(Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii))  133.  Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the above paragraphs as though  set forth fully herein.  134.  The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple  knowing and/or willful, violations of the TCPA, including, but not limited to, each of the above- cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, by making calls, except for emergency purposes, to the  cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiffs and members of Classes using an ATDS and/or an  artificial or prerecorded voice.  135.  As a result of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA,  Plaintiffs and each member of the Classes are entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for each  and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).  136.  Plaintiffs and all members of the Classes are also entitled to and do seek  injunctive relief prohibiting such willful conduct that violates the TCPA by Defendants in the  future, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).  (Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii))  129.  Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the above paragraphs as though  set forth fully herein.  130.  The foregoing act and omissions of Defendants and/or their affiliates, agents,  and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf constitute numerous and multiple  violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of  47 U.S.C. § 227, by making calls, except for emergency purposes, to the cellular telephone  numbers of Plaintiffs and members of the Classes using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded  voice.  - 21 -  131.  As a result of Defendants’ and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or  entities acting on Defendants’ behalf’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiffs and members of the  Classes are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for each and every call placed in  violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).  132.  Plaintiffs and all members of the Classes are also entitled to and do seek  injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct that violates the TCPA by Defendants in the future,  pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).  119.  Plaintiffs bring this class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  23(b)(3) individually and behalf of all others similarly situated.  Plaintiffs seek to represent the  below three (3) classes:  U.S. Bank Class (Snyder is the proposed class representative): All  persons whose cellular telephones Ocwen called using its Aspect  dialer in relation to a loan for which U.S. Bank was serving as  trustee.  Wilmington  Class  (Mansanarez  is  the  proposed  class  representative): All persons whose cellular telephones Ocwen  called using its Aspect dialer in relation to a loan for which  Wilmington was serving as trustee.  Citibank Class (Mansanarez is the proposed class representative):  All persons whose cellular telephones Ocwen called using its  - 18 -  Aspect dialer in relation to a loan for which Citibank was serving  as trustee.  Deutsche Class (Beecroft is the proposed class representative): All  persons whose cellular telephones Ocwen called using its Aspect  dialer in relation to a loan for which Deutsche Bank was serving as  trustee.  The U.S. Bank Class, Wilmington Class, Citibank Class, and Deutsche Class are hereinafter  collectively referred to as the “Classes.”  Excluded from the Classes are Defendants and any  entities in which Defendants or their subsidiaries or affiliates have a controlling interest,  Defendants’ agents and employees, the judicial officer to whom this action is assigned and any  member of the court staff and immediate family, and claims for personal injury, wrongful death,  and emotional distress.  120.  Numerosity.  Plaintiffs do not know the exact number of members in the Classes,  but, based on Defendants’ public statements regarding their business in the United States and  investigation of their counsel, Plaintiffs reasonably believe that Class members for the proposed  classes and subclasses number in the tens of thousands, if not more.    121.  Commonality.  There are questions of law and fact common to the members of  the Classes that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.   These  common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the following:  a.  Whether Defendants and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or  entities acting on Defendants’ behalf violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) by making any call,  except for emergency purposes, to a cellular telephone number using an ATDS or an artificial or  prerecorded voice;  b.  Whether Defendants and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or  entities acting on Defendants’ behalf knowingly and/or willfully violated 47 U.S.C.  § 227(b)(1)(A) by making any call, except for emergency purposes, to a cellular telephone  number using an ATDS or artificial or prerecorded voice, such that treble damages are  appropriate under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3);  - 19 -  c.  Whether Defendants are liable for autodialed or prerecorded voice debt  collection calls made by Defendants’ affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on  Defendants’ behalf; and  d.  Whether Defendants and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or  entities acting on Defendants’ behalf should be enjoined from violating the TCPA in the future.  122.  Typicality.  Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Classes.  Plaintiffs’  claims, like the claims of Classes arise out of the same common course of conduct by Defendants  and are based on the same legal and remedial theories.  123.  Adequacy.  Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  Classes.  Plaintiffs have retained competent and capable attorneys with significant experience in  complex and class action litigation, including consumer class actions and TCPA class actions.   Plaintiffs and their counsel are committed to prosecuting this action vigorously on behalf of the  Classes and have the financial resources to do so.  Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have  interests that are contrary to or that conflict with those of the proposed Classes.  124.  Predominance.  Defendants have engaged in a common course of conduct toward  Plaintiffs and members of the Classes.  The common issues arising from this conduct that affect  Plaintiffs and members of the Classes predominate over any individual issues.  Adjudication of  these common issues in a single action has important and desirable advantages of judicial  economy.  125.  Superiority. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair  and efficient adjudication of the controversy for the following reasons:  a.  It is economically impractical for members of the Classes to prosecute  individual actions;  b.  The Classes are readily definable; and  c.  Prosecution as a class action will eliminate the possibility of repetitious  litigation.  - 20 -  126.  A class action will cause an orderly and expeditious administration of the claims  of the Classes.  Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of  decisions will be ensured.  127.  Class-wide relief is essential to compel Defendants to comply with the TCPA.   The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims  against Defendants is small because the statutory damages in an individual action for violation of  the TCPA are small.  Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer  difficulties than are presented in many class claims because the calls at issue are all automated  and the Class members, by definition, did not provide the prior express consent required under  the statute to authorize calls to their cellular telephones.   128.  Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Appropriate.  Defendants have acted on  grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making final injunctive relief and  corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Classes appropriate on a class-wide basis.   Moreover, on information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that the automated calls made by  Defendants and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’  behalf that are complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an  injunction is not entered.  18.  Directly as well as through its subsidiaries, contractors, and agents, Ocwen  employs hundreds of persons at various call centers throughout the country.  These calling  centers use automatic telephone dialing systems and computerized account information to track,  record, and maintain the hundreds of thousands of debts collected by Ocwen.   19.  A significant portion, if not a majority, of Ocwen’s business operations are  dedicated to servicing consumer loans that are in default, foreclosure, have been charged off by  the original lender, or are subject to discharge in bankruptcy.   20.  Ocwen’s regular business practices include making repeated telephone calls, as  well as sending notices, statements, bills, and other written correspondence to persons it believes  responsible for paying past-due accounts.  - 5 -   21.  Part of Ocwen’s strategy for servicing consumer loans involves the use of an  automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) and/or automated or prerecorded messages.   22.  Ocwen uses ATDS equipment and software that has the capacity to store or  produce telephone numbers to be called and which includes autodialers and predictive dialers.   23.  Ocwen makes calls using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice to  cellular telephones whose owners have not provided prior express consent to receive such calls.   24.  Plaintiffs, and the other members of the Classes defined below, have each  suffered a particularized and concrete injury-in-fact from Defendants’ calls.  These calls  temporarily seized and trespassed on the use of their cellular telephones, and were an annoyance  and nuisance.  The calls invaded the recipient’s privacy, and caused Plaintiffs and Class  members to waste time and divert attention away from other activities to address them. See, e.g.,  Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 470 (2012) (discussing congressional findings of  consumer “outrage” as to autodialed and prerecorded calls).  These calls also depleted the called  party’s cellular telephone battery, including not only as a result of the calls themselves, but in  responding to them, as well—requiring an albeit small but real monetary expense in relation to  the electricity needed to recharge for such depletion.  B.  Factual Allegations Regarding Plaintiff Snyder   25.  Plaintiff Snyder is the account holder with AT&T Mobility for cellular service  and has a telephone number assigned to that account ending in 7690 (the “7690 Number”).   26.  In 2001, Plaintiff Snyder purchased a home in Las Vegas, Nevada, located on  Lido Isle Court (the “Las Vegas Home”).  In 2006, he refinanced his mortgage and took out two  loans, the first with Countrywide Home Loans (“Countrywide”) and a second junior-position  Home Equity Line of Credit (the “HELOC” loan) with Greenpoint Mortgage Funding  (“Greenpoint”).  Both loans were secured by deeds of trust.  The HELOC had an approximate  principal balance of $100,000.  He made timely payments in full for several months, but due to a  - 6 -  significant and unexpected drop in his income could not afford to continue to make payments on  either loan.   27.  In April 2007, Plaintiff Snyder made his last payment on both loans and the senior  creditor began the process of non-judicial foreclosure as permitted under Nevada law.   28.  On or about January 18, 2008, the Las Vegas Home was sold at a trustee’s sale for  $625,727.34, fully satisfying the first mortgage obligation of $585,504.56 and leaving at least  forty thousand dollars (specifically $40,222.78) to pay towards the HELOC.  The outstanding  debt on the HELOC at the time of foreclosure was $99,968.08 inclusive of late fees and other  charges.   29.  Plaintiff Snyder received no communication from any creditor regarding the  HELOC for more than eighteen months after the foreclosure.   30.  In early August 2009, Plaintiff Snyder received a notice from a new servicer  informing him that the right to collect payments on the HELOC had been transferred from  Greenpoint to the new servicer and stating that the payoff balance on the debt was  $126,049.08—far in excess of the principal amount at the time of foreclosure and reflecting no  credit at all for funds received from the foreclosure sale.   31.  By letter dated July 11, 2014, Ocwen notified Plaintiff Snyder that the servicing  rights had been transferred to it.    32.  Defendant U.S. Bank serves as the trustee for the HELOC loan serviced through  Ocwen.   33.  In mid-July of 2014, almost immediately after Ocwen acquired the servicing  rights to the HELOC, Ocwen began calling Plaintiff Snyder on his cellular telephone (the 7690  Number).     34.  Ocwen’s calls to Plaintiff Snyder at the 7690 Number were made using an Aspect  dialer, which is an ATDS under the TCPA.   - 7 -   35.  Ocwen’s calls to Plaintiff Snyder at the 7690 Number were made on behalf of,  and at the direction of, Defendant U.S. Bank.    36.  At no time did Plaintiff Snyder list the 7690 Number on an application for credit  with Countrywide or Greenpoint for the simple reason that he did not have the number when he  applied for the mortgage loans.  Plaintiff Snyder was assigned the 7690 Number in 2012, so it  would have been impossible in 2006 to have listed that number on his original application for  credit.   37.  Plaintiff Snyder is informed and believes and, on that basis, alleges that Ocwen  makes a regular business practice of using “skip tracing” methods such as pulling credit histories  and searching publicly available databases to obtain contact information for persons it believes  are obligated for consumer debts it services.   38.  Plaintiff Snyder believes that Ocwen obtained the 7690 Number via skip tracing  and included it in its automated telephone dialing system’s database.   39.  At no time did Ocwen or any predecessor in interest have Plaintiff Snyder’s  express consent to use an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice to call him at the 7690  Number.   40.  Many of the calls Ocwen placed to Plaintiff Snyder at the 7690 Number were  made using an artificial and/or prerecorded voice.     41.  On at least one occasion, when Plaintiff Snyder answered the telephone, he heard  a message stating that the call was intended to reach Keith Snyder about “an important business  matter” and inviting him to press one of an enumerated list of digits to reach a particular  department.   42.  Plaintiff Snyder tried to connect with a live staffer but the call terminated.   43.  When Plaintiff Snyder called back using the Caller ID as listed, (877) 746-2936  (the same number as listed on the written communications he received from Ocwen), he was  - 8 -  again confronted with a telephone voice message tree, which terminated his call before he could  connect with a live staffer.   44.  Plaintiff Snyder sent email messages to the address listed on the written  communications disputing the debt and asking the calls to stop.   45.  Ocwen made at least three more calls to Plaintiff Snyder at the 7690 Number  using an identical automated and/or prerecorded message.   46.  Plaintiff Snyder believes that Ocwen placed additional calls to the 7690 Number  that were not preserved and seeks discovery to identify those additional calls.   47.  Plaintiff Snyder never listed the 7690 Number in or on any documents during a  transaction with Defendant U.S. Bank, Ocwen, or any creditor, nor did he subsequently give his  express consent to receive calls at the 7690 Number.   48.  At no time did Plaintiff Snyder consent to receiving calls using an ATDS and/or  artificial or prerecorded voice.    49.  Defendant U.S. Bank is responsible, either directly or indirectly, for making the  above-described ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded calls.   50.  In calling Plaintiff Snyder, or in causing calls to be made to Plaintiff Snyder, on  his cellular telephone line multiple times at various times per day using an ATDS and without his  consent, Defendant U.S. Bank violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b).    51.  Ocwen and Defendant U.S. Bank intend to continue to make similar ATDS and/or  artificial or prerecorded calls to persons on their cellular telephones throughout the entire United  States.  C.  Factual Allegations Regarding Plaintiff Mansanarez   52.  Plaintiff Mansanarez is the account holder with T-Mobile for cellular service and  has a telephone number assigned to that account ending in 7110 (the “7110 Number”).   53.  In approximately 1995, Plaintiff Mansanarez began renting a home in Federal  Way, Washington, located on 7th Avenue Southwest (“Federal Way Home”).  - 9 -   54.  In approximately 2006, Plaintiff Mansanarez purchased the Federal Way Home.   55.  In approximately January 2014, Ocwen notified Plaintiff Mansanarez that the  servicing rights for the Federal Way Home had been transferred to it.   56.  On information and belief, Defendant Citibank served as the trustee for the loan  serviced through Ocwen, with Defendant Wilmington as its successor trustee.   57.  In approximately January of 2014, almost immediately after Ocwen acquired the  servicing rights to the Federal Way Home, Ocwen began calling Plaintiff Mansanarez on her  cellular telephone (the 7110 Number).    58.  Many of the calls Ocwen placed to Plaintiff Mansanarez at the 7110 Number were  made using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice.   59.  On many occasions in 2014 and 2015, Plaintiff Mansanarez requested that Ocwen  cease calling her on the 7110 Number.    60.  Plaintiff Mansanarez received many calls on the 7110 Number more than 31 days  after requesting that Ocwen cease calling her.   61.  During one call, Plaintiff Mansanarez asked the Ocwen representative why the  company continued to call her cellular telephone.   62.  The Ocwen representative responded by explaining that her number had been  placed in their automated calling system.   63.  Plaintiff Mansanarez demanded that the Ocwen representative remove the 7110  Number from their automated calling system.    64.  Ocwen, however, continued to place calls to Plaintiff Mansanarez at the 7110  Number using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice.   65.  Ocwen’s calls to Mansanarez were made using an Aspect dialer, which is an  ATDS under the TCPA.    66.  On information and belief, Ocwen’s calls to Mansanarez were made on behalf of,  and at the direction of, Defendants Citibank and its successor, Wilmington.   - 10 -   67.  Consequently, Defendants Citibank and Wilmington are responsible, either  directly or indirectly, for making the above-described ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded  calls.   68.  In calling Plaintiff Mansanarez, or causing calls to be made to Plaintiff  Mansanarez, on her cellular telephone line multiple times at various times per day using an  ATDS and without her consent, Defendants Citibank and Wilmington violated 47 U.S.C. §  227(b).    69.  On information and belief, Ocwen and Defendant Wilmington intend to continue  to make similar ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded calls to persons on their cellular  telephones throughout the entire United States.  D.  Factual Allegations Regarding Plaintiff Beecroft   70.  Plaintiff Beecroft has at all relevant times been the account holder with Boost  Mobile for cellular service and has a telephone number assigned to that account ending in 5370  (the “5370 Number”).   71.  On December 23, 2005, Plaintiff Beecroft and her husband executed a promissory  note to Ameriquest Mortgage Company (“Ameriquest”).  The note was secured by a mortgage  encumbering Plaintiff Beecroft’s residence in New London, Minnesota (“New London Home”).   72.  In 2008, as a result of financial difficulty, Plaintiff Beecroft stopped making her  payments, and the loan went into default.   73.  In March 2009, the loan was assigned to Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust  Company.   74.  In March 2009, Deutsche Bank commenced a foreclosure by advertisement on  Plaintiff Beecroft’s home, later advertising a sheriff’s sale in September 2009.   75.  In May 2009, Plaintiff Beecroft filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection.  The  loan Ameriquest assigned to Defendant Deutsche Bank was included in her bankruptcy petition.   - 11 -  The court ordered a discharge on August 18, 2009.  On this date, Plaintiff was no longer  personally obligated to pay back the loan.   76.  Plaintiff Beecroft did not sign a reaffirmation agreement for the loan.   77.  In October 2009, Plaintiff Beecroft and her husband filed a quiet title action  against Deutsche Bank.  After litigation and an appeal, Plaintiff Beecroft’s quite title action was  dismissed.   78.  On November 11, 2009, a Sheriff’s Certificate of Foreclosure Sale was filed with  the Kandiyohi County Recorder.  The document indicated that the property was sold at auction to  Defendant Deutsche Bank and was signed by Dan Hartog, the Kandiyohi County Sheriff.   79.  On information and belief, on or around April 1, 2013, Ocwen received Plaintiff  Beecroft’s loan for servicing on behalf of Defendant Deutsche Bank, even though the loan had  been discharged in bankruptcy and a foreclosure auction completed.   80.  Immediately thereafter, Ocwen began attempting to collect the alleged balance  due on the mortgage, despite Plaintiff Beecroft having no remaining legal obligation to pay the  mortgage.   81.  Ocwen’s collection efforts included letters, billing statements, and repeated  robocalls to Plaintiff Beecroft’s cellular and home telephones.   82.  On information and belief, on or around April 29, 2013, Ocwen obtained Plaintiff  Beecroft’s cellular telephone number by accessing Plaintiff Beecroft’s Experian credit report.   83.  Between October 1, 2013 and February 1, 2014, Ocwen made approximately  58 calls to Plaintiff Beecroft’s cellular telephone using an ATDS in an attempt to collect the  alleged balance due on the loan from Plaintiff Beecroft.   84.  The calls violated the TCPA and were an invasion of Plaintiff Beecroft’s privacy.   85.  For example, Ocwen used an ATDS to call Plaintiff Beecroft’s cellular telephone  number at approximately 8:26 a.m. on October 18, 2013, 8:27 a.m. on October 18, 2013, 8:04  a.m. on October 20, 2013, 8:38 a.m. on October 21, 2013, 7:19 p.m. on October 21, 2013, 8:34  - 12 -  a.m. on October 22, 2013, 8:31 a.m. on October 23, 2013, 8:23 a.m. on October 24, 2013, 8:30  a.m. on October 25, 2013, 8:20 a.m. on October 26, 2013, 11:02 a.m. on October 27, 2013, 8:13  a.m. on October 28, 2013, 8:07 a.m. on October 29, 2013, 8:16 a.m. on October 30, 2013, 8:21  a.m. on November 1, 2013, 8:04 a.m. on November 2, 2013, 8:10 a.m. on November 3, 2013,  9:19 a.m. on November 5, 2013, 9:02 a.m. on November 6, 2013, 8:44 a.m. on November 7,  2013, 8:58 a.m. on November 8, 2013, 8:30 a.m. on November 11, 2013, 8:22 a.m. on November  12, 2013, 11:09 a.m. on November 13, 2013, 6:29 p.m. on November 15, 2013, 8:10 a.m. on  November 16, 2013, 11:27 a.m. on November 17, 2013, 12:37 p.m. on November 18, 2013, 8:30  a.m. on November 19, 2013, 11:12 a.m. on November 20, 2013, 11:27 a.m. on November 21,  2013, 11:08 a.m. on November 22, 2013, 8:01 a.m. on November 23, 2013, 12:26 p.m. on  November 25, 2013, 11:07 a.m. on November 26, 2013, 10:25 a.m. on November 27, 2013,  11:05 a.m. on November 29, 2013, 1:14 p.m. on December 1, 2013, 11:49 a.m. on December 2,  2013, 11:07 a.m. on December 3, 2013, 8:04 a.m. on December 6, 2013, 8:04 a.m. on December  7, 2013, 3:05 p.m. on December 8, 2013, 12:30 p.m. on December 9, 2013, 1:07 p.m. on  December 11, 2013, 1:11 p.m. on December 16, 2013, 12:22 p.m. on December 17, 2013, 12:52  p.m. on December 24, 2013, 9:43 a.m. on December 26, 2013, 10:07 a.m. on December 28,  2013, 11:00 a.m. on December 29, 2013, 11:21 a.m. on January 5, 2014, 10:47 a.m. on January  7, 2014, 11:12 a.m. on January 10, 2014, 9:39 a.m. on January 11, 2014, 9:10 a.m. on January  12, 2014, 1:25 .m. on January 13, 2014, and 9:50 a.m. on January 16, 2014.   86.  All of the calls Ocwen made to Plaintiff Beecroft’s cellular telephone described in  the foregoing paragraph used the caller ID “800-746-2936.”   87.  Plaintiff Beecroft answered approximately two calls from Ocwen.   88.  After Plaintiff Beecroft answered the calls, there was a significant delay before an  operator would come onto the line and ask for Plaintiff.   89.  This delay indicated to Plaintiff Beecroft that Ocwen used an automated dialer to  make the calls.  - 13 -   90.  Plaintiff Beecroft told Ocwen’s employees to stop calling her on two occasions.   91.  On information and belief, some or all of the calls to Plaintiff Beecroft’s cellular  telephone, including, but not limited to, the calls listed above, were made using:  (a) a Premier  Global Dialer; (b) an IAT Predictive Dialer; (c) a Davox Dialer; (d) an Aspect Dialer; or (e) a  similar dialing system that has the requisite capacity pursuant to the TCPA.   92.  Ocwen’s calls to Beecroft were made on behalf of, and at the direction of,  Defendant Deutsche Bank.    93.  Defendant Deutsche Bank is responsible, either directly or indirectly, for making  the above-described ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded calls.   94.  In calling Plaintiff Beecroft, or causing calls to be made to Plaintiff Beecroft, on  her cellular telephone line multiple times at various times per day using an ATDS and without  her consent, Defendant Deutsche Bank violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b).    95.  Ocwen and Defendant Deutsche Bank intend to continue to make similar ATDS  and/or artificial or prerecorded calls to persons on their cellular telephones throughout the entire  United States.   96.  Defendants knew about the TCPA, but caused the calls alleged herein to be made  in spite of such knowledge.  E.  Factual Allegations Regarding Defendants   97.  The TCPA imposes liability upon any person who makes unlawful phone calls  using an autodialer or a prerecorded message.  The FCC—which Congress vested with the  authority to promulgate rules and regulations implementing the TCPA, see 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)  —has declared through rulemaking and adjudicative orders that liability for a TCPA violation  may be imputed to a party that did not itself place the unlawful calls if the party that placed the  calls did so as an agent of that party.   98.  To ensure that creditors and debt collectors call only those consumers who have  consented to receive autodialed or prerecorded message calls, the creditor is responsible under  - 14 -  the TCPA for demonstrating that the consumer provided prior express consent to be called.  FCC  Declaratory Ruling, 23 F.C.C. Rcd. 559 (¶ 10).   99.  Hence, a creditor on whose behalf an autodialed or prerecorded message call is  made to a wireless number bears the responsibility for any resulting violation of the TCPA.   Calls placed by a third-party collector on behalf of that creditor are treated as if the creditor itself  placed the call.  Id.  100.  Alternatively, an entity may be held vicariously liable for violations of the TCPA  “under a broad range of agency principles, including not only formal agency, but also principles  of apparent authority and ratification.”  In re Joint Petition filed by Dish Network, LLC, 28  F.C.C. Rcd. 6574, 6528 ¶ 28 (2013).  101.  Here, Defendants U.S. Bank, Wilmington, Citibank, and Deutsche Bank expressly  authorized Ocwen to act as their agent for servicing the respective loans in the trust pools, and  specified in detail how Ocwen was to carry out that authority in writing, starting with the Pooling  and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”) for each trust.  102.  Ameriquest Mortgage Company was originally the Master Servicer for the  2006-R1 Trust associated with Plaintiff Beecroft’s loan as to the New London Home, but Ocwen  succeeded to that role on March 10, 2013 when it acquired the servicing rights.  According to the  applicable PSA, Ocwen succeeds to the duties of the Master Servicer under the PSA “without the  execution or filing of any paper or any further act on the part of any of the parties hereto” so long  as Ocwen is qualified to service mortgage loans on behalf of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.   Ameriquest 2006-R1 PSA, § 6.02.   103.  Defendant Deutsche Bank serves as trustee for the Ameriquest Mortgage  Securities Inc. asset-backed, pass-through certificates Series 2006-R1.  104.  On information and belief, Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. was the original  Master Servicer for the Greenpoint Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-HE2, which holds Plaintiff  Snyder’s promissory note, but Ocwen succeeded to that role on July 1, 2014.   - 15 -  105.  Defendant U.S. Bank serves as trustee for the Series 2005-HE2 Certificates,  including as to Plaintiff Snyder’s HELOC loan.  106.  On information and belief, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. was the original servicer for  the Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust mortgage pass-through certificates, Series 2006-4, which holds  Plaintiff Mansanarez’ promissory note, but Ocwen succeeded to that role on July 1, 2014.   107.  Defendants Citibank and Wilmington served as trustees for the Series 2006  Certificates during the relevant time period including, on information and belief, as to Plaintiff  Mansanarez’ loan.  108.  The trustee of each Defendant has broad authority over the Master Servicer.  For  example, the PSA for the trust which owns Plaintiff Beecroft’s promissory note specifies that the  trustee has the right to access records and demand financial statements from the Master Servicer,  as well as any sub-servicer hired by the Master Servicer.  Ameriquest 2006-R1 PSA § 6.05.   109.  Ocwen, as the Master Servicer under each PSA, is responsible for making  payments to the trust and making detailed, regular reports.  For example, the PSA for the trust  which owns Plaintiff Beecroft’s promissory note specifies that the Master Servicer must make a  “remittance report” on each distribution date breaking down the advances made, the aggregate  amount of nonrecoverable advances, a statement of the collection account, the aggregate amount  of deposits in the collection account, and other information relating to the performance of the  loans in the trust.  Ameriquest 2006-R1 PSA § 4.03(a).  The PSA for the trust which owns  Plaintiff Mansanarez’ promissory note has similar duties for the Master Servicer, specifying  (among other things) that the Master Servicer must make monthly reports that reconcile the  actual payments made with the anticipated payments.  BSALTA 2006-4 PSA § 3.01.  110.  Each Defendant has required Ocwen as the Master Servicer for the respective loan  pool to make an annual compliance statement and have responsible officers sign that document.  111.  Each Defendant expressly delegated to Ocwen the responsibility to collect money  owed under the promissory notes that it owns and holds.  Sometimes this delegation is set out in  - 16 -  the PSA, for example in Ameriquest 2006-R1 PSA, § 3.02 (“The Master Servicer shall make  reasonable efforts to collect all payments called for under the terms and provisions of the  Mortgage Loans.”).  And sometimes the delegation is described in ancillary documents provided  under federal regulations when the sponsor of the deal made a securities offering.  “As part of its  servicing duties, the master servicer will be required to, and to cause each of the [sub-]servicers  to, make reasonable efforts to collect all payments called for under the terms and provisions of  the mortgage loans that it services.”  BSALTA 2006-4 Prospectus, at 23 (Form 424B5, filed July  18, 2006 with Securities and Exchange Commission).  112.  Ocwen is also expressly given authority by each PSA to foreclose on a property  securing a loan in the event of default by the borrower, passing the proceeds along to the trust.   See, e.g., BSALTA 2006-4 PSA § 3.05.  But when it does foreclose, each PSA requires that title  to the property be held in the name of the trust, not in Ocwen’s own name—further evidence that  each Defendant exercises control over its agents activities and the authority delegated is far from  plenary.  See, e.g., Ameriquest 2006-R1 PSA, § 3.13(a) (“The deed or certificate of sale of any  REO Property shall be taken in the name of the Trustee, or its nominee, in trust for the benefit of  the Certificateholders.”).  113.  At least one PSA expressly states that the mortgage loan files and funds collected  by the Master Servicer “shall be and remain the sole and exclusive property of the Trustee” even  though held by the Master Servicer. BSALTA 2006-4 PSA § 3.08(b); Ameriquest 2006-R1 PSA  § 3.17(b) (“the Master Servicer shall retain such Mortgage File in trust for the benefit of the  Certificateholders”).  114.  Not only is Ocwen the express, formal agent for each Defendant, but each  Defendant also ratified Ocwen’s actions by accepting the benefit of Ocwen’s collection  activities.  Ratification occurs when an agent acts for a principal’s benefit and the principal does  not repudiate the agent’s actions.  Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 376 F.3d 664,  677 (7th Cir. 2004).  - 17 -  115.  In addition to the PSAs, the course of dealings between Ocwen and Defendants  shows that Defendants knowingly accepted the benefits of the challenged calls.   116.  For example, but not by limitation, at no time did any trustee or authorized agent  of any Defendant refuse to accept the funds obtained by Ocwen as a result of its collection  efforts.  In fact, the Defendants actively and knowingly accepted the benefits of Ocwen’s calls, in  spite of their knowledge that the calls were illegal.  Such acceptance of benefits continued even  after this lawsuit was filed.   117.  At no time did any trustee or authorized agent of any Defendant terminate or  modify Ocwen’s servicing authority due to Ocwen’s collection methods or procedures, even  though Ocwen had been sued more than one hundred times for violating state and federal  consumer protection laws relating to collection methods and procedures in the years prior to the  filing of this action.  118.  Indeed, so accepting has each Defendant been of Ocwen’s performance that even  when Ocwen was the subject of multiple enforcement actions by state regulators in New York  and California, no Defendant sought to terminate Ocwen’s master servicing authority.  A.  Factual Allegations Regarding Ocwen  