10.  In 1974, Congress enacted the ECOA “to eradicate credit discrimination waged  against women, especially married women whom creditors traditionally refused to consider for  individual credit.” Mays v. Buckeye Rural Elec. Coop., 277 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir. 2002)  (quotation marks omitted).   11.  After hearing concerns from racial minorities, the elderly, and other groups,  Congress expanded the ECOA’s protection in 1976 to encompass discrimination for other  characteristics—such as race, religion, national origin, and age—to ensure the availability of  credit to all applicants who were routinely discriminated against by lenders. RL BB Acquisition,  LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., LLC, 754 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing S. Rep.  94-589, at 3).   4   12.  With the amendments, Congress not only expanded the scope of those protected  by the ECOA, but it also enhanced the strength of those protections through the enactment of the  ECOA’s notice requirements.    13.  In doing so, Congress expressly identified the notice requirements as one of the  bill’s “most important provisions” because it established “for the first time in federal legislation”  the right of applicants “to obtain a statement of reasons for the action taken against them.” S.  Rep. 94-589, at 2.   14.  In particular, the ECOA requires creditors to provide “a statement of reasons” to  each applicant whenever the creditor takes an “adverse action,” which is defined in relevant part  as a “refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested in  an application unless the creditor makes a counteroffer . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(6).   15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f)  Individual Claim   15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)  Class Claim   15.  A creditor satisfies the notice requirements by either “providing a statement of  reasons as a matter of course,” or giving the applicant written notice of the advese action which  discloses the applicant’s right to a statement of reasons and who to contact so the statement may  be obtained. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2).   16.  A statement of reasons meets the requirements of the ECOA “only if it contains  the specific reasons for the adverse action taken.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(3).  B.  McLean Mortgage Misrepresented the Reasons for the Adverse Action  Taken Against Van Dyke.    17.  On or around August 29, 2016, Van Dyke spoke with John Masci (“Masci”), a  mortgage advisor employed by McLean Mortgage, who advised her to take her house off the  market and to refinance her loan so she could keep the home and save money.   18.  On or around August 31, 2016, Van Dyke applied for refinancing with McLean  Mortgage, who then obtained a copy of her credit report from Credit Plus—a company  5  specializing in the assembly of information in the databases of Equifax, Experian, and Trans  Union for the purpose of reselling the information to mortgage companies.   19.  After Masci reviewed Van Dyke’s credit reports, he instructed Van Dyke to pay  off several accounts to reduce her debt-to-credit ratio, which would increase her credit score and,  thus, make her eligible for a lower interest rate.    20.  Acting on the advice of Masci, Van Dyke withdrew $23,663 from a retirement  account on September 13, 2016, and used it to pay off a credit card with a balance of $16,533.  Van Dyke used the remaning funds to pay federal and state taxes arising from the withdrawl.    21.  On October 10, 2016, Masci e-mailed Van Dyke a copy of the appraisal for her  home. Masci wrote that the appraisal “came in lower than the 465k we were looking for.” To that  end, Masci continued, “I’m not sure at this point how I can make this work for you.”   22.  In response, Van Dyke sent an e-mail asking if she would receive the $927 paid to  McLean Mortgage to process the loan “since it [was] not going to work.” Van Dyke further  disputed some of the information in the appraisal regarding “comps” used for the appraisal.    23.  In response, Masci indicated, “Yes, we will refund you the $927 ASAP.”   24.  Over the next several weeks, Van Dyke attempted to convince Masci that the  appraisal undervalued her property.   25.  On October 25, 2016, Masci wrote Van Dyke an e-mail indicating, “I think it’s  best that we part ways on the refinance. . . . The bottom line is we cannot make this refinance  work under the terms originally agreed upon based on the current value of the property.” (Oct.  25, 2016 E-mail, attached as Exhibit. 1).  6   26.  On or around December 12, 2016, Van Dyke received a Statement of Credit  Denial, Termination or Change (“Adverse Action Notice”) indicating that her loan was being  denied. (Dec. 12, 2016 Adverse Action Notice, attached as Exhibit 2).   27.  The Adverse Action Notice indicated that the sole reason for the credit denial was  that Van Dyke withdrew her application.   28.  Defendant’s Adverse Action Notice violated § 1691(d)(3) of the ECOA because it  misrepresented and failed to accurately provide the specific reasons for the adverse action taken.     29.  Upon information and belief, the Adverse Action Notice is a form letter used by  McLean Mortgage when it takes adverse action against consumers who applied for financing  with McLean Mortgage.  C.  McLean Mortgage Misrepresented the Reasons for the Adverse Action  Taken Against Alvarado.    30.  On or around April 21, 2016, Alvarado applied for a home loan with McLean  Mortgage. Plaintiff sought a loan of approximately $180,000.    31.  After reviewing his credit reports, an employee of McLean Mortgage, Jeremy  Johnson, informed Plaintiff that he needed a down payment of $10,000 in order to qualify for the  $180,000 loan.     32.  On or around August 17, 2016, Alvarado received a Statement of Credit Denial,  Termination or Change (“Adverse Action Notice”) indicating that his loan was being denied.  (Apr. 17, 2016 Adverse Action Notice, attached as Exhibit 3).   33.  The Adverse Action Notice indicated that the sole reason for the credit denial was  that Alvarado withdrew his application.   34.  This was false—Alvarado never withdrew his application nor suggested an intent  to do so to McLean Mortgage.   7   35.  Defendant’s Adverse Action Notice violated § 1691(d)(3) of the ECOA because it  misrepresented and failed to accurately provide the specific reasons for the adverse action taken.    D.  McLean Mortgage Impermissibly Obtained Van Dyke’s Consumer Reports.   36.  On December 4, 2016, Van Dyke obtained a copy of her credit report from  Equifax, which showed that McLean Mortgage obtained her credit report from Equifax on  November 10, 2016—more than two weeks after Masci informed Van Dyke that she could not  qualify for the refinancing.    37.  As of November 10, 2016, Van Dyke did not have a credit relationship with  McLean Mortgage, nor did she authorize McLean Mortgage to pull her report.    38.  Because it denied her application for financing, McLean Mortgage knew or  should have known that it did not have a permissible purpose to obtain Van Dykes’s credit  reports.    39.  As a result of its impermissible acquisition of Van Dyke’s reports, McLean  Mortgage willfully violated § 1681b(f) of the FCRA.   40.  Plaintiffs restate each of the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth  at length herein.   41.  The ECOA Class. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiffs bring this action  individually and on behalf of a class initially defined as follows:  All natural persons who: (1) applied for credit to McLean Mortgage within the  preceding five years; (2) were not offered credit by McLean Mortgage; and (3)  were provided with an ECOA adverse action notice by McLean Mortgage that  indicated that the principal reason for the denial was a withdrawn application.  8   42.  Numerosity, Fed. R. Civ. P 23(a)(1). Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs  allege that the class is so numerous that joinder of all is impractical. The names and addresses of  the class members are identifiable through the internal business records maintained by  Defendant, and the class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by published  and/or mailed notice. The Fourth Circuit has held that classes consisting of as few as 18  members will satisfy the numerosity requirement. Defendant’s procedure for generation of the  subject form letter appears to be automated and systemic, evidencing a likelihood that Defendant  sent at least 100 such letters during the last five years.    43.  Common Questions of Law and Fact, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Common  questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the putative class. These questions  predominate over the questions affecting only individual members. These include, by example  only and without limitation:  a. Whether McLean Mortgage violated the ECOA when it misrepresented that  the reason for its adverse action was a withdrawn application; and  b. Whether McLean Mortgage’s violation of the ECOA was willful.    44.  Typicality, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of  each putative class member. Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the same causes of action as  other members of the putative class.     45.  Adequacy of Representation, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiffs are adequate  representatives of the putative class because: their interests coincide with, and are not  antagonistic to, the interests of the members of the putative class they seek to represent; they  have retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation; and they intend to prosecute  this action vigorously. The interests of the members of the putative class will be fairly and  adequately protected by Plaintiffs and their counsel.   9   46.  Superiority, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Questions of law and fact common to the  putative class members predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and a  class action is superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the  controversy. The damages suffered by each member are such that individual prosecution would  prove burdensome and expensive give the number of individuals affected by McLean  Mortgage’s actions. Even if the members of the class themselves could individually afford such  litigation, it would be an unnecessary burden on the Courts. Furthermore, individualized  litigation presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and increases the delay  and expense to all parties and to the court system presented by the legal and factual issues raised  by McLean Mortgage’s conduct. By contrast, the class action device will result in substantial  benefits to the litigants and the Court by allowing the Court to resolve numerous individual  claims based on a single set of proof in a case.   47.  Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Appropriate for the Class, Fed. R. Civ. P.  23(b)(2). Class certification is appropriate because Mclean Mortgage acted on grounds generally  applicable to the class, making appropriate equitable declaratory and injunctive relief with  respect to Plaintiffs and the putative class members.   48.  As alleged above, Defendant failed to provide each Plaintiff with an adequate and  truthful statement of its reasons for taking the adverse action in violation of the ECOA, 15  U.S.C. §1691(d).   49.  As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiffs and the class members suffered  concrete and particularized injuries, including informational injuries, deprivation of the  opportunity to meaningfully challenge Defendant’s adverse actions, and increased risk that they  were denied for discriminatory purposes.   10   50.  Based on Defendant’s failure to provide a notice appropriate under the ECOA,  Plaintiffs and the putative class members are further entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief  pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) requiring that McLean Mortgage provide an appropriate notice with  the reason for denial of credit to Plaintiffs and the putative class members; that McLean  Mortgage be ordered to comply with the ECOA notice provisions in all future similar  transactions; and a declaration that Defendant violated the ECOA for each class member.   51.  Plaintiffs incorporate the paragraphs above as if fully set out herein.   52.  The Virginia ECOA Class. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil  Procedure, Plaintiffs bring this claim for themselves and on behalf of a subclass within the  putative ECOA class (“the Virginia ECOA class”) of similarly situated individuals initially  defined as follows:  All natural persons who: (1) applied for credit to McLean Mortgage within the  preceding four years; (2) had their mailing address within the Commonwealth of  Virginia at the time; and (3) were provided with an adverse action notice by  Mclean Mortgage that indicated that the principal reason for the denial was a  withdrawn application by the borrower.    53.  Numerosity, Fed. R. Civ. P 23(a)(1). Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs  allege that the class members are so numerous that joinder of all is impractical. The names and  addresses of the class members are identifiable through the internal business records maintained  by McLean Mortgage, and the class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by  published and/or mailed notice.   54.  Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact, Fed. R. Civ. P.  23(a)(2). Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the putative class. These  11  questions predominate over the questions affecting only individual members and include those  alleged in Count One.   55.  Typicality, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of  each putative class member. Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the same causes of action as  other members of the putative class.   56.  Adequacy of Representation, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiffs are adequate  representatives of the putative class because: their interests coincide with, and are not  antagonistic to, the interests of the members of the putative class they seek to represent; they  have retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation; and they intend to prosecute  this action vigorously. The interests of the members of the putative class will be fairly and  adequately protected by Plaintiffs and their counsel.   57.  Superiority, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Questions of law and fact common to the  putative class members predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and a  class action is superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the  controversy. The damages suffered by each member are such that individual prosecution would  prove burdensome and expensive give the number of individuals affected by McLean  Mortgage’s actions. Even if the members of the class themselves could individually afford such  litigation, it would be an unnecessary burden on the Courts. Furthermore, individualized  litigation presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and increases the delay  and expense to all parties and to the court system presented by the legal and factual issues raised  by McLean Mortgage’s conduct. By contrast, the class action device will result in substantial  benefits to the litigants and the Court by allowing the Court to resolve numerous individual  claims based on a single set of proof in a case.  12   58.  Relief Appropriate for the Class, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Class certification is  appropriate, because McLean Mortgage acted on grounds generally applicable to the class,  making appropriate equitable declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the  putative class members.   59.  Defendant willfully and intentionally violated Va. Code § 59.1-21.21:1(D) by  taking an adverse action against Plaintiff and the class members’ applications for credit without  providing each of them with a written statement of the reasons for the action.   60.  As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiffs and the class members suffered  concrete and particularized injuries, including informational injuries and deprivation of the  opportunity to meaningfully challenge Defendant’s adverse actions.    61.  Based on Defendant’s failure to provide a notice appropriate under VECOA to  members of the putative class and for its failure to identify the reasons for denial of credit to the  members of the putative class, Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs and each of the putative class  members for statutory punitive damages of $10,000.00, attorneys’ fees, and costs.   62.  Van Dyke restates each of the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if set  forth at length herein.   63.  McLean Mortgage violated the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §1681b(f) by obtaining and  using Van Dyke’s consumer reports without a permissible purpose to do so.   64.  As a result of McLean Mortgage’s conduct, Van Dyke suffered actual damages,  including without limitation:  credit damage, invasion of her privacy, and emotional distress.  13   65.  McLean Mortgage’s conduct was willful, rendering it liable for punitive damages  in an amount to be determined pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681n. In the alternative, it was negligent,  entitling Van Dyke to recover under 15 U.S.C. §1681o.   66.  Van Dyke is also entitled to recover actual damages, statutory damages, costs and  attorneys’ fees in an amount to be determined pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and 1681o.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs move for judgment against Defendant for themselves and on  behalf of the defined classes for statutory and punitive damages; equitable and injunctive relief;  attorneys’ fees; costs; and such other specific or general relief the Court finds just and  appropriate. Plaintiff Van Dyke further moves for judgment against Defendant as to her  individual claims for her actual, statutory, and punitive damages, as well as for her attorneys’  fees and costs.   A.  Purpose and Requirements of the ECOA.    Code of Virginia §59.1-21.21:1(D)  Class Claim  