10.  Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated by reference as though fully set  forth herein.   11.  Plaintiff brings this action for violations of the FLSA as both an individual and  collective action on behalf of Plaintiff and all persons who performed work as truck drivers  designated as “independent contractors” by Forward Air who also signed truck lease agreements  designating Forward Air as the “Carrier” at any time during the period from three years prior to  filing of the complaint to the present (“collective members”).  Plaintiff brings this action pursuant  to section 216(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).   12.  During all times relevant herein, Plaintiff and collective members were subjected  to an unlawful compensation system put in place by Defendant.   13.  During the relevant time period, Defendant has employed Plaintiff and collective  members as “lease-purchasers” and/or “owner-operators” and misclassified them as independent  contractors.   14.  Plaintiff and collective members are similarly situated.  During the relevant time  period, they held similar job titles; performed similar job duties; been paid under similar pay  provisions; and are all subject to Defendant’s unlawful policies and practices as described herein.  4  15.  Plaintiff and collective members are numerous. Members of the Collective are  estimated to number in hundreds, if not thousands.  Forward Air has entered into the Agreements  with thousands of persons who thereafter worked for Forward Air as “independent contractors.”    16.  Defendant maintains records of its “owner-operators” and/or “lease purchasers”  and as such they are readily identifiable by Defendant.   17.  Therefore, Plaintiff should be permitted to bring this action as a collective action  on behalf of themselves and all other individuals similarly situated pursuant to the “opt-in”  provisions of the FLSA.  18.  Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated by reference as though fully set  forth herein.   19.  Plaintiff Fredrick Blodgett worked for Defendant as an “owner-operator” and/or  “lease-purchaser” from approximately July 2015 to October 2017 and was classified by Defendant  as an independent contractor.   20.  By approximately six months into his employment, Plaintiff was required to create  and do business as Big FS, LLC.   21.  Defendant’s primary business is the transport of air goods/cargo by truck from  terminal to terminal across the United States.    22.  Defendant is a motor carrier as defined by the Motor Carrier Act.   23.  Plaintiff and collective members worked and/or work for Defendant as commercial  truck drivers during the relevant time periods.   24.  Defendant has continued to misclassify its “owner-operators” and/or “lease- purchasers” during all relevant times through the present.  5  25.  Plaintiff and collective members have been misclassified by Defendant as  independent contractors during the covered period, and are/were in fact Defendant’s employees  under federal law.  Misclassification of Owner-Operators and Lease-Purchasers as Independent Contractors   26.  Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated by reference as though fully set  forth herein.   27.  During the relevant time period, Defendant has engaged in a policy and practice of  employing truck drivers and misclassifying them as independent contractors.   28.  During all relevant times herein, Defendant has controlled and directed Plaintiff  and collective members in the performance of their job duties.   29.  During all relevant times herein, Defendant has controlled the meaningful aspects  of the business including customer flow and rates, effectively eliminating Plaintiff and collective  members’ ability to function as independent economic entities.   30.  During all relevant times herein, Plaintiff and collective members have entered into  lease agreements with companies which regularly contract with Defendant that require Plaintiff  and collective members to allow for large weekly deductions from their settlements to cover lease  payments in return for the use of one of their trucks. Trucks are in poor shape, lasting  approximately one year before needing a replacement truck. Leases extend for periods such as two  to three years.    31.  Plaintiff and collective members do not gain equity in the trucks during the term of  their sublease with Defendant. Until an individual “owner-operator” and/or “lease-purchaser”  reaches the end of the lease term and completes purchase of the truck, the “owner-operator” and/or  “lease-purchaser” is essentially paying exorbitant fees to borrow equipment.  6  32.  Plaintiff and collective members are compensated based on a number of factors  unilaterally determined by Defendant, including but not limited to the distance a load must be  hauled, the size and/or weight of the cargo, and the type of cargo.   33.  Plaintiff and collective members are not permitted to use their leased truck to carry  loads for independent companies that are/were not assigned by and/or through Defendant, even on  days Plaintiff and collective members are not assigned work from Defendant.   34.  Plaintiff and collective members can only accept loads that have been assigned to  them by Defendant.    35.  Defendant requires Plaintiff and collective members to have and maintain onboard  communications and tracing technology, such as Qualcomm systems. Payment for the required  technology is deducted from Plaintiff and collective member’s wages or escrow accounts.    36.  The onboard communications and tracing technology enables Defendant to locate  and track the trucks Plaintiff and collective members drive at all times, and to better control  Plaintiff and collective members’ schedules and loads.   37.  Defendant assigns loads to Plaintiff and collective members through its  communications and dispatch system.   38.  Plaintiff and collective members have/had little to no ability to refuse assigned  loads.    39.  When Plaintiff and collective members refuse loads, Defendant can and has  required Plaintiff and collective members to sit and extra time for another load, substantially  decreasing the amount of money they are able to earn and endangering their ability to meet their  lease payment obligations.  7  40.  As Plaintiff and collective members were not permitted to accept loads or jobs from  anyone other than Defendant, they had no meaningful opportunity to increase their profit outside  of what was offered by Defendant.   41.  Although Plaintiff and collective members are required by law to hold commercial  driving licenses, they are not required to have special skills uncommon to the over-the-road  trucking industry.    42.  During all relevant times herein, Plaintiff and members of the Collective have  performed the same or substantially similar job duties as are performed by company drivers  employed directly by Defendant.   43.  Because Defendant controls the rates paid and the available loads, Plaintiff and  collective members can do little to increase their profits other than attempt to improve their  efficiency within the bounds of the Motor Carrier Act.   44.  During all relevant times herein, Plaintiff and collective members are/were  economically dependent on Defendant.   45.  During all relevant times herein, Defendant directed, provided, and supervised the  work performed by Plaintiff and collective members on Defendant’s behalf.  Failure to Pay Plaintiff and Collective Members Minimum Wages for All Hours Worked   46.  Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated by reference as though fully set  forth herein.   47.  Defendant’s pay structure regularly caused Plaintiff and collective members to  make less than the minimum wage as set forth by section 206 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29  51.  Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated by reference as though fully set  forth herein.   52.  At all times relevant herein, Defendant was and continues to be an “employer” of  Plaintiff and collective members within the meaning of the FLSA.   53.  At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff and collective members were/are “employees”  within the meaning of the FLSA.   54.  At all times relevant herein, Defendant, as well as Plaintiff and collective members,  have been engaged in “commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203.  9  55.  Section 201 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §206, requires employers to minimally  compensate employees such as Plaintiff and collective members at the federal minimum wage rate  for all hours worked.   56.  Defendant has violated and continues to violate the FLSA by willfully failing to  compensate Plaintiff and collective members at least the federal minimum wage.   57.  As a result of Defendant’s company-wide policy and practice of not paying Plaintiff  and collective members at least the federally mandated minimum wage for all hours worked,  Plaintiff and collective members have been harmed.  Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)  Failure to Pay Minimum Wages  