25.  In 2017, Defendant, using an automated text-messaging platform, caused various text  messages to be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 2907 (“2907 Number”),  including the following text messages:   26.  Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they promoted Defendant’s  fitness facilities.    28.   Plaintiff received the subject text messages within this judicial district and, therefore,  Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district.  Upon information and belief,  Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district.     29.  At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to  be contacted by text messages using an ATDS.     30.  Plaintiff is the subscriber and user of the 2907 Number.    31.  The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text messages establishes that  Defendant utilized an ATDS to transmit the messages.  See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14-cv- 2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions,  combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short  code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice  Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer  text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would  be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D.  Cal. 2010) (finding it “plausible” that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements  written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132- IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing  that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)).     33.  Defendant’s unsolicited text message caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion  of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.  Defendant’s  text message also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life.  See Patriotic  Veterans, Inc. v. Zoeller, No. 16-2059, 2017 WL 25482, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017) (“Every call uses  some of the phone owner’s time and mental energy, both of which are precious.”).    34.  Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  herself and all others similarly situated.   35.  Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the below defined Class:  All persons within the United States who, within the four  years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text  message, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s  behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number,  advertising Defendant’s services, without the recipients’  prior express written consent.     36.  Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not  know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several  thousands, if not more.  39.  There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate  over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class.  Among the questions of law and  fact common to the Class are:  (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class  members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS;  (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior  express written consent to make such calls;  (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful;  (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and  (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.   40.  The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s  claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular  telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of  being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.  45.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-44 above, as if fully set forth  herein.    47.  “Automatic telephone dialing system” refers to any equipment that has the  “capacity to dial numbers without human intervention.”  See, e.g., Hicks v. Client Servs., Inc., No.  07-61822, 2009 WL 2365637, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2009) (citing FCC, In re: Rules and  Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Request of ACA  International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, 07–232, ¶ 12, n.23 (2007)).    48.  Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the  capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to  the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below.    49.  These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained  express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior  express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class  when its calls were made.    50.  Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an  automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent.    PROPOSED CLASS   Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  