1. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members registered a phone number on the National  Do Not Call Registry;   10. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to any other relief.    2. Whether, during the class period Defendants or their agents called (other than a  phone call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior consent of the  called party) to a Class member using any automatic dialing to any telephone  number assigned to a cellular phone service;   20. Defendants are companies that engage in the marketing, sale, and finance of vehicle  service contracts to consumers across the country.     21. Defendant, HARD TACK, is a sales agent, vendor, and/or dealer for the product and  services promoted by Defendants through the use of the unlawful telemarketing campaign.     23. Defendant ROYAL is the administrator and is the party responsible for administering  the benefits of the product and services promoted by Defendants.    24. To increase the sales volume and profits of their vehicle service contracts, Defendants  and/or their authorized sales agents repeatedly called thousands of consumers using an automatic  telephone dialing system in violation of the TCPA.     25. When Plaintiff and the Class members answered their phones, they heard silence for  several seconds, followed by a distinct “click” sound before being transferred to a live agent,  evidencing that the use of an automatic telephone dialing system was used to place the unwanted  calls.     26. Defendants and/or their authorized sales agents used an ATDS to conceal or “spoof”  their actual phone number to trick Plaintiffs into answering a familiar number.  27. During all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was a “person” as that term is defined under  the TCPA.   28. Plaintiff registered her personal cell phone number ending in 7548 on the National Do- Not-Call Registry on or about April 28, 2005.   29. On January 17, 2020, at 5:09 p.m. Plaintiff received a call on her personal cell phone  from a number ending in 6702.   3. How Defendants obtained the phone numbers of Plaintiff and Class members;   31. On January 22, 2020, at 5:24 p.m. Plaintiff received a call from the same phone number  ending in 6702 that called her on January 17, 2020, at 5:09 p.m.    32. On January 27, 2020, at 11:18 a.m. Plaintiff received another call on her cell phone  from the same phone number ending in 6702 that had called her on January 17, 2020, and January  22, 2020.   33. When Plaintiff answered her phone, Plaintiff again heard silence for several seconds  followed by the same distinct “click” sound before being transferred to a live agent.   34. The live agent advised Plaintiff that she was eligible for a warranty for her 2012 Dodge  Challenger.     35. Plaintiff advised the live agent that she was in the middle of working and the live agent  terminated the call.   36. On February 5, 2020, at 4:40 p.m. Plaintiff received another call on her phone from the  same phone number ending in 6702.    37. On February 7, 2020, at 1:50 p.m. Plaintiff received another call on her phone, this time  from a number ending in “6701” – one digit off from the numbers that had previously called her.  This evidences Defendants’ efforts to “spoof” or conceal their identity in order to increase the  likelihood that Plaintiff would again answer the phone.  The same distinct pause and click was  heard before being transferred to a live agent.   39. Through the above unsolicited phone calls, Defendants contacted Plaintiff on  Plaintiff’s cellular telephone regarding an unsolicited service via an “automatic telephone dialing  system” (“ATDS”), as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) and prohibited by 47 U.S.C. §  227(b)(1)(A).    4. Whether the dialing system used to call is an Automatic Telephone Dialing System;   40. At the beginning of each call Plaintiff heard silence, followed by audible clicks that are  associated with and indicate that an auto-dialer was used, and then after several seconds, the call  was transferred to a live person. Upon information and belief, these facts demonstrate that the calls  were made using an ATDS.   41. Upon information and belief, this ATDS has the capacity to store or produce telephone  numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.    42. Upon information and belief, this ATDS has the capacity to store numbers and to dial  numbers without human intervention.   43. Upon information and belief, Defendant used a combination of hardware and software  systems which have the capacity to generate or store random or sequential numbers or to dial  sequentially or randomly in an automated fashion without human intervention.   44. Defendants utilized the ATDS to send the subject phone calls en masse to Plaintiff and  Class Members using an autodial function regardless of whether these individuals had provided  express written consent or had registered their phone numbers on the National Do Not Call  Registry.   46. The telephone number Defendants called was assigned to a cellular telephone service  for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).   47. These calls were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i).    48. Plaintiff did not provide Defendants or its agents prior consent to receive these calls to  her cellular telephone; therefore, the unsolicited messages violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).   49. Defendants are and were aware that they were placing unsolicited calls to Plaintiff and  other consumers without their prior consent.  Defendants have previously been sued for the same  unlawful conduct alleged in this Complaint.    5. Whether Defendants engaged in telemarketing content when it made the calls which  are the subject of this lawsuit;   50. Plaintiff was damaged by Defendants’ calls. In addition to using Plaintiff’s cellular  data, phone storage, and battery life, her privacy was wrongfully invaded, her seclusion was  intruded upon, and Plaintiff has become understandably aggravated with having to deal with the  frustration of repeated, unwanted phone calls, forcing her to divert attention away from her  personal time and homelife, and causing disruption to her work and other activities. Not only did  the receipt of the phone calls distract and take time away from Plaintiff’s personal activities,  Plaintiff was forced to spend time investigating the calls. See Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier,  Inc., 905 F.3d 1200, 1211 (11th Cir. 2018). (“[T]ime wasting is an injury in fact”…. “[A] small  injury… is enough for standing purposes”).    52. Plaintiff had no relationship with Defendants prior to these illegal phone calls.  53. To the extent Defendants outsourced their illegal robocalling, they are still liable for  calls that violate the TCPA.    54. On May 9, 2013, the FCC determined that this was not a basis for avoiding liability  within a Declaratory Ruling that held that sellers may not avoid liability by outsourcing  telemarketing:  [A]llowing the seller to avoid potential liability by outsourcing its telemarketing  activities to unsupervised third parties would leave consumers in many cases  without an effective remedy for telemarketing intrusions.  This would particularly  be so if the telemarketers were judgment proof, unidentifiable, or located outside  of the United States, as is often the case.  Even where third-party telemarketers are  identifiable, solvent, and amenable to judgment limiting liability to the telemarketer  that physically places the call would make enforcement in many cases substantially  more expensive and less efficient, since consumers (or law enforcement agencies)  would be required to sue each marketer separately in order to obtain relief.  As the  FTC noted, because “[s]ellers may have thousands of “independent” marketers,  suing one or a few of them is unlikely to make a substantive difference for consumer  privacy.  May 2013 FCC Ruling, 28 FCC Rcd at 6588 (¶37) (internal citations omitted).   55. Moreover, the May 2013 FCC Ruling rejected a narrow view of TCPA liability,  including the assertion that a seller’s liability requires a finding of formal actual agency and  immediate direction and control over third parties who place a telemarketing call.  Id. at 6587 n.  107.   57. Even if Defendants did not personally place the TCPA-violating calls, Defendants are  still liable for the telemarketers’ actions if they took steps to cause or approve the calls to be made,  or if the calls were made pursuant to the Defendants’ actual authority, apparent authority and/or  ratification of the calls, and because they were acting as a joint enterprise or in concert with each  other.      58. Defendants authorized their telemarketers to generate prospective customers.   Defendants’ utilized a systematic telemarketing campaign whereby robocalls were placed in a  seamless process to make it appear to Plaintiff and Class Members that Defendants were calling  them directly from Defendants’ the telemarketing department.   59. Defendants hired, permitted, and enjoyed the benefits of the mass robocalling.   6. Whether the calls made to Plaintiff and Class Members violate the TCPA and its  regulations;    60. The FCC has explained that its “rules generally establish that the party on whose behalf  a solicitation is made bears ultimate responsibility for any violations.”  See In re Rules &  Regulations Implementing the TCPA, CC Docket No. 92-90, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10  FCC Rcd 12391, 12397 (13) (1995).   61. The FCC stated within their January 4, 2008 ruling, that a company on whose behalf a  telephone call is made bears the ultimate responsibility for any violations.    63. Defendants requested and sought from its telemarketers to solicit particular target  customer profiles on a mass scale.   64. Defendants specified the criteria of potential customers that would be most profitable  for Defendants to sell to after they had been robocalled.   65. Defendants integrated their systems with their marketers so they could access the  records of people with whom they executed contracts.   66. On information and belief, Defendants had access to the sales and customers generated  by the illegal robocalling at issue in this case.   67. The May 2013 FCC Ruling also clarifies circumstances under which a telemarketer has  apparent authority.   68. Defendants authorized their marketers to generate prospective customers for them.   69. Plaintiff reasonably believed that telemarketers who called her had received permission  and instructions to conduct activity on behalf of Defendants.    7. Whether Defendants willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA or the rules  prescribed under it;   70. Further, Defendants ratified the unlawful calls by knowingly accepting business that  originated through illegal robocalls.   72. By accepting these contacts and relying on them to execute contracts, Defendants  “manifest[ed] assent or otherwise consent[ed]… to act” on behalf of its telemarketers , as described  in the Restatement (Third) of Agency.   73. Defendants further ratified the TCPA violations by knowingly accepting the benefit of  large volume of sales, despite that these sales were generated illegally.   74. Defendants took advantage of the violations by having their salespeople solicit the  prospective customers while turning a blind eye to the way the potential customer was identified.  76. Excluded from the Classes are Defendants, and any subsidiary or affiliate of  Defendants, and the directors, officers and employees of Defendant or their subsidiaries or  affiliates, and members of the federal judiciary.   77. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action against  Defendants pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well- defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed Class is easily ascertainable.  Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definition if discovery and further investigation  reveal that any Class should be expanded or otherwise modified.   78. Numerosity: At this time, Plaintiff does not know the exact number of Class Members,  but among other things, given the nature of the claims and that Defendant’s conduct consisted of  standardized marketing phone calls placed to cellular telephone numbers, Plaintiff believes, at a  minimum, there are greater than forty (40) Class Members.  Plaintiff believes that the Class is so  numerous that joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable and the disposition of their  claims in a class action rather than incremental individual actions will benefit the Parties and the  Court by eliminating the possibility of inconsistent or varying adjudications of individual actions.   79. Upon information and belief, a more precise Class size and the identities of the  individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records, including, but not  limited to Defendant’s calls and personnel records.   81. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a  well-defined community of common questions of fact and law affecting the Plaintiff and members  of the Class. Common questions of law and/or fact exist as to all members of the Class and  predominate over the questions affecting individual Class members. These common legal and/or  factual questions include, but are not limited to, the following:   82. One or more questions or issues of law and/or fact regarding Defendants’ liability  are common to all Class Members and predominate over any individual issues that may exist and  may serve as a basis for class certification under Rule 23(c)(4).   83. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the  Classes. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Classes are based on the same legal theories  and arise from the same course of conduct that violates the TCPA.   84. Plaintiff and members of the Do-Not-Call-Registry Class each received more than  one phone call within a 12-month time period, which Defendant placed or caused to be placed to  Plaintiff and the members of the Class.   85. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class  because Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff  will fairly, adequately and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the  Class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel  competent and experienced in litigation in the federal courts, TCPA litigation, and class action  litigation.   87. Class-Wide Injunctive Relief and Rule 23(b)(2): Moreover, as an alternative to  or in addition to certification of the Class under Rule 23(b)(3), class certification is warranted  under Rule 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and  members of Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and  Class Members as a whole.  Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief on behalf of Class Members on grounds  generally applicable to the entire Class in order to enjoin and prevent Defendant’s ongoing  violations of the TCPA, and to order Defendant to provide notice to them of their rights under the  TCPA to statutory damages and to be free from unwanted calls.  88.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1  through 88 above as though fully stated herein.    89.  It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for  emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any  automatic telephone dialing system. . .to any telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone  service . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).   9. Whether Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to a permanent injunction  enjoining Defendants from continuing to engage in its unlawful conduct; and   90.  Automatic telephone dialing system refers to “equipment which has the capacity-- -(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number  generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).   91.  Defendant, DRS  – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having  the capacity to randomly or sequentially generate telephone numbers and to dial such numbers  without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of  Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined above.   92.  These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first  obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not  have prior express consent to call the cellular phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the  putative Class when its calls were made.   93.  Defendant has, therefore, violated Sec. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an  automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular phones  of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent.   95.  The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple  violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited  provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.    96.  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff  and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation,  pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).    97.  At all relevant times, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as  alleged herein violated the TCPA.   98.  Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and  knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA.  