What is it to be religiously mistaken? A Pragmatist Perspective
philosophers have always been attracted to disagreements, perhaps because they almost immediately lead to philosophically exciting questions about how to distinguish positions, theories, and so forth, that are right from those that are mistaken. Philosophy of religion is certainly no exception, and, here, focus has often been on disagreements over belief in the existence of the God of classical theism as manifested in the great Abrahamic traditions, on the one hand, and atheism, on the other—though disagreements between religious traditions have also attracted attention. Particularly in AngloAmerican philosophy of religion, these disagreements have generally been conceptualized in epistemological terms: Which (if any) religious beliefs are epistemically justified or warranted? This is a debate where the philosophical expertise in epistemology seems to have practical application, and over the years, a great number of philosophers have joined it. Where does American pragmatism fit into this picture? Well, pragmatists take disagreement to signal a need for reflection and, hopefully, mediation, and if philosophers can contribute here, then they should (James, Pragmatism 1–2). Also, pragmatists such as C. S. Peirce and John Dewey have stressed the important epistemological role that cases where we are mistaken serve as the nodes of inquiry (Dewey, Logic; Peirce). Not only is it easier to detect cases where we are mistaken, as Karl Popper rightly emphasized (Popper); they are also, pragmatists insist, important in that they concretely threaten our well-being, and we need to do something in response (James, Will to Believe 63ff.). Speaking from a pragmatist perspective, then, the judgment that some people whom we encounter are religiously mistaken is no idle or disinterested statement of fact: it is to claim (a) that something is wrong with the way they act in certain situations, and (b) that this has significant negative practical consequences for their and/or others’ welfare, and, hence, (c) that—ideally,