11.  Defendants, in a combined effort, jointly dictated, controlled and ratified all of the  policies and practices relating to ATE work, timekeeping and compensation.   12.  Defendants, in a combined effort, jointly encouraged, required and/or permitted  ATEs to work more than 40 hours per week, only paid ATEs for billable hours (i.e. only ATE  hours billed to a client) and did not pay ATEs for any hour they worked that was not billed to a  client.     14.  As part of Defendants’ combined effort to recruit, place and manage ATEs,  Defendant Cerner was typically responsible for, and did in fact:  a. Conduct orientation and on-boarding activities for ATEs;  b. Determine ATE work schedules;  c. Approve any ATE schedule changes;  d. Instruct and enforce the required dress code for ATEs;  e. Resolve issues regarding transportation schedules for ATEs;  f. Resolve requests to transfer ATEs from a different (i.e. “quiet”) area  to a busier one.  g. Conduct calls and meetings with ATEs for various reasons relating  to each respective project; and,  h. Review, update and circulate transportation schedules and approve  of alternative forms of transportation for ATEs;   15.  Defendants assigned ATEs to Project Managers, or Team Leads, who served as  their first point of management contact. For example, Plaintiff’s Team Lead was Taylor  McLaughlin.  Other Cerner management personnel included Dimitri Reese.  Defendants required  ATEs to report to, communicate with, and respond to any requests from their Team Leads and  other Cerner management personnel and direct questions to them as needed.  Defendants expected  ATEs to complete any duties assigned to them by their Team Leads or other Cerner management  personnel during the course of the project.   16.  Defendants required all ATEs to remain on campus until their scheduled shift  concluded unless they received prior approval from their Team Leads or other Cerner management  personnel.   18.  Defendants typically scheduled ATEs as full-time employees.    19.  Under Defendants’ shared guidance, ATEs’ primary duty was to provide first-line  troubleshooting relating to the implementation of the software system.  For example, Plaintiff was  assigned to the radiology units within Hershey Medical Center and was tasked with providing  direct interaction with the healthcare organization’s employees to help them use the software.     20.  Under Defendants’ shared guidance, ATEs’ other duties included reinforcing  training, providing At-The-Elbow support without touching the mouse or keyboard, not teaching  the staff any new things or tout better ways elsewhere and not providing any sort of patient care.          21.   Under Defendants’ shared guidance, ATEs had little discretion in the performance  of their job and worked within closely-prescribed limits provided by Defendants.  More complex  technical issues were escalated to the next level.    22.  Under Defendants’ shared guidance, ATEs’ primary duties: were not related to the  management of the business operations of Defendants or their customers, did not require the use  of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance, did not involve the  performance of work requiring advanced knowledge in a field of science or learning and did not  involve work requiring invention, imagination, originality, or talent in a recognized field of artistic  or creative endeavor.   24.  Despite the fact that ATEs did not meet any test for exemption, Defendants failed  to pay ATEs the requisite overtime rate of 1½ times their regular rate for hours worked over 40  per week.  Rather, Defendants paid ATEs their regular straight, hourly rate for time worked over  40 hours per week that was recorded by Defendants and nothing for the non-billable work they  were encouraged, suffered and permitted to perform.   25.  Defendants paid all hours worked, including all hours over 40 per workweek, at a  standard straight-time hourly rate of pay.    26.  Defendants did not keep accurate time records of all the work ATEs performed on  a daily basis.  Rather, ATEs were required to record only their scheduled work hours on  Defendants’ Paylocity system.    27.  Defendants knew that ATEs were routinely working more than 40 hours per week,  because they actively encouraged, suffered, permitted and/or directed ATEs to perform such work.   28.  Defendants knew that they were not properly compensating ATEs, because these  employees’ timesheets clearly indicate that they routinely worked more than 40 hours per week,  but were not receiving any wages calculated at an overtime premium rate.   29.  Plaintiff brings his FLSA claim on an opt-in, collective basis pursuant to 29 U.S.C.  § 216(b) for himself and all people who have worked for Defendants as an ATE, or in any other  similarly-titled, hourly-paid position, during the maximum limitations period (the “FLSA  Collective”).  Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary.   31.  The FLSA Collective is “similarly situated,” as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),  because its members worked under similar terms and conditions, in similar jobs and were subjected  to the common policies and practices described herein.   32.  Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective do not meet any test for exemption under the  35.    Plaintiff brings her PMWA claim on an opt-out, class action basis pursuant to Fed.  R. Civ. P. 23 for herself and all people who have worked for Defendants as an ATE, or in any  other similarly-titled, hourly-paid position in Pennsylvania during the maximum limitations period  without receiving all overtime wages due for all overtime hours they worked (the “PA Class”).   Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary.   36.  Plaintiff is a member of the PA Class because he worked as an hourly-paid ATE in  Pennsylvania during the relevant period and was not paid overtime wages due for overtime hours  he worked.   37.  Class treatment of Plaintiff’s PMWA claim is appropriate because the PA Class  satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.   38.  The PA Class is so numerous that joinder of all its members would be  impracticable.  Defendants employed over 40 people who fit the PA Class definition, meaning that  joining all of their claims would be impracticable.    39.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims belonging to the PA Class.  Plaintiff is  similarly-situated to the PA Class because he worked for Defendants under the common policies  and procedures identified above, and was denied legally-required wages for his work as a result of  Defendants’ common course of wrongful conduct.   41.  Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the PA Class because:  there is no apparent conflict of interest between Plaintiff and the PA Class; Plaintiff’s counsel have  successfully prosecuted many complex class actions, including state-law wage and hour class  actions, and will adequately prosecute these claims; and Plaintiff has adequate financial resources  to assure that the interests of the PA Class will not be harmed because her counsel has agreed to  advance the costs and expenses of litigation on the Class’ behalf contingent upon the outcome of  this litigation consistent with Pa. R. Prof. Conduct 1.8(e)(1).   43.  Allowing Plaintiff’s PMWA claim to proceed as a class action will be superior to  requiring the individual adjudication of each PA Class member’s claim, since requiring more than  100 hourly-paid employees to file and litigate individual wage claims will place an undue burden  on the PA Class members, Defendants and the Courts.  Class action treatment will allow a large  number of similarly-situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum  simultaneously, efficiently and without the unnecessary duplication of effort and expenses if these  claims were brought individually.  Moreover, as the damages suffered by each PA Class member  are relatively small, the expenses and burdens associated with individual litigation would make it  prohibitively impractical for them to bring individual claims.  Further, the presentation of separate  actions by individual PA Class members could create a risk for inconsistent and varying  adjudications, establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and/or substantially  impair or impede the ability of the PA Class members to protect their interests.    44.  Allowing Plaintiff’s claims to proceed in a class action setting is also appropriate  because Pennsylvania’s wage laws expressly permit private class action lawsuits to recover unpaid  regular and overtime wages.    45.  Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated by reference as though fully set  forth herein.    46.  Defendants are “employers” as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).   48.  The wages Defendants pay to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are “wages” as  defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(m).   49.  Defendants are an “enterprise engaged in commerce” within the meaning of 29  U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A).   50.  29 U.S.C. § 216(b) expressly allows private plaintiffs to bring collective actions to  enforce employers’ failure to comply with the FLSA’s requirements.     51.  Throughout the relevant period, Defendants have been obligated to comply with  the FLSA’s requirements, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have been covered employees entitled  to the FLSA’s protections, and Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have not been exempt from  receiving wages required by the FLSA for any reason.     52.  29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) requires employers to pay their employees an overtime rate,  equal to at least 1½ times their regular rate of pay, for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per  week.     53.  Defendants have intentionally violated this provision of the FLSA with respect to  the FLSA Collective by maintaining common timekeeping and compensation policies and  practices that include routinely failing to track the hours the PA Class members actually worked  and suffering or permitting Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective to work overtime hours per week  without paying them overtime wages for these hours.   54.  By engaging in this conduct, Defendants have acted with willful and/or reckless  disregard for the FLSA Collective members’ rights under the FLSA.    56.  For all the reasons stated above, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are similarly  situated individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b).   57.  Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated by reference as though fully set  forth herein.   58.  The unpaid wages at issue in this litigation are “Wages” as defined by PMWA §  3(d).   59.  Defendants are “Employers” as defined by PMWA § 3(g).   60.  Plaintiff and the Pennsylvania Class members are “Employees” as defined by  PMWA § 3(h).   61.  PMWA Section 4(c) requires employers to pay their employees overtime  compensation of “not less than one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate” for all hours  worked over 40 in a given workweek.  Under the PMWA, overtime is calculated based on the  number of hours worked in a “workweek”, defined in controlling regulations as “a period of 7  consecutive days”.  See 34 Pa. Code § 231.42.   62.  PMWA § 8 requires employers to “keep a true and accurate record of the hours  worked by each employee and the wages paid to each.”     64.  The PMWA does not contain an exemption to the overtime requirements of § 4(c)  for any type of computer employee. See PMWA § 333.105.   65.  Throughout the relevant period, Defendants were obligated to comply with the  PMWA’s requirements, Plaintiff and the Pennsylvania Class members were covered employees  entitled to the PMWA’s protections, and Plaintiff and the Pennsylvania Class members were not  exempt from receiving wages required by the PMWA for any reason.   66.  Defendants have intentionally violated these provisions of the PMWA by  maintaining common timekeeping and compensation policies and practices that include routinely  failing to track the hours the PA Class members actually worked and suffering or permitting  Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective to work overtime hours per week without paying them overtime  wages for these hours   67.  By engaging in this conduct, Defendants have acted with willful and/or reckless  disregard for Plaintiff’s and the PA Class members’ rights under the PMWA.    68.  There is no language in the PMWA, no exception to the PMWA or its enabling  Regulations, or any applicable provision elsewhere in Pennsylvania law that permits Defendants  to avoid paying Plaintiff and the PA Class for their overtime work, so Defendants have no good  faith justification or defense for failing to pay Plaintiff and the PA Class members all wages  mandated by the PMWA.   9.  Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class and collective are individuals who  have worked for Defendants as an ATE, or in any similarly-titled, hourly-paid position during the  statutory period.  Among other things, ATEs were all paid an hourly rate of pay, shared similar  job titles, training, job descriptions and job tasks.     VIOLATION OF THE FLSA  (For Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective)   VIOLATION OF THE PMWA  (For Plaintiff and the PA Class)  