1.5 times the regular hourly rate for all hours worked over 40 in a week.    13.  As healthcare information technology firm, Defendant provides training and  support to healthcare facilities in connection with the implementation of new electronic  recordkeeping systems.   14.  Defendant employs consultants, such as Dyse, who perform such training and  support services throughout the United States.   15.  Defendant’s financial results are significantly driven by the number of consultants  performing training and support services for Defendant’s customers, and the fees that Defendant  charges the customers for these services.     16.  Between July 2018 and March 2019, Dyse was assigned by HAC to provide  educational and support services to healthcare staff at Huntsville Hospital in Huntsville, Alabama.   18.  Work performed by Plaintiff and Collective Action Members is an integral part of  Defendant’s business. Defendant is in the business of providing information technology  educational services to the healthcare industry. Plaintiff and Collective Action Members provide  support and training to Defendant’s clients in connection with the implementation of electronic  recordkeeping systems.   19.  Plaintiff’s and Collective Action Members’ duties do not involve managerial work.  They follow the training provided to them by Defendant in performing their work, which is basic  training and support in using electronic recordkeeping systems.   20.  Plaintiff and Collective Action Members do not make any significant relative  investments in relation to their work with Defendant. Defendant provides the training and  equipment required to perform the functions of their work.   21.  Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members have little or no opportunity to  experience a profit or loss related to their employment. Defendant pays Plaintiff and the Collective  Action Members at a fixed hourly rate. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members do not share  in Defendant’s monetary success; their income from their work is limited to their hourly rate.   22.  Plaintiff’s and Collective Action Members’ work does not require special skills,  judgment or initiative. Defendant provides training to Plaintiff and Collective Action Members,  which they use to provide training and support to Defendant’s clients.   24.  Plaintiff and Collective Action Members are not customarily engaged in an  independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.   25.  Plaintiff and Collective Action Members typically enter into successive projects for  Defendant.    26.  Plaintiff and Collective Action Members have little or no authority to refuse or  negotiate Defendant’s rules and policies; they must comply or risk discipline and/or termination.   27.  Defendant instructs Plaintiff and Collective Action Members concerning how to do  their work and Defendant dictates the details of the performance of their jobs. For example:  a.  Defendant, not Plaintiff or Collective Action Members, conduct all of the  billing and invoicing to Defendant’s clients for the work. Defendant bills  the third-party customers directly;  b.  Plaintiff and Collective Action Members have no control over what prices  to charge, or the scheduling of shifts. All negotiations over the cost of the  work are done directly between Defendant and the third-party client;  c.  Defendant requires Plaintiff and Collective Action Members to work the  entire project from inception to conclusion;  d.  Defendant provides all training needed for Plaintiff and Collective Action  Members to perform their work; and  e.  Defendant requires Plaintiff and Collective Action Members to perform in  accordance with Defendant’s policies, manuals, standard operating  procedures and the third-party client’s requirements.   29.  Plaintiff and Collective Action Members have to request Defendant’s approval for  time off. Defendant have the discretion to grant or deny such requests.   Plaintiff and Collective Action Members are not Exempt as “Computer Employees” under  the FLSA   30.  Plaintiff and Collective Action Members provide support and training to hospital  staff in connection with electronic recordkeeping systems. Plaintiff has no specialized training or  certification in computer programming, software documentation and analysis, or testing of  computer systems or programs. Plaintiff and Collective Action Members were not working as, nor  were they similarly skilled as, computer systems analysts, computer programmers, or software  engineers, as defined in 29 C.F.R. § 541.400(a).   31.  Plaintiff’s and Collective Action Members’ primary duties consisted of training and  aiding healthcare staff with using the new recordkeeping software, whether one on one or in a  classroom setting. Plaintiff’s and Collective Action Members’ primary duties did not include the  higher skills of the “application of systems analysis techniques and procedures,” pursuant to 29  C.F.R. § 541.400(b)(1). Plaintiff and Collective Action Members did not analyze, consult or  determine hardware, software programs or any system functional specifications for Defendant’s  clients. See id.   32.  Plaintiff and Collective Action Members did not consult with Defendant’s  customers to determine or recommend hardware specifications. Plaintiff and Collective Action  Members did not design, develop, document, analyze, create, test or modify a computer system or  program, as defined in 29 C.F.R. § 541.400(b)(2).   34.  Plaintiff and Collective Action Members frequently worked in excess of forty (40)  hours per workweek, but were not paid overtime compensation as required by the FLSA.   35.  Plaintiff and Collective Action Members were paid only a straight hourly rate.   36.  Plaintiff and Collective Action Members were not provided with overtime  compensation at the rate of one and one-half (1 ½) times their regular pay rate, when they worked  more than forty (40) hours per week, as required by the FLSA.   37.  Plaintiff and Collective Action Members were not paid on a salary basis.  Defendant Willfully Violated the FLSA   39.  Based upon the foregoing, Defendant was cognizant that, or recklessly disregarded  whether, its conduct violated the FLSA.    40.  Plaintiff brings this lawsuit pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on  behalf of the FLSA Collective defined above.     41.  Plaintiff desires to pursue her FLSA claims on behalf of all individuals who opt-in  to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).     42.  Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members are “similarly situated” as that term is  used in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) because, inter alia, all such individuals have been subject to  Defendant’s common business and compensation practices as described herein, and, as a result of  such practices, have not been paid the legally mandated overtime compensation for hours worked  over forty (40) during the workweek. Resolution of this action requires inquiry into common facts,  including, inter alia, Defendant’s common misclassification, compensation and payroll practices.   43.  The FLSA requires non-exempt hourly employees to be compensated at a rate of   44.  Defendant misclassified Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Members as independent  contractors, and, as a result, failed to provide them overtime compensation for hours worked in  excess of 40 a week.   46.  Defendant employs many FLSA Collective Members throughout the United States.  These similarly situated employees may be readily notified of this action through U.S. Mail and/or  other means, and allowed to opt in to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose  of collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages (or,  alternatively, interest) and attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA.  47.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.   48.  The FLSA defines “employer” broadly to include “any person acting directly or  indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee...” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).    49.  Defendant is subject to the wage requirements of the FLSA because Defendants is  an “employer” under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).   50.  At all relevant times, Defendant has been an “employer” engaged in interstate  commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29  FLSA – Overtime Wages  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective)  