(Brought Individually and on Behalf of the Rule 23 Illinois Class to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23)  FAILURE TO REIMBURSE EXPENSES   § 820 ILCS 115/9.5   (Brought Individually and on Behalf of the Rule 23 Illinois Class to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23)  FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME   § 820 ILCS 105/4a  11   (Brought Individually and on Behalf of the FLSA Collective Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §  216(b))  FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME   29 U.S.C. § 207((a)(1)   (Brought Individually and on Behalf of the Rule 23 Illinois Class to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23)  FAILURE TO PAY EARNED WAGES   § 820 ILCS 115/4   19.  Defendants operate Early Intervention Consulting, a provider of ABA therapy  services to children and teens with autism.    20.  Defendants’ therapy services are performed by “tutors,” who work remotely in  states throughout the country and attend to Defendants’ patients.   21.  While Defendants classified Plaintiff and other tutors as independent contractors,  tutors were in fact treated like employees, in that tutors:  a. Played in integral role in Defendants’ business;  b. Worked consistent schedules for Defendants for significant periods of time;  c. Were subject to substantial control by Defendants;  d. Did not possess any special skills and had no opportunity for profit or loss; and   e. Made minimal investments in their work in comparison to the substantial investments  Defendants made in their business.   22.  Defendants paid tutors on an hourly basis and did not provide them with any  5  guaranteed, predetermined amount of pay per week.   23.  Tutors regularly worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek.   24.  Defendants required tutors to use a mobile application called “TSheets” to enter  notes from sessions with Defendants’ clients and to record their time for payroll purposes.   25.  Defendants had an implied agreement with tutors to pay them at their agreed-upon  hourly rates for all hours worked.    26.  Defendants only permitted tutors to report time spent on clients’ sessions into  TSheets, notwithstanding the fact that they performed additional work including travelling  between clients’ homes and/or other locations at which sessions took place and performing work  outside of their scheduled client sessions, such as completing paperwork, preparing lesson plans,  coordinating session times, purchasing supplies, and meeting with managers.   27.  Defendants failed to pay tutors for all hours worked, including:  a. Time spent recruiting colleagues and acquaintances to work as tutors;  b. Time spent training;  c. Time spent in sessions with clients that was not paid due to technical glitches with  TSheets;  d. Time spent travelling between clients’ homes and/or other locations at which sessions  took place;  e. Time spent waiting for clients to appear at sessions that were cancelled; and  f. Time spent performing work outside of their scheduled client sessions.   28.  In many weeks, the unpaid work tutors performed was in excess of forty (40) hours  in a workweek, for which they should have been compensated at 1.5x their regular rates of pay,  but instead received no compensation.  6   29.  To the extent Defendants did pay tutors for hours worked in excess of 40 in a week,  such hours were paid at their regular hourly rates, rather than the required rate of 1.5x their regular  rates of pay.   30.  Defendants failed to reimburse tutors for reasonable expenditures or losses required  of the employees in the discharge of employment duties and that inured to the primary benefit of  Defendants, including:  a. Driving their personal vehicles between work locations;  b. Use of their personal mobile devices to communicate with Defendants’ management,  staff, and clients, and access TSheets; and  c. Supplies needed for tutors’ home offices and for sessions with clients.   31.  Defendants were aware of, or alternatively, recklessly indifferent to the possibility  that tutors were working uncompensated hours in excess of 40 in a workweek, and that such hours  should have been compensated at 1.5x their regular rates of pay in accordance with the FLSA and  33.  Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on his own  behalf and on behalf of:  All current and former tutors who worked for Early Intervention Consulting in the  United States at any time within the three years preceding the commencement of  this action and the date of judgment.  7  (hereinafter referred to as the “FLSA Collective”).  Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this  definition as necessary.   34.  Excluded from the FLSA Collective are Defendants’ executives, administrative and  professional employees, including computer professionals and outside sales persons.   35.  With respect to the claims set forth in this action, a collective action under the FLSA  is appropriate because the members of the FLSA Collective are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff  under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) because (a) they have been or are employed in the same or similar  positions; (b) they were or are subject to the same or similar unlawful practice, policy, or plan; and  (c) their claims are based upon the same factual and legal theories.   36.  The employment relationships between Defendants and every FLSA Collective  member are the same and differ only in name, location, and rate of pay. The key issues – whether  Defendants knowingly failed to pay overtime compensation for all hours worked – do not vary  substantially from Collective member to Collective member.   37.  Plaintiff estimates that the FLSA Collective, including both current and former  employees over the relevant period, will include hundreds of members. The precise number of  Collective members should be readily available from a review of Defendants’ personnel and  payroll records.  38.  Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on his own  behalf and on behalf of:   All current and former tutors who worked for Early Intervention Consulting in  Illinois at any time within the applicable statutory period.   (hereinafter referred to as the “Rule 23 Illinois Class”).  Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this  definition as necessary.  8   39.  The members of the Rule 23 Illinois Class are so numerous that joinder of all Rule  23 Illinois Class members in this case would be impractical.  Plaintiff reasonably estimates that  there are hundreds of Rule 23 Illinois Class members.  Rule 23 Illinois Class members should be  easy to identify from Defendants’ computer systems and electronic payroll and personnel records.   40.  There is a well-defined community of interest among Rule 23 Illinois Class  members and common questions of law and fact predominate in this action over any questions  affecting individual members of the Rule 23 Illinois Class.  These common legal and factual  questions include, but are not limited to, the following:  a. Whether Defendants knowingly failed to pay overtime compensation for all hours  worked; and  b. Whether Defendants knowingly failed to pay earned wages and/or reimburse work- related expenses.   41.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Rule 23 Illinois Class in that he and all  other Rule 23 Illinois Class members suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of the  Defendants’ common and systemic payroll policies and practices.  Plaintiff’s claims arise from  the same policies, practices, promises and course of conduct as all other Rule 23 Illinois Class  members’ claims and his legal theories are based on the same legal theories as all other Rule 23  Illinois Class members.   42.  Plaintiff will fully and adequately protect the interests of the Rule 23 Illinois Class  and he has retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution of Illinois wage  and hour class actions. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel have interests that are contrary to, or  conflicting with, the interests of the Rule 23 Illinois Class.   43.  A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy, because, inter alia, it is economically infeasible for Rule 23  9  Illinois Class members to prosecute individual actions of their own given the relatively small  amount of damages at stake for each individual along with the fear of reprisal by their employer.   Prosecution of this case as a Rule 23 Class action will also eliminate the possibility of duplicative  lawsuits being filed in state and federal courts throughout the nation.   44.  This case will be manageable as a Rule 23 Class action. Plaintiff and his counsel  know of no unusual difficulties in this case and Defendant and its corporate clients all have  advanced, networked computer and payroll systems that will allow the class, wage, and damages  issues in this case to be resolved with relative ease.   45.  Because the elements of Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied in this case, class certification  is appropriate.  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393; 130 S.  Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) (“[b]y its terms [Rule 23] creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff  whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action”).     46.  Because Defendants acted and refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the  Rule 23 Illinois Class and declaratory relief is appropriate in this case with respect to the Rule 23  Illinois Class as a whole, class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is also appropriate.  47.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein and further  allege as follows.   48.  29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) provides:  [N]o employer shall employ any of his employees who in any  workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for  commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or  in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer  10  than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his  employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less  than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.   49.  Defendants are an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business  done exceeds $500,000.   50.  Defendants are an enterprise that has had employees engaged in commerce or in  the production of goods for commerce, and handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or  materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce.   51.  At all times relevant to the action, Defendants were an employer covered by the  mandates of the FLSA, and Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were employees entitled to the  FLSA’s protections.   52.  Plaintiff and other putative FLSA Collective members regularly worked over forty  (40) hours in a workweek.   53.   Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and other putative FLSA Collective members  for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek.   54.   Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1) and 216(b), Plaintiff and other putative FLSA  Collective members are entitled to recover the full amount of unpaid overtime compensation,  liquidated damages, interest thereon, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit.   55.  The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA,  within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Because Defendants willfully violated the FLSA, a  three-year state of limitations applies to such violations.  56.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein and further  alleges as follows.   57.  At all times relevant to the action, Defendants were an employer covered by the  mandates of the IMWL, and Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Illinois Class were employees entitled to the  IMWL’s protections.   58.  The IMWL requires employers to pay their employees overtime at time-and-a-half  their regular rate of pay of hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. See § 820 ILCS 105/4a.   59.  Plaintiff and other putative Rule 23 Illinois Class members regularly worked over  forty (40) hours in a workweek.   60.   Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and other putative Rule 23 Illinois Class  members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek.   61.  Pursuant to §§ 820 ILCS 105/4a and 820 ILCS 105/12, Plaintiff and other putative  Rule 23 Illinois Class members are entitled to recover the full amount of unpaid overtime  compensation, statutory penalties, liquidated damages, interest thereon, reasonable attorneys’ fees  and costs of suit.  62.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein and further  alleges as follows.   63.  At all times relevant to the action, Defendants were an employer covered by the  mandates of the IWPCA, and Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Illinois Class were employees entitled to the  IWPCA’s protections.  12   64.  The IWPCA requires that “[a]ll wages earned by any employee … shall be paid.”  71.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein and further  13  alleges as follows.   72.  The IWPCA requires an employer to “reimburse an employee for all necessary  expenditures or losses incurred by the employee within the employee’s scope of employment and  directly related to services performed for the employer.” § 820 ILCS 115/9.5(a).   73.  The IWPCA defines “necessary expenditures” as “all reasonable expenditures or  losses required of the employee in the discharge of employment duties and that inure to the primary  benefit of the employer.” Id.   74.  Defendants failed to reimburse Plaintiff and other putative Rule 23 Illinois Class  members for reasonable expenditures or losses required of the employees in the discharge of  employment duties and that inured to the primary benefit of Defendants.   75.  Pursuant to §§ § 820 ILCS 115/4 and 820 ILCS 115/14, Plaintiff and other putative  Rule 23 Illinois Class members are entitled to reimbursement for all such expenditures, statutory  penalties, liquidated damages, interest thereon, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit. 