24.  CSRs are typically paid at a rate of approximately $14.00 to $17.00 per hour.    25.  CSRs are employed on a full-time basis (meaning more than 30 hours per week)  and on some weeks worked over forty (40) hours in a single week, but in other weeks worked less  than forty (40) hours.   26.  Prior to being hired, CSRs receive an offer from Defendant that sets forth the  requirements of a CSR, the job duties, and the offered rate of pay.   27.  Defendant also provides all CSRs with training on how to carry out their day to day  job duties, including how to load and log into their computer programs at the beginning of the day,  and how to log out at the end of the day.   28.  Plaintiffs accepted Defendant’s offer to serve as CSRs with the understanding that  their base wage rate would be paid as promised.  In the case of Plaintiff Barnes, at $14.00 per hour  and Plaintiff Stroman at $17.00 per hour.   29.  During their training, CSRs are taught, inter alia, how to open and use Defendant’s  computer networks and software programs/applications, how to track their time, the importance of  attendance and schedule expectations, and Defendant’s policies related to each topic.   31.  Plaintiffs and other similarly situated CSRs are trained or instructed not to clock in  until they have loaded all of their essential work-related computer programs, so they can be  prepared to take calls the moment they begin their shift.   32.  In 2018, Defendant acknowledged it knew CSRs were performing off-the-clock  work.  As a remedy, they afforded CSRs a ten (10) minute grace period to boot-up and shutdown  their computers.     33.  However, as discussed herein, the grace period was grossly insufficient to address  the amount of off-the-clock work that was occurring every single day.   34.  All of Defendant’s CSRs use the same or similar computer networks, software  programs, and applications in the course of performing their job responsibilities.  These programs  and applications are integral and an important part of the CSRs’ work and they cannot perform  their jobs without them.   35.  In order to perform their job, Plaintiffs and all other CSRs are required to boot up  and log in to various computer networks, software programs and applications, in order to access  information necessary to perform their job functions.  This pre-shift process takes substantial time  on a daily basis ranging from twelve (12) to fifteen (15) minutes per day, and even longer on days  where Defendant’s computer networks and programs are not working properly.   36.  However, Plaintiffs and all other CSRs are not actually “clocked in” for their shifts  until after the computer boot-up and login process is complete, meaning that Plaintiffs and all other  CSRs work at least twelve (12) minutes each shift for which they are never compensated.   38.  The pre-shift boot-up and login process is an integral and indispensable part of the  CSRs’ job responsibilities.   39.  Additionally, at the end of the day, Plaintiffs and all other CSRs are required to  logout of the time keeping system before shutting down their computers, which results in  additional unpaid off-the-clock work.   40.  Plaintiff are also required to prepare any time adjustment forms after they clock  out.  These time adjustment forms were primarily used to adjust hours if the CSRs were stuck on  the phone during their lunch period.  However, the completion of the forms occurred after the  CSRs’ scheduled shifts, and after they clocked out, which regularly resulted in additional off-the- clock work at the end of their scheduled shifts.   41.  The post-shift work performed after disconnecting from Defendant’s network and  logging out of the timekeeping system takes between five (5) to six (6) minutes at the end of each  shift.   42.  The completion of time adjustment forms results in additional off-the-clock work.   43.  The post-shift off-the clock time Plaintiffs and all other CSRs spend logging out  shutting down directly benefitted Defendant.   44.  The post-shift logout and shutdown process was an integral and indispensable part  of the CSRs’ job responsibilities.   45.  Defendant provides CSRs with one thirty (30) minute lunch period.   47.  Many of the computer programs used by CSRs had an auto-log out feature that  would automatically log them out if they were idle for more than ten (10) minutes.  That means  that CSRs always had to perform some, if not all, of the boot up process when they returned from  their lunch break.   48.  Despite knowing Plaintiffs and all other CSRs performed work before and after  their scheduled shifts, Defendant and its managers failed to make any effort to stop or disallow  this pre-, mid, and post-shift work and instead suffered and permitted it to happen.   49.  Defendant possesses, controls, and/or has access to information and electronic data  indicating the times Plaintiffs and all other CSRs booted up and logged into their computers and  logged out and shutdown each day, along with the time they logged into their telephone systems.   50.  Defendant possesses, controls, and/or has access to information and electronic data  indicating when Plaintiffs and all other CSRs experienced down time due to technical issues.   51.  CSRs also performed off-the-clock work when they experienced technical  difficulties, which kicked them out of Defendant’s timekeeping system.   52.  Despite its ability to track the amount of time Plaintiffs and other CSRs spend in  connection with the pre-shift boot-up and login process, the mid-shift boot-up and login process,  and post-shift shutdown and logout process, and technical downtime, Defendant failed to pay  Plaintiffs and other CSRs for the off-the-clock work they performed each shift.  A. Pre-Shift Off-the-Clock Work   54.  The pre-shift start-up and login process takes substantial time on a daily basis with  said time ranging from twelve (12) to fifteen (15) minutes per day, or even longer when technical  issues arise.     55.  Defendant’s CSRs complete this process before each shift; however, they are not  actually “clocked in” for their shifts until after they start-up their computer, open the essential  programs/applications, enter their credentials (password and username), log into their phone  system, and change their status to “available” to take calls.   56.  As a result, Plaintiffs and other CSRs spend between twelve (12) to fifteen (15)  minutes or more at the beginning of each shift performing off-the-clock (uncompensated) work  for Defendant.   57.  The unpaid off-the-clock work performed prior to each shift by Plaintiffs and other  CSRs directly benefits Defendant and the tasks undertaken in connection with the off-the-clock  work are integral and indispensable to their job duties and responsibilities as CSRs.  B. Mid-Shift Off-the-Clock Work   58.  Additionally, CSRs must perform off-the-clock work throughout their shifts as  well.    59.  When CSRs take meal breaks or are away from their computers for any extended  period, the programs often automatically log them out.    60.  To access the programs, the CSRs are forced to log back in without being  compensated for that time.   62.  Technical downtime off-the-clock work also occurs during the CSRs’ scheduled  shifts.  C. Post-Shift Off-the-Clock Work   63.  Pursuant to Defendant’s policies, training, and direction, Plaintiffs and all other  CSRs are required to shut down and logout of the computer programs and applications after they  log-out of Defendant’s timekeeping system.  The post-shift logout and shutdown process takes  substantial time on a daily basis with said time ranging from five (5) to six (6) minutes or more  per shift.     64.  Accordingly, Defendant fails to pay Plaintiffs and all other CSRs for between five  (5) to six (6) minutes or more of off-the-clock work performed after each shift.     65.  The unpaid post-shift, off-the-clock, work performed by Plaintiffs and all other  CSRs after each shift directly benefits Defendant and the tasks undertaken in connection with the  post-shift off-the-clock work are integral and indispensable to the CSRs’ job duties and  responsibilities.  D. Defendant Benefitted from the CSRs’ Off-the-Clock Work   66.  At all relevant times, Defendant required and directly benefitted from the off-the- clock work performed by Plaintiffs and all other CSRs in connection with the pre-, mid-, and post- shift activities described above.   67.  At all relevant times, Defendant controlled the work schedules, duties, protocols,  applications, assignments, and employment conditions of Plaintiffs and all other CSRs.   69.  At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and all other CSRs were non-exempt hourly  employees, subject to the requirements of the FLSA and related state laws.   70.  At all relevant times, Defendant used its attendance and adherence policies against  Plaintiffs and the CSRs in order to pressure them into performing pre-, mid-, and post-shift work,  off-the-clock.   71.  Defendant expressly trained and instructed Plaintiffs and all other CSRs to perform  these off-the-clock work activities when they were not clocked into Defendant’s timekeeping  system.    72.  Defendant instructed CSRs to have all work applications and systems fully loaded  before they clocked-in, so that they were prepared to take calls the moment they clocked-in at the  start of their shift.  Similarly, at the end of the shift, Defendant instructed CSRs to clock-out before  closing all work applications and systems to make certain they were clocked-out at the moment  they stopped taking calls.   73.  Similarly, Defendant instructed CSRs to return from lunch early to reload and log- into the computer programs necessary to take calls from Defendant’s customers at the moment  they clocked back in after lunch.   74.  At all relevant times, Defendant’s policies and practices deprived Plaintiffs and the  CSRs of wages owed for the pre-, mid-, and post-shift activities they performed.    75.  During the weeks that CSRs did not work over forty (40) hours in a workweek, the  outcome of Defendant’s policies and practices is a deprivation of straight time wages, which is  usually referred to as “gap time” claims. Gap time is compensable.   77.  Defendant is in possession of the payroll and timekeeping records that will illustrate  exactly which weeks the Plaintiffs worked over forty hours and exactly which weeks worked under  forty hours.   78.  Defendant knew or should have known that the time spent by Plaintiffs and other  CSRs in connection with the pre-, mid- and post-shift activities is compensable under the law.  Indeed, in light of the explicit DOL guidance cited above, there is no conceivable way for  Defendant to establish that it acted in good faith.   79.  Unpaid straight time wages (for Plaintiffs’ gap time claims) related to the off-the- clock work described herein is owed to Plaintiffs at the rate which they are typically paid for hours  worked up to forty (40) hours in a workweek.   80.  Unpaid wages related to the off-the-clock work described herein is owed to  Plaintiffs at the FLSA mandated overtime premium of one and one-half the Plaintiffs’ regular  hourly rate because Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek.  81.  Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on behalf of  themselves and on behalf of:  All current and former hourly CSRs who worked for Marriott  International, Inc. in the United States at any time in the past three  years.  (hereinafter referred to as the “FLSA Collective”).  Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this  definition if necessary.   83.  Excluded from the proposed FLSA Collective are Defendant’s executives,  administrative and professional employees, including computer professionals and outside sales  persons.   84.  Consistent with Defendant’s policies and practice, Plaintiffs and the proposed  FLSA Collective were not paid for all premium overtime compensation when they worked beyond  forty (40) hours in a workweek.   85.  All of the work Plaintiffs and the proposed FLSA Collective performed was  assigned by Defendant, and/or Defendant was aware of all of the work the Plaintiffs and the  proposed FLSA Collective performed.   86.  As part of its regular business practice, Defendant intentionally, willfully, and  repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA with respect to  Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective.  This policy and pattern or practice includes,  but is not limited to:  a.  Willfully failing to pay its employees, including Plaintiffs and the members of the  FLSA Collective, for all premium overtime wages for hours that they worked off- the-clock in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek;   b.  Willfully failing to pay its employees, including Plaintiffs and the members of the  FLSA Collective, for other off-the-clock work; and  c.  Willfully failing to record all of the time that its employees, including Plaintiffs and  the members of the FLSA Collective, have worked for the benefit of Defendant.   87.  Defendant is aware, or should have been aware, that federal law required it to pay  Plaintiffs and the proposed FLSA Collective members an overtime premium for all hours worked  in excess of forty (40) per workweek.   89.  A collective action under the FLSA is appropriate because the employees described  above are “similarly situated” to Plaintiffs under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The employees on behalf of  whom Plaintiffs bring this collective action are similarly situated because (a) they have been or  are employed in the same or similar positions; (b) they were or are performing the same or similar  job duties; (c) they were or are subject to the same or similar unlawful practices, policy, or plan;  and (d) their claims are based upon the same factual and legal theories.   90.  The employment relationships between Defendant and every proposed FLSA  Collective member are the same and differ only by name, location, and rate of pay. The key issues  – the amount of uncompensated pre-shift startup/login time, mid-shift startup/login time, and the  amount of post-shift logout/shutdown time owed to each employee – does not vary substantially  among the proposed FLSA Collective members.   91.  There are many similarly situated current and former CSRs who were underpaid in  violation of the FLSA.  They would benefit from the issuance of a court-authorized notice of this  lawsuit and the opportunity to join.   92.  Plaintiffs estimate the FLSA Collective, including both current and former CSRs  over the relevant period, includes thousands of members.  The precise number should be readily  available from a review of Defendant’s personnel and payroll records.  94.  The members of the Rule 23 Nationwide Class are so numerous that joinder of all  Rule 23 Nationwide Class members in this case would be impractical.  Plaintiffs reasonably  estimate there are hundreds, if not thousands, of Rule 23 Nationwide Class members.  Rule 23  Nationwide Class members should be easy to identify from Defendant’s computer systems and  electronic payroll and personnel records.   95.  There is a well-defined community of interests among Rule 23 Nationwide Class  members and common questions of law and fact predominate in this action over any questions  affecting individual members of the Rule 23 Nationwide Class.  These common legal and factual  questions, include, but are not limited to, the following:  a.  Whether the pre-shift time Rule 23 Nationwide Class members spend on  startup and login activities each session is compensable time;  b.  Whether the mid-shift time Rule 23 Nationwide Class members spend on  startup and login activities each session is compensable time;  c.  Whether the post-shift time Rule 23 Nationwide Class members spend on  shutdown and logout activities is compensable time;   d.  Whether Defendant’s non-payment of wages for all compensable time  amounted to a breach of contract; and  e.  Whether Defendant’s non-payment of wages for all compensable time  resulted in an unjust enrichment to Defendant.   97.  Plaintiffs will fully and adequately protect the interests of the Rule 23 Nationwide  Class and she retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution of nationwide  wage and hour class actions. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have interests that are contrary to,  or conflicting with, the interests of the Rule 23 Nationwide Class.   98.  A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy, because, inter alia, it is economically infeasible for Rule 23  Nationwide Class members to prosecute individual actions of their own given the relatively small  amount of damages at stake for each individual along with the fear of reprisal by their employer.   99.  This case will be manageable as a Rule 23 Class action.  Plaintiffs and their counsel  know of no unusual difficulties in this case and Defendant has advanced networked computer and  payroll systems that will allow the class, wage, and damages issues in this case to be resolved with  relative ease.  100.  Because the elements of Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied in this case, class certification  is appropriate.  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393; 130 S. Ct.  1431, 1437 (2010) (“[b]y its terms [Rule 23] creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose  suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action”).  101.  Because Defendant acted and refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the  Rule 23 Nationwide Class and declaratory relief is appropriate in this case with respect to the Rule  23 Nationwide Class as a whole, class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is also appropriate. 