Presentism and Ockham's Way Out
Presentism is, roughly, the thesis that only present objects exist; eternalism is, roughly, the thesis that past, present, and future objects exist. Ockham's way out purports to be a way out of fatalist arguments for the impossibility of free action. Fatalist arguments come in two varieties: logical and theological. Arguments for logical fatalism run something like this: 1 Let t-1B = a time that obtained exactly 1 billion years ago. Let p S abbreviate: one billion years after t-1B, S will perform A. Let t S abbreviate: it is now exactly one billion years after t-1B. 1. (q S & t S) is true, and S does not have, and never had, any choice about (q S & t S). 2. [(q S & t S)  r S ]. † We are grateful to Michael Bergmann, Alvin Plantinga and Dean Zimmerman for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, and we are especially grateful to Michael Bergmann for many helpful conversations and extended correspondence about the issues discussed herein. 1 Those familiar with the literature on fatalism will note that fatalist arguments more commonly open with a premise like this: (1*) It is true at t-1B that S performs A at t and S does not have, and never had, any choice about the proposition that it is true at t-1B that S performs A at t. And, of course, subsequent premises would then have to be modified accordingly. For present purposes, however, we have chosen to work with a 'presentist-friendly' version of the standard fatalist argument—that is, a version that takes tense seriously and that doesn't implicitly presuppose (as 1* does—for example, by employing the locution 'it is true at t-1B ') that non-present times exist.