cap it at2.5% of the value of production in the initial implementation phase
328
Alan Matthews
and proposing that the subsequent linear cuts in Blue Box paymentswould continue ‘with a view to its phasing-out’.IV. Evaluation of the State of Play of the NegotiationsDespite the failure at Cancún, the positive movement in the negotiations on agriculture to date should be noted. With respect to market access issues, the tariff reductions on offer in the Derbez textare potentially larger than those agreed in the Uruguay Round.15There is the prospect that tariff peaks would be addressed. A clearformula is on offer to address tariff escalation. Moreover, the principle of special products and a special safeguard mechanism fordeveloping countries has been accepted by the developed countries,there is the possibility of mandatory binding of duty- and quota-freeaccess for the least developed countries and acceptance of minimum levels of duty-free access for products from developing countries.Compared to the Uruguay Round Agreement, there has alsobeen significant progress in the area of export subsidies. An offer tophase out export subsidies on a list of products of interest to developing countries has been made, as well as a commitment to significantly reduce remaining export subsidies in parallel with disciplineson other forms of export competition. The Derbez text also appearsto move forward from the Doha mandate in requiring members tonegotiate a final date for the end of all export subsidies, althoughthe EU would still have difficulty in agreeing to this.16Finally, much larger reductions in trade-distorting support, including Amber Box and de minimis payments, are now on offerthan in the Uruguay Round. Furthermore, a cap will be placed onBlue Box payments. Special and differential treatment would applyto developing countries, including lower reduction commitmentsfor Amber Box support, longer implementation periods and enhanced provisions under Article 6.2.
15
16
This partly depends on whether the reductions are compared in absolute or in proportionate terms. To achieve the same absolute reduction as the 36% reduction agreed in the UR would require a cut of36/64 or 56% in the remaining tariffs. Any percentage average reduction less than 56% would imply that the absolute cut in tariffswould be smaller than in the UR.CAFOD (2003)
Agriculture after Cancún
329
Despite this evidence of convergence in positions, significantdifferences remain. In the market access negotiations, three conditions raised by the developed countries could still cause difficulties.First, the EU is adamant that, while developing countries shouldcontinue to receive special and preferential treatment, this shouldnot imply a different set of rules, but different implementation periods and extent of commitments based on the same rules. The EUdoes not agree to the blended formula approach (including applyingthe Swiss formula to a certain percentage of tariff lines) for developed countries and the Uruguay Round approach alone for developing countries. A second potential stumbling block is the insistence of both the EU and the US, in their framework text, that therules and disciplines for special and differential treatment should beadjusted for significant net-exporting developing countries. Thisidea of differentiation (‘graduation’) – which is also promoted bythe EU and others across all areas of negotiation in the Doha Round– is very opposed by the developing countries. However, the EUhas highlighted that much of the benefits of the Round lie in thepotential for increased South-South trade which is currently restricted by high developing country tariffs. It is also proposing thatthe more advanced developing countries should commit to provideduty-free and quota-free access for the agricultural exports of theLDCs, partly as a way of compensating for the erosion of theirpreferential access to developed country markets. Third, the EU hasmade very little progress to date on its demands on non-trade concerns such as consumer protection, food safety, extension of Geographical Indications, the environment and animal welfare. TheHarbinson text merely called for further consideration. The EU-USframework text simply noted that these were issues of interest thatwere not yet agreed, and this language has been carried into theCastillo and Derbez drafts as well.From the developing country perspective, the blended formulaapproach to tariff reductions may not provide the sharp reductionsin developed country tariffs they want to see. For example, a characteristic of the EU’s bound tariffs is the great variance in individual rates. Large numbers of tariff lines have zero or relatively lowMFN duties, but for a small number of tariff lines MFN duties arevery high. By putting the relatively low tariffs into the groupingsubject to the Swiss formula and a maximum tariff while dealingwith the high tariff items through the linear Uruguay Round formula subject to a minimum reduction for sensitive commodities, the
330
Alan Matthews
EU could avoid making significant reductions in its highest tariffrates (although the EU-US text did provide for expanded TRQ access where Members took advantage of the minimum rate reductions). Many developing countries, including India, also argue thatthe current proposals on Special Products would need to bestrengthened considerably before they are acceptable.The export subsidy area still has the potential to cause difficulties, particularly for the EU. However, it is my view that all thoseinvolved in EU agricultural policy now accept that export subsidiesare an indefensible form of trade policy instrument; the question isnot whether they should be eliminated, but when. The key issue forthe EU is the question of parallelism. If sufficiently watertightcommitments can be given to equally discipline export credits, foodaid and the activities of single desk exporters, the EU would find itvery difficult to resist pressure to agree a date for their elimination,and the only issue would be the timeframe for this to happen.In the area of domestic support, the contentious areas which remain are whether Blue Box payments should be further reduced andwhether Green Box criteria should be further strengthened. Developing countries argue that the sheer scale of these payments distortstrade and have called for the elimination of the Blue Box and reductions in Green Box support. The EU insists that all forms ofsupport are not equally trade distorting and that this distinctionmust be maintained. It is concerned that its recent efforts in theMid-Term Review of the Agenda 2000 CAP reforms to shiftspending from Blue Box to Green Box (decoupled) paymentsshould not be undermined. It does not want to see the Blue Boxceiling further reduced or phased-out in the future, and it is concerned that the Green Box criteria should remain sufficiently flexible to allow continued support to EU farmers to enhance environmental, food quality or safety and animal welfare objectives. Withsufficient movement on market access and export subsidies, it isunlikely that these differences on domestic support would prove astumbling block to an ultimate agreement.Through the smokescreens of individual countries’ negotiatingpositions, the broad outlines of the deal are clear. Developed countries will commit to significant reductions in tariffs and trade-distorting domestic support payments and the elimination of exportsubsidies, in return for a commitment by the developing countriesto accept some lowering of their bound tariffs, subject to a deal onSpecial Products where lesser commitments would apply, while
Agriculture after Cancún
331
least developed countries would be exempt from reduction commitments. The fact that, for most developing countries, bound tariffs are well in excess of applied tariffs so that this discipline willnot have any immediate impact, will make it easier to accept. Various side-payments would need to be made to ensure the agreementof key players, e.g. addressing the EU’s concern over GIs, developing countries’ concerns over special safeguards and the concernof preference recipients over preference erosion. However, thesewould not alter the basic parameters of potentially a very farreaching and worthwhile agreement, also from the point of view ofdeveloping countries.V. After CancúnA. The Regionalism OptionFollowing the Cancún talks breakdown, US Trade RepresentativeRobert Zoellick famously attributed the breakdown to a divide between the ‘can do’ and ‘won’t do’ countries. ‘The rhetoric of ‘won’tdo’ overwhelmed the concerted efforts of the ‘can do.’ he said. Hesubsequently developed this theme in a Financial Times article inwhich he suggested that the US would place more effort in trying tosecure its trade objectives through bilateral or regional deals withthe ‘can do’ countries if the multilateral process remained boggeddown.17The US is currently negotiating free trade area agreementswith Morocco, Australia and the Central America Free TradeAgreement but these are hardly significant in global terms. AsLamy gleefully pointed out in a Washington speech in early November, ‘I am not going to lose any sleep about Bob Zoellick pursuing an FTA with Morocco, where the US starts from a tiny percentage of Morocco’s total trade … And did you know how manyFTAs the US has? Six, including counting NAFTA as two. The EU… has got a fair few more than that …’.18 A number of LatinAmerican countries, including Columbia and Peru, have since leftthe G20 group in order to be able to pursue bilateral agreementswith the US, but the big prize for the latter is the Free Trade Area ofthe Americas (FTAA) that would give it greater access to marketsin the Western Hemisphere. However, the US, backed by Canada,1718
Financial Times, 22 September 2003.Lamy (2003).
332
Alan Matthews
has insisted that it will only negotiate concessions on agriculturalsubsidies (and anti-dumping rules) – both key concerns of LatinAmerican countries – in the Doha Round and not in the FTAA.19On the other hand, US demands that the talks should cover issuessuch as rules on services, investment, government procurement andintellectual property have been resisted by Brazil. Both sides appeared to set a fairly low threshold for success at their ministerialconference in Miami in mid-November.20For the EU, with its extensive network of regional arrangements, using the threat of regionalism to try to make progress on itsmultilateral agenda is less convincing. However, it continues toextend this network (for example, most recently with Mexico) andhas also been pursuing talks with MERCOSUR. Lamy has arguedthat, if the multilateral process fails, the EU would look again atpursuing the bilateral option more actively but he does not see thisas undermining the multilateral approach. ‘For the foreseeablefuture, we in Europe, you in the US and, increasingly, they in Asia,are going to pursue a mix of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. I think this is healthy’.21 The Achilles heel of any attempt bythe EU to wield the regionalism stick is, again, its reluctance togrant sufficient agricultural concessions to its negotiating partnersto make such deals attractive. Regionalism will not prove an attractive option to the major developing countries as an alternative toreviving multilateral negotiations. It would seem strangely ironic ifthese countries were individually to accept in bilateral deals whatthey have collectively rejected in the multilateral process.B. Significance of the Peace ClauseA more attractive option for developing countries to pursue theirobjectives would be to use their existing rights under the WTOAgreements to attack developed country agricultural subsidies. Currently, Article 13 of the AoA, known as the ‘Peace Clause’ putssome restraints on the exercise of the normal rights which WTOMembers have to react against the unfair effects of other countries’subsidies. Under Articles XVI and VI of GATT 1994 and theAgreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, two types ofremedies are available against subsidies:192021
Financial Times, 24 September 2003.Financial Times, 15 November 2003.Lamy (2003).
Agriculture after Cancún
333
x
imposition of countervailing duties, if there is material injuryor the threat of material injury to domestic production resultingfrom these subsidies;x making use of the dispute settlement mechanism against thesubsidising Member if, as a result of the subsidy, there is eitherserious prejudice to the domestic industry, material injury orthreat of injury to the domestic industry, or nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to that Member even where thebehaviour of the subsidising Member does not infringe aGATT provision (these latter are called non-violation complaints).The Peace Clause limits the right of countries to impose countervailing duties or initiate dispute settlement proceedings. In thecase of domestic subsidies, a distinction is drawn between GreenBox and trade-distorting subsidies. Green Box subsidies are exempted from countervailing duty action and the dispute settlementprocess. In the case of trade-distorting subsidies, due restraintshould be shown in initiating countervailing duty investigations, thedispute settlement process cannot be activated provided that themeasures do not grant support to a commodity in excess of the levelduring the 1992 marketing year and the measures are also exemptedfrom non-violation complaints. Conforming export subsidies havethe protection that due restraint should be shown in initiating countervailing duty investigations, and action through the dispute settlement process cannot be taken.These provisions are valid for the ‘implementation period’which is defined in Article 1(f) of the AoA as the nine-year periodcommencing in 1995. Thus the Peace Clause protections are set toexpire on 1 January 2004.22 The implications of this expiry is thatcountries aggrieved by, for example, the EU’s use of export subsidies or the US use of domestic subsidies could challenge these inthe dispute mechanism process. Developing countries and otheragricultural exporters, if frustrated by the apparently slow progressin liberalising farm trade through negotiation, will be tempted toseek more rapid progress towards this objective through the disputeresolution mechanism. For example, Australia, Brazil and Thailand22
Some have tried to interpret the ‘beginning of the implementation period’ as meaning the time when their implementation commitmentsbegan, which in the case of the EU would be 1 July rather than 1January.
334
Alan Matthews
have already initiated cases against the EU and US on cotton andsugar. They may indeed be successful in this objective, althoughthere is a serious risk that the ensuing series of trade disputes wouldlead to a further poisoning of the world trade climate.23Countries, such as the EU, which have benefited from thePeace Clause will insist that its renewal is a precondition for continuing negotiations. The EU has warned that exporting countriesface a mutually exclusive choice between achieving their objectiveseither through litigation or through multilateral negotiation. However, it appears to have no real leverage to secure its continuation,as it is hard to see what they might offer to developing countries, inparticular, who have relatively few subsidies and thus have littleinterest in allowing an extension of the Clause. It hardly seemscredible that the EU, having invested so much in the Doha Development Round, would be willing to walk away from further negotiations if it did not get its way on this issue, particularly as it wouldtake at least two years before the consequences of any successfulcomplaint against it would be felt.24 However, even if there is noformal waiver or moratorium, there could be a tacit agreement toshow restraint if there was clear evidence that the developed countries were prepared to move closer to developing country demandson agricultural issues.25C. Moving towards GenevaThe meeting of the WTO Council in Geneva on 15 December 2003was mandated to take stock of the fallout from the failure of theCancún meeting, and ‘to take the action necessary at that stage toenable us to move towards a successful and timely conclusion ofthe negotiations’.26 A number of countries, such as the APEC countries (including the US), and those of the G20 meeting in BuenosAires in early October 2003, had indicated that they were willing to23
24
2526
For a view on the prospects for bringing a successful challenge toagricultural subsidies under the GATT 1994 and the Agreement onAgriculture following the expiry of the Peace Clause, see Steinberg /Josling (2003).This includes the time for the consultations, panel hearing and report,appeal to the Appellate Body and the time allowed to a country tobring its laws and regulations into compliance.Bridges Vol. 7, No. 31, 25 September 2003.WTO (2003d).
Agriculture after Cancún
335
resume negotiations on the basis of the Derbez text (even thoughthe latter roundly rejected this text at the Cancún meeting).27 TheEU reacted more cautiously, with Lamy expressing amazement at‘the amazing race over the last week to endorse the text produced inCancún on 14 September’.28 Noting that many WTO members hadattacked the document in Cancún, he said: ‘I am left to wonder,rather, what magic dust has been shaken over a text so roundly rejected in September, to find it so roundly endorsed in October’.29However, he also stated that he thought the Cancún text was a‘pretty good effort even if it caused us some real grief on agriculture’.30 Subsequently, it has been reported that the EU and the USare prepared to use the Derbez text as the basis for further discussions.31While the outline of a potential deal on agriculture can be discerned, the way forward for the resumption of the Doha Round negotiations remains unclear. Removal of the roadblock caused by theSingapore issues (the EU, at least, has now indicated that it is prepared to adopt a more flexible approach on these issues)32 wouldcertainly facilitate progress in the agricultural negotiations. Morebroadly, the frustrations of the developing countries that their concerns, on implementation and on improving special and differentialtreatment provisions, have not been addressed in the period sinceDoha despite the promises on that occasion, will also need to betackled.33 The cotton issue remains important in this regard.But there remains a sense that success might be elusive. Following the failure of the Seattle WTO Ministerial Council to launcha comprehensive round of trade negotiations, success at Doha in2001 was achieved in part because of its proximity to the terrible27
282930313233
Financial Times, 22 October 2003. There is speculation that theapparent softening in the position of the G20 group may reflect thehaemorrhaging of members since the Cancún meeting. Only 12countries signed the political declaration at the end of the Buenos Aires meeting, see Bridges Vol. 7, No. 34, 15 October 2003.Lamy (2003).Ibidem.Ibidem.Bridges Vol. 7, No. 34, 15 October 2003.See European Commission (2003).Chetaille / Tavernier (2003).
336
Alan Matthews
events of 11 September that year and the desire of countries todemonstrate solidarity at that time. Business pressures in the majorcountries, and the pressures of exporting interests in particular, haveappeared much more ambivalent about the importance of successfully concluding a new round than was the case in the UruguayRound. With a more divided international climate in 2003 overpolicy towards Iraq, the necessary momentum behind the talks hasbeen slow to build up. The US commitment to a successful round,which had never seemed wholehearted, has cooled markedly as theUS has been put on the defensive over the 2002 Farm Bill and cotton subsidies. The escalating number of US-EU trade disputes(steel, FSC, hormones, GMOs, the US Bio-Terrorism and BuyAmerican Acts, the new EU chemicals policy), the US Presidentialelection in 2004 and the replacement of Pascal Lamy as the chiefnegotiator on the EU side when the new Commission takes officenext year also add to the general uncertainty. Progress on agriculture may depend on whether an improvement in the overall negotiating climate can be achieved, but there is no doubt that progress onagriculture would also help greatly to bring about that needed improvement. Negotiations on agriculture are set to resume in March2004. Although some Members have expressed the view that sufficient progress may be made to permit at least an informal ministerial by year end, it seems more likely that meaningful negotiationswill not resume until the next Ministerial meeting planned for HongKong in 2005. Such a delay, while regrettable, would draw parallelswith the Uruguay Round experience. If a good agreement on agriculture is attainable, it is worth waiting for.
ReferencesCAFOD (2003), The Cancun WTO Ministerial Meeting, September2003: What happened? What does it mean for development?,CAFOD Policy Paper, UK (available at: www.cafod.org).Anne Chetaille / Karine Tavernier (2003), Failure of the Fifth WTOMinisterial Conference in Cancun: a Looming Crisis in theMultilateral Trade System?, Agritrade and Solgral, September2003 (available at: http://agritrade.cta.int/cancun-analysisen3.pdf).
Agriculture after Cancún
337
Danish Research Institute of Food Economics (2003), Note on theHarbinson Draft on Modalities in the WTO Agriculture Negotiations, Copenhagen 2003.European Commission (2003), Reviving the DDA Negotiations –the EU Perspective, Communication from the Commission tothe Council, to the European Parliament and to the Economicand Social Committee, Brussels, 26 November 2003.International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development(ICTSD) (2003), Agriculture Negotiations at the WTO: PostCancún Outlook Report, Geneva, November 2003 (availableat: http://www.ictsd.org/issarea/atsd/products/docs/AgricultureNegotiations9.pdf).Pascal Lamy (2003), Trade Crisis?, Speech delivered to the European Institute, Washington/D.C., 4 November 2003 (availableat http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla198_en.htm).Richard H. Steinberg / Timothy E. Josling (2003), When the PeaceEnds: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidiesto WTO Legal Challenge, in: Journal of International Economic Law 6 (2003) No. 2, 369-417.WTO (2001), Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference,Fourth Session, Doha, 9-14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1, 14 November 2001.WTO (2003a), Draft Cancún Ministerial text submitted by GeneralCouncil chairperson Carlos Pérez del Castillo and DirectorGeneral Supachai Panitchpakdi 31 August 2003,JOB(03)/150/Rev.1.WTO (2003b), Consolidated African Union / ACP/ LDC PositionOnAgriculture:CommunicationfromMauritius,WT/MIN(03)/W/17.WTO (2003c) Draft Cancún Ministerial text submitted by Ministerial Council chairperson Luis Derbez 13 September 2003,JOB(03)/150/Rev.2.WTO (2003d), Ministerial Statement following the Cancun Ministerial Council (available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_14sept_e.htm#statement).WTO (2004), WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The issues, andwhere we are now, Updated 1 March 2004 (available at:www.wto.org).
Markus F. Hofreither
Cancún and beyond A European Perspective of Agricultural IssuesI.II.
IntroductionTechnicalities, Procedures and TacticsA. Official Reactions after CancúnB. Procedural Deficiencies and TacticsC. EU’s Agricultural Approach for CancúnIII. Substance of NegotiationsA. Past Experience and Current ProblemsB. CAP Reform Trends and Doha DevelopmentAgendaC. Approaching Cancún: the Cap Reform of June2003D. The Derbez Draft – a Promising Compromise?IV. Cancún and beyondV. Conclusion and OutlookReferencesAppendix
339342342344346348348349353356359363364368
I. IntroductionThe Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference has taken place in Cancún,Mexico, from 10 to 14 September 2003.1 In WTO’s own wordingthe primary objective of this meeting was ‘to take stock of progressin negotiations and other work under the Doha DevelopmentAgenda’. On Sunday, 14 September, the meeting ended withoutconsensus on any of the items on the agenda.2 In agriculture, de1
2
The previous four WTO Ministerial Conferences took place in Singapore (1996), Geneva (1998), Seattle (1999) and Doha (2001).With negotiations still in progress, and some narrowing of the gapbetween the positions of countries apparent, the Mexican Chairman,
340
Markus F. Hofreither
spite some progress made, WTO Members were unable to adopt analready downsized modalities ‘framework’.3 No doubt, this meetingwas a clear failure with respect to the objective of pushing forwardthe current Doha Round of trade negotiations, and thus ‘the secondblack eye for the WTO in four years’.4Failures of important mid-term meetings in trade negotiationsare not uncommon: during the Uruguay Round the meeting inMontreal, which was comparable with Cancún regarding its objectives, was a blunt failure. Two years later, the scheduled final meeting in Brussels brought no agreement at all. And, last but not least,the unfortunate occurrences associated with the 3rd WTO Ministerial conference in Seattle are still an issue. Yet, for the EuropeanUnion (EU) the failure of Cancún must have represented a noveland probably surprising experience.During the Uruguay Round (UR) the Union – at least with respect to agriculture and until the scheduled final meeting in Brussels 1990 – has always been in a state which may be described asill-prepared and rather unwilling. Indeed, the Brussels meetingfailed mainly due to the inability of the EU to accept the Hellstromcompromise, although this proposal was very close to the final outcome three years later (‘Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture’, URAA). This conundrum is unravelled by the fact that the EUsimply needed some extra time to rearrange its internal agricultural
3
4
Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez, closed the conferenceabruptly, by announcing that despite considerable movement in consultations 'the conference was at an end' when no deal could be struckon the Singapore issues. The official ministerial statement can befound on the WTO’s website (http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_14sept_e.htm).According to paragraph 14 of the Doha Declaration, Members wererequired to establish modalities by 31 March 2003. After missing thisMarch deadline on agricultural modalities, chances were consideredto be quite low that full agricultural modalities could be agreed in theCancún Ministerial Conference. So, as a less ambitious alternative,negotiators tried to achieve at least a ‘framework’ for those modalities.Schott (2003), 2. While until the ‘fist black eye’, the disaster of theSeattle Ministerial of 1999, the WTO looked unstoppable, since thena continuous downsizing of expectations is recognized (Josling(2001)).
A European Perspective of Agricultural Issues
341
framework in a way, which subsequently paved the path to the Marrakech Accord 1994.With respect to the Doha Round - and particularly Cancún things have been different: in agriculture, the EU has put considerably more preparatory work into this round, has set up importantagreements with the developing countries as well as the US in atimely fashion, and even reformed the Common Agricultural Policy(CAP) a few months before the Ministerial. As a result, comparedto the UR the Union was in a much better negotiating position. Unfortunately, the outcome of Cancún was identical to Brussels 1990:the meeting was a failure, and some participants again put theblame for this outcome on the EU.However, playing the ‘blame game’ is a common ingredient ofmany negotiation processes and normally does not trigger enduringcosts. The failure of Cancún, however, could bring about some realeconomic costs as well: as an immediate reaction important negotiating parties announced to reorient their priorities towards bilateralagreements. As a matter of fact, the US could try to deepen NorthAmerican economic integration, and probably may look for agreements with Colombia, Peru, Thailand and others. The EuropeanUnion could reinforce its activities with Mediterranean neighbours,and China could probably put more effort in a ‘North-East AsiaFTA’.5 If these activities get momentum and end up with concretedeals, the failure of Cancún may bear long lasting costs in the formof rising trade diversion and discrimination through bilateral andregional agreements. Such a development would also make it moredifficult to get back to serious multilateral negotiations in the future.Attempts to analyse and understand what happened in Cancúnare undoubtedly necessary in order to facilitate a ‘successful andtimely conclusion of the negotiations’, as required by the concluding Ministerial statement. Depending on the depth of the currentcrisis, such efforts could also become a highly rewarding undertaking with respect to the long-term development of the globaleconomy.Basically, two main areas are considered with respect to thequestion of what may have caused the failure of Cancún: the firstone focuses on the technicalities, procedures, and tactics of these5
Schott (2003), 1 et seq.
342
Markus F. Hofreither
negotiations, while the second dwells on the substance of what hasbeen discussed – or not discussed – between the groups engaged.This paper tries (1) to summarize and interpret both the proceduralas well as the substantive issues of the negotiation process in agriculture, and (2) to draw some conclusions with respect to the futureof these negotiations. Both tasks are accomplished with specialemphasis on the viewpoints and positions of European agriculture.II. Technicalities, Procedures and TacticsA. Official Reactions after CancúnImmediate reactions after the closure of the Ministerial coveredquite a broad range of opinions about the substance of the talks. Inmany cases deficiencies of the negotiation process or the strategiesof the parties involved were mentioned:x Most probably aiming at the G20+,6 US Trade RepresentativeRobert B. Zoellick criticized ‘certain developing countries’ fortheir inflexibility during negotiations and expressed his disappointment about the fact that the readiness of the US to negotiate on a wide range of issues was blocked by countries whoseemed more interested in ‘tactical rhetoric’ than concrete progress. Zoellick also emphasized that henceforth, in the absenceof multilateral movement forward, the US would engage inbilateral and regional trade agreements.x Speaking for the G20+, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Ecuador and Egypt also considered the failure of Cancún as a setback, but refused the notion that the group's inflexibility inagriculture was the main reason for bringing the negotiationsto a halt. For them, the current situation must be considered asthe beginning of a new phase. They emphasized that Cancúnhelped to solidify the group and thus made it a serious player6
This paper uses the label ‘G20+’ (Group of 20-Plus) for a new coalition of developing countries, which together represent more than halfof the global population. After the dropping out of Peru and Columbia the G20+ consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China,Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia,Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa,Thailand and Venezuela. The enormous weight of this group is partlyattenuated by heterogeneous interests among its members with respect to important areas (e.g. agriculture).
A European Perspective of Agricultural Issues
x
x
x
7
8
343
not only in the area of agriculture.