United States Policy Toward Southern Africa: Economic and Strategic Constraints
The Angolan civil war of 1975-1976 and the succeeding challenge to white rule in Rhodesia thrust southern Africa into American consciousness to a degree not matched since, perhaps, the Boer War. At the same time the contradictions and the general ineptitude of American foreign policy in southern Africa were revealed as never before. Only a small part of the ineptitude can be put down to "bad luck," an unfortunate guess as to Portugal's staying power in Africa. Rather, one must question why it is that American policy makers chose not only to believe that all the various forms of white rule in southern Africa would last, but to assume as well that American interests would best be served by helping them last. Such questions are not only of historical interest; even more urgently they must be asked about the assumptions on which American policy toward southern Africa continues to be based. Chief among these assumptions is that southern Africa is a part of the world in which the United States has definite "vital interests." The purpose of this article is to disprove the claim that there are tight economic and strategic constraints on American policy toward southern Africa, especially the supposition that it is possible to identify economic and strategic interests that are clearly "vital" to the United States and to its policy makers. Such interests could be considered vital for two reasons: first, they may be of such real and compelling importance that no prudent policy maker could neglect to take them into account; second, they may be so important either to the electorate at large or to certain politically powerful individuals and institutions