1.  Balancing the interests of public disclosure with an individual's right to  privacy is a delicate, but essential, task for government. The Driver Privacy Protection  Act (H.R. 3365), safeguards the privacy of drivers and vehicle owners by prohibiting the  release of personal information--including a person's name and address—to anyone  without a specific business-related reason for obtaining the information.   19.  The DPPA’s primary purpose is to protect the privacy and safety of all consumers  that have provided information to the DMV.   2.  H.R. 3365 acknowledges that there are many businesses that depend on access  to motor vehicle records to serve their customers, including insurance companies,  financial institutions, vehicle dealers, and others. By focusing this legislation on the  personal information  contained within a driver file, this bill does not limit those  legitimate organizations in using the  information. It does, however, restrict access to all  those without a legitimate purpose.   21.  Defendants entered into contracts to obtain access to thousands of motor vehicle  records on a continuous basis in 30 states within the United States.   22.   To protect the privacy and safety of licensed drivers, and to limit misuse of the  information contained in these government record systems, Congress enacted the Driver’s  Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725. The Act imposed strict rules for  collecting the personal information in driver records, and provided for liability in cases where an  entity improperly collects, discloses, uses, or sells such records. Congress paid particular  attention to differences between motor vehicle records and other public records containing  similar information, which it decided not to regulate. One concern that motivated enactment of  the DPPA was that personal information in motor vehicle records, including names and  addresses, is associated with license plate numbers, which drivers must display to the general  public.    24.  Congressional testimony in 1993 highlighted potential threats to privacy and  personal safety from disclosure of personal information held in state DMV records.    25.  The testimony before Congress also discussed concerns that the personal  information contained in state DMV records had considerable commercial value. In particular,  the personal information sold by state DMVS were being used extensively at that time to support  the direct-marketing efforts of businesses. See 1994 WL 212836 (Feb. 3, 1994) (statement of  Richard A. Barton, Direct Marketing Association) (“The names and addresses of vehicle owners,  in combination with information about the vehicles they own, are absolutely essential to the  marketing efforts of the nation's automotive industry.”). Personal information in DMV records  “is combined with information from other sources and used to create lists for selective marketing  use by businesses, charities, and political candidates.” 140 Cong. Rec. H2522 (daily ed. Apr. 20,  1994) (statement of Rep. Moran) (“Marketers use DMV lists to do targeted mailings and other  types of marketing.”).   28.  The “opt out” provisions of the original version of the DPPA was changed to “opt  in” provisions in §§ 2721(b)(11) and (12) by the October 1999 amendments to the DPPA. See  Pub. L. No. 106-69, 113 Stat. 986 (Oct. 9, 1999). Personal information in motor vehicle records  could now be disclosed in certain circumstances for bulk distribution for surveys, marketing, or  solicitation, but only if individuals are provided an opportunity, in a clear and conspicuous  manner, to block such use of information pertaining to them. 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(12). Thus,  disclosure of motor vehicle information about an individual for direct-marketing purposes is  prohibited unless (a) the individual is provided the opportunity, under Section 2721(b)(11), to  block general disclosure of their personal information, and declines that opportunity, or (b) the  individual is given the opportunity to block use of their personal information for direct marketing  specifically, and declines that opportunity.    29.  The DPPA defines “personal information” as “information that identifies an  individual, including an individual's photograph, social security number, driver identification  number, name address, telephone number, and medical or disability information, but does not  include information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver's status.” 18 U.S.C. §  2725(3). The DPPA's general prohibition on disclosure of personal information is subject to  fourteen (14) exceptions—the permissible purposes—which allow for the limited disclosure of  personal information.    31.    Sections 2721(a) and 2722(a) make nondisclosure of personal information the  default rule. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (“In general” prohibiting disclosure of personal  information “except as provided in subsection (b)”); 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a) (“It shall be unlawful  for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal information . . . for any use not  permitted under section 2721(b) of this title.”). Section 2721(b) then lists fourteen discrete  exceptions to non-disclosure.   32.  According to section 2721(c), “[a]n authorized recipient of personal information  (except a recipient under subsection (b)(11) or (12) may resell or re-disclose the information  only for a use permitted under subsection (b) (but not for uses under subsection (b)(11) or (12)).  An authorized recipient under (b)(11) may resell or re-disclose personal information for any  purpose. An authorized recipient under section (b)(12) may resell or re-disclose personal  information pursuant to subsection (b)(12).” 18 U.S.C. § 2721(c).   33.  Any person who receives personal information from a DMV and resells or further  discloses that information must, for five years, maintain records identifying each person or entity  to whom a further resale or re-disclosure was made, and the permitted purpose for such resale or  re-disclosure. See 18 U.S.C. 2721(c).   34.  The DPPA creates a private right of action for “the individual” whose personal  information was knowingly obtained, disclosed, or used “for a purpose not permitted” under  section 2721(b). 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a). “It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or  disclose personal information . . . for any use not permitted under section 2721(b) of this title.”  18 U.S.C. § 2722(a).   36.  The Congressional record is clear: the core aims of the DPPA are to prevent the  unauthorized obtainment of a citizen’s personal information and the statute creates a tangible  right to have one’s information secure. The violation of that security is a harm that supports  standing. “Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates  standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.” Linda v. Texas, 410 U.S. 614,  617 n.3 (1973); furthermore, “The actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist  solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing ….”  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).    38.  This literal reading of the DPPA was designed to promote public safety and to  protect individual privacy, construed so as to maximize their deterrent effect – in particular, by  shifting burdens to institutional actors who regularly engage in the targeted conduct or are  otherwise in a position to minimize future violations.   39.  Congress intended the states to be the “gatekeepers” of the motor vehicle records,  limiting the number of people with access to the personal information because the greater the  number of people with access, the greater the risk that personal information will be disseminated  to those who do not have valid uses for the personal information.   41.  In each sentence of section 2721(c) Congress linked the term “authorized  recipient” to the specific section of 2721(b) that had authorized the release of the information to  the recipient. Congress intended that the authorized recipients to be individuals, entities, or their  agents, qualified to receive the information by the terms of section 2721(b). Resellers cannot  obtain all of the personal information in the database simply by calling themselves resellers.  Entities requesting motor vehicle records have to justify their receipt of personal information  under the 2721(b) exception is applicable. Defendant PoliceReports.US, LLC. was not an  “authorized recipient.”    42.  The United States Supreme Court analyzed the D.P.P.A.’s use of “authorized  recipient” (albeit in dicta) in Reno v. Condon, noting a person must have initially obtained the  data for an permissible purpose before resale or dissemination of the data:  After listing section  2721(b)’s fourteen permissible purposes, Chief Justice Rehnquist equated authorized recipients  under section 2721(c) with “private persons who have obtained drivers’ personal information for  one of the aforementioned permissible purposes to further disclose that information for any one  of those purposes.” This is also the most logical conclusion based on the language of the DPPA,  the purpose of the statute, the legislative history, and common sense.  (quoting Reno v. Condon,  528 U.S. at 146 (citing 18 U.S.C. §2721(c)).    44.  The DPPA regulates the activity of resellers when acting as a “middleman”, and  places civil damage liability on the person and/or company that knowingly obtains, re-discloses,  resells, and purchases the motor vehicle records for improper purposes.     45.  In light of the text, structure, and legislative history of the DPPA, resellers are  subject to a duty of reasonable care before disclosing DPPA-protected personal information, 18  U.S.C. § 2721(b)-(c). Resellers must exercise reasonable care in responding to requests for  personal information drawn from motor vehicle records. Resellers are liable if they do not secure  proof that representations made by the recipient of personal information were valid.  Defendants  failed to exercise such reasonable care when reselling the motor vehicle records.    47.  The structure of the DPPA clearly indicates that the liability of a reseller of motor  vehicle records is not predicated on their knowledge of the end user’s actual purpose. Rather, it  is the same as the end user’s. That is because section 2722(a) makes no distinction between the  mental state required by the person who obtains motor vehicle records and one who discloses it.  Indeed, the statue on its face applies equally to those who “obtain” and those who “disclose”  personal information. 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a).    48.  Section 2721(c) does not suggests that a reseller may re-disclose protected  information so long as its customer claims to have a permissible use. Rather, the DPPA  authorizes the resale of information only if there is an actual, not just a stated, permitted use. 18  U.S.C. § 2721(c); Thus, as a purely textual matter, the DPPA indicates that a reseller who sells  protected information to a client without an actual permissible purpose is liable regardless what  “certifications” that client has made.   50.  Subsection (b)(12) implements an important objective of the DPPA—to restrict  disclosure of personal information contained in motor vehicle records to businesses for the  purpose of direct marketing and solicitation. Direct marketing and solicitation presented a  particular concern not only because these activities are of the ordinary commercial sort but also  because contacting an individual is an affront to privacy even beyond the fact that a large  number of persons have access to the personal information. The DPPA was enacted in part to  respond to the States’ common practice of selling personal information to businesses that used it  for marketing and solicitations. Congress chose to protect individual privacy by requiring a state  DMV to obtain the license holder’s express consent before permitting the disclosure, acquisition,  and use of personal information for bulk solicitation.     51.  Defendants PoliceReports and LexisNexis acted as resellers/sources with an  actual legal duties, other than the ministerial task of soliciting rote representations from  prospective requestors. Resellers must confirm those obtaining motor vehicle records have a  DPPA permissible use to obtain motor vehicle records. This obligation is not met merely by  accepting the end user’s “say-so” in the presence of red flags suggesting the requested  information was being sought for an improper DPPA purpose.  A cursory review Defendants’  websites would reveal their business objectives, and provide “red flags” requiring additional  review prior to the release of the Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ MVRs.    53.  Defendants websites allow the purchase of crash reports by report date, location,  or driver name and payment by credit card, prepaid bulk accounts or monthly accounts.   Purchasers are not required to establish any permissible use provided in the DPPA to obtain  access to Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ MVRs.   54.  Defendants’ activities occurred throughout the United States, obtaining the motor  vehicle records of Plaintiffs and the Class Members for purposes not permitted - a course of  action, and a body of information, that is protected from access and disclosure by federal law.   55.  The collection, use, and disclosure of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ motor  vehicle records by Defendants implicate Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ privacy and physical  safety. Such information is afforded special attention due to the consequences for both privacy  and physical safety that may flow from its disclosure. The heightened privacy and physical  safety concerns generated by obtaining, using, and disclosing such information, without  authorization, is apparent in U.S. law, creating restrictive consent standards for its obtainment,  use, and disclosure.   57.  Defendants knowingly obtained, disclosed, and/or used Plaintiffs and Class  Members personal information, derived from motor vehicle records, for a purpose not permitted  legally, a violation of a federal statutory right.   58.  At all times material, Defendants, and agents of the Defendants, knew, or  reasonably should have known, that their actions violated clearly established statutory rights of  the Plaintiffs and the Class members.   59.  Plaintiffs and Class Members were harmed when Defendants intentionally, or in  the alternative, negligently, obtained, processed, disseminated, stored, and used motor vehicle  records to market and solicit Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’, obtained without authorization, and  invading their right of privacy.   60.  Defendants failed to acquire, independently, and in concert, the express consent,  of Plaintiffs and Class Members before obtaining, collecting, generating, deriving,  disseminating, storing, or causing to be stored, re-disclosing or purchasing the MVR data of  Plaintiffs and Class Members.   61.  The Defendants failed to provide adequate policies, practices, and procedures  relating to the re-disclosure and resale to third parties obtaining the Plaintiffs’ and Class  Members’ motor vehicle records.   63.  During the Class Period, each Plaintiff named herein had personal motor vehicle  records obtained, used, re-disclosed, stored, resold, and purchased for purposes that included  marketing and solicitation, without their express consent. Such data was identifiable as to each of  the Plaintiffs and Class Members and were transmitted to third parties for purposes wholly  unrelated to its use and functionality when Plaintiffs and Class Members produced such to the  state.    64.  Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and as a class action pursuant  to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs seek certification of the following  class:    NATIONWIDE CLASS: All persons in the United States who, on or after, four  (4) years prior to the date of this filed complaint, through the final disposition of this or  any related actions (the “Class Period”), had their personal motor vehicle records,  maintained by their State Motor Vehicle Departments, directly obtained, used, re- disclosed, and/or resold, for purposes not authorized by the DPPA, without their express  consent by the named Defendants.   66.  Plaintiffs reserve the right to revise these definitions of the classes based on facts  they learn as litigation progresses.   67.  The Class consists of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of individuals and  other entities, making joinder impractical.   68.  The members of the Class are identifiable from the information and records in the  custody of the Defendants identified in the Class definition.   69.  Defendants’ conduct, as complained of herein, is generally applicable to the  Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with  respect to the Class as a whole. The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of all other  Class Members.   70.  The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of all other Class Members.   72.  Plaintiffs’ have retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting  complex litigation and class actions involving unlawful commercial practices. Plaintiffs and their  counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the Class Members, and  have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interest that  might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.   73.  A class action will cause an orderly and expeditious administration of Class  Members’ claims and economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of  decisions will be ensured. Individual Class Members are unlikely to be aware of their rights and  are not likely to be in a position (either through experience or financially) to commence  individual litigation against Defendants.   74.  Absent a class action, most Class Members would find the cost of litigating their  claims to be prohibitive and will have no effective remedy. The class treatment of common  questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in  that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants, and promotes consistency and  efficiency of adjudication.   75.  The Defendants have acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to  Plaintiffs and all of the other Class Members, requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief  to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class Members.   77.  Certification of a class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 is appropriate because Plaintiffs  and the putative Class Members have questions of law and fact that are common to the Class that  predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class, and a class  action is superior to all other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of this  controversy in fact, the wrongs suffered and remedies sought by Plaintiffs and the other members  of the Class are premised upon an unlawful scheme participated in by Defendants.   79.  Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege all paragraphs previously alleged  herein.     80.  As set forth herein, Defendants violated the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18  U.S.C. § 2721, by engaging in the acts alleged in this complaint.   81.  The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §2721 (a) et seq., regulates  obtaining and disclosing personal information gathered by State Departments of Motor Vehicles,  making it unlawful for a person or organization from knowingly obtaining or disclosing personal  information, or highly restricted personal information contained in motor vehicle records for any  purpose not specifically enumerated under §2721(b).     82.  Accordingly, Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. §2721 et seq. by intentionally  obtaining, using, re-disclosing, and reselling Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ motor vehicle  records without knowledge, consent, or authorization, for purposes not specifically enumerated  with the act.     83.  Plaintiffs and Class Members are “person[s] referencing” “an individual,  organization, or entity, but does not include a State or agency thereof”, within the meaning of 18  Violations of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, § 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq.  Against All Defendants  