(Class Action Alleging Violations of Michigan Common Law)  A.  VIOLATIONS OF MICHIGAN COMMON LAW   (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations)  A.  FLSA COVERAGE   22.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ job duties consisted of  answering phone calls made by Logisticare’s customers, answering customer inquiries,  and assisting customers with scheduling medical transportation.    23.  Plaintiff Chapman was employed by Logisticare in its call center located  in Southfield, Michigan from approximately August 2019 until April 2020.   24.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are non-exempt call-center  employees who were (and are) paid by the hour.   25.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members typically worked approximately  forty (40) “on-the-clock” hours per week.   26.  In addition to their forty (40) “on-the-clock” hours, Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members worked up to three (3) compensable hours “off-the-clock” per  week and have not been compensated for that time.  Unpaid Start-Up Time   27.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for  all the hours they worked for Logisticare as a result of Logisticare’s corporate policy  and practice of requiring their hourly call-center employees to clock-in only when ready  to take their first call.    29.  If Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are not ready and on the  phone at shift start, they can be (and often are) subject to discipline.    30.  If Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members clock in prior to their shift  start time, they are also subject to discipline.    31.  Therefore, the only way to be ready on time, and avoid discipline, is to  prepare the computer “off-the-clock” and without pay.    32.  During this start up time, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were  not compensated although they were expected to have completed this process in  advance of their official start times.  Unpaid Work During Meal Period Breaks   33.  Logisticare provides Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ with one  unpaid thirty-minute meal break each day.    34.  However, Logisticare requires Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members  to perform “off-the-clock” work during their unpaid meal break.   36.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are required to log back into  their computer, perform a restart process, log back into the phone system, then clock  in, and be back on the phone before their meal break end.    37.  The log off process used prior to taking a meal break can take anywhere  from one (1) to three (3) minutes.    38.  The log in process used after returning from a meal break can take  anywhere from another one (1) to three (3) minutes.    39.  This lengthy log off and log in procedure had to be performed during  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ meal break per Logisticare’s policy.   Unpaid Technical Downtime   40.  Further, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ computers crashed  multiple times each week and required Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to reset  them, which took ten (10) minutes or more each time.    41.  At times, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members would spend anywhere  from ten minutes (10) to several hours in a day troubleshooting their computer or  talking to technical support trying to get their computer to work so they could work.    43.  Logisticare requires Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to actively  troubleshoot their issues, but Logisticare does not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class  Members for any of their time spent rebooting or troubleshooting.   44.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were not compensated for the  time they worked for Logisticare rebooting or troubleshooting Logisticare’s computers  after they crashed or experienced other technical difficulties.   Unpaid Rest Breaks Lasting Twenty Minutes or Less   45.  In addition, Logisticare also enforced a uniform company-wide policy  wherein they improperly required their non-exempt hourly employees—Plaintiff and  the Putative Class Members—to clock out for rest breaks lasting twenty minutes or less.  29 C.F.R. § 785.18; see also Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Am. Future Sys., Inc., 833 F.3d 420,  425 (3d Cir. 2017).   46.  Logisticare permitted Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to take two  fifteen-minute breaks each day but required them to clock out for any and all breaks  taken outside the two fifteen-minute breaks.     48.  Logisticare has employed other individuals who perform(ed) the same or  similar job duties under the same pay provisions as Plaintiff.   49.  Logisticare is aware of their obligation to pay overtime for all hours  worked and the proper amount of overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty (40)  each week, but have failed to do so.    50.  Because Logisticare did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members  for all hours worked, and time and a half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in  a workweek, Logisticare’s pay policies and practices violate the FLSA.    51.  Because Logisticare did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members  for all straight time hours worked, Logisticare pay policies and practices also violate  Michigan state law.  V.  52.  Paragraphs 1–51 are fully incorporated herein.   53.  The FLSA Collective is defined as:  69.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.   70.  Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this is a collective action filed on behalf of  all of Logisticare’s employees who have been similarly situated to Plaintiff with regard  to the work they performed and the manner in which they have not been paid.   71.  Other similarly situated employees of Logisticare have been victimized by  Logisticare’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA.   72.  The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 53.   73.  Logisticare’s failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members the  overtime compensation at the rates required by the FLSA results from generally  applicable policies and practices of Logisticare, and does not depend on the personal  circumstances of Plaintiff or the FLSA Collective Members.    74.  Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA  Collective Members.   75.  The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA  Collective Members do not prevent collective treatment.    77.  Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no  detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts.     78.  Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA  collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Logisticare will retain the  proceeds of its rampant violations.   79.  Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the  judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy  and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for  judicial consistency.   80.  Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be  certified as defined as in Paragraph 53 and notice should be promptly sent.   81.  Paragraphs 1–80 are fully incorporated herein.   82.  Plaintiff Chapman further brings this action pursuant to the Michigan  common law equitable theory of unjust enrichment. See Athan v. United States Steel, 364  F. Supp. 3d 748, 754 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (recognizing that the FLSA does not cover  unpaid straight-time wages).   83.  The Michigan Class is defined as:  90.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.   91.  Plaintiff Chapman and the Michigan Class Members bring their Michigan  unjust enrichment claim as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by Logisticare to work in  Michigan since October 8, 2014. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5813.   92.  Class action treatment of Plaintiff Chapman and the Michigan Class  Members is appropriate because, as alleged below, all of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  23’s class action requisites are satisfied.    93.  The number of Michigan Class Members is so numerous that joinder of  all class members is impracticable.   94.  Plaintiff Chapman’s claims share common questions of law and fact with  the claims of the Michigan Class Members.   95.  Plaintiff Chapman is a member of the Michigan Class and her claims are  typical of the claims of other class members, and she has no interests that are  antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of the other class members.   97.  Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions  affecting only individual class members and because a class action is superior to other  available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation.   98.  Accordingly, the Michigan Class should be certified as defined in  Paragraph 83.  VI. 