(29 U.S.C. § 216(b) Collective Action Claims)  Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.  FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES   (29 U.S.C. § 216(b) Individual Claims)  Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.  FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES   (Individual Claims)  Violation of the New Jersey Wage Payment Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1, et seq.  FAILURE TO PAY STRAIGHT TIME WAGES  112.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein.  113.  Defendant failed to properly compensate Plaintiff for all hours worked as alleged  herein.   114.  Defendant failed to properly compensate Plaintiff straight time wages for work  performed up to 40 hours per week.  115.  Defendant’s conduct and practices, described herein, were willful, intentional,  unreasonably, arbitrary, and in bad faith.   116.  As a result of Defendant’s uniform and common policies and practices described  above, Plaintiff was illegally deprived of straight time wages earned, in such amounts to be  determined at trial, and is entitled to recovery of such total unpaid amounts, pre and  post-judgment interest and other compensation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1, et seq.  27.  Defendant has generated over $500,000.00 in revenue per year.   28.  Defendant had two (2) or more employees handling, selling, or otherwise working  on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce.   29.  Defendant has engaged in ordinary commercial activities within the meaning of  the FLSA that result in sales made or business done.   30.  Defendant was the “employer” of Plaintiff and similarly situated store managers,  assistant store managers and associates/clerks (collectively, the “thrift store workers”) within the  meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a1(g) and N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1a.   31.  Thrift store workers including Plaintiff were “employees” of Defendant within the  meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a1(h) and N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1b.   32.  Defendant “suffered or permitted” the thrift store workers including Plaintiff to  work and thus “employed” them within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §203(g) and N.J.S.A.  34:11-56a1(f).     33.  Defendant, directly or indirectly, hired the thrift store workers including Plaintiff  and determined the rate and method of the payment of their wages.   34.  Defendant controlled the work schedules, duties, protocols, applications,  assignments and conditions of employment of the thrift store workers including Plaintiff.   35.  The store manager position at Defendant’s thrift stores is classified as non-exempt  from overtime.   36.  The store manager position at Defendant’s thrift stores is an hourly-paid position.   38.  The assistant store manager position at Defendant’s thrift stores is an hourly-paid  position.   39.  The associate/clerk position at Defendant’s thrift stores is classified as  non-exempt.   40.  The associate/clerk position at Defendant’s thrift stores is an hourly-paid position.   41.  While employed as an associate/clerk, Plaintiff regularly worked approximately  three (3) days a week.    42.  While employed as a store manager, Plaintiff regularly worked five (5) days a  week and on some occasions six (6) days a week.   43.  While employed as a store manager, Plaintiff regularly worked over forty (40)  hours a week.    44.  In multiple weeks, Defendant paid Plaintiff forty (40) hours in a workweek at her  regular hourly rate.      45.  In some weeks, Defendant additionally paid Plaintiff overtime at a rate of one and  one-half (1.5) times her regular hourly rate when she worked six (6) days a week.   46.  Defendant failed to pay the thrift store workers for time spent performing pre-shift  and/or post-shift work-related activities.     47.  Defendant required the thrift store workers to perform pre-shift and/or post-shift  off-the-clock work without pay.   49.  Plaintiff was required to arrive at approximately 7:30 a.m. – an hour prior to the  beginning of the regular shift time and store opening time – to perform off-the-clock  work-related activities.   50.  The pre-shift off-the-clock work included, but not limited to, pushing the gates up  for the truck arrival, pricing the unloaded items and putting them on the shelves.   51.  When Plaintiff was an associate/clerk, the then-store manager and assistant store  manager were also required to arrive at approximately 7:30 a.m. to perform the same pre-shift  off-the-clock work for approximately one (1) hour per workday.       52.  When she was a store manager, the then-assistant store manager and  associates/clerks with the key were also required to arrive at approximately 7:30 a.m. to perform  the same pre-shift off-the-clock work for approximately one (1) hour per workday.   53.  During the course of her employment with Defendant including the periods when  she was an associate/clerk and when she became a store manager, Plaintiff and other thrift store  workers were required to perform post-shift off-the-clock work for approximately thirty (30)  minutes to one (1) hour after the end of the regular shift time and store closing time.   54.  The post-shift off-the-clock work included, but not limited to, counting out,  getting the bank deposit ready, cleaning the store and making deposits at the bank.   55.  As a result of Defendant’s common unlawful policies, the thrift store workers  were not compensated straight time for work performed up to 40 hours per week and overtime at  a rate of not less than one and one-half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for work performed  over 40 hours per week.   57.  For instance, during the pay period of 2/12/18 to 2/25/18, even though Plaintiff  worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a week – and in excess of eighty (80) hours in two (2)  weeks – Defendant only paid Plaintiff for eighty (80) hours at her regular hourly rate, resulting in  a deprivation of overtime wages. That is, she was not paid for time spent working off the clock.   58.  The thrift store workers have been subjected to the common unlawful policies and  practices of Defendant as stated herein that violated the FLSA, NJWHLR and NJWPL.   59.  Defendant’s wrongful acts and/or omissions/commissions, as alleged herein, were  not made in good faith, or in conformity with or in reliance on any written administrative  regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation by the state and/or U.S. Department of Labor  and/or any state department of labor, or any administrative practice or enforcement practice or  enforcement policy of such departments.   60.  Defendant’s violations of the above-described federal and state wage and hour  statutes and regulations were willful, arbitrary, unreasonable and in bad faith.   61.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein.   63.  Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on behalf  of:  All hourly-paid store managers, assistant store managers and associates/clerks  employed by Defendant at any time from three (3) years prior to the filing of this  Complaint through the date of judgment.  Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary.   64.  Plaintiff brings this collective action against Defendant to recover unpaid  overtime wages, liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 29  U.S.C. § 216(b).   65.  The collective action further alleges a willful violation of the FLSA and seeks an  additional, third year of limitations.   66.  Plaintiff seeks to send Notice to all hourly-paid store managers, assistant store  managers and associates/clerks of Defendant permitting them to assert FLSA claims in this  collective action by filing their individual consent forms, as provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and  supporting case law.   67.  Certification of the collective action under the FLSA is appropriate because the  employees described herein are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  The  class of employees on behalf of whom Plaintiff brings this collective action are similarly situated  because: (a) they had the same job positions and performed the same or similar job duties as one  another on behalf of Defendant; (b) they were subject to the same or similar unlawful practices  and policies as stated herein; and (c) their claims are based upon the same factual and legal  theories.   69.  Plaintiff anticipates that there will be no difficulty in the management of this  litigation.  This litigation presents claims under the FLSA, a type that have often been  prosecuted on a class wide basis, and the manner of identifying the collective and providing any  monetary relief to it can be effectuated from a review of Defendant’s records.   70.  Plaintiff and the putative FLSA collective members demand a trial by jury.  71.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein.   72.  Plaintiff also seeks to maintain this action pursuant to Fed. R. of Civ. P. 23, as  an opt-out class action, for an on behalf all hourly-paid thrift store workers including store  managers, assistant store managers and associates/clerks who have been affected by Defendant’s  common policies and practices which include failure to properly pay for all hours worked  resulting in a deprivation of overtime time wages, in violation of the New Jersey Wage and Hour  Laws and Regulations (“NJWHLR”), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a et seq.   73.  Plaintiff brings this Rule 23 class action as to the NJWHLR claims on behalf of:  All hourly-paid store managers, assistant store managers and associates/clerks  employed by Defendant in the State of New Jersey at any time from two (2) years  prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of judgment.  Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary.   74.  Plaintiff brings this Rule 23 class action as to the NJWHLR claims against  Defendant to recover unpaid overtime time wages, pre- and post- judgment interest, and  reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25 and 12:56-1.5.   76.  Plaintiff brings this Rule 23 class action as to the NJWPL claims on behalf of:  All hourly-paid store managers, assistant store managers and associates/clerks  employed by Defendant in the State of New Jersey at any time from six (6) years  prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of judgment.  Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary.   77.  The members of the Rule 23 class are so numerous that joinder of all class  members in this case would be impractical.  The Rule 23 class members should be easy to  identify from Defendant’s computer systems and electronic payroll and personnel records.    78.  There is a well-defined community of interest among the Rule 23 class  members and common questions of law and fact predominate in this action over any questions  affecting each individual class member.  These common legal and factual questions, include,  but are not limited to, the following: whether the Rule 23 class members were properly  compensated straight time wages for work performed up to 40 hours per week and overtime  wages at a rate of not less than one and one-half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for work  performed over 40 hours per week.   80.  Plaintiff was employed by Defendant in the same capacity as all of the class  members.  All class members were treated the same or similarly by management with  respect to pay or lack thereof.  This treatment included, but was not limited to, failure to pay  proper straight time and overtime wages.  Thus, there are common questions of law and fact  which are applicable to each and every one of the class members.   81.  Plaintiff will fully and adequately protect the interests of the class members and  have retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution of nationwide  wage and hour class actions.  Plaintiff and her counsel do not have interests that are contrary  to, or conflicting with, the interests of the class members.    82.  Defendant’s corporate-wide policies and practices affected all class members  similarly, and Defendant benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each  class member.  Plaintiff’s claim arises from the same legal theories as all other class members.   Therefore, this case will be more manageable and efficient as a Rule 23 class action.  Plaintiff  and her counsel know of no unusual difficulties in this case.    83.  Plaintiff and the Rule 23 class members demand a trial by jury.  84.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein.   86.  In multiple weeks, Plaintiff worked more than forty (40) hours per week.   87.  Defendant failed to properly compensate Plaintiff for all hours worked as alleged  herein.   88.  Defendant failed to properly pay Plaintiff overtime wages at a rate of not less than  one and one-half (1.5) times her regular rate of pay for all hours she worked in excess of forty  (40) per workweek.   89.  Defendant’s conduct and practices, described herein, were willful, intentional,  unreasonably, arbitrary, and in bad faith.    90.  Because Defendant willfully violated the FLSA, a three (3) year statute of  limitations shall apply to such violation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).   91.  As a result of Defendant’s uniform and common policies and practices described  above, Plaintiff was illegally deprived of overtime wages earned, in such amounts to be  determined at trial, and is entitled to recovery of such total unpaid amounts, liquidated damages,  reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 216(b).  92.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein.   94.  In multiple weeks, Plaintiff and the FLSA collective members worked more than  forty (40) hours per week.   95.  Defendant failed to properly compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA collective  members for all hours worked as alleged herein.    96.  Defendant failed to properly pay Plaintiff and the FLSA collective members  overtime wages at a rate of not less than one and one-half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for  all hours they worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek.   97.  Defendant’s conduct and practices, described herein, were willful, intentional,  unreasonably, arbitrary, and in bad faith.    98.  Because Defendant willfully violated the FLSA, a three (3) year statute of  limitations shall apply to such violation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).   99.  As a result of Defendant’s uniform and common policies and practices described  above, Plaintiff and the FLSA collective members were illegally deprived of overtime wages  earned, in such amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such total  unpaid amounts, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and other compensation  pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 216(b). 