engineering, and passed my engineering licensing test on the first try. I earned anMBA in mid-career, while pursuing graduate engineering work simultaneously. Ihad also the experience of surviving a decade of downsizing along with most ofthe others present, so I knew enough to keep my mouth shut.But one of the employees who was buying into all the “mutual trust” rhetorickept his hand up insistently long enough that he was finally recognized. He questioned one of the more obvious flaws, and it was publicly explained to him that thecompany needed “team players” who were “open to change and new ideas”—thatperhaps some of the people in his group with “different” cultural backgroundscould explain it to him.In the fable, the little boy who observed that the emperor had no clothes onwas not chastised. When honest, trusting, and knowledgeable employees play outthe little boy’s role, the effect is disastrous for the employees; when the markettakes on that role, it is disastrous for the whole company.But how does a company go overnight from aggressively executing a centurylong tradition of adding real value of society, to being introspectively and passivelyfascinated by its own self-valued fantasy-image? The only answer that I can comeup with is that it takes two components at the top: a determined ignorance and apervasive, self-justified willingness to intimidate.I believe pride and its twin, arrogance, inevitably produces the ignorance.After all, there’s no sense wasting time learning if you’re already the expert, right?But I have not yet figured out exactly how we come to so easily intimidate otherswho have a history of competence and who share our own self-interests. Perhapssuccess reinforces our confidence in our abilities to the point that we believe weare discounting the opinions of subordinates for their own good. Possibly prideand arrogance play roles also. Or perhaps, way deep down, do we suspect that ourpride-produced ignorance has trapped us? At any rate, we seem to adopt the survival instincts of gladiators when we least need them. People are the strangest creation in the universe.
There is always tension between the ambition to excel that leads to corporate greatness and the excessive boastfulness that led Icarus to fly too close tothe sun. Perhaps no company illustrates this better than Continental Airlines,which we mentioned in a January 17, 2002, column titled “‘We’re No. 1’ Usually Means ‘Not Much Longer’ ” as an example of a boastful company. (Wefaulted Continental for saying “We’re the best-positioned airline for the future.”) The airline’s director of public relations immediately fired off a letter tous. “What can we do? We were voted the best on time, the most satisfactory toall passengers, the best managed. Does that really make us a candidate for
146 Practical Speculationshorting, as you suggest?” Actually, we specifically said we were not recommending that any of the boastful companies be shorted. We rarely recommend shorting, given the market’s upward drift. Nevertheless, Continentalstock did tumble 61 percent in the subsequent six months.
Hunting for HumilityTo balance our investigation into hubris, we looked for humble executives.We wanted to find the corporate counterparts to Pete Sampras in tennis,Sparky Anderson in baseball, Walter Payton in football, Mike Krzyzewski inbasketball, and Wayne Gretzky in hockey. Companies with executives whocould say, as Anderson did: “My daddy told me, ‘Son, be nice to everyone youmeet—be nice and treat that person like he’s someone.’” Companies with executives who, instead of doing the equivalent of the funky chicken after scoring a point, bow their heads after a spectacular putaway, as Sampras does.“He is so concentrated on the task at hand that I barely ever notice himsmile,” one Sampras fan wrote.We found just 10 of these companies after searching through hundredsof thousands of articles published over the past three years, looking for conjunctions of “CEO” with such words as “low key,” “down-to-earth,” “modest,”and “unassuming.” They are Allstate, Biomet, Costco Wholesale, Electrolux,Lockheed Martin, Wal-Mart Stores, Weyerhaeuser, and White Mountains Insurance. (The list also included AOL Time Warner and Computer Associates,which have since come under federal investigation for improper accountingpractices. Whoops! But this reminds us of the great Golda Meir quote: “Don’tbe modest. You aren’t that great.”)We compared the performance of these humble companies with that ofthe S&P 500. It turned out they outperformed the market by 40 percentagepoints from the dates of the statements containing the keywords throughJanuary 21, 2002.Humble companies won some attention in October 2001 when JamesC. Collins came out with Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make theLeap . . . and Others Don’t.19Collins found 11 companies—Abbott Laboratories, Circuit City, FannieMae, Gillette, Kimberly-Clark, Kroger, Nucor, Philip Morris, Pitney Bowes,Walgreen, and Wells Fargo—that had the kind of down-to-earth, attention-todetail style that turned them into great companies. He found that their returns were seven times that of the market in the 15 years after their transition
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to greatness. One dollar invested in the good-to-great companies in 1965would have grown to $471 versus $56 in the overall market, or almost eighttimes the market return.
So Much for CelebrityThe CEOs of these companies are invariably self-effacing. “There is a direct relationship between the absence of celebrity and the presence of good-to-greatresults,” Collins said in an interview published in the October 2001 online edition of Fast Company magazine. “Why? First, when you have a celebrity, thecompany turns into ‘the one genius with 1,000 helpers.’ It creates a sense thatthe whole thing is really about the CEO. At a deeper level, we found that forleaders to make something great, their ambition has to be for the greatness ofthe work and the company, rather than for themselves.”20Much has been made of Collins’ scientific, painstaking method of research. The book was five years in the making and involved 21 researcherswhom Collins affectionately calls chimps. It took six months and vast banksof computers just to come up with the companies. We would point out thatsince Collins selected the companies for their superior market performance
Table 5.2 “Good to Great” Stock PerformanceJune 30, 2001, to July 30, 2002Company
Percent Change
Abbott LaboratoriesCircuit CityFannie MaeGilletteKimberly-ClarkKrogerNucorPhilip MorrisPitney BowesWalgreenWells Fargo
−18.2−2.8−12.28.43.9−23.912.4−4.2−7.03.35.7
Average:
−3.2
S&P 500
−27.3
148 Practical Speculationin the first place, of course they displayed it. There is thus no prospective evidence, no scientific finding, indeed no reason whatsoever aside from anecdotes to believe that leaders or companies showing these characteristicswould perform any differently in the future than a group of randomly selectedcompanies.Good to Great calculated performance through June 2001. We took pencilto paper and updated the calculation through February 2002 (see Table 5.2).The average performance of the 10 companies over the eight-month period was −3.2 percent, outperforming the S&P 500 by 20 percentage points inone of the worst market declines ever.We would like to believe that the performance differences found byCollins will hold up in the long run. There is something ugly and unbusinesslike about the tendency of CEOs to brag about their company’s superiority, instead of focusing on their own pursuit of excellence.
Just What Is Humble?Finding indications of humility is more difficult than finding indications ofarrogance. Many different statements can indicate humility, but arroganceseems to be present when certain specific types of things are said. Then, too,as Dizzy Dean once observed, “It ain’t boasting if you can do it.” The Englishchess grandmaster Nigel Davies told us that Jose Raul Capablanca, worldchampion from 1921 to 1927 and probably the greatest natural chess player ofall time, once said, “As one by one I mowed them down, my superiority became evident.”21Davies commented in a January 19, 2002, e-mail to us: “Was this hubris?Probably more a statement of fact. I am much more wary of apparent humility than apparent hubris. Those who feign humility can be both arrogantand deceitful.”The one company with by far the most mentions for humility in thesearch engines is Berkshire Hathaway. But it was Berkshire’s CEO, WarrenBuffett, who made the following remark, reported in Fortune on November22, 1999:Sizing all this up, I like to think that if I’d been at Kitty Hawk in 1903, whenOrville Wright took off, I would have been farsighted enough, and public spiritedenough—I owed this to future capitalists—to shoot him down. I mean, KarlMarx couldn’t have done as much damage to capitalists as Orville did. . . . Therewere about 300 aircraft manufacturers in 1919–1939. Only a handful are breathing today.
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Evidently, the “world’s greatest investor” has come to believe so thoroughly in his own press that he now presumes to assist the gods in punishingtoday’s Icaruses for their attempts to soar.
The Skyscraper IndicatorIn the twenty-first century, as in the time of Cheops, there will undoubtedly betaller and taller buildings, built at great effort and often without real economicjustification, because the rich and powerful will still sometimes find satisfactionin traditional ways of demonstrating that they’re on top of the heap.—William J. Mitchell, “Do We Still Need Skyscrapers?” Scientific American22
Far too often, a company, country, or civilization builds a tall, lavishbuilding and experiences disaster shortly thereafter. Start in Babylon, circa2800 B.C., when the conqueror Nimrod attempted to build “a tower thatreaches to the heavens, so that we may make a name for ourselves.” TheLord, we are told in the “Book of Genesis,” threw the builders into confusion,halting construction permanently.Right up to modern days, the landscape is littered with disastrous examples of the tendency to build high before a fall. The soaring towers of SoutheastAsia, completed before the 1997 crash, come to mind. The world’s currenttallest buildings, the Petronas Towers, were completed in Kuala Lumpur in1997, the year the Malaysian stock market fell 50 percent. The December 28,1999, christening of the world’s largest video display, the Nasdaq’s $37 millionMarketSite Tower in Manhattan’s Times Square, came just three months before a 70 percent, 18-month crash in the Nasdaq Composite Index. Enron hadalmost completed a lavish 40-story tower designed by celebrity architect CesarPelli when it filed for bankruptcy in 2002.John Newbegin, who runs a Web site called nycskyscrapers.com, wroteus: “I was totally fooled [as to Enron’s true financial condition] by the beautiful building. . . . They appeared to be by far the most prosperous of all the energy companies I saw, judging from the appearance of the edifice. I wasconvinced that they were huge and had all kinds of innovative assets and infrastructure all over the U.S.”On October 10, 2002, Enron’s brand-new skyscraper, complete with aneight-story-high trading floor, was sold for one-third of its $300 million cost tohelp pay off some $50 billion owed to creditors.As we write in 2002, the new “tallest” building, the Shanghai World Financial Center, is under construction in China. Even higher towers are proposed for India and New York. Investors should beware.
150 Practical SpeculationOur friend Don Siskind, one of the most respected real estate attorneyson Wall Street, singled out the Lloyds of London building, Drexel BurnhamLambert’s 7 World Trade Center offices, and David Paul’s savings and loan inMiami as prime examples. “All of the foregoing took more or less the shape ofa phallic symbol,” he noted.A great new building can indeed put spring into the step. As an unnamedAlcoa executive put it in a 1953 interview with Architectural Forum:We used to think of ourselves as a staid, conservative sort of company. But youshould look at us now! Working in the most experimental office building in theU.S. suddenly put all of us into a really daring, youthful, experimental frame ofmind. I think we all started to perk up.23
An Architect’s OpinionFor further insight into the phenomenon, we consulted William Mitchell,dean of the School of Architecture and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in an interview and series of e-mail exchanges. In a seminal December 1997 Scientific American article titled “Do We Still NeedSkyscrapers?” Mitchell had argued that the computer and telecommunicationrevolutions have reduced the need to keep centralized paper files and assemble office workers in expensive downtown locations. After the destruction ofNew York’s World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, his ideas seem remarkably prescient.We found Professor Mitchell in an office stacked with skyscrapers ofbookshelves twice his height. (The intensive use of capital in the form of bookstacks in the very valuable and limited space available in the office provides anice metaphor of one of the major findings in urban economics: The morevaluable the land, the more economical it is to build higher buildings, so as toconcentrate capital and labor.) It turned out that the professor is a man ofmany hats as well as provocative theories. He writes a book every year or two,serves as dean of the school, teaches a few classes, and serves as architecturaladvisor to the president of MIT on a massive half-billion-dollar center forcomputer, information, and intelligence sciences.The World Trade Center attack, Mitchell said, highlighted yet another argument against skyscrapers: security concerns. Vulnerability to natural disasters also argues for decentralization.Sparks flew when Vic, who named four of his six daughters after AynRand heroes, asked what Mitchell thought of Howard Roark, the architecthero of The Fountainhead.24 Mitchell responded by recalling the book’s final
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scene, where Roark stands proudly atop an immense skyscraper that he hasdesigned, gazing haughtily down at the lesser mortals, as an example of absurd megalomania. “I’m more inclined to believe that great architecturecomes from listening well, being sensitive to the nuances and messy complexities of everyday life, carefully solving real problems, and showing a littlehumility.” Roark, however, saw architecture as the pure, heroic expression ofan individual’s will.We pressed Mitchell for examples that support his assertion that skyscrapers were becoming dysfunctional. Since his daughter is attending NewYork University’s Stern School of Business Administration, we asked him toimagine what he might say to her graduating class about the lessons architecture holds for investors.“Skyscrapers,” Mitchell said, “exist essentially to exploit concentrations ofinfrastructure and population in urban centers.” Downtown land is expensive, so there is a motivation to build as high as possible to reap the maximumreturn on investment. “But, the higher you build, the greater the proportion ofeach floor that must be devoted to structure (holding the building up and providing resistance to wind) and to vertical circulation (elevators, pipes, andducts). No matter how valuable the site, you eventually reach a point where itmakes no economic sense to add another floor. It is technologically possibleto go beyond this point, but the reasons for doing so are ones of pride andprestige, or bragging rights about being “the tallest.” Manhattan’s WorldTrade Towers and Kuala Lumpur’s Petronas Towers are clear examples ofskyscrapers that were pushed higher than the point of rationality in order togain attention and prestige.”Investors, he went on to say, should take a good look at organizations thatseek the title of “the tallest.” “I suspect you would find that going for the titleof ‘tallest’ is a pretty good indicator of CEO and corporate hubris. I would looknot only at ‘tallest in the world,’ but also more locally—tallest in the nation,the state, or the city. And I’d also watch out for conspicuously tall buildings inlocations where the densities and land values do not justify it; skyscrapersmake a lot more sense in Hong Kong than they do in Omaha.”“When it comes to buildings,” he concluded, “bigger may be better, butbiggest usually isn’t best.”
Best Use, or Boast?Despite the appealing plausibility of Professor Mitchell’s theories and the great esteem we felt for him, we agreed that a
152 Practical Speculationquantifiable test was in order. After all, surely there are companies that buildtall office buildings not out of hubris, but in the normal course of business. Thequestion is whether very tall downtown buildings represent uneconomic hubristhat will ultimately lead to comeuppance in the stock market, or merely a rational attempt to make the most of valuable land by maximizing the number offace-to-face meetings between bankers, lawyers, accountants, and traders.Thus, we found ourselves once again taking up our favorite tools, the pencil and the back of the envelope, to dosome counting. This approach is highly recommended notonly for testing theories about tall buildings but for testing anyother theories or conventionally accepted views about markets.For our test, we used skyscrapers named for publicly traded companies ina list published by the Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat of the 100tallest buildings in the world. The results show that in the cumulative oneyear, two-year, and three-year periods after completion of the buildings, thestocks performed 9, 19, and 22 percentage points, respectively, worse than theDow Jones Industrial Average (see Table 5.3).The past decade’s trend for very tall towers in Asia provides further support for Mitchell’s argument. In 1990, all the 50 tallest buildings were in theUnited States; in 2002, after the destruction of New York’s World Trade Center, six of the 10 highest are in Asia. We need not elaborate on just how miserable a decade the 1990s was for Asian stocks.The situation is actually even more unfavorable for tallest-building companies than appears at first glance. Many skyscrapers that in their day wereamong the world’s tallest have been torn down or destroyed. In most cases, thisoccurred in conjunction with the failure of the company that built them. TheSinger Building, built in 1908, the Manhattan and the Central buildings, bothbuilt in 1930, and the New York World building, built in 1890, no longer exist.One of the problems with architecture in general, and tall buildings in particular, is that the occupant’s fortunes and needs are likely to change over theyears from design to finish. Buildings designed to give the best and brightestlawyers, engineers, financiers, and accountants a place to exchange ideas faceto-face are strangely out of date in an age when many of these specialists prefer working out of some rural paradise with high-speed telecom links insteadof taking a two-hour commute to a congested urban center.Thus, architecture is subject to the same law of ever-changingcycles as the market.Taking one consideration with another, the results on tallbuildings support the hypothesis that hubris is indicative of inferior subsequent stock performance.
Table 5.3 How Stocks Did after Completion of a “World’s Tallest” Building(Cumulative 1-, 2-, and 3-Year Change versus Dow Industrials)
CompanyCommerzbank (CBK.GR)DowNationsBank (Atlanta) (NB)DowNationsBank (Charlotte, N.C.) (NB)DowSuntrust Banks (STI)DowU.S. BankDowMellon Bank (MEL)DowAT&T ( T )DowIBM (IBM)DowBank OneDowNationsBank Plaza, Dallas (NB)DowNationsBank Center, Houston (NB)DowFirst Interstate BankDowTranscoDowCiticorpDowJohn HancockDowSears (S)DowFirst Interstate BankDowAmocoDowTransamericaDow
Date ofBuildingCompletion1997199319921992199219911989198819871985198419831983197719761974197419731972
1
Year (%)2
3
−2116−42−713313913525−35−4−2327−712−49232628−3−435−4−12−3−11−17−3380380−28−35−17
−11444236−101591518155218−1415−7213542−6125−355626234223−81−18−201363763−50−56−40
−29361037233545754765432211221−27461636−4040−516024511151−1816−28−17−3353335518−55−16
(continued)
153
154 Practical SpeculationTable 5.3 Continued
CompanyUSX (X)DowBank of AmericaDowGeneral Electric (GE)DowChryslerDowWoolworth’sDow
Date ofBuildingCompletion19701969193319301913
1
Year (%)2
3
−136−17504−29−531−31
−1122−10111844−43−64−226
−91172740801−39521
Difference(PercentagePoints)Average 1 year company performanceAverage 1 year Dow performance
−5.73.3
9
Average 2 year company performanceAverage 2 year Dow performance
−1.218.3
19.5
Average 3 year company performanceAverage 3 year Dow performance
8.230.3
22.1
The Magazine Cover IndicatorAs our Florida attorney friend William Harrell points out, “Hubris goes out ofits way to let you know of its existence, while humility does not.” As media organizations depend on loudmouths for copy, we considered the question ofthe performance of companies featured on business magazine covers.“Whom the gods would destroy, they first put on the cover of BusinessWeek,”wrote Paul Krugman of Enron’s Kenneth Lay, in an August 17, 2001, articlefor the New York Times.25 Krugman gave no data to support his conclusion,and in typical fashion, used the anecdote to argue for decreased reliance onmarkets and increased reliance on government intervention.In fact, many CEOs have gone on to great heights after being featured byBusinessWeek. What is needed to shed light on the subject is a complete enumeration of all companies featured on magazine covers during a sufficient
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period of varying market conditions so we may draw statistically reliable conclusions, as well as compare the performanceof these companies to the market during relevant subsequentperiods.Our study of Time’s Person of the Year awards, which go back to 1926,does indicate a hubristic curse. The first company to receive the honor wasChrysler in 1928. The following year, Time featured Owen Young, chairmanof General Electric. Both companies declined about 70 percent over the nexttwo years. The most recent executive to receive the Time award was JeffreyBezos, founder of Amazon.com, on December 27, 1999. The online bookseller’s stock declined 80 percent in the year after the award.Only in bull markets, it seems, do companies and businesspeople makethe cover of Time. The only others we found were General Motors ChairmanHarlow Herbert Curtice in 1955, Cable News Network founder Ted Turner in1991, and Intel Chairman and CEO Andy Grove in 1997. On average, the sixcompanies to receive the award declined an average of 10 percent in the nexttwo years, versus an average gain of 20 percent in the S&P 500 for the sametwo-year period.Because neither the BusinessWeek covers nor the Time awards werenumerous enough to permit statistically valid conclusions, we studiedevery company featured on the cover of Forbes from 1997 through 2001. Theresults show that companies perform about 5 percentage points worsethan the market in the month after making the cover, and in line with themarket over the subsequent five months. The one-month underperformance appears unlikely to have occurred by chance variation alone—roughly 1 in 20.
The Stadium IndicatorThe naming of stadiums comes to people’s minds immediately when theythink of corporate excess. A recent and vivid illustration came February 27,2002, when Enron, having filed for bankruptcy protection, was forced to sellthe naming rights for Enron Field for $2.1 million to the Houston Astros,with 27 years remaining on a $100 million contract. “Enron went into bankruptcy and caused a great deal of pain for their employees and people who didbusiness with Enron,” Astros owner Drayton McLane explained during aHouston press conference. “Their name really didn’t have the connotationthat we wanted.”26
156 Practical SpeculationThe stadium jinx has been widely noted. The Wall Street Journal, inspired bythe unfolding Enron debacle, published a lead article in December 2001 aboutthe inordinate tendency of companies to suffer bankruptcy, financial difficulties, or drastic declines in market value after naming stadiums after themselves.Enron, TWA, PSINet, and Fruit of the Loom went out of business under the“stadium jinx,” while CMGI Inc., Savvis Communications, 3Com, and Consecomerely showed stock price declines ranging from 85 percent to 92 percent.27Chris Isidore, a sports-business columnist at CNN/Money, created a Stadium Sponsors’ Stock Index after Enron’s bankruptcy filing. The indextracks 50 publicly traded companies that have paid to put their names on stadiums. The index fell 34 percent in 2002, 11 percentage points worse thanthe S&P 500 Index.Corporations are beset by the same harmful tendencies as investors.When they are at their peak, they reach for the sun. The stadium itself is notonly an example of a wasteful expenditure unrelated to the company’s primary activity; it also signals boastfulness, excessive pride, and a resulting lackof focus.The problem is that all studies of stadiums that we haveseen are anecdotal in nature. The lists of stadiums tend to beincomplete, with no source cited, and often leave out greatrises in stocks after renaming deals. Qualcomm (San DiegoPadres), General Motors (Vancouver Canucks), PepsiCo (Denver Nuggets),and Compaq Computer (Houston Rockets) all named stadiums after themselves, and all are still very much alive and kicking.We performed a systematic study of the stadium jinx. TheAlmanac of Architecture and Design contains a complete list forall Major League baseball, football, hockey, and basketball stadiums, including data on cost, capacity, architecture, and completion date.28We went to the Web sites of the companies and found the year the renaming took place. We then constructed Table 5.4 showing the performanceof 31 companies from the year of acquisition of naming rights to three yearsthereafter. The results indicate that during the year of naming and in the subsequent year, the companies performed significantly worse than the S&P 500.However, in the second and third year after the naming, the results are mixedto bullish. The results were helped by Qualcomm’s 2680 percent gain in thesecond year.Like most transactions in life and markets, acquisitions can be very goodor very bad. For an acquired company, a good acquisition lets the owner cash
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in and enjoy a profit—the self-interested, wholly appropriate incentive forstarting a company in the first place. For the purchaser, a good acquisitionprovides an opportunity to save on costs, to improve marketing or to investcapital at higher returns than are available internally.At worst, an acquisition is a desperate attempt by the seller to unload badmerchandise based on adverse private information, or an effort by the acquiring company to create a facade of enhanced profitability.Most acquirers, we hasten to say, would never dream of succumbing tothe alluring temptations that come with acquisition accounting. But somefind that a steady stream of purchases much improves their ability to deliverthe consistent quarterly growth so dear to analysts, and they are not averse topainting the lily for temporary advantage.Nothing improves a corporation’s ability to manipulate earnings like aseries of acquisitions. With a few flourishes of the pencil, a chief financialofficer can find a cornucopia of profits in an acquired company’s earnings,pension plans, medical plans, and assets held on the balance sheet belowmarket price.In Table 5.5, we show the results from our statistical test of whatnumerous or infrequent acquisitions signal in a relatively homogenoussample of large buyers—the companies that make up the S&P 100 index.After reporting the results, which seem to support the virtue of abstemiousness on the part of large companies, we share some insights for acquirersand investors from a highly successful serial acquirer of privately heldcompanies.For more than 50 years, accountants have been trying to create rules thatwill make acquisition accounting fair. The Financial Accounting StandardBoard’s 2001 ban on “pooling of interest” accounting in mergers is a recentexample. (Without pooling, companies must amortize the premium, or“goodwill,” they paid for the target company over a period of years, thereby depressing earnings.) But as in all arms races, acquirers—and their consultantsand experts—are vigorous in mounting new attacks and finding new ways toput the best foot forward.With investors paying more attention these days to accounting treatments, we are fascinated by the possibility of developing statistical profiles ofserial acquirers versus abstainers. Might a predilection for acquisitions be asign of hubristic overconfidence in the company’s ability torun other businesses? Are abstainers unusually confident intheir ability to run their businesses without benefit of acquisitions? Because these questions are difficult to test, we started
Table 5.4
The Stadium Indicator: Naming Rights and Stock ReturnsDifference with S&P 500Return Percent
Stadium
Ticker
NamingRights
NamingYear
1 YearAfter
2 YearsAfter
3 YearsAfter
The Target CenterThe Delta CenterAmerica West ArenaThe United CenterCoors FieldThe Fleet CenterGeneral Motors PlaceKey ArenaTrans World Dome3com ParkContinental Airline ArenaEricsson StadiumEdison International FieldQualcomm StadiumAlltel StadiumNetwork Associates ColiseumBank One BallparkAmerican Airline ArenaSaf