International Norms in Ethno-Territorial Disputes: Legitimacy and Efficacy in Outsiders’ Views of Independence and Irredentism
Abstract Ethno-national territorial disputes typically involve conflicting homeland claims between states and minority ethnic groups. Where such minority ethnic groups have cross-border ethnic kin who themselves constitute a dominant or influential ethnic group in a neighbouring state, separatist goals may take the form of either irredentism or independence. We conjecture that external sympathy for irredentism and independence may vary significantly, and that this variation may be an important influence in situations where secessionist groups and ethnic kin states have a choice between the two goals. Using a bargaining framework that controls for variation in relative power, status quo conditions and minority-side leadership preferences, we present experimental evidence indicating that external audiences are likely to support more confrontational policies in pursuit of independence than in pursuit of irredentism. Our evidence also indicates that independence attracts greater support largely because outsiders perceive it as a more legitimate goal; and that practical efficacy is not important in stimulating sympathy for either independence or irredentism. These results also support a broader argument in the literature on international norms – that such norms receive support not only because they may justify pre-existing goals or interests, but also because they are perceived as having greater legitimacy per se.