26.   Defendant offers a wide variety of human resources services and software designed  to meet its clients’ payroll and benefits needs.   27.   To assist its clients during the process of implementing these services and software,  Defendant employed Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees to work as Implementation  Coordinators and Implementation Project Managers (collectively, “Implementation Rep(s)”).    28.   Despite their titles, Plaintiffs’ and other Implementation Reps’ duties were non- managerial in nature. Their work largely consisted of providing non-technical support and routine  customer service.    29.   Plaintiffs and others similarly situated served as liaisons between Defendant’s  clients and the development teams responsible for implementing Defendant’s products. Plaintiffs’  and other Implementation Reps’ duties centered on maintaining routine communications with  clients for purposes of answering any questions they had. This primarily consisted of conveying  general information in reference to a client’s service plans and providing updates regarding all  service requests. There were basic protocols aligned with all of the tasks they performed.   30.   Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were responsible for handling numerous  ongoing projects specific to Defendant’s clients. The expectation was that Plaintiffs and other  Implementation Reps would have thirty (30) to thirty-five (35) clients at one time. However, in  reality, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were responsible for significantly more than that.    31.   Plaintiffs and other Implementation Reps were required to schedule a “welcome  call” with a customer within twenty-four (24) hours of being assigned to a new project. Plaintiffs  and other Implementation Reps were required to discuss specific scripted topics on each call.    33.    Plaintiffs were not involved with managing or coordinating the implementation of  Defendant’s software. There were specialized teams managed by Defendant’s other employees  who were responsible for these tasks.    34.   The focus of Plaintiffs’ and other Implementation Reps’ tasks was customer  service. From the initial welcome call until the completion of the implementation process,  Plaintiffs were responsible for all customer service related duties. Only when a client’s software  was fully implemented were Plaintiffs’ and other Implementation Reps’ customer service duties  complete.      35.   While performing their duties, Plaintiffs and other implementation personnel did  not require any specialized training or advanced knowledge. All of their tasks were basic in nature.  They did not have any true decision-making authority.    36.   Rather than make substantive determinations, Plaintiffs and others similarly  situated were solely responsible for conveying basic information between Defendant’s customers  and Defendant’s development teams.   37.   In their roles as Implementation Project Managers and Implementation  Coordinators (collectively, “Implementation Rep(s)”), Plaintiffs and others similarly situated did  not perform any analysis.   38.   Plaintiff and other Implementation Reps lacked discretion altogether; the  performance of their duties did not require independent judgement.    40.   Plaintiffs and other Implementation Reps did not have any input in regard to  Defendant’s employment policies or procedures.    41.   Plaintiffs and other Implementation Reps did not have the authority to hire or fire  employees.    42.   Plaintiffs and other Implementation Reps were not responsible for any supervisory  tasks.    43.   Plaintiffs and others similarly situated satisfied the requirements of their positions  and adequately performed their duties to benefit Defendant.    44.   Plaintiffs and other Implementation Reps were all paid a salary. They received the  same bi-weekly payments regardless of the number of hours they worked each week.    45.   During her time as an Implementation Project Manager, Plaintiff Errickson  received an annual salary of approximately sixty-two thousand five hundred dollars ($62,500.00).  She was paid the same bi-weekly salary regardless of the number of hours she worked each week.    46.   During his time as an Implementation Coordinator, Plaintiff Trovato received an  annual salary of approximately forty-five thousand dollars ($45,000.00). His bi-weekly payments  did not change, regardless of the number of hours he worked each week.   47.   Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were scheduled to work forty (40) hours each  week. They were scheduled to work five (5) days a week, Monday through Friday. However, the  hours they actually worked far exceeded this schedule.    49.   Having to always remain available to answer customer inquiries also caused  Plaintiffs and other Implementation Reps to work hours outside of their schedule. The strict  deadlines imposed by Defendant in regard to when Plaintiff and other Implementation Reps had  to respond to each inquiry forced them to work before and after their scheduled shifts.    50.   Understaffing also contributed to Plaintiffs and others similarly situated having to  work more than their scheduled hours. Defendant failed to provide an adequate number of  personnel to meet the demands of its business. This includes not staffing the requisite number of  customer service representatives to meet its clients’ needs.    51.   As a result, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were required to handle tasks  that should have been completed by Defendant’s customer service representatives. Having to  perform tasks that should have been completed by other employees significantly increased  Plaintiffs’ and other Implementation Reps’ workload.    52.   Due to the demands of their workload, it was common for Plaintiffs and others  similarly situated to work early in the morning, late in the evening, as well as on weekends. The  demands of their employment also required them to work remotely in order to keep up with their  daily tasks. The volume of their assignments left no other choice.    53.   Due to all of these conditions, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated worked well  over forty (40) hours each week. Working overtime was integral to their employment. Plaintiffs  consistently worked fifty (50) to sixty (60) hours each week. There were times when they worked  even more.   55.   Defendant accomplished this illegal act by willfully misclassifying Plaintiffs and  other Implementation Reps as salaried employees. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and others similarly  situated failed to receive overtime wages.    56.   There is no bona fide dispute that Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees  are owed overtime wages for all hours worked over forty (40) in a week.   57.   The duties performed by Plaintiffs and others similarly situated did not implicate  any exemptions contained within the FLSA or NYLL.    58.   Defendant was well aware that the nature of the tasks performed by Plaintiffs and  others similarly situated entitled them to overtime wages.   59.   Defendant knew of the excessive overtime hours worked by Plaintiffs and others  similarly situated.    60.   Defendant’s upper management officials were well aware that Plaintiffs and other  Implementation Reps had to consistently work well over forty (40) hours a week to complete their  assigned tasks.     61.   In bad faith, Defendant suffered, permitted and/or required Plaintiffs and others  similarly situated to work these overtime hours.  62.   Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Plaintiffs brings this action on behalf of themselves  and all other similarly situated employees.   64.   As Implementation Coordinators and Implementation Project Managers  (collectively, “Implementation Reps”), Plaintiffs and the FLSA collective are or were employed  by Defendant within the meaning of the FLSA.   65.   Plaintiffs and other Implementation Reps were all paid a salary.    66.   The proposed FLSA collective class is defined as:   All persons who work or worked as salaried Implementation Coordinators,  Implementation Project Managers, or in other positions with similar job  duties for Defendant at any time during the last three (3) years prior to the  filing of this Complaint through the entry of judgment (the “FLSA  collective”).1   67.   Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Plaintiffs have consented to be a part of this action.  Plaintiffs’ signed consent forms are attached as Exhibit A.  As this case proceeds, it is likely that  additional individuals will file consent forms and join as “opt-in” Plaintiffs.   68.   At all times relevant to this Complaint, Plaintiffs and other members of the FLSA  collective worked as non-exempt employees eligible for overtime pay.    69.   The duties assigned to Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees do not  satisfy the duties tests contained within any of the exemptions specified in the FLSA.   70.   Defendant operated under a common policy of suffering, permitting and/or  requiring Plaintiffs and the FLSA collective to work unpaid overtime hours.     71.   Defendant knew, or should have known, that Plaintiffs and the FLSA collective  routinely worked unpaid overtime hours.   73.   Plaintiffs and the FLSA collective regularly worked over forty (40) hours per  workweek to meet Defendant’s production requirements.   74.   Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA collective for the overtime hours  they worked.   75.   Defendant’s unlawful conduct was widespread, repetitious and consistent, affecting  Plaintiffs and all members of the FLSA collective equally.   76.   Defendant’s conduct was willful and in bad faith.   77.   Defendant’s conduct has caused significant damages to Plaintiffs and the FLSA  collective.   78.   Defendant is liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiffs  and the FLSA collective.   79.   There are numerous similarly situated current and former employees of Defendant  who have been denied proper overtime compensation, in violation of the FLSA.   80.   These similarly situated employees would benefit from the issuance of court- supervised notice of this lawsuit by providing an opportunity to join.     81.   Notice of this action should be sent to all similarly situated Implementation  Coordinators and Implementation Project Managers.    82.   These similarly situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily  identifiable through Defendant’s records.  84.   The class Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as:  All individuals who are or were employed by Defendant as salaried  “Implementation Coordinators,” “Implementation Project Managers”  and/or in similar positions in the state of New York and who have been  denied, overtime and meal and rest period compensation as required by the  respective state labor laws and implementing regulations at any time within  six (6) years prior to the filing date of this action through the date of final  disposition.   85.   The proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.  During the relevant period, Defendant employed dozens of Implementation Coordinators and/or  Implementation Project Managers in the state of New York.   86.   The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical to the members of the proposed class.  The named Plaintiff and those similarly situated regularly worked more than forty (40) hours per  week, including working through meal and rest periods, and were denied overtime compensation.  Each member of the class was paid a salary that remained unchanged, regardless of the amount of  hours they worked each week. As a result, each and every class member suffered the same harm.   88.   Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A), a class action is superior to other available  methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of  wage and hour litigation where individual plaintiffs lack the financial resources and incentives to  prosecute separate lawsuits against their employer. The damages suffered by the individual class  members are small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecutions of this  litigation. Prosecuting hundreds of identical, individual lawsuits would not promote judicial  efficiency or equity, nor result in consistent results. Class certification will eliminate the need for  duplicate litigation.    89.   Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), Defendant has acted, or has refused to act, on  grounds generally applicable to the Rule 23 class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive  relief, or corresponding declaratory relief, with respect to the class as a whole.   90.   Plaintiff will fully and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff seeks  the same recovery as the class, predicated upon the same violations of law and the same damage  theory. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution of  statewide wage and hour class actions. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel have interests that are  contrary to, or conflicting with, the interests of the class.  91.   Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding  paragraphs.   93.   Plaintiffs and the FLSA collective are non-exempt employees entitled to FLSA  overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40).   94.   Plaintiffs and the FLSA collective work(ed) in excess of forty (40) hours per week,  but did not receive appropriate overtime compensation.   95.   Defendant failed to accurately record the actual hours worked by Plaintiffs and the  FLSA collective.    96.   Defendant willfully and intentionally failed to compensate Plaintiffs and the FLSA  collective for the overtime hours they worked.   97.   There is no bona fide dispute that Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees  are owed overtime wages for the work they performed for Defendant.    98.   The foregoing conduct constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA, within the  meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).    99.   As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and  those similarly situated have suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of income and other  damages.    COUNT I – Violation of the FLSA: Failure to Pay Overtime Wages to Plaintiffs and the  FLSA Collective  