10.  The debt arose from services which were primarily for family, personal, or  household purposes, specifically, repairs relating to a personal vehicle for Ms. Heistand, and  meets the definition of “debt” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).   11.  Around October 2015, United began attempts to collect the debt from the  Heistands.   13.  In or around November 2015, UTA called Mr. Heistand on his cell phone and  attempted to collect the debt from him.   14.  UTA’s representative initially stated that Mr. Heistand had written the check.   15.  Mr. Heistand stated that he had not written any check to Stingray, and rather, his  wife had.   16.  Thus, Mr. Heistand disputed the debt was his personal liability.   17.  UTA’s representative stated that unless Mr. Heistand paid the debt immediately,  UTA would have an arrest-warrant issued for Ms. Heistand, and the police would take Ms.  Heistand into custody later that day.   18.  UTA’s representative stated the call was regarding a “case number” and then listed  a number.   19.  At no point did UTA’s representative state the call was from a debt collector or  that the communication was from a debt collector.   20.  UTA’s representative implied he was associated with, or UTA was associated  with, a district attorney.   21.  Upon information and belief, these tactics are consistent with UTA’s normal  collection practices, in which consumers are routinely threatened with fraud charges, arrest,  imprisonment, and more.   23.  On or about August 13, 2015, UTA requested a consumer credit bureau report on  both Mr. and Ms. Heistand from Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”), a consumer  credit reporting agency (“CRA”).    24.  To lawfully request a credit report from a CRA, the person making the request  must have a “permissible purpose” to do so.  15 U.S.C. § 1681b.   25.  Experian requires any person requesting a credit report on a consumer to first  certify that they have a permissible purpose to obtain the report pursuant to the FCRA.   26.  Upon information and belief, UTA certified to Experian its permissible purpose  for requesting the credit reports on Mr. and Ms. Heistand was that UTA needed the information  for “collection” purposes.   27.  However, to have permissible purpose under the FCRA to request a report for  “collection” purposes, the debt collector must be collecting on a debt which is considered to be a  “credit transaction involving the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A).   28.  Tendering a check is not a credit transaction involving a consumer, i.e., one in  which the consumer voluntarily participated and requested an extension of credit.   29.  Thus, while UTA may have believed it was collecting on a lawful debt, it had no  reason to believe the debt related to a credit transaction involving the consumer.   30.  Further, the paper check which created the debt was signed by only one  individual.   31.  As such, there was no way UTA reasonably could have believed it had the right to  request credit reports on two different people.   33.  UTA reported that Mr. Heistand was the debtor and that $465 was delinquent to  46.  Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as  alleged above.   48.  Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the definition of the Classes based on  discovery or legal developments.   49.  Numerosity.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).  The Class members are so numerous that  joinder of all is impractical.  Although the precise number of Class members is known only to  Experian and UTA, the names and addresses of the Class members are identifiable through  documents maintained by Experian and UTA.   51.  Typicality.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims  of each Class member, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same  legal theories.  Experian disclosed consumer reports without a permissible purpose.  UTA  obtained consumer reports without a permissible purpose.  Plaintiffs have the same claims for  statutory, actual and punitive damages that they seek for absent class members.    52.  Adequacy.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).  Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of  the Class.  Their interests are aligned with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the  members of the Class they seek to represent.  They have retained counsel competent and  experienced in such litigation, and they intend to prosecute this action vigorously.  Plaintiffs and  their counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of members of the Class.   54.  This action should be maintained as a class action because the prosecution of  separate actions by individual members of the Classes would create a risk of inconsistent or  varying adjudications with respect to individual members, which would establish incompatible  standards of conduct for the parties opposing the Classes, as well as a risk of adjudications with  respect to individual members, which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests  of other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability  to protect their interests.  55.  The Heistands adopt and incorporate paragraphs 1 - 45 as if fully stated herein.   56.  Because UTA lacked a permissible purpose to obtain Mr. Heistand’s credit report,  UTA willfully and intentionally violated the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f), when it requested a  credit report on Mr. Heistand from Experian in August 2015.   57.  Because UTA lacked a permissible purpose to obtain Ms. Heistand’s credit report,  UTA willfully and intentionally violated the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f), when it requested a  credit report on Ms. Heistand from Experian in August 2015.   58.  UTA was fully aware that the debt it sought to collect was not a credit transaction  and that the credit reports it requested had no connection to any credit transaction.   60.  UTA is liable to Plaintiffs and all Class members for the above-stated violation of  the FCRA in the amount of actual damages or statutory damages not to exceed $1,000 per  incident, plus their reasonable attorney fees and costs.  61.  The Heistands adopt and incorporate paragraphs 1 - 45 as if fully stated herein.   62.  At all times relevant, Experian was aware of the nature of UTA’s business, i.e.,  that it collected on non-credit-based debts.   63.  Because Experian knew or should have known that UTA lacked a permissible  purpose to obtain Plaintiffs’ credit reports, Experian willfully and intentionally violated the  FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a), when it provided credit report(s) on the Heistands to UTA in  August 2015, and Experian knew, or should have known, that no permissible purpose existed  because Experian knew, or should have known, that UTA was not requesting the credit report in  connection with the collection of a credit transaction involving the Heistands, since UTA collects  only non-credit-based debts.   64.  Experian was aware that it was providing credit reports to UTA on an on-going  basis despite there being no permissible purpose to do so under the FCRA.   7.  During the month of July 2015, Ms. Heistand incurred a debt for automobile  repairs and parts on her personal vehicle.  Ms. Heistand allegedly wrote a check to Stingray  Chevrolet, LLC (“Stingray”) to pay the debt in the amount of $425, rounded to the nearest  whole dollar.  UTA guaranteed payment of the check to Stingray.   8.  The check was supposedly returned unpaid to Stingray.   9.  On information and belief, UTA paid Stingray the value of the check.  Having  paid Stingray, UTA was then entitled, under its contract with Stingray, to collect that sum from  the issuer of the check and keep whatever it obtained.   EXPERIAN’S VIOLATION OF THE FCRA – 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et. seq   UTA’S VIOLATION OF THE FCRA – 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et. seq  