1. Whether the class members could afford individual litigation. Whether individual litigation would be an unnecessary burden on the Courts. Whether individual litigation presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory  1. m. judgments. n Whether individual litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties.  24. Henderson had suffered a series of rejections for employment based on inaccurate background checks furnished by multiple consumer reporting agencies. He had sought legal advice, disputed those reports and even commenced litigation about them. Nevertheless, new reports continued to surface showing the inclusion of felony records for an out of state stranger with a similar name.  25. As a result, Henderson attempted to determine and dispute the content of his consumer file with each database that he discovered warehoused and sold criminal background checks.  27. In addition, in that same correspondence, Henderson disputed inaccurate information (the inaccurate attribution of a Pennsylvania felony conviction of a similarly named stranger) that he believed Defendant maintained in its file.  28. Neither Defendant nor anybody on behalf of Defendant replied to Henderson's letter which was sent by regular and certified mail.  29. Defendant did not provide Henderson a copy ofhis consumer file.  30. It is Defendant's policy to refuse to provide a consumer disclosure pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) if it has not previously furnished a consumer report regarding that consumer to a third party. 31. In February 2012 Manuel applied for a job as a banker with Wells Fargo.  32. Wells Fargo purchased a background check on Manuel from First Advantage, for an employment purpose.  33. On February 9, 2012 Manuel interviewed with a Wells Fargo recruiter.  34. The following week Manuel interviewed with an individual at a branch of Defendant.  35. On February24, 2012 Wells Fargo offered Manuel a position at the branch where he had his immediately preceding interview.  36. Defendantprovided Manuel with an offer letter dated February 24, 2012 and asked him to sign and return it ifhe was interested in the position.  37. Manuel signed the offer letter on February 27, 2012 and immediately returned it to Wells Fargo.  39. Upon information and belief, Wells Fargo ordered a consumer report on Manuel from Defendant on February 27, 2012.  40. As March 13, 2012 approached, Manuel still did not know exactly where to report for work atDefendant, nor had hesigned any additional employment related papers.  41. Manuel sentemailsto his contacts at Wells Fargo to no avail.  42. Later, Manuel calledthe recruiter from Wells Fargo, and she informed Manuel that theywere waiting ontheresults of Manuel's background report.  43. The recruiter also informed Manuel that she could not talk about his background report results with him.  44. The recruiter referred Manuel to the Defendant.  45. Manuel called Defendant and was told that Defendant was waiting for additional information.  46. Upon information and belief, Defendant completed the consumer report April 2, 2012 andimmediately conveyed theinformation inthereport to Wells Fargo.  47. Onor about April 2, 2012 therecruiter for Wells Fargo told Manuel thatthe report had been completed and theresult disqualified Manuel for employment at Wells Fargo.  48. Later in April Manuel receiveda copy of a "pre-adverse action notification" and a copy ofhis consumer report from either Wells Fargo orFirst Advantage.  49. The letter was dated April 3, 2012, butManuel does notknow when the sender put the letter in the mail.  50. The report provided by First Advantage contained numerousmaterial errors.  52. In creating and furnishing Manuel's consumer report, Defendant failed to follow reasonable procedures toensure the report was as accurate asmaximally possible.  53. Forexample, Defendant allowed and/or usedvery loose match criteria to determine whether to include information pertaining to a stranger with a different social security number living ina different state atadifferent address within Manuel's consumer report.  54. In response to Manuel's request for a copy of his file, Defendant didnotrespond or provide any documents.  55. Defendant failed to provide Manuel witha letteror any othercommunication "at the time" his consumerreportwas furnished to Wells Fargo.  56. Despite providing a report for employment purposes containing public record information likely to have an adverse effect upon his ability to obtain or maintain employment, Defendant failed to provide notice "at thetime" of the fact thatthepublic record information was beingreported by it, together with the name and address of the person to whom such information was being reported.  57. Uponinformation and belief, Defendant did not attempt for any consumer to follow the option available at 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(2), which requires a consumer reporting agency to actually contact the original source of public records information (e.g. the Court Clerk) immediately before furnishing a report which includes such information. Title 15 U.S.C. §1681k(a)(2) is thus inapplicable to the consumer reports at issuein this case.  59. FirstAdvantage refused to process the dispute until Manuel completed Defendant's proprietary form entitled "Notice ofConsumer Dispute" and an"Authorization for Reinvestigation of Consumer Dispute."  60. Manuel signed, completed and forwarded those forms to FirstAdvantage, but First Advantage never, as faras Manuel knows, corrected thereport or responded. 61. In 2008, Thomas applied and was hired by CableviewCommunications.  62. Thomas applied for a job with Cableview to cover its territory in and about the Richmond, Virginia geographic area.  63. Thomas may have authorized a background report.  64. In the fall of 2011, Cableview decided to sells its operation to FTS.  65. Cableview and FTS collectively ordered a background report on Thomas from Backgroundchecks.com on September 30,2011.  66. The background report contained numerous felony convictions for another individual.  67. Based on the results of the background report, Cableview declined to retain Thomas and FTS declined to hire him.  68. This led Thomas to question what other background check companiesmight report on him as he returned to the job market.  69. On or about December 4, 2014 Thomas sent a letter to First Advantage requesting a copy ofhis entire file.  71. White was hired by Wells Fargo and worked there for four years before being transferred to the mortgage department.  72. In connection with the transfer he submitted his fingerprints and First Advantage prepared a consumer report on him.  73. The consumer report revealed a class six misdemeanor which caused him to not only be turned down for the newposition, butto be discharged from Wells Fargo effective March 21, 2002.  74. At no time did either Wells Fargo or First Advantage provide White with a copy of the consumer report, so he is unsure whether it was accurate or not.  75. White was informed that he would not get the position before he received any written correspondence from either Wells Fargo or First Advantage.  76. Neither Defendant nor Wells Fargo ever provided White with a copy of his consumerreport or a written summary ofhis FCRA rights. 77. First Advantage knew or should have known about its legal obligations under the FCRA. These obligations are well established in the plain language of the FCRA and in the promulgations ofthe Federal Trade Commission.  78. First Advantage obtained or had available substantial written materials that apprised it of its duties under the FCRA.  80. First Advantage's conduct as alleged herein was consistent with its established and systematically executed procedures and policies for compliance with the FCRA.  81. The conduct, action, and inaction of Defendant was reckless, rendering Defendant liable for statutory and punitive damages in an amount to be determined bythe Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.  82. Inthe alternative, the conduct,action,and inaction of Defendantwas negligent, rendering Defendant liable pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681o, with a separate trial for actual damages if established.  83. Plaintiffs and other membersofthe putativeclassand subclasses are entitledto recover costs and attorney's fees, as well as appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief from Defendant, in a manner and an amountto be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and I68I0. 84. Numerosity. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that the members ofthe Class are so numerous that joinder ofall is impractical. The names and addresses of members of the Class are identifiable through documents maintained by Defendant and members of the Class may be notified of the pendency of this action by publishedand/or mailed notice.  86. Typicality. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the Class members. Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the same causes of action as the other members of the Class. Without limitation, the procedures of Defendant were uniform and systemic. The reports obtained and used regarding Plaintiffs and the circumstances for which such reports were furnished was uniform and typical ofthe facts for each member ofthe Class.  87. Adequacy. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiffs are adequate representatives ofthe Class because their interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests ofthe members of the Class they seek to represent, they have retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation, and intend to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests ofmembers of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiffs and their counsel.  89. Injunctive Relief Appropriate for the Class. Class certification is appropriate because Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate equitable injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiffs and the Class Members. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). SERVICES, CORP. Defendant. Civil Action No. 3: /HtV^SJ