12.  During the applicable statute of limitations period, Apple Bus provided  school transportation services throughout several states, including the State of Missouri.   13.  During the applicable statute of limitations period, Apple Bus employed  Plaintiffs and others similarly situated as school bus drivers in connection with Defendant’s  business.  Plaintiffs were employed on an hourly basis throughout the entirety of their  employment with Apple Bus and were paid—or were supposed to be paid—every two  weeks for the hours they worked during the previous two-week period.   14.  While employed at Defendant, Plaintiffs performed various work-related  tasks in addition to driving their normal school bus routes.  These additional tasks included,  among other things, cleaning and refueling the buses, training, filling in for other drivers  who were sick or otherwise unable to drive, and driving for school field trips and school  sporting events.   15.  Plaintiffs’ rates of pay differed depending on the particular task(s) they  performed.     16.  Plaintiffs relied on Apple Bus to properly pay them based upon the particular  task(s) they performed during particular pay periods.   18.  The form for regular “routes” was printed on white paper and titled  “Transportation Service Order”; the form for “trips” was printed on white paper and titled  “Daily Bus Movement Report”; the form for “training” was printed on orange paper; and  the form for “extra work” was printed on blue paper.   19.  These forms required employees to write down, among other things, the  particular task they performed, the date they rendered performance, and the number of  hours or fractions of an hour they spent performing the task.     20.  Apple Bus utilized these forms to determine how much bill school districts  for transporting students.   21.  Apple Bus also used these forms to determine how much to pay employees  like Hibdon and Cassidy.     22.  Because these forms were used to determine her pay, Plaintiffs carefully and  painstakingly completed each form to ensure they would be paid correctly.     23.  In reality, while Apple Bus may have used these forms to determine how  much to pay employees, it did not pay employees in strict accordance with the hours these  forms showed.  Instead, Apple Bus intentionally and routinely paid employees less than the  information on these forms warranted.     25.  Apple Bus did in fact utilize the flexibility these pre-printed forms provided  to underpay its employees.  Time and time again, Plaintiffs looked at their paychecks and  found those paychecks did not reflect the hours they had worked, but instead reflected fewer  hours and/or a lesser rate of pay.  The total dollar amount was less—and in some cases, far  less—than Plaintiffs expected and were entitled to receive.   26.  Plaintiffs complained to their supervisors and/or other management  employees on multiple occasions about this discrepancy to no avail.  Supervisors would  accuse Cassidy of falsifying hours or failing to turn in the proper form and refuse to afford  her any relief.  This was a standard practice at Apple Bus.  Whenever an employee  complained about a pay discrepancy, Apple Bus would challenge the employee’s integrity  and the veracity of the information the employee submitted.  This was intended to intimidate  the employee so as to stop him or her from continuing to press his or her claim for  additional compensation or complaining in the future.    27.  At some point, Cassidy recognized that Apple Bus could not be trusted to  pay her properly.  As a result, Cassidy began maintaining her own, separate time records so  she could better establish the pay she was entitled to receive.  She thought that by presented  detailed information about the hours she worked and the tasks she performed, Apple Bus  would be forced to do the right thing.  Yet, even when Cassidy presented these records to  Apple Bus, it balked at paying her properly.     29.  In those rare instances when Apple Bus actually agreed to correct Plaintiffs’  hours, the correction would take several weeks and require considerable effort on Plaintiffs’  parts.  And then, even though Plaintiffs received additional compensation, it was difficult if  not impossible to reconcile the additional compensation they received with the hours they  recorded.  It appeared Apple Bus was merely throwing a little money their way in the hope  that they would shut up and go away.     31.  Second, there were pay periods when Plaintiffs worked forty hours or less (so  they would not qualify for overtime pay) but worked more hours than they were paid for.   To the extent Plaintiffs worked hours for which they were not paid, they worked for free for  those hours, and therefore worked for less than the Missouri minimum wage per hour.   Hibdon recalls the end of the 2017 school year as being a time period she worked numerous  unpaid hours.   In Cassidy’s case, from January 7, 2018 to January 20, 2018, she worked a  total of 85.25 hours, but she was only paid for 47.75 hours for a total wage of $580.15.  Plaintiffs are in the process of identifying additional times when they were not paid for the  hours they worked, which also resulted in Plaintiffs being paid less than the Missouri  minimum wage.   33.  Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on  their own behalves and on behalf of all individuals who are presently employed by Apple  Bus on a non-exempt hourly basis or were employed by Apple Bus on a non-exempt hourly  basis at any time during the applicable statute of limitations period.   Excluded from the  putative class are all of Defendant’s executives, administrators, professional employees, and  outside sales persons.    34.  A collective action is appropriate because, under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the  putative class members are similarly situated to Plaintiffs, in that they worked in the same or  similar positions, were subjected to the same unlawful practice, policy, or plan, and their  claims are based upon the same factual and legal theories.     35.  The working relationships between Apple Bus and the members of the  putative class differ from class member to class member only in name, location, exact job  duties, and rate of pay. These relationships are otherwise exactly the same.  The key issue in  the collective action––whether Apple Bus intentionally and routinely shaved and continues  to shave hours from employees’ reported time to avoid paying overtime compensation in  accordance with the FLSA––does not vary substantially from class member to class member.    36.  Defendant’s malfeasance is likely provable through examination of its own  business records.  If Defendant billed school districts for a certain number of employee  hours and paid employees for a lesser number of hours, this shows or strongly suggests  Defendant shaved hours from the pre-printed forms employees were required to submit.    38.  In addition to bringing this lawsuit as a collective action under the FLSA,  Plaintiffs also bring this lawsuit as a state-wide class action under Rule 23 of the Federal  Rules of Civil Procedure.     39.  Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalves and on behalf of all  individuals in the State of Missouri who are presently employed by Apple Bus on a non- exempt hourly basis or were employed by Apple Bus on a non-exempt hourly basis at any  time during the applicable stature of limitations period.   Excluded from the class are all  managerial employees of Apple Bus and its corporate affiliates.  Plaintiffs reserve the right to  modify this class definition as discovery or other case circumstances warrant.   40.  Although the exact number of class members is presently unknown, it is  estimated that there are at least 40 individuals in the State of Missouri that fall within the  class definition.  This class easily satisfies the numerosity requirement for class certification.   42.  Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of members of the class, all of  whom are current or former employees of defendant Apple Bus.   43.  Plaintiffs are members of the class they seek to represent, and the claims they  advance on their own behalves are identical to the claims asserted on behalf of the class.   44.  Plaintiffs are adequate class representatives in that, as members of the class  and former employees of Apple Bus, their interests are entirely aligned with those of the  class.   45.  There are no individual conflicts that prevent Plaintiffs from adequately  representing the class.   46.  Plaintiffs have retained competent counsel experienced in class action  litigation.   47.  Class certification is proper because common questions of law and fact  predominate over questions that may affect only individual members of the class.  The  putative class members are or were employees of Apple Bus, which unlawfully underpaid all  class members, and unlawfully benefited from all class members’ work.   48.  A class action presents a superior form of adjudication over individual  litigation.   50.  The class action is manageable.  The proposed class represents an identifiable  community that can be readily identified, and the relief sought is one that can be overseen by  the Court.  51.  Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the forgoing allegations as if fully set forth  herein.   52.  Plaintiffs are members of a class that meets the requirements for certification  and maintenance of a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil  Procedure.   53.  Defendant is an “employer” and Plaintiffs are “employee[s]” under § 290.500  RSMo.   54.  Section 290.502 RSMo. requires employers to pay employees minimum  wages for all hours worked.  Section 290.505 RSMo. requires employers to pay employers to  pay employees one and one half times their regular rate for all hours worked over forty (40)  per work week.  Section 290.527 RSMo. provides that employers who violate the provisions  of this act are liable to the affected employee for unpaid wages, liquidated damages, costs,  attorney’s fees, and other appropriate relief.   56.  As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs  and the class have sustained and will continue to sustain damages in the form of lost wages,  unpaid overtime and other damages.   57.  Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs and the class for actual damages, liquidated  damages, recovery of attorney’s fees and costs, and prejudgment interest as allowed by law.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court will enter judgment in their favor  against Defendant for (1) an award of compensatory damages; (2) liquidated damages as  allowed by § 290.527 RSMo.; (3) attorneys’ fees and costs as allowed by § 290.527 RSMo.; (4)  prejudgment and post-judgment interest as provided by law; and (5) for such other relief as  the Court deems appropriate.   58.  Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the forgoing allegations as if fully set forth  herein.   59.  At any and all times relevant hereto, Apple Bus was an “enterprise engaged in  commerce” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).   60.  At any and all times relevant hereto, Apple Bus was an “employer” within the  meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).    62.   During the applicable statute of limitations period, Plaintiffs and class  members were not paid for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week in violation of the  maximum hours provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).   63.  At all times relevant hereto, the action of Apple Bus to not pay for all hours  worked over 40 in a week was willful in that among other things:  a.  Apple Bus knew the FLSA required it to pay time and one-half for all hours  worked over 40 in a week;  b.  Apple Bus failed to maintain true and accurate time records; and  c.  Apple Bus intimidated employees who questioned whether they were being  paid for all hours worked by falsely accusing employees of fabricating hours  and/or failing to timely submit the required forms.   64.  As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs  and class members have sustained and will continue to sustain damages in the form of lost  wages, unpaid overtime and other damages.   65.  Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs and the class for actual damages, liquidated  damages, recovery of attorney’s fees and costs, and prejudgment interest as allowed by law.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court will enter judgment in their favor and  in favor of the class and against Defendant for (1) an award of compensatory damages; (2)  liquidated damages as allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 216; (3) attorneys’ fees and costs as allowed by  29 U.S.C. § 216; (4) prejudgment and post-judgment interest as provided by law; and (5) for  such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.   67.  An implied employment agreement existed between Plaintiffs and class  members, on one hand, and Defendant, on the other hand, the terms of which included, but  were not limited to, an agreement by Plaintiffs and class members to perform services as  employees of Apple Bus and an implied agreement by Apple Bus to pay plaintiffs a lawful  rate for all work performed.   68.  The agreement was made between parties capable of contracting and  contained mutual obligations and valid consideration.  Plaintiffs and class members  performed all conditions precedent, if any, required to them under the implied agreement.   69.  Defendant failed and refused to perform its obligations in accordance with  the terms and conditions of the implied agreement by failing to compensate Plaintiffs and  the class for all time worked on behalf of Defendant.   70.  Plaintiffs and class members were thereby damaged in an amount yet to be  determined.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court will enter judgment in their favor and  in favor of the class and against Defendant for compensatory damages and pre- and post- judgment interest as provided by law and for such other relief as the Court deems  appropriate.   71.  Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set  forth herein.   72.  Plaintiffs and the class conferred a benefit upon Defendant by working on its  behalf without being compensated at a lawful rate for all work performed.   74.  Defendant accepted and retained the benefit under such circumstances as to  make it inequitable for it to retain such benefit without repayment of its value.   75.  Plaintiffs and class members have thereby been damaged.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment in their favor and in favor of the class  and against Defendant and pray for compensatory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest  as provided by law, and for such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.   76.  Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the forgoing allegations as if fully set forth  herein.   77.  Defendant has been enriched or has benefited by its deficient payments to  Plaintiffs and the class for work performed.  Such enrichment or benefit was incurred by  Defendant at the expense of Plaintiffs and class members who were not fully compensated  at a lawful rate for their work.   78.  Plaintiffs and the class reasonably expected to be compensated in accordance  with the law.   79.  Defendant intentionally and with bad faith failed to pay Plaintiffs and the  class at the proper lawful rate for all hours worked and for time worked.   80.  It is unjust for Defendant to retain the benefits from the unpaid work  performed by Plaintiffs and the class.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment in their favor and in favor of the class  and against Defendant and prays for compensatory damage, pre- and post-judgment interest  as provided by law and for such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.  OVERTIME REQUIREMENTS   REQUIREMENTS  