TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: of the Licenses; revocation is made explicit in a filing before the bankruptcy court (which filing is not itself an order) and is implicit in the Public Notice announcing the re-auction of the Licenses previously held by NextWave. Nevertheless, as this Court's prior opinion makes clear, we think that the FCC action in question is unmistakably regulatory in nature. But even if the FCC’s acts do not amount to "decisions” or "orders” of the Commission, subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, that would not expose the FCC's acts to review in the bankruptcy court. A regulatory action short of a decision or order is an exercise of regulatory discretion that is not subject to review. See Bethesda-Chevy Chase Broadcasters, Inc. v. FCC, 385 F.2d 967, 968 (D.C.Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Telecommunications Research & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding allegation made in enforcement suit does not impose the kind of legal obligation with which the finality doctrine is concerned (B) holding that obligation to pay pension benefits gave rise to a constructive trust relationship and obligation was not discharged in bankruptcy (C) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (D) holding that a regulatory action that did not impose an obligation deny a right or fix a legal relationship was not reviewable (E) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: and reimbursement claim based on the plan. Looking to FEHBA’s legislative history, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the purpose of FEHBA was to establish health insurance for federal employees and that insurance carriers “help the government fulfill the basic task of establishing a health benefits program for federal employees.” Id. at 1233. The Jacks court concluded that OPM “has direct and extensive control over these benefit contracts under the FEHBA.” The court determined that even though the plan “allows the carrier the discretion to pursue subrogation,” that “does not foreclose the application of the federal officer removal statute” because “the subrogation provision is necessarily a product of the benefit payment pro F.Supp.2d 848 (W.D.Mo.2011) (<HOLDING>); Van Horn v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that health insurer contracted with fehba was not acting under a federal agency within the meaning of the federal officer removal statute (B) holding that the fact that the insurance carrier voluntarily entered into a mutually agreed upon contract with the opm to administer healthcare benefits to federally employed enrollees does not rise to the level of a relationship defined as acting under a federal officer  (C) holding that a health plan insurer contracting with a government agency under a federal benefits program is considered a person acting under a federal officer (D) holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school (E) holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: a limited right in the secured creditor to the sale proceeds of the licenses. Id. at 380. Her decision not to recognize even such a circumscribed right, therefore, was based upon an implicit assumption — and in the bankruptcy court’s view, an erroneous one — that broadcasting licenses do not qualify as property of the estate. Id. We decline to adopt the rationale of Ridgely for two reasons. First, contrary to Ridgely’s interpretation, Judge Crabb did not reject the notion that a broadcasting license may fall within the broad range of assets that qualify as property of the estate. Indeed, she expressly assumed that it did constitute property of the estate. See 138 B.R. at 576 (citing In re Fugazy Express, Inc., 114 B.R. 865 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1990), aff'd, 124 B.R. 426 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a professionals license is a protected property interest (B) holding that a debtors interest in a tenancy by the entirety is property of the bankruptcy estate under section 541 because of debtors undivided present interests in the use possession income and right of survivorship of the property (C) holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property (D) holding that the debtors interest in a broadcasting license constitutes property of the estate (E) holding that a broadcasting license was property of the estate but not subject to a security interest

SOLUTION:

Show your work and conclude with the exact phrasing "Therefore, the final answer is [answer]." where [answer] is just the final number or expression that solves the problem.
user
(D)

