The Congressional Veto and Administrative Rulemaking
The twentieth century has not been kind to the United States Congress. Whereas in the late nineteenth century Woodrow Wilson could characterize American politics as "congressional government," the present century has been marked by a chronic sense of crisis regarding Congress's role in the political system. The scope of concern has encompassed not only the growth of presidential power, but the growth of bureaucratic power as well. Ironically, Congress itself has contributed in important ways to the erosion of legislative power and prerogative. Pressed by the exigencies of modern government and by its own limitations, Congress has created and sustained the institutionalized presidency and a vast bureaucratic establishment. It has delegated substantial amounts of discretionary authority to presidents, department heads, and agency officials. Yet it is also true that Congress has sought to adapt to the condition of modern government by strengthening its own capabilities. Most decades since the advent of the New Deal have had reform movements. At times signal and comprehensive changes have been made, ranging from committee consolidation in the 1940s to budget reform in the 1970s. In addition, as is usual in most organizations, incremental changes in structure, process, and resources have been an equally if not even more important mode of adaptive innovation. Along with staff growth and subcommittee expansion, one of the most important aspects of such change has been a growing reliance on a new and distinctive oversight device-the legislative veto.