15.  At all times relevant, Plaintiff Wolf was an individual residing in the State  of Maryland.  However, from 2010 to 2014, Plaintiff resided in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.   16.  Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by  27.  Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other  persons similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as “the Class”).   28.  Plaintiff proposes the following Class definition, subject to amendment  as appropriate:  All persons within the United States who, on or after October 16, 2013, received a  SMS text message to a cellular telephone advertising membership in the “Lyft  Pioneer” program, and for whom Lyft cannot demonstrate prior express written  consent.  Collectively, all these persons will be referred to as “Class members.”  Plaintiff represents, and is  a member of, the Class.  Excluded from the Class are Lyft and any entities in which Lyft has a  controlling interest, Lyft’s agents and employees, any Judge to whom this action is assigned and  any member of such Judge’s staff and immediate family, and claims for personal injury, wrongful  death and/or emotional distress.  8 See 2012 Declaratory Ruling, 27 F.C.C.R. at 1844 (¶33).  Case4:15-cv-01441-JSW   Document1   Filed03/30/15   Page5 of 10 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  1220377.1   - 6 -  38.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this  Complaint as if fully stated herein.   39.  The foregoing acts and omissions of Lyft constitute numerous and  multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the  above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.   Case4:15-cv-01441-JSW   Document1   Filed03/30/15   Page7 of 10 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  1220377.1   - 8 -  42.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this  Complaint as if fully set forth herein.   43.  The foregoing acts and omissions of Lyft constitute numerous and  multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above cited provisions of  47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.    44.  As a result of Lyft’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and  Class members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every SMS  text message in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).     45.  Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive  relief prohibiting Lyft’s violation of the TCPA in the future.   46.  Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’  fees and costs.   KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE  CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.   VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227  ET SEQ.  