13.  Defendants conduct background checks on many of its job applicants as part  of a standard screening process.  In addition, Defendants also conduct background checks  on existing employees from time-to-time during the course of their employment.   15.  Defendants procured a consumer report information on Plaintiff in violation  of the FCRA.    16.  Under the FCRA, it is unlawful to procure a consumer report or cause a  consumer report to be procured for employment purposes, unless:  (i)  a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the  consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be  procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a  consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and  (ii)  the consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may be  made on the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the  report.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added).   17.  Defendants failed to satisfy these disclosure and authorization requirements.   18.  Defendants did not have a stand-alone FCRA disclosure or authorization form.  The FCRA requires that a disclosure not contain extraneous information. This is commonly  referred to as the “stand alone disclosure” requirement.   19.  The FCRA also contains several other notice provisions, such as 15 U.S.C. §  1681b(b)(3)(a) (pre-adverse action); § 1681b(4)(B)(notice of national security investigation); §  1681c(h) (notification of address discrepancy); § 1681(g) (full file disclosure to consumers); §  1681k(a)(1) (disclosure regarding use of public record information); § 1681h (form and  conditions of disclosure; and §1681(m)(a) (notice of adverse action).   21.  Without clear notice that a consumer report is going to be procured, applicants  and employees are deprived of the opportunity to make informed decisions or otherwise assert  protected rights.   22.  Using a FCRA disclosure that is not “stand alone” violates the plain language of  the statute, and flies in the face of unambiguous case law and regulatory guidance from the  Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). Jones v Halstead Mgmt. Co., LLC, 81 F. Supp. 3d 324, 333  (S.D.N.Y 2015)(disclosure not “stand alone” when it contains extraneous information such as  state specific disclosures); Moore v. Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *35 (E.D.  Pa. May 29, 2015)(“The text of the statute and available agency guidance demonstrate that the  inclusion of information on the form apart from the disclosure and related authorization violates  § 1681b(b)(2)(a).”)   23.  Defendants’ Authorization for Background Investigation form required  applicants and employees to waive federal and state privacy rights.  For example, information  from an educational institution cannot be disclosed unless consent is received from the student.  See Family Educational Rights & Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g); 34 CFR Part 99.  Similarly,  covered financial institutions are required to maintain the security of banking and financial  information. See Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.  §§ 6801-6809.     25.  Defendants knowingly and recklessly disregarded case law and regulatory  guidance and willfully violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A) by procuring consumer report  information on employees without complying with the disclosure and authorization  requirements of the statute.  Defendants’ violations were willful because Defendants knew they  were required to use a stand-alone disclosure form prior to obtaining and using a consumer  report on the Putative Class members. Specifically, Defendants used A-Check America, Inc.  (“A-Check”) to procure consumer reports on Plaintiff and the members of the Putative Classes.   A-Check provided guidance regarding FCRA compliance, which Defendants either disregarded  or ignored.   26.  Defendants’ conduct is also willful because:  a. Defendants are large and sophisticated employers with access to legal  advice through its own attorneys and there is no evidence it determined its  own conduct was lawful;  b. Defendants knew or had reason to know that its conduct was inconsistent  with published FCRA guidance interpreting the FCRA, case law and the  plain language of the statute;  c. Defendants voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater  than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless;  d. Defendants ignored or failed to utilize the compliance guidance and  materials offered by A-Check, the consumer reporting agency used by  Defendants to procure consumer reports;   28.  Plaintiff applied for employment with Defendants as a Warehouse Technician.   29.  As part of the hiring process, Plaintiff was provided and executed a form titled  Authorization for Background Investigation form on or around June 30, 2015.      30.  The Authorization for Background Investigation form did not contain a clear,  stand-alone FCRA disclosure.    31.  The  Authorization for Background Investigation form contained extraneous  information and served as a functional waiver of rights afforded consumers pursuant to federal  and state laws.   32.  Plaintiff was confused by the extraneous language contained in the Authorization  for Background Investigation form.   33.  Subsequently, Defendants procured a consumer report on Plaintiff.  It was  unlawful for Defendants to procure a consumer report on Plaintiff without making the  disclosures required by the FCRA. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) by  procuring consumer reports on Plaintiff and other putative class members for employment  purposes, without first making proper disclosures in the format required by the statute.    40.  This case is maintainable as a class action because prosecution of actions by or  against individual members of the Putative Classes would result in inconsistent or varying  adjudications and create the risk of incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants.  Further, adjudication of each individual Class member’s claim as separate action would  potentially be dispositive of the interest of other individuals not a party to such action, thereby  impeding their ability to protect their interests.   41.  This case is also maintainable as a class action because Defendants acted or  refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Putative Classes, so that final  injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to the Classes  as a whole.   43.  Plaintiff intends to send notice to all members of the Putative Classes to the  extent required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The names and addresses of the Putative  Class members are readily available from Defendant’s records.  44.  Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the  preceding paragraphs 1-43.   47.  Pursuant to § 1681(b)(2), Plaintiff was entitled to receive certain information at a  specific time, namely a disclosure that a consumer report may be procured for employment  purposes in a document consisting solely of the disclosure. Such a disclosure was required to be  provided to Plaintiff before the consumer report was to be procured. By depriving Plaintiff of  this information, in the form and at the time he was entitled to receive it, Defendant injured  Plaintiff and the putative class members he seeks to represent. Public Citizen v. U.S. Department  of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989); Federal Election Commission v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11  (1998).   48.  Defendants violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports on Plaintiff and  other Background Check Class members without first making proper disclosures in the format  required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b)(2)(A)(i). Namely, these disclosures had to be made: (1) before  Defendants actually procured consumer reports, and (2) in a stand-alone document, clearly  informing Plaintiff and other Background Check Class members that Defendants might procure a  consumer report on each of them for purposes of employment. The required disclosures were not  made, causing Plaintiff an informational injury. Graham v. Pyramid Healthcare Solutions, Inc.,  Case No.: 16-cv-01324 (M.D. Fla. October 26, 2016); Moody v. Ascenda USA Inc., Case No.: 16- cv-60364 (S.D. Fla. October 5, 2016); Thomas v. FTS USA, 2016 WL 3653878, at *8 (E.D. Va.  Jun. 30, 2016).   50.  Defendants invaded Plaintiff’s right to privacy. Under the FCRA, “a person may  not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment  purposes with respect to any consumer, unless” it complies with the statutory requirements (i.e.,  disclosure and authorization) set forth in the following subsections: 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b)(2). As  one court put it, “[t]he FCRA makes it unlawful to ‘procure’ a report without first providing the  proper disclosure and receiving the consumer’s written authorization.” Harris v. Home Depot  U.S.A., Inc. F. Supp. 3d 868, 869 (N.D.Cal.2015).   51.  Plaintiff’s consumer report contained a wealth of private information which  Defendants had no right to access absent a specific Congressional license to do so. The report  included, inter alia, Plaintiff’s date of birth, address history, educational history, drivers’ license  number, driving history, partial social security numbers.    By procuring reports containing this  private information and delving deep into Plaintiff’s personal life without complying with the  FCRA’s disclosure requirements, Defendants illegally invaded Plaintiff’s right to privacy.   52.  Defendant’s illegal invasion into Plaintiff’s privacy created a foreseeable risk of  harm. Plaintiff was required to provide a blanket authorization to a broad range of individuals,  employers, federal and state agencies and educational institutions to release personal and private  information about him to Defendants and the screening company.    53.  Defendants created a foreseeable risk of harm that Plaintiff would believe he had  waived his rights protected under federal and state law.    55.  Defendants’ willful conduct is also reflected by, among other things, the  following facts:  a.  Defendants are large corporations with access to legal advice through its  own general counsels’ office and outside employment counsel, and there is  not contemporaneous evidence that it determined that its conduct was  lawful;  b.  Defendants knew or had reason to know that their conduct was inconsistent  with published FTC guidance interpreting the FCRA and the plain  language of the statute; and   c.  Defendants voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater  than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless.    57.  Plaintiff and the Background Check Class are further entitled to recover their  costs and attorneys’ fees, in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3).  58.  Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding  paragraphs 1-43.   59.  Defendants violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports relating to  Plaintiff and other Background Check Class members without proper authorization.   60.  The authorization requirement under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) follows the  disclosure requirement of § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) and presupposes that the authorization is based  upon a valid disclosure. “After all, one cannot meaningfully authorize her employer to take an  action if she does not grasp what that action entails.” Burghy v. Dayton Racquet Club, Inc.,695 F.  Supp. 2d 689, 699 (S.D. Ohio 2010); see also United States v. DeFries, 129 F. 3d 1293, 1307  (D.C. Cir. 1997)(“[A]uthorization secured ‘without disclosure of …material information’ is a  nullity.”)  Plaintiffs’ First Concrete Injury under § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii): Informational Injury   62.  Pursuant to § 1681 (b)(b)(2), Plaintiff was entitled to receive certain information  at a specific time, namely a disclosure that a consumer report may be procured for employment  purposes in a document consisting solely of the disclosure. Such a disclosure was required to be  provided to Plaintiff before the consumer report was to be procured. By depriving Plaintiff of  this information, Defendants injured Plaintiff and the putative class members he seeks to  represent. Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989); Federal  Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) Then 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii).   63.  Defendants violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports on Plaintiff and  other Background Check Class members without first making proper disclosures in the format  required by 15 U.S.C. §1681b(B)(2)(A)(i). Namely, these disclosures had to be made: (1) before  Defendants actually procured consumer reports, and (2) in a stand-alone document, clearly  informing Plaintiff and other Background Check Class members that Defendants might procure a  consumer report on each of them for purposes of employment.   64.  Plaintiff suffered an informational injury. Under the FCRA, “a person may not  procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes  with respect to any consumer, unless” it complies with the statutory requirements (i.e., disclosure  and authorization) set forth in the following subsections: 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2). As one court  put it, “[t]he FCRA makes it unlawful to ‘procure’ a report without first providing the proper  disclosure and receiving the consumer’s written authorization.” Harris v. Home Depot U.S.A.  Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 868, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  Plaintiffs’ Second Concrete Injury under § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii): Invasion of Privacy   67.  Defendants’ willful conduct is also reflected by, among other things, the  following facts:  a.  Defendants are large corporations with access to legal advice through its  own general counsel’s office and outside employment counsel, and there  is not contemporaneous evidence that it determined that its conduct was  lawful;  b.  Defendants knew or had reason to know that its conduct was inconsistent  with published FTC guidance interpreting the FCRA and the plain  language of the statute; and   c.  Defendants voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater  than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless.    68.  Plaintiff and the Background Check Class are entitled to statutory damages of  not less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for  each and every one of these violations under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), in addition to punitive  damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2).    69.  Plaintiff and the Background Check Class are further entitled to recover their  costs and attorneys’ fees, in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3).  Background Checks   Failure to Obtain Proper Authorization in Violation of FCRA   15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii)   Failure to Make Proper Disclosure in Violation of FCRA   15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)  