In [Propositions equivalent to the completeness of the real numbers](https://mathoverflow.net/questions/62340/propositions-equivalent-to-the-completeness-of-the-real-numbers) I started by asking "Can anyone point me to a reasonably comprehensive article (or book chapter) explaining which basic theorems of calculus are equivalent to the completeness axiom of the reals and which ones aren't?" and ended by speculating "Perhaps somebody wrote a beautiful Monthly article a few decades ago that explained things so clearly as to make the whole matter seem trivial, with the result that the article was forgotten? :-)"


Since the article I was looking for doesn't seem to exist, I decided to write one myself; the current draft can be found at <http://jamespropp.org/reverse.pdf> .


One issue I'm a little confused about is the relationship between truth and provability in this context. As I ask on the bottom of page 2 and the top of page 3, is saying "Every ordered ring $R$ satisfying property $P$ satisfies property $P'$" the same as saying "From the ordered field axioms plus the assumption that $P$ holds one can prove that $P'$ holds"?


I believe that they're not the same (because for instance the Riemann Hypothesis might be true but unprovable), but I'd like to hear from people who know more about foundations and model theory than I do.


All kinds of comments on the article are welcome, but comments on the truth-versus-provability issue are especially sought.



truth vs. provability for ordered fields
In your draft paper, you are using [second-order logic with standard semantics](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_logic#Semantics) over the (first-order) theory of ordered fields. What this means is that your structures are ordered fields (with the usual axioms) augmented with extra second-order structure: sets, functions, sequences, etc. You are using standard semantics because you are always considering all possible sets, functions, sequences, etc. For example, your continuous functions from an ordered field $R$ to itself are all possible functions from $R$ to $R$ that are continuous with respect to the order topology of $R$.


Unfortunately, there is no reasonable proof theory for second-order logic with standard semantics. More precisely, there is no deductive system which is simultaneously


* *sound* — every statement which is provable is valid in all models;
* *complete* — every statement which is valid in all models is provable; and
* *effective* — the validity of a proof can be checked by an idealized computer (or an idealized human).


By contrast, first-order logic has all three of these properties.


There is an alternative view of second-order logic that does admit a reasonable proof theory. This alternative is to use Henkin semantics instead of standard semantics. With Henkin semantics, one is not required to always consider all possible second-order objects. Second-order objects are simply regarded as another sort of the language, which effectively makes this a first-order system (with multiple sorts). This is the usual approach used by logicians since Henkin semantics does have a sound, complete, and effective deductive system.


However, there are drawbacks to this approach. In order to ensure that sets do look and behave like sets, one must prescribe additional axioms for these: extensionality, comprehension, choice, etc. Similarly for functions. For sequences, one needs to add yet another sort for natural numbers and axioms for these as well. This adds an extra layer of complications since Henkin semantics allows such natural numbers to be nonstandard.


