21.  Starting in 2016, Plaintiff began receiving text messages on his cellular telephone  from short-code telephone number 310-44 which stated they were from “Lexington Law.”   22.  The messages were sent to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number xxx-xxx-5199.   23.  Plaintiff is not a Lexington Law client or customer.  Lexington Law obtained  Plaintiff’s name and cellular telephone number through means unknown to Plaintiff.   25.  Defendant did not place the text messages for an emergency purpose.  B.   Defendant’s Messages are Triggered by Inquiries on Plaintiff’s Credit Report   26.  Plaintiff subscribes to a credit monitoring program through Experian and thus  remains up-to-date on all activity on his credit report.   27.  On each occasion, Plaintiff’s receipt of a text message from Lexington Law  coincided with a ‘hard’ inquiry on Plaintiff’s credit report or the negative reporting of an account  on Plaintiff’s credit report.     28.  For instance, on February 9, 2017, Deville Asset Management reported the  existence of an alleged outstanding debt on Plaintiff’s credit report.  Two days later, on February  11, 2017, Lexington Law sent a text message to Plaintiff advertising its credit report services.    29.  In addition, on more than one occasion, Plaintiff applied for a line of credit, was  denied, and then received a text message from Lexington Law shortly thereafter.   30.  On information and belief, Lexington Law received information from Plaintiff’s  credit report regarding inquiries or reporting thereon, which triggered a text message being sent  by Defendant’s system to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone to market Defendant’s credit repair  services.   31.  On information and belief, Lexington Law put this automated system in place to  deliver such automated text messages to thousands of consumers, not just Plaintiff.    33.    15 U.S.C. § 1681b permits access to consumer reports for several specific,  enumerated permissible purposes.  “Collection of an account of [a] consumer” is one of them.   Marketing of credit repair services is not.   34.  Upon information and belief, Lexington Law obtained such notifications from  Experian, or elsewhere, for an impermissible purpose, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f).   35.  As a result of Defendant’s violation of § 1681b(f), Plaintiffs are entitled to  damages, costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).   C. Allegations Regarding the Capacity of Defendant’s System   36.  The text messages sent to Plaintiff’s cellular phone by Defendant were made with  an ATDS as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) and the FCC.  The text messages were sent  automatically, without any human intervention in the actual drafting or directing of the message  to Plaintiff.     37.  Lexington Law’s website provides terms and conditions for receipt of Lexington  Law’s “automated texts about credit repair or credit repair marketing.” See  https://www.lexingtonlaw.com/info/sms-terms (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).1   38.  The text messages sent by Defendant to Plaintiff’s cell phone were sent with an  ATDS, in that Defendant acquired Plaintiff’s number, stored it in a database connected to its  telephonic or computer system, and then used its system to send text messages to Plaintiff’s cell  phone automatically and without human intervention.   40.  Plaintiff’s name and telephone number are stored on a list or database at  Lexington Law.  The database is connected to a computer system capable of sending text  messages to cellular telephones from short-code 310-44.   41.  The messages received by Plaintiff were composed of pre-written templates of  text that were then automatically filled from Lexington Law’s database.  Using computer  programming code, and replacing values, Defendant’s computer programs converted the  template text into messages like those received by Plaintiff.  Thus, what may have appeared to be  customized messages were, in fact, created through a computer algorithm with no human  involvement.    42.  Indeed, the name “Alycia” was a fictitious name not attributable to any actual  human at Lexington Law.  Plaintiff placed a call to Lexington Law as indicated in “Alycia’s”  message and received a man who (1) was not Alycia, (2) did not know anything about the text  messages Plaintiff was receiving, and (3) was not able to locate Plaintiff in Lexington Law’s  customer files by name, telephone number, or social security number.   43.  No human was involved in the sending of Defendant’s text messages to Plaintiff.   44.  Moreover, like any computer system, Defendant’s computer-based text messaging  system, which involves many computer servers equipped with multiple software applications,  has the capacity to generate random numbers. See  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudorandom_number_generator (last visited March 20, 2017).   45.  Defendant’s computer-based system likewise has the capacity to generate  sequential numbers.    47.  Defendant’s system has the capacity to store and dial the random or sequential  numbers it generates just like it stored and dialed Plaintiff’s number.    48.  In the unlikely event that Defendant’s system does not already have the capacity  to generate random or sequential numbers, that capacity can be trivially added.    49.  The following computer programming ‘PHP’-language code could be added to  Defendant’s system to generate random numbers:  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  <?php  for ($randomNumber = mt_rand(1, 9), $i = 1; $i < 10; $i++) {      $randomNumber .= mt_rand(0, 9);  }  var_dump($randomNumber);   50.  This simplified PHP code would generate random numbers in Defendant’s ATDS  system.    51.  The Code would generate random numbers as follows:   1  string(10) "3446780111"   52.  The ability to generate sequential numbers could also easily be added to  Defendant’s system if it does not have it currently.   55.  Lexington Law’s messages violated Plaintiff’s substantive consumer right to be  free from receipt of telemarketing text messages to which he had not clearly and conspicuously  consented in writing.   56.  Lexington Law’s messages came at inconvenient times for Plaintiff and  interrupted his activities.  For example, one message on February 11, 2017 was received while  Plaintiff was at the mall with his wife.   57.  Plaintiff found receipt of the messages alarming and disconcerting in that they  referred to “repairing his credit” and because he did not know why he was receiving them and  did not want to receive them.   58.  Receipt of Defendant’s unauthorized messages drained Plaintiff’s phone battery  and caused Plaintiff additional electricity expenses and wear and tear on his phone and battery.  59.  Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf  of himself and all others similarly situated.   60.  Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following class (the “Class”):  All persons within the United States who, within four years of this  Complaint, received on their cellular telephone at least one unauthorized text  message from Defendant in which Defendant marketed its credit repair  services.   62.  Upon information and belief, Defendant sent text messages to cellular telephone  numbers of thousands of consumers throughout the United States without their prior express  consent.  The members of the Class, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all  members is impracticable.   63.  The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time  and can only be ascertained through discovery.  Identification of the Class members is a matter  capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s records.   C. Common Questions of Law and Fact    65.  The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers.  If  Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant routinely obtains credit report information for an impermissible  purpose and sends automated telemarketing text messages to telephone numbers assigned to  cellular telephone services without prior express written consent are accurate, Plaintiff and the  Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and  administered in this case.    D. Typicality    66.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all  based on the same factual and legal theories.  E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members    67.  Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has  retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business  practices.  Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interests which might cause them not to  vigorously pursue this action.  F. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable    68.  A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this  controversy.  The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecutions of  separate claims against Defendant is small because it is not economically feasible for Class  members to bring individual actions.   70.  Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and  incorporates them herein by reference.   71.  Defendant sent multiple automated text messages to cellular numbers belonging  to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent.   72.  Each of the aforementioned messages by Defendant constitutes a violation of the  76.  Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and  incorporates them herein by reference.   77.  Defendant knowingly and/or willfully sent multiple automated text messages to  cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior  express written consent.   78.  Each of the aforementioned messages by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or  willful violation of the TCPA.   79.  As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA,  Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for each call in  violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).   80.  Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief  prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future.   82.  Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and  incorporates them herein by reference.   83.  The Fair Credit reporting Act limits access to consumer credit reports to several  specific, enumerated permissible purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.    84.  Defendant obtained Plaintiff and the Class members’ credit reports without a  permissible purpose as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.   85.  As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FCRA, Plaintiff and the Class are  entitled to an award of statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1);    86.  Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to punitive damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C.  § 1681n(a)(2) and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3).   87.  Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief  prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future.   A. The Class   A. Text Messages Sent to Plaintiff   Dated: March 20, 2017  Respectfully submitted,  By:  /s/ Sergei Lemberg                              Sergei Lemberg  Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the   Telephone Consumer Protection Act,   47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.   Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,   47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.   Willful Violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,   15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.  