10.  naviHealth, Inc. manages post-acute care and care transitions on behalf of health  plans, hospitals, health systems, and post-acute providers in the United States. It offers clinical  service support, proprietary technology, and advisory solutions for payers and providers. The  company provides clinical support services, such as coordinating care in the acute and post-acute  setting. naviHealth has in its possession, custody, and control all the employment records of  Plaintiffs and those similarly situated.   11.  Within the last three years until September 28, 2018, while working as an LPN on  behalf of Defendant, Barbee worked from home. Her primary job duty was to review patient  appeals regarding the decision to discharge a patient from a Skilled Nursing Facility (“SNF”). In  carrying out her assignments, Barbee compared the patient’s case files against well-established  industry guidelines for discharge. If the reasons for discharge aligned with the established  guidelines, Barbee prepared a form letter of explanation to the patient explaining the rationale for  the discharge from the SNF.  If the justifications for discharge did not align with the well- established industry guidelines, Barbee notified the naviHealth medical director who would then  review the case and decide whether discharge was appropriate. Barbee had neither discretion to  discharge a patient nor discretion to grant or deny a patient’s appeal of a discharge decision.    12.  Within the last three years until September 28, 2018, Barbee, and all others  similarly situated, worked approximately 44 to 56 hours per week. Each day, Monday through  Friday, she started her workday at 8:00 a.m. and stopped working between approximately 6:00  and 7:00 p.m. and, at times, worked up until 10:00 p.m. Additionally, Barbee was unable to take  a duty-free meal period on any day due to the volume of work Defendant required.    13.  For example, in the workweek beginning August 15, 2016, Barbee began her  workday at 8:00 a.m. and ended her workday at approximately 7:00 p.m. each day. She was  4  unable to take a duty-free meal period on any of these days. Barbee thus worked 55 hours this  week, and Defendant failed to compensate her for 15 of those hours.    14.  For example, in the workweek beginning June 4, 2018, Barbee began her  workday at 8:00 a.m. each day. She ended her workday at 7:00 p.m. on Monday, Tuesday, and  Friday and at 8:30 p.m. on Wednesday and Thursday. She was unable to take a duty-free meal  period on any of these days. Barbee thus worked 58 hours this week, and Defendant failed to  compensate her for 18 of those hours.    15.  Time-stamped emails from Barbee to naviHealth management show that Barbee  worked hours in excess of 40 hours a week for which she was not paid. naviHealth management  knew or should have known that Barbee, and all those similarly situated to her, worked in excess  of 40 hours a week without pay.    16.  Within the last three years until September 28, 2018, while working as an LPN on  behalf of defendant, Trone worked from home. Her primary job duty was to review provider  requests to transfer patients from hospitals to facilities providing post-acute care. Trone  compared the patient’s clinical chart against the applicable well-established criteria to determine  whether the criteria were met for the request for post-acute care. The applicable criteria used in  the review depended on whether the request for post-acute care was for an SNF, an in-patient  rehabilitation facility (“IRF”), or long term acute care admission (“LTAC”).  No matter which  type of post-acute care was requested, Trone was required to adhere to strict guidelines in  determining whether criteria were or were not satisfied for the requested transfer.  For example,   for an IRF/LTAC request, Trone compared the patient’s clinical file against InterQual and  LiveSafe criteria and then submitted the request for the transfer to the medical director to review  and to make the final determination of whether to approve or deny the request.   5   17.  Within the last three years until September 28, 2018, Trone, and all others  similarly situated, worked approximately 44 to 56 hours per week. From August 2018 until  September 28, 2018, plaintiff started her workday at 11:00 a.m. on two days per week, 7:30 a.m.  on two days per week, and 8:00 a.m. on one day per week. Each day, she stopped working at  approximately 6:30 p.m. and, at times, worked up until 9:00 p.m. Additionally, Trone was unable  to take a duty-free meal period on most days due to the volume of work Defendant required.  During this period, Trone worked approximately 47 hours per week, sometimes more, but  Defendant failed to compensate her for any hours worked over 40.    18.  From November 2017 until August 2018, Trone started her workday at 7:30 a.m.  on two days per week and at 8:00 a.m. on three days per week. Each day, she stopped working at  approximately 7:00 p.m. and, at times, worked up until 9:00 p.m. Trone was unable to take a  duty-free meal period on most days due to the volume of work Defendant required. During this  period, Trone worked approximately 55 hours per week, sometimes more, but Defendant failed  to compensate her for any hours worked over 40.   19.  From 2016 until November 2017, Trone started her workday at 9:00 a.m. on five  days per week and stopped working at approximately 7:00 p.m. and, at times, worked until  9:00 p.m. Trone was unable to take a duty-free meal period on most days due to the volume of  work Defendant required. During this period, Trone worked approximately 50 hours per week,  sometimes more, but Defendant failed to compensate her for any hours worked over 40.   20.  From 2014 until 2016, Trone worked four days per week. She started her workday  at 7:00 a.m. and stopped working at approximately 6:00 p.m. and, at times, worked up until  9:00 p.m. Trone was unable to take a duty-free meal period on most days due to the volume of  6  work Defendant required. During this period, Trone worked approximately 44 hours per week,  sometimes more, but Defendant failed to compensate her for any hours worked over 40.   21.  When Trone, and all those similarly situated to her, began work each morning,  she turned on her phone and activated Skype.  Trone’s Skype remained on and activated until she  finished working each shift.  naviHealth management knew or should have known when she was  on-line and working.     22.  During the weeks that Barbee and Trone, and all others similarly situated, have  worked in excess of 40 hours, Defendant naviHealth has failed to pay Plaintiffs, and all others  similarly situated, overtime compensation at the rate of one-and-one-half times the regular rate of  pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 during the workweek.    23.  Within the last three years until September 28, 2018, Plaintiffs routinely  performed the tasks referenced in paragraphs 11 and 15 throughout their workweeks, without a  duty-free meal period, normally more than 8 hours per day (and up to 11 hours a day), causing  them to work in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, for which Defendant denied Plaintiffs proper  compensation. The precise amount of uncompensated work time Plaintiffs, and those similarly  situated, performed can be identified through Defendant’s records.  24.  Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 23 in their  entirety and restate them.     7   25.  During the times that Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, have worked in  excess of 40 hours in a workweek, Defendant has not compensated such work at the rate of one- and-one-half times their regular rate of pay.     26.  Section 7(a) of the FLSA provides that employees shall be paid overtime  compensation at a rate of not less than one-and-one-half times their regular rate of pay for all  hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).   27.  Defendant has violated the FLSA by failing and refusing to compensate Plaintiffs,  and all other similarly situated employees, at a rate of not less than one-and-one-half times their  regular rate of pay in workweeks in which Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated worked 40 or  more hours per week. Id.     28.  Defendant’s violations of the FLSA have been done in a willful and bad-faith  manner.   29.  As a result of the Defendant’s willful and purposeful violations of the FLSA,  there has become due and owing to Plaintiffs, and all those similarly situated, an amount that has  not yet been precisely determined. Defendant maintains exclusive possession, custody, and  control of the employment and work records for Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs are unable to state at  this time the exact amount owing to them. The FLSA, as well as various other statutory and  regulatory provisions, imposes a duty on Defendant to maintain and preserve payroll and other  employment records with respect to Plaintiffs and all other employees similarly situated from  which the factfinder can ascertain the amount of Defendant’s liability. Id. § 211(c).   30.  Plaintiffs are entitled to recover liquidated damages in an amount equal to their  backpay damages for Defendant’s failure to pay overtime compensation. Id. § 216(b).   31.  Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs. Id.  8  5.  Plaintiff Mae Barbee (“Barbee”) has been, at all material times herein until  September 28, 2018, employed by naviHealth as a Licensed Practical Nurse (“LPN”) in the  positions of “Utilization Review Coordinator” and “Quality Improvement Organizational  Appeals Coordinator.”    6.  Plaintiff Donna Trone (“Trone”) has been, at all material times herein until  September 28, 2018, employed by naviHealth as an LPN in the positions of “Pre-service Care  Coordinator” and “Flex Team Pre-service Care Coordinator.”    7.  Plaintiffs bring this action for a declaratory judgment, back pay, and other relief  under the FLSA  to remedy Defendant’s willful and unlawful violations of federal law. 29 U.S.C.  §§ 207, 216(b).   8.  At all times material herein, Plaintiffs, while employed by Defendant, were  “employees” within the meaning of the FLSA, id. § 203(e)(1).   9.  Defendant naviHealth, Inc. is an employer within the meaning of the FLSA, id.  § 203(d). naviHealth’s principal office and place of business is located at 210 Westwood Place,  Suite 400, Brentwood, Tennessee 37027-7554.  Its registered agent for service of process is  Corporation Service Company, 2908 Poston Avenue, Nashville, Tennessee 37203-1312.  3   FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME FOR ALL HOURS PLAINTIFFS WERE  SUFFERED OR PERMITTED TO WORK IN VIOLATION  OF SECTION 7 OF THE FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207  