# How does partial key escrow work?

It is being speculated that one of the ways that NSA leaker Edward Snowden may have created his "insurance policy" – distributing sensitive documents to various individuals with instructions to disseminate them should anything happen to him--is through the use of a partial key escrow.

The concept is described vaguely in the article:

Modern crypto has lots of ways to accomplish this, including partial key escrow, in which a bunch of encryption keys are distributed to various parties; the individual keys aren't sufficient to decrypt the file, but a quorum of them are. For example, you can release a key to ten people and configure it so that any three can, in combination, unlock the file.

From a technical standpoint, how does partial key escrow work, and how is it most often implemented in practice?

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## migrated from security.stackexchange.comJun 27 '13 at 12:44

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Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme... (Not a crypto geek, but I suspect there are other similar concepts). –  Deer Hunter Jun 26 '13 at 6:12
Another note: speculations of that kind are mostly sorry fruit of barren tabloid minds.. –  Deer Hunter Jun 26 '13 at 6:14
Interesting question. And if someone gets 3 keys, would she need to use them in a specific order and provide passwords? –  Aki Jun 26 '13 at 8:18
@Aki - no. I suppose you are thinking of rubber-hose cryptography, then. –  Deer Hunter Jun 26 '13 at 9:46
I couldn't even find information other than theory about this "partial key escrow". My bet is the truecrypt-style keyfiles where you need all the "keys" and a password to decrypt the data. –  Nathan C Jun 27 '13 at 2:25

The two most popular ways I am aware of are Shamir secret sharing and additive secret sharing. I'll explain both.

I'll start with additive as it is conceptually simpler (but also more limited). I'll also use bitwise addition modulo 2 as the addition operation (i.e., XOR), but know that that isn't the only option. You could use real, no-kidding addition in a finite field (say $\mathbb{Z}_p$ for a prime $p$).
Say I have a key $k$ and a plaintext $p$. I encrypt to get $c=E(p,k)$. Now I distribute $c$ to $n$ friends. I also generate random bitstrings of the same length as $k$, $s_1,\dots,s_{n-1}$. I also set $s_n=k\oplus s_1\oplus\dots\oplus s_{n-1}$. I send $s_i$ to friend $i$. Note that $k=s_1\oplus\dots\oplus s_{n}$. Thus, if all $n$ friends get together, they can reconstruct $k$ and decrypt $c$. If any group of up to $n-1$ of my friends get together they can not reconstruct $k$ and they learn no additional information about $k$ that they didn't already have.
Shamir secret sharing is more complicated, but more powerful. In SSS, I can generate the shares such that any $t+1$ out of $n$ of my friends can get together to reconstruct $k$. Any group of at most size $t$ learns nothing about $k$. It is based on the idea of polynomial interpolation. For example, in school we learned that it takes 2 points to uniquely identify a line. If you only have one point, there are infinitely many lines that could touch that point. If you have 2 points, there is only 1 line. So, what if we encoded the secret $k$ into the line (for example, the y intercept). Then I can distribute different points on that line (excluding the y intercept) to all my friends. Any 1 of them by themselves, cannot figure out the y intercept. But, 2 of them together can reconstruct the line and figure out the y intercept and recover $k$.
SSS uses this idea. Fix a field, say $\mathbb{Z}_p$. Construct the following polynomial:
$f(x)=k+r_1x+r_2x^2+\dots+r_tx^t$ where $r_1,\dots,r_t$ are random field elements. Notice that $f(0)=k$. Send $f(1)$ to one friend, $f(2)$ to another, and so on.
It turns out that any $t+1$ of your friends can then come together and, using lagrangian interpolation, compute $f(0)=k$ to recover the secret $k$. Any group of size at most $t$, however, learns nothing about $k$.