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author: niplav, created: 2021-03-31, modified: 2022-03-15, language: english, status: notes, importance: 3, confidence: highly unlikely

This page contains my notes on ethics, separated from my regular notes to retain some structure to the notes.

# Notes on Ethics

Aber was wollen denn die Fragen, ich bin ja mit ihnen gescheitert, wahrscheinlich sind meine Genossen viel klüger als ich und wenden ganz andere vortreffliche Mittel an, um dieses Leben zu ertragen, Mittel freilich, die, wie ich aus eigenem hinzufüge, vielleicht ihnen zur Not helfen, beruhigen, einschläfern, artverwandelnd wirken, aber in der Allgemeinheit ebenso ohnmächtig sind, wie die meinen, denn, soviel ich auch ausschaue, einen Erfolg sehe ich nicht.

Frank Kafka, “Forschungen eines Hundes”, 1922

My general ethical outlook is one of high moral uncertainty, with my favourite theory being consequentialism. I furthermore favour hedonic, negative-leaning, and act-based consequentialisms.

Note that while I am interested in ethics, I haven't read as much about the topic as I would like. This probably leads to me re-inventing a large amount of jargon, and making well-known (and already refuted) arguments.

## Converging Preference Utilitarianism

One problem with preference utilitarianism is the difficulty of aggregating and comparing preferences interpersonally, as well as a critique that some persons have very altruistic and others very egoistic preferences.

### Method

A possible method of trying to resolve this is to try to hypothetically calculate the aggregate preferences of all persons in the following way: For every existing person pₐ, this person learns about the preferences of all other persons pₙ. For each pₙ, pₐ learns about their preferences and experiences pₙ's past sensory inputs. pₐ then updates their preferences according to this information. This process is repeated until the maximal difference between preferences has shrunk to a certain threshold.

### Variations

One possible variation in the procedure is between retaining knowledge about the identity of pₐ, the person aggregating the preferences. If this were not done, the result would be very akin to the Harsanyian Veil of Ignorance.

Another possible variation could be not attempting to achieve convergence, but only simply iterating the method for a finite amount of times. Since it's not clear that more iterations would contribute towards further convergence, maybe 1 iteration is desirable.

### Problems

This method has a lot of ethical and practical problems.

#### Assumptions

The method assumes a bunch of practical and theoretical premises, for example that preferences would necessarily converge upon experiencing and knowing other persons qualia and preferences. It also assumes that it is in principle possible to make a person experience other persons qualia.

#### Sentient Simulations

Since each negative experience would be experienced by every person at least one time, and negative experiences could considered to have negative value, calculating the converging preferences would be unethical in practice (just as simulating the experience over and over).

#### Genuinely Selfish Agents

If an agent is genuinely selfish (has no explicit term for the welfare of another agent in its preferences), it might not adjust its own preferences upon experiencing other lifes. It might even be able to circumvent the veil of ignorance to locate itself.

#### Lacking Brain Power

Some agents might lack the intelligence to process all the information other agents perceive. For example, an ant would probably not be able to understand the importance humans give to art.

## Humans Implement Ethics Discovery

Humans sometimes change their minds about what they consider to be good, both on a individual and on a collective scale. One obvious example is slavery in western countries: although our wealth would make us more prone to admitting slavery (high difference between wages & costs of keeping slaves alive), we have nearly no slaves. This used to be different, in the 18th and 19th century, slavery was a common practice.

This process seems to come partially from learning new facts about the world (e.g., which ethical patients respond to noxious stimuli, how different ethical patients/agents are biologically related to each other, etc.), let's call this the model-updating process. But there also seems to be an aspect of humans genuinely re-weighting their values when they receive new information, which could be called the value-updating process. There also seems to be a third value-related process happening, which is more concerned with determining inconsistencies within ethical theories by applying them in thought-experiments (e.g. by discovering problems in population axiology, see for example Parfit 1986). This process might be called the value-inference process.

One could say that humans implement the value-updating and the value-inference process—when they think about ethics, there is an underlying algorithm that weighs trade-offs, considers points for and against specific details in theories, and searches for maxima. As far as is publicly known, there is no crisp formalization of this process (initial attempts are reflective equilibrium and coherent extrapolated volition "Coherent Extrapolated Volition").

If we accept the complexity of human values hypothesis, this absence of a crisp formalism is not surprising: the algorithm for value-updating and value-inference is probably too complex to write down.

However, since we know that humans are existing implementations of this process, we're not completely out of luck: if we can preserve humans "as they are" (and many of the notes on this page try to get at what this fuzzy notion of "as they are" would mean), we have a way to further update and infer values.

This view emphasizes several conclusions: preserving humans "as they currently are" becomes very important, perhaps even to the extent of misallowing self-modification, the loss of human cultural artifacts (literature, languages, art) becomes more of a tragedy than before (potential loss of information about what human values are), and making irreversible decisions becomes worse than before.

## I Care About Ethical Decision Procedures

Or, why virtue ethics alone feels misguided.

In general, ethical theories want to describe what is good and what is bad. Some ethical theories also provide a decision-procedure: what to do in which situations. One can then differentiate between ethical theories that give recommendations for action in every possible situation (we might call those complete theories), and ethical theories that give recommendations for action in a subset of all possible situations (one might name these incomplete theories, although the name might be considered unfair by proponents of such theories).

It is important to clarify that incomplete theories are not necessarily indifferent between different choices for action in situations they have no result for, but that they just don't provide a recommendation for action.

Prima facie, complete theories seem more desirable than incomplete theories—advice in the form of "you oughtn't be in this situation in the first place" is not very helpful if you are confronted with such a situation!

Virtue ethics strikes me as being such a theory—it defines what is good, but provides no decision-procedure for acting in most situations.

At best, it could be interpreted as a method for developing such a decision-procedure for each individual agent, recognizing that an attempt at formalizing an ethical decision-procedure is a futile goal, and instead focussing on the value-updating and value-inference process itself.

## Deference Attractors of Ethical Agents

When I'm angry or stressed (or tired, very horny, high, etc), I would prefer to have another version of myself make my decisions in that moment—ideally a version that is well rested, is thinking clearly, and is not under very heavy pressure. One reason for this is that my rested & clear-headed self is in general better at making decisions – it is likely better at playing chess, programming a computer, having a mutually beneficial discussion etc. But another reason is that even when I'm in a very turbulent state, I usually still find the values of my relaxed and level-headed self (let's call that self the deferee self) better than my current values. So in some way, my values in that stressful moment are not reflectively stable.

Similarly, even when I'm relaxed, I usually still can imagine a version of myself with even more desired values—more altruistic, less time-discounting, less parochial. Similarly, that version of myself likely wants to be even more altruistic! This is a Murder-Ghandi problem: It likely leads to a perfectly altruistic, universalist version of myself that just wants to be itself and keep its own values. Let's call that self a deference attractor.

But I don't always have the same deferee self. Sometimes I actually want to be more egoistic, more parochial, perhaps even more myopic (even though I haven't encountered that specific case yet. The deferee self likely also wants to be even more egoistic, parochial and (maybe?) myopic. This version of myself is again a deference attractor.

These chains of deference are embedded in a directed graph of selves, many of which are likely reflectively stable. Some aren't, and perhaps form such chains/paths which either form cycles, or lead to attractors.

### Deceptive Deference-Attractors?

These graphs don't have to be transitive, so a deference attractor of myself now could look extremely unappealing to me. Could one be mistaken about such a judgement, and if yes, when would one be?

That is, when one would judge a deference attractor to be undesirable, could it be in fact desirable? Or, if one were to judge in desirable, could it in fact be undesirable?

## Arguments Against Preference Utilitarianism

Preference utilitarianism enjoys great popularity among utilitarians, and I tend to agree that it is a very good pragmatic compromise especially in the context of politics.

However, most formulations I have encountered bring up some problems that I have not seen mentioned or addressed elsewhere.

### The Identification Argument

One issue with preference utilitarianism concerns the word “preference”, and especially where in the world these preferences are located and how they can be identified. What kinds of physical structures can be identified as having preferences (we might call this the identification problem), and where exactly are those preferences located (one might call this the location problem)? If one is purely behavioristic about this question, then every physical system can be said to have preferences, with the addition that if it is in equilibrium, it seems to have achieved those prefereneces. This is clearly nonsensical, as also explored in Filan 2018.

If we argue that this is pure distinction mongering, and that we "know an agent when we see one", it might still be argued that evolution is agent-like enough to fall into our category of an agent, but that we are not necessarily obligated to spend a significant part of our resources on copying and storing large amounts of DNA molecules.

Even restricting ourselves to humans, we still have issue with identifying the computation inside human brains that could be said to be those preferences, see e.g. Hayden & Niv 2021. If we instead go with revealed preferences, unless we assume a certain level of irrationality, we wouldn't be able to ascertain which preferences of humans were not fulfilled (since we could just assume that at each moment, each human is perfectly fulfilling their own preferences).

These are, of course, standard problems in value learning Soares 2018.

### Preference-Altering Actions Disallowed

Even if agents bearing preferences can be identified and the preferences they bear can be located, ethical agents are faced with a dubious demand: Insofar only the preferences of existing agents matter (i.e. our population axiology is person-affecting), the ethical agent is forced to stabilize existing consistent prefereneces (and perhaps also to make inconsistent preferences consistent), because every stable preference implies a "meta-preference" of its own continued existence Omohundro 2008.

However, this conflicts with ethical intuitions: We would like to allow ethical patients to undergo moral growth and reflect on their values.

(I do not expect this to be a practical issue, since at least in human brains, I expect there to be no actually consistent internal preferences. With simpler organisms or very simple physical systems, this might become an issue, but one wouldn't expect them to have undergone significant moral growth in any case.)

### Possible People

If we allow the preferences of possible people to influence our decision procedure, we run into trouble very quickly.

In the most realistic case, imagine we can perform genetic editing (or embryo selection) to select for traits in new humans, and assume that the psychological profile of people who really want to have been born is at least somewhat genetically determined, and we can identify and modify those genes. (Alternatively, imagine that we have found out how to raise people so that they have a great preference for having been born, perhaps by an unanticipated leap in developmental psychology).

Then it seems like preference utilitarianism that includes possible people demands that we try to grow humanity as quickly as possible, with most people being modified in such a way that they strongly prefer being alive and having been born (if they are unusually inept in one or more ways, we would like to have some people around who can support them).

However, this preference for having been born doesn't guarantee an enjoyment of life in the commonsense way. It might be that while such people really prefer being alive, they're not really happy while being alive. Indeed, since most of the time the tails come apart, I would make the guess that those people wouldn't be much happier than current humans (an example of causal Goodhart).

Preference utilitarians who respect possible preferences might just bite this bullet and argue that this indeed the correct thing to do.

But, depending on the definition of an ethical patient who displays preferences, the moral patient who maximally prefers existing might look nothing like a typical human, and more like an intricate e-coli-sized web of diamond or a very fast rotating blob of strange matter. The only people I can imagine willing to bite this bullet probably are too busy running around robbing ammunition stores.

#### Side-Note: Philosophers Underestimate the Strangeness of Maximization

Often in arguments with philosophers, especially about consequentialism, I find that most of them underappreciate the strangeness of results of very strong optimization algorithms. Whenever there's an $\text{argmax}$ in your function, the result is probably going to look nothing like what you imagine it looking like, especially if the optimization doesn't have conservative concept boundaries.

#### Preference-Creating Preferences

If you restrict your preference utilitarianism to currently existing preferences, you might get lucky and avoid this kind of scenario. But also maybe you won't: If there are any currently existing preferences of the form P="I want there to be as many physically implemented instances of P to exist as possible" (these are possible to represent as quines), you have two choices:

• Either you weight preferences by how strong they were at a single point in time $t$, and just maximize the preferences existing at $t$
• Or you maximize currently existing preferences, weighted by how strong they are right now

In the latter case, you land in a universe filled with physical systems implementing the preference P.

### Summary

All forms of preference utilitarianism face the challenge of identifying which systems have preferences, and how those preferences are implemented.

• Preference utilitarianisms
• Face the challenge of identifying which systems have preferences, and how those preferences are implemented.
• That don't respect possible preferences:
• Will attempt to "freeze" current preferences and prevent any moral progress.
• If they always maximize the currently existing preferences, and self-replicating preferences exist in the universe, they will tile the universe with those preferences.
• That respect possible preferences:
• Will get mercilessly exploited by the strongest preferences they include in the domain of moral patients.

## Stating the Result of “An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies”

Arrhenius 2000 gives a proof that basically states that the type of population axiology we want to construct is impossible. However, the natural-language statement of his result is scattered throughout the paper.

The primary claim of this paper is that any axiology that satisfies the Dominance, the Addition, and the Minimal Non-Extreme Priority Principle implies the Repugnant, the Anti-Egalitarian, or the Sadistic Conclusion.

Gustaf Arrhenius, “An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies” p. 15, 2000

### Requirements

The Dominance Principle: If population A contains the same number of people as population B, and every person in A has higher welfare than any person in B, then A is better than B.

Gustaf Arrhenius, “An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies” p. 11, 2000

The Addition Principle: If it is bad to add a number of people, all with welfare lower than the original people, then it is at least as bad to add a greater number of people, all with even lower welfare than the original people.

Gustaf Arrhenius, “An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies” p. 11, 2000

The Minimal Non-Extreme Priority Principle: There is a number n such that an addition of n people very high welfare and a single person with slightly negative welfare is at least as good as an addition of the same number of people but with very low positive welfare.

Gustaf Arrhenius, “An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies” p. 11, 2000

### Conclusions

The Repugnant Conclusion: For any perfectly equal population with very high positive value, there is a population with very low positive welfare which is better.

Gustaf Arrhenius, “An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies” p. 2, 2000

The Anti-Egalitarian Conclusion: A population with perfect equality can be worse than a population with the same number of people, inequality, and lower average (and thus lower total) positive welfare.

Gustaf Arrhenius, “An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies” p. 12, 2000

The Sadistic Conclusion: When adding people without affecting the original people's welfare, it can be better to add people with negative welfare than positive welfare.

Gustaf Arrhenius, “An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies” p. 5, 2000

All of these are stated more mathematically on page 15.

## Possible Surprising Implications of Moral Uncertanity

Preserving languages & biospheres might be really important, if the continuity of such processes is morally relevant.

We should try to be careful about self-modification, lest we fall into a molochian attractor state we don't want to get out of. Leave a line of retreat in ideology-space!

For a rough attempt to formalize this, see TurnTrout & elriggs 2019.

### We Should Kill All Mosquitoes

If we assign a non-miniscule amount of credence to retributive theories of justice that include invertebrates as culpable agents, humanity might have an (additional) duty to exterminate mosquitoes. Between 5% and 50% of all humans that have ever lived have been killed by mosquito-born diseases—if humanity wants to restore justice for all past humans that have died at the proboscis of mosquito, the most sensible course of action is to exterminate some or all species of mosquito that feed on human blood and transmit diseases.

There are of course also additional reasons to exterminate some species of mosquito: 700k humans die per year from mosquito-borne diseases, and it might be better for mosquitos themselves to not exist at all (with gene drives being an effective method of driving them to extinction, see Tomasik 2017 and Tomasik 2016 as introductions):

the cost-effectiveness of the \$1 million campaign to eliminate mosquitoes would be (7.5 * 10¹⁴ insect-years prevented) * (0.0025) / \$1 million = 1.9 * 10⁶ insect-years prevented per dollar [by increasing human population]. As one might expect, this is much bigger than the impact on mosquito populations directly as calculated in the previous section.

Brian Tomasik, Will Gene Drives Reduce Wild-Animal Suffering?, 2018

A mild counterpoint to this view is that we have an obligation to help species that thrive on mosquitoes, since they have helped humanity throughout the ages, but we'd hurt them by taking away one of their food sources.