requirements and proportionality are flexible concepts, and the Court of Justice deals with a greatnumber of cases, all factors which enable the Court to be a veryvaluable actor for finding the right balance. In addition, there is anactive EC legislature, a factor which allows for a dialogue betweenjudges and policy-makers.15 Things are rather different in the WTO.For a start, the active legislature is largely missing, placing toomuch of the burden of developing the law on the dispute settlementsystem. That issue cannot be further explored here.16 But also asregards the role played by the WTO judiciary, there are significantdifferences with EC law. There are fewer cases in the WTO, whichresults in slower legal development and perhaps also in excessivefocus on the particular facts and circumstances of individual cases.In addition, there are the differences in methods of interpretation.As the Appellate Body is so careful to adhere to the customary international law rules of treaty interpretation, where the ordinarymeaning of treaty terms is central, there appears to be much lessroom for manoeuvre in the act of balancing free trade with noneconomic policies.So what is the WTO record hitherto? Within the scope of thiscomment I can offer but a few sketchy reflections. The first is that,notwithstanding the textual constraints under which the AppellateBody operates, it has proved astute at finding ways to strike a defensible balance. First the tax side. In cases such as Japan – Alcoholand Chile – Alcohol the Appellate Body has emphasized that thenational-treatment imperative of Article III:2, second sentence,GATT, concerning directly competitive or substitutable products,involves an examination of whether the tax regime affords protection. That examination includes an analysis of the objectives of thetax regime, which of course may form part of a non-economic policy.17 Differentation in the taxation of products on, say, environ151617
Eeckhout (1998).von Bogdandy (2001).Appellate Body, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R and WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 Nov 1996;
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mental grounds, is therefore not prima facie illegal, at least not asregards directly competitive or substitutable products. Second, onthe regulatory side, there is EC-Asbestos, where the Appellate Bodymanaged to introduce public-health considerations into the likeproducts analysis under Article III:4 GATT.18 Certain categories ofdomestic and imported products may not be like, basically ongrounds of the stark differences in their respective effects on humanhealth. If they are not like products, there can be no lack of nationaltreatment. Third, in the political minefield of balancing trade andenvironment, the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp/Turtle has managed to give precedence to environmental considerations, inter aliaby interpreting the notion of exhaustible natural resources in ArticleXX GATT in accordance with general developments in international (environmental) law. At the same time it has construed thechapeau of Article XX in such a way that it strictly regulates andconditions the extraterritorial application of domestic environmental standards.19The above does not of course mean that there are no problemsin WTO law. My second reflection concerns the doctrinal debateabout the aims-and-effects theory.20 For the uninitiated, this theorywas developed in the context of Article III:2, GATT 1947, by acouple of panels which emphasized that the examination of whetherdomestic and imported products were ‘like’ involved looking notonly at the effects of the tax regime in issue, but also at its aims. Ifthe aims of differentation between various products were unrelatedto protectionism, then such differentation did not constitute lack ofnational treatment. As Hudec has pointed out, the analogy with‘mandatory requirements’ was clear.21 The reference to the aims of(tax) legislation could develop into a judge-made exception to thenational-treatment principle, built into the very examination of
18
19
2021
Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/AB/R andWT/DS110/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000.Appellate Body, EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, WT/DS/135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001.Appellate Body, US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp andShrimp Products, WT/DS/58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998 andidem, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WT/DS/58/AB/RW,adopted 21 November 2001.Hudec (1998).Ibidem.
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whether a measure constituted lack of national treatment. However,the aims-and-effects theory did not as such survive the transitionfrom GATT to the WTO. In Japan – Alcohol the Appellate Bodyconsidered that the terms of Article III:2, first sentence, GATT (onlike products) did not lend support to the theory. As regards thesecond sentence, the Appellate Body emphasized that the intentionsof legislatures were irrelevant.22 In EC – Bananas the AppellateBody rejected the EC’s attempts to justify the banana legislation ongrounds of its non-protectionist aims, both as regards Article III:4GATT and Article XVII GATS.23The broad aims-and-effects theory has thus been rejected, essentially on the ground that it cannot be brought within the terms ofArticle III GATT. However, where the terms of Article III so permit, the Appellate Body has been willing to pay regard to regulatory aims and objectives. In Chile – Alcohol it emphasized in itsexamination under the heading of ‘so as to afford protection’ (Article III:2, second sentence) that ‘a measure’s purposes, objectivelymanifested in the design, architecture and structure of the measure,are intensely pertinent to the task of evaluating whether or not thatmeasure is applied so as to afford protection to domestic production’.24 In EC – Asbestos the Appellate Body was willing to giveconsiderable weight to the health effects of the various products inorder to conclude that they were not ‘like’. 25 One could certainlysee that as a concealed reference to regulatory objective: the difference in health effects was of course the very reason why the Frenchlegislature had sought to ban asbestos and not other products.There are two comments I should like to make on these jurisprudential developments. The first is that the accommodation oflegislative objectives in Chile – Alcohol and EC – Asbestos clearlyhas its limits, which would appear to preclude the development of acomprehensive doctrine comparable to ‘mandatory requirements’.As regards taxation there is no scope for consideration of legislativeobjective under Article III:2, first sentence, i.e. in case of like products. It is true that the notion of like products in this provision needs2223
2425
Above note 17.Appellate Body, EC – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 10 October 1997.Above note 17, para 71.Above note 18.
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to be narrowly construed,26 but even in case of like products theremay be tax differentation which is justified on non-economicgrounds, whereas GATT does not appear to permit such differentiation if the more highly taxed product is imported. As regardsregulation, the Appellate Body emphasized in EC – Asbestos thatthe health effects of asbestos were so relevant, under the heading ofphysical characteristics, because of their stark nature. It is not at allcertain that differences in physical characteristics which are lesspronounced (e.g. cars with different levels of fuel consumption)could significantly influence the like-products analysis. At the conference which led to this publication it was argued that EC – Asbestos signalled the introduction of something akin to ‘mandatoryrequirements’ in WTO law. I am not convinced by that analysis.The test for ‘like products’ remains essentially factual, and orientedtowards establishing whether products are in competition. As itstands it is not a proper basis for systematic reference to and inclusion of non-economic legislative objectives.This brings me to my second comment. In my view the doctrinal debate about aims-and-effects has been wrongly focused onthe notion of ‘like products’, and has not touched the real issues.The national-treatment rule is of course no more than a particularmanifestation and expression of the non-discrimination principle. Inall anti-discrimination law there are issues of determining what iscomparable (the comparator), and the notion therefore in GATT is‘like products’. Whilst I admit that locating the correct comparatoris not always straightforward, there is another important dimensionto anti-discrimination law, i.e. defining the type of different treatment which constitutes discrimination. Reflection on this issue inWTO law has progressed little beyond the slogan that not only deiure but also de facto discrimination is prohibited. Yet the contoursof this imprecise notion of ‘de facto discrimination’ remain to bedetermined. As I have argued elsewhere, the discrimination notionitself offers much more scope for consideration of non-economiclegislative objectives than the notion of ‘like products’.27 TheAppellate Body hinted at that in the famous paragraph 100 of EC –Asbestos, where it emphasized that:A complaining Member must still establish that the measureaccords to the group of ‘like’ imported products ‘less favourable2627
Japan – Alcohol, above note 17.Eeckhout (2001).
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treatment’ than it accords to the group of ‘like’ domestic products.The term ‘less favourable treatment’ expresses the general principle, in Article III:1, that internal regulations ‘should not be applied… so as to afford protection to domestic production’. If there is‘less favourable treatment’ of the group of ‘like’ imported products,there is, conversely, ‘protection’ of the group of ‘like’ domesticproducts. However, a Member may draw distinctions betweenproducts which have been found to be ‘like’, without, for this reason alone, according to the group of ‘like’ imported products ‘lessfavourable treatment’ than that accorded to the group of ‘like’ domestic products.What this means, in my view, is that regulatory distinctions between like products are not automatically in breach of Article III:4GATT on the mere basis that an imported product is treated lessfavourably than a domestic product. The Appellate Body emphasizes that the comparison is between the group of like imported andthe group of like domestic products. This opens up a lot of space fordebate about when regulatory distinctions are protectionist.28 Theanalysis could, and arguably should, include consideration of legislative objectives. Further cases may bring more clarity in thisrespect.
ReferencesCatherine Barnard / Joanne Scott (eds.) (2002), The Law of theSingle Market. Unpacking the Premises, Oxford (Hart) 2002.Piet Eeckhout (1998), The European Court of Justice and the Legislature, in: 18 Yearbook of European Law, Oxford (OxfordUniversity Press) 1998, 1-28.Piet Eeckhout (2001), Constitutional Concepts for Trade in Services, in: Gráinne de Búrca / Joanne Scott (eds.), The EU andthe WTO – Legal and Constitutional Issues, Oxford (Hart)2001, 211-236.Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (2002), Six years on the Bench of the‘World Trade Court’. Some Personal Experiences as Member
28
Ehring (2001).
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of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, in:Journal of World Trade 36 (2002), No. 4, 605-639.Lothar Ehring (2001), De Facto Discrimination in WTO Law: National and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment – or Equal Treatment?, Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/01.Robert E. Hudec (1998), GATT / WTO Constraints on NationalRegulation: Requiem for an ‘Aims and Effects’ Test, in: International Lawyer 32 (1998), 619-649.Federico Ortino (2004), Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade, Oxford (Hart) 2004.Armin von Bogdandy (2001), Law and politics in the WTO –Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship, in: Jochen A.Frowein / Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds.), Max Planck Yearbook ofUnited Nations Law Volume 5, Den Haag (Kluwer Law) 2001,605-674.
Thomas Cottier and Satoko Takenoshita*
Decision-making and the Balance of Powers in WTONegotiations: Towards SupplementaryWeighted VotingI.II.
IntroductionConsensus and Majority Voting in the WTOA. Rules and Practices on Decision-MakingB. The Future of ConsensusIII. Weighted Voting for WTO Decision-MakingA. Qualifying Equality of StatesB. The Basic Requirements for Legitimate DecisionMaking under Weighted Voting1. Weighted Voting under IMF andthe Quota Reform2. Weighted Voting for WTOC. The Variables1. The Size of Trade in Goods and Services –WTO Budget Contributions2. Gross Domestic Product (GDP)3. Market Openness4. Size of Population5. Basic VotesD. The Proposed Formula1. Formula2. Basic Requirements and the FormulaE. Calculated Voting WeightF. Assessment*
182187187190193193196197198198199199199200200201201203204208
Thomas Cottier: Professor of Law, Managing Director, World TradeInstitute and University of Berne, Switzerland; Satoko Takenoshita:Economist, World Trade Institute, Switzerland and University of Bologna, Italy, respectively. The paper partly draws from Cottier /Takenoshita (2003).
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IV. Assessing of Voting PowerA. SSI, BI, Inclusiveness and DecisionProbability IndicesB. Quantified Power Indices1. SSI and BI2. Inclusiveness3. Decision Probability4. Assessment of the Power AnalysisV. ConclusionReferencesAppendix A: Evolution of the IMF Quota FormulasAppendix B: Source of Variables
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I. IntroductionThe failure of the September 2003 Ministerial Meeting of Cancún(Mexico) to reach agreement on a negotiating agenda and on refined parameters of the Doha Development Agenda adopted in November 2001 begs the question whether consensus based diplomacyin the WTO has reached its limits. Coalitions based upon variablegeometry shape the process and render it unpredictable and difficult. The power to block consensus has been used to extract concessions and finally let the conference fail. Many would argue that thisis not new. Trade Rounds always have been very difficult andmoved from crisis to catharsis and final break-troughs based uponextraordinary efforts. The failure of the Brussels Ministerial Conference in the mid of the Uruguay Round in 1988 as well as thefailure of the Seattle Conference in 2000 reflects these inherentdifficulties and characteristics of multilateral trade negotiations.Failure, it will be argued, is mainly due to the substance of the negotiations, not the process. In Seattle, agreement failed on key issues such as trade and environment or labour. In Cancún, the paramount reasons may be ascribed to the fact that industrialized Stateswere not prepared to make sufficient commitments in the process ofliberalizing market access and reducing domestic support in thefield of agriculture. It will be a matter of closing gaps, and thennegotiations can be successful on the basis of traditional modes andprocedures. Also, it may be argued that the WTO has taken on morethan it can chew, and that the Organization and its Members need tofind back to the traditional functionalist core business of facilitating
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market access. However, the problems faced during the recentministerial conferences suggest that difficulties are not merely dueto unbridgeable differences in substance in market access issues,and this for a number of reasons.Firstly, there is the complexity and interrelation of regulatoryissues, in particular in areas relating to trade barriers of the secondand third generation: Non-tariff barriers and domestic regulation ofconditions on competition. Any attempt to exclude regulatory issuesfrom trade negotiations will rapidly show that they are inherentlylinked to the goals of the WTO and cannot be separated from efforts to reduce trade barriers and improve market access. It shouldbe recalled that the importation of standards of intellectual propertyprotection with the TRIPs Agreement was essentially and rightly somotivated by an effort to overcome de facto barriers to trade andinvestment due to lack of IPR protection. Equally, addressing domestic levels of support in agriculture is closely linked to marketaccess. Similarly, liberalization of services inherently touches upondomestic regulatory issues. This argument could be further refinedin order to show that even the fourth generational issues of antitrust and investment (Singapore issues) refuted at Cancún, areclosely related to the core business of the Organization and itsregulatory framework, and indeed, already form part of WTO lawin different agreements and specific sectors. International traderegulation has come a long way, and emerged as one of the mostcomplex regulatory areas of contemporary international law.Secondly, the structure of the law and its effectiveness haschanged. The binding effect of WTO dispute settlement decisionsno longer allow for unilateral exits. They are no longer based uponconsensus of all Members concerned, and failure to implement decisions adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body is subject to burdensome and painful retaliatory market access restrictions. Whilecommitments under GATT 1947 were equally binding, the price ofnon-compliance has increased. Inevitably, this obliges governmentsto be cautious in entering new obligations and to assure sufficientdomestic support in the negotiating process.Thirdly, the process of negotiations has become even morecomplex with the advent of new Members and increasing observation of the talks by pro-active non-governmental organizations outside the traditional circles of commerce. While, depending on thesubject matter, a core group of some 20-30 Members were leadingthe process in the Uruguay Round, participation of developing
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countries has strongly increased. It is a very positive sign that moreMembers are actively involved in the negotiations than in previousrounds. Yet, it is obvious that consensus is more difficult to buildwith soon 150 Member States. The traditions of informal consensus-building negotiations in working groups and in the Green Roomare increasingly challenged by Members, other international organizations and non-governmental organizations. Negotiationsbased upon like-minded groups are not new. Yet, it seems that constellations are more complex today and Members continue to pursue their diverging interests even within these groups. A system ofrepresentation and thus the possibility to work again in smallergroups has not emerged. As the subject-matter of trade inherentlytouches upon the realm of other international organizations, enhanced efforts at policy co-ordination are required not only domestically, but also between different international organizations.Fourthly, the system of multilateral trade rounds developedand designed for MFN tariff negotiations extends to all regulatoryissues, despite their complexity. The WTO is not in a position toengage in a process of on-going negotiations even within rounds,except for well-defined left-over areas. The post-Uruguay Roundnegotiations on telecommunication and financial services have remained the only successful examples of inter-round work andachievements, while other efforts, e.g. in the field of rules of origins, failed. The concept of working towards comprehensive package deals is a powerful one and offers many advantages. Yet, itdoes not allow for incremental progress in between rounds of negotiations. Given the fact that rounds usually extend to a full decade,the system entails important back-logs and has to leave progressessentially to judicial dispute settlement.In a previous paper, we extensively addressed the relationshipbetween negotiations and judicial dispute settlement, emphasizingthe problem of legislative response.1 The absence of inter-roundnegotiations and thus of the opportunity to effectively address andpossibly change interpretations or even rules adjudicated in disputesettlement have created a profound imbalance between the politicaland the judicial branches of the WTO process. While panels and theAppellate Body inherently take this into account by way of mainlytextual and contextual interpretations of the rules in accordancewith Article 3.2 of the DSU and Article 31 of the Vienna Conven1
Cottier / Takenoshita (2003).
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tion on the Law of Treaties, WTO jurisprudence almost exclusivelyassumes a heavy burden and extensive responsibility in applyingand interpreting WTO principles and rules. The lack of legislativeresponse not only creates an imbalance, but also prevents the lawfrom being incrementally developed beyond the narrow bounds ofthe case law.In response to this relationship of diplomacy and the judicialprocess, some have suggested rebalancing by way of rolling-backthe more powerful functions of the judicial branch on the basis ofconcerns of legitimacy and democratic accountability. The return toa former role of panels, including the Appellate Body, to formerGATT 1947 standards are based upon the assumption that the political process based upon consensus and package-deals should orcannot change in terms of realpolitik.2 Criticism is informed by theview that rulings of panels and the Appellate Body have becomeincreasingly intrusive and put a risk at democracy and legitimacy athome. However, this view and public perceptions tend to ignore thefact that the tensions caused mainly rely upon substantive WTOrules and disciplines that are negotiated rights and obligations resulting from the political, rather than the judicial, process. Problemsencountered in the causes célèbres (bananas, hormones, FSC) werenot caused by dispute settlement per se but by the very norms andrules that applied to these cases. Nevertheless, apart from fundamental critique addressing the democratic legitimacy of WTO as awhole,3 only a few have so far addressed the need to reform thediplomatic process by which these rules were brought about.4 Attention has been mainly drawn to the reform of dispute settlementas a main remedy to overcome impasses in settling major, mainlytransatlantic, disputes.5 We therefore suggested that main effortsshould primarily be made to re-establish the balance by improvingthe diplomatic process. To this end, we discussed and developedmodels and a system of weighted voting which could replace thetraditions of consensus in order to allow for effective negotiationsin between rounds and for legislative response.
2345
Barfield (2001).E.g. Krajewski (2001).Ehlermann (2002a); (2002b).Davey (2003); Petersmann (2002).
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In this paper, we will further extend the analysis for introduction of weighted voting to WTO. We argue that the idea need not belimited to inter-round negotiations and legislative response, but mayserve as a subsidiary or supplementary option for WTO negotiations in general where consensus diplomacy fails. We essentiallyrely on the same weighted voting model presented previously.However, a number of new elements were introduced.Firstly, we consider the European Union (hereinafter EU) withits future 28 Members,6 while the Union was limited to its 15 Members analyzed and considered in the previous paper. We present ahypothetical case in which EU28 is treated as a single unit. We doso by limiting data to foreign trade of the EU with the third countries, excluding distortions created by taking into account internaltrade within the EU market. We will compare its impact on votingweight and power with the model of treating 28 EU countries individually.Secondly, the study of different quota required will be moredetailed. The previous work merely analyzed voting analysis forsimple and a hypothetical 70% majority rule. Within the WTOframework, the existing voting rules other than consensus aresimple, 2/3rd and 3/4th majority rules. In this paper, these rules areexamined by using our calculated voting weight together with adouble majority rule, which imposes the second condition of simplemajority rule in terms of the number of Members to each majorityrule.Yet, before turning to these models, we attempt to show that ashift from consensus supplemented by the principle of One State –One Vote to weighted voting would not fundamentally alter themultilateral trading system, but prepare it instead to cope with thechallenges of the 21st Century.
6
The current EU25 Members are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic,Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UnitedKingdom. The 3 candidate countries are: Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.
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II. Consensus and Majority Voting in the WTOA. Rules and Practices on Decision-MakingThe WTO, as the GATT 1947 before, is based upon the formal andfundamental principle of One State – One Vote, reflecting sovereign equality of all Members States, small, medium and largealike. Article XXV:3 GATT 1947 enshrined the principle that‘Each contracting party shall be entitled to have one vote at allmeetings of the Contracting Parties’. Decisions were deemed to betaken, in accordance with para. 4 of this provision, by majority ofthe votes cast, unless otherwise provided for. A two-third majorityof votes cast was required to approve waivers in accordance withpara. 5. Special 2/3rd requirements existed also under ArticlesXXIV:10 for approving special exceptions and deviations andXXXIII GATT for admission of new Members.Amendments to the GATT partly implied unanimity aschanges to Art. I and Art. XXIV required acceptance by all contracting parties to become effective. For other provisions, it wouldseem that a simple majority was sufficient. The amendment, however, would only enter into force upon adoption by 2/3rd of themembership.Subsequent state practice overruled the majority rule andworked under the principle of consensus diplomacy on all levels ofoperation. Unlike unanimity, consensus does not require affirmativeapproval, but merely the absence of objections. Unless objectionsare voiced, the chairperson, without taking a pole, may concludethat consensus exists. Other than for waivers and accessions, alldecisions, including dispute settlement, were taken by consensus inthe Council and in committees ever since 1959.7The Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization builds upon these practices and provisions and codified acombination of consensus and a subsidiary scheme of voting procedures. The Agreement stipulates in Art IX: 1: ‘The WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed underGATT 1947’. Consensus is defined as follows in footnote 1: ‘Thebody concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on amatter submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at themeeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision’. Consensus is mandatory for amending the list of7
WTO (1995), 1098 et seq., 1108 et seq.
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plurilateral agreements in accordance with para. 9. Otherwise, voting shall take place where consensus fails. Each Member of theWTO has one vote. The Agreement specifies this for decisions ofthe Ministerial Conference and the General Council only.Article IX sets forth the principle of simple majority of votescast, and the requirement for 2/3rd for authentic interpretation inpara. 2, for 3/4th for the adoption of waivers in para. 3. Proposals byMembers to amend the Agreements requires 2/3rd for submission ofthe proposal for acceptance. In addition, a further quorum needs tobe met for the implementation and entry into force of amendmentsto the Agreements. Those listed in Annex 1 relating to the decisionmaking (Art XI) and principles of non-discrimination in GATT,GATS and TRIPs only take effect upon acceptance by all members,according to para. 2. Acceptance by 2/3rd of the Membership isrequired for altering rights and obligations of Annex 1 A Agreements and the TRIPs Agreement and a 3/4th majority may decidethat Members not accepting the amendment may be free to withdraw from the WTO, in para. 3. Similar provisions apply to GATSin para. 5.Except for the accession of Ecuador, voting has not taken placeunder WTO since 1995, nor in appointing the director-general ofthe Organization, nor in minor matters of house-keeping. Consensus is adhered to at all costs. Moreover, the principle also extends tothe adoption and implementation of agreements. The treaties wereaccepted on the basis of a single undertaking (except for the plurilateral agreements) in the Uruguay Round and rules of individuallyaccepting amendments enshrined in Article X WTO Agreementhave not been operational so far.The reasons for strict adherence to consensus are obvious. Theprinciple of One State – On Vote reflects an extensive discrepancyof real and voting powers. The voting rules represent neither thestake individual Members have in the multilateral system nor theirreal impact on power in shaping the rules of the multilateral system(both of which are recognized by consensus practices). The imbalance and material inequality of representation in terms of votingrights is significant when we look at the shares of financial contributions to the WTO, gross domestic product (GDP), and votingrates as shown in Figure 1. The group of industrial countries, composed of 24 members, occupying 79% of Member’s total GDP andsupplying 71% of the WTO budget, represent only 17% of vote atthe WTO. The group of developing countries, comprising 119
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members, on the other hand, which supplies 21% of total GDP andcontributes 29% to WTO budget, represents 83% of total vote.8 Theratio of vote representation to budget contribution is 1:4.2 for thegroup of industrial and 1:0.37 for the group of developing countries, respectively.GDPDevelopingCountries
WTO BudgetVoteGDP
Industrialized WTO BudgetCountriesVote0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Figure 1: Share of GDP, Contribution and Vote in the WTO.Source: WDI except for Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Myanmar, and Taiwan (seeAppendix B);Note: Armenia, Nepal and Macedonia are not included as they are newWTO members after 2003 and contribution is not allocated for 2003.The group of industrialized countries does not include new / candidate 13countries for the EU but these countries are placed in the group of developing countries.Contribution is the average of 2001-2003;GDP is taken from the average of 1996-2000.
These ratios depict the problem of substantial material inequality which is present under the present WTO framework, andwhich explains why voting procedures under Art. IX WTO Agreement are not used as a