(Failure to Pay Overtime Wages)   18.  Magellan operates and has operated “call centers” in Arizona and across the  nation where telephone-dedicated employees similar to Plaintiff handle phone calls  regarding various call center services including medical authorization and insurance  inquiries offered by Magellan to its customers.     20.  Magellan had the power to hire and fire Plaintiff and other persons  similarly situated.   21.  At the Magellan call center where Plaintiff Hayford worked, Magellan had  managers on the floor of the call center during the workday, managing the work activities  of the Plaintiff and other similarly situated persons.   22.  Defendant does not allow telephone-based employees to use its phones and  computers for any personal use.  Additionally, Defendant generally prohibits and does  not allow telephone-based employees to use their own personal cell phones on the call  center floor.  Under Defendant’s policies and practices, telephone-based employees are  required to store their personal cell phones during the work day and can generally only  use them on breaks and off the call center floor.    23.  At the Magellan call center where Plaintiff worked, Magellan’s managers  on the call center floor could and did regularly see with their own eyes that Plaintiff and  similarly situated telephone-based employees arrived at their work stations before the  start of their scheduled shift time, logged into Magellan’s computers, and began working  on their computers prior to the start of their scheduled shift time.   24.  Despite seeing and knowing that Plaintiff and similarly situated telephone- based employees performed work at their work stations prior to their scheduled shift time  start, Defendant and its managers on the floor of the call center did not make any effort to  stop or otherwise disallow this pre-shift work and instead allowed and permitted it to  happen.   25.  Defendant possesses, controls and/or has access to information and  electronic data that shows the times Plaintiff and similarly situated telephone-based  employees logged into their computers each day and the time they logged into their  telephone systems.     27.  Despite having this information and knowing that Plaintiff and similarly  situated telephone-based employees logged into their computers, initialized necessary  software programs, and read company issued emails and instructions prior to the start of  their scheduled shift time, Defendant did not make any effort to stop or otherwise  disallow this pre-shift work and instead allowed and permitted it to happen.     28.  Defendant knowingly required and/or permitted Plaintiff and those similarly  situated to her to perform unpaid work before and after the start and end times of their  shifts, including but not limited to booting up computers, initializing several software  programs, and reading company issued emails and instructions prior to the start of their  scheduled shift time, and completing customer service calls, closing down the software  programs, and logging off the system after the end of their scheduled shift times.   29.  In addition, by having managers on the call center floor and having access  to the electronic data, among other things, Defendant was aware that Plaintiff and those  similarly situated to her also performed work for Defendant on their break periods, for  which they were not paid.  The work that Plaintiff and similarly situated employees  performed during break periods includes, but is not limited to, completing customer  orders, finishing customer service calls, logging back into the phone system, re-booting  their computers and initializing software programs.   30.  The amount of uncompensated time Plaintiff and those similarly situated  to her spend or have spent on these required and unpaid work activities averages  approximately fifteen to twenty minutes per day per person.   31.  Defendant monitored and directed the work activities of Plaintiff and other  similarly situated persons, including the unpaid work at issue.  B.   Defendant Knew of and Assented to the Pre-Shift Work   33.  In order to be logged into Magellan’s telephone systems, Defendant  required and/or permitted Plaintiff and similarly situated telephone-based employees to  arrive at their work station prior to their scheduled shift time and boot up computers,  initialize several software programs, and read company emails and instructions.    34.  Defendant’s policy and practice disciplines telephone-based employees if  they are not logged into their phones and ready to handle calls by the start of their  scheduled shift time.     35.  This policy and practice of Defendant results in telephone-based  employees, including the Plaintiff, to boot up their computers, initialize several software  programs and/or read company emails and instructions prior to their start of their  scheduled shift time.    36.  As set forth herein, via its policies and practices and through its own  telephone and computer systems, Defendant knew and was aware that the telephone- based employees performed work prior to the start of their scheduled shift.     37.  Defendant did not instruct Plaintiff and similarly situated telephone-based  employees to not log into their computers or telephone, or to not read company emails  prior to the start of their scheduled shift time.  Rather, Defendant required, permitted  and/or allowed Plaintiff and the putative class members to work prior to their scheduled  shift time.   38.  By knowing of, permitting and/or requiring Plaintiff and similarly situated  telephone-based employees to log into their computers, initialize their various software  programs and/or read company email and instructions prior to the start of their scheduled  shift time, Defendant assented to them performing this work.    C.   Defendant’s Failure to Pay Overtime Wages to Its Telephone-Based  Hourly Employees   40.  Defendant’s managers reviewed and approved Plaintiff and other similarly  situated persons’ time records prior to receiving their paychecks.     41.  Defendant supervised and controlled the work schedule of Plaintiff and  other similarly situated persons.   42.  Defendant issued paychecks to Plaintiff other similarly situated persons,  and was involved in determining the actual amount of compensation paid by the  paycheck.   43.  Plaintiff and those employees similarly situated are individuals who were,  or are, employed by Defendant in customer service, sales, and similar positions at  Magellan’s call centers who were not paid for some or all of their work activities prior to  the beginning of their shifts, during meal and rest breaks, or after the end of their shifts.   44.  Plaintiff and the other employees are similarly situated to one another  because their duties consisted primarily of providing services related to handling phone calls  regarding various call center services including medical authorization and insurance  inquiries offered by Magellan to its customers while working in Magellan’s call centers.   Plaintiff and others similarly situated all shared similar policies, job titles, job descriptions,  training, job duties and compensation, among other things.   45.  Plaintiff and the other employees are also similar because Defendant did  not pay them for all time they actually worked.  Defendant knowingly required Plaintiff and  the similarly situated individuals to perform unpaid work before and after their scheduled  shifts, including but not limited to booting-up computers, initializing several software  programs, reading company emails and instructions, and completing customer service  calls.  Additionally, Defendant was aware that Plaintiff and those similarly situated to her  also performed work for Defendant on their break periods, for which they were not paid.   47.  Plaintiff and others similarly situated at times work or worked in excess of  forty hours per week for Defendant in a given workweek.   48.  Defendant’s policy and practice of requiring and/or permitting its  employees, including Plaintiff and other non-exempt, hourly employees, to perform work  without pay for such work performed, violates Section 6 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206.   49.  Defendant’s policy and practice of requiring its employees to perform work  without pay in many instances has caused and continues to cause Plaintiff and certain  other similarly situated hourly employees to work in excess of forty hours per week,  without being properly compensated at a wage of 1.5 times their respective hourly rate  for such work performed, as required by Section 7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207.   50.  Defendant’s failure to compensate its non-exempt, hourly call center  employees with the full amount of the applicable regular wage or overtime wage has  caused Plaintiff and other similarly situated non-exempt call center employees to suffer  harm.   51.  Defendant’s non-exempt, call center hourly employees are entitled to  compensation for all time they worked without pay in any given workweek.  52.  Plaintiff brings Count I of this Complaint as a collective action on behalf of  herself and all other current and former hourly employees of Defendant who Defendant  required to perform the work described herein without pay at any time during the three  years prior to the commencement of the action to present at call centers owned by  Magellan.    54.  Other employees similarly situated to Plaintiff work or have worked at  Magellan call centers, but were not paid overtime at the rate of one and one-half their  regular rate when those hours exceeded forty hours per workweek.     55.  Although Defendant permitted and/or required the FLSA Class Members to  work in excess of forty hours per workweek, Defendant has denied them full  compensation for their hours worked over forty.  Defendant has also denied them full  compensation at the federally mandated minimum wage rate.   56.  FLSA Class Members perform or have performed the same or similar work  as Plaintiff.   57.  FLSA Class Members regularly work or have worked in excess of forty  hours during a workweek.   58.  FLSA Class Members are not exempt from receiving overtime pay at the  federally mandated wage rate under the FLSA.   59.  As such, FLSA Class Members are similar to Plaintiff in terms of job  duties, pay structure, and the denial of overtime wages.   60.  Defendant’s failure to pay the overtime compensation wage rate required  by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices, and does not depend  on the personal circumstances of the FLSA Class Members.   61.  The experiences of Plaintiff, with respect to her pay, are typical of the  experiences of the FLSA Class Members.   63.  All FLSA Class Members, irrespective of their particular job requirements,  are entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty during a  workweek.   64.  Although the exact amount of damages may vary among FLSA Class  Members, the damages for the FLSA Class Members can be easily calculated by a simple  formula. The claims of all FLSA Class Members arise from a common nucleus of facts.  Liability is based on a systematic course of wrongful conduct by Defendant that caused  harm to all FLSA Class Members.   65.  As such, Plaintiff brings her FLSA overtime as a collective action on behalf  of the following class, and Plaintiff’s Counsel seek to send notice of this lawsuit to the  following described persons:  All persons who worked for Defendant as telephone  dedicated employees, however titled, who were compensated,  in part or in full, on an hourly basis at Magellan call centers at  any time between December 28, 2012 and the present who  did not receive the full amount of overtime wages earned and  owed to them.   66.  There are questions of law or fact common to the employees described in  paragraph 65.   67.  Plaintiff is similarly situated to the employees described in paragraph 65, as  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of those persons.   68.  Plaintiff’s claims or defenses are typical of the claims or defenses of the  persons described in paragraph 65.   69.  This is not a collusive or friendly action.  Plaintiff has retained counsel  experienced in complex employment litigation, and Plaintiff and her counsel will fairly  and adequately protect the interests of the persons described in paragraph 65.   71.  At all relevant times, Defendant employed Plaintiff and the persons  described in paragraph 65.   72.  At all relevant times, Defendant paid Plaintiff and the persons described in  paragraph 65 to work.   73.  At all relevant times, Defendant has been an “employer” of Plaintiff and the  persons described in paragraph 65, as the term “employer” is defined by Section 3(d) of  the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).     74.  At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the persons described in paragraph 65  have been “employees” of Defendant as defined by Section 3(e) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.  § 203(e).  75.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 74  as paragraph 75 of this Count I.   76.  Plaintiff, individually and on behalf and the members of the class  described in paragraph 65, asserts claims for unpaid overtime pursuant to the FLSA.   77.  At any and all times relevant hereto, Defendant was an “enterprise engaged  in commerce” within the meaning of Section 3(s) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s).   78.  At any and all times relevant hereto, Defendant was an “employer” of the  Plaintiff and the members of the class described in paragraph 65 within the meaning of  Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).     79.  At any and all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff and the members of the  class described in paragraph 65 were “employees” of Defendant as defined by Section  3(e) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e).   81.  At all times relevant hereto, Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiff and the  members of the class described in paragraph 65 premium pay for all time worked over 40  hours in a week was willful in that, among other things:  a.  Defendant knew that the FLSA required it to pay time and one-half  for all time worked over 40 hours in a week;  b.  Defendant failed to maintain true and accurate time records; and  c.  Defendant encouraged Plaintiff and other similarly situated  employees to not record all time worked.   82.  As a direct and proximate result thereof, Plaintiff and the members of the  class described in paragraph 65 are due unpaid back wages and liquidated damages,  pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216.  A.  Defendant’s Practice of Requiring and/or Permitting Telephone-Based  Hourly Employees to Work Before the Start of Their Scheduled Shift  Time  