(26 Me. Rev. Stat. §§ 664, 670: Overtime Wages)  (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiff Gagnon and All Maine Class Members)   (FLSA:  UNPAID OVERTIME WAGES)  (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiff and All Putative Collective Action Members)   (Maine Law: Unpaid Wages)  (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiff Gagnon and All Maine Class Members)   23.  Defendant employed Plaintiff and the Putative Collective Action Members and  Maine Class Members within the relevant periods.   24.  Defendant maintained control, oversight, and discretion over the operation of its  restaurants, including its employment practices with respect to Plaintiff, the Putative Collective  Action Members, and the Maine Class Members, within the relevant periods.  6   25.  Plaintiff, the Putative Collective Action Members, and the Maine Class Members  performed work as DMs or ADMs that was integrated into the normal course of Defendant’s  business, within the relevant periods.   26.  Consistent with Defendant’s policy, pattern and practice, Plaintiff, the Putative  Collective Action Members, and the Maine Class Members regularly worked in excess of 40  hours per workweek without being paid overtime premium wages, in violation of the FLSA and  Maine Law, within the relevant periods.  As but one non-exhaustive example, Plaintiff Gagnon  worked more than 40 hours during the week of July 4, 2016.   27.  Hannaford assigned all of the work performed by Plaintiff, the Putative Collective  Action Members, and the Maine Class Members, and is aware of all the work that they have  performed, within the relevant periods.   28.  This work required no capital investment.  Nor did it include primarily managerial  responsibilities, or the exercise of meaningful independent judgment and discretion.     29.  During the FLSA relevant period and the Maine relevant period, Plaintiff, the  Putative Collective Action Members, and the Maine Class Members performed the same  primary job duties:  selling the grocery products and services that constitute Defendant’s  marketplace offerings, helping and serving customers, cleaning, checking to make sure that  supplies were properly shelved, and checking inventory.     30.  Throughout the relevant periods, the primary job duties of Plaintiff and all  similarly situated Putative Collective Action Members and Maine Class Members did not  include: hiring, firing, disciplining, or directing the work of other employees, and exercising  meaningful independent judgment and discretion.  7   31.  Throughout the relevant periods, the primary job duties of Plaintiff, the Putative  Collective Action Members, and the Maine Class Members did not materially differ from the  duties of non-exempt hourly paid employees, which included many duties that were manual and  non-exempt in nature.  The performance of manual labor and non-exempt duties occupied the  majority of Plaintiff’s working hours.   32.  Pursuant to a centralized, company-wide policy, pattern and practice, Defendant  classified all Putative Collective Action Members as exempt from the overtime provisions of the  FLSA and Maine Law, within the relevant periods.   33.  Upon information and belief, Defendant did not perform a person-by-person  analysis of the job duties of the Putative Collective Action Members when making the decision  to classify all of them uniformly as exempt from the overtime protections of the FLSA and  Maine Law during their employment in the relevant periods.   34.  Pursuant to a centralized, company-wide policy, pattern and practice, Defendant  increased uniformly the salaries for Plaintiff and all Putative Collective Action Members  effective on or about December 1, 2016 to at or above the minimum salary threshold for  claiming exempt status that was announced by the U.S. Department of Labor’s new overtime  rules scheduled to become effective December 1, 2016.   35.  Upon information and belief, Defendant did not perform a person-by-person  analysis of the job duties of Plaintiff and the Putative Collective Action Members when making  the decision to increase uniformly the salaries of all of them effective on or about December 1,  2016 to meet or exceed the minimum salary level required to continue claiming that those  positions are exempt from the overtime protections of the FLSA and Maine Law.  8   36.  Throughout the relevant periods, Defendant established labor budgets to cover  labor costs for the store in which Plaintiff and the Putative Collective Action Members worked.   The wages of Defendant’s store-level employees were deducted from the labor budgets.   However, Defendant did not provide sufficient money in the labor budgets to cover all hours  needed to complete the necessary manual and non-exempt tasks in each store.  Defendant knew  or recklessly disregarded the fact that the underfunding of store labor budgets resulted in  Plaintiff and other Putative Collective Action Members (who were not paid overtime) working  more than 40 hours in a workweek without receiving any overtime premium compensation,  which allowed Defendant to avoid paying additional wages (including overtime) to the non- exempt, store-level employees.     37.  Throughout the relevant periods, Defendant knew, by virtue of the fact that their  Store Managers, Assistant Store Managers, and their managers (as its authorized agents)  actually saw Plaintiff and other Putative Collective Action Members perform primarily manual  labor and non-exempt duties, that as a result of the underfunded labor budgets, the amount of  money available to pay non-exempt employees to perform such work was limited (and,  ultimately, insufficient).  Within the relevant periods, Defendant knew that Plaintiff and other  Putative Collective Action Members were primarily performing the work of non-exempt  employees and, based on their actual job duties, they did not fall within any FLSA or Maine  Law exemptions.  Inasmuch as Defendant is a substantial corporate entity aware of its  obligations under the FLSA and Maine Law, it acted willfully or recklessly in failing to classify  and pay Plaintiff and the Putative Collective Action Members as non-exempt employees.   38.  Throughout the relevant periods, Defendant is aware or should have been aware,  through the Store Managers, Assistant Managers, and their managers (as their authorized  9  agents), that Plaintiff and the Putative Collective Action Members were primarily performing  non-exempt duties. As a supermarket chain operating at over 180 locations in the United States  and over 70 locations in Maine, Defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the  FLSA and Maine Law required Defendant to pay non-exempt employees an overtime premium  for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek.   39.  Defendant’s unlawful conduct, as described above, was willful or in reckless  disregard of the FLSA and Maine Law and was accomplished through Defendant’s centralized,  company-wide policy, pattern, and practice of attempting to minimize labor costs by violating  the FLSA and Maine Law.   40.  As part of its regular business practice within the relevant periods, Defendant  intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly engaged in a policy, pattern, and practice of violating the  FLSA and Maine Law with respect to Plaintiff, the Putative Collective Action Members and the  Maine Class Members.  This policy, pattern, and practice includes, but it is not limited to,  Defendant’s knowledge of its obligations and the kind of work that Plaintiff, the Putative  Collective Action Members, and the Maine Class Members were, and have been, performing.   As a result, Defendant has:  a.  willfully misclassified Plaintiff, the Putative Collective Action Members, and the  Maine Class Members;  b.  willfully failed to pay Plaintiff, the Putative Collective Action Members, and the  Maine Class Members overtime wages for hours they worked in excess of 40  hours per week; and  c.  willfully failed to provide enough money in their store-level labor budgets for  non-exempt employees to perform their duties and responsibilities, forcing  10  Plaintiff, the Putative Collective Action Members, and the Maine Class Members  to perform such non-exempt tasks.   41.  Defendant’s willful violations of the FLSA and Maine Law are further  demonstrated by the fact that during the relevant periods, Defendant has failed to maintain  accurate and sufficient time records for Plaintiff and the Putative Collective Action Members  and the Maine Class.  Defendant acted recklessly or in willful disregard of the FLSA and Maine  Law by instituting a policy and practice that did not allow Plaintiff to record all hours worked  during the relevant periods.   42.  Due to the foregoing, Defendant’s failure to pay overtime wages for work  performed by the Putative Collective Action Members and Maine Class Members in excess of  40 hours per workweek was willful or reckless, and has been widespread, repeated, and  consistent.  43.  Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 216(b), Plaintiff seeks to prosecute her FLSA  claims as a Collective Action on behalf of all Putative Collective Action Members at any time  during the FLSA relevant period.   44.  Defendant is liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to pay premium  overtime wages during the FLSA relevant period to Plaintiff and the Putative Collective Action  Members for all hours worked over 40 in any given workweek.   45.  Upon information and belief, there are likely hundreds of Putative Collective  Action Members who were not paid premium overtime wages during the FLSA relevant period  in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice  11  of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join.  Thus, notice should be sent to the Putative Collective  Action Members pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).   46.  The Putative Collective Action Members are known to Defendant, are readily  identifiable, and can be located through Defendant’s records.  47.  Plaintiff Gagnon, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, brings this class action on behalf  of herself and all other DMs and ADMs who were paid a salary by Defendant but were not paid  overtime premiums for working more than 40 hours in a workweek in the state of Maine during  the Maine relevant period under Maine law (the “Maine Class Members”).  Plaintiff alleges that  the Maine Class Members are entitled to, inter alia: (i) unpaid overtime wages for hours worked  above forty (40) hours in a workweek, as required by law, and (ii) liquidated damages, penalties,  interest, reimbursement of attorney’s fees and costs, and all other available relief under the  applicable statutes pursuant to Maine law.   48.  Plaintiff Gagnon, individually and on behalf of all other DMs and ADMs who  terminated employment with Defendant during the Maine relevant period, hereby makes  demand for the prompt payment of all unpaid wages due and owing under Maine Law, and,  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, brings this class action on behalf of a subclass including herself  and all other DMs and ADMs who suffered damages due to failure to pay required overtime  wages upon termination under 26 Me. Rev. Stat. § 626 as a result of Defendant’s violations of  Maine Law in the state of Maine during the Maine relevant period under Maine law (the “Maine  Termination Subclass Members”).  Plaintiff alleges that the Maine Class Members are entitled  to, inter alia: (i) unpaid overtime wages for hours worked above forty (40) hours in a  workweek, as required by law, and (ii) liquidated damages, penalties, interest, reimbursement of  12  attorney’s fees and costs, and all other available relief under the applicable statutes pursuant to  Maine law.   49.   Upon information and belief, the Maine Class contains more than 40 persons and  is so numerous so that joinder of all individual members is impracticable.   50.  Upon information and belief, the Maine Termination Subclass contains more than  40 persons and is so numerous that joinder of all individual members is impracticable.   51.  Defendant’s conduct with respect to Plaintiff Gagnon and the Maine Class (and  Maine Termination Subclass) raises questions of law and fact that are common to the entire  class, including whether Defendant employed Plaintiff Gagnon and all members of the Maine  Class within the meaning of Maine Law; the nature and extent of the class-wide injury and the  appropriate measure of damages for the Maine Class (and Maine Termination Subclass);  whether Defendant had and has a policy of misclassifying the salary-paid DMs and ADMs as  exempt from coverage of the overtime provisions of Maine Law; whether Defendant failed to  pay Gagnon and all members of the Maine Class (and Maine Termination Subclass) the legally  required amount of overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per  workweek, in violation of Maine Law; and whether Defendant is liable for all damages claimed  by Gagnon and all members of the Maine Class (and Maine Termination Subclass).   52.  Plaintiff Gagnon’s claims and Defendant’s anticipated defenses are typical of the  claims or defenses applicable to the entire class.   53.  Plaintiff Gagnon’s interests in pursuing this lawsuit are aligned with the interests  of the entire Maine Class (and Maine Termination Subclass).   54.  Plaintiff Gagnon will fairly and adequately protect the Maine Class Members’  (and Maine Termination Subclass member’s) interests because her experienced and well- 13  resourced counsel are free of any conflicts of interest and are prepared to vigorously litigate this  action on behalf of all Maine Class members (and Maine Termination Subclass members).   55.  A class action provides the fairest and most efficient method for adjudicating the  legal claims of all Maine Class Members (and Maine Termination Subclass members).   56.  Defendant violated Maine Law by failing to pay proper overtime wages to Plaintiff  Gagnon and other Maine Class Members (and Maine Termination Subclass members) for  workweeks in which they worked over 40 hours.    57.  There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the Maine Class  (and Maine Termination Subclass) that predominate over any questions solely affecting the  individual members of the Maine Class (and Maine Termination Subclass).     58.  The critical question of law and fact common to Plaintiff Gagnon and the Maine  Class (and Maine Termination Subclass) that will materially advance the litigation is whether  Defendant is required by Maine Law to pay Plaintiff Gagnon and the Maine Class (and Maine  Termination Subclass) at a rate of 1.5 times their regular hourly rate for overtime hours worked.     59.  Other questions of law and fact common to the Maine Class (and Maine  Termination Subclass) that will materially advance the litigation include, without limitation:   a.  Whether Defendant can prove that its unlawful policies were implemented  in good faith;  b.  Whether Defendant is liable for all damages claimed by Gagnon and the  Maine Class (and Maine Termination Subclass), including, without  limitation, compensatory, punitive and statutory damages, interest,  penalties, costs and disbursements, and attorneys’ fees; and  14  c.  Whether Defendant should be enjoined from continuing to violate Maine  Law in the future.   60.  Plaintiff Gagnon’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Maine  Class (and Maine Termination Subclass).  Plaintiff Gagnon has the same interests in this matter  as all other members of the Maine Class (and Maine Termination Subclass).   61.  Plaintiff Gagnon is an adequate class representative, is committed to pursuing this  action, and has retained competent counsel experienced in wage and hour law and class action  litigation.   62.  Class certification of Plaintiff Gagnon’s claim under Maine Law is appropriate  pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds  generally applicable to the Maine Class (and Maine Termination Subclass), making appropriate  declaratory relief with respect to the Maine Class (and Maine Termination Subclass) as a whole.     63.  Class certification of Plaintiff Gagnon’s claim under Maine Law is also  appropriate pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to  the Maine Class (and Maine Termination Subclass) predominate over questions affecting only  individual members of the Maine Class (and Maine Termination Subclass), and because a class  action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this  litigation.   64.  Plaintiff Gagnon knows of no difficulty that would be encountered in the  management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.  15  65.  Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all Putative Collective Action Members, re- alleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs.   66.  Throughout the FLSA relevant period, Defendant has been, and continues to be,  an employer engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce,  within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) & 207(a).   67.  Throughout the FLSA relevant period, Defendant employed Plaintiff, and  employed or continue to employ each of the Putative Collective Action Members within the  meaning of the FLSA.   68.  Throughout the FLSA relevant period, Defendant has engaged in a widespread  pattern and practice of violating the FLSA, as described in this Complaint.   69.  Plaintiff has consented in writing to be parties to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C.  § 216(b).  See Exhibit A.   70.  The overtime wage provisions set forth in 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., apply to  Defendant.   71.  Throughout the FLSA relevant period, Defendant has had a policy and practice of  refusing to pay premium overtime compensation to the Putative Collective Action Members for  hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek.   72.  As a result of Defendant’s willful failure to compensate its employees, including  Plaintiff and the Putative Collective Action Members, at a rate not less than one and one-half  times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek  16  throughout the FLSA relevant period, Defendant has violated, and continues to violate, the  FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1) & 215(a).    73.  As a result of Defendant’s willful failure to record, report, credit, and compensate  its employees, including Plaintiff and the Putative Collective Action Members, throughout the  FLSA relevant period, Defendant failed to make, keep, and preserve records with respect to  each of its employees sufficient to determine the wages, hours and other conditions and  practices of employment in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., including  29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c) & 215(a).   74.  Throughout the FLSA relevant period, as a result of Defendant’s policy and  practice of minimizing labor costs by underfunding labor budgets for its stores, Defendant knew  or recklessly disregarded the fact that Plaintiff and the Putative Collective Action Members  were primarily performing manual labor and non-exempt tasks.     75.  Due to Defendant’s (a) failure to provide enough labor budget funds; (b) failure to  take into account the impact of the underfunded labor budgets on the job duties of Plaintiff and  the Putative Collective Action Members; (c) actual knowledge, through its Store Managers,  Assistant Managers, and their managers, that the primary duties of Plaintiff and the Putative  Collective Action Members were manual labor and other non-exempt tasks; (d) failure to  perform a person-by-person analysis of Plaintiff’s and the Putative Collective Action Members’  job duties to ensure that their jobs  primarily required performing exempt job duties; and  (e) policy and practice that did not allow Plaintiff and the Putative Collective Action Members  to record all hours worked, Defendant knew or showed reckless disregard that its conduct was  prohibited by the FLSA.  29 U.S.C. § 255(a).  17   76.  As a result of Defendant’s FLSA violations, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the  Putative Collective Action Members, is entitled (a) to recover from Defendant unpaid wages for  all of the overtime hours worked, as premium overtime compensation; (b) to recover an  additional, equal amount as liquidated damages for Defendant’s willful or reckless violations of  the FLSA; and (c) recover their unreasonably delayed payment of wages, reasonable attorneys’  fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).   77.  Defendant’s violations of the FLSA have been willful or reckless, thus a three- year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255.  78.  Plaintiff Gagnon, on behalf of herself and all Maine Class Action Members, re- alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs preceding Count I.   79.  At all times within the Maine relevant period, Plaintiff was an employee covered  by the Maine Laws, and was entitled to receive pay at her regular rate for the first 40 hours  worked in a work week and overtime at a rate of one and one-half times her regular rate of pay  for all hours over 40 in a workweek.   80.  Defendant violated the provisions of Maine’s Wage Payment Statute, 26 Me. Rev.  Stat. § 621-A, by failing to timely pay in full, at regular intervals not to exceed 16 days, all  wages earned by Plaintiff and members of the Maine Class (and Maine Termination Subclass) at  the regular rate for each hour worked under 40 hours per week and at the overtime rate (one and  one-half times the regular rate) for each hour worked over 40 hours per week, within the Maine  relevant period.  As such, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and members of the Maine Class (and  Maine Termination Subclass) under 26 Me. Rev. Stat. § 626-A.  18   81.  Defendant willfully violated 26 Me. Rev. Stat. § 621-A.   82.  Defendant’s untimely payment of wages and continued refusal to pay wages owed  to Plaintiff and members of the Maine Class (and Maine Termination Subclass) throughout the  Maine relevant period, constitute violations of 26 Me. Rev. Stat. § 621-A.   83.  Plaintiff and members of the Maine Class (and Maine Termination Subclass) have  suffered economic loss as a result of Defendant’s violation of the law during the Maine relevant  period and seek redress for these injuries pursuant to 26 Me. Rev. Stat. § 626-A.  84.  Plaintiff Gagnon, on behalf of herself and all Maine Class Members (and Maine  Termination Subclass Members), re-alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs  preceding Count I.   85.  Defendant required Plaintiff and the members of the Maine Class (and Maine  Termination Subclass) to work more than 40 hours in any one week without paying them one  and one-half times their regular rate of pay throughout the FLSA relevant period, in violation of  26 Me. Rev. Stat. § 664.   86.  Defendant’s failures to pay Plaintiff and the members of the Maine Class (and  Maine Termination Subclass) one and one-half their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in  excess of 40 in a workweek throughout the FLSA relevant period constituted a willful violation  of 26 Me. Rev. Stat. § 664.   87.  Plaintiff and the members of the Maine Class (and Maine Termination Subclass)  have suffered economic loss throughout the FLSA relevant period as a result of Defendant’s  19  violations of 26 Me. Rev. Stat. § 664 and seek redress for these injuries pursuant to 26 Me. Rev.  Stat. § 670. 