"Disobedient" generals and the politics of redemocratization: The Clinton administration and Haiti
U.S. policy toward political transitions in postwar Latin America has centered around the goal of securing regime changes that ensure the continuity of the state. This is true of Republican and Democratic administrations under both conservative and liberal presidents. While issues of democracy and dictatorship have remained secondary, the task of preserving the institutions of the state (civil bureaucracies, judiciaries, military and police, etc.) have taken priority. The level of Washington's concern over challenges to the state has been incomparably greater than over changes in regime because the state, especially its coercive institutions, is perceived as the ultimate arbiter of power and guarantor of basic U.S. interests in these societies. Consequently, Washington's policy toward the state in Latin America has remained constant; toward the regime it has been variable. Whether we are discussing Eisenhower policy toward Cuba, the Kennedy-Johnson approach toward the Dominican Republic and Brazil, Richard Nixon's hostility toward Allende's Chile, Jimmy Carter's policy toward Nicaragua and El Salvador, or Ronald Reagan's support for redemocratization in Guatemala, the thread that linked them all was a singular determination to preserve key state institutions