101.  Local Rule 23-1 provides that a party seeking to maintain a class must include in  the complaint “a reference to each part of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 that the party relies on in seeking to  maintain the case as a class action.”  Plaintiff complies with this rule in this Section VII.  102.  Plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of the following two classes,  including the following “Injunctive Relief Class” pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2):  All individuals who, from November 4, 2011 to the present, have been a member  of an NCAA Division I football team;  and the following “Transfer Core Issues Class” pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(3), and (c)(4):  All individuals who, from November 4, 2011 to the present, have sought to  transfer from one NCAA Division I football school to another NCAA Division I  football school, and pursuant to NCAA transfer rules, were considered to be, or  would have been considered to be, athletically ineligible to participate in NCAA  Division I football for any period of time.  103.  Excluded from all proposed Classes are the employees of the NCAA and their  member institutions, employees, class counsel and their employees, and the judicial officers and  associated court staff assigned to this case.  Excluded from the proposed “Core Issues Class” are  individuals whose athletics-related grants-in-aid were reduced, cancelled or not renewed due to  one of the reasons enumerated in Bylaw 15.3.4.2 of the NCAA Division I Manual.  104.  Members in the Classes are collectively referred to as “class members” or “the  Class” unless otherwise specified.  105.  The persons in the Class are so numerous that individual joinder of all members is  impracticable under the circumstances of this case.  Although the precise number of such persons  - 26 -  is unknown, the exact size of the Class is easily ascertainable, as each class member can be  identified by using Defendant’s records.  Plaintiff is informed and believes that there are many  thousands of Class members in satisfaction of Rule 23(a)(1).  106.  Pursuant to Rule 23(a)(2) and (b)(3), there are common questions of law and fact  specific to the Class that predominates over any questions affecting individual members,  including:  a. Whether the NCAA and its member institutions unlawfully contracted,  combined and conspired to unreasonably restrain trade in violation of  Section 1 of the Sherman Act by agreeing to limit the number of Division  I football scholarships available to students;  b. Whether the NCAA and its member institutions unlawfully contracted,  combined and conspired to unreasonably restrain trade in violation of  Section 1 of the Sherman Act by agreeing to restrict NCAA Division I  football players’ ability to transfer to other NCAA Division I football  schools without being deemed athletically ineligible for a period of time;  c. The definition of the relevant market;  d. Whether the NCAA has any pro-competitive justification for its conduct;  e. Whether the pro-competitive effects of the conduct, if any, outweigh the  clear injury to class members;  f. Whether class members have suffered antitrust injury; and  g. The nature and scope of injunctive relief necessary to restore a  competitive market.  - 27 -  107.  Pursuant to Rule 23(a)(3), Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class claims, as  they arise out of the same course of conduct and the same legal theories as the rest of the Class,  and Plaintiff challenges the practices and course of conduct engaged in by Defendant with  respect to the Class as a whole.  108.  Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class in satisfaction  of Rule 23(a)(4).  He will vigorously pursue the claims and has no antagonistic conflicts.   Plaintiff has retained counsel who are able and experienced class action litigators and are  familiar with the NCAA.  109.  Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied, because Defendant has acted or refused to act on  grounds that apply generally to the Class, and final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory  relief is appropriate respecting the Class as a whole.  A class action is also appropriate because  Defendant has acted and refuses to take steps that are, upon information and belief, generally  applicable to thousands of individuals, thereby making injunctive relief appropriate with respect  to the Class as a whole.  110.  Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), questions of law or fact common to class members  predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.  Resolution of this action on  a class-wide basis is superior to other available methods and is a fair and efficient adjudication of  the controversy because in the context of this litigation no individual class member can justify  the commitment of the large financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit against  Defendant.  Separate actions by individual class members would also create a risk of inconsistent  or varying judgments, which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant  and substantially impede or impair the ability of class members to pursue their claims.  It is not  anticipated that there would be difficulties in managing this case as a class action.   - 28 -  U.S.C. § 1) .........................................................................................................................29  PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................................30  JURY TRIAL DEMANDED .........................................................................................................31  - 1 -  Plaintiff, by and through his attorneys, based on his individual experiences, the  investigation of counsel, and upon information and belief, alleges as follows:   I.  VIII.  CAUSES OF ACTION ......................................................................................................28  FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION  VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (15  VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (15 U.S.C. § 1)  (Applicable to Plaintiff’s Claims Regarding the NCAA’s Cap on Athletic Scholarships)  111.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the above paragraphs as if  fully set forth herein.  112.  The NCAA and NCAA member institutions by and through their officers,  directors, employees, agents or other representatives have entered into an unlawful agreement  combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade.  Specifically, the NCAA and NCAA member  institutions have unlawfully agreed to artificially fix or reduce the amount of Division I football  scholarships to be awarded to class members in exchange for the student-athletes’ labor by  agreeing among themselves to artificially limit the overall supply of Division I football  scholarships.  These unlawful agreements have unreasonably restrained price competition among  NCAA member institutions for student-athletes’ labor.  113.  Class members seeking to provide their athletic labor in exchange for in-kind  benefits, including grants-in-aid, have been deprived of the benefits of free and open price  competition.  114.  Class members’ choice of which NCAA Division I member institution to attend  has been artificially restricted by the NCAA’s restrictions on the number of Division I football  scholarships.   115.  Defendant and its member institutions have undertaken this conduct in the United  States and its territories.  - 29 -  116.  Defendant’s business activities and operations involve and affect the interstate  movement of students and the interstate flow of substantial funds (including, but not limited to,  tuition, room and board, and mandatory fees).   117.  As a direct result of the conduct of Defendant and its co-conspirators, Class  members have been injured.  Price competition among NCAA member institutions has been  unreasonably restrained, and as a result Class members have been injured because they are  paying or have paid substantially more for tuition than they would in a competitive market.  118.  The conduct of the NCAA is continuing and will continue to impose antitrust  injury on student-athletes unless injunctive relief is granted.  119.  In addition, injunctive relief is necessary to remedy the effects of the NCAA’s  past wrongful conduct.   VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (15 U.S.C. § 1)  (Applicable to Plaintiff’s Claims Regarding the NCAA’s Transfer Rules)  120.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the above paragraphs as if  fully set forth herein.  121.  The NCAA and NCAA member institutions by and through their officers,  directors, employees, agents or other representatives have entered into an unlawful agreement,  combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade.  Specifically, the NCAA and NCAA member  institutions have unlawfully agreed to restrain the ability of NCAA Division I football players to  transfer to other Division I football schools without loss of athletics eligibility.  These unlawful  agreements have unreasonably restrained competition among NCAA member institutions for  student-athletes’ labor.  - 30 -  122.  Class members seeking to provide their athletic labor in exchange for in-kind  benefits, including grants-in-aid, have been deprived of the benefits of free and open  competition.  123.  Class members’ choice of which NCAA Division I member institution to attend  has been artificially restricted by the NCAA’s restrictions on their ability to transfer without loss  of athletics eligibility.  124.  Defendant and its member institutions have undertaken this conduct in the United  States and its territories.  125.  Defendant’s business activities and operations involve and affect the interstate  movement of students and the interstate flow of substantial funds (including, but not limited to,  tuition, room and board, and mandatory fees).   126.  As a direct result of the conduct of Defendant and its co-conspirators, Class  members have been injured.  Competition among NCAA member institutions has been  unreasonably restrained, and as a result Class members have been injured because their choices  of schools to attend have been limited.  127.  The conduct of the NCAA is continuing and will continue to impose antitrust  injury on student-athletes unless injunctive relief is granted.  128.  In addition, injunctive relief is necessary to remedy the effects of the NCAA’s  past wrongful conduct.  