Attitude toward the Reasons for One's Actions: A Determinant of Perceived Freedom
The attitude of an actor toward the reasons for an action has been defended by Dworkin as the basis of freedom of action. This study tested the hypothesis that this consideration contributes to the perception of freedom by laymen. 18 items that described intentional actions were rated by 72 students along four dimensions: the actor's freedom of action, the valence of the actor's alternatives, the difference in valence of alternatives, and the actor's attitude toward the reason for his or her chosen action. Scale values for perceived freedom were correlated with scale values for the other three dimensions. The attitude variable, alone, significantly predicted perceived freedom, and it added significantly to prediction based on the other two variables. Dworkin's conception holds that the reason for an action is logically prior to a judgment of freedom. Some other conceptions imply that perceived freedom is a determinant of causal attribution.