15.  While Defendant uniformly communicates to consumers that the Products can  repair damaged hair, building this claim into the very name of its product line (“Repair”), the  truth is that damaged hair cannot be repaired.  Hairmomentum.com, a website dedicated to  providing science-based hair care information, explains why:  Hair unlike skin does not have any cells to regenerate and repair.   Hair grows  from hair follicles on the scalp.  These hair follicles behave like small organs,  composed of tissues, blood cells, and glands among other essential components  (see image).  Because these hair follicles are alive, they keep producing new hair,  pushing out old hair through the shedding process (Telogen phase).  But hair on  the other hand is mainly Keratin, Protein fibers. Once the fibers are broken, they  cannot fix themselves, and there is no ‘ointment’ available like for skin to help  them recover.1   Many of these products have been specially formulated with polymers (many of  them are protein based) such as hydrolyzed wheat protein, designed to fill the  gaps in the hair temporarily. Imagine a cracked surface and putting in some putty  just to fill those gaps.  The end result: a smooth surface, that feels repaired and  that looks nicer than it was before.2    18.  This consensus is also confirmed by individuals with scientific or medical  credentials. The Natural Haven, a blog maintained by a Ph.D. in materials science, states that  “[t]he only remedy for damaged hair is to cut off the damage and let the hair regrow.”9  Dr. Zoe  D. Draelos, M.D. explains: “One of the most common misconceptions about hair is that it is alive,  when in fact hair is nonliving and does not heal itself once it is injured. So once the hair is damaged it  cannot heal itself except through new hair growth at the scalp.”10  Researcher J. Jachowicz  summarizes the scientific research on the subject as follows:   Efforts to restore the original properties of hair after mild degradation or to protect  undamaged hair against structural weakening have been numerous but largely unsuccessful.11      20.  Defendant’s hair repair claims go well beyond the FDCA definition of a cosmetic  and promises to “affect the structure or any function of the body of man,” because this would be  the only way to actually repair hair.  Thus, Defendant cannot argue that the Products can repair  hair without also arguing that it is unlawfully marketing a drug as a non-drug cosmetic.   21.  Defendant suggests that the Products can repair damaged hair by virtue of the  Vitamin E and Ceramide 3 inside it. The Products’ back labels state:  Repair: A high-performance blend of vitamin E combined with supercharged  ceramide 3, perfected in the salon to infuse dry damaged hair with strength and  elasticity while repairing split ends and frizziness adding healthy bounce and  shine.   Defendant suggests that these two ingredients, Vitamin E and Ceramide 3, are what allow the  products to repair hair. However, this is not true because neither of these ingredients have this  ability. Even experts who believe that these ingredients often contain benefits do not argue that  they can actually repair hair.   23.  HowStuffWorks, an award-winning educational website site that seeks to provide  its target audience insight into the way many things work, makes a distinction between the  natural occurring ceramides within hair and the synthetic ceramides found within hair care  product. The article says of pseudo-ceramides: “Pseudo-ceramides are safe and nontoxic, and  they work in a similar way to the ceramides your body produces…But while pseudo-ceramides  are similar to the naturally occurring ceramides…they’re not exactly the same. Just like natural  ceramides, these synthetic lipids retain water in the upper layer of skin and repair dry, chapped  skin by replacing lost lipids – but they don’t disperse throughout the skin as natural ceramides  do.”15 Though the article makes reference to “skin”, as hair is comprised of keratin and dead  skin cells, it would then be reasonable to assume that ceramide works on hair much in the same  way it does for skin minus the ability to repair dead skin cells. If the pseudo-ceramide cannot  imitate a natural ceramide, it would therefore mean that it cannot restore hair to an exact copy of  its original state. Consequently, because these pseudo-ceramides are incapable of properly  mimicking natural ceramides as “moisture retaining building blocks”16, it would mean that its  potency is only capable of accomplishing something that is weaker in effect than the reparative  effect that Defendant suggests.   25.  According to Dr. Josh Axe, DNM, a certified doctor of natural medicine, Vitamin  E may help to “decrease environmental damage to your hair” and make “your hair look healthier  and fresher.”18. But saying that Vitamin E can help decrease damage is not the same as saying  that it can repair or restore hair to its original state. Thus, while Vitamin E may help to give the  appearance of healthy hair, this benefit does not consist in any kind of “repair” that the  Defendant had initially advertised for the Products.    26.  Defendant deceptively takes the limited evidence that Vitamin E and Ceramide 3  offer certain modest benefits to hair and without any scientific basis, blows this up into the claim  that the Product can repair hair.  Defendant’s Deception Misleads, Is Material To, And Is Relied Upon By, Reasonable  Consumers   28.  Plaintiff relied on, and a reasonable consumer would rely on, Defendant’s  deceptive misrepresentation.  Consumer product companies intend for consumers to rely upon  their representations. These representations are the only source of information consumers can use  to make decisions concerning whether to buy and use such products. Consumers lack the ability  to test or independently ascertain the efficacy and genuineness of product claims of normal  everyday consumer products, especially at the point of sale. Reasonable customers must and do  rely on the company to honestly report the nature of a product.    29.  A reasonable consumer is deceived by Defendant’s “Repair” misrepresentation  because the notion that hair can be repaired is already a widespread misconception.   Accordingly, reasonable consumers are likely to believe a company claiming that its products  can repair hair.     31.  Defendant might argue that a reasonable consumer does not interpret “Repair” as  literally as does Plaintiff.  It might argue that the term is not intended to suggest that the Products will  actually restore hair to its original undamaged state and is rather intended to advertise some lesser,  more modest benefit, like strengthening hair, improving its appearance, or preventing future damage.   This defense is implausible for several reasons.   32.  First, Plaintiff’s understanding of “Repair” is fully in line with ordinary usage.  The  Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “repair” as “putting together what is torn or broken” or “to  restore to a sound or healthy state.”21  Defendant’s “Repair” misrepresentation is deceptive by this  definition, since the Products do not restore hair to the condition it was in prior to being damaged.   Nor do the Products “put together what is torn or broken,” because split-ends remain split even after  the application of the Products.  One would not say that a piece of paper that was torn in two and then  taped back together has been “repaired,” and the Products deliver nothing more than this when it  comes to hair.          34.  Third, Defendant itself undermines this defense when it claims that the Products will  “infuse dry damaged hair with strength and elasticity while repairing split ends and frizziness  adding healthy bounce and shine.”  This claim is made on the labels of the Product. See Exhibit B.  The claim that the Products can “heal” and “repair” split-ends and frizziness undercuts any  suggestion that “repair” really means something like “strengthen”, because the Defendant’s inclusion  of these promised benefits on its labeling would then be rendered redundant.  The statement therefore  establishes that “repair” means something stronger than “strengthen”.    35.  Defendant’s promise that the Product is able to “repair split ends”, as stated on the  front label, is also deceptive. Its product suggests that it can “repair split ends” when in fact such a  result is impossible as explained by Manufacturer Renpure in ¶ 15. A reasonable consumer, seeking  to remedy damaged hair and under the reasonable assumption that the usage of the word repair is  used in a literal sense by the Product, is influenced into purchasing it. Defendant promises that  something substantial would result from usage of its Product however that promise is merely a part  of its deception in seeking to make a profit from a reasonable consumer’s assumption that split ends  are capable of being repaired.   37.  Plaintiff and the Class suffered economic injury in that Plaintiff and Class  Members did not receive the benefit of their bargain as purchasers of the Products, which are  represented as capable of repairing hair but could not deliver the benefits advertised by  Defendant.     38.  Defendant’s choice of the Products’ name—”Repair”—along with the increasing  prevalence of repairing claims by hair products generally, see ¶ 15, establishes that a product that  is capable of repairing hair has greater value than a product that is incapable of doing so.  This is  also attested to by the statements of hair care professionals, which reveal the premium value that  consumers attach to the ability to repair hair.  See ¶¶ 15, 16.  These professionals recognize that  consumers see hair repair as a way to avoid haircut appointments they would prefer not to make.   39.  Given that the value of the Products as it actually functions is less than the value  of the Products as warranted by Defendant, Plaintiff MCBRIDE and the Class have been injured  in an amount equal to the difference between the two—either the entire purchase price or some  other sum, to be determined by expert analysis at trial.           41.  Additionally, Plaintiff MCBRIDE paid a price premium for the Product because  Defendant’s deceptive misrepresentation allows it to charge a higher price than it would if the  claims of its representations were actually truthful.  This is confirmed by comparing the price of  the Product with the prices of other hair oils available through Walmart.com and Target.com that  do not make false and deceptive “Repair” representations:  46.  Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the Class definitions based on facts learned in  the course of litigating this matter.   47.  Numerosity. While the exact number and identities of purchasers of the Products  are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Class contains  thousands of purchasers who are so numerous that individual joinder of all Class members is  impracticable.     49.  Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class members because,  inter alia, Plaintiff and the other Class members are all injured by the same uniform conduct, as  detailed herein, and are subject to Defendant’s hair repair claims that accompany each and every  Product that Defendant sells. Plaintiff is advancing the same claims and legal theories on behalf  of herself and all members of the Class.     51.  Superiority. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair  and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages or other financial detriment suffered  by any individual Class member is relatively small compared to the burden and expense that  would be entailed by individual litigation of their claims against Defendant.  Thus, it would not  be economically feasible for an individual class member to prosecute a separate action on an  individual basis, and it is desirable for judicial efficiency to concentrate the litigation of the  claims in this forum. Furthermore, the adjudication of this controversy through a class action will  prevent the potentially inconsistent and conflicting adjudications of the claims asserted herein.  There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.   52.  The prerequisites to maintaining a class action for equitable relief pursuant to  Rule 23(b)(2) are also met, as Defendant acts or refuses to act on grounds generally applicable to  the Class, thereby making appropriate final equitable relief with respect to the Class as a whole.   53.   Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent equitable relief on behalf of the entire  Class, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, to prevent Defendant from engaging in  the acts described, and requiring Defendant to provide full restitution to Plaintiff and Class  members.   55.  Plaintiff MCBRIDE realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations  contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint and further alleges as follows:   56.  Plaintiff MCBRIDE brings this claim on behalf of herself and the other members  of the Class for an injunction for violations of New York’s Deceptive Acts or Practices Law  65.  Plaintiff MCBRIDE brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Class for  violations of NY GBL § 349.   66.  Any person who has been injured by reason of any violation of NY GBL § 349  may bring an action in her own name to enjoin such unlawful act or practice, an action to recover  her actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, or both such actions. The court may, in  its discretion, increase the award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the actual  damages up to one thousand dollars, if the court finds the Defendants willfully or knowingly  violated this section. The court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff.   67.  By the acts and conduct alleged herein, Defendant commits unfair or deceptive  acts and practices by promoting the Products as capable of repairing hair, thereby violating NY  GBL § 248 and depriving Plaintiff MCBRIDE and the Class of the benefit of their bargain and  charging a price premium.   68.  The foregoing deceptive acts and practices are directed at consumers.   69.  Under the circumstances, Defendant’s conduct in employing these unfair and  deceptive trade practices are malicious, willful, wanton and outrageous such as to shock the  conscience of the community and warrant the imposition of punitive damages.   71.  Plaintiff MCBRIDE realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations  contained in all preceding paragraphs and further alleges as follows:   72.  Plaintiff MCBRIDE brings this claim individually, as well as on behalf of  members of the class, for violations of NY GBL § 350.   73.  Defendants have been and/or are engaged in the “conduct of … business, trade or  commerce” within the meaning of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350.   74.  New York Gen. Bus. Law § 350 makes unlawful “[f]alse advertising in the  conduct of any business, trade or commerce.” False advertising includes “advertising, including  labeling, of a commodity … if such advertising is misleading in a material respect,” taking into  account “the extent to which the advertising fails to reveal facts material in light of …  representations [made] with respect to the commodity …” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350-a(1).   75.  Defendant caused to be made or disseminated throughout New York, through  advertising, marketing and other publications, statements that were untrue or misleading.    77.  Defendant violates N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350 because its “Repair”  misrepresentation was material and likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.    78.  Plaintiff MCBRIDE and members of the Class have suffered an injury, including  the loss of money or property, as a result of Defendant’s false and misleading advertising. In  purchasing the Products, Plaintiff and members of the Class relied on the misrepresentation that  the Products repaired hair.  This misrepresentation is false and/or misleading because hair cannot  be repaired.    79.  Plaintiff MCBRIDE and members of the Class have suffered an injury, including  the loss of money or property, as a result of Defendant’s false and misleading advertising.     80.  Pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350-e, Plaintiff MCBRIDE and members of the  Class seek monetary damages (including actual damages and minimum, punitive, or treble and/or  statutory damages pursuant to GBL § 350-a (1)), injunctive relief, restitution and disgorgement  of all monies obtained by means of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, interest, and attorneys' fees  and costs.   81.  Plaintiff MCBRIDE realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations  contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows:   83.  Plaintiff and members of the Class reasonably relied on Defendant’s false and  misleading representations and did not know the truth that the Products cannot repair damaged  hair.  Defendants knew and intended that Plaintiff and the Class would rely on its  misrepresentations.   84.  Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured as a result of Defendant’s  fraudulent conduct.   85.  Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and members of the Class for damages sustained as  a result of its fraudulent conduct.   COMMON LAW FRAUD  (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class in conjunction with substantively similar  consumer protection laws of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New  York law does not reach the claims of out-of-state Class members or, alternatively, on  behalf of the New York Class)   DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 350  (FALSE ADVERTISING LAW)  (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class in conjunction with substantively similar  consumer protection laws of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New  York law does not reach the claims of out-of-state Class members or, alternatively, on  behalf of the New York Class)   DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349  (DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT)  (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class in conjunction with substantively similar  consumer protection laws of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New  York law does not reach the claims of out-of-state Class members or, alternatively, on  behalf of the New York Class)   Defendant’s “Repair” Claims Are False Because Hair Cannot Be Repaired   INJUNCTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349  (DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT)  (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class in conjunction with substantively similar  consumer protection laws of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New  York law does not reach the claims of out-of-state Class members or, alternatively, on  behalf of the New York Class)  