(Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation in Violation of the FLSA)  172.  Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding  paragraphs.  173.  Plaintiffs consent in writing to be a part of this action, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §  216(b).  Plaintiffs’ written consent forms are attached hereto.  Plaintiffs anticipate that as this  case proceeds, other individuals will sign consent forms and join as plaintiffs.  174.  At all relevant times, Defendants have been an “employer” engaged in interstate  commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29  U.S.C. § 203.  At all relevant times, Defendants have employed and/or continue to employ  employees, including Plaintiffs, and members of the Collective.    175.  At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants have gross  operating revenues in excess of $500,000.00.    176.  The FLSA requires each covered employer to compensate all non-exempt  employees at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work  performed in excess of forty hours per work week.  177.  During their employment with Defendants, within the applicable statute of  limitations, Plaintiffs and the other Collective members worked in excess of forty hours per  workweek without lawful overtime compensation.    28  178.  Despite the hours worked by Plaintiffs and the Collective members, Defendants  willfully, in bad faith, and in knowing violation of the FLSA, failed and refused to pay them  overtime compensation.  179.  Plaintiffs were not paid FLSA mandated overtime premiums uniformly and based  on the policies and practices articulated above.    180.  Also, by failing to accurately record, report, and/or preserve records of hours  worked by Plaintiffs and the Collective, Defendants have failed to make, keep, and preserve  records with respect to each of their employees sufficient to determine their wages, hours, and  other conditions and practices of employment, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.  181.  Plaintiffs and all similarly situated employees are victims of uniform and  employer-based compensation policies.  Upon information and belief, these uniform policies, in  violation of the FLSA, have been applied, and continue to be applied, to all Security Agents,  Operations Assistants and/or Supervisors employed by Defendants in JFK.   182.  Defendants have failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with  respect to its compensation to Plaintiffs and the Collective.  183.  The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA,  within the meaning of 29 U.S.C §§ 216(b) and 255(a).  184.  Because Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were willful, a 3-year statute of  limitation applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255.  185.  Due to Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiffs and the members of the Collective  are entitled to recover from Defendants damages in the amount of their respective unpaid  overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and interest.  29  (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation in Violation of NYCRR § 142.2.2 and  Article 19 of the NYLL)  197.  Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding  paragraphs.  198.  At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were employees and the Defendants have been  employers within the meaning of the NYLL.  199.  The overtime wage provisions of NYLL Article 19 and its supporting regulations  apply to Defendants.  200.  Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class the overtime  wages to which they were entitled under the New York Labor Law.  201.  By Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class Members  premium overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, they have willfully  violated NYLL Article 19, §§ 650 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of  Labor Regulations, including but not limited to the regulations in 12 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 142.  31  202.  Also, Defendants have violated NYCRR 142-2.2 and NYLL §§ 191 and 193 by  failing to pay Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class at least one and one-half times the minimum  wage for all hours worked over 40 in any workweek during the Class Period.  203.  Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class are  entitled to recover from Defendants all unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, reasonable  attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.  (Failure to Furnish Accurate Wage Statements in Violation of NYLL §195(3))  213.  Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding  paragraphs.  214.  At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were employees and the Defendants have been  employers within the meaning of the NYLL.  215.  The recording keeping provisions of NYLL Article 19 and its supporting  regulations apply to Defendants.  216.  Defendants did not provide Plaintiffs and members of the Rule 23 Class with a  legally sufficient wage statement upon the payment of wages, as required by NYLL § 195(3).  217.  NYLL §195(3) requires that employers furnish employees with wage statements  containing accurate, specifically enumerated criteria required under the NYLL.  218.  Due to Defendants’ NYLL violations, Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to  statutory penalties of $100 for each workweek that Defendants failed to provide them with  33  accurate wage statements, or a total of $2,500.00, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and  injunctive and declaratory relief.  (Failure to Pay Minimum Wage Compensation in Violation of the FLSA)  186.  Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding  paragraphs.  187.  At all relevant times herein, Plaintiffs have been entitled to the rights, protections,  and benefits provided under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.  188.  The FLSA regulates, among other things, the payment of minimum wage by  employers whose employees are engaged in interstate commerce, or engaged in the production of  goods for commerce, or employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of  goods for commerce, per 29 U.S.C. §206(a); 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).   189.  The Defendants are subject to the minimum wage requirements of the FLSA  because they acted as an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce and its employees are  engaged in commerce.   190.  Defendants, pursuant to their policy and practice, violated the FLSA by refusing  and failing to pay Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees a lawful minimum wage for  all hours worked.     191.  Section 13 of the FLSA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 213, exempts certain categories  of employees from minimum wage obligations.  None of the FLSA exemptions apply to  Plaintiffs or other similarly situated employees.   192.  Plaintiffs and all similarly situated employees are victims of uniform and  employer-based compensation policies.  Upon information and belief, these uniform policies, in  violation of the FLSA, have been applied, and continue to be applied, to all Security Agents,  Operations Assistants and/or Supervisors employed by Defendants in JFK.   30  193.  Defendants have failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with  respect to its compensation to Plaintiffs and the Collective.  194.  The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA,  within the meaning of 29 U.S.C §§ 216(b) and 255(a).  195.  Because Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were willful, a 3-year statute of  limitation applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255.  196.  Due to Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiffs and the members of the Collective  are entitled to recover from Defendants damages in the amount of their respective unpaid  overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and interest.  (Failure to Pay Minimum Wages and “Gap Time” Wages in Violation of  NYLL §§ 191, 193 and 652 and Article 19)  204.  Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding  paragraphs.  205.  At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were employees and the Defendants have been  employers within the meaning of the NYLL.  206.  The minimum wage provisions of NYLL Article 19 and its supporting regulations  apply to Defendants.  207.  Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class the minimum  wages to which they were entitled under the NYLL.  208.  By Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class Members  minimum wages, they have willfully violated the NYLL Article 19, §§ 652 et seq., and the  supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations.  209.  Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class are  entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid minimum wages, liquidated damages,  reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.  32  210.  Similarly, Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class the  difference between the New York State minimum wage and their hourly rate of pay as  determined by Defendants for all hours worked in a workweek, a practice that is unlawful under  the NYLL.  211.  Specifically, Defendants failure to pay these – known as “gap time” wages under  the relevant precedent – is prohibited by NYLL Section 193 which expressly prohibits an  employer from making unauthorized deductions from employees’ wages.  212.  Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class are  entitled to recover from Defendants all unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, reasonable  attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.  138.  Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the factual allegations made in the  preceding paragraphs.    139.  Defendants employed Plaintiffs during the Collective Period.  140.  Defendants classified Plaintiffs and Members of the Collective as nonexempt for  the purposes of the FLSA, paying them an hourly wage rather than an annual salary.  21  141.  Upon information and belief, there are more than 300 current and former  employees who are similarly situated to the Lead Plaintiff and who were similarly denied  overtime compensation.   142.  Lead Plaintiff Douglas represents other employees, and is acting on behalf of  Defendants’ current and former employees’ interests as well as his own interests in bringing this  action.   143.  Defendants unlawfully required Lead Plaintiff Douglas and all individuals  employed as Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors to work through their  unpaid meal breaks.   144.  Defendants also unlawfully required Lead Plaintiff Douglas and all individuals  employed as Security Agents to arrive early for work for a required roll call without  compensation for such time.   145.  Further, Defendants unlawfully required Lead Plaintiff Douglas and all  individuals employed as Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors to work past the  end of their shifts without compensation.  146.  At all times during the Collective Period, Defendants, as a matter of common  policy and/or practice, have not paid Lead Plaintiff Douglas and all individuals employed as  Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors lawful overtime premiums for all hours  worked in excess of 40 hours in a work week and/or minimum wage compensation for hours  worked under 40 in a work week.   147.  Plaintiffs seek to proceed as a collective action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),  on behalf of themselves and the following class of persons:  22  Proposed Collective: All individuals employed by Defendants as Security Agents,  Operations Assistants and Supervisors at JFK and who, at any  point during the Collective Period, earned but were not paid lawful  FLSA overtime premiums for hours worked over 40 in a work  week and/or the applicable federal statutory minimum wage for  hours worked under 40 in a workweek during the Collective Period  based on the practices alleged herein.  148.  Specifically, Plaintiffs’ Proposed Collective is further defined as involving (i)  claims for unpaid overtime and minimum wage compensation for Defendants’ practice of forcing  Plaintiffs to work “off-the-clock” and without compensation during unpaid meal breaks; (ii)  claims for unpaid overtime and minimum wage compensation for Defendants’ practice of forcing  Plaintiffs to work “off-the-clock” before the beginning and after the end of their shifts, which  they knowingly suffered and permitted, and/or commonly enforced FLSA recordkeeping practice  violations which resulted in unpaid wages.   149.  As such, Lead Plaintiff Douglas and the Proposed Collective suffered damages for  unpaid earned overtime wages under the FLSA in nearly all, if not all, the weeks they worked  during the Collective Period.  150.  Defendants were aware or should have been aware that the law required them to  pay all non-exempt employees, including Lead Plaintiff Douglas and the Proposed Collective, an  overtime premium of 1 and ½ times their regular rate of pay for all work-hours Defendants  suffered or permitted them to work in excess of forty (40) per workweek.  151.  Defendants’ conduct, as set forth in this Complaint, was willful and in bad faith,  and has caused significant damages to Lead Plaintiff Douglas and the Proposed Collective.  152.  Defendants are liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Lead  Plaintiff Douglas and the Proposed Collective, and as such, notice should be sent to the Proposed  Collective.    23  153.  There are numerous similarly situated current and former employees of  Defendants who were subject to the aforementioned policies in violation of the FLSA who would  benefit from the issuance of a Court supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity  to join in the present lawsuit.    154.  Those similarly situated employees are known to the Defendants and are readily  identifiable through Defendants’ records.  155.  Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the factual allegations made in the  preceding paragraphs.    156.  Plaintiffs seek to proceed as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal  Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following defined classes:  Proposed Class:  All individuals employed by Defendants as Security Agents,  Operations Assistants and Supervisors at JFK and who, at any  point during the Class Period, who earned but were not paid lawful  NYLL overtime premiums for hours worked over 40 in a work  week and/or the New York minimum wage for hours worked under  40 in a workweek during the Collective Class Period based on the  practices alleged herein.  157.  Specifically, Plaintiffs’ Proposed Class is further defined as involving: (i) claims  for unpaid overtime and minimum wage compensation for Defendants’  practice of forcing  Plaintiffs to work “off-the-clock” and without overtime and/or “gap time” compensation both  during unpaid meal breaks, before the beginning of their shift and/or after the end of shifts which  they knowingly suffered and permitted, and/or commonly enforced NYLL recordkeeping  practice violations which resulted in unpaid wages; and (ii) claims for wage statement violations  for Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiffs’ with accurate wage statements on each payday that  24  include the information required by NYLL §195(3), including the correct  number of hours  worked during the pay period.   158.  Defendants have violated NYCRR 142-2.2 and NYLL §§ 191, 193 by failing to  pay Lead Plaintiff Douglas and the Proposed Class at least one and one-half times the New York  state minimum wage for all hours worked over 40 during the class period pursuant to the same  illegal practices and policies alleged above.  159.  Numerosity: The Proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is  impracticable.  Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that during the Class  Period, Defendants employed over 300 people who satisfy the definition of the Proposed Class.  160.  Typicality:  Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the Proposed Class.  Representative Plaintiff Douglas is informed and believes that, like other Security Agents,  Operations Assistants and Supervisors, the Class Members were subjected to Defendants’  policies, practices, programs, procedures, protocols and plans alleged herein concerning the  failure to pay proper wages, failure to keep adequate records and failure to furnish accurate wage  statements.  161.  Superiority:  A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair  and efficient adjudication of the controversy.  162.  Adequacy:  Representative Plaintiff Douglas will fairly and adequately protect  the interests of the Proposed Class, and have retained counsel experienced in complex FLSA and  NYLL class and collective action litigation.  163.  Lead Plaintiff Douglas’s interests are co-extensive with those of the Proposed  Class that they seek to represent.  They are willing and able to fairly represent the Proposed  Class and to vigorously pursue their similar individual claims in this action.  25  164.  Commonality:  Common questions of law and fact exist to all members of the  Proposed Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the  Proposed Class, including but not limited to:  a. Whether Defendants unlawfully failed to pay lawful overtime premiums for all hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek for those violations stated above; b. Whether Defendants unlawfully failed to pay lawful “gap time” wages for all hours worked under forty (40) in a workweek for those violations stated above;Whether Defendants unlawfully failed to pay the state statutory minimum wage to members of the Proposed Class in violation of the NYLL; c. Whether those violations were pursuant to a common policy or practice applicable to all class members; d. Whether Defendants furnished class members with accurate wage statements on each payday containing the information required by NYLL § 195(3); e. Whether Defendants kept and maintained records with respect to each hour worked by Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class; f. Whether those violations were pursuant to a common policy or practice applicable to all class members; g. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class within the meaning of New York law; h. The proper measure of damages sustained by the Proposed Class; and i. Whether Defendants’ actions were “willful.” 165.  These common questions of law and fact arise from the same course of events,  and each class member will make similar legal and factual arguments to prove liability.  26  166.  Further, adjudication of each individual member’s claim as a separate action  would be dispositive of the interest of other individuals not party to this action, impeding their  ability to protect their interests.  167.  The case is maintainable as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because  prosecution of actions by or against individual members of the class would result in inconsistent  or varying adjudications and create the risk of incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants.   168.  Further, adjudication of each individual member’s claim as a separate action  would be dispositive of the interest of other individuals not party to this action, impeding their  ability to protect their interests.  169.  Class certification is also appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because  questions of law and fact common to the Proposed Class predominate over any questions  affecting only individual members of the Proposed Class, and because a class action is superior  to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation.  Defendants’  common and uniform policies and practices denied the Proposed Class the wages to which they  are entitled.  The damages suffered by the individual Proposed Class members are small  compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation.  In addition,  class certification is superior because it will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation  that might result in inconsistent judgments about Defendants’ practices.  170.  Plaintiffs intend to send notice to all members of the Proposed Class to the extent  required by Rule 23.  The names and addresses of the Proposed Class are available from  Defendants.  171.  During the class period, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs each worked  more than 1 hour of gap time for which they were not paid the lawful straight time wage under  27  either the NYLL and more than 1 hour of overtime-eligible work during the class and collective  class periods for which they were not paid a lawful overtime premium of time and one half of  their regular rate of pay.    27. Defendants provide security services, janitorial services, and personnel services throughout the United States, including the New York metropolitan area.   28. Since 2013, Defendants have provided security to facilities and property at JFK pursuant to a contract between and among Defendants and the PANYNJ.   29. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants have directly employed approximately 300 Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors at JFK pursuant to  Defendants’ contract with the PANYNJ.     30. Work rules required that Plaintiffs begin the workday by reporting to a central location at JFK, Building 14.    31. At Building 14 Plaintiffs would receive their location assignments for the day.  32. Defendants did not have an FLSA compliant timekeeping system, and instead required Plaintiffs and every member of the putative Collective and Class to sign in and out of a  daily attendance log at the start and end of the shift, respectively.     33. Plaintiffs could not enter the actual time that they started or finished their workday, nor were they allowed to record the hours that they were on meal or rest breaks.   34. Instead, the Plaintiffs’ standard shift hours were pre-printed on the sheet and could not be altered without management’s approval.   7   35. ASAs were assigned to stationary posts throughout the airport and tasked with various security responsibilities, such as checking airport and airline employee identification  credentials, performing inspections on vehicles entering airport areas through secured gates, and  guarding against trespassers.     36. LASAs were assigned tasks such as patrolling perimeter fences around airport runways and tarmacs, and watching the monitors in JFK’s remote camera control room.    37. Operations Assistants reported to Supervisors and helped the Supervisors carry out their office-related functions.    38. Supervisors would typically be assigned two to a shift and were responsible for overseeing the work of Operations Assistants and Security Agents.  As such, Supervisors’ duties  included driving, or riding as a passenger, from location to location on JFK property, and much  of their time was spent outside of their offices.    39. In order to reach their assigned location, Plaintiffs were required to drive, or be a passenger in, official security vehicles owned and/or operated by Defendants.  The time  Plaintiffs spent driving in such official security vehicles was always considered “on duty,” even  if their shifts had ended.   40. Security Agents, Operations Assistants, and Supervisors were all paid on an hourly basis.  Paid shifts would consist of eight (8) hours of regular time, and forty (40) total  hours per week.     41. Pursuant to Plaintiffs’ union contract, Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors were supposed to be allotted one fifty (50) minute unpaid lunch break per shift.   42. Plaintiffs’ meal breaks were scheduled; that is, an employee would have to take his/her break at specified times during his/her shift.  8   43. While Plaintiffs were to receive a fifty (50) minute unpaid meal break, they were in practice only allotted ten (10) to twenty (20) minutes of a bona fide meal break time during  their shifts to take their meal break.   44. Additionally, as set forth in further detail below, Plaintiffs also had other twenty (20) minutes of unpaid time that should have been allotted towards Plaintiffs’ lunch breaks was  instead used by Defendants for an unpaid pre-shift “roll call”.     45. Because most, if not all, of Plaintiffs’ lunch break was unpaid, and the daily twenty (20) minute roll call was also unpaid, in order to complete an eight-hour shift, Security  Agents had to be present for at least nine (9) hours and twenty (20) minutes each day.    46. When Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors worked more than forty hours in a scheduled week, they were entitled to one and one-half time their regular hourly  rate of pay for that additional time, as overtime pay.   Defendants’ Unlawful “Off the Clock” Practice of Forcing Security Agents to Work Before  Their Shifts   47. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the factual allegations made in the preceding paragraphs.   48. All Security Agents were required to report for work twenty (20) minutes before the start of every shift for a “roll call” or attendance drill.   49. At this time, Security Agents would sign in for the start of their shift, but were not permitted to sign in at the actual time they arrived for “roll call.”   50. Instead, Security Agents would sign in for the time their assigned shift was supposed to begin, on a pre-printed sheet and did not record the twenty (20) minutes of unpaid  pre-shift time required for “roll call.”  9   51. Because Security Agents were required to arrive at least twenty (20) minutes early each work day, without compensation for such time, each and every full five-day workweek (all  weeks besides those weeks where a Security Agent took a sick day or vacation day) they worked  at least 1 hour and 40 minutes of unpaid overtime.   52. Lead Plaintiff Douglas worked at least one (1) hour and forty (40) minutes of unpaid overtime, due to time spent arriving early for the pre-shift “roll call” approximately forty  (40) weeks or more each year of his employment with Defendants as a Security Agent.     53. By way of further example, Ms. LaDonna Powell is a former Security Guard and Supervisor with Defendants, who began her employment with nonparty FJC in or around 2012,  and continued to work for pre-merger Allied Barton when that entity contracted with PANYNJ  to provide security services for JFK.    54. Ms. Powell worked as a Security Guard until June 2014, at which time she became a Supervisor.  She was terminated from her position with Allied Barton in early 2016.    55. By way of example, Ms. Powell worked at least one (1) hour and forty (40) minutes of unpaid overtime, due to time spent arriving early for the pre-shift “roll call”  approximately forty (40) weeks or more each year of her employment with Defendants as a  Security Agent.   Defendants’ Unlawful “Off the Clock” Practice of Forcing Security Agents to Work During  Unpaid Lunch Breaks    56. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the factual allegations made in the preceding paragraphs.   57. Defendants’ work rules prohibited Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors from consuming food anywhere except designated areas on JFK property.   10   58. An employee found consuming food at a post or inside a vehicle, for example, would be subject to disciplinary sanctions, and ultimately, termination.   59. Security Agents, assigned to specific posts at JFK, would have to wait to take a meal break until a replacement showed up at their post to replace them.  The replacement would  be driven in a vehicle belonging to Defendants to the post in question, and the Security Agent  leaving for his/her lunch break would then ride in the vehicle that had brought his/her  replacement to the designated place for taking meals.     60. After getting picked up, the Security Agents would be driven from post to post to pick up other Security Agents and then travel to the designated meal area.   61. If a Security Agent’s replacement appeared late to the post, the Security Agent’s lunch break would not be extended on the back end – that is, the Security Agent was on-duty, at  his/her post, during his/her allotted unpaid lunch break and was nonetheless required to return to  his/her post at the scheduled end time of the lunch break, despite not being relieved of their  duties at the start of their lunch break.    62. Because of JFK’s vast geographic size, many employees were stationed far from their designated lunch area; thus, it would frequently take approximately twenty (20) minutes for  Plaintiffs to reach the designated lunch area, including time spent on-duty at their posts waiting  to be picked up.   63. This process would be repeated on the way back to a Security Agent’s post, taking another approximately twenty (20) minutes, leaving Plaintiffs only about 10 minutes to  take a bona fide break.  11   64. As detailed further below, the time spent in the Defendants’ vehicle traveling to and from the lunch area was compensable time because Plaintiffs were not fully relieved of their  security related duties during such travel time.    65. By way of example only, time spent waiting for late replacements and traveling to and from the designated lunch area resulted in approximately three (3) hours and twenty (20)  minutes of unpaid overtime for Plaintiff Douglas each and every full five-day workweek (all  weeks besides those weeks where they took a sick day or vacation day) during his employment  with Defendants as a Security Agent.   66. Similarly, Ms. Powell worked approximately three (3) hours and twenty (20) minutes of unpaid overtime per week each and every full five-day workweek (all weeks besides  those weeks where they took a sick day or vacation day) during her employment with  Defendants as a Security Agent, due to waiting for replacements and traveling to and from the  designated lunch area.   67. Upon information and belief, all Security Agents experienced the same travel time and late relief issues that resulted in significant unpaid overtime hours each week.   68. Furthermore, at least once per week, no relief would ever appear to allow a Security Agent to take their lunch break; however, Security Agents were not paid for these  breaks that were missed entirely.   69. By way of example only, Ms. Powell was not relieved for her lunch break approximately once a week for the entirety of her time as a Security Agent.   70. Ms. Powell frequently complained that she had not been relieved and was therefore unable to take any lunch break whatsoever.  12   71. Despite her complaints, her manager and supervisor would simply promise that she would get paid for the time – but Ms. Powell was not paid for all her missed lunch breaks.   72. Additionally, pursuant to Defendants’ work rules, while driving or riding in a vehicle controlled by Defendants, all employees were “on duty.”  Thus, they were required to be  on the lookout for any security-related issues and in the event that they observed a security- related incident occurring while riding in or driving the vehicle, employees were required to take  any and all necessary action.      73. In addition, drivers were subject to Defendants’ rules regarding the operation of the vehicle.  If the employee driving the vehicle committed a traffic infraction and was ticketed  by PANYNJ Police, or if the driver drove in a manner contrary to Defendants’ rules regarding  proper driving, that employee was subject to disciplinary action by Defendants, including  termination.    74. Further, if, while riding in a vehicle, an employee-passenger observed the vehicle’s driver committing a traffic infraction or otherwise driving in a manner contrary to  Defendants’ rules regarding proper driving, the employee-passenger was duty-bound to report  such infraction to a supervisors or management.  If the employee-passenger failed to report the  driver’s infraction, that employee was herself subject to disciplinary action, up to and including  termination.   75. By way of example only, Plaintiff Douglas, as a former supervisor, is aware of specific situations which occurred during his employment in which ASAs, as employee- passengers, were disciplined for failing to report traffic infractions to management.     76. By way of further example, on one occasion as an ASA, as Ms. Powell was on her way to lunch, she witnessed a vehicle accident on the tarmac.  Ms. Powell was required to stop at  13  the accident, assist the driver and passengers, alert the proper authorities and compose a witness  incident report.  This process took at least an hour, requiring Ms. Powell to work through her  entire break.     77. Nonetheless, Ms. Powell was not paid for that time.  78. Security Agents did not receive any overtime pay for the additional time they spent “on-duty” during their lunch breaks while waiting for a replacement, driving in a vehicle to  or from a lunch break, responding to a security incident, or monitoring driving infractions.   During that time each week Plaintiffs were working without pay.   79. Upon information and belief, all Plaintiffs were subject to the same policies and practices that resulted in significant unpaid overtime for working through their meal break.   80. The SEIU would not file grievances on behalf of Security Agents who were forced to perform unpaid work during lunch breaks.    Defendants’ Unlawful “Off the Clock” Practice of Forcing Supervisors and Operations  Assistants to Work During Unpaid Lunch Breaks    81. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the factual allegations made in the preceding paragraphs.   82. Supervisors and Operations Assistants were not permitted to take their fifty (50) minute lunch breaks.   83. Supervisors were typically in the field to supervise the work of Security Agents, write incident reports, and send quality reports to upper management and corporate management.   84. Further, during “meal break shifts,” so-called meal break shift Supervisors were required to work through their lunch while driving between locations relieving ASAs and  LASAs to allow them to take their break.    14   85. Finally, regardless of whether they worked the “meal break shift” or not, Supervisors were frequently unable to take a meal break or afternoon break since they were  driving between posts and, because of the substantial drive time, did not have time to take a  break.     86. Despite being deducted the full fifty (50) minutes from each shift for an unpaid meal break, Supervisors worked through their lunch nearly every day.   87. By way of example, as a Supervisor, Ms. Powell was unable to take an uninterrupted meal break at least four (4) times per week, resulting in approximately three (3)  hours and twenty (20) minutes of unpaid overtime each full five-day workweek.    88. Ms. Powell was explicitly told on more than one occasion by her supervisor, Al Diaz, that Supervisors were not permitted to eat anywhere that someone could “see them,”  making it impossible to take a bona fide meal break.   89. Furthermore, during her time as an Operations Assistant, Ms. Powell was not permitted to leave her desk for lunch and was required to answer phones at all times during her  shift.   90. Therefore, on the rare occasion during which she asked a Security Agent to pick her up something to eat, Ms. Powell was still unable to take a bona fide meal break because she  was required to remain at her desk to be available to answer any phone call or request from upper  management regarding the Supervisor that she was assisting, or face serious discipline.   91. Upon information and belief, all Supervisors and Operations Assistants were subject to the same policies and practices that resulted in significant unpaid overtime for working  through their meal break.  15  Defendants’ Unlawful, “Off-The-Clock” Post-Shift Practices for Security Agents at JFK   92. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the factual allegations made in the preceding paragraphs.   93. After clocking in, Security Agents drove or rode to their posts in vehicles owned/and or operated by Defendants, and either spent their shifts in those vehicles riding  around JFK and/or at a designated posting.    94. Rather than clock out at Building 14 – where they had clocked in – the Security Agents would sign out of their shifts at their posts, or in the vehicles to which they were  assigned, at the exact end time of their scheduled shifts.     95. Once they had signed out for the day, either at their post or in their vehicle, Security Agents were “off-the-clock” and not paid for any further time.   96. Nonetheless, Defendants required Security Agents to continue working after their shift had ended between twenty (20) and forty-five (45) minutes per day at least three (3) days  per week, resulting in a minimum of sixty (60) minutes of unpaid post-shift overtime per week  per Security Agent.   97. For example, despite signing out at their post, Security Agents were required to return to Building 14 at the ends of their shifts, in order to return the equipment and/or vehicles  they had been provided that day.   98. Because of the large geographic area of JFK, after being relieved it could often take a Security Agent up to 35 minutes to travel back to Building 14.   99. While driving back to Building 14 after their shifts had ended, Security Agents were “on duty,” in the same way they were during their travel time to the lunch area during their  lunch breaks.    16  100.  Security Agents were obligated to fulfill identical duties as security guards and  supervisory security guards while traveling back to Building 14 as they were expected to while  standing at their posts.  101.  By way of example only, on at least two occasions as a Security Agent, Ms.  Powell witnessed a vehicle accident and was required to stop, provide assistance and prepare an  incident report, despite being “off-the-clock” after her shift had ended.  102.  This process takes approximately forty-five (45) minutes to complete.  However,  Ms. Powell was not paid any wages for this post-shift off-the-clock work.  103.  In addition, and again, similar to their lunch breaks, at the end of their shifts  Security Agents were required to stay at their posts until the Security Agent working the  following shift arrived.  104.  If the Security Agent for the following shift arrived at her assigned post after the  end of the prior shift, the Security Agent assigned to the prior shift would not be paid for either  the additional time spent at the post, or the time spent traveling back to Building 14.   105.  By way of example, including late relief, Lead Plaintiff Douglas spent at least  twenty (20) minutes and upwards of forty (40) minutes traveling back to Building 14 to drop off  their vehicles each shift during the entirety of his employment with Defendants as a Security  Agent, resulting in between one (1) hour and twenty (20) minutes and three (3) hours and twenty  (20) minutes of unpaid overtime per week.  106.  Ms. Powell also worked between one (1) hour and twenty (20) minutes and three  (3) hours and twenty (20) minutes of unpaid overtime per week for off-the-clock post-shift work  as a Security Agent.  17  107.  Upon information and belief, all Security Agents were subject to the same  policies and practices that resulted in significant unpaid post-shift overtime for late shift relief  and travel time.  108.  The SEIU would not file grievances on behalf of Security Agents who were  forced to perform the “off the clock” work after their shift.  Defendants’ Unlawful, “Off-The-Clock” Post-Shift Practices for Supervisors at JFK  109.  Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the factual allegations made in the  preceding paragraphs.  110.  The majority of a Supervisor’s work during their shift was comprised of traveling  around the airport to monitor performance and quality of the work of Security Agents and  provide assistance if necessary.  111.  Therefore, Supervisors were rarely in their offices at the end of their shift and  were frequently at least thirty (30) minutes away from their office at the end of their shifts.  112.  Nonetheless, Supervisors would technically “sign out” of their shift the moment  that their shift was scheduled to end.  113.  While traveling back to the office, in uniform, Supervisors were required to  perform identical duties as during their shift, despite being technically “off-the-clock.”  114.  By way of example only, while Ms. Powell was employed as a Supervisor, she  was frequently required to stop her vehicle on the way back to her office in order to compose an  incident report, send it to corporate management for approval, and report back that the incident  was properly recorded, despite being “off-the-clock.”  18  115.  By way of example only, this occurred at least two times per week and took  approximately one (1) hour and thirty (30) minutes.  Including travel time, on these occasions  Ms. Powell worked approximately two (2) hours of unpaid overtime.  116.  Furthermore, Supervisors frequently had paperwork to complete upon returning to  Building 14, requiring approximately forty-five (45) minutes of work several times per week  after the end of their shifts.  117.  Finally, all Supervisors were required to attend a mandatory conference call,  lasting approximately (3) hours, once a week on Tuesdays, regardless of whether the Supervisor  was even scheduled for work that day.  118.  Supervisors, including Lead Plaintiff Douglas and Ms. Powell, were not paid for  their time on this conference call, resulting in up to three (3) hours of unpaid overtime per week.  119.  Overall, on an average week, during their time as Supervisors, Lead Plaintiff  Douglas and Ms. Powell, at minimum worked approximately ten (10) hours of overtime per  week in post-shift work alone.  120.  Upon information and belief, all Supervisors were subject to the same policies  and practices that resulted in such unpaid overtime for travel time and post-shift off-the-clock  work.  Defendants Have Knowledge Of The Widespread “Off-The-Clock” Practices  at JFK  121.  Defendants’ knowledge of the widespread “off-the-clock” practices at JFK was  well known at all times relevant to this action.    122.  Defendants had on-site Human Resources personnel at JFK.  In addition, the JFK  operations were run by a Project Manager.    123.  During the relevant time period, Thomas Tarantola was the Project Manager.  19  124.  Plaintiffs repeatedly made both Human Resources personnel and Mr. Tarantola  aware of Defendants’ “off the books” practices with respect to both lunch breaks and the end of  shifts, both orally and in writing.  However, those complaints went unheeded.   125.  In one incident, when a guard complained to management about not receiving  overtime for meals and working at the post past the end of the shift, a management employee  took a dollar bill out of his pocket and threw it at the guard in an act of hostility.  126.  The amount of overtime due to Plaintiffs can be verified by time records and other  documents that were contemporaneously maintained by Defendants.  127.  Plaintiffs came to understand that the Defendants’ refused to pay them the  overtime to which they were legally entitled because Defendants’ contract with the PANYNJ did  not provide for reimbursement of overtime by the PANYNJ to Defendants.    128.  Supervisors were unable to control the compensation and scheduling practices  dictated by Defendants.  129.  Supervisors often received complaints directly from Security Agents, but were not  authorized to make any changes to a Security Agent’s pay.   130.  By way of example, while Ms. Powell was employed by Defendants as a Security  Agent, she frequently complained about working unpaid overtime before and after her shift, as  well as being unable to take a bona fide lunch break.  131.  Supervisors would tell Ms. Powell that they would “look into it” and get her paid.  132.  However, Ms. Powell was never paid for this off-the-clock pre- and post-shift  time nor was she paid for time worked during an unpaid meal time.  20  133.  In or around 2015, when Ms. Powell became a Supervisor, she came to realize  that Supervisors were under direct orders by upper management not to compensate Security  Agents for their off-the-clock work, even when they complained.  134.  By way of example only, Managers Martin Feeney, Francisco Oravallo, and  Christopher Timberlake all reacted in a similar manner when Ms. Powell would attempt to get  Security Agents paid for their off-the-clock time.  135.  On numerous occasions, Ms. Powell was told by Mr. Feeney, Mr. Oravallo,  and/or Mr. Timberlake, “What are they [Security Agents] complaining about?  It’s only 30  minutes!”  or, “It’s only 45 minutes!”  On those occasions, Ms. Powell was instructed not to pay  for the requested time.  136.  On numerous other occasions, Ms. Powell was told by Mr. Feeney, Mr. Oravallo,  and/or Mr. Timberlake to simply “take [the requested time] out of their break.”  In other words,  to apply the off-the-clock work to an unpaid break in order to have the timesheets show that a  break was taken.    137.  In actuality, of course, the Security Agents had not taken that break and were  being forced to work unpaid overtime by the Defendants. 