32.  On February 12, 2019, Defendant sent the following telemarketing text messages to  Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 2790 (the “2790 Number”):   33.  Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within  the time frame relevant to this action.     34.  The link included in the text message led to a website operated by “Massage Green Spa  of South Florida.”1   35.  The webpage advertises “Valentine’s Day Specials” and promotes Defendants spa  products. 2   37.  Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future  purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff a vehicle or refinancing for  her current vehicle. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(1).         38.  Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s  violation of the TCPA occurred within this district.  Upon information and belief, Defendant caused  other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district.     39.  At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to  be contacted using an ATDS.     40.  Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 2790 Number, and is financially  responsible for phone service to the 2790 Number.    41.  The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message demonstrates that  Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages.  See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions,  combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short  code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice  Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer  text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would  be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D.  Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements  written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d  1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013  WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable  without use of an ATDS)).     43.  The text messages originated from telephone number 201-762-8081, a number which  upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant.   44.  The number used by Defendant is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone  number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into  believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an  individual.     45.  Long codes work as follows:  Private companies known as SMS gateway providers  have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic.  These SMS  gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers,  which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the  transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code.    46.  Specifically, the text message does not identify the intended recipient by name nor  provide any identifiable characteristic of the intended recipient. Instead the text message is drafted  so that it can be sent out en masse without variation.   47.  Further, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and  software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case.  The systems utilized by Defendant  have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such  numbers without human intervention.     48.  Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion  of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.  Defendant’s  text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life.    50.  The telephone numbers Defendant called were assigned to a “cellular telephone service”  under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).   51.  Defendant is a seller because it is a person or entity on whose behalf telephone messages  were initiated to encourage consumers to engage, purchase or transact in Defendant’s goods and  services. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(9).  52.  Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  himself and all others similarly situated.   53.  Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Classes defined as follows:  All persons who from four years prior to the filing of this  action until the date of a certification Order (1) were sent a  text message to their cellular phone number by Defendant  or its agent(s), (2) using the same equipment used to send  the text messages to Plaintiff, (3) for the purpose of  advertising Defendant’s goods or services, (4) without their  prior express written consent or with the same purported  consent Defendant claims to have obtained from Plaintiff,  if any.   54.  Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff does not  know the number of members in the Classes but believes the members of the Classes number in the  several thousands, if not more.  57.  There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Classes which  predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Classes.  Among the questions  of law and fact common to the various Classes are:  (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class  members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS;  (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior  express written consent to make such calls;  (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful;  (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and  (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.   58.  The common questions in this case subject to common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that  Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone  services is accurate, Plaintiff and the members of the Classes will have identical claims capable of being  efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.  63.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth  herein.    64.  It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for  emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any  automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone  service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).    66.  These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first  obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not  have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative  Class as prior express consent was either never obtained or was revoked at the time Defendant’s  calls were made.   67.  Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an  automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent.   68.  Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and  knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone  dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing.    69.  As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA,  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a  minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an  injunction against future calls. Id.   WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Laura Wijesinha, on behalf of herself and the other members of  the Class, prays for the following relief:   a. A declaration that Defendant’s practices described herein violate the Telephone  Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227;   a. An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing  system to text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without  the prior express permission of the called party;   c.  An award of actual and statutory damages; and   d.  Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just.  PROPOSED CLASSES   Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  