<s> PracticalSpeculationVICTOR NIEDERHOFFERLAUREL KENNER
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
More Praise for Practical Speculation“Practical Speculation distills an unusual breadth of hard-won (and costly) experience and insight into an immensely readable and instructive book. Bullsand Bears are drawn and quartered alike by the authors’ exquisitely honedquantitative scalpel.”Stephen M. StiglerProfessor of StatisticsUniversity of Chicago“In my judgment, Victor Niederhoffer is the single most insightful speculatorin the world. This new book displays Victor’s unique gift for recognizing thesubtle confluence of seemingly disparate events. Although this book is partially a guide on investment strategy, it is principally a remarkable explanationof market function.”Herbert LondonJohn M. Olin Professor of Humanities, New York UniversityPresident, Hudson Institute“Whatever Victor Niederhoffer writes is worth reading—not once but at leasttwice. His analysis of markets is as brilliant as it is unorthodox. Readers willdiscover a host of nuggets in Practical Speculation that will stretch their mindsand tease their imaginations.”Lawrence S. RitterJohn M. Schiff Professor of Finance EmeritusNew York University“Victor Niederhoffer outdoes himself beginning with the first paragraph ofthe introduction. Victor and Laurel uniquely see the interrelationships and dependencies among the complex factors that are daily life and are able to interpret observations in terms of how people will react to the sequences of events.Practical Speculation is an extraordinary insight into the thinking of probablythe most original thinker of our time.”Kenneth W. RendellFounder, Kenneth W. Rendell, Inc.“Vic and Laurel are breathtakingly insightful. They paint on a global investment canvas stretching across space and time. This is their dazzling journeythrough the art, science, sport, and literature of investing. Don’t risk a pennyon stocks until you have read Practical Speculation.”Professor Elroy Dimson, London Business SchoolCo-author, Triumph of the Optimists
PracticalSpeculationVICTOR NIEDERHOFFERLAUREL KENNER
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Copyright © 2003 by Victor Niederhoffer and Laurel Kenner. All rights reserved.Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey.Published simultaneously in Canada.No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in anyform or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning, or otherwise,except as permitted under Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, withouteither the prior written permission of the Publisher, or authorization through payment of theappropriate per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers,MA 01923, 978-750-8400, fax 978-750-4470, or on the web at www.copyright.com. Requests tothe Publisher for permission should be addressed to the Permissions Department, John Wiley &Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, 201-748-6011, fax 201-748-6008, e-mail:permcoordinator@wiley.com.Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher and author have used their bestefforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to theaccuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any impliedwarranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. No warranty may be created orextended by sales representatives or written sales materials. The advice and strategies containedherein may not be suitable for your situation. You should consult with a professional whereappropriate. Neither the publisher nor author shall be liable for any loss of profit or any othercommercial damages, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or otherdamages.For general information on our other products and services, or technical support, please contactour Customer Care Department within the United States at 800-762-2974, outside the UnitedStates at 317-572-3993 or fax 317-572-4002.Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears inprint may not be available in electronic books. For more information about Wiley products, visitour web site at www.wiley.com.Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:Niederhoffer, Victor, 1943–Practical speculation / Victor Niederhoffer, Laurel Kenner.p. cm.Includes index.ISBN 0-471-44306-9 (alk. paper)1. Speculation. 2. Stocks. 3. Investment analysis. I. Kenner, Laurel. II. Title.HG6041.N522003332.63′2—dc212002190747Printed in the United States of America.10
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A fragment of a wartime speech moved through my mind:‘We shall fight them in the fields, and in the streets, we shallfight in the hills; we shall never surrender.’ True then for onepeople, it was true always for the whole human race.—Invasion of the Body Snatchers
From My New York by Kathy Jakobsen. Copyright © 1993, 2003 by KathyJakobsen. By permission of Little, Brown and Company, (Inc.).
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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his book was written from the firing line. Most of the ideas were subjected not only to the pitiless judgment of the market itself but also to thecritiques, often withering, by readers of our columns for CNBC Money,worldlyinvestor.com, and thestreet.com.The list of those who helped us accomplish our writing task amid thedaily fray is long. Almost everything in this book benefited from the insightsof our editor at CNBC Money, Jon Markman. Pamela van Giessen, our editorat John Wiley & Sons, inspired this book and shepherded it through manyiterations.Our thinking was sharpened and augmented by the daily discussions onour Speculators’ List, a group of extraordinary individuals who read and responded to our columns and then accepted our invitation to join a philosophical e-mail forum in the spirit of Ben Franklin’s junto. We are deeply gratefulto James Goldcamp, who put the list together for us. From an original membership of fewer than 10 people, the Speculators’ List now encompasses morethan 150 experts on diverse subjects, united by a common interest in markets,statistical analysis, and mutually beneficial discussion. Dr. Brett Steenbarger,whose contributions appear throughout this book, was among the early readers who became dear friends. Our thinking and our lives have been enrichedby Gitanshu Buch, Henry Carstens, Duncan Coker, Nigel Davis, “Mr. E,” BillEgan, Glenn Escovedo, Ed Gross, Bill Haynes, David Hillman, James Lackey,John Lamberg, Paul Lewis, Alix Martin, Mark McNabb, Shui Mitsuda, BipinPathak, Tom Ryan, Ken Sadofsky, Dick Sears, Russell Sears, Saurabh Singal,Don Staricka, Gary Tate, Jack Tierney, and Steve Wisdom, to name only a few.There are many other eagles too numerous to mention.v
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Acknowledgments
Market Warriors (Artist: Susan Slyman, 2000).
Acknowledgments
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The traders in Vic’s office contributed research and analysis in addition totheir daily duties. Shi Zhang and David Ciocca produced many of the studiesand scatter diagrams. Patrick Boyle researched the chapters on physics andBenjamin Graham. Rob Wincapaw located books, letters, and articles withunfailing patience. Gitanshu Buch kept track of a multitude of projects whilesimultaneously running the trading operation.Bill Egan, John Lamberg, Gaylen Larson, and Adam Robinson revieweddrafts and made many helpful suggestions.Rip MacKenzie contributed much of the material for the hubris chapter.James Cramer at TheStreet.com and Jeremy Pink at worldlyinvestor.comencouraged our early writing endeavors.We are grateful to Steve Stigler and Jim Lorie of the University of Chicago,and to Lee Henkel, Vic’s long-time mentors, and friends. Also to Dan Grossman, Vic’s partner of 30 years, for valued insights and steadfast friendship.Laurel thanks her music teachers, Aube Tzerko, Bruce Sutherland, andRobert Winter, for teaching an approach to music she has found valuable inall areas of life.We thank our families for sharing the pain and the pleasure.VICTOR NIEDERHOFFERLAUREL KENNER
CONTENTSIntroductionPart One: Mumbo Jumbo and Moonshine1The Meme2Earnings Propaganda3The Hydra Heads of Technical Analysis4The Cult of the Bear5“We Are Number One” Usually Means“Not Much Longer”6Benjamin Graham: Mythical Market Hero7News Flash: Computer Writes StockMarket Story!Part Two: Practical Speculation8How to Avoid Spurious Correlations9The Future of Returns10The Periodic Table of Investing11When They Swing for the Fences,We Run for the Exits12Boom or Bust?13Market Thermodynamics
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Practical Market Lessons from theTennis Court15The Fine Art of Bargaining for an Edge16An Amiable Idiot in the Biotechnology Revolution17Earnings Impostors18FinaleAfterwordNotesIndex
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INTRODUCTIONThe Hope Snatchers
Look! You fools! You’re in danger! Can’t you see? They’reafter you! They’re after all of us! Our wives . . . our children. . . they’re here already! You’re next!—Dr. Miles Bennell, Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956 film version)
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he nightmare is always the same. I am lying in bed, staring at headlinesflashing across a huge monitor installed on my ceiling:
Stocks Fall on Earnings PessimismStocks May Fall for Fifth Consecutive Week on Fears Economy Is SputteringMoney Market Yields Fall to 1 Percent as Stock Market Woes DeepenStocks Fail to Top Y2K High for 450th Consecutive DayStudy Shows More Than 60 percent of All Issues Below 52-Week HighMarkets Plummet as January Barometer Signals Decline for Rest of YearOracle of Omaha Says Investor Expectations Are “Too High”Market Plunges on Fears Before Fed MeetingBreak of Revered Gann Pivot Triggers Massive SellingDividend Yields Now 25 Percent Below 1996 “Irrational Exuberance” Speech
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In my dream, I am long IBM, or priceline.com, or, worst of all, KrungThai Bank, the state-owned bank in Thailand that fell from $200 to pennieswhile I held it in 1997. The rest of the dream is always the same. My stockplunges. Massive margin calls are being issued. Related stocks jump off cliffsin sympathy. Delta hedgers are selling more stocks short to rebalance theirpositions. The naked options I am short are going through the roof. Millionsof investors are blindly following the headlines. Listless as zombies, they areliquidating their stocks at any price and piling into money-market funds withan after-tax yield of −1 percent.“Stop, you fools!” I scream. “There’s no danger! Can’t you see? The headlines are inducing you to lean the wrong way! Unless you get your balance,you’ll lose everything—your wealth, your home!”The perfect allegory for this state of affairs is found in Invasion of the BodySnatchers, a 1954 sci-fi classic book by Jack Finney.1 Aliens secretly invade thefictional small town of Santa Mira, California, one by one taking over the bodies of unsuspecting residents as they sleep. In the morning, the victims lookjust the same as they did before, but they no longer have the human emotionsof joy, fear, ambition, sorrow, excitement, and hope.The hero, Dr. Miles Bennell, arriving home after an absence in the midstof the alien takeover, at first dismisses the victims’ strange demeanor. However, he soon realizes that something terrible is happening. Using forensicmedicine and nitty-gritty detective work, he and his plucky love interest,Becky Driscoll, figure out that the aliens are parasitic seedpods that replicatethemselves in greenhouses so they can take over yet more human victims.Their only aim is to survive by parasitism; they cannot make love or have children, and their gray existence ends after five years.After a harrowing escape from the town, Miles and Becky set fire to thevanguard of an army of advancing pod people. The rest of the pods concludethat Earth is an inhospitable place, and drift back into space to find new victims.Often interpreted as a warning against blind obedience to authority, Invasion’s depiction of the victims serves as an extraordinarily apt description ofaverage investors’ vacant, resigned demeanor after the fallacies and propaganda embedded in headlines like the ones in my recurring nightmare haveonce more led them in the wrong direction.The overriding problem is that these headlines induce hysteria andthen paralysis. They can blind investors to the 1,500,000 percent-a-century return that an investment in the stocks of the United States and most Europeannations yielded in the twentieth century. On average, the backdrop thenseemed every bit as bleak as it does now. As science and enterprise help us
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live increasingly healthier, more prosperous lives, a century is a highly relevant time frame to contemplate for the children of this book’s readers.Let’s take another look at the first three headlines:Stocks Fall on Earnings PessimismStocks May Fall for Fifth Consecutive Week on Fears Economy Is SputteringMoney Market Yields Fall to 1 Percent as Stock Market Woes Deepen
These headlines share a common defect: They label conditions that are bullishas bearish. We explain in detail later in this book:Stocks Fail to Top Y2K High for 450th Consecutive DayStudy Shows More Than 60 percent of All Issues Below 52-Week HighMarkets Plummet as January Barometer Signals Decline for Rest of Year
The phenomena reported in these three headlines are true of any time serieswith a large random component—such as stock returns. These observationsare meaningless to the investor.Oracle of Omaha Says Investor Expectations Are “Too High”Market Plunges on Fears Before Fed MeetingBreak of Revered Gann Pivot Triggers Massive SellingDividend Yields Now 25 Percent Below 1996 “Irrational Exuberance” Speech
These headlines tell stories about misremembered facts that sustain fallacious beliefs harmful to those who trust such pronouncements.Headlines that induce fearfulness are often based on myths, not reason.Propaganda techniques, not the verifiable propositions of science, conveythese ideas. Just as the high priests of prescientific societies usedmyths to maintain the social order and extract offerings from themasses, today’s market professionals use bold, simple myths to extract contributions from credulous investors. This phenomenon explains why the public contributes so much to the commissions, spreads,research expenditures, communications costs, skyscraper rents, sales outlays,marketing expenses, and phantasmagoric bonuses for traders and executivesthat make up the massive infrastructure of Wall Street.The headlines listed here are by no means isolated examples thatwe have culled to make our case. They are typical of the backdrop ofmyth, misinformation, and propaganda bombarding investors daily
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Practical Speculation
through every media channel. Uncritical acceptance of the fallacies embodiedin such headlines—whether wildly bullish or terrifyingly bearish—leads investors straight to the slaughter.Although propaganda is ubiquitous in the market and in otheraspects of our lives, a simple antidote can protect us from manipulation:the scientific method. If theories about the market areframed in a testable fashion, they can be verified by counting.Not only will embracing the scientific method preclude debates about the meaning of words such as “irrational” and“exuberant,” but also it will relate market theories to the real world. A sidebenefit will be that those theories that are verified can actually lead to practical profits (which is, after all, why you are reading this book).Don’t get us wrong. It is not that skepticism toward bullish propagandais inappropriate. We take a backseat to no one in loathing the bullish flummery invariably fed to investors after the market has displayed a sharp rise.Many companies store earnings in a silo and release them at opportunetimes to lure investors into buying stocks, enabling executives to cash intheir options. We are strident critics of the conflicts of interest that can causebrokerage house analysts never to recommend selling shares in a companythat is a client of the investment banking side of the firm. We abhor thehubris that leads executives like Enron’s Jeffrey Skilling to curse analystswho question the bona fides of the corporate balance sheet, and the egomania that encourages other executives to authorize golf courses as a necessarymanagement perquisite.That said, if you are going to err on one side or the other, it pays toerr on the side of optimism. After all, until 2000–2002 the last time the U.S.stock market went down three years in a row was 1939–1941. The situationis much the same in other countries. It is hard to overcome a 1,500,000percent-a-century upward drift in common stocks worldwide, even withclever market timing.Erroneous, untested suppositions dominate the market today. Despitethe advances that have come about in the four decades since efficient markets theory was developed, finance is still largely in the Dark Ages. The public is barraged with commentary from journalists who offer nothingbut superstitions, descriptions, backward-looking observations, andinterviews with fund managers struggling to keep up with the market averages.Most of these reports purport to find a relation between the day’s marketperformance and reports of a certain company’s earnings feats or woes, attributing an “up” day to earnings optimism in a few stocks, or a “down” day to
Introduction • The Hope Snatchers
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earnings pessimism in some other stocks. But the market landscape is soenormous and varied that on any given day some companies inevitably will report conditions are better (or worse) than an arbitrary standard. If investorsplace any credence in such reports, they become victims of market vagaries.They search for anecdotal evidence that is always available to justify somethingin retrospect, but that offers nothing whatsoever of predictive value. Worse,unscientific investors lose the ability to differentiate the helpful from the unhelpful, or to build a foundation for making informed, rational decisions in thefuture. Since none of the commentators ever presumes, for example, to determine the precise magnitude of the relation—if any—between earnings andmarket performance, investors are led to accept nebulous untestable assertions about the market without applying the normal skepticism that they havelearned is essential in other areas of their lives.Faced with market moves that seem to bear no relation to what they believe to be true, investors quickly become disenchanted and disgusted whenthe market declines, and hyperactive and wildly exuberant when the marketrises. In either case, they are being primed to overtrade and to make morethan their fair share of contributions to the market infrastructure. The end result is an army of disgruntled investors, ironically ever more ready to be batted around by the next pronouncement from a market guru, each ready toleave the market at the drop of a hat for money-market funds with negativereal returns at precisely the juncture when conditions for equities are best. Ultimately, the market is the richer, and customers and investors are left without any yachts—or pensions.Worse yet, the market’s victims become like the pod people of SantaMira, cynical about all new ideas, bereft of optimism and hope. They are readyto fall into step with those who do not believe in technology, do not believe ingrowth, and, after many disclosures of corporate fraud, do not believe in theenterprise system itself. Dr. Bennell could very well have been talking aboutinvestors when he said:I’ve seen how people have allowed their humanity to drain away. Only it happensslowly instead of all at once. They didn’t seem to mind . . . All of us—a little bit—we harden our hearts, grow callous.
But life, like the markets, offers the greatest rewards to those willingto assume risk. Assuming risk brings uncertainty, anxiety, and occasionalloss, but it also brings out the best in us. In becoming a speculator in life,each person embarks on a heroic quest, becoming more than he or she already is. Heroism is a potent antidote to the cynicism and alienation somany of us accept.
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Practical Speculation
If you’re familiar with my story and you’ve read this far, you may be asking: “Where does Victor Niederhoffer come off writing another book aboutspeculation and investing? Didn’t his hedge fund go defunct in 1997?”Until 1997, my record was the best in the investment world. Barclay’s, thehedge fund industry scorekeeper, named me the top hedge fund manager in1996. I collected “best-performing hedge fund manager” awards and touredthe world giving lectures in elegant settings about markets and music, accompanied by concert pianist Robert Schrade. I employed a large staff of tradersand analysts from top schools, many of whom had been with me for a decadeor more. I was a partner with George Soros in numerous investment ventures, and we were inseparable throughout the business and recreational day.My book, The Education of a Speculator, had just been published and was abestseller.2 My funds under management and personal wealth were growingexponentially, yet at a measured pace.Then the roof caved in. I lost everything. In popular Wall Street parlance,I “blew up.”The story has been extensively chronicled. On December 13, 1998, an article in the New York Times, “Trappings of Faded Richness: Sold!” by GeraldineFabrikant, captured my decline with the inimitable schadenfreude of the Times:A five-foot horn of plenty made of silver and podollan ox horn, once the propertyof King Charles XV of Sweden, is Victor Niederhoffer’s favorite in his collectionof silver trophy pieces. But Mr. Niederhoffer can no longer afford his horn ofplenty. The money manager lost all his capital in October 1997, when the GlobalSystems funds he managed for himself, his family, and investors were hurt firstby his leveraged and unhedged speculations in the Thai stock market, and then byhis bet that the United States market would not decline dramatically. The two catastrophes wiped out the funds. And so Mr. Niederhoffer is struggling to pay hisdebts, support the four of his six children who are still at home, maintain the family’s lifestyle, and tiptoe back into the only business he knows: trading.A comeback—both financially and psychologically—from the devastation ofhis funds’ collapse has been far harder than even Mr. Niederhoffer had imagined.“It is hard to be resilient when you’re 55,” he said during an interview in the library of his home. “When you have bad fortune, your suppliers and customers areafraid. I’m on a very short leash.”After 20 years of success, many investors had become friends. But many ofhis friendships unraveled. “My phone stopped ringing a lot,” he said. He feels it’simportant that he suffered with his investors. “I’m saddened and chastened,” hesaid. “My wisdom is quite suspect.” He compares his downfall with the bailout ofLong-Term Capital Management, the much bigger hedge fund recently rescuedby Wall Street. “I could have used Long-Term’s breathing time,” Mr. Niederhoffersaid. Instead, he is selling his silver.3
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In an instant, I plunged from the top of my profession to the depths. Myemployees quit en masse. My customers, many of whom had been my bestfriends for years, deserted me.To boost my returns and stay number one, I had invested in the stockmarket in Thailand, a country I knew too little about. In the United States, itis a good bet that a 90 percent decline in bank stocks precedes a rebound. InSoutheast Asia, that is apparently not the case. My biggest holding—thelargest bank in Thailand—lost a whopping 99 percent. My losses abroad depleted my reserves. The rest of the tale is still too sad and raw to retell. Sufficeit to say that the decline in Asian stocks spilled over into an unprecedentedone-day, 550-point decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. This wasenough to trigger a stock exchange rule that closed the market before 2 P.M.that day. Confronted with a demand to come up with many millions to meetmargins the next day, I was forced to close my fund.In addition to losing my investment business, I had to sell my holdings inmy other financial activities. I took out a large mortgage on my house, withrates starting at 15 percent a year. The final indignity was selling my extensivecollection of antique silver. A representative quote from my introductory notein an auction house brochure captures the flavor:From a reading of business history, I had learned that many Wall Street speculators at various times in their tumultuous sagas had placed their silver up for salein time of malaise. . . . One of my most enjoyable purchases in this regard was atrophy presented to Jay Gould for winning a professional tennis championship.Little did I figure on those occasions of Schadenfreude that I would one day bejoining such immortals.
I was devastated in every way. My sister, Diane, is a psychiatrist. Shenoted that patients with severe (a euphemism for suicidal) depression normally have 10 symptoms of clinical depression, ranging from weight lossto loss of sexual abilities. I had all 10 of them. At a meeting with outside lawyers, I mentioned this as a joke and perhaps an appeal for pity. Myown lawyer took me aside afterward and admonished me never to do thatagain: “The only reaction the other side will have is anger that you didn’t pullthe trigger.”Friends and family did their best to see me through. I received 55 copiesof Tuesdays with Morrie.4 The senders all emphasized to me that Morrie wasable to deal with his impending death with dignity, and they advised me totake a similar stance.I also received 10 copies of the Rudyard Kipling poem “If,” which remains an inspiration. Some of the senders underlined the following words:
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Practical SpeculationIf you can make one heap of all your winningsAnd risk it all on one turn of pitch-and-toss,And lose, and start again at your beginningsAnd never breathe a word about your loss;...If you can fill the unforgiving minuteWith sixty seconds’ worth of distance run,Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it,And—which is more—you’ll be a Man, my son!
Suffused with Tuesdays with Morrie, thoughts of my own deathlike experience, and other melancholy contemplations and nightmares, I paid frequentvisits to the grave of my father, Arthur. He was a scholar and a cop of infinitestrength and support whose good spirit has uplifted his family at times of trouble and all other times since his untimely death in 1981 at the age of 62. I laterasked my uncle, Howie Eisenberg, who served as a model for my loss bysnatching defeat from victory in the finals of 43 separate national handballchampionships (he also won 18 of them) what he thought Artie might havesaid about my fall. Together, we came up with the following:So what of it? It’s not the end of the world. You and your family are in goodhealth; you’re still able to live the life that you wish. That’s what’s important. All ofyour strategy, practice, and experience led to taking that shot at that point. Youwent for the overhead to get further ahead in the match and missed. It was stillthe right shot for you then. It was the same strategy that got you the substantiallead that you had.Suppose, which I don’t believe for a moment, you don’t come back. It’s notso terrible. You can still teach, and I’ll help you with the bills. Here. I’ve taken amortgage from the co-op.The consequences of missing the shot were a revelation for you. You now realize that while you had every reason to believe your advantage would be increased, you exposed yourself and those who were playing with you to possiblylosing the whole match. You now have a different perspective. You can see that although the potential to maximize your advantage may seem to be the correctcourse of action, it should be tempered by a strategy that limits, if not precludes,the possibility of not only losing the match but all of your racquets. You don’twant to be in the position of not having the wherewithal to continue playing theway you want, or causing those who bet on you to lose their pants. The crucialthing is that you are still in the game, once again racking up points.Whatever you do, be more careful in the future. Be good to your family andfriends. You have a beautiful life and everything in the world to look forward to.Take it easy.
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I did not have the luxury of wallowing in my misery for too long. I had sixkids, six private-school tuitions, a former and current wife, extensive recurring household expenses from the previous good days, and the usual legal expenses for events of this nature. We pick a basket of berries, the basket falls,and we fill the basket again. I had to fill the basket once more. But I did nothave any capital of consequence to meet these expenses. More important,none of the usual suspects for my kind of trading had any interest in establishing a normal working relationship with me.I was well experienced in losing from my career in sports. But this comeback was much more difficult. Not only had I lost my standing in the tournaments, I had lost my equipment, my coaches, my entourage, and my fans. Icould not even get into the qualifying tournaments, because the officials therewere afraid of adverse consequences.Under the circumstances, an alternate pursuit seemed appropriate. Thatalternative was to combine with Laurel Kenner in writing a column thatwould communicate the remedial lessons I had learned from my fall and perhaps prevent others from succumbing. I figured that by trying to teach others,I might learn something myself.When I met Laurel in 1999, she was the chief editor for North Americanstock markets at Bloomberg, one of the two biggest financial news wire services. Ironically, she was one of the very people responsible for perpetuatingthe misinformation and disinformation about the market described in thisbook. Life being short and time constantly ticking away, she decided to write acolumn herself. Readership soon topped that of other columnists. The kind ofpieces she wrote, filled with lessons for investors from baseball, Moby Dick,and Beethoven