(Class Action Alleging Violations of the South Carolina Act)  A.  SOUTH CAROLINA ACT COVERAGE   (Class Action Alleging Violations of Texas Common Law)  A.  VIOLATIONS OF TEXAS COMMON LAW   (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations)  A.  FLSA COVERAGE   102.  Plaintiff Bunton brings her Texas Common-Law Claims as a class action pursuant to  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by  Logisticare to work in Texas since April 1, 2015. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004.  103.  Class action treatment of the Texas Common Law Class Members is appropriate  because, as alleged below, all of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class action requisites are satisfied.  104.  The number of Texas Common-Law Class Members is so numerous that joinder of  all class members is impracticable.  105.  Plaintiff Bunton is a member of the Texas Common-Law Class, her claims are typical  of the claims of the other Texas Common Law Class Members, and she has no interests that are  antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of the other Texas Common Law Class Members.  106.  Plaintiff Bunton and her counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Texas  Common Law Class Members and their interests.  107.  Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)  because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class  members and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this litigation.  108.  Accordingly, the Texas Common Law Class should be certified as defined in Paragraph   24.  Logisticare employs non-exempt workers in its call centers to provide assistance to  Logisticare’s clients. Logisticare is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, and has additional call centers  in Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan,  Montana, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,  Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.3   25.  Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members’ job duties consisted of receiving telephone  calls from Logisticare’s clients and scheduling transportation for those clients.     26.  Plaintiff Adams was employed by Logisticare in Greenville, South Carolina from  approximately November 2015 until March 2016.    27.  Plaintiff Bunton. Was employed by Logisticare in Austin, Texas from approximately  August 2017 until July 2018.   28.  Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members are non-exempt call-center employees who  were (and are) paid by the hour.   30.  In addition to their forty (40) “on-the-clock” hours, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class  Members often worked up to six hours “off-the-clock” per week and have not been compensated for  that time.   31.  Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for all the hours  they worked for Logisticare as a result of Logisticare’s uniform corporate policy and practice of paying  its employees only during regularly scheduled shift time, and only when their computers were fully  booted up and operational.    32.  Specifically, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members are required to start up and log  in to their computers before their shift officially starts, and then log in to each Logisticare program,  and ensure that each Logisticare program is running correctly—all of which can take up to twenty  minutes—before they are able to take their first phone call, which comes in as soon as their computers  are fully operational.    33.  In addition, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members were required to arrive at work  early, well in advance in of their scheduled shifts, in order to perform work for Logisticare.   34.  Further, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members’ computers crashed multiple times  each week and required Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members to reset them, which took twenty  minutes or more each time.    35.  Logisticare also enforced a uniform company-wide policy wherein it automatically  clocked out its non-exempt hourly call-center employees—Plaintiffs and the Putative Class  Members—when their breaks exceeded fifteen (15) minutes. 29 C.F.R. § 785.18; see also Sec’y U.S. Dep’t  of Labor, 873 F.3d at 425.   37.  Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members were also not compensated for the time they  worked for Logisticare rebooting Logisticare’s computers after they crashed.    38.  Nor were Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members compensated for any break time  that exceeded fifteen (15) minutes.   39.  As a result of Logisticare’s corporate policies and practices of requiring Plaintiffs and  the Putative Class Members to perform compensable work for Logisticare, including their start-up  and rebooting tasks, and breaks that exceeded fifteen (15) minutes, while off-the-clock, Plaintiffs and  the Putative Class Members were not compensated for all hours worked, including all worked in excess  of forty (40) in a workweek at the rates required by the FLSA.   40.  Logisticare has employed other individuals who perform(ed) the same or similar job  duties under the same pay provisions as Plaintiffs.   41.  Logisticare is aware of its obligation to pay overtime for all hours worked and the  proper amount of overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) each week to Plaintiffs and  the Putative Class Members, but has failed to do so.    42.  Because Logisticare did not pay Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members time and a  half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, Logisticare’s pay policies and practices  violate the FLSA.    43.  Because Logisticare did not pay Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members for all hours  they worked, Logisticare’s pay policies and practices also violate South Carolina state law.   45.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.   46.  The FLSA Collective is defined as:  62.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.   63.  Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this is a collective action filed on behalf of all of  Logisticare’s employees throughout the United States who have been similarly situated to Plaintiffs  with regard to the work they performed and the manner in which they were paid.   64.  Other similarly situated employees of Logisticare have been victimized by Logisticare’s  patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA.   65.  The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 46.   67.  Thus, Plaintiffs’ experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective  Members.   68.  The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective  Members do not prevent collective treatment.    69.  All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job  requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be paid for all hours worked and at the  proper overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek.    70.  Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction  from the common nucleus of liability facts.     71.  Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will  not obtain redress of their injuries and Logisticare will retain the proceeds of its violations.   72.  Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system.  Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims  of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency.   73.  Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as  defined as in Paragraph 46 and notice should be promptly sent.   74.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.   75.  The South Carolina Act Class is defined as:  87.  Plaintiff Adams brings her South Carolina Act claims as a class action pursuant to  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by  Logisticare to work in South Carolina since April 1, 2016.   88.  Class action treatment of Plaintiff Adams’s South Carolina Act claim is appropriate  because, as alleged below, all of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class action requisites are satisfied.   89.  The number of South Carolina Class Members is so numerous that joinder of all class  members is impracticable.   90.  Plaintiff Adams is a member of the South Carolina Class, her claims are typical of the  claims of other South Carolina Class Members, and she has no interests that are antagonistic to or in  conflict with the interests of other South Carolina Class Members.   91.  Plaintiff Adams and her counsel will fairly and adequately represent the South Carolina  Class Members and their interests.   92.  Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)  because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class  members and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this litigation.   94.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.   95.  Plaintiff Bunton further brings this action pursuant to the equitable theory of quantum  meruit. See Artemis Seafood, Inc. v. Butcher’s Choice, Inc. No. CIV. A. 3:98-0282, 1999 WL 608853, at *3  (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 1999) (citing Schuchart & Assocs. V. Solo Serve Corp., 1983 WL 1147, at *23 (W.D.  Tex. June 29, 1983)).   96.  VI.  96.  The Texas Common-Law Class is defined as: 