Will high computing power substitute the certainty-equivalence assumption? Bloom in a recent JEP paper considers that "the increase in computing power has made it possible to include uncertainty shocks directly in a wide range of models, allowing economists to abandon assumptions built on “certainty equivalence,” which refers to the amount of money that would be required as compensation for risk." (2nd paragraph of page 154, third point).

My understanding of Bloom's point is the idea that with computing power we can treat and exploit the heterogeneity of data. We can use high-frequency and/or large-scale data, in combination with computing power, to identify the role of uncertainty shock on economic outcomes. 

My guess is that Bloom's point could be an implicit criticism of the expected utility theory given the importance of the certainty equivalent concept, and the related concept of risk premium, in this framework. Is this guess/interpretation right?
This is perhaps a good opportunity to point out that the "certainty equivalence" concept means one thing in microeconomics/choice under uncertainty theory, while it means something different in macroeconomics.  

Microeconomics/choice under uncertainty
The Certainty Equivalent of a lottery/gamble, is the amount of wealth which, if given with certainty, provides the same utility as the lottery/gamble. See for example Jehle &amp; Reny's "Advanced Microeconomic Theory" (2011, 3d ed.), p.113.

Macroeconomics
"Certainty Equivalence" is the situation in a stochastic model, where optimal decision rules prove to be identical to those that would have been derived in a deterministic framework (see for example Lungqvist &amp; Sargent's "Recursive Macroeconomic Theory" 2004, 2nd ed, p. 113-115). Informally, this is sometimes described as "agents behave as if the stochastic processes are not stochastic", or "the decision rule is not affected by stochastic variability".

It is a funny coincidence that both references treat the subject in the same page number...

The concepts are evidently linked by the "as if there was no uncertainty" angle, but they are different in essential aspects: the micro-concept is a "buy-out" of uncertainty, providing a certain alternative towards which the agent that faces the gamble is indifferent in terms of utility, while the macro-concept emerges as a property of the solution (and only under restrictive model structures, or linear approximations thereof).