Holism, thought, and the fate of metaphysics: counter-reply to Heal
The History: (Fodor & Lepore 1992) argued that many prominent arguments for semantic holism fail. In (Heal 1994), Jane Heal proposed a different understanding of holism, and attempted to show that it evades Fodor's and LePore's attacks. In (Cohen 1999 this issue) I claim that Heal's arguments for her own holism fail also. Heal responds in (Heal 1999 also this issue), holding that I misunderstood the arguments of (Heal 1994), and defending further her version of holism. I owe Heal thanks for the clarifications. Regarding the charge that I've misunderstood her, I think my interpretations have more going for them than Heal allows, but I propose not to quibble about exegesis here. Instead, I want to consider her latest defence of holism; once again, I shall conclude that Heal has not succeeded in defending any interesting version of holism.