1.  Old GM recklessly downplayed serious risks of  injury when it chose to include the SDM  Calibration Defect in the Class Vehicles. ................................. 24   1.  Old GM recklessly downplayed serious risks of injury when it  chose to include the SDM Calibration Defect in the Class Vehicles.   2.  The 45 millisecond cutoff was not necessary to protect against  “late” airbag deployments.   2.  The 45 millisecond cutoff was not necessary to  protect against “late” airbag deployments. ............................... 27   30.  When functioning properly, the combination of seatbelts and airbags is  highly effective in reducing the safety risk in automobile collisions. NHTSA reports  that the use of seatbelts and airbags reduces fatality risk by 61 percent compared to  an unbelted occupant in a vehicle without airbags.4 From 1987 to 2017, an estimated  50,457 lives were saved because frontal airbags deployed during a crash.5   31.  Although airbags work effectively to protect occupants when  necessary, they are not meant to deploy with every impact. A crash may be of lower  intensity (e.g., a fender bender in a parking lot) such that the seatbelt alone will be  sufficient protection for the occupant.6 Airbags are designed to deploy in “moderate  to severe” frontal or near-frontal crashes. A “moderate to severe” frontal crash is the  equivalent of hitting a solid, fixed barrier at 8-14 miles per hour or higher.7    33.  The “brain” behind this operation is the airbag control unit or “ACU”  (also known as an Electronic Control Unit or “ECU”).  GM refers to this component  as the “Sensing and Diagnostic Module” or “SDM,” and that term is used throughout  this Complaint. SDMs are effectively computers that control the car’s safety  systems. They are intended, where necessary, to issue a “command” to deploy  airbags and tighten seatbelts to prevent or mitigate injury to the vehicle occupants in  a crash.    34.  The SDM operates in three basic phases. First, during regular vehicle  operation, the SDM is set in a resting or “normal” mode. In this mode, the SDM  constantly receives signals from sensors placed throughout the vehicle, which collect  and report information on inputs such as acceleration, wheel speed, brake pressure,  and impacts.8  The SDM monitors and interprets these signals to determine whether  the vehicle is involved (or about to be involved) in a crash.    36.  Third, the final phase in this sequence is the “reset” phase. From “wake  up” mode, after it detects that a crash or a potential crash has fully completed, (i.e.,  that the vehicle has returned to normal operation after an irregular input) the SDM  ultimately returns to its normal operating state through “resetting.”   38.  This entire sequence—from sensing an irregular signal (the pothole), to  waking up and searching for confirmation of a crash, to firing the airbag where  needed—might take only fractions of a second.  Indeed, a typical “crash duration” in  a frontal, vehicle-to-barrier collision lasts for approximately 80-150 milliseconds  (0.08-0.15 seconds).13 For that reason, timing this sequence properly is critically  important to ensure that the seatbelts are tightened and the airbags deploy to protect  the occupants when they need to.   B.  GM used a dangerous and defective SDM software calibration in  its trucks and SUVs.    40.  Crash sensing occurs in “real-time,” meaning that the sensing algorithm  can only examine a limited window of data to predict and judge the severity of crash  events before conclusion, so that the airbags can deploy and protect the occupant on  impact.14 A decision to “deploy” the airbags should occur when thresholds set to tell  the SDM a crash is severe enough (i.e. a moderate to severe frontal collision) are met  or exceeded. These deployment thresholds are programmed into the SDM software  through a process in which engineers “calibrate” the software in the vehicle.    42.  This defect was no accident; rather, as detailed below, GM included it  by design when it modified the SDM software program (known as ALGO-S) in the  Class Vehicles to include it.    43.  In affirmatively blocking these critical safety features after 45  milliseconds, GM greatly and needlessly increased the risk of injury and death in a  variety of frontal crashes.  Specifically, the defect manifests in frontal crashes that  endure for 45 milliseconds or longer, and require airbag deployment or seatbelt  tightening after 45 milliseconds.     44.  For example, this includes frontal crashes with multiple, distinct points  of impact known as “concatenated” events. A vehicle that first hits a curb and then  veers and hits a tree, or first hits a speed bump and then crashes into the vehicle in  front of it, are examples of concatenated crashes. By their nature, concatenated  accidents involve multiple discrete inputs for the SDM to detect during a crash  sequence.   46.  In addition to concatenated crashes, the defect is also implicated in  frontal crashes that increase in severity and require airbag deployment or seatbelt  tightening after an initial, “soft” impact.  These types of crashes are referred to  herein as “prolonged” or “long-soft” crash onsets. This would include, for example,  a crash into another vehicle’s bumper which—because the bumper is comparatively  “soft”—may take time before the “soft” bumper collapses, and a “hard” impact into  the engine compartment begins.16  “Soft” crashes involve a “relatively long crash  duration” that may last 20-50 percent longer than a head-on crash into a rigid barrier,  like a cement wall.17   48.  In practice, this means that the airbags and seatbelt pretensioners in the  Class Vehicles can only be fired within 45 milliseconds of a first, irregular signal. If  a second signal occurs after 45 milliseconds, the SDM purposefully, by design,  disregards signals that would otherwise trigger airbag deployment.    49.  The net result is a “dead zone” starting just 45 milliseconds into a  crash, after which vehicle occupants are completely vulnerable. The dead zone lasts  until the SDM detects that the crash has ended completely (meaning that the  irregular signals have concluded, and the vehicle has resumed normal operation),  and then resets back to normal mode.    51.  GM knew or had reason to know of the SDM Calibration Defect and  the risks it entails from at least July 10, 2009, when GM acquired substantially all of  Old GM’s books, records, and personnel, and the knowledge about the defective  SDM software calibration those books, records, and personnel held. GM has  continued to acquire knowledge—based on lawsuits implicating the SDM  Calibration Defect and hundreds of publicly reported accidents with airbag and  seatbelt failures—from 2009 to the present.    52.  Nonetheless, GM has continued to conceal this problem and the pattern  of accidents, injuries, and deaths that have resulted from it. GM has failed to share  this information with the consumers who paid for and drive these Class Vehicles  every day.   54.  As is now public knowledge, millions of GM vehicles contain the  dangerous and defective Takata airbag inflators that can explode with too much  force and spray metal shrapnel into vehicle passenger compartments. While the  dangers of these Takata airbags were widely known for years, GM lobbied  regulators to delay a recall for its affected vehicles to avoid a resulting hit to its  profits.18 In 2016, GM reported that recalling its vehicles with Takata inflators  would cost hundreds of millions of dollars.19    56.  Here, as in Takata, GM knew or should have known that the SDM  software calibration in the Class Vehicles—which includes a dead zone that prevents  the airbag and seatbelts from deploying after 45 milliseconds—was dangerous.  Nonetheless, GM kept using it anyway, did not recall or repair the Class Vehicles to  correct it, and still has not told consumers about it.   57.  In general, the vehicle manufacturer sets the deployment thresholds in  the SDM software calibration that will trigger a command to fire the airbags and/or  tighten the seatbelts. The vehicle manufacturer uses results from laboratory crash  testing to inform these parameters.21    58.  But laboratory results are not sufficient in themselves, because real- world accidents—which can occur from multiple angles and involve inputs from  myriad variables like weather, temperature, or incline—will differ from the testing  environment.22 For that reason, manufacturers must exercise appropriate care to  design crash sensing frameworks that function to keep people safe in the real world.    60.  During this time, Old GM divided the design and development of its  vehicles into a “cars” group and a “trucks” group, with the trucks group responsible  for design, development, and production of larger model trucks and SUVs. After it  reviewed the Delco team’s proposed SDM software algorithm, ALGO-S, the trucks  group insisted on adding the 45 millisecond cut off described above when it  calibrated that program for use in its trucks and SUVs.  On information and belief,  the trucks group proposed this cutoff based on test results which indicated that  frontal-barrier accidents in its trucks and SUVs would be complete within 45  milliseconds or less in laboratory conditions.    61.  In response, the Delco team expressly warned the trucks group that  such an aggressive cutoff could fail to capture additional signals in complex crashes  outside of the laboratory, leaving occupants completely unprotected during  prolonged onset crashes or crashes with multiple impact points. The trucks group  insisted, however, and the 45 millisecond cutoff was added in the SDM software  calibration for GM trucks and SUVs.   63.  Indeed, in the ALGO-S program as it was designed by Delco, the  window in which the airbags and seatbelts can deploy in a crash is up to at least 150  milliseconds—over three times the interval that GM trucks added in the defective  calibration.  Tellingly, after the Delco team repeated the same warnings about the  truck group’s proposed 45 millisecond cutoff to GM’s cars group, the cars group  rejected the shorter cutoff. Instead, the cars group used the ALGO-S software with  the Delco-recommended period of 150 milliseconds for deployment.    65.  GM trucks group’s insistence on the 45 millisecond window after  which the airbags and seatbelts cannot deploy was unjustified and unsafe.    66.  On information and belief, the trucks group chose to set this aggressive  cutoff due to concerns about the potential for airbags to deploy “too late” during an  accident. But as the trucks group also knew, these concerns were unwarranted given  technology that mitigated the risks of “late” airbag deployments.    67.  A brief history of airbags in motor vehicles puts this reckless decision  in context. Before 1998, airbag systems were effectively one-size-fits-all. Designed  to protect against only frontal crashes, these “first-generation” airbags were built to  meet a standardized government test that required they protect an unbelted, midsize  adult male dummy (175 pounds) in a 30-MPH crash into a rigid barrier.24 To do so,  an airbag had to fill up quickly with gas, resulting in a deployment speed of up to  A.  SDMs are supposed to detect crashes and control airbags and  seatbelts.    A.  SDMs are supposed to detect crashes and control airbags  and seatbelts. ....................................................................................... 13  B.  GM used a dangerous and defective SDM software  calibration in its trucks and SUVs. ...................................................... 17  C.  GM knew that the SDM Calibration Defect was  dangerous and unjustified but has failed to warn or  compensate consumers. ....................................................................... 22   A.  The Class Definition ............................................................................ 81  B.  Numerosity: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) ...................... 83  C.  Commonality and Predominance: Federal Rule of Civil  Procedure 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3) ......................................................... 83  D.  Typicality: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) ......................... 85  E.  Adequacy: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) ......................... 86  F.  Declaratory and Injunctive Relief: Federal Rule of Civil  Procedure 23(b)(2) .............................................................................. 86  G.  Superiority: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) ....................... 86  VI.  COMMENTED ON THE ODDITY THAT, GIVEN THE DAMAGE  SUSTAINED BY THE TAHOE AND THE VELOCITY AT IMPACT, THE  AIRBAGS DEPLOYED ON ALL VEHICLES BUT THE TAHOE. *TR”  x.  NHTSA complaint #10641399 dated Saturday, October 4, 2014,  reported an accident on Tuesday, June 7, 2011 involving a 2002 CHEVROLET  TAHOE in Cheney, WA. The complaint states: “THE CONTACT STATED THAT  CONSUMER STATED THAT THE SEAT BELT DID NOT KEEP HER FROM  HITTING HER CHEST ON THE STEERING WHEEL.”  g.  NHTSA complaint #10108404 dated Tuesday, February 1, 2005,  reported an accident on Tuesday, January 11, 2005 involving a 2000 CHEVROLET  SILVERADO in Toney, AL. The complaint states: “A CAR PULLED OUT IN  DOWN TO MEET WITH THE DEALER AND CONSUMER. THE  REPRESENTATIVE INFORMED CONSUMER THAT THE VEHICLE WAS  FUNCTIONING AS DESIGNED.” NHTSA complaint # 10087718.  h.  Another driver contacted GM after the airbags did not deploy in a  February 2004 front end collision at 25-30 MPH in their 2000 Isuzu Rodeo in  Westwood, NJ. “THE CONSUMER CONTACTED THE MANUFACTURER  FAILURE.”  102. GM knew or had reason to know about these complaints, which are  publicly available on NHTSA’s website. Indeed, many complaints explicitly state  that GM was directly informed of and/or investigated these suspicious accidents. For  example:  a.  A complaint about an August 2018 accident in a 2008 GMC  Acadia details that the airbags and seatbelt pretensioners did not deploy after the  complainant’s wife fell asleep at the wheel and struck a utility pole and then a large  dirt embankment—which caused her to “hit the steering column so hard . . . it broke  the column and broke her sternum,” and caused the granddaughter in the passenger  seat to break her back in two places. It continues that “GENERAL MOTORS . . .  MANUFACTURER WAS UNABLE TO DIAGNOSE THE VEHICLE;  HOWEVER, AFTER INSPECTION OF THE VEHICLE, THE MANUFACTURER  CONFIRMED THAT THE AIR BAGS WERE ENABLED AT THE TIME OF  NEITHER TIME DID AIRBAGS DEPLOY. *TT”  k.  NHTSA complaint #10163811 dated Friday, July 28, 2006,  reported an accident on Thursday, July 20, 2006 involving a 2000 ISUZU RODEO  in Nederland, TX. The complaint states: “A GIRL RAN A RED LIGHT AND I HIT  OF THE FAILURE; HOWEVER, THEY PROVIDED NO ASSISTANCE . . . THE  CONSUMER’S VEHICLE WAS DAMAGED WHEN HE TRIED TO AVOID  HITTING THE VEHICLE BY SWERVING SIDEWAYS AND SLIDING INTO  OF THE FAILURE.”  s.  NHTSA complaint #10574295 dated Sunday, March 23, 2014,  reported an accident on Friday, February 21, 2014 involving a 2010 GMC  TERRAIN in Saint Joe, IN. The complaint states: “INVOLVED IN A 21 CAR PILE  THINGS OFFICERS, EMTS AND WITNESSES SAID WAS “I CAN'T  BELIEVE THE AIRBAGS DIDN'T GO OFF.” IN THE RECENT DAYS  AFTER THE ACCIDENT I HAVE HAD SEVERAL MECHANICS AND SUCH  Violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act  Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.01, et seq.  (On Behalf of the Ohio State Class)  413. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all preceding allegations  as though fully set forth herein.  414. Plaintiff Matthew Mastracci (for the purposes of this count, “Plaintiff”)  brings this claim on behalf of himself and the Ohio State Class against all  Defendants.   415. Defendants, Plaintiff, and Ohio State Class members are “persons”  within the meaning of Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.01(B).   416. Each Defendant is a “supplier” as defined by Ohio Rev. Code §  e.  NHTSA complaint #10082050 dated Thursday, July 15, 2004,  reported an accident on Wednesday, July 14, 2004 involving a 2003 CHEVROLET  SUBURBAN in Fresno, CA. The complaint states: “THE CONSUMER WAS 