13.  On April 6, 2017, Plaintiff received an unsolicited 2-page fax advertisement. A  copy of the subject fax advertisement is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The fax advertisement  attached as Exhibit A was sent, or caused to be sent, by Defendant.  It advertises Defendant’s  urgent care medical provider services.   14.  The subject fax advertises Defendant’s goods, products or services. Exhibit A is  an advertisement sent by fax to advertise Defendant’s urgent care medical provider services.  Exhibit A states that Defendant provides “Emergency Medical Condition Exams,” offering  “Rapid Reports,” “Professional Evaluation,” “Cost Effective” services, and “X-Rays,  Medications, and Injections.”   15.  Though the facsimile says “Miami Medical Center” (hereafter, “MMC”), the  telephone provided on the fax is that for Defendant.  The address on the fax leads to a building  with a large sign identifying the business as “RITECARE Urgent Medical Center.” Upon  information and belief, MMC is nothing but an alter-ego of Defendant.   16.  Defendant sent, or caused these unsolicited fax advertisements to be sent, to  Plaintiff and a class of similarly-situated persons.   18.  Exhibit A does not contains an opt-out notice as required by the TCPA.   19.  On information and belief, Defendant sent the same and similar facsimiles  advertising its services to Plaintiff and other recipients without first receiving the recipients’  express permission or invitation.  This allegation is based, in part, on the fact that Plaintiff never  gave permission to anyone to send the subject fax advertisement to it, that Plaintiff never  conducted business with Defendant, and that sending advertisements by fax is a very cheap way  to reach a wide audience.   20.  There are no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other putative Class member)  to avoid receiving illegal faxes.  Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent  communications their owners desire to receive.   21.  Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of itself and all others  similarly situated as members of the Class initially defined as follows:  All persons and entities who were sent one or more telephone  facsimile messages on or after four years prior to the filing of this  action, that advertised the commercial availability or quality of  property, goods, or services offered by defendant, and that did not  contain an opt-out notice on its first page.  Excluded from the Class is Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest,  any officer or director of Defendant, the legal representative, heir, successor, or assign of  Defendant, and any Judge assigned to this action, along with the members of his or her  immediate family.   23.  This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant  to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.  This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and  adequacy requirements under Rule 23 (a). Additionally, prosecution of Plaintiff’s claims  separately from the putative Class’s claims would create a risk of inconsistent or varying  adjudications under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A). Furthermore, the questions of law or fact that are  common in this action predominate over any individual questions of law or fact making class  representation the superior method to adjudicate this controversy under Rule 23 (b) (3).   24.  Numerosity/Impracticality of Joinder:  On information and belief, the Class is  so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The precise number of Class members  and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff, but can be obtained from Defendant’s records or the  records of third parties.   26.  Typicality of claims:  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the entire  Class because Plaintiff and all Class members were injured by the same conduct. Plaintiff and  the other members of the Class each received one or more unsolicited fax advertisements from  Defendant that also did not contain the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. Under the facts of  this case, because the focus is upon Defendant’s conduct, if Plaintiff prevails on its claims, then  the putative Class members must necessarily prevail as well.   28.  Prosecution of Separate Claims Would Yield Inconsistent Results:  Even  though the questions of fact and law in this action are predominately common to Plaintiff and the  putative Class members, separate adjudication of each Class member’s claims would yield  inconsistent and varying results. Such inconsistent rulings would create incompatible standards  for Defendant to operate under if/when Class members bring additional lawsuits concerning the  same unsolicited fax advertisements or if Defendant advertises by fax again in the future.   29.  This Class Action is the Superior Method to Adjudicate the Common  Questions of Law and Fact that Predominate:  A class action is superior to other available  methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the  claims of all Class members is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. The  likelihood of individual Class members prosecuting separate claims is remote, and even if every  Class member could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by  individual litigation of such cases. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the  management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. Relief  concerning Plaintiff’s rights under the laws herein alleged and with respect to the Class would be  proper. Plaintiff envisions no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.  3.    Private right of action.  A person may, if otherwise  permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state,  bring in an appropriate court of that state:  (A)  An action based on a violation of this  subsection or the regulations prescribed  under this subsection to enjoin such  violation,  (B)  An action to recover for actual monetary  loss from such a violation, or to receive  $500 in damages for each such violation,  whichever is greater, or  (C)  Both such actions.  47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3).   30.  Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.   32.  The TCPA prohibits the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or  other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine….” 47  U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1).   33.  The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement,” as “any material advertising the  commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any  person without that person’s express invitation or permission.”  47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (4).   34.  The TCPA provides:   35.  In relevant part, the TCPA states, “[t]he Commission shall prescribe regulations  to implement the requirements of this subsection . . . in implementing the requirements of this  subsection, the Commission shall provide that a notice contained in an unsolicited advertisement  complies with the requirements under this subparagraph only if . . . (i) the notice is clear and  conspicuous. . . .”  47. U.S.C. § 227 (b) (2) (D) (i).   49.  Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.    50.  Plaintiff brings Count II on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated  persons.   51.  By sending unsolicited faxes to Plaintiff and the other Class members, Defendant  improperly and unlawfully converted their telephone lines, fax machines, toner, and paper to  Defendant’s own use.  Defendant also converted the Class members’ time to its own use.    52.  Immediately prior to their receipt of the unsolicited faxes, Plaintiff and the other  Class members each owned an unqualified and immediate right to possession of its fax machine,  paper, toner, and employee time.   53.  By sending the unsolicited faxes, Defendant permanently misappropriated the  Class members’ fax machines, toner, paper, and employee time to its own use. Such  misappropriation was wrongful and without authorization.     55.  The unsolicited faxes deprived Plaintiff and the other Class members of the use of  their fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time for any other purpose.  Plaintiff and each  Class member thereby suffered damages as a result of their receipt of unsolicited fax  advertisements from Defendant.   56.  Each of Defendant’s unsolicited faxes effectively stole Plaintiff’s employees’  time because persons employed by Plaintiff were involved in receiving, routing, and reviewing  Defendant’s illegal faxes. Defendant knew or should have known employees’ time is valuable to  Plaintiff.  57.  Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.   57.  Defendant is a “person” or “entity” as used in FDUTPA.   58.  Plaintiff and the Members of the Sub-Class are “consumers” within the meaning  of Fla. Stat. § 501.203(7).   58.  Pursuant to FDUTPA, unfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or  practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are  unlawful.   60.  Within four years prior to the filing of this complaint and continuing to the  present, Defendant violated FDUTPA by engaging in unfair practices against Plaintiff and the  Sub-Class.   61.   Defendant was engaging in “trade or commerce” within the meaning of Fla. Stat.  § 501.203(8).   62.  The practices described herein also offend established public policy regarding the  protection of the consuming public and legitimate business enterprises against companies, like  Defendant, who engage in unfair methods of competition.   63.   Defendant’s conduct, which caused substantial injury to Plaintiff and the Sub- Class could have been avoided, and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to any  consumers or competition.   64.   Defendant’s business acts and practices are also unfair because they have caused  harm and injury-in-fact to Plaintiff and Sub-Class Members.   65.   In addition to actual damages, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class are entitled to  declaratory and injunctive relief as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Fla.  Stat. § 501.201, et seq.  CONVERSION   FLORIDA DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT, FLA. STAT.  § 501.201   TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227  