40.  Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all  persons similarly situated and proximately damaged by Defendants’ conduct, including, but not  necessarily limited to, the following Plaintiff Classes:  FLSA Class:   41.  The FLSA Class refers to all persons who are, or have been, employed as Salon  Assistants at the Salons (to wit, salons known as “Jeffrey Stein” located at 1498 2nd Avenue,  2345 Broadway, 495 Columbus Avenue, and 250 Columbus Avenue, in New York County) who  elect to opt-in to this action (the “FLSA Collective Plaintiffs”) from three (3) years prior to this  action’s filing through the date of the final disposition.   43.  At all relevant times, Defendants are aware and have been aware of the  requirements to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs minimum wage and, with respect to  overtime, at an amount equal to the rate of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for  all hours worked each workweek above forty, yet they purposely chose not to do so.    44.  Because Defendants unlawfully treated Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs as  salaried employees, they failed to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs federal minimum  wage and refused to pay compensation for all hours worked per workweek above forty in  violation of the FLSA.     45.  The bi-weekly weekly sums paid to Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs were  so low that they fell below federal minimum wage.    46.  The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable.  For purpose of notice  and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from  Defendants.   47.  Plaintiffs and all similarly situated employees who elect to participate in this  action seek unpaid compensation, unpaid overtime, an equal amount of liquidated damages  and/or prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  The New York Class – Rule 23 Class Allegations:   48.  The New York Class refers to all persons who are, or have been, employed as  Salon Assistants at the Salons after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in  this case and the date of final judgment in this matter as defined herein (the “Class Period”).   50.  The Defendants, their officers, and directors are excluded from the Classes, as  well as all persons who will submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion from the  Rule 23 Class.    52.  Upon information and belief, Defendants and other employers throughout the  state violate the New York Labor Law.  Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights  out of fear of direct retaliation or indirect retaliation.  Former employees are fearful of bringing  claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment and future efforts to  secure employment.  Class actions provide Rule 23 Class Members who are not named in the  complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while  eliminating or reducing these risks.  The foregoing factors and concerns are particularly  applicable to immigrant low-wage workers in the beauty salon industry in New York City.     54.  From July 24, 2009 to December 31, 2013, the New York minimum wage was  $7.25 per hour.  From January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2015, the New York minimum wage has  been $8.00 per hour.   From January 1, 2015 to present, the New York minimum wage has been  $9.00.    55.  At all relevant times, Defendants were not permitted to claim any tips or  gratuities as part of Cabezas’ minimum wage because the amount of tips or gratuities received by  Cabezas never exceeded the minimum amounts provided for under the New York State  Department of Labor’s Minimum Wage Order for Miscellaneous Industries and Occupations  (12  NYCRR § 142) required for an employer to claim a tip credit, and also because Defendants  never provided Cabezas with written notice that Defendants would apply a tip credit or  allowance toward minimum wage.   56.  Defendants unlawfully and willfully misclassified Cabezas as an exempt  salaried employee, and they provided her with no notice regarding her hourly rate of pay, despite  the clear mandate of the New York Labor Law.    58.  Upon information and belief, Defendants have been and continue to be  employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce, within  the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a).     59.  At all relevant times, Defendants employed, and/or continue to employ,  Plaintiffs and each of the FLSA Class members within the meaning of the FLSA.   60.  At all relevant times, Defendants employed, and/or continue to employ,  Plaintiff and each of the New York Class members within the meaning of the NYLL, §§ 2 and  651.    61.  At all relevant times, Defendants have been Plaintiff’s and Class Members’  employers within the meaning of the FLSA and NYLL.    62.  Defendants employ employees at their places of business in the activities of an  enterprise engaged in commerce, including employees handling, selling or otherwise working on  goods or materials that have been moved or produced for commerce.  The enterprise has an  annual gross volume of sales made or business done in an amount not less than $500,000.   Therefore, the employees are employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce within the  meaning of Section (3)(s)(1)(A) of the FLSA.   63.  At all relevant times, the Jeffrey Stein Enterprise, and its constituent entities, were  and continue to be an “enterprise engaged in commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA,  operating a group of salons under different corporate names.     65.  Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Jeffrey Stein Enterprise has remained  constant over a period of years, continuing to the present, namely:   (a) Ultimate control of the Salons is exercised by Mermelstein;   (b) Though the Salons are titled in different corporate names, Mermelstein has a  substantial ownership interest in each such entity;  (c) All the Salons have the same name, website and logo;  (d) Family members of Mermelstein have been active in the Jeffrey Stein Enterprise;  (e) Each of the Defendants acted directly or indirectly in the interest of one another in  relation to Plaintiffs.   66.  Defendants each had either functional and/or formal control over terms and  conditions of work and over the policies and practices with respect to the employment and  compensation of Plaintiff.    67.  Defendants employ or employed Plaintiff, and are or were Plaintiff’s employers  and/or Class Members’ employers within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. and the NYLL.    69.  Upon information and belief, Defendants run the business of all of the Jeffrey  Stein Enterprise as one operation, and Defendants’ operations were interrelated and united.    70.  Defendants had the power to hire and fire Plaintiff, controlled the terms and  conditions of employment, and determined the rate and method of any compensation in exchange  for Plaintiff’s services.    71.  Upon information and belief, Defendants knew or should have known of, and had  the authority to exercise control over, the accuracy of records concerning the hours and wages of  the Plaintiff and similarly situated employees.   82.  The Representative Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the FLSA Class members,  incorporate in this cause of action each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with  the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.   84.  As a result of the foregoing, the Representative Plaintiff demands judgment  against Defendants on her own behalf, and on behalf of those FLSA Class Members similarly  situated who file written consents to joinder in this action, for all unpaid wages, including  minimum wage and overtime wages owed by Defendants to the Representative Plaintiff and the  FLSA Class, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207, together with an award of an additional  equal amount as liquidated damages, costs, interest, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, as provided  for under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).   85.  Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were willful, thus the three year statute of  limitations of 29 U.S.C. § 255 applies.   86.  The Representative Plaintiff incorporates in this cause of action each and every  allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth  herein.   87.  At all relevant times hereto, the Defendants have been employers engaged in  commerce, as defined under 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) and (d).  Defendants employed members of the  FLSA Class as Salon Assistants, employment positions which engaged the employees in  commerce, as defined under 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(b), (e), (g) and 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  At all times  relevant hereto, Defendants have been an “enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production  of goods for commerce,” as defined under 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1).   89.  Indeed, in the performance of their duties for Defendants, members of the FLSA  Class routinely worked substantially more than forty (40) hours per week, yet did not receive  overtime compensation for the work, labor and services they provided to Defendants, as required  by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207.  The precise number of unpaid overtime hours will be  proven at trial.    90.  The Representative Plaintiff proposes to undertake appropriate proceedings to  have such FLSA Class Members aggrieved by Defendants’ unlawful conduct notified of the  pendency of this action and join this action as plaintiffs, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), by filing  written consents to joinder with the Court.   91.  Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were willful violations of the FLSA, within  the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).   93.  Plaintiff, for herself and on behalf of the FLSA Class and New York Class,  repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference the prior allegations of this complaint as if fully  alleged herein.    94.  This action provides a ripe and justiciable case or controversy.    95.  It is just and equitable that the Court declares the rights and other legal  relationships of the parties.    96.  Plaintiff, the FLSA Class and New York Class are entitled to a declaration that  Defendants acts are in violation of the FLSA and NYLL.  97.  Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York Class members, repeat  and re- allege and incorporate each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same  force and effect as though fully set forth herein.   98.  The NYLL and Wage Theft Prevention Act (“WTPA”) require employers to  provide employees with an accurate wage statement each time they are paid.   99.  Throughout Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants, Defendants willfully failed  to provide Plaintiff and the New York Class with wage statements at the end of every pay period  that correctly identified the name of the employer; address of employer; rates of pay or basis  thereof; regular hourly rate; whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece,  commission, or other; number of overtime hours worked; gross wages; deductions; allowances, if  any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; net wages; and such other information as required by  Declaratory Judgment  (FLSA Class and New York Class)   FLSA Minimum Wage Violations, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.  (FLSA Class)   FLSA Overtime Wage Violations, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.  (FLSA Class)   NYLL Wage Theft Prevention Act – Failure to Provide Wage Statements   (New York Class)  