16.  Defendant conducts background checks on many of its job applicants as part  of a standard screening process.  In addition, Defendant also conducts background checks  on existing employees from time-to-time during the course of their employment.   17.  Defendant does not perform these background checks in-house.  Rather,  Defendant relies on an outside consumer reporting firm to obtain this information and report it to  the Defendant.  These reports constitute “consumer reports” for purposes of the FCRA.  FCRA Violations Relating to Background Check Class   18.  Defendant procured a consumer report information on Plaintiff in violation of  the FCRA.    20.  Defendant failed to satisfy these disclosure and authorization requirements.   21.  Defendant did not have a stand-alone FCRA disclosure or authorization form. The  FCRA requires that a disclosure not contain extraneous information. This is commonly referred to  as the “stand alone disclosure” requirement.   22.  The FCRA also contains several other notice provisions, such as 15 U.S.C.  §1681b(b)(3)(a) (pre-adverse action); §1681b(4)(B)(notice of national security investigation);  §1681c(h) (notification of address discrepancy); §1681g (full file disclosure to consumers);  §1681k(a)(1) (disclosure regarding use of public record information); §1681h (form and  conditions of disclosure; and §1681m(a) (notice of adverse action).   23.  The purpose of FCRA notice provisions, including 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i), is to put  consumers on notice that a consumer report may be prepared.  This gives consumers the  opportunity to exercise substantive rights conferred by the FCRA or other statutes, allowing  consumers the opportunity to ensure accuracy, confidentiality and fairness.   24.  Without clear notice that a consumer report is going to be procured, applicants  and employees are deprived of the opportunity to make informed decisions or otherwise assert  protected rights.   26.  Along similar lines, many states have data privacy laws that restrict the  disclosure of the information in their possession.  See, e.g. Russom, Mirian B., Robert H. Sloan  and Richard Warner, Legal Concepts Meet Technology: A 50 State Survey of Privacy Laws,  ACSAC, (December 2011) (available at https://www.acsac.org/2011/workshops/gtip/p- Russom.pdf).   27.  Defendant knowingly and recklessly disregarded case law and regulatory  guidance and willfully violated 15 U.S.C. §§1681b(b)(2)(A) by procuring consumer report  information on consumers without complying with the disclosure and authorization  requirements of the statute.  Defendant’s violations were willful because Defendant knew it was  required to use a stand-alone disclosure form prior to obtaining and using a consumer report on  the Putative Class members.    28.  Defendant’s conduct is also willful because:  a.  Defendant is a large and sophisticated employer with access to legal  advice through its own attorneys and there is no evidence it determined its  own conduct was lawful;  b.  Defendant knew or had reason to know that its conduct was inconsistent  with published FCRA guidance interpreting the FCRA, case law and the  plain language of the statute;  c.  Defendant voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater  than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless;   30.  The FCRA also provides that “in using a consumer report for employment  purposes, before taking any adverse action based in whole or in part on the report, the person  intending to take such adverse action shall provide to the consumer to whom the report relates . .  . a copy of the report[.]” 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A)(i).   31.  Defendant typically does not provide consumers with a copy of their consumer  reports before taking adverse action against them based on the information in such reports. In the  instant case, Plaintiff was terminated from employment on the basis of information contained in  Plaintiff’s consumer report that was obtained by Defendant and; however, Plaintiff never  received any pre-adverse action notice from Defendant.   32.  Defendant’s practice also runs counter to long-standing regulatory guidance  from the FTC.  Specifically, 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A) requires that all employers who use  consumer reports provide a copy of the report to the affected consumer before any adverse action  is taken. Employers must comply with this provision even where the information contained in  the report (such as a criminal record) would automatically disqualify the individual from  employment or lead to an adverse employment action. Indeed, this is precisely the situation  where it is important that the consumer be informed of the negative information.1   34.  Plaintiff applied for employment with Defendant on or around February 2, 2016  as a traffic control specialist.    35.  Plaintiff was terminated on March 13, 2017 purportedly because “something  came up on his background check.”    36.  Defendant procured a consumer report on Plaintiff.  The consumer report  contained private, confidential information about Plaintiff.   37.  It was unlawful for Defendant to procure a consumer report on Plaintiff without  making the disclosures required by the FCRA. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)  by procuring consumer reports on Plaintiff and other putative class members for employment  purposes, without first making proper disclosures in the format required by the statute.    38.  Plaintiff was distracted by the presence of additional information in the purported  FCRA Disclosure.  Specifically, Defendant unlawfully inserted extraneous provisions into forms  purporting to grant Defendant authority to obtain and use consumer report information for  employment purposes. The FCRA forbids this practice, since it mandates that all forms granting  the authority to access and use consumer report information for employment purposes be “stand- alone forms” that do not include any additional agreements.    39.  Plaintiff was confused about his rights due to the presence of the additional  language contained in Defendant’s forms.   4 4 .   Plaintiff asserts claims under Counts 1 and 2 of this Complaint on behalf of a  Putative Background Check Class defined as follows:  All Area Wide Protective, Inc. employees and job applicants in the United  States who were the subject of a consumer report that was procured by All  Area Wide Protective, Inc within five years of the filing of this complaint  through the date of final judgment in this action as required by the FCRA.   41.  Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A) when it took adverse employment  action against Plaintiff and other putative class members based on information in their consumer  reports without first providing Plaintiff and other affected class members with a copy of their  consumer reports, notifying them of their rights under the FCRA, and giving them a reasonable  opportunity to respond to the information in the report and engage in discussion with Defendant.   43.  Defendant failed to follow these long-established FCRA requirements.   50.  This case is maintainable as a class action because prosecution of actions by or  against individual members of the Putative Classes would result in inconsistent or varying  adjudications and create the risk of incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendant.  Further, adjudication of each individual Class member’s claim as separate action would  potentially be dispositive of the interest of other individuals not a party to such action, thereby  impeding their ability to protect their interests.   51.  This case is also maintainable as a class action because Defendant acted or  refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Putative Classes, so that final  injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to the Classes  as a whole.   53.  Plaintiff intends to send notice to all members of the Putative Classes to the  extent required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The names and addresses of the Putative  Class members are readily available from Defendant’s records.  54.  Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding  paragraphs 1-53.   55.  In violation of the FCRA, the FCRA Disclosure form Defendant required the  Background Check Class to complete as a condition of its employment with Defendant does not  satisfy the disclosure requirements of 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) because Defendant failed to  provide a stand-alone document as to the consumer report information being obtained and  utilized.    Plaintiffs’ First Concrete Injury under §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i): Informational Injury   57.  Pursuant to §1681b(b)(2), Plaintiff was entitled to receive certain information at a  specific time, namely a disclosure that a consumer report may be procured for employment  purposes in a document consisting solely of the disclosure. Such a disclosure was required to be  provided to Plaintiff before the consumer report was to be procured. By depriving Plaintiff of  this information, in the form and at the time he was entitled to receive it, Defendant injured  Plaintiff and the putative class members he seeks to represent. Public Citizen v. U.S. Department  of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989); Federal Election Commission v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11  (1998).   59.  Defendant’s Failure to provide Plaintiff and the Putative Classes with a lawful  disclosure created a risk of harm that Plaintiff and members of the Putative Class would be  confused and distracted by the extraneous language.   Plaintiff’s Second Concrete Injury under §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i): Invasion of Privacy   60.  Defendant invaded Plaintiff’s right to privacy. Under the FCRA, “a person may  not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment  purposes with respect to any consumer, unless” it complies with the statutory requirements (i.e.,  disclosure and authorization) set forth in the following subsections: 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2). As  one court put it, “[t]he FCRA makes it unlawful to ‘procure’ a report without first providing the  proper disclosure and receiving the consumer’s written authorization.” Harris v. Home Depot  U.S.A., Inc. F. Supp. 3d 868, 869 (N.D.Cal.2015).   62.  The forgoing violations were willful. At the time Defendant violated 15 U.S.C.  §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) Defendant knew they were required to provide a stand-alone form (separate  from the employment application) prior to obtaining and then utilizing a consumer report on  Plaintiff and the Putative Class. A plethora of authority, including both case law and FTC  opinions, existed at the time of Defendant’s violations on this very issue that held waivers cannot  be included in the FCRA forms at issue. Defendant’s willful conduct is also reflected by, among  other things, the following facts:  a.  Defendant knew of potential FCRA liability (which is precisely why it  tried to avoid it);  b.  Defendant is a large corporation with access to legal advice through its  own general counsel’s office and outside employment counsel, and there  is not contemporaneous evidence that it determined that its conduct was  lawful;  c.  Defendant knew or had reason to know that their conduct was  inconsistent with published FTC guidance interpreting the FCRA and the  plain language of the statute; and   d.  Defendant voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater  than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless.    63.  Plaintiff and the Background Check Class are entitled to statutory damages of not  less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each  and every one of these violations under 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(1)(A), in addition to punitive  damages under 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(2).    65.  Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding  paragraphs 1-53.   66.  Defendant violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports relating to Plaintiff  and other Background Check Class members without proper authorization.   67.  The authorization requirement under 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) follows the  disclosure requirement of §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) and presupposes that the authorization is based  upon a valid disclosure. “After all, one cannot meaningfully authorize her employer to take an  action if she does not grasp what that action entails.” Burghy v. Dayton Racquet Club, Inc., 695  F. Supp. 2d 689, 699 (S.D. Ohio 2010); see also United States v. DeFries, 129 F. 3d 1293, 1307  (D.C. Cir. 1997)(“[A]uthorization secured ‘without disclosure of …material information’ is a  nullity.”)  Plaintiffs’ First Concrete Injury under §1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii): Informational Injury   68.  Plaintiff suffered a concrete informational injury because Defendant failed to  provide Plaintiff with information to which he was entitled to by statute, namely a stand-alone  FCRA disclosure form. Thus, through the FCRA, Congress has created a new right—the right to  receive the required disclosure as set out in the FCRA—and a new injury—not receiving a stand- alone disclosure. Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12414, *1 (11th Cir.  July 6, 2016); Moody v. Ascenda USA Inc., Case No.: 16-cv-60364 (S.D. Fla. October 5, 2015).  Thomas v. FTS USA, 2016 WL 3653878, at *8 (E.D. Va. Jun. 30, 2016).   70.  Defendant violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports on Plaintiff and  other Background Check Class members without first making proper disclosures in the format  required by 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). Namely, these disclosures had to be made: (1) before  Defendant actually procured consumer reports, and (2) in a stand-alone document, clearly  informing Plaintiff and other Background Check Class members that Defendant might procure a  consumer report on each of them for purposes of employment.   71.  Plaintiff suffered an informational injury. Under the FCRA, “a person may not  procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes  with respect to any consumer, unless” it complies with the statutory requirements (i.e., disclosure  and authorization) set forth in the following subsections: 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2). As one court  put it, “[t]he FCRA makes it unlawful to ‘procure’ a report without first providing the proper  disclosure and receiving the consumer’s written authorization.” Harris v. Home Depot U.S.A.  Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 868, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2015).   73.  Additionally, Defendant invaded Plaintiff’s right to privacy and intruded upon his  seclusion. Under the FCRA, “a person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer  report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless” it  complies with the statutory requirements (i.e., disclosure and authorization) set forth in the  following subsections: 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2). As one court put it, “[t]he FCRA makes it  unlawful to ‘procure’ a report without first providing the proper disclosure and receiving the  consumer’s written authorization.” Harris v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 868, 869  (N.D. Cal. 2015).   Plaintiff’s consumer report contained a wealth of private information which  Defendant had no right to access absent a specific Congressional license to do so.   Defendant  invaded Plaintiff’s privacy and intruded upon Plaintiff’s seclusion by procuring a consumer  report on him and viewing his private and personal information without lawful authorization.  Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., No-16-13031, (11th Cir., April 27, 2017)(Violation of  statutory right that has a close relationship to a harm traditionally recognized in English or  American law is a concrete harm for purposes of Art. III standing).   75.  Plaintiff and the Background Check Class are entitled to statutory damages of not  less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each  and every one of these violations under 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(1)(A), in addition to punitive  damages under 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(2).    76.  Plaintiff and the Background Check Class are further entitled to recover their  costs and attorneys’ fees, in accordance with 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(3).  77.  Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding  paragraphs 1-53.   78.  Defendant used a “consumer report,” as defined by the FCRA, to take adverse  employment action against Plaintiff and other members of the Adverse Action Class.   80.  The foregoing violations were willful. Defendant acted in deliberate or reckless  disregard of its obligations and the rights of Plaintiff and other Adverse Action Class members  under 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A). Defendant knew or should have known of its legal obligations  under the FCRA. These obligations are well established in the plain language of the statute and  in the promulgations of the Federal Trade Commission. Defendant obtained or otherwise had  available substantial written materials that apprised Defendant of its duties under the FCRA.   Any reasonable employer knows of the existence of these FCRA mandates, or can easily  discover their substance.   81.  Moreover, at the time Defendant failed to follow 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A) a  plethora of FTC opinion and case law existed, including case law from this District in a case  recently presided over also by Judge Byron in a case styled Miller v. Johnson & Johnson, 80 F.  Supp. 3d 1284, (M.D. Fla. 2015) (granting summary judgment as to liability to plaintiff on 15  U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A) claim). Miller addressed pre- adverse notices in compliance with the  FCRA, which, apparently, Defendant intentionally or recklessly ignored.  Plaintiff’s First Concrete Injury: Informational Injury   83.  Through the FCRA, Congress has created a new right—the right to receive pre- adverse notice as set out in the FCRA—and a new injury—not receiving said notice. The  Plaintiff’s “inability to obtain [that] information” is therefore, standing alone, “a sufficient injury  in fact to satisfy Article III.” Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).  Plaintiff’s Second Concrete Injury: Inability to  Learn of the Contents of His Report and Tell His Side of the Story   84.  Separately from the informational injury suffered, Plaintiff and Class Members  have Article III standing to pursue claims for violations of §1681b(b)(3) because Defendant’s  failure to provide timely notice deprived Plaintiff and Class Members of the opportunity to learn  of the charges against them and tell Defendant their side of the story before Defendant  terminated their employment. Thomas v. FTS USA, LLC, 193 F. Supp. 3d 623, 638 (E.D. Va.  2016).    85.  With these two recognized injuries directly traceable to Defendant’s failure to  timely provide the notices required by §1681b(b)(3), Plaintiff unquestionably has established  Article III standing.   86.  Plaintiff and the Adverse Action Class are entitled to statutory damages of not  less than $100 and not more than $1,000 for each and every one of these violations under 15  U.S.C. §1681n(a)(1)(A), in addition to punitive damages as the Court may allow under 15 U.S.C.  §1681n(a)(2).   Background Checks   Failure to Obtain Proper Authorization in Violation of FCRA   15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii)   Failure to Make Proper Disclosure in Violation of FCRA   15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)   Failure to Provide Notice in Violation of FCRA  15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)  