10.  At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been  an enterprise within the meaning of Section 3(r) of the FLSA 29  U.S.C. § 203(r).   11.  At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been  an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods  for commerce within the meaning of Section 3(s)(1) of the FLSA,  29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1), in that the enterprise has had employees  engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,  or employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or  materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by  any person and in that the enterprise has had and has an annual  gross volume of sales made or business done of not less than  $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which  are separately stated).   12.  At all times hereinafter mentioned, Plaintiff has been  an employee within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the FLSA, 29  U.S.C. § 203(e).   13.  At all times hereinafter mentioned, Plaintiff was an  individual employee who was engaged in commerce or in the  production of goods for commerce as required by 29 U.S.C. § 207.  14.  CHS is a company that provides and manages student  housing at learning institutions throughout the United States.  4	  15.  Dearman’s primary job duty as an inspector was  inspecting student housing to ensure compliance with CHS rules  and regulations.    16.  Dearman spent the majority of his working hours  conducting inspections.   17.  CHS paid Dearman on a salary basis until approximately  November 2016.  Thereafter, CHS paid Dearman on an hourly basis.   18.  Dearman regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours  per week during his tenure with CHS.   19.  Prior to changing Dearman’s pay from salary to hourly,  CHS did not pay Dearman an overtime premium for hours he worked  in excess of forty (40) each workweek.    20.  Prior to changing Dearman’s pay from salary to hourly,  CHS did not record or track the hours worked by Dearman.   21.  Subsequent to changing Dearman’s pay from salary to  hourly, CHS implemented a “no overtime” rule for its inspectors.   CHS did not, however, reduce or change the job duties and  responsibilities for its inspectors.   22.  At all relevant times, CHS had knowledge that Dearman  regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek and  in fact regularly required him to do so by scheduling him for a  40-plus hour workweek and requiring him to be on-call to answer  telephone calls and respond to emergencies during evenings and  5	 weekends and requiring him to attend open houses during non- scheduled work hours.   23.  Dearman regularly performed compensable work for CHS  during the evenings and weekends, without pay, both before and  after CHS changed his pay from salary to hourly.   24.  Dearman regularly worked through his scheduled meal  periods or experienced significant interruptions to his meal  periods because of the work expectations placed on him by CHS.   CHS did not have a system in place whereby Dearman could notify  CHS of missed meal periods and thereby receive compensation for  missed or interrupted meal periods.    25.  Prior to changing Dearman’s pay from salary to hourly,  CHS misclassified Dearman as “exempt” from the overtime  requirements of the FLSA.  26.  This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective  action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), as to claims  for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and  attorneys’ fees and costs.   27.  Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Plaintiff brings his   FLSA claim on behalf of himself and similarly situated employees  who have worked as inspectors (and/or individuals in any other  6	 similarly titled position) and who elect to opt-in to this  action (“Opt-in Plaintiffs).   28.  The FLSA § 216(b) collective action class is properly  defined as: All current and former employees of CHS who were  employed as inspectors (and/or individuals in any other  similarly titled position), anytime during the three-year period  preceding the filing of the Complaint in this action.    29.  Consistent with Defendant’s policy and pattern or  practice, Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs have not been paid  overtime compensation for all hours worked beyond 40 per  workweek.   30.  All of the work that Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs  have performed has been assigned by Defendant and Defendant has  been aware of all of the work that Plaintiff and Opt-in  Plaintiffs have performed.   31.  As part of its regular business practice, Defendant  has intentionally, willfully and repeatedly engaged in a  pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA with  respect to Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs.  This policy,  pattern and practice includes, but is not limited to, willfully  failing to pay Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs premium overtime  wages for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek.  7	  32.  Defendant is aware or should have been aware that  federal law required it to pay Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs  overtime premiums for all hour worked in excess of 40 per  workweek.   33.  Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs perform or performed  the same basic job duties, were paid pursuant to the same  compensation scheme, were subject to the same employment  policies, practices and procedures, and have been subject to the  same unlawful practices alleged herein.   34.  Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs have each worked more  than forty (40) hours in one or more workweeks within the  applicable statutory period.   35.  Defendant’s unlawful conduct has been widespread,  repeated, and consistent.   36.  There are other similarly situated current and former  employees who have been denied overtime compensation in  violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a  court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to  join it.  This notice should be sent to the Opt-in Plaintiffs  pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).   37.  Those similarly situated employees are known to  Defendant, are readily identifiable, and can be located through  Defendant’s records.  8	  38.  The foregoing conduct, as alleged herein, constitutes  a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.  § 255(a).  Defendant’s conduct was willful in that it knew that  it’s payroll policies, practices and/or procedures were in  violation of the FLSA or it showed reckless disregard to whether  it’s payroll policies, practices and/or procedures were in  violation of the FLSA.    39.  Plaintiff Greg Dearman requests that he be permitted  to serve as a representative of those who consent to participate  in this action and that this action be granted collective action  status pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  (Violation of FLSA – Overtime Collective Action)   40.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-39 of  his Complaint.   41.  Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to pay  Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs an overtime premium rate of pay  for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek.   42.  Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to keep, make  and preserve accurate records of all time worked by Plaintiff  and Opt-in Plaintiffs.   43.  Defendant’s violation of the FLSA was willful.  9	 9.  At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been  an employer within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29  U.S.C. § 203(d).  3	 