(Class Action Alleging Violations of Texas Common Law)  A.  VIOLATIONS OF TEXAS COMMON LAW   (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations)   24.  Defendants are a global customer engagement and contact center with fifteen contact  centers, that provide customer services, technical support services, and sales and marketing support  to their business clients.3   25.  On information and belief, Everise is a global customer contact corporation based out  of Singapore.4   27.  On information and belief, C3 was a customer contact center that has been wholly  acquired by Everise and is now operated and controlled by Everise.6   28.  To assist its clients, Defendants employ thousands of hourly call-center employees–– Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members––who assist Defendants’ customers and clients. The Plaintiff  and Putative Class Members work for Defendants either in call centers owned and operated by  Defendants or remotely from home.    29.  Defendants are joint employers pursuant to 229 C.F.R. § 791.2.   30.  Specifically, Defendant Everise holds itself out as the overall employer of the Plaintiff  and Putative Class Members. Hourly Call-Center Employees were told they worked for Everise,  applied for the jobs through Everise’s website, and followed Everise’s corporate policies and  procedures.    31.  Defendant Everise manages key internal relationships to Defendants Truesource and  C3—that is, it directs the financials of Defendants Truesource and C3 and controls the pay of Plaintiff  and the Putative Class Members.    32.  Defendants directly or indirectly hired Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members,  controlled their work schedules and conditions of employment, and determined the rate and method  of the payment of wages.   34.  Defendants maintained control, oversight, and direction over Plaintiff and the Putative  Class Members, including the promulgation and enforcement of policies affecting the payment of  wages for overtime compensation.   35.  Specifically, Defendants created and enforced the enterprise-wide policies and  procedures, including the policies that caused the FLSA violations, that the Plaintiff and Putative Class  Members had to follow.   36.  Defendants did not act entirely independently of each other and have not been  completely disassociated with respect to the work of Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members.   37.  Specifically, Defendants dictated the practice goals and what pressing or tactical items  needed to be done in order to meet the goals of the respective Defendants and/or their clients.    38.  Moreover, all Defendants have (or had) the power to hire and fire Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members; supervise and control Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ work  schedules and conditions of their employment; determine their rate and method of payment; and,  maintain their employment records.    39.  As a result, all Defendants are responsible, both individually and jointly, for  compliance with all of the applicable provisions of the FLSA and Texas common-law with respect to  the entire employment for the workweeks at issue in this case.   40.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ job duties consisted of answering phone  calls made by Defendants’ customers, answering customer/client inquiries, fulfilling orders, accepting  payments, selling business products, and generally assisting customers/clients.    41.  Plaintiff Rodriguez was employed by Defendants in customer service in Corpus  Christi, Texas from approximately February 2019 to August 2019.   43.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members typically worked approximately forty (40)  “on-the-clock” hours per week.   44.  In addition to their forty (40) “on-the-clock” hours, Plaintiff and the Putative Class  Members regularly worked at least twenty (20) minutes, and on occasion up to four (4) hours, “off- the-clock” per week and have not been compensated for that time.  Unpaid Start-Up Time   45.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for all the hours  they worked for Defendants as a result of Defendants’ corporate policy and practice of requiring their  hourly call-center employees to clock-in only when ready to take their first call.    46.  Specifically, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are required to start and log-in  to their computer, read company emails/alerts, open multiple different computer programs, log in to  each program, and ensure that each program is running correctly—all of which can take up to twenty  minutes—before they are allowed to clock in on the time keeping software application and then take  their first phone call.    47.  If Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are not ready and on the phone at shift  start, they can be (and often are) subject to discipline.    48.  If Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members clock in prior to their shift start time, they  are also subject to discipline.    49.  Therefore, the only way to be ready on time, and avoid discipline, is to prepare the  computer “off-the-clock” and without pay.    51.  Defendants provide Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members with one unpaid meal  break each day.    52.  However, Defendants require Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to perform  “off-the-clock” work during their unpaid meal breaks.   53.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class were required to stay on the clock and on call until the  minute their lunch break begins, they then must clock out, then perform a lengthy shut down process,  then log out of the phone system or otherwise go into an aux mode, and then log off of their computer  prior to leaving their desk for their meal break.   54.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were required to log back into their  computer, perform a restart process, log back into the phone system, then clock in, and be back on  the phone before their meal break ends.    55.  The log off process used prior to taking a meal break can take anywhere from one to  three minutes.   56.  The log in process used after returning from a meal break can take anywhere from  another one to three minutes.   57.  This lengthy log off and log in procedure had to be performed during Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members’ meal break as, per Defendants’ policy.   Unpaid Technical Downtime   59.  According to Defendants’ policy, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were to  clock out and continue troubleshooting until they could bring their system back online and begin  making phone calls, at which point they could clock back in.    60.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were not compensated for the time they  worked for Defendants rebooting and/or troubleshooting Defendants’ computers after they crashed  or experienced other technical difficulties.   61.  As a result of Defendants’ corporate policy and practice of requiring Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members to perform their computer start up tasks before the beginning of their shifts,  perform log-in log out processes during their unpaid lunch break, and requiring Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members to clock out while they troubleshoot system issues, Plaintiff and the Putative  Class Members were not compensated for all hours worked, including all worked in excess of forty  (40) in a workweek at the rates required by the FLSA.    62.  Defendants have employed other individuals who perform(ed) the same or similar job  duties under the same pay provisions as Plaintiff.   63.  Defendants are aware of their obligation to pay overtime for all hours worked and the  proper amount of overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) each week, but have failed to  do so.    64.  Because Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all hours  worked and time and a half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, Defendants’  pay policies and practices violate the FLSA and Texas state law.   V.  85.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.   86.  Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this collective claim is made on behalf of all of  Defendants employees who have been similarly situated to Plaintiff with regard to the work they  performed and the manner in which they have not been paid.    87.  Other similarly situated employees of Defendants have been victimized by  Defendants’ patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA.   89.  Defendants’ failure to pay for all hours worked and overtime compensation at the rates  required by the FLSA, results from generally applicable policies and practices of Defendants, and does  not depend on the personal circumstances of the Plaintiff or the FLSA Collective Members.   90.  Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective  Members.   91.  The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective  Members does not prevent collective treatment.   92.  All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job  requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be properly compensated for all hours  worked and the proper amount of overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40)  hours per workweek.   93.  Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction  from the common nucleus of liability facts.    94.  Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will  not obtain redress of their injuries and Defendants will retain the proceeds of its rampant violations.   95.  Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system.  Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims  of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency.   96.  Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as  defined as in Paragraph 66 and notice should be promptly sent.  98.  Plaintiff Rodriguez further brings this action pursuant to the equitable theory of  quantum meruit. See Artemis Seafood, Inc. v. Butcher’s Choice, Inc. No. CIV. A. 3:98-0282, 1999 WL 608853,  at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 1999) (citing Schuchart & Assocs. V. Solo Serve Corp., 1983 WL 1147, at *23  (W.D. Tex. June 29, 1983)).   99.  The Texas Class is defined as: 