 (FLSA Overtime Violations, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Brought by Plaintiff  on Behalf of Himself, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members)   (New York Overtime Violations, New York Labor Law § 650 et seq.,   N.Y.C.C.R. § 142 et seq., N.Y.C.C.R. § 146 et seq., Brought by  Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members)   (New York Violations, NYLL §§ 195, 198 (1-b) et seq.)   20.  Plaintiff brings and seeks to prosecute their FLSA claims as a collective action  pursuant to FLSA Section 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 207, and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all non- exempt persons currently or formerly employed by Defendants, including all employees who  were employed by Defendants for manual positions including, but not limited to, veterinary  technicians, receptionists, and kennel workers, and any other similarly situated current and  former employees holding comparable positions (“FLSA collective Plaintiffs”), at any time on or  after the date that is three years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein  (the “Collective Action Period”).     21.  At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the FLSA collective plaintiffs are and have  been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and  are and have been subject to Defendants’ decisions, policies, plans and common policies,  programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules, including willfully failing and  4  refusing to pay class members one-and-one-half times their regular hourly rate for work in  excess of forty (40) hours per workweek for work they provided thereafter.  The claims of  Plaintiff are essentially the same as those of the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs.   22.  The FLSA Claims for Relief are properly brought under and maintained as an opt- in collective action pursuant to FLSA Section 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 207, and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).   23.  The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purpose of notice  and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from the  Defendants. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the  last address known to Defendants.  24.  Plaintiff brings New York State law Claims for Relief pursuant to the Federal  Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) Rule 23, on behalf of all non-exempt persons employed by  Defendants, including all non-exempt persons currently or formerly employed by Defendants,  including all employees who were employed by defendants for manual positions including, but  not limited to, veterinary technicians, receptionists, and kennel workers, and any other similarly  situated current and former employees holding comparable positions, on or after the date that is  six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class Period”).   25.  All said persons, including Plaintiff, are referred to herein as the “Class.” The  class members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the class members are  determinable from the records of Defendants. The hours assigned and worked, the positions held,  and the rates of pay for each Class member are also determinable from Defendants’ records. For  purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily  available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under said F.R.C.P. 23.   26.  The proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is  impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a Class will benefit the parties and the court.   5  Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation  of that number are presently within the sole control of Defendants, upon information and belief,  there are more than fifty (50) Members of the Class.   27.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims which could be alleged by any  member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief which would be sought by each  member of the Class in separate actions. All the class members were subject to the same  corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein, including willfully failing and refusing to  pay class members one-and-one-half times their regular hourly rate for work in excess of forty  (40) hours per workweek for work they provided thereafter.  Defendants’ office-wide policies  and practices affected all class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type  of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Plaintiff and other class members  sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices  and procedures.   28.  Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and have  no interests antagonistic to the Class.  Plaintiff is represented by an attorney who is experienced  and competent in both Class Action litigation and employment litigation and has previously  represented both plaintiffs and defendants in wage and hour cases.   29.  A Class Action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of the controversy - particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where  individual class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit against  corporate Defendants. Class Action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated  persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and  without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expense that numerous individual actions  engender. Because the losses, injuries and damages suffered by each of the individual class  members are small in the sense pertinent to a Class Action analysis, the expenses and burden of  6  individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual class  members to redress the wrongs done to them. On the other hand, important public interests will  be served by addressing the matter as a Class Action. The adjudication of individual litigation  claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the  claims as a Class Action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of  separate actions by individual Members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or  varying adjudications with respect to the individual Members of the Class, establishing  incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and resulting in the impairment of class  members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not  parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, Class-wide proof. In  addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently  manage this action as a Class Action.   30.  Upon information and belief, Defendants and other employers throughout the  State violate the New York Labor Law. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights  out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims  because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure  employment. Class Actions provide class members who are not named in the complaint a degree  of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these  risks.   31.  There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over  any questions affecting only individual class members, including:  (a)  Whether Defendants paid the Class members the federal and state  minimum wage for all hours worked;  (b)  Whether Defendants properly compensated Plaintiff and class members for  overtime by paying them overtime pay for the hours worked in excess of  7  forty (40) hours per workweek within the meaning of New York Labor  Law, Art. 6, § 190 et. seq., and Art. 19, § 650 et. seq., and the supporting  New York State Department of Labor regulations, 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 142;  (c)  Whether Defendants paid employees New York’s “spread of hours”  premium when their workdays exceeded 10 hours  (d)  The nature and extent of the class-wide injury and the appropriate measure  of damages for the Class;  (e)  Whether Defendants can prove that their unlawful policies were  implemented in good faith; and  (f)  Whether Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs and the Class the requisite  wage notices and other documents required under the NYLL.  32.  As noted above, HBAC is a full-service veterinary care and animal boarding  facility.  At all relevant times, it has been owned and operated by defendants Steven Weinstein  and Peter Roufail and managed by defendant Lucecita Gurrera.   33.  Defendants hired Ms. Chader to work as a veterinary technician at Howard Beach  Animal Clinic, PC (“HBAC”) in October 2014.  She continued working for HBAC until May 9,  2019, when she was terminated.1     34.  Although her job title was veterinary technician, a large portion of Ms. Chader’s  time working was spent on manual tasks including, but not limited to, doing laundry, cleaning  cages, cleaning surgery rooms and tables, cleaning various spaces throughout HBAC’s offices,  answering and making telephone calls, and shoveling snow.  Ms. Chader had no independent  discretion with respect to the performance of her job duties.    1 HBAC premised her Ms. Chader’s termination on several false accusations, including time sheet manipulation and  dishonesty.  HBAC’s claims about Ms. Chader were lies.  8   35.  Ms. Chader’s schedule changed very little throughout her time working for  HBAC.  From October 2014 until approximately April 2019, Ms. Chader worked 44 hours from  Monday through Friday, and 7.5 hours twice per month on Saturdays.  During the final two  months of her employment she occasionally took off Wednesdays, reducing her weekly hours by  about 4 hours.     36.  Ms. Chader was not permitted to take a break during her workdays.    37.  HBAC paid Ms. Chader $18.00 per hour from October 2014 until approximately  January 2015; $22.00 per hour from January 2015 until October 2015; $24.00 per hour from  October 2015 until October 2017; $25.00 per hour from October 2017 until October 2018; and  $26.50 per hour from October 2018 until her termination in May 2019.     38.  Ms. Chader worked more than 50 hours per week throughout the vast majority of  her employment.  Nonetheless, at no time did HBAC pay her overtime at a rate of 1.5 times her  regular hourly rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week, as  HBAC was required to do under the Federal Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”), the New York  Labor Law (the “NYLL”) and supporting regulations.   40.  At all relevant times, Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and Class Members’  employment at HBAC has been under the direct oversight of the Individual Defendants, who  were and remain the owners and managers of HBAC.    41.  At all relevant times, Individual Defendants had total operational control over  52.  Plaintiff, on behalf of herself, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members,  realleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs.   53.  Throughout the statute of limitations period covered by these claims, Plaintiff,  FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours  per workweek and continue to do so.   54.  At all relevant times, Defendants operated under a decision, policy and plan, and  under common policies, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines and rules of  willfully failing and refusing to pay Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members at  one-and-one-half times their regular hourly rates for work in excess of forty (40) hours per  workweek, even though Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members have been  and are entitled to overtime.   55.  At all relevant times, Defendants willfully, regularly and repeatedly failed to pay  Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members at the required overtime rates, one- and- one-half times their regular rates for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek.   56.  Plaintiff, on behalf of herself, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members,  seeks damages in the amount of their respective unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated  damages as provided by the FLSA for overtime violations, attorneys’ fees and costs, pre- and  post-judgment interest, and such other legal and equitable relief as this Court deems just and  proper.  11  57.  Plaintiff, on behalf of herself, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members,  realleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs.   58.  At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class  Members were employees and Defendants were employers within the meaning of NYLL.   59.  The overtime wage provisions of Article 19 of the NYLL and its supporting  regulations apply to Defendants.   60.  It is unlawful under New York law for an employer to suffer or permit a non- exempt employee to work without paying overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of forty  (40) hours in any workweek.   61.  Throughout the class period, Defendants willfully, regularly and repeatedly failed  to pay Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members at the required overtime rates,  one-and-one-half times their regular rates for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per  workweek.   62.  By failing to pay Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members  overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, they have willfully violated  NYLL Article 19, § 650 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor  Regulations, including, inter alia, the regulations in 12 N.Y.C.R.R., Parts 142 and 146.   63.  As a result of Defendants’ willful and unlawful conduct, Plaintiff, FLSA  Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to an award of damages, including  liquidated damages, in amount to be determined at trial, pre- and post-judgment interest, costs  and attorneys’ fees, as provided by N.Y. Lab. Law § 663.  12  64.  Plaintiff, on behalf of herself, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members,  realleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs.   65.  Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs  and Class Members with wage notices, as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), containing  their rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary,  piece, commission, or other; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if  applicable; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with NYLL, Article 6,  § 191; the name of the employer; any “doing business as” names used by the employer; the  physical address of the employer’s main office or principal place of business, and a mailing  address if different; the telephone number of the employer; plus such other information as the  commissioner deems material and necessary.   66.  Through their knowing and intentional failure to provide Plaintiff and the FLSA  Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members with the wage notices required by the NYLL,  Defendants have willfully violated NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., and the supporting New  York State Department of Labor Regulations.   67.  Due to Defendants’ willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), Plaintiff and  the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to statutory penalties for  Defendants’ failure to provide them with wage notices, plus, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs,  and injunctive and declaratory relief, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-b). 