25.  On or about August 14, 2020, Defendant caused a call with a prerecorded message to  be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 9590 (the “9590 Number”).   26.  Because Plaintiff did not answer her telephone after it rang, a voicemail containing  a prerecorded message was left on Plaintiff’s phone.   27.  The following is a transcript of the voicemail that was left in Plaintiff’s voicemail  box:  Hey, it’s me. I’m really sorry that I’m calling again, but I forgot to  tell that you that I’m going to the new recreational dispensary  tomorrow called Doja. They’re in Portage and they are giving out  like a free 50-inch TV and like free tacos for an entire year from  Taco Bob’s and I really want to get out there. I don’t want to miss  it. So you should meet up with me tomorrow like a little before  eleven because they are going to be really busy. I think they are on  like 4203 East Centre Avenue. If you can’t make it just give me a  holler, but otherwise I just wanted to let you know why I’m going  to be a little late tomorrow. Alright, talk soon. Bye.    28.  The prerecorded call at issue, which was left as a voicemail, was transmitted to  Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action.   30.  Defendant’s prerecorded calls constitute telemarketing because they encourage the  future purchase or investment in property, goods, and/or services, i.e., selling cannabis products.   31.  The prerecorded calls Plaintiff received originated from telephone number 269- 459-6462, a telephone number owned and/or operated by or on behalf of Defendant.   32.  Plaintiff received the subject call with a prerecorded voice within this judicial  district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon  information and belief, Defendant caused other prerecorded messages to be sent to individuals  residing within this judicial district.   33.  At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express consent to be  contacted with a prerecorded call.   34.  Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 9590 Number and is financially  responsible for phone service to the 9590 Number.   35.  Defendant’s unsolicited prerecorded call caused Plaintiff actual harm, including  invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.  See Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Zoeller, No. 16- 2059, 2017 WL 25482, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017)  (“Every call uses some of the phone owner's time and mental energy, both of which are precious.”).   36.  Defendant’s unsolicited voice messages caused Plaintiff actual harm.  Specifically,  Plaintiff estimates that she has wasted fifteen minutes reviewing all of Defendant’s unwanted  messages.  Each time, Plaintiff had to stop what she was doing to either retrieve her phone and/or  look down at the phone to review the message.    38.  Defendant’s voice messages also can slow cell phone performance by taking up space  on the recipient phone’s memory. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message- spam#text (finding that spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking up phone  memory space).  39.  Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  herself and all others similarly situated.   40.  Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows:  No Consent Class: All persons within the United States who, within the  four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a call using an  artificial or prerecorded voice, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s  behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, without emergency  purpose and without the recipient’s prior express written consent.   41.  Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not  know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several  thousands, if not more.  44.  There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate  over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class.  Among the questions of law and  fact common to the Class are:  (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency prerecorded telemarketing calls to  Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones;  (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express  written consent to make such calls;  (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful;  (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and  (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.   45.  The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s  claim that Defendant routinely transmits prerecorded messages to telephone numbers assigned to  cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims  capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.  51.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth  herein.    52.  It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for  emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any  automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone  number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).    53.  Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – transmitted calls using an  artificial or prerecorded voice to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the  putative class.     54.  These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained  express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior  express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class  when its calls were made.    55.  Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an  artificial or prerecorded voice to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent.    56.  Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and  knew or should have known that it was using an artificial or prerecorded voice. The violations  were therefore willful or knowing.    58.  Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other  members of the putative Class had not given prior express consent to receive its prerecorded calls  to their cellular telephones the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.   59.  Plaintiff re-allege and incorporates paragraphs 1-50 as if fully set forth herein.   60.  At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as  alleged herein violated the TCPA.   61.  Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to transmit artificial or  prerecorded voice calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the  Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)   PROPOSED CLASS   Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  