12.  HCI provides information technology educational services for the healthcare  industry throughout the United States, including New York.   13.  Plaintiff Gray worked as an ATE for HCI during the statutory period and was  assigned to work at Mt. Sinai Hospital in New York, NY from January 2018 to March 2018, the  Mayo Clinic in Rochester, MN from March 2018 to April 2018, Deaconess Hospital in  Evansville, IN in May 2018, and BJC Hospital in St. Louis, MO in June 2018.   14.  Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated ATEs’ primary duty was to provide  assistance to healthcare provider staff in using healthcare-related software. Plaintiff and other  similarly situated ATEs provided “hands-off” interaction with the healthcare provider entity’s  employees to help them use such software. Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs had little  discretion in the performance of their job and worked within closely-prescribed limits provided  by HCI. More complex issues, such as technical issues with the software, were escalated to the  next level of employees.   15.  Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs were paid solely on a salary basis.   16.  HCI unlawfully classified Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs as “exempt”  from the overtime requirements of the FLSA.   17.  Throughout the statutory period, Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated ATEs’  primary duty was not related to the management of the business operations of Defendant or its  customers.   19.  Throughout the statutory period, Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated ATEs’  primary duty was not the performance of work requiring advanced knowledge in a field of  science or learning.   20.  Throughout the statutory period, Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs did  not perform work requiring invention, imagination, originality, or talent in a recognized field of  artistic or creative endeavor.   21.  Throughout the statutory period, Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs were  not employed as computer systems analysts, computer programmers, software engineers, or  similarly skilled computer employees.   22.  Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs did not perform job duties that would  otherwise permit HCI to lawfully classify them as exempt under the FLSA.   23.  Despite the fact that Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs did not meet any  test for exemption, Defendant failed to pay them the requisite overtime rate of 1½ times their  regular rate for hours worked over 40 per week.    24.  HCI encouraged, required and/or permitted Plaintiff and other similarly situated  ATEs to work more than 40 hours per week. Specifically, HCI regularly required Plaintiff and  other similarly situated ATEs to work 12-hour shifts, 6 or 7 days per week. For example, during  the workweek of March 12, 2018 to March 18, 2018, Plaintiff Gray worked approximately 84  hours but did not receive overtime compensation at 1½ times their regular rate for hours worked  beyond 40 in that workweek.   26.  Upon information and belief, Defendant did not inquire into whether its  compensation practices with respect to Plaintiff and ATEs complied with the law.  Defendant did  not take affirmative steps to ensure that its compensation practices with respect to Plaintiff and  ATEs complied with the law.   27.  Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs were subject to Defendant’s uniform  policies and practices and were victims of Defendant’s schemes to deprive them of overtime  compensation. As a result of Defendant’s improper and willful failure to pay Plaintiff and other  similarly situated ATEs in accordance with the requirements of the FLSA, Plaintiff and other  similarly situated ATEs suffered lost wages and other damages.  28.  Plaintiff brings Count I of this lawsuit pursuant to § 216(b) of the FLSA as a  collective action on behalf of herself and the following class of potential opt-in litigants (the  “FLSA Collective”):  All individuals who currently work, or have worked, for Defendant as an ATE or  any other similarly situated, salary-paid position during the applicable statute of  limitations of period.    29.  Plaintiff reserves the right to re-define the FLSA Collective prior to notice or  collective certification, and thereafter, as necessary.   31.  Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and other similarly situated  ATEs worked in excess of 40 hours in any given workweek. Nonetheless, Defendant has  operated under a scheme to deprive Plaintiff and the other members of the FLSA Collective of  overtime compensation by failing to properly compensate them for all overtime worked.  32.  Plaintiff also seeks to maintain this action as a class action, pursuant to Fed. R.  Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b), on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated ATEs who worked  for Defendant in New York, Indiana, Minnesota, or Missouri, at any time within each respective  state law’s applicable statute of limitations period.1   33.  Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs all worked under common  employment policies, were subject to the same compensation scheme, and were subject to the  same practices challenged in this action as described above.  Class Definition   35.  More than 40 ATEs were employed by Defendant who were subject to the same  practices challenged in this action as alleged above and not paid overtime compensation for all  time worked in excess of 40 in given workweeks.  Accordingly, Plaintiff satisfies the numerosity  requirements as each State Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.   36.  Members of each proposed State Class can be identified and located using  Defendant’s payroll and personnel records. State Class members may be informed of the  pendency of this action by direct mail, electronic mail, text message, and/or published and  broadcast notice.  Common Questions of Fact or Law   37.  There are questions of fact and law common to each State Class member which  predominate over questions affecting only individual members, if any. Plaintiff, the members of  each State Class, and Defendant have a commonality of interest in the subject matter and the  remedy sought.   38.  If individual actions were required to be brought by each member of each State  Class injured or affected, the result would be a multiplicity of actions, creating a hardship to the  Court, the State Classes, and to the Defendant. Accordingly, a class action is an appropriate  method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit and distribution of the common fund  to which each State Class is entitled.   Typicality   40.  Plaintiff is an adequate representative of each State Class she seeks to represent  because she is a member of each State Class, and her interests do not conflict with the interests  of the members of each State Class she seeks to represent. The interests of each State Class  member will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her undersigned counsel.  Plaintiff has hired competent attorneys who are experienced in class action litigation of this type  and who are committed to the prosecution of this Action.  Superiority   41.  A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of the parties is impracticable.  Class  action treatment will allow a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their  common claims in a single forum, simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary  duplication of effort and expense if these claims were brought individually.   42.  Moreover, as the damages suffered by each State Class member may be relatively  small, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it difficult for each State  Class member to bring individual claims.     44.  Plaintiff reasserts and reallege the allegations set forth in each of the above  paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.   45.  Count I arises from Defendant’s violation of the FLSA, for its failure to pay  overtime wages earned by Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs.   46.  At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been an employer within the  meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).   47.  At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been an enterprise within the  meaning of Section 3(r) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(r).   48.  At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been an enterprise engaged in  commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Section 3(s)(1) of  the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1), in that the enterprise has had employees engaged in commerce  or in the production of goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or otherwise  working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person  and in that the enterprise has had and has an annual gross volume of sales made or business done  of not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which are separately  stated).   50.  Throughout the relevant period, Defendant violated the FLSA by routinely  suffering or permitting Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs to work overtime hours per  week without paying them overtime wages for these hours.   51.  Throughout the relevant period, Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs  worked in excess of 40 hours per week but were not paid an overtime premium of 1½ times their  regular hourly rate for those additional hours.   52.  Plaintiff and other ATEs are similarly-situated individuals within the meaning of  the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b).    53.  The foregoing actions of Defendant violated the FLSA.   54.  The conduct alleged above reduced HCI’s labor and payroll costs at the expense  of Plaintiff and ATEs who should have received overtime payment for overtime hours worked.   55.  Defendant has acted willfully and has either known that its conduct violated the  FLSA or has shown reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct violated the FLSA.   Defendant has not acted in good faith with respect to the conduct alleged herein.   56.  Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs were subject to HCI’s uniform policies  and practices and were victims of HCI’s schemes to deprive them of overtime compensation.  As  a result of HCI’s improper and willful failure to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs  in accordance with the requirements of the FLSA, Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs  suffered lost wages and other damages.   58.  Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs for actual  damages, liquidated damages and equitable relief, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b), as well as  reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses.   59.  Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs are also entitled to injunctive relief to  prevent Defendant from continuing its violation of the FLSA and other appropriate collective- wide injunctive relief.  60.  Plaintiff reasserts and realleges the allegations set forth in each of the above  paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.   61.  Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs that worked in New York during the  applicable statute of limitations period (the “New York Class”) meet the requirements for  certification and maintenance of a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil  Procedure.   62.  At all relevant times, Plaintiff Gray was employed by Defendant within the  meaning of New York Labor Law §§ 2 and 651.   63.  Under New York law, an employee must be paid overtime, equal to 1½ times the  employee’s regular rate of pay, for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week in the manner and  methods provided by the FLSA. 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2.   64.  By engaging in the above-alleged conduct, Defendant has failed to pay members  of the New York Class proper overtime compensation as required by the New York Labor Law.   66.  The conduct alleged above reduced HCI’s labor and payroll costs at the expense  of Plaintiff and ATEs who should have received overtime payment for overtime hours worked.   67.  Defendant has acted willfully and has either known that its conduct violated the  New York Labor Law or have shown a reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct  violated the New York Labor Law. Defendant has not acted in good faith with respect to the  conduct alleged herein.   68.  As a result of Defendant’s violations of the New York Labor Law, Gray and other  members of the New York Class have suffered harm and are entitled to recoup their unpaid  wages and other losses in an amount to be determined at trial, along with liquidated damages,  interest and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.  69.  Plaintiff reasserts and realleges the allegations set forth in each of the paragraphs  above.   70.  Plaintiff and other members of the New York Class meet the requirements for  certification and maintenance of a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil  Procedure.   72.  Pursuant to New York Labor Law art. VI, § 195(3), as of April 9, 2011, all  employers are required to provide employees with a written statement with the payment of wages  which lists, inter alia, the number of regular and overtime hours worked and overtime rate of  pay.   73.  Defendant willfully and systematically failed to provide Plaintiff and other  members of the New York Class with the required notices or written statements pursuant to New  York Labor Law art. VI, § 195(1) and (3).   74.  Accordingly, Plaintiff and other members of the New York Class are entitled to  recover from Defendant’s damages pursuant to New York Labor Law art. VI, § 198.   75.  Plaintiff and other members of the New York Class also seek injunctive relief  precluding Defendant from continued violations of these laws and affirmatively mandating its  compliance with the provisions of the New York Labor Law.  76.  Plaintiff reasserts and realleges the allegations set forth in each of the paragraphs  above.   77.  Plaintiff and other members of the New York Class meet the requirements for  certification and maintenance of a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil  Procedure.   79.   Defendant has accepted and received the benefits of the work performed by  Plaintiff and other members of the New York Class at the expense of Plaintiff and other  members of the Class.   80.  It is inequitable and unjust for Defendant to reap the benefits of Plaintiff’s and  other members of the New York Class’s labor, which includes unpaid overtime hours and the  pay due for spread of hours.   81.  Plaintiff and other members of the New York Class are entitled to relief for this  unjust enrichment in an amount equal to the benefits unjustly retained by Defendant, plus interest  on these amounts.  82.  Plaintiff reasserts and realleges the allegations set forth in each of the above  paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.   83.  Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs that worked in Indiana during the  applicable statute of limitations period (the “Indiana Class”) meet the requirements for  certification and maintenance of a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil  Procedure.   84.  At all relevant times, Plaintiff Gray was employed by Defendant within the  meaning of IWPS §§ 22-2-2-3.   86.  Additionally, under Indiana law, an employer must compensate their employees  for all amounts due. Employers that fail to make payments of wages for all amounts due, such as  withheld overtime compensation, shall be liable to the employee for the amount of unpaid wages,  and if employer does not act in good faith, the court shall order liquidated damages equal to two  (2) times the amount of wages due to the employee. IWPS § 22-2-5-2.   87.  By engaging in the above-alleged conduct, Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiff  and other members of the Indiana Class proper overtime compensation as required by the IWPS.   88.  Gray and other members of the Indiana Class are victims of a uniform company- wide compensation policy. This uniform policy, in violation of the IWPS, has been applied to all  members of the Indiana Class, and has deprived them of earned overtime compensation.   89.  Defendant has acted willfully and has either known that its conduct violated the  IWPS or has shown a reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct violated the IWPS.  Defendant has not acted in good faith with respect to the conduct alleged herein.   90.  As a result of Defendant’s violations of the IWPS, Gray and other members of the  Indiana Class have suffered harm and are entitled to recoup their unpaid wages and other losses  in an amount to be determined at trial, along with liquidated damages, interest and reasonable  attorneys’ fees and costs.   92.  Plaintiff and other members of the Indiana Class meet the requirements for  certification and maintenance of a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil  Procedure.   93.  At all times material to this Complaint, Defendant, by its policies and actions,  benefited from, and increased its profits by failing to pay Plaintiff and other members of the  Indiana Class all wages due for work performed, including but not limited to overtime  compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek.   94.   Defendant has accepted and received the benefits of the work performed by  Plaintiff and other members of the Indiana Class at the expense of Plaintiff and other members of  the Indiana Class.   95.  It is inequitable and unjust for Defendant to reap the benefits of Plaintiff’s and  other members of the Indiana Class’s labor, which includes unpaid overtime hours.   96.  Plaintiff and other members of the Indiana Class are entitled to relief for this  unjust enrichment in an amount equal to the benefits unjustly retained by Defendant, plus interest  on these amounts.  97.  Plaintiff reasserts and realleges the allegations set forth in each of the above  paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.   99.  At all relevant times, Plaintiff Gray was employed by Defendant within the  meaning of the MFLSA §§ 177.23(5)-(7).   100.  Under Minnesota law, an employee must be paid overtime compensation, equal to  1½ times the employee’s regular rate of pay, for all hours worked in excess of 48 per week.  INDIANA COMMON LAW  UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND/OR QUANTUM MERUIT   INDIANA WAGE PAYMENT STATUTE SECTION 22-2-2-4  DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME UNDER INDIANA LAW   MINNESOTA FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT SECTION 177.25  DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME UNDER MINNESOTA LAW   MISSOURI COMMON LAW  UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND/OR QUANTUM MERUIT  119.  Plaintiff reasserts and realleges the allegations set forth in each of the paragraphs  above.  120.  Plaintiff and other members of the Missouri Class meet the requirements for  certification and maintenance of a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil  Procedure.  121.  At all times material to this Complaint, Defendant, by its policies and actions,  benefited from, and increased its profits by failing to pay Plaintiff and other members of the  Missouri Class all wages due for work performed, including but not limited to overtime  compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek.  122.   Defendant has accepted and received the benefits of the work performed by  Plaintiff and other members of the Class at the expense of Plaintiff and other members of the  Missouri Class.  123.  It is inequitable and unjust for Defendant to reap the benefits of Plaintiff’s and  other members of the Missouri Class’s labor, which includes unpaid overtime hours.  124.  Plaintiff and other members of the Missouri Class are entitled to relief for this  unjust enrichment in an amount equal to the benefits unjustly retained by Defendant, plus interest  on these amounts.  NEW YORK LABOR LAW SECTION 195  DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE COMPLETE WRITTEN STATEMENTS  CONCURRENT WITH THE PAYMENT OF WAGES   NEW YORK LABOR ARTICLE 6 AND 19  FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME UNDER NEW YORK LABOR LAW   NEW YORK COMMON LAW  UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND/OR QUANTUM MERUIT   THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT SECTION 207  DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO PAY EARNED OVERTIME  