10.  Plaintiff then received a letter dated October 5, 2015 from RTR, attached as Exhibit  A, attempting to collect $237.00 allegedly due based on the Citation (the “October 5 Letter”).   11.  The October 5 Letter stated, in pertinent part:  Dear ALIZA D LEVI:  3 Please be advised that the Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency  has placed the above-referenced fine with this office.  We ask that you forward payment in the amount set forth above. Please detach and  return the lower portion of this letter with your payment. Should you wish to pay  by credit card you must contact our office. Note that a processing fee will be added  to the amount of your payment.  Please direct all future telephone calls and letters to our office, at the telephone  number and address set forth above.  If you do not contact our office within 15 days of the date of this letter, this fine  will be reported to the credit bureaus. In addition, failure to pay may result in the  suspension of your driver’s license, motor vehicle registration, and/or a judgment  being entered against you.   12.  The October 5 Letter is a form letter used by Defendant, generated by a computer,  with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer.   13.  Following its mailing of the October 5 Letter, Defendant failed to send to Plaintiff  any further information generally relating to the debt allegedly owed, and specifically her right to  seek verification of the debt.   14.  The alleged debt that is the subject matter of the October 5 Letter is a consumer  debt.   15.  RTR’s actions violated the FDCPA several times over, as specifically described in  16.  The FDCPA generally prohibits “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation  or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.   17.  The FDCPA specifically prohibits “the false representation of the character,  amount, or legal status” of an alleged debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2).   4  18.  The FDCPA specifically prohibits threatening “to take any action that cannot  legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).   19.  The FDCPA specifically prohibits the “use of any false representation or deceptive  means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10).   20.  The FDCPA requires a debt collector “to disclose in the initial written  communication with the consumer and, in addition, if the initial communication with the consumer  is oral, in that initial oral communication, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and  that any information obtained will be used for that purpose[.]”15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11).   21.  The FDCPA prohibits the use of any “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or  attempt to collect any debt” including “the collection of any amount (including any interest, fee,  charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly  authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).   22.  The FDCPA also requires that a debt collector, “[w]ithin five days after the initial  communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, . . . send the  consumer a written notice containing-- . . . (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty  days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt  will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; [and] (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies  the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is  disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the  consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt  collector[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).  23.  Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules  of Civil Procedure on behalf of all natural persons who were sent a collection letter by RTR on or  5 after November 2, 2014 that stated (a) that a processing fee would be added to the amount of any  payment for a debt; (b) that failure to pay could result in the suspension of a driver license or motor  vehicle registration; (c) failed to identify itself as a debt collector and to notify the consumer that  any information obtained will be used for the purpose of collecting a debt; (d) failed to notify the  consumer that the consumer had 30 days to dispute the debt, otherwise RTR would assume the  debt to be valid; or (e) failed to notify the consumer that if the consumer notified RTR within 30  days that the alleged debt or any part thereof was disputed, RTR would obtain verification of the  debt (the “Class”).    24.  The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. On information and belief,  there are more than 50, if not thousands, of members of the Class.  (a)  There are questions of law and fact common to members of the Class that  predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. Specifically, the question  of whether the October 5 Letter violates the FDCPA predominates over all others.   25.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because all are based on the same  factual basis and legal theories.   26.  Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel  who are experienced in class action consumer litigation. Plaintiff has no interests which conflict  with those of the Class.   27.  A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy.  28.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every preceding paragraph as though  fully set forth herein.   6  29.  RTR’s statement in the October 5 Letter that a processing fee will be added to  payments made by credit card violates the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). The processing fee is  incidental to the alleged debt and is not authorized by contract or law. Further, such statement is a  false representation that RTR is entitled to receive compensation in violation of the FDCPA. 15  U.S.C. § 1692e(2).   30.  RTR’s statement in the October 5 Letter that failure to pay the alleged debt could  result in suspension of Plaintiff’s license or motor vehicle registration violates the FDCPA. 15  U.S.C. § 1692e(5) and (10).  There was no debt owed to begin with.1  In addition, had Plaintiff  owed a debt, RTR did not have any authority or power to suspend anyone’s license or motor  vehicle registration regardless of whether the payment was made to RTR.2     31.  In the October 5 Letter, RTR failed to identify itself as a debt collector and to notify  the consumer that any information obtained will be used for the purpose of collecting a debt. Such  failure by Defendant violated the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11).   32.  In the October 5 Letter and within five days of its sending, RTR failed to notify the  consumer that the consumer had 30 days to dispute the debt, otherwise RTR would assume the  debt to be valid. Such failure by Defendant violated the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(3).   33.  In the October 5 Letter and within five days of its sending, RTR failed to notify the  consumer that if the consumer notified RTR within 30 days that the alleged debt or any part thereof  1 New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 227(4)(b) provides that “[n]o . . . civil action shall be commenced  nor shall [any] final order [to collect an unpaid traffic fine] be filed until at least thirty days after the  department has posted by ordinary mail to the person at the address of such person on file with the  department or at the current address provided by the United States postal service notice of the amount of  such fine or fines and that such fine or fines are due and owing.” Moreover, any determination of a traffic  hearing officer is subject to appeal if filed within thirty days after notice of the determination is served. Id.  § 228(4).   2 See id. §510(1) (“Who may suspend or revoke. Any magistrate, justice or judge, in a city, in a town, or in  a village, any supreme court justice, any county judge, any judge of a district court, the superintendent of  state police and the commissioner of motor vehicles or any person deputized by him, shall have power to  revoke or suspend the license to drive a motor vehicle or motorcycle . . . .”)   7 was disputed, RTR would obtain verification of the debt. Such failure by Defendant violated the  FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(4).  8.  On May 28, 2015, Plaintiff received a traffic citation in Nassau County, ticket  number BE603713-5 (the “Citation”). Plaintiff pled not guilty to the infraction alleged in the  Citation.    9.  On September 16, 2015, the Citation was dismissed.   Background    The FDCPA   Violation of the FDCPA  