 (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations)  A.  FLSA COVERAGE   (Class Action Alleging Violations of Texas Common Law)  A.  VIOLATIONS OF TEXAS COMMON LAW   21.  Briarwood Manor is “a licensed long term care nursing facility” located in Bellville,  Texas that provides long-term care to “residents who are elderly or medically challenged.”2   23.  Plaintiff Mertz was employed by Briarwood as a dietary cook from December 1, 2019  until March 2, 2021.   24.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are non-exempt employees that were (and  continue to be) paid by the hour. Specifically, Plaintiff Mertz was paid $13.25 per hour for his work  as a dietary cook.   25.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours  per workweek, but were not paid overtime of at least one and one-half their regular rates for all hours  worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek.    26.  Nor were Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members paid for all hours worked.    27.  When calculating Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ hours each pay period,  Briarwood systematically deducted (and continues to deduct) time from Plaintiff and the Putative  Class Members’ daily on-the-clock hours in violation of the FLSA and Texas common law.    28.  Moreover, Plaintiff Mertz was regularly required to work on his scheduled days off all  while off-the-clock, and was only rarely permitted to submit time worked outside of his scheduled  hours.   29.  Briarwood intentionally deducted hours worked from Plaintiff and the Putative Class  Members in order to not pay the full and correct amount of overtime.    30.  Briarwood’s systematic deduction of time from Plaintiff and the Putative Class  Members’ hours worked for breaks they were unable to fully utilize caused Plaintiff and the Putative  Class Members to work hours for which they were (and are) not compensated in violation of the  FLSA and Texas common law.   32.  Briarwood has employed other individuals who perform(ed) the same or similar job  duties under the same pay provisions as Plaintiff.   33.  Briarwood is aware of its obligation to pay for all hours worked and to pay the proper  amount of overtime for all hours worked over forty (40) each week, but has failed to do so.     34.  Because Briarwood did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all hours  worked and time and a half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, Briarwood’s  pay policies and practices violate the FLSA.    35.  Because Briarwood did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all hours  they worked on behalf of Briarwood, Briarwood’s pay policies and practices also violate Texas  common law.   V.  36.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members incorporate by reference all paragraphs and  allegations set forth in the statement of facts of this complaint as though fully and completely set forth  herein.   37.  The FLSA Collective is defined as:  54.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.   55.  Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this collective claim is made on behalf of all of  Briarwood’s employees who have been similarly situated to Plaintiff with regard to the work they  performed and the manner in which they have not been paid.   56.  Other similarly situated employees have been victimized by Briarwood’s patterns,  practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA.   57.  The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 37.   58.  Briarwood’s failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members for all hours  worked and overtime compensation at the rates required from the FLSA, results from generally  applicable policies and practices of Briarwood and does not depend on the personal circumstances of  Plaintiff or the individual FLSA Collective Members.   59.  Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective  Members.   60.  The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective  Members does not prevent collective treatment.   61.  All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job  requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be properly compensated for all hours  worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek.   63.  Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will  not obtain redress of their injuries and Briarwood will retain the proceeds of its rampant violations.   64.  Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system.  Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims  of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency.   65.  Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as  defined as in Paragraph 37 and notice should be promptly sent.  66.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.   67.  Plaintiff Mertz further brings this action pursuant to the equitable theory of quantum  meruit. See Artemis Seafood, Inc. v. Butcher’s Choice, Inc. No. CIV. A. 3:98-0282, 1999 WL 608853, at *3  (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 1999) (citing Schuchart & Assocs. V. Solo Serve Corp., 1983 WL 1147, at *23 (W.D.  Tex. June 29, 1983)).   68.  VI.  68.  The Texas Common-Law Class is defined as:  74.  Plaintiff Mertz brings his Texas Common-Law Claims as a class action pursuant to  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by  Briarwood to work in Texas since March 29, 2017. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004.   75.  Class action treatment of the Texas Common Law Class Members is appropriate  because, as alleged below, all of Rule 23’s class action requisites are satisfied.    76.  The number of Texas Common-Law Class Members is so numerous that joinder of  all class members is impracticable.   77.  Plaintiff Mertz’s claims and the claims of the Texas Common-Law Class share  common questions of law and fact.   78.  Plaintiff Mertz is a member of the Texas Common-Law Class, his claims are typical of  the claims of the other Texas Common Law Class Members, and he has no interests that are  antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of the other Texas Common Law Class Members.   80.  Class certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) because common questions of  law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members and because a class  action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation.   81.  Accordingly, the Texas Common Law Class should be certified as defined in Paragraph   §   CLASS ACTION PURSUANT  d/b/a BRIARWOOD MANOR   §  TO FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)  §  Defendant.  § 