45012843
Reasoning about common knowledge with infinitely many agents
Complete axiomatizations and exponential-time decision procedures are provided for reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge when there are infinitely many agents. The results show that reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge with infinitely many agents is no harder than when there are finitely many agents, provided that we can check the cardinality of certain set differences G G' where G and G' are sets of agents. Since our complexity results are independent of the cardinality of the sets G involved, they represent improvements over the previous results even with the sets of agents involved are finite. Moreover, our results make clear the extent to which issues of complexity and completeness depend on how the sets of agents involved are represented.
152014
Causality, Responsibility, and Blame: A Structural-Model Approach
This talk provides an overview of work that I have done with Hana Chockler, Orna Kupferman, and Judea Pearl (H. Chockler and J. Y. Halpern, 2004), (H. Chockler, et al., 2003), (J. Y. Halpern and J. Pearl, 2005), on defining notions such as causality, explanation, responsibility, and blame. I first review the Halpern-Pearl definition of causality, what it means that A is a cause of B, and show how it handles well some standard problems of causality. This definition of causality (like most in the literature) views causality as an all-or-nothing concept. Either A is a cause of B or it is not. I show how it can be extended to take into account the degree of responsibility of A for B. For example, if someone wins an election 11-0, each person is less responsible for his victory than if he had won 6-5. Finally, I show how this notion of degree of responsibility can be used to provide insight into model checking notions such as coverage
215949262
Knowledge, probability, and adversaries
What should it mean for an agent to know or believe an assertion is true with probability 9.99? Different papers [2, 6, 15] give different answers, choosing to use quite different probability space...
14995360
A model-theoretic analysis of knowledge
A general semantic model of knowledge is introduced, to allow reasoning about statements such as «He knows that I know whether or not she knows whether or not it is raining». This approach more naturally models a state of knowledge than previous proposals (including Kripke structures). Using this notion of model, a model theory for knowledge is developed. This theory enables one to interpret the notion of a «finite amount of information»
15233558
A new look at fault tolerant network routing
Consider a communication network G in which a limited number of link and/or node faults F might occur. A routing &rgr; for the network (a fixed path between each pair of nodes) must be chosen without any knowledge of which components might become faulty. Choosing a good routing corresponds to bounding the diameter of the surviving route graph R(G,&rgr;)/F, where two nonfaulty nodes are joined by an edge if there are no faults on the route between them. We prove a number of results concerning the diameter of surviving route graphs. We show that if &rgr; is a minimal length routing, then the diameter of R(G,&rgr;)/F can be on the order of the number of nodes of G, even if F consists of only a single node. However, if G is the n-dimensional cube, the diameter of R(G,&rgr;)/F≤3 for any minimal length routing &rgr; and any set of faults F with |F|<n. We also show that if F consists only of edges and does not disconnect G, then the diameter of R(G,&rgr;)/F is ≤ 3|F|+1, while if F consists only of nodes and does not disconnect G, then the diameter of R(G,&rgr;)/F is ≤ the sum of the degrees of the nodes in F, where in both cases &rgr; is an arbitrary minimal length routing. We conclude with one of the most important contributions of this paper: a list of interesting and apparently difficult open problems.
47316226
Equations Between Regular Terms and an Application to Process Logic
Regular terms with the Kleene operations $ \cup $, ; and $ * $ can be thought of as operators on languages, generating other languages. An equation $\tau _1 = \tau _2 $ between two such terms is said to be satisfiable just in case languages exist which make this equation true. We show that the satisfiability problem even for $ * $-free regular terms is undecidable. Similar techniques are used to show that a very natural extension of the Process Logic of Harel, Kozen and Parikh is undecidable.
14707750
Probability Update: Conditioning vs. Cross-Entropy
Conditioning is the generally agreed-upon method for updating probability distributions when one learns that an event is certainly true. But it has been argued that we need other rules, in particular the rule of cross-entropy minimization, to handle updates that involve uncertain information. In this paper we re-examine such a case: van Fraassen's Judy Benjamin problem [1987], which in essence asks how one might update given the value of a conditional probability. We argue that--contrary to the suggestions in the literature--it is possible to use simple conditionalization in this case, and thereby obtain answers that agree fully with intuition. This contrasts with proposals such as cross-entropy, which are easier to apply but can give unsatisfactory answers. Based on the lessons from this example, we speculate on some general philosophical issues concerning probability update.
35307334
Performing Work Efficiently in the Presence of Faults
We consider a system of t synchronous processes that communicate only by sending messages to one another, and together the processes must perform n independent units of work. Processes may fail by crashing; we want to guarantee that in every execution of the protocol in which at least one process survives, all n units of work will be performed. We consider three parameters: the number of messages sent, the total number of units of work performed (including multiplicities), and time. We present three protocols for solving the problem. All three are work optimal, doing O(n+t) work. The first has moderate costs in the remaining two parameters, sends $O(t\sqrt{t})$ messages, and takes O(n+t) time. This protocol can be easily modified to run in any completely asynchronous system equipped with a failure detection mechanism. The second sends only O(t log t) messages, but its running time is large (O(t2(n+t) 2n+t)). The third is essentially time optimal in the (usual) case in which there are no failures, and its time complexity degrades gracefully as the number of failures increases.
7572747
Set-theoretic completeness for epistemic and conditional logic
The standard approach to logic in the literature in philosophy and mathematics, which has also been adopted in computer science, is to define a language (the syntax), an appropriate class of models together with an interpretation of formulas in the language (the semantics), a collection of axioms and rules of inference characterizing reasoning (the proof theory), and then relate the proof theory to the semantics via soundness and completeness results. Here we consider an approach that is more common in the economics literature, which works purely at the semantic, set-theoretic level. We provide set-theoretic completeness results for a number of epistemic and conditional logics, and contrast the expressive power of the syntactic and set-theoretic approaches.
12474954
Modeling Belief in Dynamic Systems, Part II: Revisions and Update
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper (Friedman & Halpern, 1997), we introduce a new framework to model belief change. This framework combines temporal and epistemic modalities with a notion of plausibility, allowing us to examine the change of beliefs over time. In this paper, we show how belief revision and belief update can be captured in our framework. This allows us to compare the assumptions made by each method, and to better understand the principles underlying them. In particular, it shows that Katsuno and Mendelzon's notion of belief update (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991a) depends on several strong assumptions that may limit its applicability in artificial intelligence. Finally, our analysis allow us to identify a notion of minimal change that underlies a broad range of belief change operations including revision and update.
227589
Updating Sets of Probabilities
There are several well-known justifications for conditioning as the appropriate method for updating a single probability measure, given an observation. However, there is a significant body of work arguing for sets of probability measures, rather than single measures, as a more realistic model of uncertainty. Conditioning still makes sense in this context--we can simply condition each measure in the set individually, then combine the results--and, indeed, it seems to be the prel ferred updating procedure in the literature. But how justified is conditioning in this richer setting? Here we show, by considering an axiomatic account of conditioning given by van Fraassen, that the single-measure and sets-of-measures cases are very different. We show that van Fraassen's axiomatization for the former case is nowhere near sufficient for updating sets of measures. We give a considerably longer (and not as compelling) list of axioms that together force conditioning in this setting, and describe other update methods that are allowed once any of these axioms is dropped.