, they are muktzeh for all of Shabbat because they were not fit for use during bein ha-shmashot. It is assumed that one puts them out of his mind; had he wanted to use them on Shabbat, he would have picked them before Shabbat began (SA 322:3; MB ad loc. 7). Additionally, the Sages made a special decree against eating fruits that fall off on Shabbat, to ensure that no one would end up picking them on Shabbat (Beitza 3a; MB 325:22). Therefore, even if it is known before Shabbat that a non-Jew is planning to pick the fruit on Shabbat, in which case they are not muktzeh, they nevertheless may not be eaten because of this decree (SHT ad loc. 26).In contrast, if a kosher animal was alive during bein ha-shmashot, and was slaughtered on Shabbat to feed a dangerously sick person, a healthy person may eat from the fresh meat. We do not say that it was muktzeh during bein ha-shmashot, as we do with the fruit. The difference is that while anyone can pick fruit (and would have done so before Shabbat if they were interested), not everyone knows how to slaughter. Thus, even though the owner did not slaughter the animal, that does not mean he put it out of his mind (SA 318:2; MB ad loc. 8).</i>
  
  Section 11
  
  Muktzeh / Making an Item Unsuitable for Its Normal Usage on Shabbat
  One may not cause an object to become unsuitable for its normal usage (levatel kli me-heikhano) on Shabbat. Doing so is akin to demolishing something (Soter) on Shabbat. Therefore, if oil is dripping from a lamp, one may not put a container underneath it to collect the oil. Since the lamp and its oil are muktzeh, the container will become forbidden to move, and thus it will no longer be fit for normal use on Shabbat. If one wants to ensure that the dripping oil does not make a mess, he should put something under it before Shabbat. Similarly, one may not put a container under a chicken in which it can lay its eggs. Since an egg laid on Shabbat is muktzeh, the container with an egg in it will become forbidden to move (Shabbat 42b; SA 310:6, 265:3).
  However, there is a way around this problem. Before placing the receptacle beneath the lamp or the chicken, one may place an item that is more important than the oil or egg. One may then move the container for the sake of that non-muktzeh item (MB 265:6).
  If one is worried about sparks flying from a lamp, he may put a kli underneath it to collect the sparks. Because sparks are insubstantial and go out almost immediately, the kli may subsequently be moved. It is not rendered unsuitable for its normal use. However, he should not put water into the kli, because that will extinguish the sparks more quickly (Shabbat 47b; SA 265:4).
  Making pillows and blankets wet is forbidden, because doing so makes them unsuitable for their normal use (SA 305:19). It is also forbidden to make an item of clothing so dirty that it is no longer wearable without washing. If liquid spilled on the floor, one may not use clothing to mop it up; by doing so, one is making the clothing unfit to wear. However, one may use a rag to mop up the spill, since this is the intended use of the rag. It is also permissible for many people to dry their hands on a towel, even if it will eventually become too wet to use any longer. This is because they are not making it unusable; rather, they are using it for its intended purpose. Similarly, one may put a garbage bag into a garbage can on Shabbat and put garbage in it, even though doing so gives the bag the muktzeh status of the garbage inside it. This is not considered rendering it unusable, as holding garbage is the purpose of the garbage bag (Levush 265:3; Shulḥan Shlomo 308:17:7; Yalkut Yosef vol. 2, p. 480; Orḥot Shabbat 2:19:329).
  One may place a box in front of chicks as a step stool so that they can go back and forth from their coop. Even though animals are muktzeh, this is not considered making the box unusable, since he can shoo the chicks away from it whenever he wants. However, while they are on the box, he may not move it (Shabbat 128b; SA 308:39).
  
  Section 12
  
  Muktzeh / “Graf Shel Re’i”
  Even though a truly disgusting item – such as a graf shel re’i (a receptacle that contains excrement), a dead mouse, or food scraps – is muktzeh maḥmat gufo, the Sages permitted removing it for the sake of human dignity. They did not encumber this removal by requiring that it be done with a shinui or min ha-tzad. Rather, one may remove it directly. This is all on condition that the item is in a place where it is disturbing people. However, if it is in a place where it is not bothering anyone, it may not be moved (Beitza 36b; Shabbat 121b; SA 308:34).
  The details of this law depend on how disgusting the item is and where it is located. Inside one’s home, even if an item is only slightly dirty – such as a pot with food remnants, a cup with a little wine left over, or an oil lamp covered in soot – as long as it causes discomfort, it is considered a graf shel re’i and may be removed. This is also the case in a yard if people are sitting nearby. However, if there are no people nearby, one may not remove it. If there is excrement in the street or in a yard where people walk, since it is truly repulsive, it may be removed even if no one is sitting nearby. However, if it is in a backyard that almost no one walks through, removing it is forbidden. If there is a dead animal giving off a horrible stench, then even if no one walks by it may be removed (MB 308:131; BHL 308:4 s.v. “keli”; Rema 279:2; MB ad loc. 5).
  Even though shells and pits are muktzeh, one may clear them from the table with one’s hands and throw them in the garbage. This may even be done in two steps: first piling them on the side of the table, then collecting them to deposit in the trash (some say that this is the basis for permission to sweep on Shabbat; see n. 14 below).
  One who is cracking seeds with his mouth may remove each shell from his mouth by hand and either throw it away or pile it on a plate and then dispose of it later. However, he should not keep them in his hands in order to throw them out later (SSK 20:26). Similarly, one may empty out the refuse that accumulates in a sink strainer.
  A garbage can that has garbage in it is muktzeh. However, if it is unpleasant to have a full garbage can, it may be taken out (on condition that there is an eruv). If one lives somewhere that has a dumpster (as opposed to private garbage cans), the garbage pail may be emptied into the dumpster and then brought back inside (SSK 22:48).11<i class="footnote">One may not turn something into a <em>graf shel re’i</em> in order to make it permissible to move. If he did so, however, <em>be-di’avad</em> it may be moved. For a great need or to prevent loss, one may to turn something into a <em>graf shel re’i</em> in order to be permitted to move it (SA 308:36-37). Therefore, if a roof is leaking dirty water (which is <em>muktzeh</em> as it is unusable even for washing), or if an air conditioner is dripping clean water (which is <em>muktzeh</em> as it is <em>nolad</em>, a new creation), one may not set out a bucket to collect the water. Doing so would make the bucket unusable, since one may not move an item that contains a <em>muktzeh</em> item within it. While it is true that one may remove the dirty water because it is a <em>graf shel re’i</em>, as we said, <em>le-khatḥila</em> we do not turn something into a <em>graf shel re’i  </em>to make an item disgusting for this purpose (Rambam; SA 338:8; MA <em>ad loc.</em> 12). Nevertheless, in a case of great need, in order to prevent dirtiness or damage, one may rely on those who permit placing a bucket to collect the water. Since the water is leaking in any case, and since one may dump the water out of the bucket because of <em>graf shel re’i</em>, the bucket has not become unusable. Therefore, one may pour the water out of the bucket before it fills up, in order to avoid dirtying the floor (<em>Tur</em> §338, <em>Taz</em><em>ad loc</em>. 4; <em>Ḥayei Adam</em>; BHL <em>ad loc</em>., s.v. “asur”).</i>
  
  Section 13
  
  Muktzeh / Broken Kelim and Worn-Out Clothing
  As we have seen (section 3), any item that is not suitable for Shabbat use is muktzeh maḥmat gufo. We must now clarify at what point an item is considered unusable and therefore muktzeh. As a rule, there are two factors that affect the status of such an object: its objective state, and the owner’s subjective attitude toward it. We will now explain.
  If one threw out perfectly good clothes or kelim before Shabbat, they do not become muktzeh even though he is their owner. Since his personal attitude differs from that of most people, it is disregarded by halakha. Nevertheless, if before Shabbat he threw out used clothing and kelim, they become muktzeh even if some people would use such items. Since the owner threw them out, and they are used, they become muktzeh (SA 308:12; MB ad loc. 51; Rema 308:7). But if he threw them out on Shabbat, they do not become muktzeh. Since they were not muktzeh when Shabbat began (as they were still somewhat fit for use), they do not lose their status over the course of Shabbat (MB 308:32).
  If a kli breaks on Shabbat and the broken parts are still usable, the parts are not muktzeh. The broken pieces are only muktzeh if there is no possibility of using them. Nevertheless, if there is a danger that people may be hurt by the broken pieces, one may even use his hands to clear them away. If a kli broke before Shabbat and the owner threw away the broken pieces, then even if they could be used on Shabbat, they are muktzeh (SA 308:6-7; MB ad loc. 48; SSK 20:42).
  If one part of a kli fell off (whether on Shabbat or before Shabbat) but it can be reattached, then even though it is not usable over Shabbat, it is not muktzeh. Just as one may move the kli, one may move the part that broke off, because it is still considered part of the kli. Therefore, if a beaded necklace broke, since one intends to restring the beads, they are not muktzeh (on condition that there is no concern that a knot will be tied on Shabbat to hold the necklace together). Similarly, false teeth or crowns that fall out are not muktzeh, since one intends to put them back. A button that falls off an item of clothing is not muktzeh either, since it will be replaced. Even though a new button is muktzeh since there is no use for it on Shabbat, in this case the button is not muktzeh, since it has already been part of the item of clothing.12<i class="footnote">. This is the approach of <em>Minḥat Shabbat</em> 88:2; <em>Az Nidberu</em> 7:46; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 1:12:40; and <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 19:167. SSK 15:72 and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> vol. 2, p. 394, agree, but conclude that it is good to be stringent and avoid carrying a button that fell off because there are Rishonim (Me’iri, R. Yonatan of Lunel) who maintain that the only reason that one may move the detached door of a <em>kli</em> is that it can still be used (to cover something), not that it retains its status of part of the <em>kli</em>. If so, a button that cannot be used at all on Shabbat is <em>muktzeh</em>.We should add that if there is a concern that one might end up taking the part of the <em>kli</em> that fell off on Shabbat and reattaching it in a permanent way, thus transgressing <em>Boneh</em>, the Sages forbade moving the broken part. For example, if the leg of a bench fell off, one may not move the broken bench on Shabbat in order to rest it on a different bench, because he may end up fixing it. However, if it would be difficult to fix the <em>kli</em>, or if it has already been used in its broken state before Shabbat, we are not concerned that anyone will forget and fix it on Shabbat, so one may move it, as explained in SA 313:8 and Rema 308:16; above, 15:6.</i>
  In contrast, if an item was attached to the ground and then broke on Shabbat, it is muktzeh because nobody plans to move something attached to the ground. Therefore, if a door in a house falls off on Shabbat, one may not move it (Shabbat 122b; SA 308:8-10; MB ad loc. 35).13<i class="footnote">Other similar examples include a door handle, a faucet handle, or a toilet seat that fell off. In each of these cases, the item may only be used on Shabbat if two conditions are fulfilled: first, it must be possible to replace the broken part in a clearly temporary way, so that it can still be used for its designated purpose; and second, there must be no reason to be concerned that one will reattach it properly on Shabbat. Some further details about a door handle are explained in 15:3 above. See also <em>Ḥut S</em><em>hani</em>, 2:36:4:7, 9.Another example is if the door of a cabinet or closet fell off. If the cabinet is small (its volume is less than forty se’ah, which is an ama by an ama by three amot), then if the door will eventually be reattached, it is not muktzeh (Rema 314:1; SSK 20:45 and n. 164). However, if the cabinet or closet is larger than forty se’ah, its door is considered the same as the door of a house, and it is muktzeh. Orḥot Shabbat ch. 19 n. 236 suggests that if a piece of furniture is larger than forty se’ah but is occasionally moved (like the bima on which the Torah scroll is read), when it comes to muktzeh it is considered a kli (rather than a house).</i>
  If disposable dishes have been used but could still be reused, they are not muktzeh. However, once they have been thrown into a filthy garbage can, they are muktzeh. Even if they have not been thrown away, they are muktzeh if they are so dirty that they would generally not be reused. However, if they are in a place where their filthiness disturbs people, they may be cleared away, as they are considered a graf shel re’i (as explained in section 12; SSK 20:42).
  If one dried his hands with paper towels and then put them into the paper recycling bin, they are still not muktzeh if people sometimes reuse them to wipe up spills. However, if the paper towels were deposited in a regular dirty garbage can, from which people generally would not retrieve them, they are muktzeh.
  
  Section 14
  
  Muktzeh / The Permissibility of Moving Muktzeh Indirectly or with the Body
  The main prohibition of muktzeh consists of taking a muktzeh item in one’s hand, the way it is normally moved. The more one deviates from the normal manner of taking an object, the more lenient the law becomes. There are two types of change (shinui) that can be used: min ha-tzad (indirectly, literally “from the side”) and be-gufo (using a part of the body besides the hand. One may move a muktzeh item indirectly, but only for a permitted activity. One may move a muktzeh item with his body even for the sake of the muktzeh item or a prohibited activity. We will now explain:
  Min ha-tzad is accomplished by hand, but indirectly. For example, one may pick up fruit covered in straw or dirt in a way that causes them to move. Since the muktzeh items are moved indirectly, through the permitted action of moving the fruit, and the purpose is a permitted activity – eating the fruit – there is no prohibition (Shabbat 123a; SA 311:8-9). Similarly, if one wants to study Torah from a book that has a pen lying on it (assuming the pen was forgotten there, so the book is not a basis; see section 5 above), he may pick up the book even though the pen will then fall off. Likewise, if one accidentally left coins on a pillow and he now wants to sleep on it, he may lift up the pillow so that the coins will fall off. If one accidentally left a rock on top of a barrel and now wants wine from the barrel, he may tip the barrel and cause the rock to fall off. If the barrel was packed tightly among other barrels so that it cannot be tipped over, or if tipping it would break the barrel next to it, he may lift up the barrel while the rock is on top of it and move it to where he can slide the rock off without causing damage (Shabbat 142b; SA 309:4).
  One may pick up a broom and use it to sweep up dust or leaves, which are muktzeh. This is because one is doing it indirectly, not with his hands but with a broom, for a permitted purpose – so that the place will be clean. Similarly, if one wants to use a table, he may use a knife to move away shells (that do not have the status of graf she re’i) that have been left on the table (Taz 308:18; MB ad loc. 115).14<i class="footnote">It is true that some are stringent, maintaining that since a broom is taken in order to move <em>muktzeh </em>objects, moving with a broom is considered direct, not <em>min ha-tzad</em> (SAH 308:60; <em>Ḥayei Adam</em> §67 and <em>Nishmat Adam</em> <em>ad loc.</em> 6; <em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 47:14). Nevertheless, since <em>muktzeh</em> is a rabbinic law, the lenient ruling is primary. This is the approach of SSK 22:37-38 and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> vol. 2, pp. 326-327. Besides, there are additional reasons to justify leniency in the case of sweeping – e.g., because what is being swept is considered a <em>graf shel re’i</em> or because it is insignificant. See <em>Harḥavot</em>.The Aḥaronim disagree whether one may indirectly move something <em>muktzeh</em> in order to use the <em>muktzeh </em>object itself for a permitted activity. For example, may one move a tray with a burning lamp on it in order to benefit from the lamplight (assuming that the tray also has a non-<em>muktzeh</em> item on it that is more important than the lamp, and thus the tray is not a <em>basis</em>, as we explained in section 6)? <em>Beit Meir</em> 276:3 and <em>Pri Megadim</em> (<em>Mishbetzot Zahav</em> 308:18) are lenient; it is indirect movement for a permitted activity. However, SAH 376:10 is stringent; since the primary purpose of moving the tray is to use the lamp, the activity is not permitted, as it constitutes moving <em>min ha-tzad </em>for the purpose of something forbidden. SSK ch. 20 n. 194 states that one who wishes to be lenient has an opinion on which to rely.One may move part of a muktzeh item for a permitted activity. For example, one may adjust the vents of an air conditioner or the dials on a wall clock, even though the clock is muktzeh maḥmat ḥesron kis, according to SSK 28:26, n. 55. Orḥot Shabbat ch. 19 n. 466, disagrees and prohibits doing so.</i>
  If one wants to move the muktzeh item for its own sake, to protect it, one may not move it even indirectly. For example, if money was left on a chair and one is concerned that the money will be stolen, he may not tip the chair so that the money will fall off and become hidden.
  In contrast, one may use part of his body to move the money and conceal it. For the entire prohibition of moving muktzeh on Shabbat is to do so in the normal manner, with one’s hand. The Sages did not prohibit moving muktzeh with the body. This includes moving with one’s foot, his arm, his breath, or any other limb other than the hand (SA 311:8; Rema 308:3). Therefore, if money is lying on the ground, one may move it with his foot to conceal it. Similarly, if an item is lying on the ground and is at risk of being stepped on and broken, he may use his foot to move it out of harm’s way. So, too, if a drawer has become a basis but has an item in it which one needs, he may open the drawer with part of his body and remove the necessary item. One may sit on a stone or on the wood of a construction site even though sitting down causes it to move (MB 308:82). Similarly, one may lean on a car, on condition that doing so will not set off the alarm.
  
  Section 15
  
  Muktzeh / If One Picked up Muktzeh Permissibly or Mistakenly, and the Status of a Minor
  As we have seen, one may move a kli she-melakhto le-isur for a permitted purpose (le-tzorekh gufo) or for its space (le-tzorekh mekomo). Thus, one may take a hammer to crack nuts. After use, one is not required to drop it. Rather, he may return the hammer to its proper place. If there were scissors on the table where one now wants to eat, he need not drop them as close to the table as possible, but may put them away. Since he picked them up in a permitted fashion, he may carry them to their proper place.
  Similarly, if one finished eating fruit and is left holding peels or pits that are muktzeh maḥmat gufo, he does not need to drop them. Since they reached his hand permissibly, he may take them where he wants.
  In contrast, once one has already put down a muktzeh item that he had been permitted to hold, it resumes its muktzeh status. At that point, even if it is not in its proper place, he may no longer move it (SA 308:3; MB 506:29). Similarly, if one forgot that an item is muktzeh and picked it up, he must put it down immediately (MB 308:13).
  If one is carrying a muktzeh item that he had been permitted to hold, le-khatḥila he should not shift the object from one hand to the other. This is because some maintain that moving the item to his other hand is like putting it down, in which case he may no longer move it. Be-di’avad, if he did shift the muktzeh item to his other hand, he may continue going to the place where he wants to put it down.15<i class="footnote">. Those who prohibit continuing to carry after shifting a <em>muktzeh</em> object from one hand to the other include <em>Tosefet Shabbat</em>, introduction to §308; <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Miketz 3; <em>Kaf Ha-ḥayim</em> 308:27; <em>Az Nidberu</em> 9:33; <em>Menuḥat Ahava</em> 1:13:2. Those who permit include <em>Pri Megadim</em>, <em>Mishbetzot Zahav</em> 446:2; <em>Torat Shabbat</em> 308:4; SSK ch. 20 n. 27 is inclined this way as well.According to MA 308:7, if one mistakenly picked up a <em>kli she-melakhto le-isur</em>, he may put it down wherever he wants. According to most <em>poskim</em>, though, the status of a <em>kli she-melakhto le-isur </em>is the same as that of other types of <em>muktzeh</em> – he should put it down immediately, wherever he is (<em>Bi’ur Ha-Gra</em> 266:12; MB <em>ad loc.</em> 13; SSK 22:34).</i>
  If a child is younger than the age of ḥinukh (see ch. 24), one may hold his hand and walk with him, even if he is holding something muktzeh in his other hand. As long as the adult is not carrying the child, the adult is not considered carrying the muktzeh item. However, one may not pick up a child who is holding something muktzeh. Rather, the adult should first shake the muktzeh item out of the child’s hand, and then pick him up. This shaking is permitted, because it is min ha-tzad for a permitted purpose, i.e., to pick up the child. If the child is crying hysterically and will not calm down unless someone picks him up along with the muktzeh item he is holding, one may pick him up. As we will see (24:6), the Sages permitted transgressing rabbinic enactments for the sake of a sick child, and a child who is crying hysterically is liable to become weak like a sick person. However, if the object the child is holding is valuable, one may not pick him up, because we are concerned that if the object falls, the adult will end up picking it up and carrying it (Shabbat 141b; SA 309:1).16<i class="footnote">Some say that one may not even hold the hand of a child and walk with him if the child is carrying an expensive <em>muktzeh</em> item in his other hand. Others maintain that as long as one does not carry the child, it is permitted (Ramban). Under pressing circumstances, one may be lenient (BHL 309:1).</i>
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Children / The Mitzva of Ĥinukh, Educating One’s Children
  It is a Torah commandment to teach Torah to children. Thus we read: “Teach them to your children” (Devarim 11:19). The primary objective of this teaching is to ensure that the children observe all the Torah’s instructions: “Study them and be careful to do them” (Devarim 5:1). Therefore, the Sages stated that alongside the mitzva to teach children Torah is the obligation to educate them toward mitzva observance. For how can they be taught the mitzvot without getting used to keeping them in practice? Thus, there is a Torah commandment both to teach children Torah and to accustom them to keeping the mitzvot in general. Nevertheless, the actual observance of specific mitzvot by the child is a rabbinic obligation.
  A child should be educated to keep the positive commandments from the time that he can understand what the mitzva involves, and can properly observe it. Thus, the appropriate age for each mitzva varies in accordance with its complexity and the difficulty of its observance. For example, a boy should be educated about tzitzit once he knows how to put them on, can make sure that there are two sets of strings in back and two in front, and can recite the berakha. However, since one may only put on tefilin if he is able to maintain a clean body and utter concentration, a boy should only be educated about this mitzva shortly before his bar mitzva (Sukka 42a; MB 343:3).
  The age at which we begin to educate children about mitzvot is about six or seven because that is when children start to study Torah in earnest and thus can begin to keep most mitzvot properly. This applies to berakhot and prayers as well. The age of ḥinukh is six or seven, as that is when most children can begin to do them properly. Nevertheless, we begin habituating them to recite berakhot and prayers from around the age of three, just as they start learning Torah at that age (BB 21a; Sukka 42a; SA YD 245:5).
  The same principle applies to kiddush and havdala; from the age of three we begin to encourage the children come and listen. When the child understands the idea of Shabbat and can listen properly to kiddush and havdala, we make sure that he does so. If he is not present when kiddush or havdala is made, he should recite it himself.
  
  Section 2
  
  Children / Educating Children about Negative Commandments
  It is a mitzva to train children to avoid prohibited activities from the time they begin to understand that certain things are permitted and certain things are prohibited. In other words, it is not enough that a child understands that he must stop what he is doing when he is told “no”; rather, he must understand that what he is doing is never allowed. Most children begin to understand this at approximately age three. From then on, if one sees his child engaged in a prohibited activity, such as eating non-kosher food or turning on a light on Shabbat, one must stop him from doing so (MB 343:3). Once the child reaches the age of ḥinukh – when we start teaching him Torah at about age six or seven – one should begin to explain more about the principles behind the prohibitions, so that he will know how to observe them properly.
  There is no mitzva to teach one’s child who is younger than three to avoid prohibitions. Therefore, if such a child finds prohibited food and wants to eat it, or if he wants to turn a light on or off on Shabbat, one does not need to stop him from doing so. Similarly, if one’s small child is a kohen, and he goes to a place of ritual impurity (such as a cemetery), one does not need to stop him, since he does not understand the prohibition.
  All of this refers to situations in which the small child is acting autonomously. In contrast, if an adult causes a child, even a day-old baby, to do something prohibited, the adult violates a Torah prohibition, for the Torah commands us not to cause a child to violate prohibitions. Thus one may not feed a child blood or insects or bring a young kohen into contact with ritual impurity (Yevamot 114a; MB 343:4). An adult may not even feed a child rabbinically prohibited food (SA 343:1).
  However, it is not prohibited to give a small child an item that he might use in an impermissible fashion. For example, one may give paper to a small child on Shabbat even though it is likely that he will tear it and destroy letters that are written upon it, as giving him paper is not considered the same as instructing him to tear paper. However, one who puts non-kosher food into a small child’s hand, though, is considered feeding him, as this is the normal way to feed a child (MA; MB 340:14).
  On Shabbat, there is an additional prohibition, for we are commanded not to have children undertake melakha on our behalf: “But the seventh day is a Shabbat of the Lord your God; you shall not do any melakha – you, your son or daughter” (Shemot 20:10). This means that if a child turns on a light because he thinks this is what his parents want, and his parents know and do not object, then in addition to neglecting the rabbinic mitzva of ḥinukh, they are also transgressing a Torah prohibition by having their child do melakha for them. If a child turns on the light for another Jew (other than a parent), who sees him doing so and does not object, that Jew transgresses rabbinically (SHT 334:54).
  Even though we have seen that one may not feed a minor forbidden food, if a child is hungry or thirsty before kiddush or havdala or during a fast, then even after he has reached the age of ḥinukh, the adult may give him food and drink. It is only forbidden to feed a child food that is intrinsically non-kosher. If the food is kosher but rendered unfit by the time, a child who is hungry or thirsty may be fed (MB 269:1; above 6:9).
  
  Section 3
  
  Children / Who Is Obligated to Educate and Object?
  According to some, the obligation of ḥinukh devolves equally upon the father and mother (Terumat Ha-deshen). However, most poskim maintain that only the father is obligated to train children to do mitzvot, that is, objecting when they transgress negative commandments and requiring them to perform positive commandments. This is an extension of the obligation to teach them Torah, which also devolves upon the father. Despite this, it is clear that the mother has a general mitzva to educate her children about Torah and mitzvot; the general commandment to love one’s fellow and the demand for truth obligate every mother to educate her children to cling to the holy Torah and observe its commandments. What is incumbent upon the father alone is the responsibility to meticulously educate about Torah and mitzvot (Ri; Maharam; Hagahot Maimoniyot). If no father is present, whether due to death or absence, then the mother is obligated to teach her children meticulously about the Torah and mitzva observance (Eliya Rabba 640:4; Kaf Ha-ḥayim 343:9).
  Thus, if a child who has reached the age of ḥinukh (about six or seven) is involved in a game and does not want to come to hear kiddush or havdala or recite Birkat Ha-mazon, the father must insist, so as to educate him properly. However, the mother may occasionally ignore such breaches in order to maintain a pleasant atmosphere in the home. If the father has passed away or is absent, the mother must take his place and insist that her children become habituated to keeping the mitzvot.1<i class="footnote">All agree that a mother must educate her children about Torah and <em>mitzvot</em>. Part of the mitzva of “Love your fellow as yourself (<em>Ve-ahavta le-re’akha kamokha</em>)” (Vayikra 19:18) is enabling one’s child to benefit from engaging in Torah and <em>mitzvot</em>. The mother is also obligated on account of “Reprove your friend (<em>Hokhe’aḥ tokhi’aḥ et amitekha</em>)” (<em>ibid</em>. v. 17). Elaborating on this, the Sages tell us: “If one is able to object to the members of his household sinning but does not do so, he is held responsible for their sin” (<em>Shabbat</em> 54b). Nevertheless, the Torah tasked the father with the specific obligation to teach children Torah. If he does not wish to do so, the rabbinic courts can force him to pay for the education of his sons (SA YD 245:4). If he has no money to do so, he must sell his clothing or seek charity. The mother has no such obligation. Since the father is obligated to teach the children Torah, he is also obligated to make sure that they observe the <em>mitzvot</em> with precision. Thus, the father has a more demanding role – educating toward exacting mitzva observance – while the mother has a more general job – establishing a positive relationship between the children and Torah and <em>mitzvot</em>. This is the meaning of the verse: “My son, heed the discipline of your father, and do not forsake the instruction of your mother” (Mishlei 1:8). The Vilna Gaon (on Mishlei 20:20) writes similarly: “The son is taught Torah by his father. His mother guides him to do <em>mitzvot</em> and walk a straight path” (see <em>Berakhot</em> 17a). However, if the father is not present, the mother must take his place, dealing with <em>ḥinukh</em> in order to fulfill <em>Ve-ahavta le-re’akha kamokha</em><em>tzedaka</em>, and <em>Hokhe’aḥ tokhi’aḥ et amitekha</em>. (See <em>Eliya Rabba</em> 640:4; <em>Kaf ha-ḥayim</em> 343:9.) In some families, it is easier for the mother to be the demanding parent, while it is more difficult for the father. In such cases, it is a mitzva for the mother to take over the role of educating toward exacting mitzva observance.</i>
  When parents neglect to educate their children and do not stop them from violating Torah law, the local beit din or public representatives who are responsible for local education must admonish the father. However, if the parents are negligent in educating their children about rabbinic obligations, there is no need to admonish the father.
  The poskim disagree regarding what an adult must do if he sees someone else’s child of educable age (six or seven) desecrate Shabbat or eat forbidden foods. Some maintain that the obligation to educate children is the sole responsibility of the father, and nobody else is obligated to prevent them from sinning (Rambam; SA 343:1). Others maintain that all Jews are obligated to prevent children of educable age from transgressing (Tosafot; Rosh; Rema). Practically speaking, several Aḥaronim rule that if an adult sees any child transgressing a Torah prohibition – such as turning on a light or washing his clothes on Shabbat, or eating foods prohibited by Torah law – he must stop him. However, if one sees a child transgressing a rabbinic prohibition – such as eating chicken with milk, or playing with muktzeh items on Shabbat – he does not need to stop him (Ḥayei Adam; MB 343:7). It would seem that if a minor repeatedly transgresses the same prohibition, even if it is rabbinic, it is proper to inform his parents.
  If a minor is in danger of harming someone or damaging property, one must stop him in order to prevent the harm or damage. This law is derived from the mitzva to return a lost object to its owner: “If you see your fellow’s ox or sheep gone astray, do not ignore it…restore it to him” (Devarim 22:2). If there is a mitzva to return another’s lost item, there is certainly a mitzva to prevent damage to his property. Similarly, we are told: “Do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor” (Vayikra 19:16). According to the Sages, the mitzva of saving someone’s property is included in this mitzva (Sifra).
  We must stress that the mitzva of ḥinukh must be done in such a way that the child will be receptive. Therefore, one should not force a child to begin keeping all the mitzvot and saying all the prayers properly at the age of six or seven. A child’s early years are meant to allow him to get used to praying and keeping mitzvot. This way, by the time children reach halakhic maturity at the age of bar or bat mitzva, they will be capable of keeping all the mitzvot properly.
  
  Section 4
  
  Children / The Prohibition for a Child to Turn Lights On and Off
  If the lights went off in a home, and a child understands that his parents would be pleased if he would turn them back on, the parents must tell him not to do so. As we have already learned, parents have an obligation to educate their children to keep the mitzvot, and this includes preventing them from transgressing prohibitions. Even if a child is not yet three years old, which is generally the age at which we begin teaching children to avoid prohibited activities, the law is more stringent for Shabbat. As long as the child understands that turning on the lights would be helpful to his parents, it is as if he is doing it for them, and they must prevent him from doing it, based on the verse we cited above: “But the seventh day is a Shabbat of the Lord your God; you shall not do any melakha – you, your son or daughter” (Shemot 20:10). This means that we are commanded to make sure that children do not perform melakha on our behalf. Even if the lights went off in a neighbor’s home and one’s child goes over to turn on the lights for them, the neighbor must not allow him to do melakha for them.
  Similarly, if a fire breaks out on Shabbat and a child attempts to put it out, whether at his parents’ home or at someone else’s house, he must be stopped from extinguishing it. Since the child understands that the adults want the fire to be extinguished, he is essentially doing the melakha for them, and thus they are obligated to tell him not to do so (Shabbat 121a; SA 334:25; MB ad loc. 66). Certainly, then, one may not tell a child explicitly to turn on a light or extinguish a fire; as we already learned, an adult may not cause a child to do anything prohibited (Yevamot 114a).2<i class="footnote">If an adult tells a child to do a <em>melakha</em> on Shabbat or to violate any other Torah prohibition, the adult violates Torah law, since the Torah forbids causing a child to sin. If the adult tells the child to transgress on the rabbinic level, the adult is transgressing rabbinically (<em>Yevamot</em> 114a; SA 343:1). There is an additional stringency that applies to Shabbat. If a child is about to engage in a prohibited activity on Shabbat in order to help an adult, then even if the adult did not ask the child to do so, the adult must object. If he does not, he is transgressing. If the adult is the child’s father, he is violating Torah law; otherwise, he is transgressing rabbinically (SHT 334:54). Therefore, when it is permissible to ask a child to perform a rabbinic prohibition, it is preferable to avoid asking one’s own child, as will be explained in the next note.</i>
  Of course, if a child mistakenly turned off a light, it is important that no one yell at him in a way that will cause him to try to “correct” his mistake by turning the light back on. Even if no one yelled at him, but he simply wants to correct his mistake and turn it back on, he must be told not to do so.
  If a child mistakenly performed a melakha on Shabbat (such as turning on the light), others may not benefit from it if he did it for the sake of an adult, but if he did it for his own sake, others may benefit from the light (BHL 325:10, s.v. “eino yehudi”).
  
  Section 5
  
  Children / Permissive Rulings under Pressing Circumstances
  Sometimes, under pressing circumstances, one may tell a minor to transgress a rabbinic prohibition, but one may never tell a minor to violate Torah law. First, as we saw regarding ḥinukh in general, the Torah forbids causing a child to transgress. Second, as noted, there is an explicit injunction against children doing melakha on Shabbat: “But the seventh day is a Shabbat of the Lord your God; you shall not do any melakha – you, your son or daughter” (Shemot 20:10). We will now explain when one may ask a minor to transgress a rabbinic injunction.
  According to Rashba and Ran, one may tell a child to transgress a rabbinic prohibition if it is for his own sake. Even though this is forbidden according to most Rishonim (Rambam; Tosafot; SA 343:1), under pressing circumstances we rely on those who are permissive (R. Akiva Eger; BHL 343:1, s.v. “mi-divrei”). Therefore, if the light in a child’s room was accidentally left on or turned on, and he finds it difficult to sleep, one may tell him to turn off the light, as this action is rabbinically prohibited. It is preferable that a child under the age of six do it. If the child is older than six, it is preferable that he turn it off with a shinui.
  Under pressing circumstances, one may tell a child to transgress a rabbinic prohibition, even if he does not stand to gain from the transgression personally. As we have seen (9:11), the Sages permitted transgressing a shvut di-shvut for the sake of a mitzva or under pressing circumstances. The entire obligation of a child to keep Shabbat is rabbinic, so if he transgresses a rabbinic prohibition, it is by definition a shvut di-shvut. As long as one is lenient in this respect only occasionally, there is no concern that the child will become accustomed to belittle Shabbat (Mordechai; Taz 346:6; SAH 343:6; Livyat Ḥen §124).3<i class="footnote">In cases where it is permissible to ask a child to perform a rabbinically prohibited <em>melakha</em>, it is preferable that the act not be done by the child of the person who needs it done. As we saw in the previous note, there is a Torah commandment not to have <em>melakha</em> performed by one’s children, so even though for the child the prohibition is a <em>shvut di-shvut</em>, for the parent there is only one <em>shvut</em> involved. If one of the parents needs to ask the child to perform a <em>melakha</em>, it is somewhat preferable that the mother ask rather than the father, since the primary responsibility for <em>ḥinukh</em> is the father’s. See <em>Pri Megadim</em> cited in BHL 266:5.</i>
  If the light went out on Shabbat in a place where it is needed, a baby who is not old enough to understand that his parents want him to turn on the light (about a year old) and who will play with a switch without understanding whether he is doing something helpful or harmful may be held in front of the switch with the hope that he will play with it and turn it on and removed from there as soon as he turns it on. Since he does not understand the implications of flipping the switch on and off, his action is not significant for the purposes of transgression. Rather, he is considered mitasek (performing a melakha obliviously; see below, 26:3) (Rashba, Yevamot 114a; Orḥot Shabbat 24:7-8).
  
  Section 6
  
  Children / A Child Is Comparable to a Sick Person
  The Sages forbade a Jew to ask a non-Jew to do melakha for him on Shabbat. In contrast, if a child needs something very badly, his status is akin to that of one who is ill, for whom one may ask a non-Jew to do melakha. For example, if a child has no food and is hungry, one may ask a non-Jew to cook for him. If he desperately needs light, one may ask a non-Jew to turn on a light for him (Rema 276:1; MB ad loc. 6; see below 28:2). In general there is greater need to be lenient on behalf of babies, but one may be lenient even with very needy older children just as he would be lenient with a sick person.4<i class="footnote">Some maintain that the comparison of children to the sick applies only until the age of two or three (<em>Melamed Le-ho’il</em> citing <em>Sha’agat Aryeh</em><em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 59:3). Others maintain that it extends until age six (<em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 8:15:12:7, based on <em>Mor U-ketzi’a</em>). Still others say age nine or ten (SSK 37:2), while the most lenient say it extends until the age of bar or bat mitzva (<em>Or Le-Tziyon </em>2:36:4). It would seem that everything depends on the specific details of the situation. Thus MB 276:6 states that if a child is “very needy,” he has the status of a sick person. The younger the child is, the needier he is. A similar point is made by <em>Nishmat Avraham</em> 328:57 and <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> ch. 20 n. 162.</i>
  A child who is not feeling well may take medicine even if the pain is mild. Just as the enactment prohibiting the use of medication on Shabbat does not apply to a sick person, so too it does not apply to a child. Thus, if necessary, one may put cream on a baby’s skin, on condition that one does not spread it. Rather, one should simply place the cream on the skin. If the baby’s diaper then causes the cream to spread, one does not violate any prohibition, since the cream was not applied in order to smooth the skin (see 14:5 above and 28:8 below).
  
  Section 7
  
  Children / Permitted and Prohibited Games on Shabbat
  It is a mitzva to educate children to study a great deal of Torah on Shabbat. It is thus proper to teach them to minimize game playing so that they will not get used to wasting the precious and holy time of Shabbat on mundane activities. The closer they get to the age of bar or bat mitzva, the more they should be encouraged to study Torah more and play games less. It is good for the parents themselves to learn with their children, thus fulfilling the mitzva of “Teach them to your children” (Devarim 11:19). It is proper for each community to offer many Torah classes for children on Shabbat.
  Nevertheless, children may play on Shabbat. Therefore, the laws detailed in the following paragraphs apply to all children who are under bar or bat mitzva age. However, for adults the laws are different. First of all, le-khatḥila it is preferable to follow the opinion that adults may not play any games on Shabbat (22:13 above). Second, even according to those who allow adults to play games on Shabbat, some games are problematic. For children, who are obligated to keep Shabbat only as training for adulthood, we are lenient; for adults, who are required to keep Shabbat by Torah law, we are stringent. Below we will explain the laws for minors. When adults need to be stringent even according to the lenient position that allows them to play games, we will say so explicitly.
  One may play checkers, chess, and memory games on Shabbat. One may also play with dice and spinning tops. However, one may not play any game in which the winner is awarded money or food. It is also forbidden to play games that normally involve writing (SA 338:5, 322:6; Ḥayei Adam 38:11). Some maintain that it is preferable not to play Monopoly or other games in which people win money and property, even though it is not real money. Children who wish to be lenient about this may (SSK 16:33), but adults should be stringent.
  All games that involve writing, pasting, cutting, or weaving are forbidden on Shabbat. However, minors may put together a jigsaw puzzle or form words by joining letters on a board. Even though adults must be stringent in these two cases, children may rely on those who are lenient. According to this opinion, there is no violation of Kotev since all the writing was already there, and the letters and puzzle pieces are simply being moved together temporarily (18:4 above).
  One may not build model planes or boats out of plastic parts if they require a great deal of precision and are meant to last for a long time.
  Children may play with interlocking blocks, build with them, and take apart what they have built. Children may also make paper planes or boats. However, it is proper for adults to be stringent. (See above 15:7 and Harḥavot.)
  The Sages forbade making a temporary tent on Shabbat, but this is permissible if it is erected in a different order from usual. Therefore, children may not drape a blanket over chairs in order to create a tent to play in. However, this is permissible if they hold the blanket horizontally in the air, and afterward place chairs underneath. It is also forbidden to use interlocking blocks to build a house or garage whose inside area is a square tefaḥ or more, but if they start by holding the roof up and then attach the walls from underneath, it is permitted (above 15:5).
  One may use a kit to make jewelry that is not made to last, on condition that the end of the thread is not tied with a regular knot but rather with a bow knot (SSK 16:22).
  One may not sort playing pieces or cards of two games that got mixed up together, as it constitutes Borer. However, if people want to play one of the games, they may remove the pieces they need from the mix. This sorting is not considered derekh melakha but rather derekh misḥak (the normal way to play), because one normally begins such a game by taking out its pieces (above 11:16).
  One may not make shapes out of Play-Doh or modeling clay, as it constitutes Memare’aḥ (SA 314:11). If one makes shapes that have meaning, it also constitutes Kotev (Ḥayei Adam, Yom Tov, 92:3). Therefore, Play-Doh and modeling clay are muktzeh.
  
  Section 8
  
  Children / Additional Games and Playing in the Yard
  One may compress a spring on a toy car so that the car will move forward, as long as the car does not make noise and no lights light up. One may not play with any battery-operated toy (17:2 above).
  One may not blow up a balloon because a knot is usually tied at the end. However, if the balloon is sealed with a valve instead of a knot, and it has previously been inflated, it may be inflated on Shabbat (above 15:8).
  Children may not play with toy musical instruments such as trumpets, pianos, guitars, bells, and noisemakers on Shabbat. Such toys are muktzeh. However, one may give a baby a toy that makes noise when it is shaken or a button is pushed. However, the adult himself may not cause the toy to make noise (MB 338:1; BHL s.v. “aval”; SSK 16:2-3 and n. 10; Harḥavot).
  Sand is muktzeh unless it was set aside before Shabbat for children to play with (23:3 above). In that case, they may play with the sand as long as it is fine and dry enough that it cannot be used to fashion shapes. However, if the sand is wet enough that one can scoop out holes or fill them up, one may not play with it on account of the melakha of Boneh. One may not make sand wet, because of the melakha of Lash (15:2 above).
  One may not play with marbles on the ground, because one may level the ground to make sure that the marbles roll smoothly. Similarly, one may not play any game on the ground that requires that the ground be flat, because one may end up leveling it. Even if the ground is paved, one may not play there, as there is a concern that one might then end up playing on unpaved ground. However, one may play on the floor inside; since all homes today have flooring, we are not worried that playing there will lead anyone to play outside on unpaved ground (15:2 above).
  It is permissible to play with apricot pits, which children commonly play with; since they are set aside for this purpose by the children, they are not muktzeh like other pits. Even pits removed from apricots on Shabbat are not muktzeh, since many children play with them (see SSK ch. 16 n. 33).
  One may swing on a swing, but if it hangs from a tree, even if only on one side, it is prohibited. If the swing hangs from a peg that was driven into the tree, it is permitted (19:7 above).
  
  Section 9
  
  Children / Ball Games and Running
  Children may not play soccer, football, baseball, or basketball on Shabbat. Since adults make a big deal out of these games and they have intricate rules and procedures, they are prohibited, as they are considered a prohibited weekday activity. Besides, sometimes these games involve additional prohibited activities, such as preparing the field for a game, driving to the field, registering for the game, and buying and selling tickets or team merchandise. It is also prohibited to watch a soccer or basketball game on Shabbat, because this is a weekday activity. It is even prohibited to play with the balls associated with these sports at home or in a yard, because they are muktzeh and because it is a weekday activity. For the same reasons, all of the above applies to tennis as well.5<i class="footnote">Some prohibit playing soccer and basketball on Shabbat out of concern that people will end up leveling the ground, similar to what appears in SA 338:5 and MB 308:155. Others forbid these games out of concern that the players will end up fixing the ball or inflating it (<em>Ketzot Ha-shulḥan</em>). In any case, the rabbinic consensus is that one may not play soccer or basketball on Shabbat. It would seem that the primary reason is that it is a weekday activity (which is also the reason behind the prohibition to ride bicycles). This prohibition should not be taken lightly, as it is rooted in the Torah. Any activity that is burdensome and taxing serves to destroy the peace and rest of Shabbat, and is prohibited by Torah law (Ramban on Vayikra 23:24). The book of Yeshayahu elaborates upon this: “If you refrain from trampling the Shabbat, from pursuing your affairs on My holy day; if you call Shabbat ‘delight,’ the Lord’s holy [day] ‘honored’; and if you honor it, and not go in your own way, nor look to your affairs, nor speak of them” (Yeshayahu 58:13). The Sages elaborated further: “‘Not go in your own way’ – the way you walk on Shabbat should not be like the way you walk on weekdays…. ‘Nor speak of them’ – your speech on Shabbat should not be like your speech on weekdays. Speaking [about mundane matters] is forbidden, but thinking about them is permitted” (<em>Shabbat</em> 113a). Since soccer games and basketball games involve a big production, have intricate rules and regulations, and are taken very seriously by many people (some even make their living playing these sports), they are the ultimate weekday activity. The leniency for children to run for enjoyment is limited to running around freely, not in the organized framework of a sport or exercise. Rav Kook presents this approach in <em>Oraḥ Mishpat</em> §152.</i>
  Children may play and run around for their enjoyment but may not participate in exercise classes (see above 22:8).
  Children may play with balls designed for young children, on condition that they play indoors or in a paved yard. However, they may not play on grass or on a dirt yard, out of concern that they will level the ground. They may play table tennis for fun, since that is generally played indoors. There is no need to worry that by allowing children to play with balls at a young age, they will get used to it and will continue doing so as adults, since the permission is limited to balls designed for children, which in any case adults do not play with.
  One may not recover a ball from a tree using one’s hand or a stick, as it might lead to breaking a branch. If the ball fell out on its own, one may play with it (19:7 above; SSK 16:8).
  
  Section 10
  
  Children / Bicycles, Scooters, and Skates
  One may not ride a regular two-wheeler bicycle, because this is a weekday activity (22:8 above). Even if a bicycle has training wheels, one may not ride it. However, small children may ride tricycles, because tricycles are only used by small children, and there is a significant difference between tricycles and bicycles. Therefore, riding them is not considered a weekday activity (above, 22:8 and n. 4).
  Some allow children to ride scooters and wear skates on Shabbat. According to them, just as children may run on Shabbat, they may use scooters and skates. Opposing them are those who feel that while children may run on Shabbat, that permission is limited to unassisted movement. In contrast, using equipment that makes one move faster and more effectively is considered a weekday activity.
  Even though those who are lenient here have an opinion on which to rely be-di’avad, it is proper to be stringent, since the stringent opinion seems more compelling. Just as the widespread practice is to refrain from riding bicycles because this is a weekday activity that clashes with the spirit of Shabbat, it is similarly inappropriate to use scooters or skates on Shabbat. Additionally, by our limiting small children to simpler games, older children will learn to dedicate Shabbat to Torah and to rest.
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Melakha Performed by a Non-Jew / Asking a Non-Jew to Do Melakha on Shabbat
  Shabbat belongs to Jews alone, as the Torah states: “For it is a sign between Me and you throughout the ages, that you may know that I the Lord have consecrated you” (Shemot 31:13). In addition, the Sages go so far as to say that “A non-Jew who observes Shabbat is liable for the death penalty” (San. 58b). In other words, if a non-Jew were to invent his own religion and establish a “Shabbat” for himself, during which he would refrain from engaging in melakha and in developing the world, he would be liable for death at the hands of heaven (see Rashi ad loc. and MT, Laws of Kings 10:9).
  Although a non-Jew may do melakha on Shabbat, the Sages forbade a Jew to ask a non-Jew to do melakha for him on Shabbat. This includes even rabbinically prohibited activities. The Sages found support for this from the wording of the verse: “No melakha shall be done on them” (Shemot 12:16). The verse does not use the active “Do not do melakha,” but rather the passive “No melakha shall be done.” Thus we see that it is proper that no melakha is done for a Jew on Shabbat or Yom Tov. As the Midrash elaborates: “‘No melakha shall be done’ – neither by you, nor by your friend, nor by a non-Jew” (Mekhilta ad loc.).1<i class="footnote">. <em>Smag</em>, <em>Lo Ta’aseh</em> §75, indicates that this <em>Mekhilta</em> means that the prohibition of asking a non-Jew to do <em>melakha</em> is a Torah law. <em>Beit Yosef</em> §244 quotes this. However, the overwhelming majority of <em>poskim</em> maintain that the prohibition is rabbinic, and the verse is not the law’s source but merely a support for it. This is stated by Rambam (MT 6:1); Ramban, Shemot 12:16; SAH 243:1; and SHT 243:7. There are two reasons presented for this prohibition. Rashi (<em>Shabbat </em>153a) writes that if one requests that a non-Jew perform <em>melakha</em> for him, it is as if the non-Jew is acting as the Jew’s proxy. Alternatively, Rambam suggests that if one asks a non-Jew to do <em>melakha</em> for him, he will take Shabbat less seriously and thus may come to do <em>melakha</em> himself (MT 6:1). Either way, the rabbinic prohibition is an extension of the Torah’s command that servants rest on Shabbat, as explained above in 9:10.One may not even ask a non-Jew on Shabbat to do <em>melakha</em> for a Jew after Shabbat (MB 307:9) or ask him before Shabbat to do <em>melakha</em> for a Jew on Shabbat. However, one may hint to a non-Jew to do <em>melakha</em> in the future. For example, one may say: “Why didn’t you turn off the extra light in my house last Shabbat?” The non-Jew will realize that the Jew would like him to turn out the light the next Shabbat (SA 307:2).</i>
  If the melakha will be done with a Jew’s property, one may not ask a non-Jew to do a melakha even for the non-Jew’s benefit. For example, one may not tell a visiting non-Jew: “Turn on the light for yourself.” Similarly, one may not say to a non-Jew: “Cook my food for yourself.” However, if the meat belongs to the non-Jew, one may tell him to cook it for himself. Since the non-Jew is performing the melakha with his own possessions for his own benefit, the Sages did not forbid such speech (SA 307:21; MB ad loc. 73).
  The Sages decreed that a Jew may not benefit from a melakha performed by a non-Jew for the Jew’s benefit. For example, if the lights in one’s home went out, and a non-Jewish neighbor came and turned the lights on, neither the Jews living in that home nor any other Jews may benefit from these lights, since they were turned on for a Jew on Shabbat (SA 276:1). If the melakha undertaken by the non-Jew is time-consuming, a Jew may not benefit from it immediately after Shabbat either. Rather, he must wait until enough time has passed so that the melakha could have been done after Shabbat. For example, if a non-Jew picked fruit or fished for a Jew on Shabbat, the fruit or fish may not be eaten after Shabbat until enough time has passed that they could have been picked or caught then (SA 325:5-6).2<i class="footnote">The prohibition on benefiting from <em>melakha</em> done by a non-Jew on Shabbat is explained in <em>Shabbat</em> 122a, while the need to wait after Shabbat is explained in <em>Beitza</em> 24b. According to Rashi and Ran, the reason for the first prohibition is so that one will not benefit from <em>melakha </em>done on Shabbat; while according to <em>Tosafot</em> and Ramban, it is so that a Jew will not desecrate Shabbat by asking a non-Jew to do <em>melakha</em> for him (MB 325:29). If the <em>melakha</em> is undertaken publicly so that everyone knows that it was done for a particular Jew, that Jew may never benefit from it (SA 325:14; MB <em>ad loc.</em> 73).</i>
  If the melakha performed by the non-Jew for the Jew is only prohibited rabbinically, then only the Jew for whom the melakha was performed may not benefit from it on Shabbat. Other Jews may benefit from the melakha even on Shabbat. Once Shabbat is over and enough time has passed so that the melakha could have been done after Shabbat, even the Jew for whom the melakha was performed may benefit from it (SA 325:8; MB ad loc. 41).
  
  Section 2
  
  Melakha Performed by a Non-Jew / Benefiting from a Melakha That a Non-Jew Performed for Himself
  The prohibition on benefiting from a melakha done by a non-Jew on Shabbat is limited to a case where the non-Jew undertook the melakha for the benefit of a Jew. However, if he did the melakha for himself or for another non-Jew, then a Jew may benefit from it. For example, if a non-Jew turned on a light because he wanted to read a book, a Jew may benefit from this light (SA 276:2). Moreover, even if the non-Jew intended to turn on the light for both himself and a Jew, the Jew may benefit from it since in any case the non-Jew needed to turn on the light for himself (Ḥayei Adam; AHS 276:8; BHL 276:2 s.v. “ve-im” is inclined this way as well, in contrast to MA).
  Therefore, if the lights went out in a Jew’s home, he may not ask a non-Jewish neighbor to turn on the light, but he may arrange things so that the non-Jew will turn on the light for himself, after which the Jew may benefit from the light. For example, he can invite the non-Jew to come over and eat something. When the non-Jew arrives and sees that the house is dark, he will realize that he should turn on the light. Since the non-Jew is turning the light on for himself, so that he can see the food that is being served, the Jew may benefit from the light as well (AHS 276:9).
  Similarly, if a Jew has non-Jewish household help, one may send him to wash dishes in the kitchen even if it is dark there. Upon entering the kitchen, the non-Jew will turn on the light for himself, after which the Jew may benefit from the light. The Jew may even request that the non-Jew leave the light on after finishing his work (MB 276:27; SSK 30:57). However, if a Jew needs to walk somewhere in the dark, he may not ask his non-Jewish domestic worker to come along so that he will turn on a flashlight for himself. In this case, it is clear that the non-Jew is actually doing the melakha for the Jew (SA 276:3).
  If a non-Jew heated water for himself on Shabbat and some extra water remained, a Jew may not use it, since the non-Jew may have heated the extra water with him in mind. Even if this was not the case, if the non-Jew sees the Jew using the remaining water, he may decide to add extra water for the Jew on future occasions. However, if the non-Jew does not know the Jew, then the Jew may use the extra water, because there is no concern that the non-Jew added the water for him or will add water for him in the future (SA 325:11; MB ad loc. 66). If a non-Jew picked fruit, caught fish, or milked cows on Shabbat for his own use, a Jew may not eat or drink the products on Shabbat, even if the non-Jew is a stranger. Since these food items were not edible when Shabbat began, they are muktzeh (SA 325:5).3<i class="footnote">However, after Shabbat a Jew may benefit from these products immediately, since the non-Jew picked, caught, or milked them for his own use (SA 325:5). According to some, a Jew may not benefit from bread that was baked by a non-Jew on Shabbat, for two reasons. First, it is <em>muktzeh</em>. Second, there is a concern that the Jew will end up requesting that the non-Jew bake for him on Shabbat in the future. Others permit benefiting from the bread, maintaining that since a non-Jew may bake on Shabbat, the bread is not <em>muktzeh</em>. One may rely upon this opinion under pressing circumstances or for the sake of a mitzva (SA 325:4).In 17:9 above, we explain that if one forgot to remove the light bulb in the refrigerator, he may suggest to a non-Jew to take some food for himself from the refrigerator. Even though the light will turn on when the non-Jew opens the refrigerator, the request is permitted because he is not telling the non-Jew explicitly to perform a <em>melakha</em>. Afterward, one may ask the non-Jew to remove the light bulb. Since turning off a light is only rabbinically prohibited, removing the bulb is a <em>shvut di-shvut</em> for the sake of a mitzva, as explained below in section 5.</i>
  
  Section 3
  
  Melakha Performed by a Non-Jew / Making Use of a Melakha Performed on Shabbat for a Jew
  If a Jewish home was dimly lit – enough to allow the household members to eat, clean up, and wash the dishes, but not enough to allow them to read – and a non-Jew came and turned on an additional light for them, a Jew may use its light to eat, clean up, and wash the dishes, but not read. They may only do what they could have done without the additional light, but activities that were impossible to do without the additional light may not be done (SA 276:4; MB ad loc. 32).
  If a non-Jew turned off a light to help a Jew sleep, the Jew may sleep in that room. Even though the non-Jew turned off the light on his behalf, and had he not done so the Jew would not have been able to sleep, the Jew is not benefiting from anything substantive created by the non-Jew’s melakha but from the absence of light.
  Even though a Jew may benefit in the above situations from the light or darkness that a non-Jew contributed to a room, a Jew may not ask a non-Jew to turn the lights on or off. However, he may hint at such a request. He must be careful with his formulation, though. It may not include anything that might be taken as a command. For example, if there is not enough light, one may not say to a non-Jew: “Do me a favor – there is not enough light in the room.” Pointing to the light is also forbidden, because this is considered a hint that resembles a command (Ḥayei Adam 62:2). Similarly, if the light is on and is keeping one from sleeping, he may not say to a non-Jew: “Do what needs to be done” or “Do me a favor – I cannot sleep here,” nor may he point to the light.
  In contrast, one may hint by way of description. Thus if one needs more light, he may say to a non-Jew: “It is difficult for me to clean the house or to read when the light is so dim,” or “The house is not well lit because only one light is on.” These descriptions do not comprise a request that the non-Jew act; he is simply reporting the facts. The non-Jew then decides on his own to help the Jew by turning on an additional light. Similarly, if light is keeping a Jew from sleeping, he may say: “It is hard for me to sleep with the light on.” The non-Jew will then figure out on his own that if he wants to help the Jew, he should turn off the light.
  If no toilet paper was cut before Shabbat, this also may be reported to a non-Jew in descriptive form: “I have no toilet paper.” The non-Jew will then cut toilet paper for him. This is not considered benefiting from a melakha that a non-Jew performed, because it is possible in a pinch to use toilet paper even when it has not been cut. However, he may not formulate his statement as a command, such as “Do me a favor – I have no toilet paper.” Similarly, if the oven was left on accidentally, one may say to a non-Jew: “What a shame that so much electricity is being wasted.” The non-Jew will understand the hint on his own and turn it off. However, one may not include a command in the hint, such as: “Whoever turns it off will not lose [i.e., will be rewarded].”4<i class="footnote">. In a case where there is a possibility of major financial loss, such as a fire, the Sages permitted saying to a non-Jew: “Whoever puts it out will not lose” (SA 334:26). This is because in such a case, it would likely be ineffective to say: “Too bad about the house,” because the non-Jew cannot be expected to expend effort to put out the fire if he does not expect to be rewarded. If the Jew hints that a reward is involved, this will motivate the non-Jew to expend major effort to help the Jew. Therefore, the Sages permitted hinting that the non-Jew will profit, even though this is the type of hint that is generally not permitted because it encourages the non-Jew to take action and is thus considered a kind of command.</i>
  In short, one may benefit from the actions of a non-Jew on Shabbat as long as he is careful to avoid two rabbinic prohibitions. First, he may not tell the non-Jew to perform a melakha, but must hint at it by reporting the facts. Second, one may not benefit from melakha performed by a non-Jew if it makes it possible for him to do something that he could not have done otherwise. Thus one may hint one’s request to a non-Jew by means of a description, and one may benefit from light that a non-Jew added where there was already enough light to manage in a pinch. In addition, one may benefit from a non-Jew’s act of turning off a light or an oven, since this does not involve direct benefit from the melakha he performed.5<i class="footnote">If one sinned by explicitly asking a non-Jew to turn on a light in a room where there was already some light, then even though the Jew has transgressed, since there was some light was there prior to his request, a Jew may benefit from the additional light (MB 276:20).</i>
  All the methods presented here are permitted le-khatḥila. When none of these methods are sufficient, then for a great need or for the sake of a mitzva, the Sages permitted asking a non-Jew to perform a rabbinically forbidden melakha. Sometimes one may even ask him to perform a melakha that is prohibited by Torah law, as will be explained in the upcoming sections.
  
  Section 4
  
  Melakha Performed by a Non-Jew / For the Sake of a Mitzva or for a Great Need
  The Sages permitted asking a non-Jew to do a rabbinically forbidden melakha in cases of great need, such as to prevent suffering or loss, or for the sake of a mitzva. Such cases are a shvut di-shvut, a combination of two rabbinic prohibitions: the action itself is prohibited rabbinically, and the entire prohibition of asking a non-Jew to perform melakha on Shabbat is rabbinic. In contrast, one may not ask a non-Jew to perform a melakha that is prohibited by Torah law, even for the sake of a mitzva. One may do so only for the sake of settling Eretz Yisrael or when there is a pressing communal mitzva need. Additionally, if not doing the melakha would entail suffering a very large financial loss, the Sages permit asking a non-Jew to do it. This is because they were afraid that if they were to prohibit this, the person suffering the loss would end up desecrating Shabbat himself on account of his great anguish. These laws are detailed above (9:11-12; 16:5 and n. 1).
  Let us illustrate this principle. One may ask a non-Jew to remove a shofar from a tree in order to use it on Rosh Ha-shana, since the prohibition of using a tree is rabbinic (SA 307:7; above, 19:7). Similarly, one may ask a non-Jew to bring wine for kiddush or siddurim for the synagogue through a karmelit, as carrying there is rabbinically prohibited (MB 325:60; 21:3 above). One may also ask a non-Jew to bring food that is essential to the Shabbat meals through a karmelit, as this food enables people to fulfill the mitzva of oneg Shabbat. However, one may not ask a non-Jew to carry food that is not essential to the meal (MB 325:62).
  One may ask a non-Jew to move muktzeh items in order to prevent a loss. For example, one may ask a non-Jew to collect scattered money, so that it will not get lost or stolen. One may also ask a non-Jew to bring bags of cement from the yard into the house so that they are not ruined in the rain (SA 307:19; see MB ad loc. 69).
  If a door is squeaking so loudly that it is difficult to sleep, one may ask a non-Jew to oil the hinges. The relevant prohibition is rabbinic, since the door can be used even if the hinges are not oiled (Melakhim Omnayikh 6:1 and n. 1). Additionally, if mosquitoes are buzzing around in a room and disturbing one’s sleep, one may ask a non-Jew to spray and kill them. Since mosquitoes are not being killed to use their bodies, the prohibition is rabbinic (20:8 above).
  If it is uncertain whether a particular action is prohibited rabbinically or by Torah law, one may ask a non-Jew to undertake the action for the sake of a mitzva or a great need. The prohibition of asking a non-Jew to perform melakha is rabbinic, and in general when there is uncertainty pertaining to a rabbinic rule, we are lenient.
  If the lights went out in a synagogue or in a beit midrash, one may ask a non-Jew to turn them on using a shinui, since doing so is only prohibited rabbinically. If using a shinui is not feasible, as long as there is a pressing need that relates to a communal mitzva, one may ask a non-Jew to turn on the light even without a shinui. If possible, it is preferable to give him something to eat there, so that he will be turning the light on for himself, which is permissible even if it is not for the sake of a mitzva.
  
  Section 5
  
  Melakha Performed by a Non-Jew / A Non-Jew’s Melakha for Someone Sick or Suffering (and Air Conditioners)
  Under normal circumstances, one may not ask a non-Jew to perform melakha on Shabbat. However, for the sake of a sick person, one may ask a non-Jew to perform melakhot, even those that are prohibited by Torah law. These leniencies apply even to one who is not dangerously ill. If one is dangerously ill, then even a Jew must desecrate Shabbat in order to help him, as saving a life overrides Shabbat (SA 328:17). The laws pertaining to sick people will be explained below in chapters 27 and 28.
  A child who needs something very badly has the same status as a sick person, and one may ask a non-Jew to do even melakhot that are prohibited by Torah law on his behalf. Therefore, one may ask a non-Jew to cook for a child who has nothing to eat or to turn on a light in the home of children who are very scared of the dark (Rema 276:1; MB ad loc. 6; Rema 328:17; 24:6 above).
  In the cold areas of northern Europe, keeping homes warm on Shabbat was an ongoing struggle. Since homes were generally heated by coal- or wood-burning stoves, by Shabbat morning the fuel supply would be depleted and the fire in the stove would go out. Since all people are considered ill when it comes to extreme cold, the rabbis permitted asking a non-Jew to come and light the stove on Shabbat morning (SA 276:5). The non-Jew who did this was known as the “Shabbos goy.” Nowadays, however, when heaters are powered by electricity or gas and do not run out during Shabbat, there is no justification for using a “Shabbos goy” on a regular basis. Only if, by chance, the heater went off and it is extremely cold, may one ask a non-Jew to turn on the heat. One may do this even if there are no small children. In a home with children who truly need the heat, one may ask a non-Jew to turn on a heater even if it is not extremely cold (SSK 23:28; see n. 87 ad loc.).
  Permission to ask a non-Jew to do melakhot that are prohibited by Torah law is limited to the needs of the ill. For one who is suffering but not ill, one may ask a non-Jew to perform a rabbinically prohibited melakha but not one that is prohibited by Torah law. Based on this, some maintain that on a hot day one may ask a non-Jew to turn on an air conditioner, claiming that turning on an air conditioner is only rabbinically prohibited. Accordingly, for the sake of the mitzva of oneg Shabbat, and in order to alleviate great suffering, one may ask a non-Jew to turn on an air conditioner. However, since others maintain that turning on an air conditioner is prohibited by Torah law (17:2 above), it is proper to ask the non-Jew to turn it on using a shinui (for example, using a teaspoon to depress the air conditioner’s on button), which renders the action a shvut di-shvut.
  If the air conditioner is running and has gotten too cold, one may ask a non-Jew to turn it off. Preferably, one should simply tell him that it is too cold, and allow him to figure out on his own that he should turn off the air conditioner. If he does not take the hint, one may tell him directly.6<i class="footnote">According to <em>y</em><em>Sanhedrin</em> 10:5 and <em>Tosafot</em><em>Ketubot</em> 30a, s.v. “ha-kol”), heat causes more suffering than cold but does not cause as much illness as the cold. Therefore, the Sages permitted asking a non-Jew to do a rabbinically prohibited activity in order to avoid the heat, but not one that is prohibited by Torah law. For those who say that turning on an electrical appliance without a heating element is only rabbinically prohibited, asking a non-Jew to do so is a <em>shvut di-shvut</em>; accordingly, one may alleviate great suffering, and even more so when the mitzva of <em>oneg</em><em>Shabbat</em> is involved as well. Many rule accordingly (SSK 13:39; <em>Minḥat Yitzḥak</em> 3:23-24; <em>She’arim Metzuyanim Ba-halakha</em> 90:20). In contrast, according to those who maintain that using electricity is prohibited by Torah law (17:2 above), asking a non-Jew to turn on the air conditioner is only a single <em>shvut</em>. Therefore, one should ask the non-Jew to turn it on using a <em>shinui</em>. Then all would agree that the case is a <em>shvut di-shvut</em>. If it cannot be turned on using a <em>shinui</em>, one may ask the non-Jew to turn it on normally rely on the opinion that turning on an air conditioner is only rabbinically prohibited when asking a non-Jew to do a <em>melakha</em>, which itself is only rabbinically prohibited. Furthermore, we can take into account the opinion of <em>I</em><em>tur</em> that one may ask a non-Jew to do even a <em>melakha</em> that is prohibited by Torah law for the sake of a mitzva, as explained in 9:11 above. As for turning off an air conditioner, all <em>poskim</em> agree that it is only rabbinically prohibited, so one may ask a non-Jew to do this for the sake of the mitzva of <em>oneg</em><em>Shabbat</em> or in order to alleviate great suffering, since such a case is a <em>shvut di-shvut</em>. Thus <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 3:42 permits asking a non-Jew to turn off the air conditioner in the synagogue, so that the congregants can remain there.</i>
  
  Section 6
  
  Melakha Performed by a Non-Jew / Employees, Sharecroppers, and Renters in Fields and Factories
  A Jew may not hire workers to do work for him on Shabbat, as a Jew may not ask a non-Jew to do anything for him on Shabbat that he may not do himself. Therefore, a Jew may not hire a non-Jew to work in his field, factory, or store. However, one may hire a non-Jewish worker to help serve food or wash dishes on Shabbat. Since a Jew may do these activities on Shabbat, he may hire a non-Jew to do them. In this case, it is not necessary for the Shabbat payment to be subsumed within a weekday payment (Tehila Le-David 243:1; SSK 28:63; and above 22:14).
  If a non-Jew did some work for a Jew on Shabbat, the Jew may not benefit from it on Shabbat. After Shabbat he may benefit from it, but only once enough time has elapsed so that the melakha could have been performed after Shabbat. If the melakha that the non-Jew did for him was done publicly on Shabbat, such as building a home, the Sages decreed that he may never live in the house. However, he may sell it to another Jew. Under pressing circumstances, the first Jew may live in the house the non-Jew built for him (SA 244:3-4 and MB ad loc. 19-20; SA 325:14 and MB ad loc. 73).
  All of the above applies to a wage earner. In contrast, a non-Jewish sharecropper or tenant farmer in a Jew’s field may work on Shabbat. Since he shares in the profits, he is working for his own benefit.
  Therefore, a Jewish factory owner or store owner may allow a non-Jew to run his business over Shabbat if the non-Jew receives a percentage of the earnings. Even though the Jew is profiting from the work of the non-Jew on Shabbat, since the non-Jew is working to earn money for himself, he is not viewed as working on behalf of the Jew. The Jew may profit from a percentage of this work.7<i class="footnote">em&gt;Noda Bi-Yehuda 1:29 is permissive even if the non-Jew is an employee with a regular salary, as long as he also gets a small commission for each sale. In this case too, the non-Jew is viewed as working for himself. This is a possible solution for owners of factories and telemarketing firms. If their employees receive a commission for each sale, they can be viewed as working for their own benefit. Ḥatam Sofer requires that this commission be a significant amount. If it is minimal, then an employee’s primary motivation remains his regular salary paid by the Jewish owner (OḤ 59).</i>
  Similarly, a Jew in Israel who owns a field, factory, or store abroad may rent them to a non-Jew in return for a set fee. The non-Jew may then keep the establishment open on Shabbat. Since the Jew gets his rent money in any case, the non-Jew who works on Shabbat is viewed as working for himself. This is on condition that the non-Jew is not only renting on Shabbat, because then it would be clear that the Jew wants the non-Jew to work on Shabbat. Rather, he should rent out the store on a weekly, monthly, or yearly basis, so Shabbat is subsumed within the total.
  
  Section 7
  
  Melakha Performed by a Non-Jew / Marit Ayin and Causing a Jew to Sin
  Every case where we have learned that a Jew may rent his store or factory to a non-Jew or give his field to a non-Jewish sharecropper applies only where there is no marit ayin (“appearance” of transgression). However, if the site is known to be Jewish-owned, and those who see it operating on Shabbat are liable to suspect the owner of hiring non-Jews to work for him on Shabbat, such rental or profit-sharing arrangements are prohibited.
  This is what the Sages meant when they forbade a Jew to contract his bathhouse to a non-Jew to operate on Shabbat. Since generally bathhouses were run by day laborers, people who saw the bathhouse open on Shabbat would suspect that a Jew had desecrated Shabbat by hiring non-Jews. This could breach the boundaries of Shabbat, as others might begin hiring non-Jews to work for them on Shabbat. However, if it was publicly announced that the Jew rented the bathhouse to a non-Jew, it is permitted. So too, if the widespread local custom is to operate bathhouses under profit-sharing arrangements, the custom may be followed (SA 243:1-2).8<i class="footnote">. The Sages distinguished between different cases: If a <em>melakha</em> is performed outside the <em>teḥum</em>, one need not be concerned about <em>marit ayin</em> (SA 244:1). It is important to be aware that big businesses stand to lose large amounts of money if they do not operate on Shabbat. In such cases, even if the business is known to belong to a Jew, a profit-sharing arrangement can be made with a non-Jew. The Jew may even buy the business <em>le-khatḥila</em> with such an arrangement in mind (SA 244:6). One may be lenient to prevent a large potential profit from being forfeited (<em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 4:53). One may rent a business to a non-Jew for all <em>Shabbatot</em> (Rema, <em>ad loc</em>.). It is preferable to rent it for a few hours on Friday as well, so that the Shabbat rent can be subsumed within the weekday (see BHL <em>ad loc</em>. s.v. “de-vimkom” and MB 243:16). Additionally, when dealing with big businesses, there is less concern about <em>marit ayin</em>, because whatever the companies do is generally public knowledge.At first glance, it seems problematic to forbid certain arrangements because of <em>marit ayin</em>, as doing so would seem to violate the principle that we do not make a protective fence around a protective fence (“<em>gezeira li-gezeira</em>”). After all, the prohibition of asking a non-Jew to do <em>melakha</em> is already rabbinic. So why disallow these arrangements? <em>Pri Megadim</em> (<em>Mishbetzot Zahav</em> 244:1) explains that the prohibition of asking a non-Jew to do <em>melakha</em> is supported by a verse and therefore treated more stringently than regular rabbinic rules.</i>
  The same applies to a store. If it is known that a store is Jewish-owned, one may not rent it out to a non-Jew who will open it on Shabbat, because of marit ayin. However, if it has been publicly announced that the store has been rented to a non-Jew, it is not prohibited.
  Even if there is a possibility that Jews who do not observe Shabbat will enter this store and shop there on Shabbat, the Jew is not viewed as aiding their transgression, since they could buy what they need in a different store. However, if most prospective customers are Jews, and keeping the store open breaches the boundaries of Shabbat, then the arrangement is prohibited (see Tzitz Eliezer 13:39).9<i class="footnote"><em>Binyan Tziyon</em> §15 and <em>Meshiv Davar</em> 2:31 permit a Jew to assign work to a non-Jewish contractor who has Jewish employees who might work on Shabbat, because even without him they would desecrate Shabbat; thus, the Jew does not transgress <em>lifnei iver </em>(“Do not put a stumbling block in front of the blind” – Vayikra 19:14). If he were to assign them the work on Shabbat, he would be viewed as aiding (<em>mesayei’a</em>) their violation. However, when it is assigned before Shabbat, there is no prohibition. This point is made in the book <em>Amira Le-nokhri</em> 77:16. Along the same lines, Maharsham 2:184 permits renting one’s home to Shabbat desecrators. However, if most customers of a rented store will be Jews, R. Eliezer Waldenberg forbids the rental (<em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 13:39). It seems correct to be stringent when such an arrangement will breach the boundaries of Shabbat.</i>
  
  Section 8
  
  Melakha Performed by a Non-Jew / Non-Jewish Contractors
  The prohibition on hiring non-Jews to work on Shabbat applies to wage-earners but not to contractors. For these purposes, “contract work” means that the worker agrees to complete a job by a specified date for an agreed-upon amount of money. It makes no difference which days the contractor works. As long as he finishes the work by the agreed-upon date, he receives payment in full. Since the non-Jew can complete the work without working on Shabbat, even if he works on Shabbat it is for his own benefit, to complete the job he contracted, and is permitted even though the Jew benefits from the swift completion of the work.
  For example, a Jew may make an agreement with a non-Jew to sew clothes or make shoes for him for a certain sum. The non-Jew’s choice to work on Shabbat does not make it prohibited. However, a Jew may not ask a non-Jew on Friday to sew clothes or make shoes for him by the time Shabbat ends, since in order to do so the non-Jew would have to work on Shabbat. This is the equivalent of a Jew asking a non-Jew to work for him on Shabbat.
  Similarly, a Jew may bring his car to a non-Jew’s garage on Friday, even though he knows that the non-Jewish mechanic might fix it on Shabbat. Since the non-Jew is being paid contractually, at the going rate for the job, and the Jew did not ask him to work specifically on Shabbat, he is not viewed as working for the Jew on Shabbat. Even if he informs the Jew immediately after Shabbat that he finished working on the car, the Jew may retrieve the car and use it. However, one may not arrange with the mechanic to finish the job by a time that would require him to work on Shabbat. In such a case, the non-Jew is working for the Jew on Shabbat (SA 244:1; MB ad loc. 2).10<i class="footnote">. This is the opinion of MA 307:4; <em>Taz</em> <em>ad loc</em>. 3; SAH 252:4; MB 247:4 and 252:15; and <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 23:173. However, according to <em>Beit Yosef</em> (307:3), as long as one did not explicitly tell the non-Jewish contractor to work on Shabbat, even if it would be impossible for him to finish the job by the time specified without working on Shabbat, it is permitted. <em>Minḥat Kohen</em> 1:4,<em> Beit Yehuda</em> 1:44, <em>Rav Pe’alim</em> 2:43, and <em>Yeḥaveh Da’at</em> 3:17 concur. In a time of need, such as if one needs the car urgently on Sunday, one may rely on them.Sometimes it is impossible to agree upon a price for the work in advance, as for example when one brings a car to a garage without knowing what the problem is. In such a case, if an agreement was reached that the going rate for the job would be paid, or that a price for the job would be worked out, then since the non-Jew knows he will receive reasonable payment for his work, he is considered a contractor. But if the non-Jew is uncertain that he will receive the going rate, even if he knows he will receive some payment, he is viewed as working for the Jew, and a Jew may not arrange for him to work on Shabbat on the Jew’s behalf (SA 247:2; BHL 252:2, s.v. “im katzatz”). If the non-Jew volunteers to do the work for free, since he hopes to be rewarded, it is considered contract work. If the Jew requests that he work for free, and the non-Jew agrees, according to SA 247:4 this is also considered contract work and is permitted, while according to Rema it is preferable to be stringent.</i>
  A non-Jew may only do contract work for a Jew on Shabbat if it is not apparent that the work is being done on a Jew’s behalf. If it is apparent, as is the case if the work is being done in the Jew’s home, it is forbidden to contract the work to a non-Jew because of marit ayin. Therefore, the Sages instructed that one should not allow a non-Jewish contractor who is hired to build a home to work on Shabbat, since if people see the contractor working they will think that the homeowner has desecrated Shabbat by hiring a non-Jew to work on Shabbat (SA 244:1). Today, when the norm is to hire a contractor to build one’s home, it would seem that it should be permissible to be lenient. Observers will generally assume that the non-Jewish workers are working for a non-Jewish contractor, and there will be no issue of marit ayin. However, in practice, the custom is to be stringent and follow the opinion that even today people will likely suspect the homeowner of building his house using wage-earners (Ran). Furthermore, there is a concern that the homeowner, who knows that his house is being built on Shabbat, will end up supervising the construction and desecrating Shabbat. However, under pressing circumstances, for a great need, where there is a concern that if the non-Jews do not work on Shabbat the construction will not be completed, one may be lenient at the instruction of a halakhic authority.11<i class="footnote">According to Rambam, Rosh, Ramban, and others, if a non-Jew accepted contract work from a Jew, he may be allowed to work on Shabbat. Only if this type of work is generally done by wage-earners is it prohibited on account of <em>marit ayin</em>, so that no one will think that they are wage-earners working for a Jew on Shabbat (SA 243:1; see BHL, s.v. “she-ken”). In contrast, Ran and those who follow him maintain that even when it is common practice for a field to be contracted out, it is still prohibited to let a non-Jew work there on Shabbat. Since the non-Jew does not receive a share of the produce the way a sharecropper does, he resembles a wage-earner and it will lead people to hire day laborers. Thus, according to Ran, one may not contract the construction of a house. Although other Rishonim agree with Ran, the <em>halakha</em> follows the lenient position. This is the ruling of SA and Rema 244:1 as well as <em>Noda Bi-Yehuda</em> and R. Akiva Eger. (Additionally, there are Rishonim who maintain that even in a place where many regularly hire wage-earners one may still contract a field to a non-Jew, since people will think that he is a sharecropper. Rabbeinu Tam even considers permitting contract work indoors.) While in practice we do take the opinion of Ran into account, and the common practice is not to rely on those who are lenient to use a contractor to build a house, nevertheless one may be lenient under pressing circumstances at the instruction of a halakhic authority. Thus MB 244:13 states that if a synagogue is being built where there is a possibility that unless building continues on Shabbat it may not get built at all, a non-Jewish contractor may build it on Shabbat. Following this reasoning, in times of need the practice is to be lenient and allow a non-Jewish contractor to build homes in Judea and Samaria, if there is a chance that building there will be halted. See BHL 244:1, s.v. “o liktzor” and <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 3:35. According to <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 244:1, if an agreement was reached with a contractor to remove construction waste within a few days, and the non-Jew shows up on Shabbat, one need not object. Since this type of job is generally done by a contractor, there is no problem of <em>marit ayin</em>.</i>
  
  Section 9
  
  Melakha Performed by a Non-Jew / Partnerships, Stocks, and Banks
  If a Jew and a non-Jew have joint ownership of a store or factory, they must agree when they enter into the partnership that the non-Jew will be responsible for the store on Shabbat and all of that day’s earnings will be his, while the Jew will be responsible for the store on a designated weekday and all of that day’s earnings will be his. For the remainder of the week, they may split the earnings evenly. This assumes that the owners keep track of the store’s daily earnings so that these calculations can be made. If each day’s profit is roughly similar or cannot be determined, they may split all the profits evenly. Then it is assumed that each partner collects the earnings of the day when the store is his sole responsibility (SA 245:1; SAH ad loc. 5; MB ad loc. 5-6; Igrot Moshe, OḤ 2:65).12<i class="footnote">. What if they did not initially make this agreement? When they come to divide the profits, the Jew may not say to the non-Jew, “You take the profits from Shabbat, and I will take the profits from one of the weekdays.” The non-Jew would then be considered the Jew’s <em>shali’aḥ</em> on Shabbat, because the Jew would receive the profits from the given weekday as a direct result of the non-Jew’s Shabbat work. If they wish to split the profits equally, without stating explicitly that the Jew has worked on a weekday to make up for the non-Jew having worked on Shabbat, they may not do so according to Rambam and SA 245:1, but according to Rosh it is permitted. Rema permits as well if one would otherwise incur a major financial loss.All of this is relevant to a business in which the two partners do not generally both work at the same time and thus the non-Jew’s work on Shabbat is in addition to the evenly-divided work during the week. In such a case, the non-Jew is considered the <em>shali’aḥ</em> of the Jew, which is prohibited. However, if it is a business in which they do generally work at the same time, and the non-Jew wants to work alone on Shabbat, the Jew may split the profits with the non-Jew, as the non-Jew is considered like a sharecropper in this case. Since he is working for his half of the profits, he is not viewed as the Jew’s <em>shali’aḥ</em> (Rema 245:1; MB <em>ad loc.</em> 9-11).If the store’s sales on Shabbat are double the volume on weekdays, the partners should agree from the outset that Shabbat profits will belong to the non-Jew, while the profits from two of the weekdays will go to the Jew.</i>
  This is all, of course, on condition that it is known that they are partners, so there is no concern that observers will think that the non-Jew is working for the Jew. Alternatively, the partnership is permissible if it is common to have profit-sharing arrangements in this type of business.13<i class="footnote">. If it is impossible to publicize the fact that the non-Jew is a contractor or sharecropper, then as long as the non-Jew is a minor partner in addition to being a contractor or sharecropper, <em>marit ayin</em> is not a problem (<em>Responsa Maharam Schick</em>, OḤ 97). This is also quoted as the ruling of R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv in <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> ch. 23 n. 376. However, <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> qualifies this, explaining that it works only when the business does not need the non-Jew to work on Shabbat. Nevertheless, as we saw in n. 10, many disagree with this and are lenient. In a time of need, one may rely upon them. When a major financial loss is involved, all would allow leniency, as explained in n. 8.</i>
  One may purchase stock in a company that is managed by non-Jews and does business on Shabbat, because the non-Jews running the company on Shabbat are doing so for their own profit. The Jew’s profit is a byproduct (SA 245:4). Even when it is likely that the company employs Jews who desecrate Shabbat as part of their work, a stockholder is not responsible for this. Those Jews are desecrating Shabbat in any case, so buying stock does not directly abet their Shabbat desecration (see above, n. 9). However, if the company is run by Jews, or if the majority of its work is done by Jews who are desecrating Shabbat, a stockholder would become a partner in Shabbat desecration. Thus, one may not purchase stock in such a company.14<i class="footnote">. See <em>Minḥat Yitzhak</em> 3:1, 3:31:2, and <em>Amira Le-nokhri</em> ch. 67. <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> vol. 2, p. 130 permits the purchase of stock in a Jewish company that does business on Shabbat, on condition that the stocks are bought after they have already been traded, i.e., from a previous shareholder. Since the company is open on Shabbat in any case, buying its stock did not cause it to do any additional work. In contrast, buying initial shares is forbidden. Even though the company will work on Shabbat in any case, this purchase aids in the commission of a transgression. In my humble opinion, one should be stringent even about buying shares from a shareholder, as shareholders are in some sense partners in the company. Accordingly, if the company is Jewish, the shareholder is a partner in Shabbat desecration. In any case, under pressing circumstances, the lenient opinions may be used in combination with others.One may place a limit order (an order to buy or sell stocks when they reach a certain price), even though non-Jewish brokers might end up buying or selling the stocks on Shabbat. Since the stocks could hit the threshold at any time, he has not specified that the non-Jews work for him on Shabbat. Therefore, the brokers are making the purchase in order to earn their percentages. See Amira Le-nokhri 67:6, which rules stringently in this case.</i>
  If a bank is under Jewish ownership and has non-Jewish clients, it may enter into an agreement with a bank under non-Jewish ownership specifying that on Shabbat the non-Jewish bank will take care of all necessary transactions for the Jewish bank’s non-Jewish clients. The non-Jewish bank is not viewed as working for Jews on Shabbat; since it profits from each transaction, it is viewed as working for its own profit (Melamed Le-ho’il 1:33).15<i class="footnote">One may receive daily interest on money that is held in a Jewish-owned bank (assuming the bank uses a <em>heter iska</em> – a method of restructuring a loan as an investment). Even though one’s account receives interest on Shabbat, this is not considered earning money on Shabbat. Since the bank considers a day to start in the afternoon, the interest accrued on Shabbat is subsumed within the interest accrued from Friday and Saturday night (aee above, 22:14 and n. 9.) If one signs a standing direct deposit or direct withdrawal order at a non-Jewish bank in which the money will be transferred according to secular dates and occasionally on Shabbat, it is preferable that he let the bank workers know that he does not need the transaction to take place on the exact date, and that from his perspective it is acceptable if they do it a day earlier or later. Then, even if they execute the transaction on Shabbat, they are doing so for their own convenience (<em>Ḥeshev Ha-efod</em> 3:51).</i>
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Ma’aseh Shabbat and Lifnei Iver / Principles Behind the Prohibition of Benefiting from Melakha Done on Shabbat
  The Torah commands us to refrain from melakha on Shabbat. The Sages added a protective fence by prohibiting deriving benefit from melakha done on Shabbat (ma’aseh Shabbat), as it is improper to benefit on Shabbat from Shabbat desecration. Whether the melakha was done knowingly (be–mezid) or unknowingly (be-shogeg), it is forbidden for any Jew to benefit from the melakha for the rest of that Shabbat. Some maintain that if the melakha was done be-shogeg, one may benefit from it. Some rely on this opinion under pressing circumstances (as explained in the next section). For our purposes, shogeg means that one was aware of his actions but forgot that it was Shabbat or was unaware that this act is a forbidden melakha on Shabbat; we have translated it, here and elsewhere, as “unknowing.”
  After Shabbat, anyone may benefit from a melakha that was done on Shabbat except for the perpetrator, if he did it be-mezid, who may never benefit from it (SA 318:1, as explained in section 7 below).
  If a small child performed a melakha on Shabbat on behalf of an adult, during Shabbat no one may benefit from it. On Saturday night, anyone may benefit once enough time has passed that the melakha could have been completed after Shabbat. If the child did the melakha for his own sake, an adult may benefit from it on Shabbat (above, 24:4).
  If a non-Jew did melakha on Shabbat for a Jew, no Jew may benefit from it until enough time has elapsed after Shabbat for the melakha to have been completed, so that no one benefits from melakha done on Shabbat and no one profits from work done by a non-Jew on Shabbat (above, ch. 25 n. 2). If a non-Jew did a melakha for himself, a Jew may benefit from it on Shabbat (above, 25:2). In some cases, one may hint to a non-Jew to do melakha on Shabbat (above 25:3). For the sake of a mitzva, or to avoid great loss or suffering, one may ask a non-Jew to do a rabbinically prohibited melakha (25:4).
  
  Section 2
  
  Ma’aseh Shabbat and Lifnei Iver / The Prohibition of Benefiting from a Melakha Performed on Shabbat
  As we have seen, if a Jew knowingly performs a melakha on Shabbat, neither he nor any other Jew may benefit from it during Shabbat. Even if he did the melakha unknowingly, according to most poskim no one may benefit from it, because the Sages did not want any Jew to benefit from melakha done on Shabbat (SA 318:1). Others maintain that only if the melakha was done knowingly is it forbidden to benefit from it on Shabbat; in contrast, if the melakha was done unknowingly, one may benefit from it. Some allow one to rely on this opinion when necessary (MB 318:7). A non-observant Jew who is aware that it is Shabbat and that the action he is taking may be prohibited is considered to be transgressing knowingly. Even those who are lenient maintain that one may not benefit from his melakha on Shabbat.1<i class="footnote">. According to R. Meir, one who cooks on Shabbat unknowingly may eat the food on Shabbat, while one who cooks knowingly may eat the food only after Shabbat. According to R. Yehuda, if one cooked food on Shabbat, whether knowingly or unknowingly, no one may eat from the food on Shabbat. After Shabbat, others may always eat the food. The one who cooked the food may eat it after Shabbat only if he cooked it unknowingly, while if he did so knowingly he may never eat it (<em>Ḥullin</em> 15a). Since there is an accepted principle that in a disagreement between R. Meir and R. Yehuda we follow R. Yehuda, most Rishonim rule that one may not benefit on Shabbat from <em>melakha</em> that was done unknowingly. This is the opinion of Rif, Rambam, Ramban, and many others. This is also the ruling of SA 318:1. Nevertheless, according to a minority of <em>poskim</em><em>Tosafot</em><em>Ḥullin</em> 15a; <em>Sefer Ha-Teruma</em>; Ritva; Vilna Gaon), in this case the <em>halakha</em> follows R. Meir, since the Talmud goes on to say that Rav taught his students R. Meir’s opinion on the topic. MB states that in a time of need, one may benefit from an unknowing violation on Shabbat (318:7). However, if one picked fruit unknowingly on Shabbat, even those who are lenient concede that one may not benefit from it, since it is <em>muktzeh</em></i>
  Therefore, if a Jew turned on a light on Shabbat, neither he nor any other Jew may benefit from the light. As we have already seen, some maintain that under pressing circumstances, as long as the light was turned on unknowingly, one may benefit from it. Under normal circumstances, though, or if the light was turned on knowingly, one may not benefit from it.
  Nevertheless, if one could have engaged in a certain activity with difficulty even without the light, one may also engage in this activity after the light is turned on. For example, if a light in a stairwell was turned on on Shabbat, as long as one could have ascended the stairs in the dark, one may do so in the light. However, one should not run up the stairs, as this would constitute taking advantage of the light. If a bathroom light was turned on on Shabbat, one may still use the bathroom, since one could have done so without light as well. However, if one could not have arranged certain items in one’s home without the light, one may not arrange them using the light. If there was originally enough light to read, even with difficulty, and then an additional light was turned on, one may continue reading even though it has become easier.
  If a light in a room was on and one knowingly turned it off, one may sleep in the room. Even though it is now easier to sleep there, it is permitted, since there is no direct benefit from the melakha; it simply removed an impediment to sleep.
  If a Jew turned on a radio or music player on Shabbat, one may not benefit by listening to it. However, if it would be inconvenient to leave the room, he need not do so, since the sound was turned on against his wishes, and he does not want to benefit from it. Even if a non-Jew turned on such a device, one still may not benefit from it, both because it is a weekday activity and because it detracts from the honor due Shabbat (above 22:19).
  One is not obligated to stay out of his room because his roommate sinned by turning on the heat in their shared room. However, le-khatḥila he should try to prevent his roommate from transgressing. If he was unsuccessful, he should have in mind not to benefit from the prohibited action. He should not move toward the heater in order to warm up. Rather, he should remain in his usual place. If he benefits against his will, he is not transgressing. If he can open a window in order to avoid benefiting from the heat, this is preferable (based on Rema 276:1; AHS ad loc. 4; MB ad loc. 11-13).2<i class="footnote">. This is the ruling in <em>Ha-tzava Ka-halakha</em> 34:1-2 and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 318:36. It would also seem to be the opinion of <em>Har Tzvi</em>, OḤ 1:185. However, the one who turned on the light, the heat, or the radio knowingly, as well as the person who told him to do so, technically must leave the room in order to avoid benefiting from the <em>melakha</em> (MB 276:13; <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 318:14, n. 20).</i>
  Some maintain that one must not even fulfill a mitzva through a melakha that was performed on Shabbat. Others maintain that since mitzvot were not given for our benefit, doing a mitzva cannot be considered deriving benefit from a melakha. In their opinion, if a light was turned on during Shabbat, one may study Torah or pray by its light. One who wishes to follow this leniency has an opinion to rely on. However, if food was cooked on Shabbat, all agree that one may not eat it. Even though eating it would fulfill the mitzva of oneg Shabbat, since the way one fulfills this mitzva is by experiencing pleasure, it would violate the Sages’ decree forbidding benefit from a melakha done on Shabbat. Similarly, if a light was turned on during Shabbat, one may not eat by its light.3<i class="footnote">See <em>Sdei Ḥemed</em> (<em>Kuntres Ha-klalim, Ma’arekhet Mem</em>, <em>Klal</em> 95), which quotes dissenting opinions. These are also cited in <em>Ha-tzava Ka-halakha</em> 33:7 and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 318:18-20. When dealing with a physical pleasure such as eating, one should be stringent, as it is not clear that any authority would be lenient. See <em>Ḥayei Adam</em> 62:6 and <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 1:126. When there is no physical pleasure involved, then since it is a rabbinic dispute, one who wishes to be lenient has an opinion to rely on. This applies even more so if the <em>melakha</em> was done unknowingly, as then one can take into account the authorities who follow R. Meir and permit benefiting from it.</i>
  
  Section 3
  
  Ma’aseh Shabbat and Lifnei Iver / Cases In Which Deriving Benefit Is Permitted
  The prohibition on deriving benefit on Shabbat from the unknowing performance of a melakha applies only to a case of a melakha that is prohibited by Torah law. In contrast, if a rabbinically prohibited action was done unknowingly, one may benefit from it on Shabbat. Nevertheless, if it was done knowingly, it has the same status as a Torah prohibition: one may benefit from it only after Shabbat (MB 318:3 and BHL ad loc.; Yalkut Yosef 318:3). For example, the Sages prohibited separating teruma, ma’aser, and ḥalla on Shabbat, because it resembles tikun (fixing or improving) of the produce. If one unknowingly performed the separation on Shabbat, the “improved” produce may be eaten on Shabbat, but if he did this knowingly, it may not be eaten until after Shabbat (MB 339:25; above 22:5).
  If one unknowingly turned on an electrical appliance without a heating element (e.g., a fan, air conditioner, or refrigerator), since some maintain that this action is not prohibited by Torah law, one who wishes to be lenient and benefit from the appliance has an opinion on which to rely. However, if one turned on a heater with metal heating coils or a light bulb with an incandescent filament, he has definitely transgressed a Torah prohibition. Thus, even if it was done unknowingly, he may not benefit from the results of his action on Shabbat. In the case of the heater, he should open the window or leave the room to avoid benefiting from the melakha.4<i class="footnote">. As we have seen above (17:2 and n. 1), according to many contemporary authorities, turning on an electric appliance with no incandescent filament or heating element is only rabbinically prohibited. Even though in practice we tend to be stringent and treat turning on electricity as a Torah prohibition, here we may also take into account the opinion of those who follow R. Meir. According to him, even if one transgresses a Torah prohibition, as long as it was unknowing, one may derive benefit from it. This is the approach of <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 318:56.</i>
  If one performed a melakha obliviously (mitasek), there is no prohibition on deriving benefit from it, since the melakha had no intent. This is true even if the melakha is prohibited by Torah law. For example, if one absentmindedly brushed his hand or leaned against a light switch and turned it on, one may derive benefit from it. There is a difference between shogeg and mitasek. As noted, shogeg means that one was aware of his actions but forgot that it was Shabbat or was unaware that this act is a forbidden melakha on Shabbat. When the Temple stood, one who did a melakha be-shogeg was obligated to bring a sin offering. In contrast, mitasek means that one did a melakha obliviously, without being aware of his actions. Such an act did not obligate its perpetrator to bring an offering. Since mitasek is less severe than shogeg, there is no prohibition to benefit from what was done obliviously.5<i class="footnote">Among those who say <em>mitasek</em> does not constitute a transgression are <em>Leḥem Mishneh</em> (1:5) and <em>Eretz Tzvi</em> §76. Some are stringent and maintain that even <em>mitasek</em> constitutes a transgression, and therefore one may not derive benefit from a <em>melakha </em>done <em>be-mitasek</em> (<em>Oneg Yom Tov</em>; <em>Minḥat Barukh</em>). According to R. Akiva Eger, in some cases <em>mitaskek</em> has the same status as <em>shogeg</em>. Nevertheless, in practice, one may be lenient in all cases of <em>mitasek</em>. First, the prohibition on benefiting from <em>melakha</em> done on Shabbat is rabbinic, so in cases of uncertainty we are lenient. Second, the <em>poskim</em> who follow R. Meir are permissive even in the case of <em>shogeg</em>. This is also the opinion of <em>Az Nidberu</em> 6:17 and <em>Yalkut Yosef </em>318:23. See <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 25:4.</i>
  However, if one absentmindedly turned on a light out of habit, as he does all week long when entering a room, he is considered shogeg. Even though he was not thinking explicitly about what he was doing, nevertheless since the intent of his action was to turn on the light, he is considered shogeg and one may not derive benefit from his melakha.
  
  Section 4
  
  Ma’aseh Shabbat and Lifnei Iver / Benefiting from an Action That Did Not Alter an Item
  Some say that if a melakha did not physically alter an object, like if it was transported from a public domain to a private domain, the item does not become prohibited, and one may benefit from it on Shabbat in the private domain (Rabbeinu Yona and Ritva). The same would apply to food that was transported via motor vehicle on Shabbat; since the food itself underwent no change, it would not be prohibited. However, others maintain that there is no difference between types of melakhot (Tosafot, Ramban, and Rashba). Even if the melakha did not alter the food at all, one may not benefit from it on Shabbat if it was transported in a prohibited fashion. In practice, le-khatḥila it is proper to be stringent, but under pressing circumstances one may rely on those who are lenient, particularly if the melakha was done unknowingly.6<i class="footnote">. According to Rabbeinu Yona and Ritva, if the object was not physically altered, the prohibition of <em>ma’aseh Shabbat</em> does not apply to it. This is also the opinion of <em>Korban Netanel</em>. In contrast, <em>Tosafot</em>, Ramban, and Rashba as well as <em>Har Tzvi</em> maintain that this is not grounds for leniency. In practice, if the <em>melakha</em> was done unknowingly, in times of need one may be lenient. (This is the implication of <em>Ḥayei Adam</em> 9:11; MB 318:7; and BHL 318:1 s.v. “aḥat.”) Under pressing circumstances, one may be lenient even if the <em>melakha</em> was done knowingly, since the prohibition of <em>ma’aseh Shabbat</em> is rabbinic. See <em>Yabi’a Omer</em>, 10:25. This applies when soldiers have been brought food by a vehicle on Shabbat: under pressing circumstances, they may eat the food. However, if their consumption of the food will cause additional Shabbat desecration in future, they should not eat it (<em>Ha-tzava Ka-halakha</em> 35:10). All agree that if fruit was knowingly brought from outside the <em>teḥum</em> (at a height of under ten <em>tefaḥim</em>), one may not benefit from it, as explained in <em>Eruvin</em> 41b and SA 405:9. According to Rabbeinu Yona, the reason for this is that the Sages reinforced their own safeguards.Regarding <em>melakha</em> performed by a non-Jew, all agree that <em>Hotza’ah </em>is just as severe as other <em>melakhot</em>. For example, if a non-Jew delivered something to a Jew via an action that is prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law, the Jew may not benefit from it until enough time has elapsed after Shabbat that the item could have been brought after Shabbat. This is to make sure that Jews do not ask non-Jews to do <em>melakha </em>for them on Shabbat. If a non-Jew performed a rabbinically prohibited <em>melakha</em>, then the Jew for whom the <em>melakha</em> was performed may not benefit from it until enough time has elapsed after Shabbat that the <em>melakha</em> could have been done. Other Jews may benefit from it even on Shabbat (SA 325:10), as explained in 25:1 above.</i>
  If a melakha that was performed on Shabbat enables an additional, permissible action to occur, one may benefit from the permissible action. For example, if a hammer was fixed on Shabbat, it may not be used, even for permitted purposes like cracking nuts. However, if one violated this prohibition and cracked nuts with the hammer, he may benefit from the nuts, since the act of cracking the nuts is not intrinsically forbidden.
  If a locked door was unlocked in a forbidden fashion, such as with the use of an electronic key card, some say that one may not enter the room through that opening, since the door was unlocked in a prohibited fashion. Others maintain that one may enter, since unlocking the door did not create anything new; it simply removed an impediment to entering. Be-di’avad, in a time of need, one may be lenient. If a refrigerator door was opened and the refrigerator light went on, one may remove food from the refrigerator (see above, 17:9).
  If a Jew who does not observe Shabbat approached an automatic door and thus caused it to open, one may not enter through it. Only under pressing circumstances may one be lenient. If another Jew passed by and unintentionally caused the door to open, one may enter through it (see above, 17:11).7<i class="footnote">According to <em>Mor</em> <em>U-ketzi’a</em>, <em>Ma’amar Mordechai</em>, and <em>Nehar Shalom</em>, if a fire was lit on Yom Tov (which is prohibited) and then used to cook food, one may benefit from the food since cooking is not prohibited on Yom Tov (in opposition to <em>Taz</em> 502:1, which forbids). This indicates that one may benefit from a consequence of <em>ma’aseh</em><em> Shabbat</em>. A key that was transported via a public domain is subject, as we saw in the previous note, to a disagreement about whether one may benefit from a <em>melakha</em> that did not physically alter an object. Under pressing circumstances, one may be lenient. In any case, if the door has already been unlocked with that key, entering through the doorway does not constitute benefiting from the transgression itself, but rather from a consequence. As we said, in such a case one may benefit. This is the opinion of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (however, <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 2:77 prohibits; see 2:71 as well).In contrast, if a door was unlocked in a prohibited fashion, such as with an electronic key card, then it would seem that one may not benefit by entering, since the very act of unlocking was done in a prohibited manner. (As we saw, according to Tosafot, Ramban, and Rashba, ma’aseh Shabbat applies to Hotza’ah even though the item is not changed.) This is certainly the position of Igrot Moshe, and it seems to be that of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach as well. Nevertheless, according to R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (cited in Melakhim Omnayikh, p. 525), it is permissible because opening the door is simply removing an impediment, and this kind of benefit is not prohibited. Furthermore, even without this explanation, we saw above in n. 6 that under pressing circumstances one may rely upon the opinion of Rabbeinu Yona. If a refrigerator door was opened and the refrigerator light went on, even R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach allows removing food from the refrigerator, since the light was turned on only incidentally (SSK 10:16 and n. 47). For further discussion of all these cases, see Orḥot Shabbat 25:29-32 and §14 in the Birurim section.If a non-observant Jew opened an electric door by approaching it, one should be stringent and avoid taking advantage of his transgression, as doing so is a desecration of God’s name. However, under pressing circumstances, where there is no choice, one may rely on Rabbeinu Yona (as mentioned above in 17:11 and n. 11).</i>
  
  Section 5
  
  Ma’aseh Shabbat and Lifnei Iver / If One Did an Action of Disputed Permissibility
  The prohibition on benefiting from a melakha done on Shabbat only applies when the action is clearly prohibited. However, if the action is the subject of dispute, even if general practice follows the stricter opinion, one may benefit be-di’avad from the melakha. This is because the entire foundation of the prohibition on benefiting from work done on Shabbat is rabbinic, and since we are lenient whenever there is a uncertainty pertaining to a rabbinic rule, we follow the lenient position in the dispute over whether this act is prohibited (Pri Megadim; MB 318:2).
  For example, if one cooks raw meat, it is clear that he has transgressed, and the food may not be eaten on Shabbat. However, if one took partially-cooked food that is edible under pressing circumstances and placed it on a fire until it cooked fully, it may be eaten on Shabbat. Even though the halakha follows the opinion that doing so is prohibited by Torah law (SA 318:4), since there is an opinion that if the food was already edible, cooking it further is not prohibited (above, ch. 10 n. 1), if one transgressed and cooked such food on Shabbat, it may be eaten.
  Similarly, if one took cold soup that had been cooked before Shabbat and heated it on a plata on Shabbat, although many maintain that he has violated Torah law (SA 318:4), it may be eaten, because Rambam allows doing this (above, 10:5-6).
  Let us say one took a tea bag, put it in a glass, and poured boiling water over it directly from an urn, which is a kli rishon. Doing so is prohibited because, according to most poskim, pouring boiling water from a kli rishon cooks the outer layer of the food (above, 10:7-8). Nevertheless, be-di’avad one may drink the tea, because some maintain that one does not violate Bishul by pouring hot water over a tea bag, only by placing the tea bag directly into a kli rishon (Rashbam, Ramban, Rashba).
  
  Section 6
  
  Ma’aseh Shabbat and Lifnei Iver / Power Outages
  If there is a power outage, whether local or citywide, Jewish technicians may do what is necessary to restore power to all the area’s residents. This is because many areas have sick people whose lives would be at risk without the electric equipment they need. Because of the possibility of loss of life, the area’s electricity supply must be restored. Moreover, since the restoration is permissible, all residents of the neighborhood may benefit from it (above, 17:5). If there was food on the plata that cooled down while the electricity was off and then warmed up again when the electricity was restored, it may be eaten even if the food was not fully cooked beforehand, and only finished cooking after the electricity was restored, since it was cooked in a permissible manner.
  If a small area lost electricity and it is clear that there is no risk to life involved, one may not restore the electricity. If the electricity was nevertheless restored, and as a result a light came on, one may not benefit from it. This means that anything that could not have been done without the light may not be done using the light (as explained in section 2 above). If food warmed up as a result of the electricity that was restored impermissibly, one must wait until it cools off before eating it. If food finished cooking as a result of this transgression, one may not eat it (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in SSK ch. 32 n. 182; see above, 10:3).
  
  Section 7
  
  Ma’aseh Shabbat and Lifnei Iver / Benefiting after Shabbat from a Melakha Performed on Shabbat
  As we have learned, one who performs a melakha on Shabbat be-shogeg may benefit from it immediately after Shabbat, as may other Jews. If he transgressed be-mezid, he may never benefit from it, though others may benefit from it after Shabbat. For example, if one knowingly cooked food on Shabbat, he may never eat it. Others, including those he cooked for, may eat the food after Shabbat (MB 318:5). Similarly, if one built a house on Shabbat, others may benefit from it after Shabbat, but he may never use it. However, he may sell the house to others (MB 318:4).
  One who knowingly laundered his clothes on Shabbat may not wear them even after Shabbat, because one may never benefit from a melakha that he performed knowingly on Shabbat. A solution in such a case is to wash the clothes again during the week, after which he may wear them (Ben Ish Ḥai, Year 2, Vayeḥi 19).
  If a non-observant Jew regularly performs melakha on Shabbat for other Jews, they may not benefit from this melakha even after Shabbat. Only when a melakha is done occasionally may those on whose behalf the melakha was done benefit from it after Shabbat, as there is no concern that they will ask him to desecrate Shabbat again so that they can benefit after Shabbat. However, if he does this melakha regularly, they may never benefit from it. For example, one may not buy bread from one who regularly bakes it on Shabbat in order to sell it after Shabbat, even if all the ingredients are kosher. Eating it encourages him to continue desecrating Shabbat, and they would take part in his transgression. Similarly, no Jew may eat at a restaurant where a Jewish chef cooks on Shabbat for customers who will come after Shabbat.
  One may not watch sports games or other televised events after Shabbat if these events were filmed by Jews on Shabbat. Since the filming involved intentional Shabbat desecration on the part of the videographers for the sake of their viewers after Shabbat, the viewers may not benefit from this Shabbat desecration. The same applies to fruits and vegetables brought to market on Sunday. If it is known for certain that they were picked by Jews on Shabbat, no Jew may eat them.8<i class="footnote">If a Jew knowingly cooked on Shabbat for his friend, after Shabbat only the cook may not enjoy the food; the friend may do so immediately after Shabbat, as explained in <em>Beit Yosef</em> and MB 318:5. However, <em>Responsa</em><em>Ketav Sofer</em>, OḤ 50 limits this law to a case in which the cook is an observant Jew; in contrast, if the cook is a <em>mumar</em>, a Jew who regularly commits this transgression, then the people for whom he undertook the <em>melakha</em> may never benefit, because that would encourage him to continue desecrating Shabbat. <em>Responsa Har Tzvi</em>, OḤ 180 is lenient and allows the people for whom the <em>melakha</em> was done to benefit after Shabbat, as long as the desecration was not done in accordance with their wishes. Nevertheless, many Aḥaronim maintain that one should be stringent (<em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:30:1; <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 318:6 and 318:71-76; <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 25:8).A pot in which a non-observant Jew knowingly cooked kosher food on Shabbat, according to MA (following Rashba), has the same status as the food he cooked and is therefore prohibited until he performs <em>hagala</em><em>Pri Megadim</em> and MB 318:4 state this as well. Others maintain that only the food is forbidden, not the pot. This is the lenient position of Ra’ah and Rosh, who are not discussing <em>ma’aseh Shabbat </em>but rather<em> bishul akum</em>, the general prohibition for Jews to eat food cooked by a non-Jew. The laws of <em>ma’aseh</em><em> Shabbat</em> are not as strict as those of <em>bishul akum</em>. For example, in the case of <em>bishul akum</em> no Jew may ever eat the food, while with <em>ma’aseh Shabbat</em> the food is forever forbidden only to the person who cooked it (and according to R. Meir, even the cook may eat it if he cooked the food unknowingly). Accordingly, the lenient position of Ra’ah and Rosh in a case of <em>bishul akum</em> should certainly apply to <em>ma’aseh</em><em> Shabbat</em> as well (<em>Erekh Ha-shulḥan</em> 318:1; <em>Livyat Ḥen</em> §42). In any case, according to all opinions, a pot that was used to cook food on Shabbat may be used by anyone besides the cook, the same way that they may eat the food itself after Shabbat.</i>
  Technically, one may buy dairy products from a dairy farm that desecrates Shabbat when milking the cows (see above 20:4), because the milk produced on Shabbat is mixed with the milk produced on other days. Thus, for any bag of milk that one buys, it is uncertain whether it was milked on Shabbat. Since the prohibition of benefiting from melakha done on Shabbat is rabbinic, in cases of uncertainty we may be lenient. This also applies to a factory that produces paper all week long, including Shabbat. Technically, one may buy its paper. Nevertheless, it is always preferable to buy products from factories and companies that observe Shabbat. If all Shabbat observers were to unite in order to strengthen Shabbat observance, it would be possible as a temporary measure to forbid any benefit from the products of factories that desecrate Shabbat (see Yalkut Yosef 318:72, 74-5; Orḥot Shabbat 25:57-61).
  
  Section 8
  
  Ma’aseh Shabbat and Lifnei Iver / After Shabbat
  Starting half an hour after Shabbat ends, one may listen to news broadcasts produced by Jews, since sufficient time has elapsed for the producers to have collected the material and write the stories after Shabbat. However, one who listens to the news immediately after Shabbat transgresses the prohibition on benefiting from melakha done on Shabbat. Starting fifteen minutes after Shabbat, one may listen to other types of programs, because in that amount of time a news program can be prepared for broadcast. Even if the technicians and newscasters live far from the studio and desecrated Shabbat to travel to the studio, since the listeners gain nothing from this desecration, it is not forbidden to listen to the broadcast.
  When Shabbat is over in Israel, one may not listen to broadcasts by Jews in America, since Shabbat there ends between seven and ten hours later than in Israel. Thus, one who listens in Israel would be benefiting from the Shabbat desecration of American Jews. For the same reason, one who is in Israel must wait approximately two hours after Shabbat ends before listening to Jewish broadcasts from Western Europe. In contrast, one may listen to broadcasts produced by non-Jews immediately after Shabbat in Israel ends.
  One may travel by bus starting half an hour after Shabbat, as that is a reasonable amount of time for the bus driver to reach one’s stop without having desecrated Shabbat. If the bus route is so long that it is clear that the driver started the route when it was still Shabbat, some forbid riding the bus (Minḥat Yitzḥak 9:39; Orḥot Shabbat 25:62), and others permit (Mishneh Halakhot 7:50). Many maintain that there is technically no prohibition because one who boards the bus half an hour after Shabbat does not benefit from the fact that the bus traveled on Shabbat; nevertheless, they continue, it is proper to be stringent as a protective measure (Tzitz Eliezer 13:48; SSK 59:9; Yalkut Yosef 318:76).
  
  Section 9
  
  Ma’aseh Shabbat and Lifnei Iver / Interacting with Non-Observant Jews and Lifnei Iver
  The Torah commands: “Do not put a stumbling block before the blind” (Vayikra 19:14), meaning that one may not cause another person to transgress (MT, Laws of a Murderer 12:14). This commandment is known as “lifnei iver” (“before the blind”). If the other person would have transgressed even without his aid, many maintain that the accessory has not transgressed the Torah prohibition on causing others to sin. However, he has transgressed the rabbinic prohibition of aiding (mesayei’a) a transgressor. Therefore, one may not allow a non-observant Jew to borrow his car or radio on Shabbat.
  Similarly, one may not give directions to a Jew who is driving on Shabbat and stops to ask for directions, even if the driver may actually end up spending more time driving without directions. There are two reasons for this. First, one may not aid a transgressor. Second, one may not speak on Shabbat about things that are prohibited on Shabbat (above 22:9). It is proper to apologize to the driver and explain that giving him directions is forbidden on Shabbat.9<i class="footnote">. R. Avigdor Nebenzahl reports in the name of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (in the journal <em>Kotlenu</em> vol. 14, pp. 254-255) that it is preferable to give the driver directions so as to minimize his driving on Shabbat. Nevertheless, <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 15:18 and <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> vol. 2, p. 180 prohibit doing so. See <em>Re’akha Kamokha</em>, pp. 152-156. There is a dispute regarding the nature of the prohibition of aiding a Jew to transgress in a situation where he can transgress even without that aid. Some say that the prohibition is rabbinic (<em>Tosafot</em>; Rema, YD 151:4); according to others, Rabbeinu Ḥananel and Rambam maintain that it is prohibited by Torah law (<em>Melumdei Milḥama</em>, p. 33f); still others maintain that if the transgressor is a <em>mumar</em> and sins knowingly, there is no prohibition at all (<em>Shakh</em>, YD 151:6). It is generally assumed that the prohibition is rabbinic.</i>
  An observant soldier may leave the light on in the bathroom before Shabbat, even though he knows that at some point a non-observant soldier will turn it off. One does not need to waive his right to leave the light on just so that his non-observant friend does not transgress by extinguishing the light. Additionally, it is reasonable to assume that his non-observant friend would turn the light on and off in any case (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in Ha-tzava Ka-halakha 31:5).
  One may invite a non-observant Jew for an entire Shabbat, even if he knows that after Friday night dinner his friend will drive home. This is as long as one honestly offers him a place to stay, such that the invitation does not necessitate Shabbat desecration. Although some forbid this, one may be lenient when one’s intent is to spread love among Jews, bringing people closer to Torah and to each other. However, sometimes it is proper to be stringent for educational reasons.
  Some are stringent and forbid a synagogue to host the celebration of a bar mitzva from a non-observant family when it is clear that some of the guests will drive to the synagogue. They maintain that the synagogue’s agreement to host the bar mitzva is like accepting and aiding Shabbat desecration. Others permit it on the grounds that these guests would be desecrating Shabbat in any case. Furthermore, the synagogue members did not ask anyone to drive, and in fact they would prefer that people come on foot. In practice, as long as the non-observant guests are respectful of the synagogue and are careful not to desecrate Shabbat inside it, the synagogue may host the bar mitzva. Nevertheless, according to many, it is still preferable to advise the family to have the boy called up to the Torah on a Monday or Thursday during Minḥa instead of on Shabbat.
  There is a similar disagreement about hosting a brit mila on Shabbat when it is clear that many family members will desecrate Shabbat by driving to the brit. In practice, a mohel may perform the brit on Shabbat in this situation.10<i class="footnote">According to <em>Igrot Moshe</em> (OḤ 1:98-99 and 4:71), one may not invite a non-observant Jew to a Shabbat event if it is clear that he will drive, but if necessary, he may notify the non-observant acquaintance of the event. <em>Shevet Ha-Levi </em>8:256 states this as well. <em>Shevet Ha-Levi</em> 1:205 and 4:135 forbid holding a <em>brit</em> on Shabbat if this will lead people to desecrate Shabbat by driving to the <em>brit</em> and taking pictures. In contrast, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach says that one may invite a non-observant Jew for Shabbat as long as the guest is given the opportunity to stay without desecrating Shabbat. This opinion is cited in <em>Rivevot Ephraim</em> 7:402 and <em>Sho’alin Ve-dorshin </em>vol. 2, pp. 18-19. <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 6:3 states that one may hold a <em>brit</em> on Shabbat even when this may lead to Shabbat desecration. See <em>Re’akha Kamokha</em>, pp. 157-163. In the text above, I am lenient, since non-observant Jews will desecrate Shabbat in any case. Besides, while they are in the synagogue they will not desecrate Shabbat, so one is not aiding them in their transgression by inviting them but in fact minimizing it. Nevertheless, to ensure that a bar mitzva celebration is free of transgression, it is preferable to celebrate by having the boy called up to the Torah on a Monday or Thursday at <em>Minḥa</em>. The guests may form a <em>minyan</em> for this purpose. Since some of the participants will not have heard the Torah reading that normally takes place every Monday and Thursday morning, they may read the Torah with the <em>berakhot</em> as part of <em>Minḥa</em> (<em>Peninei Halakha:</em> <em>Prayer</em> 22:9). This way, there is no problem with traveling or taking pictures of the event. In contrast, performing a <em>brit</em> <em>mila</em> on the baby’s eighth day is mandated by the Torah; if the eighth day is Shabbat, the <em>brit</em> should take place on Shabbat.</i>
  
  Section 10
  
  Ma’aseh Shabbat and Lifnei Iver / Keeping Websites and Vending Machines Open on Shabbat
  If a Jew owns a vending machine, and most of its users are Jewish, he must disable it for Shabbat in order to avoid aiding their desecration of Shabbat. If most of the customers are non-Jews, he need not disable it (see SSK 29:28-29 and n. 75). The money that the non-Jews put in the vending machine is not considered payment for work done on Shabbat, since they are paying primarily for the product and not to operate the machine itself.
  Some maintain that websites designed for a Jewish audience must be disabled on Shabbat so that they do not aid transgression. Since this is difficult practically, the site owner is not obligated to take them down; after all, the site visitors can easily desecrate Shabbat by visiting other sites, and as long as the site owner has done nothing to promote his site on Shabbat, there is no prohibition. However, if the site is primarily commercial, and most prospective customers are Jews, it means that the owner of the site benefits from the Shabbat activity, so he must make efforts to disable it for Shabbat. If this is very difficult, it is not obligatory. Since those who access the site are already desecrating Shabbat knowingly and regularly, some maintain that the prohibition of aiding someone’s transgression does not apply. 
  In contrast, if most of the customers are non-Jews, it is not necessary to disable the website for Shabbat. The purchases made on Shabbat are not considered payment for work done on Shabbat since the work to set up the site was done during the week.11<i class="footnote">See also <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 22:41. In n. 55, it states that a commercial website has the same status as a vending machine. It is true that some are stringent, as discussed in <em>Kedushat Ha-Shabbat</em> vol. 2, p. 15f. Nevertheless, what I wrote in the main text seems most reasonable. This is also the conclusion of <em>Responsa</em><em>Be-mar’eh Ha-bazak</em> 5:37-40. I will now explain the underlying principles. According to <em>Responsa Maharil Diskin</em><em>Kuntres Aḥaron</em> §145), one is not obligated to spend money to avoid violating <em>lifnei iver</em>, even though it is a Torah prohibition. According to <em>Atzei Ḥayim</em> (YD 5), one need not spend money to avoid <em>mesayei’a</em>, as it is only a rabbinic prohibition (though one would need to spend to avoid <em>lifnei iver</em>). In any case, leaving a website up is certainly no more than <em>mesayei’a</em>, as there are always alternative websites. According to <em>Shakh</em>, there is no prohibition at all of aiding a <em>mumar</em>’s violation of <em>halakha</em>. Therefore, if it is difficult for one to take down his website for Shabbat, he is not obligated to do so. Furthermore, the owner of the website is not transgressing the prohibition of buying and selling on Shabbat, since he is not doing anything. Rather, what takes place on the site is a commitment to complete the transaction. The money is not collected from the customer’s account until after Shabbat. If a site earns money based on page views or subscriptions, we can say that the payment is for setting up the site and publishing content, which is how we permit paying rent or for use of a <em>mikveh</em> on Shabbat. It is assumed that the payment is for the cleaning and heating of the premises, which takes place before Shabbat (<em>Noda Bi-Yehuda</em>, OḤ 2:26; see above, 22:14 and n. 9). We may also take into account the position of BHL 244:6, which permits accepting money for work done on Shabbat if one would otherwise sustain a major financial loss. One need not worry about <em>marit ayin</em>, since everyone understands that no Shabbat desecration on the part of any Jew is necessary in order to keep a website open on Shabbat.</i>
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / The Principles of Piku’aĥ Nefesh (Saving a Life)
  Saving a life overrides Shabbat, as the Torah states: “Keep My decrees and laws, which a person shall do and live by; I am the Lord” (Vayikra 18:5). The Sages expound: “‘live by’ – and not die by” (Yoma 85b); the mitzvot of the Torah were given so that people may live by them, not die to fulfill them.1<i class="footnote">Saving a life overrides all <em>mitzvot</em>, with the exception of the three cardinal sins: idolatry, murder, and sexual transgressions. Concerning these three, the rule is “One should be killed and not transgress” (<em>San</em>. 74a; MT, Laws of Torah Principles 5:1-2). The punishment that the Torah prescribes for Shabbat desecration is stoning, the most severe punishment in the Torah and the same punishment specified for idol worship. Nevertheless, when it comes to lifesaving activities, performing <em>melakha</em> on Shabbat is not considered a transgression. In contrast, the three cardinal sins are considered transgressions no matter how dire the situation. This is because if one transgresses one of them, his life loses all meaning, and he brings death and destruction to the world.</i>
  We desecrate Shabbat to attempt a rescue, even if the chances of its success are slim. Thus, we desecrate Shabbat to bring someone medication, even if it works in only a small percentage of cases, and even if it is an experimental drug that might not be effective. However, we do not desecrate Shabbat to acquire a drug if there is no substantive reason to think that it might help (MA 328:1; Rema, YD 155:3; Orḥot Shabbat 20:7).
  In a case of uncertainty, we still desecrate Shabbat. For example, if a building collapses, and we do not know whether anyone was inside, and even if someone was inside, we do not know whether he is still alive, we clear away the rubble on Shabbat despite the uncertainty (SA 329:2-5). The act of clearing rubble (“mefakḥin et ha-gal”) lends its name to the general category of piku’aḥ nefesh, which overrides Shabbat.
  Even if a rescue attempt fails, God rewards all who made an effort. Similarly, if several people drove to different places to obtain a certain medicine that someone needed, they all receive divine reward, even though some of them traveled for naught (Menaḥot 64a; SA 328:15).
  Even though one may desecrate Shabbat to save a sick person, one who knows that he will need to care for a dangerously sick person on Shabbat should prepare as much as possible beforehand to minimize the melakhot he will perform on Shabbat, since one must prepare for Shabbat before Shabbat (MB 344:11). If it is uncertain whether one will need to care for a sick person on Shabbat, it is good for him to prepare before Shabbat, though it is not obligatory (MB 330:1). For instance, if one sometimes is called upon to care for the wounded, he should preferably prepare adhesive and cloth bandages before Shabbat so that he will not have to cut them on Shabbat.
  It is good for a woman who is due to give birth to prepare her hospital bag before Shabbat. If the expectant couple is planning to drive to the hospital in their car, they should preferably remove unnecessary items from the car before Shabbat. However, the expectant mother does not need to spend the Shabbatot near her due date close to the hospital, as that is an excessive burden that one is not required to undertake on Friday. If she has to travel to the hospital on Shabbat, she may do so, since saving a life overrides Shabbat (SSK 32:34 and 36:6-7).
  
  Section 2
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / Determining Danger
  Any illness that doctors normally consider dangerous or that regular people would make haste to save a patient suffering from it is deemed dangerous halakhically, even if only a small minority of people die because of it, and therefore justifies desecrating Shabbat. Thus, one may drive a woman in labor to the hospital, even though in a clear majority of cases she can safely give birth at home (Magid Mishneh 2:11). However, one may not desecrate Shabbat on account of illnesses and risks that are generally not considered dangerous (Shevet Mi-Yehuda 1:19:2; SSK ch. 32 nn. 2 and 23).
  The Sages defined certain conditions as dangerous. These include internal injuries (severe pains or wounds or internal bleeding); injuries on the back of the hand and foot (that is, infections and dangerous cuts); very high fevers; scorpion or snake bites; and eye afflictions (SA 328:3-9). The Sages determined all of these cases based on experience, and today’s doctors agree in principle, though they use different terminology to describe the conditions. This is not the place to expand on the definition of a life-threatening condition, but there is a general principle: If those present think that the ill or injured party might be in mortal danger, they immediately do whatever is necessary to help him. If they need to call a doctor, they should do so; if they need to drive him to the hospital, they should do so.
  When the people nearby do not know whether the patient might be in danger, they should ask a doctor, nurse, or medic in the vicinity, or they should call a doctor. If the doctor thinks that the patient might be in mortal danger, even if the patient claims that his condition is not dangerous, they must heed the doctor (SA 328:10 and 618:1, 5).
  If the patient maintains that he is in danger, then even if the doctor thinks he is not, we must desecrate Shabbat and take him to the hospital to be examined. This is because “The heart knows its own bitterness” (Mishlei 14:10), meaning that sometimes only the patient can assess his own condition. Similarly, if a sick person demands a certain medicine or treatment that, based on his experience, could save his life, we heed him (SA 618:1). We only rely on the patient’s intuition on condition that it makes some sense. However, if his illness is known and he demands a treatment that the doctors believe is ineffective, we heed the doctors (BHL 328:10, s.v. “ve-rofe”). Similarly, if the sick person is known to be hypochondriac or excessively fearful and a medically knowledgeable person is certain that he is not in any danger, we do not desecrate Shabbat on his account.
  If, in an effort to be pious, one asks a rabbi whether to desecrate Shabbat in order to help someone in mortal danger, he is a killer, for while he is asking, the patient’s situation may deteriorate, and the Torah commands us: “Do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor” (Vayikra 19:16). Furthermore, the rabbi whose students ask such questions is reprehensible, as he should have taught them that saving a life overrides Shabbat (y. Yoma 8:5; MB 328:6).
  
  Section 3
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / For Whom Do We Desecrate Shabbat?
  The Sages offered a rationale for desecrating Shabbat to save someone’s life: “Desecrate one Shabbat so that he will observe many Shabbatot” (Yoma 85b). However, in practice, even when it is clear that the person being saved will not observe Shabbat, one is commanded to desecrate Shabbat to save him because the Torah strives to increase life. Therefore, we desecrate Shabbat to save a mentally impaired person (shoteh), who is exempt from observing the mitzvot. Similarly, we desecrate Shabbat for someone who is unconscious and about to die, in order to prolong his life for a short while (BHL 329:4, s.v. “ela”).
  We desecrate Shabbat in order to save an unborn fetus, even if forty days have not yet passed since conception (Behag; Ritva; BHL 330:7, end of s.v. “o”). 
  Similarly, we desecrate Shabbat to save a premature baby. Although in the past it was forbidden to desecrate Shabbat to save a baby born in the eighth month, whose nails and hair had not yet grown in, as it was certain that it would not survive, nowadays, with the improvement of medicine and the invention of the incubator, whenever doctors assess that the baby has a chance of long-term survival, we desecrate Shabbat to save him. (See SA 330:7-8; SSK 36:12 and n. 26.)
  Technically, a Jew may not desecrate Shabbat to save a non-Jew, since one may only desecrate Shabbat for the sake of someone who is himself commanded to keep Shabbat. However, in practice, this rule only applies when another non-Jew is present to save his fellow non-Jew. If no other non-Jew is present, one must treat the non-Jew, even if this requires desecrating Shabbat. Since we want non-Jews to save Jews, we must save them as well. Thus, saving a non-Jew’s life is included in the category of piku’aḥ nefesh.2<i class="footnote">The basis of this permissive ruling, namely, that it ultimately prevents danger to Jews, is articulated in <em>Ḥatam Sofer</em>, YD 131 and <em>Divrei Ḥayim</em>, OḤ 2:25. Similar rulings appear in <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 4:79; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, cited in SSK ch. 40 n. 47; <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 8:15:6 and 9:17:1; and <em>Yabi’a Omer</em> 8:38. Additionally, according to Ramban (<em>Hasagot Le-sefer Ha-mitzvot</em><em>Hosafot Le-mitzvot Aseh </em>15), we desecrate Shabbat to save a <em>ger toshav</em> (a “resident alien,” a non-Jew who has accepted the seven Noaḥide laws before a <em>beit din</em>). This is also the opinion of Rashbatz. Others maintain that even if a non-Jew did not accept the Noahide laws before a <em>beit din</em>, if he observes these laws in practice, he is considered a <em>ger toshav</em> (Maharatz Ḥayot; R. Meir Dan Plotzky). This is also the opinion of R. Naḥum Rabinovitch in <em>Melumdei Milḥama</em>, p. 143. Many others maintain that we do not desecrate Shabbat for a <em>ger toshav</em>, and that this category does not even exist nowadays. However, according to all opinions, in practice we desecrate Shabbat to save the life of any person, as explained above. In a hospital that operates in accordance with <em>halakha</em>, it is preferable to have non-Jewish doctors and nurses on duty during Shabbat. If non-Jewish patients arrive, the non-Jewish medical staff can care for them. If a Jewish doctor has the most expertise on an illness afflicting a non-Jewish patient, and during the week such a case would normally be referred to him, the Jewish doctor treats the non-Jewish patient, even if this will involve performing <em>melakhot</em> that under normal circumstances are prohibited by Torah law.</i>
  
  Section 4
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / Using a Non-Jew or Child to Minimize Shabbat Desecration
  As we have seen (above, 25:1), a Jew who performs melakha on Shabbat violates Torah law, whereas a Jew who asks a non-Jew to perform melakha for him violates rabbinic law. Similarly, a minor who performs melakha on Shabbat only transgresses rabbinically (above, 24:1). Consequently, it would seem, at first glance, that when it is necessary to do melakha in order to save a sick person, it is preferable to ask a non-Jew or a child to do it, thereby minimizing Shabbat desecration. However, the Sages stated: “These things should not be done by non-Jews or children, but rather by adult Jews” (Yoma 84b; SA 328:12). This means that even if a non-Jew or a child is present, one should not ask him to do the melakha. Only an adult Jew should do it. Rishonim offer two possible explanations for this rule. First, it is possible that a non-Jew or a child will hesitate and not act aggressively enough to help the sick person (Tosafot). Second, even when it is clear that they will act aggressively enough, we are concerned that those present might incorrectly conclude that an adult Jew may not desecrate Shabbat in order to help someone who is dangerously ill. Then, if faced with a similar situation sometime in the future, they might delay helping in order to look for a non-Jew or a child. In the meantime, the sick person might die (Ran).
  Therefore, the Rishonim write that if many people are available to help the sick person, it is a mitzva for the most respected person present to do so, thus making it clear to everyone that saving a life overrides Shabbat and that there is no need to seek ways to minimize the melakha (Ri’az; Tashbetz; MB 328:34).
  If the situation is less pressured, and it is easy to find a non-Jew or a child to do the necessary melakhot, and doing so will not cause any delay, then even though le-khatḥila an adult Jew may do whatever melakha is necessary to save a life, it is optimal greater enhancement to minimize Shabbat desecration by having a non-Jew or a child perform the melakhot (SSK 38:2). However, if there is even the slightest, tiniest shadow of a doubt that using a non-Jew or a child will delay the provision of lifesaving treatment, either now or in the future, it is better for an adult Jew to do the melakha.3<i class="footnote">According to Rashba and Ran, Shabbat is superseded (<em>deḥuya</em>) by danger to life; in contrast, according to Maharam of Rothenburg, danger to life effectively suspends Shabbat and causes all <em>melakha </em>to become completely permitted (<em>hutra</em>). It would seem that according to those who feel that Shabbat is simply superseded, Shabbat desecration should be minimized whenever possible. Those <em>melakhot</em> that are necessary should be done using a <em>shinui</em> or by a non-Jew or minor. In contrast, according to those who maintain that Shabbat is suspended, everything may be done in the normal way and all is permitted <em>le-khatḥila</em>. In truth, there is little practical difference between these approaches, since even according to those who maintain that Shabbat is merely superseded, it is still preferable for a Jew to engage in lifesaving activity rather than a non-Jew (SAH 328:13), as stated in <em>Yoma</em> 84b. Rishonim there explain that if one asks a non-Jew to help, he might not act aggressively enough (<em>Tosafot</em>), or Jews who witness this might hesitate and not act aggressively enough in future cases (Ran). Therefore, even though Rema writes in 328:12 that it is preferable to use a non-Jew, a minor, or a <em>shinui</em>, almost all Aḥaronim follow SA’s opinion that it is preferable for a Jew to be the one to desecrate Shabbat to save a life (<em>Taz</em><em>Eliya Rabba</em><em>Tosefet Shabbat</em>; MB <em>ad loc</em>. 37; SSK 32:6). Nevertheless, when there is no concern about hesitation, either in the present or in the future, it is preferable to minimize Shabbat desecration and ask a non-Jew to do the <em>melakha</em>. After all, when <em>Shabbat</em> 128b discusses the case of a woman in labor who is not in a state of panic, it states that one should use a <em>shinui</em> if possible, in order to minimize Shabbat desecration. SSK 38:2 states this as well. The order of preference is: a non-Jew, a minor, a Jew using a <em>shinui</em>, and two Jews working together.</i>
  
  Section 5
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / Using a Shinui to Minimize Shabbat Desecration
  When dealing with saving lives on Shabbat, a serious dilemma arises. On the one hand, it would seem to be preferable to use a shinui when doing whatever melakhot are necessary. After all, when a melakha is done in the normal way, one violates Torah law, while when it is done with a shinui, one transgresses only rabbinically (above 9:3). On the other hand, when it comes to saving a life on Shabbat, the Sages proclaimed that “One who acts quickly is to be praised” (Yoma 84b; SA 328:2). If so, it would seem preferable to refrain from placing constraints upon one who is attempting to save a life. Rather, he should act as he would on a weekday, as efforts such as minimizing Shabbat desecration or attempting to do the melakhot with a shinui are likely to slow him down. This is especially true if he thinks it is necessary to consult with a rabbi about how to act when a person’s life is in danger.
  In practice, the basic principle is that rescue efforts must be undertaken in the best and fastest way possible. If trying to do melakhot with a shinui is likely to delay treatment, it is preferable to do them in the normal fashion, without any shinui. This is because according to halakha, the rescuer may do melakhot in the normal way, since saving a life overrides Shabbat. Nevertheless, when it is clear that a shinui will not hamper the rescue in any way, it is preferable le-khatḥila to make use of a shinui. Therefore, it is advisable for doctors, nurses, and emergency medical workers to learn how to minimize Shabbat desecration while saving a person’s life.
  There is a similar dilemma regarding treatments normally administered to a gravely ill patient during the week, some of which are not necessary to prevent his death. Since the caregivers do not know which treatments are truly necessary and which are not, they must treat the patient just as they would treat him during the week. However, one who understands medicine and knows for certain that a specific melakha is not necessary to save the patient, or that the treatment can be postponed until after Shabbat, he should avoid doing the melakha on Shabbat (SA 328:4). Palliative treatments are administered on Shabbat even when it is clear that they do not treat the disease, because when the patient’s pain is reduced, he will have more strength to overcome his illness.4<i class="footnote">At first glance, according to those who maintain that Shabbat is suspended (<em>hutra</em>) by danger to life, all treatments normally administered to the patient are permitted, and there is no need to use a <em>shinui</em> or to minimize prohibitions. Indeed, this is implied in SA 328:4: “We do everything for him [on Shabbat] that we do for him during the week.” However, BHL, s.v. “kol” states that since the vast majority of Rishonim maintain that Shabbat is merely superseded (<em>deḥuya</em>) by danger to life, one should not do <em>melakhot</em> that are prohibited by Torah law unless they are necessary to save a life. Additionally, Rema writes in 328:12 that when possible, it is proper to employ a <em>shinui</em> when doing a <em>melakha</em>. Nevertheless, it seems that in practice there is almost no disagreement. Even according to MB, we must do anything that effectively minimizes the patient’s pain or strengthens him, because this can indirectly affect his ability to heal (SSK 32:22, 57). On the other hand, when it is possible to do the <em>melakha</em> with a <em>shinui</em> without causing any delay or hesitation, it is preferable to do so, as in the case of a woman in labor (SA 330:1). This is also the opinion of <em>Ben Ish Ḥai</em>, Year 2, Tetzaveh 15. Indeed, although some maintain that a woman in labor is an exceptional case, and that for any other sick person one should not do anything differently from what would be done during the week (<em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:36:2-3; <em>Halikhot Olam</em> vol. 4, Tetzaveh 1:4), it nevertheless seems, as I wrote in the main text, that when there is no concern that using a <em>shinui</em> will delay treatment, it is preferable to use a <em>shinui</em> and minimize Shabbat desecration. This can be seen in <em>Menaḥot</em> 64a and SA 328:16, which state (in the context of cutting figs for the needs of a gravely ill person) that one should minimize Shabbat desecration. At the same time, in order to make sure that people will not hesitate to take care of sick people, the basic instruction is that on Shabbat we do for the sick person “everything that we do for him during the week” (SA 328:4). Anyone who acts accordingly, even if he could have incorporated a <em>shinui</em>, has acted properly, as saving a life overrides Shabbat. In my humble opinion, it seems that all <em>poskim</em> would agree with this delineation. Even if those who maintain that Shabbat is suspended would say that it is unnecessary to use a <em>shinui</em>, one should <em>le-khatḥila</em> follow the majority opinion, that Shabbat is superseded, when possible (see <em>Harḥavot</em>). Hospital administrators should examine their Shabbat procedures, including the arrangements for operations, tests, changing sheets, and food preparation, in order to minimize transgressing as much as possible without harming the standard of care. It is also proper to use non-Jews for Shabbat shifts whenever possible.</i>
  
  Section 6
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / Traveling to the Hospital
  When rushing a patient to the hospital, one drives normally, as he would during the week. He should not try to drive with a shinui, as this may cause delay or be dangerous. One may travel to the hospital in a private vehicle or call an ambulance. All items necessary for the patient or woman in labor – vital medications, medical documents, and proper identification – may be carried from the house to the car, even in an area without an eruv. Even items that are not vital to saving lives but are important to the patient or his chaperone – including changes of clothing, food, and books – may be taken to the hospital. If there is no eruv, such items should be carried with a shinui. In addition, the person carrying them should walk directly from the house to the car without stopping, so that the act of carrying will qualify as a shvut di-shvut, which is permitted in a case of great necessity. Muktzeh items may not be brought, but if they were packed in the hospital bag together with necessary items, one may bring the bag. Muktzeh items that will be greatly needed after Shabbat – such as money and a cellphone – may be placed in the bag on Shabbat using a shinui and brought to the hospital along with the bag.5<i class="footnote">. Many maintain that one may carry vital items if one simply walks from the house to the car without stopping (as our streets are considered a <em>karmelit</em> according to many, and if he walks without stopping there is no Torah prohibition according to most <em>poskim</em>; see 21 n. 3). Under pressing circumstances, if one cannot figure out how to incorporate a <em>shinui</em>, one may rely upon these authorities. However, <em>le-khatḥila</em> it is proper to carry items with a <em>shinui</em>, thus meeting the requirements of all the <em>poskim</em>.Many <em>halakha</em> books have lengthy discussions about how to drive with a <em>shinui</em>. However, concerning oneself with this is likely to make it more difficult to save lives, and sometimes could even endanger the driver and passenger. Therefore, the rule is that one should drive without a <em>shinui</em>. Only one who knows how to incorporate a <em>shinui</em> without endangering anyone’s life should do so. <em>Nishmat Avraham</em> (278:4, n. 37) presents this approach in the name of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach. Regarding <em>muktzeh</em> items, see <em>Harḥavot</em>. A soldier who is called up on Shabbat may take his <em>tefilin</em> with him, because under pressing circumstances we rely on those who maintain that <em>tefilin</em> are not <em>muktzeh</em> (above, 23:8).</i>
  After arriving at the hospital and parking in a place that does not interfere with the arrival of other vehicles, it is, at first glance, forbidden to turn off the car. After all, thus far all travel was for the patient’s sake; in contrast, one turns off the car for the sake of the car itself – to lock it and to make sure that the batteries do not die. Therefore, when possible, one should ask a non-Jew to turn off the car’s motor and headlights and then to lock the car to minimize Shabbat desecration. 
  If no non-Jew is available, or if searching for one is likely to delay attending to the patient, one may turn off the car and headlights with a shinui, so that the prohibition is only rabbinic. For example, he may grasp the key or press the button that operates the headlights with the back of his fingers. He should also lock the car with a shinui, for example, by pushing the remote control with the back of his fingers. Then, even though the headlights will go on as a result, it will have been done with a shinui. The reason all this is permitted is that the Sages allowed one to take such steps at the end of a rescue effort to ensure that people are willing to do what needs to be done at the beginning. After all, if a driver knows that he will not be able to turn off and lock his car upon arrival at the hospital, the next time he might avoid taking the patient to the hospital altogether. Therefore, the Sages permitted transgressing any rabbinic prohibitions to make it easier for those individuals helping to save lives.6<i class="footnote">Many maintain that one may carry vital items if one simply walks from the house to the car without stopping (as our streets are considered a <em>karmelit</em> according to many, and if he walks without stopping there is no Torah prohibition according to most <em>poskim</em>; see 21 n. 3). Under pressing circumstances, if one cannot figure out how to incorporate a <em>shinui</em>, one may rely upon these authorities. However, <em>le-khatĥila</em> it is proper to carry items with a <em>shinui</em>, thus meeting the requirements of all the <em>poskim</em>. Many <em>halakha</em> books have lengthy discussions about how to drive with a <em>shinui</em>. However, concerning oneself with this is likely to make it more difficult to save lives, and sometimes could even endanger the driver and passenger. Therefore, the rule is that one should drive without a <em>shinui</em>. Only one who knows how to incorporate a <em>shinui</em> without endangering anyone’s life should do so. <em>Nishmat Avraham</em> (278:4, n. 37) presents this approach in the name of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach. Regarding <em>muktzeh items, see Harĥavot</em>. A soldier who is called up on Shabbat may take his tefilin with him, because under pressing circumstances we rely on those who maintain that <em>tefilin</em> are not <em>muktzeh (above, 23:8).</em></i>
  
  Section 7
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / Choosing a Hospital and Doctor
  When one must drive a gravely ill person or a woman in labor to the hospital, he should drive to the nearest hospital, in order to avoid additional Shabbat desecration. Even if there are better hospitals available, for routine matters, like births and treatment of injuries and common diseases, there is no significant difference between hospitals, so one drives to the closest one. Even if the patient or woman in labor prefers a more distant hospital because it is cheaper, has nicer rooms, or is more conveniently located for relatives who will wish to visit, since these are not medical considerations, one may not drive farther on Shabbat for any of these reasons. Similarly, if a woman is away from home for Shabbat and goes into labor, she should go to a local hospital.
  When a case is more complicated and there is a medical reason to prefer a more distant hospital, one may drive there on Shabbat. For example, if the more distant hospital specializes in the treatment of the patient’s illness, or if the illness is complex, and the more distant hospital is already familiar with the patient and will therefore be able to provide the appropriate treatment more quickly, one may drive the patient there. So too, if a woman’s pregnancy is considered high-risk, and the distant hospital has a protocol in place for her needs, one may drive her there on Shabbat. Everything should be done in accordance with accepted medical recommendations. The more complicated and difficult the case, the farther one may travel to ensure the best care. Thus, if there is only a slight medical advantage, one may travel only slightly farther to gain that advantage. After all, during the week, sick people and women in labor are not advised to travel long distances to the best hospitals for every minor medical issue. So too on Shabbat, they may not travel farther to reach the best hospitals, since accepted medical recommendations do not demand it.
  If a woman in labor claims that she will receive better medical care at a more distant hospital, even if her claim has no realistic basis, one may drive a bit farther in order to ease her mind, but not a lot farther. Even when one may extend the drive for a medical reason, it must remain within reason.
  In general, it is preferable to go to a hospital that operates in accordance with halakha. On Shabbat, one may travel slightly farther in order to reach such a hospital. This way there will be less Shabbat desecration in the hospital, and the patient will feel more comfortable. However, one should not travel much farther for this purpose.7<i class="footnote">If the more distant hospital has a medical approach that is more compatible with the patient’s or pregnant woman’s outlook (for example, a preference for natural childbirth over Caesarean sections), one may travel farther to get there. However, since this is not a clear advantage, and in most cases this difference in outlook does not come into play, one should not travel much farther to reach the preferred hospital for this reason.According to R. Eliezer Waldenberg, if there is no medical reason to prefer a more distant doctor, but the patient believes that the distant doctor is better, one must listen to the patient and call the preferred doctor, even when it involves additional Shabbat desecration (<em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 13:55-56). As the Yerushalmi states: “A person does not merit to be healed by just anyone” (<em>y. Nedarim</em> 4:2). He also infers this from AZ 55a, which speaks of suffering resulting from the treatment of a particular doctor. Therefore, one must listen to a patient who demands a specific doctor. SSK 32:38 states similarly, as does R. Yitzḥak Zilberstein (<em>Torat Ha-yoledet</em> 7:2), who adds that if a woman in labor feels that the standard of medical care is better in the more distant hospital, one may travel there. He cites R. Scheinberg (n. 4) as saying that under normal circumstances, one should rely on the nearest hospital since we do not allow additional Shabbat desecration in order to put the patient’s mind at rest unless it is a situation where the Sages tell us that if we do not ease his mind, he will be in danger.In my opinion, if there is no substantive medical reason to prefer the more distant hospital, but nevertheless the patient feels that the distant hospital is medically superior, one may travel a little farther, but not much farther. The reason for this is that for a dangerously sick person, we do everything on Shabbat that we would do during the week (Rambam; SA 328:3). However, going beyond this is overly indulgent. During the week, medical opinion is that it is proper to travel a little farther to ease the mind of a gravely ill person or a woman in labor, but that there is no need to travel much farther. A possible support for this position appears in another area of Shabbat law: during the course of a circumcision, one may cut away bits of skin that do not invalidate the circumcision, even though cutting them off on Shabbat would otherwise be prohibited by Torah law (Shabbat 133b; SA 331:2). This is because once circumcision overrides Shabbat, everything that is part of the circumcision process overrides it as well (Rashi). Thus, arguably, once one may travel on Shabbat, one may extend the trip a little to get to the hospital that the patient thinks is medically superior. However, to extend the trip greatly would mean that the patient would no longer view the extra travel as an addition to the basic trip but rather a separate trip – which may be undertaken only if it may save a life. In contrast, if the patient concedes that the more distant hospital is not medically superior, but he just has a better feeling about it, the trip should not be extended at all. See Torat Ha-yoledet ch. 7, end of n. 4. We should add that in the case of a complex illness, there can sometimes be a medical advantage if the patient is personally acquainted with a member of the medical staff.Zilberstein points out that one should not increase travel time in order to reach a hospital just because it has higher kashrut standards. However, if the more distant hospital will make a point of minimizing Shabbat desecration, it may be that it is preferable to travel to it, because of the principle (Menaḥot 63b, 72a) that it is better to transgress one melakha many times than several melakhot a few times each (Torat Ha-yoledet 7:3-4). We should add that it also may be that the sick person has more confidence in the medical staff at the religious hospital, in which case one may travel a little farther to reach it.If a woman in labor tells an ambulance driver that she prefers the more distant hospital because she feels that it is medically superior, but the real reason for her preference is so that her family will be able to visit her, the resulting Shabbat desecration is her responsibility, since the driver has no way to know that she is lying. From his perspective, this may be a case of saving a life, on account of which one desecrates Shabbat.</i>
  
  Section 8
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / Accompanying a Sick Person or Woman in Labor to the Hospital
  A patient who is rushed to the hospital generally needs a chaperone, to offer support and to ensure that he is given proper care by the medical staff. Unfortunately, due to heavy volume of patients at a hospital, patients who are alone are sometimes overlooked. Therefore, if a family finds out that a relative has been hospitalized with a serious injury or illness and is alone in the hospital, one of the family members must travel there, even on Shabbat.
  Similarly, a woman in labor must be accompanied to the hospital. Even if she does not request, someone – her husband, mother, or doula – should travel with her. If the woman in labor or the patient arrives at the hospital without a chaperone, it is permitted to call someone to travel to the hospital. Even though caring for a woman in labor is straightforward and familiar, there is still a concern that she will panic and endanger herself. Therefore, one may desecrate Shabbat on her behalf and do whatever he may do for a dangerously sick person (SA 330:1; MB ad loc. 3; BHL s.v. “u-madlikin”).
  Recently, some women request the presence of both their husbands and their mothers at the hospital. Some also ask their doulas to attend. Since this is not a lifesaving medical necessity, only one chaperone may travel along – her husband, her mother, or her doula. Only in an unusual circumstance, such as when a woman becomes hysterical and insists that both her husband and her mother must accompany her, may they both do so. Similarly, if she experiences anxiety and demands that they call her doula, the doula may be called. Nevertheless, one may not plan for more than one person to accompany her on Shabbat.
  Others disagree and maintain that one should do whatever the woman in labor wants, even if she is not hysterical. If she wants her husband, mother, and doula to come with her, they all travel along, to put her mind at ease. According to this approach, one may even make a detour in order to pick them up or call them to request that they make their own way to the hospital. However, this would seem to be excessive, and it does not legitimize driving on Shabbat. The widespread custom is that one person accompanies a woman in labor. However, if the drive is long and the husband is driving, the mother or doula may come along as well, since sometimes another person is needed to help the woman during the drive.
  If the woman in labor has small children at home, one must prearrange for neighbors to care for the children in the event that the parents must travel on Shabbat. However, if they live in a remote location, or if the neighbors are bad or untrustworthy people, with whom it dangerous to leave children, and leaving the children home alone would also be dangerous, the children may travel with the parents to the hospital. One may also make a slight detour in order to drop them off with a family that can take care of them.8<i class="footnote">One may violate Torah prohibitions in order to accompany a sick person or a woman in labor, just as one may light a fire for a woman in labor even when it is not truly necessary (SA 330:1; MB <em>ad</em><em>loc</em>. 3; BHL s.v. “u-madlikin”). This is even more relevant today, when the generally accepted wisdom is that the patient needs someone to accompany him in the hospital in order to ensure that he receives proper care (<em>Nishmat Avraham</em>, OḤ 278:4 with n. 29, and 330:6 citing R. Yehoshua Neuwirth; R. Yoel Katan in <em>Assia</em> 9). If a non-Jew is available to drive the children to family or friends, one may ask him to do so, even if the neighbors can watch the children in a pinch. If it is not necessary to take a detour or make an extra trip to pick up the mother or the doula, even if the woman in labor is not completely hysterical, if she demands that they travel with her even on Shabbat, they may be picked up in a pinch. However, one may not plan for them to travel with her, because in fact there is no need for more than one person to escort her.A woman in labor who wants to rely on the lenient opinion and have two people accompany her must be honest with herself regarding how much she truly needs the extra person. She should imagine that, for example, she went into labor on a Shabbat that her mother or doula happened to be hosting large numbers of guests for a son’s <em>aufruf</em>, when traveling to the hospital would mean deserting her guests until after Shabbat and missing her son being called up to the Torah. If, under such circumstances, the woman in labor would still demand that her mother or doula accompany her in addition to her husband, and they would still agree to go, this indicates that they really do consider their role in her childbirth potentially lifesaving, and they may accompany her according to the lenient opinion. However, if under such circumstances the woman in labor would forgo their presence, it indicates that she does not consider their role to be life-saving. Accordingly, even on a regular Shabbat, she should suffice with one chaperone. The ambulance driver does not count as a chaperone, as he will not stay in the hospital with the patient or woman in labor (see <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 1:132; <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:36:23; BHL 330:1, s.v. “u-madlikin”; <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 330:9). It is proper not to rely on the lenient opinion at all, because adding another chaperone has no lifesaving value; the merit of keeping Shabbat is more effective.</i>
  
  Section 9
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / Driving Home on Shabbat
  If the patient is released after it is determined that he is not in danger, he and his chaperones may not desecrate Shabbat to return home. If necessary – for example, if the patient needs rest – he may be transported home by a non-Jewish driver. However, the chaperone may not ride along unless the patient needs help en route (see below, 28:2).
  Similarly, if a woman is rushed to the hospital to give birth and then released after an examination reveals that she is not yet ready to give birth, she may not desecrate Shabbat to return home. In a time of need, if she is still considered sick – for example, if she needs to lie down – she may be driven home by a non-Jew, but her chaperone may not ride along.
  A Jewish ambulance driver from an outlying community, which needs an ambulance for emergencies, may return to his community after transporting a patient to the hospital. However, he may not drive home the patient or his chaperone, as transporting them entails transgressing Torah prohibitions, since their added weight causes the engine to burn more fuel. Even if the prohibition were merely rabbinic, it would still be forbidden for them to ride home with a Jewish driver.9<i class="footnote">. As explained in the next section and in n. 12, the Sages’ permissive ruling that “the end is permitted because of the beginning” applies primarily to doctors, nurses, and emergency medical volunteers, who often need to travel on Shabbat. If we would not make it easy for them to return home, there is a real concern that in the future they will avoid setting out in the first place. In contrast, the Sages were not lenient for the patients themselves and their chaperones because there is no concern that they will hesitate to come in the future. After all, a person will always be concerned about his own health. Moreover, the incidents are infrequent and would not regularly disrupt the patient’s Shabbat rest. However, in a time of need a patient may return home with a non-Jewish driver because one may instruct a non-Jew to perform <em>melakhot</em> that are prohibited by Torah law on behalf of a sick person, even if there is no danger to life (SA 328:17; MB <em>ad loc.</em> 47; below, 28:2). However, there are no grounds for leniency for a chaperone, as his added weight would cause the engine to burn more fuel (<em>Nishmat Avraham</em> 278:4 and n. 47; 330:9). But if the patient requires a chaperone on the trip back, the chaperone may travel with the patient and the non-Jewish driver.</i>
  If a Jewish ambulance driver in a city drives to treat a patient, he may not drive back to the EMT station afterwards on Shabbat. Since ambulances contain two-way radios, the driver can be contacted at his present location if he is needed for another emergency. However, if there is a real need to drive back – for example, if he expects that he will need an additional medic or more medical equipment for his next trip, or if resting at the station will enable him to treat people more effectively later – he may return to the station.
  If an ambulance was summoned to treat someone in grave danger, but before the ambulance arrives another way to rush him to the hospital was found, someone must call and cancel the request for an ambulance, as it may be needed for a patient elsewhere while it continues to a destination where it is no longer needed. Additionally, there is a concern that medical personnel will not take things seriously when they are alerted on Shabbat in the future, thinking that their help might no longer be necessary but that no one has notified them because they do not want to make a phone call on Shabbat.
  If a Jewish driver is transporting a woman in labor to the hospital, and during the drive she says that her contractions have stopped (to the point that, if she were at home, she would not consider going to the hospital), he may not continue driving. He must stop and park in a safe place until Shabbat is over (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach). If the ambulance must be returned to the station for reasons of piku’aḥ nefesh, the driver returns to the station, and the woman and her chaperone may remain in the ambulance and return with him.
  A Jewish doctor who is summoned to treat a gravely ill patient may drive to the patient without ascertaining the details, since even the possibility of saving a life overrides Shabbat. Nevertheless, it is preferable that he call to clarify the patient’s state, since it is possible that the clarification will lead the doctor to decide that the trip is unnecessary, and it is preferable to minimize the Shabbat desecration. Even when it is clear that the patient is gravely ill and requires the doctor, the phone conversation is still useful. First, it is possible that the doctor will be able to give specific instructions for how to care for the patient until he arrives. Additionally, it may become clear to the doctor that he needs to bring additional equipment with him.10<i class="footnote">The Talmud states in <em>Eruvin</em> 32b that it is preferable for a learned person to transgress a minor prohibition in order to save an unlearned person from unknowingly transgressing a severe prohibition. This is the ruling of SA 306:14 and MB <em>ad loc</em>. 56, which state that one should desecrate Shabbat to save a Jew from apostasy. Based on this, when an ambulance was summoned but an alternative arrangement was made after the request was issued, one should call and cancel the request. Compared to driving on Shabbat, which involves multiple violations of <em>Mav’ir</em>, making a phone call is a less severe transgression. However, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach opposes this approach, presenting a strong argument: there is no transgression involved in traveling to save lives, so calling to cancel does not minimize Shabbat desecration (cited in <em>Ha-tzava Ka-halakha</em> 32:1, n. 3). <em>Torat Ha-yoledet</em> ch. 21 n. 2 makes the same point in the name of R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv. Nevertheless, R. Chaim Pinchas Scheinberg comments there that even those who are undertaking lifesaving work should minimize Shabbat desecration, as MB states in 328:35. It would seem, though, that someone must cancel the request for an ambulance for a different reason: to potentially save another life. There may be someone elsewhere who is gravely ill, and the ambulance will not be available to help him if it is making this unnecessary trip. In addition, a false alarm is likely to cause the emergency medical workers to hesitate in the future, especially if they know that on Shabbat people will not call to cancel the request for a doctor or an ambulance.If a Jewish ambulance driver is in the process of driving a woman in labor to the hospital and her contractions stop, he may not continue traveling (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Minḥat Shlomo 1:91:21; Nishmat Avraham 330:25 and n. 7). However, if he is from an outlying community and must return there with the ambulance, he need not stop to drop off the passengers before he returns to the station. Doing so would require additional violations of Mav’ir with respect to the lights and the engine. Since the passengers are already in the vehicle, they may return with him.</i>
  
  Section 10
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / Doctors and Nurses Driving to Work and Back Home on Shabbat
  If a doctor has a shift on Shabbat morning and lives too far away from the hospital to reach it on foot, he must drive to the hospital before Shabbat so he will not have to desecrate Shabbat. Be-di’avad, if he did not drive to the hospital beforehand, he may drive there on Shabbat, since saving a life overrides Shabbat. Nevertheless, if he knows before Shabbat that he will have a shift on Shabbat, he must arrange to spend Shabbat in the hospital or nearby (Igrot Moshe, OḤ 1:131).
  The best solution for doctors and nurses in such a situation is to hire a non-Jewish driver to drive them from their homes to the hospital. This way, these doctors and nurses can enjoy Shabbat in their homes, and then when they need to go to the hospital, they can get there with the help of a non-Jew. Even though the Sages prohibited benefiting from melakha performed by a non-Jew on Shabbat (above, 25:1), they permitted this for the sake of a sick person.11<i class="footnote">. In a place where using a non-Jewish driver is not possible, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach says (in opposition to <em>Igrot Moshe</em>) that a doctor may stay at home until he needs to go to the hospital for his shift. When the time comes for him to leave, since it is for a lifesaving endeavor, he may drive to the hospital. Even though it is true as a rule that one should prepare before Shabbat to obviate the need for Shabbat desecration, there is no need to take the very difficult step of spending all of Shabbat away from home, thus harming both his <em>oneg Shabbat</em> and his family time. However, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach emphasizes that one should be lenient in this case only if the hospital administration makes serious efforts to prevent unnecessary Shabbat desecration. Therefore, in his opinion, one should not in fact be lenient in this situation nowadays, as it is possible to arrange for a non-Jewish driver. With a non-Jewish driver, one may also be lenient and travel farther than twelve <em>mil</em>, which some say is the <em>teḥum</em> by Torah law (SSK ch. 32 n. 106; ch. 40 n. 71; see the end of the next note).</i>
  Doctors and nurses who finish their shifts on Shabbat morning may return home with the help of a non-Jewish driver. The Sages ruled that those involved with saving lives on Shabbat may transgress rabbinic prohibitions in order to return home, so that they will not be tempted in the future to refuse to go in the first place. If they are forced to stay in the hospital until after Shabbat, it will be very upsetting for them and their families, and we are concerned that as a result they will quit their jobs or avoid working shifts on Shabbat.12<i class="footnote">The Mishna in<em> Eruvin</em> 44b states that those who set out on a rescue mission outside of the <em>teḥum</em> may travel 2,000 <em>amot</em> in any direction, the same as anyone else at their destination. <em>Tosafot</em> (s.v. “kol”) comment that this is an example of the rationale of “the end is permitted because of the beginning,” where certain actions at the end of an undertaking are permitted in order to ensure that people will be willing to do what needs to be done at the beginning. For instance, if we do not allow the rescuers 2,000 <em>amot</em> of movement, they will hesitate to undertake the rescue mission in the first place. Similarly in RH 23b, the Talmud states that a midwife who traveled beyond the <em>teḥum</em> on Shabbat may then travel 2,000 <em>amot</em> as well. This is the ruling of SA 329:9 and §407. See below, 30:11. Most <em>poskim</em> limit this rationale to rabbinic transgressions (MA 497:18; <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 11:39), and they do not always permit these either (<em>Har Tzvi</em>, OḤ 2:10; <em>Minḥat Shlomo</em> 1:8). However, <em>Minḥat Shlomo</em>, <em>Mahadura Tinyana </em>60:11 permits returning with the help of a non-Jewish driver if it is within twelve <em>mil</em>. Some maintain that when necessary, this principle overrides even Torah prohibitions, to ensure that people will not hesitate before setting out on future lifesaving trips (see <em>Ḥatam Sofer</em>, OḤ 203; <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 4:80; <em>Amud Ha-yemini</em> §17). See <em>Ha-tzava Ka-halakha</em> 24 n. 18; <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 20:59-61 and Essay 5 at the end of the work; SSK 40:81, 83; <em>Nishmat Avraham</em> 278:4 and n. 47.In practice, since it is possible to arrange for a non-Jewish driver to take doctors and nurses back to their homes, under no circumstances should one be lenient and drive home on Shabbat with a Jewish driver. If no non-Jewish driver is available, there is no concern that in the future they will hesitate to go to the hospital in the first place because of this one instance. With a non-Jewish driver, one may be lenient and drive even beyond twelve mil, since according to most Rishonim even this distance is only a rabbinic prohibition (Rosh and Rashba; see below 30:1). In addition, when people are inside a vehicle, the road is a karmelit and the Jewish passenger is not actively doing anything, so there is a strong case to say that even those who are stringent regarding twelve mil would not maintain that any Torah prohibition is involved (see Assia 7, pp. 241-249).</i>
  
  Section 11
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / Scheduling Surgeries and Circumcisions on the Days Preceding Shabbat
  Sometimes, one may need to schedule a surgical procedure that will then require follow-up care involving the performance of various melakhot. Similarly, some procedures, such as the extraction of a wisdom tooth, cause pain for several days, which may impair one’s ability to enjoy Shabbat. If the surgery is not urgent, it is proper le-khatḥila to schedule it for the first three days of the week. However, if the best surgeon is only available during the second half of the week, the operation may be scheduled for then, even if it is possible to get an appointment at the beginning of the week with a less expert surgeon (see above, 2:10-11).
  If a woman is due to give birth and her doctors decide that labor should be induced, it may be done on Friday, even though it is reasonable to assume that this will cause her to give birth on Shabbat (SSK 32:33 and the notes).
  If an operation is urgent, it should not be postponed, even if it is possible to postpone it until the beginning of the week. This is because sometimes problems arise, and the surgery may be delayed beyond the time that is medically desirable.
  If a baby boy was sick and his circumcision was delayed, poskim disagree whether the circumcision may be held on a Thursday or Friday. Some argue that since it has already been postponed beyond the Torah-mandated eighth day, the baby should not be circumcised on Thursday or Friday, because in the days following the circumcision he might require care that would involve Shabbat desecration. This is the custom in many Sephardic communities (Tashbetz 1:21; Rav Pe’alim, YD 4:28; Yabi’a Omer, YD 5:23). Others maintain that the likelihood of needing to desecrate Shabbat following the circumcision is not high, and since there is a mitzva to perform the circumcision as soon as possible, one should do so even on Thursday or Friday (Shakh, YD 266:18; MA 331:9). This is the widespread custom among Ashkenazic and Yemenite Jews, as well as some Sephardim.
  
  Section 12
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / Fighting Wars on Shabbat
  It is a mitzva to wage a defensive war against Israel’s enemies. This mitzva is even greater than the mitzva of saving human life, as one is not required to risk his own life in order to save the life of another, or even multiple lives. In contrast, it is a mitzva – incumbent upon every individual – to risk one’s life to save the Jewish people from their enemies (Mishpat Kohen §143; Tzitz Eliezer 13:100; see Peninei Halakha: Collected Essays II 11:3).
  Therefore, if enemies attack Israel, it is a mitzva to wage war against them even if this will endanger lives and require Shabbat desecration. Indeed, Rambam rules: “There is a mitzva incumbent upon all capable Jews to come to the aid of their brothers who are under siege, and to save them from non-Jews on Shabbat; they may not delay until after Shabbat…” (MT 2:23). Similarly, if it is known that enemies or terrorists are planning to attack Jews, it is a mitzva to attack them in order to deter them. If there is a strategic objective served by attacking them on Shabbat, we attack on Shabbat (Heikhal Yitzḥak, OḤ 37:3; Amud Ha-yemini §16; see Rema 329:6).
  Furthermore, it is also a mitzva to wage war to prevent future danger, even though doing so will put lives at risk and require Shabbat desecration. This is in accordance with the statement of the Sages that if enemies come to pillage border towns, even if they are taking only straw and hay, “we attack them with weapons and desecrate Shabbat on their account” (Eruvin 45a). We do this because if our enemies know that they can steal without repercussions, they will ultimately end up attacking people. This is also the ruling of Shulḥan Arukh (329:6). Accordingly, it is a mitzva to perform ongoing security operations on Shabbat, to protect our borders from our enemies. Nowadays, the entire country of Israel has the status of border towns with respect to preventing terror attacks (R. Shlomo Goren). Therefore, throughout Israel, it is a mitzva to perform ongoing security operations on Shabbat, to protect life and property.
  If Jews who do not observe Shabbat go on a hike on Shabbat in an area where it is necessary to travel with an armed escort, and there is no way to prevent them from hiking in the first place, it is a mitzva for soldiers to protect them, even if this entails Shabbat desecration. Even though it is the hikers’ Shabbat desecration that creates the need for security, nevertheless, since they are in fact in a dangerous place, they must be protected from the enemy (R. Goren, Meshiv Milḥama 1:7 and 2:110; see Ha-tzava Ka-halakha ch. 21). However, soldiers may not help them desecrate Shabbat. Thus, soldiers may not open checkpoints for them so that they can pass through, give them travel permits, or board their bus to enable them to set out. Only after the group is already underway may soldiers provide security for them.
  Bodies of fallen soldiers may be retrieved from the battlefield on Shabbat to ensure that they do not fall into enemy hands. Even though technically one may not desecrate Shabbat in order to save corpses, since abandoning bodies harms the morale of soldiers, and since Israeli society is willing to free terrorists in order to retrieve bodies captured by the enemy, retrieving them from the battlefield prevents danger to life. After the bodies are recovered, one may not desecrate Shabbat any further to care for the bodies (Meshiv Milḥama vol. 1, p. 61 and 2:117; Ha-tzava Ka-halakha ch. 20).
  The war to conquer the Eretz Yisrael is considered a milḥemet mitzva (obligatory war). Accordingly, when there is a tactical advantage, one may initiate an attack even on Shabbat, as our ancestors did in the days of Yehoshua when they conquered Yeriḥo on Shabbat (y. Shabbat 1:8; Tur, OḤ 249:1).13<i class="footnote">A <em>milḥemet reshut</em> (discretionary war) should not be started on Shabbat, nor on the last three days of the week. However, if a war continues until Shabbat, even if it seems as if it will not hurt the war effort to stop fighting on Shabbat, we do not stop. As the Torah states: “You may cut [trees] down for constructing siege works against the city that is waging war on you, until it has been reduced” (Devarim 20:20). The Sages tell us: “We do not begin a siege against a non-Jewish town in the last three days of the week; but if it was begun, we do not stop. Shammai used to say that ‘until it has been reduced’ means even on Shabbat.” A <em>milḥemet reshut</em> is a war that is meant to extend the boundaries of Israel and increase its power. Such a war is undertaken only by a Jewish king and with the consent of the <em>Sanhedrin</em> (MT, Laws of Kings 5:1-2). It should be noted that in the past, when all monarchies would launch discretionary wars, the monarchy of Israel had to initiate such wars as well, in order to solidify its position. Had it not done so, it would have endangered its long-term survival.In contrast, a war undertaken to conquer Eretz Yisrael is a <em>milḥemet mitzva</em>, as Ramban writes (<em>Hasagot Le-sefer Ha-mitzvot</em><em>Hosafot Le-mitzvot Aseh </em>4). A great many authorities agree with him (see <em>Li-netivot Yisrael</em> vol. 1 ch. 23: “Le-mitzvot Ha-aretz”). At first glance, it seems Rambam believes that conquering Eretz Yisrael is not included in the definition of <em>milḥemet mitzva</em>. However, he too concedes that if an enemy attacks, it is a mitzva to mount a defensive war, both because of the mitzva to settle the land (<em>Devar Yehoshua</em>, OḤ 2:48), and because of the danger to life (<em>Melumdei Milḥama</em> §1). See <em>Ha-tzava Ka-halakha</em>, pp. 7-10.In Meshiv Milḥama 1:2, R. Goren analyzes the Gemara’s dictum, “‘until it has been reduced’ means even on Shabbat.” He extrapolates that permission to violate Shabbat for war is even more sweeping than permission to violate Shabbat to save a life. Specifically, a milḥemet mitzva completely suspends (hutra) Shabbat, whereas saving a life only supersedes (doḥeh) Shabbat. When Rambam limits starting a siege to the beginning of the week, he is referring to local battles, but an all-out war has no Shabbat limitations. It is as if Shabbat has been canceled entirely. However, many view the legitimacy of fighting on Shabbat as an expanded form of saving a life, since the soldiers are engaged in saving many lives. Others, based on MT 30:13, maintain that even for a milḥemet mitzva, we do not begin a siege at the end of the week. This is the opinion of Radbaz 4:77. Tur, OḤ 249, states that it is a milḥemet reshut that we do not start in the days preceding Shabbat, but we may start a milḥemet mitzva even on Shabbat itself. The entire disagreement is limited to a case in which there is no tactical advantage to beginning the war on Shabbat; but if starting the war on Shabbat is likely to save lives, then all agree that we may start the war on Shabbat. See Ha-tzava Ka-halakha 25:13, pp. 250-251.</i>
  
  Section 13
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / A Commanding Officer’s Authority During Wartime and Normal Times
  During a war, one must do everything possible for the sake of victory, on Shabbat as well. One may not delay matters by referring questions to rabbis, nor should he bother commanding officers by asking them what is or is not necessary. Rather, anything required must be done as quickly as possible.
  In contrast, in normal times, when routine and ongoing security operations and intelligence-gathering are being carried out, Shabbat desecration should be minimized. Only activities meant to prevent life-threatening situations should be undertaken. When possible, it is preferable to use a shinui or another method that renders these actions prohibited on the rabbinic level only. To that end, the military rabbinate of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) must establish special Shabbat procedures that enable each soldier to carry out his security operations while minimizing Shabbat desecration. Normally, one may not conduct training exercises on Shabbat. Only when forces are on high alert and there is a security need may soldiers be trained for an upcoming operation in which they will participate.14<i class="footnote">. See the previous note. In an all-out war, R. Goren maintains that Shabbat is suspended. Even according to those who disagree and argue that Shabbat is only superseded, we must avoid doing anything that might prolong the war. As we saw above in sections 4-5, a <em>shinui</em> should not be used if it may delay victory, either now or in the future. In contrast, in normal times, when one can wait patiently to undertake an activity, he should minimize Shabbat desecration as much as possible. For example, one should begin with the least severe prohibition, similar to how a sick person should eat on Yom Kippur (SA 619:7-8). Rema YD 155:3 and <em>Bi’ur Ha-Gra</em> <em>ad loc</em>. 24 extend this principle to medical treatments in general. See above in 18:2, where we discuss when writing is necessary on Shabbat and how to minimize the prohibitions involved. See also <em>Ha-tzava Ka-halakha</em> 16:26 with n. 51, and 17:8.</i>
  When things function properly, one may rely on a commanding officer’s familiarity with both security needs and halakha, in accordance with the directives of the military rabbinate. Then, if he gives an order that entails Shabbat desecration, the implication is that it is necessary for security needs and must be obeyed. However, when there is reason to distrust the officer – whether because he does not take the rabbinate’s directives seriously, because the rabbinate is not fulfilling its responsibilities, or because the order is illogical – the soldier must clarify with his commanding officer whether the action requested is necessary for security. If, despite what the officer says, it is clear to the soldier that the order involves Shabbat desecration that is not necessary to maintain security, he may not obey the order, as one may not desecrate Shabbat except to save a life. If the soldier is uncertain, he must follow the order, because even the possibility of saving a life overrides Shabbat. However, after Shabbat he must clarify with the army rabbinate, and if necessary with his own rabbis, whether the order was legitimate or not. If it was not, he must file a complaint against his commanding officer and object to his actions, using all avenues available to him.
  The primary way to determine if the purpose of an army operation is connected to piku’aḥ nefesh is to see how the army actually relates to the operation. If all week long it is taken seriously and viewed as indispensable to security, and it is carried out even if it involves missing rest time or canceling an entertainment program, then it may be done on Shabbat. However, if all week long it is not taken seriously, and the operation is sometimes canceled for the sake of convenience, then there is no license to desecrate Shabbat in order to do it.15<i class="footnote">It is difficult to define what level of danger justifies desecration of Shabbat, since there are endless dangers. Even routine life is full of danger – on the roads, while going for a walk, and even while climbing a ladder at home. Even the flu can become life-threatening on rare occasions. Nevertheless, we do not hospitalize everyone who contracts the flu. The rule is that if something is generally considered dangerous, and people take serious, directed action to avoid it, it is considered a danger for which one desecrates Shabbat. This is the position of R. Isser Yehuda Unterman in <em>Shevet Mi-Yehuda</em> 1:19:2, as quoted in SSK ch. 32 n. 2. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and R. Eliezer Waldenberg (<em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> 9:17:8:22) agree with this position. Thus we can generally establish the <em>halakha</em> based on how people relate to the danger all week. See <em>Ha-tzava Ka-halakha</em> 16:8, 13, 14, 16-19.</i>
  
  Section 14
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / Common Army Questions
  Soldiers who are patrolling in a vehicle on Shabbat may not deviate from the established route in order to eat in a more convenient outpost or to meet up with friends, because driving is permitted to them only for the sake of security. However, if there is no specific patrol route, the soldiers may plan the route to suit their convenience. If they have a half-hour break to eat and rest, they may plan for that break to be at a place of their convenience. If they are expected to patrol inside settlements to make the army presence felt and to deter terrorists, they may park near a synagogue or somewhere convenient for eating.16<i class="footnote">. The Talmud states in <em>Yoma</em> 84b that one may engage in actions that are aimed at saving lives even when the actions serve a secondary purpose as well. For example, one may use a net to retrieve a child who fell into a river, even if some fish will be caught as well. Similarly, one may build steps to rescue a child from a pit, even if these steps will be useful later on as well. This is the ruling of SA 328:13. All this is on condition that no additional <em>melakha </em>is done to achieve the secondary purpose. Rishonim disagree about whether one may intend to achieve the secondary purpose; this is discussed in SHT <em>ad loc</em>. 17. However, in the case of patrolling soldiers, even if they intend to eat at a convenient place, it would seem that all would permit this. After all, there is a slight tactical advantage in doing so, as they will be more refreshed as a result. See <em>Ha-tzava Ka-halakha</em> 17:6, pp. 172-3.</i>
  Soldiers who know that they will be commencing a military operation on Shabbat must spend Shabbat on their base, since if they travel home before Shabbat, they would have to desecrate Shabbat to return to the base (see MB 344:11). Even if the commanding officer is married and will greatly upset his family members by remaining on base, if the operation will definitely take place on Shabbat, he may not go home, since that would force him to travel back on Shabbat. However, if there is a chance that the operation will be canceled, he may go home for Shabbat. As long as it is not certain that the operation will be executed on Shabbat, he may try to preserve his and his family’s oneg Shabbat. The officer should be sure to explain to his family that since it is uncertain whether or not he will be called, he may remain at home. This way they will not belittle Shabbat observance. If he finds out on Shabbat that the operation is taking place, he may drive to the base. If it can be arranged for a non-Jew to drive him to the base on Shabbat, then even if he is certain that the operation will take place on Shabbat, he may go home for Shabbat and then have the non-Jew drive him to the base. After the operation, if a non-Jew is available to drive him home, he may travel with him. If no non-Jewish driver is available, he may not return home.17<i class="footnote">See section 10 and n. 11 above regarding a doctor who has a shift on Shabbat. It emerges from there that when it is certain that a military operation will begin on Shabbat, the officers and soldiers must spend Shabbat on the base. According to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, they may spend Shabbat at home and then drive to the base on Shabbat, but the accepted ruling is to be stringent. Even if one could be lenient on a one-time basis, one may not rely on this leniency regularly (see section 2 and n. 7 above). Furthermore, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach himself did not rule this way in practice. He only said that one is not obligated to object if someone else is lenient (<em>Ha-tzava Ka-halakha</em> 26:19 and n. 41). Therefore, in practice, an officer who knows that he will need to lead an operation on Shabbat should remain on base. However, if there is a chance that the operation will be canceled, it would seem that a career officer may spend Shabbat at home. If he is called up, then he travels to the base. We must take into account that if we are too stringent and demand that he remains on base, the pressure from his family to leave the army will increase. Even though we do not use this reasoning to allow him to return home after an operation if Torah prohibitions are involved (as explained above in n. 12), nevertheless, before the operation, when there is some doubt about whether it will be carried out, he may be lenient. See further above, 2:10-11. If a non-Jewish driver is available, the officer may travel both ways with him just as doctors and nurses do, as explained above in section 10 and n. 12.</i>
  If soldiers are summoned to deal with an incident, but before they arrive it becomes clear that they are not needed, they should be called and told not to come, in order to minimize Shabbat desecration. An additional justification for this is that if it later becomes clear to soldiers that they were not informed of the cancelation because people did not want to use the phone on Shabbat, there is a concern that if they are summoned again on Shabbat, they will hesitate to come (see above, n. 10).
  If an observant soldier is assigned guard duty or patrol duty on Shabbat, it is good if he swaps his Shabbat assignment with a non-observant soldier’s weekday assignment as long as the non-observant soldier is willing and there is no concern that switching the assignments will cause the guard duty to be taken lightly. Thus, the observant soldier will be able to pray and enjoy Shabbat, and the non-observant soldier will accrue merit for enabling this. Additionally, while the non-observant soldier is guarding, he is doing a mitzva and not desecrating Shabbat. Nevertheless, the observant soldier need not initiate such a swap, because defending the country is a mitzva, and there is no need to seek ways to get out of it on Shabbat (see Ha-tzava Ka-halakha ch. 27).
  
  Section 15
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / What Must One Give Up to Minimize Shabbat Desecration?
  One need not forgo his Shabbat rest or anything else that is dear to him in order to minimize the Shabbat desecration of another person who is involved in lifesaving activities. In addition, there is a concern that if one is forced to forgo something dear to him, he will hesitate to do what is needed to remove a hazard. For example, if one sees fallen electrical wires that are exposed and deadly, he could theoretically stand there for all of Shabbat in order to warn passersby not to touch the wires. Nevertheless, if this is difficult for him – e.g., if Shabbat will not be over for hours – he may alert the electric company, which will send repairmen to fix the wires on Shabbat (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, cited in SSK 41:21; Tzitz Eliezer 8:15:11:7).
  If a gravely ill person’s home is so cold that it endangers his life, a neighbor whose home is heated need not be asked to inconvenience himself by taking in the sick person. Rather, the heat may be turned on in the sick person’s home, as saving a life overrides Shabbat. Even if the neighbor is asked to take in the sick person, he is not required to do so (based on the ruling of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in SSK ch. 32 n. 174; he derives this from the rule that one need not forgo his property and may confront a burglar even if the results may be lethal).
  Similarly, a soldier on guard duty need not volunteer to do an extra shift in order to prevent his replacement from traveling on Shabbat. Since one may travel on Shabbat in order to perform guard duty, the first guard does not have to forfeit his rest in order to prevent this travel.
  If soldiers need to travel in tanks for a security mission but will destroy the eruv if they take the shortest possible route, they should take a longer route, unless all of the eruv’s beneficiaries agree to let it be destroyed. This is because the eruv’s beneficiaries do not have to forfeit their benefit just so that the tank driver can minimize driving on Shabbat. Similarly, one who is driving a patient to the hospital should not barrel through private or public gardens, even when that is the shortest route to the hospital. Rather, the driver must go around, because neither the individual nor the community is obligated to forfeit its gardens so that someone involved in life-saving travel can minimize his Shabbat desecration (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, as cited in Ha-tzava Ka-halakha 26:4-7; see there for the dissenting opinion as well).
  
  Section 16
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / Police Activity on Shabbat
  All agree that police officers must desecrate Shabbat to save lives. Thus, if a suspicious object is found, or if dangerous people are seen engaging in suspicious activities, one must call the police. If a serious fight breaks out that could turn lethal, one must call the police. If robbers break into a home and might harm the residents, one must call the police. However, according to some poskim, in a situation where there is no danger to life, a police officer may not perform melakhot that are prohibited by Torah law. For example, if thieves robbed a home and left, since there is no longer any danger to human life, one may not call the police. Even if the thieves are still in the home, but the residents are not home, since there is no danger to life, one may not call the police. Similarly, if one witnesses thieves breaking into a closed store or bank, one may not call the police. In addition, a police officer may not write up reports about a theft, fingerprint an apprehended thief, or transport a thief to the police station on Shabbat (SSK 41:24-25; Yalkut Yosef 329:20-27).
  However, several leading rabbinic authorities maintain that one may call the police in order to prevent theft or property damage, and a police officer may respond by driving to the scene of the crime, because if property damage or theft is not dealt with on Shabbat, the crime rate will skyrocket, and ultimately people’s lives will be endangered. Within this opinion, there is debate about whether police officers may drive back to the station after an incident and whether they may perform regular patrols on Shabbat. Some are inclined to permit this when the drivers are not Jewish (Heikhal Yitzḥak, OḤ 32; Yaskil Avdi, OḤ 5:44; Tzitz Eliezer 4:4).
  Our master and teacher R. Shaul Yisraeli (Amud Ha-yemini §17) allows Jewish police officers to drive on patrol, to drive back to the station after an incident, and to transport suspects. He argues that if we go easy on criminals or make it difficult for the police to do their jobs on Shabbat, police officers might quit or become hesitant in doing their jobs, and the crime rate will rise to the point that lives are endangered. Therefore, we may do whatever is necessary to prevent criminal activity on Shabbat. Furthermore, as we have seen, the Sages allow those involved with saving lives to return home, even though they will be carrying their weapons through a public domain. If we do not let them return, they might hesitate to go out to help people in the future (above, section 10). Another factor supports this approach. As we have seen, the Sages stated that if a gravely ill person needs someone to take care of him, then even if a non-Jew is available, it is preferable for a Jew to undertake whatever melakhot are necessary to help him. If a non-Jew is asked to take care of him, it may happen that if someone is dangerously ill in the future and no non-Jew is available, people will be hesitant to desecrate Shabbat in order to help him (above, section 4). The same logic applies regarding police activity. If we restrict the ability of the police to catch thieves and prevent crime on Shabbat, ultimately this will lead to loss of life. We should add that nowadays some criminal activity in Israel is connected with terrorist activity. Therefore, the struggle against thieves is, to a large extent, also a struggle against terrorists, and thus directly involves saving lives.
  According to all opinions, one may not call the police on Shabbat in order to fill out reports that are strictly financial, such as for the purpose of making an insurance claim or the like. Additionally, one may not call the police on Friday night to complain about noisy neighbors.
  The police force should commission rabbis to review the entire array of police operations and determine, together with the police chiefs, what is vital and must be done on Shabbat and what is not. Similarly, they should establish special Shabbat protocols to minimize Shabbat desecration; for example, the officers can use a shinui whenever possible. They should also establish a procedure ensuring that if a non-Jewish police officer is on duty, he will be the one to drive and to write reports. All Jewish police officers should also be provided with a Shabbat pen, so that their writing will only be rabbinically prohibited (above, 18:2; see Harḥavot).
  
  Section 17
  
  Sick People and Saving Lives / Mobile Phones and Weapons Necessary for Health and Security
  In an area enclosed by an eruv, emergency medical professionals and volunteers who always carry beepers or cell phones may carry these devices on Shabbat. Similarly, one who always carries a pistol or rifle may carry it on Shabbat. Muktzeh is not an issue, because many maintain that a pistol is a kli she-melakhto le-heter, since its purpose is defense and deterrence. Similarly, since a two-way radio is designed to help save lives, it is also a kli she-melakhto le-heter. A cell phone is used primarily for calls that are unrelated to saving lives, so it is a kli she-melakhto le-isur. Nevertheless, one may carry such an object to use it le-tzorekh gufo, and therefore it may be carried to save lives.
  However, in an area without an eruv, one should not carry these items. When there are life-saving reasons for people to remain close to weapons and communication devices in case of emergency, they may carry these items to places where one normally goes on Shabbat, such as to prayers and celebrations. If we do not allow this, no one will volunteer to undertake security and rescue efforts. In general, this consideration is used to permit rabbinic transgressions. Only under very pressing circumstances is it permitted for one to transgress Torah prohibitions (see above, n. 12). Therefore, one should carry the two-way radio with a shinui (for example, under one’s shirt), which makes the transgression rabbinic. However, one should carry the gun normally, because it would be dangerous to carry it with a shinui. Additionally, some maintain that for security personnel, a weapon is not considered something that is carried, but an article of clothing that is worn.18<i class="footnote">R. Goren writes that a gun is a <em>kli she-melakhto le-heter</em>, because it is meant to save lives (<em>Meshiv Milḥama</em> 2:61). This is also the opinion of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, who maintains that guns, beepers, and hand-held computers (containing medical information that a doctor needs) are not <em>muktzeh</em><em>Shulḥan Shlomo</em> 2:308:16; <em>Nishmat Avraham</em> 301:19 and n. 6). A mobile phone, which is used primarily for everyday purposes, is a <em>kli she-melakhto le-isur</em> (above, 23:8). However, one may carry it to use it <em>le-tzorekh gufo</em>, like calling for help if necessary.According to the Sages in the Mishna (<em>Shabbat</em> 63a), a sword and a bow are not considered ornamental, but rather they are considered shameful, because in the prophesied future, “no one will study war” (Yeshayahu 2:4). Therefore one may not bear them on Shabbat. R. Eliezer disagrees, saying they are considered ornamental, and one may go out carrying them on Shabbat. SA 301:7 rules in accordance with the Sages. However, AHS 301:7 makes the innovative claim that soldiers may go with weapons on their bodies because the weapon is part of their clothing. R. Goren writes that one may rely upon this rationale if there is a great need to do so (<em>Meshiv Milḥama</em> 2:61). Therefore, when there is a need for some people to have weapons close at hand, but people will hesitate to volunteer to bear weapons unless we permit them to attend the synagogue and celebrations, it is preferable that they bear weapons in their belt as they n</i>
  However, one may not carry a gun or a two-way radio on Shabbat for the sake of a leisurely stroll to a place with no eruv. Thus, one should not take a walk outside the eruv in an area where he must be armed for security reasons, as this will require people to carry weapons needlessly.
  If a soldier wants to leave his base in order to participate in prayer services taking place in a nearby community, and he will need to pass through an area with no eruv to get there, after he leaves the base he should rest his gun and two-way radio on a mekom petur. He should then carry the items from there to the community. He should do this on his way back as well, as explained above in 21:7.
  Regarding putting out a dangerous fire, see 16:6-7 above. Regarding alarm systems, see 17:15 above.
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Illness That Is Not Life-Threatening / Principles of the Halakhot of Sick People
  There are three categories of sick people according to halakha:
  1) a gravely ill person – one whose life is in danger; When caring for a dangerously sick person, one does everything on Shabbat that he would do during the week. All Shabbat prohibitions are overridden in order to save a life, as we saw in the previous chapter.
  2) a “regular” sick person – one whose whole body is ill but whose life is not in danger; When caring for a regular sick person – one who is sick enough that he is forced to lie down, but whose life is not in danger – one may disregard rabbinic prohibitions, but Torah prohibitions remain in force (as will be explained in the next section).1<i class="footnote">According to most Rishonim, one may not violate a Torah prohibition for a person who is in danger of losing a limb (Rosh, Ran, Rashba, and seemingly Rambam). Others maintain that one may indeed desecrate Shabbat to save a limb (<em>Tosafot</em>, Rabbeinu Tam, <em>Sefer Ha</em><em>aguda</em>, and Me’iri). In practice, SA rules that one may not violate a Torah prohibition in such a case (328:17). However, according to current medical opinion, in practice, when a person’s limb is in danger, it is almost always life-threatening, as there is always the possibility of infection setting in (<em>Nishmat Avraham</em> 328:49). This may be the rationale of the Rishonim who are lenient in a case of danger to a limb. <em>Melamed Le-ho’il</em> 2:32 presents similar reasoning, as detailed in <em>Harḥavot</em></i>
  3) a “mildly” sick person – one who is ailing in part of his body or who experiences pain from a bodily ailment. A mildly sick person or one who is bothered by ailments – that is, one who can walk around as though healthy, but experiences discomfort from a mild ailment – is subject to all rabbinic laws, and one may not even violate shvut di-shvut on his behalf. However, if he is in pain, one may do certain things for him even though they are categorized as shvut di-shvut. Specifically, one may ask a non-Jew to transgress a rabbinic prohibition for him, or a Jew may make use of a shinui to do so (SA 307:5; MB 328:3; above 9:11).
  There is a specific rabbinic enactment forbidding a mildly sick person to take medicine. The poskim disagree whether this prohibition pertains to today’s medications, which are factory-made (the laws pertaining to one bothered by a mild ailment will be explained in sections 3-5).
  The main idea of Shabbat is that on this day we calmly and tranquilly accept reality as it is. If we have no clean clothes, we wear dirty ones. If we forgot to cook a certain dish, we content ourselves with the food we have, or we ask a neighbor for help. If we forgot to turn on the heat, we put on a coat. If we forgot to turn on the air conditioning, we suffer a bit from the heat. Even though Shabbat laws sometimes cause suffering, they liberate us from the burden and tension of having to pay constant attention and ensure that every little detail of our lives is properly addressed. Therefore, Shabbat is a valuable gift. The feeling of faith, tranquility, and rest that results from accepting reality on Shabbat is enjoyable and uplifting.
  The Sages continue this trend through their enactments, one of which is to refrain from using medicine on Shabbat. If we experience some discomfort, even if it is irritating and unpleasant, we bear it calmly, as this too is part of Shabbat rest. However, if the discomfort causes pain and negates oneg Shabbat, the Sages permitted transgressing minor rabbinic prohibitions (shvut di-shvut) to relieve the suffering. And when it comes to caring for one who is actually sick, the Sages allow us to transgress all rabbinic prohibitions, as taking care of one’s health is a mitzva.
  
  Section 2
  
  Illness That Is Not Life-Threatening / A Regular Sick Person
  As is well known, there are two types of Shabbat prohibitions: Torah prohibitions and rabbinic prohibitions (the latter type is also called shvut). There is a principle that one desecrates Shabbat and performs even melakhot prohibited by Torah law on behalf of a gravely ill person, someone whose life is in danger. In contrast, when caring for someone who is ill but whose life is not in danger, one may not violate Torah prohibitions. However, the Sages permitted the violation of prohibitions that they themselves enacted to treat someone who is sick.
  One who is bedridden due to his illness is considered a regular sick person. Even if, for some reason, he is not actually lying down, he is considered sick as long as this is the type of illness that generally causes people to lie down. Similarly, if one is suffering from pain that weakens his entire body (for example, a migraine), he is considered a sick person, even if he has not actually gone to lie down (SA 328:17). Furthermore, even if one is walking around and looks well, if it is clear that without a particular treatment he will need to lie down, one may transgress rabbinic prohibitions to prevent this from happening (SSK 33:1). If a child needs something very badly, he is considered a sick person, even if he has not gone to lie down (Rema 328:17; MB 276:6; above 24:6).
  The easiest and most accepted way of taking care of a sick person is with the help of a non-Jew. As we have seen (above 25:1), under normal circumstances the Sages prohibited asking a non-Jew to undertake melakha on behalf of a Jew on Shabbat, but they permitted doing so for the sake of a sick person (Shabbat 129a). Therefore, one may ask a non-Jew to turn a light on or off for a sick person, to turn a heater on for him, to cook food for him, to travel in order to bring him medication, to press elevator buttons for him, and to administer X-rays for him. Similarly, one may ask a non-Jewish dentist to treat a patient whose toothache is causing him pain that extends throughout his body. One may ask a non-Jewish doctor to write a prescription for a sick person. One may ask a non-Jew to drive a sick person to the doctor or to the hospital. In such a case, a Jew may accompany the patient, on condition that neither he nor the sick person performs any melakha themselves.
  A regular sick person may take whatever medications he needs, since the rabbinic prohibition against taking medicine applies only to a mildly sick person (Rema 328:37; see BHL ad loc.).
  If no non-Jew is available, according to Ran, a Jew may not transgress rabbinic prohibitions for a sick person. According to Rashba, however, he may, and we follow this position in practice. However, le-khatḥila, if possible, it is still preferable to arrange for a non-Jew to do whatever is necessary, or for a Jew to use a shinui, so that the prohibition will be reduced to a shvut di-shvut (above, 9:11). If there is no choice, and the sick person desperately needs care, a Jew may do rabbinically prohibited melakhot on his behalf. For example, if he needs a light turned on or off, one should do this with a shinui such as using one’s arm or leg, so that the prohibition is only rabbinic (above, 9:3). Similarly, if the sick person needs a heater or air conditioner turned on or off, one may do this with a shinui.2<i class="footnote">According to Ran, the Sages’ dispensation for a sick person was limited to requesting things of a non-Jew, as stated in <em>Shabbat</em> 129a. In contrast, according to Rashba (and Rambam as well, according to <em>Magid Mishneh</em> and <em>Tur</em>) one may transgress all rabbinic prohibitions for a sick person. This is borne out by the law recorded in the Gemara that a sick person may nurse from an animal on Shabbat; while this is a prohibited form of milking the animal, the <em>shinui</em> renders the prohibition rabbinic (<em>Ketubot</em> 60a). Ramban agrees that all rabbinic prohibitions are suspended if there is danger to a limb. But, he continues, if there is no danger to a limb, one may only ask a non-Jew to help; a Jew may not transgress even rabbinic prohibitions in such a case. That is permitted only if a <em>shinui</em> is used, in which case the action is reduced to a <em>shvut di-shvut</em>. SA 328:17 states that Ramban’s position seems correct. The Vilna Gaon follows it as well, as do MB <em>ad loc. </em>57 and SHT 396:9. In contrast, <em>Ḥayei Adam</em> 69:12 states that when it is impossible to use a <em>shinui</em> to do what is necessary, one may do it without a <em>shinui</em> (even though he thus transgresses a <em>shvut </em>rather than a <em>shvut di-shvut</em>). MB 328:102 concurs. Going even further, some Aḥaronim maintain that a Jew may even perform a <em>melakha</em> that is prohibited by Torah law with a <em>shinui</em> if no non-Jew is available. This is based on Rashba and his followers. (Some maintain that Ramban would agree as well, and that this can be inferred from his book <em>Torat Ha-adam</em>.) This is the approach of SAH 328:19; <em>Eglei Tal</em><em>Toḥen</em> 18; and <em>Tehila Le-David</em> 328:22. Since this is a rabbinic disagreement, the law follows the lenient opinion. Recent <em>poskim</em> who agree include: R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, as cited in SSK 33:18; <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:36, n. 4; and R. Ovadia Yosef, as cited in <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 328:11. See too <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> ch. 20 nn. 148-149.All agree that one may not turn off a light so a sick person can sleep (Shabbat 30a). At first glance, since this is a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah, which according to many poskim is only rabbinically prohibited (above, 9:6), Rashba and those who follow him should permit it for a sick person even without a shinui. Nevertheless, since turning off the light is more severe than other rabbinic prohibitions, the Sages forbade doing it even for a sick person (MB 278:3). Turning off a light to allow a sick person to sleep is permitted if one does so with a shinui, for example by using his arm.Eating rabbinically prohibited food is more severe than transgressing a shvut, and a regular sick person thus may not do this (Rema, YD 155:3). However, he may eat food that was cooked by a non-Jew (SA 328:19), and he should make the regular berakhot over the food (MB ad loc. 63). One may move a muktzeh item for a sick person without using a shinui. Some are stringent and maintain that le-khatḥila one should still use a shinui (MB 328:58). Some argue that the enactment against taking medicine (out of concern that people will end up grinding ingredients) applies to a regular sick person. (See BHL 328:37, s.v. “ve-khen.”) However, in practice, we rule that the enactment applies only to a mildly sick person or to one experiencing discomfort, as described in the next section (Beit Yosef and Rema 328:37).</i>
  
  Section 3
  
  Illness That Is Not Life-Threatening / A Mildly Sick Person and One Experiencing Discomfort
  If one walks around and seems to be healthy, but in fact is mildly sick or experiencing discomfort, his status is the same as that of anyone else. He must observe all the Shabbat prohibitions, including the rabbinic ones. The permission to transgress rabbinic prohibitions (as explained in the previous section) is for a regular sick person, but this permission does not extend to one who is bothered by a mild illness or ailment. Therefore, if the light is bothering him, one may not ask a non-Jew to turn it off; if he needs light, heat, or air conditioning, one may not ask a non-Jew to turn them on. Even asking a non-Jew to do these things with a shinui – which would reduce the prohibition to a shvut di-shvut – is prohibited, because all rabbinic prohibitions still apply to him (SA 328:1).
  All of this applies in a case where the illness is merely irritating and uncomfortable. However, if the illness or ailment causes pain, one may relieve it by performing a shvut di-shvut. If the person suffering has a great need for light, heat, or air conditioning, one may ask a non-Jew to turn them on using a shinui, such as with his arm. However, a Jew may not do so even with a shinui, because there would still be a standard rabbinic prohibition (shvut), which applies even when there is some pain (SA 307:5; 328:25; above 9:11-12; Harḥavot).
  If one’s fingernail has been torn off most of the way and is bothersome, this is considered an ailment, and one may not remove the nail even via a shvut di-shvut. However, if the torn nail is painful, one may remove it using a shinui, such as with one’s hand or teeth. Since most of the nail has already been torn off, it is viewed as if it has already fallen off, so the prohibition to tear it off completely is only rabbinic. For this reason, the Sages permitted removing a nail with a shinui if it is causing pain (Shabbat 94b; SA 328:31; above, 14:2). If the nail was not torn off most of the way but is painful, one may ask a non-Jew to remove it with a shinui, since doing so reduces the prohibition to a shvut di-shvut.
  Similarly, if a splinter becomes embedded in a person’s skin and it is clear that removing it will cause bleeding, one may not remove it if it is merely irritating. However, if it is painful, one may remove it, since the prohibition of causing bleeding in this way is only a shvut di-shvut, as one does not intend to cause bleeding, and the bleeding is effected via a shinui, as a side effect of removing the thorn (see MB 328:88; above, ch. 9 n. 3 and 14:2).
  
  Section 4
  
  Illness That Is Not Life-Threatening / Grinding Ingredients
  The Sages further enacted that one who is bothered by an ailment or mild illness may not obtain medical treatment on Shabbat. That is, he may not ingest medicine, apply a medicinal ointment, or take any actions designed for the purpose of healing. The concern is that one who is preoccupied with alleviating the ailment will pulverize herbal ingredients to prepare a medication and thereby violate the Torah prohibition of Toḥen (Shabbat 54b and Rashi).
  Thus, the Sages forbade someone with an eye ailment to drip wine or another medication to his eye (SA 328:20). Similarly, one may not apply ointment to a wound to heal it (SA 328:22). If one has a sore throat, he may not gargle with oil for therapeutic purposes. One who has a toothache may not rinse his teeth and gums with vinegar, salt water, or alcohol for therapeutic purposes. However, he may drink an alcoholic beverage in order to relieve the pain, on condition that he does not retain the liquid in his mouth longer than usual (SA 328:32).
  If the ailment causes pain, one may ask a non-Jew to drip wine to his eye or apply alcohol to his painful tooth. This reduces the prohibition to the level of shvut di-shvut, which the Sages permitted if one is in pain (SA 307:5; 328:25; above, 9:11-12 and Harḥavot; according to Radbaz and R. Mordechai Benet, a Jew in pain may take medicine by himself; see n. 3 below).
  The enactment prohibiting taking medicine also includes eating or drinking items that only sick people eat or drink. However, a sick person may eat or drink items that healthy people eat or drink as well, even if his intention is to use these items as medicine (Shabbat 109b; SA 328:37). Therefore, one who has a sore throat may not suck on throat lozenges, but he may suck on ordinary hard candies (SSK 34:4). Similarly, one may not drink water with flaxseed to ease constipation, but prune juice is permitted, as healthy people sometimes drink it as well.
  One who experiences discomfort may do things that healthy people normally do, even if his intention is to relieve the discomfort. For example, one who has itchy skin may apply oil that healthy people apply as well (SA 327:1). One may also apply oil to one’s hands and lips, since nowadays people do so even when their skin is not chapped – to soften them or for pleasure.
  If one has medicine that helps relieve his minor aches and pains, he may mix it into a drink before Shabbat, as long as no one can tell that it contains medicine. He may then drink the medicinal liquid on Shabbat (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, cited in SSK 34:5).
  
  Section 5
  
  Illness That Is Not Life-Threatening / Modern Medications
  Some maintain that one may take modern, mass-produced medications on Shabbat for any type of ache or pain, as there is no real concern that anyone will grind anything in order to produce the medicine. However, most poskim maintain that even nowadays one who is only mildly ill or bothered by an ailment may not take medicine on Shabbat. There are two reasons for this. First, according to many, no rabbinic enactment may be nullified except by a larger and more prominent beit din than the one that passed the enactment. Second, some people still prepare household remedies, so there are cases where the reason for the enactment still applies.
  In practice, as long as the ailment is merely irritating but not painful, it is proper to be stringent and avoid taking mass-produced medications. However, if the ailment causes pain, one may take medication, because some maintain that the Sages never prohibited taking medication when pain is involved. Even though many maintain that the Sages’ enactment applies even when pain is involved, in the case of mass-produced medication, where there is no concern that a private individual would try to prepare it himself, it is proper to be lenient. It is worth noting that when the technical law allows leniency, it is proper to act accordingly so as to fulfill the mitzva of oneg Shabbat.
  Therefore, if one is bothered by an ailment of the eyes or ears, he should not use drops. However, if the ailment causes him pain, he should use the drops. The same applies to a runny nose: if it is merely irritating, one should not use nose drops, but if it causes pain, he should. Similarly, one may take sleeping pills to relieve insomnia, since without them he will suffer pain. Perhaps we can suggest that if one is pained to the point that he would be willing to walk a kilometer in order to get medicine, it indicates that he is truly suffering and may thus take mass-produced medications. However, if he thinks it is unnecessary to go to that much trouble, it indicates that he has a mere ailment, and he should thus refrain from taking medicine.3<i class="footnote">em&gt;Ketzot Ha-shulḥan (§134, <em>Badei Ha-shulḥan</em> 7) states the argument for leniency based on the fact that nowadays people do not prepare medicine by themselves. However, for the two reasons I presented above, it is inclined to be stringent. <em>Tzitz Eliezer </em>8:15:15 states that it depends on the rationale for the enactment against medicine. If the concern is specific – that in order to prepare the medicine, people will end up grinding the ingredients – then there is room for leniency. In contrast, if the concern is more general – that as part of dealing with medical issues, people will end up violating various transgressions – then the prohibition stands even nowadays. <em>Tzitz Eliezer </em>concludes by inclining toward leniency. <em>She’arim Metzuyanim Ba-halakha</em> 91:2 also inclines toward leniency. Many oppose them and prohibit taking mass-produced medicine on Shabbat, including SSK 34:3; <em>Igrot Moshe</em>, OḤ 3:53; R. Ovadia Yosef, <em>Halikhot Olam</em> vol. 4, Tetzaveh §19; and <em>Or Le-Tziyon</em> 2:36:9. Nevertheless, when great pain is involved, R. Ovadia is lenient, even if the sick person is not bedridden. SSK 34:3 rules stringently, stating in n. 7 in the name of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach that the entire enactment is relevant only when there is pain, because that is when one would end up grinding medication. Nevertheless, SSK 33:16 permits taking sleeping pills in order to relieve great pain.Some are lenient concerning all medicine, even for regular pain. This is the opinion of R. Mordechai Benet, who argues that sometimes the Sages were permissive when one is in pain, even in a case resembling a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah (SA 328:28; above, 14:2); certainly, then, they would permit taking medicine in a case of pain. Minḥat Shabbat 91:1 and She’arim Metzuyanim Ba-halakha 91:3 take this position as well. Radbaz 3:540, appearing earlier than any of them, states that the prohibition on taking medicine is even less severe than a shvut di-shvut. Therefore, when any pain is involved, one may be lenient.Thus there are two disagreements here: 1) Does the enactment apply to mass-produced medicine? 2) Does it apply to people who are in pain? It is true that in each of these disagreements, most poskim feel that one should be stringent. Nevertheless, since these disagreements concern a rabbinic prohibition, one who is lenient has an opinion to rely upon. Furthermore, in a situation where there are two reasons to be lenient, such as if the medicine is mass-produced and the person is in pain, then it is a twofold doubt that affects oneg Shabbat. Accordingly, one may be lenient even le-khatḥila. (We should add that when the medication simply relieves pain but does not cure the illness, some poskim maintain that it is not considered medication for purposes of the rabbinic enactment. See Tzitz Eliezer 8:15:15:21 as well as 14:50, and Yalkut Yosef 328:52.)</i>
  
  Section 6
  
  Illness That Is Not Life-Threatening / Medications Taken in Regular Doses
  If one began taking a medication during the week, and it must be taken for several days consecutively so that skipping the Shabbat dose will harm its effectiveness, he may continue taking the medicine on Shabbat. This is because some maintain that the rabbinic enactment does not apply to dosing that began before Shabbat (R. Shlomo Kluger). When dealing with mass-produced medicine, one may rely on this opinion even le-khatḥila, and one may take such medicine even when he is not in pain.
  Similarly, a woman who is taking birth control pills or medication to help her maintain a pregnancy may continue taking this medication on Shabbat as well.4<i class="footnote">Some permit anyone who has started taking a medication before Shabbat to continue taking it on Shabbat, as they maintain that the Sages’ enactment was not meant for such a case. Since he has already started taking the medicine on Friday, he has enough time to prepare whatever amount he needs for Shabbat, and there is no concern that he will need to grind anything (R. Shlomo Kluger, <em>Sefer Ha-ḥayim</em> 328:25). Some are lenient only when a medication must be taken every day for at least a week, and skipping a day could be harmful (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach). See SSK ch. 34 n. 77 and <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 20:124. Even if the medication is not mass-produced, there is room for leniency, since the disagreement concerns a rabbinic law; certainly, then, one may be lenient when the medication is mass-produced.SA 328:37 rules that a healthy person may eat food that sick people eat to help them get better. According to this, a healthy person may take vitamins and diet pills on Shabbat. However, according to MA and MB ad loc. 120, a healthy person may not do this in order to improve his health. Igrot Moshe, OḤ 3:54 takes this stringent opinion into account for a weak person, but permits a healthy person to take vitamins prophylactically. This is also the opinion of R. Ovadia Yosef, Halikhot Olam vol. 4, Tetzaveh §41. Nevertheless, if a sick person wishes to be lenient, he may rely on Tzitz Eliezer (cited in the previous note), which rules leniently because people do not grind medicine themselves anymore. Certainly, then, one may be lenient if he takes the vitamins daily, as we explained above.</i>
  If one takes daily vitamin supplements or weight loss pills to improve his health, he may continue on Shabbat as well.
  
  Section 7
  
  Illness That Is Not Life-Threatening / Injections, Intravenous Infusion, and Nursing
  Sometimes, a regular sick person needs an injection or intravenous (IV) infusion on Shabbat. Since a subcutaneous injection does not necessarily cause bleeding, halakha views it no differently from other types of medicine: it is permitted for a sick person. If one is not sick but is in pain, he may ask a non-Jew to administer the injection.
  However, a Jew may not administer an intravenous injection or infusion on Shabbat, because doing so causes bleeding, which some maintain is prohibited by Torah law. Thus, as long as the person is not dangerously ill, one should defer to this stringent opinion. If a port was installed beneath the skin (with a catheter surgically inserted into a vein) before Shabbat, one may attach an IV bag to it on Shabbat, even when there is no danger to life (see SSK 33:7). A non-Jew may administer an intravenous injection or infusion to a regular sick person.
  If a wound or a needle needs to be disinfected with iodine or peroxide, one may not apply the disinfectant using cotton wool or a bandage, because squeezing liquid out of them is prohibited on account of Seḥita. Rather, one should pour the iodine or peroxide directly onto the surface that needs to be disinfected. Alternatively, one may apply it with a tongue depressor or synthetic, non-absorbent material.
  If one knows before Shabbat that he will have to administer an injection on Shabbat, it is preferable that he prepare and disinfect the syringe and needle before Shabbat. If he forgot to prepare in advance, or if it was medically inadvisable to do so, he may prepare the shot on Shabbat, as this does not involve a Torah prohibition (see SSK 33:8-10).
  A nursing woman whose breasts are engorged may express or pump her excess milk on Shabbat, on condition that she pumps it in such a way that the milk goes to waste, such as into the sink or into a container with soap in it so that the milk is immediately ruined. It is true that expressing milk on Shabbat in order to feed a baby is prohibited by Torah law as a tolada of Dash (SA 328:34; above, 10:17). However, when the milk goes to waste, the prohibition is only rabbinic, and to relieve pain the Sages permitted it (SA 330:8). One may use a manual pump for this purpose or an electric pump attached to a timer that was set before Shabbat. On Shabbat, when the timer activates the pump, the nursing woman may use it to pump her milk (SSK 36:22 n. 63). If the doctors believe that it is necessary for a baby to have breast milk, and the mother tries not to miss any opportunity to pump during the week, then she may also pump on Shabbat for the baby, as this is a case of saving a life (see SSK 36:22 and n. 67).
  
  Section 8
  
  Illness That Is Not Life-Threatening / Ointments and Compresses
  Even when using medicine is permissible, one may not apply topical medication (such as creams or ointments) to a bandage or a wound. If one applies ointment and smoothes its surface to spread it, he violates Torah law, as Memare’aḥ is a tolada of Memaḥek (Shabbat 75b; above, 18:6). It is also forbidden to place the ointment onto the body or the bandage without spreading it, out of concern that one will end up spreading it. Even if the bandage was prepared with ointment before Shabbat, one may not place it on the wound on Shabbat, out of concern that he will end up spreading it (SA 328:25).
  However, to alleviate or prevent pain, the Sages allow one to place ointment directly on a wound or bandage, though one who does so must be careful to avoid spreading it. If the ointment was in a tube, he should place the tube directly on the wound. If it is in a container, one may apply the ointment using a tongue depressor or a spoon. The primary concern is that it should not be spread. When the bandage is placed on the wound, the cream will spread out along the sides. Nevertheless, as long as one does not smooth the surface intentionally, this is not prohibited (SSK 33:14; above, section 5).
  Similarly, if one is in pain, he may place medicated cream on his skin and rub it in until it is completely absorbed. This is because as long as one wants all the cream to be absorbed, it is not considered Memare’aḥ. However, if one wants part of the cream to remain on the surface of the skin to make it smooth, applying the cream is prohibited by Torah law (Da’at Torah 328:26; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in SSK ch. 33 n. 64; based on MA 316:24 and MB ad loc. 49; see above, 14:5, and Harḥavot).
  If one is suffering from great pain that is weakening his entire body, he is considered a sick person, and one may treat him with compresses. Cloths that were dampened before Shabbat may be used for this purpose. If necessary, one may wet a completely clean cloth on Shabbat to use as a compress (see above, 14:4 and n. 2). In any case, he must take great care not to wring out the compress, whether in order for the water to reach the sore spot or in order to clean it after use (SSK 33:19; see Harḥavot here and above, 12:8, 10).
  
  Section 9
  
  Illness That Is Not Life-Threatening / Adhesive Bandages, Cloth Bandages, and Treating Wounds
  One may use an adhesive bandage (“Band-Aid”) to protect a wound or a sensitive area from the friction caused by clothing or other objects. Even one who is bothered by a mild ailment may do so, since an adhesive bandage does not cure but merely protects (SA 328:23).
  Although one may not affix an adhesive bandage to paper or the like because of the prohibition of Tofer, affixing one to the body is not prohibited, because Tofer does not apply to the human body. Besides, adhesive bandages are meant to remain on the body for only a short time.
  Le-khatḥila, one should try not to attach the ends of the adhesive bandage to each other and to avoid using an adhesive bandage to keep a cloth bandage in place. This is because some maintain that these cases are rabbinically prohibited, as sticking one item to another in such a manner resembles Tofer. If necessary one may be lenient and rely on those who maintain that since adhesive bandages are affixed temporarily, for a short period of time, one may do so just as one may tie a temporary knot that lasts only a short time.5<i class="footnote">. We saw above in ch. 13 n. 9 that according to Rabbeinu Yoel, Ra’avya, Rashbam, and others, the laws of <em>Tofer</em> are similar to the laws of <em>Kosheir</em>, and thus there is no prohibition of sewing something that will last for less than a week. Rabbeinu Peretz and <em>Mordechai</em> disagree, arguing that the two <em>melakhot</em> are not analogous, and the rabbinic prohibition of <em>Tofer</em> applies even to temporary attachments. In times of need, one may rely on the lenient authorities; see there. This is also the opinion of <em>Tzitz Eliezer</em> (8:15 and in the summary, 14:14-15). R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (cited in SSK ch. 35 n. 67) adds that even when the cloth bandage is later thrown away together with the adhesive bandage so that they stay attached for an extended period of time, this is not considered a permanent attachment, since it serves no purpose. We also saw above in ch. 13 n. 9 that it is not prohibited to remove the plastic strips protecting the adhesive on the tapes of a disposable diaper. The same applies to removing the plastic strips protecting the adhesive of an adhesive bandage.</i>
  One may not cut a bandage or adhesive bandage to size, and one who does so violates the Torah prohibition of Meḥatekh (MB 322:18; above 15:10). If a bandage is too long, one should wrap it around the injury multiple times rather than cutting it. If one knows that he may need to bandage wounds on Shabbat, he should prepare bandages of various sizes before Shabbat. It is also good to prepare methods of fastening them with safety pins or an elastic sleeve, since it is preferable le-khatḥila not to use an adhesive bandage in order to keep a cloth bandage in place.
  One may use a butterfly bandage to hold together the edges of a cut. This is because of two lenient opinions. First, some maintain that there is no prohibition of Tofer when it comes to the body. Second, some say that this type of bandage cannot qualify as sewing, since all it does is hold closed the edges of the cut, helping the wound close up on its own (SSK 35:25; see Harḥavot 27:2:4).
  In order to stop bleeding, one may use a bandage (using a permissible method of tying) or antihemorrhagic sprays or powders (like Dermatol). These measures are not considered medicinal; they simply stop the bleeding (see SA 328:29). Additionally, one may place iodine on a wound in order to prevent infection (SSK 35:13).6<i class="footnote"><em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> ch. 20 n. 250 expresses surprise at SSK’s permission to use Dermatol, maintaining that it is indeed medicinal. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach seems to maintain that Dermatol and iodine are not meant to heal, but simply to stop bleeding and prevent infection. In any case, even if they do heal, someone who is suffering would be permitted to use them, as I pointed out here in section 5 and n. 3.</i>
  One may clean blood with a bandage or paper towel, even though this will color them red. Similarly, one may bandage a wound that has been treated with iodine, even though the color of the iodine will stain the bandage or paper towel. This is because this “coloring” is in fact a manner of soiling the material. Additionally, none of these items (bandage, paper towel, body) are meant to be dyed (SAH §302, Kuntres Aḥaron; MB 303:79 and 320:58; above 18:5).
  If an adhesive bandage is irritating, one may remove it. When doing so, le-khatḥila one should try to avoid ripping out hairs, because of the melakha of Gozez. If there is no alternative, one may remove the adhesive bandage even if it is clear that this will rip out hairs, since one does not want this to happen and it is simply an ancillary effect of his action (SSK 35:30).
  
  Section 10
  
  Illness That Is Not Life-Threatening / Opening Medicine Packages
  When it is permissible to take medicine but it is packaged in plastic, paper, or cardboard, one may tear open the packaging in order to get to the medicine. Those who are stringent make sure to destroy the packaging, rendering it unusable for storing the medicine (above, 15:12). It is preferable to avoid tearing words on the packaging. Be-di’avad, if it cannot be opened without tearing words, it may still be opened, because one’s intention is not to erase the letters, and the “erasing” happens through a destructive action (as explained above, 18:3).
  When one may take pills that are inside a sealed plastic container, he may remove the cover, even though doing so breaks the temporary plastic seal connecting the cover to the container. This is not considered making a kli, because the container and cover were already finished products; they were simply attached to the plastic seal (above 15:13-14).
  
  Section 11
  
  Illness That Is Not Life-Threatening / Measuring for Medical Purposes and Using a Thermometer
  When medically necessary, one may use a regular mercury thermometer to take someone’s temperature. One may also use a manual blood pressure monitor. Although without a significant need one may not measure things on Shabbat, as this is a weekday activity, it is nevertheless permitted for a mitzva or medical need (SA 306:7 and 328:43; above 22:6). It is also permitted to shake down a thermometer so that the mercury contracts (SSK 40:2).
  Some rule leniently and permit a sick person to use a thermometer strip, which displays body temperature upon being placed on one’s forehead’s. They maintain that this is not considered Kotev since the numbers are already imprinted on the strip, and the temperature merely makes them visible for a short time, after which they disappear (Yeḥaveh Da’at 4:29). Others maintain that using this type of thermometer is rabbinically prohibited, considering it temporary writing (SSK 40:2). Since it is a rabbinic law, one may be lenient in a case of necessity (Tzitz Eliezer 14:30; see Harḥavot 18:4:4).
  The poskim disagree about whether one may perform a medical test on Shabbat that causes color to appear. Some prohibit this on account of Tzove’a. Others permit it, as one is not interested in the color, only in the test result. Le-khatḥila one should be stringent, but when necessary he may be lenient, since this is a case of uncertainty regarding rabbinic law (see SSK 33:20, and Harḥavot).
  
  Section 12
  
  Illness That Is Not Life-Threatening / Permitted Actions
  On Shabbat, one may perform therapeutic treatments that are not normally done with the aid of medications. Since there is no concern that one will come to grind ingredients, such treatment is not included in the prohibition of medicine on Shabbat. However, if there is no real need, even such treatment is prohibited because it is a weekday activity. But as long as a real need exists, for example when one is in pain, it is permissible (SA 328:43; MB ad loc. 136).
  Therefore, one may apply pressure to an injury with a utensil or his hand to prevent swelling, as this is a type of therapeutic action that is not normally done with medications (Ḥayei Adam 69:5; MB 328:144; SHT ad loc. 104). Similarly, one may apply ice to an injury in order to prevent swelling and reduce the pain, because this is not normally done with medicine (SSK 35:35 and n. 92).
  If one’s eyes hurt, he may do eye exercises on Shabbat, because there is no medication that substitutes for these exercises. If one’s eyes do not hurt, but he wants to strengthen his eye muscles, the exercises have the same status as physical therapy exercises: if one needs to do them several times daily, one may do them on Shabbat as well (as explained in the next section).
  One may place an orthodontic retainer in one’s mouth on Shabbat, as no medication can straighten one’s teeth (SSK 34:29).7<i class="footnote">. SA 328:43 states that someone in pain may perform actions to alleviate an illness that is not normally treated with medication. Such treatments were not included in the Sages’ enactment, since there is no concern in these cases that one will end up grinding ingredients for medicine. MB<em> ad loc</em>. 136 clarifies that when there is no pain, one may not administer such treatments because it is a weekday activity. Along the same lines, SA 306:7 permits measuring for the sake of a mitzva or for a medical need, even though measuring is normally considered a weekday activity. MB <em>ad loc</em>. 36 explains that healing the body is itself a mitzva. At first glance it would seem that placing a retainer in one’s mouth should be prohibited because it is a weekday activity, as it does not alleviate pain. However, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (cited in SSK ch. 34 n. 113) explains that it seems reasonable that the prohibition on weekday activities does not apply when results are seen only after a long period of time. This is also cited in <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> 20:154. I maintain that administering treatments is considered a prohibited weekday activity only when not necessary. Since they can wait, undertaking them on Shabbat is considered a weekday activity. However, when there is a real need, then even if there is no pain involved, it is not considered a weekday activity. This can be inferred from the position of Radbaz and those who follow him (above, n. 3), namely, that the enactment banning medicines is less severe than a <em>shvut di-shvut</em>, which is itself permitted when pain is involved (above, 9:11). When it comes to treating sick people, the prohibition on weekday activities is even less severe than the ban on medication (as explained in MB 328:136).</i>
  One who has a stomach ache or an earache may place a hot water bottle on the affected area to relieve his pain (MB 326:19). Ice may also be used to relieve pain (SSK 33:15).8<i class="footnote"><em>Shabbat</em> 40b states that one may not place a container of hot water on a person’s stomach, due to the risk of spilling. Rashi and Ran explain that this is the reason for the prohibition on Shabbat as well, but <em>Tosafot </em>state that it is forbidden on Shabbat because of the ban on medicine on Shabbat. It would seem that according to Rashi and Ran, if the hot water bottle is sealed well, one may use it on Shabbat, whereas according to <em>Tosafot</em> it is still prohibited. MB 326:19 states that one may be lenient if there is a great need. Based on what we said in section 5, nowadays, when medicine is mass-produced, one may be lenient concerning all medicine for one in pain.</i>
  One who has an earache may put cotton in his ears. This is not considered medicinal, since it does not heal the ear, but simply protects it from the wind (SA 303:15; SSK 34:9). 
  One who wishes to soothe his throat may swallow a raw egg, as this is not considered a medicinal act (SA 328:38). 
  One may put talcum powder into one’s shoes to absorb sweat and foot odor or to soothe his feet. However, one who has athlete’s foot may not put medicated powder in his shoes. If he is in pain, though, he may (section 5 above).
  
  Section 13
  
  Illness That Is Not Life-Threatening / Physical Therapy, Massage, and Acupuncture
  Physical therapy exercises are often meant to restore function to limbs or muscles that have atrophied as a result of injury or paralysis. If it is not strictly necessary to do the exercises on Shabbat, one should not do them then, because this is a weekday activity. For example, if one is not always careful to do the exercises regularly during the week, one may not do them on Shabbat. Even if no equipment is used, since these exercises are undertaken with professional guidance, they are considered a weekday activity. One should instead exercise on Friday before Shabbat begins, and on Saturday night after Shabbat ends. However, if the exercises are indeed necessary for the patient, and during the week he takes care to do them several times a day, he may do them on Shabbat as well. One may even use equipment, as long as it does not require electricity to operate. These exercises have the same status as pills that must be taken for several consecutive days: one may take them on Shabbat as well (n. 4 above; Nishmat Avraham 328:93 in the name of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach).
  One may do gentle stretches to loosen his back or neck or to refresh himself. This is not considered medicinal, nor is it considered a weekday activity. However, one may not do calisthenics, which maintain or improve one’s fitness, as they are a weekday activity (see above, 22:8).
  One may not give a professional massage to someone who is experiencing discomfort in his back or another limb. Since such aches are treated with pills and ointments, their treatment is included in the rabbinic enactment against medicine on Shabbat. In addition, a professional massage is considered a weekday activity. Nevertheless, if the ailment is truly painful, one may give a professional massage in order to relieve it. As we have already seen (section 5), since medications today are generally mass-produced, one who is in pain may use such medications. Certainly, then, one may provide treatments that do not involve medication at all. Furthermore, the prohibition on weekday activities does not apply when pain is involved.
  One may always give a non-professional massage. Since it is not professional, it is not considered medicinal, nor is it considered a weekday activity. Even a professional masseur may give his family members a non-professional massage that is meant to be soothing. Since they are not in pain and the massage is not done in a therapeutic context, it is not prohibited.
  Acupressure is a treatment in which one applies pressure to various parts of the head or body in order to relieve pain and restore the health and vitality of the body and its limbs. When there is no great need, one may not perform it on Shabbat, both because of the enactment against medicine and because it is a weekday activity. However, one who is in pain may undergo acupressure, either manually or with an instrument designed for this purpose.
  One may not administer acupuncture on Shabbat even for one who is in pain, because the needles are muktzeh meḥamat ḥesron kis. However, a patient who needs acupuncture very badly may be treated. As we already have seen (n. 2 above), the Sages suspended their enactments for the sake of caring for a sick person. Even for a sick person, acupuncture is only permitted on condition that the treatment will not necessarily cause bleeding, which is prohibited by Torah law.
  In circumstances where a professional may provide treatment (of pain or illness) on Shabbat, he may not accept payment for his services. However, if he provides treatment during the week as well, the Shabbat payment may be subsumed within the weekday payments (above, 22:12). When a professional is summoned to provide treatment on Shabbat, one may not discuss the arrangements for subsuming his fee. Rather, one may say that after Shabbat they will discuss the details that they may not discuss on Shabbat. This is because when necessary, the Sages permitted alluding to such matters (above, 22:3, 10).
  
  Section 14
  
  Illness That Is Not Life-Threatening / Seeing a Non-Observant Doctor
  If a sick person whose life is not threatened needs to see a doctor on Shabbat for an examination or treatment, he should try to visit a religious doctor who knows how to avoid melakhot that are prohibited by Torah law. If he goes to a Jewish doctor who normally desecrates Shabbat, there is a concern that he will cause the doctor to desecrate Shabbat. For example, the doctor might turn on a light in order to examine him, write down his personal information, or write a prescription for him. We have already seen that only rabbinic prohibitions are suspended for the sake of caring for a sick person who is not dangerously ill, but Torah prohibitions remain in force. Furthermore, just as one should give preference to an observant doctor, one should also give preference to a hospital that operates in accordance with halakha. In hospitals that do not operate in accordance with halakha, he may encounter Jewish staff members who will transgress Torah prohibitions on his account.
  If it is not possible to see an observant doctor or visit a hospital that operates in accordance with halakha, one may see a non-observant doctor as long as he requests that the doctor refrain from desecrating Shabbat by Torah law on his account. If the doctor insists on writing in the normal fashion or on doing other melakhot that are prohibited by Torah law, the patient should forgo the treatment to avoid aiding Shabbat desecration. Under pressing circumstances, when the exam and treatment are extremely urgent, the patient may rely on the lenient position and accept treatment from this doctor.9<i class="footnote">R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (cited in SSK ch. 40 n. 32) says that when one is entitled to treatment covered by his health fund or HMO, he is entitled to go to the hospital and is not responsible to prevent the doctor from violating Torah prohibitions. Just as a creditor has a right to bring his debtor to court even if the debtor threatens to curse him, blaspheme God, and swear falsely, the creditor may still takeakeucedalized painstch this to Bactine or a  him to court. Similarly, one may accept the medical treatment to which he is entitled. SSK 40:10 rules this way in practice. This ruling can be combined with that of <em>Shakh</em>, which maintains that one does not have to worry about aiding the Shabbat desecration of a non-observant Jew who desecrates Shabbat regularly. However, according to <em>Ḥavot Yair</em> and most <em>poskim</em>, the prohibition of aiding Shabbat desecration applies even to him (<em>Pitḥei Teshuva</em>, YD 151:3).In any case, many are stringent here because in practice, one who sees a non-observant doctor on Shabbat indeed causes him to sin. The Torah commands us to reprove our fellow Jew in order to help them avoid sin. Yet here the patient is aiding the Shabbat desecration of the doctor. Those who are stringent include Zivḥei Tzedek, OḤ 2:19; Ben Ish Ḥai in Rav Berakhot, ma’arekhet lamed, 3; and Yesodei Yeshurun. See Harḥavot.</i>
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Eruvin / Transforming a Public Domain
  As we learned in chapter 21, one may transport items on Shabbat within a private domain (reshut ha-yaḥid) but not more than four amot within a public domain (reshut ha-rabim) and not from a public to a private domain and vice versa.
  An eruv, however, transforms a reshut ha-rabim into a reshut ha-yaḥid, thus allowing people to transport items within that area without limit, as well as to transport items from homes and yards into that area, and vice versa.
  An eruv has two components, one pertaining to the area that will be transformed into a private domain, and the other relating to the people who will live within the eruv’s boundaries. In order to define the area as a single private domain, it must be enclosed by a fence. However, this is not enough. The people who live within the area must also establish a partnership with one another. This is done by means of two meals worth of food that is owned collectively by everyone and from which anyone may partake. This communal food is called an eruv (literally “merging”) because it merges or joins together all the homes and yards, turning them into a single private domain. Nevertheless, it has become commonplace to call the enclosure itself an eruv as well, and we follow this convention.
  As we learned (21:2-3), there is a difference between a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law and a semipublic domain (karmelit), which is treated as a reshut ha-rabim by rabbinic law. In order to permit carrying in a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law, the area must be enclosed by a wall or fence at least ten tefaḥim high (approximately one meter),1<i class="footnote">A <em>tefaḥ</em>, according to R. Ḥayim Naeh, is eight cm. Ten <em>tefaḥim</em>, then, is 80 cm. He bases his calculations on Rambam’s opinion regarding the size of a dirhem (a unit of mass derived from the Greek drachma coin). However, it has since been ascertained that a dirhem at the time of Rambam was more than ten percent smaller in volume than the Turkish dirhem with which R. Naeh was familiar. This means that R. Naeh’s <em>shi’ur</em> is too large. Using the corrected measurements, a <em>tefaḥ</em> is 7.6 cm and ten <em>tefaḥim</em> is 76 cm. Ḥazon Ish, basing himself on <em>Noda Bi-Yehuda</em>, maintains that a <em>tefaḥ</em> is 9.6 cm. The law accords with Rambam, whose opinion is accepted by the vast majority of <em>poskim</em>, taking into account the current knowledge about the size of the dirhem. Nevertheless, for two generations, people have grown accustomed to relying on R. Naeh’s <em>shi’ur</em>. Additionally, some follow the stringent opinion of Ḥazon Ish. It would seem reasonable <em>le-khatḥila</em> to follow Ḥazon Ish when building an <em>eruv</em> (whether enclosed by a fence or <em>tzurot ha-petaḥ</em>), since sometimes the wire droops. When that happens, if the <em>eruv</em> was constructed based on a small <em>shi’ur</em>, its validity is uncertain. By following Ḥazon Ish, we avoid this problem. In addition, an <em>eruv</em> is meant to serve the entire community. <em>Le-khatḥila</em>, when acting on behalf of the entire community, it is more important than usual to try to meet the requirements of all the different opinions. In light of all this, I write generally that ten <em>tefaḥim</em> is approximately one meter (following Ḥazon Ish), even though technically one could follow the smaller, updated <em>shi’ur</em>. When there is a gap of ten <em>amot</em>, which can disqualify the <em>eruv</em>, one should be stringent and use the smaller, updated <em>shi’ur</em> of 4.56 m.</i> and the gates that people use to enter the enclosure must be locked at night (SA 364:2).
  However, a karmelit, considered a public domain on the rabbinic level, need not be enclosed by an actual fence. Rather, it is sufficient to surround it with tzurot ha-petaḥ (defined in the following section) to transform it into a reshut ha-yaḥid (SA 362:10-11).
  
  Section 2
  
  Eruvin / Tzurat Ha-petaĥ
  We have learned (21:8-9) that according to most poskim, today’s streets are considered a karmelit. Thus, to permit carrying in the streets, it is sufficient to surround them with structures resembling doorways (tzurot ha-petaḥ), which form a kind of wall around them.
  The basic form of a doorway is comprised of two doorposts with a lintel atop them. A lintel can be formed by laying a board across the top of two posts or running a string above the posts.
  The main requirement for a tzurat ha-petaḥ is for the posts on the sides and the string or wire above them to be configured like a doorway. Since the lowest doorway is ten tefaḥim high, the poles of a tzurat ha-petaḥ must be at least that high to be considered valid for an eruv. The wire extended above them must also be at least ten tefaḥim above the ground. Accordingly, if any part of the wire droops lower than that, the entire area between the poles is considered breached, since there is no actual doorway in which any part of the lintel is lower than ten tefaḥim. And if the poles are more than ten amot (4.56 m) away from one another, the entire eruv is disqualified, as a breach of ten amot disqualifies an eruv.
  Since the poles form the sides of the tzurat ha-petaḥ, they must be strong enough that a normal wind would not cause them to sway, and to support some type of door, even if only an extremely light one made of straw (SA 362:11).2<i class="footnote">The pole that is used to form the <em>tzurat ha-petaḥ</em> must look like a pole. Therefore, one should not use a wall as a pole for this purpose (MA 363:28). However, if the <em>tzurat ha-petaḥ</em> is parallel to a wall and continues where the wall leaves off, the edge of the wall can be considered a pole (Ḥazon Ish 70:15; see R. Elimelech Lange, <em>Hilkhot Eruvin</em> 4:12, p. 55).</i>
  According to most poskim, there is no limit to how wide a tzurat petaḥ may be, as it can retain the basic form of a doorway even if it extends for a thousand amot. However, Rambam maintains that when most of the eruv’s perimeter is comprised of tzurot ha-petaḥ, no tzurat ha-petaḥ may extend longer than ten amot. Le-khatḥila, when possible, his opinion should be taken into consideration. However, in practice, since it is very difficult to enclose towns and cities using tzurot he-petaḥ that are limited to ten amot, we are lenient and do not limit the width of a tzurat petaḥ (SA 362:10).
  The wire that is stretched between the tops of the poles must be secured well enough that it will not become detached in a normal wind. Le-khatḥila, when possible, it should be stretched taut so that it will not even sway in the wind or droop down below the tops of the posts, since lintels do not normally sway or droop. However, be-di’avad, even if the wire sways or droops, the eruv is kosher (MB 362:65; AHS 362:37).
  
  Section 3
  
  Eruvin / Ensuring That the Wire Is Stretched Across the Tops of the Posts and Electrical Poles
  One must take care that the wire that serves as the lintel stretches over the poles, not alongside them, as in a tzurat ha-petaḥ the lintel sits atop the doorposts. Even if the post is low and the wire runs far above its tip (as with power lines), as long as the wire runs directly over the post, and the post is at least ten tefaḥim high, it is considered a valid doorpost, and the wire is considered a valid lintel. But if the wire is not directly above the pole, the eruv is invalid. If the pole is crooked, the wire must extend directly above the tip of the pole; if the wire is above any other part of the pole, the eruv is invalid (SA 362:11; MB ad loc. 64).3<i class="footnote">. When erecting a low pole underneath a wire that extends high above, one must ensure that there is nothing between the poles and the wire, such as an awning. This is the position of <em>Taz</em> and MB 363:112. However, some are lenient <em>be-di’avad</em>, including AHS 363:46 and <em>Meshiv Davar</em> 1:26.If a pole has a hole near the top, according to most poskim one can thread the wire through it. The wire is not considered situated on the side of the pole, since it is still situated above the section of the pole below it. Even though the pole continues above the wire, this is not a problem. This is the approach of AHS 362:32 and Ḥazon Ish 7:9. However, Pri Megadim and MB 362:64 are stringent. Since the pole continues above the wire, the wire cannot be considered situated above the pole. The same disagreement applies to a pole that has deep grooves, where the wire is wrapped around them in such a way that it is contained completely within the grooves. Those who are lenient consider the wire situated above the pole, while those who are stringent maintain that since the pole continues above the wire, the wire cannot be considered situated above the pole. In a time of necessity, one may rely on those who are lenient.</i>
  Utility poles and the cables they support cannot serve as tzurot ha-petaḥ, because the cables generally do not pass directly over the poles, but alongside. In order to solve this problem, additional poles, each about a meter high, must be erected directly underneath the cables.4<i class="footnote">When several utility poles are situated in a straight line, it is enough to erect <em>eruv</em> posts underneath the cables of the two outlying utility poles. The poles in the middle are not considered doorposts, but only extra supports for the lintel. This is the opinion of most <em>poskim</em>, including <em>Divrei Malkiel</em> 3:16. Nevertheless, some are stringent and require placing an <em>eruv</em> pole underneath every single utility pole, because otherwise those who see them may mistakenly think that utility poles never need to be supplemented with <em>eruv</em> poles.What I have written concerning utility poles is the opinion of the vast majority of poskim. A lenient opinion maintains that only if one constructs a tzurat ha-petaḥ but attaches the wire to the side of the poles does he show that he is not interested in constructing a valid tzurat ha-petaḥ. In contrast, if poles are erected for a different purpose, such as in the case of utility poles, and wires are attached to the sides of these poles, this does not show that one is not interested in a tzurat ha-petaḥ. Therefore, this opinion allows these poles to be used for an eruv (Sho’el U-meshiv, Mahadura Kama 2:88). Some are lenient because the settings over which electrical wires pass are tightly connected to the utility pole and are considered part of it, so the wires are above the pole in accordance with the lenient opinion in the previous note. Furthermore, according to some, Rif and Rambam maintain that even if the wire is situated at the side of the pole, this does not invalidate the eruv. This opinion is quoted in Ḥelkat Yaakov 1:200. In practice, we do not use utility poles for tzurot ha-petaḥ without first making the adjustments described above. See R. Elimelech Lange, Hilkhot Eruvin ch. 4 nn. 60, 66, and 67.</i>
  
  Section 4
  
  Eruvin / Fences, Breaches, and a Tel Ha-mitlaket
  A fence that is ten tefaḥim high is considered a bona fide wall and is effective in transforming even a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law into a reshut ha-yaḥid (as explained above in 21:2-3). Even a chain-link fence is acceptable for this purpose. As long as each of the spaces between the wires is less than three tefaḥim wide, the fence is considered continuous, and it can transform even a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law into a reshut ha-yaḥid.
  If a fence or series of tzurot ha-petaḥ encloses an area but has gaps in the perimeter, as long as each gap is less than ten amot wide and the combined width of all the gaps on any side of the perimeter is less than the combined length of the fence or tzurot ha-petaḥ on that side, the eruv is kosher (MB 362:45; however, AHS 362:23 maintains that the lengths to compare are those of the entire perimeter, not just one side). In contrast, if the unfenced section of any side of the city is longer than the fenced section on that side, or if there is a gap anywhere that is longer than ten amot, the eruv is invalid (SA 362:9).
  If one side of the city consists of houses with yards enclosed by fences, with open space between the yards, then if the distance between each yard is less than ten amot, and the width of each yard is greater than ten amot, there is no need to enclose that side any further with a wall or tzurat ha-petaḥ. The fences surrounding the yards are considered walls, and the gaps of less than ten amot do not disqualify them.
  If a city is encircled by a garden with terraces at least ten tefaḥim high, then it is considered walled, and there is no need to add another wall or tzurat ha-petaḥ. If only part of the city is enclosed by a terrace, then that part needs no additional wall.
  If one side of a city is built on a hill, then if the hill is steep enough that it declines ten tefaḥim (76 cm) every four horizontal amot (1.824 m), it renders everything above the slope a reshut ha-yaḥid. The Sages refer to such a hill as a tel ha-mitlaket, and it is considered a bona fide wall (SA 345:2).
  If a town is surrounded by a fence, and the gate at the entrance road is wider than ten amot, then as long as the gate will be closed at night, the eruv is valid even when the gate is open (SA 364:2; Melumdei Milḥama §74). However, if the gate is generally left open at night, or if it merely serves as a barrier (or boom gate), which, even when closed, is not a proper wall, a tzurat ha-petaḥ should be erected above the gate.
  
  Section 5
  
  Eruvin / Forming a Partnership Using Two Meals’ Worth of Food
  As we have seen (section 1 above), in order to transform a reshut ha-rabim or karmelit into a reshut ha-yaḥid in which carrying is permitted, it is not enough to enclose it in a fence or tzurat ha-petaḥ. A partnership must also be formed among all the residents in the enclosed area. This is accomplished by means of bread owned jointly by every resident of the enclosed area. It is not necessary to use bread made from one of the five species of cereal grains; rice bread is also acceptable (SA 366:8). If fewer than eighteen people live in the enclosed area, it is sufficient to have enough jointly-owned bread for each person to have the volume of one grogeret (dried fig). If there are exactly eighteen people, a volume of eighteen grogarot is required, the quantity considered the equivalent of two meals’ worth. For a group of more than eighteen residents – even a thousand – the amount of bread required to form a partnership between all of them does not change, but remains uniform at two meals’ worth.
  The poskim disagree about the precise quantity of two meals’ worth of food. The accepted ruling is that le-khatḥila the volume of eight eggs (about 400 ml) should be used, while be-di’avad the volume of six eggs (about 300 ml) is sufficient (SA 368:3). As mentioned above, this communal food is called an eruv (literally “merging”) because through it everyone is merged or joined together, and their enclosed property is defined as a reshut ha-yaḥid.
  Since the eruv bread belongs to all residents of the city, any of them may eat it whenever he wishes. If the eruv was eaten during Shabbat, the residents may continue to carry for all of that Shabbat. Since the eruv was there during bein ha-shmashot on Friday (when Shabbat began), the partnership was already formed. For the next Shabbat, however, a new eruv must be set aside.5<i class="footnote">There are actually two types of “<em>eruv</em>” that transform a public domain into a private domain: <em>eruv ḥatzerot</em> (“merging of courtyards”) and <em>shitufei mevo’ot </em>(“sharing of alleyways”). The purpose of an <em>eruv ḥatzerot</em> is to permit carrying in a <em>reshut ha-yaḥid</em> that is divided into areas owned by different people. The Sages decreed that one should not carry from a home belonging to one person to a home belonging to another, even when both homes are a private domains. Since they belong to different people, the area between them resembles a public domain. By setting aside an <em>eruv</em><em>ḥatzerot</em>, the homeowners become partners, and may carry from one home to another. The food for an <em>eruv ḥatzerot</em> must be placed in one of the homes (SA 368:3), and it must consist of bread (SA 368:1). In contrast, a <em>shitufei mevo’ot</em> is more effective, because it transforms all the homes, yards, and streets into one domain, within which everyone may carry. Therefore, the food for a <em>shitufei mevo’ot</em> does not need to be placed in a home; a yard can suffice. It also does not have to consist of bread; two meals’ worth of any food is acceptable. When a <em>shitufei mevo’ot</em> is set aside, there is no need for an <em>eruv ḥatzerot</em>. This is why nowadays the custom is to leave the <em>eruv </em>food in the synagogue; even though it cannot be considered a home, the <em>eruv</em> is valid, because it is in fact a <em>shitufei mevo’ot</em> (SA 368:3; 386:1 and BHL <em>ad loc</em>.). Nevertheless, since a <em>shitufei mevo’ot </em>can also serve as an <em>eruv ḥatzerot</em>, we make sure to use bread.</i>
  On a kibbutz or anywhere else where all the residents eat together in a communal dining hall, it is sufficient to erect a tzurat ha-petaḥ around the area. It is not necessary to put aside two meals’ worth of food in such a case, since the food in the communal kitchen serves to form the general partnership necessary for an eruv.
  
  Section 6
  
  Eruvin / Setting Aside the Eruv and Reciting Its Berakha
  It is customary to use matza for the eruv, as it has a long shelf life and can continue to serve as the eruv for as long as it remains edible (SA 368:5). Common practice is to set aside a new eruv before Pesaḥ each year and to recite the berakha and the formula for setting aside the eruv of the upcoming year (detailed below). In many communities, the rabbi is given the honor of performing this ritual on behalf of the community. Even if the residents forgot to set aside a new eruv before Pesaḥ, as long as the old eruv is still in existence, one may continue carrying throughout the enclosed area.
  The eruv must be placed in one box or bag. The custom is to leave it in the synagogue or nearby, as the synagogue is a communal space.
  Before setting aside the eruv, one must make sure that it belongs to all residents of the city. Therefore, the person charged with setting aside the eruv first lifts the matzot one tefaḥ with the intent to acquire them on behalf of all the city’s residents. In order for him to acquire the matzot successfully, they must have previously belonged to a different person.
  Before acquiring the eruv and setting it aside, the following berakha must be recited: “Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us concerning the mitzva of eruv” (“asher kideshanu be-mitzvotav ve-tzivanu al mitzvat eruv”). Afterward, he should recite: With this eruv it shall be permitted to us (all the people living here in the town, city, or courtyard) to bring things in and out – from the houses to the yard and the yard to the houses, from house to house, from yard to yard, from roof to roof, from houses and yards to alleyways, and from alleyways to houses and yards in this city – for us, all who live here, and whoever joins us during all upcoming Shabbatot and holidays. (SA 365:15; MB ad loc. 83)
  
  Section 7
  
  Eruvin / An Eruv Where Shabbat Desecrators Live
  The eruv, the two meals’ worth of food that all residents within the enclosed area own jointly, unites all the residents and renders the enclosed area a private domain, where carrying is permitted. However, all this is on condition that all the area residents, without exception, are partners in the eruv. If any one of them is not interested in participating, then the area can no longer be considered a single domain, and the eruv is invalid.
  In light of this, it is problematic to implement an eruv in cities and towns whose residents include Jews who do not observe Shabbat. Since they are not interested in an eruv, they and their homes are not included in the partnership of the eruv, which means the eruv cannot be valid. The same problem exists if a non-Jew lives in the area; since his home is not included in the eruv, the eruv is invalidated (SA 385:3; 382:1).
  The solution is for the Shabbat desecrator or non-Jew to rent out his home for Shabbat to one of the Shabbat observers. This way his home will be included in the eruv as well. The problem with this solution is that it is almost impossible to implement in large towns, let alone cities. Therefore, it became customary to use a different solution – renting all the homes in the area from a city official who has the authority to enter every house in the city (SA 391:1).
  Some argue that this solution is not viable today. In a democratic country, the mayor of a city does not have the right to enter the home of a private individual without a warrant. Still, the custom is to be lenient. After all, during wartime, the town major and the head of home front command may requisition homes of their choosing. They may even do so during training exercises. Therefore, these authorities have a share of ownership in all the homes, and one may rent their share from them before Shabbat for the purposes of the eruv.6<i class="footnote">In Israel, a local rabbi generally acquires ownership from the mayor, as well as from the chief of police. Some also do so from the director of the local branch of the Ministry of the Interior, since in an emergency the police chief is authorized to enter any home, while the mayor and the representative of the Ministry of the Interior have authority over the streets. The terms of the acquisition grant the rabbi permission to leave things wherever he wants, making him a part owner of all places within the enclosed area. As a result, the <em>eruv </em>can include everyone in the area.It should be noted that we always tend to be lenient regarding the issue of constructing an eruv in a place where Shabbat desecrators live. This is because the prohibition on including non-Jews or Shabbat-desecrating Jews in an eruv is really a punitive stringency; technically, they may join with Shabbat-observing Jews to form an eruv partnership. The Sages wanted to discourage observant Jews from living in neighborhoods with Shabbat desecrators and non-Jews, so they penalized those who did so by forbidding such an eruv. However, if there is no alternative, we make use of any reasonable justification to be lenient and participate with all local residents in making an eruv. See Ḥazon Ish 18:9; AHS 391:4; Menuḥat Ahava vol. 3, p. 363.</i>
  
  Section 8
  
  Eruvin / An Eruv That Becomes Invalidated on Shabbat
  Sometimes it becomes apparent during Shabbat that a wire from the eruv has snapped in a certain place, thus invalidating the eruv. Two questions then arise: 1) May the eruv be fixed on Shabbat? 2) If it turns out that the eruv cannot be fixed, do all the residents need to be informed that the eruv is down so they know not to carry?
  Le-khatḥila, if a non-Jew is available, it is preferable that he fix the eruv. Although asking a non-Jew to do melakha for Jews on Shabbat is rabbinically prohibited, nevertheless, when there is a great need to save the masses from the prohibition of carrying on Shabbat, the Sages permitted asking a non-Jew to fix the eruv, even if this will involve melakhot that are prohibited by Torah law (MB 276:25; above 9:12).
  However, if no non-Jew is available, a Jew certainly may not violate Torah prohibitions in order to fix the eruv. For example, if a pole has fallen over, a Jew may not stand it back up by jamming it into the ground. Similarly, if the wire has snapped, one may not tie it back together with a permanent knot, as tying this type of knot on Shabbat is forbidden by Torah law. However, the poskim debate whether one may tie a bow knot (the type used to tie shoelaces), as tying this type of knot on Shabbat is permissible.
  Some argue that fixing the eruv on Shabbat is absolutely forbidden. Even though it is permissible to tie a bow knot on Shabbat, nevertheless in this case tying it would permit carrying on Shabbat. This means that by tying it, one constructs a meḥitza ha-materet (above, 15:4), which is forbidden on Shabbat. In other words, the Sages prohibited making a wall that serves to permit something that was previously halakhically forbidden. In this case, before one tied the knot it was prohibited to carry, while afterward it was permitted.
  Others maintain that although the Sages generally forbade constructing a meḥitza ha-materet, nevertheless, in order to save the masses from sinning by carrying on Shabbat, one may create a meḥitza ha-materet by tying a bow knot. This is the common custom (Responsa Mahari Ashkenazi §13; Panim Me’irot 1:30; Sho’el U-meshiv, Mahadura Tinyana 1:89; SSK 17:34).
  If the eruv cannot be fixed, this should not be announced publicly. This information is withheld out of concern that some people will carry anyway, desecrating Shabbat knowingly, and it is better that they transgress unknowingly rather than knowingly. The only people who should be informed are those who will definitely follow the halakha and refrain from carrying.7<i class="footnote">This is the approach of <em>Maḥshavot Be-etza</em> §16. In principle, whenever there is a chance that people will listen, even if it is more likely that they will not, we do not say that “it is better that people transgress unknowingly rather than knowingly.” As long as there is a chance that they will listen to reproof, we must reprove them (MB 608:3 based on Rosh). Accordingly, it would seem at first glance that the public must be informed that the <em>eruv</em> is down, as there is a chance that many people will follow the <em>halakha</em> and refrain from carrying. Nevertheless, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach explains (SSK ch. 17 n. 139) that carrying unknowingly in this case is considered even less severe than transgressing unknowingly in general; since people believe the <em>eruv</em> is still valid, as far as they know they are carrying permissibly. Thus, one who carries in such a situation is viewed as transgressing a rabbinic prohibition obliviously (<em>mitasek</em>). Therefore, it is better not to announce that the <em>eruv</em> is down.</i>
  
  
  
  
  
  Section 1
  
  Teĥum Shabbat / General Principles of Teĥum Shabbat
  The need to travel from place to place stems from man’s deficiency: he cannot find his livelihood and meet his needs by remaining stationary. So he must roam and leave his place. But the idea of Shabbat is for every Jew to rest from his travails and worries, contemplate the inner perfection of creation, thank God for choosing Israel from all peoples and giving us His Torah, and delight in God and His goodness.
  For this reason, the Sages ordained boundaries (teḥumin) within which one may walk on Shabbat, and beyond which one may not walk. One’s teḥum Shabbat (Shabbat boundary) is determined by his mekom shevita – the place where he is spending Shabbat (literally “stopping place”) – plus 2,000 amot in each direction (2,000 amot corresponds to 2,000 steps of an average person, approximately 912 m).1<i class="footnote">. According to R. Ḥayim Naeh’s calculations, which are based on Rambam (with whom the vast majority of <em>poskim</em> agree), one <em>ama</em> is 48 cm, and 2,000 <em>amot</em> is 960 m. According to Ḥazon Ish, one <em>ama</em> is 57.6 cm, and 2,000 <em>amot</em> is 1152 m. Since it has been ascertained that the Turkish dirhem with which R. Naeh was familiar is larger than the dirhem used in Rambam’s time, we should follow the more accurate calculation even though it results in a stringency. (Additionally, the <em>shi’urim</em> of volume need to be in sync with the <em>shi’urim</em> of distance, since the Sages said that the volume of forty <em>se’ah</em> can fit into an area of one <em>ama</em> by one <em>ama</em> by three <em>amot</em>.) Therefore, R. Ḥayim Beinish writes in <em>Midot Ve-shi’urei Torah </em>5:24 that according to Rambam, one <em>ama</em> is 45.6 cm and 2,000 <em>amot</em> is 912 m. In addition, the actual length of the average man’s forearm (<em>ama</em>) is approximately 45 cm. See <em>Peninei Halakha:</em><em>Berakhot</em>, ch. 10 n. 11. This is how we present every halakhic measurement. See above, ch. 29 n. 1.</i>
  If one is spending Shabbat in a field (i.e., not in a city or town), his mekom shevita is defined as four amot squared. This is the amount of space one occupies when lying on the ground with his arms and legs outstretched.2<i class="footnote">. According to SA 396:1, one’s “place” is four <em>amot</em> by four <em>amot</em>, as it is with regard to carrying in a <em>reshut ha-rabim </em>or a <em>karmelit</em>. Rema writes that some maintain for the purposes of <em>teḥumin</em>, one’s place extends four <em>amot</em> from the center in each direction, for a total of eight <em>amot</em> by eight <em>amot</em>.</i> He may walk 2,000 amot beyond that in each direction. If he is spending Shabbat in a city or town, the entire settled area is considered one place, and he may travel 2,000 amot beyond the city limits (see section 8 below).
  According to Rambam and Smag, teḥum Shabbat restrictions are based on Torah law, though the Torah prohibition forbids one to travel more than twelve mil (24,000 amot, which is 10944 m, almost eleven km) from his mekom shevita. This is based on the size of the Israelite camp in the wilderness, as the Torah states: “Let everyone remain where he is; let no man leave his place on the seventh day” (Shemot 16:29). However, according to Ramban, Rosh, Rashba, and most Rishonim, this verse does not refer to the laws of teḥum but rather to those of carrying in a reshut ha-rabim; all boundary restrictions (even beyond twelve mil) are rabbinic law.3<i class="footnote">The Sages were uncertain whether boundary restrictions apply above ten <em>tefaḥim</em>; perhaps, since people do not walk there, the prohibition does not apply there. In practice, when there is uncertainty pertaining to a rabbinic prohibition, the law follows the more lenient position. Therefore, regarding boat travel in oceans and rivers, where Rambam agrees that the prohibition is not a Torah prohibition (as such travel is not comparable to travel in the wilderness), as long as one is ten <em>tefaḥim</em> above the seabed, the <em>teḥum</em> prohibitions do not apply (<em>Eruvin</em> 43a; SA 404:1). According to SA 248:2, the ten <em>tefaḥim</em> above the seabed are measured from the bottom of the boat, while according to R. Eliezer of Metz they are measured from one’s feet. SAH and MB 248:14 state that in times of need one may be lenient. However, if one is traveling at a height of more than ten <em>tefaḥim</em> above land, several <em>poskim</em> maintain that one should be stringent in accordance with Rambam and not travel more than twelve mil (Rema 404:1).</i>
  The Sages ordained that if one must travel beyond the teḥum on Shabbat – in order to attend a wedding celebration or a Torah lecture – he may make an eruv teḥumin, which extends his teḥum in the necessary direction (as explained below in sections 12-14). One who leaves his teḥum forfeits it and must remain within his four amot (as explained below, section 11).
  
  Section 2
  
  Teĥum Shabbat / Squaring the Teĥum
  The Sages established that one’s mekom shevita on Shabbat is square, and thus his teḥum is square as well. This means that if he is spending Shabbat in a field, and his mekom shevita is thus four amot, the measurement is not made by drawing a circle around him with a diameter of four amot. Rather, to determine his mekom shevita we inscribe such a circle in a square with four-ama sides along the four cardinal directions, which adds space to his mekom shevita at the corners. Similarly, if one’s mekom shevita is in a city or town, even if the area is round, we inscribe it in a square or rectangle, adding space at the corners (m. Eruvin 53a).
  
  Then 2,000 amot are measured in each direction. Once again we draw a square or rectangle, which once again grants him additional space in the corners.4<i class="footnote">When measuring 2,000 <em>amot</em> from a city or town, according to Rambam and SA 398:5, we measure from the outermost homes or from the <em>eruv</em> (following the opinion of the Sages in <em>Eruvin</em> 57a). According to Rosh and Rema, one first adds the equivalent area of a <em>karpif</em> (an enclosed courtyard in front of the houses) to the city, which amounts to 70 2/3 <em>amot</em> (approximately 32 meters). This area is now considered part of the city. From there we measure 2,000 <em>amot</em> (following the opinion of R. Meir in the above <em>gemara</em>; see MB 398:21 and BHL s.v. “ve-khen”). As explained in section 8 below, when there are two settled areas adjacent to each other, SA agrees to the <em>karpif</em> rule.</i>
  
  This rule, that we square off the city, is derived from the Torah’s description of the area the Levites were given outside each of their cities: You shall measure off two thousand amot outside the city wall all around. You shall measure off two thousand amot outside the town on the east side (lit. corner; same applies to the other directions), two thousand on the south side, two thousand on the west side, and two thousand on the north side, with the city in the center. (Bamidbar 35:5)
  The most straightforward explanation for why we square the teḥum is that it is extremely difficult to measure and mark off a circular boundary. One would need to measure 2,000 amot from almost each and every point of the city’s perimeter. In contrast, when marking off a square boundary, only four measurements need to be made – one in each of the four cardinal directions. After that, a straight line can be drawn in each direction, and the result is the teḥum.
  Additionally, this method reflects a spiritual reality. A circle represents the infinite, which has no beginning and no end. A person’s life is circular and cyclical. His actions, wishes, and thoughts repeat themselves cyclically. Even his limbs are circular and cylindrical. This makes it difficult for a person to realize his aspirations. The way to solve the problem is to take one’s “circular” infinite ideas, and give them a “square” finite framework that will help him put them into practice. This is the meaning of teḥum Shabbat, which is meant to provide a framework for absorbing the holiness and blessing of Shabbat. This is why each city belonging to the Levites, who are charged with revealing faith in this world, is surrounded by a square boundary.
  
  Section 3
  
  Teĥum Shabbat / Teĥum Shabbat Is Individual
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">
  Teḥum Shabbat is specific to every individual, based on his location. For example, let us say that the homes of two neighbors (who do not live in a city) are located 1,000 amot apart from each other. Each neighbor has his own teḥum Shabbat, part of which overlaps with his neighbor’s teḥum Shabbat, and part of which does not.
  The laws of teḥumin apply to one’s animals and belongings, and to Jews as well as non-Jews (see n, 12 below). Therefore, if one carried his talit to the edge of his teḥum, and his friend wants to borrow it but has a different teḥum, the friend may not carry the talit beyond its owner’s teḥum (SA 397:3). 
  If the talit is jointly owned, it may be carried only where their teḥumin overlap (ibid., 397:9).
  <img 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m4bZqyO+kxxNDbq/wDx8XU+51VR/DAvOB+Pet6b4r+BA10W1iI5U5+V2yAoz94c8ED5sA/dbCqpPnnxS/aCh8Kato0vhn7Fq9q6SreQSh8kgr0ZgOvqcliAWGVFJAemx6drmoa/G8tvfpqEGs+a91IrLDbafH92ONj8r+auNwXPLsWxtArofhlpv2PQJbqXTnsL3ULue7uI5YfLfLSEqCDz8q7VH09K4P4b/GLwv8SFS1sILq21KM+bJaTEkryCSHH3vmPXqSN+PM2g9V8IrG3k/wCEj1l4t2oT6xd2zzuct5UchCIPRQO3GSSTyTTQEGveHvF/h3VLnxTpup3XiCOSVzdaNIFUpACfL+ykD5ZEBP3sh8t0JFaGg61a6/pdnf6ZNaz27sRkKVKkfKVKnlWGdm08jOznPmDusV5hqthbaV8XYlsrcxpqemtc3ccZws0ySBFkI/vbWIJA5Bw3y7iADpHWZo7gbLdsvgDGc5O3BGe+NmO+NmRjzC8iZ53+WBw8X+9vz+W7dt9t23+HbloHjjMVyDaSYLcjrnt346fhjg/utrVIyIZ5M2shzEckknOcZB3degzuxnjfgCPIAqecwtjiBsknOd2c/NntnON2eM7d2F27GaxmEMjYgH7zO7OP9vOf/H84/wBvGT5YaqIRb5tZerdSxxkgn73PUDryTgtiQICjInlSH7LLnzM/ebPXPUc9efXPzD97laAJ385JZ/lgTamf7u3Az77cZznnbuz827aqIJke3+WBAqkHA27MDGB124ztxzt3bfm3blYyRiWbFrJwgxgkdORjb05JxtyRyUyxcAjSNZLbFrIMLgYOMYBA+704Jxt4AyFyhcgANs/khfLt8+bgrt4/udM/8Axn/Yzj95T3Eztc/JA+4ADI3bs/Lg9M5xtxxu27crt3NAI4vs4H2STb5vT8MdOnTj0x8v8Aqvmp8iRs13m1kOV5zzuyAD97rwBnPBGA2ECEgCTs5vtB3shzfo/ytnOba4+bpzn+9xn+6uOevrjpcC+0LEbpnUFJ3Fjk/Zrj17+pPzn+IDiuxoAKKKKACsTWf+Rh8P8A/XWf/wBEtW3WJrP/ACMPh/8A66z/APolqANuiiigAooooAKKKKACiiigAooooAKKKKAMPw3/AMfOu/8AYSb/ANFRVzXxE+Bngv4kxvJqmmrbagR8t/aARzA/7Rxhx/vA103hv/j613/sJN/6KirboAxPBfhtfB/hXSvD6XBuU062S2WYrtLhRjOO1bdFFABXG2DKugPul8v/AIm1/wAjH/P1Oe/t+A5LZUMD2Rrj9NZl0CTY6Kf7Wvz87YHF3Mc9D0xnPbG7DY2kAfI8avc5unGFycjGMAE/e6cEE7uAMFsoUA4P4h/CXRfiXrGi3Gt6jcraafG+63jyjTEkdXY/IM4zkbhwGbLLXfuZke4+aBNqgjnbtwM574xndnnbu3fNu2qqeckkPMCbUwf4duBj324zjvt3Y+bdlQDE8O+GtC8K6dFZaJbQ6fAZRuSCEoXOdvP8ROeOeQcL/rcGsL4e/Enwf4Xt9d07WvEVhY3a67fuYZ5Ar7TKcHH+PPrXaqJhFEv7gfvMYxj/AGcY/wDHMZ4zsyc+YBxMwuR+4bJAxjdnPy47ZzjbjjO3Zldu9gCr/wALs+HP/Q46R/3+Fcq/i/QPF3xWsLnQdZt7+GDSJUlktmDBWMykKfqATx2BJyoYHtx5zzr80D74v97fu/Ldnb7btv8ADt+ZiGZo7dt8DZfJO7OcndnOB1xvzjnG/Ax5ZAI5JIxFck3b43Zz6d+/HT8MfMf3RVakZ0WeTN04xEcggjGMZJ3dOozuzjjfkGPA7TLHcHfbrh8g5xjHzZzjtnfnHGd+Dnyw8+ck7cwIEi/3dmPz27d3vt3fxbsKARK6AW2buTq3UEdCAc7uepHXkHAbMhQhrOnlSj7XL/rMfdbOc46Dnrx65+UfvctUqecotxmBcEgjG3GPlx3xjO3HOM7ctu3qjCYxSL+4P7zGMZ/2cY/8cxntszkeYQBGdDLNi6k5QYwCevAxt69Djbgk5CYYOSRvG0lti6c5XjAznIJH3evAONvBGSuEDgyP5zyT8wPuTH97dnj23ZxjHG7bj5du5kQzO9v80D7lJPO7dkZz2znG7PG7bu+XbtYAg8yP7OD9rfHm9eMdM9enTn0x83+q+WnyOga6zduMDnIxtwMn73sRndwBgtlCgC7pvIDb7fPm53bv+B5zj/gecf7eP+WdPczI1z80CbQCOdu3A3ZPXGM7s87d27DbtqgEEpBvtCxI741BQdysMH7Ncevf1B+cfxE8V2NcfOrC+0HcqDbfonyrjbi2uPl68Yz93nGfvNnjsKACiiigArE1n/kYfD//AF1n/wDRLVt1iaz/AMjD4f8A+us//olqANuiiigAooooAKKKKACiiigAooooAKKKKAMTw3/x9a7/ANhJv/RUVbdYnhv/AI+td/7CTf8AoqKtugAooooAK47Tv+QBJ+7L/wDE3vjgMRjF3Mc8fT6g8rlgoPYmuO08geH3y7qP7XvhlN3X7XNjp749842/PtNAEjKqvcYtW4UYIYjOOf4c4xknjJBJK5cuAsaKssGLVl2xgAg424GABtzjGTjbkDJC5UuQ1mjL3GJ5ei9MnHpjb75+7znITDhyVjeMy2+2eU5jG3HOQQcfd68A428HnZhRJkAYkaiGIfZCB5mMZGOm3oOOnGOmPlH7rLU6RFZbnNoTkgcnOc8d+OgxzwQArYjCsWI8XkREXEu3zODkeme3GNv4Y5H7nIp0jxBbrdPKMYzk9OMn73HTGc8YwW/d7BQBJsVpxm1Y7ouSTuznrndjOcDO7GcDfjamY0VTHbH7K33yeWJxznqeeoz6k/McSAKX74xcDdPKMRHOeOnXO7p1Gd/TjfkmPEaPH5dtmebO8jnOSd2D1568c854P73aaAFdVEdwfsrffB4YjPO7ORz15z1B+YZkJUSbFWdsWrDbFwQdvTpjbnGMnG3OMnZks+InaPy7nE82d4HGcg7sdufvccc54H73cafvjNwds8vMQwBz16Y29ehxs687MESZAERFUWwFqwxkcHG3HHb2OOOACVXKFmDWjUwyj7IT+8xjIweNvTp04x0x8p/dYaq99qunaTp6X99qBt7WFS7yuw2hcZH3eOmcY4I+7+73g8/pPju21CdbW/stV0b7dmfT3vVVReQjuvUKcDJRgMA8jygVAB1ksavJcZtWO6M5JO7dkYwd2M9ADuwDgBsKEJ3bOxtZLOB3toiTGD8yljzgnlgGOSASSMkgE81gyPGJbndPKCIzuzxgADP3unGM7uBxvypjA6CKPztKSEyyx74QpcFlcZXr83zA/Xn15pNgPFjaE/8AHrB13fcHXduz/wB9fN9eetAsrRDlbaAHjkIOxJH5Ek/UmuQ8DeHLbQ9c1a50me4j0e7SIQ281y8wlmUt5k67ySA25Fz3K59M89NfXi6hc6sS/wDa6eKo9NQZIItTtHl4/uGMmTHTPzdRRcD08WNmhjKW0CmIKEwgGwAEDHpgFgPqfWrKuDivFrPVdWs9M0bWLESSa3qSaq16uCS7RrIyqy/7DqiqOwOB1rovA8ptNf0q2sZXltb7w9HfXbFi3mT71AlP+0wZ8nqdo9KBHpNFed63481fzi2kHT0hbVI9Ito7mNme7l3gTOpDDCou/sclD0rIufif4kt7qRli057EHUZvOaFwVtrYhRKfn6F+B/e/2etCYz1uonhimdHeNGaPJViASuRjg9uK82k+IniEWD3JtrGKWxlsbO4t2jZmu7uZY2eKL5hsCiQAE7uc9hk9H4P1DUtY1bxBe3F3HJYRXrWNnCkZXaIuHYncckuWXoPuCmB1QGAKWkHIpaACiiigAooooAKKKKACiiigAooooAxPDf8Ax9a7/wBhJv8A0VFW3WJ4b/4+td/7CTf+ioq26ACiiigANcfpu7+wJNpUH+1r8ZZc9buYY6984x3zgEEhh2FcdpybtAk/ciX/AIm1+MEDjN3OO/1xjoc4OFLEAE7tI73H76JtygD+LORjtjOcbcDG7btG0qWYR5Hkh/fRPvTJwQ2/IzkYxuzjPGN23I2hSGbIhZ7nNqrblxyQ27Ix3xnOMc4BACthVVmVVZpYf9GB3J1Lbs5553Y3ZxzuxuwC20qoYAaskpiib7RCSZM7twIP8fXH/A846fPjaPLKu8ii4PnwrtIIJIXbj5uvOMZ3Z5xnechggaqsYoj9lH+sz98nHO7OcZ/2s4zn58eZhKVlZRcEWwHIPDYzg7s8ZxjOcjkE7hlyygAkDSJOv76JNkXQ/Ltx9c7cbu+du7nduG1iNII7cedEPmxjGOh24x7Z247Z2ZJO8OClJ0/0YLtiHIbbtxngbc7cZ42525O3dufbHHGRHbD7Iow2MAgYx8vQcd8Y6AHaMoS4AFdpDHcDzYj8+MYz1O3GPfGzHcjZkEbzIWkeZsTQvvi6Z3b930xuzt7Y3beNu07onjJiuB9kU5fGMg5z8vQ8dsY6EDaSIwHL3QvO+bUNuiOSW3bs9juxnOOd2N2Bu27U3AHKeCtEn+JM1v4r8RypNplvPL/ZelI2YlZJCpnmOB5khZMgfdXqBk8egeI/DGmeK9Lk0zVYPOgYhlIO14nHKujDlWB5BFc38Ezn4caaT18266kn/l4k7nmu6oA8t8OX2s6Rr2q+FdY1GG9k060iubfUGwjywEsAZBjAZCDlgCBnJBzhZk+KXhrUfEVv4HivtPvrueB1mgiBaONFQ5V2yQpI/hySCNvO7cvJfFDwNc/EDxz4g0m21u+0lho9rIHt2OxyHmwJFAyy/Q59A3SvKfh58CvF/g74qaauom+trKSK42appki/IfLI2ltrbCc46EHnBxkgA+h7PwP4W07TL2xsfDmg2kOoAQXSQWwXzlHABGeSH7f3vk6/PWylraR6g+oR2Wm/bYkCRz7C0mNuwc55PBA6FuUyNuTyP/Cu7v7OE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 
  Section 4
  
  Teĥum Shabbat / Spending Shabbat In or Outside a City
  For someone who is spending Shabbat in a city or town, whether its residents are Jewish or non-Jewish, the whole area that is built up contiguously is considered one place, and the 2,000 amot of the teḥum are measured from its perimeter. Even if there is space between the homes, as long as they are surrounded by a fence or an eruv, the entire enclosed area is considered one place, and the 2,000 amot are measured from its perimeter (as will be explained in section 8).
  All this pertains to one who spends Shabbat in the city or within its squared-off area. However, one who spends Shabbat in a field near the city is limited to 2,000 amot in each direction, and if his 2,000 amot terminate inside a city, his teḥum ends right there, in the middle of the city. We do not consider the whole city his four amot.5<i class="footnote">If a town is so small that the entire area is within his 2,000 <em>amot</em>, then the area of the town is skipped (the whole city is considered four <em>amot</em>), and his 2,000 <em>amot</em> continue from the far edge of the town (SA 408:1). Here is an example:</i>
  
  Section 5
  
  Teĥum Shabbat / Measuring Teĥum in Rabbinic Times and Nowadays
  The Sages established rules for measuring the teḥum Shabbat as precisely as possible. First, they declared: “Teḥum Shabbat may be measured only with a rope that is fifty amot long, no more or less” (Eruvin 57b). If a longer rope were used, its weight would make it hard to pull taut, and the resulting measurement would be too short. If a shorter rope were used, one might pull it too tight, and the resulting measurement would be too long. Second, they required those measuring to hold the rope at chest height. If the person holding one end of the rope were to hold it at head level, while the person at the other end were to hold it at foot level, the resulting measurement would be too short (SA 399:1-3). Third, they said that when measuring an area that contains a valley, one person should stand on either side of the valley, so that they can measure the distance in the air. When measuring an area that contains a hill, tall poles should be set up so that the rope stretches above the hill. If the valley or hill is more than fifty amot wide, thus making it impossible to use a fifty-ama rope, the area should be measured with a four-ama rope. The person standing above should hold the rope at foot level, and the person standing below should hold it at chest level. If the slope is so steep that it would be difficult to calculate the measurement this way, the measurement should be estimated. If the area contains a cliff, as long as the cliff is less than four amot wide, it is not taken into account at all (Eruvin 58a-b; SA 399:4-5).
  The Sages added that for these measurements, we rely only on an expert who knows how to calculate distances properly. If two experts arrive at different measurements, we follow the measurement that results in a larger teḥum. Since the laws of teḥum are rabbinic, we follow the more lenient opinion (Eruvin 58b-59a; SA 399:7-9). If one happens to spend Shabbat in a place where teḥum Shabbat has not been calculated, and he needs to go somewhere for the sake of a mitzva, he may take 2,000 medium-sized strides, which is approximately 2,000 amot (Eruvin 42a; SA 397:2; MB ad loc. 5).
  Today it is best to establish teḥum Shabbat using aerial maps or GPS devices, as these can measure distances with extreme precision. We should not insist on measuring in the way that the Sages established. After all, their whole purpose was to measure as precisely as possible, using the tools available to them, without terribly inconveniencing those charged with measuring. Now that we have methods of measuring that are both more precise and more convenient, we must take advantage of them.
  
  Section 6
  
  Teĥum Shabbat / The Cardinal Directions and Squaring a City
  As we have seen (section 2), we square a person’s mekom shevita to determine his teḥum. If he is in a field (i.e., not in a city or town), his mekom shevita is a square with four-ama sides; if he is in a city, we inscribe the city in a square. From this square we measure 2,000 amot in each direction.
  Let us add now that when we square the city, we do so based on the four cardinal directions (SA 398:3).6<i class="footnote">. The city’s residents may not decide to square the city in a way that does not follow the four cardinal directions just because they would like to add space in the corners in the direction they wish to go. This is because the law is unequivocal: the city must be squared in accordance with the four cardinal directions. This is based upon the procedure described for the Levite cities: “You shall measure off two thousand <em>amot</em> outside the city wall all around. You shall measure off two thousand <em>amot</em> outside the city on the east side, two thousand on the south side, two thousand on the west side, and two thousand on the north side, with the city in the center” (Bamidbar 35:5). We see that the verse follows the four cardinal directions. This understanding is implied in MT 28:7 and SA 398:3, and is also followed by MB 398:7 and <em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 110:23. Some maintain that the city’s residents do have the right to decide to square their city in a way that does not correspond with the four cardinal directions. In such a case, every individual is bound by the group’s decision (Rabbeinu Yehonatan, <em>Eruvin</em> 16a, s.v. “im”; <em>Perisha</em> 398:1; <em>Mirkevet Ha-Mishneh</em>, Shabbat 27:2; <em>Noda Bi-Yehuda</em><em> Mahadura Tinyana</em>, OḤ 51).</i> If the city already has corners that lend themselves to squaring in a way that does not follow the four cardinal directions, the squaring is done accordingly (SA 398:1).
  Examples of squaring based on the four cardinal directions:
  
  Examples in which it is agreed that the squaring does not follow the four cardinal directions:
  
  When a city’s shape lends itself to squaring that does not correspond to the four cardinal directions, the poskim disagree how to square it. Some maintain that only when there is a compelling reason not to follow the four cardinal directions may one follow the layout of the city (SAH 398:3; Ḥayei Adam 76:14). However, most poskim maintain that if the shape of a city clearly lends itself to squaring in a certain way, we follow this squaring even though it does not correspond to the four cardinal directions (see n. 7). In cases of doubt, the local rabbinate or rabbinic authority should make the decision.
  Examples of such intermediate cases in which a city’s shape clearly lends itself to squaring in a direction other than the four cardinal directions include cases where one side of the city is straight from one end of the city to the other (figure 1) and cases where the perimeter of the city contains a right angle (figure 2, in which case we follow the directions of the right angle and not the four cardinal directions).7<i class="footnote">In the city featured in figure 1, most Rishonim and Aḥaronim rule that it is squared based on the right angle (as is the case with a city that is shaped like an L, according to Rashba, Ran, Ritva, and Me’iri). In the city featured in figure 2, one side of the entire city is a straight line. The law in such a case can be derived from the case of a city that is shaped like a bow (section 7), where it is squared based on this straight line, or “bowstring” (Me’iri, <em>Eruvin</em> 55a). Ḥazon Ish states this as well in OḤ 80 and 110. Some maintain that in both the above cases, the city must be squared based on the four cardinal directions (SAH 388:3; <em>Ḥayei Adam</em> 76:14). Others maintain that in all doubtful cases, the city is squared in whichever way will add the least area to the city (<em>Ḥazon Ish</em> 110:23). The <em>halakha</em> follows the first opinion, that of the majority of <em>poskim</em>, and the figures above reflect this opinion. Nevertheless, when it is not clear if the perimeter of a city contains a right angle, the local rabbinate or rabbinic authority may decide to rely on those who rule that such a city should be squared based on the four cardinal directions.</i>
  
  It is important to note that if one is spending Shabbat outside a city and his mekom shevita is limited to four amot square, he may choose to square his mekom shevita in whatever direction he wishes, and this will also determine how his 2,000-ama teḥum is squared (see section 12 below).
  
  Section 7
  
  Teĥum Shabbat / Cases In Which We Do Not Square a City
  As we have seen, by squaring the city, we add space in the corners to the teḥum. However, the Sages pointed out that sometimes we cannot draw straight lines to square the whole city, because the resulting square would include uninhabited areas that are too large to be considered subsumed by the city. Examples of this would be cities that are shaped like a bow or like an L. The operative principle is that if there are 4,000 amot between the two ends of the shape, that part of the city cannot be squared.
  An L-shaped city:
  
  A bow-shaped city:8<i class="footnote">Rambam and SA 388:4 state, in disagreement with this diagram, that the 2,000 <em>amot</em> are measured from the edges of the inhabited homes. The resulting <em>teḥum</em> follows the curve of the bow. However, the diagram follows the opinion of <em>Tosafot</em> (55b, s.v. “ve-im lav”), Rosh, most Rishonim, and Rema that for the inside of the bow, where the arc narrows to less than 4,000 <em>amot</em>, we draw a “bowstring” from one end of the arc to the other and measure the <em>teḥum</em> as 2,000 <em>amot</em> from that straight line (see diagram). The <em>halakha</em> follows the majority of <em>poskim</em>, especially since the laws of <em>teḥumin</em> are rabbinic, so the <em>halakha</em> follows the lenient position. Although <em>Tur</em> has an even more lenient opinion, the rest of the <em>poskim</em> disagree, as detailed in BHL s.v. “ve-yesh omrim.” Uncertainty still remains regarding how to measure the <em>teḥum</em> for the rest of the bow, where the arc widens to 4,000 <em>amot </em>and greater. It would seem that we can follow the position of Rambam and SA that the <em>teḥum</em> follows the curve, as displayed in the diagram. Ḥazon Ish maintains this as well (OḤ 110:10). See <em>Harḥavot</em></i>
  
  Section 8
  
  Teĥum Shabbat / Connecting Settled Areas
  As long as the houses in a city are contiguous, meaning that they are not farther away from one another than the size of a karpif (a large courtyard, approximately 32 m long), they are considered part of one area for the purpose of assessing the teḥum. If they are separated from one another by more space than that, they are not considered part of one area, and each house’s teḥum Shabbat is then calculated separately.9<i class="footnote">The <em>shi’ur</em> of a <em>karpif</em> is 70 <em>amot</em> and four <em>tefaḥim</em>. Following the updated calculation described in n. 1, this is 32.224 m, and the size of two large courtyards is 64.448 m. For the sake of simplification, we use the rounded-off measurements of 32 m and 64 m.</i>
  If the houses in a city are contiguous, then even if one house is out of alignment, as long as it is not more than 32 m from the next house, the teḥum’s square or rectangle expands to include the unaligned house. If there are additional houses after this one, the teḥum expands to include them as well; this can continue even if it means that the teḥum extends outside the city proper for a distance that would take days to walk. As long as each house is not separated from the next by more than 32 m, the teḥum extends to include them. However, if a house is more than 32 m away, it is not included within the rectangle.
  
  If the distance between two adjacent neighborhoods is greater than the size of two large courtyards (i.e., over 64 m), then each neighborhood is considered a town in its own right. We square each on its own, and then 2,000 amot are measured in each direction from that square. In contrast, if the distance separating the two neighborhoods is 64 m or less, they are considered one area and we square them together. There must be at least fifty residents living in an area for a group of houses to be defined as a neighborhood (Eruvin 60a). Even if there are fewer than fifty people, as long as the area contains three courtyards, each of which joins two homes together, or six homes, each of which has a courtyard, the area is still considered a neighborhood (MB 398:38; Ḥazon Ish OḤ 110:19).
  
  If an area is enclosed by a wall or an eruv, all its homes and neighborhoods are considered one area. This is true even when the wall or eruv is farther than a karpif’s length from the last house, and even if there is a large distance between the homes and neighborhoods.
  
  Section 9
  
  Teĥum Shabbat / Overlapping Squares
  When the squares or rectangles formed around two cities overlap, even when there is no joint eruv, the overlapping area connects the cities. We draw a new rectangle around the entire area to include both cities. The residents of both cities may then walk 2,000 amot beyond the joint rectangle.
  
  However, if the distance separating the corners of the two rectangles is greater than 4,000 amot, as we have seen (section 7), we do not square the entire area. Rather, each city is assigned a standard teḥum of 2,000 amot beyond its rectangle in each direction.
  
  Section 10
  
  Teĥum Shabbat / The Status of Large Cities
  If a highway within a city is more than 64 m wide and bisects the entire city, then the city is viewed as divided in two, and the teḥum Shabbat for residents of each of the two sections is calculated separately. This is also the case for a wide-open area such as a park or large garden. If it is more than 64 m wide and bisects the entire city, then the city is viewed as divided in two, and the teḥum Shabbat for each of the two sections is calculated separately.
  
  At first glance, it would seem that the Ayalon Highway divides Tel Aviv into two cities. Nevertheless, since there is an eruv that encompasses all of Tel Aviv and the nearby cities, the eruv unites the different sections. Additionally, if a highway bisects a city but the rectangles drawn around each section overlap, then the overlapping area joins together the sections and we draw a new rectangle around the entire area, as explained above. Additionally, one could argue that since it is intended that all a city’s residents will make use of a highway, park, or large garden, they are considered part of the city and do not actually divide it.
  
  Others disagree, maintaining that these factors – an eruv, usage by all city residents, and overlapping rectangles – cannot join together the two sections formed by a highway or park that bisects a city. The primary position is the lenient one. However, it is proper to be stringent and avoid walking more than twelve mil beyond the highway, since some say that traveling beyond twelve mil is forbidden by Torah law (see section 1 above).10<i class="footnote">As mentioned above, two cities or neighborhoods do not join together if they are separated by 64 m, which is double the size of a city’s outskirts (SA 398:7). Rema adds that if the entire length of a city is bisected with at least this much space, then the city is viewed as divided in two. Similarly, if a park that is more than 64 m wide stretches the entire length of a city, it divides the city, and each part is considered its own city. R. Ephraim Ariel Buchwald in his book <em>Kiryat Ariel</em> presents a ruling of R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv that the Ayalon Highway, Namir Highway (north of the Yarkon River), and the Yarkon itself – each of which is over 64 m wide – divide Tel Aviv into five cities.Nevertheless, for several reasons it seems that these highways and the river do not divide the city. First of all, the Tel Aviv <em>eruv</em> encloses all these parts, joining them together into one city. When the <em>halakha</em> speaks of a bisected city being divided in two, it is referring to a situation in which the walls have been breached. If the city is walled, however, it is still considered one area. Furthermore, even if the <em>eruv</em> happens to be down and in practice one may not carry in the area, as long as the majority of the <em>eruv</em> is still standing, the city may still be considered one area. <em>Orḥot Shabbat</em> states this in ch. 28 n. 163 in the name of R. Shmuel Auerbach, who derives it from the laws of sacrifices (certain types of which had to be eaten within the walls of Jerusalem), for which a wall whose breaches cover less length than its standing parts is effective (<em>Tosafot</em>, BM 53b).If the road bisecting a city is not straight, the rectangles drawn around each section can overlap, thus uniting the city even if there is no eruv. This opinion was expressed by R. Shalom Noaḥ Segal Weiss in Tikun Eruvin 2:5:39 (p. 211) and n. 156 (pp. 236-237). Maḥazeh Avraham OḤ 70 states that even if the rectangles do not touch each other, as long as the distance between them is less than 64 m, they are considered joined.Another justification for leniency is that the shi’ur of 64 m – double the size of a city’s outskirts – was based on the standards in talmudic times. However, now that cities are much more sprawling, the entire area that serves the city’s residents should be considered part of the city’s outskirts. This can be derived from the law of a city that is situated next to a stream. If the bank of the stream that is closer to the city has a balcony that is four amot wide, the entire stream is considered part of the city, and the city’s teḥum is measured from the farther bank. This would seem to be the case even when the width of the stream is greater than 64 m. MB 398:46 cites Ritva (Eruvin 61a, s.v. “ve-Ra”Ḥ z”l”) that since “this stream is in front of the whole city and is fit to be used by all the city’s residents, we can consider it an extension of the city even though it is not habitable.” We may also add the possibility raised by MA (398:13) that from the status of the stream we can extrapolate to any place that the city residents use. If so, urban highways are a part of the city even if they are very wide, since their purpose is to be used by the city’s residents. This would also be the case with public parks and gardens. R. Michael Bleicher writes along these lines in Teḥum Shabbat U-medidato, p. 24. (Nevertheless, we see from Rema, cited at the beginning of this note, that the definition of a city is based on physical criteria, not on whether the two sections share a municipality.)In practice, since the law is rabbinic, we may be lenient, whether based on the rationale that the city has an eruv, or on the rationale that the rectangles drawn around each section overlap. Each rationale is sufficient on its own, and they are even stronger when considered together. Even when distances greater than twelve mil are involved, where some Rishonim maintain that a Torah prohibition applies, we may be lenient based on these rationales. However, if there is no great need, it is proper to defer to the stringent opinion.</i>
  
  Section 11
  
  Teĥum Shabbat / Traveling Beyond the Teĥum and Items Arriving from Beyond the Teĥum
  One who traveled beyond the boundaries of the teḥum, whether knowingly or unknowingly, forfeits his 2,000 amot and may now only move within his four amot (SA 405:1; n. 1 above). Should he need to move his bowels, he may walk to a place where he will be able do so privately. Afterward, he may distance himself from this place enough to avoid the foul smell, so that he may recite prayers and berakhot, but he may not move more than four amot from that spot (SA 406:1).
  One who traveled beyond the teḥum knowingly and reached an area enclosed by a wall or eruv is nonetheless limited to his four amot. Even if he is now inside a house, he may not move more than four amot. In contrast, if he traveled beyond the teḥum unknowingly or under duress, he may walk freely within the enclosed area (SA 405:6; BHL s.v. “aval”).
  If one traveled beyond the teḥum in order to save a life, the Sages ordained that upon completing his mission, he may walk 2,000 amot in each direction. If this new teḥum overlaps his original teḥum, he may return home, and he retains his original teḥum as though he never left (Eruvin 44b). In certain cases he may even return to his original place regardless of teḥumin, as explained above in 27:10 and n. 12).
  If one is traveling on a plane that, due to unforeseen circumstances, lands in an airport on Shabbat, his teḥum Shabbat is established upon his landing, and he may not go farther than 2,000 amot in any direction.11<i class="footnote">. See n. 3 above, which discusses the Sages’ uncertainty about whether the prohibitions of <em>teḥumin</em> apply to airspace more than ten <em>tefaḥim</em> above land. The plane in this case has flown more than twelve <em>mil</em> on Shabbat; therefore, according to Rambam and those who follow his position, who maintain that traveling beyond twelve <em>mil</em> on Shabbat is prohibited by Torah law, one who lands on Shabbat should be stringent and stay within his four <em>amot</em>. However, according to most <em>poskim</em>, traveling beyond one’s <em>teḥum</em> is never prohibited by Torah law, so we may be lenient cases of uncertainty. Therefore, we do not have to worry about <em>teḥumin</em> above ten <em>tefaḥim</em>. The passenger’s <em>teḥum</em> is established only once his plane lands, after which he has 2,000 <em>amot</em> in each direction, as I wrote in the main text. In any case, even according to Rambam, since the passenger’s arrival on Shabbat was unintentional, he may walk through the entire airport as long as it is enclosed by a fence (see Rema 248:4; MB <em>ad loc.</em> 32; <em>Yaskil Avdi</em> 8:20:62; <em>Yalkut Yosef</em> 248:4).</i> Since an airport is generally surrounded by a fence and often contains an area for sleeping, the whole airport is considered his four amot, and he can walk another 2,000 amot beyond it. However, if the airport is not surrounded by a fence, then his mekom shevita is established the moment the plane touches down. If the plane then taxies on the runway for another 2,000 amot, he has gone beyond his teḥum, and he may not move any farther than his four amot. This means he must remain on the plane until Shabbat ends. If the crew or security personnel insist that he leave, or if he needs to leave in order to use the bathroom, he may do so. If he then reaches an enclosed area, he may move around within it, since the only reason he originally traveled beyond his teḥum is that he was forced to do so (SA 405:6). If his flight was for the sake of a mitzva, then even if the plane taxies for a full kilometer and the airport is not fenced in, he may still walk 2,000 amot from the airplane door (SA 248:4; MB ad loc. 32).
  One whose boat docked on Shabbat may leave the boat and walk 2,000 amot in each direction. This is because until reaching the port, the boat was more than ten tefaḥim above the ocean floor, so teḥum Shabbat did not apply to it. Only once he sets foot on dry land is his teḥum established. If the port is fenced in, he may walk 2,000 amot beyond the enclosure (SA 404:1; n. 3 above).
  One who traveled beyond his teḥum and then returned inside his teḥum unknowingly or due to circumstances beyond his control may still walk within his teḥum (SA 406:1). However, if he traveled beyond the teḥum knowingly, then even if he returned unknowingly, he forfeits his teḥum, though he may still walk throughout the city (SA 405:8).
  Just as one may not travel beyond his teḥum on Shabbat, he also may not move his possessions outside the teḥum. If he took fruit beyond the teḥum unknowingly, even though they may not be carried more than four amot, they may be eaten. If he did so knowingly, the fruit may not be eaten (SA 405:9; MB ad loc. 52; see above, ch. 26 n. 6).
  If a non-Jew brought fruit from outside the teḥum on Shabbat, as long as he brought them for himself or for another non-Jew, a Jew may eat the fruit. However, one may not carry them more than four amot. If the non-Jew brought the fruit into a home or a site that is enclosed by a fence or an eruv, one may carry the fruit within the enclosed area. In contrast, if the non-Jew brought the fruit for a Jew, that Jew and the members of his household may not eat the fruit until enough time has passed after Shabbat for the fruit to have been brought then (SA 325:8).12<i class="footnote">Two sets of laws apply to objects that arrive from outside the <em>teḥum</em>. The first is the standard laws of <em>teḥum Shabbat</em>. Objects carried outside of their <em>teḥum</em> are considered the same as people who left their <em>teḥum</em> unknowingly or due to circumstances out of their control, since objects have no will of their own. Therefore, if the objects arrived in an enclosed area, they may be carried throughout the enclosed area. However, if they were brought to a place that is not enclosed, they may be moved only four <em>amot</em>. If they are returned to their original place, they revert to their original status.The second set of laws relates to benefiting from prohibited actions done on Shabbat, and the intent of the person transporting the fruits determines their status. If he did so knowingly, no one may benefit from his actions, and the fruit may not be eaten. If he brought them unknowingly, then since the prohibition itself is rabbinic, they may be eaten (Pri Megadim; BHL 318:1, s.v. “ha-mevashel”; see Harḥavot 26:4:1). If a non-Jew brought the fruit from outside the teḥum for himself or for another non-Jew, a Jew may eat them; but if he brought them for a Jew, that Jew and his household may not eat the fruit until enough time has elapsed for the fruit to have been brought to them permissibly after Shabbat.The Sages established that the laws of teḥumin also apply to objects belonging to non-Jews, and such objects acquire a mekom shevita wherever they are when Shabbat began. If it was permitted to carry objects belonging to non-Jews without limit, people might mistakenly come to believe that objects belonging to Jews are also not subject to the laws of teḥum Shabbat. Ownerless items, however, are not subject to teḥumin restrictions (SA 401:1).</i>
  
  Section 12
  
  Teĥum Shabbat / Eruv Teĥumin
  If one wants to walk on Shabbat to a place that lies beyond his teḥum, he can render it permissible by making an eruv teḥumin before Shabbat, that is, by establishing his mekom shevita at the place where he puts the eruv. By placing this eruv, he merges the old teḥum (which would not have allowed him to go where he wants) with the new teḥum (which will allow him to go there) – this is why it is called an eruv (which literally means “merging”) teḥumin. However, the distance that the eruv teḥumin affords him in one direction is lost in the opposite direction. For example, if one places the eruv teḥumin 2,000 amot to the east of his home, he may now walk 4,000 amot eastward (2,000 amot from his home to the eruv and 2,000 amot beyond the eruv), but he may no longer walk westward at all.
  
  There are two ways to shift one’s mekom shevita. The first is by simply walking 2,000 amot in the desired direction before Shabbat begins and staying there for the onset of Shabbat. As long as one is there during the entire period of bein ha-shmashot, that becomes his place, and his teḥum Shabbat is now calculated from that point. He does not need to verbalize anything for this to take effect. It is enough for him to intend to establish his teḥum from that point. In contrast, if one is hiking in a field during bein ha-shmashot but does not intend to establish his mekom shevita there, his mekom shevita remains his home (SA 409:7; MB ad loc. 29).13<i class="footnote">. The Sages allow a traveler who wishes to establish his <em>mekom shevita</em> someplace further along the way to do so by merely verbalizing this wish. This special leniency is effective as long as two conditions are met. First, it must be possible for him to reach that location before dark if he hurries. Second, at the moment when Shabbat begins, he must be within 2,000 <em>amot</em> of the location (SA 409:11). However, if he intends to establish his <em>mekom shevita</em> somewhere beyond his 2,000 <em>amot</em>, he loses his <em>teḥum</em> Shabbat, and he may not move beyond his four <em>amot</em>, since he cannot establish the desired location as his <em>mekom shevita</em>, as he is beyond its <em>teḥum</em>, and he cannot establish his current location as his <em>mekom shevita</em> either, since he pushed it out of his mind. This is the opinion of Rashba, Rosh (<em>Eruvin</em> 4:13), and <em>Tur</em> (409:11). However, according to Rambam, whenever one fails to establish his <em>mekom shevita</em> at his desired location, he establishes it at his current location instead. SA cites Rambam as a secondary opinion (“<em>yesh omrim</em>”).If one is traveling and wishes to establish his place verbally, he must specify the four <em>amot</em> that he intends as his <em>mekom shevita</em>. An example of such a verbalization might be “The four <em>amot</em> surrounding such-and-such tree trunk.” If he did not delineate the area precisely, according to most Rishonim the entire uncertain area is included in his <em>mekom shevita</em>. If he said, “My place for Shabbat is under that tree,” but half the tree is outside his 2,000 <em>amot</em>, he has not established a <em>mekom shevita</em>, and he is left with only his four <em>amot</em>. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, according to Rambam, whenever one does not specify his <em>mekom shevita</em> adequately, rendering his desired <em>teḥum</em> ineffective, his current location becomes his <em>mekom shevita </em>instead, and his <em>teḥum</em> is 2,000 <em>amot</em> from there. Under pressing circumstances, one may rely on this opinion.</i>
  The second way is to set aside two meals’ worth of food at that place and recite the declaration for making an eruv teḥumin, along with a berakha, as will be explained in the next section. An eruv teḥumin should be made only for the purpose of a mitzva – for example in order to attend a Torah lecture or a mitzva celebration. If one makes an eruv teḥumin for some other purpose, it is still effective be-di’avad (SA 415:1).
  When making an eruv teḥumin, one must place it within 2,000 amot of his home. This way his home will be within the teḥum of the eruv, and he may then walk from his home to the eruv. If his home is outside the eruv’s teḥum, the eruv is ineffective, and his teḥum is measured from his home.14<i class="footnote">At first glance, it would seem that in most large cities, setting aside an <em>eruv</em> <em>teḥumin</em> is ineffective. After all, we saw in section 4 that when one is outside the city at the start of Shabbat, we do not include the whole city in his four <em>amot</em>. He may travel within the city only as far as his 2,000 <em>amot</em> allow. If so, when one’s home is more than 2,000 <em>amot</em> from the <em>eruv</em> that one makes, the <em>eruv</em> is ineffective, and his status is the same as that of any other resident of the city. Indeed, this is how <em>Beit Me’ir</em>, <em>Maḥatzit Ha-shekel</em>, and <em>Olat Shabbat</em> understand SA 408:1, and so states <em>Eliya Rabba</em> 408:8 as well. According to MA and MB 408:3, 7, 10, SA agrees that one’s <em>mekom shevita</em> in such a case is indeed the location where he set aside the <em>eruv</em>. Since he was in his home when Shabbat began, he may walk within the city in the direction of the <em>eruv</em>, but once he has left the city, he may not return home. According to Rema, since this person’s home is in the city, if he placed an <em>eruv</em> outside the city, he has a connection to both places; therefore, in addition to the 2,000 <em>amot</em> granted him by his <em>eruv</em>, the whole city is considered four <em>amot</em> and he may walk freely within it. Even after he leaves the city, he may return to it and walk within it. BHL’s discussion of this matter concludes with an endorsement of MA’s understanding of SA (408:1, s.v. “raḥok”). However, many rule in accordance with Rema, including <em>Baḥ</em>, <em>Noda Bi-Yehuda</em> (<em>Mahadura Tinyana </em>49), and AHS. SHT<em> ad loc. </em>11 states that one should not object to those who are lenient in accordance with Rema. Since the laws of <em>teḥum Shabbat</em> are completely rabbinic, when necessary one may rely on Rema.</i>
  One can actually use an eruv teḥumin to travel 5,600 amot, not just 4,000 amot. Since the mekom shevita where he sets aside the eruv is temporary (unlike a city, as above in section 6), he may have in mind for the new teḥum created by the eruv to be oriented so that the square’s diagonal faces his desired direction. He thus gains the additional corners.
  
  Section 13
  
  Teĥum Shabbat / Placing the Eruv Teĥumin and Reciting the Berakha
  One who wishes to make an eruv by placing food must set aside two meals’ worth of food. If bread is used, it must amount to the volume of six eggs, which is approximately 300 ml. (Others maintain that it must amount to the volume of eight eggs.) If one wishes to use food that is eaten together with bread, it is sufficient to use the amount of that food that would normally be spread on or eaten together with six eggs’ volume of bread (SA 409:7). If the eruv is meant to serve several people, two meals’ worth of food must be left for each person. If a large number of people are involved and one would like to minimize the bulkiness of the eruv, he may use olive oil, chocolate spread, or peanut butter, as relatively small quantities of these foods are used with a large amount of bread. One may also use a revi’it (75 ml) of vinegar, which is enough to use as a dip or dressing for two meals’ worth of vegetables (MB 386:35; 409:36). Drinks may also be used for the eruv as long as there are two revi’iyot (150 ml) per person (SA 386:6). Salt and water may not be used for the eruv (Eruvin 26a).15<i class="footnote">em&gt;Eruvin 26a states that one may use a saltwater mixture for an <em>eruv</em>, and Rambam writes this as well (MT, Laws of <em>Eruvin</em> 1:8). However, based on the continuation of the Gemara, <em>Tosafot</em><em>ad loc. </em>s.v. “aval” state that this is limited to a case in which oil is mixed in with the saltwater. SA 386:5 presents Rambam’s opinion, and then cites <em>Tosafot</em> as a secondary opinion. MB <em>ad loc. </em>29 states that the <em>halakha</em> follows the lenient first opinion.</i>
  The food must belong to the person who plans to make use of the eruv, as he uses this food to establish his mekom shevita. When the eruv is meant for several people, the food’s owner must arrange for each person to acquire some of the food, making all of them partners in it. This is accomplished by means of third person, who lifts up the food with the intent to acquire it on behalf of all those who need to use the eruv (SA 413:1).
  If the food set aside for the eruv was eaten before bein ha-shmashot, the eruv is ineffective. However, after bein ha-shmashot the eruv may be eaten, because once one has established his mekom shevita during bein ha-shmashot, it remains in effect for all of Shabbat (Rema 394:2). If the eruv was left in a place where it could not be accessed during bein ha-shmashot without transgressing a Torah law (for example, if a boulder would need to be rolled away to retrieve it), the eruv is ineffective (SA 394:3; 409:3-4).
  When setting aside the eruv, one should recite the following berakha: “Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us regarding the mitzva of eruv” (“asher kideshanu be-mitzvotav ve-tzivanu al mitzvat eruv”). One should follow this with the declaration: “With this eruv it shall be permitted to me to walk 2,000 amot from this place in every direction.” Bedi’avad, even if he simply said: “This shall be an eruv,” it is effective. But if he said nothing at all, he has not established an eruv (SA 415:4; MB ad loc. 15).
  When the eruv is meant to serve several people, their names should be explicitly mentioned as part of the declaration. One must also take care that the eruv contains two meals’ worth of food for each person who needs to rely on it (SA 415:4). If he would like the eruv to be effective for multiple Shabbatot, he should add at the end of the declaration the phrase “for all Shabbatot of the year.” Then, as long as the eruv remains in existence, it is effective (MB ad loc. 16).
  An eruv may be placed by a shali’aḥ (emissary or proxy). However, a minor, a non-Jew, or one who does not believe in the mitzva of eruv cannot serve as a shali’aḥ. The shali’aḥ must recite the berakha and the declaration. If he said nothing, the eruv is not effective (SA 409:8). However, it is effective if the owner of the eruv declares: “With the eruv that my shali’aḥ is setting aside, I will be permitted to walk 2,000 amot from the eruv in every direction” (BHL s.v. “ve-yomar”).
  One cannot place an eruv on behalf of another without the other person’s knowledge. One may place an eruv for his minor children, and the teḥum that it establishes is binding for them. Similarly, one may place an eruv for members of his household who are over the age of bar or bat mitzva. However, if upon hearing that there is an eruv teḥumin they object and state that they do not want it, the teḥum that it establishes is not binding for them. A child who is under the age of six is considered secondary to his mother, so an eruv that is effective for the mother is effective for her child as well (SA 414:1-2).
  
  Section 14
  
  Teĥum Shabbat / Establishing a Conditional Eruv for All Local Residents
  One may place an eruv conditionally. For example, if one knows that on Shabbat two Torah scholars will be lecturing in two nearby towns, but he has yet to decide if he will attend the lecture to the east, the one to the west, or neither, he places one eruv in the east and one in the west and stipulates in his mind that on Shabbat he will decide which teḥum to use, the one based on his home, on the eruv in the west, or on the eruv in the east. Once he has made his decision, though, he is bound by his chosen teḥum. If he did not make a conscious decision but merely started walking in accordance with only one specific teḥum, he has thus established his teḥum and may no longer change his mind and walk in accordance with a different teḥum (Eruvin 82a; SA 413:1; MB ad loc. 8).16<i class="footnote">The Tanna’im disagree about this law. According to the Sages and R. Yehuda in the Mishna (<em>Eruvin</em> 36b), a stipulation is effective when placing an <em>eruv</em>, based on the principle of retroactive clarification (“<em>yesh breira</em>”). In this case, it means that when one decides which <em>eruv</em> he wants to use, it clarifies retroactively which of the two potential <em>eruvin</em> he set aside before Shabbat was the true <em>eruv</em>. The <em>beraita</em> mentions that some maintain that retroactive clarification is ineffective (<em>Eruvin</em> 36b and 37b). The Talmud in <em>Beitza</em> 38a cites the opinion of R. Oshaya that for Torah laws retroactive clarification is ineffective, while for rabbinic laws it is effective. This is the opinion of most <em>poskim</em>, including Rambam, Rabbeinu Tam, Rosh, Ramban, Ran, and SA YD 331:11. SA 413:1 and MB<em> ad loc.</em> 7 conclude similarly. Therefore, one may set aside multiple <em>eruvin</em> and then decide on Shabbat which <em>eruv</em> he will use to establish his <em>teḥum</em>. (Some disagree: Ri maintains that retroactive clarification is effective even for Torah laws, while Maharam of Rothenburg as quoted in <em>Mordechai</em> maintains that it is ineffective even for rabbinic laws.)SA 413:1 uses the expression, “It all depends on his stipulation.” This implies that if one places an <em>eruv </em>conditionally, such as by saying: “If the Torah scholar comes to the east, my <em>eruv</em> will be in the east,” and then the Torah scholar comes to the east, the person’s <em>teḥum</em> is set and cannot be changed.</i>
  One may volunteer to place an eruv on behalf of all residents of a locale. He then declares: “With this eruv it shall be permitted for all local residents and their guests to walk 2,000 amot from this place in every direction.” Anyone who is aware of the existence of this eruv before Shabbat, even if he did not decide that the site of the eruv is his mekom shevita, may decide on Shabbat that he wishes to walk in that direction and may rely on the communal eruv. However, one who was unaware of the eruv’s existence before Shabbat may not rely on it (SA 413:1).
  If there are so many local residents that the person placing the eruv cannot leave two meals’ worth of food for each one of them, then as long as he knows that there will be no more than twenty people who will want to rely on the eruv, he may place two meals’ worth of food for twenty people and declare: “With this eruv it shall be permissible for anyone who wishes to walk 2,000 amot from this place in every direction for all Shabbatot of the year.” This allows all who are interested in relying upon his eruv to do so, on condition that they are aware of its existence before the Shabbat they rely on it (SA 413:1; BHL s.v. “le-khol eḥad”). It seems that when it is clear that someone will make use of the eruv, the berakha should be recited, but when it is uncertain whether anyone will make use of it, no berakha should be recited.
  If one places an eruv unconditionally, his teḥum is determined by the location of the eruv. He may not change his mind and follow the teḥum measured from his home.