Question:
<citphrase id="cp4.0">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">finance broker</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">finance brokers control act 1975 (wa)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">finance broker</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.3">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">definition</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.4">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">whether carrying on business as such</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.5">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">licensing requirement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.6">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">financial advisor and arranger of major project capital</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.7">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">whether carrying on business as finance broker</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.8">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">information memorandum</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.9">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">to be circulated to prospective financiers</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.10">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">fee for preparation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.11">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">part of agreement for services including arrangement of project finance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.12">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">whether preparation of memorandum is service provided in capacity as a finance broker</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.13">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">whether fee recoverable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.14">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">construction of finance brokers control act 1975</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.15">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">protective and penal aspects</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.16">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">preliminary issue</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.17">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">illegality</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.18">cited from="[1993] FCA 293">whether within preliminary issue.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.0">cited from="[1984] FCA 232">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.1">cited from="[1984] FCA 232">leave for agent, not being a legally qualified practitioner, to appear on behalf of a company</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.2">cited from="[1984] FCA 232">0.4 r.14 federal court rules</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.3">cited from="[1984] FCA 232">the nature of the discretion pursuant to 0.4 r.14</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.4">cited from="[1984] FCA 232">considerations taken into account in deciding whether to exercise the discretion.  trade practices act 1974  federal court rules : 0.4 r.14  practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.5">cited from="[1984] FCA 232">application for company to be represented by an agent not being a solicitor or counsel</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.6">cited from="[1984] FCA 232">nature of the discretion conferred upon the court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.7">cited from="[1984] FCA 232">federal court rules 1979 (cth), o. 4, r. 14. held: (per smithers and keely jj., sweeney j. not deciding) o. 4, r. 14(2) which relevantly provides that a corporation may not without the leave of the court commence or carry on any proceeding otherwise than by a solicitor, confers a discretion upon the court to grant leave, which discretion will be exercised in favour of a company where there is sufficient reason.  (2) (per smithers and keely jj., sweeney j. not deciding.) where a refusal to grant leave would leave the company unable to continue its proceedings, the loss of skilled legal assistance to the court should be a factor which carries no weight in the exercise of the discretion.  adam p. brown male fashions pty ltd v. philip morris incorporated (1981) 148 clr 170 mcgrath v. dobie [1890] viclawrp 133 ; (1890) 16 vlr 646 ; o'toole v. scott (1965) ac 939 ; hubbard association of scientologists international v. anderson [1972] vicrp 37 ; (1972) vr 340 ; tritonia ltd v. equity and law life assurance society (1943) ac 584 ; frinton and walton urban district council v. walton and district sand and mineral co. ltd (1938) 1 all er 649 ; london county council and london tramways co. (1897) 13 tlr 254 ; scriven v. jescott (leeds) ltd (1908) 53 sol. j. 101; federated engine-drivers' and firemen's association of australasia v. broken hill proprietary co. ltd [1913] hca 71 ; (1913) 16 clr 245 ; house v. the king [1936] hca 40 ; (1936) 55 clr 499. 4</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.0">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.1">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">application for leave pursuant to o 4 r 14(2) for applicant corporation to carry on proceeding otherwise than by a solicitor</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.2">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">applicant corporation seeks leave for sole director and shareholder to conduct litigation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.3">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">principles relevant to grant of leave by court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.4">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">capability of sole director to conduct proceedings on behalf of applicant corporation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.5">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">apparent impecuniosity of both applicant corporation and sole director</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.6">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">requirement for interpreter to assist sole director</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.7">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">substantive issues involving narrow but difficult questions of law in substantive proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.8">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">no legal qualifications or training of sole director</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.9">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">discrepancies in previous evidence as to financial position of applicant compared with current financial position</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.10">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">lack of explanation or evidence as to financial position of applicant corporation and sole director</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.11">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">no other applicant represented by counsel in proceeding</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.12">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">trial of substantive issues estimated to be three weeks</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.13">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">litigation strenuously opposed by respondents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.14">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">sole director the applicant's principal witness in substantive proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.15">citing from="[2010] FCA 878">scandalous allegations by sole director</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.0">citing from="[2010] FCA 715">corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.1">citing from="[2010] FCA 715">application by australian securities and investments commission to appoint provisional liquidator</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.2">citing from="[2010] FCA 715">considerations relevant to appointment of provisional liquidator, including: apparent or probable insolvency of companies, risk of dissipation of companies' assets, public interest in a prompt independent examination of companies' accounts, financial records and transactions.</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2010] FCA 878" id="cs0">Finally, as observed by Allsop J in Silkearl [2006] FCA 949 at [34] , one of the fundamental obligations of any practitioner in the discharge of his or her obligations to the client and the Court is the civil and dispassionate communication with other parties to that litigation. Yesterday in Court Mr Yahalom made allegations to the effect that the respondents, or Mr Nir Avrahami, had been involved in criminal activity in respect of their tax liabilities. Making scandalous accusations and allegations of impropriety against the respondents which were in any event irrelevant to the proceedings yesterday suggests that Mr Yahalom is not a proper person to conduct the proceedings on behalf of the applicant. Conclusion
  Fifth, I am not satisfied that reliable financial information has been produced to the Court explaining why neither the applicant, nor Mr Yahalom who is the applicant's sole director and shareholder, can fund a solicitor to represent the applicant. In this respect I note that while Mr Yahalom may be the alter ego of the applicant, nonetheless as explained by Smithers J in Molnar [1984] FCA 232 ; [1984] 3 FCR 68 when a trader decides to use the corporate form in which to carry on his or her business for the advantages flowing therefrom, the accessibility to the courts by that corporation is conditional as set forth in O 4 r 14(2). The lack of reliable evidence as to the applicant's financial position is a factor which is relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion in relation to applications for leave pursuant to O 4 r 14(2): cf Silkearl Pty Ltd v Ainsworth Game Technology Ltd [2006] FCA 949 at [25] . In this case: substantial evidence was produced by the applicant in April 2010 supporting the proposition that the applicant had significant resources at its disposal; the material tendered yesterday in Court by Mr Yahalom suggested that both the applicant and Mr Yahalom had, at least at the close of the 2008-2009 financial year, significant resources; and as recently as 20 May 2010 Mr Yahalom agreed to a variation of the estimate of legal fees and costs of his previous solicitors, resulting in an estimate of $250,000 in relation to the proceeding, presumably on the basis that he could pay that sum in fees. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] FCA 715" id="cs1"/>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 1065" id="cs2">Order 4 r 14(2) of the Federal Court Rules provides:

 Except as provided by or under any Act, a corporation may not, without the leave of the Court, commence or carry on any proceeding otherwise than by a solicitor.

Counsel for the parties referred me to the following authorities in relation to the approach to be taken on an application for leave under the rule: Tobacco Control Coalition Inc v Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd [2000] FCA 131 ( Tobacco Control ); Checked-Out Pty Ltd v Eagle Eye Inspections Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1002 ( Checked-Out ); Silkearl Pty Ltd v Ainsworth Game Technology Ltd [2006] FCA 949 ( Silkearl ) and Cytel Pty Ltd v Peoplebank Recruitment Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 985 ( Cytel ). I will return to these authorities below. </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">EVIDENCE ACT 1995 </title>
<title id="l1">EVIDENCE ACT 1995 - SECT 135 General discretion to exclude evidence</title>
<title id="l2">TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 </title>
<title id="l3">TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 No. 51, 1974 - SECT 52 Misleading or deceptive conduct.</title>
<title id="l4">FEDERAL COURT RULES 1979 </title>
<title id="l5">SUPREME COURT RULES 1970 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2007] FCAFC 135">income tax</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2007] FCAFC 135">superannuation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2007] FCAFC 135">payment to non-complying fund by way of discretionary trust</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2007] FCAFC 135">no fringe benefits tax payable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2007] FCAFC 135">no deduction under s 82aae income tax assessment act 1936 (cth) income tax</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.5">cited from="[2007] FCAFC 135">payment to superannuation fund capital not revenue expense</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 256">admiralty and maritime</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 256">shipping and navigation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 256">compulsory pilotage</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 256">construction and interpretation of s 410b of navigation act 1912 (cth) and ss 85 and 86 of the ports corporatisation and waterways management act 1995 (nsw)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 256">shipowner liable for fault of pilot, though pilot not properly licensed. trade practices act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 256">no reliance by master of ship on conduct of the pilot contract</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.6">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 256">formation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.7">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 256">no contract between shipowner and pilotage service provider tort</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.8">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 256">contributory negligence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.9">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 256">no relevant causal link between conduct of the plaintiff and the damage</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">stevens v kabushiki kaisha sony computer entertainment  intellectual property</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">copyright</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">circumvention devices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">circumvention of a technological protection measure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.4">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">definition of "technological protection measure" in s 10(1) of the copyright act 1968 (cth) ("the act ")</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.5">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">respondents produced and sold computer games on cd-roms for use with playstation consoles</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.6">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">access codes on the cd-roms could not be reproduced by conventional cd recording or copying devices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.7">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">games could only be played if access codes were read by the boot rom device within a playstation console</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.8">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">appellant sold and installed "mod chips" into playstation consoles which allowed unauthorised copies of games to be played</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.9">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">whether appellant had knowingly sold or distributed a circumvention device which was capable of circumventing, or facilitating the circumvention of, a technological protection measure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.10">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">whether access codes and boot rom were technological protection measures</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.11">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">whether access codes and boot rom prevented or inhibited the infringement of copyright by preventing access to unauthorised copies of games.  intellectual property</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.12">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">copyright</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.13">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">circumvention devices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.14">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">literary works</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.15">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">computer programs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.16">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">reproduction in a material form</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.17">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">definition of "material form" in s 10(1) of the act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.18">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">parts of program code reproduced in the random access memory ("ram") of a playstation console as game is being played</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.19">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">whether access codes and boot rom prevented or inhibited the infringement of copyright in a literary work by preventing a substantial part of a computer program from being reproduced in ram</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.20">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">whether ram a "material form" for the purposes of the act .  intellectual property</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.21">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">copyright</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.22">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">circumvention devices</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.23">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">subject-matter</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.24">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">cinematograph films</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.25">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">part of the aggregate of visual images contained in program code copied in the ram of a playstation console as game is being played</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.26">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">whether access codes and boot rom prevented or inhibited the infringement of copyright in a cinematograph film by preventing a copy of the film being made in ram</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.27">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">whether a substantial part of a cinematograph film is embodied in ram as game is being played.  statutes</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.28">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">statutory construction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.29">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">approach where provision is ambiguous</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.30">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">approach where provision is the product of legislative debate over evolving technology and compromise</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.31">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">use of extrinsic materials</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.32">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">relevance of legislative history</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.33">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">relevance of policy considerations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.34">cited from="[2005] HCA 58">preference for interpretation which upholds fundamental rights.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 126">taxation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 126">goods and services tax</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 126">apportionment of credits</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 126">whether full input tax credits available to taxpayer</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 126">appeal from administrative appeals tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.5">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 126">taxpayer acquired services in a taxable supply by way of a feasibility study as to whether it should acquire debts and recover them</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.6">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 126">taxpayer carrying on enterprise of acquiring debts and recovering them, acquisition of debts a financial supply</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.7">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 126">taxpayer also acquired services relating to recovery of debts</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.8">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 126">whether input credits disallowed as relating to the making of a financial supply (the acquisition of the debts) which would be input taxed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.9">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 126">whether credits disallowed where acquisition of recovery services related to the financial supply (the acquisition of the debts) a new tax system (goods and services tax) act 1999 (cth), ss 11 -15(2)(a), 11 -5, 11 -20, div 132 a new tax system (goods and services tax) regulations 1999 (cth), regs 70-5.02, 40-5.09</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.0">cited from="[2004] HCA 14">network ten pty limited v tcn channel nine pty limited  copyright</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">cited from="[2004] HCA 14">infringement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">cited from="[2004] HCA 14">television broadcast</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.3">cited from="[2004] HCA 14">television programme broadcast by appellant contained excerpts from programmes previously broadcast by respondent</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.4">cited from="[2004] HCA 14">each excerpt of brief duration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.5">cited from="[2004] HCA 14">meaning of the "subject matter" of broadcast copyright</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.6">cited from="[2004] HCA 14">whether each visual image capable of being observed as a separate image on a television screen and accompanying sounds is "a television broadcast" in which copyright subsists</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.7">cited from="[2004] HCA 14">whether a "substantial part" of a television broadcast must be copied to constitute infringement.  statutes</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.8">cited from="[2004] HCA 14">construction and interpretation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.9">cited from="[2004] HCA 14">relevance of legislative history and context</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.10">cited from="[2004] HCA 14">relevance of legislative history and context of similar united kingdom statute</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.11">cited from="[2004] HCA 14">copyright act 1968 (cth), ss 25(4) , 87 .</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.0">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">eastman v director of public prosecutions (act)  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.1">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">injunction and declaration sought to prevent magistrate from conducting an inquiry under s 475 crimes act 1900 (act)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.2">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">whether supreme court judge had power to instigate such an inquiry in the circumstances</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.3">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">whether a doubt as to an accused person's fitness to plead is a doubt as to the "guilt" of that person</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.4">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">whether "guilt" means "guilt as established by the conviction" or only the occurrence of the acts or omissions that constitute the offence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.5">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">whether a doubt as to the fitness to plead of an accused person is relevant to such an inquiry.  criminal law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.6">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">inquiry after conviction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.7">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">inquiry under s 475 crimes act 1900 (act) instituted</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.8">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">whether supreme court judge had power to instigate such an inquiry in the circumstances</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.9">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">whether a doubt as to an accused person's fitness to plead is a doubt as to the "guilt" of that person</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.10">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">whether "guilt" means "guilt as established by the conviction" or only the occurrence of the acts or omissions that constitute the offence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.11">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">whether a doubt as to the fitness to plead of an accused person is relevant to such an inquiry.  statutes</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.12">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">interpretation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.13">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">provision for inquiry into a suggested doubt or question as to the guilt of a person convicted of a criminal offence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.14">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">construction of words of legislation so that all integers operate congruously and harmoniously</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.15">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">construction by reference to words included and omitted</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.16">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">construction by reference to legal history of australian and english progenitors to the subject provision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.17">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">construction to give effect to a beneficial, remedial provision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.18">cited from="[2003] HCA 28">adoption of a purposive approach to statutory construction.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.0">cited from="[2001] HCA 44">hollis v vabu pty ltd t/as crisis couriers  negligence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.1">cited from="[2001] HCA 44">vicarious liability</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.2">cited from="[2001] HCA 44">employee or independent contractor</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.3">cited from="[2001] HCA 44">control</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.4">cited from="[2001] HCA 44">bicycle courier negligently injured plaintiff</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.5">cited from="[2001] HCA 44">bicycle courier wearing defendant's uniform but otherwise unidentified</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.6">cited from="[2001] HCA 44">whether defendant vicariously liable for courier's negligence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.7">cited from="[2001] HCA 44">whether relationship between bicycle courier and defendant one of employment or independent contract</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.8">cited from="[2001] HCA 44">whether bicycle courier is agent carrying out activity as principal's authorised representative dealing with third party.  employer and employee</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.9">cited from="[2001] HCA 44">independent contractor</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.10">cited from="[2001] HCA 44">bicycle courier and courier company</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.11">cited from="[2001] HCA 44">whether bicycle courier's relationship is that of employment or independent contract.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.0">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">corporation of the city of enfield v development assessment commission  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.1">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">judicial review of administrative discretion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.2">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">jurisdictional facts</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.3">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">consent of statutory authority to provisional development plan</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.4">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">consent prohibited if development "non-complying"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.5">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">classification a jurisdictional fact</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.6">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">whether statutory authority exceeded power</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.7">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">whether weight to be accorded to opinion of statutory authority upon judicial review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.8">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">whether court restricted to evidence before statutory authority.  courts and judges</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.9">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">jurisdiction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.10">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">equity</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.11">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">public law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.12">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">restraint of apprehended breach of law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.13">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">error with respect to jurisdictional fact.  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.14">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">remedies</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.15">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">error with respect to jurisdictional fact</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.16">cited from="[2000] HCA 5">availability of prerogative writs and equitable remedies.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.0">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">project blue sky inc  ors v australian broadcasting authority  statutes</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.1">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">construction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.2">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">reconciliation of conflicting provisions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.3">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">intention of legislature</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.4">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">presumption that provisions intended to achieve consistent goals</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.5">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">leading and subordinate provisions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.6">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">grammatical meaning and legal meaning.  statutes</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.7">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">construction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.8">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">acts done in breach of a condition regulating a statutory power</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.9">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">whether invalid</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.10">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">mandatory and directory provisions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.11">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">purpose-based test.  media law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.12">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">television</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.13">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">regulation of programming</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.14">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">australian broadcasting authority</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.15">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">standard prescribing australian content requirements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.16">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">whether inconsistent with legislative requirement that functions be performed consistently with australia's international obligations.  media law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.17">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">television</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.18">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">regulation of programming</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.19">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">australian broadcasting authority</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.20">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">power to make standards that "relate to ... the australian content of programs"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.21">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">whether restricted to standards conferring preferential treatment.  trade law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.22">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">australia new zealand closer economic relations trade agreement.  broadcasting services act 1992 (cth), ss 3 , 122 , 158, 160.  broadcasting services (transitional provisions and consequential amendments) act 1992 (cth), s 21.  tasker v fullwood [1978] 1 nswlr 20 at 23-24 applied.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.0">cited from="[1990] HCA 24">statute</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.1">cited from="[1990] HCA 24">crown</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.2">cited from="[1990] HCA 24">whether bound</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.3">cited from="[1990] HCA 24">implication</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.4">cited from="[1990] HCA 24">prohibition of destruction of aboriginal sites and objects</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.5">cited from="[1990] HCA 24">operation upon crown servants and agents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.6">cited from="[1990] HCA 24">aboriginal heritage act 1972 (w.a.), ss. 6 , 10 , 17 , 18 .</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.0">cited from="[1986] HCA 1">negligence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.1">cited from="[1986] HCA 1">vicarious liability</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.2">cited from="[1986] HCA 1">employee or independent contractor</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.3">cited from="[1986] HCA 1">supervision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.4">cited from="[1986] HCA 1">control</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.5">cited from="[1986] HCA 1">logging operations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.6">cited from="[1986] HCA 1">trucker injured by negligence of snigger</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.7">cited from="[1986] HCA 1">liability of sawmiller for whom both performed work</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.8">cited from="[1986] HCA 1">independent contractor</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.9">cited from="[1986] HCA 1">liability of principal for injury sustained in performing work</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.10">cited from="[1986] HCA 1">extra-hazardous activities</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.11">cited from="[1986] HCA 1">safe system of work</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.12">cited from="[1986] HCA 1">duty of principal to provide</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.13">cited from="[1986] HCA 1">breach of duty.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.0">cited from="[1985] HCA 48">contract</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.1">cited from="[1985] HCA 48">carriage of goods</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.2">cited from="[1985] HCA 48">duties and liabilities</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.3">cited from="[1985] HCA 48">special contracts</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.4">cited from="[1985] HCA 48">exemption clauses</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.5">cited from="[1985] HCA 48">contracts by which persons contract out of remedies for negligence of other persons driving motor vehicle declared void by statute</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.6">cited from="[1985] HCA 48">third party claim for property damage</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.7">cited from="[1985] HCA 48">"person"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.8">cited from="[1985] HCA 48">motor vehicles act 1959(s.a.), s. 133.  statutes</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.9">cited from="[1985] HCA 48">construction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.10">cited from="[1985] HCA 48">divisions and headings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.11">cited from="[1985] HCA 48">section operating independently of other sections in part</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.12">cited from="[1985] HCA 48">heading of part.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.0">cited from="[1963] HCA 26">workers' compensation (w.a.)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.1">cited from="[1963] HCA 26">servant or independent contractor</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.2">cited from="[1963] HCA 26">timber faller</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.3">cited from="[1963] HCA 26">payment per load</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.4">cited from="[1963] HCA 26">to supply own equipment and employ swamper</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.5">cited from="[1963] HCA 26">whether remuneration "in substance a return for manual labour"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.6">cited from="[1963] HCA 26">workers' compensation act, 1912-1960 (w.a.), s. 5*.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.0">citing from="[2010] AATA 311">taxation and revenue</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.1">citing from="[2010] AATA 311">income tax</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.2">citing from="[2010] AATA 311">personal services income obtained through a personal services entity</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.3">citing from="[2010] AATA 311">whether personal services entity is conducting a personal services business</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.4">citing from="[2010] AATA 311">whether results test met in relevant years</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.5">citing from="[2010] AATA 311">whether income is for producing a result</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.6">citing from="[2010] AATA 311">decision under review affirmed    income tax assessment act 1997: ss 87-15 , 87-18 , 87-20 , 87-65</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.0">citing from="[2010] AATA 215">taxation and revenue</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.1">citing from="[2010] AATA 215">income tax</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.2">citing from="[2010] AATA 215">personal services income obtained through a personal services entity</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.3">citing from="[2010] AATA 215">whether personal services entity is conducting a personal services business</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.4">citing from="[2010] AATA 215">whether possible to be "forever exempt"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.5">citing from="[2010] AATA 215">whether results test met in relevant years</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.6">citing from="[2010] AATA 215">whether income is for producing a result</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.7">citing from="[2010] AATA 215">penalty</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.8">citing from="[2010] AATA 215">failure to take reasonable case to comply with a taxation law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.9">citing from="[2010] AATA 215">whether discretion to remit penalty should be exercised</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.10">citing from="[2010] AATA 215">decision under review varied    income tax assessment act 1997 (cth) part 2</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.11">citing from="[2010] AATA 215">42 , ss 84-5, 86-15, 87-15, 87-18   tax administration act 1953 (cth) sch 1 ss 284-75, 284-90</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.0">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">taxation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.1">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">income tax and penalty assessments issued by commissioner of taxation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.2">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">allegedly false or misleading statements as to personal services by the appellant as to his income resulting in a tax shortfall</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.3">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">whether the income received by a new zealand incorporated company from an australian company was mainly a reward for the appellant's personal efforts or skills</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.4">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">whether the aforementioned income constituted the appellant's "personal services income"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.5">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">whether the new zealand company was a "personal services entity"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.6">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">whether 80% of the appellant's personal services income was from the same entity</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.7">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">whether the appellant met the results test under s 87-18 income tax assessment act 1997 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.8">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">whether an overseas company can be a personal services entity in relation to the assessment of personal services income of an individual</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.9">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">whether the attribution of income paid to the new zealand company by the australian company as the appellant's personal services income is contrary to the australia-new zealand double taxation agreement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.10">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">whether the penalty assessment for intentional disregard of a taxation law was assessed correctly</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.11">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">whether the commissioner's related penalty remission decision was attended with error such that the court should reach its own conclusion on that subject</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.12">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">held payments from australian company to new zealand company constituted part of the appellant's "personal services income"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.13">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">held payments were an additional commission reward for services or skills provided to australian company</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.14">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">held new zealand company was a "personal services entity"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.15">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">held appellant's "personal services income" was not income from conducting a "personal services business"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.16">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">held new zealand company can be a "personal services entity" in respect of part 2</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.17">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">42 of the income tax assessment act 1997 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.18">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">held nz double taxation agreement subjects the appellant to taxation in australia in respect of the appellant's "personal services income" pursuant to part 2</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.19">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">42 of the income tax assessment act 1997 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.20">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">held appeal allowed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.21">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">question as to whether possible by court order to increase the amount of an assessment on an appeal from an objection decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.22">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">reserved for consideration after receipt of supplementary submissions   taxation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.23">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">goods and services tax</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.24">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">whether the assessment of the gst net amount and related penalty assessment was excessive</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.25">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">whether any of the items the subject of the claimed input tax credits were acquired by the partnership in carrying on an "enterprise"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.26">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">characterisation of the "enterprise" of the partnership</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.27">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">whether the items the subject of the claimed input tax credits were of a private or domestic nature</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.28">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">whether the statutory pre-conditions to the assessment of the base penalty were satisfied</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.29">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">whether the commissioner of taxation properly exercised his discretion not to remit the base penalty</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.30">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">whether the commissioner of taxation's opinion that there was an avoidance of tax due to fraud or evasion was an error of law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.31">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">held gst assessment excessive</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.32">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">held entitlement to claim tax credits in respect of forestry enterprise was an entitlement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.33">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">held no entitlement to claim tax credits in respect of accountancy practice and naturist retreat</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.34">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">held commissioner of taxation's remission decision was a error of law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp20.35">citing from="[2009] FCA 1224">held appeal allowed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.0">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 115">taxation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.1">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 115">departure authorisation certificate</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.2">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 115">humanitarian grounds</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp21.3">citing from="[2009] FCAFC 115">whether applicant unable to give security within the meaning of s 14u(1)(b)(ii) taxation administration act 1953 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.0">citing from="[2009] AATA 626">taxation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.1">citing from="[2009] AATA 626">departure prohibition order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.2">citing from="[2009] AATA 626">departure authorisation certificate</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.3">citing from="[2009] AATA 626">whether unable to give security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp22.4">citing from="[2009] AATA 626">meaning of "unable".</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.0">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">taxation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.1">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">income tax</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.2">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">personal services income</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.3">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">whether a personal services entity was conducting a personal services business</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.4">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">results test</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.5">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">whether the income of the entity was for producing a result</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.6">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">relevance of statements made by treasurer in a doorstop interview</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.7">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">relevance of the general law tests for an independent contractor</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.8">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">other personal services business tests</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.9">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">unrelated clients test</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.10">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">employment test</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.11">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">"principal work"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.12">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">business premises test</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.13">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">none of the personal services business tests met</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.14">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">income of personal services entity attributed to taxpayer</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.15">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">certain deductions disallowed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.16">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">other matters best dealt with by commissioner</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.17">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">objection decision affirmed in part</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp23.18">citing from="[2009] AATA 87">outstanding issues remitted to commissioner for reconsideration in accordance with these reasons</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.0">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.1">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">constitution</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.2">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">interpretation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.3">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">directors' powers</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.4">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">retirement deed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.5">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">whether board of directors had authority to enter into retirement deed with director</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.6">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">whether board had to adopt scheme or plan before conferring retirement benefits on directorcorporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.7">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">directors</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.8">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">retirement benefits</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.9">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">conferral without member approval</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.10">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">whether retirement deed contravened provisions relating to termination payments in part 2d.2 of [icorporations law/i]</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.11">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">qualification of prohibition in s 200b on giving retirement benefits by s 200g</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.12">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">payment limit fixed by s 200g(2)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.13">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">whether payments to third party for provision of director's services constituted part of director's total remuneration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.14">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">definition of "remuneration" by reference to disclosure requirements in accounting standard (aasb 1017)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.15">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">whether remuneration to be calculated by reference to period during which recipient was an officer of corporation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.16">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">[icorporations law/i], ss 200b, 200ginterest</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.17">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">pre-judgment interest</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.18">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">whether third party should be paid interest on amount ordered</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.19">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">whether proceedings for specific performance were "proceedings for the recovery of any money"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.20">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">whether order that money be paid involved "amount for which judgment is given"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.21">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">whether judgment referred only to judgment in action at law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.22">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">[icivil procedure act/i] 2005 (nsw), s 100remedies</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.23">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">standing of plaintiffs to seek relief</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.24">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">where specific performance sought</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.25">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">whether director and third party provided consideration for variation deedstatutory interpretation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.26">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">accounting standards</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.27">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">purposive interpretation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.28">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">interpretation of "remuneration" in [icorporations law/i] by reference to accounting standard (aasb 1017)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.29">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">[iaustralian securities and investments commission act/i] 1989 (cth) ss 224, 228</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.30">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">[icorporations law/i], s 9statutory interpretation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.31">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">correction of typographical error</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.32">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">[icorporations law/i], ss 200bwords  phrases</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.33">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">"action"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.34">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">"indirectly"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.35">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">"may be effected"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.36">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">"otherwise made available"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.37">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">"payment limit"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp24.38">citing from="[2008] NSWCA 322">"remuneration"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.0">citing from="[2008] AATA 1060">taxation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.1">citing from="[2008] AATA 1060">gst</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.2">citing from="[2008] AATA 1060">meaning of supply</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.3">citing from="[2008] AATA 1060">acquisition of quarry in accordance with notice in the gazette</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.4">citing from="[2008] AATA 1060">whether some form of action is required for the purposes of section 9-10(1) of the gst act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.5">citing from="[2008] AATA 1060">acquisition in consequence of a right analogous to a statutory put option</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.6">citing from="[2008] AATA 1060">whether a legal obligation was incurred under para (g) of subsection (2)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.7">citing from="[2008] AATA 1060">surrender under para (d) of subsection (2)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp25.8">citing from="[2008] AATA 1060">relevance of deed of release in respect of the compensation which was paid.</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2010] AATA 311" id="cs0">

 Having regard to the authorities the remuneration Coopers Consulting received from Ajilon during the relevant years was not for producing a result within the meaning of s 87-18(3)(a) because: (a) the relevant agreement does not identify any result; Coopers Consulting was simply contracted to provide "professional business services" for the duration of the agreements; (b) Coopers Consulting was not remunerated for producing any result; it was simply remunerated for the days that the Applicant provided professional business services: clause 4.1 of the relevant agreement; (c) The remuneration Coopers Consulting received under the terms of the relevant agreement was not in any way dependent on producing a result; (d) On early termination of the relevant agreement, Coopers Consulting was entitled to "payments ... for all worked performed by the Applicant up to the date of termination" (clause 7.2 of the relevant agreement) - which supports the contention that Coopers Consulting was simply being remunerated for the provision of professional business services by the Applicant; (e) The relevant agreement did not confer any freedom on Coopers Consulting to delegate or subcontract the "professional business services", it was obligated to engage the Applicant: clauses 1.1 and 2.1 of the relevant agreement. Having regard to the preceding provisions, Coopers Consulting cannot be said to have conducted a personal services business because the remuneration it received was not for producing a result within the meaning of s 87-18(3)(a). The conclusions reached in: IRG Technical Services Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1867 ; 165 FCR 57 at [110] ; Dibarr Pty Ltd [2004] AATA 1030 ; 57 ATR 1183 at [43] --- [44]; Re Nguyen and Commissioner of Taxation [2005] AATA 876 ; 2005 ATC 2304 at [38] --- [41] (Member Webb) and Taneja [2009] AATA 87 ; 2009 ATC 10-078 at [35] - [41] are entirely apposite to the circumstances in these proceedings. In particular, the conclusion in Skiba [2007] AATA 1705 ; 67 ATR 682 at [65] - [66] is particularly apt:

 [65] Here, the evidence shows that the personal services income derived by the applicant was not paid upon producing a result but was a fortnightly or monthly payment based on the number of hours logged onto a weekly timesheet while working under the ultimate control of the CESPs and applying skill and effort to assist the CESPs complete the projects for their clients.
 [66] The ongoing skilled work provided by the applicant to the CESPs is not converted into "producing a result" within the meaning of s 87-18(3) by applying the label "deliverables" where the actuality of what occurred was the performance of ongoing work by the applicant (a skilled professional selected by the CESPs and/or their clients as suitable for their needs) under the ultimate control of the CESPs during the term of the contracts.
 [66] The ongoing skilled work provided by the applicant to the CESPs is not converted into "producing a result" within the meaning of s 87-18(3) by applying the label "deliverables" where the actuality of what occurred was the performance of ongoing work by the applicant (a skilled professional selected by the CESPs and/or their clients as suitable for their needs) under the ultimate control of the CESPs during the term of the contracts.

 The failure on the part of Coopers Consulting to satisfy the requirements of "producing a result" under s 87-18(3)(a) is fatal in relation to the results test overall. It is not necessary for the Tribunal to consider the elements in s 87-18(3)(b) and (c) because the three elements in s 87-18(3) which comprise the results test are conjunctive: see IRG Services Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1867 ; 165 FCR 57 at [111] ; Dibarr Pty Ltd [2004] AATA 1030 ; 57 ATR 1183 at [45] and; Nguyen 2005 ATC 2304 at [45]. Nevertheless, for the reasons set out in RSFIC [53] - [57], the Tribunal notes that Coopers Consulting has not satisfied the requirements of s 87-18(3)(c), but there is evidence (of academic relevance only) which would suggest that the requirements of s 87-18(b) may have been satisfied; as set out previously the Tribunal was referred in this context to a tax return by the Company; (see also Re Dibarr Pty Ltd and Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2004] AATA 1030 ; 57 ATR 1183 at [46] ). Since all of the Applicant's personal services income which Coopers Consulting received in the relevant years came from one source, Ajilon, Coopers Consulting was not entitled to self assess the "unrelated clients test" (s 87-20); the "employment test" (s 87- 25 ) or the "business premises test" (s 87-30): see s 87-15(3); Metaskills Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 766 ; 130 FCR 248 at [26] . ) In accordance with s 87-18(3):

 (3) A *personal services entity meets the results test in an income year if, in relation to at least 75% of the *personal services income of one or more individuals that is included in the personal services entity's *ordinary income or *statutory income during the income year:
 (a) the income is for producing a result; and
 (b) the personal services entity is required to supply the *plant and equipment, or tools of trade, needed to perform the work from which the personal services entity produces the result; and
 (c) the personal services entity is, or would be, liable for the cost of rectifying any defect in the work performed.

 The results test in s 87-18(3) has been said to embrace the defining characteristics of an "independent contractor" at common law: see Metaskills [2003] FCA 766 ; [2003] FCA 766 ; 130 FCR 248 at [28] . While such common law principles are useful in interpreting s 87-18(3), it is the text of the section itself which controls the outcome: see IRG Technical Services Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 1867 ; (2007) 165 FCR 57 at [37] and [47] (Allsop J); Re Taneja and Commissioner of Taxation [2009] AATA 87 ; 2009 ATC 10-078 at [27] (Deputy President Professor Walker and Member Frost). Having regard to the observations of Sheller JA in World Book (Australia) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 27 NSWLR 377 at 386, the Commissioner in TR 2001/8: Income tax: what is a personal services business , at [114] defines the phrase "producing a result" in s 87-18(3)(a) to mean:

 [T]he performance of a service by one party for another where the first-mentioned party is free to employ his/her own means (i.e., third party labour, plant and equipment etc) to achieve the contractually specified outcome. As the cases show, the essence of the contract has to be to achieve a result and not to do work. So too what Allsop J said in IRG Technical Services Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 1867 ; 165 FCR 57 , 70[37], 71-72[47], 83-84[110] (Allsop J):

 [I]n my view, the income of Mr Green (the personal services income of the relevant individual included in IRG's income) was not for producing a result. Without restricting what I have already said, it was for the performance of work as a skilled engineer in the business of the KJV as part of a co-ordinated team of engineers and remunerated on an hourly rate for such work. This work involved Mr Green producing, from time to time, documents, schedules and data sheets, and involved him in identifiable tasks and responsibilities. It would not be a reflection of substantial reality, however, to say that his income was for the results he produced. It was for his work as a skilled engineer, which work produced those results or outcomes, as a necessary professional consequence of the work of a skilled lead instrument engineer on such a project.

  (There is no mention in any of them of "milestones". )

 (c) whether the work can be delegated and who bears the risk of costs arising from defective work. See for example, IRG Technical Services Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1867 ; 165 FCR 57 at [44] :

 [44] The capacity of work to be delegated or subcontracted, if present, is a significant factor weighing in favour of a conclusion of an independent contractor. So is the question of risk of costs for defective work.

 Having regard to the authorities the remuneration Coopers Consulting received from Ajilon during the relevant years was not for producing a result within the meaning of s 87-18(3)(a) because: (a) the relevant agreement does not identify any result; Coopers Consulting was simply contracted to provide "professional business services" for the duration of the agreements; (b) Coopers Consulting was not remunerated for producing any result; it was simply remunerated for the days that the Applicant provided professional business services: clause 4.1 of the relevant agreement; (c) The remuneration Coopers Consulting received under the terms of the relevant agreement was not in any way dependent on producing a result; (d) On early termination of the relevant agreement, Coopers Consulting was entitled to "payments ... for all worked performed by the Applicant up to the date of termination" (clause 7.2 of the relevant agreement) - which supports the contention that Coopers Consulting was simply being remunerated for the provision of professional business services by the Applicant; (e) The relevant agreement did not confer any freedom on Coopers Consulting to delegate or subcontract the "professional business services", it was obligated to engage the Applicant: clauses 1.1 and 2.1 of the relevant agreement.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] AATA 215" id="cs1">The results test in s 87-18(3) has been said to embrace the defining characteristics of an "independent contractor" at common law: see Metaskills [2003] FCA 766 ; [2003] FCA 766 ; 130 FCR 248 at [28] . While such common law principles are useful in interpreting s 87-18(3), it is the text of the section itself which controls the outcome: see IRG Technical Services Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 1867 ; (2007) 165 FCR 57 at [37] and [47] (Allsop J); Re Taneja and Commissioner of Taxation [2009] AATA 87 ; 2009 ATC 10-078 at [27] (Deputy President Professor Walker and Member Frost).  Having regard to the preceding provisions, Coopers Consulting cannot be said to have conducted a personal services business because the remuneration it received was not for producing a result within the meaning of s 87-18(3)(a). The conclusions reached in: IRG Technical Services Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1867 ; 165 FCR 57 at [110] ; Dibarr Pty Ltd [2004] AATA 1030 ; 57 ATR 1183 at [43] --- [44]; Re Nguyen and Commissioner of Taxation [2005] AATA 876 ; 2005 ATC 2304 at [38] --- [41] (Member Webb) and Taneja [2009] AATA 87 ; 2009 ATC 10-078 at [35] - [41] are entirely apposite to the circumstances in these proceedings. In particular, the conclusion in Skiba [2007] AATA 1705 ; 67 ATR 682 at [65] - [66] is particularly apt:

 [65] Here, the evidence shows that the personal services income derived by the applicant was not paid upon producing a result but was a fortnightly or monthly payment based on the number of hours logged onto a weekly timesheet while working under the ultimate control of the CESPs and applying skill and effort to assist the CESPs complete the projects for their clients.
 [66] The ongoing skilled work provided by the applicant to the CESPs is not converted into "producing a result" within the meaning of s 87-18(3) by applying the label "deliverables" where the actuality of what occurred was the performance of ongoing work by the applicant (a skilled professional selected by the CESPs and/or their clients as suitable for their needs) under the ultimate control of the CESPs during the term of the contracts.

  The failure on the part of Coopers Consulting to satisfy the requirements of "producing a result" under s 87-18(3)(a) is fatal in relation to the results test overall. It is not necessary for the Tribunal to consider the elements in s 87-18(3)(b) and (c) because the three elements in s 87-18(3) which comprise the results test are conjunctive: see IRG Services Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1867 ; 165 FCR 57 at [111] ; Dibarr Pty Ltd [2004] AATA 1030 ; 57 ATR 1183 at [45] and; Nguyen 2005 ATC 2304 at [45]. Nevertheless, for the reasons set out in RSFIC [53] - [57], the Tribunal notes that Coopers Consulting has not satisfied the requirements of s 87-18(3)(c), but there is evidence (of academic relevance only) which would suggest that the requirements of s 87-18(b) may have been satisfied; as set out previously the Tribunal was referred in this context to a tax return by the Company; (see also Re Dibarr Pty Ltd and Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2004] AATA 1030 ; 57 ATR 1183 at [46] ).  (There is no mention in any of them of "milestones". )

(c) whether the work can be delegated and who bears the risk of costs arising from defective work. See for example, IRG Technical Services Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1867 ; 165 FCR 57 at [44] :

 [44] The capacity of work to be delegated or subcontracted, if present, is a significant factor weighing in favour of a conclusion of an independent contractor. So is the question of risk of costs for defective work.

 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 1224" id="cs2">That being so, the "results test" then falls to be answered. That test is found in s 87 - 18 of the ITAA 1997. In IRG Technical Services Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 1867 ; (2007) 165 FCR 57 at 70, [36] , Allsop J (as his Honour then was) observed of that section that its elements "were to be understood against the background of the jurisprudence concerning independent contractors". In so doing, his Honour referred with approval to an earlier observation made by Lindgren J in Commissioner of Taxation v Metaskills Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 766 ; (2003) 130 FCR 248 at 254, [28], that, "Broadly speaking, an individual or entity, who or which is an 'independent contractor' under traditional concepts should meet the results test.". Their Honours were not in these cases promoting the use of the common law as a substitute for the language of the statute, for that would clearly be erroneous. It is just that, for example, the phrase "the income is for producing a result" in s 87 - 1 (a) and s 87 - 18 (3)(a) of the ITAA 1997 obviously draws upon one of the traditional touchstones for distinguishing between a contract for service and a contract of service. Thus guidance offered by cases decided at common law as to whether a payment is or is not for the production of a result is relevant. That this is what Parliament intended is confirmed by recourse to secondary materials, as Allsop and Lindgren JJ note in their respective judgements. Approaching the matter this way, I respectfully agree with their Honours observations in relation to s 87 - 18 . </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] FCAFC 115" id="cs3">23 Sixth, the result for which the Commissioner contends leads to surprising and unexpected results. The same precondition qualifies s 14U(1)(b)(ii)(B) referring to refusal of a departure authorisation certificate being "detrimental to the interests of Australia". According to Mr Lui, it would be surprising if the Commissioner could only act to avoid a situation detrimental to the interests of Australia if the Commissioner is satisfied that increased or further security cannot be provided. This indicates that the reasonably open alternative construction should be preferred ( IRG Technical Services Pty Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 165 FCR 57 ; [2007] FCA 1867 at [21] ). The same consideration must apply to the exception for humanitarian grounds.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] AATA 626" id="cs4">In IRG Technical Services Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 1867 ; (2007) 165 FCR 57 Allsop J distilled (at [21] and [22]) the principles of interpretation applied in Australia to the text of statutes including revenue statutes. Such principles, of course, apply also to statutes concerning administration of the revenue system. It is not necessary to restate his Honour's distillation, which proceeded from authority at the highest level, beyond noting the legitimacy of adopting a "construction reasonably open and more clearly conforming with the legislative intent otherwise discovered. " I have already expressed the view that a construction of s 14U(1)(b)(ii) which supports Mr Lui's claims in the present case is open but it is not the one, in my view, which more clearly conforms to the apparent legislative intent. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] AATA 87" id="cs5">The taxpayer's submission is that, if the Commissioner accepts for the purposes of paragraph (3)(c) that the Company is liable for the cost of rectifying defects, then by implication "the contract must be for producing a result": Applicant's Submissions, C.11.c. We do not agree. Each paragraph in s 87-18(3) has independent operation: see IRG Technical Services Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 1867 (" IRG "), especially at [37].
 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] NSWCA 322" id="cs6">48 In a practical and commercial sense, Dome was not managed by the corporate entities, Goldspark or FCL: rather, it obtained from those companies the skills, expertise and time of Mr Silver. It was Mr Silver who was the person responsible for managing Dome, in relevant respects. The payment in a practical and commercial sense was made for his services. Neither he nor Dome expected that he would obtain no financial benefit for his time. Nor should the scope of the term "remuneration" be governed by ascribing a literal meaning to the introductory words of the definition, namely a benefit "given to" an officer, or one "received by" a director. For the purposes of disclosure provisions, it would make a mockery of the Corporations Law if directors had been able to avoid disclosure of their remuneration by having companies contract with their family trusts or other entities and make payment to those trusts or other entities, which did not constitute remuneration payable "to" the director. The statutory requirements, as in other fields, may require that conduct be traced through corporate entities, not stopping the analysis at the point where a new entity is introduced: cf Politis (above) and IRG Technical Services Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 1867 ; 165 FCR 57 (Allsop J), both cases involving taxation laws. On this approach, the payments made to both Goldspark and FCL by Dome, for the provision of Mr Silver's personal services, constituted part of his total remuneration from the company. It was therefore, subject to other issues which should now be dealt with, a sum which could properly be inserted in the calculation required by s 200G(2).</sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] AATA 1060" id="cs7">It was contended that IRG Technical Services Pty Ltd  Anor v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 1867 ; (2007) 165 FCR 57 is authority for the proposition that a ruling in not binding on the tribunal. It is also clear that in the absence of reliance, a ruling, although expressed to be public binding ruling, is not in respect of an indirect tax such as GST binding on the respondent. The Ruling in its terms is not binding on the tribunal. </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">ACTS INTERPRETATION ACT 1901 </title>
<title id="l1">ACTS INTERPRETATION ACT 1901 - SECT 15AB Use of extrinsic material in the interpretation of an Act</title>
<title id="l2">INCOME TAX ASSESSMENT ACT 1997 </title>
<title id="l3">TAXATION ADMINISTRATION ACT 1953 </title>
<title id="l4">TAXATION ADMINISTRATION ACT 1953 - SECT 1 Short title [see Note 1]</title>
<title id="l5">TAXATION ADMINISTRATION ACT 1953 - SECT 12 Notice of intention to issue warrant in default of payment</title>
<title id="l6">TAXATION ADMINISTRATION ACT 1953 - SECT 18 Regulations</title>
<title id="l7">TAXATION LAWS AMENDMENT ACT (NO. 6) 2001 </title>
<title id="l8">TAXATION LAWS AMENDMENT ACT (NO. 6) 2001 - SECT 1 Short title [see Note 1]</title>
<title id="l9">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2007] FCAFC 140">sex discrimination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2007] FCAFC 140">registrar's refusal to alter birth certificate of transsexual person</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2007] FCAFC 140">claim of unlawful discrimination on the ground of marital status</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2007] FCAFC 140">whether inconsistency between state and commonwealth legislation  constitutional law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2007] FCAFC 140">whether inconsistency between s 22 sex discrimination act 1984 (cth) and the births, deaths and marriages registration act 1996 (vic)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2006] FCA 901">industrial relations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2006] FCA 901">alleged unlawful termination of employment on grounds of temporary absence from work, complaint to authorities and disability</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2006] FCA 901">whether employee terminated for a temporary absence from work because of illness or injury within the meaning of reg 30c of the workplace relations regulations 1996 (cth)held</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2006] FCA 901">regulation 30c not satisfied and termination not otherwise in breach of s 170ck(2) of the workplace relations act 1996 (cth). the application is dismissed.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 99">industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 99">employment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 99">termination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 99">whether employee's employment was terminated for a reason proscribed in s 170ck(2)(e) of the workplace relations act 1996 (cth). costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.4">cited from="[2005] FCAFC 99">whether costs were incurred because of an unreasonable act or omission in connection with the conduct of the proceeding.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[2004] FCA 1392">industrial</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[2004] FCA 1392">termination of employment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[2004] FCA 1392">unlawful reason</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[2004] FCA 1392">complaint</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[2004] FCA 1392">no complaint made practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.5">cited from="[2004] FCA 1392">strike out</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.6">cited from="[2004] FCA 1392">frivolous application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.0">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 161">industrial relations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 161">termination of employment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 161">whether australian industrial relations commission obliged to consider legality of termination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.3">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 161">whether commission had jurisdiction to deal with allegation that termination was for the reason of the filing of a complaint against employer involving alleged violation of laws or regulations or recourse to competent administrative authorities</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.4">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 161">whether alleged inaccuracies in transcript of commission proceedings a ground for relief in court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.5">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 161">whether commission erred in calculation of compensation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.6">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 161">whether rule relating to calculation of damages for wrongful dismissal applicable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.7">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 161">whether jurisdictional error</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.8">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 161">whether failure to take into account a relevant consideration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.9">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 161">whether jurisdictional error</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.10">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 161">exercise of discretion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.11">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 161">employer willing to pay balance of maximum amount dismissed employee could have received, in order to avoid further proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.12">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 161">whether, if such amount were paid, relief sought by applicant should be refused</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.13">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 161">proper form of order</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.0">citing from="[2010] FMCA 965">industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.1">citing from="[2010] FMCA 965">alleged underpayment of pilots under australian workplace agreements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.2">citing from="[2010] FMCA 965">whether applicant estopped from exercising statutory discretion to enforce obligation to pay increases under australian workplace agreements.  industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.3">citing from="[2010] FMCA 965">alleged duress</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.4">citing from="[2010] FMCA 965">whether illegitimate pressure applied by employer to pilots to enter into australian workplace agreements.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.0">citing from="[2009] FMCA 728">industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.1">citing from="[2009] FMCA 728">unlawful termination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.2">citing from="[2009] FMCA 728">jurisdictional prerequisite</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.3">citing from="[2009] FMCA 728">whether recourse to competent administrative authority.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.0">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 177">industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.1">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 177">termination of employment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.2">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 177">employment terminated because employee had complained to union of over-zealous supervision by manager</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.3">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 177">whether complaint amounted to "recourse" to union</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.4">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 177">whether union was a "competent administrative authority". industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.5">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 177">termination of employment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.6">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 177">statutory proscription of termination for certain reasons</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.7">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 177">reasons derived from terms of international convention</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.8">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 177">adoption of terms in domestic legislation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.9">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 177">construction of convention and statute</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.10">citing from="[2008] FCAFC 177">whether broad or specific meaning to be given to terms of convention.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.0">citing from="[2008] FMCA 638">industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.1">citing from="[2008] FMCA 638">termination of employment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.2">citing from="[2008] FMCA 638">unfair dismissal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.3">citing from="[2008] FMCA 638">provision concerning a probationary period of employment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.4">citing from="[2008] FMCA 638">probation report noted performance as unsatisfactory.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.0">citing from="[2008] FMCA 571">industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.1">citing from="[2008] FMCA 571">unlawful termination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.2">citing from="[2008] FMCA 571">temporary absence due to illness or injury</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.3">citing from="[2008] FMCA 571">reasons for termination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.4">citing from="[2008] FMCA 571">reasons of decision maker</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.5">citing from="[2008] FMCA 571">notice of termination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.6">citing from="[2008] FMCA 571">reasonable notice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.7">citing from="[2008] FMCA 571">whether term implied</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.8">citing from="[2008] FMCA 571">application of company policies.  workplace relations act 1996 (cth) ss.659 , 659 (2)(a), 664 , 665 , 666  jones v dunkel [1959] hca 8 ; [1959] hca 8 ; (1959) 101 clr 298  general motors-holden's pty ltd v bowling (1976) 51 aljr 235</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.0">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.1">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">unlawful termination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.2">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">complaint to employer only does not satisfy criteria of s.659(2)(e)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.3">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">reverse onus of proof not enlivened</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.4">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">s.793(1)(j) may not be limited to interaction with industrial associations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.5">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">discussion of objects clauses</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.6">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">discussion of whether workcover is a "person or body having the capacity under an industrial law" to seek compliance with that law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.7">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">discussion of whether provisions of the occupational health and safety act 2000 (nsw) may be industrial laws</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.8">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">summary dismissal application not frivolous and vexatious only because dismissal not sought below in the australian industrial relations commission.  practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.9">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">no reasonable prospects of success</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.10">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">summary dismissal application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.11">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">appropriate test</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.12">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">discussion of "frivolous and vexatious"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.13">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">application in a case not out of time if proceedings still on foot</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.14">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">grant of interim relief to applicant inappropriate while application to summarily dismiss proceedings pending.  practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.15">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">disqualification application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.16">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">refusal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.17">citing from="[2007] FMCA 2104">allegations of bias not made out.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.0">citing from="[2007] FCA 1917">industrial law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.1">citing from="[2007] FCA 1917">unlawful termination contrary to s 659 workplace relations act 1996 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.2">citing from="[2007] FCA 1917">penalty under s 665</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.3">citing from="[2007] FCA 1917">lost remuneration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.4">citing from="[2007] FCA 1917">superannuation</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2010] FMCA 965" id="cs0">[27] See generally Further Amended Points of Defence, para.122(a) and particulars thereto; G E Dal Pont, Law of Agency (Chatswood, NSW: Butterworths, 2001) para.4.5, page 93. [28] "Pilot Principals". As to the discretionary nature of the order under s.719(6) of the post-reform WR Act see Claveria v Pilkington Australia Limited [2007] FCA 1692 ; (2007) 167 IR 444 at 478-479 (para.147); AFMEPKIU v Mechanical Engineering Services Pty Limited [2007] FCA 1736 at para.21 (" Mechanical Engineering Services "); Flattery v Italian Eatery [2007] FMCA 9 ; (2007) 163 IR 14 at 29 (para.71). [29] [1996] VicRp 67 ; [1996] 2 VR 235 (" Ryan "). [30] Ryan at 239-243, 251, 254 and 267-268.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] FMCA 728" id="cs1">This is to adopt an unjustifiably narrow approach, which is at odds with the history of Art 5(c), and the aim of the Termination of Employment Convention and Art 5(c). The purpose of Art 5(c) is best served if a liberal interpretation of the expression "competent administrative authorities" is adopted, because it extends to an employee the protection against illegitimate retaliatory termination that Art 5(c) was designed to give. [17] </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] AIRC 53" id="cs2">An Order ( 2 [2007] FCA 1692

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 URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AIRC/2009/53.html

 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FCAFC 177" id="cs3">1 There are two issues raised in this appeal from a judgment of a single judge of the Court in Claveria v Pilkington Australia Limited (No 2) [2007] FCA 1917 , in which final orders were made, consequent upon reasons for judgment given earlier in Claveria v Pilkington Australia Ltd [2007] FCA 1692. The issues are whether, for the purposes of s 659(2)(e) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ("the WR Act"), the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union ("the Union"), an organisation of employees registered under the WR Act, fell within the phrase "competent administrative authorities" and, if so, whether the respondent "had recourse" to the Union.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FMCA 638" id="cs4">Kang v Attorney General's Department [2008] FMCA 638 (29 May 2008)

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Last Updated: 10 February 2011

 FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
 KANG v ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT [2008] FMCA 638
 INDUSTRIAL LAW --- Termination of employment --- unfair dismissal --- provision concerning a probationary period of employment --- probation report noted performance as unsatisfactory. Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)
 Claveria v Pilkington Australia Limited [2007] FCA 1692
 He, in the matter of an application for Writs of Mandamus and Certiorari or constitutional relief against Lewin [2004] FCAFC 161
 Robertson v South [2000] FCA 1402
 Zhang v The Royal Australian Chemical Institute Inc. [2005] FCAFC 99
 Zhang v The Royal Australian Chemical Institute Inc . [2006] HCATrans 227
 Zhang v The Royal Australian Chemical Institute Inc. supra
 Applicant: LILI KANG
 Respondent: ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT
 File number: MLG 736 of 2007
 Judgment of: Burnett FM
 Hearing dates: 12, 13 and 14 December 2007
 Date of last submission: 14 December 2007
 Delivered at: Brisbane
 Delivered on: 29 May 2008
 REPRESENTATION
 The Applicant appeared on her own behalf
 Solicitors for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
 ORDERS

 (1) That the application be dismissed.
 FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
 COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
 BRISBANE
 MLG 736 of 2007
 LILI KANG
Applicant

And

 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT
Respondent

 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
 Introduction
 The Applicant, Lili Kang in her application seeks orders for reinstatement to her former position of employment as an APS6 employee of the Attorney-General's Department. She claims that she was unlawfully dismissed within the meaning provided in section 559(2)(a) and/or (e) of the Workplace Relations Act . </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] FMCA 571" id="cs5">Section 664 is substantially identical to s.170CQ of the WR Act as it stood prior to the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (" WorkChoices Act" ) The authorities on s.170CQ and the predecessor provisions are therefore relevant: (see e.g., Laz v Downer Group Ltd at [255] per Moore J and Claveria v Pilkington Australia Ltd [2007] FCA 1692 at [8] per Kenny J). </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] AIRC 196" id="cs6">Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

Price code C

 [1] [2005] FCAFC 99

 [2] PR974659

 [3] PR932454

 [4] PR974880

 [5] [2007] AIRCFB 405

 [6] [2007] FCA 1692

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 URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AIRC/2008/196.html

 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] FMCA 2104" id="cs7">Fairfax's submission relies too heavily on a reading of the Act which limits the sections relied upon by Mr Dowling to the protection of employees from adverse treatment because of their possible interaction, to use a neutral term, with an industrial association. Although the objects of pt.16 are, amongst other things, to protect rights to freedom of association, the protections provided by the sections relied upon by Mr Dowling cannot be limited by the objects set out in s.778 , if only because the section itself says so. But in any event, generally an objects clause in a statute can only be an aid to interpretation; it cannot justify an interpretation which contradicts the clear words of the enactment. Further, it was not submitted by either of the parties that the provisions in question amount to an enactment into Australian law of an international Convention which might require a more liberal construction of the statute than the common law would usually allow: Claveria v Pilkington Australia Ltd [2007] FCA 1692 at [95] . Here, the provisions which Mr Dowling relies on are not ostensibly limited to circumstances where a person proposes an inquiry of or a complaint to an industrial association, as that expression is defined in s.779. It is to be noted that they make no reference to industrial bodies or industrial associations, and thus are unlike most of the other paragraphs in s.793(1). </sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] FCA 1917" id="cs8">In Kelly at [14] Tracey J adopted "as potentially relevant and applicable" to the question of penalty the "non-exhaustive range of considerations" referred to by Mowbray FM in Mason . Plainly enough, the particular circumstances of the contravention are relevant. These circumstances are set out in my earlier reasons for judgment: see generally Claveria v Pilkington Australia Ltd [2007] FCA 1692 , especially at [148]. This case involved the one breach, which occurred on the day of Mr Claveria's termination. In my previous reasons for judgment, I referred to the nature of the respondent's business.</sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT </title>
<title id="l1">WORKPLACE RELATIONS AND OTHER LEGISLATION AMENDMENT ACT 1996 </title>
<title id="l2">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
<title id="l3">INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT 1988 </title>
<title id="l4">INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REFORM ACT 1993 </title>
<title id="l5">INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REFORM ACT 1993 No. 98 of 1993 - SECT 21 </title>
<title id="l6">ACCIDENT COMPENSATION ACT 1985 </title>
<title id="l7">OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT 2004 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>