26.  Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein, was, a “person,” as defined by 47  49.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if  fully stated herein.   50.  Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly  situated (hereinafter referred to as “the Class”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.   52.  Excluded from the Class are Metlife, and any entities in which Metlife has a  controlling interest; Metlife’s agents and/or employees; any Judge to whom this action is  assigned and any member of such Judge’s staff and immediate family; claims for personal injury,  wrongful death and/or emotional distress.   53.  Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class, but Plaintiff  reasonably believes Class members to number, at minimum, in the thousands.   54.  Plaintiff and all members of the Class have been harmed by the acts of the  Metlife, because their privacy has been violated, they were subject to annoying and harassing  texts that constitute a nuisance, they temporarily lost legitimate use of their cell phones in having  to deal with the texts, and they were charged for incoming texts.     55.  This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages.     56.  The joinder of all Class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively  modest value of each individual claim.     57.  Additionally, the disposition of the claims in a class action will provide  substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits.     59.  There are well defined, nearly identical, questions of law and fact affecting all  parties.     60.  The questions of law and fact, referred to above, involving the class claims  predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members.     61.  Such common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the  following:   a.  Whether the third-party texting services, acting on behalf of Metlife, used  an automatic telephone dialing system in sending non-emergency text messages to Plaintiff and  Class members;  b.  Whether Metlife can meet its burden of showing it obtained and possessed  prior express written consent (i.e., written consent that is clearly and unmistakably stated), to  make such texts before such texts were made;   c.  Whether Metlife’s conduct was knowing and/or willful;  d.  Whether Metlife is liable for statutory damages; and  e.  Whether Metlife should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the  future.     62.  As persons who received non-emergency texts from an automatic telephone  dialing system, without their prior express written consent within the meaning of the TCPA,  Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Class member who also received such texts.    63.  Further, Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of  the Class.    65.  Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims  involving violations of federal consumer protection statutes, including claims under the TCPA.     66.  A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this  controversy.     67.  Classwide relief is essential to compel Metlife to comply with the TCPA.     68.  The interest of the Class members in individually pursuing claims against Metlife  is slight because the statutory damages for an individual action are relatively small, and are  therefore not likely to deter Metlife from engaging in the same behavior in the future.    69.  Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties  than are presented in many class claims because the texts at issue are all automated and the Class  members, by definition, did not provide the prior express written consent required under the  statute to authorize such texts to their cellular telephones.     70.  Metlife has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making  final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole  appropriate.     71.  Moreover, on information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that the TCPA violations  complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not  entered.  73.  The foregoing acts and omissions of Metlife constitutes numerous and multiple  violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above cited provisions of 47  U.S.C. §  227 et seq.    74.  As a result of Metlife’s violations of 47 U.S.C. §  227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class  members are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for each and every call in  violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).     75.  Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief  prohibiting Metlife’s violation of the TCPA in the future.   76.  Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and  costs.   77.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if  fully stated herein.   78.  The foregoing acts and omissions of Metlife constitute numerous and multiple  knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above- cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.    79.  As a result of the Metlife’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. §  227  et seq., Plaintiff and each member of the Class is entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for  each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).   81.  Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and  costs.  Facts Related to Plaintiff   KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE  CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.   STATUTORY VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT  47 U.S.C. §  227 ET SEQ.  