Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">australian broadcasting corporation v o'neill  defamation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">injunctions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">interlocutory injunctions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">interlocutory injunction to restrain publication</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">appellant restrained from broadcasting documentary film making allegations including that respondent suspected of having committed notorious unsolved crime</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.5">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">principles on which interlocutory injunction to restrain publication granted</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.6">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">relevance of "flexible" or "rigid" approaches to granting interlocutory injunctions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.7">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">significance of value of free speech</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.8">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">significance of avoiding "trial by media"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.9">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">whether relevant that only nominal damages likely to be awarded</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.10">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">significance of status of respondent as convicted life prisoner.  injunctions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.11">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">interlocutory injunctions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.12">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">defamation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.13">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">whether general principles governing grant of interlocutory injunctions to restrain wrongs apply to interlocutory applications to restrain publication of allegedly defamatory matter</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.14">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">relationship between beecham group ltd v bristol laboratories pty ltd [1968] hca 1 ; (1968) 118 clr 618 and american cyanamid co v ethicon ltd [1975] ukhl 1 ; [1975] ac 396</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.15">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">whether respondent had made out an entitlement to an interlocutory injunction within the principles established by beecham</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.16">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">whether full court and primary judge shown to have erred in granting of interlocutory injunction.  defamation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.17">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">injunctions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.18">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">jurisdiction to grant interlocutory injunction to restrain publication of allegedly defamatory matter</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.19">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">nature of equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions to restrain publication</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.20">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">effect of common law procedure act 1854 (uk)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.21">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">effect of judicature act 1873 (uk).  appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.22">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">interlocutory injunction in defamation proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.23">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">necessity of demonstrating error in order to justify intervention by high court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.24">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">whether error shown in approach and conclusion of full court and primary judge.  defamation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.25">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">defences</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.26">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">justification</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.27">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">whether avoiding "trial by media" relevant to determination of "public benefit" required by defamation act 1957 (tas) s 15.</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 </title>
<title id="l1">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 23 Making of orders and issue of writs</title>
<title id="l2">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp4.0">citing from="[2011] AATA 546">veterans' affairs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">citing from="[2011] AATA 546">entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">citing from="[2011] AATA 546">disability support pension</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.3">citing from="[2011] AATA 546">defence service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.4">citing from="[2011] AATA 546">defence-caused disease</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.5">citing from="[2011] AATA 546">clinical worsening</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.6">citing from="[2011] AATA 546">tribunal not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that clinical worsening of condition was contributed to in a material degree or aggravated by defence service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.7">citing from="[2011] AATA 546">decision under review affirmed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.0">citing from="[2011] AATA 336">veterans affairs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.1">citing from="[2011] AATA 336">applicant served as a radar operator on hmas sydney in korean waters</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.2">citing from="[2011] AATA 336">nine events in service advanced to support claim of connection between service and ptsd</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.3">citing from="[2011] AATA 336">evidence of applicant unreliable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.4">citing from="[2011] AATA 336">ptsd diagnosis not made</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.5">citing from="[2011] AATA 336">collection of symptoms consistent with dysthymic disorder</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.6">citing from="[2011] AATA 336">hypothesis not consistent with applicable factors within three sops within the assessment period</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.7">citing from="[2011] AATA 336">decision affirmed.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.0">citing from="[2010] AATA 1042">veterans' compensation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.1">citing from="[2010] AATA 1042">post-traumatic stress disorder</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.2">citing from="[2010] AATA 1042">depressive disorder</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.3">citing from="[2010] AATA 1042">alcohol abuse disorder</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.4">citing from="[2010] AATA 1042">whether applicant experienced clinical worsening as a result of operational service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.5">citing from="[2010] AATA 1042">claims of stressful events</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.6">citing from="[2010] AATA 1042">historical discrepancies</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.7">citing from="[2010] AATA 1042">decision set aside.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.0">citing from="[2010] AATA 298">veterans' affairs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.1">citing from="[2010] AATA 298">application remitted from federal court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.2">citing from="[2010] AATA 298">veteran died after vrb decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.3">citing from="[2010] AATA 298">claim by estate</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.4">citing from="[2010] AATA 298">multiple hypotheses</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.5">citing from="[2010] AATA 298">whether death from liver cancer connected with alcohol dependence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.6">citing from="[2010] AATA 298">applicant's representative did not call evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.7">citing from="[2010] AATA 298">decision of vrb affirmed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.0">citing from="[2010] AATA 23">veterans' entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.1">citing from="[2010] AATA 23">review of determination by respondent that applicant's condition of sleep apnoea was not related to service. did material raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the disease suffered by the applicant and the circumstances of his operational service. did the circumstances of operational service make a material contribution to the cause or clinical worsening of the applicant's sleep apnoea. was the tribunal satisfied beyond reasonable doubt operational services was not a contributing factor.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.0">citing from="[2009] AATA 870">veterans' affairs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.1">citing from="[2009] AATA 870">veterans' entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.2">citing from="[2009] AATA 870">service with royal australian navy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.3">citing from="[2009] AATA 870">diagnosed conditions of posttraumatic stress disorder, depressive disorder and alcohol dependence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.4">citing from="[2009] AATA 870">conditions not related to period of operational or eligible service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.5">citing from="[2009] AATA 870">decision under review affirmed.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.0">citing from="[2009] AATA 89">veterans' affairs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.1">citing from="[2009] AATA 89">benefits and entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.2">citing from="[2009] AATA 89">alcohol abuse/dependence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.3">citing from="[2009] AATA 89">whether alcohol abuse/dependence was defence-caused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.4">citing from="[2009] AATA 89">clinical onset of alcohol abuse</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.5">citing from="[2009] AATA 89">whether applicant was unable to obtain appropriate clinical management</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.6">citing from="[2009] AATA 89">decision affirmed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.0">citing from="[2008] AATA 1099">veterans' affairs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.1">citing from="[2008] AATA 1099">benefits and entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.2">citing from="[2008] AATA 1099">alcohol abuse/dependence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.3">citing from="[2008] AATA 1099">diagnosis</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.4">citing from="[2008] AATA 1099">whether alcohol abuse war-caused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.5">citing from="[2008] AATA 1099">clinical onset of alcohol abuse</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.6">citing from="[2008] AATA 1099">whether reasonable hypothesis</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.7">citing from="[2008] AATA 1099">deledio step 4</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.8">citing from="[2008] AATA 1099">decision affirmed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.0">citing from="[2008] AATA 1032">veterans' affairs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.1">citing from="[2008] AATA 1032">veterans' entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.2">citing from="[2008] AATA 1032">disability pension</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.3">citing from="[2008] AATA 1032">applicant suffers from ischaemic heart disease, post-traumatic stress disorder and alcohol dependence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.4">citing from="[2008] AATA 1032">causation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.5">citing from="[2008] AATA 1032">whether applicant's conditions are war-caused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.6">citing from="[2008] AATA 1032">applicant's conditions are not war-caused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.7">citing from="[2008] AATA 1032">decision affirmed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.0">citing from="[2008] AATA 264">veterans' affairs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.1">citing from="[2008] AATA 264">veterans' entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.2">citing from="[2008] AATA 264">whether psychiatric condition defence-caused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.3">citing from="[2008] AATA 264">whether applicant meets statement of principles</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.4">citing from="[2008] AATA 264">decision affirmed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.0">citing from="[2008] AATA 78">veterans' affairs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.1">citing from="[2008] AATA 78">veterans' entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.2">citing from="[2008] AATA 78">disability pension</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.3">citing from="[2008] AATA 78">applicant served in royal australian navy from 1962 to 1982</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.4">citing from="[2008] AATA 78">applicant rendered operational service in 1970-1971</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.5">citing from="[2008] AATA 78">applicant suffers from spondylolysis, depressive disorder and hypertension</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.6">citing from="[2008] AATA 78">statements of principles (sops)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.7">citing from="[2008] AATA 78">material before tribunal raises hypothesis that applicant's conditions connected with operational service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.8">citing from="[2008] AATA 78">raised hypothesis not upheld by sops</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.9">citing from="[2008] AATA 78">raised hypothesis not a reasonable hypothesis</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.10">citing from="[2008] AATA 78">tribunal satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that no sufficient ground for determining that applicant's conditions war-caused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.11">citing from="[2008] AATA 78">applicant's conditions not war-caused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.12">citing from="[2008] AATA 78">decision under review affirmed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.0">citing from="[2007] FCA 1674">veteran's entitlement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.1">citing from="[2007] FCA 1674">whether injuries or disabilities related to eligible service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.2">citing from="[2007] FCA 1674">wrong test identified and decided by administrative appeals tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.3">citing from="[2007] FCA 1674">findings made in the absence of evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.4">citing from="[2007] FCA 1674">whether futile to remit to administrative appeals tribunal upon the possibility of a different outcome being reached.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.0">citing from="[2007] AATA 1809">veterans' affairs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.1">citing from="[2007] AATA 1809">medical conditions of depressive disorder, diabetes, hypertension</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.2">citing from="[2007] AATA 1809">whether conditions are service related</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.3">citing from="[2007] AATA 1809">application of deledio steps</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.4">citing from="[2007] AATA 1809">depression was accepted as related to service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.5">citing from="[2007] AATA 1809">experienced stressor, marital breakdown, anxiety, alcohol misuse, binge eating</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.6">citing from="[2007] AATA 1809">respondent conceded diabetes and hypertension if depressive condition war caused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.7">citing from="[2007] AATA 1809">decision set aside</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.8">citing from="[2007] AATA 1809">remit to respondent to assessment pension rate.   veterans' entitlements act 1986</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.9">citing from="[2007] AATA 1809">ss9 , 13 , 120 (1),(4), s 120a (3)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.0">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">veterans' affairs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.1">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">veterans' entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.2">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">claim for disability pension</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.3">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">peacekeeping and defence service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.4">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">claimed disabilities</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.5">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">post traumatic stress disorder</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.6">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">major depression</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.7">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">hypertension</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.8">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">benign positional vertigo</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.9">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">gout</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.10">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">rupture of left achilles tendon</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.11">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">recurrent seborrhoeic dermatitis</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.12">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">impotence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.13">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">alcohol abuse</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.14">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">clinical worsening</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.15">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">stressors</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.16">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">decision under review set aside</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.17">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">conditions of depressive disorder, hypertension, erectile dysfunction and rupture of left achilles tendon accepted as defence-caused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.18">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">applicant does not suffer post traumatic stress disorder</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.19">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">other conditions not defence-caused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.20">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">matter remitted to respondent for reassessment of applicant's pension    veterans' entitlements act 1986</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.21">citing from="[2007] AATA 1640">sections 20 , 70 , 120 , 120a , 120b , 196a , 196b</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.0">citing from="[2007] FCA 1087">social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.1">citing from="[2007] FCA 1087">appeal from decision of administrative appeals tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.2">citing from="[2007] FCA 1087">pension entitlement of veteran</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.3">citing from="[2007] FCA 1087">alcoholism and anxiety related diseases</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.4">citing from="[2007] FCA 1087">whether reasonable hypothesis connecting veteran's death and service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.5">citing from="[2007] FCA 1087">application of principles relevant to analysis</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.6">citing from="[2007] FCA 1087">error of law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.0">citing from="[2007] AATA 1608">veterans' entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.1">citing from="[2007] AATA 1608">application for review of decision rejecting conditions of adjustment disorder and impotence as diseases attributable to defence service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.2">citing from="[2007] AATA 1608">civil standard of proof</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.3">citing from="[2007] AATA 1608">decision under review affirmed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.0">citing from="[2007] AATA 1422">veterans' affairs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.1">citing from="[2007] AATA 1422">operational service in the royal australian navy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.2">citing from="[2007] AATA 1422">whether veteran's death was war-caused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.3">citing from="[2007] AATA 1422">whether smoking and alcohol consumption is attributable to veteran's operational service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.4">citing from="[2007] AATA 1422">statement of principles</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.5">citing from="[2007] AATA 1422">kind of death</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.6">citing from="[2007] AATA 1422">cerebrovascular accident</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.7">citing from="[2007] AATA 1422">subarachnoid haemorrhage</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.0">citing from="[2007] AATA 1284">veterans' affairs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.1">citing from="[2007] AATA 1284">disability pension</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.2">citing from="[2007] AATA 1284">service in the australian army</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.3">citing from="[2007] AATA 1284">cervical spondylosis</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.4">citing from="[2007] AATA 1284">intervertebral disc prolapse</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.5">citing from="[2007] AATA 1284">statement of principles</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.6">citing from="[2007] AATA 1284">applicant engaged in numerous heavy lifting activities during service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.7">citing from="[2007] AATA 1284">tribunal found that applicant suffered clinical onset and clinical worsening of cervical condition during service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.8">citing from="[2007] AATA 1284">disc prolapse as clinical worsening of cervical condition</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.9">citing from="[2007] AATA 1284">decision under review set aside.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.0">citing from="[2007] AATA 1163">veterans' affairs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.1">citing from="[2007] AATA 1163">modest and infrequent consumption of alcohol before enlistment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.2">citing from="[2007] AATA 1163">sense of apprehension after arrival in vietnam</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.3">citing from="[2007] AATA 1163">alcohol consumption increased</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.4">citing from="[2007] AATA 1163">applicant a passenger in a helicopter which was attacked</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.5">citing from="[2007] AATA 1163">thought he would die</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.6">citing from="[2007] AATA 1163">significant increase in alcohol subsequently</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.7">citing from="[2007] AATA 1163">findings of 1) clinical onset of 2) generalised anxiety disorder and alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse 3) within two years by reason of having 4) experienced a severe stressor and a severe psychosocial stressor as defined by statements of principles</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.8">citing from="[2007] AATA 1163">decision under review set aside</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.0">citing from="[2007] AATA 1148">veterans' entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.1">citing from="[2007] AATA 1148">operational service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.2">citing from="[2007] AATA 1148">claim that hypertension and ischaemic heart disease were war-caused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.3">citing from="[2007] AATA 1148">consideration of evidence, legislation and statement of principles</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.4">citing from="[2007] AATA 1148">the tribunal decides that the decision under review is affirmed.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.0">citing from="[2006] FMCA 1050">administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.1">citing from="[2006] FMCA 1050">appeal from aat</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.2">citing from="[2006] FMCA 1050">claims under veteran entitlements act 1986</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.3">citing from="[2006] FMCA 1050">eight days service in east timor</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.4">citing from="[2006] FMCA 1050">failure to ask and answer the right questions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.5">citing from="[2006] FMCA 1050">proper construction of ss.120(1), 120(3) and 120a(1) of the veterans entitlements act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.6">citing from="[2006] FMCA 1050">failure to have consideration of the whole of the material before the tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.7">citing from="[2006] FMCA 1050">reasonable hypotheses</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.8">citing from="[2006] FMCA 1050">identification of hypothesis connecting claim to service</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.9">citing from="[2006] FMCA 1050">statements of principle</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.10">citing from="[2006] FMCA 1050">hypothesis to fit template of statement of principle</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp26.11">citing from="[2006] FMCA 1050">standard of proof.</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2011] AATA 546" id="cs0">In Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 ; (2006) 93 ALD 107 , at 114 [35], Finn J said that the requirement for a clinical worsening "imposed a medical-scientific standard, not a lay standard", emphasising, at 115 [47]:

 ... Whether there has been a clinical worsening of a particular depressive disorder ... was a diagnostic question that addressed the features and symptoms of that disorder as defined in the SoP and required a clinical judgment be made.

 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2011] AATA 336" id="cs1">The Instruments of 2007 and 2008 do not contain factors concerning the clinical worsening of dysthymic disorder but there is such a provision within Instrument No 58 of 1998. If it were to apply, the applicant would be permitted to have considered whether he experienced a severe psychosocial stressor or stressors within two years before the clinical worsening of dysthymia. Clinical worsening is not determined by an increase in symptoms alone but regard must be given to clinical criteria and therefore upon a medical --- scientific standard ( Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 ; (2006) 93 ALD 107 at [29] , [33] and [35]). </sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] AATA 1042" id="cs2">The leading case on this point is the Federal Court's decision in Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 ; (2006) 93 ALD 107. That case considered whether there had been a clinical worsening of an alcohol abuse condition. Finn J said it was not enough for the Tribunal to find the applicant was drinking more heavily after a particular event. His Honour said the Tribunal must refer back to the diagnostic criteria in the SoP when it was considering whether there was a clinical worsening of the condition. Mr Stoner questioned whether there was enough evidence before me to reach a view that there had been a clinical worsening in that sense. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] AATA 298" id="cs3">Clinical worsening is not determined only by an examination of the quantities of alcohol consumed or a finding that there was an increase in the alcohol consumed. A finding of clinical worsening is a medical issue directed at satisfaction of the diagnostic or definitional criteria. Clinical worsening must be of the disease having the features, symptoms and manifestations prescribed in the definition within the SoP (refer Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 at [33] ). Finn J, at [34] also decided that the worsening is in the clinically significant impairment or distress which resulted from the maladaptive pattern of alcohol abuse and which, importantly for these proceedings, was manifested in one or more of the prescribed ways within a 12 month period. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] AATA 23" id="cs4">Finn J in Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 referred to the issue of clinical worsening in the following terms, viz:
 "...The Tribunal misconstrued what was comprehended by the clinical worsening requirement of par 5 (d) of the SOP. That requirement imposed a medical-scientific standard, not a lay standard. Though the Tribunal found a clinical worsening of Mr Milenz's alcohol abuse it did not address whether there was a worsening in the disease as defined and manifest...".
 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] AATA 870" id="cs5">The respondent's advocate, Mr Kelly, referred to the applicant's failure to mention the fuel tanker incident for some years, including at the earlier Tribunal hearing in 2004. He stated that despite the applicant's submission that the 1975 fuel tanker incident was a stressful and life threatening event, he did not mention it to either his doctors or psychiatrists until 2007 (when he told Dr Anderson). On that basis, Mr Kelly submitted, the applicant's actions during and after the incident indicated that it did not have the claimed effect on him. Mr Kelly submitted that the incident was not a category 1A stressor or a life threatening event as maintained by the applicant. Mr Kelly noted that although Dr Anderson had said that the fuel tanker incident aggravated pre-existing conditions of depressive disorder, alcohol dependence and PTSD, no examples of how this might have occurred were given. Mr Kelly submitted that the applicant's submissions failed in accordance with the principles referred to in Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 ; (2006) 93 ALD 107. In relation to alcohol abuse, Mr Kelly reminded the Tribunal that the applicant had given evidence of his heavy drinking since 1968. In conclusion, Mr Kelly referred to Mansfield J's statement in Stoddart v Repatriation Commission [2003] FCA 334 ; (2003) 74 ALD 366 at 378 [50] : "I do not think it [the definition of 'severe stressor'] provides for idiosyncratic and personal perceptions of events which, judged objectively, do not fall within the adjectival clause. "
 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] AATA 89" id="cs6">That factor must be pointed to by the evidence before the necessary connection with relevant service can be said to exist. It applies only to a material contribution to or aggravation of, alcohol abuse in circumstances where the condition of alcohol abuse "... was suffered or contracted before or during (but not arising out of) the person's relevant service". So much is made clear by paragraph 7 of the SOP. It must be assessed according to a medical scientific standard (not a lay standard) and there must be evidence of a clinical worsening of the disease as defined in the SOP. In other words, there must be evidence of "...clinically significant impairment or distress" as manifested by at least three of the factors shown in the definition ( Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 ; (2006) 93 ALD 107). I accept there is a clinical worsening of the condition as defined in the SOP and based on Dr Rees' diagnosis. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] AATA 1099" id="cs7">Relevant case law makes plain, that "clinical onset" and "clinical worsening" are medical issues, requiring diagnostic judgement [18] . The terms refer to the time at which a person's constellation of symptoms is such that a medical practitioner would have diagnosed the particular disease as present or as having worsened [19] . Recent Federal Court decisions emphasise the importance of differentiating the exact nature of the medical condition in issue [20] . There is a tendency with alcohol abuse and dependence to ignore the difference between the two diagnoses. As the Statements of Principles make plain, alcohol abuse can only be diagnosed if "the symptoms have never met the criteria for alcohol dependence".  Relevant case law makes plain, that "clinical onset" and "clinical worsening" are medical issues, requiring diagnostic judgement [18] . The terms refer to the time at which a person's constellation of symptoms is such that a medical practitioner would have diagnosed the particular disease as present or as having worsened [19] . Recent Federal Court decisions emphasise the importance of differentiating the exact nature of the medical condition in issue [20] . There is a tendency with alcohol abuse and dependence to ignore the difference between the two diagnoses. As the Statements of Principles make plain, alcohol abuse can only be diagnosed if "the symptoms have never met the criteria for alcohol dependence". </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] AATA 1032" id="cs8">In those circumstances, it is necessary to identify material suggesting there was an aggravation or clinical worsening of the pre-existing PTSD condition as a result of what occurred during operational service. The expression "aggravation" is reasonably well-known: it means more grave, more grievous or more serious in its effects: Federal Broom Co Pty Ltd v Semlitch [1964] HCA 34 ; (1964) 110 CLR 626 at 639 per Windeyer J. But as Mr Stoner pointed out, it is not enough to say the condition looked worse, or that the applicant felt worse in some general sense. The Federal Court explained in Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 ; (2006) 93 ALD 107 at [29] , [35] that there must be a worsening having regard to the diagnostic criteria set out in the relevant statement of principles. Those criteria set out a medical-scientific standard rather than a lay person's standard. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FCA 1614" id="cs9">30 In relation to Ground 3.2, s 5D(1)(a) of the VE Act defines a "disease" as "any physical or mental ailment, disorder, defect or morbid condition (whether of sudden onset or gradual development)". The Commission submitted that whether or not a person suffers from a disease, the time of clinical onset of a disease, and whether or not there has been a clinical worsening of a disease are all matters susceptible of being answered only by an expression of medical opinion; see Repatriation Committee v Cooke (1998) 90 FCR 307 at 312; Repatriation Commission v Cornelius [2002] FCA 50 at [26] ; Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 at [33] - [35].</sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] AATA 264" id="cs10">The Federal Court's decision in Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 ; [2006] FCA 1436 ; (2007) 93 ALD 107 says aggravation is assessed having regard to the diagnostic criteria set out in the relevant statement of principles. The parties agreed the relevant statement of principles is that relating to generalised anxiety disorder (No 102 of 2007). Mr Stoner, for the respondent, conceded the statement of principles in relation to depression (No 18 of 2007) was also formally relevant. We understand it was accepted by both parties that the applicant's claim would stand or fall on the strength of the anxiety statement of principles. Mr Stoner also pointed out there was an accrued right to be considered under the earlier statement of principles if the applicant was unsuccessful under the most recent iteration. The parties nonetheless agreed that it would be unnecessary to go that far since the most recent statements of principles were more generous from the applicant's point of view. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] AATA 78" id="cs11">The phrase "clinical worsening" (within the meaning, and for the purposes, of the various SoPs in which it appears) has recently been considered by the Federal Court of Australia. In Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 ; (2006) 93 ALD 107 Finn J said (at 113-114):
 " [33] The question whether a disease as defined in a SoP has clinically worsened is a medical one, raising as it does a diagnostic question. I have emphasised 'as defined' for the reason that the clinical worsening must be of the disease having the features, symptoms and manifestations prescribed in the relevant SoP's definition ..." (original emphasis)

Later (at 115-116) his Honour commented that the question whether there has been a "clinical worsening" of a particular disease is

 "a diagnostic question that addresse(s) the features and symptoms of that [disease] as defined in the SoP and require(s) [that] a clinical judgment be made".

 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] FCA 1674" id="cs12">43 The clinical onset of such a condition is a diagnostic issue requiring medical opinion: see Cornelius [2002] FCA 750 at [28] ; Lees [2002] FCAFC 398 ; 125 FCR 331 ; Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 ; (2006) 43 AAR 565 at [34] ; Repatriation Commission v Brady [2007] FCA 1087 at [36] . </sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] AATA 1809" id="cs13"/>
<sentence from="[2007] AATA 1640" id="cs14">"Clinical worsening" is not defined in any of the relevant SoPs, however the meaning of that term was addressed by Deputy President McMahon in Re A'Bell and Repatriation [1999] AATA 739 ; (1999) 58 ALD 721. DP McMahon, after consideration of various authorities, made the point that in all cases, "distinctions have been drawn between temporary worsening of symptoms and aggravation as a compensable concept". Aggravation is not necessarily indicated by a temporary worsening of symptoms with consequential temporary incapacity. The question to be determined is whether the pre-existing condition itself has been worsened. Further, in Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 ; (2006) 93 ALD 107 Finn J defines the term "clinical worsening" as the presence of signs and symptoms which would permit a clinician to conclude that the signs and symptoms of the primary condition, as prescribed by the SoP, have been made worse.
 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] FCA 1087" id="cs15">36 I accept the contentions of the Commission that in determining whether that factor existed, it was necessary for the Tribunal:

(1) to distinguish between the two disorders; and

(2) to have before it (and it appears that it did not) evidence from a medical practitioner determining for the purposes of the Alcohol SoP whether the disease is or was present at a particular time: Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 ; (2006) 93 ALD 107 at [34] citing Repatriation Commission v Cornelius [2002] FCA 750 at [26] . The latter requirement imposed a medical-scientific standard, not a lay standard, which in the present case required evidence from a medical practitioner identifying the date of the clinical onset of the disease the veteran had contracted within two years from October 1970 (being the date of a helicopter incident in Vietnam). Moreover, such a diagnosis would have to take into account the criteria prescribed by the Alcohol SoP for each relevant disorder --- alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] AATA 1608" id="cs16">The term "clinical worsening" was explained by Finn J in Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 to require a clinical judgement as to whether there had been a worsening of the features and symptoms of the disorder as defined. We note that Finn J refers to the disorder as defined in the SoP, but following the decision of Keifel J in Repatriation Commission v Warren [2007] FCA 866 ; the reference must be to the disorder as either defined in the SoP or the appropriate diagnostic text. For example for Psychiatric Disorders the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] AATA 1422" id="cs17">It is not fanciful or untenable nor is it contrary to known scientific evidence. The evidence is also consistent with the definitions of "death from subarachnoid haemorrhage" or "death from cerebrovascular accident" and with the factors outlined in the relevant SoPs. The hypothesis is based on this evidence and is consistent with the manifestations required under the SoPs ( Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 ; (2006) 93 ALD 107). We are therefore satisfied that there is also a causal connection and that the raised facts in the evidence are consistent with the templates contained in the relevant SoPs and therefore create a reasonable hypothesis. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] AATA 1284" id="cs18">We should at this point comment on the aspects of clinical onset and clinical worsening in the context of the evidence as a whole. Both are matters that require the exercise of clinical judgement by medical practitioners, a point more recently highlighted by the Federal Court in Repatriation Commission v Milenz . [35] In matters of this kind it will be usual that the event took place some time ago, and the evidence will rarely be available that would enable exact findings on the clinical onset or clinical worsening (if present). As stated, it calls upon clinical judgement, usually in the context of incomplete records, without comprehensive medical tests undertaken at the time. In other words, clinical judgement will involve drawing inferences in the absence of a full set of objective physical tests. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] AATA 1163" id="cs19">For the purposes also of this part of the decision I am aware of the recent decision of Finn J in Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436. His Honour then decided that clinical worsening of a disease is a medical issue and is resolved by resorting to the definition of the disease in an applicable Statement of Principle. (Whilst the present case concerns clinical onset, the decision in Milenz is no less applicable). </sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] AATA 1148" id="cs20">'Clinical worsening' requires a 'medical-scientific standard not a lay standard' , with 'features or manifest symptoms of the disease' ( Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436). Unfortunately the SoP provides no guidance as to what might amount to a clinical worsening of hypertension. We looked at whether the blood pressure readings after Mr McPherson's operational service were more elevated than beforehand. The additional readings recorded by the veteran were:
 Date Age Blood Pressure recorded (mmHg)

 19/07/62 33 125/80

 14/08/64 35 150/90

 18/11/69 40 150/90

(We note that there was either an additional reading or a misprint in lieu of 19 July 1962 recorded by Dr Wyndham on 14 September 1962, at 125/80). The majority of blood pressure readings between 1955 and 1969 are consistent with the SOP definition of hypertension but do not suggest any clinical worsening. In fact, after Mr McPherson's operational service, his blood pressure marginally improved between 1962 and 1969. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] FCA 50" id="cs21">

1 In Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436 the Repatriation Commission successfully appealed to this Court under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) against a decision of the Tribunal granting the respondent, Yurgen Milenz, a further pension entitlement under the Veterans Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth).</sentence>
<sentence from="[2006] FMCA 1050" id="cs22">The relevance of the stipulation to determine the "clinical worsening" was considered recently by his Honour Finn J in Repatriation Commission v Milenz [2006] FCA 1436.</sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL ACT 1975 </title>
<title id="l1">ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL ACT 1975 - SECT 44 Appeals to Federal Court of Australia from decisions of the Tribunal</title>
<title id="l2">EVIDENCE ACT 1995 - SECT 120 Unrepresented parties</title>
<title id="l3">MIGRATION ACT 1958 </title>
<title id="l4">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 9 Certain sea installations to be part of Australia</title>
<title id="l5">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 13 Lawful non-citizens</title>
<title id="l6">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 120 Certain information must be given to visa holder</title>
<title id="l7">VETERANS' ENTITLEMENTS ACT 1986 </title>
<title id="l8">VETERANS' ENTITLEMENTS ACT 1986 - SECT 120 Standard of proof</title>
<title id="l9">VETERANS' ENTITLEMENTS ACT 1986 - SECT 120A Reasonableness of hypothesis to be assessed by reference to Statement of Principles</title>
<title id="l10">VETERANS' ENTITLEMENTS ACT 1986 - SECT 196B Functions of Authority</title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2006] FCA 1530">corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2006] FCA 1530">receivers and managers</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2006] FCA 1530">appeal against decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2006] FCA 1530">refusal to release funds for legal representation of company in winding up proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2006] FCA 1530">principles governing scope of appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.5">cited from="[2006] FCA 1530">discretionary decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.6">cited from="[2006] FCA 1530">restraint principle</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.7">cited from="[2006] FCA 1530">appeal dismissed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2005] FCA 232">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2005] FCA 232">pleadings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2005] FCA 232">application for leave to amend statement of claim</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2005] FCA 232">application to strike out, set aside or vary statement of claim</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2005] FCA 232">application to dismiss proceedings or claim</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[2005] FCA 232">whether cause of action is tenable or arguable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.6">cited from="[2005] FCA 232">whether the statement of claim should be struck out</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.7">cited from="[2005] FCA 232">whether the applicant should be granted leave to amend or re-plead.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">winding up</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">proof of debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">appeal against rejection of proof of debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.4">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">matters which court can take into consideration in determining appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.5">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">procedure to be followed on such appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.6">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.7">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">winding up</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.8">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">winding up by the court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.9">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">proper scope of interlocutory process filed in winding up proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.10">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.11">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">supreme court procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.12">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">relationship between relief sought by an interlocutory process, and relief sought by principal proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.13">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">equity</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.14">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">rectification</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.15">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 818">whether available against a company after company has been ordered to be wound up</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.0">cited from="[2002] NSWSC 731">corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">cited from="[2002] NSWSC 731">deed of company arrangement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">cited from="[2002] NSWSC 731">proof of debt against company in administration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.3">cited from="[2002] NSWSC 731">proof lodged for voting purposes relied on for purposes of distribution</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.4">cited from="[2002] NSWSC 731">whether deed can limit statutory right of appeal under s 1321</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.5">cited from="[2002] NSWSC 731">considerations relevant to extension of time for appeal under corporations rule 14.1</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.6">cited from="[2002] NSWSC 731">late submission of proof of debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.7">cited from="[2002] NSWSC 731">whether new proof of debt may be lodged which repeats claim made in a rejected proof</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.8">cited from="[2002] NSWSC 731">whether varied proof should be treated as a fresh proof</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.9">cited from="[2002] NSWSC 731">what constitutes rejection of a proof of debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.10">cited from="[2002] NSWSC 731">entitlement of proving creditor to participate in distribution</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.0">cited from="[1977] FCA 15">bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.1">cited from="[1977] FCA 15">refusal of official receiver to allow bankrupt to travel overseas</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.2">cited from="[1977] FCA 15">appeal against refusal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.3">cited from="[1977] FCA 15">considerations applicable on appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.4">cited from="[1977] FCA 15">bankruptcy act 1966 , ss. 77 , 178 , 272 . the applicant, a bankrupt, delivered his passport to the official receiver, as trustee of his estate, after the making of the sequestration order against his estate, as required by s. 77 of the bankruptcy act 1966 . later, the applicant sought permission from the official receiver to travel overseas on business assignments. the official receiver refused permission, and the applicant appealed to the federal court against the refusal, pursuant to s. 178 of the act, which provides as follows: "if the bankrupt, a creditor or any other person is affected by an act, omission or decision of the trustee, he may apply to the court, and the court may make such order in the matter as it thinks just and equitable".  held: (1) section 178 of the act confers the widest possible discretion as to the appropriate order in an application pursuant to the section, and the court is not confined to interfering with the trustee's act, omission or decision only if it is of the view that the trustee has acted absurdly or unreasonably or in bad faith.  re peters; ex parte lloyd (1882), 47 lt 64 ; re a debtor; ex parte the debtor v. dodwell, (1949) ch 236 ; leon v. york-o-matic ltd., (1966) 1 wlr 1450 ; re carson; ex parte carson (1960), 19 abc 108 ; re hall (1957), 20 abc 21 , referred to.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.0">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">companies</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.1">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">no-liability companies</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.2">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">shares</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.3">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">agreement to take new shares on allotment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.4">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">breach</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.5">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">whether right to sue for outstanding moneys</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.6">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">the companies acts, 1961 to 1964 (q.), s. 320.  practice (q.)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.7">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">applications for summary judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.8">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">leave to defend</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.9">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">issue of law only</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.10">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">rules of the supreme court (q.), o. 18 r. 1.  high court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.11">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">powers on appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.12">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">appeal from refusal of primary judge to grant leave to enter summary judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.13">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">issue of law only</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.14">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">arguable case</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.15">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">full argument on appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.16">cited from="[1972] HCA 41">decision to allow appeal.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.0">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">practice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.1">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">summary power to terminate action</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.2">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">principles applicable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.3">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">inherent jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.4">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">jurisdiction under rule of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.5">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">high court rules, o. 26, r. 18.  patents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.6">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">invention</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.7">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">use for services of commonwealth or state</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.8">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">"authority of the state"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.9">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">commissioner for railways</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.10">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">construction of carriages for use in state railway system</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.11">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">"services of the state"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.12">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">written authority to use invention</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.13">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">when contract itself sufficient authority</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.14">cited from="[1964] HCA 69">patents act 1952-1960 (cth), ss. 125, 132*.</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">BANKRUPTCY ACT 1966 </title>
<title id="l1">BANKRUPTCY ACT 1966 - SECT 178 Appeal to Court against trustee's decision etc.</title>
<title id="l2">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 </title>
<title id="l3">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 421 Managing controller's duties in relation to bank accounts and financial records</title>
<title id="l4">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 554A Determination of value of debts and claims of uncertain value</title>
<title id="l5">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 1321 Appeals from decisions of receivers, liquidators etc.</title>
<title id="l6">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 1324 Injunctions</title>
<title id="l7">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 </title>
<title id="l8">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 31A Summary judgment</title>
<title id="l9">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 48 Change of venue</title>
<title id="l10">JURISDICTION OF COURTS (CROSS-VESTING) ACT 1987 </title>
<title id="l11">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
<title id="l12">FEDERAL COURT (CORPORATIONS) RULES 2000 </title>
<title id="l13">FEDERAL COURT (CORPORATIONS) RULES 2000 - REG 14.1 Appeal from act, omission or decision of administrator, receiver or liquidator etc (Corporations Act s 554A, s 1321)</title>
<title id="l14">COMPANIES ACT 1981 </title>
<title id="l15">COMPANIES ACT 1981 No. 89 of 1981 - SECT 279 Exempt proprietary company need not appoint auditor in certain circumstances</title>
<title id="l16">COMPANIES ACT 1981 No. 89 of 1981 - SECT 538 Appeals from decisions of receivers, liquidators, </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2006] FCA 885">corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2006] FCA 885">insolvency</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2006] FCA 885">whether transactions unfair preferences or uncommercial transactions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2006] FCA 885">order that commissioner of taxation repay monies to liquidator</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2006] FCA 885">whether directors had reasonable grounds for expecting solvency</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.5">cited from="[2006] FCA 885">directors bear onus of proving expectation of solvency</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.6">cited from="[2006] FCA 885">no reasonable grounds</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 985">corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 985">winding up</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 985">insolvent transactions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 985">voidable preferences</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 985">application by liquidators for order that commissioner of taxation repay money said to be voidable preference</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 985">commissioner's defence concedes central elements of liquidators' claim</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.6">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 985">claim by commissioner for indemnity order against directors in liquidators' proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.7">cited from="[2004] NSWSC 985">whether directors entitled to defend claims conceded by commissioner</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[1974] HCA 32">contract</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[1974] HCA 32">work and labour</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[1974] HCA 32">implied warranty of quality and fitness for purpose</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[1974] HCA 32">contract to service helicopter</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[1974] HCA 32">manufacturer of parts nominated by customer</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.5">cited from="[1974] HCA 32">repairer's inability to check quality known to customer</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.6">cited from="[1974] HCA 32">repairer a wholly owned subsidiary company of customer</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.7">cited from="[1974] HCA 32">whether warranties excluded by circumstances.  practice (q.)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.8">cited from="[1974] HCA 32">parties</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.9">cited from="[1974] HCA 32">third party</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.10">cited from="[1974] HCA 32">leave to defend</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.11">cited from="[1974] HCA 32">judgment for plaintiff against defendant and for defendant against third party</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.12">cited from="[1974] HCA 32">no appeal by defendant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.13">cited from="[1974] HCA 32">whether third party competent to appeal against judgment entered against defendant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.14">cited from="[1974] HCA 32">rules of the supreme court (q.) o. 17, r. 4 (4).</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.0">citing from="[2010] NSWSC 360">procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.1">citing from="[2010] NSWSC 360">application by defendant for leave to amend list response to allege sub-contractors are concurrent wrongdoers</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.2">citing from="[2010] NSWSC 360">proportionate liability</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.3">citing from="[2010] NSWSC 360">where pleading did not identify relevant acts or omissions and causal connection between those acts or omissions and the losses in respect of which the plaintiffs sue</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.4">citing from="[2010] NSWSC 360">whether pleading sufficient to demonstrate what is necessary to show duty of care between sub-contractor and subsequent owner</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.5">citing from="[2010] NSWSC 360">leave granted</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.6">citing from="[2010] NSWSC 360">civil liability act 2002 (nsw) pt 4.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.0">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.1">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.2">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">where applicant's application for separate trials refused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.3">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">where ground on which application refused not raised until six months after hearing of application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.4">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">where application would otherwise have succeeded</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.5">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">whether applicant ought to have its costs of application for separate trials</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.6">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">whether costs thrown away held: applicant to have its costs of application for separate trials</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.7">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">costs thrown away procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.8">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.9">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">where cross-respondents sought leave to defend main action</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.10">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">where third cross-respondent successful in application for leave to defend</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.11">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">where one hearing conducted on basis of unarguable defence later abandoned</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.12">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">where other cross-respondent unsuccessful in application for leave to defend</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.13">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">where other cross-respondent withdrew application for leave to defend</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.14">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">appropriate order as to costs held: no order as to costs of hearing conducted on basis of unarguable defence later abandoned</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.15">citing from="[2008] FCA 25">costs otherwise reserved</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2010] NSWSC 1320" id="cs0">

86 Consistent with this, in Shrimp v Landmark Operations Limited [2007] FCA 1468 ; (2007) 163 FCR 510 , Besanko J held that a "concurrent wrongdoer" referred to in s 87CB(3) of the Trade Practices Act only includes persons whose acts or omissions caused the damage or loss that is the subject of the claim if they are liable to the claimant for that loss or damage. His Honour stated at 523 [62]: "The definition of concurrent wrongdoer seems to be the critical subsection and, in my opinion, the word 'caused' in s 87CB(3) should be read as meaning such as to give rise to a liability in the concurrent wrongdoer to the plaintiff or applicant. "</sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] NSWSC 360" id="cs1">4 The debate proceeded also on the basis that, for a person to be a concurrent wrongdoer under Part 4 of the Civil Liability Act , the person must be liable to the plaintiff: perhaps, an extended reading of the word "caused" in the definition of "concurrent wrongdoer" in s 34(2) of that Act. The reasons for that construction were given by Besanko J in Shrimp v Landmark Operations Ltd [2007] FCA 1468 ; (2007) 163 FCR 510 at 523 [62] . His Honour's analysis was adopted and applied by Nettle JA, with whom Mandie J and Beach AJA agreed, in St George Bank Limited v Quinerts Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 245 at [58] , [64].</sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] VSCA 245" id="cs2">64 In my view, however, that is not the case. [41] As Besanko J held in Shrimp v Landmark Operations, [42] a 'concurrent wrongdoer' includes a person whose acts or omissions caused the damage or loss that is the subject of the plaintiff's claim only if the person is 'liable' to the plaintiff for that loss and damage. In light of s 24AI(3) , however, 'liable' in the sense identified by Besanko J must include both presently liable and liable in the sense of having been liable and, but for ceasing to exist, would still be liable. It would be inapposite to describe a person who was liable, but has ceased to be liable because they have ceased to exist, as being 'liable'. Hence, it appears to me that the drafter of s 24AH chose 'cause' rather than 'liable' to accommodate the possibility that apportionment may be ordered in relation to a concurrent wrongdoer who is not presently liable but who was liable and, but for ceasing to exist, would still be liable.

 58 It is important to keep in mind, however, that the proportionate liability provisions were not designed to do any more than that. As Besanko J observed in Shrimp v Landmark Operations Ltd, [33] concerning the comparable provisions of Part VIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth):

 The above references [to extrinsic materials] suggest that the mischief to which the amendments were directed was a plaintiff being able to recover 100% of his damages from any one of several wrongdoer's when that wrongdoer's 'fault', when compared with the other wrongdoers, was less or far less than that. In other words, the amendment was directed to what were considered to be the undesirable consequences of the joint and several liability rule. There is no suggestion that the mischief the amendments were designed to remedy was any wider than that. The definition of concurrent wrongdoer seems to be the critical subsection and, in my opinion, the word 'caused' in s 87CB(3) [34] should be read as meaning such as to give rise to a liability in the concurrent wrongdoer to the plaintiff or applicant . [35]  That one respondent can be held liable for all the claimant's loss regardless of how much he or she contributed to that loss. This common law principle protects claimants by allowing them to recover the total damage suffered from at least one of the respondents. [37] </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] QCA 72" id="cs3">Shrimp v Landmark Operations Ltd [2007] FCA 1468 para 59).</sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] QDC 269" id="cs4">There have been two recent decisions where courts have confined the scope of the definition of "concurrent wrongdoer" in corresponding legislation, where the definition is in essentially the same terms, in this way: Shrimp v Landmark Operations Ltd [2007] FCA 1468 and Atkins v Interprac Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 445. Shrimp v Landmark Operations Ltd [2007] FCA 1468 --- followed.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] VSCA 208" id="cs5">It was put this way in Shrimp  Anor v Landmark Operations Ltd  Ors: [19]

... the mischief to which the amendments were directed was a plaintiff being able to recover 100% of his damages from any one of several wrongdoers when that wrongdoer's 'fault', when compared with the other wrongdoers, was less or far less than that.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] VCC 764" id="cs6"/>
<sentence from="[2008] SADC 42" id="cs7">The plaintiff has not established that the delay attached to the resolution of the issue of discovery between CGU and WMC is a circumstance sufficient to require a direction, in the interests of justice, that there be a separate trial on the issue of the liability of WMC and quantum of damages. Any benefit to the plaintiff in having a separate trial is outweighed in my opinion by the desirability of having all parties bound by the decision between the plaintiff and the defendant so as to avoid the possibility of inconsistent findings, the burden of the additional cost and expense of two trials, the disadvantages to WMC in two trials, including reliance on the plaintiff having to be available to give evidence for a second time in the trial between WMC and CGU, and WMC's possibly having to satisfy a judgment in favour of the plaintiff well before its claim against the third party is determined. ( Barclays Bank v Tom [1923] 1 KB 221 ; New World Oil and Developments Pty Ltd and another v 163 Clarence Street Pty Ltd and others [1995] FCA 1108 , unreported, 6 March 1995; Shrimp v Landmark Operations Limited [2007] FCA 1468 , unreported, 19 September 2007)  District Court Rules 1992 r 37.05, referred to. Port Pirie City and Districts Council v Leenders  Partners Pty Ltd [2001] SASC 208 ; Mulvaney (as liquidator of the Hellenic Athletic  Soccer Club of SA Inc) v Commissioner of Taxation for the Commonwealth of Australia [2004] SASC 166 , applied. Barclays Bank v Tom [1923] 1 KB 221 ; New World Oil and Developments Pty Ltd and another v 163 Clarence Street Pty Ltd and others [1995] FCA 1108 ; Shrimp v Landmark Operations Limited [2007] FCA 1468 , considered. BENNETT v WMC (OLYMPIC DAM CORPORATION) P/L  AKULA P/L (IN LIQ)  CGU INSURANCE LTD  ORS
 [2008] SADC 42

 This is an appeal against a decision of a Master. The appeal is brought pursuant to section 43 of the District Court Act 1991 , which relevantly provides:

A party to an action may, in accordance with the rules of the appellate court, appeal against any judgment given in the action.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FCA 25" id="cs8">

4 I published reasons for making those orders: Shrimp v Landmark Operations Limited [2007] FCA 1468 and those reasons should be read with these reasons.</sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 </title>
<title id="l1">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 22 Determination of matter completely and finally</title>
<title id="l2">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
<title id="l3">FAIR TRADING ACT 1989 </title>
<title id="l4">FAIR TRADING ACT 1989 - SECT 38 38 Definition for div 2</title>
<title id="l5">FAIR TRADING ACT 1989 - SECT 40 40 Embargo period for embargo notice</title>
<title id="l6">FAIR TRADING ACT 1989 - SECT 42 42 Power of inspector to secure goods</title>
<title id="l7">FAIR TRADING ACT 1989 - SECT 52 52 Miscellaneous supporting provision for proceedings for recovery of pecuniary penalties</title>
<title id="l8">FAIR TRADING ACT 1989 - SECT 53 53 Interpretation of offence provisions</title>
<title id="l9">SALE OF GOODS ACT 1896 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">human rights</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">interlocutory application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">application to amend application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">whether leave to amend should be granted</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">unlawful discrimination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.5">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">human rights and equal opportunity commission</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.6">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">whether applicant should be permitted to pursue allegations of unlawful discrimination not included in the complaint terminated by hreoc</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.7">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.8">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">whether the court has jurisdiction to deal with facts or issues that were not the subject of the terminated complaint</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.9">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">extraterritoriality</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.10">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">extra-territorial jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.11">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">whether the court has jurisdiction to deal with allegations of discriminatory acts or practices that occurred outside australia.  human rights</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.12">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">summary dismissal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.13">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">whether the proceeding or claim has a reasonable prospect of success</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.14">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">abuse of process</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.15">cited from="[2009] FMCA 736">whether applicant's claim "foredoomed to fail".</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 96">discrimination law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 96">disability discrimination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 96">respondent suffering psychiatric disability refused entry into health facility and hospital while accompanied by an "assistance animal"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 96">appellant required respondent to obtain prior approval and satisfy it that the respondent's dogs were trained, safe and hygienic</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 96">whether indirect discrimination pursuant to s 6 of the disability discrimination act 1992 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 96">consideration of requirements of s 6 and evidence necessary to meet requirements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.6">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 96">consideration of whether requirement or condition imposed was unreasonable. discrimination law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.7">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 96">disability discrimination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.8">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 96">whether discrimination pursuant to s 9 of the disability discrimination act 1992 (cth) because respondent was accompanied by an assistance animal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.9">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 96">consideration of meaning of "trained to assist the aggrieved person to alleviate the effect of the disability"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.10">cited from="[2008] FCAFC 96">consideration of whether s 9 requires a finding that the discrimination is "on the ground of the person's disability" for the purposes of finding unlawful discrimination under ss 23 and 24 of the disability discrimination act 1992 (cth).</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[2007] NSWCA 54">appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[2007] NSWCA 54">factual errors in reasoning</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[2007] NSWCA 54">whether trial judge erred in not accepting the plaintiff's evidence based on adverse credibility findings and lack of corroboration where there had been factual errors in reaching that conclusionprocedural fairness</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">cited from="[2007] NSWCA 54">18 months delay in delivering judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.4">cited from="[2007] NSWCA 54">whether finding of judicial error more readily supportablemiscarriage of justice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.5">cited from="[2007] NSWCA 54">supreme court rules part 51 rule 23</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.6">cited from="[2007] NSWCA 54">supreme court act 1970 (nsw) s 75a</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.7">cited from="[2007] NSWCA 54">whether substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice thereby occasioned from the errors and delay in judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">nais v minister for immigration and multicultural and indigenous affairs  immigration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">refugee review tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">substantial delay between first tribunal hearing and tribunal decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">whether delay resulted in real and substantial risk of prejudice to appellants</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">whether prejudice to appellants can be inferred</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.5">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">whether delay by administrative tribunal constitutes denial of procedural fairness or failure to conduct review as required by law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.6">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">whether decision of administrative tribunal may be set aside following substantial delay</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.7">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">effect of delay on question of assessing appellants' demeanour</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.8">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">calculation of the period of delay.  immigration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.9">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">refugee review tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.10">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">migration act 1958 (cth), s 420 provides for an objective of administrative review that is "fair, just, economical, informal and quick"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.11">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">relevance of s 420 to complaint of delay</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.12">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">special considerations relevant to delay in asylum cases.  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.13">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">jurisdictional error</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.14">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">whether denial of procedural fairness</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.15">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">significance of delay</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.16">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">grounds for judicial review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.17">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">whether delay affected the refugee review tribunal's capacity to make a proper assessment of demeanour</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.18">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">whether there was a real and substantial risk that the tribunal's capacity to assess the appellants was impaired.  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.19">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">judicial review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.20">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">assessment of fairness of procedures followed by administrative decision-maker</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.21">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">substantial delay between first tribunal hearing and tribunal decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.22">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">limited role of courts performing judicial review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.23">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">relevance of general notions of fairness and justice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.24">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">relevance of authority on delay in context of appeals against judicial determinations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.25">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">importance of contextual factors in assessing complaint of delay.  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.26">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">jurisdictional error</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.27">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">substantial delay between first tribunal hearing and tribunal decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.28">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">appropriate remedy where denial of procedural fairness due to substantial delay</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.29">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">failure by appellants to seek mandamus</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.30">cited from="[2005] HCA 77">whether relief should be refused on discretionary grounds.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.0">cited from="[2004] FCA 1275">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">cited from="[2004] FCA 1275">leave to appeal from interlocutory judgments of federal magistrates court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">cited from="[2004] FCA 1275">whether indemnity costs should be awarded against self-represented litigant in the circumstances</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.0">cited from="[1991] FCA 655">appeals</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.1">cited from="[1991] FCA 655">leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.2">cited from="[1991] FCA 655">whether the full court should regard itself as bound to apply a formula derived from niemann v. electronic industries ltd [1978] vicrp 44 ; (1978) vr 431</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.3">cited from="[1991] FCA 655">width of the discretion to grant leave to appeal under s. 24(1a) of the federal court of australia act 1976 .  patents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.4">cited from="[1991] FCA 655">taking of an account of profits</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.5">cited from="[1991] FCA 655">whether any part of general overhead costs is allowable as a deduction in the determination of the profits made by an infringer</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.6">cited from="[1991] FCA 655">principles relating to the taking of an account of profits</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.7">cited from="[1991] FCA 655">whether the case of a side-line is an exceptional case</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.8">cited from="[1991] FCA 655">reference to standard accountancy methods as indicating what must be deducted in order to determine the amount of a profit</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.9">cited from="[1991] FCA 655">discussion of a line of cases establishing the approach adopted in the united states to the solution of this problem</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.10">cited from="[1991] FCA 655">onus on wrongdoer who has mixed legitimate activities with activities involving infringement of another's property right to justify the particular apportionment of costs adopted by him in his accounts</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.11">cited from="[1991] FCA 655">declaration of principle that the infringer is generally at liberty to show that various categories of overhead contributed to the obtaining of the relevant profit and to show in what proportion they should be allocated in the taking of the account of profits</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.12">cited from="[1991] FCA 655">discussion of whether the profits for which the defendants must account are (in the case of a patented closure for a canister) the profits for the closures only or for the closures and canisters to which they are fitted</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.13">cited from="[1991] FCA 655">whether the infringer's particular pricing policy can be relied on by him as a contribution by him to the profits unrelated to the patent</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.14">cited from="[1991] FCA 655">whether the profits of the whole canister and closure are fairly traceable to the use by the infringer of the invention.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.0">citing from="[2010] FMCA 569">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.1">citing from="[2010] FMCA 569">amendment to application and statement of claim</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.2">citing from="[2010] FMCA 569">whether rule 7.01(1) of the federal magistrates court rules 2001 (cth) sufficient</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.3">citing from="[2010] FMCA 569">scope of rule 7.01(1)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.4">citing from="[2010] FMCA 569">discretionary power</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.5">citing from="[2010] FMCA 569">factors related to exercise of discretion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.6">citing from="[2010] FMCA 569">whether resort to federal court rules required.  industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.7">citing from="[2010] FMCA 569">civil penalty proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.8">citing from="[2010] FMCA 569">application to amend application and statement of claim.</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2010] FMCA 569" id="cs0">An appeal was dismissed in Moran v Lydiard Financial Services Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 872 , in which Riley FM's findings in para.43 of Lydiard were not dealt with. [18] Vijayakumar v Qantas Airways Limited [2009] FMCA 736 ; (2009) 233 FLR 369 at 375 per Scarlett FM; [2009] FMCA 736 at para.42 per Scarlett FM (" Vijayakumar "). An application for leave to appeal Vijayakumar was dismissed by the Federal Court in Vijayakumar v Qantas Airways Limited [2009] FCA 1121 , in which Scarlett FM's finding in para.43 of Vijayakumar was not disturbed. [19] SZGTE at para.34 per Graham J. [20] Donnelly v Prentice [2003] FMCA 50.</sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT 1992 </title>
<title id="l1">DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT 1992 - SECT 4 Interpretation</title>
<title id="l2">DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT 1992 - SECT 5 Direct disability discrimination</title>
<title id="l3">DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT 1992 - SECT 6 Indirect disability discrimination</title>
<title id="l4">DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT 1992 - SECT 7 Discrimination in relation to associates</title>
<title id="l5">DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT 1992 - SECT 11 Unjustifiable hardship</title>
<title id="l6">DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT 1992 - SECT 12 Application of Act</title>
<title id="l7">DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT 1992 - SECT 23 Access to premises</title>
<title id="l8">DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT 1992 - SECT 24 Goods, services and facilities</title>
<title id="l9">DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT 1992 - SECT 31 Disability standards</title>
<title id="l10">DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT 1992 - SECT 32 Unlawful to contravene disability standards</title>
<title id="l11">RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ACT 1975 </title>
<title id="l12">RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ACT 1975 - SECT 9 Racial discrimination to be unlawful</title>
<title id="l13">RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ACT 1975 - SECT 13 Provision of goods and services</title>
<title id="l14">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
<title id="l15">FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT RULES 2001 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">citing from="[2010] NSWSC 1339">corporationsapplication for reinstatement of company by plaintiffs aggrieved by de-registration due to outstanding liabilities owed under loan agreement with the company</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2010] NSWSC 1339" id="cs0">96 The decisions of Bergin J (as her Honour then was) in Actwane Pty Ltd (Receiver and Manager Appointed) (In Liquidation) and William James Moss v Hotel Redfern Pty Ltd, Actwane Holdings Pty Ltd and Stephen Michael Larkin [2002] NSWSC 265 and Emmett J in Rafeletos v Great Wall Resources Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1395 seem to me to be relevant on this issue. They suggest that, whilst the onus does ultimately lie with the person claiming rectification, if particular factual issues are asserted by the defendant (by way of the defences raised) then an evidentiary onus may nonetheless fall upon the defence to prove those issues, failing which the plaintiff's evidence in favour of rectification may be sufficient to support the relief sought. </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 </title>
<title id="l1">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 175 Correction of registers</title>
<title id="l2">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2009] FCAFC 71">practice and procedure: application for leave to appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2009] FCAFC 71">whether decision below attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by the full court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2009] FCAFC 71">whether substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal refused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2009] FCAFC 71">operation and scope of confidentiality orders under s 50 federal court of australia act 1976 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2009] FCAFC 71">application of the principles of open justice.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2005] FCA 1224">corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2005] FCA 1224">summonses for examination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2005] FCA 1224">examinees' application to stay pending special leave application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2005] FCA 1224">whether substantial prospect of leave being granted</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2005] FCA 1224">balance of convenience</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[1986] HCA 84">high court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[1986] HCA 84">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[1986] HCA 84">stay of supreme court order pending application for special leave to appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">cited from="[1986] HCA 84">jurisdiction to grant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.4">cited from="[1986] HCA 84">preservation of subject-matter of litigation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.5">cited from="[1986] HCA 84">factors relevant to exercise of discretion to grant stay.</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 </title>
<title id="l1">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 50 Prohibition of publication of evidence etc.</title>
<title id="l2">JUDICIARY ACT 1903 </title>
<title id="l3">JUDICIARY ACT 1903 - SECT 35A Criteria for granting special leave to appeal</title>
<title id="l4">JUDICIARY ACT 1903 - SECT 50 Reports</title>
<title id="l5">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">members of the yorta yorta aboriginal community v victoria  aboriginals</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">native title to land</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">determination of native title</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">native title rights and interests in s 223(1) native title act 1993 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.4">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">possessed under traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed in s 223(1)(a).  aboriginals</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.5">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">native title to land</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.6">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">determination of native title</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.7">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">consequences of sovereignty</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.8">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">whether traditional laws and customs observed must originate in pre-sovereignty laws and customs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.9">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">effect of development of, or changes in, traditional laws and customs since sovereignty</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.10">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">whether proof of continuous acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs required</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.11">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">effect of interruption to continuous acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.12">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">whether substantially uninterrupted acknowledgment and observance is sufficient</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.13">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">whether traditional law and customs need only be presently acknowledged and observed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.14">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">whether continuous existence of claimant society required</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.15">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">effect of cessation of claimant society on acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs.  aboriginals</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.16">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">native title to land</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.17">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">native title rights and interests</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.18">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">section 223(1)(c) native title act 1993 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.19">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">meaning of rights and interests recognised by the common law of australia</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.20">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">whether there are common law requirements of native title.  aboriginals</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.21">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">native title to land</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.22">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">extinguishment of native title</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.23">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">whether s 223 native title act 1993 (cth) incorporates notions of extinguishment of native title</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.24">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">whether concepts of "abandonment" or "expiration" of native title can be applied.  aboriginals</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.25">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">native title to land</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.26">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.27">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">proof</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.28">cited from="[2002] HCA 58">oral and written testimony.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[2002] FCA 1208">native title</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[2002] FCA 1208">consent determination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[2002] FCA 1208">within power and appropriate</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[2002] FCA 1208">western desert people</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[2002] FCA 1208">shared area</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.5">cited from="[2002] FCA 1208">co-existing native title holders from different groups</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.6">cited from="[2002] FCA 1208">order in terms of consent minute.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.0">citing from="[2010] FCA 1343">native title</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.1">citing from="[2010] FCA 1343">application for determination of native title under s 87 of the native title act 1993 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.2">citing from="[2010] FCA 1343">consideration of whether the parties have satisfied the criteria set out in s 87 such that the jurisdiction of the court is enlivened</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.3">citing from="[2010] FCA 1343">consideration of whether it is appropriate for the court to make an order in terms of the agreement reached by the parties</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.4">citing from="[2010] FCA 1343">the central focus is on the agreement and whether it was freely entered into on an informed basis</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.5">citing from="[2010] FCA 1343">if the court finds this to be the case it will infer the existence of the native title that is at the heart of that agreement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.6">citing from="[2010] FCA 1343">the court must be satisfied that the state has taken a real interest in the proceedings in the interests of the community generally</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.7">citing from="[2010] FCA 1343">however there must be a balance between the stringency of the processes followed by the state in assessing the applicant's evidence and the need to take a flexible approach that is aimed at facilitating negotiation and achieving agreement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.8">citing from="[2010] FCA 1343">parties filed joint submissions in support of a minute of a proposed consent determination and a statement of agreed facts</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.9">citing from="[2010] FCA 1343">held that the agreement is free and informed and that the terms of the proposed orders are unambiguous and clear.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.0">citing from="[2009] FCA 1334">first schedule</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.1">citing from="[2009] FCA 1334">description of the determination area</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2010] FCA 1343" id="cs0">In considering the effect of these words, it is important to identify what it is that s 87(1A) requires the Court to consider appropriate. The wording of the section makes it clear that the question for the Court is whether it is appropriate to make an order in the terms of the agreement reached between the parties. Therefore the central focus of the section is that agreement: Lovett v Victoria [2007] FCA 474 (" Lovett ") at [37]; Nangkiriny v Western Australia (2002) 117 FCR 6 ; [2002] FCA 660 at [8] ; James v Western Australia [2002] FCA 1208 at [4] ; Ward v Western Australia [2006] FCA 1848 at [9] ; Cox v Western Australia [2007] FCA 588 at [12] ; Brown v Western Australia [2007] FCA 1025 at [23] ; Hughes v Western Australia [2007] FCA 365 at [9] ; Kogolo v Western Australia [2007] FCA 1703 at [18] and Eringa v South Australia [2008] FCA 1370 (" Eringa ") at [33]. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 1334" id="cs1">Numerous decisions of the Federal Court have emphasised that provisions such as s 87 and s 87A of the Native Title Act are designed to facilitate and encourage the resolution of native title claims by agreements between parties. They recognise that the Court adopts a different approach to the task of deciding whether it is appropriate to make a determination reached by agreement, than it brings to the task of deciding if native title should be recognised after a contested hearing. In each case, the definition of native title is the same. The Act requires the Court to set out details of the matters mentioned in s 225 of the Native Title Act in all determinations whether reached by agreement or following a hearing. These decisions make plain that, although there needs to be some foundation upon which the Court can exercise its jurisdiction, in matters in which the parties have reached agreement on the terms of a determination, the Court will have particular regard to whether the agreement has been freely entered into on an informed basis. See for example: Eringa, Eringa No 2, Wangkangurru/Yarluyandi and Irrwanyere Mt Dare Native Title Claim Groups v The State of South Australia [2008] FCA 1370 per Lander J at 33; Nangkiriny v State of Western Australia [2002] FCA 660 ; (2002) 117 FCR 6 ; Ward v State of Western Australia [2006] FCA 1848 ; Lovett on behalf of the Gundtjmara People v State of Victoria [2007] FCA 474. If that question is answered in the affirmative, the Court will consider the fact that an agreement has been reached as weighing in favour of the making of the determination of native title: James on behalf of the Martu People v State of Western Australia [2002] FCA 1208. It may even be that in some cases, the freely informed agreement will be a sufficient basis for the Court to make such consent orders: Ward v State of Western Australia , North J at [8]; Hughes (On behalf of the Eastern Guruma People) v Western Australia [2007] FCA 365 , Bennett J at [9]. </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993 </title>
<title id="l1">NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993 - SECT 47A Reserves etc. covered by claimant applications</title>
<title id="l2">NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993 - SECT 57 Determination of prescribed body corporate etc.</title>
<title id="l3">NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993 - SECT 61 Native title and compensation applications</title>
<title id="l4">NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993 - SECT 66 Notice of application</title>
<title id="l5">NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993 - SECT 67 Overlapping native title determination applications</title>
<title id="l6">NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993 - SECT 87 Power of Federal Court if parties reach agreement</title>
<title id="l7">NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993 - SECT 87A Power of Federal Court to make determination for part of an area</title>
<title id="l8">NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993 - SECT 94A Order containing determination of native title</title>
<title id="l9">NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993 - SECT 225 Determination of native title</title>
<title id="l10">NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993 - SECT 251D Land or waters on which a public work is constructed, established or situated</title>
<title id="l11">TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 1997 </title>
<title id="l12">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
<title id="l13">AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION ACT 1989 </title>
<title id="l14">TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 1975 </title>
<title id="l15">MINING ACT 1971 </title>
<title id="l16">MINING ACT 1971 - SECT 6 </title>
<title id="l17">NATIONAL PARKS AND WILDLIFE ACT 1972 </title>
<title id="l18">NATIONAL PARKS AND WILDLIFE ACT 1972 - SECT 35 </title>
<title id="l19">PASTORAL LAND MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION ACT 1989 </title>
<title id="l20">PASTORAL LAND MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION ACT 1989 - SECT 47 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>