18584094
Cognitive sophistication does not attenuate the bias blind spot.
The so-called bias blind spot arises when people report that thinking biases are more prevalent in others than in themselves. Bias turns out to be relatively easy to recognize in the behaviors of others, but often difficult to detect in one's own judgments. Most previous research on the bias blind spot has focused on bias in the social domain. In 2 studies, we found replicable bias blind spots with respect to many of the classic cognitive biases studied in the heuristics and biases literature (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Further, we found that none of these bias blind spots were attenuated by measures of cognitive sophistication such as cognitive ability or thinking dispositions related to bias. If anything, a larger bias blind spot was associated with higher cognitive ability. Additional analyses indicated that being free of the bias blind spot does not help a person avoid the actual classic cognitive biases. We discuss these findings in terms of a generic dual-process theory of cognition.
143452957
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty.
12293631
Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment
Perhaps the simplest and the most basic qualitative law of probability is the conjunction rule: The probability of a conjunction, P(A&B), cannot exceed the probabilities of its constituents, P(A) and P(B), because the extension (or the possibility set) of the conjunction is included in the extension of its constituents. Judgments under uncertainty, however, are often mediated by intuitive heuristics that are not bound by the conjunction rule. A conjunction can be more representative than one of its constituents, and instances of a specific category can be easier to imagine or to retrieve than instances of a more inclusive category. The representativeness and availability heuristics therefore can make a conjunction appear more probable than one of its constituents. This phenomenon is demonstrated in a variety of contexts including estimation of word frequency, personality judgment, medical prognosis, decision under risk, suspicion of criminal acts, and political forecasting. Systematic violations of the conjunction rule are observed in judgments of lay people and of experts in both between-subjects and within-subjects comparisons. Alternative interpretations of the conjunction fallacy are discussed and attempts to combat it are explored. mtribution represented.
7985259
Individual differences in rational thought.
Much research in the last 2 decades has demonstrated that humans deviate from normative models of decision making and rational judgment. In 4 studies involving 954 participants, the authors explored the extent to which measures of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions can predict discrepancies from normative responding on a variety of tasks from the heuristics and biases literature including the selection task, belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, argument evaluation, base-rate use, covariation detection, hypothesis testing, outcome bias, if-only thinking, knowledge calibration, hindsight bias, and the false consensus paradigm. Significant relationships involving cognitive ability were interpreted as indicating algorithmic-level limitations on the computation of the normative response. Relationships with thinking dispositions were interpreted as indicating that styles of epistemic regulation can predict
197667095
Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?
Much research in the last two decades has demonstrated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision making and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be interpreted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experimenter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implications of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance errors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations underlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Unexpected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.
53595398
Heuristics and Biases as Measures of Critical Thinking: Associations with Cognitive Ability and Thinking Dispositions
In this article, the authors argue that there are a range of effects usually studied within cognitive psychology that are legitimately thought of as aspects of critical thinking: the cognitive biases studied in the heuristics and biases literature. In a study of 793 student participants, the authors found that the ability to avoid these biases was moderately correlated with a more traditional laboratory measure of critical thinking—the ability to reason logically when logic conflicts with prior belief. The correlation between these two classes of critical thinking skills was not due to a joint connection with general cognitive ability because it remained statistically significant after the variance due to cognitive ability was partialed out. Measures of thinking dispositions (actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition) predicted unique variance in both classes of critical thinking skills after general cognitive ability had been controlled.
144362953
Need for Cognition and Choice Framing Effects
Two experiments tested the hypothesis that framing biases in decision making would affect more strongly individuals with relatively low levels of need for cognition (NC). Participants were classified as high or low NC based on responses to a standard scale and subsequently were exposed to one of two framings of a choice problem. Different choice problems were used in each experiment, modeled after those developed by Kahneman and Tversky. Experiment 1 employed a monetary task and Experiment 2 a medical decision-making task. Consistent with expectations, framing effects on choice were observed in both experiments, but only for low NC participants. High NC participants were unaffected by problem framing, showing that they were less susceptible to attempts to alter their frame of reference.
143471573
Developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning: The role of cognitive capacity, instructions, thinking styles, and relevant knowledge
In three experiments we explored developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning, taking into account the effects of cognitive capacity, thinking styles, and instructions. Normative responding increased with grade levels and cognitive capacity in all experiments, and it showed a negative relationship with superstitious thinking. The effect of instructions (in Experiments 2 and 3) was moderated by level of education and cognitive capacity. Specifically, only higher-grade students with higher cognitive capacity benefited from instructions to reason on the basis of logic. The implications of these findings for research on the development of probabilistic reasoning are also discussed.
54852259
Executive functions in decision making: An individual differences approach
This individual differences study examined the relationships between three executive functions (updating, shifting, and inhibition), measured as latent variables, and performance on two cognitively demanding subtests of the Adult Decision Making Competence battery: Applying Decision Rules and Consistency in Risk Perception. Structural equation modelling showed that executive functions contribute differentially to performance in these two tasks, with Applying Decision Rules being mainly related to inhibition and Consistency in Risk Perception mainly associated to shifting. The results suggest that the successful application of decision rules requires the capacity to selectively focus attention and inhibit irrelevant (or no more relevant) stimuli. They also suggest that consistency in risk perception depends on the ability to shift between judgement contexts.
22824496
The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is designed to measure the tendency to override a prepotent response alternative that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response. In this study, we showed that the CRT is a more potent predictor of performance on a wide sample of tasks from the heuristics-and-biases literature than measures of cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, and executive functioning. Although the CRT has a substantial correlation with cognitive ability, a series of regression analyses indicated that the CRT was a unique predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks. It accounted for substantial additional variance after the other measures of individual differences had been statistically controlled. We conjecture that this is because neither intelligence tests nor measures of executive functioning assess the tendency toward miserly processing in the way that the CRT does. We argue that the CRT is a particularly potent measure of the tendency toward miserly processing because it is a performance measure rather than a self-report measure.
6863319
Is probability matching smart? Associations between probabilistic choices and cognitive ability
In three experiments involving over 1,500 university students (n=1,557) and two different probabilistic choice tasks, we found that the utility-maximizing strategy of choosing the most probable alternative was not the majority response. In a story problem version of a probabilistic choice task in which participants chose from among five different strategies, the maximizing response and the probabilitymatching response were each selected by a similar number of students (roughly 35% of the sample selected each). In a more continuous, or trial-by-trial, task, the utility-maximizing response was chosen by only one half as many students as the probability-matching response. More important, in both versions of the task, the participants preferring the utility-maximizing response were significantly higher in cognitive ability than were the participants showing a probability-matching tendency. Critiques of the traditional interpretation of probability matching as nonoptimal may well help explain why some humans are drawn to the nonmaximizing behavior of probability matching, but the traditional heuristics and biases interpretation can most easily accommodate the finding that participants high in computational ability are more likely to carry out the rule-based cognitive procedures that lead to maximizing behavior.
55806468
Natural myside bias is independent of cognitive ability
Natural myside bias is the tendency to evaluate propositions from within one's own perspective when given no instructions or cues (such as within-participants conditions) to avoid doing so. We defined the participant's perspective as their previously existing status on four variables: their sex, whether they smoked, their alcohol consumption, and the strength of their religious beliefs. Participants then evaluated a contentious but ultimately factual proposition relevant to each of these demographic factors. Myside bias is defined between-participants as the mean difference in the evaluation of the proposition between groups with differing prior status on the variable. Whether an individual difference variable (such as cognitive ability) is related to the magnitude of the myside bias is indicated by whether the individual difference variable interacts with the between-participants status variable. In two experiments involving a total of over 1400 university students (n = 1484) and eight different comparisons, we found very little evidence that participants of higher cognitive ability displayed less natural myside bias. The degree of myside bias was also relatively independent of individual differences in thinking dispositions. We speculate that ideas from memetic theory and dual-process theory might help to explain why natural myside bias is quite dissociated from individual difference variables.
15829678
On the failure of cognitive ability to predict myside and one-sided thinking biases
Two critical thinking skills—the tendency to avoid myside bias and to avoid one-sided thinking—were examined in three different experiments involving over 1200 participants and across two different paradigms. Robust indications of myside bias were observed in all three experiments. Participants gave higher evaluations to arguments that supported their opinions than those that refuted their prior positions. Likewise, substantial one-side bias was observed—participants were more likely to prefer a one-sided to a balanced argument. There was substantial variation in both types of bias, but we failed to find that participants of higher cognitive ability displayed less myside bias or less one-side bias. Although cognitive ability failed to associate with the magnitude of the myside bias, the strength and content of the prior opinion did predict the degree of myside bias shown. Our results indicate that cognitive ability—as defined by traditional psychometric indicators—turns out to be surprisingly independent of two of the most important critical thinking tendencies discussed in the literature.
11678342
Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making
This paper introduces a three-item "Cognitive Reflection Test" (CRT) as a simple measure of one type of cognitive ability—the ability or disposition to reflect on a question and resist reporting the first response that comes to mind. The author will show that CRT scores are predictive of the types of choices that feature prominently in tests of decision-making theories, like expected utility theory and prospect theory. Indeed, the relation is sometimes so strong that the preferences themselves effectively function as expressions of cognitive ability—an empirical fact begging for a theoretical explanation. The author examines the relation between CRT scores and two important decision-making characteristics: time preference and risk preference. The CRT scores are then compared with other measures of cognitive ability or cognitive "style." The CRT scores exhibit considerable difference between men and women and the article explores how this relates to sex differences in time and risk preferences. The final section addresses the interpretation of correlations between cognitive abilities and decision-making characteristics.
143690070
Executive functions in insight versus non-insight problem solving: An individual differences approach
This study investigated the roles of the executive functions of inhibition and switching, and of verbal and visuo-spatial working memory capacities, in insight and non-insight tasks. A total of 18 insight tasks, 10 non-insight tasks, and measures of individual differences in working memory capacities, switching, and inhibition were administered to 120 participants. Performance on insight problems was not linked with executive functions of inhibition or switching but was linked positively to measures of verbal and visuo-spatial working memory capacities. Non-insight task performance was positively linked to the executive function of switching (but not to inhibition) and to verbal and visuo-spatial working memory capacities. These patterns regarding executive functions were maintained when the insight and non-insight composites were split into verbal and spatial insight and non-insight composite scores. The results are discussed in relation to dual processing accounts of thinking.
149191349
Thinking, Fast and Slow
Daniel Kahneman, recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his seminal work in psychology challenging the rational model of judgment and decision making, is one of the world's most important thinkers. His ideas have had a profound impact on many fields - including business, medicine, and politics - but until now, he has never brought together his many years of research in one book. In "Thinking, Fast and Slow", Kahneman takes us on a groundbreaking tour of the mind and explains the two systems that drive the way we think and make choices. One system is fast, intuitive, and emotional; the other is slower, more deliberative, and more logical. Kahneman exposes the extraordinary capabilities - and also the faults and biases - of fast thinking, and reveals the pervasive influence of intuitive impressions on our thoughts and behaviour. The importance of properly framing risks, the effects of cognitive biases on how we view others, the dangers of prediction, the right ways to develop skills, the pros and cons of fear and optimism, the difference between our experience and memory of events, the real components of happiness - each of these can be understood only by knowing how the two systems work together to shape our judgments and decisions. Drawing on a lifetime's experimental experience, Kahneman reveals where we can and cannot trust our intuitions and how we can tap into the benefits of slow thinking. He offers practical and enlightening insights into how choices are made in both our professional and our personal lives-and how we can use different techniques to guard against the mental glitches that often get us into trouble. "Thinking, Fast and Slow" will transform the way you take decisions and experience the world.
18516635
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a survey of 84 participants at the 1969 meetings of the Mathematical Psychology Society and the American Psychological Association (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). The respondents, including several authors of statistics texts, were asked realistic questions about the robustness of statistical estimates and the replicability of research results. The article commented tongue-in-heek on the prevalence of a belief that the law of large numbers applies to small numbers as well: Respondents placed too much confidence in the results of small samples, and their statistical judgments showed little sensitivity to sample size. The mathematical psychologists who participated in the survey not only should have known better – they did know better. Although their intuitive guesses were off the mark, most of them could have computed the correct answers on the back of an envelope. These sophisticated individuals apparently had access to two distinct approaches for answering statistical questions: one that is spontaneous, intuitive, effortless, and fast; and another that is deliberate, rule-governed, effortful, and slow. The persistence of large biases in the guesses of experts raised doubts about the educability of statistical intuitions. Moreover, it was known that the same biases affect choices in the real world, where researchers commonly select sample sizes that are too small to provide a fair test of their hypotheses (Cohen, 1969, 1992).
12246493
Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition.
This article reviews a diverse set of proposals for dual processing in higher cognition within largely disconnected literatures in cognitive and social psychology. All these theories have in common the distinction between cognitive processes that are fast, automatic, and unconscious and those that are slow, deliberative, and conscious. A number of authors have recently suggested that there may be two architecturally (and evolutionarily) distinct cognitive systems underlying these dual-process accounts. However, it emerges that (a) there are multiple kinds of implicit processes described by different theorists and (b) not all of the proposed attributes of the two kinds of processing can be sensibly mapped on to two systems as currently conceived. It is suggested that while some dual-process theories are concerned with parallel competing processes involving explicit and implicit knowledge systems, others are concerned with the influence of preconscious processes that contextualize and shape deliberative reasoning and decision-making.
142709805
Thinking Twice: Two minds in one brain
1. The two minds hypothesis 2. Evolutionary foundations 3. Two ways of knowing 4. Two ways of deciding 5. Reasoning and imagination 6. Thinking about the social world 7. Consciousness and control 8. The two minds in action: co-operation and conflict Addendum: Some technical issues References
2404654
Social cognitive neuroscience: a review of core processes.
Social cognitive neuroscience examines social phenomena and processes using cognitive neuroscience research tools such as neuroimaging and neuropsychology. This review examines four broad areas of research within social cognitive neuroscience: (a) understanding others, (b) understanding oneself, (c) controlling oneself, and (d) the processes that occur at the interface of self and others. In addition, this review highlights two core-processing distinctions that can be neurocognitively identified across all of these domains. The distinction between automatic versus controlled processes has long been important to social psychological theory and can be dissociated in the neural regions contributing to social cognition. Alternatively, the differentiation between internally-focused processes that focus on one's own or another's mental interior and externally-focused processes that focus on one's own or another's visible features and actions is a new distinction. This latter distinction emerges from social cognitive neuroscience investigations rather than from existing psychological theories demonstrating that social cognitive neuroscience can both draw on and contribute to social psychological theory.
142717542
Who Is Rational?: Studies of individual Differences in Reasoning
Contents: Preface. Conceptualizing Rationality: Some Preliminaries. Performance Errors and Computational Limitations, With R.F. West.The Inappropriate Norm Argument. The Problem of Rational Task Construal. Dual-Process Theories and Evolutionary Adaptation Versus Normative Rationality. Thinking Dispositions and Decontextualized Reasoning, With R.F. West, W.C. Sa.The Fundamental Computational Bias. Has Human Irrationality Been Empirically Demonstrated?
142227166
Rationality and the Reflective Mind
Preface CHAPTER I: Dual-Process Theory and the Great Rationality Debate The Great Rationality Debate Individual Differences in the Great Rationality Debate Dual Process Theory: The Current State of Play Properties of Type 1 and Type 2 Processing Dual-Process Theory and Human Goals: Implications for the Rationality Debate The Rest of This Book: Complications in Dual Process Theory and Their Implications for the Concepts of Rationality and Intelligence CHAPTER II: Differentiating the Algorithmic Mind and the Reflective Mind Unpacking Type 2 Functioning Using Individual Differences Cognitive Ability and Thinking Dispositions Partition the Algorithmic and the Reflective Mind Intelligence Tests and Critical Thinking Tests Partition the Algorithmic from the Reflective Mind Thinking Dispositions as Independent Predictors of Rational Thought CHAPTER III: The Key Functions of the Reflective Mind and the Algorithmic Mind that Support Human Rationality So-Called "Executive Functioning" Measures Tap the Algorithmic Mind and Not the Reflective Mind CHAPTER IV: The Tri-Process Model and Serial Associative Cognition The Cognitive Miser and Focal Bias Converging Evidence in the Dual Process Literature CHAPTER V: The Master Rationality Motive and the Origins of the Nonautonomous Mind Metarepresentation and Higher-Order Preferences What Motivates the Search for Rational Integration? The Master Rationality Motive as a Psychological Construct Evolutionary Origins of the Master Rational Motive and Type 2 Processing CHAPTER VI: A Taxonomy of Rational Thinking Problems (with Richard F. West) Dual-Process Theory and Knowledge Structures The Preliminary Taxonomy Heuristics and Biases Tasks in Terms of the Taxonomy Multiply-Determined Problems of Rational Thought Missing Input from the Autonomous Mind CHAPTER VII: Intelligence as a Predictor of Performance on Heuristics and Biases Tasks (with Richard F. West) Intelligence and Classic Heuristics and Biases Effects Belief Bias and Myside Bias Why Thinking Biases Do and Do Not Associate with Cognitive Ability Cognitive Decoupling, Mindware Gaps, and Override Detection in Heuristics and Biases Tasks CHAPTER VIII: Rationality and Intelligence: Empirical and Theoretical Relationships and Implications for the Great Rationality Debate Intelligence and Rationality Associations in Terms of the Taxonomy Summary of the Relationships Individual Differences, the Reflective Mind, and the Great Rationality Debate Skepticism About Mindware-Caused Irrationalities CHAPTER IX: The Social Implications of Separating the Concepts of Intelligence and Rationality Broad Versus Narrow Concepts of Intelligence Intelligence Imperialism Intelligence Misidentified as Adaptation and the Deification of Intelligence Strategies for Cutting Intelligence Down to Size Society's Selection Mechanisms CHAPTER X: The Assessment of Rational Thought (with Richard F. West and Maggie E. Toplak) A Framework for the Assessment of Rational Thinking Operationalizing the Components of Rational Thought The Future of Research on Individual Differences in Rational Thought References Figures and Tables
3900455
Cognitive abilities and superior decision making under risk : A protocol analysis and process model evaluation
Individual differences in cognitive abilities and skills can predict normatively superior and logically consistent judgments and decisions. The current experiment investigates the processes that mediate individual differences in risky choices. We assessed working memory span, numeracy, and cognitive impulsivity and conducted a protocol analysis to trace variations in conscious deliberative processes. People higher in cognitive abilities made more choices consistent with expected values; however, expected-value choices rarely resulted from expected-value calculations. Instead, the cognitive ability and choice relationship was mediated by the number of simple considerations made during decision making --- e.g., transforming probabilities and considering the relative size of gains. Results imply that, even in simple lotteries, superior risky decisions associated with cognitive abilities and controlled cognition can reflect metacognitive dynamics and elaborative heuristic search processes, rather than normative calculations. Modes of cognitive control (e.g., dual process dynamics) and implications for process models of risky decision-making (e.g., priority heuristic) are discussed.
2657323
Correlations of cognitive reflection with judgments and choices
We investigated the role of individual differences in cognitive reflection in decision making. We measured the performance of 157 participants in the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005) and a number of decision-making tasks. We examined the relation of cognitive reflection with performance in tasks that assess correspondence (as distinct from coherence), such as predicting the ratings of chess players. We found significant correlations between cognitive reflection and all the estimation measures in correspondence tasks. Our results suggest that cognitive reflection is a thinking disposition that includes more characteristics than originally proposed by Frederick (2005). We proposed that cognitive reflection is related to the concept of actively open-minded thinking (Baron, 1985, 2008). We concluded that cognitive reflection is a thinking disposition that interacts with knowledge, domain-specific heuristics and characteristics of the environment and that it may play an essential role in the adaptation of the decision maker to different environments and situations.
17828158
Probability matching and strategy availability
Findings from two experiments indicate that probability matching in sequential choice arises from an asymmetry in strategy availability: The matching strategy comes readily to mind, whereas a superior alternative strategy, maximizing, does not. First, compared with the minority who spontaneously engage in maximizing, the majority of participants endorse maximizing as superior to matching in a direct comparison when both strategies are described. Second, when the maximizing strategy is brought to their attention, more participants subsequently engage in maximizing. Third, matchers are more likely than maximizers to base decisions in other tasks on their initial intuitions, suggesting that they are more inclined to use a choice strategy that comes to mind quickly. These results indicate that a substantial subset of probability matchers are victims of “underthinking” rather than “overthinking”: They fail to engage in sufficient deliberation to generate a superior alternative to the matching strategy that comes so readily to mind.
14259317
The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others
Three studies suggest that individuals see the existence and operation of cognitive and motivational biases much more in others than in themselves. Study 1 provides evidence from three surveys that people rate themselves as less subject to various biases than the “average American,” classmates in a seminar, and fellow airport travelers. Data from the third survey further suggest that such claims arise from the interplay among availability biases and self-enhancement motives. Participants in one follow-up study who showed the better-than-average bias insisted that their self-assessments were accurate and objective even after reading a description of how they could have been affected by the relevant bias. Participants in a final study reported their peer’s self-serving attributions regarding test performance to be biased but their own similarly self-serving attributions to be free of bias. The relevance of these phenomena to naïve realism and to conflict, misunderstanding, and dispute resolution is discussed.
2754235
Perception and misperception of bias in human judgment
Human judgment and decision making is distorted by an array of cognitive, perceptual and motivational biases. Recent evidence suggests that people tend to recognize (and even overestimate) the operation of bias in human judgment - except when that bias is their own. Aside from the general motive to self-enhance, two primary sources of this 'bias blind spot' have been identified. One involves people's heavy weighting of introspective evidence when assessing their own bias, despite the tendency for bias to occur nonconsciously. The other involves people's conviction that their perceptions directly reflect reality, and that those who see things differently are therefore biased. People's tendency to deny their own bias, even while recognizing bias in others, reveals a profound shortcoming in self-awareness, with important consequences for interpersonal and intergroup conflict.
40554213
Actions, Intentions, and Self-Assessment: The Road to Self-Enhancement Is Paved with Good Intentions
Actions and intentions do not always align. Individuals often have good intentions that they fail to fulfill. The studies presented here suggest that actors and observers differ in the weight they assign to intentions when deciding whether an individual possesses a desirable trait. Participants were more likely to give themselves credit for their intentions than they were to give others credit for theirs (Studies 1 and 2). This caused individuals to evaluate themselves more favorably than they evaluated others (Studies 3-5). Discussion focuses on the motivational and information-processing roots of this actor-observer difference in the weight assigned to intentions as well as the implications of this tendency for everyday judgment and decision making.
145634141
Do people really believe they are above average
Abstract A question that has plagued self-enhancement research is whether participants truly believe the overly positive self-assessments they report, or whether better-than-average effects reflect mere hopes or self-presentation. In a test of people’s belief in the accuracy of their self-enhancing trait ratings, participants made a series of bets, each time choosing between betting that they had scored at least as high on a personality test as a random other participant, or betting on a random drawing in which the probability of success was matched to their self-assigned percentile rank on the test. They also reported the point at which they would switch their bet from their self-rating to the drawing, or vice versa. Participants were indifferent between betting on themselves or on the drawing, and it took only a slight change in the drawing’s probability for them to switch their bet, indicating that people truly believe their self-enhancing self-assessments.
1210432
Peering Into the Bias Blind Spot: People’s Assessments of Bias in Themselves and Others
People tend to believe that their own judgments are less prone to bias than those of others, in part because they tend to rely on introspection for evidence of bias in themselves but on their lay theories in assessing bias in others. Two empirical consequences of this asymmetry are explored. Studies 1 and 2 document that people are more inclined to think they are guilty of bias in the abstract than in any specific instance. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that people tend to believe that their own personal connection to a given issue is a source of accuracy and enlightenment but that such personal connections in the case of others who hold different views are a source of bias. The implications of this asymmetry in assessing objectivity and bias in the self versus others are discussed.
145001808
I AM Being Fair: The Bias Blind Spot as a Stumbling Block to Seeing Both Sides
Past research has demonstrated that people more readily recognize bias in others' perceptions than they do in their own. The current research demonstrates the tenacity of this effect in the context of interpersonal conflicts. In Study 1, participants assumed their own construals of conflict were fair and uninfluenced by affective preferences, whereas those disagreeing with them were seen as unfair and biased. In Study 2, participants were induced to exhibit a liking bias, yet still reported themselves uninfluenced by liking. In Study 3, participants received an explanation of the liking bias and were asked to correct for it. Despite heavy demand characteristics, they failed to do so. Together, these studies suggest that social perceivers are particularly blind to their own biases in conflict situations.
14034924
Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot
People see themselves as less susceptible to bias than others. We show that a source of this bias blind spot involves the value that people place, and believe they should place, on introspective information (relative to behavioral information) when assessing bias in themselves versus others. Participants considered introspective information more than behavioral information for assessing bias in themselves, but not others. This divergence did not arise simply from diVerences in introspective access. The blind spot persisted when observers had access to the introspections of the actor whose bias they judged. And, participants claimed that they, but not their peers, should rely on introspections when making self-assessments of bias. Only after being educated about the importance of nonconscious processes in guiding judgment and action—and thereby about the fallibility of introspection—did participants cease denying their relative susceptibility to bias.
142924295
Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds
1. Introduction 2. A Cognitive Theory of Pretence 3. Pieces of Mind: A Theory of Third-Person Mindreading 4. Reading One's Own Mind 5. Objections, Replies, and Philosophical Implications References
145485209
The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representations.
Ten years ago, Jerry Fodor published The Modularity of Mind, a book that received much well-deserved attention. His target was the then-dominant view according to which there are no important discontinuities between perceptual processes and conceptual processes. Information flows freely, “up” and “down,” between these two kinds of processes, and beliefs inform perception as much as they are informed by it. Against this view, Fodor argued that perceptual processes (and also linguistic decoding) are carried out by specialized, rather rigid mechanisms. These “modules” each have their own proprietary data base, and do not draw on information produced by conceptual processes. Although this was probably not intended and has not been much noticed, “modularity of mind” was a paradoxical title, for, according to Fodor, modularity is to be found only at the periphery of the mind, in its input systems. In its center and bulk, Fodor's mind is decidedly nonmodular. Conceptual processes – that is, thought proper – are presented as a big holistic lump lacking joints at which to carve. Controversies have focused on the thesis that perceptual and linguistic decoding processes are modular, much more than on the alleged nonmodularity of thought. In this chapter, I have two aims. The first is to defend the view that thought processes might be modular too (what Fodor [1987: 27] calls “modularity theory gone mad” – oh well!). Let me however echo Fodor and say that, “when I speak of a cognitive system as modular, I shall… always mean ‘to some interesting extent’” (Fodor, 1983: 37).
145607370
The Psychology of Problem Solving: The Fundamental Computational Biases of Human Cognition: Heuristics That (Sometimes) Impair Decision Making and Problem Solving
Consider the following syllogism. Ask yourself whether it is valid – whether the conclusion follows logically from the two premises: Premise 1: All living things need water. Premise 2: Roses need water. Therefore, Roses are living things. What do you think? Judge the conclusion either logically valid or invalid before reading on. If you are like about 70% of the university students who have been given this problem, you will think that the conclusion is valid. And if you did think that it was valid, like 70% of university students who have been given this problem, you would be wrong (Markovits & Nantel, 1989; Sa, West, & Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 1998c). Premise 1 says that all living things need water, not that all things that need water are living things. So just because roses need water, it doesn't follow from Premise 1 that they are living things. If that is still not clear, it probably will be after you consider the following syllogism with exactly the same structure: Premise 1: All insects need oxygen. Premise 2: Mice need oxygen. Therefore, Mice are insects. Now it seems pretty clear that the conclusion does not follow from the premises. If the logically equivalent “mice” syllogism is solved so easily, why is the “rose” problem so hard? Well for one thing, the conclusion (roses are living things) seems so reasonable and you know it to be true in the real world. And that is the rub.
143067939
The Robot's Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin
The idea that we might be robots is no longer the stuff of science fiction; decades of research in evolutionary biology and cognitive science have led many esteemed thinkers and scientists to the conclusion that, following the precepts of universal Darwinism, humans are merely the hosts for two replicators (genes and memes) that have no interest in us except as conduits for replication. Accepting and now forcefully responding to this disturbing idea that precludes the possibilities of morality or free will, among other things, Keith Stanovich here provides the tools for the "robot's rebellion," a program of cognitive reform necessary to advance human interests over the limited interest of the replicators. He shows how concepts of rational thinking from cognitive science interact with the logic of evolution to create opportunities for humans to structure their behavior to serve their own ends. These evaluative activities of the brain, he argues, fulfill the need that we have to ascribe significance to human life. Only by recognizing ourselves as robots, argues Stanovich, can we begin to construct a concept of self based on what is truly singular about humans: that they gain control of their lives in a way unique among life forms on Earth - through rational self-determination.
143297497
Evolutionary Psychology -- The New Science of the Mind
PART ONE - FOUNDATIONS OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY Chapter 1. The Scientific Movements Leading to Evolutionary Psychology Chapter 2. The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology PART TWO - PROBLEMS OF SURVIVAL Chapter 3. Combating the Hostile Forces of Nature: Human Survival Problems PART THREE - CHALLENGES OF SEX AND MATING Chapter 4. Women's Long-Term Mating Strategies Chapter 5. Men's Long-Term Mating Strategies Chapter 6. Short-Term Sexual Strategies PART FOUR - CHALLENGES OF PARENTING AND KINSHIP Chapter 7. Problems of Parenting Chapter 8. Problems of Kinship PART FIVE - PROBLEMS OF GROUP LIVING Chapter 9. Cooperative Alliances Chapter 10. Aggression and Warfare Chapter 11. Conflict between the Sexes Chapter 12. Status, Prestige, and Social Dominance PART SIX - AN INTEGRATED PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Chapter 13. Toward a Unified Evolutionary Psychology
54270115
The cognitive unconscious: An evolutionary perspective
Abstract In recent decades it has become increasingly clear that a substantial amount of cognitive work goes on independent of consciousness. The research has been carried out largely under two rubrics, implicit learning and implicit memory. The former has been concerned primarily with the acquisition of knowledge independent of awareness and the latter with the manner in which memories not readily available to conscious recall or recognition play a role in behavior; collectively these operations comprise the essential functions of the cognitive unconscious. This paper reviews the recent history of work on these issues, identifies some of the problems confronting researchers, and introduces a theoretical framework based on principles of evolutionary biology within which to view them. The argument is that the cognitive unconscious, despite its apparent sophistication, is of considerable evolutionary antiquity and antedates conscious cognitive systems by a considerable amount of time. Various entailments of this evolutionary perspective are explored including such issues as phylogeny and ontogeny of implicit processes, the robustness of the implicit functions as displayed by the capacity to resist disruptions from psychological and neurological disorders, the relationship between implicit cognition and intelligence, and individual differences in implicit cognitive abilities.
143710406
An evolutionary context for the cognitive unconscious
Abstract This paper is an attempt to put the work of the past several decades on the problems of implicit learning and unconscious cognition into an evolutionary context. Implicit learning is an inductive process whereby knowledge of a complex environment is acquired and used largely independently of awareness of either the process of acquisition or the nature of that which has been learned. Characterized this way, implicit learning theory can be viewed as an attempt to come to grips with the classic epistemological issues of knowledge acquisition, representation and use. The argument is made that the process, despite its seeming cognitive sophistication, is of considerable evolutionary antiquity and that it antedates awareness and the capacity for conscious control of mentation. Various classic heuristics from evolutionary biology are used to substantiate this claim and several specific entailments of this line of argument are outlined.
142841688
The Adapted mind : evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture
Although researchers have long been aware that the species-typical architecture of the human mind is the product of our evolutionary history, it has only been in the last three decades that advances in such fields as evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, and paleoanthropology have made the fact of our evolution illuminating. Converging findings from a variety of disciplines are leading to the emergence of a fundamentally new view of the human mind, and with it a new framework for the behavioral and social sciences. First, with the advent of the cognitive revolution, human nature can finally be defined precisely as the set of universal, species-typical information-processing programs that operate beneath the surface of expressed cultural variability. Second, this collection of cognitive programs evolved in the Pleistocene to solve the adaptive problems regularly faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors--problems such as mate selection, language acquisition, cooperation, and sexual infidelity. Consequently, the traditional view of the mind as a general-purpose computer, tabula rasa, or passive recipient of culture is being replaced by the view that the mind resembles an intricate network of functionally specialized computers, each of which imposes contentful structure on human mental organization and culture. The Adapted Mind explores this new approach--evolutionary psychology--and its implications for a new view of culture.
84433900
Evolutionary Psychology – Towards a More Integrative Model
Aspects of the history of behavioural science are reviewed, pointing to its fragmented and faction-ridden nature. The emergence of evolutionary psychology (EP) is viewed in this context. With the help of a dual-layered model of behavioural control, the case is made for a more integrative perspective towards EP. The model's application to both behaviour and complex human information processing is described. Similarities in their control are noted. It is suggested that one layer of control (‘on-line’) corresponds to the encapsulated modules of EP whereas the off-line controls provide the plasticity and flexibility suggested by its critics.
43460355
A model of the hierarchy of behaviour, cognition, and consciousness
Processes comparable in important respects to those underlying human conscious and non-conscious processing can be identified in a range of species and it is argued that these reflect evolutionary precursors of the human processes. A distinction is drawn between two types of processing: (1) stimulus-based and (2) higher-order. For 'higher-order,' in humans the operations of processing are themselves associated with conscious awareness. Conscious awareness sets the context for stimulus-based processing and its end-point is accessible to conscious awareness. However, the mechanics of the translation between stimulus and response proceeds without conscious control. The paper argues that higher-order processing is an evolutionary addition to stimulus-based processing. The model's value is shown for gaining insight into a range of phenomena and their link with consciousness. These include brain damage, learning, memory, development, vision, emotion, motor control, reasoning, the voluntary versus involuntary debate, and mental disorder.
194804
Role of mobile phones in motor vehicle crashes resulting in hospital attendance: a case-crossover study
Abstract Objectives To explore the effect of drivers' use of mobile (cell) phones on road safety. Design A case-crossover study. Setting Perth, Western Australia. Participants 456 drivers aged ≥ 17 years who owned or used mobile phones and had been involved in road crashes necessitating hospital attendance between April 2002 and July 2004. Main outcome measure Driver's use of mobile phone at estimated time of crash and on trips at the same time of day in the week before the crash. Interviews with drivers in hospital and phone company's records of phone use. Results Driver's use of a mobile phone up to 10 minutes before a crash was associated with a fourfold increased likelihood of crashing (odds ratio 4.1, 95% confidence interval 2.2 to 7.7, P < 0.001). Risk was raised irrespective of whether or not a hands-free device was used (hands-free: 3.8, 1.8 to 8.0, P < 0.001; hand held: 4.9, 1.6 to 15.5, P = 0.003). Increased risk was similar in men and women and in drivers aged ≥ 30 and < 30 years. A third (n = 21) of calls before crashes and on trips during the previous week were reportedly on hand held phones. Conclusions When drivers use a mobile phone there is an increased likelihood of a crash resulting in injury. Using a hands-free phone is not any safer.
14700725
Cell-Phone–Induced Driver Distraction
Our research examined the effects of hands-free cell-phone conversations on simulated driving. We found that even when participants looked directly at objects in the driving environment, they were less likely to create a durable memory of those objects if they were conversing on a cell phone. This pattern was obtained for objects of both high and low relevance, suggesting that very little semantic analysis of the objects occurs outside the restricted focus of attention. Moreover, in-vehicle conversations do not interfere with driving as much as cell-phone conversations do, because drivers are better able to synchronize the processing demands of driving with in-vehicle conversations than with cell-phone conversations. Together, these data support an inattention-blindness interpretation wherein the disruptive effects of cell-phone conversations on driving are due in large part to the diversion of attention from driving to the phone conversation.
15730996
Driven to Distraction: Dual-Task Studies of Simulated Driving and Conversing on a Cellular Telephone
Dual-task studies assessed the effects of cellular-phone conversations on performance of a simulated driving task. Performance was not disrupted by listening to radio broadcasts or listening to a book on tape. Nor was it disrupted by a continuous shadowing task using a handheld phone, ruling out, in this case, dual-task interpretations associated with holding the phone, listening, or speaking. However, significant interference was observed in a word-generation variant of the shadowing task, and this deficit increased with the difficulty of driving. Moreover, unconstrained conversations using either a handheld or a hands-free cell phone resulted in a twofold increase in the failure to detect simulated traffic signals and slower reactions to those signals that were detected. We suggest that cellular-phone use disrupts performance by diverting attention to an engaging cognitive context other than the one immediately associated with driving.
18614736
Self-Reported GPA and SAT: A Methodological Note
The use of self-reports from students is a common, yet risky, methodological venture in psychological research. Relying upon an individual to provide an accurate and unbiased rating of her or his ability, attitude, or past experiences is problematic, considering that the behavioral revolution in psychology was driven in part by a rejection of the reliance on malleable data sources. Researchers now concentrate on observable phenomena that can be validated; however, they are often forced to ask participants to provide various forms of data without having the means to verify their accuracy.
146386662
The Validity of Self-Reported Grade Point Averages, Class Ranks, and Test Scores: A Meta-Analysis and Review of the Literature
Self-reported grades are heavily used in research and applied settings because of the importance of grades and the convenience of obtaining self-reports. This study reviews and meta-analytically summarizes the literature on the accuracy of self-reported grades, class ranks, and test scores. Results based on a pairwise sample of 60,926 subjects indicate that self-reported grades are less construct valid than many scholars believe. Furthermore, self-reported grade validity was strongly moderated by actual levels of school performance and cognitive ability. These findings suggest that self-reported grades should be used with caution. Situations in which self-reported grades can be employed more safely are identified, and suggestions for their use in research are discussed.
6476098
Personality predictors of academic outcomes: big five correlates of GPA and SAT scores.
The authors examined relations between the Big Five personality traits and academic outcomes, specifically SAT scores and grade-point average (GPA). Openness was the strongest predictor of SAT verbal scores, and Conscientiousness was the strongest predictor of both high school and college GPA. These relations replicated across 4 independent samples and across 4 different personality inventories. Further analyses showed that Conscientiousness predicted college GPA, even after controlling for high school GPA and SAT scores, and that the relation between Conscientiousness and college GPA was mediated, both concurrently and longitudinally, by increased academic effort and higher levels of perceived academic ability. The relation between Openness and SAT verbal scores was independent of academic achievement and was mediated, both concurrently and longitudinally, by perceived verbal intelligence. Together, these findings show that personality traits have independent and incremental effects on academic outcomes, even after controlling for traditional predictors of those outcomes. ((c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved).
51766515
A dual-process account of the development of scientific reasoning: The nature and development of metacognitive intercession skills
Abstract Metacognitive knowledge of the dual-processing basis of judgment is critical to resolving conflict between analytic and experiential processing responses [Klaczynski, P. A. (2004). A dual-process model of adolescent development: Implications for decision making, reasoning, and identity. In R. V. Kail (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior, Vol. 31 (pp. 73–123). San Diego, CA: Academic Press]. Such conflict is ubiquitous when reasoning scientifically. Three studies explored the nature, development, and stability of this metacognitive knowledge. In each study, participants completed the ratio-bias judgment task, which assessed their tendency to make analytically based responses, and the ratio-bias evaluation task, which assessed their metacognitive knowledge of the processing basis of judgments on the task (Metacognitive Status). In Study 1, college students’ judgment performance was related to metacognitive status but not to general cognitive ability. In Study 2, metacognitive status was related to age and mathematics-related changes. Metacognitive status again predicted participants’ tendency to make analytically based judgments. In Study 3, college students’ judgments, but not metacognitive status, were affected by task conditions. The evidence suggests that assessing metacognitive knowledge is important for understanding how conflict between analytically and experientially based judgments is resolved.
141068233
The Incidental Acquisition of Information from Reading
In a study of ninety college seniors, measures of exposure to print predicted individual differences in vocabulary and cultural literacy after differences in general ability (SAT scores) had been statistically controlled, but did not predict differences in grade point average or knowledge of the field of major (psychology). Measures of exposure to nonprint media (television and films) predicted variance in cultural literacy, but not in vocabulary, after cognitive ability had been controlled. The data challenge the view that knowledge acquisition is determined only by the efficiency of cognitive components that encode and store information. Instead, the results indicate that differences in exposure to information are a significant independent contributor to differences in knowledge across individuals. The investigation further demonstrated the convergent validity of two briefly administered indicators of individual differences in exposure to print.
12724085
Scholastic Assessment or g?
There is little evidence showing the relationship between the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) and g (general intelligence). This research established the relationship between SAT and g, as well as the appropriateness of the SAT as a measure of g, and examined the SAT as a premorbid measure of intelligence. In Study 1, we used the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. Measures of g were extracted from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery and correlated with SAT scores of 917 participants. The resulting correlation was .82 (.86 corrected for nonlinearity). Study 2 investigated the correlation between revised and recentered SAT scores and scores on the Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices among 104 undergraduates. The resulting correlation was .483 (.72 corrected for restricted range). These studies indicate that the SAT is mainly a test of g. We provide equations for converting SAT scores to estimated IQs; such conversion could be useful for estimating premorbid IQ or conducting individual difference research with college students.
1502678
The nature of individual differences in working memory capacity: active maintenance in primary memory and controlled search from secondary memory.
Studies examining individual differences in working memory capacity have suggested that individuals with low working memory capacities demonstrate impaired performance on a variety of attention and memory tasks compared with individuals with high working memory capacities. This working memory limitation can be conceived of as arising from 2 components: a dynamic attention component (primary memory) and a probabilistic cue-dependent search component (secondary memory). This framework is used to examine previous individual differences studies of working memory capacity, and new evidence is examined on the basis of predictions of the framework to performance on immediate free recall. It is suggested that individual differences in working memory capacity are partially due to the ability to maintain information accessible in primary memory and the ability to search for information from secondary memory.
28500057
Reasoning independently of prior belief and individual differences in actively open-minded thinking.
A sample of 349 college students completed an argument evaluation test (AET) in which they evaluated arguments concerning real-life situations. A separate regression analysis was conducted for each student predicting his or her evaluations of argument quality from an objective indicator of argument quality and the strength of his or her prior beliefs about the target propositions. The beta weight for objective argument quality was interpreted in this analysis as an indicator of the ability to evaluate objective argument quality independent of prior belief. Individual differences in this index were reliably linked to individual differences in cognitive ability and actively open-minded thinking dispositions. Further, actively openminded thinking predicted variance in AET performance even after individual differences in cognitive ability had been partialled out. Discussions of critical thinking in the educational and psychological literature consistently point to the importance of decontextualized reasoning styles that foster the tendency to evaluate arguments and evidence in a way that is not
13995836
Dispositional Differences in Cognitive Motivation : The Life and Times of Individuals Varying in Need for Cognition
Need for cognition in contemporary literature refers to an individual's tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors. Individual differences in need for cognition have been the focus of investigation in over 100 empirical studies. This literature is reviewed, covering the theory and history of this variable, measures of interindividual variations in it, and empirical relationships between it and personality variables, as well as individuals' tendencies to seek andengage in effortful cognitive activity and enjoy cognitively effortful circumstances. The article cotacludes with discussions of an elaborated theory of the variable, including antecedent conditions; interindividual variations in it related to the manner information is acquired or processed to guide perceptions, judgments, and behavior; and the relationship between it and the 5-factor model of personality structure.
26091312
Outcome bias in decision evaluation.
In 5 studies, undergraduate subjects were given descriptions and outcomes of decisions made by others under conditions of uncertainty. Decisions concerned either medical matters or monetary gambles. Subjects rated the quality of thinking of the decisions, the competence of the decision maker, or their willingness to let the decision maker decide on their behalf. Subjects understood that they had all relevant information available to the decision maker. Subjects rated the thinking as better, rated the decision maker as more competent, or indicated greater willingness to yield the decision when the outcome was favorable than when it was unfavorable. In monetary gambles, subjects rated the thinking as better when the outcome of the option not chosen turned out poorly than when it turned out well. Although subjects who were asked felt that they should not consider outcomes in making these evaluations, they did so. This effect of outcome knowledge on evaluation may be explained partly in terms of its effect on the salience of arguments for each side of the choice. Implications for the theory of rationality and for practical situations are discussed.
5643902
The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice.
The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways. Reversals of preference are demonstrated in choices regarding monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in questions pertaining to the loss of human lives. The effects of frames on preferences are compared to the effects of perspectives on perceptual appearance. The dependence of preferences on the formulation of decision problems is a significant concern for the theory of rational choice.
7866970
Developing a tool for measuring the decision-making competence of older adults.
The authors evaluated the reliability and validity of a tool for measuring older adults' decision-making competence (DMC). A sample of 205 younger adults (25-45 years), 208 young-older adults (65-74 years), and 198 old-older adults (75-97 years) made judgments and decisions related to health, finance, and nutrition. Reliable indices of comprehension, dimension weighting, and cognitive reflection were developed. Comparison of the performance of old-older and young-older adults was possible in this study, unlike previous research. As hypothesized, old-older adults performed more poorly than young-older adults; both groups of older adults performed more poorly than younger adults. Hierarchical regression analyses showed that a large amount of variance in decision performance across age groups (including mean trends) could be accounted for by social variables, health measures, basic cognitive skills, attitudinal measures, and numeracy. Structural equation modeling revealed significant pathways from 3 exogenous latent factors (crystallized intelligence, other cognitive abilities, and age) to the endogenous DMC latent factor. Further research is needed to validate the meaning of performance on these tasks for real-life decision making.
15104876
Heuristic and analytic processing: age trends and associations with cognitive ability and cognitive styles.
Developmental and individual differences in the tendency to favor analytic responses over heuristic responses were examined in children of two different ages (10- and 11-year-olds versus 13-year-olds), and of widely varying cognitive ability. Three tasks were examined that all required analytic processing to override heuristic processing: inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning under conditions of belief bias, and probabilistic reasoning. Significant increases in analytic responding with development were observed on the first two tasks. Cognitive ability was associated with analytic responding on all three tasks. Cognitive style measures such as actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition explained variance in analytic responding on the tasks after variance shared with cognitive ability had been controlled. The implications for dual-process theories of cognition and cognitive development are discussed.
144023573
Trajectory of risky decision making for potential gains and losses from ages 5 to 85.
The ability to make advantageous decisions in the face of uncertainty is an essential human skill, yet the development of such abilities over the lifespan is still not well understood. In the current study, from childhood through older adulthood, we tracked the developmental trajectory of risk taking for gains and losses, and expected value (EV) sensitivity in risky choices. In the gain domain, risk-taking decreased consistently across the lifespan. In the loss domain, risk-taking was relatively constant across ages, a result we attribute to the pervasiveness of loss aversion. EV sensitivity showed an inverted-U-shaped function, increasing from childhood to adulthood but then decreasing for the elderly, which occurred for both risky gains and risky losses. This finding is consistent with neuropsychological and neuroanatomical evidence concerning the role of the frontal lobe in decision making, which is relatively late to develop during childhood but may degrade earlier in the later years. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
207651095
Bayesian t tests for accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis
Progress in science often comes from discovering invariances in relationships among variables; these invariances often correspond to null hypotheses. As is commonly known, it is not possible to state evidence for the null hypothesis in conventional significance testing. Here we highlight a Bayes factor alternative to the conventional t test that will allow researchers to express preference for either the null hypothesis or the alternative. The Bayes factor has a natural and straightforward interpretation, is based on reasonable assumptions, and has better properties than other methods of inference that have been advocated in the psychological literature. To facilitate use of the Bayes factor, we provide an easy-to-use, Web-based program that performs the necessary calculations.
5884920
Mixtures of g Priors for Bayesian Variable Selection
Zellner's g prior remains a popular conventional prior for use in Bayesian variable selection, despite several undesirable consistency issues. In this article we study mixtures of g priors as an alternative to default g priors that resolve many of the problems with the original formulation while maintaining the computational tractability that has made the g prior so popular. We present theoretical properties of the mixture g priors and provide real and simulated examples to compare the mixture formulation with fixed g priors, empirical Bayes approaches, and other default procedures. Please see Arnold Zellner's letter and the author's response.
6774874
Running experiments on Amazon Mechanical
Although Mechanical Turk has recently become popular among social scientists as a source of experimental data, doubts may linger about the quality of data provided by subjects recruited from online labor markets. We address these potential concerns by presenting new demographic data about the Mechanical Turk subject population, reviewing the strengths of Mechanical Turk relative to other online and offline methods of recruiting subjects, and comparing the magnitude of effects obtained using Mechanical Turk and traditional subject pools. We further discuss some additional benefits such as the possibility of longitudinal, cross cultural and prescreening designs, and offer some advice on how to best manage a common subject pool.
145345440
Associations between myside bias on an informal reasoning task and amount of post‐secondary education
SUMMARY One hundred and twelve undergraduate university students completed an informal reasoning task in which they were asked to generate arguments both for and against the position they endorsed on three separate issues. Performance on this task was evaluated by comparing the number of arguments they generated which endorsed (myside arguments) and which refuted (otherside arguments) their own position on that issue. Participants generated more myside arguments than otherside arguments on all three issues, thus consistently showing a myside bias effect on each issue. Differences in cognitive ability were not associated with individual differences in myside bias. However, year in university was a significant predictor of myside bias. The degree of myside bias decreased systematically with year in university. Year in university remained a significant predictor of myside bias even when both cognitive ability and age were statistically partialled out. Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
142044973
Subjective Construal, Social Inference, and Human Misunderstanding
Publisher Summary This chapter examines social psychological implications of human subjectivity—implications of the fact, and perhaps more importantly the insight, that people are governed not by the passive reception and recognition of some invariant objective reality, but by their own subjective representations and constructions of the events that unfold around them. The history of the subjective-objective distinction, first in some traditional theoretical and methodological concerns of social psychology, and then human motivation are discussed in this chapter. Social cognition, a research area that has held center stage in the field for most of the past two decades is expalined. The particular focus will be the problem of situational construal and its contribution to the difficulties of predicting social actions and making inferences or attributions about social actors. Construal processes are variable and uncertain, and they contribute heavily to the variability and unpredictability of a wide range of social responses. The second and less familiar thesis, social perceivers, fail to recognize, or at least fail to make adequate inferential allowance for, these “vagaries” of construal. People characteristically make attributions and other social judgments, and decisions predicated on a kind of naive realism. The process of subjective construal is fundamental to psychological inquiry at all levels of analysis.
143304765
The Perception of Social Conventionality by Children and Adults
Numerous studies have found that by late childhood individuals recognize conventional norms as social contrivances that are arbitrary, relative, and changeable. However, this conclusion conflicts with other evidence that children and adults “reify” social formations by apprehending them as something other than social products. For example, it is difficult to reconcile the phenomenon of ethnocentrism with the image of people who perceive their social worlds as arbitrary and relative. Most of the studies have questioned respondents about comparatively “transparent” rules, that is, those whose arbitrary human origins are evident. Moreover, the customary questions used to measure perceived conventionality are often simplistic indicators of a complex phenomenon. The result is an exaggerated portrayal of children's and adults' awareness of the conventionality of the social world.
143308307
Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious
Preface 1. Freud's Genius, Freud's Myopia 2. The Adaptive Unconscious 3. Who's in Charge? 4. Knowing Who We Are 5. Knowing Why 6. Knowing How We Feel 7. Knowing How We Will Feel 8. Introspection and Self-Narratives 9. Looking Outward to Know Ourselves 10. Observing and Changing Our Behavior Notes Bibliography Index
6480784
Illusory Control
Three experiments demonstrated that the experience of power leads to an illusion of personal control. Regardless of whether power was experientially primed (Experiments 1 and 3) or manipulated through roles (manager vs. subordinate; Experiment 2), it led to perceived control over outcomes that were beyond the reach of the power holder. Furthermore, this illusory control mediated the influence of power on several self-enhancement and approach-related outcomes reported in the power literature, including optimism (Experiment 2), self-esteem (Experiment 3), and action orientation (Experiment 3). These results demonstrate the theoretical importance of perceived control as a generative cause of and driving force behind many of power's far-reaching effects. A fourth experiment ruled out an alternative explanation: that positive mood, rather than illusory control, is at the root of power's effects. The discussion considers implications for existing and future research on the psychology of power, perceived control, and positive illusions.
6849439
Effects of optimism on psychological and physical well-being: Theoretical overview and empirical update
The primary purpose of this paper is to review recent research examining the beneficial effects of optimism on psychological and physical well-being. The review focuses on research that is longitudinal or prospective in design. Potential mechanisms are also identified whereby the beneficial effects of optimism are produced, focusing in particular on how optimism may lead a person to cope more adaptively with stress. The paper closes with a brief consideration of the similarities and differences between our own theoretical approach and several related approaches that have been taken by others.
762759
Illusion and well-being: a social psychological perspective on mental health.
Many prominent theorists have argued that accurate perceptions of the self, the world, and the future are essential for mental health. Yet considerable research evidence suggests that overly positive selfevaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism are characteristic of normal human thought. Moreover, these illusions appear to promote other criteria of mental health, including the ability to care about others, the ability to be happy or contented, and the ability to engage in productive and creative work. These strategies may succeed, in large part, because both the social world and cognitive-processing mechanisms impose niters on incoming information that distort it in a positive direction; negative information may be isolated and represented in as unthreatening a manner as possible. These positive illusions may be especially useful when an individual receives negative feedback or is otherwise threatened and may be especially adaptive under these circumstances. Decades of psychological wisdom have established contact with reality as a hallmark of mental health. In this view, the well-adjusted person is thought to engage in accurate reality testing, whereas the individual whose vision is clouded by illusion is regarded as vulnerable to, if not already a victim of, mental illness. Despite its plausibility, this viewpoint is increasingly difficult to maintain (cf. Lazarus, 1983). A substantial amount of research testifies to the prevalence of illusion in normal human cognition (see Fiske& Taylor, 1984;Greenwald, 1980; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Sackeim, 1983; Taylor, 1983). Moreover, these illusions often involve central aspects of the self and the environment and, therefore, cannot be dismissed as inconsequential. In this article, we review research suggesting that certain illusions may be adaptive for mental health and well-being. In particular, we examine evidence that a set of interrelated positive illusions—namely, unrealistically positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism—can serve a wide variety of cognitive, affective, and social functions. We also attempt to resolve the following para
8744608
Temporal view of the costs and benefits of self-deception
Researchers have documented many cases in which individuals rationalize their regrettable actions. Four experiments examine situations in which people go beyond merely explaining away their misconduct to actively deceiving themselves. We find that those who exploit opportunities to cheat on tests are likely to engage in self-deception, inferring that their elevated performance is a sign of intelligence. This short-term psychological benefit of self-deception, however, can come with longer-term costs: when predicting future performance, participants expect to perform equally well—a lack of awareness that persists even when these inflated expectations prove costly. We show that although people expect to cheat, they do not foresee self-deception, and that factors that reinforce the benefits of cheating enhance self-deception. More broadly, the findings of these experiments offer evidence that debates about the relative costs and benefits of self-deception are informed by adopting a temporal view that assesses the cumulative impact of self-deception over time.
5725102
The Paranoid Optimist: An Integrative Evolutionary Model of Cognitive Biases
Human cognition is often biased, from judgments of the time of impact of approaching objects all the way through to estimations of social outcomes in the future. We propose these effects and a host of others may all be understood from an evolutionary psychological perspective. In this article, we elaborate error management theory (EMT; Haselton & Buss, 2000). EMT predicts that if judgments are made under uncertainty, and the costs of false positive and false negative errors have been asymmetric over evolutionary history, selection should have favored a bias toward making the least costly error. This perspective integrates a diverse array of effects under a single explanatory umbrella, and it yields new content-specific predictions.
4384687
The evolution of overconfidence
Confidence is an essential ingredient of success in a wide range of domains ranging from job performance and mental health to sports, business and combat. Some authors have suggested that not just confidence but overconfidence—believing you are better than you are in reality—is advantageous because it serves to increase ambition, morale, resolve, persistence or the credibility of bluffing, generating a self-fulfilling prophecy in which exaggerated confidence actually increases the probability of success. However, overconfidence also leads to faulty assessments, unrealistic expectations and hazardous decisions, so it remains a puzzle how such a false belief could evolve or remain stable in a population of competing strategies that include accurate, unbiased beliefs. Here we present an evolutionary model showing that, counterintuitively, overconfidence maximizes individual fitness and populations tend to become overconfident, as long as benefits from contested resources are sufficiently large compared with the cost of competition. In contrast, unbiased strategies are only stable under limited conditions. The fact that overconfident populations are evolutionarily stable in a wide range of environments may help to explain why overconfidence remains prevalent today, even if it contributes to hubris, market bubbles, financial collapses, policy failures, disasters and costly wars.
8472237
Evolution: Selection for positive illusions
Everybody knows that overconfidence can be foolhardy. But a study reveals that having an overly positive self-image might confer an evolutionary advantage if the rewards outweigh the risks. See Letter p.317
 Overconfidence is a major puzzle in evolutionary biology, economics and political science, because despite causing costly errors and policy failures, it remains a widespread bias in human judgement and decision-making. Animals too, in examples seen during conflict behaviour, are liable to overconfidence. Dominic Johnson and James Fowler use game theory to model the situations under which overconfidence is an advantage, and find that they occupy a large part of the parameter space. They also show that overconfidence and conflict tend to increase with greater resource availability. As long as the prize at stake sufficiently exceeds the cost of competing for it, it seems, fortune favours the brave.