By . Claire Ellicott . and David Wilkes . Archived files have revealed how Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher considered deploying the army against striking miners . Margaret Thatcher planned to mobilise hundreds of troops and considered declaring a state of emergency at the height of the 1984 miners’ strike, previously secret files reveal. Another option was to switch to a three-day working week after ministers warned her that the lights could go out in Britain, according to the National Archives. As panic appeared to grip the government, Mrs Thatcher faced the possibility of defeat in the prolonged and violent strike that became a defining episode of her time in power. The dispute was triggered in March . 1984 by plans to close 20 loss-making pits. Arthur Scargill, leader of . the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), went into battle with the . Tories and a year-long war of attrition ensued. Mrs . Thatcher had been expecting the  confrontation and preparing for it . since 1981. Publicly, she remained resolute, but the files show how, . privately, panic surrounded her. John . Redwood, head of the policy unit, warned that giving in to the unions . would be ‘the end of effective government’ in Britain. ‘The . Left’s aim is to pave the way for the  ultimate defeat of the . Government by destroying its policies and its credibility,’ he wrote to . the prime minister. ‘Its purpose is to oppose and destroy.’ There was stalemate until July, when a dockers’ dispute escalated into a national strike, giving the NUM extra leverage. There were fears that power supplies would run out and the Ministry of Agriculture warned of possible panic-buying of food. As the pressure grew, Mrs Thatcher held a meeting on July 16 at which declaring a state of emergency was discussed. The . minutes noted: ‘It was not clear how far a declaration of a state of . emergency would be interpreted as a sign of weakness, nor to what extent . it would increase docker support for the miners’ strike.’ Scroll down for video . Miners from the Kellingley colliery march in support of the general strike in1985 . The files reveal that plans were drawn up for soldiers to transport food and coal. It was suggested that 4,500  military drivers would be needed. The Government suspected that the NUM was receiving hundreds of thousands of pounds from  Russia during the miners’ strike. MI5 informed ministers in November 1984 that the Soviets were funding the union and it was reported in Russia that £500,000 had been raised by workers to support the strike. Officials suspected government involvement, with a briefing  letter noting that it was ‘most unlikely that the Soviet miners’ union could have been given access to convertible Roubles without official permission’. But they had to admit that they were powerless to do anything about the funding and would  have to rely on detecting a representative of the NUM ‘entering this country with a suitcase full of bank notes’. NUM leader Arthur Scargill has always insisted that the miners received no overseas money. In a letter from the Ministry of Defence to Andrew Turnbull, the PM’s private secretary, on July 11, 1984 the idea was dismissed on the grounds that it would cause panic. It said: ‘My secretary of state [Michael Heseltine] … supports the view that the use of servicemen to move existing coal stocks would raise the emotional temperature and recommends that it should not be considered any further at this stage in the dispute.’ The correspondence also reveals that one of the options being considered was a state of emergency – proclaimed by the Queen – if power supplies were interrupted. It spoke of using servicemen ‘as a last resort’. The concern at the heart of government was summarised in a letter to the PM from Norman Tebbit, the trade and industry secretary, warning her that ‘time is running out’. Dated July 25, 1984, he said coal . stocks would last until January, adding that the prospect would . strengthen the miners’ resolve. ‘I . have no wish to rock the boat, and believe it essential that we should . continue to present our existing public face,’ he wrote. ‘But it is just . as important that we should be utterly realistic among ourselves about . what is actually going to happen.’ Last night, Lord Tebbit recalled that the miners’ strike was a ‘close-run thing’ but said that Mrs Thatcher ‘never wavered’. The files reveal that plans were drawn up for soldiers to transport food and coal. It was suggested that 4,500  military drivers would be needed . ‘I was obviously concerned because I was looking after industry and people in industry were concerned so I was expressing those fears,’ he said. His letter alarmed the PM, but she was encouraged by the response of industry leaders following a hastily arranged meeting. The prospect of a three-day week remained on the table but in the end the strike failed to have a widespread impact. As support among miners and the public drained away, it came to a formal end on March 3, 1985. Margaret Thatcher did not mention Nelson Mandela’s detention during an official meeting with the former prime minister of South Africa – despite being advised to by the Foreign Office, documents reveal. Margaret Thatcher with South African Prime Minister P W Botha in 1984 . In a briefing paper written by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office ahead of the four-hour meeting with P W Botha, it was suggested that Mrs Thatcher include Mr Mandela’s release as  a ‘point to make’. The documents reveal that the ANC leader’s imprisonment was mentioned with ‘little success’ during a private, 40-minute ‘tete-a-tete’ with Mr Botha, ahead of the official meeting in 1984. A memo about the meeting of the two politicians – who both died last year – notes that Mrs Thatcher mentioned Mr Mandela, but Mr Botha said he was not able to interfere with the official process.
PM considered declaring a state of emergency at height of strike in 1984 .
Another option was to switch to a three-day working week .
Ministry of Agriculture warned of possible panic-buying of food .
By . Claire Ellicott . and David Wilkes . Archived files have revealed how Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher considered deploying the army against striking miners . Margaret Thatcher planned to mobilise hundreds of troops and considered declaring a state of emergency at the height of the 1984 miners’ strike, previously secret files reveal. Another option was to switch to a three-day working week after ministers warned her that the lights could go out in Britain, according to the National Archives. As panic appeared to grip the government, Mrs Thatcher faced the possibility of defeat in the prolonged and violent strike that became a defining episode of her time in power. The dispute was triggered in March . 1984 by plans to close 20 loss-making pits. Arthur Scargill, leader of . the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), went into battle with the . Tories and a year-long war of attrition ensued. Mrs . Thatcher had been expecting the confrontation and preparing for it . since 1981. Publicly, she remained resolute, but the files show how, . privately, panic surrounded her. John . Redwood, head of the policy unit, warned that giving in to the unions . would be ‘the end of effective government’ in Britain. ‘The . Left’s aim is to pave the way for the  ultimate defeat of the . Government by destroying its policies and its credibility,’ he wrote to . the prime minister. ‘Its purpose is to oppose and destroy.’ There was stalemate until July, when a dockers’ dispute escalated into a national strike, giving the NUM extra leverage. There were fears that power supplies would run out and the Ministry of Agriculture warned of possible panic-buying of food. As the pressure grew, Mrs Thatcher held a meeting on July 16 at which declaring a state of emergency was discussed. The . minutes noted: ‘It was not clear how far a declaration of a state of . emergency would be interpreted as a sign of weakness, nor to what extent . it would increase docker support for the miners’ strike.’ Scroll down for video . Miners from the Kellingley colliery march in support of the general strike in1985 . The files reveal that plans were drawn up for soldiers to transport food and coal. It was suggested that 4,500  military drivers would be needed. The Government suspected that the NUM was receiving hundreds of thousands of pounds from  Russia during the miners’ strike. MI5 informed ministers in November 1984 that the Soviets were funding the union and it was reported in Russia that £500,000 had been raised by workers to support the strike. Officials suspected government involvement, with a briefing  letter noting that it was ‘most unlikely that the Soviet miners’ union could have been given access to convertible Roubles without official permission’. But they had to admit that they were powerless to do anything about the funding and would  have to rely on detecting a representative of the NUM ‘entering this country with a suitcase full of bank notes’. NUM leader Arthur Scargill has always insisted that the miners received no overseas money. In a letter from the Ministry of Defence to Andrew Turnbull, the PM’s private secretary, on July 11, 1984 the idea was dismissed on the grounds that it would cause panic. It said: ‘My secretary of state [Michael Heseltine] … supports the view that the use of servicemen to move existing coal stocks would raise the emotional temperature and recommends that it should not be considered any further at this stage in the dispute.’ The correspondence also reveals that one of the options being considered was a state of emergency – proclaimed by the Queen – if power supplies were interrupted. It spoke of using servicemen ‘as a last resort’. The concern at the heart of government was summarised in a letter to the PM from Norman Tebbit, the trade and industry secretary, warning her that ‘time is running out’. Dated July 25, 1984, he said coal . stocks would last until January, adding that the prospect would . strengthen the miners’ resolve. ‘I . have no wish to rock the boat, and believe it essential that we should . continue to present our existing public face,’ he wrote. ‘But it is just . as important that we should be utterly realistic among ourselves about . what is actually going to happen.’ Last night, Lord Tebbit recalled that the miners’ strike was a ‘close-run thing’ but said that Mrs Thatcher ‘never wavered’. The files reveal that plans were drawn up for soldiers to transport food and coal. It was suggested that 4,500  military drivers would be needed . ‘I was obviously concerned because I was looking after industry and people in industry were concerned so I was expressing those fears,’ he said. His letter alarmed the PM, but she was encouraged by the response of industry leaders following a hastily arranged meeting. The prospect of a three-day week remained on the table but in the end the strike failed to have a widespread impact. As support among miners and the public drained away, it came to a formal end on March 3, 1985. Margaret Thatcher did not mention Nelson Mandela’s detention during an official meeting with the former prime minister of South Africa – despite being advised to by the Foreign Office, documents reveal. Margaret Thatcher with South African Prime Minister P W Botha in 1984 . In a briefing paper written by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office ahead of the four-hour meeting with P W Botha, it was suggested that Mrs Thatcher include Mr Mandela’s release as  a ‘point to make’. The documents reveal that the ANC leader’s imprisonment was mentioned with ‘little success’ during a private, 40-minute ‘tete-a-tete’ with Mr Botha, ahead of the official meeting in 1984. A memo about the meeting of the two politicians – who both died last year – notes that Mrs Thatcher mentioned Mr Mandela, but Mr Botha said he was not able to interfere with the official process.
declaring a state of emergency at the height of reveal. Another option was to switch to a three-day working week after ministers warned her Agriculture warned of possible panic-buying of