(Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act)   (Violations	of	29	CFR	516)	  19.  Plaintiff KRISTY REYES, files this case as an “opt in” collective action, as it  is specifically allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).   20.  The class that Plaintiff KRISTY REYES, seeks to represent may be described  as follows:  All current and former employees of Defendant who worked as  “Care Givers” and/or “Cooks”, and was not compensated at  time and a half for hours worked above forty each  workweek and who were not compensated for off-the- clock work performed, in violation of 29 U.S.C. 201 et. seq.   21.  Plaintiff, KRISTY REYES, seeks to represent only those members of the  above-described group who, after appropriate notice of their ability to opt into this action, have  provided consent in writing to be represented by counsel for Plaintiff KRISTY REYES, as  required by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).   22.  Those persons who choose to opt in, referred to as the “Putative class  members”, will be listed on subsequent pleadings and copies of their written consents to sue  will be filed with the Court.   23.  Plaintiff KRISTY REYES contends that this action is appropriate for  collective action status because Defendant herein has acted in the same manner with regard to all  members of the putative class.  25.  For purposes of this action, the “relevant period” is defined as such period  commencing on the date that is three years prior to the filing of this action, and continuing  thereafter.   26.  Defendant employed Plaintiff KRISTY REYES from approximately June 19  2015 to January 18, 2016.  Plaintiff worked as a Care Giver whose job was to care for the elderly.   27.  During her employment and in the routine performance of day-to-day job duties,  Plaintiff has performed non-exempt work, during a significant period of most days, as classified  by the Act, because the performance of Plaintiff’s job required it and because Defendant’s  management required the performance of those non-exempted job duties, as a condition of her  continued employment.    28.  During Plaintiff KRISTY REYES’S employment, she and similarly situated  employees wore a uniform and were given instructions by Defendant as to their day-to-day job  duties and responsibilities.   29.  Defendant supervised Plaintiff and similarly situated employees.    30.  Plaintiff was not an independent contractor.   31.  Plaintiff was paid an hourly rate and was therefore not a salaried employee.   32.  Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee, as no lawful exemption excused  defendant from paying her at a rate of time and a half for all hours worked above forty in a  given week.   33.  Plaintiff’s regular workweek schedule was 6:00AM to and 6:00PM Monday  through Sunday.    35.  Although Plaintiff worked 84 hours per week, her overtime pay would not  begin until she had worked fifty-six (56) hours.   36.  Plaintiff was required to work the first sixteen (16) hours above forty (40) hours  each week at her regular rate of $9.17 per hour instead of the overtime rate of $13. 75 per hour.   37.  Plaintiff was denied sixteen (16) hours of overtime pay for the duration of her  employment with defendant.    38.  Further, during these hours worked, Plaintiff performed the function of her job,  which included the performance duties typically performed by “hourly” paid non-exempt  employees because the job required it and the Defendant’s management required it, as a condition  of Plaintiff’s continued employment.   39.  Defendant required Plaintiff and all others similarly situated to perform all  necessary work to include the performance of those duties otherwise typically performed  by “hourly” employees which routinely required Plaintiff and other similarly situated  employees to work “overtime” and “off-the-clock” hours as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.,  for which they failed to receive overtime compensation as required by the Act.   40.  Defendant failed to pay statutory overtime as required by 29 U.S.C. § 201 et  seq.   41.  Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged  as if fully written herein.   43.  Plaintiff KRISTY REYES and all others similarly situated are entitled to receive  overtime pay for all hours they have worked in excess of 40 during each seven-day workweek  and minimum wage for off-the-clock hours worked.   44.  Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff and all others similarly situated,  their entitled pay (including overtime pay) for those hours they worked in excess of 40 per  week.   45.  Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, their  entitled pay (including overtime pay) for those hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week  and for off-the-clock work performed.    46.  Defendant has violated 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. by failing to compensate the  Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees “overtime” pay for all hours worked in excess  of 40 hours per week.  Defendant failed to Compensate Plaintiff for overtime hours worked both  on and off the clock and failed to compensate Plaintiff and similarly situated employees at  minimum wage for off-the-clock hours worked.    47.  Defendant failed to keep or record accurate time records reflecting the hours  employees, such as the Plaintiff and those similarly situated actually worked.      48.  The Defendant’s conduct was willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).   49.  No lawful exemption excused the Defendant from compensating Plaintiff and  all others similarly situated, overtime pay for hours worked over forty per week or for time  worked off the clock.   51.  Defendants knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out an  illegal pattern and practice of deceptive and fraudulent accounting practices regarding  overtime a n d  o f f - t h e - c l o c k  compensation due to Plaintiff and to all others  similarly situated.   52.  Plaintiff and all others similarly situated seek an amount of back-pay equal to  the unpaid overtime compensation from the date they commenced employment for the  Defendant until the date of trial.   53.  Plaintiff and all others similarly situated further seek an additional equal amount  as liquidated damages, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as provided by 29  U.S.C. § 216(b), along with post-judgment interest at the highest rate allowed by law.  54.  Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged as if  fully written herein.   55.  Other employees have been victimized by the above referenced pattern,  practice, and policy of Defendants in violation of the FLSA.   56.  Thus, from personal knowledge, Plaintiff is aware that the illegal practices  and policies of Defendant have been imposed on other workers.   57.  Other, similarly situated employees are being denied their lawful wages.   59.  Plaintiff KRISTY REYES experiences are typical experiences of the putative class  as it pertains to compensation.   60.  The specific job titles or job requirements of the various members of the class do  not prevent collective treatment.   61.  All employees, regardless of their job requirements or rates of pay, who are  denied overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 per week and not paid for off- the-clock work performed, are similarly situated.   62.  Although the issue of damages may be individual in character, there is no  detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts.   63.  All current and former employees who worked as “Caregivers” or “Cooks” who  at any time during the three years prior to the date of filing of this action to the date of judgment  were denied overtime pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) and not compensated for  off-the-clock work in any given workweek are properly included as members of the class. 