Question:
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2006] FCA 1778">procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2006] FCA 1778">application to dismiss proceeding</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2006] FCA 1778">obligation on australian electoral commission to screen voters from observation when marking ballot-papers</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2006] FCA 1778">whether application relating to prospective future refusal of voter to enter booth as provided at last election gives rise to a 'matter'</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2006] FCA 1778">effect of draft proposed substitute application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[2006] FCA 1778">whether applicant has sufficient material interest  electoral law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.6">cited from="[2006] FCA 1778">obligation to screen voters from observation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.7">cited from="[2006] FCA 1778">whether reasonably arguable that obligation requires provision of enclosed booths</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.8">cited from="[2006] FCA 1778">whether anticipated refusal to vote in non-enclosed booths at next federal election gives rise to justiciable matter</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[2006] FCA 458">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[2006] FCA 458">strikeout application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[2006] FCA 458">whether s 31a federal court of australia act 1976 (cth) applies to proceedings commenced before operation of section</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">cited from="[2006] FCA 458">termination of employment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.4">cited from="[2006] FCA 458">breach of contract claims</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.5">cited from="[2006] FCA 458">whether subsequent grievance procedure formed part of contract of employment and applied to applicant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.6">cited from="[2006] FCA 458">whether statements made at time of termination made in trade or commerce</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.7">cited from="[2006] FCA 458">whether unconscionable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.8">cited from="[2006] FCA 458">whether, if federal claims struck out, jurisdiction for defamation claim</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 3">procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 3">costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 3">application by successful defendant for indemnity costs order against plaintiff and plaintiff's solicitor</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 3">legal practitioners</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 3">statutory duty in pursuing claim for damages</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.5">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 3">statutory liability for costs and analogous general law liability discussed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.0">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">mulholland v australian electoral commission  constitutional law (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">parliament</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">elections</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.3">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">registration of political parties</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.4">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">requirement that political parties have 500 members in order to become registered or remain registered ("the 500 rule")</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.5">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">prohibition on one person being counted as a member of two or more parties ("the no-overlap rule")</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.6">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">constitutional validity of electoral scheme.  constitutional law (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.7">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">parliament</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.8">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">elections</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.9">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">house of representatives and senate</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.10">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">members and senators to be "directly chosen by the people"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.11">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">meaning of "directly chosen"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.12">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">whether the 500 rule and the no-overlap rule impair "direct choice" or the making of an informed choice by electors</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.13">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">whether the 500 rule and the no-overlap rule unreasonably discriminate between candidates</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.14">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">whether inconsistent with constitutional provision for filling of casual vacancies by persons "publicly recognized by a particular political party".  constitutional law (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.15">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">implied freedom of political communication</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.16">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">whether the 500 rule and the no-overlap rule effectively burden freedom of communication about government or political matters</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.17">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">whether laws reasonably appropriate and adapted to a legitimate purpose</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.18">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">whether laws proportionate to constitutional provisions.  constitutional law (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.19">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">implied freedoms</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.20">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">whether the constitution contains an implied freedom of political association</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.21">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">whether the constitution contains an implied freedom of participation in federal elections</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.22">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">whether the constitution contains an implied freedom of political privacy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.23">cited from="[2004] HCA 41">whether the 500 rule and the no-overlap rule infringe any such implied freedoms.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.0">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">james andrew mcginty and ors v the state of western australia   constitutional law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.1">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">commonwealth constitution</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.2">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">s 24</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.3">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">"directly chosen by the people"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.4">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">constitutional implications</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.5">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">representative government or democracy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.6">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">equality of voting power</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.7">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">franchise.   constitutional law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.8">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">commonwealth constitution</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.9">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">s 106</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.10">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">source of state constitutional power</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.11">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">application to states of implied constitutional freedoms.   constitutional law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.12">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">western australia</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.13">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">electoral system</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.14">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">constitutional implications</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.15">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">representative government or democracy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.16">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">equality of voting power</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.17">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">manner and form</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.18">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">constitution act 1889 (wa) s 73(2)(c)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.19">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">"chosen directly by the people"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.20">cited from="[1996] HCA 48">constitution acts amendment act 1899 (wa) s 6; electoral distribution act 1947 (wa) ss 2a , 6 and 9 .  hearing canberra, 12-14 september 1995</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.0">cited from="[1994] HCA 15">evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.1">cited from="[1994] HCA 15">criminal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.2">cited from="[1994] HCA 15">listening devices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.3">cited from="[1994] HCA 15">authority to use</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.4">cited from="[1994] HCA 15">judge empowered to authorize use of listening device</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.5">cited from="[1994] HCA 15">"ether power to authorize use included power to authorize entry on to premises to install device</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.6">cited from="[1994] HCA 15">validity of authority</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.7">cited from="[1994] HCA 15">invasion of privacy act 1971 (q.), ss. 43 , 46 (1).   police</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.8">cited from="[1994] HCA 15">listening devices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.9">cited from="[1994] HCA 15">offence under state law to use without obtaining authority</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.10">cited from="[1994] HCA 15">federal police not required to obtain "licence or permission" under state law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.11">cited from="[1994] HCA 15">"ether federal police enabled to use listening device without obtaining authority</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.12">cited from="[1994] HCA 15">invasion of privacy act 1971 (q.), ss. 43 , 46 (1)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.13">cited from="[1994] HCA 15">australian federal police act 1979 (cth), ss. 9 , 12 .</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.0">cited from="[1992] HCA 45">constitutional law (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.1">cited from="[1992] HCA 45">powers of commonwealth parliament</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.2">cited from="[1992] HCA 45">broadcasting</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.3">cited from="[1992] HCA 45">elections</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.4">cited from="[1992] HCA 45">implied right of freedom of communication in relation to elections</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.5">cited from="[1992] HCA 45">prohibition on broadcasting political matters during elections</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.6">cited from="[1992] HCA 45">validity</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.7">cited from="[1992] HCA 45">whether burden on functions of states</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.8">cited from="[1992] HCA 45">validity in relation to territories</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.9">cited from="[1992] HCA 45">whether obnoxious to freedom of intercourse between states</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.10">cited from="[1992] HCA 45">broadcasters required to provide free time to political parties</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.11">cited from="[1992] HCA 45">whether acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.12">cited from="[1992] HCA 45">the constitution (63 and 64 vict. c. 12), ss. 51(v) , (xxxi), 92 , 122</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.13">cited from="[1992] HCA 45">broadcasting act 1942 (cth), ss. 95a, 95b, 95c, 95d, 95h, 95l, 95m, 95q, 95s.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.0">cited from="[1992] HCA 46">constitutional law (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.1">cited from="[1992] HCA 46">powers of commonwealth parliament</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.2">cited from="[1992] HCA 46">conciliation and arbitration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.3">cited from="[1992] HCA 46">industrial relations commission</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.4">cited from="[1992] HCA 46">words calculated to bring commission or member into disrepute</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.5">cited from="[1992] HCA 46">offence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.6">cited from="[1992] HCA 46">defences</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.7">cited from="[1992] HCA 46">fair comment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.8">cited from="[1992] HCA 46">justification</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.9">cited from="[1992] HCA 46">validity</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.10">cited from="[1992] HCA 46">implied constitutional right of free communication about matters relating to commonwealth government</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.11">cited from="[1992] HCA 46">freedom of interstate intercourse</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.12">cited from="[1992] HCA 46">the constitution (63 and 64 vict., c. 12), ss. 51(xxxv) , (xxxix), 92</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.13">cited from="[1992] HCA 46">industrial relations act 1988 (cth), s. 299(1)(d)(ii).</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.0">cited from="[1990] HCA 6">criminal law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.1">cited from="[1990] HCA 6">driving offence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.2">cited from="[1990] HCA 6">prescribed concentration of alcohol</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.3">cited from="[1990] HCA 6">sample of breath</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.4">cited from="[1990] HCA 6">analysis of sample furnished within three hours after driving vehicle indicating presence in blood of more than prescribed concentration of alcohol</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.5">cited from="[1990] HCA 6">whether offence committed only when vehicle involved in accident</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.6">cited from="[1990] HCA 6">road safety act 1986 (vict.), s.49(1)(f).</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.0">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">practice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.1">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">summary power to terminate action</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.2">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">principles applicable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.3">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">inherent jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.4">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">jurisdiction under rule of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.5">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">high court rules, o. 26, r. 18.  patents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.6">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">invention</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.7">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">use for services of commonwealth or state</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.8">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">"authority of the state"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.9">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">commissioner for railways</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.10">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">construction of carriages for use in state railway system</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.11">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">"services of the state"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.12">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">written authority to use invention</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.13">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">when contract itself sufficient authority</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.14">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">patents act 1952-1960 (cth), ss. 125, 132*.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.0">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">workers' compensation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.1">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">injury by accident arising out of or in course of employment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.2">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">death of worker</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.3">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">negligence of employer</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.4">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">option of dependants to apply for compensation or take other proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.5">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">award of compensation obtained by widow on behalf of herself and children</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.6">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">effect of award as barring claim by dependants under lord campbell's act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.7">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">workers' compensation acts 1928</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.8">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">1946 (no. 3806</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.9">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">no. 5128) (vict.)*</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.10">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">wrongs act 1928 (no. 3807) (vict.), part iii.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.11">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">the 1946 workers' compensation rules, rr. 8, 81.*  practice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.12">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">supreme court (vict.)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.13">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">dismissal of action</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.14">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">abuse of process</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.15">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">inherent jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.16">cited from="[1949] HCA 1">rules of the supreme court (vict.), order xxv., rr. 2, 4.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.0">citing from="[2010] WASCA 67">electoral law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.1">citing from="[2010] WASCA 67">commonwealth</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.2">citing from="[2010] WASCA 67">failure to vote</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.3">citing from="[2010] WASCA 67">whether valid and sufficient reason for failure to vote</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.4">citing from="[2010] WASCA 67">wrong view of the law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.5">citing from="[2010] WASCA 67">persisting in wrong view after federal court decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.0">citing from="[2009] WASC 267">commonwealth election</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.1">citing from="[2009] WASC 267">obligation to vote</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.2">citing from="[2009] WASC 267">whether valid and sufficient reason not to vote</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.3">citing from="[2009] WASC 267">no reasonable prospects of success</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.0">citing from="[2008] FCA 43">costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.1">citing from="[2008] FCA 43">submission that there be no order as to costs in relation to litigation said to be pursued in the public interest</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.2">citing from="[2008] FCA 43">submission rejected</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.3">citing from="[2008] FCA 43">costs awarded on the basis of conventional principles recognising degree of success of each party</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2010] WASCA 67" id="cs0">7 In November 2007, with a federal election pending, the appellant made an urgent application to the Federal Court, which was heard by McKerracher J: Horn v Australian Electoral Commission [2007] FCA 1827 ; (2007) 163 FCR 585. The applicant sought a declaration that the respondent (the AEC), which was responsible for administering the conduct of federal elections, had failed to provide polling booths for use by voters that complied with s 206 and s 233 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act . The appellant contended that the polling booths were not constructed and arranged in such a manner as to screen voters from observation while marking their ballot papers, so as to allow a voter to mark his or her vote on the ballot paper in private. 18 The grounds of appeal the appellant foreshadowed if leave to appeal were granted by McKechnie J were:
 The primary court erred in law in failing properly to apprehend the Appellant's reasons for not voting at the Commonwealth election of 24 November 2007, and accordingly in failing to make any, or any sufficient, findings of fact about those reasons in light of the statutory scheme under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) (the Act), which failures deprived the Appellant of a reasonable chance of an acquittal.
 In particular, the primary court:

 1.1 Failed to construe, properly or at all, the statutory provisions that the Appellant reasonably contended were at material times breached by the Respondent, and/or the Executive Government of the Commonwealth, namely ss.206 and 233 (1) of the Act (which reasonable contentions of statutory breach were relevant to whether the Appellant had a valid and sufficient reason for failing to vote). 1.2 Misconstrued the Act in that it:

 (a) wrongly approached its task of fact-finding on the basis that an elector has a 'duty' to vote, unqualified by any recognition of the range of reasons that may give rise to a 'valid and sufficient reason' for failing to vote; and

 (b) failed to recognise that a sincerely held and consistently pursued position concerning the absence of a secret ballot, including the assertion of breaches of ss.206 and 233 (1) of the Act, is capable of giving rise to such a 'valid and sufficient reason'.

 1.3 Failed properly to make findings concerning the voting compartments tendered in evidence in light of the Appellant's contention that the compartments (which were materially the same as the compartments in use at the Commonwealth election of 24 November 2007) do not facilitate a secret ballot. 1.4 Allowed an extraneous and irrelevant matter to guide it, namely the decision of McKerracher J in Horn v Australian Electoral Commission [2007] FCA 1827 ; (2007) 163 FCR 585 , when that decision, and the factual findings of McKerracher J, did not absolve the primary court from making its own factual findings on the evidence before it as to whether the Appellant had a valid and sufficient reason for failing to vote. 1.5 Despite having initially adverted to the operation of the burden of proof, failed properly to recognise and apply the legal burden of proof on the Respondent to negative beyond reasonable doubt the existence of a valid and sufficient reason (the Appellant having met the evidential burden on him in relation to that excuse).

 The primary court erred in fact in failing to find that the voting compartments in use at the Commonwealth election:

 (a) were not constructed so as to screen voters from observation while they are marking their ballot papers; and

 (b) did not allow voters to, in private, mark their votes on their ballot-papers

 or, alternatively, that an elector might reasonably reach the conclusions at (a) and (b) and thereby have a valid and sufficient reason for not voting. 20 The appellant now appeals to the Court of Appeal against the decision of McKechnie J. The grounds of appeal read:
 The learned primary Judge erred in law in failing to find that the trial Magistrate erred in failing properly to apprehend the appellant's reasons for not voting at the Commonwealth election of 24 November 2007, and accordingly failing to make any, or any sufficient, findings of fact about those reasons in light of the statutory scheme under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), which failure deprived the appellant of a reasonable chance of acquittal;
and in particular, erred in law in failing to find that the trial Magistrate:

 1.1 misconstrued the Act in that he:

 (a) wrongly approached its task of fact-finding on the basis that an elector has a 'duty' to vote, unqualified by any recognition of the range of reasons that may give rise to a 'valid and sufficient reason' for failing to vote;

 (b) failed to recognise that a sincerely held and consistently pursued position concerning the absence of a secret ballot, including the assertion of breaches of ss 206(1) and 233 (1) of the Act, is capable of giving rise to such a 'valid and sufficient reason'.

 1.2 Failed to properly make a finding concerning the voting compartments tendered in evidence in light of the appellant's contention that the compartments (which were materially the same as the compartments in use at the Commonwealth election of 2007) do not facilitate a secret ballot. 1.3 Allowed an extraneous matter, namely the decision of McKerracher J in Horn v Australian Electoral Commission [2007] FCA 1827 ; (2007) 163 FCR 585 to dictate the outcome of the proceedings before him, when that decision, and the factual findings of McKerracher J, did not absolve the trial Magistrate from making his own factual findings on the evidence before him as to whether the appellant had a valid and sufficient reason for failing to vote.

 The learned primary judge erred in law in failing:

 2.1 properly to make findings of fact about the voting compartments in use at the Commonwealth election in light of the appellant's reason advanced for not voting; and

 2.2 to find that the trial Magistrate erred in fact in failing to find that the voting compartments in use at the Commonwealth election:

 (a) were not constructed so as to screen voters from observation while they are marking their ballot papers; and

 (b) did not allow voters to, in private, mark their votes on their ballot papers

or, alternatively, that an elector might reasonably reach the conclusions at (a) and (b) and thereby have a valid and sufficient reason for not voting. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] WASC 267" id="cs1">HORN -v- BUTCHER [2009] WASC 267 (30 June 2009)

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Last Updated: 15 September 2009

 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

 CITATION : HORN -v- BUTCHER [2009] WASC 267

 CORAM : McKECHNIE J

 HEARD : 30 JUNE 2009

 DELIVERED : 30 JUNE 2009

 FILE NO/S : SJA 1057 of 2009

 BETWEEN : DIETER HANS GUSTAV HORN

Appellant

AND

IAN BUTCHER

Respondent

 ON APPEAL FROM:

 Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

 Coram : MAGISTRATE M D WHEELER

 File No : PE 65312 of 2008

 Catchwords:
Commonwealth election - Obligation to vote - Whether valid and sufficient reason not to vote - No reasonable prospects of success

 Legislation:
 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth)

 Result:
Leave to appeal refused

 Category: A

 Representation:

 Counsel:

Appellant : Mr R L Hooker

Respondent : No appearance

 Solicitors:

Appellant : Richard Hooker

Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth)

 Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Horn v Australian Electoral Commission [2007] FCA 1827

Samuels v State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193 ; (2005) 30 WAR 487

 1 McKECHNIE J : The appellant holds strong views about certain aspects of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) and its implementation, particularly where the votes are cast in secrecy. Prior to the 2007 election those views led him to take an urgent application before the Federal Court which was heard by McKerracher J and reported as Horn v Australian Electoral Commission [2007] FCA 1827. Without quoting from that decision, in short point, McKerracher J rejected the factual and legal bases that the appellant put forward and rejected them comprehensively. 6 The appellant now seeks leave to appeal with ground 1 and a foreshadowed ground 2:
 The primary court erred in law in failing properly to apprehend the Appellant's reasons for not voting at the Commonwealth election of 24 November 2007, and accordingly in failing to make any, or any sufficient, findings of fact about those reasons in light of the statutory scheme under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) (the Act), which failures deprived the Appellant of a reasonable chance of an acquittal.
 In particular, the primary court:

 1.1 Failed to construe, properly or at all, the statutory provisions that the Appellant reasonably contended were at material times breached by the Respondent, and/or the Executive Government of the Commonwealth, namely ss.206 and 233 (1) of the Act (which reasonable contentions of statutory breach were relevant to whether the Appellant had a valid and sufficient reason for failing to vote). 1.2 Misconstrued the Act in that it:

 (a) wrongly approached its task of fact-finding on the basis that an elector has a 'duty' to vote, unqualified by any recognition of the range of reasons that may give rise to a 'valid and sufficient reason' for failing to vote; and

 (b) failed to recognise that a sincerely held and consistently pursued position concerning the absence of a secret ballot, including the assertion of breaches of ss.206 and 233 (1) of the Act, is capable of giving rise to such a 'valid and sufficient reason'.

 1.3 Failed properly to make findings concerning the voting compartments tendered in evidence in light of the Appellant's contention that the compartments (which were materially the same as the compartments in use at the Commonwealth election of 24 November 2007) do not facilitate a secret ballot. 1.4 Allowed an extraneous and irrelevant matter to guide it, namely the decision of McKerracher J in Horn v Australian Electoral Commission [2007] FCA 1827 ; (2007) 163 FCR 585 , when that decision, and the factual findings of McKerracher J, did not absolve the primary court from making its own factual findings on the evidence before it as to whether the Appellant had a valid and sufficient reason for failing to vote. 1.5 Despite having initially adverted to the operation of the burden of proof, failed properly to recognise and apply the legal burden of proof on the Respondent to negative beyond reasonable doubt the existence of a valid and sufficient reason (the Appellant having met the evidential burden on him in relation to that excuse).

 The primary court erred in fact in failing to find that the voting compartments in use at the Commonwealth election:

 (a) were not constructed so as to screen voters from observation while they are marking their ballot papers; and

 (b) did not allow voters to, in private, mark their votes on their ballot-papers

 or, alternatively, that an elector might reasonably reach the conclusions at (a) and (b) and thereby have a valid and sufficient reason for not voting. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FCA 43" id="cs2">7 In particular, Mr Horn says that the following matters should be taken into account:

 (a) his success in the notice of motion, both as to the existence of a 'matter' sufficient to ground the jurisdiction of the Court under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and further, my rejection of the respondent's assertion that the proceedings were in some way brought frivolously or vexatiously;
 (b) my findings at [26] of the reasons for judgment ( Horn v Australian Electoral Commission [2007] FCA 1827) as to Mr Horn's motivation and responsible conduct of the proceedings;
 (c) the legitimate characterisation of the proceedings as being within the category of 'public interest litigation'; and
 (d) the strongly arguable nature of numerous aspects of the application's merits.
 </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">ACTS INTERPRETATION ACT 1901 </title>
<title id="l1">ACTS INTERPRETATION ACT 1901 - SECT 15AA Regard to be had to purpose or object of Act</title>
<title id="l2">COMMONWEALTH ELECTORAL ACT 1918 </title>
<title id="l3">COMMONWEALTH ELECTORAL ACT 1918 - SECT 206 Separate voting compartments</title>
<title id="l4">COMMONWEALTH ELECTORAL ACT 1918 - SECT 233 Vote to be marked in private</title>
<title id="l5">COMMONWEALTH ELECTORAL ACT 1918 - SECT 245 Compulsory voting</title>
<title id="l6">COMMONWEALTH ELECTORAL ACT 1918 - SECT 338 Unlawfully marking ballot papers</title>
<title id="l7">COMMONWEALTH ELECTORAL ACT 1918 - SECT 348 Control of behaviour at polling booths etc.</title>
<title id="l8">COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT </title>
<title id="l9">COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT - CLAUSE 7 Repeal of Federal Council Act [see Note 4]</title>
<title id="l10">COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT - SECT 24 Constitution of House of Representatives</title>
<title id="l11">COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT - SECT 75 Original jurisdiction of High Court</title>
<title id="l12">COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT - SECT 76 Additional original jurisdiction</title>
<title id="l13">COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT - SECT 77 Power to define jurisdiction</title>
<title id="l14">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 </title>
<title id="l15">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 31A Summary judgment</title>
<title id="l16">JUDICIARY ACT 1903 </title>
<title id="l17">JUDICIARY ACT 1903 - SECT 39B Original jurisdiction of Federal Court of Australia</title>
<title id="l18">JUDICIARY ACT 1903 - SECT 78B Notice to Attorneys-General</title>
<title id="l19">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
<title id="l20">ELECTORAL ACT </title>
<title id="l21">ELECTORAL ACT - SECT 206 Periods of less than financial year</title>
<title id="l22">ELECTORAL ACT - SECT 233 Constitution</title>
<title id="l23">ELECTORAL ACT - SECT 245 Court may have regard to certain rejected ballot papers</title>
<title id="l24">ELECTORAL ACT - SECT 338 Conditions of appointment</title>
<title id="l25">ELECTORAL ACT - SECT 348 Definitions</title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2007] FMCA 1453">bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2007] FMCA 1453">application to set aside bankruptcy notice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2007] FMCA 1453">whether counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand equal to or exceeding amount claimed in bankruptcy notice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2007] FMCA 1453">assignment of debt.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">indemnity costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">application by respondent for indemnity costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">where applicant failed to comply with orders of court requiring applicant to file certain documents in preparation for trial</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">where respondents brought notice of motion seeking orders in relation to applicant's non-compliance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">where commencement of trial adjourned</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.6">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">where applicant's failure to file documents the principal reason for adjournment of trial</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.7">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">circumstances in which court may vary ordinary rule as to costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.8">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">whether applicant's conduct warrants special order as to costs.  costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.9">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">application for costs to be paid before conclusion of principal proceeding</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.10">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">whether appropriate to depart from general rule in o 62, r 3(3). practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.11">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">guillotine orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.12">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">where respondents seek order pursuant to o 35a that proceedings be stayed or dismissed if applicant does not comply with another order of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.13">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">whether such order appropriate in circumstances</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.14">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">relevant principles.  held: applicant's failure to comply with orders of court do not amount to misconduct</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.15">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">applicant's conduct does not warrant special order as to costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.16">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">costs to be paid on a party and party basis</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.17">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">no inference that applicant's failure to comply with orders part of a delaying strategy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.18">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">no reason to order payment of costs before conclusion of principal proceeding</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.19">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">not appropriate circumstances for making of guillotine order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.20">cited from="[2007] FCA 903">respondents' application for order pursuant to o 35a dismissed.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[2006] FCA 933">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[2006] FCA 933">application to dismiss applicant's claim</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[2006] FCA 933">power of the court to control its proceedings to prevent abuse of process</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">cited from="[2006] FCA 933">applicant in default of court orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.4">cited from="[2006] FCA 933">applicant's response to subpoena oppressive</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.5">cited from="[2006] FCA 933">no specifics of claim provided</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.6">cited from="[2006] FCA 933">indemnity costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[2006] FCA 36">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[2006] FCA 36">application for summary judgement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[2006] FCA 36">o 35a, federal court rules</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[2006] FCA 36">respondents in default for failure to defend the proceeding with due diligence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[2006] FCA 36">appropriate relief in the circumstances</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.5">cited from="[2006] FCA 36">indemnity costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.0">cited from="[1990] FCA 520">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">cited from="[1990] FCA 520">dismissal of proceeding for want of compliance with court's pre-trial directions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">cited from="[1990] FCA 520">applicable principles</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.3">cited from="[1990] FCA 520">types of case where order justified</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.4">cited from="[1990] FCA 520">circumstances where appellate court will interfere with primary exercise of discretion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.5">cited from="[1990] FCA 520">effect of "guillotine" order which came into effect whilst proceeding stood dismissed.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.0">citing from="[2009] FCA 798">costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.1">citing from="[2009] FCA 798">basis of payment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.2">citing from="[2009] FCA 798">conduct of parties</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.3">citing from="[2009] FCA 798">indemnity</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.0">citing from="[2009] FCA 601">bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.1">citing from="[2009] FCA 601">application for annulment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.2">citing from="[2009] FCA 601">dismissed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.3">citing from="[2009] FCA 601">appeal   practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.4">citing from="[2009] FCA 601">appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.5">citing from="[2009] FCA 601">want of prosecution</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.6">citing from="[2009] FCA 601">failure by appellant to prepare an appeal book</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.7">citing from="[2009] FCA 601">an appeal in the nature of a "rehearing"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.8">citing from="[2009] FCA 601">further evidence on appeal</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 798" id="cs0">Reference was made to Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 536 ; (1993) 46 FCR 225 , Davidova v Murphy [2009] FCA 601 at [23] and Khera v Jones [2008] FCA 548 at [24] .</sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 601" id="cs1">But the power to dismiss an appeal for want of prosecution is a power available to be exercised in an appropriate case. " [S]uccessive and cavalier omissions by the appellant " led the Full Court to dismiss an appeal in NBCI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 280. So, too, can " persistent breach of the Court's directions ": Khera v Jones [2008] FCA 548 at [16] per Buchanan J. This power can be invoked in respect to all appeals, including bankruptcy appeals: e.g. Singh v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2008] FCA 544. </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">BANKRUPTCY ACT 1966 </title>
<title id="l1">BANKRUPTCY ACT 1966 - SECT 41 Bankruptcy notices</title>
<title id="l2">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2008] FMCA 1277">bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2008] FMCA 1277">application to set aside bankruptcy notice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2008] FMCA 1277">application to set aside orders of county court and revisit trial of matters before the county court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2008] FMCA 1277">application dismissed.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 245">bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 245">sequestration order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 245">refusal to go behind judgment debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 245">discretionary decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 245">error in law in reaching decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[1991] FCA 222">bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[1991] FCA 222">bankruptcy notice based on default judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[1991] FCA 222">debts incurred by partner in a partnership where debtor only "silent partner"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[1991] FCA 222">whether partnership in existence at time debts incurred</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[1991] FCA 222">whether trial judge determined preliminary question of whether the present was an appropriate case to investigate whether true debt existed or determined the question whether bankruptcy notice based on true debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.5">cited from="[1991] FCA 222">no formal request for trial judge to decide preliminary question of existence of judgment debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.6">cited from="[1991] FCA 222">whether failure to call full evidence can ground an appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.7">cited from="[1991] FCA 222">circumstances in which court will go behind judgment debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.8">cited from="[1991] FCA 222">onus of proving existence of debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.9">cited from="[1991] FCA 222">whether creditor required to prove existence of entire debt upon which judgment founded.  partnership acts 1891-1965 (qld.) s.8</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.0">cited from="[1972] HCA 5">bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">cited from="[1972] HCA 5">sequestration order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">cited from="[1972] HCA 5">judgment debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.3">cited from="[1972] HCA 5">power of bankruptcy court to go behind judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.4">cited from="[1972] HCA 5">indemnity</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.5">cited from="[1972] HCA 5">whether liability before payment of principal debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.6">cited from="[1972] HCA 5">bankruptcy act 1966 (cth), s. 52.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.0">cited from="[1951] HCA 31">bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.1">cited from="[1951] HCA 31">sequestration order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.2">cited from="[1951] HCA 31">judgment debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.3">cited from="[1951] HCA 31">validity</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.4">cited from="[1951] HCA 31">power of court to go behind judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.5">cited from="[1951] HCA 31">bankruptcy act 1924-1950 (no. 37 of 1924</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.6">cited from="[1951] HCA 31">no. 80 of 1950), s. 56 (2) (a).</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.0">citing from="[2011] FMCA 86">bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.1">citing from="[2011] FMCA 86">application to set aside a bankruptcy notice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.2">citing from="[2011] FMCA 86">whether valid service of bankruptcy notice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.3">citing from="[2011] FMCA 86">whether circumstances such as to go behind judgment/order on which bankruptcy notice based</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.4">citing from="[2011] FMCA 86">whether counter-claim asserted by corporation constituted counter-claim of debtor within s.40(1)(g) of the bankruptcy act 1966 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.5">citing from="[2011] FMCA 86">application dismissed.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.0">citing from="[2011] FMCA 38">bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.1">citing from="[2011] FMCA 38">application opposing a creditor's petition</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.2">citing from="[2011] FMCA 38">whether the court should look behind the judgment debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.3">citing from="[2011] FMCA 38">principles considered</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.4">citing from="[2011] FMCA 38">debt did not exist at the time judgment was entered</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.5">citing from="[2011] FMCA 38">creditor's petition dismissed.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.0">citing from="[2010] FMCA 325">bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.1">citing from="[2010] FMCA 325">creditor's petition based on default judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.2">citing from="[2010] FMCA 325">debtor's evidence challenged only part of the alleged indebtedness</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.3">citing from="[2010] FMCA 325">insufficient reasons to go behind judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.4">citing from="[2010] FMCA 325">sequestration order made.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.0">citing from="[2010] FMCA 58">bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.1">citing from="[2010] FMCA 58">application for rehearing to set aside sequestration order made by registrar.</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2011] FMCA 86" id="cs0">More generally, insofar as Mr Gorczynski sought that this court go behind the judgments of the Local Court by way of revisiting the costs assessments (as he had sought to do in the application for leave to appeal from the costs assessments), in an appropriate case the court has the power to go behind a judgment debt to determine whether there is in truth consideration for a judgment debt on an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice, as well as on the hearing of a creditor's petition. However substantial reasons must be given for questioning whether there is, in truth and reality, a debt due to the creditor (see Olivieri v Stafford ; Goyan v Motyka [2009] FCA 776 ; and Boglari v Coadys (a firm) (2009) 7 ABC(NS) 553; [2009] FCA 1398). </sentence>
<sentence from="[2011] FMCA 38" id="cs1">In Boglari v Coadys [2009] FCA 1398 His Honour Gray J cites the relevant authorities in relation to the 'discretion' held by a bankruptcy court to go behind a judgment, particularly a default judgment and to investigate the actual state of indebtedness or lack thereof between the creditor and the debtor. His Honour sets these out at [11]-[13] as follows: Going behind the judgment [11] The power of a court on an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice to "go behind the judgment" on which the bankruptcy notice is based is a discretionary power. In an appeal from a judgment involving the exercise of discretion, the question for the appeal court is not whether it would have exercised the discretion differently from the court below.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] FMCA 325" id="cs2">I was referred to a recent judgment of Gray J in Boglari v Coadys (A Firm) (Receiver and Manager Appointed) [2009] FCA 1398. In this judgment, Gray J cites the relevant authorities at [11] to [13] in relation to what has been referred to as a 'discretion' held by a bankruptcy court to 'go behind' a judgment, particularly a default judgment, and to investigate the actual state of indebtedness or lack thereof between creditor and debtor. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] FMCA 58" id="cs3">The Court as presently constituted has had the recent benefit of a decision of Gray J sitting as the Full Court of the Federal Court in Boglari v Coadys [2009] FCA 1398 in which the Court sets out in the clearest terms the basis of the Court's powers and upon which they should be exercised. </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
<title id="l1">LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 2004 </title>
<title id="l2">Legal Profession Act 2004 - SECT 3.4.19. On what basis are legal costs recoverable?</title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2005] FCA 908">costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2005] FCA 908">action for declaration that rights of entry under federal law inconsistent with rights of entry under state law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2005] FCA 908">reliance upon s 109 of the constitution</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2005] FCA 908">whether matter arising under the workplace relations act 1996 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2005] FCA 908">declarations sought dependent upon the existence and scope of rights of entry under the workplace relations act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.5">cited from="[2005] FCA 908">matter arising under the workplace relations act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.6">cited from="[2005] FCA 908">costs provision of workplace relations act applicable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.7">cited from="[2005] FCA 908">no order as to costs made  industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.8">cited from="[2005] FCA 908">proceedings alleging inconsistency between rights of entry under workplace relations act 1996 (cth) and industrial relations act 1979 (wa)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.9">cited from="[2005] FCA 908">whether proceedings in a matter arising under the workplace relations act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.10">cited from="[2005] FCA 908">whether costs provision of workplace relations act applicable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2005] FCA 613">trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2005] FCA 613">threatened strike</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2005] FCA 613">secondary boycott</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2005] FCA 613">interim injunction  industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2005] FCA 613">protected action</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[2002] WASC 57">discontinuance of action</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[2002] WASC 57">costs on discontinuance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[2002] WASC 57">plaintiff obtained an interlocutory injunction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[1999] WASC 153">injunctions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[1999] WASC 153">interim injunction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[1999] WASC 153">undertaking as to damages</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[1999] WASC 153">discontinuance before trial on merits</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[1999] WASC 153">enquiry as to damages sought by defendant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.0">cited from="[1993] FCA 585">contract</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.1">cited from="[1993] FCA 585">agreement to dispose of waste partly oral, partly in writing, partly implied from conduct</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.2">cited from="[1993] FCA 585">whether owner-operator or subcontractor</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.3">cited from="[1993] FCA 585">warranty to execute memorandum of agreement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.4">cited from="[1993] FCA 585">whether contract repudiated by respondent's breach or applicant's financial circumstances  damages</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.5">cited from="[1993] FCA 585">whether future profit recoverable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.6">cited from="[1993] FCA 585">what to do in absence of evidence  trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.7">cited from="[1993] FCA 585">whether misleading or deceptive conduct</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.8">cited from="[1993] FCA 585">reliance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.0">cited from="[1983] HCA 31">constitutional law (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.1">cited from="[1983] HCA 31">privy council</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.2">cited from="[1983] HCA 31">appeal from state supreme court invested with federal jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.3">cited from="[1983] HCA 31">matter arising under law made by commonwealth parliament</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.4">cited from="[1983] HCA 31">whether court exercising federal jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.5">cited from="[1983] HCA 31">import licences issued under customs (import licensing) regulations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.6">cited from="[1983] HCA 31">agreement relating to benefit of licensed quota</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.7">cited from="[1983] HCA 31">action to enforce agreement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.8">cited from="[1983] HCA 31">customs act 1901 (cth), s. 50(1)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.9">cited from="[1983] HCA 31">customs (import licensing) regulations, reg. 7,9,16</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.10">cited from="[1983] HCA 31">the constitution (63  64 vict. c.12), s. 76(ii)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.11">cited from="[1983] HCA 31">judiciary act 1901 (cth), s. 39.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.0">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">constitutional law (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.1">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">powers of the commonwealth parliament</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.2">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">trading and financial corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.3">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">trade practices legislation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.4">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">prohibition of corporations from engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.5">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">imposition of liability for damages on persons involved in such conduct</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.6">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">imposition on persons other than corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.7">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">validity</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.8">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">the constitution (62  63 vict. c. 12), s. 51(xx)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.9">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">trade practices act 1974 (cth), ss. 4(1) , 52 (1), 75b, 82 (1), 84 (2).  constitutional law (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.10">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">trading and financial corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.11">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">character of corporation which has barely begun to carry on business</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.12">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">relevance of constitution including objects</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.13">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">the constitution (62  63 vict. c. 12), s. 51(xx).  constitutional law (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.14">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">judicial power of the commonwealth</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.15">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">federal jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.16">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">federal court of australia</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.17">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">non-federal claims</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.18">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">whether part of same matter as federal claims</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.19">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">the constitution (62  63 vict. c. 12), ss. 76 , 77</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.20">cited from="[1983] HCA 12">trade practices act 1974 (cth), s. 86.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.0">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">constitutional law (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.1">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">privy council</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.2">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">appeal from state supreme court invested with federal jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.3">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">matter arising under law made by common</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.4">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">commonwealth parliament</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.5">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">raised by defence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.6">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">whether court exercising concurrent state and federal jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.7">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">the constitution (63  64 vict. c. 12), s. 76 (ii.)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.8">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">judiciary act 1901-1968 (cth), ss. 39, 40.  courts</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.9">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">ouster of jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.10">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">public policy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.11">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">proceedings for divorce</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.12">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">agreement between husband and wife concerning maintenance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.13">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">whether invalid</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.14">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">whether invalidity derived from common law or statute</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.15">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">matrimonial causes act 1959-1966 (cth).  matrimonial causes</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.16">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">agreement between husband and wife concerning maintenance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.17">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">whether enforceable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.18">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">whether attempt to oust jurisdiction of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.19">cited from="[1971] HCA 39">matrimonial causes act 1959-1966 (cth), ss. 5, 8, 23 (2) (3), 87 (1) (k).</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.0">citing from="[2006] WAIRComm 4186">industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.1">citing from="[2006] WAIRComm 4186">right of entry</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.2">citing from="[2006] WAIRComm 4186">application for costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.3">citing from="[2006] WAIRComm 4186">whether order for costs should be awarded by commission</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.4">citing from="[2006] WAIRComm 4186">state and federal jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.5">citing from="[2006] WAIRComm 4186">principles applied</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.6">citing from="[2006] WAIRComm 4186">present case does not fit the extreme circumstances criteria warranting costs order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.7">citing from="[2006] WAIRComm 4186">application dismissed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.8">citing from="[2006] WAIRComm 4186">industrial relations act 1979 (wa) s 26 , s 27(1)(c) , s 44 , s 49h ; industrial relations commission regulations 1985 reg 79; workplace relations act 1996 (cth) s 16 , s 347 (repealed), s 824 ; workplace relations amendment (work choices) act 2005 (cth); workplace relations regulations 2006 reg 1.2(2); judiciary act 1903 s 39</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2006] WAIRComm 4186" id="cs0">The second respondent Killarnee, represented by different solicitors, made a number of submissions. As to the relevant law, counsel made submissions in relation to s 27(1)(c) of the Act consistent with those made by the other parties. As to the then s 347 of the WRA, the second respondent submitted that the matter before the Commission was "a proceeding... in a matter arising under this Act" (the WRA) under s 347 on the basis that a matter of defence raised by the respondents enlivens this section: Broad Construction Services (WA) Pty Ltd v The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union of Workers (No 2) [2006] FCA 44 which applied Fencott in relation to this issue. It was submitted that for these purposes the relevant "justiciable controversy" before the Commission also required a determination of the respondents' defences relying upon the WRA and therefore the proceedings fell within the then s 347 of the WRA.
 </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT 1988 </title>
<title id="l1">TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 </title>
<title id="l2">TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 No. 51, 1974 - SECT 80 Injunctions.</title>
<title id="l3">WORKPLACE RELATIONS ACT 1996 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">rural press limited v australian competition and consumer commission  australian competition and consumer commission v rural press limited  trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">exclusionary provisions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">arrangement between regional newspaper publishers providing that one would withdraw newspaper services from the prime circulation area of the other</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">whether provision had purpose of preventing, restricting or limiting supply of services to, or acquisition of services from, particular persons or classes of persons</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">trade practices act 1974 (cth), ss 4d, 45 (2)(a)(i), 45 (2)(b)(i).  trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">where regional newspaper publisher threatened to circulate new newspaper in prime circulation area of a second regional newspaper publisher, unless second publisher ceased circulation of its own newspaper in first publisher's prime circulation area</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.6">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">where second publisher subsequently ceased circulation of newspaper in first publisher's prime circulation area</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.7">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">whether an "arrangement"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.8">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">whether arrangement had purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.9">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">trade practices act 1974 (cth), ss 45(2)(a)(ii) , 45 (2)(b)(ii).  trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.10">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">accessorial liability</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.11">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">whether officers of newspaper publisher were "involved in" publisher's contraventions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.12">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">whether officers participated in or assented to contraventions with actual knowledge of essential elements constituting the contraventions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.13">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">trade practices act 1974 (cth), ss 75b(1), 76 (1), 80 (1).  trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.14">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">misuse of market power</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.15">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">whether publisher took advantage of market power in its prime circulation area in threatening to enter prime circulation area of second publisher</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.16">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">trade practices act 1974 (cth), s 46(1).  practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.17">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.18">cited from="[2003] HCA 75">form of declarations.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[1985] HCA 65">trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[1985] HCA 65">consumer protection</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[1985] HCA 65">misleading or deceptive conduct by corporation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">cited from="[1985] HCA 65">liability of persons aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring or party to contravention by corporation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.4">cited from="[1985] HCA 65">whether knowledge of material facts necessary</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.5">cited from="[1985] HCA 65">whether knowledge that facts constitute contravention necessary</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.6">cited from="[1985] HCA 65">trade practices act 1974 (cth),ss. 52, 75b, 82</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[1984] FCA 180">trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[1984] FCA 180">misleading or deceptive conduct</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[1984] FCA 180">whether publication of statements including statements of opinions made in ordinary course of publication of news (not being advertising material) can constitute misleading or deceptive conduct</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[1984] FCA 180">publication of material constituting conduct for purposes of sub-s. 52(1) of the trade practices act 1974</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[1984] FCA 180">publication of incorrect information constituting misleading or deceptive conduct only if conduct contains or conveys a misrepresentation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.5">cited from="[1984] FCA 180">some articles of news more readily to be taken as statements by newspaper than others</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.6">cited from="[1984] FCA 180">disadvantages of stated case procedure.  trade practices act 1974 , ss. 4(2) , 80 , 52 (1), 53 (e), 82 , 84 85 (3), 87  federal court of australia act 1976 , sub-s. 25(6)  trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.7">cited from="[1984] FCA 180">misleading or deceptive conduct</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.8">cited from="[1984] FCA 180">publication of statements including statements of opinion in ordinary course of publication of newspaper</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.9">cited from="[1984] FCA 180">whether misleading or deceptive conduct</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.10">cited from="[1984] FCA 180">whether statements convey misrepresentation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.11">cited from="[1984] FCA 180">trade practices act 1974 (cth), s. 4(2). held: (1) publication of statements, including statements of opinion, made in the ordinary course of the publication of a newspaper can constitute misleading and deceptive conduct within the trade practices act 1974 (cth), s. 52. there is no definable boundary between conduct which is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive and material which is defamatory; defamatory material does not fall outside the operation of s. 52(1) merely by reason of its being defamatory.</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">EVIDENCE ACT 1995 </title>
<title id="l1">EVIDENCE ACT 1995 - SECT 45 Production of documents</title>
<title id="l2">EVIDENCE ACT 1995 - SECT 52 Adducing of other evidence not affected</title>
<title id="l3">EVIDENCE ACT 1995 - SECT 53 Views</title>
<title id="l4">EVIDENCE ACT 1995 - SECT 69 Exception: business records</title>
<title id="l5">EVIDENCE ACT 1995 - SECT 83 Exclusion of evidence of admissions as against third parties</title>
<title id="l6">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
<title id="l7">TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1975 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2005] FCA 830">corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2005] FCA 830">winding up</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2005] FCA 830">neglect to pay debt after statutory demand</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2005] FCA 830">tender of bank cheque by defendant at winding up hearing followed by tender of bank cheque in evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2005] FCA 830">continuation of proceedings by creditor</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.5">cited from="[2005] FCA 830">whether applicant a creditor</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.6">cited from="[2005] FCA 830">application dismissed as a matter of discretion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 397">corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 397">winding up</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 397">application by creditor for winding up in insolvency</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 397">subsequent deed of company arrangement purports to extinguish plaintiff's debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 397">pending application by plaintiff for order setting deed aside</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 397">whether s.444e(2)(b) precludes application by plaintiff for adjournment of winding up application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.6">cited from="[2005] NSWSC 397">whether extinguishment of plaintiff's debt means that winding up application must now be dismissed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[1994] TASSC 126">corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[1994] TASSC 126">companies</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[1994] TASSC 126">winding up</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">cited from="[1994] TASSC 126">inability to pay debts</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.4">cited from="[1994] TASSC 126">neglect to pay after statutory demand</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.5">cited from="[1994] TASSC 126">payment before hearing of application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.6">cited from="[1994] TASSC 126">continuation of proceedings by creditor who made the application. deputy commissioner of taxation v cye international pty ltd (no 2) (1985) 10 aclr 305 ; de montford v southern cross exploration nl (1987) 17 nswlr 468 , considered.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.0">cited from="[1967] HCA 9">limitation of actions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">cited from="[1967] HCA 9">debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">cited from="[1967] HCA 9">acknowledgment in writing</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.3">cited from="[1967] HCA 9">sufficiency</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.4">cited from="[1967] HCA 9">implication of promise to pay.  companies</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.5">cited from="[1967] HCA 9">winding up by the court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.6">cited from="[1967] HCA 9">creditor</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.7">cited from="[1967] HCA 9">who may petition</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.8">cited from="[1967] HCA 9">debt becoming statute-barred between presentation of petition and making of winding up order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.9">cited from="[1967] HCA 9">provable debts</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.10">cited from="[1967] HCA 9">companies act, 1961 (n.s.w.), s. 221 (1) (b).*</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.0">cited from="[1960] HCA 86">bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.1">cited from="[1960] HCA 86">offence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.2">cited from="[1960] HCA 86">undischarged bankrupt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.3">cited from="[1960] HCA 86">obtaining credit for 20 pounds or more without disclosing status</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.4">cited from="[1960] HCA 86">cheques not post-dated given in payment of price of goods upon their delivery</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.5">cited from="[1960] HCA 86">cheques dishonoured on presentation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.6">cited from="[1960] HCA 86">credit not thereby obtained</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.7">cited from="[1960] HCA 86">bankruptcy act 1924-1958 (cth), s. 211 (a).*</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">CURRENCY ACT 1965 </title>
<title id="l1">CURRENCY ACT 1965 - SECT 16 Legal tender</title>
<title id="l2">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 </title>
<title id="l3">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 459A Order that insolvent company be wound up in insolvency</title>
<title id="l4">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 459C Presumptions to be made in certain proceedings</title>
<title id="l5">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 459E Creditor may serve statutory demand on company</title>
<title id="l6">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 459P Who may apply for order under section 459A</title>
<title id="l7">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 467 Court's powers on hearing application</title>
<title id="l8">RESERVE BANK ACT 1959 </title>
<title id="l9">RESERVE BANK ACT 1959 - SECT 36 Notes to be legal tender</title>
<title id="l10">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
</citphrases>
<citances>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 </title>
<title id="l1">FEDERAL COURT RULES 1979 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">citing from="[2006] FCA 254">bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">citing from="[2006] FCA 254">personal insolvency agreements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">citing from="[2006] FCA 254">meeting of creditors and control of debtor's property</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">citing from="[2006] FCA 254">where controlling trustee must call and hold meeting in accordance with div 2 of part x of the bankruptcy act 1966 (cth) within certain time</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">citing from="[2006] FCA 254">whether trustee failed to comply with prescribed procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.5">citing from="[2006] FCA 254">whether quorum at purported meeting</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.6">citing from="[2006] FCA 254">where time now expired</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.7">citing from="[2006] FCA 254">whether purported meeting a meeting for the purposes of the act. practice  procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.8">citing from="[2006] FCA 254">standing</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.9">citing from="[2006] FCA 254">where 'bar council' not legal entity</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.10">citing from="[2006] FCA 254">where certain powers and functions conferred upon council by state legislation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.11">citing from="[2006] FCA 254">where costs order and judgments in favour of council</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.12">citing from="[2006] FCA 254">whether council may commence bankruptcy proceedings in its own name</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.13">citing from="[2006] FCA 254">whether proceedings must be brought in the names of the members.</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2006] FCA 254" id="cs0">1 On 17 January 2006, the second respondent, Michael Saadey Abdul-Karim ('Mr Abdul-Karim'), signed an authority under s 188 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ('the Act') naming and authorising the first respondent, Nicholas James Eddy ('Mr Eddy'), as his controlling trustee under Part X of the Act. An application by the applicant, the Council of the New South Wales Bar Association ('the Bar Council'), to set that authority aside was rejected by me on 3 February 2006: See Council of New South Wales Bar Association v Abdul-Karim [2006] FCA 28. </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">BANKRUPTCY ACT 1966 </title>
<title id="l1">BANKRUPTCY ACT 1966 - SECT 116 Property divisible among creditors [see Table B]</title>
<title id="l2">BANKRUPTCY ACT 1966 - SECT 188 Debtor may authorise trustee or solicitor to be controlling trustee [see Table B]</title>
<title id="l3">BANKRUPTCY ACT 1966 - SECT 188A Personal insolvency agreement [see Table B]</title>
<title id="l4">FAMILY LAW ACT 1975 </title>
<title id="l5">FEDERAL COURT RULES 1979 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2006] FCA 1045">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2006] FCA 1045">consideration of the exercise of the power conferred by s 426a</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2006] FCA 1045">consideration of the principles informing the exercise of the discretion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2006] FCA 1045">consideration of whether an obligation arises in the refugee review tribunal to adjourn or reschedule a hearing upon the failure of the applicant to appear in circumstances where the applicant has expressed a desire to appear.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2006] FCAFC 59">practice  procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2006] FCAFC 59">history of litigation in the refugee review tribunal, federal court and high court involving husband wife and two sons as applicants for refugee status</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2006] FCAFC 59">earlier segments of litigation favourable to appellants</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2006] FCAFC 59">ultimate proceedings in federal court at first instance pursued unsuccessfully by present appellants</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2006] FCAFC 59">objection to competency of ultimate application for leave to review or appeal from federal court decision at first instance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[2006] FCAFC 59">issues raised on ultimate application for leave to appeal addressed in any event</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.6">cited from="[2006] FCAFC 59">all issues resolved in favour of minister</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 </title>
<title id="l1">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 24 Appellate jurisdiction</title>
<title id="l2">MIGRATION ACT 1958 </title>
<title id="l3">FEDERAL COURT RULES 1979 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[1984] FCA 34">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[1984] FCA 34">security for costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[1984] FCA 34">jurisdiction of court to make order against limited liability company which is an applicant in proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[1984] FCA 34">matters relevant to exercise of judge's discretion.  federal court of australia act 1976 , sub-sec. 56(1), s. 59 , order 28 of the rules  judiciary act 1903 , s.79  companies code 1981 (q.)  practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[1984] FCA 34">security for costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[1984] FCA 34">bases of jurisdiction to make orders</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.6">cited from="[1984] FCA 34">discretion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.7">cited from="[1984] FCA 34">federal court of australia act 1976 (cth), ss 56(1) , 59</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.8">cited from="[1984] FCA 34">federal court rules 1979 (cth), o. 28</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.9">cited from="[1984] FCA 34">companies code 1981 (qld), s. 553. held: (1) the jurisdiction of the federal court to make orders for security for costs under the federal court of australia act 1976 (cth), s. 56(1) was not limited to the circumstances envisaged by o. 28.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">citing from="[2009] FCA 466">costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">citing from="[2009] FCA 466">discretion to award costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">citing from="[2009] FCA 466">whether appropriate to depart from general rule</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">citing from="[2009] FCA 466">public interest litigation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">citing from="[2009] FCA 330">administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">citing from="[2009] FCA 330">decision made under s 133 of the environment protection and biodiversity conservation act 1999 (cth) to approve proposal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">citing from="[2009] FCA 330">whether the decision was ultra vires the act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">citing from="[2009] FCA 330">whether the minister failed to take into account the "precautionary principle"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">citing from="[2009] FCA 330">information "available" to the minister</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.5">citing from="[2009] FCA 330">whether the minister was obliged to seek further information prior to making decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.6">citing from="[2009] FCA 330">whether the decision was unreasonable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.7">citing from="[2009] FCA 330">whether the result of the decision was uncertain</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.8">citing from="[2009] FCA 330">whether the decision was irrational or capricious</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 466" id="cs0">LFF is an incorporated association. Its objects include: the promotion of the conservation and better management of Australia's native forests and the stimulation and encouragement of public interest in the value and importance of protecting native forests and related environmental issues: see Lawyers for Forests Inc v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts [2008] FCA 588 at [2] . It has determined that, in pursuit of its objects and, in what it perceives to be the public interest, that the Minister's approval of construction of the pulp mill should be challenged. It has a democratic and legal right to do so. These considerations do not, however, weigh strongly in favour of the making of the orders which it seeks.  The case advanced by LFF was arguable. It was so held by Marshall J in the course of a preliminary hearing in which security for costs was sought: see Lawyers for Forests Inc v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts [2008] FCA 588 at [14] . It was not, however, a test case; nor did it raise novel issues. The resolution of the various issues raised by the grounds relied on by LFF turned, in the main, on the application of well established judicial review principles to the written reasons of the Minister and the documentary material considered by him when he made his decision. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 330" id="cs1">Gunns Limited ("Gunns") proposes to build and operate a pulp mill at Bell Bay in Tasmania. When the mill is operative effluent from the production process is to be discharged into Bass Strait some kilometres offshore. It is possible that such discharge may have an adverse effect on an area of Bass Strait which forms part of the Commonwealth marine environment. In order to undertake the construction of the mill it was, therefore, necessary that Gunns first obtained the approval of the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts ("the Minister") under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ("the Act"). The Minister gave his approval on 4 October 2007. The applicant ("LFF") has been found to be a person aggrieved by that decision within the meaning of s 487(3) of the Act: see Lawyers for Forests Inc v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts [2008] FCA 588. LFF seeks judicial review of the Minister's decision on a number of grounds. The review is sought under both the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ("the ADJR Act") and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS (JUDICIAL REVIEW) ACT 1977 </title>
<title id="l1">ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS (JUDICIAL REVIEW) ACT 1977 - SECT 5 Applications for review of decisions</title>
<title id="l2">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 </title>
<title id="l3">ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999 - SECT 487 Extended standing for judicial review</title>
<title id="l4">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 </title>
<title id="l5">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 3 Extension to Territories</title>
<title id="l6">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 56 Security</title>
<title id="l7">JUDICIARY ACT 1903 </title>
<title id="l8">JUDICIARY ACT 1903 - SECT 39B Original jurisdiction of Federal Court of Australia</title>
<title id="l9">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
<title id="l10">ASSOCIATIONS INCORPORATION ACT 1981 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">intellectual property</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">trade marks</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">alleged infringement of s120 trade marks act 1995 (cth) by software enabled internet postal service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">whether mark substantially identical or deceptively similar</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">whether goods or services in respect of which mark registered</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.5">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">nature of first respondent's business</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.6">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">nature of software</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.7">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">whether software incidental to service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.8">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">effect of undertaking given during trial intellectual property</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.9">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">trade marks</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.10">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">assessment of damages</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.11">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">whether damages at large applicable to trade mark infringement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.12">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">whether wrongful conduct enough</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.13">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">whether applicant established damage intellectual property</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.14">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.15">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">whether breach of ss 52 and 53 trade practices act 1974 (cth) (tpa)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.16">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">application of established principles</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.17">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">whether confusion transient and ephemeral</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.18">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">whether representation of sponsorship or approval intellectual property</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.19">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">tort</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.20">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">wrongful passing off</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.21">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">whether applicant established elements pursuant to recognised principles</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.22">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">whether sufficient reputation in mark</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.23">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">likelihood of injury to business held: application allowed in part</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.24">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">trade mark infringement established prior to undertaking</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.25">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">passing off and tpa claim dismissed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.26">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">no damages payable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.27">cited from="[2008] FCA 1760">applicant entitled to injunctive relief in accordance with undertaking</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2008] FCA 1761">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2008] FCA 1761">application for leave to reopen case to adduce further evidence following conclusion of trial and judgment reserved</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2008] FCA 1761">circumstances invoking court's discretion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2008] FCA 1761">whether interests of justice require reopening held: application dismissed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2008] FCA 1761">reopening not in interests of justice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[2008] FCA 1761">tactical decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.6">cited from="[2008] FCA 1761">evidence unlikely to affect result</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.7">cited from="[2008] FCA 1761">principle of finality of litigation precludes reopening</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">appeal from decision of a single judge</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">discretion to award costs under s 43(2) federal court of australia act 1976 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">factors in exercise of discretion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.4">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">where respondents to claim of unjustified threats brought cross-claim for infringement of patents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.5">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">where new parties joined much later as respondents to cross-claim</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.6">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">where cross-claim not actively defended by newly joined cross-respondents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.7">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">where defence of inactive cross-respondents denied infringement and validity of patent</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.8">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">where cross-claimants successful against all cross-respondents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.9">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">where active and inactive cross-respondents made liable jointly and severally for cross-claimant's costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.10">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">where primary judge held it to be settled law that liability for payment of costs order ordinarily joint and several</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.11">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">where primary judge considered whether inactive cross-respondents raised a separate and distinct defence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.12">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">whether inactive cross-respondents submitting parties</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.13">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">whether exercise of discretion to award costs miscarried held: inactive cross-respondents not submitting parties in circumstances</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.14">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">discretion to award costs pursuant to s 43(2) federal court of australia act 1976 (cth) is broad</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.15">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">no automatic rules for exercise of discretion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.16">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">need for order to be just in circumstances of particular case</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.17">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">lack of separate and distinct defence not determinative of whether liability for payment of costs order should be joint and several</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.18">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">exercise of discretion miscarried</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.19">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">no sufficient basis for making inactive cross-claimants liable for costs of proceedings in period prior to their joinder</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.20">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">defence of inactive cross-respondents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.21">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">cross-claimants had to prove case in greater detail in any event because of stance of active cross-respondents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.22">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">appeal allowed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.23">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 5">liability of inactive cross-respondents to pay costs reduced to 10 percent on joint and several basis with active cross-respondents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">foots v southern cross mine management pty ltd  bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">provable debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">costs order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">trial judge gave judgment and awarded damages in favour of second respondent against first respondent and appellant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">after judgment appellant became bankrupt upon presentation of own petition</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.5">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">after appellant's bankruptcy trial judge made order for indemnity costs against appellant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.6">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">whether costs order was a provable debt within the meaning of s 82 of the bankruptcy act 1966 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.7">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">whether costs order was a debt or liability arising from an obligation before bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.8">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">whether costs order was a contingent liability</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.9">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">whether costs order was "incidental" to a provable debt.  bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.10">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">stay of proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.11">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">whether proceedings in which costs order was sought should have been stayed pursuant to s 58(3) of the bankruptcy act 1966 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.12">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">whether leave to proceed should have been granted pursuant to r 72(1) of the uniform civil procedure rules 1999 (q).  statutes</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.13">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">interpretation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.14">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">relevance of legislative history and antecedent statutes</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.15">cited from="[2007] HCA 56">relevance of decision in in re british gold fields of west africa [1899] 2 ch 7.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.0">cited from="[1998] HCA 11">oshlack v richmond river council  costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.1">cited from="[1998] HCA 11">statutory power under environmental planning and assessment legislation to award costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.2">cited from="[1998] HCA 11">relevant considerations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.3">cited from="[1998] HCA 11">"public interest"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.4">cited from="[1998] HCA 11">arguable case</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.5">cited from="[1998] HCA 11">significant issues of interpretation of that legislation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.6">cited from="[1998] HCA 11">whether discretion with respect to costs miscarried.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.0">cited from="[1993] FCA 259">passing off</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.1">cited from="[1993] FCA 259">trade name</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.2">cited from="[1993] FCA 259">essentially descriptive words</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.3">cited from="[1993] FCA 259">necessity for distinctive or secondary meaning</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.4">cited from="[1993] FCA 259">rationale</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.5">cited from="[1993] FCA 259">logic and policy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.6">cited from="[1993] FCA 259">substantial evidence necessary to establish secondary meaning</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.7">cited from="[1993] FCA 259">mere expression of confusion or belief by individuals insufficient.  costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.8">cited from="[1993] FCA 259">both parties successful on some issues</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.9">cited from="[1993] FCA 259">unsuccessful on others</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.10">cited from="[1993] FCA 259">discretion of trial judge</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.11">cited from="[1993] FCA 259">matter of impression and evaluation.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.0">cited from="[1986] FCA 382">trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.1">cited from="[1986] FCA 382">application under s.82 and accrued jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.2">cited from="[1986] FCA 382">judgment in favour of applicant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.3">cited from="[1986] FCA 382">form of judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.4">cited from="[1986] FCA 382">whether injunctive relief appropriate  costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.5">cited from="[1986] FCA 382">applicant unsuccessful in many of the issues raised by him</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.6">cited from="[1986] FCA 382">whether entitled to costs of the action</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.7">cited from="[1986] FCA 382">award of costs in discretion of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.8">cited from="[1986] FCA 382">summary of principles upon which discretion exercised</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.0">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">trade marks</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.1">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">first respondent gave an undertaking during trial</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.2">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">appellant succeeded in trade marks infringement claim under trade marks act 1995 (cth) before the primary judge</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.3">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">injunction followed the terms of undertaking</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.4">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">whether injunction too narrow in light of the words "in relation to" in s 20(1) and s 120(1) , as defined in s 7(4) of the trade marks act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.5">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">appellant did not show that primary judge failed to have regard to s 7(4)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.6">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">terms of undertaking imprecise</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.7">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">injunction gave insufficient protection</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.8">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">appeal allowed in part trade practices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.9">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">whether, on factual findings, the primary judge erred in rejecting misleading and deceptive conduct claim under s 52 of the trade practices act 1974 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.10">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">different nature of inquiries under s 120 of the trade marks act and s 52 of trade practices act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.11">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">role of appellate court in considering primary judge's evaluation of primary facts</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.12">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">no error disclosed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.13">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">appeal dismissed costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.14">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">exercise of discretion in relation to costs by primary judge</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.15">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">no relevant error</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.16">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 131">appeal dismissed</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2009] FCAFC 131" id="cs0">

30 In another set of reasons for judgment --- Bing! Software Pty Ltd v Bing Technologies Pty Limited (No 3 ) [2008] FCA 1869 at [7] --- the primary judge explained her position as follows:
 • I found in Bing! Software Pty Ltd v Bing Technologies Pty Limited (No 1) [2008] FCA 1760 that compliance by the first respondent with its undertaking meant a cessation of conduct infringing the applicant's trade mark, and that injunctive relief in terms of that undertaking was appropriate. In my view the alternative wording of the injunction more accurately reflects that undertaking than the applicant's preferred wording of the injunction.</sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 </title>
<title id="l1">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 43 Costs</title>
<title id="l2">TRADE MARKS ACT 1995 </title>
<title id="l3">TRADE MARKS ACT 1995 - SECT 7 Use of trade mark</title>
<title id="l4">TRADE MARKS ACT 1995 - SECT 10 Definition of deceptively similar</title>
<title id="l5">TRADE MARKS ACT 1995 - SECT 43 Trade mark likely to deceive or cause confusion</title>
<title id="l6">TRADE MARKS ACT 1995 - SECT 120 When is a registered trade mark infringed?</title>
<title id="l7">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
</legistitles>
</case>