supplementary means and decision-makingremains strictly reserved to consensus. Current voting rules inWTO, in other words, fail to respond to the requirement that majority voting procedures need to be able to assure that major trading8
The number of official WTO membership as of April 2004 is 146(with EU 147). However, Armenia, Nepal and Macedonia are not included in this figure, as they entered into the membership after 2003and the contribution for 2003 is not allocated. At the time of writingthis paper, Cambodia was accepted but Parliament refuted approval.Russia’s accession is likely to be next. For calculations, the paper isbased on 147 Members (including Cambodia, but not Russia).
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partners in the system keep a profound interest in dealing reliablywith each other on the basis of the WTO law. The WTO cannot becompared to the United Nations General Assembly and its OneState – One Vote principle or other international organizations operating under this principle. The General Assembly does not exercise law-making functions, and matters of international security aredealt with by the Security Council which is subject to customaryveto powers of permanent members. Other international organizations operating on One State – One Vote do not exercise comparable law making functions and do not adopt package deals whichwere essentially mandatory for all members upon completion of theUruguay Round.In the WTO, the principle of One State – One Vote raises fundamental problems of inequality to which we return shortly. At thisstage, we merely emphasize that loss of substantial influence orcontrol through One State – One Vote majority voting runs the riskthat key stakeholders informally leave the system and turn to unilateral, bilateral or regional trade regulation which they are able toeffectively control. This is not in the interest of smaller nations whostrongly depend on most-favoured-nation (MFN) and non-discriminatory market access rules. For such reasons, consensus has beenstrongly favoured by all Members alike and occasional efforts toresolve a problem by voting have been abandoned.B. The Future of ConsensusObserving the past decades of GATT, the consensus principle overall has been successfully applied. While it has often led to protraction and delay, eight rounds of multilateral negotiations were completed with far reaching effects and impact on real life and thestructure of the economies of Members. Consensus successfullyoperates in many instances, as interests of Members are taken intoaccount ex ante in the negotiating process. All Members present(not those absent) have the right to oppose, and from this point ofview it is a method that inherently reflects formal equality of States.At the same time, consensus informally reflects differences inpower and influence of Members in the organization. Real powersto shape and block consensus is not evenly spread. Some clearly aremore equal than others, based upon their stake and interest in themultilateral trading system and the influence they yield on the basisof market size and geopolitical roles. In practical terms, consensusdiplomacy results in largely divergent powers to effectively use the
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veto power. While large trading entities are in a position to blockconsensus more frequently in the daily operations of the organizations and on ministerial levels, smaller nations and interest groupsneed to dose the usage of their blocking rights very carefully. Inpractical terms, the power for them is limited to issues of existentialimportance; yet even there it may be impossible to exercise vetopowers in light of disadvantages to be expected from such conduct.The trend to form interest groups and coalitions, such as the groupof 21 or the group of 10, may be seen to enhance effective influenceand veto powers with a view to discharge individual members fromsolely assuming responsibilities and the political and economiccosts of blocking consensus.Consensus as a model of decision-making which preserves thevital interests of both large partners and equally protects smallernations alike is likely to continue to be successful when dealingwith multifarious issues negotiated with a view to achieve an overall and balanced package deal. Enlarged membership may furtherprotract results, but does not exclude them, in particular in the fieldof market access negotiations. There is a predominant view amongMembers to the effect that negotiations should continue to basedupon consensus diplomacy.For reasons already indicated, however, there are increasingdoubts since the failure of the Ministerial Meeting of Cancúnwhether consensus diplomacy alone and without the backing of aneffective voting system will be able to cope with the complexitiesof future rounds which reach well beyond the realm of market access negotiations. It is increasingly difficult to cope with all theregulatory issues and tasks within the framework of a package dealwithin a reasonable period of time. While package deals negotiatedunder the pressures of consensus diplomacy may be able to hammerout basic agreement, the potentials of blocking consensus is increasing, given the divergence of economic and political interests atstake. Moreover, the quality of rule-making may suffer if packagedeals need to deal with all the details of regulations. Clearly, itwould be beneficial if more work could be effectively left to interround negotiations. Here, for reasons discussed in our first paper,consensus has largely failed. Little progress has been achieved andthe main burden has been placed on dispute settlement, leading to asystem out of balance. Authentic interpretation and legislative response are virtually impossible to achieve. A winning party is not
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likely to concede changes on an issue that may put the successfulimplementation of a ruling adopted by the DSB at risk.The evidence affirms this view. Up until now, not a single authentic interpretation, let alone an amendment of an agreement, hasmaterialized following dispute settlement. Formal reactions havebeen limited to the granting of waivers under Article IX:3 WTOAgreement. Unlike legislative response, this however amounts todispensation from existing agreements and is limited in effect toparticular Members. It is at this stage that we recognize one of themain roots of the problem: panels and the Appellate Body are confronted with the interpretation and application of rights and obligations. The scope of law-making and shaping by panels and the Appellate Body is inextricably intertwined with the modes and processes of negotiations applied. Whilst treaty law in many areas callsfor support and completion by way of adjudication and case law,the practical impossibility of bringing about legislative responseobliges the Appellate Body to exercise strong restraint and refrainfrom more extensive interpretations, in particular of obligationsincurred by the agreements. The emphasis of textual interpretationis an emanation of this constellation. Panels may have somewhatmore leeway, as their views can still be tested before the AppellateBody. The same is not true for the review process. It is quasi finaluntil the law changes in a new round of multilateral negotiations.Such restraint, at the same time, bears the risk of limiting forwardlooking, purposing interpretations and clarifications that may beused to guide Members, for example in determining the relationshipto agreements outside the WTO or to other international organizations. Ideally, the fragmented and often incomplete law of the WTOwould rather call for a larger scope of interpretation in order toachieve full coherence with the system. Yet, the lack of possibilitiesof legislative response and thus a true dialogue between the judicialand the political branches of the WTO renders this politically difficult.For these reasons we submit that consensus diplomacy shouldbe supplemented by a workable and realistic system of voting towhich the Members of the WTO could revert in cases of stalemate,melt-downs and break-downs of negotiations, both within roundsand in between rounds. We do not argue to replace consensus andits advantages by voting at all times. We suggest to understandvoting as a supplementary instrument of decision-making. Its primary field of application will be work undertaken in between
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rounds and in regular business of the WTO. In trade rounds, it willassist overcoming major difficulties and influence conduct duringnegotiations. The proposal thus stays within the foundations enshrined in Article IX WTO Agreement and its requirement of qualified majorities, except for the One State – One Vote principle.Importantly, decisions taken within the WTO on the basis ofweighted voting and the adoption of an amendment remains subjectto Art. X:3 WTO Agreement. Each Member is free to decidewhether an agreement approved on the basis of weighted votingshall be adhered to.Any voting system effectively available as a supplementarymeans of decision-making, of course, exerts ex ante influences onthe operation of consensus practices. Consensus diplomacy backedwith weighted voting will not be based upon exactly the samepower constellations as today. The possibility to revert to voting incase of failure will shape the modes of consensus diplomacy. Evenif not practiced and used, the allocation of voting rights and of voting powers is of crucial importance – humming like an operationalsystem in the background. Deviations from the current consensusalone rule will therefore depend upon the modes of allocation ofrights and voting powers. Before turning to this crucial point, weaddress legitimacy of weighted voting.III. Weighted Voting for WTO Decision-MakingA. Qualifying Equality of StatesFormal equality of States is one of the fundamental principles ofinternational law. All States, large and small alike, enjoy the samerights and obligations under the United Nations Charter and incustomary international law as a horizontal order between sovereign nations. The principle was strongly reinforced through theprocess of decolonization in the 20th century. The principle of OneState – One Vote is expression of sovereign equality; so is decisionmaking by consensus which equally allows all States alike to voiceobjections and block a consensus if they wish to do so. Both, consensus and One State – One Vote therefore are perceived as an important guarantee of equality and even democracy in the international system. Formal equality of States has a strong appeal andlegitimacy, and it is necessary to state the reasons why unequaltreatment nevertheless should be preferred. Some of the operationalreasons were already stated above. The failure of consensus and a
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complete lack of supplementary means of decision-making due toformal equality is neither in the interest of Members, large andsmall alike, nor from the point of view of effective multilateralism.It is important to note at this stage that equality before the lawis not limited to a formal concept. Substantially, equality requires totreat alike similar or comparable constellations of facts, and treatdiverging settings differently. The essence of equality amounts tooperate these distinctions in order to achieve justice and fairness.Factual differences therefore matter a great deal in law. This isequally true in allocating powers in decision-making. States andmarkets are vastly different in size and power, and taking such realities into account renders international law and thus the rule oflaw more effective. Formal equality does not exclude to take intoaccount factual differences in allocating voting powers to individualstates. There are many examples to this effect in law, and withininternational law as well. Voting powers of individual shareholdersdepend on stakes and vary in company law while all are treatedalike in terms of procedural rights. Seats allocated in parliamentdepend on the size of population, and voting powers of citizens infederal states operating dual majority requirements substantiallyvary. The Member States of the European Union operate under asystem of weighted voting in the Council and their people are presented in the European Parliament in accordance with the size ofpopulation. Voting rights in the Bretton Woods system, discussedshortly, are based upon weighted voting on the basis of stakes andshares. Finally, some States are vested with a permanent seat in theSecurity Council and with customary veto power while other Members are not entitled to such rights. Finally, it was seen that consensus rule in substance and reality rather reflects different weight andinfluence of Members within formal equality of States.Differences in allocating voting powers therefore explicitlyand implicitly exist under the principle of formal equality andsovereignty. Equality, however, requires that differences are basedupon relevant and rational factual distinctions. They need to bejustified in light of the overall goal and purpose of a particularstructure. They need to support its efficiency and contribute to itslegitimacy. By taking into account differences in reality – such asthe size of markets, size of contributions made, population, economic performance, dependence on international trade, importantlinkages to reality are established which allow to operate a systemin real terms and to provide, at the same time, a careful balance of
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power, avoiding abuses of rights. Shaping the criteria for distinctiontherefore amounts to the main challenge. It is here, less so than onthe principle of unequal treatment, that main discussions shouldtake place and efforts being made.These efforts should also be made for the WTO, for reasonsdiscussed above. We submit, as in our first paper, that there is amutual interest in creating models of weighted voting by whichdecisions can be taken on the basis of simple of qualified majorityof the votes cast, allowing to overcome impending difficulties tofind consensus. In constructing majority requirements, it is essentialto achieve a careful balance:Firstly, no Member alone should individually be in a positionto block the adoption of a decision – similar to the current state oflaw in dispute settlement in relation to DSB decisions based uponan Appellate Body report. Secondly, no decision should be adoptedagainst the combined will of major stakeholders. We define majorstakeholders as those countries whose relations should essentiallyand genuinely be based upon WTO law, and not be mediated byway of bilateral or regional preferential agreements. Direct relationsof these countries therefore form the backbone of the multilateralsystem, or the golden triangle. This triangle has essentially entailedthe relationship of the United States, the European Communities,and Japan. It is in the process of being enlarged to other majorcountries depending their development on international trade, inparticular the People’s Republic of China. As long as their mutualrelations essentially and genuinely rely upon WTO law, the increasing number of regional systems and agreements of the keystakeholders with their neighbours or allies will work as a complement, rather than a threat to, the WTO. Failure to preserve and develop the multilateral backbone, in return, will render the proliferation of unilateralism, bilateralism and regionalism in a manner detrimental to the WTO. It will inevitably lead to the decline of theWTO as the basic constitutional structure of international trade. It istherefore of paramount importance that major stakeholders keep aviable interest in WTO, and incentives to informally depart from itare countervailed.Thirdly it is important to do justice to medium and smallerMember States alike. Weighted voting for the purposes of lawmaking and legislative response to dispute settlement must assist inavoiding such effects and provide a start for strengthening longerterm global integration and governance within the WTO. A system
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would be able to assure that smaller and medium sized Memberscannot be systematically outvoted.Models of weighted voting complying with these basic requirements could usefully support negotiations and rational decisionmaking within the organization. Supplementary voting will contribute to transparency and thus legitimacy of results. It would alsofacilitate the work governments who often are exposed to conflicting domestic interests. We submit that voting following difficultiesto find consensus is beneficial to discharge responsibilities of governments vis-à-vis their constituencies at home. Today, a government forced to block consensus is confronted with challenges bothat home and abroad. At home, interests seeking progress in negotiations will be frustrated. Abroad, the exercise of blocking rightsamounts to be blamed for derailing negotiations and will be metwith increased pressures to comply in subsequent efforts. A votewill allow governments who fail to achieve their goals, to concededefeat in a rational manner. Voters will accept in the long run whena qualified majority of Members has brought about results differentfrom what their own government has fought for. The burden ofblocking consensus is an overly burdensome one and is likely todestabilize governments more than the process of accepting a subsequent vote on the matter.In proposing an introduction of weighted voting model for theWTO, the next section first overviews the basic requirements forlegitimacy of weighted voting model, variables to be used in calculating the voting weight, and the proposed formula, all of which areinitially discussed in detail.9 Then the quantification of the proposedformula follows.B. The Basic Requirements for Legitimate Decision-Makingunder Weighted VotingWeighted voting in international law is not new. While it clearlyentails an important step in rationalizing international relations, itdoes not leave the realm of international law and does not turn theWTO into a constitutional framework which exceeds the foundations of equal sovereignty and consent. The Bretton Woods systemof the IMF and the World Bank offer an important precedent inpoint. For many, however, it is bad example. Weighted voting inthe WTO faces the problem that many object to it because of that9
Cottier / Takenoshita (2003).
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precedent and how weighted voting was shaped in these institutions. It is therefore important to assess that experience and learnthe lessons from it. Different models of weighted voting can bedesigned, and a future system in the WTO needs to follow the patterns and allocations chosen in the Bretton Woods institutions.Nevertheless, it is important to recall their foundations and the experience made in the World Bank and the International MonetaryFunds. In particular, their efforts at reform under way provide important insights.1. Weighted Voting under IMF and the Quota ReformThe IMF is a prime example of multilateral organization operatingunder weighted voting,10 although many decisions are taken byconsensus. Its voting weight is allocated to Member states in amanner in which ‘each member receives 250 (basic) votes, plus 1additional vote for each part of its quota equivalent to one 100,000Special Drawing Rights’ (IMF Articles of Agreement Art. XII Section 5a). The basic votes are introduced so as to ‘pay some homageto the traditional principle of the equality of states, to avoid tooclose an analogy to the private business corporation, and to guardagainst too great a concentration of voting power in the hands ofone or two members’.11 The majority rule adopted depends on different issues: for example, it requires 85% negative majority forauthentic interpretation of the provisions of the Agreement whereasdouble majority rule of three-fifths of the total membership andfour-fifths of the total voting weight of members is adopted as regard to an amendment of the Articles of the Fund.The legitimacy of decision-making is currently questioned as itis often criticized that it reflects too much interest of economicallystrong Members. Reflecting the criticism and the change in economic relations over time, the IMF quota allocation and weightedvoting are currently under a process of reform. In fact, the currentvoting weight of industrial countries constitutes more than 60%,although it represents only 16% of Membership. In addition, the EU10
11
The World Bank also adopts weighted voting system, which is similar to that of IMF. The voting weight is derived from specified number of membership votes (as in IMF basic votes) and additional votesbased on the number of shares of the stock held. The voting weightdistribution among Membership is also similar to IMF.Gold (1974), 688.
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and the US are provided with de facto veto power when 85% majority is adopted, as their voting weights in IMF decision-makingrepresent almost 30% and 17% respectively.12 The situation partlystems from the fact that the number of basic votes has remainedconstant while the level of quota increased by 37 folds due to inflation and economic growth in general since 1944. As a consequence,the share of basic votes to total votes declined from 11.3 to 2.1 percent despite the quadrupled number of Membership.13 The initialintention to preserve equality of States has thus become ineffectiveand the balance of power shifted toward countries with large quota.Ultimately, the quota and voting weight reform is required to reestablish a more appropriate balance. Overall, it should bring aboutenhanced legitimacy and is supposed to achieve three major functions: simplicity, transparency, and robustness to changes in theinternational economy and to the relative change in the position of acountry.142. Weighted Voting for WTOThe goals and functions aspired for IMF quota reform should betaken into account and reflected in designing a weighted votingsystem in the context of the WTO in order to maintain the legitimacy as an international organization. Additional criteria, however,need to be taken into account in order to meet the basic criticismwhich the Bretton Woods voting system faces. Besides trade specific factors, two other elements will be added in our proposal inorder to ensure the legitimacy of decision-making in the WTO. Anysystem of fair weighted voting needs to assure that particular countries do not have independent veto power and that the representation between two groups of countries, industrial and developing isadequately assured. All these requirements will seek to ensure enhanced legitimacy of an international organization, whose primarytask is to process a wide range of interests and obligations.C. The VariablesAs the WTO is an international organization that primarily dealswith trade and trade-related rules among Member countries, it isnatural to assume that variables for voting weight allocation should121314
See Cottier / Takenoshita (2003) for details.Buira (2003), 2.IMF (2001).
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reflect each member’s performance and power in terms of tradingactivities undertaken by its economy. As in our first paper, we propose four possible variables to be considered: the size of trade ingoods and services, the size of GDP, the openness of the market,and population. Most suggested variables are economic in nature,reflecting the fact that the WTO is an organization dealing withrules related to economic activity although its activity tends to expand to trade-contiguous issues.151. The Size of Trade in Goods and Services –WTO Budget ContributionsThe size of trade in goods and services are a fundamental elementin assessing a Member’s performance and power in the context ofthe WTO. Indeed, this factor is used for the allocation of WTObudget contribution of individual Member States. As the contribution is allocated in proportion to each Member’s three-year averageshare of international trade in goods, services and intellectual property rights, we suggest the use of WTO contribution as a variable inorder to allow double assessment of performance and power – tradesize and budgetary contribution to the organization. In particular, asthe allocation of WTO contribution provides minimum threshold of0.015% for Members whose trade proportion to the total is less than0.015%, those who contribute 0.015% should be treated as suchalso in assessing the voting power, rather than using the raw data ontrade size.162. Gross Domestic Product (GDP)GDP is one of the most comprehensive indicators for measuring aMember’s economic size relative to other members and the availability of data is relatively well established. The three-year averageGDP is used in order to smooth the effects of short-term cyclicalfluctuation yet to reflect update condition of a Member state.
15
16
There may be other options such as commitment level to, e.g. WTOrule in general, Intellectual Property Rights or Environmental standards, however, the credibility of such assessment is not yet established. On the other hand the economic indicators used here are morewidely accepted.There are 35 Members subject to 0.015% of WTO contribution for2003.
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3. Market OpennessMarket openness is defined as the proportion of imports to GDPand is used as an assessment of a Member’s contribution to worldtrade by offering open markets, regardless of the size of the GDP.We consider this to be an important factor as it also establishesdependence and reliance of an economy on the multilateral tradingsystem. Open economies thus have a larger stake in the system, andthis should be reflected in voting rights. Further, as small countriesare in general more open to trade than large countries, the insertionof this variable is effective in offsetting a bias against smallercountries whose size of trade and GDP tend to be small.4. Size of PopulationThe population variable can be an option to be included as a noneconomic social factor. This enables to assess the size of populationaffected by a decision, independent from different level of socialand economic development.5. Basic VotesThe combination of these above variables for assessing the votingweight will prove effective in balancing the representation betweenthe group of industrial and developing countries as the variables oftrade and GDP are dominated by industrial and emerging countrieswhereas the variables of openness and population are generallyprivileging developing countries in general (See Table 1). However,the benefit of the latter two variables within this group is disproportionate. Hence a number of Members from developing countriesmay be left with very small numbers of votes. In order to ensure amore equal distribution of voting weight, the insertion of basicvotes can be an effective option, following the principle adopted byIMF. Thus the insertion of basic votes will also be tested.Table 1: Regional Distribution of Variables1Contribution Contribution GDP ø OpennessWTO 20032WTO‘98ø 98-2000Revised2000
Population2001
37 IndustrialCountries
72.8
62.5
81.2
0.273
19.1
USA (1)
15.9
22.2
31.2
0.14
5.3
4
10.22.4
EU (28)
42.9
20.6
30.0
0.12
Japan (1)
6.4
8.8
14.9
0.09
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Contribution Contribution GDP ø OpennessWTO 20032WTO‘98ø 98-2000Revised2000
Population2001
110 Devel.Countries
27.2
37.5
18.8
0.47
80.9
Africa (40)
1.8
2.4
1.2
0.42
11.0
Asia (23)
17.7
24.4
9.9
0.55
58.2
Europe (7)
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.51
0.5
MiddleEast (8)
1.9
7.9
6.5
0.48
1.6
Americas(32)
5.7
7.9
6.5
0.48
9.6
Source: Calculations by the authors from various sources; WTO, WDI,National statistics, UN Statistics Division, DOTS, IFS, Eurostat (seeAppendix B and C for details);Notes:1Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of Members for eachregion. Country composition of regional area adopts classification ofIFS except for Liechtenstein, Taiwan, and Cuba, which are put intocategory of Industrial, Asia, and Americas, respectively.2Excluding Members joined WTO after 2003 (Armenia, Macedoniaand Nepal) and Members subject to ratification for the entry (Cambodia)3Excluding Liechtenstein (inclusion of the country yields 0.52 foraverage openness for industrial countries as its openness is exceptionally high at 2.75);4Excluding intra-EU28 trade. The openness for EU28 is 0.33 whenintra-EU trade is included. Concerning intra-EU trade, the trade ingoods and services 1998-2000 are used for intra-EU15 countries.However, the data for intra-trade concerning the candidate countries(between EU 15 and candidates as well as among candidate countries) is based on only the merchandise trade in 2001.
D. The Proposed Formula1. FormulaAs a basis for deriving the voting weight of each Member, theabove-discussed requirements of simplicity, transparency, and robustness to changing economic climate and Member’s relativepower must be fulfilled. Upon testing a number of options, we pro-
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pose the following formula,17 which is linear in share of vote andindividual country variables:V = a + bCs + cYs + dP + eLswhere V = number of votesa = basic votes (a = 0 in case of no basic votes)C = contribution (= three year average trade share ingoods and services)Y = GDP over three year averageP = opennessL = population, andthe subscript s denotes ‘share’.For actual calculation of the voting weight for 2003, variablesutilized are:x Contribution 2003 whose calculation is based on internationaltrade statistics for the years 1998 – 2000; or revised contribution 2003 (excluding intra-EU trade among EU28 countries)x GDP average over the period of 1998 – 2000;x Openness average over the period of 1998 – 2000;x Population statistics of 2001.The variables of contribution and GDP are allocated each with500 votes whereas variables of basic votes, openness and population with 250 votes. The former two variables are provided withlarger weights in respect to the latter. This is to place adequate em17
Other formulae examined were:1. linear model in value: V = a + bC + cY + dP +eL;2. square root model: V = a + b(Cs)1/2 + c(Ys)1/2 + d(P)1/2 +e(Ls)1/2;3. log-log model: log(V) = log(a) + b log(C) + c log(Y) + d log(P)+ e log(L) + f log(G)which is equivalent to: V = ĮCbYcPdLe; where Į is a normalization factor;4. lin-log model: V = a + b log(C) + c log(Y) + d log(P) + e log(L)+ f log(G).These formulae are dismissed either because the distribution of voteis heavily biased towards a particular country or region, and/or theattribution of weight of each variable is unclear and hence lackstransparency. Cottier / Takenoshita (2003) examined also non-linearmodel (V = a + bCs0.75 + cYs0.75 + dP0.75 + eLs0.75) in detail. Asthe voting weight and power of this model strongly favoured EU inrelation to the US, we focus our study on the linear model in this paper.
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phasis on economic power and trade performance, the latter beingthe most important and most legitimate element in assessing theposition in power relations in the WTO context. The latter variables, on the other hand, are given lower weight and seek to avoidtoo strong a concentration of votes to economically strong Membersand to assure a reasonable balance between the industrial and developing groups. The coefficients are designed so as to achieve asclosely as possible the set number of each variable vote. The sum ofall variables is finally rounded for each country.2. Basic Requirements and the FormulaThe proposed formula is simple as the number of votes just amountsto the summation of share of variables. It is transparent as the formula is simple, being comprised of basic economic and socialvariables. It is also robust to changing economic climate and Member’s relative power for three reasons. Firstly, multiple variables areused, none of which has particularly strong dominance in determining the number of votes. Secondly, as the economic variablesrepresent the average of most recent three-year period, wide fluctuations due to short-run cyclical effects are avoided. At the sametime, it is effective in capturing the recent change in economic performance and ranking. Thirdly, by fixing the weight of variables,the problem faced by the IMF of an increasing proportion of quotavariable in total votes arsing from inflation and growth over time,can be avoided.The problem of avoiding de facto veto power and the need fora balanced representation between the two groups of countries, industrial and developing, will be examined in the next subsectionwhen the formula is quantified. In this respect, two calculations aremade under different hypothesis. Under Hypothesis 1, the EUMember countries are treated individually according to currentpractice and hence the existing contribution allocation is used. Hypothesis 2 makes two changes to this. Firstly, the EU28 will betreated as one entity in assessing the voting weight. This affects thevariable of openness of the EU. Secondly, the contribution is recalculated by excluding intra-EU28 trade.18 Under the existing alloca18
The recalculation of contribution was made according to the currentWTO practice. In subtracting