1. Plaintiff and class representative Michael Daley is an individual and a resident and citizen of the State of Illinois.  10. The COA describes plaintiff and putative class members as “independent contractors.”    11. As Jones Motor drivers, plaintiff and members of the putative class are at the core of Jones Motor’s common carrier business; without reliable drivers who are under defendant’s direction and control, defendant has no business.   14. Plaintiff and members of the putative class were at all relevant times employees of Jones Motor under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act.  15. The Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act  820 ILCS 115/2 states: “As used in this Act, the term "employee" shall include any individual permitted to work by an employer in an occupation, but shall not include any individual: (1) who has been and will continue to be free from control and direction over the performance of his work, both under his contract of service with his employer and in fact; and (2) who performs work which is either outside the usual course of business or is performed outside all of the places of business of the employer unless the employer is in the business of contracting with third parties for the placement of employees; and (3) who is in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.”  16. Plaintiff and members of the putative class were at all relevant times employees of Jones Motor under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act and under Illinois Common Law and pursuant to IRS tests/standards for determining employment status.  18. The COA requires plaintiff and putative class members to purchase an  “occupational accident policy” and allow Jones Motor to make weekly deductions for the  “occupational accident policy.”   19. Jones Motor made weekly deductions of approximately $38.60 from the wages of plaintiff and putative class members throughout the recovery period.  20. Furthermore, undisclosed to plaintiff and putative class members, Zurich on information and belief sold a “contingent liability policy” to Jones Motor for an annual premium of, on information and belief, approximately $1,500.  22. In its contracts and agreements with its shippers Jones Motor agreed to secure workers’ compensation coverage for its employees and drivers.  23. The contingent liability policy required Zurich to pay for Jones Motor’s liability under state workers’ compensation acts and also required Zurich to pay for Jones Motor’s legal defense in defending workers’ compensation claims brought by plaintiff and prospective class members.  24. The contingent liability policy was sold to Jones Motor as part of a package of insurance products that also included the occupational accident policy sold to the drivers.   25. The approximately $1,500 per year in annual premium Jones Motor paid to Zurich for the contingent liability policy did not cover and was never intended to cover the costs and exposure of Jones Motor’s liabilities for plaintiff’s and putative class members’ workers’ compensation claims.  27. The risk – a workers’ compensation claim brought by a driver – that was spuriously insured by the contingent liability policy was in reality a risk covered, in whole or in part, by the occupational accident policy.    28. When plaintiff filed his workers’ compensation claim, Zurich paid his statutory workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act.  Initially, Zurich paid benefits from a “general liability policy” account and subsequently paid the workers’ compensation claim through the “occupational accident policy,” thus effectively using the premiums plaintiff paid to Zurich for the occupational accident policy to indemnify Jones Motor for its workers’ compensation liability.   29. Plaintiff and putative class members, therefore, paid for Jones Motor’s statutory workers’ compensation premiums and paid for Jones Motor’s attorney to represent Jones Motor against them.  3. Defendant Jones Motor is a foreign corporation registered in Illinois, doing business in interstate trucking industry; it does business in Illinois and during the time of the recovery period operated a hiring terminal out of Pontoon Beach, Madison County, Illinois.      30. It is unlawful in Illinois for employees to pay their own workers’ compensation.  The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act provides for “Automatic Coverage” stating as follows: “The provisions of this Act, hereinafter following shall apply automatically and without election…to all employers and all their employees…” Coverage is required by 820 ILCS 305/3.3 for employers engaged in “[c]arriage by land, water or aerial service and loading or unloading in connection therewith, including distribution of any commodity by horse drawn or motor vehicle where the employer employs more than 2 employees in the enterprise or business.”   32. Jones Motor has withheld from the plaintiff’s wages and from the class member’s wages workers’ compensation premiums in violation of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act 820 ILCS 305/4(g); as such, Jones Motor’s conduct as alleged herein is criminal conduct under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act.  Jones Motor Unlawfully Deducted Monies from Plaintiff’s and Putative Class Members’ Compensation  33. Jones Motor made multiple deductions from plaintiff’s and putative class members’ compensation.    34. Jones Motor deducted, inter alia, collision insurance, unladen insurance, other forms of insurance, and administrative fees.  35. Plaintiff and putative class members did not give their express written consent at the times these deductions were made as required by 820 ILCS 115/9.  36. As plaintiff and putative class members were employees of Jones Motor under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, these deductions were unlawful. Class Action Allegations  38. Numerosity – Rule 23 (a)(1): The class is numerous; the putative class of misclassified driver/employees is well in excess of one hundred members. Proceeding in individual suits or with simple joinder of members is impracticable; judicial economy is achieved in avoiding multiple duplicative suits. On information and belief there are no other class actions pending or filed regarding the issues raised in this complaint.   4. Jones Motor is a regulated motor carrier subject to the authority and regulations of the United States Department of Transportation (DOT).   40. Commonality – the issues and allegations made in the paragraph immediately above involve similar issues of law and fact applicable to all class members; the class members have all suffered the same injury – paying their own workers’ compensation premiums and being deprived of their rights pursuant to the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act.   41. Consistent with the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2), answering the common issues of law and fact as described in detail above and in this proceeding will significantly advance resolution of each proposed class member’s litigation.    42. Typicality – Rule 23(a)(3): The named plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The named plaintiff and each and every putative class member have been subjected to the same misclassification, deception, and consequences of misclassification. A sufficient relationship exists between the injury the defendants caused to the plaintiff and the defendants’ illegal conduct affecting the class so that this Court may find a collective nature to the defendants’ illegal and improper conduct. By proving the plaintiff’s claim, plaintiff will at the same time prove the claims of the class members.  44. Adequate Representation – Rule 23(a)(4): The attorney for plaintiff and the class is experienced, qualified, and competent to handle this class action litigation. The class attorney has decades of experience litigating complex cases and has successfully tried numerous cases to verdict. Class counsel will vigorously prosecute the class interest. Class counsel’s interests are not in conflict with the plaintiff’s interests or the class’s interests.   45. As specifically alleged herein, questions of law and fact common to the class predominate over any questions affecting individual members of the class.  46. A class action is superior to other available litigation methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Without class representation many individual class members will be deterred from litigation by its complexity and expense.  Even if individual class members were willing and able to litigate alone, the Court would be inundated with myriad lawsuits involving identical facts and identical legal issues; this would exponentially increase the expenses to all parties and the burdens on the Court. Proceeding by class action presents fewer management difficulties and provides the benefit of unitary adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by this Court. 47. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other allegations made in this Complaint as if fully set forth in this Count.  49. Jones Motor is required by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305 et. seq., to provide workers’ compensation benefits/coverage to its employees.  5. Jones Motor hired plaintiff out of its Pontoon Beach, Illinois facility in approximately December 2013.  50. Plaintiff and the class members were at all relevant times employees of Jones Motor and were entitled to the protections, rights, and benefits afforded to employees by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act.  51. For the reasons alleged herein, Jones Motor and Zurich are equitably and judicially estopped from denying the employer/employee relationship between the plaintiff and putative class members and Jones Motor.  52. Jones Motor and Zurich each knew plaintiff and members of the putative class were employees of Jones Motor.  53. Jones Motor and Zurich each knew there was a risk that if the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission reviewed the issues and the facts, the Commission would determine that plaintiff and members of the putative class were employees of Jones Motor.  54. Jones Motor and Zurich each knew that if plaintiff or a member of the putative class filed a workers’ compensation claim and the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission determined the driver was a Jones Motor employee, then Jones Motor would be required to pay premiums to purchase a workers’ compensation policy to benefit plaintiff and the putative class members, and Zurich would lose customers paying premiums for its “occupational accident policy” that was redundant to the workers’ compensation policy Jones Motor was required by law to provide.    56. Jones Motor and Zurich intended plaintiff and the other class members to rely upon Jones Motor’s and Zurich’s misrepresentations that plaintiff and the class members were not entitled to the protection of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act.  57. Jones Motor and Zurich knowingly conspired with each other to discourage plaintiff and putative class members from filing workers’ compensation claims and having the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission determine that the driver was an employee. For example, the “occupational accident policy” Zurich sold included a term immediately terminating benefit payments from the policy if the driver filed a workers’ compensation claim; the true purpose of this policy term was to discourage drivers, who at the time would be off work and relying on the payments from the policy for their sustenance, from filing workers’ compensation claims. There is no legitimate business reason to include this coercive term.    59. In furtherance of the defendants’ conspiracy, Zurich has, in an effort to assist Jones Motor in avoiding its legal obligations under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, stated to Jones Motor employees and others: Zurich “Occupational Accident coverage … is not a Worker’s Compensation plan, automobile plan or a liability insurance plan. There is no employer.”  6. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §1332(d), as the amount in controversy in aggregate exceeds five million dollars, there are more than 100 putative class members in the proposed class, and there is “minimal diversity” (as the term “minimal diversity” is understood in the context of 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)).   Plaintiff and Class Members are Employees, Not Independent  Contractors, of Jones Motor  60. In furtherance of the defendant’s conspiracy, Zurich has, in an effort to assist Jones Motor in avoiding its legal obligations under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, stated to plaintiff and others: “[driver] is NOT covered under a Workers’ Compensation plan.”  61. In furtherance of the defendants’ conspiracy, Zurich has, in an effort to avoid paying the medical bills it would be required to pay under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, stated to plaintiff’s health care providers that the “Occupational Accident Policy” does not pay for “expenses which are covered under any other insurance of any kind” ...  and that therefore the health care providers must submit bills for work-related injuries to the employee’s private healthcare plan.   62. The Zurich Occupational Accident Policy’s benefits, compensation, and payments are of significantly less value than the benefits, compensation, and payments provided by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. By way of example, the Zurich Occupational Accident Policy contains coverage limits not found in the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and pays benefits less frequently than benefits are paid under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act.  64. The misclassification of Jones Motor employees as “independent contractors,” the requirement that the driver/employees purchase and pay the premiums for a Zurich “Occupational Accident Policy,” and the defendants’ misleading and deceptive statements made in concert with each constitute an unlawful scheme and conspiracy to illegally transfer legal liability and financial responsibility for work-related injuries from Jones Motor to Jones Motor’s employees and to the employees’ private healthcare plans.  65. The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/4 provides, inter alia: (h) It shall be unlawful for any employer, insurance company or service or adjustment company to interfere with, restrain or coerce an employee in any manner whatsoever in the exercise of the rights or remedies granted to him or her by this Act or to discriminate, attempt to discriminate, or threaten to discriminate against an employee in any way because of his or her exercise of the rights or remedies granted to him or her by this Act.  67. Jones Motor and Zurich illegally and unlawfully conspired with each other to shift from Jones Motor to plaintiff and the class members the legal obligations of Jones Motor under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/1 et. seq., to provide workers’ compensation coverage to its employees.    69. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ conspiracy and unlawful/illegal/criminal acts, plaintiff and the class members have suffered damages, including but not limited to paying premiums for an “occupational accident insurance” policy that plaintiff and class members would not have purchased but for defendants’ conspiracy and the acts and statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy.  7. In violation of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305, the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115, and Illinois common law, defendant Jones Motor misclassified its employee truck drivers as independent contractors.  71. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations contained elsewhere in this Complaint.  72. Plaintiff and all class members are or have been at relevant times hereto employees of Jones Motor.  74. Jones Motor required plaintiff sign a “Driver Information Sheet and Beneficiary Designation” (as part of the COA) that states: “I am an independent contractor...”  It also states: “I understand that the cost of the insurance is my sole obligation and responsibility regardless of the above arrangement for premium payment.” These statements are false.  75. Jones Motor intended for the plaintiff and class members to rely upon Jones Motor’s misrepresentations as to their status as independent contractors and purchase an “occupational accident policy” from Zurich that was not necessary to purchase as the drivers/employees were covered by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act; further, the policy sold by Zurich, if it was worth anything, was worth far less than Zurich represented to plaintiff and class members it was worth.    76. Plaintiff and putative class members, as a proximate result of Jones Motor’s misrepresentations as to their employment status and other acts alleged herein, were deceived into paying their own workers’ compensation premiums.  77. Jones Motor benefitted financially from its violations of the Illinois Deceptive Business Practices Act by transferring to plaintiff and putative class members its statutory obligation to pay for workers’ compensation insurance premiums.  78. Plaintiff and class members, as a proximate result of Jones Motor’s deception, suffered actual damages which damages include, inter alia, the amount of the premiums the plaintiff and class members paid to Zurich.    81. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations contained elsewhere in this Complaint.  82. Plaintiff and class members at all relevant times hereto were and are employees of Jones Motor.  83. Zurich represented to plaintiff and class members that plaintiff and class members were not employees but were independent contractors of Jones Motor.  84. Zurich intended for the plaintiff and class members to rely upon Zurich’s representation as to their employment status and purchase an “occupational accident policy” from Zurich.        85. Plaintiff and class members, as a proximate result of the defendant Zurich’s misrepresentation, were deceived into paying to defendant Zurich their own workers’ compensation premiums, premiums Jones Motor was required by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act to pay.  86. During the course of its doing business with plaintiff and other class members, Zurich represented that the “Occupational Accident Insurance Policy” was not a workers’ compensation policy, that there was no employment relationship between the plaintiff and the putative class members and Jones Motor.  88. Contrary to Zurich’s repeated representations that the “Occupational Accident Insurance Policy” was not a workers’ compensation policy, Zurich has at all relevant times treated the “occupational accident policy” as a workers’ compensation policy; Zurich has used premiums paid for the “occupational accident policy” to settle and pay workers’ compensation claims filed by Jones Motor drivers with the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission.  89. Zurich never disclosed to plaintiff and putative class members the other critical component of the package of insurance products it sold to Jones Motor: the contingent liability policy.    9. As a condition of employment, Jones Motor required plaintiff and class members to sign a de facto “Contractor Operating Agreement” (“COA”). Exhibit 2.  90. Zurich never disclosed to plaintiff and putative class members that Zurich would use their “occupational accident policy” premiums payments, which subsidized the contingent liability policy, to pay for Jones Motor’s workers’ compensation liabilities to them and to pay for an attorney to represent Jones Motor against them in the workers’ compensation litigation.  92. Pursuant to the Illinois Deceptive Business Practices Act, plaintiff and class members must be awarded their reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in bringing this matter.  94. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations made elsewhere in this Complaint.  95. Jones Motor unlawfully misclassified its employee drivers as independent contractors.  96. As a result of Jones Motor’s misclassification, fraud, and misdemeanor crimes, Jones Motor has been unjustly enriched.  97. Jones Motor has been unjustly enriched by, inter alia, avoiding FICA contributions, payroll taxes, and unemployment tax.    98. Jones Motor has been further unjustly enriched by, inter alia, unlawfully  passing on certain business expenses to its employee drivers, including, inter alia, fuel costs.  CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT COMES NOW the Plaintiff MICHAEL DALEY, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, by his undersigned attorney, and for this CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT brought pursuant to Federal Rule 23 against the defendants ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY (“Zurich”)  and JONES MOTOR CO. INC. (“Jones Motor”), states: The Parties, Jurisdiction and Venue  vs Zurich Illinois Deceptive Business Practices Act  vs. Jones Motor Unjust Enrichment  vs. Jones Motor and Zurich Civil Conspiracy  vs. Jones Motor Illinois Deceptive Business Practices Act  