Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2005] FCA 254">trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2005] FCA 254">price-fixing understanding</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2005] FCA 254">consideration of principles applicable to the imposition of an appropriate penalty for making and giving effect to the price-fixing understanding</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2004] FCA 1215">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2004] FCA 1215">penalty</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2004] FCA 1215">contempt admitted to be wilful and contumacious</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2004] FCA 1215">discretion of court to impose penalties</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2004] FCA 1215">suspended prison terms imposed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.0">cited from="[1986] HCA 46">contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.1">cited from="[1986] HCA 46">civil and criminal contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.2">cited from="[1986] HCA 46">federal court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.3">cited from="[1986] HCA 46">powers</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.4">cited from="[1986] HCA 46">fine for civil contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.5">cited from="[1986] HCA 46">daily fine for existing and continuing contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.6">cited from="[1986] HCA 46">anticipatory punishment for future default in complying with order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.7">cited from="[1986] HCA 46">sequestration order in execution of order imposing fines</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.8">cited from="[1986] HCA 46">judiciary act 1903 (cth), s. 24</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.9">cited from="[1986] HCA 46">federal court of australia act 1976 (cth), ss. 23 , 31 .</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.0">cited from="[1983] HCA 2">contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.1">cited from="[1983] HCA 2">federal court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.2">cited from="[1983] HCA 2">statements calculated to undermine public confidence in court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.3">cited from="[1983] HCA 2">punishment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.4">cited from="[1983] HCA 2">appropriateness.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.0">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.1">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">solicitor</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.2">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">interlocutory injunctions appeal lodged</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.3">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">client wrongly advised of effect of appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.4">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">breaches of injunction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.5">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">judge dealing with contempt not fully informed of all relevant facts</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.6">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">fresh evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.7">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">action subsequently settled and injunction discharged</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.8">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">fine imposed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.9">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">apology tendered on appeal  contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.10">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">interlocutory injunction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.11">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">appeal lodged</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.12">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">no stay obtained</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.13">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">appellant wrongly advised by solicitors that appeal would operate to stay orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.14">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">breaches of injunction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.15">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">judge dealing with contempt not fully informed of all relevant facts</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.16">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">fresh evidence tendered on appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.17">cited from="[1982] FCA 190">apology by appellant. the respondents had sought and obtained interlocutory relief restraining the appellant from marketing certain cricket helmets. the appellant had appealed against the granting of the interlocutory relief and, although no stay of those orders was sought or granted, the appellant was informed by its former solicitor that the effect of the appeal was to operate as a stay of the interlocutory orders. acting on this advice the appellant continued to market its cricket helmets in breach of the interlocutory orders. proceedings for contempt of court were then instituted against the appellant. at the hearing of the contempt proceedings the appellant's former solicitor failed to produce all relevant facts fully and properly before the learned trial judge and accordingly the appellant was adjudged to have committed a serious contempt and was fined $10,000. the appellant appealed and sought to tender fresh evidence to explain the circumstances of the contempt. the appellant also tendered an apology to the court.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.0">cited from="[1955] HCA 12">contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.1">cited from="[1955] HCA 12">publication by newspaper</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.2">cited from="[1955] HCA 12">allegations of police violence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.3">cited from="[1955] HCA 12">charges pending in court of petty sessions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.4">cited from="[1955] HCA 12">tendency to prejudice proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.5">cited from="[1955] HCA 12">summary jurisdiction of supreme court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.6">cited from="[1955] HCA 12">public interest</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.7">cited from="[1955] HCA 12">similar allegations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.8">cited from="[1955] HCA 12">judicial inquiry already ordered.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.0">citing from="[2011] VSC 448">contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.1">citing from="[2011] VSC 448">breach of freezing order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.2">citing from="[2011] VSC 448">entering into uncompleted contracts to sell property restrained</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.3">citing from="[2011] VSC 448">sentencing considerations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.4">citing from="[2011] VSC 448">punishment on terms, including suspension</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.5">citing from="[2011] VSC 448">supreme court (general civil procedure) rules 2005 (vic) r 75.11.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.0">citing from="[2011] FCA 557">contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.1">citing from="[2011] FCA 557">contempt of orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.2">citing from="[2011] FCA 557">considerations to be taken into account when fixing penalty</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.0">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.1">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">sentence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.2">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">defiance of orders of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.3">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">whether term of imprisonment manifestly excessive</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.4">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">comparison with other sentences for contempt imposed by court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.5">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">whether imprisonment appropriate</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.6">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">power to fine</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.7">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">effect of bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.8">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">whether sentence should have been in parity with sentence of another contemnor</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.9">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">whether primary judge failed to take account of appellant's advanced age and ill health</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.10">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">whether primary judge failed to give credit for previous good character</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.11">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">whether double punishment for the same offence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.12">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">separate sentences for manufacturing and selling prohibited products at different locations on different dates</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.13">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">whether primary judge misconstrued earlier statement of appellant to court through counsel  costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.14">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.15">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">sentence for contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.16">citing from="[2011] FCAFC 17">whether respondent should be ordered to pay costs of successful appellant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.0">citing from="[2011] FCA 74">contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.1">citing from="[2011] FCA 74">civil contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.2">citing from="[2011] FCA 74">breach of undertaking not to publish or cause to be published</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.3">citing from="[2011] FCA 74">whether statements posted on the respondent's facebook and twitter pages by others constitutes publication by the respondent</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.4">citing from="[2011] FCA 74">appropriate penalty</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.0">citing from="[2010] FCA 1176">category: no</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.0">citing from="[2010] FCA 1125">contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.1">citing from="[2010] FCA 1125">power to punish contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.2">citing from="[2010] FCA 1125">alleged breach of court orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.3">citing from="[2010] FCA 1125">standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.4">citing from="[2010] FCA 1125">whether conduct of alleged contemnor constituted a deliberate breach of court orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.0">citing from="[2010] FCA 657">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.1">citing from="[2010] FCA 657">court's power to punish contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.2">citing from="[2010] FCA 657">whether disobedience of court order constitutes contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.3">citing from="[2010] FCA 657">whether criminal standard of proof applies to contemnors in breach of court order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.4">citing from="[2010] FCA 657">service of orders alleged contemnors</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.5">citing from="[2010] FCA 657">rationale of contempt to enforce court's decisions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.6">citing from="[2010] FCA 657">standard of proof</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.0">citing from="[2010] FCA 391">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.1">citing from="[2010] FCA 391">court's power to punish contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.2">citing from="[2010] FCA 391">whether disobedience of court order constitutes contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.3">citing from="[2010] FCA 391">whether criminal standard of proof applies to contemnors in breach of court order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.4">citing from="[2010] FCA 391">service of orders alleged contemnors</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.5">citing from="[2010] FCA 391">rationale of contempt to enforce court's decisions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.6">citing from="[2010] FCA 391">standard of proof</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.7">citing from="[2010] FCA 391">alleged contemnor to be aware of orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.8">citing from="[2010] FCA 391">must be given notice of charges with 'proper particularity'</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.9">citing from="[2010] FCA 391">opportunity of answering charges</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.10">citing from="[2010] FCA 391">court has discretion to dispense with personal service required by federal court rules o 40 r 8</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.11">citing from="[2010] FCA 391">charges of contempt in civil and criminal matters must be proved beyond reasonable doubt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.0">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.1">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">contempt, attachment and sequestration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.2">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.3">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">what constitutes</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.4">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">disobedience of orders of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.5">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.6">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">difference between civil and criminal contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.7">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">statement of charge</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.8">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">facts required to be proved to establish charge</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.9">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">elements of charge</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.10">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">whether information in charge comprised elements or particulars of charge</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.11">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">whether all particulars of charge required to be made out for each element of charge to be proven</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.12">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.13">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">burden and standard of proof</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.14">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">whether each element of charge proved beyond reasonable doubt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.15">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">interpretation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.16">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">construction of court orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.17">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">whether primary judge erred in construing orders in accordance with definitions and terminology in corporations law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.18">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">whether primary judge erred in substituting a reference in orders to repealed corporations law for corporations act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.19">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">construction of phrase "undertaking a business"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.20">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">whether sending letter to 1,650 recipients containing investment advice amounted to undertaking a business of advising about and dealing in securities appeal and new trial</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.21">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">appeal against sentence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.22">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">grounds for interference</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.23">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">whether primary judge attributed suitable weight to various matters</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.24">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">bail</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.25">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">application for bail</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.26">citing from="[2009] NSWCA 155">power of court of appeal to grant bail in respect of committal for contempt pending determination of appeal and effect of any such grant of bail</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.0">citing from="[2009] FCA 650">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.1">citing from="[2009] FCA 650">contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.2">citing from="[2009] FCA 650">penalties</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.3">citing from="[2009] FCA 650">considerations relevant to penalty</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.4">citing from="[2009] FCA 650">contempt found to be wilful</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.5">citing from="[2009] FCA 650">whether contempt public in nature</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.6">citing from="[2009] FCA 650">the effect of the contempt on the administration of justice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.7">citing from="[2009] FCA 650">the contemnor's culpability</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.8">citing from="[2009] FCA 650">whether any relevant prior convictions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.9">citing from="[2009] FCA 650">relevance of lack of apology</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.10">citing from="[2009] FCA 650">whether any order for costs should mitigate penalty</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.0">citing from="[2009] FCA 266">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.1">citing from="[2009] FCA 266">civil contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.2">citing from="[2009] FCA 266">principles governing imposition of penalty</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.3">citing from="[2009] FCA 266">costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.4">citing from="[2009] FCA 266">discretion to award indemnity costs in contempt proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.5">citing from="[2009] FCA 266">whether immediate taxation appropriate in contempt proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.0">citing from="[2009] FCA 194">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.1">citing from="[2009] FCA 194">court order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.2">citing from="[2009] FCA 194">whether orders sufficiently clear to found proceedings for contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.3">citing from="[2009] FCA 194">whether statement of charge adequate to found proceedings for contempt   practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.4">citing from="[2009] FCA 194">whether the australian building construction commissioner should be heard as an intervener</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.0">citing from="[2009] NSWSC 77">procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.1">citing from="[2009] NSWSC 77">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.2">citing from="[2009] NSWSC 77">alleged contravention of permanent injunctions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.3">citing from="[2009] NSWSC 77">construction of orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.4">citing from="[2009] NSWSC 77">corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.5">citing from="[2009] NSWSC 77">conduct relating to solicitation of investment in securities</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.6">citing from="[2009] NSWSC 77">"undertake" a "business"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.7">citing from="[2009] NSWSC 77">content of such business</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.0">citing from="[2009] FCA 16">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.1">citing from="[2009] FCA 16">civil contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.2">citing from="[2009] FCA 16">injunction preventing publication of certain types of allegations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.3">citing from="[2009] FCA 16">contemnor allegedly misunderstood the true construction of the injunction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.0">citing from="[2008] FCA 1965">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.1">citing from="[2008] FCA 1965">penalty hearing</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.2">citing from="[2008] FCA 1965">considerations relevant to penalty</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.3">citing from="[2008] FCA 1965">contempt found to be wilful</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.4">citing from="[2008] FCA 1965">fine imposed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.0">citing from="[2008] FCA 1586">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.1">citing from="[2008] FCA 1586">breach of court orders restraining respondent from offering businesses for sale without first satisfying certain conditions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.2">citing from="[2008] FCA 1586">belated guilty plea</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.3">citing from="[2008] FCA 1586">substantial criminal record</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.4">citing from="[2008] FCA 1586">previous imprisonment for offences of similar nature to that constituting the contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.5">citing from="[2008] FCA 1586">principles relevant to imposing penalty</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.6">citing from="[2008] FCA 1586">appropriate penalty where respondent bankrupt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.7">citing from="[2008] FCA 1586">whether sentence of imprisonment appropriate</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.8">citing from="[2008] FCA 1586">whether sentence should be suspended</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.9">citing from="[2008] FCA 1586">no prior contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.10">citing from="[2008] FCA 1586">held repeated and flagrant breach of court orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.11">citing from="[2008] FCA 1586">substantial damage to the public</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.12">citing from="[2008] FCA 1586">limited, if any, remorse</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.0">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">family law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.1">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.2">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.3">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">breaches of the court's orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.4">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">appeal against findings of contempt pursuant to s 112ap of the family law act 1975 (cth) and the imposition of two sentences of imprisonment with respect to such contempts</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.5">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">terms of settlement entered into by the husband and wife providing for the husband's appeal to be allowed and the trial judge's orders set aside</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.6">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">whether appropriate to allow "settlement" of contempt proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.7">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">need to balance the avoidance of the undermining of the administration of justice by condoning breaches of the court's orders, and the limit to the public interest which thus arises by virtue of the inter partes nature of the breaches</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.8">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">in the circumstances of the case, disposal of the appeal as urged would be inappropriate</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.9">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">merits of the husband's appeal considered.  family law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.10">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.11">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">not established that the trial judge erred in finding beyond reasonable doubt that the husband's action constituted a flagrant challenge to the authority of the court within the meaning of s.112ap(1)(b)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.12">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">not established that the trial judge's exercise of discretion in relation to the findings of contempt was vitiated by the failure to refer to any relevant fact or circumstance or by reliance upon any irrelevant facts or circumstances or by placing excessive weight on any matter or by any discernible error of principle</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.13">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">an absence of significant or enduring adverse consequences for the other party does not preclude the application of s 112ap , nor does the attribution, or absence, of a "motive" to the husband for his actions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.14">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">correct standard of proof in relation to the evidence supporting the finding of flagrancy applied</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.15">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">adverse findings in relation to the credit of the husband reasonably supported by the evidence.  family law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.16">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">procedural fairness and natural justice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.17">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">not established that husband denied procedural fairness by refusing to allow affidavit evidence where deponent unavailable for cross-examination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.18">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">not established that any purported failure to particularise the wife's claims as to the conduct constituting flagrancy in any way prejudiced the husband.  not established that the trial judge's orders in any way precluded the husband from making an application for reduction of sentence pursuant to s 112ap(7).  family law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.19">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">sentence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.20">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">not established that the trial judge's exercise of discretion in relation to sentence was vitiated by the failure to refer to any relevant fact or circumstance or by reliance upon any irrelevant facts or circumstances or by placing excessive weight on any matter or by any discernible error of principle</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.21">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">appropriate standard of proof applied</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.22">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">no distinction in principle between a contempt constituting a flagrant breach to the authority of the court involving interim as opposed to final orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.23">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">not established that his honour applied incorrect principle by imposing a custodial sentence upon the husband as opposed to a fine or other penalty upon the basis of his wealth</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.24">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">consideration of the husband's purported contrition was not in error</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.25">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">character of the husband not impermissibly taken into account to the husband's detriment or as in any way "aggravating" the offence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.26">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">whether sentences were manifestly excessive or unreasonable, or plainly unjust</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.27">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">established that circumstances of the case rendered custodial sentences inappropriate</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.28">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">challenge to the severity of the sentences imposed upon the husband upheld.  family law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.29">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">re-exercise of discretion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.30">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">re-exercise of the discretion of the trial judge carried out by reference to the facts and circumstances of the case at the present time</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.31">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">the husband's appeal against the sentences imposed upon him allowed, sentences of imprisonment set aside, and no sanctions imposed.  family law act 1975 (cth) s 112ap ; s 94(2b)(b)  family law rules 2004</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp28.32">citing from="[2008] FamCAFC 154">r 15.14  abalos v australian postal commission [1990] hca 47 ; (1990) 171 clr 167  abduramanoski v abduramanoska (2005)191 flr [2005] famca 88 ; 360; (2005) flc 93-215 ; (2005) 33 fam lr 1  allesch v maunz (2000) 203 clr 172; 173 alr 648  asic v michalik [2004] nswsc 1259 ; (2004) 52 acsr 115  attorney-general v times newspapers ltd [1974] ac 27</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp30.0">citing from="[2007] FCA 1814">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp30.1">citing from="[2007] FCA 1814">penalty hearing</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp30.2">citing from="[2007] FCA 1814">where respondent guilty of multiple counts of contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp30.3">citing from="[2007] FCA 1814">considerations relevant to penalty</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp30.4">citing from="[2007] FCA 1814">contempt found to be wilful and contumacious</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp30.5">citing from="[2007] FCA 1814">prison term imposed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.0">citing from="[2007] FCA 1612">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.1">citing from="[2007] FCA 1612">civil contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.2">citing from="[2007] FCA 1612">failure to pay fine imposed by the full court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.3">citing from="[2007] FCA 1612">capacity to pay fine</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.4">citing from="[2007] FCA 1612">whether respondent had the capacity to pay all or any part of the fine</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.5">citing from="[2007] FCA 1612">whether refusal to pay fine was "wilful"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.6">citing from="[2007] FCA 1612">standard of proof</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.7">citing from="[2007] FCA 1612">beyond reasonable doubt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.0">citing from="[2007] FCA 1609">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.1">citing from="[2007] FCA 1609">civil contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.2">citing from="[2007] FCA 1609">injunction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.3">citing from="[2007] FCA 1609">extra-territorial operation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.4">citing from="[2007] FCA 1609">failure to comply</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.5">citing from="[2007] FCA 1609">clarity of order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.6">citing from="[2007] FCA 1609">standard of proof</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.7">citing from="[2007] FCA 1609">beyond reasonable doubt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.0">citing from="[2007] VSC 15">contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.1">citing from="[2007] VSC 15">relevant principles</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.2">citing from="[2007] VSC 15">alleged breach of two orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.3">citing from="[2007] VSC 15">defendants change locks, enter premises and remove assets and vehicles in possession of receivers</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.4">citing from="[2007] VSC 15">alleged sale of some vehicles and assets to third party</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.5">citing from="[2007] VSC 15">plea of guilty to contempt of first order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.6">citing from="[2007] VSC 15">whether wilful</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.7">citing from="[2007] VSC 15">first order not endorsed in accordance with r.66.10(3) of supreme court rules</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.8">citing from="[2007] VSC 15">whether fine may or should be imposed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.9">citing from="[2007] VSC 15">second order endorsed in accordance with r.66.10(3)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.10">citing from="[2007] VSC 15">contempt of second order denied</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.11">citing from="[2007] VSC 15">defendants deny service of second order.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp34.0">citing from="[2006] NSWLEC 738">30 in pelechowski v registrar, court of appeal (nsw) [1999] hca 19 ; (1999) 198 clr 435 at 484</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp34.1">citing from="[2006] NSWLEC 738">485 [147]</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp34.2">citing from="[2006] NSWLEC 738">[148] kirby j distinguished between contempts which were " technical ", contempts which were " wilful but without a specific intent to defy the authority of the court ", and contempts which were " contumacious ". he said that in a case of " technical " contempt, where the contemnor has offered an apology which the court accepts, it will sometimes be sufficient to make a finding of contempt coupled with an order for the payment of costs.31 although the authorities to which i have referred seem to me to indicate that it is unnecessary to prove that a breach of a court order was deliberate in order to establish a " technical " civil contempt, in louis vuitton malletier sa v design elegance pty ltd [2006] fca 83 ; (2006) 149 fcr 494 at 497</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp34.3">citing from="[2006] NSWLEC 738">498 [6] merkel j expressed a different view: deliberate conduct which is in breach of a court order will constitute wilful disobedience of the order, and therefore a civil contempt, unless the conduct be casual, accidental or unintentional: see australian meat industry employees' union v mudginberri station pty ltd [1986] hca 46 ; (1986) 161 clr 98 at 106-107 and 112-113. however, the disobedience will amount to a criminal contempt if it involves ' deliberate defiance or, as it is sometimes said, if it is contumacious ': see witham v holloway (1995) 183 clr 525 at 530. as is apparent from the statement of charge, louis vuitton is alleging both civil and criminal contempt. however, as all proceedings for contempt are now regarded as criminal in nature, all of the charges must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: see witham at 534. 32 in lade  co pty ltd v black [2006] qca 294 the queensland court of appeal split on whether a finding of contempt of an order or undertaking requires proof that the contemnor has deliberately engaged in conduct which breaches the order or undertaking. jerrard ja thought it did and said at [26]: " ...a deliberate act or omission which is in fact in breach of an order will constitute contempt, and to prove contempt it is necessary and sufficient to prove that much. there will be no contempt proved if the act or omission is ' casual, accidental or unintentional '. the challenge in this case is in describing what constitutes a deliberate omission ". his honour noted at [21] that in evenco pty ltd v australian building construction employees  builders labourers federation (qld branch) [2001] 2 qd r 118 the queensland court of appeal split on what was necessary to prove contempt and that the president wrote (at 122) that a failure to comply with an injunction or undertaking may not amount to contempt when genuine and reasonable attempts to comply have been made. keane ja and jones j in separate judgments held that the court, to establish contempt, did not require proof of any specific mental element. keane ja said at [57]:  under the general law, apart from statute, it was established that " contempt lies in disobedience of a court's order ". references in the authorities to the requirement that conduct be contumacious were concerned with the power to fine a contemnor by way of punishment for a contempt; they were not concerned with establishing whether a contempt had occurred. punishment was regarded as a consequence solely appropriate to a defiant breach of a court's order. thus, at common law, this mental element was necessary to authorise imposition by the court of a fine by way of punishment of a criminal contempt as a result of a breach of an order. this mental element was never thought to be necessary to establish a civil contempt of court sufficient to enliven the power of the court to impose non-punitive orders by reason of disobedience to an order of the court or an undertaking to the court.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.0">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">contempt of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.1">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">jurisdiction to punish contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.2">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">service and enforcement of orders under federal court rules</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.3">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">where final orders by consent required respondent to provide documents to specified persons</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.4">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">where emails and cd-rom provided were password protected</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.5">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">where password not supplied and conditions imposed to obtain password</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.6">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">where incomplete documents provided</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.7">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">whether non-compliance with orders was technical</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.8">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">whether non-compliance with orders was deliberate and wilful</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.9">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">contempt established</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.10">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">consideration of appropriate penalty</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.11">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">indemnity costs order practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.12">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">order required provision of disclosure document under trade practices (industry codes</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.13">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">franchising) regulations 1998 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.14">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">where respondent company in liquidation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.15">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">whether order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous and capable of compliance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.16">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">whether respondent in contempt for non-compliance with requirements of disclosure document</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.17">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">no contempt established</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.18">citing from="[2006] FCA 695">order vacated</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp36.0">citing from="[2006] FCA 397">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp36.1">citing from="[2006] FCA 397">whether imprisonment is an appropriate penalty for a deliberate defiance of interim orders made by the court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp37.0">citing from="[2006] FCA 326">contempt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp37.1">citing from="[2006] FCA 326">whether order of a judge of the court made on an ex parte application was a nullity or was valid unless set aside</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp37.2">citing from="[2006] FCA 326">whether the respondent engaged in deliberate conduct in breach of the order</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2011] VSC 448" id="cs0">

 Principles applying on sentencing for contempt

 5 The considerations relevant to determining an appropriate penalty include the following: [4]

 (a) the contemnor's personal circumstances;
 (b) the nature and circumstances of the contempt;
 (c) the actual consequences of the contempt;
 (d) the effect of the contempt on the administration of justice;
 (e) the contemnor's culpability;
 (f) the need to deter the contemnor and others from repeating the contempt;
 (g) the contemnor's reasons for his or her conduct;
 (h) the absence or presence of a prior conviction for contempt;
 (i) the contemnor's financial means; and
 (j) whether the contemnor has exhibited general contrition and made a full and ample apology.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2011] FCA 557" id="cs1">The considerations relevant to the determination of an appropriate penalty for contempt of court were discussed by the High Court in Mudginberri Station . See also Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 13 ; (2003) 196 ALR 350 (" BHP Steel ") and Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at 501-2. Those considerations include: The nature and circumstances of the contempt; The effect of the contempt on the administration of justice; The contemnor's culpability; The need to deter the contemnor and others from repeating the contempt; The absence or presence of a prior conviction for contempt; The contemnor's financial means; and Whether the contemnor has exhibited general contrition and made a full and ample apology. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2011] FCAFC 17" id="cs2">In Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 at [25], Merkel J set out the factors which he accepted were relevant to penalty. The primary judge adopted that analysis, but it is not apparent to me that he applied it, at least in one important respect. Relevantly, Merkel J identified the following in relation to the question of imprisonment:

 Imprisonment
 1.8 It is widely accepted that the court should only impose a term of imprisonment in the most serious criminal contempt cases: Keeley v Justice Brooking [1979] HCA 28 ; (1979) 143 CLR 162 at 179; Gallagher v Durack [1983] HCA 2 ; (1983) 152 CLR 238. 1.9 In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hickey [1999] FCA 259 [(1999) 42 ATR 229] , Carr J held that imprisonment is a "last resort": see also R v Vasin (1985) 39 SASR 45 ; James (1985) 14 A Crim R 364 ; Skipper (1992) 64 A Crim R 260.

 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2011] FCA 74" id="cs3">A neat summary of the factors to be considered when determining the appropriate penalty is found in Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 , [25] per Merkel J. They are:

 (1) The contemnor's personal circumstances including the contemnor's financial circumstances;

 (2) The nature and circumstances of the contempt;

 (3) The effect of the contempt on the administration of justice;

 (4) The contemnor's culpability;

 (5) The need to deter the contemnor and others from repeating the contempt;

 (6) The absence or presence of a prior conviction for contempt. Other criminal history is irrelevant; and

 (7) Whether genuine contrition has been shown and a full and ample apology proffered.

 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] FCA 1176" id="cs4">Merkel J outlined the factors relevant to contempt penalties in Louis Vuitton Malletier South Australia v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 at [25] in terms which I adopt:

 It was common ground between the parties that the following factors, ..., are relevant to penalty.

 1.5 In deciding the appropriate penalty, a court should consider the following factors:

 (1) contemnor's personal circumstances;

 (2) nature and circumstances of the contempt: R v West Australian Newspapers Ltd; Ex Parte DPP (WA) (1996) 16 WAR 518 ;

 (3) effect of the contempt on the administration of justice: Durack v Gallagher (1982) 44 ALR 272 at 286-7;

 (4) contemnor's culpability: Durack v Gallagher (1982) 44 ALR 272 at 286-7;

 (5) need to deter the contemnor and others from repeating contempt: DPP v John Fairfax  Sons Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 732 , Kirby P at 741; and

 (6) absence or presence of a prior conviction for contempt: Attorney-General (NSW) v Macquarie Publications Pty Ltd (1988) 40 A Crim R 405 at 410. However, other criminal history is irrelevant: R v Giscombe (1984) 79 Cr App R 79 at 84.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] FCA 1125" id="cs5">The Bulzomi Interests conceded that the failure to comply with a court order is what, in the past, has been described as a civil contempt: Witham at 530. At least to some extent the distinction between civil and criminal contempt has been made superfluous by the High Court adopting a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of proof for both: Witham at 534. However, the concession by the Bulzomi interests that the present alleged contravention is a civil contempt may still have some significance if, as has been said, the level of disobedience (i.e. intent or mens rea) required to make out a civil case remains lower. Merkel J summarised the current state of contempt law in Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at [6] as follows:

 Deliberate conduct which is in breach of a court order will constitute wilful disobedience of the order, and therefore a civil contempt, unless the conduct be casual, accidental or unintentional: see Australian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46 ; (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 106-107 (' Mudginberri' ) and 112-113. However, the disobedience will amount to a criminal contempt if it involves "deliberate defiance or, as it is sometimes said, if it is contumacious": see Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 (' Witham' ) at 530. ... However, as all proceedings for contempt are now regarded as criminal in nature, all of the charges must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: see Witham at 534.

 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] FCA 657" id="cs6">In Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at 501-2, Merkel J identified the following considerations as being relevant to the determination of an appropriate penalty for contempt of Court: The contemnor's personal circumstances; The nature and circumstances of the contempt; The effect of the contempt on the administration of justice; The contemnor's culpability; The need to deter the contemnor and others from repeating contempt; The absence or presence of a prior conviction for contempt; The contemnor's financial means; Whether the contemnor has demonstrated genuine contrition and made a full and ample apology; Whether the conduct falls within the most serious category of criminal contempt cases such as to warrant the imposition of a term of imprisonment; and Whether or not imprisonment is a "last resort" penalty in the circumstances of the case.
See also Info4pc.Com Pty Ltd at 54; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v World Netsafe Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1501 ; (2003) 133 FCR 279 at 283.
 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] FCA 391" id="cs7">In Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at 497-8 Merkel J summarised the current state of the law on when disobedience of a Court order will constitute a contempt of court. His Honour said:

 "Deliberate conduct which is in breach of a court order will constitute wilful disobedience of the order, and therefore a civil contempt, unless the conduct be casual, accidental or unintentional: see Australasian Meat Industry Employee' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46 ; [1986] HCA 46 ; (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 106-107 and 112-113. However, the disobedience will amount to a criminal contempt if it involves 'deliberate defiance or, as it is sometimes said, if it is contumacious': see Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 530 ... However, as all proceedings for contempt are now regarded as criminal in nature, all of the charges must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: see Witham at 534. "

See also Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46 ; (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 112-113; Heatons Transport v TGWU [1973] AC 15 at 109. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] NSWSC 1465" id="cs8">3 The relevant principles concerning such an application were conveniently summarised by Finn J in Metcash Trading Ltd v Bunn (No 5) [2009] FCA 16 at [9] , in terms that have been applied in this court on several occasions (for example, by Barrett J in ASIC v Matthews [2009] NSWSC 77 at [5] ):

 " First , the order alleged to be breached must be clear and unambiguous: see Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan [1965] HCA 21 ; (1965) 112 CLR 483 at 515-516; and be capable of being complied with: see Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Siminton (No 7) [2007] FCA 1609 at [40] . Secondly , the proper construction of an order is not a matter of fact but a question of law: Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman Networks Ltd [2006] FCAFC 41 ; (2006) 150 FCR 110 at [19] . Thirdly , it is not necessary for an applicant to prove that an alleged contemnor intended to disobey the order: ibid, at [17]; nor is it necessary to prove that the alleged contemnor understood the true meaning of the terms of an order or that he or she was aware that his or her conduct constituted a breach of the order: Microsoft Corporation v Marks (No 1) (1996) 65 FCR 117 at 143. Nonetheless it may be highly relevant to the question of penalty that the alleged contemnor disobeyed an order because he or she placed a construction on it that was not it is s true construction: Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd at [38]. Fourthly , deliberate conduct which is in breach of a court order will constitute wilful disobedience of the order, and therefore a civil contempt, unless the conduct be casual, accidental or unintentional: Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at [6] . Fifthly , the facts in issue in a contempt charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 534. " </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] NSWCA 155" id="cs9">16 His Honour relevantly commenced his discussion of the issues by stating (at [5]) that the applicable legal principles had been " usefully and succinctly stated " in the recent judgment of Finn J in Metcash Trading Ltd v Bunn (No 5) [2009] FCA 16 at [9] in the following terms:

 " First, the order alleged to be breached must be clear and unambiguous: see Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan [1965] HCA 21 ; (1965) 112 CLR 483 at 515-516; and be capable of being complied with: see Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Siminton (No 7) [2007] FCA 1609 at [40] . Secondly, the proper construction of an order is not a matter of fact but a question of law: Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman Networks Ltd [2006] FCAFC 41 ; (2006) 150 FCR 110 at [19] . Thirdly, it is not necessary for an applicant to prove that an alleged contemnor intended to disobey the order: ibid, at [17]; nor is it necessary to prove that the alleged contemnor understood the true meaning of the terms of an order or that he or she was aware that his or her conduct constituted a breach of the order: Microsoft Corporation v Marks (No 1) (1996) 69 FCR 117 at 143. Nonetheless it may be highly relevant to the question of penalty that the alleged contemnor disobeyed an order because he or she placed a construction on it that was not its true construction: Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd at [38]. Fourthly, deliberate conduct which is in breach of a court order will constitute wilful disobedience of the order, and therefore a civil contempt, unless the conduct be casual, accidental or unintentional: Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at [6] . Fifthly, the facts in issue in a contempt charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 534. "

 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 650" id="cs10">In my view, the position remains that, where a contemnor has admitted the contempt, genuine contrition and a full and ample apology may reduce the penalty: see, for example, Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at 501; Australian Industry Group v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing  Kindred Industries Union (2000) 97 IR 474 ; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Info4PC.Com Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 949 ; (2002) 121 FCR 24. However, where, as here, the charges of contempt are contested, the absence of an apology by the contemnor does not carry any significant weight in the sentencing process.  The considerations relevant to the determination of an appropriate penalty for contempt of Court were discussed by the High Court in Mudginberri Station ; see also Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 13 ; (2003) 196 ALR 350 (" BHP Steel ") and Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at 501-502. Those considerations include: The contemnor's personal circumstances; The nature and circumstances of the contempt; The effect of the contempt on the administration of justice; The contemnor's culpability; The need to deter the contemnor and others from repeating contempt; The absence or presence of a prior conviction for contempt; The contemnor's financial means; and Whether the contemnor has exhibited general contrition and made a full and ample apology. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 266" id="cs11">Turning now to the issue of penalty, the applicable principles are not in dispute and it is convenient to deal with them under the following headings which are drawn from those used by Merkel J in Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 225 ALR 541 ; see also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v World Netsafe Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1501 ; (2003) 133 FCR 279 at [16] - [17]. (1) The Contemnor's personal circumstances
 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 194" id="cs12">In Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at 497-8 Merkel J summarised the current state of the law on when disobedience of a court order will constitute a contempt of court. His Honour said:
 "Deliberate conduct which is in breach of a court order will constitute wilful disobedience of the order, and therefore a civil contempt, unless the conduct be casual, accidental or unintentional: see Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46 ; (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 106-107 and 112-113. However, the disobedience will amount to a criminal contempt if it involves "deliberate defiance or, as it is sometimes said, if it is contumacious": see Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 530 ... However, as all proceedings for contempt are now regarded as criminal in nature, all of the charges must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: see Witham at 534. "

See also Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46 ; (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 112-3; Heatons Transport (St Helens) Ltd v Transport and General Workers' Union [1973] AC 15 at 109. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] NSWSC 77" id="cs13">Thirdly, it is not necessary for an applicant to prove that an alleged contemnor intended to disobey the order: ibid, at [17]; nor is it necessary to prove that the alleged contemnor understood the true meaning of the terms of an order or that he or she was aware that his or her conduct constituted a breach of the order: Microsoft Corporation v Marks (No 1) (1996) 69 FCR 117 at 143. Nonetheless it may be highly relevant to the question of penalty that the alleged contemnor disobeyed an order because he or she placed a construction on it that was not its true construction: Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd at [38]. Fourthly, deliberate conduct which is in breach of a court order will constitute wilful disobedience of the order, and therefore a civil contempt, unless the conduct be casual, accidental or unintentional: Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at [6] . Fifthly, the facts in issue in a contempt charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 534. "

 Approach to the construction of the orders

6 As Finn J stated in the second of the principles he mentioned, the proper construction of an order said to have been disobeyed is a question of law.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 16" id="cs14">9 These are not in issue and can be stated shortly. First, the order alleged to be breached must be clear and unambiguous: see Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan [1965] HCA 21 ; (1965) 112 CLR 483 at 515-516; and be capable of being complied with: see Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Siminton (No 7) [2007] FCA 1609 at [40] . Secondly, the proper construction of an order is not a matter of fact but a question of law: Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman Networks Ltd [2006] FCAFC 41 ; (2006) 150 FCR 110 at [19] . Thirdly, it is not necessary for an applicant to prove that an alleged contemnor intended to disobey the order: ibid, at [17]; nor is it necessary to prove that the alleged contemnor understood the true meaning of the terms of an order or that he or she was aware that his or her conduct constituted a breach of the order: Microsoft Corporation v Marks (No 1) (1996) 69 FCR 117 at 143. Nonetheless it may be highly relevant to the question of penalty that the alleged contemnor disobeyed an order because he or she placed a construction on it that was not its true construction: Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd at [38]. Fourthly, deliberate conduct which is in breach of a court order will constitute wilful disobedience of the order, and therefore a civil contempt, unless the conduct be casual, accidental or unintentional: Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at [6] . Fifthly, the facts in issue in a contempt charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 534.
 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FCA 1965" id="cs15"/>
<sentence from="[2008] FCA 1586" id="cs16">59 In Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Siminton (No 3) [2006] FCA 397 ; (2006) 230 ALR 528 Merkel J considered principles relevant to the question of penalty for contempt, citing from his earlier reasons in Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494.  104 In Louis Vuitton [2006] FCA 83 ; 149 FCR 494 , Merkel J in listing relevant considerations identified 'the absence or presence of a prior conviction for contempt' (at [25]) as a relevant consideration for determining penalty. His Honour went on to say, however, that other criminal history is irrelevant, citing R v Giscombe (1984) 79 CR APP R 79 at 84.  106 In this particular case, the proposition requires closer consideration. The question falls squarely for consideration in the present case (but does not appear to have been of direct relevance in those other cases which have followed the factors listed by Merkel J in Louis Vuitton [2006] FCA 83 ; 149 FCR 494). </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FamCAFC 154" id="cs17">In Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd and Another [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 225 ALR 541 , Merkel J discussed the appropriateness of "settlement" of contempt proceedings. His Honour recorded that the "civil contempt constituted by the mere failure to comply with an order or a deliberate, but not contumacious, breach of an order was traditionally regarded as a matter for the parties, rather than for the courts. " With that proposition we do not disagree. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FCA 1182" id="cs18">5 Merkel J summarized the current state of contempt law in Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 67 IPR 611 at [6] as follows:

 Deliberate conduct which is in breach of a court order will constitute wilful disobedience of the order, and therefore a civil contempt, unless the conduct be casual, accidental or unintentional: see Australian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46 ; (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 106-107 (' Mudginberri' ) and 112-113. However, the disobedience will amount to a criminal contempt if it involves "deliberate defiance or, as it is sometimes said, if it is contumacious": see Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 (' Witham' ) at 530. ... However, as all proceedings for contempt are now regarded as criminal in nature, all of the charges must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: see Witham at 534.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] FCA 1814" id="cs19">15 In Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at 501-502, Merkel J identified the following considerations as being relevant to the determination of an appropriate penalty for contempt of Court:

 • The contemnor's personal circumstances;
 • The nature and circumstances of the contempt;
 • The effect of the contempt on the administration of justice;
 • The contemnor's culpability;
 • The need to deter the contemnor and others from repeating contempt;
 • The absence or presence of a prior conviction for contempt;
 • The contemnor's financial means;
 • Whether the contemnor has exhibited general contrition and made a full and ample apology;
 • Whether the conduct falls within the most serious category of criminal contempt cases such as to warrant the imposition of a term of imprisonment; and
 • Whether or not imprisonment is a "last resort" penalty in the circumstances of the case.

See also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Info4PC.Com Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 949 ; (2002) 121 FCR 24 at 54; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v World Netsafe Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1501 ; (2003) 204 ALR 537 at 540.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] FCA 1612" id="cs20">14 In Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at 497-8 Merkel J summarised the current state of the law on when disobedience of a Court order will constitute a contempt of court. His Honour said:

 "Deliberate conduct which is in breach of a court order will constitute wilful disobedience of the order, and therefore a civil contempt, unless the conduct be casual, accidental or unintentional: see Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46 ; (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 106 to 107 and 112 to 113. However, the disobedience will amount to a criminal contempt if it involves 'deliberate defiance or, as it is sometimes said, if it is contumacious': see Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 530 ... However, as all proceedings for contempt are now regarded as criminal in nature, all of the charges must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: see Witham at 534. "

See also AMIEU v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46 ; (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 112-3; Heatons Transport v TGWU [1973] AC 15 at 109.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] FCA 1609" id="cs21">39 In Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at 497-8 Merkel J summarised the current state of the law on when disobedience of a Court order will constitute a contempt of court. His Honour said:

 "Deliberate conduct which is in breach of a court order will constitute wilful disobedience of the order, and therefore a civil contempt, unless the conduct be casual, accidental or unintentional: see Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginbeeri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46 ; (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 106-107 and 112-113. However, the disobedience will amount to a criminal contempt if it involves 'deliberate defiance or, as it is sometimes said, if it is contumacious': see Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 530 ... However, as all proceedings for contempt are now regarded as criminal in nature, all of the charges must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: see Witham at 534. "

See also AMIEU v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46 ; (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 112-3; Heatons Transport v TGWU [1973] AC 15 at 109.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] VSCA 174" id="cs22">108 In Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [30] Merkel J of the Federal Court dealt with contemptuous conduct consisting of deliberate breaches on a number of occasions of consent orders not to re-infringe trade marks.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] VSC 15" id="cs23">33 In Louis Vuitton Malletier South Australia v Design Elegance Pty Ltd , Merkel J stated:

 " Witham did not go so far as to decide that the distinction between civil and criminal contempt no longer existed, although McHugh J observed (at 549) that the case for abolishing the distinction between civil and criminal contempt is a strong one. " [9]  179 In Louis Vuitton Malleterier South Australia v Design Elegance Pty Ltd, [41] Merkel J endorsed the following factors as relevant to penalty:

 "1.5 In deciding the appropriate penalty, a court should consider the following factors:

(1) contemnor's personal circumstances;

(2) nature and circumstances of the contempt: R v West Australian Newspapers Ltd; Ex Parte DPP (WA) (1996) 16 WAR 518 ;

(3) effect of the contempt on the administration of justice; Durack v Gallagher (1982) 44 ALR 272 at 286-7;

(4) contemnor's culpability: Durack v Gallagher (1982) 44 ALR 272 at 286-7;

(5) need to deter the contemnor and others from repeating contempt: DPP v John Fairfax  Sons Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 732 , Kirby P at 741; and

(6) absence or presence of a prior conviction for contempt: Attorney-General (NSW) v Macquarie Publications Pty Ltd (1988) 40 A Crim R 405 at 410. However, other criminal history is irrelevant: R v Giscombe (1984) 79 Cr App R 79 at 84.
 1.6 In deciding the amount of any fine the Court should take into account the contemnor's financial means: Smith v R (1991) 25 NSWLR 1. The court may also suspend the fine on terms.

Contrition and apology

1.7 Genuine contrition and a full and ample apology may also reduce the penalty: R v Gray (1900) 2 QB 36 at 41-2;

Imprisonment

1.8 It is widely accepted that the court should only impose a term of imprisonment in the most serious criminal contempt cases: Keeley v Justice Brooking [1979] HCA 28 ; (1979) 143 CLR 162 at 179; Gallagher v Durack [1983] HCA 2 ; (1983) 152 CLR 238. 1.9 In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hickey [1999] FCA 259 , Carr J held that imprisonment is a 'last resort': see also R v Vasin (1985) 39 SASR 45 ; James (19875) 14 A Crim R 364 ; Skipper (1992) 64 A Crim R 260. "

 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2006] NSWLEC 738" id="cs24">31 Although the authorities to which I have referred seem to me to indicate that it is unnecessary to prove that a breach of a court order was deliberate in order to establish a " technical " civil contempt, in Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at 497 --- 498 [6] Merkel J expressed a different view:
 Deliberate conduct which is in breach of a court order will constitute wilful disobedience of the order, and therefore a civil contempt, unless the conduct be casual, accidental or unintentional: see Australian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46 ; (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 106-107 and 112-113. However, the disobedience will amount to a criminal contempt if it involves ' deliberate defiance or, as it is sometimes said, if it is contumacious ': see Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 530. As is apparent from the Statement of Charge, Louis Vuitton is alleging both civil and criminal contempt. However, as all proceedings for contempt are now regarded as criminal in nature, all of the charges must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: see Witham at 534. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2006] FCA 695" id="cs25">55 The Court has a range of remedies available to it to ensure compliance with its Orders, including fines, sequestration of property and imprisonment: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Matthews [1999] FCA 803 ; (1992) 32 ACSR 404 at 411; ACCC v Hughes at [28]; and Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 ; (2006) 67 IPR 611 (' Louis Vuitton '). Imprisonment is reserved for the most serious criminal contempt cases and is not appropriate here: see Keeley v Mr Justice Brooking [1979] HCA 28 ; (1979) 143 CLR 162 at 179; Gallagher v Durack [1983] HCA 2 ; (1983) 152 CLR 238 at 245; Hickey at 245-246 [38]-[39].</sentence>
<sentence from="[2006] FCA 397" id="cs26"/>
<sentence from="[2006] FCA 326" id="cs27">10 In Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance [2006] FCA 83 (at [6]), I set out the principles applicable to proceedings for contempt:

 'Deliberate conduct which is in breach of a court order will constitute wilful disobedience of the order, and therefore a civil contempt, unless the conduct be casual, accidental or unintentional: see Australian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46 ; (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 106-107 (' Mudginberri ') and 112-113. However, the disobedience will amount to a criminal contempt if it involves 'deliberate defiance or, as it is sometimes said, if it is contumacious': see Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 ('Witham') at 530. ' </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">FEDERAL COURT RULES 1979 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2006] FMCA 1472">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2006] FMCA 1472">review of refugee review tribunal decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2006] FMCA 1472">refusal of a protection visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2006] FMCA 1472">applicant claiming political persecution in india</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2006] FMCA 1472">first rrt decision quashed by consent</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.5">cited from="[2006] FMCA 1472">second rrt relying upon applicant's evidence given at the first rrt hearing</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.6">cited from="[2006] FMCA 1472">second rrt's disclosure obligations under s.424a considered</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.7">cited from="[2006] FMCA 1472">no reviewable error found</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.8">cited from="[2006] FMCA 1472">application dismissed.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2006] FMCA 1142">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2006] FMCA 1142">rrt decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2006] FMCA 1142">nepali student feared return</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2006] FMCA 1142">claim that family extorted by maoists and persecuted by government</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2006] FMCA 1142">disbelieved by tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[2006] FMCA 1142">no jurisdictional error found.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 59">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 59">protection visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 59">fair hearing</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 59">failure to consider case put by applicant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 59">failure of the tribunal to consider whether there was a well founded fear of persecution on journey back to place of resettlement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.0">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">muin v refugee review tribunal  lie v refugee review tribunal  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">constitutional writs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">procedural fairness</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.3">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">alleged failure to have regard to relevant documents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.4">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">alleged failure to provide reasonable opportunity to respond to adverse material</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.5">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">jurisdictional error for denial of procedural fairness and natural justice.  immigration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.6">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">refugee</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.7">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">protection visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.8">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">decision by minister to refuse application for visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.9">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">review of decision by refugee review tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.10">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">obligation of secretary of department of immigration and multicultural affairs to give relevant documents to registrar of tribunal for purpose of review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.11">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">nature and extent of obligation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.12">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">migration act 1958 (cth), ss 418(3) , 424 (1).  constitutional law (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.13">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">high court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.14">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">federal court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.15">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">review of administrative decision by officers of the commonwealth</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.16">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.17">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">refusal to grant protection visa to claimant for refugee status</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.18">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">requirement of procedural fairness</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.19">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">alleged failure to have regard to relevant documents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.20">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">alleged failure to provide reasonable opportunity to respond to adverse materials</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.21">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">jurisdictional error</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.22">cited from="[2002] HCA 30">availability of constitutional relief under s 75(v) and other relief for denial of procedural fairness and natural justice.</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 </title>
<title id="l1">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 24 Appellate jurisdiction</title>
<title id="l2">MIGRATION ACT 1958 </title>
<title id="l3">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 30 Kinds of visas</title>
<title id="l4">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 36 Protection visas</title>
<title id="l5">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 424 Tribunal may seek information</title>
<title id="l6">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 424A Information and invitation given in writing by Tribunal</title>
<title id="l7">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 430 Refugee Review Tribunal to record its decisions etc.</title>
<title id="l8">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 439 Disclosure of confidential information</title>
<title id="l9">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 440 Refugee Review Tribunal may restrict publication or disclosure of certain matters</title>
<title id="l10">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 476 Jurisdiction of the Federal Magistrates Court</title>
<title id="l11">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
<title id="l12">FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT RULES 2001 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2006] FCA 134">industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2006] FCA 134">application under s 178 of the workplace relations act 1996 (cth) for imposition of penalty for award breaches</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2006] FCA 134">award interpretation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2006] FCA 134">whether award rostering requirements applicable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2006] FCA 134">no question of principle</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">citing from="[2006] FCA 134">industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">citing from="[2006] FCA 134">application under s 178 of the workplace relations act 1996 (cth) for imposition of penalty for award breaches</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">citing from="[2006] FCA 134">award interpretation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">citing from="[2006] FCA 134">whether award rostering requirements applicable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">citing from="[2006] FCA 134">no question of principle</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2006] FCA 134" id="cs0">18 No breach of cl 26 has been established in respect of the period 16 June 2003 to December 2003 because the award did not intend that a roster be formally set for relief staff whose working hours may vary on short notice to meet practical exigencies. From December 2003 Ms Bell became employed on fixed hours in circumstances where no rostering was necessary for the reasons explained in Mackay v Minister for Health [2006] FCA 132. </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">FEDERAL COURT RULES 1979 </title>
<title id="l1">WORKPLACE RELATIONS ACT 1996 </title>
<title id="l2">WORKPLACE RELATIONS ACT 1996 - SECT 178 Definitions</title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2007] FCA 1507">administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2007] FCA 1507">judicial review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2007] FCA 1507">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2007] FCA 1507">judicial review of ministerial decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2007] FCA 1507">statement of claim filed with application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[2007] FCA 1507">whether proceedings should continue on pleadings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.6">cited from="[2007] FCA 1507">whether discovery should be ordered</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.7">cited from="[2007] FCA 1507">relevant to whether minister considered relevant factors in "a real sense" and undertook "active intellectual process"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.8">cited from="[2007] FCA 1507">pleadings unwarranted</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.9">cited from="[2007] FCA 1507">statement of claim to stand as statement of case</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.10">cited from="[2007] FCA 1507">discovery declined subject to justification for particular discovery</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[2004] FCA 1723">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[2004] FCA 1723">s 501 of the migration act 1958</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[2004] FCA 1723">submissions which included draft reasons for minister</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">cited from="[2004] FCA 1723">material exaggeration in draft reasons</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.4">cited from="[2004] FCA 1723">lack of procedural fairness.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[2004] FCA 1120">administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[2004] FCA 1120">superannuation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[2004] FCA 1120">claim for disability benefit</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[2004] FCA 1120">application for review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[2004] FCA 1120">decision that superannuation complaints tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear complaint</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.5">cited from="[2004] FCA 1120">time limit on making complaint to tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.6">cited from="[2004] FCA 1120">whether a 'decision' was in fact made by trustee</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.7">cited from="[2004] FCA 1120">proper decision-maker</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.8">cited from="[2004] FCA 1120">delegation of authority</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.9">cited from="[2004] FCA 1120">presumption of regularity.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.0">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.1">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">judicial review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.2">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">natural justice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.3">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">application to set aside minister's decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.4">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">aboriginal and torres strait islander heritage protection act 1984</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.5">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">declaration made under s10</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.6">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">procedural fairness</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.7">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">whether excluded by statute</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.8">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">nature of interest to be protected</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.9">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">nature of process under heritage protection act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.10">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">legitimate expectations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.11">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">whether urgency justifies departure from natural justice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.12">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">delay of decision-maker's own making</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.13">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">opportunity to respond to further information</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.14">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">whether information new</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.15">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">whether prejudice necessary</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.16">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">credibility of representations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.17">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">whether minister considered representations   aborigines</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.18">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">aboriginal and torres strait islander heritage protection act 1984</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.19">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">sacred sites</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.20">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">minister's decision to prohibit construction activities</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.21">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">proposed crocodile farm</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.22">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">whether minister considered representations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.23">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">confidential information   evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.24">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.25">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">s13 reasons</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.26">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">weight to be given</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.27">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">absence of other evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.28">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">inference to be drawn</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.29">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">application of rule in jones v dunkel to judicial review proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.30">cited from="[1996] FCA 1509">failure of minister to call evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.0">cited from="[1990] FCA 427">administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.1">cited from="[1990] FCA 427">decision made by respondent secretary of department of transport and communications under regulation 106b of air navigation regulations to approve timetable different from that previously submitted by applicant for international air service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.2">cited from="[1990] FCA 427">whether respondent made one decision or two</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.3">cited from="[1990] FCA 427">meaning of "decision" for purposes of administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 .  practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.4">cited from="[1990] FCA 427">whether court should make order setting aside respondent's decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.5">cited from="[1990] FCA 427">considerations involved.  practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.6">cited from="[1990] FCA 427">standing of applicant for statement of reasons pursuant to s.13 adjr act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.7">cited from="[1990] FCA 427">purpose of s.13</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.8">cited from="[1990] FCA 427">entitlement to reasons not diminished by virtue of proceedings already commenced to set aside decision relating to s.13 statement.  practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.9">cited from="[1990] FCA 427">circumstances where court should order decision-maker to furnish s.13 statement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.10">cited from="[1990] FCA 427">court generally not to order s.13 statement to be furnished where decision to which statement relates to be set aside.  administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 ss.5 , 13 ,  federal court of australia act 1976 s.23  judiciary act 1903-1976 s.39b</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.0">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.1">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.2">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">whether unverified statement under s.13 of the administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 (cth) admissible</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.3">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">whether self-serving</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.4">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">whether part of the res gestae  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.5">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.6">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">s.13</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.7">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">nature of s.13 statement  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.8">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.9">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">s.16(1) adjr act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.10">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">whether decision void or voidable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.11">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">whether trial judge failed to exercise discretion under s.16(1).  practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.12">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">order 54 r.8 federal court rules</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.13">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">court may dispense with cross-examination of decision-maker in judicial review proceedings.  administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 (cth), ss.13 , 16 (1)  evidence act 1905 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.14">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">ss.7a, 7b, 7c  migration act 1958 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.15">cited from="[1990] FCA 169">ss.38 , 39</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.0">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.1">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">commissioner to inquire into land claims and report to minister</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.2">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">report to contain recommendation if certain facts found</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.3">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">requirement to comment on detriment to others of acting on recommendation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.4">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">report made in ignorance of certain material facts</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.5">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">submissions by persons who would be detrimentally affected by recommended action</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.6">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">reference to material facts not known to commissioner</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.7">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">submissions not drawn to minister's attention</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.8">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">whether failure to take relevant consideration into account</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.9">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">administrative decision (judicial review) act 1977 (cth), s. 5(2)(b)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.10">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">aboriginal land rights (northern territory) act 1976,ss. 11(1), 50(3).  courts</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.11">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.12">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">discretionary judgments</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.13">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">appellate court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.14">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">functions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.15">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">allegation of improper exercise of power by minister</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.16">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">discretion to refuse relief</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.17">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">finding of trial judge that exercise not improper</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.18">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">reversed on appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.19">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">exercise of discretion by appellate court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.20">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">further appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.21">cited from="[1986] HCA 40">grounds on which further appellate court will interfere with intermediate court's exercise of discretion.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.0">citing from="[2008] FCA 1899">costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.1">citing from="[2008] FCA 1899">s 43 of the federal court of australia act 1976 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.2">citing from="[2008] FCA 1899">whether court should depart from the ordinary rule that costs follow the result</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.3">citing from="[2008] FCA 1899">special circumstances shown</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.4">citing from="[2008] FCA 1899">applicant failed on issues originally argued</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.5">citing from="[2008] FCA 1899">applicant ultimately successful on different grounds</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.6">citing from="[2008] FCA 1899">applicant awarded only 50% of its costs</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2008] FCA 1899" id="cs0">6 It will be apparent from my earlier judgment ( Phosphate Resources Ltd v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts (No. 2) [2008] FCA 1521) that the applicant ("PRL") failed upon the case which it initially brought to trial. PRL put the entirety of its written and oral case in chief upon premises and arguments which I found in the earlier judgment did not provide a legal foundation for its application for relief to be granted. The respondent was required to devote its energies to a comprehensive written and oral response. Had the case gone forward on the basis of pleadings, and had PRL sought and been granted leave to supplement its case at such a late stage in the proceedings as occurred in this case, there seems little doubt that it would only have been permitted to do so in return for some protection of the respondent on the question of costs. The case was not conducted on pleadings. As I explained in the earlier judgment that was the result of a position taken by the respondent.</sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL ACT 1975 </title>
<title id="l1">ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER HERITAGE PROTECTION ACT 1984 </title>
<title id="l2">ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER HERITAGE PROTECTION ACT 1984 - SECT 10 Other declarations in relation to areas</title>
<title id="l3">ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER HERITAGE PROTECTION ACT 1984 - SECT 31 Delegation</title>
<title id="l4">ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS (JUDICIAL REVIEW) ACT 1977 </title>
<title id="l5">ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS (JUDICIAL REVIEW) ACT 1977 - SECT 5 Applications for review of decisions</title>
<title id="l6">ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS (JUDICIAL REVIEW) ACT 1977 - SECT 13 Reasons for decision may be obtained</title>
<title id="l7">ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS (JUDICIAL REVIEW) ACT 1977 - SECT 16 Powers of the Federal Court and the Federal Magistrates Court in respect of applications for order of review</title>
<title id="l8">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 </title>
<title id="l9">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 3A Principles of ecologically sustainable development</title>
<title id="l10">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 16 Requirement for approval of activities with a significant impact on a declared Ramsar wetland</title>
<title id="l11">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 17B Offences relating to declared Ramsar wetlands</title>
<title id="l12">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 18 Actions with significant impact on listed threatened species or endangered community prohibited without approval</title>
<title id="l13">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 18A Offences relating to threatened species etc.</title>
<title id="l14">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 20 Requirement for approval of activities with a significant impact on a listed migratory species</title>
<title id="l15">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 20A Offences relating to listed migratory species</title>
<title id="l16">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 23 Requirement for approval of activities involving the marine environment</title>
<title id="l17">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 24A Offences relating to marine areas</title>
<title id="l18">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 27A Offences relating to Commonwealth land</title>
<title id="l19">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 67 What is a controlled action?</title>
<title id="l20">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 68 Referral by person proposing to take action</title>
<title id="l21">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 75 Does the proposed action need approval?</title>
<title id="l22">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 82 What are the relevant impacts of an action?</title>
<title id="l23">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 87 Minister must decide on approach for assessment</title>
<title id="l24">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 102 Tailored guidelines</title>
<title id="l25">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 103 Designated proponent must invite comment on draft environmental impact statement</title>
<title id="l26">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 104 Finalising environmental impact statement</title>
<title id="l27">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 105 Recommendation report</title>
<title id="l28">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 130 Timing of decision on approval</title>
<title id="l29">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 131 Inviting comments from other Ministers before decision</title>
<title id="l30">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 133 Grant of approval</title>
<title id="l31">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 136 General considerations</title>
<title id="l32">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 139 Requirements for decisions about threatened species and endangered communities</title>
<title id="l33">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 140 Requirements for decisions about migratory species</title>
<title id="l34">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 391 Minister must consider precautionary principle in making decisions</title>
<title id="l35">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 523 Actions</title>
<title id="l36">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 524 Things that are not actions</title>
<title id="l37">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 524A Provision of grant funding is not an action</title>
<title id="l38">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 525 Commonwealth areas</title>
<title id="l39">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 527 Convictions</title>
<title id="l40">FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 1982 </title>
<title id="l41">FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 1982 - SECT 13 Documents in certain institutions</title>
<title id="l42">MIGRATION ACT 1958 </title>
<title id="l43">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 501 Refusal or cancellation of visa on character grounds</title>
<title id="l44">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 501G Refusal or cancellation of visa--notification of decision</title>
<title id="l45">OMBUDSMAN ACT 1976 </title>
<title id="l46">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
<title id="l47">MINING ACT 1978 </title>
<title id="l48">MINING ACT 1978 - SECT 58 </title>
<title id="l49">MINING ACT 1978 - SECT 75 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>