10.  Plaintiff, via his counsel, sent Defendant written correspondence dated May 22,  2012, regarding his account ending in 5618, and in such correspondence, notified Defendant that  he was represented by counsel and demanded that Defendant cease and desist from engaging in  any and all direct communications with Plaintiff, telephonic or otherwise.     11.  The May 22, 2012 letter was written by Tracey Tiedman, an attorney at Weisberg  & Meyers, LLC, and sent to Chase Card Services.  It stated, in relevant part:  Please be advised that this office represents the above-named individual regarding  the aforementioned account.  Having been formally notified of our representation, we respectfully demand you  not contact our client for any reason.  Instead, please direct all future contact and  correspondence to this office and in fact consider this letter express and unequivocal  revocation of any permission our client may have provided you to call them….. We  reserve the right to seek injunctive relief and damages under federal and state law should  you fail to honor these directives.   12.  Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant received Plaintiff’s notice of  representation and request to cease and desist communications on or before May 28, 2012—the  date on which Defendant responded to the May 22, 2012 letter.   23.  The proposed Class specifically excludes the United States of America, the State  of Colorado, counsel for the parties, the presiding United States District Court Judge, the Judges  of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and the Justices of the United States  Supreme Court, any entity in which Defendant has or had a controlling interest, all officers and  agents of Defendant, and all persons related to within the third degree of consanguinity or  affection to any of the foregoing individuals.   24.  The Class is averred to be so numerous that joinder of all members is  impracticable.     25.  The exact number of members of the Class is unknown to Plaintiff at this time  and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery.     26.  Upon information and good-faith belief, the proposed Class is ascertainable in  that the names and addresses of all members of the Class can be identified in business records  maintained by Defendant.     28.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class he seeks to  represent.   29.  Plaintiff and all members of the Class’s claims originate from the same conduct,  practice, and procedure on the part of Defendant, and Plaintiff possesses the same interests and  has suffered the same injuries as each Class member.  Like all proposed members of the Class,  Plaintiff received telephone calls from Defendant using an automatic telephone dialing system,  and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227.  Thus, if brought and  prosecuted individually, the claims of each of the members of the Class would require proof of  the same material and substantive facts.   30.  Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the  Class and has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with the members of the Class.   31.  Plaintiff is willing and prepared to serve this Court and the proposed Class.   33.  Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and  23(b)(1)(B).  The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the proposed Class  would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class who are  not parties to the action or could substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their  interests.   34.  The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the proposed Class  would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members  of the Class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing  the Class.  Such incompatible standards of conduct and varying adjudications, on what would  necessarily be the same essential facts, proof, and legal theories, would also create and allow the  existence of inconsistent and incompatible rights within the Class.   35.  Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) in that Defendant  has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the proposed Class, making final  declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate.   36.  Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) in that the  questions of law and fact that are common to members of the proposed Class predominate over  any questions affecting only individual members.   38.  There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.   39.  Absent a class action, Defendant’s violations of the law will be allowed to  proceed without a full, fair, judicially supervised remedy.   40.  Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation above.   41.  Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by utilizing an automatic  telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice to make and/or place telephone  calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number.   42.  Defendant willingly or knowingly violated 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) as  Defendant was advised that it did not have consent to call Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, yet  repeatedly used an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice  to make and/or place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number anyway.   9.  Prior to May 2012, Defendant began placing telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular  telephone number.   VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)  