Truthmaker Maximalism defended again
In this note we shall argue that Milne�s new effort does not refute Truthmaker Maximalism. According to Truthmaker Maximalism, every truth has a truthmaker. Milne (2005, Not every truth has a truthmaker. Analysis 65: 221�4; 2013, �Not every truth has a truthmaker II. Analysis 73: 473�81) has attempted to refute it using the following self-referential sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. Essential to his refutation is that M is like the Godel sentence and unlike the Liar, and one way in which Milne supports this assimilation is through the claim that his proof is essentially object-level and not semantic. In Section 2, we shall argue that Milne is still begging the question against Truthmaker Maximalism. In Section 3, we shall argue that even assimilating M to the Liar does not force the truthmaker maximalist to maintain the �dull option� that M does not express a proposition. There are other options open and, though they imply revising the logic in Milne�s reasoning, this is not one of the possible revisions he considers. In Section 4, we shall suggest that Milne�s proof requires an implicit appeal to semantic principles and notions. In Section 5, we shall point out that there are two important dissimilarities between M and the Godel sentence. Section 6 is a brief summary and conclusion.