66.  Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the  preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.   67.  Plaintiffs have a right against wealth-based detention. In the pretrial detention  context, courts have regularly found that setting arbitrary monetary release conditions that  exceed an individual’s ability to pay violates the equal protection clause. The Fourteenth  Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses prohibit jailing a person because of her  inability to make a monetary payment. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).  Because  Plaintiffs are detained based solely on their inability to pay, heightened scrutiny is implicated.    ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 161 (5th Cir. 2018) ( “[T]he Supreme Court has found  that heightened scrutiny is required when criminal laws detain poor defendants because of their  indigence.”); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397-99 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241- 42 (1970).    68.  Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ substantive rights by enforcing against them a  system of wealth-based detention that keeps them in jail solely because they cannot afford to  make a monetary payment.   23   69.  Defendants do not inquire into an individual’s ability to afford monetary release  conditions or consider less restrictive alternatives before recommending or setting unaffordable  monetary bail.   70.  Defendants’ actions fail any form of scrutiny, as empirical research indicates no  correlation between monetary release conditions and an individual’s likelihood to appear in  court.    71.  Here, Defendants’ policies and practice result in poor arrestees being detained  when similarly situated wealthy arrestees are not, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The  Commissioner of Corrections and Sheriff enforce these unconstitutional detention orders. Thus  Defendants deny individuals their equal protection and due process rights.  72.  Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the  preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.   73.  Defendants, acting under color of law, deny pretrial detainees their  constitutionally protected right to liberty without any compelling state interest.    74.  It is well settled that freedom from imprisonment “lies at the heart of the liberty  that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 679, 690 (2001); Foucha v.  Louisiana, 504 U.S. 117, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core  of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”). Pretrial  detention infringes upon this right and may only be applied if it is “narrowly focuse[d]” to serve  “compelling” interests.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).  24   75.  The state’s interest at the pretrial bond stage is limited to ensuring the accused  will appear for trial and protecting the public from danger associated specifically with that  individual’s release. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 452-54 (2013).    76.  Here, the City’s Bond Commissioner and individual judges fail to consider a  particular detainee’s likelihood to appear or whether that individual poses any danger to the  community, and make no findings regarding the necessity of detention, before setting de facto  detention orders through imposition of unaffordable monetary conditions of release. The  Commissioner of Corrections and Sheriff enforce these unconstitutional detention orders. Thus  Defendants deny pretrial detainees their fundamental right to liberty in the absence of any  compelling government interest and in violation of their substantive due process rights.  77.  Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the  preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.   78.  Defendants provide absolutely no process before detaining individuals for weeks  on unaffordable monetary release conditions. No hearing occurs, much less a hearing with  sufficient process. Since no hearing occurs, no determination is made that any government  interests require detention, in violation of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights.   79.  Before an individual may be detained pretrial, procedural due process requires an  individual be given the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful  25  manner” before being deprived of liberty. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citing  Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).   80.  Defendants’ total lack of procedures—including no notice that a hearing will  occur, no notice that the issue at the hearing will be whether the individual arrested is a flight  risk or poses a danger to the community, no hearing with the opportunity to present evidence and  cross-examine witnesses, and no hearing with counsel present—flagrantly violates the  Fourteenth Amendment.   81.  Individuals who qualify for public defenders remain incarcerated an average of 4- 5 weeks before they are given any hearing to challenge or modify their release conditions.  Individuals who do not qualify for the public defender, but cannot afford to hire a private  attorney, fair even worse—often being denied an opportunity to address their release conditions  or discuss their financial status even longer. Conversely, wealthier individuals can obtain almost  immediate release or obtain counsel to immediately challenge release conditions.   Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Equal Protection and Due  Process through a Policy or Practice that Jails Individuals Based on their Poverty under 42  U.S.C. § 1983  By Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and  all others similarly situated, against all Defendants   Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Right to  Liberty under 42 U.S.C. § 1983   By Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and  all others similarly situated, against all Defendants    Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Right to Procedural Due Process 42  U.S.C. § 1983  By Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and  all others similarly situated, against all Defendants  