Perfect Bayesian Equilibria What are the perfect Bayesian equilibria in the following game?



The part that is confusing me is the right-hand side, where player 2 is of type N.

Thanks!

EDIT: My workings out so far are given below:

We start off by noticing that if player 2 is type $N$, it can be rational for him to play both $Steal$ and $Split$, as he does not know what player 1 plays.

Let us therefore first look at the case where player 2 plays $Steal$ if he is type $N$. Then player 1's expected payoff from stealing is $100\beta$ and his expected payoff from splitting is $50\alpha + 50\beta$. In this case player 1 steals when $100\beta &gt; 50\alpha + 50\beta \Leftrightarrow \alpha &lt; \beta$, and therefore splits if $\alpha &gt; \beta$ and is indifferent when $\alpha = \beta$. This means we get the following potential PBE's in this case:
\begin{align*}
    (Steal, Steal; \alpha \leq \beta) \text{ and } (Split, Steal; \alpha \geq \beta).
\end{align*}

Let us next look at the case where player 2 plays $Split$ if he is type $N$. Then player 1's expected payoff from stealing is $100\beta + 100(1-\alpha-\beta)=100(1-\alpha)$ and his expected payoff from splitting is $50$. In this case player 1 steals when $100(1-\alpha) &gt; 50 \Leftrightarrow \alpha &lt; 1/2$, and therefore splits if $\alpha &gt; 1/2$ and is indifferent if $\alpha = 1/2$. This means that we get the following potential PBE's in this case:
\begin{align*}
    (Steal, Split; \alpha \leq 1/2) \text{ and } (Split, Split; \alpha \geq 1/2).
\end{align*}

As such, we have can write up the set of pure-strategy PBE:
\begin{alignat*}{1}
    \text{PBE} = \{&amp;(Steal, Steal; \alpha \leq \beta),(Split, Steal; \alpha \geq \beta), \\ &amp;(Steal, Split; \alpha \leq 1/2),(Split, Split; \alpha \geq 1/2)\}.
\end{alignat*}
Hint:
You can convert the game into the following normal form:
\begin{equation}
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
&amp; Steal &amp; Split \\\hline 
Steal &amp; 100\beta, 0&amp; 100(1-\alpha),0 \\\hline 
Split &amp; 50(\alpha+\beta),50+50(1-\alpha-\beta) &amp; 50,50 \\\hline
\end{array}
\end{equation}
Note that Steal is a weakly dominant strategy for player 2, so (Split, Split) can never be an equilibrium.