(Class Action Alleging Violations of Texas Common Law)  A.  VIOLATIONS OF TEXAS COMMON LAW   (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations)  A.  FLSA COVERAGE   22.  Defendant C6 is a full-service solid waste company providing waste collection,  recycling and disposal services to commercial, industrial and residential customers across the state of  Texas.2    23.  To provide their services, C6 employed (and continues to employ) numerous  workers—including Plaintiff and the individuals that make up the putative or potential class. While  exact job titles may differ, these employees were subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices  for similar work throughout the United States.   24.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are (or were) non-exempt Waste Disposal  Drivers employed by C6 for the relevant time-period preceding the filing of this Complaint through  the final disposition of this matter.   25.  Importantly, none of the FLSA exemptions relieving a covered employer (such as C6)  of the statutory duty to pay its employees overtime at one and one-half times the regular rate of pay  apply to Plaintiff or the Putative Class Members.   26.  Moreover, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are similarly situated with respect  to their job duties, their pay structure and, as set forth below, the policies of C6 resulting in the  complained of FLSA violations.   28.  C6 was (and continues to be) aware that Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members  regularly worked (and continue to work) through their 30-minute or one-hour meal periods without  pay in violation of the FLSA.   29.  When calculating Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ hours each pay period, C6  deducted (and continues to deduct) thirty minutes from Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’  daily on-the-clock hours in violation of the FLSA.   30.  In other words, for each 5-day workweek, C6 deducted (and continues to deduct) a  minimum of 2.5 hours from each workweek’s total “on-the-clock” hours. For a 6-day workweek, C6  deducted (and continues to deduct) a minimum of 3 hours from each workweek’s total “on-the-clock”  hours.     31.  C6’s systematic deduction of the 30-minute meal period from Plaintiff and the Putative  Class Members’ “on-the-clock” time resulted (and continues to result) in Plaintiff and the Putative  Class Members working overtime hours for which they were (and are) not compensated at a rate not  less than time and one-half as is required by the FLSA.     32.  C6’s systematic deduction of the 30-minute meal period from actual hours worked in  excess of 40 hours per workweek deprived (and continues to deprive) Plaintiff and the Putative Class  Members of the required and proper amount of overtime pay in violation of the FLSA.   33.  C6 also has a corporate policy to not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for  all time spent waiting in line at the landfill. Specifically, Plaintiff Taylor would only be paid for thirty  (30) minutes of wait time at the landfill even though his actual wait time could be over an hour per  day.    35.  As a result of C6’s failure to compensate Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for  performing work “off-the-clock,” Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked overtime hours  for which they were not compensated.   36.  C6’s failure to compensate Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for their “off-the- clock” overtime hours violated (and continues to violate) the FLSA.   37.  C6 knew or should have known that it was miscalculating Plaintiff and the Putative  Class Members’ regular rates of pay and that the proper amount of overtime compensation was not  being paid to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members in violation of the FLSA.   38.  C6 knew or should have known that its failure to pay the correct amount of overtime  to Plaintiff and Putative Class Members would cause, did cause, and continues to cause financial injury  to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members.     39.  C6 knew or should have known that causing and/or requiring Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members to perform necessary work “off-the-clock” would cause, did cause, and  continues to cause financial injury to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members.     40.  C6’s actions therefore constitute willful violations under the FLSA and were not made  in good faith.   V.  41.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.   59.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.   60.  Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this is a collective action filed on behalf of C6’s  employees who are (or were) similarly situated to Plaintiff with regard to the work they performed and  the manner in which they were paid.   61.  Other similarly situated employees of C6 have been victimized by C6’s patterns,  practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA.   62.  The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 42.   63.  C6’s failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members overtime compensation  at the rates required by the FLSA, results from generally applicable policies and practices of C6, and  does not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiff or the FLSA Collective Members.    64.  Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective  Members.   65.  The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective  Members does not prevent collective treatment.    67.  Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction  from the common nucleus of liability facts.     68.  Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective will not  likely obtain redress of their injuries and C6 will retain the proceeds of its violations.   69.  Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system.  Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims  of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency.   70.  Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as  defined as in Paragraph 42 and notice should be promptly sent.   71.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.   72.  Plaintiff Taylor further brings this action pursuant to the equitable theory of quantum  meruit. See Artemis Seafood, Inc. v. Butcher’s Choice, Inc. No. CIV. A. 3:98-0282, 1999 WL 608853, at *3  (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 1999) (citing Schuchart & Assocs. V. Solo Serve Corp., 1983 WL 1147, at *23 (W.D.  Tex. June 29, 1983)).   73.  The Texas Class is defined as:  79.  The Texas Common Law Plaintiffs bring their Texas Common Law Claims as a class  action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals  employed by C6 to work in Texas since April 3, 2015. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.  § 16.051.   80.  Class action treatment of the Texas Common Law Class Members is appropriate  because, as alleged below, all of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class action requisites are  satisfied.    81.  The number of Texas Common Law Class Members is so numerous that joinder of  all class members is impracticable.   83.  Plaintiff Taylor and his counsel will fairly and adequately represent the class  members and their interests.   84.  Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)  because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual  class members and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and  efficient adjudication of this litigation.   85.  Accordingly, the Texas Common Law Class should be certified as defined in  Paragraph 73.  VI. 