10.  On or about July 11, 2019, Chase mailed an account statement to Plaintiff  regarding an alleged debt owed to “JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.” A copy of this account  statement is attached to this complaint as Exhibit A.   11.  Upon information and belief, the alleged debt referenced by Exhibit A was  incurred by use of a credit card, which was used exclusively for personal, family, and household  purposes.   12.  Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form account statement, generated by  computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer.   13.  Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form account statement, used by  Chase to attempt to collect alleged debts.   15.  Exhibit A includes the following representation which largely reflects the debt  validation notice that the FDCPA requires to be included with the initial written communication  to the consumer:   16.  If Exhibit A was actually mailed on July 11, 2019, it would have been received on  or after July 14, 2019.   17.  If Exhibit A was received on July 14, 2019, the consumer would have until  August 13, 2019 to mail out a request for validation.  Chauncey v. JDR Recovery Corp., 118  F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1997) (consumer triggers verification rights by mailing out written notice  of dispute on thirtieth day after receiving validation notice).   18.  Exhibit A also contains the following settlement offer:   19.  The above offer requires that the consumer’s payment be received by   August 25, 2019.   20.  The above offer also states that MRS is “not obligated to renew this offer.”     22.  Thus, any consumer who wished to take advantage of the settlement offer in  Exhibit A would feel compelled to mail out payment on or before August 22, 2019.   23.  The 30-day validation period identified in Exhibit A would end at or around the  same time the consumer would feel compelled to mail out a payment to take advantage of the  settlement offer in Exhibit A before it expires.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).   24.  Assuming the consumer sought verification at or near the end of the statutorily  mandated 30-day validation period, there would be no way for MRS to provide verification in  time for the consumer to tender payment in acceptance.   25.  The unsophisticated consumer, realizing that the debt could not be verified before  the settlement offer in Exhibit A expired and that MRS was not obligated to renew the offer  would be unsure how, or whether, they could seek verification of the debt but accept the  settlement offer if the debt could be verified.   26.  The statement that a debt collector is “not obligated to renew” an offer tracks  safe-harbor language that was created by the Seventh Circuit, which is meant to signal to the  unsophisticated consumer that the offer may not actually expire on the expiration date because  renewal of the offer is, at the very least, a possibility.  Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding  L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2007).   28.  In the context of an initial settlement letter, the unsophisticated consumer,  believing that the foregoing of validation rights is a material aspect of the settlement offer, would  understand the language that the debt collector is “not obligated to renew” to mean that the debt  collector would most likely not renew the offer, since the debtor would no longer have validation  rights to bargain away. See, e.g., Preston v. Midland Credit Mgmt., No. 18-3119, 2020 U.S. App.  LEXIS 1775 (7th Cir. Jan. 21, 2020) (Rovner, J. concur.) (“The [Evory] language is no different  from the creditors’ language of ‘limited time offer’ or a ‘time sensitive matter’ or ‘act now,’ and  reinforces the idea that if the debtor does not act immediately, she may lose the opportunity to do  so forever.”).   30.  The unsophisticated consumer, wishing to take advantage of the settlement offer  as long as it could be verified, might tender her payment to accept the settlement offer along with  the notice of dispute.   31.  The unsophisticated consumer would also not know whether or how they could  receive her money back from Defendant if Defendant is unable to verify the debt or if the debt  actually is not valid.  See, e.g., Glackin v. LTD Fin. Servs., L.P., 2013 U.S. Dist. ELXIS 108031,  at *7-8 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 1, 2013) (“an unsophisticated consumer would likely believe that setting  up payment arrangements would act as a waiver of the right to dispute the debt.”) (emphasis  added).    32.  In fact, though the unsophisticated consumer would not realize it, the debt  collector need not even verify the debt as long as it ceases further attempts to collect the debt.   See Jang v. A.M. Miller & Assocs., 122 F.3d 480, 483 (7th Cir. 1997).   33.  Thus, the purpose and effect of providing a settlement offer with a letter  containing the validation notice is to discourage the unsophisticated consumer from submitting a  written dispute.   35.  Because the settlement offer in Exhibit A expires at or around the same time as  the validation period, there is an apparent contradiction between the settlement offer and the  validation notice.  See Flood v. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC, 176 P.3d 769, 776 (Colo.  2008) (“The extended time for taking advantage of the settlement offer – couched within a  personalized assurance that all her rights will be preserved through oral communication –  effectively misleads the consumer into delaying the transmission of the consumer’s written  request for the verifying documentation, thereby causing the loss of valuable consumer rights.”).   36.  The unsophisticated consumer would be confused about whether the settlement  offer in Exhibit A would require them to forego their right to validate the debt.   37.  The unsophisticated consumer would not know whether requesting verification of  the debt would be interpreted as a rejection of the settlement offer.   38.  The plain language of Exhibit A is unclear as to how MRS would proceed in the  event that the consumer mailed a dispute along with a payment that was intended to accept the  settlement offer in the case that the debt could be verified.   40.  Where a consumer mails a dispute along with a payment that was intended to  accept a settlement offer with an impending expiration date, whether the FDCPA requires a debt  collector to proceed along any of the above paths is an open question in the Seventh Circuit.  See  Bailey v. TRW Receivables Management Services, Inc., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19638, *7-8 (D.  Haw. Aug. 16, 1990) (“There is nothing in the statute which indicates that a debt collector is not  required to provide verification where a consumer requests it after paying the debt.”).    41.  Whether accepting payment, or even holding payment pending verification, is a  “further attempt to collect the debt” is an open question in the Seventh Circuit.  See Sambor v.  Omnia Credit Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1243 (D. Haw. Feb. 5, 2002) (“Because the debt  collector in Bailey had already collected the debt, there was no collection to ‘cease’ pending  validation.  In Bailey, keeping the consumer’s money was tantamount to continuing collection  activity.”).   42.  The unsophisticated consumer would be confused as to whether she had  effectively exercised her validation rights by sending a payment along with a dispute letter.   43.  The unsophisticated consumer may unwittingly reject a settlement offer by  tendering the settlement payment along with her dispute letter.  If the debt collector treated the  acceptance of a settlement offer as a continuing attempt to collect a debt, see Sambor, 183 F.  Supp. 2d at 1243, the debt collector would need to return the settlement payment pending  verification of the debt.   45.  Moreover, the unsophisticated consumer would have no idea how to both seek  verification of the debt and preserve the settlement offer in Exhibit A.   46.  The consumer needs time to process the information contained in an initial debt  collection letter before deciding whether to dispute, pay or take other action. This is the point of  the 30-day period in 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a).    47.  Prior to deciding whether to dispute a debt, a consumer may have to sort through  personal records and/or memories to try to remember if the debt might be legitimate. She may  not recognize the creditor – debts are freely assignable and corporations, especially banks, often  change names.   48.  The § 1692g validation period lasts for 30 days. It is the consumer’s right to  request verification until the end of the 30-day period. If the request is not made until the end of  the 30-day period, the verification request would not be processed, researched by the creditor,  and returned to the consumer until long after settlement offer payment deadline has expired. The  consumer would be left with no time to review the verification and determine whether to accept  the settlement offer.   49.  The unsophisticated consumer would have no idea how to both seek verification  of the debt and preserve the settlement offers in Exhibit A. It is likely that the settlement offer  would expire before the debt collector provides verification. The consumer would be left with  little or no time to review the verification and determine whether to accept the settlement offer.   51.  Defendant did not include explanatory language in Exhibit A. See, e.g., Bartlett,  128 F.3d 497, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1997).    52.  Any explanatory language should make clear whether a dispute will extend the  settlement offer while the debt collector is in the process of complying with its obligation to  verify the debt.   53.  Plaintiff was misled and confused by Exhibit A.   54.  The unsophisticated consumer would be misled and confused by Exhibit A.  The FDCPA   56.  Moreover, Congress has explicitly described the FDCPA as regulating “abusive  practices” in debt collection. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(a) – 1692(e). Any person who receives a debt  collection letter containing a violation of the FDCPA is a victim of abusive practices. See 15  U.S.C. §§ 1692(e) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection  practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive  debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State  action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses”).   58.  15 U.S.C. § 1692e generally prohibits the “use [of] any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”   60.  15 U.S.C. § 1692f generally prohibits the "use [of] unfair or unconscionable  means to collect or attempt to collect any debt."   61.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) requires that the debt collector identify the name of the  creditor to whom the debt is owed in a non-confusing manner.  Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 500.  See  also Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 875  (7th Cir. 2000) (statutory disclosures must be made in a non-confusing way):  It is no excuse that it was “impossible” for the defendants to comply when  as in this case the amount of the debt changes daily. What would or might  be impossible for the defendants to do would be to determine what the  amount of the debt might be at some future date if for example the interest  rate in the loan agreement was variable. What they certainly could do was  to state the total amount due--interest and other charges as well as  principal--on the date the dunning letter was sent. We think the statute  required this.   62.  While Miller addressed a debt collector’s obligation to provide the amount of the  debt under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), the Seventh Circuit has held that the standards for claims  under § 1692e and § 1692g are the same. McMillan v. Collection Professionals, Inc., 455 F.3d  754, 759 (7th Cir. 2006).  We cannot accept the district court’s view that claims brought under §  1692e or § 1692f are different from claims brought under § 1692g for  purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. Whether or not a letter is ‘false,  deceptive, or misleading’ (in violation of § 1692e) or ‘unfair or  unconscionable’ (in violation of § 1692f) are inquiries similar to whether a  letter is confusing in violation of § 1692g. After all, as our cases reflect,  the inquiry under §§ 1692e, 1692g and 1692f is basically the same: it  requires a fact-bound determination of how an unsophisticated consumer  would perceive the letter.”)   64.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations  contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.   65.  By providing a settlement offer which purportedly expires shortly after the 30-day  validation period without explaining how the validation notice and settlement “deadline” fit  together, Exhibit A includes representations which are false, deceptive, and misleading and  overshadow the validation notice.   66.  Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10), 1692f, and 1692g(b).  67.  Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a Class, consisting of (a) all natural  persons in the State of Wisconsin (b) who were sent a collection letter in the form represented by  Exhibit A to the complaint in this action, (c) seeking to collect a debt for personal, family or  household purposes, (d) between March 16, 2019 and March 16, 2020, inclusive, (e) that was not  returned by the postal service.   68.  The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable.  Upon information and  belief, there are more than 50 members of the Class.   69.  There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, which  common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members.   The predominant common question is whether the Defendants complied with the FDCPA.   70.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members.  All are based on  the same factual and legal theories.   72.  A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute.    Individual cases are not economically feasible. 