Concerning Lev Shestov's conception of ethics
Anyone acquainted with Shestov's ideas knows that this philosopher regards ethics, together with reason, as being the enemies of man. Usually readers experience great difficulty in accepting his position on this matter, and it frightens them. It is as if Shestov is pushing his readers right out of their depth. In order to put right 'damage' of that kind, Professor George Kline has taken the step of amending Shestov's use of the word 'ethics' by adding the word 'rational' and thus arriving at the term 'rational ethics'. Doing so suggests that in Shestov's scheme of things there is another ethics, which is a somehow pure, good, authentic ethics, one that saves the philosopher from pronouncing an absolute condem nation of ethics as such. Reading Shestov is rendered bearable and acceptable again. Be that as it may, I do not think it permissible to proceed in that manner, for Shestov himself never speaks of two different kinds of ethics. Here I wish to examine two important matters: on one hand, to probe the question regarding what we fear if we are obliged to reject ethics; on the other hand, to consider where Shestov's antipathy to ethics springs from. I am struck by the fact that almost all his readers react alike: "He is a very beguiling thinker, but...." This "but" could equally well be conveyed by the words "But of course it is necessary to purify and correct his texts because it is plain that he exaggerates. What he writes could even be dangerous." Didn't Filosofov and Frank reproach him for "corrupting young people," that same notorious reproach which, as we know, cost Socrates his life? This means that Shestov's works do conceal some kind of threat, just as do the works of Nietzsche and even those of Dostoevskij, though people have always tried, and continue trying, to ascribe holy and prophetic