24.  On or about September 29, 2020 and throughout 2020, Defendant also sent prerecorded  voice messages to the 7300 Number.   26.  Defendant called Plaintiff from at least the following phone numbers 281-872-7800 and  281-389-6511.   27.  When Plaintiff listened to the voice messages, she was easily able to determine that  it was a prerecorded message. Rahn v. Bank of Am., No. 1:15-CV-4485-ODE-JSA, 2016 U.S. Dist.  LEXIS 186171, at *10-11 (N.D. Ga. June 23, 2016) (“When one receives a call, it is a clear-cut  fact, easily discernible to any lay person, whether or not the recipient is speaking to a live human  being, or is instead being subjected to a prerecorded message.”).   28.  At the time Plaintiff received these calls and messages Plaintiff was the subscriber  and/or sole user of the 7300 Number.    29.  Defendant’s prerecorded message calls constitute telemarketing/advertising because  they promote Defendant’s business, goods and services.   30.  At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to  be contacted by prerecorded message.   31.  Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar prerecorded messages to be sent  to individuals residing within this judicial district.   32.  Defendant’s unsolicited prerecorded messages caused Plaintiff additional harm,  including invasion of privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.   Defendant’s call also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to Plaintiff’s daily life.   33.  Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  Plaintiff and all others similarly situated.   35.  Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the Class definitions as warranted as facts are  learned in further investigation and discovery.    36.  Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff does not  know the number of members in each the Class but believes the Class members number in the several  thousands, if not more.  39.  There are numerous questions of law and fact common to members of the Class which  predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class.  Among the questions  of law and fact common to the members of the Class are:  a) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’  cellular telephones using an prerecorded message;  b) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express  written consent to make such calls;  c) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful;  d) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and  e) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.   45.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations set forth in paragraphs 1  through 44 as if fully set forth herein.   46.  It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency  purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any …artificial or prerecorded  voice to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. §  227(b)(1)(A)(iii).    47.  Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used prerecorded messages to make  non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class  defined below.    48.  Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used prerecorded messages to make  non-emergency telephone calls to the telephones of Plaintiff and other members of the Class.   49.  These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained  express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior  express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its  calls were made.    50.  Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an  prerecorded messages to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the  other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent.   51.  Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew  or should have known that it was using prerecorded messages. The violations were therefore willful or  knowing.    52.  As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff  and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00  in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the members of the Class are also entitled to an injunction  against future calls. Id.   53.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations set forth in paragraphs 1  through 44 as if fully set forth herein.   54.  It is a violation of the TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC to “initiate any  telephone call…using an… artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a paging  service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common  carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call.”  47 C.F.R. §   55.  Additionally, it is a violation of the TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC  to “[i]nitiate, or cause to be initiated, any telephone call that includes or introduces an advertisement or  constitutes telemarketing, …artificial or prerecorded voice …other than a call made with the prior  express written consent of the called party or the prior express consent of the called party when the call  is made…”  47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2).   56.  Defendant transmitted calls using prerecorded messages to call the telephone numbers  of Plaintiff and members of the putative class without their prior express written consent and/or  continued to prerecorded messages after consent was revoked.    57.  Defendant has therefore violated § 64.1200(a)(1)(iii) and § 64.1200(a)(2) by using an  automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the telephones of  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent.    58.  Defendant knew that it did not have prior express written consent to make these calls,  and knew or should have known that it was using prerecorded messages. The violations were therefore  willful or knowing.    60.  Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other members of  the putative Class had not given prior express written consent to receive its messages to their telephones  the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of  the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.   64.1200(a)(1)(iii).   PROPOSED CLASS  