31.  Throughout their employment with Defendant, Plaintiff and other CMs regularly  worked in excess of 40 hours per week.     32.  Defendant was aware that Plaintiff and other CMs worked more than 40 hours per  workweek, yet Defendant failed to pay them overtime compensation for any of the hours worked  over 40 in a workweek.   33.  Defendant failed to keep accurate records of the hours that Plaintiff and other  CMs worked.   35.  Plaintiff and other CMs were closely supervised by their Store Managers, and  through common corporate policies and procedures that defined and circumscribed their work.   Store Managers were responsible for the overall performance of the stores, and for coaching,  evaluating and disciplining store employees, including those who worked in the café.  Plaintiff  and other CMs were not responsible for the overall performance of the stores, or for coaching,  evaluating or disciplining store employees.   36.  Plaintiff and other CMs did not have authority to hire or fire store employees, nor  did they have much, if any, input into who was hired and fired.   37.  During the relevant period, Defendant uniformly classified CMs as exempt from  federal and state overtime pay requirements, including during the CMs’ training period.   38.  All of the work that Plaintiff and other CMs performed was assigned by  Defendant and/or Defendant has been aware of all of the work that Plaintiff and other CMs  performed.    39.  Upon information and belief, Defendant’s unlawful conduct has been pursuant to  a corporate policy or practice of minimizing labor costs by violating the FLSA and state wage  and hour laws.   40.  Defendant was aware, or should have been aware, that federal and state wage and  hour laws required it to pay Plaintiff and other CMs overtime compensation for hours worked in  excess of 40 per week.     42.  Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiff and other CMs overtime was willful.   Defendant’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent.  43.  Plaintiff bring the First Cause of Action, pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §  216(b), on behalf of herself and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked for  Defendant as CMs at any BN bookstore in the United States, on or after September 20, 2013,  who elect to opt-in to this action (the “FLSA Collective”).   44.  Plaintiff also brings the Second Cause of Action, pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.  § 216(b), on behalf of herself and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked for  Defendant as a CM in training at any BN bookstore in the United States, on or after September  20, 2013, who elect to opt-in to this action (the “FLSA Training Collective”).   45.  All of the work that Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective and FLSA Training Collective  have performed has been assigned by Defendant, and/or Defendant has been aware of all of the  work that Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective and FLSA Training Collective have performed.   47.  Defendant is aware or should have been aware that federal law required it to pay  employees performing non-exempt duties, including Plaintiff and members of the FLSA  Collective, an overtime premium for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek.     48.  Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective all perform or performed the same primary  duties.   49.  Defendant’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent.  50.  Plaintiff Brown brings the Third Cause of Action under Rule 23 of the Federal  Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of a class of persons consisting of all persons who have  worked for Defendant as CMs in the State of Illinois (the “Illinois Class”) at any time between  September 20, 2013 and the date of final judgment in this matter (the “Illinois Class Period”).    51.  Plaintiff Brown also brings the Fourth Cause of Action, pursuant to the Illinois  Act, on behalf of herself and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked for  Defendant as a CM in training in the State of Illinois, on or after September 20, 2013 and the  date of final judgment in this matter (the “Illinois Training Class”).   52.  Excluded from the Illinois Class and the Illinois Training Class are Defendant’s  legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individual who has, or  who at any time during the class period has had, a controlling interest in Defendant; the Judge(s)  to whom this case is assigned and any member of the Judge’s immediate family; and all persons  who will submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion from the Illinois Class and  the Illinois Training Class.   54.  Upon information and belief, the size of the Illinois Class is at least 100 workers.   55.  Defendant acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Illinois  Class and the Illinois Training Class, thereby making final injunctive relief or corresponding  declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the Illinois Class and the Illinois Training Class as a  whole.   57.  Brown’s claims are typical of the claims of the Illinois Class and the Illinois  Training Class sought to be represented.  Brown and the other Illinois Class and the Illinois  Training Class members work or have worked for Defendant and have been subjected to its  policy and pattern or practice of failing to pay overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40  hours per workweek.  Defendant acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the  Illinois Class and the Illinois Training Class, thereby making injunctive and/or declaratory relief  with respect to the Illinois Class and the Illinois Training Class appropriate.   59.  Brown has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action  employment litigation.    60.  A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this litigation – particularly in the context of wage litigation like the present  action, where individual Plaintiff may lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a  lawsuit in federal court against a corporate defendant.  The members of the Illinois Class and the  Illinois Training Class have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of Defendant’s  common and uniform policies, practices, and procedures.  Although the relative damages  suffered by individual members of the Illinois Class and the Illinois Training Class are not de  minimis, such damages are small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution  of this litigation.  In addition, class treatment is superior because it will obviate the need for  unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments about Defendant’s  practices.    61.  This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil  Procedure 23(b)(3).  62.  Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding  paragraphs.   63.  Defendant has engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the  FLSA, as described in this Collective and Class Action Complaint.   65.  At all relevant times, Plaintiff and other similarly situated current and former  employees were engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the  meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a).    66.  The overtime wage provisions set forth in §§ 201 et seq. of the FLSA apply to  Defendant.    67.  Defendant is an employer engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods  for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a).   68.  At all relevant times, Plaintiff and other similarly persons are, or were, employees  within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 207(a).   69.  Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated current and former  employees the overtime wages to which they were entitled under the FLSA.    70.  Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, as described in this Collective and Class  Action Complaint, have been willful and intentional.  Defendant failed to make a good faith  effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to their compensation of Plaintiff and other  similarly situated current and former employees.    71.  Because Defendant’s violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year  statute of limitations applies to this Cause of Action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255.   72.  As a result of Defendant’s willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and all other  similarly situated employees have suffered damages by being denied overtime wages in  accordance with 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.    74.  Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding  paragraphs.   75.  Defendant has engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the  FLSA during the CMs’ training period, as described in this Collective and Class Action  Complaint.   76.  During their training period, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly  situated current and former employees the overtime wages to which they were entitled under the  81.  Plaintiff Brown realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all  preceding paragraphs.   82.  At all times relevant, Plaintiff Brown and the members of the Illinois Class have  been employees and Defendant has been an employer within the meaning of the Illinois Act.   Brown and the members of the Illinois Class are covered by the Illinois Act.   83.  Defendant employed Brown and the members of the Illinois Class as an employer  in Illinois.   84.  Defendant failed to pay Brown and the members of the Illinois Class wages to  which they are entitled under the Illinois Act.  Defendant failed to pay Brown and the members  of the Illinois Class for overtime at a wage rate of one and one-half times their regular rates of  pay.     85.  Defendant failed to keep, make, preserve, maintain, and furnish accurate records  of time worked by Brown and the Illinois Class members.   87.  Plaintiff Brown realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all  preceding paragraphs.   88.  At all times relevant, Plaintiff Brown and the members of the Illinois Training  Class have been employees and Defendant has been an employer within the meaning of the  Illinois Act.  Brown and the members of the Illinois Training Class are covered by the Illinois  Act.   89.  Defendant employed Brown and the members of the Illinois Training Class as an  employer in Illinois.   90.  During their training period, Defendant failed to pay Brown and the members of  the Illinois Training Class wages to which they are entitled under the Illinois Act.  Defendant  failed to pay Brown and the members of the Illinois Training Class for overtime at a wage rate of  one and one-half times their regular rates of pay.     91.  Defendant failed to keep, make, preserve, maintain, and furnish accurate records  of time worked by Brown and the Illinois Training Class members.   Fair Labor Standards Act – Overtime Wages  (On behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective)   Fair Labor Standards Act – Overtime Wages  (On behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Training Collective)   Illinois Minimum Wage Laws  (On behalf of Plaintiff Brown and the Illinois Class)   Illinois Act Training Claims   (On behalf of Plaintiff Brown and the Illinois Training Class)  