 (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations)  A.  FLSA COVERAGE   (Class Action Alleging Violations of Texas Common Law)  A.  VIOLATIONS OF TEXAS COMMON LAW   21.  Sagora Senior Living, Inc. (“Sagora”) “provides customized lifestyles and care for  independent senior living, assisted living, and memory care in Texas, Oklahoma, Florida, [and]  Alabama.”2   22.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ job duties consisted of providing care for  Sagora’s residents, including feeding and showering some of the residents, and assisting Sagora’s  nurses.   24.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are non-exempt employees that were (and  continue to be) paid by the hour. Specifically, Plaintiff Mickle was paid $13.25 per hour for her work  as a nursing assistant.   25.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours  per workweek, but were not paid overtime of at least one and one-half their regular rates for all hours  worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek.    26.  Nor were Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members paid for all hours worked.    27.  When calculating Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members’ hours each pay period,  Sagora systematically deducted (and continues to deduct) time from Plaintiff and the Putative Class  Members’ daily on-the-clock hours in violation of the FLSA and Texas common law.    28.  Specifically, many of Plaintiff Mikle’s time cards reflected that they had been  “edited”—always reducing her hours worked—often by as much as ten (10) hours in a pay period.   29.  Sagora intentionally deducted hours worked from Plaintiff and the Putative Class  Members in order to not pay the full and correct amount of overtime.    30.  Sagora’s systematic deduction of time from Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’  hours worked, which is commonly referred to as “time-shaving,” resulted (and continues to result) in  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ working hours for which they were (and are) not  compensated in violation of the FLSA.   31.  As a result of Sagora’s company-wide policy and practice of intentionally deducting  their hours, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for all hours worked,  including all worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek at the rates required by the FLSA.   33.  Sagora is aware of its obligation to pay for all hours worked and to pay the proper  amount of overtime for all hours worked over forty (40) each week, but has failed to do so.     34.  Because Sagora did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all hours  worked and time and a half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, Sagora’s pay  policies and practices violate the FLSA.    35.  Because Sagora did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all hours they  worked on behalf of Sagora, Sagora’s pay policies and practices also violate Texas common law.   V.  36.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members incorporate by reference all paragraphs and  allegations set forth in the statement of facts of this complaint as though fully and completely set forth  herein.   37.  The FLSA Collective is defined as:  54.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.   55.  Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this collective claim is made on behalf of all of Sagora’s  employees who have been similarly situated to Plaintiff with regard to the work they performed and  the manner in which they have not been paid.   56.  Other similarly situated employees have been victimized by Sagora’s patterns,  practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA.   58.  Sagora’s failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members for all hours worked  and overtime compensation at the rates required from the FLSA, results from generally applicable  policies and practices of Sagora and does not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiff or the  individual FLSA Collective Members.   59.  Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective  Members.   60.  The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective  Members does not prevent collective treatment.   61.  All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job  requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be properly compensated for all hours  worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek.   62.  Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction  from the common nucleus of liability facts.    63.  Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will  not obtain redress of their injuries and Sagora will retain the proceeds of its rampant violations.   64.  Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system.  Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims  of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency.   65.  Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as  defined as in Paragraph 37 and notice should be promptly sent.  67.  Plaintiff Mickle further brings this action pursuant to the equitable theory of quantum  meruit. See Artemis Seafood, Inc. v. Butcher’s Choice, Inc. No. CIV. A. 3:98-0282, 1999 WL 608853, at *3  (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 1999) (citing Schuchart & Assocs. V. Solo Serve Corp., 1983 WL 1147, at *23 (W.D.  Tex. June 29, 1983)).   68.  The Texas Common-Law Class is defined as:  68.  VI.  74.  Plaintiff Mickle brings her Texas Common-Law Claims as a class action pursuant to  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by Sagora  to work in Texas since January 28, 2015. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004.   75.  Class action treatment of the Texas Common Law Class Members is appropriate  because, as alleged below, all of Rule 23’s class action requisites are satisfied.    76.  The number of Texas Common-Law Class Members is so numerous that joinder of  all class members is impracticable.   77.  Plaintiff Mickle is a member of the Texas Common-Law Class, her claims are typical  of the claims of the other Texas Common Law Class Members, and she has no interests that are  antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of the other Texas Common Law Class Members.   78.  Plaintiff Mickle and her counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Texas  Common Law Class Members and their interests.   79.  Class certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) because common questions of  law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members and because a class  action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation.   80.  Accordingly, the Texas Common Law Class should be certified as defined in Paragraph  