Auction models for tickets Consider a typical event for which tickets are sold. The event only occurs once, and for simplicity we can assume that only one kind of ticket is provided, i.e, no VIP seats etc. $N$ tickets are available for purchase, and the $N$ highest bids win the tickets.

Does it exist any clever method for auctioning this type of good? 

In a classical auction, the highest bid at any time is shown and participants can increase their bid to be the winning participant. But when auctioning this type of good that does not make any sense, since there will be multiple winning bids. 

Should we perhaps display the currently lowest bid that is needed to win a ticket?

What if we think that it is desirable that all winners pay the same amount, how does this effect things?

I have tried to find existing research about this, but to no avail. Maybe there exist some other type of good with similar characteristics to tickets (oil/electricity?) that is auctioned in a similar way? Pointers to existing literature would be greatly appreciated.
First, you should note that there is a Revenue Equivalence Theorem that says under a set of conditions, the seller's revenue from using different forms of auctions will be the same. This same result holds also in the multi-object case. 

Thus, if you have $n$ identical objects, you can sell them using a ($n+1$)th price sealed bid auction, where 


each bidder submits a bid,
the highest $n$ bidders each gets $1$ object, and 
they all pay a price equal to the ($n+1$)th highest bid. 


In such an auction, it is a weakly dominant strategy for every bidder to bid their true valuation of the object. The reasoning is similar to the second price auction.