(Individual and Deputy Attorney General class members’ First     Amendment claim against all Defendants)   (Individual and Objecting State Employee class members’ First  Amendment claim against the State Defendants)   10.  At all relevant times, New Jersey Statute Annotated Section 52:14-15.9e has  required that State disbursing officers shall, if they receive written authorization  from an employee, deduct union dues from employee’s compensation and remit those  monies to the union.     12.  Effective May 18, 2018, New Jersey amended Section 52:14-15.9e in the so- called “Workplace Democracy Act” to, among other things, prohibit employees from  stopping the deduction of union dues from their wages except during an annual ten- day escape period. Section 52:14-15.9e now states, in part:  Employees who have authorized the payroll deduction of fees to employee organi- zations may revoke such authorization by providing written notice to their public  employer during the 10 days following each anniversary date of their employment.  Within five days of receipt of notice from an employee of revocation of authoriza- tion for the payroll deduction of fees, the public employer shall provide notice to  the employee organization of an employee’s revocation of such authorization. An  employee’s notice of revocation of authorization for the payroll deduction of em- ployee organization fees shall be effective on the 30th day after the anniversary  date of employment.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:14-15.9e (as amended by P.L. 2018, c.15, § 6, eff. May, 18, 2018).  However, a “collectively negotiated agreement may also include a provision specifying  the effective date of a termination in deductions as of the July 1.” Id. Hereinafter,  this restriction shall be referred to as Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period restriction.   14.  On information and belief, the dues deduction authorization forms the State  generally uses and enforces as evidence of employee consent to union dues deductions  under Section 52:14-15.9e are on forms, or are based on forms, developed and ap- proved by the Department of the Treasury. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:14-15.8.    15.  Dues deduction authorization forms signed by State employees before May 18,  2018, and some dues deduction forms signed by State employees after that date, did  not include terms stating the signatory agreed that he or she could revoke the au- thorization only by providing written notice during ten-days prior to the anniversary  date of his or her employment.    15.9e, violate those individuals First Amendment right to free speech and association,  as secured against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United  States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.   15.9e, compel those individuals to subsidize a union and its speech as a condition of  their employment and against their will.     16.  On information and belief, the dues deduction authorization forms the State  uses and enforces do not include terms that notify employees that they have a First  Amendment right not to subsidize a union and its speech or that state the employee  agreed to waive that constitutional right by signing the form.   18.  Since on or around October 2010, IBEW Local 33 has been the exclusive rep- resentative of State employees in the “Deputy Attorneys General Unit,” which con- sists of deputy attorney generals employed by the State Department of Law and Pub- lic Safety, subject to certain exclusions.    19.  The State and IBEW Local 33 were parties to collective bargaining agree- ments governing the Deputy Attorneys General Unit effective July 1, 2013 to June  30, 2015 (“2013-15 CBA”) and effective July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2019 (“2015-19 CBA”),  and are currently parties to a collective bargaining agreement governing the unit  effective from July 1, 2019 to June 30, 2023 (“2019-23 CBA”).   20.  All three collective bargaining agreements include a provision at Article  VII(1)(a) that states, in relevant part, “the State agrees to deduct from the regular  paycheck of any employee, by automatic payroll deduction, dues of the union provided  the employee submits an authorization for dues deduction in writing and in proper  form to the responsible payroll clerk.”    21.  The 2013-15 CBA and 2015-19 CBA also included a provision at Article  VII(1)(b) that restricted when employees could stop dues deductions that stated, in  relevant part: “DAsG [Deputy Attorneys General] shall be eligible to withdraw such  authorization only as of July 1 of each year provided the notice of withdrawal is filed  timely with the responsible payroll clerk. Unless a DAG withdraws authorization for  the deduction of Union dues, the State will continue the deductions.”    23. The 2013-15 CBA and 2015-19 CBA also included “representation fee (agency  shop)” provision at Article VII(2) that required, in relevant part, that “[a]ny employee  in the negotiated unit on the effective date of this Agreement who does not join the  Union within thirty (30) days thereafter shall pay a representation fee in lieu of dues  to the Union by automatic payroll deduction for services rendered by the majority  representative.” This representation fee requirement was authorized by New Jersey  Statute Annotated Sections 34:13A-1-5.6 to 5.8.      24.  Plaintiff Heather Anderson is a deputy attorney general employed by the  State in the Department of Law and Public Safety. Anderson is subject to IBEW Local  33’s exclusive representation and to its collective bargaining agreements with the  State.     26.  On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court in Janus held that the First Amend- ment guaranteed public employees a right to not pay for union speech and that States  and unions could not deduct or collect payments for union speech from employees  without clear and compelling evidence that the employees’ waived that First Amend- ment right. 138 S. Ct. at 2486.   27.  Anderson does not want to financially support IBEW Local 33 or its speech.  Her attempts to exercise her First Amendment right under Janus to stop paying for  that speech has been frustrated by Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period restriction, as  detailed below.   28.  In an email from Anderson to IBEW Local 33 President Andrew Reese dated  November 14, 2019, Anderson wrote “[p]lease provide instructions on how to with- draw from the union. Thank you.” Reese responded with an email the next day stating  that “[y]our email is enough. Can I ask why you’re withdrawing, and right when we’re  focusing our efforts on negotiating our next contract?” Anderson responded the same  day with “[p]ersonal choice. Thank you.”       30.  The State and IBEW Local 33 continued to seize union dues from Anderson’s  wages, over her objections, pursuant to Section 52:14-15.9e and the 2019-23 CBA.   31.  In an email from Anderson to Reese dated July 22, 2020, Anderson wrote  “[p]lease withdraw me from the union. Thank you.” Reese responded with an email  to Anderson dated July 30, 2020 that referenced to and attached his December 2019  email, which stated that “[t]he State has told us that members are not able to with- draw from the union unless they make the request within 10 days after their anni- versary date, as set forth in the Workplace Democracy Act.”    32.  The State and IBEW Local 33 continued to seize union dues from Anderson’s  wages, over her objections, pursuant to Section 52:14-15.9e and the 2019-23 CBA.   33.  In a letter dated and sent by email on February 10, 2021, Anderson provided  notice to IBEW Local 33 and her state employer that she resigned her union mem- bership, revoked any deduction authorization she may have signed, and did not con- sent to the deduction of any union dues or fees from her wages. The letter is attached  as Exhibit A and is incorporated herein.    35.  On February 12, 2021, two State officials notified Anderson in separate emails  that the State would not honor Anderson’s request to stop dues deductions because  the request was not made within the ten-day period mandated by the 2019-23 CBA.  Specifically, Kathleen Dollard responded to Anderson’s letter with an email stating:   Good Morning Ms. Anderson: As per the IBEW Union Contract, in order to  withdraw from the Union you need to notify the union within 10 days of your  New Hire Anniversary date. Please note, your new hire date is August 4, 2003,  therefore you will need to withdraw from the Union within 10 days of August  4, 2021. I have attached the proper form for you to complete and returned  within those 10 specific days. Thank you.  Melica Blige, an employee relations administrator with the State Department of Law  and Public Safety, sent an email to Anderson that stated in relevant part:   Per the Memorandum of Agreement between the State of NJ and the IBEW  Local 33, in order to withdraw from a dues authorization, a DAG must submit  a written request to withdraw within ten days following his/her anniversary  date of employment. According to our records your anniversary date is 8/4/03.  Kindly resubmit your request, for removal from the union, between August 5,  2021 through August 15, 2021. Upon receipt of your request, your withdrawal  will be effective on the 30th day after your anniversary date.  A copy of these emails are attached as Exhibit C and incorporated herein.   36.  After February 10, 2021, the State and IBEW Local 33 continued to seize un- ion dues from Anderson’s wages, over her repeated objections, pursuant to Section  52:14-15.9e and the 2019-23 CBA.   38.  The State and IBEW Local 33, by seizing union dues from Anderson over her  objections, compelled and continue to compel Anderson to subsidize union speech as  a condition of her employment and in violation of her First Amendment right to not  that subsidize that speech.   39.  Plaintiff brings this case on her own behalf and on behalf of two classes of  similarly situated employees:  (a) a “Deputy Attorneys General” class of all State employees in Deputy Attor- neys General Unit who are subject or become subject to the escape period re- striction authorized by Section 52:14-15.9e and/or Article VII(1)(b) of the 2019- 23 CBA, or any similar provision in a subsequent agreement; and   (b) an “Objecting State Employee” class that consists of all State employees  who had or are having union dues seized from their wages by the State De- fendants after providing notice to the State that they opposed those seizures  outside of the ten-day escape period prescribed by Section 52:14-15.9e.      Alternatively, Plaintiff requests certification of the class or subclass the Court deems  appropriate.       41.  There are questions of fact and law common to all Deputy Attorneys General  class members. Factually, all are subject to the same escape-period restriction on  when they can exercise their First Amendment right to not subsidize union speech.  The dispositive question of law is the same for the Plaintiffs and Deputy Attorneys  General members: does the escape-period restriction violate the employees’ First  Amendment rights to not subsidize union speech?    42.  There are questions of fact and law common to all Objecting State Employee  class members. Factually, all are State employees who suffered injury as a result of  Section 52:14-15.9e escape period restriction—i.e., the State seized payments for un- ion speech seized from all of these employees over their objections because of Section  52:14-15.9e. The dispositive question of law is the same for the Plaintiffs and Object- ing State Employee class members: does it violate the First Amendment for the State  to enforce Section 52:14-15.9e escape period restriction against them and seize pay- ments for union speech from them over their objections?   43.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Deputy Attorneys General  and Objecting State Employee class members’ claims because all claims concern  whether the State violates the First Amendment by seizing payments for union  speech from employees who object, or want to object, to those seizures outside the ten- day escape period prescribed by Section 52:14-15.9e.    45.  Both proposed classes can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) because sep- arate actions by Deputy Attorneys General and/or Objecting State Employee mem- bers concerning the constitutionality of Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period restriction  and Defendants’ enforcement of that restriction would risk inconsistent adjudications  that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants.   46.  Both proposed classes can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) because an  adjudication determining the constitutionality of Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period  restrictions and Defendants’ enforcement of that restriction will, as a practical mat- ter, be dispositive of the interests of all Deputy Attorneys General and/or Objecting  State Employee members or substantially impair or impede their ability to exercise  their First Amendment rights.    47.  The Deputy Attorney General class can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(2)  because, by maintaining and enforcing Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period restriction,  Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to members  of the Deputy Attorneys General class, so that final injunctive or declaratory relief is  appropriate for class members as a whole.   54.  Defendants, by maintaining and enforcing Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period  restriction and Article VII(1)(b) of the 2019-23 CBA against Anderson and members  of the Deputy Attorney General class, violate those individuals’ First Amendment  right to free speech and association, as secured against state infringement by the  Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.   55.  Anderson and members of Deputy Attorney General class are suffering the  irreparable harm and injury inherent in a violation of First Amendment rights, for  which there is no adequate remedy at law.     57.  Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period restriction is unconstitutional on its face  or, alternatively, as applied to Anderson and members of the Deputy Attorney Gen- eral class.  58.  The State Defendants, by seizing payments for union speech from Anderson  and Objecting State Employee class members’ over their objections because those ob- jections were made outside of the ten-day escape period prescribed by Section 52:14-  59.  The State Defendants, by seizing payments for union speech from Anderson  and Objecting State Employee class members’ over their objections because those ob- jections were made outside of the ten-day escape period prescribed by Section 52:14-  60.  Anderson and members of Objecting State Employee class are suffering the  irreparable harm and injury inherent in a violation of First Amendment rights, for  which there is no adequate remedy at law.   62.  Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period restriction is unconstitutional on its face  or, alternatively, as applied to Anderson and members of the Objecting State Em- ployee class.  A. The State of New Jersey Prohibits State Employees from Exercising  Their First Amendment Right to Stop Subsidizing Union Speech Except  During a Ten-Day Escape Period.   