39.  Plaintiffs bring this matter on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated.   As detailed at length in this Complaint, Defendant orchestrated deceptive marketing and labeling  practices.  Defendant’s customers were uniformly impacted by and exposed to this misconduct.   Accordingly, this Complaint is suited for classwide resolution, including injunctive relief.     40.  The Class is defined as all consumers who purchased the Products anywhere in  the United States during the Class Period (the “Class”).   41.  This action should be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(a), satisfying the  class action prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy because:   42.  Numerosity: Class Members are so numerous that joinder of all members is  impracticable.  Plaintiffs believe that there are thousands of consumers who are Class Members  described above who have been damaged by Defendant’s deceptive and misleading practices.     44.  Typicality: Plaintiffs are members of the Class.  Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of  the claims of each Class Member in that every member of the Class was susceptible to the same  deceptive, misleading conduct and purchased the Defendant’s Products.  Plaintiffs are entitled to  relief under the same causes of action as the other Class Members.   46.  Predominance: Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), the common issues of law and fact  identified above predominate over any other questions affecting only individual members of the  Class.  The Class issues fully predominate over any individual issue because no inquiry into  individual conduct is necessary; all that is required is a narrow focus on Defendant’s deceptive  and misleading marketing and labeling practices.     48.  Accordingly, this Class is properly brought and should be maintained as a class  action under Rule 23(b)(3) because questions of law or fact common to Class Members  predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and because a class action is  superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this controversy.  52.  Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in all the  foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.    53.  New York General Business Law Section 349 (“GBL § 349”) declares unlawful  “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce or in the  furnishing of any service in this state . . .”   55.  There is no fully adequate remedy at law.   56.  Defendant misleadingly, inaccurately, and deceptively advertises and markets its  Products to consumers.   57.  Defendant’s false Nonstick Representations constitute consumer-oriented conduct  which is misleading in a material way in that it, inter alia, induced Plaintiffs and the Class  Members to purchase and pay a premium for Defendant’s Products and to use the Products when  they otherwise would not have. Defendant made their untrue and/or misleading statements and  representations willfully, wantonly, and with reckless disregard for the truth.     58.  Plaintiffs and the Class Members have been injured inasmuch as they paid a  premium for products based on the Nonstick Representations.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the  Class Members received less than what they bargained and/or paid for.   59.  Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in all the  foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.   59.  Defendant’s Nonstick Representations induced Plaintiffs and the Class Members  to buy Defendant’s Products and to pay a premium price for them.   60.  Defendant’s deceptive and misleading practices constitute a deceptive act and  practice in the conduct of business in violation of New York General Business Law §349(a) and  Plaintiffs and the Class Members have been damaged thereby.   60.  N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350 provides, in part, as follows:  False advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or  commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state is hereby  declared unlawful.   61.  N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350a(1) provides, in part, as follows:  The term ‘false advertising’ means advertising, including labeling,  of a commodity, or of the kind, character, terms or conditions of  any employment opportunity if such advertising is misleading in a  material respect.  In determining whether any advertising is  misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things)  not only representations made by statement, word, design, device,  sound or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the  advertising fails to reveal facts material in the light of such  representations with respect to the commodity or employment to  which the advertising relates under the conditions proscribed in  said advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary or  usual. . .    62.  Defendant’s labeling and advertisements contain untrue and materially misleading  statements concerning Defendant’s Products inasmuch as the Nonstick Representations are false.    64.  Defendant’s advertising, packaging and products’ labeling induced the Plaintiffs  and the Class Members to buy Defendant’s Products.   65.  Defendant made their untrue and/or misleading statements and representations  willfully, wantonly, and with reckless disregard for the truth.     66.  Defendant’s conduct constitutes multiple, separate violations of N.Y. Gen. Bus.  Law § 350.   67.  Defendant made the material misrepresentations described in this Complaint in  Defendant’s advertising, and on the Products’ packaging and labeling.    68.  Defendant’s material misrepresentations were substantially uniform in content,  presentation, and impact upon consumers at large.  Moreover, all consumers purchasing the  Products were and continue to be exposed to Defendant’s material misrepresentations.    69.  As a result of Defendant’s recurring and unlawful deceptive acts and practices,  Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to monetary, compensatory, treble and punitive  damages, injunctive relief, restitution and disgorgement of all moneys obtained by means of  Defendant’s unlawful conduct, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs.  71.  Defendant provided the Plaintiffs and Class Members with an express warranty in  the form of the Nonstick Representations which were written affirmations of fact.    72.  The Nonstick Representations were not couched as “belief” or “opinion,” and  were not “generalized statements of quality not capable of proof or disproof.”   73.  These affirmations of fact became part of the basis for the bargain and were  material to the Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ transactions.   74.  Plaintiffs and Class Members reasonably relied upon the Defendant’s affirmations  of fact and justifiably acted in ignorance of the material facts omitted or concealed when they  decided to buy Defendant’s Products.   75.  Within a reasonable time after they knew or should have known of Defendant’s  breach, Plaintiffs, on behalf of himself and Class Members, placed Defendant on notice of their  breach, giving Defendant an opportunity to cure their breach, which they refused to do.   76.  Defendant breached the express warranty because the Products are not "nonstick.”     77.  As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach of express warranty,  Plaintiffs and Class Members were damaged in the amount of the price they paid for the  Products, in an amount to be proven at trial.  79.  The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides a federal remedy for consumers who  have been damaged by the failure of a supplier or warrantor to comply with any obligation under  a written warranty or implied warranty, or other various obligations established under the  Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.   80.  The Products are “consumer products” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss  Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1).   81.  Plaintiffs and other members of the Class are “consumers” within the meaning of  the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3).   82.  Defendant is a “supplier” and “warrantor” within the meaning of the Magnuson- Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(4) and 2301(5).   83.  Defendant made the Nonstick Representations in writing.    84.  These statements were made in connection with the sale of the Products and relate  to the nature of the Products and affirm and promise that the Products are as represented and  defect free and, as such, are “written warranties” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss  Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A).   86.  Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in the foregoing  paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.   87.  Defendant is in the business of manufacturing, distributing, marketing and  advertising the pans described above.   88.  Under the Uniform Commercial Code’s implied warranty of merchantability, the  Defendant warranted in writing and on the advertising and packaging that the pans were  “Nonstick.”    89.  Defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability in that Defendant’s  Products’ characteristics deviate from the label and products’ description, and reasonable  consumers expecting a product that conforms to its label would not accept the Defendant’s  Products if they knew the pans did not conform to the Nonstick Representations.   90.  Within a reasonable amount of time after the Plaintiffs discovered the Products’  misrepresentations, Plaintiffs notified the Defendant of such breach.   91.  The inability of the Defendant’s Products to meet the label description was wholly  due to the Defendant’s fault and without Plaintiffs’ or Class Members’ fault or neglect, and was  solely due to the Defendant’s manufacture and distribution of the Products to the public.   93.  Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each preceding paragraph as  though set forth at length herein.   94.  Plaintiffs and the Class members conferred benefits on Defendant when they  purchased the Gotham Steel pans or cookware.     95.  Under the circumstances, it would be against equity and good conscience to  permit Defendant to retain the entirety of the benefits conferred on it when Plaintiffs and the  Class purchased the Products.  This is because Defendant knew that the Nonstick  Representations were material to consumers yet false. Plaintiffs and the Class members would  not have purchased the Products if they had known the truth about the Nonstick Representations.    96.  It would therefore be unjust and inequitable for Defendant to retain all of the  benefits they received and not provide restitution to Plaintiffs and the Class.  BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY  (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and All Class Members)   BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTIBILITY  (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and All Class Members)   Unjust Enrichment  (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiffs and All Class Members)   VIOLATION OF NEW YORK GBL § 350  (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)   VIOLATION OF NEW YORK GBL § 349  (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)   VIOLATION OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS   WARRANTY ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.  (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and All Class Members)  