32.  Each defendant is an "employer" as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).    33.  Defendants were joint employers within the meaning of the FLSA. For  example, hourly employees drove or rode in trucks with logos and branding of RSI, were  required to purchase and wear RSI uniforms, but were paid by Bobcat Disposal, and had  their conditions of employment controlled by Bobcat North America.     34.  Defendants have employees subject to the provisions of the FLSA, 29  U.S.C. § 207, in the facilities where Mr. Huff performed work.   36.  Mr. Huff avers that at all times relevant to the violations of the Fair Labor  Standards Act, the Defendants are an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made  or business done was not less than $500,000, in accordance with 29 U.S.C. §  203(s)(1)(A)(ii).     37.  Mr. Huff was employed by Defendants from 2014 until 2018.   38.  Mr. Huff performed work for Defendants in Central Florida and operated  out of their base facility in Ocoee, Florida.     39.  Mr. Huff also performed work for Defendants’ customers at their local  construction sites.   40.  Mr. Huff’s job duties included, but were not limited to inspecting vehicles,  operating heavy equipment, loading and unloading equipment, driving trucks, delivering  equipment to customers, and performing manual labor in service to Defendants’ clientele.      41.  At all times relevant to employment, Mr. Huff regularly used the  instrumentalities of interstate commerce while performing work.     42.  At all times relevant to employment, Mr. Huff also regularly used the  channels of commerce while performing work.   43.  Throughout his employment, Mr. Huff was paid an hourly rate plus  overtime for some but not all hours worked by Defendants.     45.  Mr. Huff was routinely required to come into work before the official start  of business to inspect his vehicle for the day’s work.     46.  Throughout his employment, Mr. Huff was subjected to Defendants’  timesheet manipulation practice.     47.  Defendants’ regularly and routinely adjusted or manipulated Mr. Huff’s  timesheets to reflect a later start time of 6 a.m. in order to reduce overtime compensation.   48.  Defendants implemented a practice whereby Mr. Huff’s timesheets were  manipulated, without his knowledge, after work had been completed to reflect that he  worked less time.   49.  At the Ocoee location, Defendants “officially” opened for business at 6 am  each workday, but Mr. Huff regularly commenced work at 5:30 a.m.  When work before 6  am was performed, Defendants adjusted the timesheets to reflect a later start time.    50.  Defendants implemented a common practice wherein work performed  before or after their “official hours of operation”, would not be compensated, although  Defendants required employees perform the uncompensated work before and after the  hours of operation.     51.  Defendants’ timesheet manipulation practice was not limited to any job  title, but was applied across hourly employees with similar job duties as Mr. Huff.     53.  Despite knowing that meal breaks were not taken, Defendants automatically  deducted thirty-minute meal breaks from Mr. Huff’s timesheets.    54.  Defendants knew or should have known that Mr. Huff was not breaking for  lunch.    55.  Mr. Huff was not able to have a meal break on most days, and usually  worked through lunch, but was not compensated for this time as a result of Defendants’  policy.     56.  Mike Russo and Marilyn Russo had actual knowledge that employees,  including Mr. Huff, were working overtime without proper compensation.     57.  Mike Russo and Marilyn Russo could have forced compliance with FLSA  rules and regulations, but decided against complying with the FLSA.    58.  Mr. Huff brings Count II under the Fair Labor Standards Act as a collective  action, and will request the Court to grant conditional class certification under 29 U.S.C. §  216(b).   59.  Mr. Huff, as Class Representative, seeks to prosecute this matter on behalf  of himself and similarly situated employees who were all subject to the same common plan  and practices complained of herein.    61.  While working for Defendants, Mr. Huff and other similarly situated  employees, were subject to the same practice of denying proper overtime compensation to  its employees because of two policies and practices:  a. the timesheet manipulation practice, where employees’ timesheets were  manipulated, without their knowledge, after work had been completed to  reflect that less time was worked; and/or  b. the automatic lunch deduction practice, where Defendants automatically  subtracted thirty minutes daily off employee timesheets even though a lunch  break was not taken or the lunch break was interrupted.     62.  Throughout their employment, Mr. Huff, and other similarly situated  employees were subjected to Defendants’ timesheet manipulation practice.     63.  Throughout their employment, Mr. Huff, and other similarly situated  employees were routinely required to come into work before the official start of business  to inspect vehicles for the day’s work.     64.  Throughout their employment, Mr. Huff, and other similarly situated  employees had their timesheets manipulated and adjusted, without their knowledge, to  reflect less time worked.     66.  Throughout their employment, Mr. Huff, and other similarly situated  employees were subject to Defendants’ practice of subtracting thirty minutes off employee  timesheets on a daily basis even though a lunch break was not taken or the lunch break was  interrupted.     67.  Defendants’ payroll system automatically deducted thirty minutes each day  during the workweek (Monday – Friday) from Mr. Huff’s, and other similarly situated  employees’ timesheets and payroll records, regardless of whether an uninterrupted lunch  break was taken.    68.  Defendants had knowledge that Mr. Huff and other similarly situated  employees were working overtime without proper compensation.     69.  As a result of the Defendants’ unlawful practices, throughout their  employment, Mr. Huff, and other similarly situated employees worked numerous  workweeks where their hours exceeded forty but they were not paid time-and-a-half for  each overtime hour worked.     70.  Defendants failed to make a good faith effort to determine if Mr. Huff and  similarly situated employees were compensated appropriately pursuant to the FLSA.   71.  Defendants failed to maintain and keep accurate time records as required by  the FLSA.    72.  Defendants also failed to post the required notice pursuant to the FLSA.    74.  Mr. Huff, as Class Representative for a group of similarly situated  individuals, will seek conditional certification of two classes of employees with similar job  duties who were paid hourly while working at the Ocoee location, during the relevant claim  period, and were subject to either or both of the following common policies:  a. the timesheet manipulation practice, where employees’ timesheets were  manipulated, without their knowledge, after work had been completed to  reflect that less time was worked; and/or  b. the automatic deduction practice, where Defendants automatically  subtracted thirty minutes daily off employee timesheets even though a lunch  break was not taken or the lunch break was interrupted.    75.  The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-57 above are realleged herein.   76.  By way of tolling agreement between the Parties, the applicable statute of  limitations extends back two or three years (upon a finding of willfulness) from March 8,  2019.   77.  Defendants actions were willful and thus the claim period for Mr. Huff  extends to March 8, 2016.   79.  Specifically, Mr. Huff worked numerous weeks in excess of forty (40) hours  a week, yet was not compensated for all work in excess of forty (40) hours at a rate not less  than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he was employed.    80.  Defendants willfully failed to maintain and keep accurate time records as  required by the Fair Labor Standards Act.    81.  Defendants failed to post the required notice pursuant to the Fair Labor  Standards Act.     WHEREFORE, Mr. Huff, individually, demands judgment against Defendants,  jointly and severally, for the following:  (a)    Unpaid overtime wages found to be due and owing;  (b)    An additional equal amount equal to the unpaid overtime wages found to   be due  and owing as liquidated damages;  (c)    Prejudgment interest;  (d)  A reasonable attorney’s fee and costs; and,  (e)    Such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.  82.  Mr. Huff, as Class Representative, re-alleges and incorporates herein the  allegations contained in paragraphs 1-74 above.   83.  By way of tolling agreement between the Parties, the applicable statute of  limitations extends back two or three years (upon a finding of willfulness) from March 8,  2019.   84.  Defendants actions were willful and thus the claim period for Mr. Huff, as  Class Representative, and all other similarly situated employees, extends to March 8, 2016.   85.  Mr. Huff, as Class Representative, and all other similarly situated  employees, were employed by Defendants during the relevant limitations period.   86.  Throughout the employment of Mr. Huff, as Class Representative, and all  other similarly situated employees, Defendants repeatedly and willfully violated § 7 and §  15 of the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to compensate the Class Representative and  all other similarly situated employees, at a rate not less than one and one-half times the  regular rate at which they were employed for workweeks longer than forty (40) hours.     88.  Defendants failed to maintain and keep accurate time records as required by  the FLSA.    89.  Defendants failed to post the required notice pursuant to the FLSA.     WHEREFORE, Mr. Huff, as Class Representative, on behalf of himself and  similarly situated employees, demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally,  for the following:  (a)    Unpaid overtime wages found to be due and owing;  (b)    An additional equal amount equal to the unpaid overtime wages found to   be due  and owing as liquidated damages;  (c)    Prejudgment interest;  (d)  Reasonable attorney’s fee and costs; and,  (e)    Such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.  COLLECTIVE ACTION BY CLASS REPRESENTATIVE   FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE OVERTIME PROVISION OF THE FAIR LABOR  STANDARDS ACT   PLAINTIFF’S INDIVIDUAL CLAIM   AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE   OVERTIME PROVISION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT  