Lebenswelt and lebensformen: Husserl and Wittgenstein on the goal and method of philosophy
In recent discussions of the foundations of the social sciences, little attention has been given to the conception of "grounding" itself. Appeals frequently have been made to philosophy, notably to the phenomenology of Husserl and the analytic philosophy of Wittgenstein. Some approaches, e.g., ethnomethod? ology, claim both as intellectual progenitors. Problems arise, however, in the attempts to synthesize two such diverse programs. Not the least of these is the difference between the two thinkers' views on language and certainty. On these and other issues, Husserl's goal of "philosophy as rigorous science" and Wittgen? stein's "therapeutic" practice are widely at odds. Here we can only begin the comparison that is a necessary step in evaluating the potential contribution of each approach to the issue of grounding the social sciences.