From Noise to Clarity: Unraveling the Adversarial Suffix of Large Language Model Attacks via Translation of Text Embeddings
Hao Wang, Hao Li, Minlie Huang, Lei Sha
The safety defense methods of Large language models(LLMs) stays limited because the dangerous prompts are manually curated to just few known attack types, which fails to keep pace with emerging varieties. Recent studies found that attaching suffixes to harmful instructions can hack the defense of LLMs and lead to dangerous outputs. This method, while effective, leaves a gap in understanding the underlying mechanics of such adversarial suffix due to the non-readability and it can be relatively easily seen through by common defense methods such as perplexity filters.To cope with this challenge, in this paper, we propose an Adversarial Suffixes Embedding Translation Framework(ASETF) that are able to translate the unreadable adversarial suffixes into coherent, readable text, which makes it easier to understand and analyze the reasons behind harmful content generation by large language models. We conducted experiments on LLMs such as LLaMa2, Vicuna and using the Advbench dataset's harmful instructions. The results indicate that our method achieves a much better attack success rate to existing techniques, while significantly enhancing the textual fluency of the prompts. In addition, our approach can be generalized into a broader method for generating transferable adversarial suffixes that can successfully attack multiple LLMs, even black-box LLMs, such as ChatGPT and Gemini. As a result, the prompts generated through our method exhibit enriched semantic diversity, which potentially provides more adversarial examples for LLM defense methods.