11.  Upon information and belief, Defendant develops marketing campaigns  using a combination of sales channels, with an emphasis on outbound telemarketing.   12.  Upon information and belief, Defendant utilizes third party vendors to  market its services.   13.  Upon information and belief, Defendant’s vendors are essential to their  telemarketing activities.     14.  Upon information and belief, Defendant’s ability to increase revenue  depends significantly on its access to high-quality vendors.    16.  Defendant’s third party vendors identify themselves as representatives of  “EverQuote.”     17.  Upon information and belief, Defendant’s outbound telemarketing efforts  include the use of an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) to solicit consumers  nationwide.   18.  The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has held that a basic function of an  ATDS is the ability to dial thousands of numbers in a short time period.   19.  The technology employed by Defendant has the capacity – (A) to store or  produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator;  and (B) to dial such numbers.   20.  An ATDS allows Defendant’s telemarketing agents to only communicate  with consumers who answer their phone.   21.  Consequently, Defendant shifts the burden of wasted time to consumers  with unsolicited calls and messages.  22.  At all times relevant, Plaintiff was the sole operator, possessor, and  subscriber of the number ending in 8898.   23.  At all times relevant, Plaintiff’s number ending in 8898 was assigned to a  cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).   25.  Years ago (less than four years), Plaintiff was on the market for automobile  insurance and may have submitted his contact information to an insurance broker (not  Defendant) that was assisting Plaintiff in securing automobile insurance.   26.  Shortly thereafter, Defendant began placing sales calls to Plaintiff’s cellular  phone.    27.  Plaintiff answered Defendant’s calls on numerous occasions and advised  Defendant that he already secured automobile insurance coverage and requested that  Defendant cease the sales calls. Specifically, Plaintiff told Defendant to “lose my number.”    28.  During each answered call, Plaintiff experienced a lengthy pause prior to  being connected to a representative of Defendant.   29.  Despite Plaintiff’s request that the calls cease, Defendant continued placing  sales calls to Plaintiff cellular phone.   30.  Defendant’s sales calls came from various numbers, including (800) 928- 8914.    31.  In total, Plaintiff received dozens of sales calls from Defendant after he  requested that the calls cease.   32.  At no time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with express written consent to  place calls to his cellular phone.    34.  Concerned with Defendant’s intrusive conduct, Plaintiff retained counsel to  compel Defendant to cease its sales calls.  35.  All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated  herein as though fully set forth herein.   36.  Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3)  individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“Putative Class”) defined as  follows:  All persons residing in the State of Colorado: (a) to whom Defendant and/or  a third party acting on Defendant’s behalf, made one or more non- emergency phone call(s); (b) promoting Defendant’s products or services;  (c) to their cellular telephone number; (d) using an automatic telephone  dialing system; and (e) at any time in the period that begins four years  before the date of the filing of the original complaint through the date of  class certification.   38.  The exact number of members of the Putative Class are unknown and not  available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable.     39.  Upon information and belief, Defendant made phone calls to thousands of  consumers who fall into the definition of the Putative Class.   40.  Members of the Putative Class can be objectively identified from records of  Defendant and any affiliated marketers/vendors to be gained in discovery.  B.  Commonality and Predominance   42.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of members of the Putative Class because  Plaintiff and members of the Putative Class are entitled to damages as result of  Defendant’s conduct.  D.  Superiority and Manageability   43.  This case is also appropriate for class certification as class proceedings are  superior to all other available methods for the efficient and fair adjudication of this  controversy.     44.  The damages suffered by the individual members of the Putative Class will  likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense required for individual  prosecution.   45.  By contrast, a class action provides the benefits of single adjudication,  economies of scale and comprehensive supervision by a single court.     46.  Economies of effort, expense, and time will be fostered and uniformity of  decisions ensured.  E.  Adequate Representation   48.  Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Putative Class, and  Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff.   49.  Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced counsel in consumer  class action litigation.  50.  All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated  herein as though fully set forth herein.   51.  Among other things, the TCPA prohibits certain calls to wireless and  residential numbers unless the caller has the prior express consent of the called party.   47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).   52.  Under the TCPA consent rules, some types of calls require prior express  written consent, while other types of calls do not require that the consent be in writing.   53.  “Prior  express  written  consent”  is  required  for  (a)  all  telemarketing/promotional calls/texts made using an ATDS placed to wireless numbers,  and (b) all artificial or prerecorded telemarketing/promotional voice calls to wireless and  residential numbers.1   55.  Defendant and/or a third party acting on Defendant’s behalf placed or  caused to be placed solicitation phone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending  in 8898 utilizing an ATDS without Plaintiff’s prior express written consent in violation of  47 U.S.C. §227 (b)(1)(A)(iii).   56.  Upon information and belief, based on the noticeable pause Plaintiff  experienced upon answering Defendant’s phone calls, Defendant employed an ATDS to  place calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone.     57.  Upon information and belief, the ATDS employed by Defendant transfers  the call to a live representative once a human voice is detected, hence the conspicuous  delay before being connected to a live representative.   58.  Upon information and belief, the system employed by Defendant to place  the calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone produced Plaintiff’s telephone number using a random  or sequential number generator as Plaintiff never provided his phone number to  Defendant.   60.  Upon information and belief, Defendant has no database to maintain and  update consumers’ contact preferences and consent to call them.     61.  As a result of Defendant’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the members  of the Putative Class are entitled to receive $500.00 in damages for each such violation.     63. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein.   64. In Colorado, “to prevail on a claim for intrusion upon seclusion as a violation of one’s privacy, a plaintiff must show that another has intentionally intruded, physically  or otherwise, upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, and that such intrusion would be  considered offensive by a reasonable person.”  Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d  1060, 1065 (Colo. App. 1998).   65. This tort can encompass conduct such as persistent and unwanted telephone calls.  Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1073 (10th Cir. 2003).   66. Defendant’s relentless telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone violated Plaintiff’s right to privacy based on an intrusion upon his seclusion.    Invasion of Privacy by Seclusion  (Plaintiff’s Individual Claim)    Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. § 227 et. seq.)  (On behalf of Plaintiff and Members of the Putative Class)  