Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2006] FCA 1418">native title</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2006] FCA 1418">application for an interim injunction to restrain the conduct of an authorisation meeting at hope vale convened by the cape york land council in connection with a native title determination application by the dingaal claim group.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">australian broadcasting corporation v o'neill  defamation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">injunctions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">interlocutory injunctions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">interlocutory injunction to restrain publication</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">appellant restrained from broadcasting documentary film making allegations including that respondent suspected of having committed notorious unsolved crime</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">principles on which interlocutory injunction to restrain publication granted</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.6">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">relevance of "flexible" or "rigid" approaches to granting interlocutory injunctions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.7">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">significance of value of free speech</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.8">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">significance of avoiding "trial by media"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.9">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">whether relevant that only nominal damages likely to be awarded</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.10">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">significance of status of respondent as convicted life prisoner.  injunctions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.11">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">interlocutory injunctions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.12">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">defamation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.13">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">whether general principles governing grant of interlocutory injunctions to restrain wrongs apply to interlocutory applications to restrain publication of allegedly defamatory matter</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.14">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">relationship between beecham group ltd v bristol laboratories pty ltd [1968] hca 1 ; (1968) 118 clr 618 and american cyanamid co v ethicon ltd [1975] ukhl 1 ; [1975] ac 396</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.15">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">whether respondent had made out an entitlement to an interlocutory injunction within the principles established by beecham</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.16">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">whether full court and primary judge shown to have erred in granting of interlocutory injunction.  defamation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.17">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">injunctions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.18">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">jurisdiction to grant interlocutory injunction to restrain publication of allegedly defamatory matter</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.19">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">nature of equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions to restrain publication</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.20">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">effect of common law procedure act 1854 (uk)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.21">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">effect of judicature act 1873 (uk).  appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.22">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">interlocutory injunction in defamation proceedings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.23">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">necessity of demonstrating error in order to justify intervention by high court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.24">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">whether error shown in approach and conclusion of full court and primary judge.  defamation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.25">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">defences</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.26">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">justification</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.27">cited from="[2006] HCA 46">whether avoiding "trial by media" relevant to determination of "public benefit" required by defamation act 1957 (tas) s 15.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[2004] FCA 1652">native title</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[2004] FCA 1652">consent determination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[2004] FCA 1652">whether order under s 87 of the native title act 1993 (cth) appropriate</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[1968] HCA 1">injunctions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[1968] HCA 1">patents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[1968] HCA 1">action for infringement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[1968] HCA 1">interlocutory injunction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[1968] HCA 1">principles governing grant or refusal.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.0">citing from="[2009] FCA 579">native title</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">citing from="[2009] FCA 579">consideration of an application by indigenous respondents to dismiss an application for a compensation determination filed by walmbaar aboriginal corporation as registered native title body corporate for the purposes of the hopevale determination, pursuant to s 50(2) of the native title act 1993 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">citing from="[2009] FCA 579">consideration of the decision-making process by which the prescribed body corporate reached a decision to institute proceedings under s 61(1) of the act</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.3">citing from="[2009] FCA 579">consideration of the rules of the corporation, the provisions of the native title act and native title (prescribed bodies corporate) regulations 1999 as the source of the corporation's authority to commence the proceeding</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2009] FCA 579" id="cs0">The relevance of that proceeding for present purposes is simply that Gordon Charlie continued to assert a different composition of or foundation for the Dingaal clan notwithstanding the Hopevale determination and the terms recited in the Rules of Walmbaar adopted by Gordon Charlie and other Charlie family members. First, the Dingaal clan was said to properly embrace the Brim family and secondly, the Baru and Yoren families were said not to be part of the Dingaal clan. Gordon Charlie was unsuccessful in the injunction application ( Gordon Charlie v Cape York Land Council (No. 2) [2006] FCA 1683). </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993 </title>
<title id="l1">NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993 - SECT 203BB Facilitation and assistance functions</title>
<title id="l2">FEDERAL COURT RULES 1979 </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">project blue sky inc  ors v australian broadcasting authority  statutes</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">construction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">reconciliation of conflicting provisions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">intention of legislature</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">presumption that provisions intended to achieve consistent goals</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">leading and subordinate provisions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.6">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">grammatical meaning and legal meaning.  statutes</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.7">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">construction</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.8">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">acts done in breach of a condition regulating a statutory power</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.9">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">whether invalid</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.10">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">mandatory and directory provisions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.11">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">purpose-based test.  media law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.12">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">television</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.13">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">regulation of programming</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.14">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">australian broadcasting authority</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.15">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">standard prescribing australian content requirements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.16">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">whether inconsistent with legislative requirement that functions be performed consistently with australia's international obligations.  media law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.17">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">television</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.18">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">regulation of programming</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.19">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">australian broadcasting authority</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.20">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">power to make standards that "relate to ... the australian content of programs"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.21">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">whether restricted to standards conferring preferential treatment.  trade law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.22">cited from="[1998] HCA 28">australia new zealand closer economic relations trade agreement.  broadcasting services act 1992 (cth), ss 3 , 122 , 158, 160.  broadcasting services (transitional provisions and consequential amendments) act 1992 (cth), s 21.  tasker v fullwood [1978] 1 nswlr 20 at 23-24 applied.</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 </title>
<title id="l1">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 445D When Court may terminate deed</title>
<title id="l2">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 447A General power to make orders</title>
<title id="l3">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp4.0">cited from="[1993] FCA 498">administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">cited from="[1993] FCA 498">administrative appeals tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">cited from="[1993] FCA 498">application to</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.3">cited from="[1993] FCA 498">extension of time for making</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.4">cited from="[1993] FCA 498">whether inexcusable delay by legal representative acceptable explanation to justify extending time</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.5">cited from="[1993] FCA 498">whether explanation for delay required to be given as a precondition of success in application to extend time. (1) in an application to the aat seeking an extension of time to bring a substantive application, delay occasioned by the fault of the solicitors for the applicant is a consideration which may relevantly be taken into account in favour of the application, and may constitute an explanation sufficient to warrant the granting of the extension of time.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.0">cited from="[1983] FCA 94">judicial review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.1">cited from="[1983] FCA 94">extension of time</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.2">cited from="[1983] FCA 94">considerations to be taken into account</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.3">cited from="[1983] FCA 94">administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 , s.11.  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.4">cited from="[1983] FCA 94">decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.5">cited from="[1983] FCA 94">review of</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.6">cited from="[1983] FCA 94">application for extension of time of prescribed period for application to review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.7">cited from="[1983] FCA 94">whether extension of time should be granted</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.8">cited from="[1983] FCA 94">matters to be taken into account</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.9">cited from="[1983] FCA 94">administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 (cth), ss 5 , 11 (1), 11 (3)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.10">cited from="[1983] FCA 94">public service act 1922 (cth), s. 32a(1). the applicants, some 153 in number, are all public servants employed in the commonwealth department of social services. decisions were made by the respondents, who were senior officers of a commonwealth department, pursuant to s. 32a(1) of the public service act 1922 (cth) that the applicants not be paid salary from a certain date. these decisions were made in november 1981. the times for making applications for review of the decisions pursuant to s. 5 of the administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 (cth) (the act) expired on various days in december 1981. in november 1982 the applicants filed this application seeking an extension of time to institute proceedings under the act for review of the decisions.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.0">cited from="[1983] FCA 91">administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.1">cited from="[1983] FCA 91">judicial review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.2">cited from="[1983] FCA 91">application for extension of time to lodge application under administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.3">cited from="[1983] FCA 91">decision to "stand-down" employees following declarations under s.43a of the telecommunications act 1975</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.4">cited from="[1983] FCA 91">principles relevant to granting extension of time</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.5">cited from="[1983] FCA 91">undue delay.  administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 , s.11  telecommunications act 1975 , s.43a  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.6">cited from="[1983] FCA 91">judicial review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.7">cited from="[1983] FCA 91">application for extension of time to lodge application under administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.8">cited from="[1983] FCA 91">decision to "stand down" employees following declarations under s. 43a of the telecommunications act 1975 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.9">cited from="[1983] FCA 91">principles relevant to granting extension of time</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.10">cited from="[1983] FCA 91">undue delay</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.11">cited from="[1983] FCA 91">relevance of public interest and prejudice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.12">cited from="[1983] FCA 91">administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 (cth), s. 11</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.13">cited from="[1983] FCA 91">telecommunications act 1975 (cth), s. 43a. during a period of industrial dispute the respondent "stood down" certain employees and made directions under s. 43a of the telecommunications act 1975 (cth) that those employees should not be paid their salary for the relevant period. following the end of the dispute the applicants' union commenced inquiries and sought legal advice as to the validity of the order to "stand down". the applicants gave no notice to the respondent of any intention to bring proceedings. the applications for extension of time (within which to lodge applications for orders to review) were lodged about eighteen months after the "stand down" orders.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.0">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.1">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">application for order of review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.2">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">application for extension of time</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.3">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">whether time in which to lodge application with registry can be granted in an application which has been lodged out of time</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.4">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">long delay</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.5">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">not explained by applicant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.6">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">exercise of discretion.  administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 ss.5(1) , 8 , 11 (1)(c)  federal court of australia act 1976 s.19  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.7">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">applications for orders of review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.8">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">application seeking extension of time</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.9">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">whether court had power to extend time for lodging applications</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.10">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">no satisfactory explanation of delay in lodging applications</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.11">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">exercise of discretion by court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.12">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 (cth), ss. 5 , 8 , 11</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.13">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">federal court of australia act 1976 (cth), s. 19</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.14">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">federal court rules , o. 54, r. 4; o. 3, r. 3</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.15">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">public service act 1922 (cth), s. 32a</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.16">cited from="[1982] FCA 159">conciliation and arbitration act 1904 (cth). the fifteen applicants were employed in the department of social security under the public service act 1922 (the act). each applicant was a member of the administrative and clerical officers' association which was an organization of employees under the conciliation and arbitration act 1904, as amended. during november 1981 each applicant refused to perform normal duties because work bans were in force and, in purported exercise of powers under s. 32a of the act their superiors declared that each applicant was not to be paid a salary.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.0">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">administrative decisions (judicial review) act, 1977</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.1">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">notice of objection to competency on ground that applicant not a "person aggrieved"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.2">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">whether applicant an "aboriginal body"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.3">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">whether decision set out findings, references to evidence and reasons</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.4">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">interrelation of s.11(3) and s. 13 of the administrative decisions (judicial review) act considered</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.5">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">whether request "in accordance with" or "under" s.13(1)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.6">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">whether "not entitled to make the request"  administrative decisions (judicial review) act , s.5(1) , s. 11 (1), s. 11 (3), s. 11 (4), s. 13 (1), s. 13 (4a), s. 13 (5).  aboriginal development commission act, s.3, s.4(1), s,8, s.27(1), s.24(1), s.28.  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.7">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">application for extension of time to apply for order of review of decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.8">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">notice of objection to competency</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.9">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">whether applicant was a "person aggrieved"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.10">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">whether applicant was entitled to request a statement under s. 13 of the administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.11">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">meaning of "aboriginal body"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.12">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">observations concerning prescribed period under s. 11(3)(a)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.13">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">whether request was "made under" s. 13(1)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.14">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">meaning of provisions of s. 13(4a)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.15">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">criteria for court to consider in extending time</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.16">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">aboriginal development commission act 1980 (cth), ss 3 , 4 (1), 8 , 24 (1), 27 (1), 28</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.17">cited from="[1982] FCA 153">administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 (cth), ss 5(1) , 11 (1), 11 (3), 11 (4), 13 (1), 13 (4a), 13 (5). section 4(1) of the aboriginal development commission act 1980 (cth) provides as follows:  "in this act unless the contrary intention appears, 'aboriginal body' means a body corporate</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.0">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.1">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">australian military regulations, redress of wrongs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.2">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">application for extension of time</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.3">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">grounds upon which to exercise discretion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.4">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">length of delay</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.5">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">whether applicant a "person aggrieved"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.6">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">whether alternative remedy.  administrative decisions (judicial review) act s.5(1) , s. 11 (1)(c) s. 10 (2) (b) (ii).  australian military regulations 194, 765, 769.  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.7">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">judicial review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.8">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">extension of time to lodge application for order of review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.9">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">principles upon which granted</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.10">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 (cth), ss 10(2)(b)(ii) , 11 (1)(c).  defence and war</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.11">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">compulsory retirement</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.12">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">member not promoted</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.13">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">complaint dismissed by chief of general staff</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.14">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">judicial review sought by member</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.15">cited from="[1982] FCA 124">australian military regulations, regs 194, 765, 769. the applicant retired as an officer in the australian regular army on 31 december 1981, at the compulsory retiring age of forty-seven years for officers not promoted above the rank of major. prior to his retirement, he lodged a complaint under reg. 194 of the australian military regulations claiming he should have been promoted. the complaint was referred direct to the chief of general staff and dismissed in january 1981. on 4 december 1981 the applicant applied to the court for further time within which to lodge an application for an order of review pursuant to s. 11(1) of the administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 (cth), as the twenty-eight day period for lodging such an application had expired ten months earlier. although the applicant had retired from the army by the time the matter came before the court, he claimed that he had been prejudiced in his career in the army and in later civilian life by the lack of promotion. on the question of delay the applicant gave evidence, accepted by the court, that throughout the whole of the ten month period he had been active in various ways in attempting to have the decision of the chief of general staff reviewed, but only recently became aware of his rights under the act and immediately took steps to make application to the court.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.0">cited from="[1953] HCA 25">practice</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.1">cited from="[1953] HCA 25">taxing officer</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.2">cited from="[1953] HCA 25">bill of costs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.3">cited from="[1953] HCA 25">taxation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.4">cited from="[1953] HCA 25">certificate</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.5">cited from="[1953] HCA 25">signed immediately after completion of taxation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.6">cited from="[1953] HCA 25">effect</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.7">cited from="[1953] HCA 25">objections</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.8">cited from="[1953] HCA 25">re-opening of taxation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.9">cited from="[1953] HCA 25">alteration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.10">cited from="[1953] HCA 25">application to high court for order to review</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.11">cited from="[1953] HCA 25">decisions involving discretionary judgments</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.12">cited from="[1953] HCA 25">presumption in favour of correctness</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.13">cited from="[1953] HCA 25">affirmation unless clearly wrong</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.14">cited from="[1953] HCA 25">high court rules, o. liv., rr. 53, 54, 55, 67.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.0">citing from="[2010] FMCA 701">practice  procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.1">citing from="[2010] FMCA 701">extension of time to commence proceedings pursuant to s.46po of the australian human rights commission act 1986</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.2">citing from="[2010] FMCA 701">decision made without oral hearing.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.0">citing from="[2010] FMCA 100">human rights</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.1">citing from="[2010] FMCA 100">application for an extension of time under s.46po of the australian human rights commission act 1986 (cth).</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.0">citing from="[2008] AATA 967">child support</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.1">citing from="[2008] AATA 967">child support assessment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.2">citing from="[2008] AATA 967">objection</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.3">citing from="[2008] AATA 967">application for review to the social security appeals tribunal (ssat) was outside the prescribed time limit</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.4">citing from="[2008] AATA 967">application for extension of time refused by ssat</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.0">citing from="[2006] FCA 1325">discrimination law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.1">citing from="[2006] FCA 1325">application pursuant to human rights and equal opportunity commission act 1986 (cth) s 46po</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.2">citing from="[2006] FCA 1325">allegation of unlawful discrimination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.3">citing from="[2006] FCA 1325">racial discrimination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.4">citing from="[2006] FCA 1325">disability discrimination</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.5">citing from="[2006] FCA 1325">complaint made to human rights and equal opportunity commission</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.6">citing from="[2006] FCA 1325">complaint terminated as trivial, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.7">citing from="[2006] FCA 1325">whether allegations of religious or political discrimination also before court. practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.8">citing from="[2006] FCA 1325">application to extend time for filing application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.9">citing from="[2006] FCA 1325">discretion of court</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.10">citing from="[2006] FCA 1325">principles to be applied in exercising discretion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.11">citing from="[2006] FCA 1325">whether merits of applicant's claim sufficient to warrant exercise of discretion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.12">citing from="[2006] FCA 1325">whether any reasonable prospect of success.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.0">citing from="[2006] FCA 869">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.1">citing from="[2006] FCA 869">extension of time sought for leave to appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.2">citing from="[2006] FCA 869">principles to be applied</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.3">citing from="[2006] FCA 869">whether delay adequately explained</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.4">citing from="[2006] FCA 869">fairness and equity</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.5">citing from="[2006] FCA 869">whether prejudice to the respondents</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.6">citing from="[2006] FCA 869">merits of application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.7">citing from="[2006] FCA 869">whether applicant sexually harassed practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.8">citing from="[2006] FCA 869">summary dismissal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.9">citing from="[2006] FCA 869">principles of summary dismissal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.10">citing from="[2006] FCA 869">whether case so very clear as to justify summary intervention to prevent the applicant submitting his case for determination practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.11">citing from="[2006] FCA 869">interlocutory relief</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.12">citing from="[2006] FCA 869">leave to appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.0">citing from="[2006] FCA 812">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.1">citing from="[2006] FCA 812">human rights</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.2">citing from="[2006] FCA 812">extension of time sought for application under s 46po(2) human rights and equal opportunity commission act 1986 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.3">citing from="[2006] FCA 812">principles to be applied</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.4">citing from="[2006] FCA 812">whether delay adequately explained</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.5">citing from="[2006] FCA 812">merits of application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.6">citing from="[2006] FCA 812">disability discrimination in employment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.7">citing from="[2006] FCA 812">whether a disability</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.8">citing from="[2006] FCA 812">whether indirect discrimination</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2010] FMCA 701" id="cs0">The applicant submits that the delay resulted from administrative failures which caused the termination notice dated 10 February 2010 to not be received when it was apparently originally sent and that once he learned of the termination of his complaint he acted expeditiously to file an application with the Court. Further, by reference to what Cowdroy J said in Ingram-Nader v Brinks Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 624 ; (2006) 151 FCR 524 , the applicant submitted that the only period relevant for consideration of prejudice is the period following the expiry of the period prescribed by s.46PO(2) and that the minor delay in filing his application could not have been the cause of any prejudice to the respondents. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] FMCA 100" id="cs1">It is also necessary to consider any prejudice to the respondent arising from the delay, bearing in mind that in this case the delay in issue is the delay in filing the application. In that respect it is relevant to have regard to Ingram-Nader v Brinks Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 524 ; [2006] FCA 624 , in which Cowdroy J pointed out that he had " not been referred to any authority in which a court ha [d] taken into account prejudice caused by delay prior to the commencement of the prescribed period " (at [17]), and that the only relevant period for consideration of prejudice was the time following the expiration of the prescribed period and prior to the filing of the application. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] AATA 967" id="cs2">This approach was adopted by McInnis FM in Phillips v Australian Girls' Choir and Another [2001] FMCA 109 where the Federal Magistrate said it is clear that this principle referred to by Wilcox J in the Hunter Valley case needs to be modified so that it is no longer regarded as law that an applicant has to show an acceptable explanation for delay, or that it is fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend time, as a pre-condition to the exercise of discretion in favour of the applicant. The Federal Magistrate's approach was endorsed by Cowdroy J in Ingram-Nader v Brinks Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 624 ; (2006) 151 FCR 524 and more recently in Budd v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] FCA 1540. According to McInnis FM, the principles which should be regarded when determining whether to grant an extension of time are as follows: There is no onus of proof upon an applicant for extension of time though an application has to be made. Special circumstances need not be shown, but the court will not grant the application unless positively satisfied it is proper to do so.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2006] FCA 1325" id="cs3">However, the mere absence of prejudice was not enough to justify the grant of an extension. Importantly, he added that the merits of the substantial application were properly to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted. In Ingram-Nader v Brinks Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 624 , Cowdroy J held (at [12]) that those principles were relevant to an application under s 46PO. I am of the same view.
 THE REASON FOR THE DELAY

 In support of her application to extend time, Ms Bahonko tendered a number of medical certificates.</sentence>
<sentence from="[2006] FCA 869" id="cs4">28 The issue of prejudice in the context of cases involving an application for extension of time was recently discussed by Cowdroy J in Ingram-Nader v Brinks Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 624 at par 16. His Honour referred to comments of Bray CJ in Lovett v Le Gall (1975) 10 SASR 479:

 'If the defendant has suffered no prejudice, as when he was well aware within the limitation period of the plaintiff's claim, or where the excess period of time is small, or where he cannot show that he has lost anything by reason of the delay, it may well be that the court will not find it difficult to come to the conclusion that it is fair and equitable in the circumstances to grant the extension. ' (at 485) </sentence>
<sentence from="[2006] FCA 812" id="cs5">19 The discretion of the Court conferred by the words 'or within such further time as the court concerned allows' appearing in s 46PO(2) HREOC Act is similar to the discretion given to the Court in s 11(1) Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (' ADJR Act '). Principles applicable to the exercise of the discretion under s 46PO(2) were described by McInnis FM in Phillips v Australian Girls Choir [2001] FMCA 109 , based in turn on principles formulated by Wilcox J in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 176 ; (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348 in relation to s11 ADJR Act . These considerations articulated in Phillips have been applied in a number of Federal Court decisions including Pham , Ingram-Nader v Brinks Australia Pty Limited [2005] FCA 1541 (Jacobsen J) and Ingram-Nader v Brinks Australia Pty Limited [2006] FCA 624 (Cowdroy J), and are relevant in the case before me. The principles listed by McInnis FM are as follows:

 1. There is no onus of proof upon an applicant for extension of time though an application has to be made.</sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS (JUDICIAL REVIEW) ACT 1977 </title>
<title id="l1">ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS (JUDICIAL REVIEW) ACT 1977 - SECT 11 Manner of making applications</title>
<title id="l2">BANKRUPTCY ACT 1966 </title>
<title id="l3">BANKRUPTCY ACT 1966 - SECT 106 Trustee may administer oaths etc.</title>
<title id="l4">SEX DISCRIMINATION ACT 1984 </title>
<title id="l5">SEX DISCRIMINATION ACT 1984 - SECT 3 Objects</title>
<title id="l6">SEX DISCRIMINATION ACT 1984 - SECT 28A Meaning of sexual harassment</title>
<title id="l7">SEX DISCRIMINATION ACT 1984 - SECT 28B Employment, partnerships etc.</title>
<title id="l8">SEX DISCRIMINATION ACT 1984 - SECT 106 Vicarious liability etc.</title>
<title id="l9">HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ACT 1986 </title>
<title id="l10">HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ACT 1986 No. 125 of 1986 - SECT 3 Interpretation</title>
<title id="l11">FEDERAL COURT RULES 1979 </title>
<title id="l12">HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ACT 1986 - SECT 46P Lodging a complaint</title>
<title id="l13">HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ACT 1986 - SECT 46PH Termination of complaint</title>
<title id="l14">HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ACT 1986 - SECT 46PO Application to court if complaint is terminated</title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2003] AATA 770">social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2003] AATA 770">benefits and entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2003] AATA 770">eligibility</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2003] AATA 770">assets</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2003] AATA 770">whether applicant is a home-owner</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.5">cited from="[2003] AATA 770">characterisation of monies owed by a trust to the applicant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.6">cited from="[2003] AATA 770">whether monies amount to a "financial asset" under the social security act 1991  social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.7">cited from="[2003] AATA 770">benefits and entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.8">cited from="[2003] AATA 770">age pension</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.9">cited from="[2003] AATA 770">overpayment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.10">cited from="[2003] AATA 770">whether applicant received monies to which he was not entitled</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.11">cited from="[2003] AATA 770">whether debt should be recovered</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2002] AATA 407">social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2002] AATA 407">pensions, benefits and allowances</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2002] AATA 407">newstart allowance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2002] AATA 407">whether applicant's assets exceed assets test limit</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2002] AATA 407">"reasonable security of tenure"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[2002] AATA 407">whether applicant is deemed to be a homeowner</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[1993] AATA 384">social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[1993] AATA 384">rent assistance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[1993] AATA 384">whether applicant a homeowner</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">cited from="[1993] AATA 384">whether right to share in proceeds of sale of principal home a right or interest</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.4">cited from="[1993] AATA 384">whether reasonable security of tenure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.5">cited from="[1993] AATA 384">whether pays or is liable to pay rent</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.6">cited from="[1993] AATA 384">decision set aside.   words and phrases</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.7">cited from="[1993] AATA 384">"homeowner"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.8">cited from="[1993] AATA 384">"right or interest"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.9">cited from="[1993] AATA 384">"reasonable security of tenure"   social security act 1991 ss. 11(4) , 11 (8), 1066 -d1,</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.0">cited from="[1989] HCA 63">landlord and tenant (q.)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.1">cited from="[1989] HCA 63">lease</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.2">cited from="[1989] HCA 63">instrument capable of being registered</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.3">cited from="[1989] HCA 63">non-registration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.4">cited from="[1989] HCA 63">entry into possession</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.5">cited from="[1989] HCA 63">payment of rent</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.6">cited from="[1989] HCA 63">guarantee of lessee's obligations "under this lease"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.7">cited from="[1989] HCA 63">whether non-registration failure of consideration for guarantee</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.8">cited from="[1989] HCA 63">default by lessee</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.9">cited from="[1989] HCA 63">whether lessee's obligations under lease</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.10">cited from="[1989] HCA 63">real property act 1861 (q.). s. 43</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp3.11">cited from="[1989] HCA 63">property law act 1974 (q.), s. 129(1).</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.0">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">lien</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">equitable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">contract for provision of work, labour and materials</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.3">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">progress payments</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.4">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">whether lien obtained over unfinished object</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.5">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">whether dependent upon right to specific enforcement of contract.  contract</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.6">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">character</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.7">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">work, labour and materials or sale of goods.  bankruptcy</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.8">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">preference</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.9">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">contract for prefabrication of house</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.10">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">risk with builder until practical completion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.11">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">property not to pass until full payment of price</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.12">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">progress payments</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.13">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">builder placed in liquidation before completion</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.14">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">prior agreement for purchaser to pay for work done after last progress payment and take unfinished house</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.15">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">whether preference</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.16">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">companies act 1961 (w.a.), s. 293</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.17">cited from="[1983] HCA 7">bankruptcy act 1966 (cth), s. 122.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.0">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">real property</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.1">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">grazing licence granted pursuant to statute</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.2">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">not assignable</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.3">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">terminable on notice by minister</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.4">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">whether estate or interest in land</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.5">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">whether profit a prendre</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.6">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">crown lands act 1931 (n.t.), s. 107(1)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.7">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">crown land regulations (n.t.), regs. 70, 71, 71a.  aboriginal lands</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.8">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">traditional land claim</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.9">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">unalienated crown land</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.10">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">application to aboriginal land commissioner</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.11">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">report</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.12">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">findings</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.13">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">comment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.14">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">aboriginal land rights (northern territory) act 1970 (cth), s. 50.  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.15">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">mandamus</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.16">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">commissioner to ascertain whether aboriginals traditional owners of land and if so to recommend grant of land</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.17">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">findings to be reported to minister</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.18">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">requirement to have regard to various matters</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.19">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">requirement to comment on other matters</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.20">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">whether in deciding whether to recommend grant commissioner bound to have regard to matters for comment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.21">cited from="[1982] HCA 69">aboriginal land rights (northern territory) act 1976 (cth), s. 50.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.0">cited from="[1959] HCA 45">landlord and tenant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.1">cited from="[1959] HCA 45">lease or licence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.2">cited from="[1959] HCA 45">test</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.3">cited from="[1959] HCA 45">right to exclusive possession.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.0">citing from="[2011] AATA 360">social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.1">citing from="[2011] AATA 360">rent assistance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.2">citing from="[2011] AATA 360">ineligible homeowner</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.3">citing from="[2011] AATA 360">applicant is director of corporation acting as trustee for unit trust that owns the property the applicant is renting</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.4">citing from="[2011] AATA 360">reasonable security of tenure in home</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.5">citing from="[2011] AATA 360">symmetrical relationship between landlord and tenant</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp8.6">citing from="[2011] AATA 360">decision under review affirmed.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.0">citing from="[2010] AATA 736">social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.1">citing from="[2010] AATA 736">newstart allowance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.2">citing from="[2010] AATA 736">whether assets of applicant exceed asset value limit</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.3">citing from="[2010] AATA 736">should a loan to a trust be considered an asset</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.4">citing from="[2010] AATA 736">loan may not be recognised as such under the social security act 1991 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp9.5">citing from="[2010] AATA 736">decision set aside and remitted to the secretary for reconsideration of the application in accordance with reasons given.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.0">citing from="[2010] AATA 442">social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.1">citing from="[2010] AATA 442">newstart allowance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.2">citing from="[2010] AATA 442">"asset hardship" provisions</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.3">citing from="[2010] AATA 442">whether loan to trust exists</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.4">citing from="[2010] AATA 442">whether unrealisable asset</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.5">citing from="[2010] AATA 442">decision under review affirmed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.0">citing from="[2010] AATA 466">social welfare</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.1">citing from="[2010] AATA 466">overpayments and debt recovery</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.2">citing from="[2010] AATA 466">family tax benefit</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.3">citing from="[2010] AATA 466">rent assistance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.4">citing from="[2010] AATA 466">applicant not an "ineligible homeowner"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.5">citing from="[2010] AATA 466">security of tenure not a consequence of interest in land</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.6">citing from="[2010] AATA 466">decision under review affirmed   words  phrases</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp11.7">citing from="[2010] AATA 466">"reasonable security of tenure"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.0">citing from="[2010] AATA 252">social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.1">citing from="[2010] AATA 252">pensions, benefits and entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.2">citing from="[2010] AATA 252">applicant in receipt of family tax benefit including component of rent allowance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.3">citing from="[2010] AATA 252">applicant an ineligible homeowner</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.4">citing from="[2010] AATA 252">cancellation of rent allowance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp12.5">citing from="[2010] AATA 252">decision affirmed.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.0">citing from="[2010] AATA 167">social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.1">citing from="[2010] AATA 167">age pension</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.2">citing from="[2010] AATA 167">rejection of application for rent assistance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.3">citing from="[2010] AATA 167">tenant a shareholder in the company that owns the property</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.4">citing from="[2010] AATA 167">ineligible homeowner</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.5">citing from="[2010] AATA 167">right or interest in person's principle home</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.6">citing from="[2010] AATA 167">right or interest gives rise to reasonable security of tenure in the home</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp13.7">citing from="[2010] AATA 167">decision affirmed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.0">citing from="[2010] AATA 124">social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.1">citing from="[2010] AATA 124">benefits and entitlements</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.2">citing from="[2010] AATA 124">newstart allowance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp14.3">citing from="[2010] AATA 124">correct interpretation of ss 611, 1118(b), 1121 social security act 1991 (cth).</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.0">citing from="[2009] AATA 702">taxation</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.1">citing from="[2009] AATA 702">superannuation shortfall guarantee</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.2">citing from="[2009] AATA 702">market research interviewers</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.3">citing from="[2009] AATA 702">whether employees or independent contractors</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.4">citing from="[2009] AATA 702">control over manner of performing tasks</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.5">citing from="[2009] AATA 702">s 12 superannuation guarantee (administration) act 1992</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp15.6">citing from="[2009] AATA 702">decision affirmed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.0">citing from="[2009] AATA 668">social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.1">citing from="[2009] AATA 668">disability support pension</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.2">citing from="[2009] AATA 668">debt due to the commonwealth</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.3">citing from="[2009] AATA 668">quantum of debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.4">citing from="[2009] AATA 668">whether debt should be waived</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.5">citing from="[2009] AATA 668">"special circumstances"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp16.6">citing from="[2009] AATA 668">decision under review is varied.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.0">citing from="[2009] AATA 624">social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.1">citing from="[2009] AATA 624">assessment for age pension and disability support pension</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.2">citing from="[2009] AATA 624">ownership of properties</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.3">citing from="[2009] AATA 624">whether homeowners</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.4">citing from="[2009] AATA 624">whether principal place of residence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp17.5">citing from="[2009] AATA 624">eligibility for rent assistance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.0">citing from="[2008] AATA 1141">social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.1">citing from="[2008] AATA 1141">parenting allowance</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.2">citing from="[2008] AATA 1141">parenting payment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.3">citing from="[2008] AATA 1141">private company</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.4">citing from="[2008] AATA 1141">change in circumstances</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.5">citing from="[2008] AATA 1141">assets not declared</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.6">citing from="[2008] AATA 1141">shareholder loan to company</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.7">citing from="[2008] AATA 1141">real estate owned by partner</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.8">citing from="[2008] AATA 1141">loan not repaid</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.9">citing from="[2008] AATA 1141">asset</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.10">citing from="[2008] AATA 1141">overpayment debt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.11">citing from="[2008] AATA 1141">debt not solely the result of administrative error</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.12">citing from="[2008] AATA 1141">no special circumstances</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp18.13">citing from="[2008] AATA 1141">decision affirmed</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.0">citing from="[2007] AATA 1503">social security</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.1">citing from="[2007] AATA 1503">rate of age pension</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.2">citing from="[2007] AATA 1503">assets</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.3">citing from="[2007] AATA 1503">homeowner</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.4">citing from="[2007] AATA 1503">right or interest in principal home</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.5">citing from="[2007] AATA 1503">reasonable security of tenure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.6">citing from="[2007] AATA 1503">bare trustee</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp19.7">citing from="[2007] AATA 1503">tenancy at will</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2011] AATA 360" id="cs0">But that fact does not mean that Mr Halliday is not a "homeowner" within the meaning of that word in the Act. As Greenwood J explained in Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations v Vanderpluym [2007] FCA 876 ; (2007) 161 FCR 388 at 402:

 Section 11(4)(b) of the Social Security Act contemplates a point on a continuum of possible rights or interests. An applicant may be a registered proprietor; a beneficiary under a unit or discretionary trust; a party with the benefit of an agreement for lease for three years or more; a lessee under a registered lease pursuant to such an agreement; a lessee occupying premises pursuant to such arrangements where the lease has not been registered by the lessor; a lessee under an unregistered short term lease for a period of less than three years; a tenant under a written tenancy agreement for a fixed term; a weekly tenant under a written agreement or a weekly tenant under oral arrangements with no fixed term and no terms other than those implied by law. In the last case, the measure of the right or interest enjoyed by the applicant tenant might simply be a right to remedial relief in aid of occupation of the premises to restrain a breach of an obligation implied by law and in that sense the tenant might enjoy an equitable interest. Of course, vesting property (land and a residence) in a company or, for example, a corporate trustee of a discretionary trust coupled with a tenancy agreement conferring occupation in favour of a pension applicant related to the shareholders or directors of the entity has the apparent structural advantage of placing ownership of the home at arms-length yet retaining security of tenure in the home so as to enable a pension applicant to say that he or she is not, in orthodox terms, a homeowner and therefore entitled to a higher assets value limit for the calculation of the relevant pension entitlement. The social policy of the Social Security Act is to adopt a broad notion of 'homeowner' by s 11(4)(b) so as to ensure that those applicants (or their partners) who have a right or interest in a residence which gives reasonable security of tenure in the home are to be treated as homeowners for the purposes of calculating assets value limits and thus pension entitlements.

 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] AATA 736" id="cs1">During the hearing of this application, I stated that if there had not been an advance of money by the applicant into the funds of the Trust there may not be a "loan" for the purposes of s 1122 of the Act as this would not be a case where "a person lends an amount" in terms of the section. Certainly in one recent case where the Federal Court of Australia considered s 1122 , there were funds advanced and still unpaid by the applicant. [10] One issue that was raised was the conceptual difficulty of the enforcement of a loan. This would require the applicant as trustee being sued by the applicant themselves. In the hearing, I raised for consideration that if there was not a transaction of a loan, the entry in the accounts of the Trust of the sum of $3,740,897.65 might nevertheless represent some other "asset" of the applicant such as the value of the equity of redemption of the applicant. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] AATA 442" id="cs2">The Federal Court in Secretary, Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Dolores Vanderpluym [2007] FCA 876 also concluded that for the purposes of s 1122 of the Act, so much of the loan that remains unpaid is to be included in the calculation of the assets:

 "....As to the monies lent by Mr Vanderpluym to MMPL being the further advances, the remaining unpaid amount of those loans properly forms part of the assets of Mr Vanderpluym and is properly brought to account within the assets value limit calculation applicable to Mrs Vanderpluym...."

 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] AATA 466" id="cs3">Mr Black of counsel, who appeared for the Secretary, submitted that Mr Iva's interest as a co-owner permitted him a right of occupation but that right must be qualified in a case such as this by the absence of any beneficial interest in the land. The case for the Secretary was put on the footing that an "objective assessment" [6] of the relationship between Mr Iva and his parents could demonstrate the type of "symmetrical relationship" described by Greenwood J in Vanderpluym . But that case, in my view, was entirely different. The applicants there were renting from a proprietary company of which one of the applicants was the sole director and member. There was, in reality, a symmetrical relationship between landlord and tenant. It could not be reasonably expected that one applicant, qua director of the landlord company, would take steps adverse to his interests as a tenant. That is not the situation that arises here. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] AATA 252" id="cs4">In that case, Mr Vanderpluym was sole director and shareholder of the company which owned the principal home in which he and his wife enjoyed exclusive occupancy on a weekly basis pursuant to oral agreement only. Greenwood J held that the weekly tenancy arrangement coupled with occupation and payment of rent gave rise to an equitable interest in the residence [14] . This was sufficient for Mr Vanderpluym to have a right or interest in the principal home for the purposes of s 11(4)(b) of the SS Act. Because of the control of the tenancy arrangement exercisable by Mr Vanderpluym as sole director and shareholder of the company which owned the principal home, Greenwood J also held that the interest they had in the home gave them reasonable security of tenure in the home, saying: .

 61. ........in this case, Mr and Mrs Vanderpluym enjoyed an equitable interest in the residence in circumstances where they could hold no doubt as to the assured continuity of occupation of the home. The symmetrical relationship between the landlord and the tenant in the sense that either Mr Vanderpluym or Mrs and Mrs Vanderpluym by consensus controlled both the occupation of the premises and the conduct of the landlord makes it clear that Mrs Vanderpluym enjoyed a very high threshold of security of tenure in the residence as principal home.

  For the respondent, Robert Hamilton submitted that the effect of the arrangements between Mr and Mrs Stillhard, on the one hand, and the Fund, on the other hand, is that, as trustees of the Fund which owns the property, Mr and Mrs Stillhard executed a lease of the property to themselves as tenants. Mr Hamilton submitted that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the FA Act and the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (the SS Act), the Federal Court decision Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations and Vanderpluym [9] and the Tribunal and Federal Magistrates Court decisions in Dart and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [10] , Mrs Stillhard was an ineligible homeowner because the property is her principal home and she a right or interest in the property which gives her reasonable security of tenure in it.
  It is common ground that the property is the principal home of Mr and Mrs Stillhard and that the Fund is the legal owner of the property. The concept of homeowner in s 11(4)(b) of the SS Act is not limited to the person who has indefeasible title to the land on which the principal residence is built [11] . It includes the tenant of a principal home which, through the device of a discretionary trust of which the tenant is the principal beneficiary, is owned by a trustee company of which the tenant is also sole director and shareholder [12] . Also, absent a trust arrangement, it includes the tenant of a principal home that is owned by a company of which the tenant is sole director and shareholder as arose in Secretary, Department of Workplace Relations v Vanderpluym [13] . There, Greenwood J, noting that s 11(4)(b) of the SS Act did not provide a definition of right or interest , said :

 49. ...........a right or interest in the principal home is synonymous with a right or interest in real property ( Delos Reyes and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1993] AATA 384 ; (1993) 32 ALD 287 p 290; Re Schultz and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2003] AATA 770 ; [2003] 76 ALD 247) ; an interest in property is a right of a proprietary nature not a mere personal right ( Delos , p 291); a person occupying a property even under a tenancy at will with no written agreement is to be regarded as having an interest in real property and not simply as having rights under a contract and such an interest is a 'right or interest in a residence' for the purpose of the section ( Re Johnston and Repatriation Commission (31 May 1994, AAT, Full Tribunal, unreported No. 9508); a tenancy at will is enforceable at equity and confers an interest in real property which represents a right or interest under the section ( Koch and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2002] AATA 407 ; (2002) 68 ALD 651 at p 655 [18]); lessees under a written lease for three years with two 5 year options from a company controlled by the lessees enjoyed a right of interest under the Act ( Re Secretary of Social Security and Williams (1998) 52 ALD 418) ; established legal relationships put in place by an applicant should be given their real legal effect in determining whether an unpaid loan to a trustee of a discretionary trust should be brought to account as an asset of a claimant ( Re Schultz ). ......

  It is common ground that the property is the principal home of Mr and Mrs Stillhard and that the Fund is the legal owner of the property. The concept of homeowner in s 11(4)(b) of the SS Act is not limited to the person who has indefeasible title to the land on which the principal residence is built [11] . It includes the tenant of a principal home which, through the device of a discretionary trust of which the tenant is the principal beneficiary, is owned by a trustee company of which the tenant is also sole director and shareholder [12] . Also, absent a trust arrangement, it includes the tenant of a principal home that is owned by a company of which the tenant is sole director and shareholder as arose in Secretary, Department of Workplace Relations v Vanderpluym [13] . There, Greenwood J, noting that s 11(4)(b) of the SS Act did not provide a definition of right or interest , said :

 49. ...........a right or interest in the principal home is synonymous with a right or interest in real property ( Delos Reyes and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1993] AATA 384 ; (1993) 32 ALD 287 p 290; Re Schultz and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2003] AATA 770 ; [2003] 76 ALD 247) ; an interest in property is a right of a proprietary nature not a mere personal right ( Delos , p 291); a person occupying a property even under a tenancy at will with no written agreement is to be regarded as having an interest in real property and not simply as having rights under a contract and such an interest is a 'right or interest in a residence' for the purpose of the section ( Re Johnston and Repatriation Commission (31 May 1994, AAT, Full Tribunal, unreported No. 9508); a tenancy at will is enforceable at equity and confers an interest in real property which represents a right or interest under the section ( Koch and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2002] AATA 407 ; (2002) 68 ALD 651 at p 655 [18]); lessees under a written lease for three years with two 5 year options from a company controlled by the lessees enjoyed a right of interest under the Act ( Re Secretary of Social Security and Williams (1998) 52 ALD 418) ; established legal relationships put in place by an applicant should be given their real legal effect in determining whether an unpaid loan to a trustee of a discretionary trust should be brought to account as an asset of a claimant ( Re Schultz ). ......

 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] AATA 167" id="cs5">Mr Ivory is a shareholder in the company that owns the property. Shareholders do not have any legal or equitable interest in the property of a company simply because they hold shares in that company. But the cases make it clear that the social security law takes a broader view of what might constitute a right or interest in property: see Secretary, Department of Workplace Relations v Vanderpluym [2007] FCA 876 ; see also Dart v Secretary, Department of family and Community Services [2004] FMCA 485. A tenancy agreement like the one in this case might confer a sufficient right to satisfy the section. In Dart , a tenancy agreement was regarded as sufficient. In Vanderpluym , the Federal Court accepted that an oral, week to week tenancy might suffice. I am satisfied the applicant in this case does have a right or interest in his home in the sense intended by the legislation. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2010] AATA 124" id="cs6">I note the Federal Court has recently considered this statutory provision again but the facts there were a novel and more complex arrangement and pertained only to s 1118(b) (see Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations v Vanderpluym [2007] FCA 876 per Greenwood J). </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] AATA 702" id="cs7">So, for example, in Secretary, Department of Social Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations v Vanderpluym [115] Greenwood J considered the word " interest " in s 11(4)(b) as part of the definition of a " homeowner ".</sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] AATA 668" id="cs8">The Federal Court in Secretary, Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Dolores Vanderpluym [2007] FCA 876 also concluded that for the purposes of section 1122 of the Act, so much of the loan that remains unpaid is to be included in the calculation of the assets. </sentence>
<sentence from="[2009] AATA 624" id="cs9">In Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations v Vanderpluym [2007] FCA 876 Greenwood J stated at [58]:
 [58] ...The social policy of the Social Security Act is to adopt a broad notion of 'homeowner' by s 11(4)(b) so as to ensure that those applicants (or their partners) who have a right or interest in a residence which gives reasonable security of tenure in the home are to be treated as homeowners for the purposes of calculating assets value limits and thus pension entitlements.
 ...
 [60] Section 11(4)(b) of the Social Security Act contemplates an 'interest' which is either a legal or an equitable interest. However, the reference to the term 'right' also contemplates a class or species of 'right' which may not necessarily involve a legal or equitable interest in the residence...Accordingly, having regard to the objectives of the Social Security Act and the disjunctive reference, the term 'right' is not to be read in a way which is simply a synonym for 'interest' which comprehends a legal or equitable interest in the residence. The balance the legislation seeks to strike in determining whether an applicant is a homeowner in respect of a principal home is achieved by the application of the second limb of s 11(4)(b) which asks the question whether such a right 'gives' to the person with that right, reasonable security of tenure in the home. The same question is asked in respect of a legal or equitable interest. The different character of the right or interest will inform the objective assessment of reasonable security of tenure in the home.
 ...
 [61] ...It is the conjunction of the character of the right or interest and the circumstances in which it arises that conveys an objective sense of whether the right or interest confers reasonable security of tenure in the home.
 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2008] AATA 1141" id="cs10">The irrecoverability of the outstanding amount is not a reason to exclude that part of the loan from her assets at an earlier time. To do so would be inconsistent with s 1122 of the Act and the settled authorities on this point, concerning the inclusion of the unpaid part of such a loan as an asset, for the purposes of ss 9 , 11 , 500Q and 1122 and the assets value limit calculation. [6] The total of the loan must be included even if Mrs Wicke-Fitzgerald did not gain a net advantage from the loan transaction so far as her assets were concerned. [7]
 </sentence>
<sentence from="[2007] AATA 1503" id="cs11">In a decision handed down after the hearing of this matter ( Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations v Vanderpluym [2007] FCA 876) , Greenwood J said that the first step is to identify whether the applicant (in relation to section 11(4)(b) of the Act) enjoys a right or interest in a residence that is a principal home. As was the case in Vanderpluym , Mr Lountzis and his wife appear to be tenants at will under an oral undocumented arrangement with their son Alex. </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL ACT 1975 </title>
<title id="l1">ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL ACT 1975 - SECT 44 Appeals to Federal Court of Australia from decisions of the Tribunal</title>
<title id="l2">SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 1991 </title>
<title id="l3">SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 1991 - SECT 4 Family relationships definitions--couples</title>
<title id="l4">SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 1991 - SECT 10 Maintenance income definitions</title>
<title id="l5">SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 1991 - SECT 11 Assets test definitions</title>
<title id="l6">SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 1991 - SECT 500 Qualification for parenting payment</title>
<title id="l7">SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 1991 - SECT 500Q Assets test--payment not payable if assets value limit exceeded [see Appendix for CPI adjusted figures]</title>
<title id="l8">SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 1991 - SECT 1118 Certain assets to be disregarded in calculating the value of a person's assets</title>
<title id="l9">SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 1991 - SECT 1122 Loans</title>
<title id="l10">SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 1991 - SECT 1223 Debts arising from lack of qualification, overpayment etc. [see Note 5]</title>
<title id="l11">SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 1991 - SECT 1237AAD Waiver in special circumstances</title>
<title id="l12">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
<title id="l13">LAND TITLE ACT 1994 </title>
<title id="l14">LAND TITLE ACT 1994 - SECT 191 191 Vendor does not have equitable lien</title>
<title id="l15">PROPERTY LAW ACT 1974 </title>
<title id="l16">PROPERTY LAW ACT 1974 - SECT 10 10 Assurances of land to be in writing</title>
<title id="l17">PROPERTY LAW ACT 1974 - SECT 11 11 Instruments required to be in writing</title>
<title id="l18">PROPERTY LAW ACT 1974 - SECT 12 12 Creation of interests in land by parol</title>
<title id="l19">PROPERTY LAW ACT 1974 - SECT 106 106 Obligations in short leases</title>
<title id="l20">PROPERTY LAW ACT 1974 - SECT 130 130 Notice of termination of tenancy</title>
<title id="l21">PROPERTY LAW ACT 1974 - SECT 131 131 Form and contents of notice</title>
<title id="l22">PROPERTY LAW ACT 1974 - SECT 132 132 Manner of giving notice</title>
<title id="l23">PROPERTY LAW ACT 1974 - SECT 133 133 Notice to terminate weekly tenancy</title>
<title id="l24">RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT 1994 </title>
<title id="l25">RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT 1994 - SECT 4 4 Lessor</title>
<title id="l26">RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT 1994 - SECT 6 6 Residential premises</title>
<title id="l27">RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT 1994 - SECT 7 7 Residential tenancy</title>
<title id="l28">RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT 1994 - SECT 8 8 Residential tenancy agreement</title>
<title id="l29">RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT 1994 - SECT 9 9 Tenant</title>
<title id="l30">RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT 1994 - SECT 101 101 Quiet enjoyment</title>
<title id="l31">RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT 1994 - SECT 103 103 Lessor's obligations generally</title>
<title id="l32">RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT 1994 - SECT 106 106 Tenant's obligations generally</title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2008] FMCA 963">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2008] FMCA 963">persecution</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2008] FMCA 963">review of refugee review tribunal decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2008] FMCA 963">visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2008] FMCA 963">protection visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.5">cited from="[2008] FMCA 963">refusal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.6">cited from="[2008] FMCA 963">court not empowered in judicial review proceedings to review the tribunal's factual findings nor its decision on the merits of the application before it</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.7">cited from="[2008] FMCA 963">tribunal did not fail to consider the evidence which was before it</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.8">cited from="[2008] FMCA 963">tribunal not required in its decision record to refer to every piece of evidence or every argument which is before it</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.9">cited from="[2008] FMCA 963">no breach of the rules of natural justice as codified by s.422b of the migration act 1958</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.10">cited from="[2008] FMCA 963">tribunal does not need to have found a negative case against an applicant before it can affirm the delegate's decision.</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 </title>
<title id="l1">FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 25 Exercise of appellate jurisdiction</title>
<title id="l2">MIGRATION ACT 1958 </title>
<title id="l3">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 5 Interpretation</title>
<title id="l4">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 36 Protection visas</title>
<title id="l5">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 65 Decision to grant or refuse to grant visa</title>
<title id="l6">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 474 Decisions under Act are final</title>
<title id="l7">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
<title id="l8">FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT RULES 2001 </title>
<title id="l9">FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT RULES 2001 - REG 13.03A When a party is in default</title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">szbyr v minister for immigration and citizenship  immigration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">refugees</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">the appellants were refused a visa under s 36(2) of the migration act 1958 (cth) ("the act ")</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">the appellants gave a statutory declaration to the refugee review tribunal ("the tribunal")</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.4">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">the tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant a visa partly on the basis of discrepancies between the statutory declaration and the appellants' oral evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.5">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">whether relief was available to the appellants.  immigration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.6">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">refugees</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.7">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">s 424a of the act , read with s 441a , requires that an applicant be given written notice of particulars of any information that would be a reason or a part of the reason for affirming a decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.8">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">whether s 424a applied to the appellants' statutory declaration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.9">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">temporal scope of s 424a</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.10">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">whether the tribunal breached s 424a</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.11">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">whether the tribunal committed jurisdictional error</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.12">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">meaning of "information"</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.13">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">whether "information" included discrepancies or inadequacies in previously submitted evidence</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.14">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">meaning of "reason, or a part of the reason".  administrative law</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.15">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">constitutional writs</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.16">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">certiorari and mandamus</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.17">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">impact of discretionary considerations governing availability of relief</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.18">cited from="[2007] HCA 26">whether relief should be denied on discretionary grounds for lack of a convention nexus.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">cited from="[2006] FCAFC 2">practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">cited from="[2006] FCAFC 2">circumstances in which a later full court can depart from an earlier full court decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">cited from="[2006] FCAFC 2">stare decisis</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">cited from="[2006] FCAFC 2">determining ratio decidendi</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">cited from="[2006] FCAFC 2">application of minister for immigration and multicultural affairs v al shamry (2001) 110 fcr 27  migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.5">cited from="[2006] FCAFC 2">the application of s 424a(1) of the migration act 1958 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.6">cited from="[2006] FCAFC 2">meaning of 'application', 'information', and 'reason, or part of the reason' in s 424a</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.0">cited from="[2005] FCA 1271">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.1">cited from="[2005] FCA 1271">appeal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.2">cited from="[2005] FCA 1271">adverse credibility finding</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp2.3">cited from="[2005] FCA 1271">no error</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.0">cited from="[2005] FCA 744">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.1">cited from="[2005] FCA 744">appeal from federal magistrate</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.2">cited from="[2005] FCA 744">protection visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.3">cited from="[2005] FCA 744">refugee review tribunal ("the rrt") failed to give appellant particulars in writing</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.4">cited from="[2005] FCA 744">whether information provided by applicant on protection visa application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.5">cited from="[2005] FCA 744">whether converted to information given by applicant for purpose of application for review by rrt</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.6">cited from="[2005] FCA 744">whether exception in s424a(3)(b) of migration act 1958 (cth) enlivened</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.7">cited from="[2005] FCA 744">whether breach of s424a amounts to jurisdictional error that invalidates decision of rrt practice and procedure</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.8">cited from="[2005] FCA 744">joinder of rrt migration act 1958 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp4.9">cited from="[2005] FCA 744">s424a</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.0">cited from="[2005] FCA 131">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.1">cited from="[2005] FCA 131">visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.2">cited from="[2005] FCA 131">protection visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.3">cited from="[2005] FCA 131">tribunal relied on documents attached to earlier student visa application and on information attached to protection visa application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.4">cited from="[2005] FCA 131">in written submission to tribunal, applicant's counsel stated that details of claim contained in protection visa application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.5">cited from="[2005] FCA 131">whether information given to tribunal for the purpose of the application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.6">cited from="[2005] FCA 131">tribunal drew to applicant's attention each of documents attached to student visa application, in course of hearing</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.7">cited from="[2005] FCA 131">whether tribunal gave particulars of information, explained its relevance, and invited comment</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.8">cited from="[2005] FCA 131">whether failure to do these things jurisdictional error</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp5.9">cited from="[2005] FCA 131">whether discretion should be exercised to refuse relief</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.0">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 199">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.1">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 199">migration act 1958 (cth)</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.2">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 199">false visa application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.3">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 199">false application signed by appellant's confederate</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.4">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 199">whether appellant responsible for content of false application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp6.5">cited from="[2004] FCAFC 199">whether application valid</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.0">cited from="[2004] FCA 160">immigration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.1">cited from="[2004] FCA 160">application for protection visa</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.2">cited from="[2004] FCA 160">validity of application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.3">cited from="[2004] FCA 160">application rejected on ground that applicant had previously made a protection visa application</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.4">cited from="[2004] FCA 160">earlier application made in a different name</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp7.5">cited from="[2004] FCA 160">whether earlier application was made by or on behalf of present applicant.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.0">citing from="[2008] FMCA 182">migration</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.1">citing from="[2008] FMCA 182">review of decision</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.2">citing from="[2008] FMCA 182">refugee review tribunal</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.3">citing from="[2008] FMCA 182">whether jurisdictional error</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.4">citing from="[2008] FMCA 182">citizens of india of sikh faith</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.5">citing from="[2008] FMCA 182">whether well grounded fear of persecution</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp10.6">citing from="[2008] FMCA 182">need to consider arguments not advanced before tribunal.</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2008] FMCA 182" id="cs0">More recently in NAWZ v Minister for Immigration  Multicultural Affairs [2008] FCA 6 Madgwick J (constituting the Full Court) accepted at [25] that any negative inference that the Tribunal may have drawn from information supplied by the appellant after the Tribunal hearing could not be considered "information" for the purposes of s.424A. Information in this context is "knowledge of relevant facts or circumstances communicated to, or received by, the Tribunal": SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 2 ; (2006) 150 FCR 214 at [215] , and not "the Tribunal's subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations": SZEEU 150 FCR at [206]. </sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">MIGRATION ACT 1958 </title>
<title id="l1">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 1 Short title [see Note 1]</title>
<title id="l2">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 48A Non-citizen refused a protection visa may not make further application for protection visa</title>
<title id="l3">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 48B Minister may determine that section 48A does not apply to non-citizen</title>
<title id="l4">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 424A Information and invitation given in writing by Tribunal</title>
<title id="l5">MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 425 Tribunal must invite applicant to appear</title>
<title id="l6">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
</legistitles>
</case>


Question:
<citphrase id="cp0.0">cited from="[1995] FCA 1259">corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.1">cited from="[1995] FCA 1259">application to reinstate deregistered company</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.2">cited from="[1995] FCA 1259">whether applicant person aggrieved</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp0.3">cited from="[1995] FCA 1259">whether reinstatement just.</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.0">citing from="[2007] NSWSC 1341">corporations</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.1">citing from="[2007] NSWSC 1341">deregistered company</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.2">citing from="[2007] NSWSC 1341">application for reinstatement and validation of transaction, and for appointment of provisional liquidator</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.3">citing from="[2007] NSWSC 1341">plaintiff's standing</citphrase>
<citphrase id="cp1.4">citing from="[2007] NSWSC 1341">discretionary considerations</citphrase>
</citphrases>
<citances>
<sentence from="[2007] NSWSC 1341" id="cs0">11 In Brereton v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2007] FCA 651 Finkelstein J held that a shareholder of a solvent company who stands to lose his or her capital has a sufficient basis for standing (at [4]), and he expressed the opinion that there was a strong argument in favour of holding that a former director of a solvent company would also have standing (at [5]), though he found it unnecessary to resolve that question. The authorities to which his Honour's attention was drawn on this point were decided in the 1980s, and his attention does not appear to have been drawn to more recent cases (see Butterworths' Australian Corporations Law: Principles and Practice (looseleaf), vol 2, [5.6.0 555], note 20) including the decision of Young CJ in Eq in Casali v Crisp , which has been followed in this and other courts ( Euphron Pty Ltd (in liq) v Hunter Valley Piggery Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 543 at [12] ; Melluish v Underwood Development Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 429 at [6] ; Warton v Harris [2005] NSWSC 1168 ; (2005) 56 ACSR 122 at [4] ; Jones v 3R Gas Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 290 ; (2006) 24 ACLC 450 at [8] ; Piccoli Tesori Pty Ltd (Deregistered); Ex parte Bertuol [2006] FCA 462 ; (2006) 151 FCR 109 at [23] ; Herbert v Nozala Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1437 at [38] ; Callegher v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2007] FCA 482 ; (2007) 25 ACLC 438 at [50] and [53]; Middleton Nominees Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp [2007] FCA 845 at [6] ).</sentence>
</citances>
<legistitles>
<title id="l0">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 </title>
<title id="l1">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 601AE What the Commonwealth or ASIC does with the property</title>
<title id="l2">CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 - SECT 601AH Reinstatement</title>
<title id="l3">FEDERAL COURT RULES </title>
</legistitles>
</case>