Gruesome perceptual spaces
Discussion of Goodman's paradox seems to have become rather becalmed in recent years, after the initial explosion of interest. No doubt many will say thank goodness, if not Goodman, for that. But perhaps this is one sleeping dog we should not let lie. For while something of a consensus as to the right strategy for resolving Goodman's problem seems to have emerged, I will argue that this strategy does not address the strongest formulations of Goodman's basic idea. The paper is in six sections. In $1, I sketch the consensus resolution, in $II I set out a version of the paradox which that resolution cannot accommodate; $III considers the problems this version causes for confirmation theory and inductive logic while $IV considers objections which turn on the connections between grue predicates and scientific and causal explanation. In the fifth section I relate the discussion to some influential comments by Mary Hesse while in the final section I conclude with some morals to be drawn for scientific rationality.