20.  First Energy describes itself as a “forward-thinking electric utility” that “has invested  $10  billion  in  environmental  efforts  since  1970.”  See  https://www.firstenergycorp.com/about.html#gsc.tab=0 (last visited Nov. 29, 2017).   21.  First Energy “includes one of the nation's largest investor-owned electric systems, more  than 24,000 miles of transmission lines that connect the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic regions, and a  diverse generating fleet with a total capacity of nearly 17,000 megawatts.”  See id.   22.  First Energy operates throughout the United States, including Pennsylvania and Ohio.  To complete their business objectives, First Energy hires personnel to perform its necessary work.   23.  First Energy Field Agents are required to assist First Energy in acquiring property to  expand First Energy’s network of services and to identify easements and rights-of-way to permit them  to  operate.  See  “Real  Estate  Matters,”  https://www.firstenergycorp.com/content/  customer/help/safety/real-estate-power-lines/real-estate-matters.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2017).    25.  For example, Ewing worked exclusively for First Energy from approximately June 13,  2016 to June 30, 2017 as a Field Agent performing duties as a “Stakeholder Management Land Agent.”  Throughout her employment with First Energy, she was classified as an independent contractor and  paid on a day-rate basis.  Ewing was never paid on a salary basis.  She never received any guaranteed  weekly compensation from First Energy irrespective of days worked (i.e., the only compensation she  received was the day-rate for each day that she actually worked).   26.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked for First Energy in the  Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and/or Ohio and throughout the United States over the past three  years as independent contractors.   27.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were subjected to the same illegal pay practice  for similar work.    28.  Specifically, First Energy paid Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members a day rate,  regardless of the number of hours that they worked each day (or in a workweek), and failed to provide  them with overtime pay for hours that they worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek.    29.  The day to day activities of the Putative Class Members were conducted within  designated parameters defined by First Energy.     30.  Ewing and the Putative Class Members worked well in excess of 40 hours each week  while employed by First Energy.   32.  During Ewing’s employment with First Energy while she was classified as an  independent contractor, First Energy exercised control over all aspects of her job. First Energy did  not require any substantial investment by Ewing for her to perform the work required of her.    33.  Ewing was not required to possess any unique or specialized skillset (other than that  maintained by all other Field Agents) to perform her job duties.    34.  First Energy determined Ewing’s opportunity for profit and loss.    35.  Indeed, First Energy controlled all the significant or meaningful aspects of the job  duties performed by Ewing.   36.  First Energy ordered the hours and locations Ewing worked, the equipment and forms  she used, and the rates of pay she received.   37.  First Energy controlled all aspects of Ewing’s job activities by enforcing mandatory  compliance with First Energy’s policies and procedures.   38.  No real investment was required of Ewing to perform her job. More often than not,  Ewing utilized equipment provided by First Energy to perform her job duties.    39.  Ewing did not provide the equipment she worked with on a daily basis.    40.  First Energy made the large capital investments in buildings, tools, and supplies in the  business in which Ewing worked.   41.  Ewing did not incur operating expenses like rent, payroll and marketing.   42.  Ewing was economically dependent on First Energy during her employment.   43.  First Energy set Ewing’s rates of pay, her work schedule, and prohibited her from  working other jobs for other companies while she was working on jobs for First Energy.   45.  Very little skill, training, or initiative was required of Ewing to perform her job duties.   46.  Indeed, the daily and weekly activities of the Putative Class Members were routine and  largely governed by standardized plans, procedures, and checklists created by First Energy.    47.  Virtually every job function was pre-determined by First Energy, including the tools  used, the data to research and compile, the work schedule, and related work duties.    48.  The Putative Class Members were prohibited from varying their job duties outside of  the pre-determined parameters. Moreover, the job functions of the Putative Class Members were  primarily technical in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education or  other advanced degree.   49.  The Putative Class Members did not have any supervisory or management duties.   50.  For the purposes of their overtime claims, the Putative Class Members performed  substantially similar job duties related to servicing First Energy’s core business.    51.  Ewing performed routine duties that were largely dictated by First Energy.   52.  Ewing worked exclusively for First Energy from approximately June 2016 to July 2017  as an independent contractor.   53.  Ewing was not employed by First Energy on a project-by-project basis.   54.  In fact, while Ewing was classified as an independent contractor, she was regularly on  call for First Energy and was expected to drop everything and work whenever needed.   55.  All of the Putative Class Members perform the same or similar job duties and are  subjected to the same or similar policies and procedures which dictate the day-to-day activities  performed by each person.   57.  First Energy’s policy of failing to pay its independent contractors, including Ewing,  overtime violates the FLSA because these workers are, for all purposes, employees performing non- exempt job duties.   58.  Because Ewing (and First Energy’s other independent contractors) were misclassified  as independent contractors by First Energy, she and the Putative Class Members should receive  overtime for all hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours in each workweek.   59.  First Energy’s day-rate system violates state and federal law because Ewing and the  other Field Agents did not receive any pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours each week.  VI.  64.  During all relevant times, Ewing and the PMWA Class were covered employees entitled  to the above-described PMWA’s protections.  See 43 P.S. § 333.103(h).   65.  First Energy’s compensation scheme that is applicable to Ewing and the PMWA Class  failed to comply with either 43 P.S. § 333.104(c) or 34 Pa. Code § 231.43(b).   66.  At all relevant times, First Energy was subject to the requirements of the PMWA.   67.  At all relevant times, First Energy employed Ewing and each Class Member with  Pennsylvania state law claims as an “employee” within the meaning of the PMWA.    68.  The PMWA requires employers like Defendant to pay employees at one and one-half  (1.5) times the regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any one week.  Plaintiff and each member of the Pennsylvania Class are entitled to overtime pay under the PMWA.    69.  Defendants have and had a policy and practice of misclassifying Ewing and each  member of the Pennsylvania class as independent contractors and failing to pay these workers  overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek.    70.  Ewing and each member of the Pennsylvania Class seek unpaid overtime in amount  equal to 1.5 times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek,  prejudgment interest, all available penalty wages, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court  deems just and proper.   71.  Ewing and each member of the Pennsylvania Class also seek recovery of attorneys’  fees, costs, and expenses of this action, to be paid by Defendant, as provided by the PMWA.  72.  Plaintiff brings this claim under the Ohio Wage Act as a Rule 23 class action.   73.  The conduct alleged violates the Ohio Wage Act (O.R.C. §§4111).   75.  The Ohio Wage Act requires employers like Defendant to pay employees at one and  one-half (1.5) times the regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any one  week. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are entitled to overtime pay under the Ohio Wage  Acts.      76.  Defendants had a policy and practice of misclassifying Plaintiff and each member of  the Ohio Wage Act class as independent contractors and failing to pay these workers overtime for  hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek.    77.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members seek unpaid overtime in amount equal to 1.5  times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, prejudgment  interest, all available penalty wages, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just  and proper.  78.  Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices  Defendant imposed on Plaintiff were likewise imposed on the Putative Class Members.   79.  Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in  willful violation of the FLSA, Ohio Wage Acts, and PMWA.    80.  Numerous other individuals who worked with Plaintiff indicated they were improperly  classified as independent contractors, paid in the same manner, performed similar work, and were not  properly compensated for all hours worked as required by state and federal wage laws.   81.  Based on her experiences and tenure with Defendant, Plaintiff is aware that  Defendant’s illegal practices were imposed on the Putative Class Members.   83.  Defendant’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by  state and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are  not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members.   84.  Plaintiff’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Putative Class  Members.   85.  The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Putative Class Members do not  prevent class or collective treatment.     86.  Plaintiff has no interest contrary to, or in conflict with, the Putative Class Members.  Like each Putative Class Member, Plaintiff has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages  owed to them under state and/or federal law.   87.  A class and collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available  means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit.    88.  Absent this action, many Putative Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their  injuries and Defendant will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA and applicable state labor  laws.   89.  Furthermore, even if some of the Putative Class Members could afford individual  litigation against Defendant, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system.    90.  Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity  among the claims of individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency.   92.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Putative Class Members. Plaintiff and  the Putative Class Members sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s illegal and uniform  employment policy.    93.  Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this  litigation that would preclude its ability to go forward as a collective or class action.   94.  Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no  detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude  collective and class action treatment.  WHO  WERE  CLASSIFIED  AS  §  COLLECTIVE ACTION  §  PURSUANT TO 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)  Defendant.  § 