24.  Plaintiffs are all former employees of Defendants at Shipley’s warehouse and  corporate office in Houston, Harris County, Texas.  Both facilities are located on the same site  on or about 5200 North Main Street in Houston.   25.  The Shipley’s business involves mixing and preparing products such as yeast mix,  fillings and other food goods to be delivered to retail stores and franchises across Texas and  other states within the United States.  At the North Main Street location in Houston, Shipley’s  employs non-exempt employees who work in the warehouse, who perform clerical/secretarial  functions in the corporate office, and who clean the offices, company-owned houses located  adjacent to the warehouse and corporate office and personal residences of Defendant Lawrence  Shipley or his family members and of other Shipley’s employees.   26.  Plaintiff Esmeralda Sanchez was employed in a non-exempt secretarial/clerical  position.  She answered the phone, took phone orders from retail stores and franchisees,  translated from Spanish to English and vice versa, distributed mail, sent store orders to the  warehouse, performed data entry, made copies and ran general errands.  She was supervised by  Defendant Lawrence Shipley.  She was paid forty hours each workweek regardless of the  number of hours she worked and was not paid any overtime.     27.  Plaintiff Martha Garcia was a non-exempt cleaning/housekeeping employee.  She  cleaned the office and cleaned other properties at the request of Shipley, including personal  residences of family members, the company-owned houses located adjacent to the warehouse  and corporate office, and Shipley’s employees’ residences.  She was supervised by Defendant  Lawrence Shipley.  She was paid forty hours each workweek regardless of the number of hours  7  she worked each workweek and was not paid any overtime.  Her hourly rate was $11.00 at the  time of her termination.   28.  Plaintiff Elizabeth Peralta was a non-exempt cleaning/housekeeping employee.   She cleaned the office and cleaned other properties at the request of Shipley, including personal  residences of family members, the company-owned houses located adjacent to the warehouse  and corporate office, and Shipley’s employees’ residences.  She was supervised by Defendant  Lawrence Shipley.  She was paid forty hours each workweek regardless of the number of hours  she worked each workweek and was not paid for any overtime.  Her hourly rate was $9.00 at the  time of her termination.   29.  Plaintiff Juan Sanchez was a non-exempt warehouse employee.  He primarily  worked at the Shipley’s warehouse for 40-60 hour workweeks with minimal breaks.  He was  paid forty hours each workweek regardless of the number of hours he worked each workweek  and was occasionally paid overtime.    30.  All Plaintiffs regularly worked over forty hours per week.  Shipley’s knew or  reasonably should have known that Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty hours per workweek.     31.  At the direction of Defendant Lawrence Shipley, Plaintiff Peralta regularly drove  her personal vehicle long distances from the Shipley’s corporate office and warehouse on N.  Main Street to other locations in the Houston area to clean residences or other properties owned  by Defendants.  The expenses incurred by Plaintiff Peralta in connection with her driving, plus  the number of hours she worked in excess of a 40-hour workweek, reduced her minimum wage  below the applicable required minimum wage rate.  Shipley’s never reimbursed Plaintiff Peralta  for any mileage or expenses incurred with these trips made at Defendant Lawrence Shipley’s  request and solely for Defendants’ benefit.  8   32.  Shipley’s did not pay Plaintiffs or other warehouse and secretarial/clerical and  cleaning/housekeeping employees overtime “at a rate not less than one and one-half times the  regular rate at which [they were] employed.”  29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).     33.  Instead, Shipley’s paid Plaintiffs and other warehouse and secretarial/clerical and  cleaning/housekeeping employees only forty hours for each workweek regardless of how many  hours they worked.  They received little or no compensation for overtime hours.   34.  Plaintiffs Peralta and Garcia were paid an hourly rate of $9.00 per hour.  When  they worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, this wage would produce an hourly rate below  the applicable required minimum wage.     35.  Peralta’s repeated usage of her personal vehicle for trips during the work day at  Defendant Lawrence Shipley’s request and solely for Defendants’ benefit would produce an  hourly rate below the applicable minimum wage.   36.  Shipley’s kept no timekeeping records for Plaintiffs and other warehouse and  secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees.  On information and belief, Shipley’s  had a timekeeping clock for a brief period of time in the warehouse, but it quit working and no  other method of timekeeping was adopted.  Shipley’s kept no timekeeping records for the  secretarial/clerical and housekeeping/cleaning personnel.   37.  Shipley’s knew or showed a reckless disregard for whether its pay practices  violated the FLSA.   38.  Shipley’s is liable to Plaintiffs and other non-exempt warehouse and office  personnel for unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages, liquidated damages and attorneys’  fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  9   39.  All current and former non-exempt warehouse and secretarial/clerical and  cleaning/housekeeping employees of Shipley’s at the warehouse and corporate office location  are similarly situated to Plaintiffs because they (1) work (or worked) at Shipley’s warehouse and  corporate office with a fairly small number of employees (less than 100) whose work hours and  pay rates were singularly controlled by Defendant Lawrence Shipley; (2) Defendant Lawrence  Shipley decided not to pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated warehouse, secretarial/clerical and  cleaning/housekeeping employees for overtime hours; (3) Defendants did not keep timekeeping  records  for  Plaintiffs  and  similarly  situated  warehouse,  secretarial/clerical  and  cleaning/housekeeping  employees;  (4)  Plaintiffs  and  similarly  situated  warehouse,  secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees were not paid the applicable minimum  wage, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 206(a); (5) Plaintiffs and similarly situated warehouse,  secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees were not paid for overtime hours  regularly worked in excess of forty hours per workweek, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1);  and (6) are entitled to recover their unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages, liquidated  damages and attorneys’ fees and costs from Shipley’s pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  40.  Under the FLSA, employers such as Defendants are generally required to pay  non-exempt employees like Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth  Peralta time and one-half their regular rate for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek.  See 29  U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  As the Fifth Circuit has stated:  “The Fair Labor Standards Act generally  requires that employees be paid an overtime premium of ‘time-and-one-half’ for all hours  worked in excess of forty hours in a week.”  Samson v. Apollo Resources, Inc., 242 F.3d 629,  633 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)).  10   41.  There are some exceptions to this rule (for example, for “computer professionals”  as defined by the FLSA and its interpretive regulations), but none of them applied to Esmeralda  Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta, or any of their similarly situated  current and former non-exempt warehouse and secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping  employees of Shipley’s at the warehouse and corporate office location.  Thus, for every hour  Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta worked over 40 in a  workweek, Defendants were required by the FLSA to pay them time-and-one-half their regular  rate.  Defendants, however, failed to do that.  Thus, Defendants violated the FLSA rights of  Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta.   42.  Defendants owe Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth  Peralta an equal amount in liquidated damages.  This is so because, under the FLSA, an  employer who violates the overtime provisions is liable not only for the unpaid overtime  compensation, but also for “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. §  216(b).  While an employer may try to avoid liquidated damages by showing its FLSA violations  was in “good faith,” that is a standard that is extremely difficult to satisfy.  As the Fifth Circuit  has put it, “[a]n employer ‘faces a “substantial burden” of demonstrating good faith and a  reasonable belief that its actions did not violate the FLSA.’”  Singer v. City of Waco, 324 F.3d  813, 823 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of Neb., 154 F.3d 259, 267 (5th Cir.  1998)).   43.  Defendants have no evidence that its violation of the FLSA’s basic “time-and- one-half” overtime rule was in “good faith.”  The fact is that the rule Defendants violated is so  basic that it could not have been in “good faith,” but must instead have been willful.  This is  especially obvious given that Shipley’s has previously been sued for FLSA violations.  See  11  Alvarado et al. v. Shipley Donut Flour & Supply Co., Inc., 4:06-CV-02113 (S.D. Tex. June 22,  2006); Chavez-Cipriano et al. v. Shipley Donut Flour & Supply Co., Inc., 4:07-CV-02314 (S.D.  Tex. July 15, 2007).   44.  All conditions precedent, if any, to this suit, have been fulfilled.   45.  At all material times, Plaintiffs Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia  and Elizabeth Peralta were employees under the FLSA.  29 U.S.C. § 203(e).   46.  At  all  material  times,  warehouse  and  secretarial/clerical  and  cleaning/housekeeping employees of Shipley’s at the warehouse and corporate office location  similarly situated to Plaintiffs Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth  Peralta were and are employees under the FLSA.  29 U.S.C. § 203(e).   47.  At all material times, Defendants were and are a covered employer under the  FLSA.  29 U.S.C. § 203(d).   48.  At all material times, Defendant Lawrence Shipley was and is a covered employer  under the FLSA.  29 U.S.C. § 203(d).    49.  At all material times, Plaintiffs Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia  and Elizabeth Peralta and those current and former non-exempt warehouse and  secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees of Shipley’s at the warehouse and  corporate office location similarly situated to Plaintiffs routinely worked in excess of 40 hours  per seven-day workweek, and Defendants knew that.   50.  At all material times, Plaintiffs Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia  and Elizabeth Peralta and those current and former non-exempt warehouse and  secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees of Shipley’s at the warehouse and  12  corporate office location similarly situated to Plaintiffs were and are entitled to overtime  compensation for hours worked over 40 in a seven-day workweek.  29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).   51.  At all material times, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan  Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta and those current and former non-exempt  warehouse and secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees of Shipley’s at the  warehouse and corporate office location similarly situated to Plaintiffs overtime compensation of  one and one-half their regular hour rate of pay for hours worked over 40 in a seven-day  workweek.  Rather, at all material times, Defendants only paid Plaintiffs Esmeralda Sanchez,  Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta and those similarly situated to Plaintiffs  regular straight-time for a 40-hour workweek and paid them nothing for hours worked in excess  of 40 hours in a workweek.   52.  Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.  § 255(a).  See Singer v. City of Waco, 324 F.3d 813, 821-22 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding a jury  finding of willfulness).   53.  Defendants did not and have not made a good faith effort to comply with the  requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 260.  54.  Plaintiffs adopt by reference all of the facts set forth above.  See FED. R. CIV. P.  10(c).   55.  Defendants knowingly, willfully and intentionally failed to compensate Plaintiffs  the applicable minimum hourly wage in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a).   56.  Further, Defendants willfully required Plaintiff Peralta to incur expenses while  driving her personal vehicle at the request of Defendants and solely for their benefit.  The  13  expenses she incurred further reduced her wages below the minimum wage in violation of 29  U.S.C. § 206(a) and applicable regulations, specifically 29 C.F.R. § 531.35.   57.  Because of Defendants’ willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs are entitled to  recover from Defendants, jointly and severally, their unpaid minimum wages, and an amount  equal in the form of liquidated damages, as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of action,  including pre-judgment interest, pursuant to the FLSA, all in an amount to be determined at trial.   29 U.S.C. § 216(b).   58.  Plaintiffs adopt by reference all of the facts set forth above.  See FED. R. CIV. P.  10(c).   59.  The FLSA requires employees to keep accurate records of hours worked by non- exempt employees.  29 U.S.C. § 211(c); 29 C.F.R. pt. 516.   60.  In addition to the pay violations of the FLSA described above, Defendants also  failed to keep proper time records, as required by the FLSA.  61.  Plaintiffs adopt by reference all of the facts set forth above.  See FED. R. CIV. P.  10(c).   62.  On information and belief, other current and former employees of Shipley’s have  been victimized by the violations of the FLSA committed by Defendants, as identified above.   63.  Where, as here, “the employers’ actions or policies were effectuated on a  companywide basis, notice may be sent to all similarly situated persons on a companywide  basis.”  Ryan v. Staff Care, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 820, 825 (N.D. Tex. 2007).  14   64.  All current and former non-exempt warehouse and secretarial/clerical and  cleaning/housekeeping employees of Shipley’s at the warehouse and corporate office location  are similarly situated to Plaintiffs because they (1) work (or worked) at Shipley’s warehouse and  corporate office with a fairly small number of employees (less than 100) whose work hours and  pay rates were singularly controlled by Defendant Lawrence Shipley; (2) Defendant Lawrence  Shipley decided not to pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated warehouse, office secretarial/clerical  and cleaning/housekeeping employees for overtime hours; (3) Defendants  did not keep  timekeeping records for Plaintiffs and similarly situated warehouse, office secretarial/clerical and  cleaning/housekeeping employees; (4) Plaintiffs and similarly situated warehouse, office  secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees were not paid the applicable minimum  wage, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 206(a); (5) Plaintiffs and similarly situated warehouse, office  secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees were not paid for overtime hours  regularly worked in excess of forty hours per workweek, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1);  and (6) are entitled to recover their unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages, liquidated  damages and attorneys’ fees and costs from Shipley’s pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  This class  of similarly situated employees does not include warehouse foremen or supervisors who were/are  properly treated as exempt under the FLSA.     65.  Defendants’ policy or practice of failing to pay the legally-required minimum  wage and overtime compensation is a generally applicable policy or practice and does not  depend on the personal circumstances of the putative class members.  Although the issues of  damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of  liability facts.  On information and belief, Plaintiffs’ experiences are typical of the experiences of  the putative class members, and, thus, collective action treatment is appropriate.  15   66.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and  Elizabeth Peralta seek to represent a class under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of:  “all current and former non-exempt warehouse, secretarial/clerical  and cleaning/housekeeping employees of Shipley’s at the  warehouse and corporate office location at 5200 North Main Street  in Houston who were employed by Shipley’s during the three-year  period preceding the filing of this complaint.” 