21.  PNC utilized Corevest and Prins to originate mortgage loans to consumers  looking to acquire properties over a period of years out of the New York office.   23.  Corevest and Prins solicited Barli for four different mortgage loans, spanning over  60 single-family homes as collateral.   24.  Corevest and Prins affirmatively represented to Barli that as part of the mortgage  payment, there would be an escrow for Capital Expenditures, which could be drawn upon at  Borrower’s request.   25.  Neither Corevest nor Prins ever disclosed that there would be a fee incurred for  each draw request of Borrower’s own funds.   26.  Corevest and Prins affirmatively represented that each loan had a standard five- year prepayment schedule, which is common in commercial financing.   27.  Corevest and Prins further represented that there would be a Holdback Reserve as  part of the mortgage payment, which again were Borrower’s own funds, which could be drawn  upon at Borrower’s request.   28.  Once again, neither Corevest nor Prins disclosed that there would be any fee to  access these funds, nor that they would require Borrower to default on their mortgage loan.     29.  Prins sent an email to Barli offering a $1,000 closing cost credit if the initial  expense deposit wire was sent by November 21, 2018. (a true and accurate copy of the email  from Prins to Barli, dated November 21, 2018 is annexed hereto as “Appendix A.”)   30.  In reliance on Prins’ email, Barli wired the expense deposit to Corevest and Prins.   32.  When Barli questioned Prins about it, Prins threatened to not close the loan over  this and called Barli an “asshole” and hung up on him.   33.  Since so much time and money had been expended by Barli to get to closing, the  loan closed with only the $500 credit. (a true and accurate copy of the signed HUD statement is  annexed hereto as “Appendix B.”)   34.  The credit of only $500.00 appears on line 205 of the HUD statement.   35.  Barli took out four (4) separate mortgages with PNC, Corevest, and Prins.   36.  The first mortgage covered a portfolio of ten (10) single-family homes.   37.  The second mortgage covered a portfolio of nineteen (19) single-family homes.   38.  The third mortgage spanned a portfolio of fourteen (14) single-family homes.   39.  The fourth mortgage covered a portfolio of twenty-nine (29) single-family homes.   40.  After making mortgage payments for several years, Barli contacted Corevest to  recapture some of his escrowed funds for Capital Expenditures performed on the properties.   41.  Barli emailed with PNC, Corevest and Midland over a period of seven (7) months  in an effort to get his own funds back for the repairs that were performed. (a true and accurate  copy of emails between Barli, Corevest and Midland are annexed hereto as “Appendix C.”)   42.  PNC, Corevest and Midland charged Barli Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00)  per draw request.   44.  PNC, Corevest and Midland willfully delayed the process of giving Barli back his  own escrowed funds. (See Appendix C, email from CJ Suzuki to Barli, stating it should take 2  weeks from submitting the complete package to receive funds)   45.  PNC, Corevest and Midland unilaterally reduced the draw request by determining  that certain items were non-reimbursable, demanding that Barli submit another new draw request  to obtain the additional funds, in an effort to charge another Two Hundred Fifty Dollar ($250.00)  fee on the loan. (a true and accurate copy of emails between Barli, PNC, Corevest and Midland  are annexed hereto as “Appendix D.”)   46.  In the last draw request made by Barli, PNC and Midland unilaterally reduced the  amount again, forcing Barli to request those funds on the next draw request, forcing another fee  to be incurred. (a true and accurate copy of the email from Elizabeth Buckley to Barli, dated  January 22, 2020 is annexed hereto as “Appendix E.”)   47.  PNC, Midland, Corevest, AlterDormus, Prins and Vilimas began engaging in even  more egregious and shocking conduct once the COVID-19 pandemic broke out.   48.  In April of 2020, Barli contact PNC and Midland in an effort to discuss options  for the hardships being faced by millions across our country. (a true and accurate copy of the  email between Barli and Carla Byers, dated April 2, 2020 is annexed hereto as “Appendix F.”)   50.  Over the next four (4) months, Byers, PNC and Midland unilaterally changed  their options for borrowers. (true and accurate copy of emails between Byers and Barli, from  April – June, 2020 are annexed hereto as “Appendix G.”)   51.  The new options being offered by PNC, Corevest and Midland all came with  hefty fees the borrower would have to pay.   52.  PNC, Corevest and Midland had actual knowledge that Barli was facing financial  hardships due to the COVID-19 pandemic and still tried to force egregious fees onto him. (see  Appendix G)   53.  For the fourth of Bali’s mortgages, there was a Holdback Escrow of $17,527.96,  which Barli asked to utilize to make one months’ mortgage payment, to enable the portfolio to  get up and running. (see Appendix G)   54.  After weeks of intentionally delaying the processing of returning Barli’s own  escrowed funds back to him, PNC, Corevest and Midland ignored Barli’s request and forced him  to incur a late charge and an NSF fee assessed by PNC, Corevest and Midland. (see Appendix G)   55.  On June 15, 2020, DeAnna Barela, a Loan Servicing Senior Analyst for Midland  sent an email to Byers stating that Barli had advised that he wanted to use his escrowed funds to  cover the mortgage payment. (a true and accurate copy of that email from Barela to Byers, dated  June 15, 2020 is annexed hereto as “Appendix H.”)   57.  Barli spoke via telephone to Byers who explained that the legal retainer could end  up as high as Twenty Thousand to Thirty Thousand Dollars ($20,000 - $30,000) for this  modification.    58.  Barli responded by stating that the loan agreement stated exactly what was being  asked for and that no modification was being requested at all. (see Appendix H)   59.  Byers proceeded to respond that to continue with using Barli’s own funds, PNC  and Midland would have to declare Barli’s loan in default due to non-payment, in a further  international act to charge additional fees to the mortgage. (see Appendix H)   60.  Byers then proceeded to try and charge Barli  an additional processing fee of $500  to  $1,000 per loan. (see Appendix H)   61.  Barli continued to explain to Byers, PNC and Midland that he was not late, nor  seeking any modification. He was simply looking to use his own escrowed funds to cover the  mortgage payment, of which there was plenty of.   62.  Despite the numerous requests and emails documenting everything, PNC,  Corevest and Midland forced the loan into default so they could charge exorbitant fees against  Barli.   63.  In August of 2020, Barli contacted Corevest in an effort to discuss options for two  of his mortgages.    65.  Barli inquired about the prepayment penalty on the loan, which was represented  by Prins, PNC and Corevest to be a standard five-year prepayment schedule.   66.  Bolanos stated she could not provide a payoff without having a formal quote  prepared, which costs Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per request. (see Appendix I)   67.  As evidenced from the email exchanges between Bolanos and Corevest and Barli,  Midland was directing Barli to Corevest and Corevest was simply redirecting Barli back to  Midland, in an international effort to frustrate and thwart Barli’s efforts.   68.  In October of 2020, Barli was introduced to Vilimas as someone who could  provide assistance with the mortgage payments given the state of affairs with the COVID-19  pandemic.   69.  Barli sent an email to Vilimas, stating he was trying to be proactive and asking for  a disclosure of fees before moving forward. (a true and accurate copy of the email from Barli to  Vilimas, dated October 13, 2020 is annexed hereto as “Appendix J.”)   70.  Vilimas responded that to even consider a forbearance agreement, there would be  fees, “which would include but are not limited to legal fees, a loan modification fee, and Special  Servicing Fees.” (see Appendix J)   71.  Barli emailed Vilimas on October 16, 2020, stating that due to the exorbitant fees,  it did not make sense to get a forbearance. (a true and accurate copy of the email from Barli to  Vilimas, dated October 16, 2020 is annexed hereto as “Appendix K.”)   73.  Byers had represented to Barli in an earlier call that the standard five-year  prepayment schedule was followed, as evidenced by Barli’s email dated November 16, 2020 to  Byers. (see Appendix L)   74.  Rachel LaCombe, an Asset Manager for Midland, responded to that email stating  that “we cannot give you a rough estimate of this premium without ordering a quote from our  Payoff Dept.” and trying to charge another Two Hundred Fifty Dollar ($250.00) fee to prepare a  payoff. (see Appendix L)   75.  When Barli further questioned Rachel LaCombe, she responded that “the  calculation is complex and is only calculated by the Payoff Dept.” trying to charge another Two  Hundred Fifty Dollar ($250.00) fee on the loan. (a true and accurate copy of the email from  Rachel LaCombe to Barli, dated November 19, 2020 is annexed hereto as “Appendix M.”)   76.  Meanwhile, Vilimas had emailed Barli again on October 29, 2020 to advise him  that the prepayment penalty on one mortgage loan, with a principal balance of $737,000 would  be Three Hundred Twenty Thousand Dollars ($320,000.00) plus legal fees and accrued interest.  (a true and accurate copy of the email from Vilimas to Barli, dated October 29, 2020 is annexed  hereto as “Appendix N.”)   77.  Barli was appalled at this egregious and exorbitant payoff figure and expressed  that to Vilimas by telephone.   79.  Vilimas then proceeded to demand the payment and threatened that additional  fees would accrue if Barli did not pay the $1,500.00. (see Appendix O)   80.  Barli responded to Vilimas that no fees were ever disclosed to him, despite Barli  asking repeatedly for that and asked for documentation in writing of the fees being disclosed to  Barli. (see Appendix O)   81.  Vilimas responded that “I understand that we did not come to terms on a loan  modification, but being transferred to Special Servicing automatically triggers the accrual of  those fees.” (See Appendix O, emphasis added)   82.  The repeated course of conduct and bad faith exuded by all the Defendants are  completely unreasonable and egregious, shocking the conscience of any reasonable person.  Defendants knew that Plaintiff was dealing with financial hardships due to the COVID-19  pandemic, yet proceeded to charge excessive and unnecessary fees, instead of providing any  assistance.   83.  The deplorable actions taken by the Defendants should not be tolerated by this  Court under any circumstances.  85.  All of the members of the classes and sub-classes are collectively referred to as  the “Class” or “Class Members.”   86.  Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the Class definition before the  Court determines whether class certification is appropriate.   87.  Excluded from the Class are: (i) Defendant and any entities in which Defendant  has a controlling interest; (ii) any entities in which Defendant’s officers, directors, or employees  are employed and any of the legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns of Defendant; (iii)  the Judge to whom this case is assigned and any member of the Judge’s immediate family and  any other judicial officer assigned to this case; and (iv) all governmental entities.   88.  The members of the Class are so numerous that their joinder is impracticable.   90.  The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class and do  not conflict with the interests of any other members of the Class in that the Plaintiffs and the  other members of the Class were subject to the same wrongful policies and practices by  Defendants.   91.  The individually named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests  of the proposed Class. They are committed to the vigorous prosecution of the Class’ claims and  have retained attorneys who are qualified to pursue this litigation and have experience in  litigation matters.   92.  Counsel competent and experienced in federal class action and federal civil rights  litigation has been retained to represent the class.  In that regard, Rita Dave, Esq. is an  experienced attorney with extensive experience in litigation.  Daniel Barli, Esq., is likewise an  experienced commercial litigator with extensive experience in complex transactions.  Moreover,  plaintiff’s counsel intend to retain co-counsel specializing in federal class action and federal civil  rights litigation.     93.  This class action is superior to any other method for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this legal dispute, as joinder of all Class members is impracticable. The damages  suffered by members of the Class, although substantial, are small in relation to the extraordinary  expense and burden of individual litigation and therefore it is highly impractical for such Class  members to attempt individual redress for damages.   95.  The Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to  the Class, making final declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate   96.  The Class is easily ascertainable as Defendants’ computerized records can identify  all mortgagors who took out loans with their companies and all mortgagors who have contacted  them for relief options.   97.  The questions of law and fact common to members of the Classes predominate  over any questions affecting only individual members.   98.  Notice to the proposed Class can be achieved through the U.S. mail to the  addresses of the Class members that are kept within Defendants’ records.  