19.  Plaintiff is, and has been at all times relevant to this action, the regular and sole  user of his cellular telephone number: 940-631-XXXX.   20.  At 3:48 p.m. CDT on May 22, 2018, Plaintiff received a text message on his  cellular telephone from SMS short code 30838 stating:  The Fresh Start Program  can reduce or remove  what you owe to the IRS.  I am in the office, click on   the this number to call  me now (949) 335-4642  55.  Plaintiff brings this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and as a  representative of the following class:  All persons throughout the United States (1) to whom Defendants  delivered, or caused to be delivered, a text message, (2) directed to  a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, (3) by using an  automatic telephone dialing system, (4) within four years preceding  the date of this complaint through the date of class certification.   83.  Plaintiff incorporates herein all preceding factual allegations.   84.  A text message is a “call” as defined by the TCPA. See Satterfield v. Simon &  Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009); Arredondo v. Flexi Corp., No. 5:17-CV-4, 2017  WL 7796192, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2017) (“Making a call using an automatic telephone  dialing system triggers responsibility under the TCPA regardless of whether the recipient  answers. . . . A text message to a cellular telephone qualifies as a ‘call’ for such purposes.”).   85.  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) makes it “unlawful for any person within the United  States . . . to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the  prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an  artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular  telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or  any service for which the called party is charged for the call . . . .”   86.  47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2) additionally states, with respect to advertisement and  telemarketing calls—of which Defendants’ texts to Plaintiff are—that “[n]o person or entity  may . . . [i]nitiate or cause to be initiated, any telephone call that includes or introduces an  advertisement or constitutes telemarketing, using an automatic telephone dialing system or an  artificial or prerecorded voice, to any of the lines or telephone numbers described in  paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (iii) of this section, other than a call made with the prior express  written consent of the called party . . . .”    Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)  