 (Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §1692, et seq.)   (Against PCA and applicable DOES)    (Violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Civil Code §1788, et seq.)   (Against PCA and applicable DOES)    (Violations of Business and Professions Code §17200, et seq.)  (Against PCA and applicable DOES)   12.  Plaintiff purchased a used 2003 Mercedes E350. The dealership arranged financing for  the vehicle in the form of a conditional sales contract, which was later assigned to Santander  Consumer USA, Inc. (“Santander”).   13.  Plaintiff fell behind on payments, and Santander repossessed the vehicle in August 2013.   Thereafter, Santander assessed a deficiency against Plaintiff following the sale of the vehicle.    15.  On September 16, 2014, Santander and the plaintiffs in the Rees-Levering Case entered  into a Settlement Agreement and Release (the “Settlement Agreement”).  Pursuant to the  Settlement Agreement, Santander was required to cease collecting alleged deficiency balances  and to recall and/or repurchase the account of any Rees-Levering Class member that was  assigned to any outside collection agencies as of the date of execution of the Settlement  Agreement.  Specifically, the Settlement Agreement provides that (i) “the NOIs prepared and  sent to Settlement Class members did not strictly comply with the requirements of Civil Code  §2983.2 pertaining to NOIs”, which renders any alleged deficiency balance uncollectible  (Settlement Agreement, §1.02); (ii) “[i]mmediately upon execution of this Agreement Santander  shall take no further action to collect, sell the right to collect, or to attempt directly or indirectly  to collect Deficiency Balances from Settlement Class members; . . . [and] shall recall and/or  repurchase the account of any Settlement Class members that were assigned to any outside  collection agencies” (Settlement Agreement, §3.03); and (iii) within 30 days after final  judgment, “Santander shall take all steps necessary to cease all efforts to collect the Deficiency  Balances for Settlement Class members . . . [including] recalling all Settlement Class member  accounts from outside agencies[.]” (Settlement Agreement, §5.03(b)).  True and correct copies of  pertinent pages of the Settlement Agreement are attached hereto as Exhibit A.1   17.  On February 18, 2015, the District Court entered its Order Granting Motion for Final  Approval of Class Action Settlement (the “Final Judgment”) in the Rees-Levering Case pursuant  to which it certified a settlement class (collectively, the “Rees-Levering Class”) defined as any  consumer who:  a.  purchased a motor vehicle and, as part of that transaction, entered into an  agreement subject to California’s Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act,  Civil Code §2981, et seq.;  b.  whose motor vehicle was repossessed or voluntarily surrendered;  c.  who were issued a statutory notice by Santander from July 1, 2011 to July 31,  2014 or to whom Santander failed to provide an NOI within 60 days of  repossession; and  d.  against whose account a deficiency balance was assessed.   18.  Pursuant to the Final Judgment, any deficiency balances owed by a Rees-Levering Class  member to Santander were rendered uncollectible by operation of state law.  (Final Judgment,  ¶25.)  A true and correct copy of the Final Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit C.3   19.  Plaintiff is a member of the Rees-Levering Class, meaning that any alleged deficiency  balance she owed to Santander became uncollectible pursuant to the Settlement Agreement on  September 16, 2014 and pursuant to the Final Judgment on February 18, 2015.    20.  On or about March 11, 2015, Plaintiff received a written statement in the form of a letter  from PCA.  The letter is attached hereto as Exhibit D.  The letter states that PCA is attempting to  recover the uncollectible $15,846.02 balance allegedly owed to Santander.   22.  Plaintiff has lost money or property on account of PCA’s acts as set forth above on  account of PCA’s actions, as Plaintiff has incurred costs and expenses while attempting to  protect her rights vis-à-vis PCA, including, among other things, by locating and traveling to meet  with her attorneys, by taking time away from her job to speak with and meet with her attorneys,  and by using her cell phone to call her attorneys.  23.  Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class  action on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated.  Plaintiff brings this action in  a representative capacity to remedy the ongoing unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business  practices alleged herein, and to seek redress on behalf of all those persons who have been  affected thereby.   24.  Plaintiff is unable to state the precise number of potential members of the proposed class  because that information is in the possession of PCA.  It consists of at least hundreds of members  and is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable.  The exact size of the  proposed class, and the identity of the members thereof, will be readily ascertainable from the  business records of PCA.   25.  The class on whose behalf this Complaint is brought is composed of all consumers:  a.  who are members of the settlement class certified in Vitrano v. Santander  Consumer USA, Inc., et al., Case No. 2:13-cv-02492-AB-MRW, pending in the  United States District Court for the Central District of California;  b.  whose accounts were assigned to PCA for collection; and  c.  from whom PCA attempted to and/or did collect a deficiency balance from  September 16, 2014 to the present.   26.  This class definition is subject to such further definition, limitations, and exclusions as  may be ordered by the Court.   28.  The common questions which predominate include, inter alia:  a.  whether PCA negligently and/or fraudulently misrepresented to class members  that they were liable for balances when there was no obligation to pay such  amounts;  b.  whether PCA attempted to and/or collected on balances of class members;  c.  whether PCA’s practices related to class members violate the Rees-Levering Act;  d.  whether PCA’s practices related to class members violate the FDCPA;  e.  whether PCA’s practices related to class members violate the UCL.   29.  Proof of a common set of facts will establish PCA’s liability and the right of each class  member to recover.   30.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the class which they represent, and she will fairly  and adequately represent the interests of the class. Plaintiff is represented by counsel competent  and experienced in both consumer protection and class action litigation.   31.  A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this  controversy. Because the damages suffered by the individual class members may be relatively  small compared to the expense and burden of litigation, it would be impracticable and  economically unfeasible for class members to seek redress individually. The prosecution of  separate actions by the individual class members, even if possible, would create a risk of  inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members against PCA, and  would establish incompatible standards of conduct.   32.  The claims asserted by Plaintiff will be governed by the laws of the State of California  and the injuries resulting from PCA’s conduct were incurred in California.  33.  Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegation in each and every  paragraph above.    35.  PCA has sent out form letters demanding payment from Plaintiff and members of the  class.   36.  In sending form debt collection letters to Plaintiff and members of the class, PCA was  acting and continues to act as a person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly, on  behalf of themselves and others, engaged in debt collection. PCA is and continues to be a “debt  collector” within the meaning of Civil Code §1788.2(c).   37.  The alleged debt that PCA attempted to collect from Plaintiff and members of the class is  “debt” within the meaning of Civil Code §1788.2(d).   38.  The alleged debt that PCA attempted to collect from Plaintiff and members of the class is  “consumer debt” within the meaning of Civil Code §1788.2(f), as it is money, property, or their  equivalent, due or owing or alleged to be due or owing from a natural person by reason of a  consumer credit transaction.   39.  PCA violated Civil Code §1788.17 by using false, deceptive, and misleading  representations and means in connection with the collection and/or attempted collection of  balances rom Plaintiff and the class.    40.  The Rosenthal Act expressly incorporates the provisions of 15 U.S.C. §§1692b-1692j,  and declares that it is unlawful for a debt collector, in connection with the collection of any debt,  to make any false representation regarding the character, amount, or legal status of any debt, as  well as any other false representation. See Civil Code §1788.17; 15 U.S.C. §1692e, subd. (2)(A),  (5), (10). The Rosenthal Act also declares that it is unlawful to collect any amount that is not  permitted by law. See 15 U.S.C. §1692f(1).    42.  PCA violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A), and in turn violated Civil Code §1788.17, by  making representations that would mislead the least sophisticated consumer regarding the  character, amount, or legal status of a debt; namely, PCA sent collection letters to Plaintiff and  the class falsely representing that Plaintiff and the class owed a balance to Santander that should  be remitted to PCA; this was false in that the underlying alleged debt was deemed unlawful and  rendered uncollectible on account of the Settlement Agreement and the Final Judgment in the  Rees-Levering Case.   43.  PCA violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e(5), and in turn violated Civil Code §1788.17, by making  representations that would mislead the least sophisticated consumer by threatening to take any  action that cannot legally be taken; namely, PCA sent collection letters to Plaintiff and the class  falsely representing that Plaintiff and the class owed a balance to Santander and that PCA would  attempt to collect that balance; this was false in that the underlying debt was unlawful and  uncollectible on account of the Settlement Agreement and the Final Judgment in the Rees- Levering Case.   44.  PCA violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10), and in turn violated Civil Code §1788.17, by  making representations that would mislead the least sophisticated consumer by using false  representations and deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect a debt; namely, PCA sent  collection letters to Plaintiff and the class falsely representing that Plaintiff and the class owed a  balance to Santander that should be remitted to PCA; this was false in that the underlying alleged  debt was deemed unlawful and rendered uncollectible on account of the Settlement Agreement  and the Final Judgment in the Rees-Levering Case.   45.  PCA violated 15 U.S.C. §1692f, and in turn violated Civil Code §1788.17, by using  unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt a debt, by sending Plaintiff and the class  collection letters that were false in that the underlying debt was unlawful and uncollectible on  account of the Settlement Agreement and the Final Judgment in the Rees-Levering Case.    46.  These false, deceptive, and misleading representations or means were likely to deceive  the least sophisticated consumer.    48.  Plaintiff seeks recovery of her attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in the filing  and prosecution of this action.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.  49.  Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegation in each and every  paragraph above.    50.  Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that Santander assigned Plaintiff’s and class  members’ accounts to PCA for debt collection purposes.   51.  Plaintiff and class members are “consumers” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. §1692a(3).   52.  The alleged debt that PCA attempted to collect from Plaintiff and members of the class is  consumer “debt” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5).   53.  PCA is and continues to be a “debt collector” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C.  §1692a(6).   54.  In sending form debt collection letters to Plaintiff and members of the class, PCA was  acting and continues to act as a person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly, on  behalf of themselves and others, engaged in debt collection. These form letters constitute debt  “communications” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2).   55.  PCA violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A) by making representations that would mislead the  least sophisticated consumer regarding the character, amount, or legal status of a debt; namely,  PCA sent collection letters to Plaintiff and the class falsely representing that Plaintiff and the  class owed a balance to Santander that should be remitted to PCA; this was false in that the  underlying alleged debt was deemed unlawful and rendered uncollectible on account of the  Settlement Agreement and the Final Judgment in the Rees-Levering Case.   57.  PCA violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10) by making representations that would mislead the  least sophisticated consumer by using false representations and deceptive means to collect or  attempt to collect a debt; namely, PCA sent collection letters to Plaintiff and the class falsely  representing that Plaintiff and the class owed a balance to Santander that should be remitted to  PCA; this was false in that the underlying alleged debt was deemed unlawful and rendered  uncollectible on account of the Settlement Agreement and the Final Judgment in the Rees- Levering Case.   58.  PCA violated 15 U.S.C. §1692f by using unfair or unconscionable means to collect or  attempt a debt, by sending Plaintiff and the class collection letters that were false in that the  underlying debt was unlawful and uncollectible on account of the Settlement Agreement and the  Final Judgment in the Rees-Levering Case.    59.  As a direct and proximate result of the acts herein alleged and PCA’s ongoing violations  of the FDCPA, Plaintiff and the class have suffered general, specific, actual, and other damages  as will be shown at trial.    60.  Plaintiff seeks recovery of her attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in the filing  and prosecution of this action.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.  61.  Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations in each and every  paragraph above.   63.  Beginning on an exact date unknown to Plaintiff but at all times relevant herein and  during the four years preceding the filing of the complaint in this action, PCA committed acts of  unfair competition proscribed by the UCL, including the practices alleged herein.  The acts of  unfair competition include the following:  a.  PCA negligently misrepresented and continues to misrepresent to members of the  class that they are obligated to pay amounts alleged to be due and owing to  Santander that were previously rendered uncollectible;  b.  PCA actively concealed and continues to conceal its unlawful activity from  members of the class;  c.  PCA unlawfully, unfairly, and/or fraudulently carried and continues to carry on its  accounts records balances of members of the class alleged to be due and owing to  Santander that were previously rendered uncollectible;  d.  PCA unlawfully, unfairly, and/or fraudulently attempted to collect and continues  to attempt to collect from members of the class amounts alleged to be due and  owing to Santander that were previously rendered uncollectible.   64.  The business acts and practices of PCA as hereinabove alleged constitute unlawful  business practices in that, for the reasons set forth above, said acts and practices violate the  provisions of the Rosenthal Act and the FDCPA, and constitute violations of the common law.   65.  The business acts and practices of PCA, as hereinabove alleged, constitute unfair  business practices in that said acts and practices offend public policy and are substantially  injurious to consumers.  Said acts and practices have no utility that outweighs their substantial  harm to consumers.   67.  The unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts and practices of PCA described herein  present a continuing threat to Plaintiff and members of the class in that PCA is currently  engaging in such acts and practices, and will persist and continue to do so unless and until an  injunction is issued by this Court.   68.  As a direct and proximate result of the acts and practices described herein, Plaintiff has  suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unlawful, unfair, and  fraudulent acts and practices of PCA challenged herein by incurring costs and expenses while  attempting to protect her rights vis-à-vis PCA, including, among other things, by locating and  traveling to meet with her attorneys, by taking time away from her job to speak with and meet  with her attorneys, and by using her cell phone to call her attorneys   69.  Pursuant to Business and Professions Code §17203, Plaintiff seeks an order enjoining  PCA from engaging in such acts and practices as hereinabove alleged, and providing appropriate  restitution to Plaintiff and the members of the class.   70.  In addition, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1021.5, Plaintiff seeks recovery of  attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses incurred in the filing and prosecution of this action.   WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below. 