Sequential games and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Reading the paper http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/002205319190155W
I came up with the following question. 

Given that this paper deals with games in which players move simultaneously, the formula in (1) of Definition 3.1 makes perfectly sense. If someone considers sequential movements of the players, how Definition 3.1 (and hence formula in (1)) would change?

Any good reference about "sequential moving" games?
As Fudenberg and Tirole note, the fact that they assume players move simultaneously does not matter:


  This specification is more general than
  it may appear, because the set of feasible actions can be time and history
  dependent, so that games with alternating moves are included.


Moreover, all actions are observable by all players, so the definition would be unchanged by the assumption that moves are alternating.