(Alternative Violation - Compulsory Opt-Out Requirements Violate the First Amendment)   (Compulsory Opt-Out Requirements Violate the Railway Labor Act)   (Compulsory Opt-Out Requirements Breach the Duty of Fair Representation)   11. Yet unions spend large sums of money on politics and “‘advocate political ideas, support  political candidates, and advance national economic concepts which may or may not be of an  employee’s choice.’” Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 747 (1961) (quoting Hanson v. Union  Pac. R. Co., 71 N.W.2d 526, 546 (Neb. 1955), rev’d on other grounds by Ry. Emps.’ Dep't v.  Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956)). They also spend money on organizing, which is money “spent on  employees outside” a nonmember’s immediate craft/class of employees, and other ideological  activities. Ellis v. Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 452 (1984).    12. As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that forced fees threaten  individuals’ freedom of speech, association, and thought because it forces them to fund private  organizations (unions) “with political aspects.” Street, 367 U.S. at 747.  And ultimately “political  causes” which they may oppose. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 447 (quoting Street, 367 U.S. at 768).    13. To protect individual autonomy, the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the RLA and First  Amendment as only allowing unions to compel nonmembers to pay union fees relating to  collectively bargaining with their employer. Thus, a union may not charge nonmembers for its  spending on nonchargeable activities. Street, 367 U.S. at 764.     14. IAM has a forced fees agreement with United Airlines, which requires all employees,  including its nonmembers, like Baisley, to pay union dues-equivalent fees just to keep their job.  If not preempted by the RLA, the Texas Right to Work law would void IAM’s forced fees  agreement in its entirety. Tex. Labor Code Ann. §101.051 et seq.      15. On information and belief, IAM spends millions of dollars a year on nonchargeable  activities, including lobbying.    17. According to IAM’s forced fees policy, each nonmember must do the following to opt- out, and thereby, maintain their political and ideological autonomy, and not subsidize  nonchargeable spending:     i. Research and decipher IAM’s opt-out requirements;   ii. Plan and draft a written notice of objection;  iii. Reveal to IAM in the objection notice the employee’s full name and home address;   iv. Include in the objection notice the employee’s local union number, if known;   v. Sign the objection notice;    vi. Buy at least one envelope;   vii. Pay for sufficient postage to send the objection notice to IAM;   viii. Postmark the objection notice during the month of November;   ix. Specifically state in the objection notice that the objection is “continuing in nature” or  face having to file new objections every year;   x. If the employee is currently a member of IAM, the IAM imposes the additional  obligation of resigning from membership, and then submitting the objection notice  within 30 days of resigning; if newly hired, a nonmember must submit an objection  notice within 30 days of being subject to IAM’s forced fees agreement.    19. But to avoid paying the same rate as full union members and supporting and subsidizing  IAM’s nonchargeable spending, Baisley mailed a letter to IAM on or around November 23,  2018, which objected to paying for union fees unrelated to collective bargaining activities.  Baisley paid $3.95 in postage to mail this objection letter.    20. Baisley received a letter from IAM dated November 28, 2018, which acknowledged his  objection and promised to reduce his fees by the amounts that are not legally chargeable to  nonmembers. But IAM’s letter stated that he must send a new letter in November 2019 renewing  his objection if he wishes to receive a reduction in the year 2020.    21. This is brought as a class action according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(A)  and (b)(2), and alternatively, 23(b)(3), by Plaintiff for himself and for all others similarly  situated.       22. The class for all counts consists of all former (employed at some time since November  16, 2018), current, and future nonmember employees within the meaning of RLA, 45 U.S.C.  §§151, 181 who are, have been, or will be represented by IAM and are, have been, or will be  subject to IAM’s opt-out requirements.    23. Upon information and belief, the numbers of persons in the classes are so numerous and  scattered throughout the United States that joinder is impractical.    25. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other class members, who are subject to the  same deprivations of their rights by IAM’s opt-out requirements. IAM owes an identical duty  with regard to these claims to Plaintiff and all other class members.    26. Plaintiff can adequately represent the interests of the class and has no conflict with other  class members who are nonmembers of IAM.    27. Because IAM’s compulsory fee practices and procedures apply equally to all in the class,  the prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of  inconsistent or varying adjudications which would establish incompatible standards of conduct  for IAM.   28. The IAM has acted, and continues to act, to deprive Plaintiff and each class member of  their statutory and constitutional rights on grounds generally applicable to all, making  appropriate declaratory, injunctive, and other equitable relief appropriate for all class members.   29. Alternatively, the questions of law or fact raised in this complaint about the statutory and  constitutional rights of nonmembers of IAM are common to the class members and predominate  over any questions affecting only individual class members.   30. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication  of the controversy, in that individual class members are deprived of the same statutory and  constitutional rights by IAM’s opt-out requirements, differing only in immaterial aspects of their  factual situations. The limited amount of money at stake for each individual employee makes it  burdensome for class members to maintain separate actions.   32. The facts alleged above are incorporated here by reference.   33. The Railway Labor Act protects the rights of railway and airline employees to refuse to  join a union and to otherwise disassociate from a union. These rights are in RLA, Section 2,  Third, 45 U.S.C. § 152, which prohibits interfering, influencing or coercing employees in their  choice of bargaining representatives, and RLA Section 2, Fourth, 45 U.S.C. § 152, which  protects the right of employees to “join, organize, or assist in organizing” a union of their choice  as well as the right to refrain from any of those activities.    35. The RLA prohibits union rules that burden employees’ exercise of their RLA rights or  that otherwise add requirements to the exercise of a RLA right that are “over and above” what  the RLA requires. Felter v. S. Pac. Co., 359 U.S. 326, 335 (1959).    36. Nothing in the RLA’s text permits unions to require that employees affirmatively opt-out  of paying forced fees that are unrelated to union spending on collective bargaining.    37. Opt-out requirements put a “burden” on employees’ right to refrain from paying union  fees that are unrelated to a union’s spending on collective bargaining activities, including its  spending on politics. Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 312 (2012). As the U.S. Supreme  Court explained in Knox, a union’s opt-out requirements create a risk that nonmembers’ fees will  go to “political and ideological ends with which they do not agree.” Id. at 312. And these opt-out  requirements irrationally conflict with the “probable preferences of most nonmembers,” which is  to refrain from paying fees they have no legal obligation to pay. Id.    38. In Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, the Court held that nonmembers only pay for non- chargeable spending by waiving their rights not to pay those amounts and that a waiver of rights  “cannot be presumed.”  _ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2465, 2486 (2018) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst,  44. The facts alleged above are incorporated here by reference.   45. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the associational and free speech  rights of individuals.    46. The First Amendment constrains a union’s actions when it enforces a forced fees  agreement that receives immunization from state right to work laws due to the RLA’s  preemption of those laws. Shea v. Machinists, 154 F.3d 508, 513 n.2 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The [U.S.  Supreme] Court has found that there is sufficient state action to implicate the First Amendment  in RLA cases because the RLA expressly states that it supersedes state law, and hence federal  law is the authority through which private rights are lost.”) (citing Railway Employees’ Dep't v.  Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956)).    47. Unions subject to constitutional constraints violate the First Amendment when they  require employees to opt-out of paying union fees that they have no legal obligation to pay. The  only choice structure consistent with the First Amendment is one where unions seek employees’  affirmative consent to paying fees they otherwise have no legal obligation to pay—i.e., an “opt- in” system. Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486.   49. Thus, if the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh, is construed to allow unions to impose opt- out requirements, then the statute as construed violates employees’ First Amendment free speech  and association rights.    50. Defendant IAM’s forced fees agreement with United Airlines was made based on the  RLA authorizing unions and employers to enter those types of agreements. Thus, the First  Amendment constrains any requirements that IAM imposes on employees when it maintains and  enforces a forced fees agreement.    51. Defendant IAM violated the First Amendment free speech and associational rights of  Plaintiff Baisley and the class when it forced them to affirmatively opt-out of paying union fees  unrelated to its spending on collective bargaining. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2448, 2486.   52. Defendant IAM caused Plaintiff Baisley and the class to suffer monetary and non- monetary harms when it violated the First Amendment by imposing the opt-out requirements on  them.   53. The facts alleged above are incorporated here by reference.   54. Under the RLA, a union acting as the exclusive representative of a craft/class of  employees owes a fiduciary duty of fair representation to all the employees that it represents,  members and nonmembers alike. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991). That  duty is “akin to the duty owed by other fiduciaries to their beneficiaries,” such as the “duty a  trustee owes to trust beneficiaries,” or the duty an “attorney” owes to a “client.” Id. at 74.    56. Unions breach the duty of fair representation when they impose burdensome and arbitrary  requirements for employees to exercise their statutory or constitutional rights. Shea v.  Machinists, 154 F.3d 508, 515 (1998).    57. IAM owed a duty of fair representation to Plaintiff Baisley and the class.    58. IAM breached that duty when it acted arbitrarily by requiring Plaintiff Baisley and the  class to affirmatively object (“opt-out”) to paying union fees that they had no legal obligation to  pay. These opt-out requirements arbitrarily burden the opportunity of Plaintiff Baisley and the  class to freely exercise their right not to pay union fees unrelated to collective bargaining. See  Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 312 (2012).    59. Although in Machinists v. Street, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that the First  Amendment permits unions to impose opt-out requirements on nonmembers, 367 U.S. 740, 750,  774 (1961), the Court clarified in Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 312-13 (2012), and  confirmed in Janus that Street is dicta and no longer, if it ever was, good law. Janus, 138 S. Ct.  at 2448, 2486.   60.  IAM’s opt-out requirements caused Plaintiff Baisley and the class to suffer monetary and  non-monetary harms.   8. Defendant IAM is a labor union that exclusively represents a nation-wide craft/class of  “fleet service employees” that work for United Airlines. Plaintiff Arthur Baisley falls within this  craft/class because he works for United Airlines as a “Ramp Service Employee.”       9. Under the Railway Labor Act, IAM’s status as the fleet service employees’ exclusive  representative means IAM has a legal right to demand that United Airlines negotiate only with it  for their terms and conditions of employment, including their wages. 45 U.S.C. § 152; Virginian.  Ry. Co. v. System Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 548 (1937). IAM’s exclusive representative status  forecloses United’s ability to negotiate with IAM’s nonmembers, i.e., employees who fall within  the “craft/class” that IAM represents but who chose not to sign up for union membership. Id. As  a result, the RLA forces nonmembers to accept IAM’s representation and extinguishes their  individual right to deal directly with their employer. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,  323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944); c.f. N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967)  (“The employee may disagree with many of the union decisions but is bound by them.”).   