11.  Part 2.5 of the purchase agreement, termed “Assumed Liabilities,” stated  that Defendant assumed “all Suzuki Product Liability[.]”  Part 16 of the purchase  agreement defined “Product Liability” to include “any Liability of Seller [American  Suzuki Motor Corporation], regardless of whether arising before or after the Petition  Date, (i) under the Express Warranty Claims on any Suzuki products; (ii) for recalls and  other obligations under the NTMVSA with respect to Suzuki Products; or (iii) under any  Lemon Laws with respect to Suzuki Products.”   12.  From at least 2004-2008, the American Suzuki Motor Corporation  manufactured, marketed, distributed, and/or sold the Suzuki Forenza and Suzuki Reno  motor vehicle throughout the United States, including in Oklahoma.   13.  Upon information and belief, all Suzuki Forenzas for the years 2004-2008  and all Suzuki Renos for the years 2005-2008 contained a three-year / 36,000 mile  express warranty covering all parts and workmanship except for normal wear and tear.   14.  “Unfair trade practice” means any practice which offends established  public policy or if the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive,  unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers[.]   16.  The dates outlined in paragraphs 14-15 above make clear that the American  Suzuki Motor Corporation was aware of electrical defects related to lighting causing fires  in 2004-2008 model Suzuki Forenzas as early as April 5, 2007 or shortly thereafter and  was aware of similar defects in 2005-2008 model Suzuki Forenzas as early as December  1, 2009 or shortly thereafter.   17.  At the very least, the dates outlined in paragraphs 14-15 above also make  clear that the American Suzuki Motor Corporation deliberately continued to distribute,  market, and sell affected vehicles with a known defect after April 5, 2007 or possibly  earlier.   18.  In spite of knowledge of the electrical lighting defect causing fires, which  knowledge Defendant Suzuki Motor of America, Inc., had or should have had no later  than the first half of 2007, Defendant did not issue a vehicle recall notice to correct the  defect until many years later on July 22, 2014.   20.  The Recall Notice further stated:  “Affected vehicles may generate heat in  the Headlamp Switch or DRL Module, located on or near the left side of the steering  column, which could melt the switch or module.  If the heat generated within the  Headlamp Switch or DRL Module melts the component, there is an increased risk of fire.   You do not need to stop driving your vehicle, however if local driving rules or driving  conditions require the use of your headlamps or DRL lighting, Suzuki can not  recommend you operate the vehicle if the lighting is not operating as designed.  If you  smell unusual odors associated with possible overheated plastic or wire insulation while  driving, please safely drive the vehicle off the roadway and exit the vehicle immediately.   In addition, avoid parking the vehicle near permanent structures or in a garage until  repairs can be performed.”  (Emphasis added.)   21.  The Recall Notice further stated that Defendant would repair the defect but  added that “Recall service parts are not yet available to correct this condition.  Providing  repair parts is a top priority, however, their availability is not known at this time.   Vehicle owners will be notified by mail when repair parts are available and  scheduling appointments can then begin.”  (Emphasis in original.)   23.  Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered an ascertainable loss of money,  property, and/or value of their vehicles subject to the Recall Notice, including diminution  of value to such vehicles,      24.  Plaintiff  is  the  owner  of  a  2007  Suzuki  Forenza,  VIN  KL5JD56Z77K552255 (“Plaintiff’s Forenza”) which was purchased new by Plaintiff in  2007 from Richardson Suzuki in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma County, Oklahoma.   25.  Plaintiff received a copy of the vehicle Recall Notice referenced in  Paragraph 17 above in late July 2014.   26.  Around the same time, the headlamps in the Plaintiff’s Forenza began not  turning off intermittently when Plaintiff would attempt to switch them off.  On these  occasions, the lights would take approximately 20 - 40 minutes to turn off.   27.  On or about the morning of August 18, 2014, Plaintiff left for work driving  his Forenza.   28.  Approximately five minutes later, gray smoke started to billow out from  behind the dashboard and instrument panel and down by the pedals, primarily on the  driver’s side of Plainitff’s Forenza.   30.  The fire department arrived and put out the fire in Plaintiff’s Forenza.  The  fire department confirmed that the fire was an electrical fire.   31.  Plaintiff’s Forenza was towed to Big Red Sports and Imports in Norman,  Oklahoma.  Plaintiff was repeatedly advised by Big Red Sports and Imports as well as by  representatives of Defendant that Plaintiff would have to submit an insurance claim to  pay for repair of Plaintiff’s Forenza.  Defendant did not repair Plaintiff’s Forenza or offer  to cover the costs of the repair.   32.  In an effort to repair Plaintiff’s Forenza, Plaintiff has dealt with his  insurance company, Liberty Mutual Insurance.  An October 7, 2014 e-mail from Liberty  Mutual Insurance to Plaintiff stated:  “Our appraiser indicated the fire under the  instrument panel caused damage to the main harness, fuse box, carpet, trim items. . . .   There are about 4 electrical modules that are burnt and Bruce advised that one of them is  the one that was recalled for possible fire damage.  We believe the probable cause of the  fire to be in the area of the recalled item.”   33.  Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of  himself and the following proposed class:  All individuals in the United States who purchased or leased any of the  motor vehicles (2004-2008 Suzuki Forenzas and 2005-2008 Suzuki Renos)  which are the subject of the July 22, 2014 Recall Notice.     35.  Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(A)(1), Plaintiff states that the proposed class  is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable as a matter of law because the  proposed class consists of the owners or lessees of the 184,244 vehicles that were  recalled.  Thus the class consists, at least, of tens of thousands of potential members  which is easily ascertainable whose identities can be readily determined from the Recall  Notice records themselves and/or other records maintained by Defendant.     37.  Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(A)(3), Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant  are typical of the claims of the proposed class because the conduct of Defendant with  respect to the defect and recall was identical with respect to Plaintiff as it was with  respect to all other proposed class members.  So far as is known at this point, the defect is  common to all affected vehicles owned or leased by Class Members and Defendant has  sent all proposed Class Members, including Plaintiff, identical copies of a form letter  advising recipients of the recall.   39.  Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(B)(3), the issues of law and fact common to  members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.   Therefore, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy.  The legal grievances of proposed class members are  common to all class members, including Plaintiff.  If Defendant is liable to any class  member on any of the questions of law outlined in Paragraph 36 above, it will  automatically be liable to all class members.  Defendant undertook a single course of  conduct that resulted in the same liability with respect to all class members.  A class  action is clearly superior to the many hundreds or thousands of lawsuits which might be  brought, raising the same legal claims against Defendant, burdening the courts, and  potentially resulting in unjustly disparate outcomes.  See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).  40.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations pled in the  foregoing paragraphs and brings this claim both individually and on behalf of all others  similarly situated.   42.  Pursuant to the statutory definitions, Plaintiff and all other proposed class  members were “buyers” as defined by 12A Okla. Stat. § 2-103(1)(a); Defendant [for  purposes of this claim and all further claims below, “Defendant” shall include both  Defendant Suzuki Motor of America, Inc., and its predecessor in interest the American  Suzuki Motor Corporation and Plaintiff specifically incorporates all acts and omissions  by either entity in Plaintiff’s use of the term “Defendant” herein] was a “seller” as  defined by 12A Okla. Stat. § 2-103(1)(c) and was a “merchant” as defined by 12A Okla.  Stat. § 2-104; and the vehicles purchased by Plaintiff and all other proposed class  members were transactions in “goods” as defined by 12A Okla. Stat. § 2-105(1).   43.  Pursuant to 12A Okla. Stat. § 2-313, Defendant’s warranty mentioned in  paragraph 13 above was an “express warranty” governed by the provisions of the  Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code.   45.  Defendant breached its express warranty to Plaintiff and all other proposed  class members by not furnishing (according to Defendant’s own admission in the Recall  Notice) a vehicle with working parts and quality workmanship.  Rather, Plaintiff and all  other proposed class members were furnished vehicles with a defective component that  can cause a serious and dangerous risk of overheating and fire in vehicles distributed,  marketed, and sold by Defendant.  Defendant further breached its warranty by not taking  affirmative steps to correct the defect as soon as it was discovered by Defendant.  Rather,  Defendant waited approximately seven years before bringing the defect to the attention of  consumers and still has not, to this day, made any remedy, repair, and/or reimbursement  available to said consumers.   46.  Defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability by furnishing  vehicles that did not “pass without objection” (if the vehicles were unobjectionable, then  a recall would be unnecessary); were not of “fair average quality”; were not “fit for the  ordinary purpose” for which vehicles are used, namely, as a safe and reliable means of  transportation; and generally are unsatisfactory, dangerous, and of questionable value to  consumers absent a remedy, repair, and/or reimbursement by Defendant.   48.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations pled in the  foregoing paragraphs and brings this claim both individually and on behalf of all others  similarly situated.   49.  Plaintiff and all other proposed class members are “consumers” as defined  at 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3); Defendant is both a “supplier” as defined at 15 U.S.C. §2301(4)  an a “warrantor” as defined at 15 U.S.C. § 2301(5); and the vehicles that are the subject  of this lawsuit are “consumer goods” as defined at 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1).   50.  Therefore, pursuant to the foregoing paragraph, the warranty claims in this  lawsuit are covered by the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“the Act”), 15 U.S.C.  §§ 2301 et seq., as well as by Oklahoma warranty laws.  Specifically, Defendant’s  express warranty, as described more fully above, is governed by the provisions of the Act  and is a “full warranty” as defined at 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(1) and Defendant’s implied  warranty of merchantability is also governed by the provisions of the Act pursuant to 15  U.S.C. § 2308.  Such implied warranty is of infinite duration for purposes of the Act  pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2).   52.  Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d), the amounts in controversy of Plaintiff’s  individual claim and all other proposed class members’ individual claims in this matter  are each in excess of $25.00; the amount in controversy of all claims to be determined in  this suit is in excess of $50,000.00; and the number of named Plaintiffs in this lawsuit  will easily exceed one hundred.   53.  Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2310(e), Defendant has had an ample opportunity  already to cure its failure to comply with its warranties.  Defendant has admitted that a  dangerous defect exists and has, to date, offered no further solution to Plaintiff or to any  other proposed class member.  Therefore, any preliminary demand under § 2310(e)  would be utterly futile given that, by Defendant’s own admission to Plaintiff and to all  other proposed class members, there is no “cure” available at this time.  Indeed,  Defendant’s failure to make such a “cure” available forms part of the basis of this  lawsuit.   55.   Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations pled in the  foregoing paragraphs and brings this claim both individually and on behalf of all others  similarly situated.   56.  The elements of a claim for manufacturer’s product liability in Oklahoma  are:  (1) that the Defendant manufactured, sold, or leased the product in question; (2) that  the Defendant was in the business of manufacturing, selling, or leasing such products; (3)  that the product was defective and was therefore unreasonably dangerous to the user,  consumer, and/or to one who might reasonably be expected to be affected by the product;  (4) that the product was defective at the time it was manufactured, sold, or leased by the  Defendant or when the product left the Defendant’s control; (5) that Plaintiff was a  person who used, consumed, or could have reasonably been affected by the product; and  (6) Plaintiff sustained personal injuries and/or damage to property directly caused by the  defect in the product.   57.  With respect to element (1), it is undisputed that Defendant was the  distributor, marketer, and seller of the vehicles that are the subject of this lawsuit.   58.  With respect to element (2), it is undisputed that Defendant was in the  business of distributing, marketing, and selling such vehicles.   59.  With respect to element (3), Defendant has admitted that the vehicles are  defective and dangerous to consumers.   61.  With respect to element (5), Plaintiff and all other proposed class members  were users and consumers of the vehicles that are the subject of this lawsuit.   62.  With respect to element (6), Plaintiff and all other proposed class members  have incurred damages that go beyond mere damage to the vehicles themselves.  Rather,  Plaintiff and all other proposed class members have been exposed to an unreasonable risk  of harm; have been forced to forego driving the vehicles for safety reasons; have suffered  a diminution in the value of the vehicles; property damage to their vehicles; and have  been placed in an untenable situation in which they are unable to obtain a prompt repair,  leading to the stress and mental/emotional distress of being stuck with unsafe vehicles.   The facts specific to Plaintiff in this lawsuit starkly demonstrate the extreme risk of  danger and loss to which Plaintiff and all other proposed class members have been  exposed by Defendant.   63.  Therefore, Defendant should be held strictly liable for the defects in the  vehicles that are the subject of this lawsuit and Plaintiff and all other proposed class  members should be compensated for their damages accordingly.  65.  Oklahoma common law, like the law of most states, recognizes four  elements of negligence:  duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages.  See, e.g., Flint  Ridge Development Co. v. Benham-Blair & Affiliates, Inc., 1989 OK 48.   66.  Defendant has a duty, pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle  Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq., and related federal regulations, as well as other  statutory and common law duties, to conduct vehicle recalls in a manner that is safe for  consumers of Defendant’s vehicles.   67.  Defendant breached said duty to its consumers by:  (1) failing to issue a  vehicle recall notice regarding the risk of electrical fire due to vehicle lights until July 22,  2014 in spite of knowledge of such defect as early as April 5, 2007; (2) failing to issue a  vehicle recall notice that warned consumers not to drive the vehicles (indeed, the Recall  Notice specifically stated “You do not need to stop driving your vehicle” except in  certain circumstances); (3) failing to offer immediate repair given the risk of danger to  consumers; and (4) failing to perform repairs of such vehicles.   68.  The facts specific to Plaintiff illustrate the consequences of the risk to  which Defendant unnecessarily and unreasonably exposed Plaintiff and all other  proposed class members:  Plaintiff’s Forenza in fact did catch on fire, at great personal  risk to Plaintiff, damaging Plaintiff’s Forenza and resulting in a costly repair to Plaintiff’s  Forenza which Defendant refused to pay for.   70.  Therefore, Defendant should be held liable for its negligent handling of the  recall that is the subject of this lawsuit and Plaintiff and all other proposed class members  should be compensated for their damages accordingly.  71.   Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations pled in the  foregoing paragraphs and brings this claim both individually and on behalf of all others  similarly situated.   72.  The Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, first enacted in 1972, provides  that it is unlawful, when dealing with a consumer, for a person to  “Commit[] an unfair or  deceptive trade practice as defined in Section 752 of this title[.]  15 Okla. Stat. § 753.   The definitions in § 752 are:   73.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that “[b]ecause the OCPA is  remedial in nature it is to be liberally construed to effectuate its underlying purpose.”   Patterson v. Beall, 2000 OK 92, ¶ 28 (emphasis added).  Patterson also lists the “four  elements” of an OCPA cause of action:  (1) that the defendant engaged in an unlawful practice as defined at 15 O.S.  (1991) § 753; (2) that the challenged practice occurred in the course of  defendant’s business; (3) that the plaintiff, as a consumer, suffered an  injury in fact; and (4) that the challenged practice caused the plaintiff’s  injury.  Id. at ¶ 30.  The Paterson court concluded that the protection against an “unfair trade  practice” is a “broad protection” and is left “to the courts to determine whether specific  conduct qualifies.”  Id. at ¶ 34.   74.  Plaintiff and prospective class members were all harmed by Defendant’s  mishandling of its vehicle recall.  Such conduct was in violation of the Oklahoma  Consumer Protection Act’s prohibitions, including, but not limited to, prohibitions  against deceptive practices, practices that are contrary to public policy, and practices that  are substantially injurious to consumers.   76.  Defendant engaged in practices that are contrary to public policy by  botching its recall and failing to repair vehicles in a prompt and safe manner that would  have eliminated unnecessary risk to consumers.  For example, vehicle recalls are intended  to promote motor vehicle safety as defined in 49 U.S.C. § 301 and as overseen by the  National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.  Therefore, a vehicle recall that does  not result in promoting the interests of safety is contrary to public policy.   77.  Defendant engaged in practices that are substantially injurious to  consumers by failing to timely recall their defective vehicles and then by botching the  recall in a manner that exposed consumers to dangerous risks.  The facts of Plaintiff’s  vehicle fire speak for themselves with respect to the unnecessary and injurious risks  imposed on consumers by Defendant.   78.  Therefore, Defendant should be held liable for its violations of the  Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act and Plaintiff and all other proposed class members  should be compensated for their damages accordingly.  79.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations pled in the  foregoing paragraphs and brings this claim both individually and on behalf of all others  similarly situated.   81.  This case presents a classic instance of unjust enrichment whereby  Defendant accepted payment in full for vehicles which were warranted to be safe, without  defect to any components, and merchantable.  Yet the vehicles measured up to none of  these promises by Defendant.  Further, Defendant concealed a dangerous defect for seven  years and still has not provided a solution to its consumers.  In short, Defendant obtained  the benefit of the bargain, but Plaintiff and all other proposed class members did not.   Therefore, Defendant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff and all other  proposed class members.   82.  Therefore, this Court should grant Plaintiff and all other proposed class  members the remedy of imposing a constructive trust on the monetary benefits unjustly  received and retained by Defendant, both in the past and to the present day.  Plaintiff  specifically requests that this Court provide whatever legal and/or equitable relief it  deems proper, given Defendant’s conduct and unlawful retention of funds rightfully  belonging to Plaintiff and all other proposed class members.  83.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations pled in the  foregoing paragraphs and brings this claim both individually and on behalf of all others  similarly situated.   9.  American Suzuki Motor Corporation was a California corporation engaged  in the business of manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling new motor vehicles  in the United States, including in the State of Oklahoma.   BREACH OF EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES   CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT   DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE RECALL   MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT  