24.  Defendant’s text message was transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within  the time frame relevant to this action.     25.  Defendant’s text message constitutes telemarketing because it encourages the future  purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff cannabis products.        26.  The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s cannabis specials  and prices, which Defendant sends to promote its business.   27.  Defendant sent the subject texts within this judicial district, resides within this judicial  district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district.  Upon  information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within  this judicial district.     29.  Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 7856 Number, and is financially  responsible for phone service to the 7856 Number.    30.  The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message demonstrates that  Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages.  See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions,  combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short  code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice  Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer  text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would  be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D.  Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements  written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d  1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013  WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable  without use of an ATDS)).     31.  The text message originated from telephone number 214-239-0959, a number which  upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant.   32.  The number used by Defendant is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone  number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into  believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an  individual.     34.  Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware  and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case.  The systems utilized by Defendant  have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such  numbers from a list without human intervention.    35.  To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”)  that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human  involvement.     36.  The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in  fact utilized by Defendant.   37.  The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was  in fact utilized by Defendant.   38.  The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity  was in fact utilized by Defendant.   39.  The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which  capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.   40.  The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which  capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.   41.  The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission  of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement.   43.  The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human  intervention, and almost instantaneously.  Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands  of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less.   44.  Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending  on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks.  In other words, the platform controls  how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion.  The platform performs  this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function.   46.  Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion  of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.  Defendant’s  text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life.     47.  Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm.  Specifically,  Plaintiff estimates that she has wasted approximately 10 minutes reviewing Defendant’s unwanted  messages and retaining counsel for this case in order to stop Defendant’s unwanted messages.     48.  Furthermore, Defendant’s text message took up memory on Plaintiff’s cellular  phone. The cumulative effect of unsolicited text messages like Defendant’s poses a real risk of  ultimately rendering the phone unusable for text messaging purposes as a result of the phone’s  memory being taken up. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message-spam#text  (finding that text message solicitations like the ones sent by Defendant present a “triple threat” of  identity theft, unwanted cell phone charges, and slower cell phone performance).   49.  Defendant’s text messages also can slow cell phone performance by taking up space  on the recipient phone’s memory. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message- spam#text (finding that spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking up phone  memory space).  50.  Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  herself and all others similarly situated.   52.  Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not  know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several  thousands, if not more.  56.  The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s  claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular  telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of  being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.  61.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth  herein.    62.  It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for  emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any  automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone  service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).    63.  Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the  capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to  the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below.    64.  These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first  obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not  have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative  Class when its calls were made.    65.  Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an  automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent.   66.  Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and  knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone  dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing.    68.  Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-60 as if fully set forth herein.   69.  At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as  alleged herein violated the TCPA.   70.  Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and  knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA.   71.  Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members  had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the  amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class  pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.   72.  As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled  to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C.  § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).  Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)   PROPOSED CLASS   Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  