Ethics of Belief
The broad question asked under the heading “Ethics of Belief” is: What ought one believe? An ethics of belief attempts to uncover the norms that guide belief formation and maintenance. The dominant view among contemporary philosophers is that evidential norms do; I should always follow my evidence and only believe when the evidence is sufficient to support my belief. This view is called “evidentialism,” although, as we shall see, this term gets applied to a number of views that can be distinguished from one another. Evidentialists often cite David Hume (1999: 110) as their historic exemplar who said “a wise man … proportions his beliefs to the evidence” and thus argued against the reasonableness of believing in miracles (see Hume, David; Wisdom). Those who argue that there can be good practical reasons for believing, independent of one's evidence, can turn for inspiration to Blaise Pascal (1966: 124), who argued that the best reason to form a belief in God was a practical one, namely the possibility of avoiding eternal suffering (see Reasons; Reasons for Action, Morality and; Faith). 
 
 
Keywords: 
 
ethics; 
James, William; 
philosophy; 
Williams, Bernard; 
duty and obligation; 
knowledge; 
rationality; 
responsibility