17.  Defendants operate an electrical construction and maintenance business, whose  customers are primarily or exclusively local electric power utilities.      18.  Defendants provide construction and maintenance services on a power utility’s  distribution systems.   19.  During the past three years, at any given time, LVU and JGC employed  approximately thirty (30) Field Construction Workers in Pennsylvania, including Plaintiffs and  the Classes.  Factoring in turnover, LVU and JGC employed well in excess of forty (40)  Construction Workers in Pennsylvania over the last three years.   20.  As employees of LVU and JGC, Plaintiffs and the Classes performed various type  of electrical construction and maintenance work on electrical distribution power systems for  local power utilities.     21.  From approximately April 2017 through approximately late December 2017,  Plaintiff Steele typically worked a range of approximately 40-50 hours per week for JGC,  averaging approximately 45 hours per week.   23.  Plaintiff Steele was illegally classified as an independent contractor and paid on a  day-rate basis.  Plaintiff Steele never received an overtime premium for hours worked over forty  in a workweek.   24.  Since approximately early 2016, Plaintiff Ramos was employed by LVU and  JGC.  Plaintiff Ramos typically worked a range of approximately 45-60 hours per week for LVU  and JGC, averaging approximately 53 hours per week.   25.  Plaintiff Ramos’ work for Defendants included constructing, maintaining, and  installing electrical equipment on a power utility’s distribution systems.   26.  From approximately early 2016 through approximately November 2018, Plaintiff  Ramos was illegally classified by LVU and JGC as an independent contractor and paid on a day- rate basis.  Plaintiff Ramos never received an overtime premium for hours worked over forty in a  workweek.   27.  Since approximately December 2018, Plaintiff Ramos has been classified as an  employee of LVU.  As a classified employee, Plaintiff Ramos is paid on an hourly basis, but still  does not receive any overtime premium for the hours he works over forty in a workweek.    28.  The Classes were similarly classified as either independent contractors or exempt  employees, and in any case were not provided any overtime premium for hours worked over  forty in a workweek.  Employer Status   30.  Defendants supervised the work of Plaintiffs and the Classes and had the ability to  control and did control the manner in which that work was performed.   31.  Plaintiffs and the Classes enjoyed no opportunity for profit or loss based on  managerial skill.  Rather, they were paid purely on an hourly or day-rate basis and exercised no  managerial duties or skill.   32.  Plaintiffs and the Classes provided no significant investment in equipment or  materials required for their work.  Plaintiffs and the Classes did not employ helpers or any other  employee.   33.  The work of Plaintiffs and the Classes did not require special skill.  Rather, their  work was routine electrical construction work.     34.  The working relationship between Defendants and Plaintiffs/Classes was in a  nature of a permanent relationship.  Day to day and week to week, Plaintiffs and the Classes  were regularly employed by Defendants as Field Construction Workers.   36.  At all relevant times, Andrew was a principal of, and owned an interest in, JGC  and LVU.   37.  Andrew directed the work of Plaintiffs and the Classes at both JGC and LVU.   38.  Andrew had the power to, and did, hire, fire and discipline Field Construction  Workers at both JGC and LVU.   39.  As described herein, Andrew exercised supervisory authority over Plaintiffs and  the Classes.  Furthermore, Andrew also exercised discretionary control over payroll decisions  with respect to Plaintiffs and the Classes.  Thus, Andrew also was an employer within the  meaning of the FLSA and the PMWA.  See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole,  667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012); Schneider v. IT Factor Prods., No. CIV.A. 13-5970, 2013 WL  6476555 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2013).  Individual Liability – Christina Miklos   40.  At all relevant times, Christina was a principal of, and owned an interest in, JGC  and LVU.   41.  Christina directed the work of Plaintiffs and the Classes at both JGC and LVU.   42.  Together with Andrew, Christina had the power to, and upon information and  belief, did, hire, fire and discipline Field Construction Workers at both JGC and LVU.   43.  Christina controlled payroll decisions of JGC and LVU, including the decision not  to pay Plaintiffs and the Classes overtime compensation.   45.  As described herein, Christina exercised supervisory authority over Plaintiffs and  the Classes.  Furthermore, Christina also exercised discretionary control over payroll decisions  with respect to Plaintiffs and the Classes.  Thus, Andrew also was an employer within the  meaning of the FLSA and the PMWA.  See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole,  667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012); Schneider v. IT Factor Prods., No. CIV.A. 13-5970, 2013 WL  6476555 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2013).            Single Employer/Joint Employers   46.  At any given point in time within the last three years, one or more of JGC and  LVU (“Corporate Employers”) directly employed Plaintiffs and the Classes.   47.  To the extent there was overlap in the operation of Corporate Employers, they  were together functionally integrated in that they utilized the same or similar construction  equipment, tools, and labor relations personnel.  Corporate Employers each implemented and  carried out the same labor relations policies including the salary basis compensation of Plaintiff.   Corporate Employers each exhibited common ownership and control, including through Andrew  and Christina.  Thus, Corporate Employers constitute a single employer. N.L.R.B. v. Browning- Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982).   48.  Alternatively, even if Corporate Employers are not functionally integrated such  that they constituted “one integrated enterprise,” id, Corporate Employers jointly employed  Plaintiffs and the Classes because Corporate Employers through Andrew and Christina or other  agents, shared or co-determined control over Plaintiffs and the Classes with respect to the terms  and conditions of employment.  Id. at 1124; 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b).  Successor Employer/Alter-Ego/Shareholder Distributions   50.  LVU has operated the electrical construction business owned, controlled and  managed by Andrew and Christina from approximately 2019 through present, and has continued  to provide the same related electrical construction services as had JGC.   51.  LVU continued JGC’s management structure, through at least Andrew and  Christina.   52.  LVU generally continued to employ the same or similar employees as had JGC.   53.  LVU generally continued to operate out of the same physical location(s) as JGC.   54.  LVU generally continued to serve the same or similar customers as JGC,  including PPL, an electric utility.   55.  LVU generally possessed the same or similar assets as JGC.   56.  LVU had actual or constructive knowledge of the potential wage and hour  liabilities of JGC, through at least the continuity described above and the circumstances  described in this Complaint.   57.  JGC does not itself have the ability to pay the judgment requested in this action.   58.  LVU is liable as a successor employer for JGC’s wage and hour liability under  federal and state law.  See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network, 748 F.3d 142 (3d Cir.  2014).   59.  Alternatively, LVU and JGC are mere alter-egos of each other.   60.  In or about 2018, was dissolved by the New Jersey Secretary of State.     62.  In or about 2017, the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry (“DLI”)  investigated Defendants concerning their classification of their field construction employees as  independent contractors under various state labor laws.   63.  As opposed to true independent contractors, only employees enjoy the protections  of numerous federal and state labor laws which regulate an employee’s wages.  Unless otherwise  exempt, pursuant to the FLSA and PMWA, employees enjoy the right to receive overtime pay  when they work more than forty hours in a workweek.   64.  It is well established that construction workers such as Defendants’ Field  Construction Workers, are not exempt employees. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.3.  The  Pennsylvania Construction Workplace Misclassification Act, 43 P.S. §§ 933.1 -- 933.17 (“Act  72”) further clarifies the employment relationship under state law.   65.  In or about 2017, DLI found that field construction workers performing services  for JGC were employees as a matter of law under and thus that JGC had misclassified their  construction employees as independent contractors.   66.  As a result of its investigation, DLI assessed fines against JGC.   67.  On multiple occasions, Plaintiff Steele complained on the job to Andrew that he  was not receiving overtime pay, even though he was working more than 40 hours a week.   Others also made similar complaints to Andrew.   69.  To date, Defendants have willfully refused not only to pay the assessed fines, but  have also willfully refused to reclassify their field construction workers as non-exempt  employees or to pay them overtime wages when they work over forty hours in a workweek.   70.  Defendants do not maintain accurate records of the actual hours that Plaintiffs and  FLSA Class Members worked each workday and the total hours worked each workweek as  required by the FLSA.  See 29 U.S.C. § 211(c); 29 C.F.R. §§ 516.2, 516.5(a), 516.6(a)(1).    71.  Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiffs and FLSA Class Members  were not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements.   72.  Defendants are sophisticated businesses with access to knowledgeable human  resource specialists and competent labor and employment counsel.   73.  Defendants have acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable  FLSA provisions by failing to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class overtime pay when worked.  74.  Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action  on behalf of the FLSA Class defined above.   75.  Plaintiffs desire to pursue their FLSA claims individually and on behalf of any  individuals who opt-in to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).   77.  The similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, are readily  identifiable, and may be located through Defendants’ business and human resource records.     78.  Defendants employ many FLSA Class Members.  These similarly situated  employees may be readily notified of this action through direct U.S. mail and/or other  appropriate means, and allowed to opt into it pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of  collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages (or,  alternatively, interest), and attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA.  79.  Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23 on  behalf of himself and the Pennsylvania Class defined above.   80.  The members of the Pennsylvania Class are so numerous that joinder of all  members is impracticable.  Upon information and belief, there are in excess of thirty (30)  members of the Pennsylvania Class.   81.  Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the  Pennsylvania Class because there is no conflict between the claims of Plaintiffs and those of the  Pennsylvania Class, and Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Pennsylvania Class.   Plaintiffs’ counsel are competent and experienced in litigating wage and hour and other complex  labor matters, including class and collective actions like this one.   83.  Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Pennsylvania Class in the  following ways, without limitation: (a) Plaintiffs are members of the Pennsylvania Class; (b)  Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the same policies, practices and course of conduct that form the  basis of the claims of the Pennsylvania Class; (c) Plaintiffs’ claims are based on the same legal  and remedial theories as those of the Pennsylvania Class and involve similar factual  circumstances; (d) there are no conflicts between the interests of Plaintiff Steele and the  Pennsylvania Class Members; and (e) the injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are similar to the injuries  suffered by the Pennsylvania Class members.   84.  Class certification is appropriate under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) because questions  of law and fact common to the Pennsylvania Class predominate over any questions affecting  only individual Class members.   85.  Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient  adjudication of the controversy alleged herein because it will permit a large number of similarly  situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently,  and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail.   No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would  preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and  efficient adjudication of this controversy.  The Pennsylvania Class is readily identifiable from  Defendants’ own employment records.  Prosecution of separate actions by individual members  of the Pennsylvania Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with  respect to individual Pennsylvania Class members that would establish incompatible standards of  conduct for Defendants.   87.  Without a class action, Defendants will retain the benefit of their wrongdoing,  which will result in further damages to Plaintiffs and the Pennsylvania Class.  Plaintiffs envision  no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.  88.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.   89.  The FLSA requires that covered employees be compensated for all hours worked  at a rate of not less than $7.25 per hour.  See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1).   90.  LVU is subject to the wage requirements of the FLSA because LVU is an  “employer” under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).   91.  During all relevant times, LVU is an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce  and/or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §  203.    92.  JGC is subject to the wage requirements of the FLSA because JGC is an  “employer” under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).   93.  At all relevant times, JGC is an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce  and/or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §  203.    95.  At all relevant times, Andrew is an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce  and/or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §  203.    96.  Christina is subject to the wage requirements of the FLSA because Christina is an  “employer” under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), as he exercised supervisory control over Plaintiffs and the  FLSA Class and accordingly acted in the interest of LVU and JGC.  Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty.  Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012).   97.  At all relevant times, Christina is an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce  and/or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §  203.     98.  During all relevant times, Plaintiff Steele and the FLSA Class were covered  employees of Defendants, and as such were entitled to the above-described FLSA’s protections.   See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e).   Employment by LVU and JGC   Violation of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act   (On Behalf of the Pennsylvania Class)  105.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.  106.  The Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act of 1968 (“PMWA”) requires that covered  employees be compensated for all hours worked.  See 43 P.S. § 333.104(a) and 34 PA. CODE §  231.21(b).  107.  The PMWA also requires that covered employees be compensated for all hours  worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week at Overtime Rate.  See 43 P.S. § 333.104(c) and  Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act  (On Behalf of the FLSA Class)  