(Declaratory Relief)  (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  109. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set  forth fully herein.  110.  An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that  Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Public Facility  contains access barriers denying metabolically-disabled customers full and equal access to the  goods, services, and facilities of the Public Facility, which Defendant owns, operates, and/or  controls, and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the  Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and  N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the metabolically- disabled.  111.  A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each  of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly.  27  WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.  (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law,   Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)  (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass)   (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law,  N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.)  (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass)   (Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq.—Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act)  (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)   (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R,  Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)  (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass)   25.  Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification  of the following nationwide Class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil  Procedure: “all legally metabolically-disabled individuals in the United States who have attempted  to access the Public Facility and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and  services offered in the Public Facility during the relevant statutory period.”   26.  Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York Subclass pursuant to Fed.  R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all metabolically-disabled individuals in  New York State who have attempted to access the Public Facility and as a result have been  denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant during the relevant  statutory period.”   27.  Millions of people have a physical disability that is partly treatable by diet in the  United States, including in New York. Thus, the persons in the Class are so numerous that joinder  of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to  the parties and to the Court.   28.  This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an  inaccessible Public Facility, denying metabolically-disabled persons access to the events, goods,  and services of the Public Facility and Defendant. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of  imposing access barriers, metabolically-disabled persons have been and are being denied full and  equal access to the Public Facility.   29.  There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without  limitation, the following:  (a)  Whether the Public Facility is a “public accommodation” under the ADA;  i. Whether the Public Facility is a “place or provider of  10  public accommodation” under the laws of the New  York;  ii. Whether Defendant through the Public Facility  denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods,  services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or  accommodations  to  people  with  metabolic  disabilities in violation of the ADA; and  iii. Whether Defendant through the Public Facility  denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods,  services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or  accommodations  to  people  with  metabolic  disabilities in violation of the laws of New York.   30.  The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class,  similarly to Plaintiff, have metabolic disorders that render them metabolically-disabled, and claim  that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by imposing access barriers  on the Public Facility, such that it is not accessible to the Class of people who are legally disabled  due to eating constraints.   31.  Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the  members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and  experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic  to the members of the Class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R.  Civ P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to  11  the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and  the Class as a whole.   32.  Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)  because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions  affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available  methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation.   33.  Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in  that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the  filing of numerous similar suits by people with metabolic disabilities throughout the United States.   34.  References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each  member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated.  35.  Defendant operates the Public Facility located at 3052 West 21 Street, Brooklyn,  NY 11224 .   36.  The Public Facility is a service and benefit offered by Defendant in New York. The  Public Facility is owned, controlled, and/or operated by Defendant. Defendant sells tickets to  events at the Public Facility and on their Website, including in New York State.    37.  The Public Facility, which is marketed to consumers located in New York State, is  a commercial Public Facility that hosts events and sells goods and services.   38.  This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the  metabolically-disabled access to the Public Facility, including the goods and services offered by  Defendant through the Public Facility. Due to Defendant’s imposition of access barriers to the  Public Facility, metabolically-disabled individuals have been and are being denied equal access to  12  the Public Facility, as well as to the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public  through the Public Facility.   39.  Defendant denies the metabolically-disabled access to goods, services, and  information made available through the Public Facility by preventing them from freely entering  the Public Facility with the food they need to treat their disability.   40.  Allowing disabled people to bring medical supplies into the Public Facility presents  no significant obstacles or difficulties for Defendant. Other public facilities allow diabetic  individuals to bring insulin supplies onto their premises. However, simply bringing insulin  supplies is insufficient because: 1) diabetic individuals need readily available food in case their  blood sugar drops, 2) many diabetic individuals (including Plaintiff) need to bring pre-measured  food to match their insulin to the quantity of food consumed, and 3) Defendant’s policy ignores  metabolically-disabled individuals with other disabilities that are treated by food.    41.  The Public Facility states clearly on the Website that it does not allow outside food,  which constitutes an access barrier that prevents free and full use by Plaintiff and metabolically- disabled persons. See Exhibit A.   42.  The Public Facility thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access  to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Public Facility and who would otherwise be able to fully  and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Defendant.   43.  Plaintiff attempted to purchase tickets for One Africa show at the Public Facility,  most recently in August 2018. However, Plaintiff did not purchase tickets because he would have  been unable to ultimately access the Public Facility because of the access barrier imposed by  Defendant’s no outside food policy, as seen on the Website and attached hereto as Exhibit A.  13  These access barriers have caused the Public Facility to be inaccessible to, and not independently  usable by, metabolically-disabled individuals.    44.  As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s  Public Facility contains access barriers causing the Public Facility to be inaccessible to—and not  independently usable by—metabolically-disabled individuals.   45.  These barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the  goods, benefits, and services of the Public Facility and Defendant. Plaintiff did not attempt to  attend an event at the Public Facility because he understood Defendant’s discriminatory policy and  knew that such an attempt would be futile. The ADA explicitly does not require “a person with a  disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization  . . . does not intend to comply [with Title III of the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2)). This is  particularly true for Plaintiff, for whom going out in public without available snacks would be a  health risk. Disabled Ams. for Equal Access, Inc. v. Ferries del Caribe, Inc., 405 F.3d 60, 65 n.7  (1st Cir. 2005).   46.  Plaintiff was injured by his loss of opportunity to enjoy the Public Facility. The  ADA “expressly contemplates loss of opportunity as an actionable injury.” Betancourt v.  Federated Dep’t Stores, 732 F. Supp. 2d 693, 707 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a),  (b)). Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the  following policies or practices:   (a)  constructing and maintaining a Public Facility that is inaccessible to  metabolically-disabled class members with knowledge of the  discrimination; and/or  (b)  constructing and maintaining a Public Facility that is sufficiently intuitively  14  and/or obviously inaccessible to metabolically-disabled Class members;  and/or  (c)  failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of  substantial harm and discrimination to metabolically-disabled Class  members.   47.  Defendant utilizes standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the  effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others.   48.  Plaintiff and the Class are disabled for purposes of the ADA. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12102  reads in pertinent part:  (1)  Disability. The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual—   ▪  (A)  a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more  major life activities of such individual;   . . . .  (2)  Major life activities.  ▪  (A)  In general. For purposes of paragraph (1), major life activities  include, but are not limited to . . . eating . . . .   49.  Accordingly, courts have interpreted diseases such as food disorders and diabetes  as disabilities because those diseases interfere with eating.   50.  Even before the ADA was amended in 2008 to explicitly include “eating” as a  “major life activity,” courts interpreting the ADA considered eating to be a major life activity.  Recent decisions also hold that diabetes is a disability covered by the ADA. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12102  codifies this law because diabetes limits the major life activity of eating. See, e.g., Kells v. Sinclair  Buick--GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 830–831 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that diabetes is a  “recognized ADA impairment[]”); Lee v. District of Columbia, 920 F. Supp. 2d 127, 135 (D.D.C.  2013) (“A reasonable jury could therefore find that Mr. Lee was disabled within the meaning of  the Americans with Disabilities Act.”); Girten v. Town of Schererville, 819 F. Supp. 2d 786, 798  (N.D. Ind. 2011) (“Without question, Girten’s diabetes is quite serious and a jury could reasonably  15  find that Girten’s condition substantially limits the major life activity of eating.”); Nawrot v. CPC  Intern., 277 F.3d 896, 904–905 (7th Cir. 2002) (diabetes affected ability to think and perform  tasks); Bugg-Barber v. Randstad US, L.P., 271 F. Supp. 2d 120, 128 (D.D.C. 2003) (similar);  Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 924–926 (7th Cir. 2001) (diabetes substantially limited  eating); Downs v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-1117, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4848, at *5  (S.D. Ohio Jan. 20, 2006) (similar); U.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Public Safety, 309 F. Supp. 2d  837, 840 (S.D. Miss. 2004) (similar); Gonsalves v. J.F. Fredericks Tool Co., Inc., 964 F. Supp.  616, 621 (D. Conn. 1997) (diabetes affected eating and sleeping); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851  F. Supp. 808, 813–814 (N.D. Tex.1994) (similar); Erjavac v. Holy Family Health Plus, 13 F. Supp.  2d 737, 746–748 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (eating and waste elimination); Shirley v. Westgate Fabrics, Civil  Action No. 3:95-CV-2550-D, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16545, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 1997)  (similar).   51.  Even episodic disabilities less severe than Plaintiff’s disease would qualify for  protection under Title III. Service v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1192 (E.D.  Cal. 2001) (“Plaintiff need not be in a constant state of distress or suffer an asthmatic attack to  qualify as disabled under the ADA.”). Plaintiff’s disease is severe enough to decisively limit his  major life activity of eating.  52.  Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set  forth fully herein.   53.  Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a),  16  provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and  equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of  any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a  place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or  criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of  disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I).   54.  The Public Facility, located in New York, is a public accommodation within the  definition of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) because it is “a motion picture house, theater, concert hall,  stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment.” (emphasis added).   55.  Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates the Public  Facility.   56.  Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful  discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the  opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,  or accommodations of an entity.   57.  Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful  discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an  opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,  or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals.   58.  Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful  discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in  policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods,  services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities,  17  unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the  nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.”   59.  In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful  discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary  to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise  treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services,  unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of  the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result  in an undue burden.”   60.  Many public facilities allow outside food into their venues (as required under the  ADA). The policy of allowing outside food does not unduly burden those venues. Plaintiff and  the Class merely seek to bring into the Public Facility the food they need for medical reasons.  This would not disrupt the Public Facility’s operations.   61.  The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C.  § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Defendant who are  metabolically-disabled have been denied full and equal access to the Public Facility, have not  been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been  provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons.    62.  Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its  discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing.    63.  As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate  against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the  full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,  18  accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Public Facility and Defendant in violation of Title III  of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing  regulations.   64.  Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful  practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass will continue to suffer  irreparable harm.   65.  The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore  Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination.   66.  Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.     67.  Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth  and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.  68.  Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as  though fully set forth herein.   69.  N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory  practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or  employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any  person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the  accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”   70.  The Public Facility, located in New York State, is a sales establishment and public  accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). The Public Facility is a service,  privilege, or advantage of Defendant. Food at the Public Facility is sold by, and integrated with,  19  the Public Facility.   71.  Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and  operates the Public Facility. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1).   72.  Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in imposing access barriers to  the Public Facility, causing the Public Facility and the services integrated with the Public Facility  to be completely inaccessible to the metabolically-disabled. This inaccessibility denies  metabolically-disabled patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that  Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public.    73.  Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory  practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies,  practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges,  advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate  that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges,  advantages or accommodations.”   74.  In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice  also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a  disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services,  unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of  the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue  burden.”   75.  To make the Public Facility accessible to the metabolically-disabled, Defendant  need only cease its existing policy. Making the Public Facility accessible by allowing people to  bring in food would not alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to  20  Defendant.   76.  Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the  Subclass on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y.  Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has:   (a)  constructed and maintained a Public Facility that is inaccessible to  metabolically-disabled Subclass members with knowledge of the  discrimination; and/or  i. constructed and maintained a Public Facility that is  sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is  inaccessible to metabolically-disabled Subclass  members; and/or  ii. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers  in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to  metabolically-disabled Subclass members.   77.  Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its  discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing.   78.  As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate  against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and  equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or  opportunities of the Public Facility and Defendant under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing  regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful  practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm.   79.  The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human  21  Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the  discrimination.   80.  Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and  fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense.   81.  Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.   82.  Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth  and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.   83.  Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y.  Civil Rights Law § 41.   84.  Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as  though fully set forth herein.   85.  N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of  this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and  privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the  conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons,  being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such  place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the  accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . . .”   86.  N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . .  disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be  subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in  22  section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm,  corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.”   87.  Plaintiff and Class are within the Jurisdiction of New York. Plaintiff is a resident  of New York State and accessed the Website in New York State. Class members are residents of  New York State and have accessed the Website in New York State. Plaintiff and Class members  are covered by the New York Civil Rights Laws. The Public Facility and the Website, targeting  New York citizens in New York State, are sales establishments and public accommodations  within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). The Public Facility and the Website are  services, privileges, and/or advantages of Defendant. Food at the Public Facility is sold by, and  integrated with, the Public Facility. Events at the Public Facility are integrated with ticket sales  and information on the Website.   88.  Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates  the Public Facility. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2).   89.  Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in imposing access barriers  to the Public Facility, causing the Public Facility and the services integrated with the Public  Facility to be completely inaccessible to the metabolically-disabled. This inaccessibility denies  metabolically-disabled patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that  Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public.    90.  To make the Public Facility accessible to the metabolically-disabled, Defendant  need only cease its existing policy. Making the Public Facility accessible by allowing people to  bring in food to would not fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an  undue burden to Defendant.   91.  In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall  23  violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and  every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than  five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . . .”   92.  Specifically, under NY Civ Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any  of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31  of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each  and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more  than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of  competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . . .”   93.  Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its  discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing.   94.  As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate  against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Subclass  on the basis of disability are being directly  or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and  privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations.    95.  Plaintiff and Subclass members are entitled to compensatory damages of five  hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40  et seq. for each and every offense.  96.  Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if  set forth fully herein.   97.  N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful  24  discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager,  superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because  of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of  the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”   98.  The Public Facility and the Website, targeting New York citizens in New York  State, are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C.  Administrative Code § 8-102(9). The Public Facility and the Website are services, privileges,  and/or advantages of Defendant. Food at the Public Facility is sold by, and integrated with, the  Public Facility. Events at the Public Facility are integrated with ticket sales and information on  the Public Facility website.   99.  Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the Public Facility.  Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1).  100.  Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in imposing  access barriers to the Public Facility, causing the Public Facility and the services integrated with  the Public Facility to be completely inaccessible to the metabolically-disabled. This  inaccessibility denies metabolically-disabled patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods,  and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant  is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any  person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of  disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy  the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by  the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a).  101.  Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the  25  Subclass on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code §§ 8-107(4)(a)  and 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has:  (a) constructed and maintained a Public Facility that is inaccessible to  metabolically-disabled Subclass members with knowledge of the  discrimination; and/or  (b) constructed and maintained a Public Facility for which it is sufficiently  intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to metabolically-disabled  Subclass members; and/or  (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of  substantial harm and discrimination to metabolically-disabled Subclass  members.  102.  Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its  discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing.  103. To make the Public Facility accessible to the metabolically-disabled, Defendant  need only cease its existing policy. Making the Public Facility accessible by allowing people to  bring in food to would not fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an  undue burden to Defendant.  104.  As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate  against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the  full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,  accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Public Facility and Defendant under § 8-107(4)(a)  and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to  engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer  26  irreparable harm.  105.  The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City Law and therefore  Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination.  106.  Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and  fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code §§ 8-120(8) and 8-126(a) for each offense.  107.  Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.  108.  Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code §§ 8-120 and 8-126 and the remedies,  procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth  below. 