Who's in Charge? Accountability in Political Action Committees
Of all the resources of political power, none excites American suspicions quite as surely as money. When the source of the money is novel, well organized, and, above all, widely thought to be politically effective, suspicions turn quickly to apprehensions or even to real fear. That, in brief, seems to explain the preoccupation with political action committees (PACs) in the last few electoral cycles.' Most public and scholarly attention to the newly vigorous PACs has centered on two issues of influence and power. The first concerns their ability to affect the outcome of elections, both as a consequence of the sums of money they give to candidates and the precision and sophistication with which they do so. Implicit in this issue is a possible altering of the balance of political interests -the favoring of incumbents or conservatives, for example -as a result of the uneven distribution of PAC expenditures. The second is the issue of subsequent donor influence in legislatures: the belief that PACs will eventually influence some of the legislative behavior of their recipients. It is the issue summed up in that cynical cliche about "the best Congress money can buy." If these suppositions or fears are right, or even partially right, PACs have become major organizers of political power in American politics. And therein lies another major policy issue: their accountability. Americans have worried for