25.  Repsol is “a global, integrated company at the forefront of the energy industry”1  operating in over 40 countries and throughout the United States, including Pennsylvania. To complete  their business objectives, Repsol employed independent contractors.     26.  Many of the individuals who worked for Repsol were paid on a day-rate basis,  misclassified as independent contractors, and these make up the proposed Putative Class. While the  exact job titles and job duties may differ, the Putative Class Members are and were subjected to the  same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work.  These so-called independent contractors were  paid a flat sum for each day worked, regardless of the number of hours that they worked that day (or  in that workweek) without any overtime pay for hours that they worked in excess of forty (40) hours  in a workweek.   28.  The work Brady performed was an essential and integral part of Repsol’s core  business.   29.  While he was classified as an independent contractor, Repsol exercised control over all  aspects of his job.     30.  Repsol did not require any substantial investment by Brady or the Putative Class  Members for them to perform the work that was required.     31.  Repsol determined Brady and the Putative Class Members opportunity for profit and  loss.  Brady and the Putative Class Members were not required to possess any unique or specialized  skillset (other than that maintained by all other employees in their respective position) to perform their  job duties.     32.  Repsol controlled all the significant or meaningful aspects of the job duties performed  by Brady and the Putative Class Members.   33.  Repsol determined the hours and locations Brady and the Putative Class Members  worked, tools used, and rates of pay received.   34.  Even though Brady and the Putative Class Members often worked away from Repsol’s  offices without the presence of a direct supervisor employed by Repsol, Repsol still controlled all  aspects of Brady and the Putative Class Members job activities by enforcing mandatory compliance  with Repsol and its client’s policies and procedures.   35.  No real investment was required of Brady and the Putative Class Members to perform  their job.     37.  Repsol made the large capital investments in buildings, machines, equipment, tools,  and supplied in the business in which Brady and the Putative Class Members worked.   38.  Brady and the Putative Class Members did not incur operating expenses like rent,  payroll, marketing, and insurance.   39.  Brady and the Putative Class Members were economically dependent on Repsol during  their employment.   40.  Repsol set Brady and the Putative Class Members rates of pay, their work schedules,  and prohibited them from working other jobs for other companies while they were working on jobs  for Repsol.   41.  Repsol directly determined Brady and the Putative Class Members opportunity for  profit and loss.  Brady and the Putative Class Members earning opportunities were based on the  number of days Repsol scheduled them to work.   42.  Moreover, the job functions of Brady and the Putative Class Members were primarily  manual labor/technical in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education  or other advanced degree.    43.  Brady and the Putative Class Members did not have any supervisory or management  duties.   44.  Brady and the Putative Class Members were not employed by Repsol on a project-by- project basis.  In fact, while Brady and the Putative Class Members were classified as independent  contractors, they were regularly on call for Repsol and/or its clients and were expected to drop  everything and work whenever needed.   46.  Brady and the Putative Class Members also worked similar hours and were denied  overtime as a result of the same illegal pay practice.    47.  Repsol’s policy of failing to pay their independent contractors, including Brady and  the Putative Class Members, overtime violates the FLSA and PMWA because these workers are, for  all purposes, employees performing non-exempt job duties.   48.  Because Brady (and Repsol’s other independent contractors) were misclassified as  independent contractors by Repsol, they should receive overtime for all hours that they worked in  excess of 40 hours in each workweek.  VI.  60.  Brady incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices  Repsol imposed on Brady were likewise imposed on the Putative Class Members.   61.  Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in  willful violation of the FLSA and PMWA.    63.  Based on his experiences and tenure with Repsol, Brady is aware that Repsol’s illegal  practices were imposed on the Putative Class Members.   64.  The Putative Class Members were all improperly classified as independent contractors  and not afforded the overtime compensation when they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week.   65.  Repsol’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by state  and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not  dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members.   66.  Brady’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Putative Class  Members.   67.  The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Putative Class Members do not  prevent class or collective treatment.     68.  Brady has no interest contrary to, or in conflict with, the Putative Class Members. Like  each Putative Class Member, Brady has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed to  them under state and/or federal law.   69.  A class and collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available  means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit.    70.  Absent this action, many Putative Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their  injuries and Repsol will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA and applicable state labor laws.   71.  Furthermore, even if some of the Putative Class Members could afford individual  litigation against Repsol, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system.    73.  The questions of law and fact common to the Putative Class Members predominate  over any questions affecting solely the individual members. Among the common questions of law and  fact are:  a.  Whether Repsol employed the Putative Class Members within the meaning of  the applicable state and federal statutes, including the FLSA and PMWA;  b.  Whether the Putative Class Members were improperly misclassified as  independent contractors;  c.  Whether Repsol’s decision to classify the Putative Class Members as  independent contractors was made in good faith;   d.  Whether Repsol’s decision to not pay time and a half for overtime to the  Putative Class Members was made in good faith;   e.  Whether Repsol’s violation of the FLSA and PMWA was willful; and   f.  Whether Repsol’s illegal pay practices were applied uniformly across the nation  to all Putative Class Members.   74.  Brady’s claims are typical of the claims of the Putative Class Members. Brady and the  Putative Class Members sustained damages arising out of Repsol’s illegal and uniform employment  policy.    75.  Brady knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this  litigation that would preclude its ability to go forward as a collective or class action.   76.  Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no  detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude  collective and class action treatment.  IX. 