text: Having read this book as well as Barnet Schacter's on New York during the Revolution, both works I find are flawed in different ways.  The likeable thing about Gallagher is that he manages to convey the story in less than half the time.  The hard thing to realize about the battle of Brooklyn is that it really wasn't much of a battle.  The author here makes some grandoise statements about a new age of citizen warfare being ushered in with the advent of this battle.  If that is so then the complete defeat of Washy's army bodes ill for that development!  
  
  Gallagher is on better ground when he provides a nice overall of tactics and warfare in the 18th century.  He gives a good account of training and recruitment in both armies.  One of the more interesting things he mentions is that due to the two-rank line used by both sides in the Revolutionary War, casualties from musketry and artillery tended to be light.  This is an interesting point, and one not brought out by many historians of the period.  In europe stronger lines of 3 and sometimes 4 ranks were employed, which provided greater strength, but also more density.  Hence increased loss from fire.  A point well worth considering when looking at the battles of the Revolution.  Most historians miss this completely, or are not interested in it.  
  
  Gallagher provides more of a military history in general on this subject, but he does waste a lot of time with preleminaries.  More than half of the book is spent providing the standard background for the causes of the Revolution, etc.  While certainly required for the general reader; when a book is as short as this one is it seems almost pointless.  When we get down to the battle itself Gallagher gives us not much more than Schacter does.  The British flank march completely compromises Washy's position, the outlying forces are swept away clear and simple.  The confusion of command between Putnam and Sullivan no doubt made a bad situation worse.  Washy's complete lack of strategic perspective shows up totally here.  The defense of Brooklyn, much less Manhatten itself was a foregoon conclusion.  Washy was mad to consider defending Brooklyn, much less manhatten in the first place.  He committed his ill-trained army to an impossible task.  That he did not lose completely was due more to how the British under Howe chose to wage their campaign. 
  
  Most American authors try to put a bright light on what is essnetially a dark canvas.  At Brooklyn the Americans ran.  Period.  A few units stood their ground, in particular the Marylanders, but no one else really did.  The reason why American losses were not greater was because they did run.  Some authors try to say that British losses in killed and wounded were greater than Americans at this battle. This is true partly because the British had to attack some strong positions that held for a time until pireced by the assault.  British losses were often greater in this regard because Americans usually ran once the British bayonet began to strike home.  Still, of the 1,000+ casualities sustained by the Americans here, more than most US historians care to admit fell to British musketry and bayonets. The British loss was still well below 400.  As the great Maurice de Saxe said in his memoirs of warfare in this period, more of the enemy can usually be despatched when he runs as opposed to when he stands.  To reserve fire until the enemy line breaks was considered the most effective tactic of this period.  In that respect many dozens of rebels must have been shot down as they ran before British bayonets.  
  
  Gallagher provides some understanding why the British did not storm the heights right away.  This has often been one of the major criticisms of Howe's victory.  Why didn't he follow up?  After marching all night to outflank the Americans, the British were disorganized, and tired.  They had also foght a running battle with a fleeing enemy.  Howe did not believe his army was in any condition to storm Brooklyn heights, memory of Bunker Hill or no.  Of course this does not explain why it was not done the following day.  If we look more closely at Howe's position we can perhaps explain his rationale.  His commission was both a general and peacemaker.  He wanted to convince the rebels to come back into the royal fold.  He could best do this by showing how futile their resistence to the crown was.  To have destroyed Washy's army in Brooklyn would have been gratuitous, excessive.  Such loss of blood would have defeated the purpose in mind.  In restrospect it is easy to find fault with this strategy, and it would prove to be the only chance the British really had to crush the Revolution in its infancy.  
  
  The battle of Brooklyn needs to be looked at from several perspectives.  Gallagher gives us a good start, but I think a more comprehensive work still needs to address all the issues here. 
  