00.011.79.02.710.71.27.32.274.33.19.77.938.8
2002All productsi)100.0Agricultural products9.3Food7.5Raw materials1.8Mining products12.6Ores and other minerals1.0Fuels9.8Non-ferrous metals1.8Manufactures75.1Iron and steel2.3Chemicals10.5Other semi-manufactures7.3Machinery and transport40.5equipmentAutomotive products6219.29.9Office and telecom83812.113.4equipmentOther machinery and1,08017.517.2transport equipmentTextiles1523.02.4Clothing2013.23.2Other consumer goods5538.78.8i)Includes unspecified products. They account for 3.3 percent of worldmerchandise exports in 2002.
Table A2: World Merchandise Exports by Region, 2002(Billion US$ and percentage)
WorldNorth AmericaUnited StatesLatin AmericaMexicoWestern EuropeEU (15)
Value20026,2729486943501612,6572,449
1990100.015.411.64.31.248.344.4
Share1995100.015.511.74.61.644.841.5
2002100.016.912.55.82.740.037.0
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Fritz BreussValue2002314
19903.1
Share19953.9
2002C./E. Europe/Baltic4.3States/CISC./E. Europe1481.41.61.9Russian Federation1071.61.7Africa1403.12.22.3South Africa300.70.60.5Middle East2444.13.04.3Asia1,62021.826.026.4Japan4178.58.87.6China3261.83.04.06 East Asian traders6037.810.310.4Memorandum item:NAFTA (3)1,10716.517.119.5MERCOSUR (4)891.41.41.4ASEAN (10)4054.26.46.8Source (A1 + A2): WTO, International Trade Statistics 2003, available athttp://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2003_e/its03_bysubject_e.htm#sector
80706050403020SOUTH
10
EAST
0NORTH
NORTHEAST
SOUTH
Figure A1: Network of world merchandise trade, 2002 (in percentof world trade)North = North America, Western Europe, Japan, New Zealand;East = Central and Eastern Europe, Baltic States, Russian Federation;South = Latin America, Africa, Middle East, Other Asia.
Alan Matthews*
Agriculture after Cancún**I. IntroductionII. The Road to CancúnIII. Analysis of the Key IssuesA. Market AccessB. Export SubsidiesC. Domestic SupportIV. Evaluation of the State of Play of the NegotiationsV. After CancúnA. The Regionalism OptionB. Significance of the Peace ClauseC. Moving towards GenevaReferences
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I. IntroductionWTO Members met for the Fifth Ministerial Conference at Cancúnin September 2003 to undertake a mid-term review of the Doharound of trade negotiations. Agriculture is a key element of thesenegotiations as mandated in the Declaration launching the DohaRound:‘Building on the work carried out to date and without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations we commit ourselves tocomprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial improvements inmarket access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all formsof export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distortingdomestic support. We agree that special and differential treatment*
**
Alan Matthews is Jean Monnet Professor of European AgriculturalPolicy Trinity College Dublin, Ireland. Correspondence toAlan.Matthews@tcd.ie.Revised Paper presented to the International Conference ‘The futureof the World Trading System after the Failure at Cancún’, Vienna,Austria, November 20 and 21, 2003.
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for developing countries shall be an integral part of all elements ofthe negotiations and shall be embodied in the Schedules of concessions and commitments and as appropriate in the rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as to be operationally effective and toenable developing countries to effectively take account of theirdevelopment needs, including food security and rural development.We take note of the non-trade concerns reflected in the negotiatingproposals submitted by Members and confirm that non-trade concerns will be taken into account in the negotiations as provided forin the Agreement on Agriculture’.1The failure of the Cancún Ministerial to reach agreement on aframework text on negotiating modalities for the market accessagenda and on the extent of new rule-making left the agriculturalnegotiations, as with the other areas under negotiation, in suspension. A meeting of the WTO General Council on 15 December2003 was unable to provide the necessary momentum to move towards a successful and timely conclusion of the negotiations. However, although there is little sign at the beginning of 2004 thatcountries are yet ready to re-engage in meaningful negotiations, it istoo early to write off the Round as dead.Agriculture is one of the make-or-break issues in the DohaRound. Thus it is timely to review what progress was made, if any,in the discussions on agriculture in the run-up to Cancún andwhether the shape of a final agreement can yet be discerned. Thischapter addresses this question through an analysis of the successive drafts of the framework text on the modalities of the agricultural negotiations and a comparison of the positions of the majorplayers in these negotiations.2 Particular attention is paid to the position of the developing countries and the way their concerns havebeen addressed in successive drafts. The paper is upbeat about theprospects of reaching an agriculture agreement. It argues that themain constraint to a successful resumption and conclusion of theDoha Round lies in broader political calculations in areas other than
12
WTO (2001).A similar exercise undertaken by the International Centre for Tradeand Sustainable Development only came to my attention after thecompletion of this chapter (ICSTD (2003)). See also the agriculturalbackgrounder regularly prepared by the WTO Secretariat and updated 1 March 2004 (WTO (2004)).
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agriculture, but that progress in agriculture could greatly assist inimproving the overall prospects for success.II. The Road to CancúnThe first draft text on modalities was circulated to WTO Membersby Stuart Harbinson, Chairman of the Special Session on Agriculture, on 12 February 2003. A mini-ministerial meeting in Tokyolater that month was the first opportunity for some of the WTOmembership to comment on the paper. The proposal failed to getmuch support and, indeed, no country strongly supported the firstdraft. Members could not even agree on a term to describe the draft(whether as a starting point, reference or basis for the negotiations),eventually agreeing to call it a ‘catalyst’. Despite these disagreements, however, Harbinson’s second draft in the following monthmade few significant changes.3A second mini-ministerial took place in Montreal on 28-30July. Despite some limited signs of flexibility (for example, the EUincreased its offer to cut trade-distorting support from 55% to 60%,while expressing its willingness to eliminate export subsidies andexpand tariff rate quotas for an agreed list of products) the meetingfailed to give a political momentum to the negotiations. Followingthat meeting, the US and the EU were asked to work together tobreak the deadlock.In August 2003, the EU and the US issued a joint frameworksuggesting some areas of agreement on how they thought progresscould be made. Among other things, this text proposed a blendedformula for tariff reductions, a special safeguard for developingcountries to protect sensitive products and improved duty-free access for developing country exports. Many of the proposals fromthis paper were included in the framework text on agriculture contained in Annex A of the Draft Ministerial Text prepared by theWTO Secretariat and published on 31 August as the basis for dis-
3
This is not surprising. A statistical analysis by the Danish ResearchInstitute of Food Economics (2003) which measured the distance between the negotiating proposals of each country showed that the Harbinson draft, if it were considered as the negotiating proposal of aseparate ‘country’, was located in the middle of all other major proposals.
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cussion at the Cancún meeting (called the Castillo draft after theChairman of the General Council).4Developing countries felt that this text leant excessively in thedirection of developed country interests and it sparked a series ofcounter-proposals. A group of (initially) 21 developing countries,including Brazil, China, India and South Africa (now usually referred to as the G20 as its membership varied both during and afterthe Cancún meeting), put forward an alternative text,5 followed bythe African and least developed countries, which proposed another.6Four African cotton-producing countries pursued a Sectoral Initiative on Cotton demanding the removal of all cotton subsidies andfinancial compensation while the subsidies still existed.A revised framework text on agriculture was presented to theConference by the Secretariat on 13 September (called the Derbezdraft after the Mexican Foreign Minister who chaired the conference).7 Although the negotiations on this text broke down the following day because of incompatible positions on the Singapore issues,8 there was some optimism that a deal could be reached on agriculture on the basis of this draft. The manner in which it addressedthe concerns of the major participating groups is discussed in thefollowing section of the paper.The Cancún conference was notable for the capacity of developing countries to organise around common positions. While theUruguay Round negotiations on agriculture were largely a US-EUaffair, and were concluded once these countries reached the BlairHouse agreement, the Doha Round negotiations are more a NorthSouth issue although with sub-plots within each of these groupings.Already at the Doha Conference a loose alignment of developingcountries calling themselves ‘Friends of the Development Box’ had45678
WTO (2003a).The G21 alternative text on agriculture can be found atwww.icstd.org.WTO (2003b).WTO (2003c).The Singapore issues cover trade and investment, trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement and measuresto facilitate trade such as the simplification of customs proceduresThey are referred to as the Singapore issues because the MinisterialDeclaration following the WTO Council meeting in Singapore in1996 agreed to establish working groups to analyse them.
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been formed to promote acceptance of ideas for greater special anddifferential treatment for developing countries in the agricultureagreement. The G20 group was notable for bringing together countries which traditionally have held very divergent positions in theagricultural negotiations, particularly on the importance to be attached to the Development Box. While the G20 grouped the developing country heavyweights, the least developed countries, African,Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and African Union countries cametogether in a group which was designated (by others if not by themselves, since the group contains only 61 WTO members, 2003) asthe G90, led by Mauritius. This group, in addition to supporting theDevelopment Box proposals, sought measures to address tariffpeaks and escalation, the binding of preferential access to developed country markets, and a compensatory mechanism to compensate for the erosion of trade preferences due to tariff liberalisation.A final group of eventually 33 countries (dubbed the G33), led byIndonesia and the Philippines, formed the Alliance for StrategicProducts and a Special Safeguard Mechanism, which emphasisedthe particular importance of strengthening measures to protect vulnerable farmers.Membership of these groups overlapped, and the fact that leading countries in each alliance are members of the Cairns Group ofagricultural exporting countries is also significant. The CairnsGroup, which had been dominated by Australia following a hardline free trade stance focusing on improved market access and theremoval of subsidies, played a much more subdued role in Cancúnas its developing country members followed a more developmentoriented path. CAFOD remarks on the fact that agriculture was thefocus of all these developing country groupings, highlighting itscentral importance for them and the essential distraction which theSingapore issues represented.9The cotton initiative proposed by four West and Central African LDCs – Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali – became thesymbolic issue at Cancún, just as access to medicines at the DohaConference. The African countries requested an ‘early harvest’decision in Cancún to phase out all cotton subsidies and domesticsupport measures by 2005, along with the payment of compensationto LDCs during the transition period. The US and the EU were opposed to a decision of this kind, which they viewed as setting a9
CAFOD (2003)
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precedent for commitments on specific products, challenging theaggregate approach adopted for Amber Box trade-distorting subsidies in the AoA.10A further feature of the Cancún conference was the role playedby civil society organisations. Development NGOs turned up instrength and acted as a counterweight to the farm lobby representatives in influencing national delegations. The EU AgriculturalCommissioner went so far as to partly blame their influence on developing country delegations for the breakdown of the talks. Whilethe comment was seen as somewhat patronising with respect to developing country governments,11 it provides a further illustration ofthe changed dynamics of the conference negotiations.III. Analysis of the Key IssuesThis section of the paper traces how negotiating positions havebeen reflected in successive draft texts of the modalities, beginningwith the Harbinson draft through the Castillo text at the outset ofthe Cancún conference and the Derbez text at the end of that conference. Areas of agreement as well as disagreement are highlightedin order to form a view on the degree of convergence which hasbeen achieved in the negotiations to date.A. Market AccessThe US proposal on market access was to use a harmonising formula (the Swiss formula12) to reduce agricultural tariffs, ensuringthat no individual tariff exceeds 25% after a five-year phase in period. Tariffs should be simplified to either ad valorem or specific,but not mixed. The EU, on the other hand, proposed to continue theUruguay Round (UR) linear formula, reducing agricultural tariffsby 36% on average, with a cut of at least 15% per dutiable item.The Harbinson draft proposed a banded approach. Tariffsgreater than 90% would be reduced by 60% on average, with aminimum cut of 45% per tariff line. Tariffs between 90 and 15%101112
The EU position has since become more supportive of the Africancountries’ position, see European Commission (2003).CAFOD (2003)The Swiss formula is Tn = (amax * T0)/(amax + T0) where T0 is theoriginal tariff, Tn is the new tariff and amax is the upper bound on allresulting tariffs. With amax = 50, an initial tariff of 40 per cent wouldbe reduced to 22 per cent.
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would be reduced by 50/30%, while tariffs lower than 15% wouldbe reduced by 40/25%. Reductions would take place in equal instalments over five years. Developing countries would be given aten year implementation period and lighter reduction commitments.Least developed countries would not be required to undertake reduction commitments but might be encouraged to do so on a voluntary basis, taking into account their development needs. Newlyacceded countries (such as China), who often offered more ambitious tariff concessions than those required under the UR formula,would have the flexibility to defer the implementation period fornew commitments by two years. The Harbinson formula was opposed both by the supporters of a Swiss formula approach (whichwould bring all tariffs down to a specific maximum level) and bythose (such as the EU) which wanted to continue the flexibility tohave smaller reductions for certain sensitive products.The joint EU-US framework proposal proposed a blended approach instead. Some proportion of tariff lines would be subject to aSwiss formula coefficient; some proportion would be subject to theUR formula of an average tariff cut subject to a minimum; andsome proportion of tariff lines would be duty-free. Moreover, amaximum tariff level would be agreed; countries which wished toretain tariffs above this level would be required to offer effectiveadditional market access through a request/offer process, includingincreases in tariff rate quotas.The G20 group accepted this blended approach although – forthe UR element of the formula – they proposed a simple uniformtariff cut (instead of an average reduction subject to a minimum).However, for developing countries, they proposed the continuationof the UR formula across-the-board. They also called for an overalltarget for average tariff reductions by developed countries. Similardemands were included in the G90 proposal.The Castillo draft retained the blended formula approach basedon the EU-US framework proposal, while adding the proviso thatthe resulting simple average tariff reduction for all agriculturalproducts should be no less than a specified minimum as called forby the G20. It proposed to treat maximum tariffs as in the EU-USframework proposal, although the Derbez text offered a slight loophole that additional flexibility would be possible for a limited number of products on the basis of non-trade concerns. From the G20perspective, an objectionable element of this text was that it re-
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tained the use of the Swiss formula also for developing countries,implying a maximum tariff level for at least some products.Harbinson recognised the need for special and differentialtreatment for developing countries by proposing lower tariff reductions and longer implementation periods. However, both the Castillo and Derbez texts proposed that setting maximum tariffs also fordeveloping countries should remain under negotiation, a proposalrejected by the developing countries. Reflecting the demand for aDevelopment Box, Harbinson introduced the concept of ‘SpecialProducts’ (SPs) which would be defined with respect to food security, rural development and/or livelihood security concerns. Harbinson suggested that the tariff reductions to be sought on SPs shouldbe limited to an average of 10% (with a minimum reduction of 5%).The Castillo draft proposed a less attractive formulation from a developing country perspective, namely, a lower minimum reductionfor SPs within the proportion of tariff lines which would be subjectto the UR linear formula. Presumably, this would require compensating higher reductions on other tariff lines in order to achieve theoverall targeted average reduction. The Castillo draft also proposedexempting SPs from any obligation to increase Tariff Rate Quotas(TRQs). The Derbez text added that, where existing tariff bindingswere very low, no further reductions would be sought. Development Box proponents see these as very weak provisions to securethe protection they believe to be necessary for these particularlysensitive products.An important element of the market access proposals in theHarbinson draft proposals was a clear formula to address tariff escalation issues. Where the tariff on a processed product was higherthan the tariff for the product in its primary form, the rate of tariffreduction for the processed product would be equivalent to that forthe product in its primary form multiplied by, at a minimum, a factor of 1.3. The EU-US framework text did not address this issue,and in the Castillo draft, it was reduced to ‘best endeavour’ language, stating that ‘the issue of tariff escalation will be effectivelyaddressed.’ The G20 draft proposed retaining the Harbinson formula, and it was reinstated in the Derbez text.The Harbinson draft proposed the elimination of the currentspecial safeguard mechanism (SSG) which allows countries to levyan additional, time-limited import surcharge to protect domesticproducers from a sudden surge in imports of certain products. Thismechanism is only available to products which underwent tariffica-
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tion in the UR and where countries had reserved the right to use itin their schedules. In the EU-US framework text, the use of theSSG was left as a matter for further negotiation and this languagewas retained in the Castillo and Derbez texts. The G20 draft callsfor the conditions and timetable for its elimination to be negotiated.The Harbinson modalities also included provision for a newSpecial Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) to be added to the modalitiesto enable developing countries to effectively take account of theirdevelopment needs. The SSM is strongly supported by both theG20, the G90 and the G33 ‘subject to conditions and for products tobe determined’. The EU-US framework draft also accepted a SSMbut linked it to the notion of ‘import-sensitive products’ whichwould also benefit from lower tariff reduction commitments. Boththe Castillo and Derbez texts contained a proposal to establish aSSM along the lines of the G20 proposal. Other developing countries in the G33, however, want the SSM to be available for allproducts, as well as ensuring that SPs would also have access to theSSM.On TRQs, the Harbinson text proposed that quota amountswould be increased up to 10% of current domestic consumption ofeach product, as well as calling for simplification and greater transparency in the administration of tariff rate quotas. It did not proposea reduction of in-quota tariffs, except for tropical products or products which might substitute for crops which were illegal or harmfulto human health, or where fill rates over a recent period had beenparticularly low. The EU-US proposal did not address this issue,although it implied that TRQs would be increased in cases wherecountries made use of the flexibilities under the tariff reductionformula to maintain particularly high tariffs or to implement minimum reductions for import-sensitive products. Taking its cue fromthis draft, the Castillo and Derbez texts proposed a reduction of inquota tariffs while leaving the terms and conditions of further TRQexpansion under negotiation. The G20 text supports the Harbinsondraft in calling for an expansion of TRQs, while the G90 text contents itself with a call for simplification and greater transparency ofTRQ regimes.The erosion of trade preferences following from any reductionin agricultural tariffs in developed countries has emerged as an important issue for a number of developing countries. The Harbinsondraft modalities called for the maintenance of the nominal marginsof tariff preferences where technically feasible – this is obviously
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not possible in cases where duty-free access is already granted. Itproposed a longer implementation period and a two year moratorium for ‘tariff reductions affecting long-standing preferences inrespect of products which are of vital export importance for developing country beneficiaries …’ How this would work in practice isnot clear, as eligible products are defined as those which accountfor at least 20% of the total merchandise exports of any beneficiary.This would seem to open up a potentially large number of productsfor which this special exception would apply. The formulation issupported in both the Castillo and Derbez texts, as well as in theproposals from the G20. The G90, in addition, seek the development of a compensatory mechanism to address the erosion of preferences for countries adversely affected.The EU-US framework text addressed this issue by calling forduty-free access for a certain percentage of developing country imports to be provided ‘through a combination of Most Favoured Nation and preferential access’.13 This formulation was carried into theCastillo and Derbez texts, although using the ‘best endeavour’ language that all developed countries ‘will seek to provide’ this minimum amount of duty-free access. The G20 text strengthens this tothe mandatory ‘shall provide’, with the implication that, where provided through preferential schemes, this access would be bound inthe schedules of commitments entered by developed countries. TheHarbinson draft modalities, in addition, had offered that developedcountries either ‘should’ or (much stronger) ‘shall’ provide dutyand quota-free access to their markets for all agricultural importsfrom the least developed countries. This was weakened to ‘best endeavour’ language in the Castillo text that the objective of dutyand quota-free access for least developed countries ‘shall be expeditiously pursued’. Both the G20 and the G90 sought the strongerHarbinson alternative and, in the Derbez text, the Harbinson dualformulation was restored.B. Export SubsidiesAs was evident already in negotiating the Doha mandate in November 2001, the future of export subsidies is a hotly contested issue. The US, Cairns Group and developing countries have called13
In its original negotiating proposal to the Special Session, the EUproposed zero duty access for 50% of total imports of agriculturalproducts from developing countries, as well as unrestricted access forimports from the least developed countries.
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for their elimination. The EU is the single largest user of exportsubsidies, accounting for around 85% of the total by value notifiedto the WTO Committee on Agriculture. It had originally proposed a45% reduction in expenditure on average, provided that all forms ofexport subsidies, including export credits and the activities of statetrading exporters, were treated equally.The Harbinson draft proposed that export subsidies for products accounting for 50% of export subsidy expenditure would bephased out over five years, while the remainder would be phasedout over nine years, with the greatest reductions occurring in theearlier years. Developing countries would be given 10 and 12 yearsrespectively. In the EU-US framework text, the EU offered toeliminate export subsidies on certain products of particular interestto developing countries (to be determined) while subsidies for theremaining products would only be reduced.The Harbinson text had also proposed to discipline exportcredits. Non-conforming export financing subsidies would be subject to reduction commitments, with exceptions for emergencysituations in importing Members. The EU-US framework text proposed that parallel disciplines should be applied to export credits,state trading export enterprises and food aid programmes. It alsoadded that, without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations, reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies including export credits would occur in a parallel manner.The Castillo text combined these elements by affirming thatreduction commitments shall be applied in a parallel manner toexport subsidies, export credits, export state trading enterprises andfood aid. It retained the commitment to phase out export subsidiesfor products of interest to developing countries, but added that, forthe remaining products, ‘Members shall commit to reduce, with aview to phasing out, budgetary and quantity allowances for exportsubsidies’. The G20 draft proposed adding a definite time horizonto this last commitment, turning it from a ‘best endeavour’ to amandated commitment, but the Derbez draft retained the Castillowording. However, the Castillo draft contained a commitment(para. 3.6) that ‘the question of the end date for phasing out allforms of export subsidies remains under negotiation’. This wasfurther strengthened in the Derbez draft to become ‘An end date for
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phasing out all forms of export subsidies remains under negotiation’, thus changing the issue from ‘if’ to ‘when’.14C. Domestic SupportWhile high-support countries are broadly satisfied with the GreenBox as defined in the URAA, intended to permit countries to continue support programmes to agriculture which are deemed to benot or minimally trade-distorting, agricultural exporters and developing countries have sought to limit Green Box payments, arguingthat their sheer volume has a distorting effect on global trade. TheHarbinson draft modalities did propose some minor tightening ofthe criteria for eligibility for the Green Box in Annex 2 of theURAA but did not propose a cap on Green Box spending or removeany income support payments from the Green Box. At the sametime, it responded to the demands from the EU, Switzerland andothers to allow payments for animal welfare programme to be classified as a Green Box measure.The Castillo text simply noted that the Green Box criteria remain under negotiation. This was slightly strengthened in the Derbez draft to state that Green Box criteria shall be reviewed with aview to ensuring that Green Box measures have no, or at mostminimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production. The G20text altered this to propose that the Green Box disciplines should bestrengthened with a view to ensuring that Green Box measures haveno, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production.Developing country interest also focused on Article 6.2 measures to encourage agricultural and rural development which are exempted from reduction commitments under this paragraph. TheHarbinson draft modalities proposed extending the range of exempted measures and attached a list of possible amendments forfurther consideration. Surprisingly, this issue was not explicitly included in either the Castillo or Derbez texts nor in the G20 draft.With respect to trade-distorting (Amber Box) support, the Harbinson draft proposed that the Aggregate Measurement of Support(AMS) should be decreased by 60% in five years for developedcountries, and 40% in ten years for developing country members.The EU-US draft did not contain numbers for the extent of the reduction in trade-distorting support, but it did state that the reduc14
CAFOD (2003)
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tions would be ‘significantly larger than in the Uruguay Round’(namely, 20% for developed countries). It also stated that Memberswith higher levels of trade-distorting subsidies would have to makegreater efforts than others. The unspecified AMS reduction wascarried into the Castillo draft, but a significant addition in the Derbez text was the commitment that product-specific AMS shall becapped at their respective average levels during a base period to beagreed. The G20 proposed, in addition, that the product-specificceilings might be reduced in further negotiations and that, for heavily exported products, additional disciplines should be negotiated.The EU-US text also proposed a reduction in de minimis limitswhich was repeated in both the Castillo and Derbez drafts, althoughdeveloping countries would be exempt from this reduction.The Uruguay Round Agreement introduced the Blue Box category of production-limited support. The Harbinson draft proposedto cap these payments at their 1991-2001 level and reduce them by50% over five years. Alternatively, it suggested that the Blue Boxshould be merged with the Amber Box. The US had initially proposed to scrap the Blue Box entirely, but the EU-US frameworktext proposed to cap Blue Box spending at 5% of the total value ofagricultural production at the end of the implementation period. Italso proposed to relax the criteria for Blue Box payments by nolonger requiring production limiting or supply management programmes. Under this new design, the US could seek to exempt itscountercyclical payments under the 2002 Farm Act from its reduction commitments. The EU-US text also proposed a reduction in deminimis limits, as well as introducing a new ceiling where the sumof Amber Box, Blue Box and de minimis payments would be significantly reduced below the combined sum of these payments in2004.This formulation was carried over into the Castillo draft (withthe total value of agricultural production fixed at the level of the2000-2002 period) with the cap to be achieved by a specified dateand with the proviso that, following that date, such support wouldbe subject to a further linear reduction for an additional period ofyears. The Derbez text added that there should be a specified cut inthe first year of implementation in the total sum of support underthe Amber Box, Blue Box and de minimis ceilings. The G20 draftsought stronger disciplines on Blue Box support, seeking to