(Brought Individually and on a Class Basis Pursuant to Rule 23)  VIOLATIONS OF THE MISSOURI MINIMUM WAGE LAW,   MO. REV. STAT. § 290.500   (Brought Individually and on a Collective Basis Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b))  VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT,   29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.  11   (Brought Individually and on a Class Basis Pursuant to Rule 23)  BREACH OF CONTRACT   24.  Plaintiff worked as a Representative for Defendant at its call center in St. Louis,  Missouri from about November 1, 2018 through September 13, 2019. During her employment,  Plaintiff earned $14.00 per hour.   25.  Throughout her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff and other Representatives  regularly worked off-the-clock.   26.  In order to perform their jobs, Plaintiff and other Representatives were required  to boot up their computers and start-up and log-in to various computer programs, software  programs, and applications before the start of their scheduled shifts. This process took  approximately ten minutes per shift.    27.  The time spent booting up their computers, starting up and logging in to various  6  computer programs, software programs, and applications benefited Defendant and was essential  to their responsibilities as Representatives.   28.  Defendant prohibited Representatives from clocking in prior to the start of their  scheduled shifts but required Plaintiff and other Representatives to be call-ready immediately at  the start of their scheduled shifts. Because it took approximately ten minutes to boot up their  computers and start-up and log-in to various computer programs, software programs, and  applications in order to be call-ready, Defendant’s rule compelled them to perform these  activities before clocking into Defendant’s timekeeping system.   29.  During the course of the workday, Plaintiff and other Representatives took an  unpaid lunch break, during which they were required to log out of their computers and log back  in, but were not paid for such time.   30.  Defendant required Plaintiff and other Representatives to clock out at the end of  their scheduled shifts, causing them to perform post-shift work off the clock including  closing/shutting down computer programs and systems.   31.  Because Plaintiff and other Representatives typically worked at least 40 hours in a  workweek, she was not paid for time spent working excess of 40 hours in a workweek, in  violation of the FLSA, the MMWL, and Defendant’s contractual obligation to pay  Representatives for all hours worked.   32.  As a non-exempt employee, Plaintiff and other Representatives were entitled to  full compensation for all overtime hours worked at a rate of 1.5 times their “regular rate” of pay.   33.  At all relevant times, Defendant was Plaintiff’s “employer” and Defendant  directed and directly benefited from the work performed by Plaintiff and other Representatives  before the start of their scheduled shifts.  7   34.  At all relevant times, Defendant controlled Plaintiff’s and all other  Representatives’ work schedule, duties, protocols, applications, assignments, and employment  conditions.   35.  Defendant knew or should have known that the time Representatives spent in  connection with the pre-shift start-up/log-in process, the mid-shift time spent on logging in and  out of the computer during the unpaid lunch break, and the post-shift time spent closing/shutting  down computer programs and systems is compensable under the FLSA, MMWL, and the  common law.    36.  At all relevant times, Defendant was able to track the amount of time that Plaintiff  and other Representatives spent in connection with the pre-shift start-up/log-in process, the  mid-shift time spent on logging in and out of the computer during the unpaid lunch break, and  the post-shift time spent closing/shutting down computer programs and systems; however,  Defendant failed to document, track, or pay them for such work.    37.  At all relevant times, Defendant’s policies and practices deprived Plaintiff and the  putative Collective of wages owed for the pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift activities Plaintiff  and the putative Collective performed. Because Plaintiff and the putative Collective typically  worked 40 hours or more in a workweek, Defendant’s policies and practices also deprived  Plaintiff and the putative Collective of overtime pay at a rate of 1.5 times their regular rate of  pay, as required under the FLSA.   38.  Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on her own  behalf and on behalf of:  All current and former hourly customer service representatives who worked for  Defendant in any of its call centers in the United States at any time within the  8  three years preceding the commencement of this action and the date of judgment.  (hereinafter referred to as the “Collective”).  Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition  as necessary.   39.  Excluded from the Collective are Defendant’s executives, administrative and  professional employees, including computer professionals and outside sales persons.   40.  With respect to the claims set forth in this action, a collective action under the  FLSA is appropriate because the employees described above are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff  under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  The Collective of employees on behalf of whom Plaintiff brings this  collective action are similarly situated because (a) they have been or are employed in the same or  similar positions; (b) they were or are subject to the same or similar unlawful practice, policy, or  plan; and (c) their claims are based upon the same factual and legal theories.   41.  The employment relationships between Defendant and every Collective member  are the same and differ only in name, location, and rate of pay. The key issues – the amount of  uncompensated pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift time owed to each employee – do not vary  substantially from Collective member to Collective member.   42.  The key legal issues are also the same for every Collective member, to wit:  uncompensated pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift time is compensable under the FLSA.   43.  Plaintiff estimates that the Collective, including both current and former  employees over the relevant period, will include hundreds of members. The precise number of  Collective members should be readily available from a review of Defendant’s personnel and  payroll records.  44.  Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on her  9  own behalf and on behalf of:   All current and former hourly customer service representatives who worked for  Defendant in any of its call centers in Missouri at any time within the two years  preceding the commencement of this action and the date of judgment.   (hereinafter referred to as the “Rule 23 Missouri Class”).  Plaintiff reserves the right to amend  this definition as necessary.   45.  The members of the Rule 23 Missouri Class are so numerous that joinder of all  Rule 23 Missouri Class members in this case would be impractical.  Plaintiff reasonably  estimates that there are hundreds of Rule 23 Missouri Class members.  Rule 23 Missouri Class  members should be easy to identify from Defendant’s computer systems and electronic payroll  and personnel records.   46.  There is a well-defined community of interest among Rule 23 Missouri Class  members and common questions of law and fact predominate in this action over any questions  affecting individual members of the Rule 23 Missouri Class.  These common legal and factual  questions include, but are not limited to, the following:  a. Whether the uncompensated pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift time is  compensable under the FLSA;  b. Whether Rule 23 Missouri Class members are owed wages for time spent  performing pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift, and if so, the appropriate  amount thereof; and   47.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Rule 23 Missouri Class in that she and  all other Rule 23 Missouri Class members suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of  the Defendant’s common and systemic payroll policies and practices.  Plaintiff’s claims arise  from the same policies, practices, promises and course of conduct as all other Rule 23 Missouri  Class members’ claims and her legal theories are based on the same legal theories as all other  Rule 23 Missouri Class members.  10   48.  Plaintiff will fully and adequately protect the interests of the Rule 23 Missouri  Class and she has retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution of  Missouri wage and hour class actions. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel have interests that are  contrary to, or conflicting with, the interests of the Rule 23 Missouri Class.   49.  A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy, because, inter alia, it is economically infeasible for Rule 23  Missouri Class members to prosecute individual actions of their own given the relatively small  amount of damages at stake for each individual along with the fear of reprisal by their employer.   Prosecution of this case as a Rule 23 Class action will also eliminate the possibility of  duplicative lawsuits being filed in state and federal courts throughout the nation.   50.  This case will be manageable as a Rule 23 Class action. Plaintiff and her counsel  know of no unusual difficulties in this case and Defendant and its corporate clients all have  advanced, networked computer and payroll systems that will allow the class, wage, and damages  issues in this case to be resolved with relative ease.   51.  Because the elements of Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied in this case, class certification  is appropriate.  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393; 130 S.  Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) (“[b]y its terms [Rule 23] creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff  whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action”).     52.  Because Defendant acted and refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the  Rule 23 Missouri Class and declaratory relief is appropriate in this case with respect to the Rule  23 Missouri Class as a whole, class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is also appropriate.  53.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein and further  alleges as follows.   54.  At all times relevant to this action, Defendant was an employer under 29 U.S.C. §  203(d) of the FLSA, subject to the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.   55.    Defendant is engaged in interstate commerce, or in the production of goods for  commerce, as defined by the FLSA.   56.  At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and other Collective members were  “employees” of Defendant within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) of the FLSA.   57.   Plaintiff and other Collective members either (1) engaged in commerce; or (2)  engaged in the production of goods for commerce; or (3) were employed in an enterprise engaged  in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.   58.  At all times relevant to this action, Defendant “suffered or permitted” Plaintiff and  other Collective members to work and thus “employed” them within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §  203(g) of the FLSA.   59.  At all times relevant to this action, Defendant required Plaintiff and other Collective  members to perform pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift work as described herein, but failed to pay  these employees the federally mandated minimum wage or overtime compensation for such time.   60.  The uncompensated pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift work performed by Plaintiff  and other Collective members was an essential part of their jobs and these activities and the time  associated with these activities is not de minimis.   61.  In workweeks where Plaintiff and other Collective members worked 40 hours or  more, the uncompensated pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift time should have been paid them at  the federally mandated rate of 1.5 times each employee’s regularly hourly wage.  29 U.S.C. § 207.  12   62.  Defendant’s violations of the FLSA were knowing and willful. Defendant knew or  could have easily determined how long it took for its Representatives to complete the pre-shift,  mid-shift, and post-shift activities and Defendant could have properly compensated Plaintiff and  the Collective for such time, but did not.     63.   The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), provides that as a remedy for a violation of the  Act, an employee is entitled to his or her unpaid wages (and unpaid overtime if applicable) plus an  additional equal amount in liquidated damages (double damages), plus costs and reasonable  attorneys’ fees.  64.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein and further  alleges as follows.   65.  At all times relevant to the action, Defendant was an employer covered by the  mandates of the MMWL, and Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Missouri Class are employees entitled to the  MMWL’s protections.   66.  The MMWL requires employers to pay their employees minimum wages and  time-and-a-half their regular rate of pay of hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. Mo.  Rev. Stat. § 290.505.   67.  Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.527 provides that as a remedy for a violation of the MMWL,  an employee is entitled to his or her unpaid wages (and unpaid overtime if applicable) plus an  additional equal amount in liquidated damages (double damages), plus costs and reasonable  attorneys’ fees.   68.  Defendant violated the MMWL by regularly and repeatedly failing to compensate  13  Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Missouri Class for the time spent on the pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift  work activities described in this Complaint, including hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek.   69.  As a result, Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Missouri Class have and will continue to suffer  loss of income and other damages. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Missouri Class are  entitled to recover unpaid wages owed, liquidated damages, costs and attorneys’ fees, and other  appropriate relief under the MMWL at an amount to be proven at trial.   70.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein and further  alleges as follows.   71.  At all times relevant to this action, Defendant had a contract with Plaintiff and every  other Rule 23 Missouri Class member to pay each employee for each hour they worked at a  pre-established (contractual) regularly hourly rate.   72.  Each Rule 23 Missouri Class member’s contractual hourly rate is identified in  paystubs and other records that Defendant prepares as part of its regular business activities.   73.  Plaintiff and other Rule 23 Missouri Class members performed under the contract  by doing their jobs and carrying out the pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift activities that Defendant  required or accepted.   74.  By not paying Plaintiff and other Rule 23 Missouri Class members the agreed upon  hourly wage for the pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift activities, Defendant systematically  breached its contracts with Plaintiff and other Rule 23 Missouri Class members.   75.  Plaintiff’s and the Rule 23 Missouri Class members’ remedies under the FLSA are  inadequate in this case to the extent Defendant paid them more than the federally mandated  14  minimum wage of $7.25 per hour but less than 40 hours per week (i.e., pure “gap time” claims).   76.  Defendant also breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to keep  track of the time Plaintiff and other Rule 23 Missouri Class members spent performing pre-shift,  mid-shift, and post-shift activities, which are a fundamental part of an “employer’s job.”   77.  As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breaches of the contracts alleged  herein, Plaintiff and other Rule 23 Missouri Class members have been damaged, in an amount to be  determined at trial. 