Arrow's impossibility theorem In social choice theory, Arrow's impossibility theorem, the general possibility theorem or Arrow's paradox is an impossibility theorem stating that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no ranked voting electoral system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide (complete and transitive) ranking while also meeting a specified set of criteria: unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)

So, I'm looking for an example where the preferences satisfy unrestricted domain, non dictatorship, IIA and is an ordering, but not meet the Pareto criteria.
Let the set of alternatives be $A = \left\{a_1,a_2,...,a_k\right\}$. Let the number of players be $n$. Let the set of preference orderings over $A$ be $\mathcal{P}$. Then the set of preference profiles is the Cartesian product 
$$
\mathcal{P}^n = \times_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{P}.
$$
Let us denote the preference ordering
$$
a_1 \succ a_2 \succ ... \succ a_k 
$$
by $p^*$. Define the Social Choice Function $F$ by
$$
\forall p \in \mathcal{P}^n: F(p) = p^*.
$$
This SCF $F$ clearly has universal domain, is not a dictatorship, and is also independent of irrelevant alternatives. (Or any alternatives for that matter.)