- Hao-Chuan Wang, C. Rosé. 2007. A Process Analysis of Idea Generation and Failure. Abstract: A Process Analysis of Idea Generation and Failure Hao-Chuan Wang and Carolyn Penstein Rose (haochuan,cprose@cs.cmu.edu) Language Technologies Institute, Carnegie Mellon University 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA Abstract This paper presents an experimental study and detailed process analysis investigating the temporal characteristics of idea generation and idea failure during brainstorming. In this investigation, we test the hypothesis that cognitive interference resulting from group interactions has a temporary effect and thus decays as the rate of unique idea generation decays. A further hypothesis is that the effects of cognitive stimulation from external stimuli become more evident over time as the effects of cognitive interference decay. Both of these hypotheses are confirmed by our process analysis. Keywords: Cognitive stimulation; cognitive interference. Introduction The task of idea generation in brainstorming groups has been extensively studied through controlled experiments (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987) and simulation studies (Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006). In the study of group brainstorming for idea generation, empirical work has repeatedly revealed evidence of process losses, in which a group with idea sharing may not always perform better than a collection of non- interacting individuals whose contributions are simply pooled afterwards (i.e., nominal groups), both in terms of the quantity and quality of unique ideas (Hill, 1982; Diehl & Stroebe). A wide range of social and cognitive explanations for process losses have been proposed and evaluated, including social pressure (e.g., evaluation apprehension), social loafing (e.g., “free riding”), production blocking resulting from turn taking conventions (Diehl & Stroebe), and cognitive interference from exposure to similar ideas to the current idea generation focus (Nijstad & Stroebe). One influential explanation for process losses in group idea generation grows out of the theory of cognitive stimulation and cognitive interference, which models idea generation by individuals as a memory retrieval process (Dugosh, Paulus, Roland & Yang, 2000; Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006). Idea failure related to cognitive interference occurs when one fails to retrieve an image from memory, retrieves an image but fails to generate an idea from it, repeatedly activates the same images, or generates ideas that have already been mentioned. When brainstorming in groups, ideas verbalized by peers may serve as external stimulation potentially leading to one of two extreme results, either process gains or process losses. In the first case, overhearing a peer’s ideas may serve as cognitive stimulation for memory retrieval and idea generation when those ideas are significantly different from what an individual was capable of generating alone, while in the later case, this external stimulation becomes a source of cognitive interference leading to process losses. This may occur because the same domain knowledge continues to be activated, which facilitates the generation of similar ideas to those mentioned recently. In cases such as these, brainstorming individuals may believe they have exhausted the number of ideas they are able to generate (Nijstad & Stroebe). The temporal properties of priming and cognitive stimulation have been investigated (Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981), but a similar investigation of the temporal properties of cognitive interference have not been investigated. Rather, the effects of cognitive interference and related process losses have primarily been evaluated summatively. In order to investigate the temporal properties of cognitive interference and resulting process losses, we present in this paper an experimental study and detailed process analysis. In the remainder of the paper we discuss the theoretical model of idea generation that underlies this work, our experimental study, and findings from our process analysis. Theoretical Model Brainstorming may be modeled from a cognitive perspective as a two stage process in which a search is initiated in response to a challenge presented during the first stage, and then an idea is constructed during this search by means of inferences building upon prior knowledge (Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006). Psychological studies in spreading activation have demonstrated that it is more efficient to retrieve a concept from memory when relevant information is offered as a prime or cue (Anderson, 2005). Based on the cognitive theory of associative memory (Anderson; Brown & Paulus, 2002; Dugosh et al., 2000), idea generation can be viewed as a process of building on the retrieval of information encoded in the stimulated portions of a semantic network stored in one’s long-term memory. The process of generating a new idea is said to involve a constructive process analogous to that of self-explanation (Chi, De Leeuw, Chiu & Lavancher, 1994) in which bridging inferences link instances of known domain facts on the way towards generating ideas (Brown & Paulus, 2002). For example, someone may have access to the following two domain facts: (1) Debris flow refers to the mass movement of rocks and sedimentary materials in a fluid like manner. And, (2) There are many typhoons, or hurricanes, in Taiwan in the summer time. That person may then make the following two bridging inferences: (1) Heavy rain implies the presence of a massive amount of water. And, (2) The presence of a massive amount of water may lead to erosion or the movement of rocks in a fluid like manner. That person may then generate the following idea: “Typhoons may be a factor leading to the occurrence of a debris flow hazard.” It is the middle stage, where bridging
