"nuclear deterrence"
214612863
On Adapting Nuclear Deterrence to Reduce Nuclear Risk
Since the end of the Cold War, changes to the practice of nuclear deterrence by the United States have been pursued as part of a comprehensive approach aimed at reducing nuclear risks. These changes have included steps to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. defense and deterrence strategies. Looking to the future, the United States can do more, but only if the conditions are right. Policy makers must avoid steps that have superficial appeal but would actually result in a net increase in nuclear risk. These include steps that make U.S. nuclear deterrence unreliable for the problems for which it remains relevant.
Daedalus
Brad Roberts
226541513
University Education in Nuclear Deterrence
Large scale social debates ubiquitously have disparate viewpoints with disparate constituencies, and thus education in such important social issues necessitate teaching and learning many difference opinions and perspectives. Teaching history and social sciences in today's schools prepares students to address large scale (perhaps catastrophically global) social issues like nuclear deterrence. The American center for strategic and budgetary assessments in Washington, D.C. announces the extraordinary monetary costs to maintain deterrence, and it is easy to argue those moneys could be better spent elsewhere, demanding critical thinking (stemming from solid education) of this global social issue. This manuscript explores nuclear deterrence education within United States civilian institutions of higher learning. The subjects of nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons are prevalent throughout many academic programs and initial data indicates these topics are sometimes not taught in a balanced fashion, and the potential for bias can lead to demotion of some university education programs to comprise instead mere indoctrination. No doubt, nuclear weapons have a long and controversial history, but the current American national security strategy considers nuclear weapons vital to the ability to preserve peace and stability. Data analysis is performed in veins: qualitative examination of fifty six nuclear weapons class syllabi and the vitas and curricula vitae (CV) of each instructor. Readings and assignments for each course were examined and each syllabus was searched for the presence of important key words, both positive and negative. Key words like deterrence, modernization, surety, victim, and abolish were crucial to understanding the scope of the classes. In addition, a study of the course instructor's background provides a glimpse into their qualifications to teach in the subject area of nuclear weapons and deterrence comprehensively. Based on this methodology, each class and instructor were given an assessment, and the results reveal that some courses were taught in a negative and biased manner, and some instructors lacked sufficient background to teach such topics.
Ian Kurtz
213473363
Understanding Nuclear Deterrence Within the International Constitutional Architecture
Once they were created, and scientific knowledge spread, it has proved very difficult to remove nuclear weapons from the international security landscape. However, if the broader international constitutional architecture, which includes the UN Charter as well as the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is considered, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence can be contained and, moreover, pathways to nuclear disarmament can be laid. This chapter places the non proliferation regime and the doctrine of nuclear deterrence within the wider constitutional order derived from the UN Charter. In this order 'security' and 'law' are separate but related, and nuclear deterrence sits uneasily between the two. 'Security' is defined by the five Permanent Members/recognised nuclear weapon States. This has an influence on non proliferation law especially as regards non State actors, executive law making, and non forcible measures against Iran and North Korea. Beyond these measures the five States have used their position in the constitutional order to protect the existing nuclear hierarchy and with it the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Although the UN General Assembly and disarmament bodies have provided balance by consensual law making in the area of non proliferation law, the fulfilment of Article VI of the NPT will require a recognition and management of nuclear deterrence.
Nigel D White
212938694
Running Out of (Legal) Excuses: Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Era of the Prohibition Treaty
Since the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) States that rely on extended nuclear deterrence as a cornerstone of their security policy are now in a less legally defensible position with respect to their obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Using Australia as the primary example, this chapter argues that the hostility of nuclear umbrella States towards the TPNW undermines their contention that they remain committed to nuclear disarmament under Article VI. It demonstrates that Australia's main criticism of the TPNW that banning nuclear weapons is not an effective measure for disarmament is a weak legal justification designed to mask the fact that it is prioritising nuclear deterrence over nuclear elimination.
Monique C Cormier
214419893
Nuclear Deterrence in a New Age of Disruptive Technologies and Great Power Competition
An increasingly dangerous 'second nuclear age' is threatening the survival of humankind as geopolitical competition increases between established nuclear powers, unstable 'rogue states' and transnational terrorist groups seek nuclear arms, and an emerging technological arms race breaks out. In this context nuclear weapons look set to remain a permanent feature of the international strategic landscape, making it critical that developments undermining nuclear deterrence and strategic stability are interrogated. This chapter does this in four stages. First, it outlines the evolution of nuclear deterrence theory during the Cold War, and how changes after the Cold War led to a reconceptualization of deterrence theory and strategy by the United States. Second, it shows that a raft of emerging technologies, including ballistic missiles defenses, cyber technologies, Artificial Intelligence and social media, are undermining the foundations of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. Third, it explains why contemporary international politics is not conducive to the nuclear disarmament agenda, as great power competition escalates between the U.S. and China, and U.S. and Russia. It concludes by asserting that the arms control regime must be reconfigured to address the most destabilising features of the contemporary security environment.
Reuben Steff
230582829
Pakistan's Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia
The analysis is undertaken to evaluate the lumbering state of nuclear deterrence in South Asia. It ponders to foresee the veracity of India Pakistan strategic stability by deliberating upon the equivocal doctrines and ambiguity on nuclear weapon postures at both ends. Communication, Command and Control Systems (C3S) traditionally considered as a robust feature of nuclear apparatus, faces an extraordinary challenge in the age of cyber propaganda and disinformation. The escalating tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad over the Kashmir dispute are deemed alarming for the international community as the two countries particularly India possess no ceding traits within its present foreign policy behaviour. The successful working of nuclear deterrence depends upon the rationality of state leadership. It is questionable whether it may be so in the case of ruling Bhartiya Janata Party whose war mongering anti Pakistan fervour continues to be inspired by religious fanaticism and jingoism. The animus surviving for several decades in India Pakistan bilateral coalesce has the potential to transform the South Asian region into a nuclear cauldron the consequences of which would be appalling for states in the region and beyond.
Ramla Khan Zaeem Hassan Mehmood
214024023
Precarious Peace: Nuclear Deterrence and Defence Doctrines of Nuclear Weapon States in the Post Cold War Era
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the deterrence and defence policies of the nuclear weapon States under the NPT the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, and France. It begins by reviewing the concept of deterrence, followed by an examination of each nuclear weapon State's present stance on nuclear deterrence within its respective military doctrine. It subsequently looks at the requirements under Article VI of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) moving to explore concerns regarding disarmament matters, noting the continued reliance on deterrence as a central feature of military protection and defence doctrine. Instead of deterrence becoming an out dated concept that should have expired with the Cold War, it remains the status quo, despite requirements to the contrary under Article VI of the NPT.
Jonathan L Black-Branch
211441922
The Status of Nuclear Deterrence Under International Law in Light of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear deterrence is not illegal under international law but is being delegitimised, in part as a result of the adoption of the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty prohibits not only possession, control over, threat of use, and use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; it also precludes a state party from encouraging and assisting anyone to engage in such prohibited activities. Moreover, artificial intelligence, offensive cyber operations, and enhanced non nuclear weapons with strategic impact are combining to render nuclear deterrents ineffective while greatly increasing the risks of unintended or accidental use. Conflict in February 2019 between two nuclear armed states, India and Pakistan, has shown the dangers and frailties of nuclear deterrence. Nonetheless, nuclear armed states are engaging in major nuclear weapon modernisation programmes, resulting in a new nuclear arms race. This new race is characterised by the development and deployment of hypersonic missiles containing multiple independently targetable warheads as well as by variable yield nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament, which was negotiated by statesmen at the height of the Cold War, is urgently needed.
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 21 (2018)
Stuart Casey-Maslen
231681486
Deterrence in the age of artificial intelligence autonomy: a paradigm shift in nuclear deterrence theory and practice?
ABSTRACT How might nuclear deterrence be affected by the proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous systems? How might the introduction of intelligent machines affect human to human (and human to machine) deterrence? Are existing theories of deterrence still applicable in the age of AI and autonomy? The article builds on the rich body of work on nuclear deterrence theory and practice and highlights some of the variegated and contradictory especially human cognitive psychological effects of AI and autonomy for nuclear deterrence. It argues that existing theories of deterrence are not applicable in the age of AI and autonomy and introducing intelligent machines into the nuclear enterprise will affect nuclear deterrence in unexpected ways with fundamentally destabilising outcomes. The article speaks to a growing consensus calling for conceptual innovation and novel approaches to nuclear deterrence, building on nascent post classical deterrence theorising that considers the implications of introducing non human agents into human strategic interactions.
James Johnson
228908030
Sound Matters: How Sonic Formations Shape the Nuclear Deterrence and Non Proliferation Regimes
Sound matters for international political sociology. Drawing upon literature from cultural geography and sound studies, we argue that sound contributes to political dynamics that are constitutive of world politics. To capture these dynamics, we offer a set of conceptual frameworks to analyze sound. First, we differentiate the concept of sound from noise and show the importance of doing so. Second, we introduce "sonic formations" as a means of capturing how sound contributes to world politics. Third, we make the case for analyzing sound's historicity, adaptability, relationality, and performativity (SHARP) in any given context. Fourth, using sonic formations and the SHARP framework, we examine an illustrative case study: the nuclear deterrence and non proliferation regimes. By focusing on the role of sound in these regimes, our preliminary findings demonstrate the utility for the field of undertaking additional work to capture the wider significance of sound. This includes its contributions to shaping relations of power.
Xavier Guillaume Kyle Grayson