The Rescue of King Hussein's Regime
The Israeli involvement in the September 1970 crisis, and her willingness to intervene militarily in Northern Jordan against the Syrian army, in order to save King Hussein's regime, were both the result of a crucial strategic decision that had been taken exactly two years before, in September 1968. The initial choice of the Israeli government was the ‘Palestinian Option,’ and it took about a year to formulate a new policy, to abandon this option and to adopt instead the ‘Jordanian Option,’ which became the Israeli official policy in September 1968. Jordan was regarded by the Israeli policymakers as an important strategic ally. So, when the September 1970 crisis erupted, saving of the King's regime, and preventing by that the creation of a Palestinian state, or even a graver result – a takeover of Jordan by Syria, seemed to be the only logical decision. Declassified documents released by Israel's state archives reveal that the Israeli decision makers acted in a very careful and prudent way. Although they all believed that an Israeli intervention was almost inevitable, in the case the Syrians would proceed south of Irbid, or if the Iraqi forces would intervene in the battles, they were not quarrelsome. The Israelis wanted to ensure, and to receive the US commitment and obligations, to many conditions and promises prior to agree to a military intervention. They also were aware of the opportunity to upgrade Israel's status as a strategic asset for the US, and they decided to exploit it.