25.  Defendant embarked upon an intrusive telemarketing campaign to promote its car  insurance services.   26.  Specifically, on numerous dates, including May 14, 2018, Defendant placed, or caused  to be placed, an automated text message to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 1818 (“1818  Number”):   28.  Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing/advertising because they promoted  Defendant’s business, goods, and services.   29.  The text messages originated from telephone number 629-772-7961, a number which,  on information and belief, is owned and operated by Defendant.   31.  Long codes work as follows:  Private companies known as SMS gateway providers  have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic.  These SMS  gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers,  which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the  transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code.   32.  Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s  violation of the TCPA occurred within this district.  Upon information and belief, Defendant caused  similar texts to be placed to individuals residing within this judicial district.     33.  At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express consent to be  contacted by telephone using an ATDS.     34.  Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 1818 Number.    35.  The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text messages establishes that  Defendant utilized an ATDS to transmit the messages.   36.  Specifically, the text messages are impersonal as they never state the name of their  intended recipient or provide any other specific information which would establish that the text  messages were drafted with a specific intended recipient in mind.     37.  Additionally, the text message state “cancel to cancel.”  The inclusion of opt-out  instructions in the text messages is another sign that Defendant used an ATDS to transmit the messages.    39.  Defendant’s unsolicited text caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her  privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.  Defendant’s text  message also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life.    40.  Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  herself and all others similarly situated.   41.  Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the below defined Class:  All persons within the United States who, within the four years  prior to the filing of this Complaint; were sent a text message;  from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf; to said  person’s cellular telephone number; using the same  equipment, or type of equipment, used to text Plaintiff’s  cellular telephone; without the recipient’s prior express  consent.     42.  Defendant and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class.  Plaintiff does  not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several  thousands, if not more.  45.  There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate  over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class.  Among the questions of law and  fact common to the Class are:  (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency text messages to Plaintiff and Class  members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS;  (2) Whether Defendant can meet their burden of showing that they obtained prior  express written consent to make such text messages;  (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful;  (4) Whether Defendant are liable for damages, and the amount of such damages;  and  (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.   46.  The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s  claim that Defendant places automated and/or prerecorded telephone numbers assigned to cellular  telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of  being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.  51.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.    52.  It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency  purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone  dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. §  227(b)(1)(A)(iii).    54.  Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity  to store telephone numbers, using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers and/or to  dial numbers from a list automatically, without human intervention, to make non-emergency telephone  calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class.    55.  These text messages were sent without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained  express permission from the text messaged party to make such text messages. In fact, Defendant did not  have prior express consent to text message the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the  putative Class when its text messages were made.    56.  Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone  dialing system to send non-emergency telephone text messages to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the  other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent.    57.  All Defendant are directly, jointly, or vicariously liable for each such violation of the  PROPOSED CLASS   Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  