Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation
What value should we place on political activity? Is it intrinsically valuable, engaged in for its own sake as part of the good life, as essential to complete development as a human being? Is it, on the other hand, an evil to be avoided at all costs or at best engaged in as a necessary means toward other, nonpolitical goals? Where did Aristotle stand on this issue? He is often seen as supporting the view that politics and political activity belong to the good life itself. This appears implicit, for example, is his doctrine that man is a political animal, in his concept of political rule as the alternation of ruling and being ruled among equals, and in his definition of citizenship as having a share in deliberative and judicial office.' On the other hand, there are parts of Aristotle that appear to support withdrawal from politics or at least reluctant participation. In both Ethics, he argues for the supremacy of philosophical contemplation and clearly prefers the life of the philosopher over the life of the statesman, arguments that are repeated in the Politics. Leisure, not political activity, is the ethical goal to be pursued by his ideal state. If someone of outstanding ability appears, the virtuous citizen will willingly surrender power to him, without, it appears, any loss of virtue or happiness.2 As we shall see, neither of these interpretations is wholly sustainable, and each, as Aristotle himself might have said, has something to contribute to the truth. Aristotle does not reject the whole of ethical and political life in favor of philosophy; but neither is he a wholehearted advocate of political participation as essential for happiness.