10. Harpersville contracted with JCS which operates a “for profit” enterprise that markets its services to various municipal governments and has previously contracted with over 100 cities and towns throughout Alabama.  JCS’s marketing approach emphasizes that its fees will be paid by the “offender” before the municipal court and that its efforts will improve collection of court fines and costs at no cost to the city.  11. The City of Harpersville did not seek bids for this contract. Rather, it granted JCS this exclusive contract in violation of Ala. Const. Art. I, § 22 and Ala. Code 1975, §41-16-50.  12. The fees required to be paid to JCS under the contract with Harpersville, are not permissible court cost and are charged to individuals in addition to fines adjudicated.  13. The JCS approach is highly systemized and uniform throughout the Alabama municipal courts in which it operates, including Harpersville.  15. Harpersville, by contract and practice, unlawfully delegated to JCS many administrative and judicial functions of its municipal court, clothing it with the color of state law for the collection of court fines, costs and the JCS private fees.  16. The agreement between Harpersville and JCS and signed by the City mayor Theoangelo Perkins attests that the Harpersville municipal “court agrees that each court order shall provide for the following:  a probation fee of $35.00 per month flat fee one time probationer set up fee of $10.00. . . . " (emphasis added).  (Exhibit 2)  17. Harpersville, through its mayor and council, approved the JCS contract on March 3, 2006 and continued the relationship thereafter fully aware of the practices and system of JCS and jointly participating and approving in those practices. The City of Harpersville also approved the employment of Larry Ward as a part time judge of its municipal court.  19. In their initial complaint, the state court plaintiffs brought the lawsuit to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief for themselves and for those similarly treated.  20. On July 17, 2012, the plaintiffs in CV-2010-900183 filed an amended complaint asserting class claims and requesting damages as well as injunctive relief.  21. The state court has not yet certified a damage class in CV-2010-900183 and that case is still pending without a class certification scheduling deadline.  22. The collection system at Harpersville continued unabated until an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court was entered on July 11, 2012 enjoining many actions of Harpersville which are more specifically set out below. (Exhibit 3).  That order was followed by a decision of the Harpersville city council on August 8, 2012 to dissolve the Harpersville Municipal Court.   23. Thereafter, on December 27, 2012, Assistant District Attorney Alan Miller filed a motion in the District Court of Shelby County requesting that the Court ‘remit all outstanding fees, fines and costs and to establish this account as “Paid in Full”’ for all the then existing traffic cases. (Exhibit 4). That motion was granted on December 27, 2012 by Judge Ronald Jackson, Presiding District Judge of Shelby County, who ordered that all traffic cases listed in the motion were declared PAID IN FULL and ordered that any warrant associated with the case was recalled, set aside and held for naught.  24. Since the dissolution of the municipal court, however, Harpersville has taken no action to reimburse the many people it forced to pay illegal fees or who were imprisoned or otherwise damaged by the unlawful collection system at Harpersville.   27. Once on probation to collect the fines, “offenders” who could not keep up their payments at Harpersville were arrested typically based upon FTA or FTOCO rather than probation violation.  These codes stand for “Failure to Appear” and “Failure to Obey Court Order.”   Warrants were issued by the City based upon JCS’s report that the offender failed to appear as directed at the JCS established date after notice from JCS.  Similarly, FTOCO arrests resulted from JCS reporting that the “offender” failed to comply with their probation order – that is, they failed to pay or appear at the JCS offices as JCS directed. There is no ordinance or statute establishing Failure to Obey Court Order as an offense. The arrests and incarceration on these charges occurred without any determination of contempt or willfulness in these arrests and the additional costs were added without any finding whatsoever. Under this system, the “offender” arrested was jailed for an undetermined period of time with bond set by the city magistrate to approximate the money JCS claimed the person owed, which included fines, court costs, fees for time spent in jail, and JCS fees. Unlike legitimate probation systems where a probationer would be entitled to a finding of the reasons for revocation, appointed counsel and, at worse, suffer jail time equating to the original sentence, the system at Harpersville ignored all those safeguards focusing instead on the money it could demand.  29. The City Council and Mayor control the policy making for Harpersville and also hired the municipal court judge and contracted for services of JCS at the municipal court. The decision to use this JCS system was an administrative decision of Harpersville, by and through its mayor, and not a decision of the municipal court judge or the Chief Justice, or any other employee of the Administrative Office of Courts (‘AOC’).   30. Harpersville, through its contract, pattern and practice, clothed JCS with the appearances of state authority and has previously even allowed JCS employees to carry badges.3  The JCS employees attended each municipal court session and were referred to as “probation officers” in the operation of the municipal court and city clerk’s office, though none had such authority under Alabama statutes.  Under this system, “offenders” were not permitted to pay fines at the city clerk’s office, but were instead required by Harpersville to make all payments, including those for fines, restitution, fees for being in jail, ‘probation’ fees and court costs, to JCS at the JCS office.  32. This system, as a matter of routine, violated the rights of persons such as the Plaintiff and the class she seeks to represent by imposing fines and charging fees to indigent persons with no hearing or consideration of their indigency and by converting fines to jail time for which they were also charged.  33. As a policy and practice, the Harpersville court did not conduct Bearden hearings or inquire into the offender’s ability to pay, or allow the offenders to fill out hardship forms requesting community service or other alternatives due to their client’s poverty.4   34. Despite the lack of authority to do so, Harpersville allowed JCS to use threats of revoking probation, arrest, increased fines and costs and jail time for purposes of collection.  Under the system operated by Harpersville,  JCS’s determination to incarcerate an individual and/or impose unreasonable bond requirements was routinely accepted by City personnel as a matter of policy without conducting delinquency or probation hearings and without making any findings, much less any determination of indigency or appointment of counsel before taking such punitive action and despite the fact that both Harpersville and JCS have a significant financial stake in the proceedings.  36. After improperly imposing probation even when no jail sentence was involved, incarceration then followed if the fine, together with the fees added by JCS, were not paid as dictated. The collection purpose of this system was emphasized by the fact that probation was terminated once full payment was made.  37. The City enforced a policy and practice of initiating and issuing warrants when a person missed a payment or failed to make sufficient payments.  That policy did not consider the person’s ability to pay5 – even when the City or its agent, JCS, had knowledge that the person was indigent and/or disabled – all without providing notice or validly summoning the person to court for a hearing.  38. Instead, City policy was to issue and execute warrants,6  and for its police officers go to the homes of traffic debtors to arrest them. The City policy and practice were also therefore to deprive people of their liberty without any prior notice and opportunity to be heard and without any basic inquiry into whether the debt was owed, actually unpaid, or still valid.  40. Under the Harpersville system, JCS had a monetary interest to conduct its role as “probation officer” in a way that maximized its personal profit and not as a neutral court officer.  41. Under the scheme implemented by Harpersville, the town allowed its agent JCS to initiate probation revocation proceedings, to make recommendations to the city judge about that revocation, and to initiate charges of failure to appear or failure to obey court order – all while financially interested in the outcome of these strong-arm collection efforts.  Under the system at Harpersville, Judge Ward routinely signed “orders” in blank allowing JCS to fill in terms, amounts and requirements with many such “orders” never being filed with the court clerk and kept only in the computer records of JCS.   42. Under the scheme implemented by Harpersville, neither Harpersville nor JCS undertook any determination of the reasons for nonpayment, and did not consider such things as the Plaintiffs’ disability, unemployment, or assets in regard to the nonpayment of the fines and routinely sought collection from exempt income such as Social Security Disability payments.  As a result, juveniles and hundreds of persons on disability and social security were illegally also placed on ”probation” with the required monthly costs.  43. Under the scheme implemented by Harpersville, both Harpersville and JCS denied any responsibility to determine indigency, and provided no instruction to its employee’s for the consideration of indigency.  45. Under the scheme implemented by Harpersville, after simple fines were converted to “probation” for payment, jail often resulted for the “offender” who did not meet the payment schedule. This Harpersville system used JCS’s conclusion of a “probation violation” or “failure to obey court order” to incarcerate individuals who, had they been financially able to pay at the point of adjudication, would have paid only a fine with no probation whatsoever.  46. The amount of the fine announced to debtors by the judge in open court often differed from the amount listed on the probation paperwork JCS created. The JCS papers usually showed an amount higher than the fine and court costs set by City ordinance.  In addition, Harpersville also charged people for each day it confined the person to jail.8  47. Under its scheme, Harpersville, which was also financially interested, took advantage of its control over its police force and jail facilities to deny these “offender”/debtors the statutory and constitutional protections that every other Alabama debtor may invoke against a private creditor by allowing JCS to use or threaten debtors of the City with arrest and jail as coercion for payment.  49. Harpersville arrested "offenders" and jailed them for an undetermined period of time. The cash bond was set by the city magistrate to approximate the money JCS claimed the person owed. Unlike legitimate probation systems where a probationer would be entitled to a finding of the reasons for revocation, appointed counsel and, at worse, suffer jail time equating to the original sentence, the system at Harpersville ignored all those safeguards. 8. The Plaintiff brings this action because the policy and practices of Harpersville have violated the Plaintiff’s statutory and constitutional rights and those of persons similarly situated.  92. The Classes which the named Plaintiff seeks to represent consist of:  All individuals who were assigned by the Harpersville Municipal Court to “probation” with JCS for the collection of fines. AND All individuals who, despite their indigency, were incarcerated without consideration of their indigency for failure to pay fines, charges and fees from the Harpersville Municipal Court.  93. The members of the Classes and subclasses are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.  94. As of this time, the exact number in the Classes is unknown but would be more than one thousand and the class is ascertainable.  95. Plaintiff’s treatment by the Defendant is typical of the members of the Classes and subclasses.   96. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes and has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in class litigation.  Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse or antagonistic to the Classes. 