24.  Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47  U.S.C. § 153(39).   25.  Beginning in or around March of 2019, Plaintiff began receiving numerous  autodialed calls on her cellular telephone ((XXX) XXX-7223) from Defendant.    26.  When Plaintiff did not pick up the phone, Defendant left a message on her  cellular telephone voicemail informing Plaintiff that Defendant was calling in regard to an  overdue medical account owed by someone other than, and unknown to, Plaintiff.     27.  There was at least one number that appeared in Plaintiff’s caller ID for these  calls: 800-275-4524.    28.  Telephone number 800-275-4524 is associated with Defendant.     30.  Plaintiff believes Defendant called her cellular telephone number on at least  seven (7) separate occasions between March 2019 and June 2019.    31.  KCI’s calls were not intended for Plaintiff. Rather, KCI placed its calls in an  effort to reach someone other than, and unknown to, Plaintiff named “Brenda Stearns”.     32.  Moreover, Plaintiff recalls that some of the calls contained prerecorded  messages in which a generic message played stating that KCI was calling in regard to a  delinquent medical account purportedly owned by Ms. Stearns.     33.  On more than one occasion, Plaintiff contacted Defendant via email and by  telephone to explain to Defendant that it was calling the wrong person. Defendant, however,  failed to rectify the problem and continued placing calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone.     34.  In receiving unwanted and unsolicited calls on her cellular telephone, Plaintiff  suffered concrete harm in the form of lost time spent fielding the unwanted calls and attempting  to get Defendant to stop the calls, loss of use of her cellular telephone as the calls came in, and  the invasion of privacy and intrusion upon her seclusion.    35.  Upon information and good faith belief, and in light of the frequency, number,  nature, and character of the calls at issue, including KCI’s use of artificial or prerecorded voice  messages, telephone contact made by KCI to Plaintiff on her cellular telephone occurred via  an “automatic telephone dialing system,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).     37.  KCI called Plaintiff on her cellular telephone by utilizing an artificial or  prerecorded voice as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). To be sure, when Defendant left a  message on Plaintiff’s voicemail, it was a prerecorded message informing Plaintiff the call was  in regard to an account belonging to someone other than, and unknown to, Plaintiff.     38.  The telephone number on which KCI contacted Plaintiff was assigned to a  cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).   39.  Plaintiff did not provide her “prior express consent” allowing KCI to place  telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone utilizing an “automatic telephone dialing  system” and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. §  227(b)(1)(A).    41.  In fact, KCI asked for someone other than Plaintiff—a person whom Plaintiff  did not know and with whom Plaintiff had no connection whatsoever.     42.  Plaintiff is not, nor was at the time of the calls in question, one of Defendant’s  customers.    43.  Plaintiff does not have, nor did have at the time of the calls in question, a  business relationship with Defendant.    44.  The telephone calls made to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone by Defendant were  not “for emergency purposes” as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).   45.  The telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone made by Defendant, which  utilized an “automatic telephone dialing system” and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice for  non-emergency purposes and in the absence of Plaintiff’s prior express consent, violated 47  U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).  46.  Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other persons  similarly situated (“the Class”).   48.  Upon information and belief, the members of the Class are so numerous that joinder  of all of them is impracticable.    49.  Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members of the Class, but on  information and belief, the number of Class members is in the thousands.    50.  The members of the Class are ascertainable because the Class is defined by  reference to objective criteria.    51.  In addition, the members of the Class are identifiable in that, upon information and  belief, their cellular telephone numbers, names and addresses can be identified in business records  maintained by Defendant and by third parties.    52.  Plaintiff’s claims, and the claims of the members of the Class, originate from the  same conduct, practice and procedure on the part of Defendant.   53.  Plaintiff’s claims are based on the same theories as are the claims of the members  of the Class.   54.  Plaintiff suffered the same injuries as the members of the Class.    55.  Plaintiff and all members of the Class have been harmed by the acts of Defendant,  including, but not limited to, the invasion of their privacy, annoyance, waste of time, depletion of  their cellular phone battery, and the intrusion on their cellular telephone that occupied it from  receiving legitimate communications.    56.  This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages.    58.  There are well defined, nearly identical, questions of law and fact affecting all Class  members. The questions of law and fact involving the Class claims predominate over questions  which may affect individual Class members. Those common questions of law and fact include, but  are not limited to, the following:   a.  Whether non-emergency calls made to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular  telephones used an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or  prerecorded voice;   b.  Whether such calls were made by Defendant;   c.  Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express  consent (i.e., consent that is clearly and unmistakably stated) to make such calls to  wrong or reassigned telephone numbers;   d.  Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and/or willful;   e.  Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and   f.  Whether Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future.    59.  As a person who received numerous and repeated telephone calls using an automatic telephone  dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without her prior express consent within  the meaning of the TCPA, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Class member.    60.  Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class  and has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Class.   62.  A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this  controversy.    63.  Class wide relief is essential to compel Defendant to comply with the TCPA. The  interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against  Defendant is small because the statutory damages in an individual action for the violation of the  TCPA are relatively small.    64.  Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than  are presented in many class actions because the calls at issue are all automated and the Class  members did not provide prior express consent, as required under the statute, to authorize such  calls to their cellular telephones.    65.  Defendant has acted on grounds applicable to the Class, thereby making final  injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole  appropriate.    66.  Moreover, on information and belief, the TCPA violations complained of herein  are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered.  67.  Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in  paragraphs 1-66.   69.  The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple  violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C.  § 227 et seq.  Specifically, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by utilizing an  automatic telephone dialing system to place calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number, without  her consent.    70.  Defendant separately violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by utilizing an artificial  or prerecorded voice in connection with calls it placed to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number,  without her consent.    71.  As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class  members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation of  the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).    72.  Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief  prohibiting Defendant’s violation of the TCPA in the future.   FIRST COUNT  STATUTORY VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER  PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.  