Is redistribution to help the needy unjust
Is redistribution to help the needy unjust? According to an argument frequently pressed by libertarians (e.g. [2] and [4]), redistribution to assist those in need is indeed unjust, since rights are thereby violated. One of the most well known advocates of such a position is Robert Nozick. Nozick proclaims, for instance, that 'the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others,' ([4], p. ix) 'redistribution is a serious matter indeed, involving as it does, the violation of people's rights,' ([4], p. 168) and '[t]axation of earnings from labour is on a par with forced labour' ([4], p. 169). Nozick, along with many other libertarians, clearly believes that redistribution to assist the needy is unjust, and unjust because rights are thereby violated. Importantly, the rights that are apparently being violated are the rights to the freedom to do whatever we want with our wealth, income and property more generally.1 Those who maintain that their rights would be violated (if some of their property were to be redistributed to meet needs) frequently offer arguments for property rights which are labour-based (that is to say, they frequently recognize labour as the crucial feature in generating rights to property).2 As I briefly discuss, these labour-based arguments are far from unproblematic. However, one of the central theses I argue for in this article is that even if we are sympathetic to libertarian arguments for property rights, we cannot get to libertarians' desired conclusion that any redistribution to meet needs violates the rights in question. As I argue in this article, to assume that others' needs may not affect the validity of property rights, involves confusions about property rights. The kinds of cases under which property rights are justified and the nature of the right which is thereby accorded are not sufficient to render property rights immune from the sorts of claims others' needs can make on such rights. I begin by examining one of the most frequently invoked arguments for the defensibility of property rights in order to highlight some of the salient issues.