26.  Defendants operate a luxury car and limousine transportation business,  using an integrated network of transportation, communication, and dispatch facilities.   27.  During the relevant periods, upon information and belief, Carey N.Y.  has employed over two hundred Drivers to pick up, transport, and drop off passengers, at  times and locations, and for prices, determined by Defendants. The Drivers transport  passengers to and from the major commercial airports in the New York City  metropolitan area, including John F. Kennedy Airport, LaGuardia Airport, and Newark  Airport. The Drivers also transport passengers on other non-airport runs that are  contracted between Defendants and their customers.   29.  Defendants employ dispatchers, customer service representatives, and  other managerial employees at their dispatch facilities, who obtain and assign  customers and jobs to the Drivers. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ managerial  employees have supervisory responsibility over the Drivers. Upon information and  belief, the customer   service representatives field complaints about the Drivers, which  may then be used to discipline the Drivers. Defendants’ dispatchers instruct the Drivers  where to go and which passengers to pick up. The Drivers interact with Defendants’  personnel throughout their workday.   30.  During relevant the statutory period, Carey mandated the clothes that the  Drivers were required to wear, including a Carey-designed black and silver tie, a black  conservative suit, and a white dress shirt.   31.  The Drivers are required to provide vehicles that comply with Defendants’  specifications. The vehicles must be black and must be one of the specified models  approved by Defendants. The vehicles must be more under three years old.   33.  Upon information and belief, until fall 2013, the Drivers were required to  participate in an insurance policy from a single underwriter (hereinafter, the “Policy”)  which covered all Drivers. The Drivers paid Defendants insurance premium at a rate  determined by Defendants, and Defendants paid collective premium to the underwriter  for the Policy. Drivers had no control over the terms and condition of the Policy,  including the premium amount and deductibles. Upon information and belief, insurance  policies which provided substantively the same coverage as the Policy were available in  the market at lower premium.   34.  Upon information and belief, the total of premium payments collected  from the Drivers exceeded the collective premium payment made to the insurance  underwriter for the Policy. Upon information and belief, Defendants retained the excess  amount collected from the Drivers. For example, Defendants paid approximately  $1,056,881 to an insurance underwriter for an insurance policy which covered all Drivers  from January 31, 2013 to January 31, 2014. Upon information and belief, Defendants  collected more  than  two  million  dollars  of  insurance premium from the Drivers for  the insurance policy during the same time period.   35.  Upon information and belief, since fall 2013, the Drivers were able to  purchase insurance policies which provided substantively the same coverage as the  Policy at lower premium from other insurance underwriters.   37.  Upon information and belief, the Drivers are required to accept jobs  assigned to them by Defendants, or the Drivers will be punished by getting written up  and/or by the withholding of other assignments, forcing the Drivers to sit idly without  receiving pay.   38.  Upon information and belief, during the relevant time period, the Drivers  have routinely worked more than ten hours a day and more than 40 hours a week.  They have been required by Carey to work late nights, weekends, and holidays.   39.  Upon information and belief, the Drivers do not cruise for customers, and  cannot accept passengers who attempt to hail the Drivers on the street without a prior  reservation made through Defendants. Until around the fall of 2013 (approximately the  time when other lawsuits similar to this one were being litigated against Carey affiliates  in other states), the Drivers were not permitted to provide services independent of   Defendants’  dispatch  system  without Defendants’ consent, upon threat of  discipline. Throughout the relevant time period, Drivers have depended on Defendants  for the opportunity to render their services and receive pay.   40.  Defendants control the compensation paid to the Drivers. Defendants  unilaterally set the prices charged to customers for the services rendered by the Drivers.  Pursuant to contracts with the Drivers, Defendants have agreed to pay the Drivers a  specified percentage of the fees Defendants charge the customers, minus various  employment-related deductions. The Drivers have no control over the rates charged to  Defendants’ customers.   42.  Defendants promulgate and enforce detailed rules and policies that govern,  among other things, Driver appearance, vehicle appearance, and specific items that must  be contained in the vehicle. Drivers must pay for business cards bearing the Driver’s  name and the Company’s reservation telephone number and logo. If a Driver violates the  Company’s rules, the Company may terminate the Driver’s employment, while retaining  the significant “base fee” payments the Driver has made to the Company.   43.  Upon information and belief, Carey International arranges reservations for  a substantial percentage of the passengers driven by Plaintiffs and the Class Members.  Upon information and belief, Carey International communicates with Carey N.Y.,  which then relays Carey International’s job assignments to the Drivers. Upon  information and belief, Carey International is responsible for paying Drivers and mailing  their paychecks.   44.  Plaintiffs and similarly-situated Drivers perform the services that are the  central, essential portion of Defendants’ business: providing and operating the vehicles  that transport Defendants’ customers.   45.  Despite Defendants’ pervasive control over the Drivers’ work,  Defendants have uniformly classified and treated the Drivers as non-employee  “independent operators.”   47.  As a result of Defendants misclassifying the Class Members as  “independent operators,” and the long hours Defendants have required the Class  Members to work, Defendants have willfully and knowingly failed to pay premium  overtime compensation to Plaintiffs and similarly-situated Class Members for hours  worked in excess of 40 hours per week.   48.  As a result of Defendants misclassifying the Class Members as  “independent operators,” and the long hours Defendants have required the Class  Members to work, and taking into account the employment-related expenses and  deductions the Class Members are forced to bear, Defendants have failed to pay  minimum wage compensation to Plaintiffs and similarly- situated Class Members for all  hours worked.   49.  As a result of Defendants misclassifying the Class Members as  “independent operators,” Defendants have willfully and knowingly failed to pay an  additional hour’s pay at the minimum hourly wage rate for each day on which Plaintiffs  and the Class Members worked ten or more hours.   51.  Plaintiffs  are  informed,  believe,  and  on  that  basis  allege,  that  as  a   result  of Defendants misclassifying the Class Members as “independent operators,”  Defendants have not properly maintained payroll records showing the actual hours  worked each day by the Class Members, including Plaintiffs.   52.  As a result of Defendants misclassifying the Class Members as  “independent contractors,” Defendants have willfully and knowingly failed to pay  Drivers, upon termination of employment, all accrued compensation due.   53.  Defendants, by and through their agents, induced and/or coerced  Plaintiffs and certain Class Members, on threat of non-assignment of future work, to pay  Defendants’ agents part of their earned compensation as a “kickback.” Upon information  and belief, the Drivers have been coerced to pay Defendants’ dispatchers as much as one  thousand dollars per month to be assigned desirable work. Upon information and belief,  Drivers who do not participate in the “kickback” scheme are punished by being  assigned fewer customers than the Drivers who do.   54.  Upon information and belief, Defendants’ managerial employees were  aware of the “kickback” scheme but failed to take any corrective measures.   56.  Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and other employees  similarly situated as authorized under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The similarly- situated employees are:  Collective Class: All persons who worked as drivers for Carey N.Y. during the  period commencing six years prior to the filing of the action entitled Lim v. Carey  Limousine NY, Inc., 14 Civ. 05883 (WFK)(JO) (E.D.N.Y.) (filed on October 7, 2014)   through the entry of final judgment in this action (tolled for failure to post notice and  based on prior filing) who are not covered by the settlement of the Prior Action or opted  out of the settlement of the Prior Action.   57.  Upon information and belief, Defendants suffered and permitted Plaintiffs  and the Collective Class to work more than 40 hours per week without overtime  compensation, and at a rate sometimes below the minimum wage.   58.  Defendants’ unlawful conduct has been repeated and consistent.   59.  Upon information and belief, Defendants knew that Plaintiffs and the  Collective Class performed work that required overtime pay. Defendants have operated  under a scheme to deprive these employees of appropriate overtime compensation.   61.  Defendants misclassified Plaintiffs and the Collective Class members as  independent contractors who were not offered the protection of Federal minimum wage  and overtime laws. Defendants misrepresented to these employees that they were  independent contractors and therefore not entitled to minimum wages or overtime pay.  Class Action Allegations   62.  Plaintiffs bring the New York law claims alleged herein as a class  action on behalf of all persons who worked as Drivers for Carey N.Y. during the  Class Period covered herein who opted out of the class action settlement agreement in  the action Lim v. Carey Limousine NY, Inc., 14 Civ. 05883 (WFK)(JO) (E.D.N.Y.).  Plaintiffs seek to pursue their claims on behalf of the following class:  New York Class: All persons who worked as drivers for Carey N.Y. during the  period commencing six years prior to the filing of the action entitled Lim v. Carey  Limousine NY, Inc., 14 Civ. 05883 (WFK)(JO) (E.D.N.Y.) (filed on October 7, 2014)   through the entry of final judgment in this action, who are not covered by the settlement  of the Prior Action or opted out of the settlement of the Prior Action.   63.  The New York class claims may properly be maintained as a class  action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The claims satisfy the  requirements of Rule 23, and the proposed Class is easily ascertainable.   65.  Typicality:  Plaintiffs’  claims  are  typical  of  those  of  the  New   York  Class Members. Plaintiffs, like other Class Members, worked as Drivers for  Defendants and were misclassified as independent contractors. Plaintiffs and the Class  Members have all sustained similar damages in that they have been under-compensated  due to Defendants’ misclassification of them. Plaintiffs’ duties were typical of the Class,  and Plaintiffs were subject to the same common policies and practices by which  Defendants controlled the conduct of other Class Members. Like other Class Members,  Defendants paid Plaintiffs lower amounts than they were promised under their contracts  with Carey N.Y.   66.  Adequacy: Plaintiffs are members of the Class, do not have any  conflicts of interest with the Class, and will prosecute the case vigorously on behalf of  the Class. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the  Class. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class  actions, and in particular, misclassification litigation.   67.  Commonality: There are questions of law and fact common to Plaintiffs  and the Class Members that predominate over any question affecting only individual  members of the class. These common questions of law and fact include, without  limitation:   68.  Whether the Class Members have served Defendants as employees rather  than independent contractors under New York law;   70.  Whether Defendants have knowingly and intentionally made improper  deductions from the compensation paid to the Class Members in violation of NYSLL §  193;   71.  Whether Defendants have required, encouraged, or permitted the Class  Members to work in excess of 40 hours per week;   72.  Whether Defendants knew or should have known that the Class  Members regularly worked over 40 hours per week;   73.  Whether Defendants have knowingly and intentionally failed to pay  the Class Members minimum wage for all hours worked in violation of NYSLL § 652;   74.  Whether Defendants have failed to pay the Class Members overtime  wages for time worked in excess of 40 hours per week in violation of NYSLL § 652 and  83.  Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation in the foregoing  paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.   84.  Plaintiffs consent in writing to be parties to this action, pursuant to 29  U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiffs’ written consent forms are attached hereto. Plaintiffs  anticipate that other individuals will continue to sign consent forms and join as Plaintiffs.   85.  At all relevant times, notwithstanding Defendants’ classification of  Plaintiffs and similarly-situated Drivers as independent contractors, Defendants  exercised control over the terms and conditions their work so that they were actually  “employees” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).   87.  Defendants, as owners, officers and/or management of Defendants, were  responsible for the wage and hour practices complained of herein and are therefore  considered “employers” within the definition of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).   88.  Plaintiffs and the Drivers directly facilitated the movement of passengers  engaged in business that included interstate transactions, and also transported  passengers across state lines. Plaintiffs and the Drivers are therefore employees  “engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” as defined in 29  U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a).   89.  Defendants’ operations, individually and collectively, constitute an  “enterprise” as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 203(r). The annual gross volume of sales made or  business done by Defendants’ operations, individually and collectively, is in excess of  $500,000. Accordingly, Defendants are an “enterprise engaged in commerce” within the  meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1).   90.  Pursuant to Section 206 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §  206, the federal minimum wage for the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint  was $7.25 per hour.   91.  During the Class Period, Plaintiffs and the other Drivers have each  worked weeks in which they earned less than the federal minimum wage, after deductions  and expenses.   92.  Defendants, by the above acts, have violated 29 U.S.C. § 206.   94.  Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation in the  foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.   95.  At all relevant times, notwithstanding Defendants’ classification of  Plaintiffs and the Class Members as independent contractors, Defendants exercised  control over the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ work so that  they were actually “employees” within the meaning of NYSLL § 651.   96.  Defendants, through integrated operations, were Plaintiffs’ and the  Class Members’ “employers” within the meaning of NYSLL § 651.   97.  Defendants, as owners and/or officers of Defendants, were responsible  for the wage and hour practices complained of herein and are therefore considered  “employers” within the definition of NYSLL § 651.   98.  Pursuant to Section 652 of the NYSLL, the minimum rate of wage for  the six years preceding the filing of this complaint was $7.15 per hour until July 23,  2009; $7.25 per hour from July 24, 2009 to December 30, 2013; and $8.00 per hour  from December 31, 2013 to December 30, 2014; and $8.75 per hour from December 31,  2014 to December 30, 2015; and $9.00 per hour from December 31, 2015 to the present.   99.  During the Class Period, Plaintiffs and the Class Members have each  worked weeks in which they earned less than the applicable minimum wage, after  deductions and expenses.  100.  Defendants, by the above acts, have violated NYSLL § 652 and 12  Failure to Pay Overtime Wage – NYSLL  (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the New York Class)  107.  Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation in the foregoing  paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.  108.  At all relevant times, Defendants have not paid Plaintiffs and the Class  Members at the statutorily required overtime rate of 1.5 times their normal hourly  rate for the hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a week.  109.  Defendants, by the above acts, have violated NYSLL § 652 and 12  Failure to Pay Minimum Wage – NYSLL  (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the New York Class)   Failure to Pay Wages When Due – NYSLL  (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the New York Class)  122.  Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations set forth in the foregoing  paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.  123.  Defendants misclassified Plaintiffs and the Drivers as independent  contractors, and therefore failed to pay them overtime and minimum wage when due,  among other wages owed.  124.  Plaintiffs and the Class Members were “manual workers” as defined in  Failure to Pay Overtime Wage – FLSA  (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Collective Class)  102.  Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation in the foregoing  paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.  103.  Plaintiffs and the similarly-situated Drivers regularly worked more than  40 hours per week during their employment with Defendants.  104.  At all relevant times, Defendants have not paid Plaintiffs and the  Drivers at the statutorily required overtime rate of 1.5 times their normal hourly wage  for the hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a week.  105.  Defendants, by the above acts, have violated 29 U.S.C. § 207.  106.  Upon information and belief, said violations are willful within the  meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).  Failure to Pay Minimum Wage – FLSA  (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Collective Class)   Failure to Pay Spread of Hours Pay – NYSLL  (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the New York Class)  111.  Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations set forth in the foregoing  paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.  112.  For each day in which the “spread of hours” from the beginning of  Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ day to the end of the day exceeded ten hours,  Defendants failed to pay them an additional hour’s pay at the minimum hourly wage rate.  113.  Defendants, by the above acts, have violated NYSLL § 652 and 12  Notice and Recordkeeping Requirements – NYSLL  (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the New York Class)  128.  Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation in the foregoing  paragraphs as if recited at length herein.  129.  Pursuant to NYSLL § 195, Defendants were required to furnish Plaintiffs  and the Class Members with an annual notice containing the rate or rates of pay and the  basis thereof, whether paid by hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other;  allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging  allowances; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with section  191 of the NYSLL; the name of the employer; any “doing business as” names used by  the employer; the physical address of the employer’s main office or principal place of  business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer; and  such other information as the commissioner deems material and necessary.  130.  Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs and the Class Members with  any such notice at any time during their employment.  131.  Defendants had no good faith basis to believe that their actions were in  compliance with the law, within the meaning of NYSLL § 198. 