Signalling in a moral hazard contract with informed principals (that know their own type before contracting) I was studying Laffont &amp; Martimort textbook for a paper, but their section on moral hazard contract with informed principals assumes that the principal only knows his own type after contracting.
But I need a model where principal knows the type before contracting (probably with signalling issues).
Laffont &amp; Martimort manuscript reads that such contract would be explored in a Vol. III of the textbook, but I think this volume do not exist (as Laffont got cancer and deceased right after the publishing of Vol. I). Is there any other textbook or paper that describes this model?
Thank you.
I'm not sure what exactly you're looking for, but here are some wild guesses:

Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) Contract Theory, MIT Press. [Probably Chapters 5 and 6]
Maskin and Tirole (1990) &quot;The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values&quot;, Econometrica 58: 379-409.
Maskin and Tirole (1992) &quot;The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values&quot;, Econometrica 60: 1-42.
Myerson (1983) &quot;Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal&quot;, Econometrica 51: 1767-1797.