14707750
Probability Update: Conditioning vs. Cross-Entropy
Conditioning is the generally agreed-upon method for updating probability distributions when one learns that an event is certainly true. But it has been argued that we need other rules, in particular the rule of cross-entropy minimization, to handle updates that involve uncertain information. In this paper we re-examine such a case: van Fraassen's Judy Benjamin problem [1987], which in essence asks how one might update given the value of a conditional probability. We argue that--contrary to the suggestions in the literature--it is possible to use simple conditionalization in this case, and thereby obtain answers that agree fully with intuition. This contrasts with proposals such as cross-entropy, which are easier to apply but can give unsatisfactory answers. Based on the lessons from this example, we speculate on some general philosophical issues concerning probability update.
8145017
Characterizing the Common Prior Assumption
Abstract Logical characterizations of the common prior assumption (CPA) are investigated. Two approaches are considered. The first is called frame distinguishability , and is similar in spirit to the approaches considered in the economics literature. Results similar to those obtained in the economics literature are proved here as well, namely, that we can distinguish finite spaces that satisfy the CPA from those that do not in terms of disagreements in expectation. However, it is shown that, for the language used here, no formulas can distinguish infinite spaces satisfying the CPA from those that do not. The second approach considered is that of finding a sound and complete axiomatization. Such an axiomatization is provided; again, the key axiom involves disagreements in expectation. The same axiom system is shown to be sound and complete both in the finite and the infinite case. Thus, the two approaches to characterizing the CPA behave quite differently in the case of infinite spaces. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, D80.
2990183
Performing work efficiently in the presence of faults
We consider a system of t synchronous processes that communicate only by sending messages to one another, and together the processes must perform n independent units of work. Processes may fail by crashing; we want to guarantee that in every execution of the protocol in which at least one process survives, all n units of work will be performed. We consider three parameters: the number of messages sent, the total number of units of work performed (including multiplicities), and time. We present three protocols for solving the problem. All three are work optimal, doing O(n+t) work. The rst has moderate costs in the remaining two parameters, sends O(t p t) messages, and takes O(n+t) time. This protocol can be easily modied to run in any completely asynchronous system equipped with a failure detection mechanism. The second sends only O(tlogt) messages, but its running time is large (O(t 2 (n+t)2 n+t )). The third is essentially time optimal in the (usual) case in which there are no failures, and its time complexity degrades gracefully as the number of failures increases.
1225089
Defining Explanation in Probabilistic Systems
As probabilistic systems gain popularity and are coming into wider use, the need for a mechanism that explains the system's findings and recommendations becomes more critical. The system will also need a mechanism for ordering competing explanations. We examine two representative approaches to explanation in the literature-- one due to Gardenfors and one due to Pearl--and show that both suffer from significant problems. We propose an approach to defining a notion of "better explanation" that combines some of the features of both together with more recent work by Pearl and others on causality.
12474954
Modeling Belief in Dynamic Systems, Part II: Revisions and Update
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper (Friedman & Halpern, 1997), we introduce a new framework to model belief change. This framework combines temporal and epistemic modalities with a notion of plausibility, allowing us to examine the change of beliefs over time. In this paper, we show how belief revision and belief update can be captured in our framework. This allows us to compare the assumptions made by each method, and to better understand the principles underlying them. In particular, it shows that Katsuno and Mendelzon's notion of belief update (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991a) depends on several strong assumptions that may limit its applicability in artificial intelligence. Finally, our analysis allow us to identify a notion of minimal change that underlies a broad range of belief change operations including revision and update.
3055934
A knowledge-theoretic analysis of uniform distributed coordination and failure detectors
Abstract.It is shown that, in a precise sense, if there is no bound on the number of faulty processes in a system with unreliable but fair communication, Uniform Distributed Coordination (UDC) can be attained if and only if a system has perfect failure detectors. This result is generalized to the case where there is a bound t on the number of faulty processes. It is shown that a certain type of generalized failure detector is necessary and sufficient for achieving UDC in a context with at most t faulty processes. Reasoning about processes’ knowledge as to which other processes are faulty plays a key role in the analysis.
672129
Extensive games with possibly unaware players
Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they may not be aware of moves that they and other agents can make. We show how such games can be represented; the key idea is to describe the game from the point of view of every agent at every node of the game tree. We provide a generalization of Nash equilibrium and show that every game with awareness has a generalized Nash equilibrium. Finally, we extend these results to games with awareness of unawareness, where a player i may be aware that a player j can make moves that i is not aware of.
1036451
A new approach to updating beliefs
We define a new notion of conditional belief, which plays the same role for Dempster-Shafer belief functions as conditional probability does for probability functions. Our definition is different from the standard definition given by Dempster, and avoids many of the well-known problems of that definition. Just as the conditional probability Pr(.IB) is a probability function which is the result of conditioning on B being true, so too our conditional belief function BeZ(-IB) is a belief function which is the result of conditioning on B being true. We define the conditional belief as the lower envelope (that is, the inf) of a family of conditional probability functions, and provide a closedform expression for it. An alternate way of understanding our definition of conditional belief is provided by considering ideas from an earlier paper [Fagin and Halpern, 19891, where we connect belief functions with inner measures. In particular, we show here how to extend the definition of conditional probability to nonmeasurable sets, in order to get notions of inner and outer conditional probabilities, which can be viewed as best approximations to the true conditional probability, given our lack of information. Our definition of conditional belief turns out to be an exact analogue of our definition of inner conditional probability.
6543858
Decidability and Expressiveness for First-Order Logics of Probability
We consider decidability and expressiveness issues for two first-order logics of probability. In one, the probability is on possible worlds, while in the other, it is on the domain. It turns out that in both cases it takes very little to make reasoning about probability highly undecidable. We show that when the probability is on the domain, if the language contains only unary predicates then the validity problem is decidable. However, if the language contains even one binary predicate, the validity problem is ?21 complete, as hard as elementary analysis with free predicate and function symbols. With equality in the language, even with no other symbol, the validity problem is at least as hard as that for elementary analysis, ?1∞ hard. Thus, the logic cannot be axiomatized in either case. When we put the probability on the set of possible worlds, the validity problem is ?21 complete with as little as one unary predicate in the language, even without equality. With equality, we get ?1∞ hardness with only a constant symbol. We then turn our attention to an analysis of what causes this overwhelming complexity. For example, we show that if we require rational probabilities then we drop from ?21 to ?11. In many contexts it suffices to restrict attention to domains of bounded size; fortunately, the logics are decidable in this case. Finally, we show that, although the two logics capture quite different intuitions about probability, there is a precise sense in which they are equi-expressive.
2113595
Knowledge-based programs
Reasoning about activities in a distributed computer system at the level of the knowledge of individuals and groups allows us to abstract away from many concrete details of the system we are considering. In this paper, we make use of two notions introduced in our recent book to facilitate designing and reasoning about systems in terms of knowledge. The first notion is that of a knowledge-based program. A knowledge-based program is a syntactic object: a program with tests for knowledge. The second notion is that of a context, which captures the setting in which a program is to be executed. In a given context, a standard program (one without tests for knowledge) is represented by (i.e., corresponds in a precise sense to) a unique system. A knowledge-based program, on the other hand, may be represented by no system, one system, or many systems. In this paper, we provide a sufficient condition for a knowledge-based program to be represented in a unique way in a given context. This condition applies to many cases of interest, and covers many of the knowledge-based programs considered in the literature. We also completely characterize the complexity of determining whether a given knowledge-based program has a unique representation, or any representation at all, in a given finite-state context.
6723894
Equations between regular terms and an application to process logic
Regular terms with the Kleene operations &ugr;,;, and * can be thought of as operators on languages, generating other languages. An equation r1 &equil; r2 between two such terms is said to be satisfiable just in case languages exist which make this equation true. We show that the satisfiability problem even for *-free regular terms is undecidable. Similar techniques are used to show that a very natural extension of the Process Logic of Harel, Kozen and Parikh is undecidable.