16.  More than a decade later, Commissioner Swindle’s comments ring truer than  ever, as consumer data feeds an information marketplace that supports a $26 billion dollar per  year online advertising industry in the United States.3   17.  The FTC has also recognized that consumer data possesses inherent monetary  value within the new information marketplace and publicly stated that:  Most consumers cannot begin to comprehend the types and amount  of information collected by businesses, or why their information  may be commercially valuable. Data is currency. The larger the  data set, the greater potential for analysis—and profit.4   18.  In fact, an entire industry exists where companies known as data miners  purchase, trade, and collect massive databases of information about consumers.  Data miners  then profit by selling this “extraordinarily intrusive” information in an open and largely  unregulated market.5   20.  Further, “[a]s use of the Internet has grown, the data broker industry has already  evolved to take advantage of the increasingly specific pieces of information about consumers  that are now available.”7   21.  Recognizing the serious threat the data mining industry poses to consumers’  privacy, on July 25, 2012, the co-Chairmen of the Congressional Bi- Partisan Privacy Caucus  sent a letter to nine major data brokerage companies seeking information on how those  companies collect, store, and sell their massive collections of consumer data.8   22.  In their letter, the co-Chairmen recognized that:  By combining data from numerous offline and online sources, data  brokers have developed hidden dossiers on every U.S. consumer.   This large[-]scale aggregation of the personal information of  hundreds of millions of American citizens raises a number of  serious privacy concerns.9   24.  Information disclosures like Defendant’s are particularly dangerous to the  elderly.  “Older Americans are perfect telemarketing customers, analysts say, because they are  often at home, rely on delivery services, and are lonely for the companionship that telephone  callers provide.”12  The FTC notes that “[t]he elderly often are the deliberate targets of  fraudulent telemarketers who take advantage of the fact that many older people have cash  reserves or other assets to spend on seemingly attractive offers.”13   26.  Thus, as consumer data has become an ever-more valuable commodity, the data  mining industry has experienced rapid and massive growth.  Unfortunately for consumers, this  growth has come at the expense of their most basic privacy rights.  Consumers Place Monetary Value on their Privacy and Consider Privacy Practices When  Making Purchases   27.  As the data mining industry has grown, so too have consumer concerns  regarding the privacy of their personal information.   28.  A recent survey conducted by Harris Interactive on behalf of TRUSTe, Inc.  showed that 89 percent of consumers polled avoid doing business with companies who they  believe do not protect their privacy online.15  As a result, 81 percent of smartphone users polled  said that they avoid using smartphone apps that they don’t believe protect their privacy online.16   29.  Thus, as consumer privacy concerns grow, consumers are increasingly  incorporating privacy concerns and values into their purchasing decisions and companies viewed  as having weaker privacy protections are forced to offer greater value elsewhere (through better  quality and/or lower prices) than their privacy- protective competitors.   31.  These companies’ business models capitalize on a fundamental tenet underlying  the personal information marketplace:  consumers recognize the economic value of their private  data.  Research shows that consumers are willing to pay a premium to purchase services from  companies that adhere to more stringent policies of protecting their personal data.18   32.  Thus, in today’s economy, individuals and businesses alike place a real,  quantifiable value on consumer data and corresponding privacy rights.19  As such, where a  business offers customers a service that includes statutorily guaranteed privacy protections, yet  fails to honor these guarantees, the customer receives a service of less value than the service paid  for.  Defendant Unlawfully Sells Its Customers’ PII   33.  Every time a customer makes a purchase at a Yankee Candle retail store in  Virginia, the cashier requests that the customer provide her PII, including her name and address.   35.  Defendant then sells their mailing lists—which include customers’ PII, and can  include the sensitive information obtained from data miners—to data miners, other consumer- facing businesses, non-profit organizations seeking to raise awareness and solicit donations, and  to political organizations soliciting donations, votes, and volunteer efforts. (See Exhibits A–C).   36.  As a result of Defendant’s data compiling and sharing practices, companies can  purchase mailing lists from Defendant that identify Yankee Candle customers by their most  intimate details:  income, political affiliation, religious practice, and charitable donations.   Defendant’s sale of such sensitive and personal information puts consumers, especially the more  vulnerable members of society, at risk of serious harm from scammers.  For example, Yankee  Candle will sell—to anyone willing to pay for it—a list with the names and addresses of all  Yankee Candle customers who are Jewish, over the age of 50, with an income of greater than  $100,000, no children in the household, and a history of charitable donations.    37.  Defendant does not seek their customers’ prior consent to any of these sales, nor  do they notify their customers about these sales.  Thus, their customers remain unaware that their  PII and other sensitive personal information is being bought and sold on the open market.   38.  As a result, Defendant sold and continues to sell their customers’ PII – including  their purchasing habits and preferences – to anybody willing to pay for it.   40.  Plaintiff seeks to represent a class defined as all Virginia residents who had their  PII sold to third parties by Defendant without consent (the “Class”).  Excluded from the Class is  any entity in which Defendant have a controlling interest, and officers or directors of Defendant.   41.  Members of the Class are so numerous that their individual joinder herein is  impracticable.  On information and belief, members of the Class number in the thousands.  The  precise number of Class members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff at this time but  may be determined through discovery.  Class members may be notified of the pendency of this  action by mail and/or publication through the distribution records of Defendant.   42.  Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class members and predominate  over questions affecting only individual Class members.  Common legal and factual questions  include, but are not limited to:  (a) whether Defendant obtained consent before selling to third  parties Plaintiff’s and the Class’s PII; (b) whether Defendant provided notice before selling to  third parties Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s PII; (c) whether Defendant’s sale of Plaintiff’s and the  Class’s PII violated the Personal Information Privacy Act, Va. Code §§ 59.1-442, et seq.; and (d)  whether Defendant’s sale of Plaintiff’s and the Class’s PIIconstitutes unjust enrichment.   43.  The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class in that the  named Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages as a result of Defendant’s uniform wrongful  conduct, based upon Defendant’s sale of Plaintiff’s and the Class’s PII.   45.  The class mechanism is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient  adjudication of the claims of Class members.  Each individual Class member may lack the  resources to undergo the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex and  extensive litigation necessary to establish Defendant’s liability.  Individualized litigation  increases the delay and expense to all parties and multiplies the burden on the judicial system  presented by the complex legal and factual issues of this case.  Individualized litigation also  presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments.  In contrast, the class action  device presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single  adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court on the issue of  Defendant’s liability.  Class treatment of the liability issues will ensure that all claims and  claimants are before this Court for consistent adjudication of the liability issues.  46.  Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully  set forth herein.   47.  Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of members of the Class  against Defendant.   48.  Defendant is a “merchant” as that term is defined in the VPIPA.  See Va. Code §  69.  Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set  forth herein.   70.  Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the Class  against Defendant.   72.  Because Defendant received and processed Plaintiff’s and the Class’s payments  and PII, and because Defendant has employees handling customer accounts and billing as well as  customer data, Defendant appreciates or has knowledge of such benefits.   73.  Under the VPIPA, Plaintiff and the Class members were entitled to confidentiality  in their PII as part of their Yankee Candle purchases.   74.  Under principles of equity and good conscience, because Defendant failed to  comply with the VPIPA, Defendant should not be allowed to retain the full amount of money  Plaintiff and the Class paid for their Yankee Candle purchases or the money they received by  selling Plaintiff’s and the Class’s PII.   75.  Plaintiff and the other Class members have suffered actual damages as a result of  Defendant’s unlawful conduct in the form of the value Plaintiff and the other Class members  paid for and ascribed to the confidentiality of their PII.  This amount is tangible and will be  calculated at trial.   76.  Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class members have suffered actual damages  inasmuch as Defendant’s failure to inform them that they would sell their PII caused them to  make purchases at Yankee Candle retail stores in Virginia when they otherwise would not have.   77.  Further, a portion of the purchase price of each Yankee Candle product sold to  Plaintiff and the other Class members was intended to ensure the confidentiality of Plaintiff’s  and the other Class members’ PII, as required by the VPIPA.  Because Plaintiff and the other  Class members were denied services that they paid for and were entitled to receive—i.e.,  confidentiality of their PII—and because Plaintiff and the Class would have commanded a  discount to voluntarily forego those benefits, they incurred actual monetary damages.   79.  Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Class members seek an order declaring that  Defendant’s conduct constitutes unjust enrichment, and awarding Plaintiff and the Class  restitution in an amount to be calculated at trial equal to the amount of money obtained by  Defendant through their sale and disclosure of Plaintiff’s and the Class’s PII.  The Personal Information Market: Consumers’ Personal Information Has Real Value   Unjust Enrichment   Violation of the Personal Information Privacy Act  (Va. Code §§ 59.1-442, et seq.)  