  The forensic science community has increasingly sought quantitative methods for conveying the weight of evidence. Experts from many forensic laboratories summarize their findings in terms of a likelihood ratio. Several proponents of this approach have argued that Bayesian reasoning proves it to be normative. We find this likelihood ratio paradigm to be unsupported by arguments of Bayesian decision theory, which applies only to personal decision making and not to the transfer of information from an expert to a separate decision maker. We further argue that decision theory does not exempt the presentation of a likelihood ratio from uncertainty characterization, which is required to assess the fitness for purpose of any transferred quantity. We propose the concept of a lattice of assumptions leading to an uncertainty pyramid as a framework for assessing the uncertainty in an evaluation of a likelihood ratio. We demonstrate the use of these concepts with illustrative examples regarding the refractive index of glass and automated comparison scores for fingerprints. 
Likelihood Ratio as Weight of Forensic Evidence: A Closer Look