Workforce productivity If I would like to say, in a technical way, that the problem of a place is its lazy people, then I could say that its workforce productivity is low. However, "workforce productivity" is composed by these elements:


Physical-organic, location, and technological factors;
Cultural belief-value and individual attitudinal, motivational
and behavioural factors;
International influences – e.g. levels of innovativeness and
efficiency on the part of the owners and managers of inward
investing foreign companies;
Managerial-organizational and wider economic and political-legal
environments;
Levels of flexibility in internal labour markets and the
organization of work activities – e.g. the presence or absence of
traditional craft demarcation lines and barriers to occupational
entry; and
Individual rewards and payment systems, and the effectiveness of
personnel managers and others in recruiting, training, communicating
with, and performance-motivating employees on the basis of pay and
other incentives.


In that sense, saying that the problem of a place is lazyness, some advocates would ask: How do you measure it? The answer would be: With workforce productivity. However, those advocates of lazy people could argue that workforce productivity is low because it is affected by any components from 1 to 6.

Is there any technical term to refer lazyness?
The terms of art here for laziness like concepts are "shirking" and "effort", particularly  "endogenous effort" or "variable effort". You should also look into "efficiency wages". "Free riding" sometimes appears in this literature but because it is used heavily in the public goods literature it will have more false positives. 

This paper may also be of interest:


  Using a sample of male and female workers from the 1992 Employment in
  Britain survey we estimate a model of employees’ self-reported effort
  levels. Effort is modelled as a function of wages, the perceived
  monitoring and supervision environment in the individual's workplace,
  labour-leisure preferences, local unemployment rates and unionisation.
  Using a two-step estimation strategy to account for the endogeneity of
  the wage, we find that effort levels are increasing in wages and in
  preferences for work over leisure. While the extent of monitoring
  seems not to affect workers’ effort levels the ease with which they
  can be dismissed is a motivating factor. Unionisation reduces
  self-reported effort levels which may reflect the outcome of an
  effort-bargain and, in contrast to the efficiency wage shirking story,
  local unemployment rates do not affect effort. Finally, in spite of
  being paid more than women, men report exerting less effort at work.


The Determinants of Work Effort: Evidence from the Employment in Britain Survey
(Clark and Tomlinson (2001))