20.  Defendants operate a mental health support agency with offices in Yanceyville,  Wilmington and Marion, North Carolina, and Douglasville, Georgia.    22.  Plaintiff’s hours varied from week to week during her employment with  Defendants, but she regularly worked more than forty (40) hours in a workweek.    23.  For example, during the workweek of June 24, 2019 to June 30, 2019, Plaintiff  provided forty-eight (48) hours of peer support services.  She was paid straight time for forty-eight  (48) hours but was not paid an overtime premium for the eight (8) hours she worked over forty  (40) in the workweek, nor was she compensated for her travel time between Defendants’ clients.     24.  Likewise, during the workweek of July 1, 2019 to July 7, 2019, Plaintiff was paid  for forty-eight (48) hours of work but not paid an overtime premium for the hours worked over  forty (40) in the work, nor was she paid any wages for the time she spent traveling from one client  to the next.   25.  Upon information and belief, the collective and class members were also regularly  scheduled to and did work more than forty (40) hours in a workweek.    26.  Up until approximately January 2020, Defendants misclassified all peer support  specialists as independent contractors when in fact, they were employees under the meaning of the  FLSA and NCWHA.    27.  The misclassified independent contractors, including Plaintiff, were required to  comply with Defendants’ policies and procedures which were set forth in written company  policies.   28.  The misclassified independent contractors, including Plaintiff, were supervised by  employees of Defendants, and were subject to discipline.   30.  Defendants advertised and posted job openings on social media and labor sites for  peer support specialists who were eventually assigned work by Defendants.   31.  Defendants directed the work Plaintiff and all peer support specialists, and provided  substantial oversight of their activities.   32.  The work performed by Plaintiff and the collective and class members was integral  to Defendants’ business.  Without their work, Defendants could not have performed their  contracted responsibilities for their clients.    33.   Defendants profited directly from the work performed by Plaintiff and the  collective and class members.   34.  Plaintiff and the collective and class members could not negotiate their  compensation with Defendants’ clients, and they did not share in the profits.   35.  In short, Plaintiff and the collective and class members were economically  dependent on Defendants.   36.  Defendants paid misclassified independent contractors by the hour and paid straight  time for all hours worked, except for travel time between Defendants’ clients, but failed to pay an  overtime premium for all hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek.   37.  In or about January 2020, Defendants reclassified the peer support specialists to  regular W-2 employees, and began to pay overtime wages.   38.  Nonetheless, Defendants failed to pay any wages for travel between clients, and did  not consider travel time between clients as hours worked.   40.  Plaintiff is aware of other current and former employees of Defendants who were  subject to the same payroll practice.  V.  69.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding  paragraphs.   70.  Plaintiff files this action on behalf of herself and the Misclassification and Travel  Overtime Collectives as defined above.   71.  Defendants’ practice and policy of misclassifying their employees as independent  contractors and not paying overtime affects Plaintiff and the Misclassification Collective members  and is a willful violation of the FLSA.    72.  Defendants’ practice and policy of not paying overtime for travel time affects  Plaintiff and the Travel Overtime Collective members and is a willful violation of the FLSA.    73.  The collective members are victims of Defendants’ unlawful compensation  practices and are similarly situated to Plaintiff in terms of job duties, pay and employment  practices.   74.  Defendants’ failure to pay overtime compensation as required by the FLSA results  from a generally applicable, systematic policy and practice and is not dependent on the personal  circumstances of any individual employee. Thus, Plaintiff is similarly situated to the members of  the Misclassification Collective and Travel Overtime Collective.   76.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding  paragraphs.   77.  Plaintiff files this action on behalf of herself and the NCWHA Class as defined  above.   78.  Defendants’ practice and policy of travel time, including associated overtime,  affects Plaintiff and the NCWHA Class members and is a willful violation of the NCWHA.    79.  NCWHA Class members are victims of Defendants’ unlawful compensation  practices and are similarly situated to Plaintiff in terms of job duties, pay and employment  practices.   80.  Defendants’ failure to pay travel time as required by the NCWHA results from a  generally applicable, systematic policy and practice and is not dependent on the personal  circumstances of any individual employee. Thus, Plaintiff and the NCWHA Class members are  similarly situated employees.   81.  The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the NCWHA Class members  do not prevent collective treatment under the NCWHA.  All employees, regardless of their precise  job requirements or rates of pay, are entitled to be properly compensated for all hours worked  including the time spent traveling between Defendants’ clients. Although the issue of damages  may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts.   83.  Plaintiff’s state law claims satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality,  adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.    84.  The NCWHA Class meets the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) because  Defendants have employed numerous peer support specialists in the state of North Carolina while  requiring them to spend time traveling between clients without compensation. The precise number  of NCWHA Class members should be readily available from a review of Defendants’ personnel,  scheduling, time, payroll, and billing records, and from input received from the NCWHA Class  members.   86.  The NCWHA Class meets the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) because  Plaintiff and the NCWHA Class members were all employed by Defendants and performed their  job duties without receiving entitled compensation owed for that work.    87.  The NCWHA Class meets the fair and adequate protection requirement of Rule  23(a)(4) because there is no apparent conflict of interest between Plaintiff and the NCWHA Class  members, and because Plaintiff’s attorneys have successfully prosecuted many complex class  actions, including wage and hour and collective actions, and will adequately represent the interest  of Plaintiff and the NCWHA Class members.   88.  The NCWHA Class meets the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) because  issues common to the NCWHA Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual  members, including, but not limited to, whether Defendants calculated the NCWHA Class  members’ compensation under the same formula in the same way.   89.  The Class meets the superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) because allowing the  parties to resolve this controversy through a class action would permit a large number of similarly  situated persons to prosecute common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and  without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort, or expense that numerous individual  actions would engender.    91.  Defendants knowingly, willfully, or in reckless disregard of the law, maintained an  illegal practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and the NCWHA Class members proper travel time  wages, including associated overtime wages.  XI.  92.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding  paragraphs.   93.  At all times pertinent hereto, specifically including the collective and class periods,  Defendants, Mann and Pickens, were owners, managers and/or executive officers of Ariel  Community Care.   94.  Defendants Mann and Pickens exercised supervisory and managerial  responsibilities and substantial control over the terms and conditions of Plaintiff and the collective  and class members’ work including, but not limited to, assigning work, hiring and firing  employees.   95.  Further, Defendants Mann and Pickens are or were solely and jointly responsible  for the administration of the business affairs of Ariel Community Care and exercised complete  control over the work situation and conditions of its employees.   97.  Defendants Mann and Pickens were and are vested with authority to, and actually  acted directly or indirectly for, and had operational control over Ariel Community Care’s business  activities including managerial responsibilities for all aspects of operations and its employees.   98.  Accordingly, Defendants Mann and Pickens are “employers” under the FLSA and  the NCWHA, as such, are jointly and severally liable for damages for his failure to comply with  the FLSA and the NCWHA including all damages claimed herein. 