On MILP-Based Automatic Search for Differential Trails Through Modular Additions with Application to Bel-T
Using modular addition as a source of nonlinearity is frequently used in many symmetric-key structures such as ARX and Lai–Massey schemes. At FSE’16, Fu et al. proposed a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP)-based method to handle the propagation of differential trails through modular additions assuming that the two inputs to the modular addition and the consecutive rounds are independent. However, this assumption does not necessarily hold. In this paper, we study the propagation of the XOR difference through the modular addition at the bit level and show the effect of the carry bit. Then, we propose a more accurate MILP model to describe the differential propagation through the modular addition taking into account the dependency between the consecutive modular additions. The proposed MILP model is utilized to launch a differential attack against Bel-T-256, which is a member of the Bel-T block cipher family that has been adopted recently as a national standard of the Republic of Belarus. In particular, we employ the concept of partial Differential Distribution Table to model the 8-bit S-Box of Bel-T using a MILP approach in order to automate finding a differential characteristic of the cipher. Then, we present a \(4\frac{1}{7}\)-round (out of 8) differential attack which utilizes a 3-round differential characteristic that holds with probability \(2^{-111}\). The data, time and memory complexities of the attack are \(2^{114}\) chosen plaintexts, \( 2^{237.14} \) \(4\frac{1}{7}\)-round encryptions, and \(2^{224}\) 128-bit blocks, respectively.