10.  Although Section H-10 was set to go into effect on July 1, 2019, Defendant began  requiring eviction-defense attorneys to pay the previously waived court fees of indigent  defendants prior to July 1, 2019.   11.  For example, on April 15, 2019, Mary Eason – a defendant in an eviction case  brought by the Chicago Housing Authority – was granted a waiver of court fees which stated:  “The applicant may participate in this case without payment of fees, costs, or charges including:  filing, service or process, publication, mediation, guardian ad litem, or any other court ordered  fees as listed in 735 ILCS 5/5-105(a)(1).”  See 4/15/2019 Order For Waiver of Court Fees,  attached hereto as Exhibit A.   12.  However, after Ms. Eason subsequently retained Plaintiff to defend her in the  eviction suit, Defendant refused to allow Plaintiff to file an appearance in the case because she  had not paid Ms. Eason’s previously waived court fees.  See May 22, 2019 Filing Rejection  Notice, attached hereto as Exhibit B.   13.  In order to represent Ms. Eason in her eviction case, Plaintiff paid her previously  waived court fees – under protest – in the amount of $228.92 on June 5, 2019.  See June 5, 2019  Appearance and Jury Demand, attached hereto as Exhibit C.   14.  On May 22, 2019, the Illinois General Assembly repealed the prospective Section  H-10 before it could go into effect.  Public Act 101-0036.  Illinois Gov. J.B. Pritzker approved  the repeal on June 28, 2019.  Id.  4  15.  Nevertheless, Defendant has continued enforcing the now-repealed Section H-10  by forcing private eviction-defense attorneys to pay the previously waived court fees of their  indigent clients.   16.  For example, on July 1, 2019, Plaintiff was required to pay $171.30 in previously  waived court fees in order to file an appearance to defend an eviction case for an indigent client.   See July 1, 2019 Appearance and Jury Demand, attached hereto as Exhibit D.  17.  Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action pursuant to Fed. R.  Civ. P. 23 on behalf of the following class:  All Illinois private eviction-defense attorneys who have paid and are being  required to pay court fees, costs and charges for clients who previously  had those fees, costs and charges waived due to indigency, and all eviction  defendants who have been or will be subjected to the fee requirement  despite being issued fee waivers.   18.  This case meets the Rule 23(a) prerequisites:   19.  Numerosity.  Upon information and belief, the members of the class are so  numerous that their individual joinder would be impracticable.   20.  Commonality.  There are numerous questions of law and fact that are common to  Plaintiffs and all members of the class, including, but not limited to the following:  a) Whether Defendant unlawfully collected court fees from private eviction-defense  attorneys whose indigent clients previously had those fees waived.  b) Whether Defendant’s practice of collecting previously waived court fees violates  the equal protection rights of private eviction-defense attorneys.  c) Whether Plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that Defendant’s collection of  previously waived court fees is unlawful.  d) whether Defendant has been unjustly enriched;  e) whether Plaintiff and class members have suffered damages; and  5 f) whether Plaintiff and class members are entitled to equitable relief.   21.  Typicality.  Plaintiff is a member of the class and has claims that are typical of all  members of the class.  Plaintiff’s claims and all class members’ claims arise out of the same  uniform course of conduct by Defendant and may be remedied under the same legal theories.   22.  Adequacy.  Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the  members of the class.  Plaintiff has no conflicts of interest with, or interests that are any different  from, those of the other class members.  Plaintiff has retained competent counsel experienced in  class actions of this type and other complex litigation.   23.  This case may be maintained as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action for declaratory relief  and meets the requirements for a Rule 23(b)(3) damages action:   24.  Predominance.  Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions  affecting only individual class members, and the court, as well as the parties, will spend the vast  majority of their time working to resolve these common issues.   25.  Superiority.  A class action is superior to all other feasible alternatives for the  resolution of this matter.  Individual litigation of multiple cases would be highly inefficient, a  gross waste of the resources of the court and of the parties, and potentially could lead to  inconsistent results that would be contrary to the interests of justice.     26.  Manageability.  This case is well suited for treatment as a class action and can  easily be managed as a class action, because evidence of both liability and damages can be  adduced, and proof of liability and damages can be presented, on a class-wide basis, while the  allocation and distribution of damages to class members would be essentially a ministerial  function.  6  27.  Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and class  members by uniformly, unlawfully collecting money from them.  Accordingly, injunctive relief,  as well as legal and/or equitable monetary relief (such as disgorgement and/or restitution), along  with corresponding declaratory relief, are appropriate with respect to the class as a whole.  28.  Plaintiff incorporates the allegations in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint  as if fully set forth herein.   29.  Section 1983 states:  Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of  any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any  citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the  deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,  shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper  proceeding for redress…  35.  Plaintiff incorporates the allegations in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint  as if fully set forth herein.   36.  The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act provides in relevant part:  In a case of an actual controversy within its jurisdiction…any court of the  United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the  rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such  declaration, whether or not further relief could be sought.  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).   37.  As set forth above, there is a real and actual controversy between Plaintiff and  Defendant on whether private eviction-court attorneys may be required to pay the previously  waived court fees of their indigent clients.   38.  The controversy between Plaintiff and Defendant is thus real and substantial and  demands specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character.   39.  Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment decreeing that Defendant may  not require attorneys to pay the previously waived court fees of their indigent clients.  8 40.  Plaintiff incorporates the allegations in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint  as if fully set forth herein.   41.  Defendant’s collection and retention of previously waived court fees benefits  violates the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.   42.  As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff has been damaged in  an amount to be determined at trial, including but not limited to the actual amounts of previously  waived court fees that private eviction-defense attorneys were forced to pay on behalf of their  indigent clients.  6.  The Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, 735 ILCS 5/9-101 et seq., provides a  mechanism by which a landlord may legally evict a tenant.  Defendants sued under the Act have  a right to a jury trial and are entitled to much of the same discovery processes available to any  other civil litigant.   7.  Approximately 20,000 eviction cases are filed in the Circuit Court of Cook  County’s Municipal Division every year.   8.  Low-income eviction defendants are eligible to have their court fees waived if  they meet statutory requirements.  Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 298.   9.  However, a statutory amendment that was set to become effective July 1, 2019  added the following provision, which would have required attorneys to pay the previously  waived court fees of their indigent clients:  If an attorney files an appearance on behalf of a person whose fees, costs, and  charges were initially waived under this Section, the attorney must pay all fees,  3 costs and charges relating to the civil action, including any previously waived  fees, costs, and charges, unless the attorney is either a civil legal services  provider, representing his or her client as part of a court-sponsored pro bono  program as defined in Section 5-105.1 of this Code, or appearing under a limited  scope appearance in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 13(c)(6).  735 ILCS 5/5-105 (h-10).   Equal Protection and Due Process  42 U.S.C. § 1983   Federal Declaratory Judgment Act  28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq.   Unjust Enrichment  