Morality incorporated? Some peculiarities of legal thinking
In his monograph on freedom, Pettit defends a comprehensive theory of personal and political freedom which carries ‘fitness to be held responsible’ as its hallmark: “You are free ... just so far as you are fit to be held responsible.”1 He argues, convincingly in our view, that this feature already entails two other well-known characteristics of full-blown free agency, namely under-determination and ownership. That is to say, (i) there is reason to think that any action φ for which an agent A can be held responsible is an action that is not fully determined by antecedents, so that A is left with a choice either to φ or not. And (ii), there is equal reason to think that if A is fit to be held responsible for φ, φ is something that A can and must “own”, believing – in a first-person, reflexive mode – “this is (or was, or is going to be) me φ-ing”. Note also that, throughout his argument, Pettit focuses on fitness to be held responsible in the specifically moral sense, which presupposes a basic distinction between good and bad in the following way: We proceed to impute blame on people for those actions we see as bad, and praise people for those we see as good. These imputations are rooted in moral sentiments such as resentment or gratitude, rather than in objective audits of one’s own or another person’s behavior. This, however, does not make them subjective or arbitrary. When asked what skills or accomplishments would allow us to say, in an objectified way, that A is fit to be held responsible, Pettit espouses a theory of “discursive control”2 in both ratiocinative and relational aspects of discursive interaction.3 Better than theories of freedom as rational (Davidson) or volitional (Frankfurt) choice, this theory is able to explain what it is for a person to be free; what it is, by extension, for a self to be free; and lastly, what it is for an action to be free. For instance, when I am threatened at gunpoint to hand over my wallet, I have a rational choice to do it or not, and I am in a position to exercise volitional control. But, being pressed hard, or indeed dominated, by another person, I am unable to engage in discursive interaction with the mugger on how I can be responsible for my choice. Apparently, this feature governs our understanding when we refuse to characterize handing over the wallet as exercising freedom. The organization of discursive control in society spills over into the political dimension of freedom as non-domination, and the institutional settings thereof in a democratic state under the rule of law. In the paper discussed in the present issue4 Pettit