The dispositional/categorical distinction
Following the demise of the simple subjunctive conditional “analysis” of dispositional concepts, a satisfactory account of the conceptual distinction between the dispositional and the categorical is needed. I argue that attempts to characterize the distinction due to Stephen Mumford, D. H. Mellor, and Elizabeth Prior, Robert Pargetter and Frank Jackson all fail. My new take on the old idea of grounding the distinction in conditional entailments avoids the problems that plague these other accounts. I propose that disposition ascriptions entail a certain kind of modal conditional, whereas categorical ascriptions do not. My goal in this paper is to defend a new account of the dispositional/categorical distinction. In so doing, I will criticize three other accounts, principally that given by Stephen Mumford, which is a centrepiece of his recent book. My new account is not a radical one. Like Mumford and many others, I believe the distinction lies in the fact that disposition ascriptions entail a type of conditional, whereas categorical ascriptions do not. I suggest replacing failed attempts with an account of the distinction based on the entailment of a particular kind of modal conditional. I The failure of analysis The prospects for analysing the concept of a disposition in terms of conditional statements about occurrences seem rather dismal. Reductionists about dispositions ought to find this preliminary result discouraging. If analysis fails, we lose one important reason to believe in the reduction of dispositions to occurrences. Many thanks to C. B. Martin, John Heil, William G. Lycan, Zena Ryder, and Mark Changizi. 1 Dispositions, Oxford UP, 1998. 2 At least, that is how I see the results of the recent debate: See C. B. Martin, 'Dispositions and Conditionals', Philosophical Quarterly, 44 (1994), pp. 1-8; David Lewis, 'Finkish Dispositions', Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997), pp. 143-58 (a response to Martin); Jonathan Kvanvig, ‘Lewis on Finkish Dispositions’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (1999); Alexander Bird, 'Dispositions and Antidotes', Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (1998), pp. 227-34 (a response to Lewis); Lars Bo Gundersen, ‘Bird on Dispositions and Antidotes’, Philosophical Quarterly, 50 (2000), pp. 227-9; Alexander Bird, ‘Further Antidotes: a Response to Gundersen’, Philosophical Quarterly, 50 (2000), pp. 229-33; George Molnar, ‘Are Dispositions Reducible?’, Philosophical Quarterly, 49 (1999), pp. 1-17; Wolfgang Malzkorn, ‘Realism, Functionalism and the Conditional Analysis of Dispositions’, Philosophical Quarterly, 50 (2000), pp. 452-469; Stephen Mumford, ‘Realism and the Conditional Analysis of Dispositions: Reply to Malzkorn’, Philosophical Quarterly, 51 (2001), pp. 375-8. 3 There are two types of reductionists: Those of a Humean or Rylean stripe wish to reduce dispositions to (possible) events, while functionalists wish to reduce dispositions to (possible) events plus causation, i.e. (possible) processes. (Lewis is a Humean in functionalist clothing.) In the main text, I use “occurrences” to cover both events and processes.