Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">orders for judgment for cross-respondents on part of cross-claim made under s 31a(2) of federal court of australia act 1976 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">balance of cross-claim remaining on foot</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">nature of orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">interlocutory or final</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.5">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">test for determining nature of order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.6">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">legal effect of judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.7">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">whether judgment or order under s 31a for party on part or all of claim finally disposes rights of parties</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.8">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">applicability of case law concerning dismissal of proceedings that are frivolous or vexatious, do not disclose a cause of action, or are an abuse of the process of the court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.9">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">applicability of case law concerning summary judgment under federal court rules , o 20 r 2 trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.10">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">unconscionable conduct</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.11">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">claim pursuant to s 51ac(1) of trade practices act 1974 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.12">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">relationship between sub-ss 51ac(1) and (9)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.13">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">meaning of "price" in s 51ac(9)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.14">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">price of "supply or possible supply of goods or services"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.15">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">whether prices in all transactions between parties must be aggregated regardless of limited time at which conduct alleged to be unconscionable  statutory interpretation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.16">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">legislation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.17">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">interpretation and construction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.18">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">legislative intent behind s 31a</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.19">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">construction of test in s 31a</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.20">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">purposive test, acts interpretation act 1901 (cth), s 15aa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.21">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">legislative intent behind s 51ac</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.22">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">whether sub-s 51ac(9) intended to provide an exception to sub-s 51ac(1)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.23">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 60">onus of proof</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2008] FCA 473">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2008] FCA 473">application for summary judgment for an applicant in relation to part of a proceeding</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2008] FCA 473">consideration of "no reasonable prospect of successfully defending" and of "part of the proceeding"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2008] FCA 473">limited utility of principles relating to verdicts by direction when assessing whether a respondent has a reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or any part of the proceeding</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[2007] FCA 875">racial discrimination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[2007] FCA 875">removal of applicant from premises of university</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[2007] FCA 875">applicant of sri lankan appearance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[2007] FCA 875">applicant's belief of racial discrimination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[2007] FCA 875">whether removal based partly or wholly, or sufficiently connected to, applicant's race, colour, descent or national or ethnic background</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.5">cited from="[2007] FCA 875">s 9 of the racial discrimination act 1975 (cth). practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.6">cited from="[2007] FCA 875">summary judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.7">cited from="[2007] FCA 875">federal court act 1976 (cth), s 31a</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.8">cited from="[2007] FCA 875">no reasonable prospect of success.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.0">cited from="[2006] FCA 1352">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">cited from="[2006] FCA 1352">application for summary dismissal of proceedings under section 31a of the federal court of australia act 1976 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">cited from="[2006] FCA 1352">test to be applied</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.3">cited from="[2006] FCA 1352">claim for damages for breach of contract and under section 82(1) of the trade practices act 1974 (cth)  assignment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.4">cited from="[2006] FCA 1352">assignment of choses in action</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.5">cited from="[2006] FCA 1352">claim for damages for breach of contract and under section 82(1) of the trade practices act 1974 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.6">cited from="[2006] FCA 1352">where claim brought by person claiming to be assignee under a contract for sale of a business to enforce rights of assignor in contract and under section 51ac and s 52 of the trade practices act 1974 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.7">cited from="[2006] FCA 1352">where assignor company now deregistered</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.8">cited from="[2006] FCA 1352">whether purported assignment effective</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.9">cited from="[2006] FCA 1352">whether statutory claim capable of assignment  assignment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.10">cited from="[2006] FCA 1352">trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.11">cited from="[2006] FCA 1352">whether claim for damages under section 82(1) of the trade practices act 1974 (cth) capable of assignment  held</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.12">cited from="[2006] FCA 1352">claim for damages under s 82(1) of the trade practices act 1974 (cth) not capable of assignment; pleadings fundamentally flawed and disclosed no reasonable prospect of success; proceedings summarily dismissed  words  phrases</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.13">cited from="[2006] FCA 1352">"no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.0">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 232">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.1">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 232">service outside australia of statement of claim for indemnity for workers compensation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.2">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 232">application for leave to proceed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.3">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 232">whether cause of action arising in the state</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.4">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 232">application to set aside statement of claim</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.5">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 232">whether insufficient prospect of success or abuse of process. acts cited: supreme court rules</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.6">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 232">pt 10, r 1a, 2, 6a; part 10a; part 11, r 8 workers compensation act 1987</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.7">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 232">s 151z(1)(d)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.0">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 242">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.1">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 242">proceedings relating to decisions of minister for immigration and multicultural and indigenous affairs refusing grant of student visa and refusing revocation of refusal to grant visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.2">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 242">where minister contended certain information protected under s 503a of migration act 1958 ("the act ")  practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.3">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 242">estoppel</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.4">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 242">whether anshun estoppel should apply to judicial review of administrative action</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.5">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 242">issue estoppel</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.6">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 242">res judicata</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.7">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 242">questions concerning the construction of s 503a of the act unreasonably not raised in previous proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.8">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 242">whether special circumstances exist that permit raising questions in these proceedings that should reasonably have been raised in previous proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.9">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 242">no special circumstances found</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.0">cited from="[2004] FCA 422">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.1">cited from="[2004] FCA 422">application by respondent ('the minister') for stay pending hearing and determination of minister's appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.2">cited from="[2004] FCA 422">submission by successful applicant (respondent to the minister's motion and appeal) ('mr wong') that stay should be granted only on condition that minister give proper consideration to issuing bridging e (class we) visa, permitting mr wong to be released from detention pending hearing and determination of appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.3">cited from="[2004] FCA 422">common ground that mr wong barred from applying for such a visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.4">cited from="[2004] FCA 422">whether minister has power to issue such a visa in absence of application for it, by reason of s 73 of migration act 1958 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.5">cited from="[2004] FCA 422">classes of visa created by act and classes created by being prescribed in migration regulations 1994 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.6">cited from="[2004] FCA 422">reg 2.25.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.0">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.1">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">res judicata</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.2">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">issue estoppel</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.3">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">' anshun estoppel'</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.4">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">applicability where earlier judgment was dismissal of application for judicial review of administrative decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.5">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">'special circumstances' why anshun estoppel should not apply</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.6">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">whether 'special circumstances' exception to issue estoppel.  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.7">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">appeal from administrative appeals tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.8">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">objection to competency</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.9">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">whether 'decision' of tribunal appealed from was the effective decision or determination of the application for review that was before tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.10">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">objection to competency upheld.  migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.11">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">whether s 503a of migration act 1958 (cth) obliged minister not to give particulars of information communicated to authorised migration officer by gazetted agency on condition of confidentiality</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.12">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">distinction between 'authorised migration officer' and 'the minister' in s 503a</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.13">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">'gazetted agency'</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.14">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">definition of 'gazetted agency' in s 503a</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.15">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">whether particular notice published in gazette valid</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.16">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">whether severance possible so that notice valid as to part.  evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.17">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">res judicata</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.18">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">issue estoppel</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.19">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">' anshun estoppel'</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.20">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">applicability where earlier judgment was dismissal of application for judicial review of administrative decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.21">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">'special circumstances' why anshun estoppel should not apply</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.22">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">whether 'special circumstances' exception to issue estoppel.  statutory interpretation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.23">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">inconsistency between definition of 'authorised migration officer' in s 503a of migration act 1958 (cth) as including 'the minister' and text and scheme of the section which distinguished between 'authorised migration officer' and 'the minister'.  practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.24">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">res judicata</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.25">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">issue estoppel</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.26">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">' anshun estoppel'</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.27">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">applicability where earlier judgment was dismissal of application for judicial review of administrative decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.28">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">'special circumstances' why anshun estoppel should not apply</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.29">cited from="[2004] FCA 51">whether 'special circumstances' exception to issue estoppel.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.0">cited from="[2001] NSWCA 142">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.1">cited from="[2001] NSWCA 142">abuse of process</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.2">cited from="[2001] NSWCA 142">res judicata</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.3">cited from="[2001] NSWCA 142">defendant not party to earlier proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.4">cited from="[2001] NSWCA 142">plaintiffs seeking to re-litigate issue they lost in earlier proceedings against new defendant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.5">cited from="[2001] NSWCA 142">action dismissed as abuse</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.0">cited from="[1995] FCA 1299">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.1">cited from="[1995] FCA 1299">the anshun estoppel</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.2">cited from="[1995] FCA 1299">whether applies to failure to raise a cross-claim</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.3">cited from="[1995] FCA 1299">whether claims now made should reasonably have been raised in earlier proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.4">cited from="[1995] FCA 1299">whether there were "special circumstances" excluding the application of the anshun principle.   estoppel</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.5">cited from="[1995] FCA 1299">the anshun estoppel</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.6">cited from="[1995] FCA 1299">whether applies to failure to raise a cross-claim</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.7">cited from="[1995] FCA 1299">whether claims now made should reasonably have been raised in earlier proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.8">cited from="[1995] FCA 1299">whether there were "special circumstances" excluding the application of the anshun principle.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.0">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">hire purchase</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.1">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">repossession</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.2">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">statutory notice by owner of hirer</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.3">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.4">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">sufficiency</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.5">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">posting to hirer at last known place of abode or business permissible</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.6">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">post office given by hirer as postal address</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.7">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">whether place of abode</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.8">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">hire-purchase act of 1959 (q.), ss. 13(3), (4), 42(1)(c), (2)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.9">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">acts interpretation acts 1954 to 1962 (q.),s. 39(1).  practice (q.)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.10">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">summary judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.11">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">supreme court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.12">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">leave to defend</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.13">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">affidavit failing to establish triable issue</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.14">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">question left to be investigated</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.15">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">failure of affidavits in reply to deal with question</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.16">cited from="[1983] HCA 25">rules of the supreme court (q.), o. 18,r. 1.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.0">cited from="[1981] HCA 45">estoppel</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.1">cited from="[1981] HCA 45">res judicata</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.2">cited from="[1981] HCA 45">issue estoppel</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.3">cited from="[1981] HCA 45">hire of plant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.4">cited from="[1981] HCA 45">contractual indemnity by hirer against loss caused to owner from use of plant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.5">cited from="[1981] HCA 45">action for damages against hirer and owner arising out of use of plant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.6">cited from="[1981] HCA 45">notices of contribution between hirer and owner</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.7">cited from="[1981] HCA 45">claim of contribution by owner</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.8">cited from="[1981] HCA 45">apportionment of liability between defendants</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.9">cited from="[1981] HCA 45">subsequent action by owner for indemnity</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.10">cited from="[1981] HCA 45">whether estopped by failure in original action to plead indemnity in defence to the claim for contribution</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.11">cited from="[1981] HCA 45">wrongs act 1958 (vict.) s. 24 (1) (c).</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.0">cited from="[1980] HCA 41">practice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.1">cited from="[1980] HCA 41">high court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.2">cited from="[1980] HCA 41">appeal from state supreme court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.3">cited from="[1980] HCA 41">objection to competency</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.4">cited from="[1980] HCA 41">supreme court order for stay of action as absue of process</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.5">cited from="[1980] HCA 41">whether interlocutory order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.6">cited from="[1980] HCA 41">judiciary act 1903 (cth), s. 35</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.7">cited from="[1980] HCA 41">high court rules , o. 70, r. 8.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.0">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">companies</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.1">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">no-liability companies</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.2">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">shares</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.3">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">agreement to take new shares on allotment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.4">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">breach</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.5">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">whether right to sue for outstanding moneys</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.6">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">the companies acts, 1961 to 1964 (q.), s. 320.  practice (q.)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.7">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">applications for summary judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.8">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">leave to defend</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.9">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">issue of law only</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.10">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">rules of the supreme court (q.), o. 18 r. 1.  high court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.11">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">powers on appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.12">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">appeal from refusal of primary judge to grant leave to enter summary judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.13">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">issue of law only</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.14">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">arguable case</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.15">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">full argument on appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.16">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">decision to allow appeal.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.0">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">practice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.1">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">summary power to terminate action</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.2">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">principles applicable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.3">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">inherent jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.4">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">jurisdiction under rule of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.5">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">high court rules, o. 26, r. 18.  patents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.6">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">invention</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.7">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">use for services of commonwealth or state</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.8">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">"authority of the state"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.9">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">commissioner for railways</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.10">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">construction of carriages for use in state railway system</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.11">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">"services of the state"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.12">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">written authority to use invention</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.13">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">when contract itself sufficient authority</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.14">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">patents act 1952-1960 (cth), ss. 125, 132*.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.0">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">workers' compensation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.1">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">injury by accident arising out of or in course of employment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.2">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">death of worker</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.3">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">negligence of employer</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.4">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">option of dependants to apply for compensation or take other proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.5">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">award of compensation obtained by widow on behalf of herself and children</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.6">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">effect of award as barring claim by dependants under lord campbell's act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.7">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">workers' compensation acts 1928</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.8">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">1946 (no. 3806</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.9">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">no. 5128) (vict.)*</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.10">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">wrongs act 1928 (no. 3807) (vict.), part iii.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.11">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">the 1946 workers' compensation rules, rr. 8, 81.*  practice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.12">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">supreme court (vict.)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.13">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">dismissal of action</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.14">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">abuse of process</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.15">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">inherent jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.16">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">rules of the supreme court (vict.), order xxv., rr. 2, 4.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.0">citing from="[2010] AATA 937">compensation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.1">citing from="[2010] AATA 937">diabetes and paranoid schizophrenia</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.2">citing from="[2010] AATA 937">whether contributed to in a material degree by employment in army</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.3">citing from="[2010] AATA 937">decisions affirmed.    practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.4">citing from="[2010] AATA 937">law under which decisions reviewed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.5">citing from="[2010] AATA 937">law in effect at the earlier of the times when applicant sought treatment or was first incapacitated or impaired as a result of the diseases for which compensation claimed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.6">citing from="[2010] AATA 937">law before 2007 amendments applicable.    practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.7">citing from="[2010] AATA 937">statements of principle under the veterans' entitlements act 1986 not relevant.    practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.8">citing from="[2010] AATA 937">application to dismiss on basis frivolous and vexatious</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.9">citing from="[2010] AATA 937">whether application regarding claim for paranoid schizophrenia should be dismissed on the basis that effectively determined by findings made in previous tribunal proceedings.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.0">citing from="[2010] AATA 720">social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.1">citing from="[2010] AATA 720">newstart allowance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.2">citing from="[2010] AATA 720">meaning of "unemployed"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.3">citing from="[2010] AATA 720">failure of one business but continuation of another</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.4">citing from="[2010] AATA 720">underemployed but not unemployed.    practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.5">citing from="[2010] AATA 720">application dismissed for applicant's failure to appear at a proceeding</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.6">citing from="[2010] AATA 720">reinstated</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.7">citing from="[2010] AATA 720">effect of reinstatement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.8">citing from="[2010] AATA 720">continuation of application.    practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.9">citing from="[2010] AATA 720">applicant bankrupt after dismissal but before reinstatement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.10">citing from="[2010] AATA 720">effect of bankruptcy on application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.11">citing from="[2010] AATA 720">considerations differ according to whether bankrupt before or after application commenced</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.12">citing from="[2010] AATA 720">application not stayed by bankruptcy.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.0">citing from="[2010] AATA 447">immigration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.1">citing from="[2010] AATA 447">refugees</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.2">citing from="[2010] AATA 447">protection visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.3">citing from="[2010] AATA 447">whether applicants are persons to whom australia has protection obligations under refugee conventions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.4">citing from="[2010] AATA 447">whether serious reasons to believe applicants have committed serious non-political crimes</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.5">citing from="[2010] AATA 447">decisions set aside.    al-habr and minister for immigration and multicultural affairs [1999] aata 150  al-kateb v godwin [2004] hca 37 ; (2004) 219 clr; 562 ; 208 alr 124 ; 78 aljr 1099</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.0">citing from="[2010] FCA 264">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.1">citing from="[2010] FCA 264">strike out application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.2">citing from="[2010] FCA 264">s 31a federal court of australia act 1976 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.3">citing from="[2010] FCA 264">moving party bears the onus of proving the other party has no reasonable prospects of success</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.4">citing from="[2010] FCA 264">consideration of the standard to be applied when question of law involved</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.5">citing from="[2010] FCA 264">there must be a real question of law and one that is sufficiently strong to warrant a full hearing  defence and war</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.6">citing from="[2010] FCA 264">veterans' entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.7">citing from="[2010] FCA 264">statements of principles</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.8">citing from="[2010] FCA 264">effect when deciding claim relating to operational service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.9">citing from="[2010] FCA 264">consideration of the deledio approach</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.10">citing from="[2010] FCA 264">whether hypothesis of claimant a reasonable one and consistent with the relevant statement of principles</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.11">citing from="[2010] FCA 264">the tribunal is not to engage in any fact finding at this 'third' step</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.12">citing from="[2010] FCA 264">no onus of proof involved</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.0">citing from="[2010] AATA 180">compensation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.1">citing from="[2010] AATA 180">application to review reviewable decision accepting liability for a condition</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.2">citing from="[2010] AATA 180">whether necessary implication that claims for permanent impairment and non-economic loss refused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.3">citing from="[2010] AATA 180">characterisation of reviewable decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.4">citing from="[2010] AATA 180">limited to liability for injury alone.    practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.5">citing from="[2010] AATA 180">application to dismiss application on basis that it is frivolous and vexatious</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.6">citing from="[2010] AATA 180">parameters of power</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.7">citing from="[2010] AATA 180">application dismissed.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.0">citing from="[2009] FCA 1240">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.1">citing from="[2009] FCA 1240">application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of the federal magistrates court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.2">citing from="[2009] FCA 1240">relevant principles</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.3">citing from="[2009] FCA 1240">amendment of pleadings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.4">citing from="[2009] FCA 1240">summary dismissal under s 17a of the federal magistrates act 1999 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp27.5">citing from="[2009] FCA 1240">application dismissed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.0">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.1">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">application to strike out statement of claim</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.2">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">application for summary judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.3">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">whether pleadings disclose reasonable cause of action</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.4">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">pleadings struck out</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.5">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">whether leave to re-plead should be granted   equity</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.6">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">applicant claims designs and technical information of railway wagons confidential</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.7">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">claimed misuse of confidential information</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.8">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">elements of breach of confidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.9">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">whether confidential information precisely identified in pleadings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.10">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">whether breach of confidential information adequately pleaded   copyright</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.11">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">claimed copyright in documentary materials evidencing design of wagons</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.12">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">copyright infringement pleaded</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.13">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">whether applicant identified works alleged to have been reproduced or the manner of alleged reproduction   trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.14">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">misleading and deceptive conduct</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp29.15">citing from="[2009] FCA 363">conduct said to be misleading not pleaded    held: each statement of claim will be struck out with liberty to re-plead within six weeks. the applications are otherwise dismissed.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp30.0">citing from="[2008] FCA 1618">bankruptcy and insolvency</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp30.1">citing from="[2008] FCA 1618">claim that property transferred under value should be void as against the trustee in bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp30.2">citing from="[2008] FCA 1618">motion for dismissal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp30.3">citing from="[2008] FCA 1618">transferor was not the subsequent bankrupt but an entity allegedly acting on his instruction and direction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp30.4">citing from="[2008] FCA 1618">property said to be held on bare trust on behalf of the bankrupt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp30.5">citing from="[2008] FCA 1618">whether trustee or agent</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp30.6">citing from="[2008] FCA 1618">novel point</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp30.7">citing from="[2008] FCA 1618">not obviously without reasonable prospects</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp30.8">citing from="[2008] FCA 1618">not dismissed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.0">citing from="[2008] FCA 1529">constitutional law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.1">citing from="[2008] FCA 1529">judicial power of the commonwealth</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.2">citing from="[2008] FCA 1529">validity of s 31a of the federal court of australia act 1976 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.3">citing from="[2008] FCA 1529">whether an impermissible intrusion into affairs of the judiciary</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.4">citing from="[2008] FCA 1529">s 31a sets standard for summary dismissal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.5">citing from="[2008] FCA 1529">affects nature of the balancing act carried out by the court in exercise of judicial power</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.6">citing from="[2008] FCA 1529">does not direct the court as to the manner and outcome of the exercise of its jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.7">citing from="[2008] FCA 1529">not a bill of attainder</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.8">citing from="[2008] FCA 1529">not a "commitment" or "prosecution"  statutes</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.9">citing from="[2008] FCA 1529">s 31a of the federal court of australia act 1976 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.10">citing from="[2008] FCA 1529">interaction of o 20 r 5 of the federal court rules and s 31a</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.11">citing from="[2008] FCA 1529">whether s 31a and o 20 r 5 operate to prevent the court from receiving evidence in a summary dismissal application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.12">citing from="[2008] FCA 1529">nothing in s 31a or the balance of the act to suggest that evidence cannot be admitted</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp31.13">citing from="[2008] FCA 1529">other court rules allow or require evidence to be admitted on a summary dismissal application australian capital territory (self-government) act 1988 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.0">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1363">bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.1">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1363">creditor's petition based on fresh act of bankruptcy where earlier creditor's petition dismissed in prior proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.2">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1363">whether principles of res judicata , issue estoppel or anshun estoppel apply</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.3">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1363">whether proceedings an abuse of process</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.4">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1363">whether creditor's petition meets the requirements of the bankruptcy act in relation to description and value of security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.5">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1363">whether court should go behind the judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.6">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1363">whether incorrect car registration number made petition defective</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.7">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1363">whether incorrect amount of debt in creditor's petition</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp32.8">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1363">whether for other sufficient cause sequestration order ought to be made.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.0">citing from="[2008] FCA 1470">industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.1">citing from="[2008] FCA 1470">appeals from decisions of federal magistrates court summarily dismissing proceedings on the basis that they had no reasonable prospects of success</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.2">citing from="[2008] FCA 1470">statutory construction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.3">citing from="[2008] FCA 1470">meaning of provisions in pt 16 of the workplace relations act 1996 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp33.4">citing from="[2008] FCA 1470">freedom of association.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp34.0">citing from="[2008] FCA 1461">human rights and discrimination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp34.1">citing from="[2008] FCA 1461">application for summary dismissal of proceedings under the federal court act of australia 1976 (cth) and federal court rules</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp34.2">citing from="[2008] FCA 1461">whether applicant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp34.3">citing from="[2008] FCA 1461">whether applicant has failed to prosecute the proceedings with due diligence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp34.4">citing from="[2008] FCA 1461">whether proceedings are an abuse of process</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.0">citing from="[2008] AATA 558">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.1">citing from="[2008] AATA 558">compensation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.2">citing from="[2008] AATA 558">estoppel</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.3">citing from="[2008] AATA 558">claims previously made for compensation arising from employment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.4">citing from="[2008] AATA 558">whether raising same substantive issues</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.5">citing from="[2008] AATA 558">relevance of principles of res judicata, estoppel, issue estoppel and ashun estoppel in proceedings of tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.6">citing from="[2008] AATA 558">whether application frivolous or vexatious</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.7">citing from="[2008] AATA 558">power of tribunal to limit evidence on matters canvassed in review of previous decisions and subject of extensive findings of fact</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp35.8">citing from="[2008] AATA 558">application not dismissed but evidence restricted.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp36.0">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 115">trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp36.1">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 115">appellants claimed email of article from the first respondent, a freelance journalist, to media organisation was misleading and deceptive and not protected by the media safe harbour defence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp36.2">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 115">primary judge found no reasonable prospects of success and summarily dismissed the application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp36.3">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 115">proper construction of s 65a of the trade practices act 1974 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp36.4">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 115">'publication' includes communication of prescribed information from freelance journalist to media organisation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp36.5">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 115">exception to media exemption in s 65a(1)(a)(i) of the trade practices act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp36.6">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 115">article covering corporate misdeeds not relevantly "in connection with" the provision of journalistic services</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp36.7">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 115">decision of primary judge affirmed</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2010] AATA 937" id="cs0">" [51]

30. " [49] In JF Keir Pty Limited v Sparks , [50] Graham J put it a little differently saying that " An action can be stayed as vexatious 'if it can really lead to no possible good'.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] AATA 720" id="cs1">As Gray J explained in Pitt v OneSteel Reinforcing Pty Limited [2008] FCA 923 , " the word 'frivolous', especially when coupled with 'vexatious', is a technical legal term, in substance meaning the absence of a cause of action. " (at [9]). Graham J explained in JF Keir Pty Limited v Sparks [2008] FCA 611 that " An action can be stayed as vexatious 'if it can really lead to no possible good'. " (at [62]). The limits of such a power given to the courts were considered by Barwick CJ in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] AATA 447" id="cs2">Gray J explained in Pitt v OneSteel Reinforcing Pty Limited , [155] " the word 'frivolous', especially when coupled with 'vexatious', is a technical legal term, in substance meaning the absence of a cause of action. " [156] Graham J said in JF Keir Pty Limited v Sparks , [157] " An action can be stayed as vexatious 'if it can really lead to no possible good'. " [158] The power to dismiss an application summarily is a power known to, and exercised by, the courts under various names. It is a power whose limits were considered by Barwick CJ in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W. ) : [159]

 " The plaintiff rightly points out that the jurisdiction summarily to terminate an action is to be sparingly employed and is not to be used except in a clear case where the Court is satisfied that it has the requisite material and the necessary assistance from the parties to reach a definite and certain conclusion. 107. Gray J explained in Pitt v OneSteel Reinforcing Pty Limited , [155] " the word 'frivolous', especially when coupled with 'vexatious', is a technical legal term, in substance meaning the absence of a cause of action. " [156] Graham J said in JF Keir Pty Limited v Sparks , [157] " An action can be stayed as vexatious 'if it can really lead to no possible good'. " [158] The power to dismiss an application summarily is a power known to, and exercised by, the courts under various names. It is a power whose limits were considered by Barwick CJ in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] FCA 264" id="cs3">[73] Gordon J at [128]-[131] was of a different view. She said that the existence of a real issue of law does not necessarily preclude summary judgment because the Court can usually hear and determine a disputed point of law expeditiously, without the need for a trial. Graham J has expressed his disagreement with this: JF Keir Pty Ltd v Sparks [2008] FCA 611 at [12] and [52]. [74] We do not need to decide which of the competing views expressed in Jefferson Ford is correct. On any view, the learned primary judge considered that there was no room for debate about the questions of construction of s 65A on which it was necessary for Bond and Lesotho to succeed so as to avoid summary judgment.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] AATA 180" id="cs4">As Gray J explained in Pitt v OneSteel Reinforcing Pty Limited , [76] " the word 'frivolous', especially when coupled with 'vexatious', is a technical legal term, in substance meaning the absence of a cause of action. " [77] As Graham J said in JF Keir Pty Limited v Sparks , [78] " An action can be stayed as vexatious 'if it can really lead to no possible good'. " [79] The power to dismiss an application summarily is a power known to, and exercised by, the courts under various names. It is a power whose limits were considered by Barwick CJ in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W. ) : [80]

 "The plaintiff rightly points out that the jurisdiction summarily to terminate an action is to be sparingly employed and is not to be used except in a clear case where the Court is satisfied that it has the requisite material and the necessary assistance from the parties to reach a definite and certain conclusion. 105. As Gray J explained in Pitt v OneSteel Reinforcing Pty Limited , [76] " the word 'frivolous', especially when coupled with 'vexatious', is a technical legal term, in substance meaning the absence of a cause of action. " [77] As Graham J said in JF Keir Pty Limited v Sparks , [78] " An action can be stayed as vexatious 'if it can really lead to no possible good'. " [79] The power to dismiss an application summarily is a power known to, and exercised by, the courts under various names. It is a power whose limits were considered by Barwick CJ in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 1240" id="cs5">A judicial determination concludes not merely the point actually decided but also a matter which it was necessary to decide and which was actually decided as the ground work for the decision itself, though not directly the point in issue. Matters cardinal to a later claim or contention cannot be raised if to raise them would necessarily involve an assertion that the judicial determination previously made was erroneous (per Dixon J, as his Honour then was, in Blair v Curran [1939] HCA 23 ; (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532; see generally per Graham J in J F Keir Pty Limited v Sparks [2008] FCA 611 at [55] - [61]). Summary dismissal under s 17A(2) and Rule 13.10(a)
 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 1080" id="cs6">I do not intend in these reasons to elaborate all the principles relating to res judicata, issue estoppel and Anshun estoppel that may arise. I would refer to my consideration of those matters in JF Keir Pty Ltd v Sparks [2008] FCA 611 at [55] and following, and also to the decision of the High Court in Ramsay v Pigram [1968] HCA 34 ; (1968) 118 CLR 271.
It does not seem to me that there are any relevant issues relating to possible estoppels which will prejudice the opportunity of Idameneo to bring fresh proceedings for the torts which it alleges or wishes to allege in an appropriate Court independently of the present proceedings. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 363" id="cs7">The law on s 31A FCA has been exhaustively analysed. While there is no doubt that the bar has been lowered for summary dismissal, it is still a serious matter to dismiss a proceeding at an early stage. None of those cases would suggest otherwise. To those I would also adopt the observations of Graham J in J F Keir Pty Limited v Sparks [2008] FCA 611 at [9] - [15] and Gilmour J in Dandaven v Harbeth Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 955. It is clear that, despite the bar being lowered, the Court should approach the question of summary dismissal with considerable caution. For all the reasons expressed in these authorities, as I apprehend it, the lowering of the bar or relaxing of the standard was intended only to give a power which the Court may exercise in the more obvious instances. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FCA 1618" id="cs8">13 The law on s 31A FCA has been exhaustively analysed. While there is no doubt that the bar has been lowered for summary dismissal, it is still a serious matter to dismiss a proceeding at an early stage. None of those cases would suggest otherwise. To those I would also adopt the observations of Graham J in J F Keir Pty Limited v Sparks [2008] FCA 611 at [9] - [15] and Gilmour J in Dandaven v Harbeth Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 955. It is clear that, despite the bar being lowered, the Court should approach the question of summary dismissal with considerable caution. For all the reasons expressed in these authorities, as I apprehend it, the lowering of the bar or relaxing of the standard was intended only to give a power which the Court may exercise in the more obvious instances. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FCA 1529" id="cs9">45 Despite the fact that there is some difference of opinion in the Court as to the precise test to be applied and as to whether a decision under s 31A is final or interlocutory, it is clear from the discussion in Boston Commercial and Jefferson Ford that it is for the judge to decide whether there are reasonable prospects of success. In doing so, the judge conducts an inquiry into the merits of the question in order to decide whether it is sufficiently strong to warrant a trial ( Jefferson Ford at [23] per Finkelstein J, at [74] per Rares J; Bond v Barry [2008] FCAFC 115 at [72] per curiam). That test and the matters to be considered in coming to a conclusion are not mandated by the legislature. That is the case whether or not it is mandatory ( Jefferson Ford at [128]---[129] per Gordon J) or discretionary ( J F Keir v Sparks [2008] FCA 611 at [12] per Graham J) to give summary judgment once that assessment is made or whether the discretion is a general one ( Boston Commercial at [45] per Rares J) or limited by the circumstances of "no reasonable prospect of success" ( Jefferson Ford at [129] per Gordon J). The Court is still in the position of determining the facts and inferences to be drawn in deciding whether or not the test in s 31A has been satisfied in any given case. It is for the Court to decide whether the basis for summary judgment has been established ( Gypsy Jokers at [7] per Gleeson CJ).</sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FMCA 1363" id="cs10">The outcome of the present proceedings does not depend on the creditor asserting a right or claim inconsistent with any earlier finding by Riethmuller FM. The creditor does not seek to raise any matters cardinal to the later creditor's petition which would necessarily involve any assertion that the judicial determination of Riethmuller FM was erroneous. I note in that respect that as Dixon J stated in Blair v Curran at 532 --- 533 (and see J F Keir Pty Limited v Sparks [2008] FCA 611 at [58] ): " Findings, however deliberate and formal, which concern only evidentiary facts and not ultimate facts forming the very title to rights give rise to no preclusion. Decisions upon matters of law which amount to no more than steps in a process of reasoning tending to establish or support the proposition upon which the rights depend do not estop the parties if the same matters of law arise in subsequent litigation . " </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FCA 1470" id="cs11">6 There is a divergence in the authorities about the nature of the power to dismiss proceedings on the ground that they have no reasonable prospects of success. On one view it is a power conditional on the finding of the relevant facts without any element of discretion (for example, Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372 ; [2008] FCAFC 60 at [128] --- [129]). On another it is a discretionary power that may or may not be exercised if the facts enlivening its exercise are found (for example, JF Keir Pty Ltd v Sparks [2008] FCA 611 at [12] ). This difference could be relevant to the nature of the appellate function because of the restrictions on appellate review of discretionary decisions ( House v The King [1936] HCA 40 ; (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505). In this case, however, the divergence is immaterial because the trial judge's decision to dismiss the proceedings summarily was based on the construction of the statutory provisions.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FCA 1461" id="cs12">

24 Although there has been debate about whether the word "may" in s 31A(2) vests in the Court a power conditional on certain facts being found or discretion (see, for example, Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372 ; [2008] FCAFC 60 at [127] --- [128] and JF Keir Pty Ltd v Sparks [2008] FCA 611 at [12] ), certain aspects of the operation of the provision are clear. First, s 31A(3) , in terms, discloses that s 31A(2) involves a less stringent test than that applicable at common law for summary dismissal. Secondly, and as Rares J observed in Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 720 ; [2006] FCA 1352 at [46] , " s 31A regulates the attainment of justice by creating an entitlement in a party to be protected from claims or defences which fail to meet the threshold prescribed in the section". Thirdly, and again as Rares J said in Boston Commercial Services at [45], "in assessing what reasonable prospects of success are for the purposes of s 31A , the court must be very cautious not to do a party an injustice by summarily dismissing the proceedings where... contested evidence might reasonably be believed one way or the other so as to enable one side or the other to succeed. As soon as the evidence may have such an ambivalent character prior to a final determination, I am of opinion that then, as a matter of law, at that point there are reasonable prospects of success within the meaning of s 31A. Unless only one conclusion can be said to be reasonable, the moving party will not have discharged its onus to enliven the discretion to authorise a summary termination of the proceedings which s 31A envisages". This is consistent with the statement by Tamberlin J in Paramasivam v University of New South Wales [2007] FCA 875 at [14] that "... it is essential that the Court must be careful not to do an injustice by summarily dismissing proceedings, or denying an applicant an opportunity to ventilate their case ...". Fourthly, and as Lindgren J noted in White Industries Aust Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 160 FCR 298 ; [2007] FCA 511 at [50] , s 31A "is concerned with the bringing and defending of proceedings, not just with pleadings; with substance, not just with form".</sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] AATA 558" id="cs13">114. As Gray J explained in Pitt v OneSteel Reinforcing Pty Limited , [179] " the word 'frivolous', especially when coupled with 'vexatious', is a technical legal term, in substance meaning the absence of a cause of action. " [180] As Graham J said in JF Keir Pty Limited v Sparks , [181] " An action can be stayed as vexatious 'if it can really lead to no possible good'. " [182] The power to dismiss an application summarily is a power known to, and exercised by, the courts under various names. It is a power whose limits were considered by Barwick CJ in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W. 36. As Graham J said in JF Keir Pty Ltd v Sparks : [65]

" Unlike res judicata, issue estoppel may arise when the cause of action in each proceeding is entirely different (per Merkel J in Somander v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs ... 92000) [2000] FCA 1192 ; 178 ALR 677 at [69] ). " [66]

  36. As Graham J said in JF Keir Pty Ltd v Sparks : [65]

" Unlike res judicata, issue estoppel may arise when the cause of action in each proceeding is entirely different (per Merkel J in Somander v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs ... 92000) [2000] FCA 1192 ; 178 ALR 677 at [69] ). " [66]

  As Gray J explained in Pitt v OneSteel Reinforcing Pty Limited , [179] " the word 'frivolous', especially when coupled with 'vexatious', is a technical legal term, in substance meaning the absence of a cause of action. " [180] As Graham J said in JF Keir Pty Limited v Sparks , [181] " An action can be stayed as vexatious 'if it can really lead to no possible good'. " [182] The power to dismiss an application summarily is a power known to, and exercised by, the courts under various names. It is a power whose limits were considered by Barwick CJ in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W. ) : [183]

" The plaintiff rightly points out that the jurisdiction summarily to terminate an action is to be sparingly employed and is not to be used except in a clear case where the Court is satisfied that it has the requisite material and the necessary assistance from the parties to reach a definite and certain conclusion.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FCAFC 115" id="cs14">73 Gordon J at [128]-[131] was of a different view. She said that the existence of a real issue of law does not necessarily preclude summary judgment because the Court can usually hear and determine a disputed point of law expeditiously, without the need for a trial. Graham J has expressed his disagreement with this: J F Keir Pty Limited v Sparks [2008] FCA 611 at [12] and [52]. </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 </title>
<title id="l1">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 436A Company may appoint administrator if board thinks it is or will become insolvent</title>
<title id="l2">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 440D Stay of proceedings</title>
<title id="l3">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 </title>
<title id="l4">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 31A Summary judgment</title>
<title id="l5">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
<title id="l6">MIGRATION LITIGATION REFORM ACT 2005 NO. 137, 2005 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2008] FCA 149">administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2008] FCA 149">refugee review tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2008] FCA 149">apprehension of bias</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2008] FCA 149">test to be applied</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2008] FCA 149">leave to raise a new ground of appeal refused migration law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.5">cited from="[2008] FCA 149">migration act 1958 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.6">cited from="[2008] FCA 149">s 425(1) does not confer upon an applicant a unilateral right to secure an adjournment of proceedings so that particular evidence can be presented</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.7">cited from="[2008] FCA 149">s 425(1) complied with as long as applicant is given a meaningful opportunity to give evidence and present arguments</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 328">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 328">application for protection visa by chinese nationals</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 328">jurisdictional error</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 328">the decision of the refugee review tribunal affected by apprehended bias</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 328">also lack of satisfaction reached by the refugee review tribunal not lawful, but arbitrary and capricious.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[2004] HCA 62">applicant naff of 2002 v minister for immigration and multicultural and indigenous affairs  immigration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[2004] HCA 62">refugees</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[2004] HCA 62">refugee review tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">cited from="[2004] HCA 62">decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.4">cited from="[2004] HCA 62">judicial review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.5">cited from="[2004] HCA 62">procedural fairness</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.6">cited from="[2004] HCA 62">non-compliance with statutory duties</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.7">cited from="[2004] HCA 62">tribunal concerned by inconsistencies in applicant's evidence at oral hearing</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.8">cited from="[2004] HCA 62">tribunal said it would give the applicant a chance to respond in writing to its concerns</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.9">cited from="[2004] HCA 62">whether tribunal's failure to do so involved a failure to complete the review process</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.10">cited from="[2004] HCA 62">whether failure involved a breach of the duty to conduct a review under s 414(1) of the migration act 1958 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.11">cited from="[2004] HCA 62">whether failure involved a breach of the duty to hear from the applicant under s 425(1)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.12">cited from="[2004] HCA 62">whether reviewable error where absence of evidence from the applicant about effect of failure.  migration act 1958 (cth), ss 56 , 414 (1), 415 (1), 425 (1), 427 (1)(b), 420 , pt 7 divs 2-7a.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.0">cited from="[2001] WASC 276">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.1">cited from="[2001] WASC 276">rules of the supreme court 1971 (wa) , o 56 r 3administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.2">cited from="[2001] WASC 276">prerogative writs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.3">cited from="[2001] WASC 276">application for a writ of certiorari</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.4">cited from="[2001] WASC 276">whether minister of local government acted lawfully in suspending local council</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.5">cited from="[2001] WASC 276">whether the minister for local government is required to afford procedural fairness to the applicant councillors before suspension under part 8 of the local government act 1995 (wa) administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.6">cited from="[2001] WASC 276">prerogative writs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.7">cited from="[2001] WASC 276">application for a writ of prohibition to prohibit inquiry panel established by minister of local government, pursuant to s 8.20 of local government act 1995 (wa) , from proceeding to hear inquiry</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.8">cited from="[2001] WASC 276">whether conduct of members of inquiry panel gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.9">cited from="[2001] WASC 276">turns on own facts</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.0">cited from="[2001] HCA 23">re minister for immigration and multicultural affairs; ex parte epeabaka  immigration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.1">cited from="[2001] HCA 23">refugees</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.2">cited from="[2001] HCA 23">protection visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.3">cited from="[2001] HCA 23">affirmation by refugee review tribunal of decision to refuse application for protection visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.4">cited from="[2001] HCA 23">public statements made by tribunal member on personal internet home page about truthfulness of applicants for refugee status</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.5">cited from="[2001] HCA 23">whether pt 7 of migration act 1958 (cth) constitutes a code excluding the common law rules of natural justice and in particular the ostensible bias rule.  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.6">cited from="[2001] HCA 23">natural justice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.7">cited from="[2001] HCA 23">bias</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.8">cited from="[2001] HCA 23">reasonable apprehension of bias</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.9">cited from="[2001] HCA 23">whether a reasonable party or member of the public might apprehend that decision of tribunal member was affected by a prejudiced mind</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.10">cited from="[2001] HCA 23">whether ostensible bias may be inferred from statements made after a decision.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.0">cited from="[1960] HCA 70">criminal law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.1">cited from="[1960] HCA 70">evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.2">cited from="[1960] HCA 70">accused primitive native unable to speak english</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.3">cited from="[1960] HCA 70">confession made by accused in native dialect to native interpreter</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.4">cited from="[1960] HCA 70">instantaneous translation into english by interpreter to patrol officer</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.5">cited from="[1960] HCA 70">patrol officer without knowledge of native dialect</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.6">cited from="[1960] HCA 70">evidence from interpreter at trial that translation full and correct</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.7">cited from="[1960] HCA 70">evidence by patrol officer of interrogation and confession translated into english</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.8">cited from="[1960] HCA 70">objection that evidence inadmissible as hearsay</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.9">cited from="[1960] HCA 70">admissibility.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.0">citing from="[2009] FCA 992">administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.1">citing from="[2009] FCA 992">procedural fairness</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.2">citing from="[2009] FCA 992">whether inadequate interpretation by translator</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.3">citing from="[2009] FCA 992">whether applicant effectively prevented from giving evidence because of inadequate interpretation of key witness</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.4">citing from="[2009] FCA 992">whether presence of legal representation before the tribunal cured inadequate interpretation by providing opportunity to be heard</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.5">citing from="[2009] FCA 992">breach of s 39 administrative appeals tribunal act 1975</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.6">citing from="[2009] FCA 992">appeal allowed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.0">citing from="[2009] FMCA 7">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.1">citing from="[2009] FMCA 7">review of migration review tribunal decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.2">citing from="[2009] FMCA 7">refusal of partner visas</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.3">citing from="[2009] FMCA 7">adverse credibility findings by the tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.4">citing from="[2009] FMCA 7">disclosure of adverse information by the tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.5">citing from="[2009] FMCA 7">whether the tribunal breached s.359a of the migration act 1958 (cth) considered</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.6">citing from="[2009] FMCA 7">interpretation errors at the tribunal hearing</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.7">citing from="[2009] FMCA 7">whether the tribunal breached s.360 of the migration act considered</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.8">citing from="[2009] FMCA 7">whether further hearing required to deal with adverse information emerging after the hearing considered.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.0">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1649">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.1">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1649">visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.2">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1649">protection (class xa) visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.3">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1649">refugee review tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.4">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1649">application for review of rrt decision affirming a decision of a delegate of the minister refusing to grant the applicants a protection visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.5">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1649">applicants are citizen of the people's republic of china claiming fear of persecution for reasons of their religion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.6">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1649">allegation of bias</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.7">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1649">apprehension of bias</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.8">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1649">interpreter</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.9">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1649">whether applicants were deprived of procedural fairness due to errors on the part of the interpreter</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.10">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1649">credibility issues.  practice  procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.11">citing from="[2008] FMCA 1649">where proceeding reopened to allow further submissions.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.0">citing from="[2008] FCA 1898">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.1">citing from="[2008] FCA 1898">grounds of appeal drafted by migration agent</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.2">citing from="[2008] FCA 1898">no instructions by appellant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.3">citing from="[2008] FCA 1898">alleged bias on part of refugee review tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.4">citing from="[2008] FCA 1898">argument not raised before federal magistrates court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.5">citing from="[2008] FCA 1898">allegation that decision of federal magistrate neither " fair " nor " reasonable "</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.6">citing from="[2008] FCA 1898">provision of proper interpreter services</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.7">citing from="[2008] FCA 1898">appeal dismissed  attorney-general for the state of new south wales v quin (1990) 170 clr 1 applied</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.0">citing from="[2008] FCA 1789">immigration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.1">citing from="[2008] FCA 1789">whether breach of procedural fairness</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.2">citing from="[2008] FCA 1789">applicant unwell</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.3">citing from="[2008] FCA 1789">applicant failed to attend tribunal hearing due to illness</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.4">citing from="[2008] FCA 1789">tribunal gave opportunity to provide explanation and further information</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.5">citing from="[2008] FCA 1789">tribunal made aware of reason for non-attendance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.6">citing from="[2008] FCA 1789">tribunal refused to reschedule hearing</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.7">citing from="[2008] FCA 1789">tribunal then proceeded to make its decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.8">citing from="[2008] FCA 1789">no jurisdictional error. evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.9">citing from="[2008] FCA 1789">federal magistrate accepted evidence of illness</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.10">citing from="[2008] FCA 1789">no medical evidence lead</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.11">citing from="[2008] FCA 1789">cross-examination of witness</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.12">citing from="[2008] FCA 1789">medical opinion not required.</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 992" id="cs0">In my view, the evidence of Ms Yu-Lin was effectively precluded from being properly presented because of the inadequacy of the translator. I am satisfied that the interpretation was so inadequate that it prevented the applicant from putting before the Tribunal the evidence she desired to rely upon, and that the evidence was significant to the applicant's case: see, eg Tobasi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 1050 ; (2002) 122 FCR 322 ; Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 507 ; [1999] FCA 507 ; (1999) 92 FCR 6 ; and SZGWN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 238 per Gilmour J. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 200" id="cs1">I do not propose to adjourn the appeal to permit evidence and argument on the second issue. The issue of interpretation generally was canvassed at some length by the learned Federal Magistrate. Detailed consideration was given to the question of quality of translation. It has been accepted that some errors in translation occur in practically all circumstances partly because of the difficulty of finding direct correlations for expressions used in the respective languages. It is equally clear that if the translation errors are of significant dimension going to the heart of the issues, there will not have been a fair hearing. See for example: SZGWN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 238. Unlike SZGWN , the specific translation difficulties said to have occurred in this case have not been raised on the notice of appeal, have not been supported by any evidence, have not been identified with the slightest precision and have not been said to occur in an area of the case which was critical to its disposition. I will therefore not allow an adjournment of the appeal. ANALYSIS
 Grounds 1 and 2
 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] FMCA 7" id="cs2">The Tribunal was put on notice of this alleged inadequacy in the course of the hearing. The statutory obligation under s.360 to "invite" the applicants to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments lay with the Tribunal. It is a continuing obligation: Applicant NAAF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration [2004] HCA 62 ; (2004) 221 CLR 1 at [26]- [27]. The applicant contends that, being on notice of the potential errors in the interpretation the Tribunal should have extended an invitation to the applicant to attend a further hearing so that she could give evidence, with better interpretation. The failure by the applicant to ask for a further hearing did not affect that obligation if it existed. See SZGWN v Minister for Immigration [2008] FCA 238 at [47] .  Despite being on notice of the potential errors in the interpretation it extended no such invitation to the appellant to attend a further hearing so that he could give evidence, with adequate interpretation. The failure by the appellant to ask for a further hearing did not affect that obligation. See SZGWN v Minister for Immigration  Citizenship [2008] FCA 238 at [47] . In this case the question is whether the standard of interpretation by the interpreter was such that the applicants and their witnesses were prevented from giving their evidence effectively or at all. The applicants note the observations of Ryan J (with whom Tamberlin and Middleton JJ agreed) in WALN v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 131 at [29] : To succeed on this ground the appellant must establish that he was effectively prevented from giving his evidence; see Perera (above) at [38]---[41]. In fact, a reading of the whole of the transcript reveals that the standard of interpretation was good, and consistently good throughout the hearing. It would be surprising if a hearing lasting that long did not result in some instances of confusion, instances where questions and answers needed to be clarified, and the odd occasion where a question or answer was misinterpreted. However, this in no way comes close to a situation where the standard of interpretation would draw the Court to the conclusion that "here the standard of interpretation at the Tribunal hearing was so inadequate that the appellant was effectively prevented from giving evidence at the Tribunal" for the purposes of s 360 of the Act: see Appellant P119 at [17]; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1376 ; (2001) 115 FCR 1 at 6 [27] ; Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 507 ; (1999) 92 FCR 6 at [38] - [41]; SZGWN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 238.
 The 'second limb'

 The second limb identified in Appellant P119 of 2002 is not conceded by the Minister to amount to a separate stand alone 'limb' or species of jurisdictional error in connection with alleged faulty or bad interpretation at a Tribunal hearing. That limb --- if it can be so described - requires demonstration of demonstration of a "material error" of fact resulting in a conclusion that "the decision-making process had occurred": see Soltanyzand v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1168 at [18] .</sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FMCA 1649" id="cs3">It is submitted that the applicants by forwarding in writing a transcript together with their complaints about the failure of interpreting and the actions of the Tribunal in sorting through errors of admissions was an appropriate response by the Tribunal. I was referred to the comments of Kenny J in Perera v Minister for Immigration  Multicultural Affairs [11] . Counsel for the Minister submitted that if interpretation errors are made, then they are able to be rectified. It is submitted that it was open to the Tribunal to take that approach. I was also referred to a decision of my own in SZGWN  Anor v Minister for Immigration  Anor [12] . However, that decision was subsequently reversed on appeal ( SZGWN and SZGWO v Minister for Immigration  Citizenship [13] ) and, for that reason, I made the decision to reopen the matter and hear further submissions.  Counsel for the Minister submitted that there is nothing in SZGWN [28] that alters the well established principles in relation to s 425 and translation errors, nor is there anything that alters the principles in relation to apprehended bias. She also put that the applicants' further submission did not add in any substantial way to the case that had already been argued at the previous hearing. The details of interpreting errors were not developed in any way to take matters further. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FCA 1898" id="cs4">11 Even if an argument as to bias had not been raised before the Federal Magistrate, leave to now raise such an argument on appeal would have been refused: cf SZGWN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 238 at [120] , [2008] FCA 238 ; 103 ALD 144 at 174 per Gilmour J. Leave may be granted where it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so. But it is well accepted that a " reasonable apprehension " of bias must be " firmly established ": Re JRL, Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39 ; (1986) 161 CLR 342 at 352 per Mason J. The circumstances more relevant to an application in respect to proceedings before the Refugee Review Tribunal, where proceedings are heard in private, has been addressed by Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ as follows in Re Refugee Review Tribunal, Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28 , 179 ALR 425:
 [27] The test for apprehended bias in relation to curial proceedings is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question to be decided. That formulation owes much to the fact that court proceedings are held in public. There is some incongruity in formulating a test in terms of "a fair-minded lay observer" when, as is the case with the tribunal, proceedings are held in private. [28] Perhaps it would be better, in the case of administrative proceedings held in private, to formulate the test for apprehended bias by reference to a hypothetical fair-minded lay person who is properly informed as to the nature of the proceedings, the matters in issue and the conduct which is said to give rise to an apprehension of bias. Whether or not that be the appropriate formulation, there is, in our view, no reason to depart from the objective test of possibility, as distinct from probability, as to what will be done or what might have been done. To do otherwise, would be to risk confusion of apprehended bias with actual bias by requiring substantially the same proof. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FCA 1789" id="cs5">23 I make the assumption as to the correctness of SCAR [2003] FCAFC 126 ; 128 FCR 553 even though SCAR has not met with universal approval: see, eg, Appellant P119/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 230 ; NALQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 121 ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SZFDE [2006] FCAFC 142 ; (2006) 154 FCR 365 ; SZJZY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 280 ; SZGWN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 238. </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">MIGRATION ACT 1958 </title>
<title id="l1">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 11 Visa applicable to 2 or more persons</title>
<title id="l2">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 21 Failure to comply with section 18 notice</title>
<title id="l3">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 91R Persecution</title>
<title id="l4">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 424 Tribunal may seek information</title>
<title id="l5">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 425 Tribunal must invite applicant to appear</title>
<title id="l6">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">citing from="[2009] NSWSC 975">[contempt]</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">citing from="[2009] NSWSC 975">penalty hearing</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">citing from="[2009] NSWSC 975">special circumstances warranting lenient approach</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2009] NSWSC 975" id="cs0">45 On the first day the matter was before me ex parte, 12 May 2009, I alerted the plaintiff's counsel to the fact that a new regime had come into force, without expressly mentioning s 128A of the Act (tr 6). I have little doubt that had the parties addressed the s 128A regime in their Consent Orders, any confusion in respect of the steps to be taken would have been dispelled. However the defendants, to their credit, made an admission of contempt subject to the preliminary application with which I dealt in the Judgment. A great deal happened between 15 May 2009 and 9 July 2009 in respect of the main case. The defendants made a large amount of material available to Mr Feldman so that it could be produced to the solicitors for the plaintiff. The defendants were also winding down their business, moving out of premises and terminating the employment of approximately 17 employees. There was also the application by Beautree in the Federal Court of Australia for the appointment of provisional liquidators to Willow Glade Pty Ltd and Pazoluca Pty Ltd, the fifth and sixth defendants in the main proceedings. Those applications were heard on 7 and 8 July 2009 and judgment was delivered on 9 July 2009: Beautree Pty Ltd, in the matter of Willow Glade Pty Ltd v Willow Glade Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 738. </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 </title>
<title id="l1">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 461 General grounds on which company may be wound up by Court</title>
<title id="l2">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 472 Court to appoint official liquidator</title>
<title id="l3">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
<title id="l4">REAL PROPERTY ACT 1900 </title>
<title id="l5">REAL PROPERTY ACT 1900 - SECT 57 Procedure on default</title>
</legistitles>
</case>