19.  At all times relevant, Plaintiff Lanteri was an individual residing in the State  of Indiana. Lanteri is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47  33.  Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-32.   34.  The telephone calls and texts from Defendants to Plaintiff’s cellular  telephone number were made using a pre-recorded voice or an ATDS, as defined by 47  U.S.C. § 227 (a)(1), as it had the capacity to store or produce numbers randomly or  sequentially, and to dial such numbers, to place telephone calls and/or SMS or text  messages to Plaintiff's cellular telephone.   35.  Over the course of the putative class period, Defendants and its agents  directed the mass transmission of pre-recorded messages and text messages to cell  phones nationwide.   36.  The telephone number that Defendants, or their agents, sent the text  messages to were assigned to cellular telephone services for which Plaintiff incurred a  charge for incoming calls or text messages, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).   37.  These telephone text messages constituted "calls" under the TCPA that  were not for emergency purposes, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(i).   38.  Defendants made unsolicited telephone calls to the wireless telephone  number of plaintiff and the other members of the class with pre-recorded voices and or  using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be  called, using a random or sequential number generator.   39.  These phone calls were made without the prior express consent of plaintiff  or the class or were made after any such consent had been revoked.   40.  Defendants have therefore violated the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii),  9  which makes it unlawful for any person within the United States “... to make any call (other  than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the  called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded  voice ... ”.  As a result of Defendants’ illegal conduct, the members of the class suffered  actual damages and, under § 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of  $500.00 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA.   41.  Plaintiff and class members are also entitled to, and do, seek injunctive  relief prohibiting Defendants’ violations of the TCPA in the future.  42.  Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-32.   43.   Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using any false  and/or any deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the  collection of a debt, including, but not limited to, the false representation of the character,  amount or legal status of any debt, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). Demanding payment of  a debt that is no longer owed, due to a bankruptcy, constitutes the use of false and/or  deceptive or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of a  debt, in violation of § 1692e of the FDCPA, see, Randolph, 368 F3d at 728-730.   44.  Defendants, by continuing to attempt to collect a debt from Plaintiff which  was subject to her bankruptcy, via telephone calls and text messages to her cell phone,  used false and/or deceptive or misleading means to attempt to collect a debt, in violation  of § 1692e of the FDCPA.   45.  Moreover, § 1692c(c) of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from   10  communicating with a consumer after a direction to cease communications, and from  continuing to demand payment of a debt that the consumer has indicated that they  refuse to pay.  See, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c).   46.  Here, the bankruptcy and the notice issued by that court (Exhibit D) told  Defendants to cease communications and cease collections.  By continuing to  communicate regarding this debt and demanding payment, Defendants violated §  1692c(c) of the FDCPA.   47.  Additionally, § 1692c(a)(2) of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from  communicating with a consumer if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented  by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain,  such attorney’s name and address, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2).    48.  Defendants were given direct, written notice, through Plaintiff’s bankruptcy,  that Plaintiff was represented by an attorney in connection with her debts. Accordingly,  Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy before it made the collection phone calls  and texts. By continuing to call and text Plaintiff directly, despite direct, written notice that  she was represented by counsel, Defendants violated § 1692c(a)(2) of the FDCPA.   49.  Defendants’ violations of the FDCPA render them liable for statutory  damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.  See, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.   50.  Plaintiff Lanteri, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated,  brings, the above claim on behalf of a Class and four Sub-Classes. The TCPA Class  consists of:  (1) All persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3)  Defendants placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) using an automatic  11  telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice (5) within 4 years of  the complaint (6) where Defendants did not have express consent to call said  cellular telephone number OR where consent had been revoked for any such  calls.  The TCPA Stop Text Sub-Class consists of:  (1) All persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3)  Defendants placed a non-emergency telephone call via text message (4) using an  automatic telephone dialing system (5) within 4 years of the complaint (6) where  the person previously replied to a text from Defendants with the message Stop.  The TCPA Bankruptcy Stay Sub-Class consists of:  (1) All persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3)  Defendants placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) using an automatic  telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice (5) within 4 years of  the complaint (6) during the period of an automatic stay from a Bankruptcy Court.  The TCPA Cease Communication Represented By Attorney Sub-Class consists of:  (1) All persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3)  Defendants placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) using an automatic  telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice (5) within 4 years of  the complaint (6) where Defendants received written notice that the person was  represented by an attorney and to cease communication.  The FDCPA Sub-Class consists of:  (1) All persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3)  Defendants placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) using an automatic  telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice (5) within 1 year of  the complaint (6) while that person’s debt was subject to or discharged in a  bankruptcy or was subject to a notice of attorney representation, or was subject to  a cease communication request.   51.  Plaintiff represents and is a member of the Class and the Sub-Classes.   Excluded from the Class and Sub-Classes are Defendants and any entities in which  Defendants have a controlling interest, Defendants’ agents and employees, the Judge to  whom this action is assigned and any member of the Judge’s staff and immediate family,  and claims for personal injury, wrongful death and/or emotional distress.    12   52.  Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class and  Sub-Classes, but based upon the size and national scope of Defendants’ business, as  well as its creditor client, along with the nature of the message campaign to plaintiff,  plaintiff reasonably believes that class members number at minimum in the hundreds if  not thousands.   53.  Plaintiff and all members of the class and sub-class have been harmed by  the acts of Defendants.   54.  This Class Action Complaint seeks money damages and injunctive relief.   55.  The joinder of all class members is impracticable due to the size and  relatively modest value of each individual claim. The disposition of the claims in a class  action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity  of identical suits. The class can be identified easily through records maintained by  Defendants.   56.  There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class  and sub-class, which common questions predominate over any questions that affect only  individual class members. Those common questions of law and fact include, but are not  limited to:  a.  Whether the Defendants engaged in a pattern of using automated  equipment or pre-recorded voices to place calls to cellular telephones;  b.   Whether the Bankruptcy Court’s Automatic Stay and/or the Discharge  Injunction revoked consent for any calls to be placed to cellular telephone  numbers;   c.   Whether Defendants ignored stop texting messages that revoked   13  consent;  d.  Whether the Defendants thereby violated the TCPA;  e.  Whether Defendants ignored notices of consumer’s bankruptcy filings  or attorney representation and/or cease communications and instead  kept calling and texting those consumers; and,   f.  Whether Defendants thereby violated the FDCPA.   57.  As a person who received numerous and repeated telephone calls using an  automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without her prior  express consent within the meaning of the TCPA, and during the period of the Automatic  Bankruptcy stay, plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of the members of the class  member and each sub-class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the  interests of the class and sub-classes, and has no interests which are antagonistic to any  member of the class or sub-classes.   58.  Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims  involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes such as the TCPA  and the FDCPA.   59.  A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of  this controversy.  Class-wide relief is essential to compel Defendants to comply with the  TCPA and FDCPA.  The interest of class members in individually controlling the  prosecution of separate claims against Defendants is small because the statutory  damages in an individual action for violation of the TCPA and FDCPA are small.   Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than are  presented in many class claims because the calls at issue are all automated and the class  14  members, by definition, did not provide the prior express consent required under the  statute to authorize calls to their cellular telephones.   60.  Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class and  sub-classes, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief  with respect to the class as a whole appropriate. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that the TCPA  violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an  injunction is not entered.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff,  the Class and sub-classes and against Defendants for:  A.    Statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1);   B.  Injunctive relief prohibiting such violations of the TCPA by Defendants in  the future;  C.   An award of attorneys’ fees and costs to counsel for Plaintiff and the  Class;  D.    Statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, along with reasonable  attorneys’ fees and costs;   E.   Such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.   Violations Of The FDCPA Via Improper Collection Calls And   Text Messages, Attempting To Collect A Debt Included   In A Bankruptcy From A Consumer Represented By Counsel   Violation Of The TCPA Via Improper   Phone Calls And Text Messages To Cellular Phones  