This would improve thechance to better incorporate the interests of a large part of thepopulation of developing countries into the Doha Round.The ACP-AU-LDC Group,7 an alliance of poorest countries,mainly pointed to the Singapore issues as the main stumblingblock. Due to their opposition to launching negotiations on anyof the Singapore issues they would have had no option but toreject the EU's offer to drop only two of them. Moreover, thesecountries expressed their dissatisfaction that the negotiationsnever got to seriously deal with their priorities (agriculture,non-agricultural market access, S&D, and cotton).Compared to its impact during the UR the Cairns Group8 wasrelatively quiet in Cancún. Probably weakened through the exitof some weighty developing countries, which moved over tothe G20+, after Cancún only Australia published a statementexpressing its disappointment over a missed opportunity forthe farmers of the world.For the EU, Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy diagnosed theDoha Round as definitely being ‘in intensive care’. For himthis outcome was both a severe blow for the WTO and a lostopportunity for developed and developing countries. Lamymainly put the blame for the failure on the procedures andrules of the WTO by stating that the WTO would be ‘a medieval organisation’, which is not able ‘to steer discussions among146 Members in a manner conducive to consensus.’ He alsoput across that in the near future the EU could take a more proactive stance.
This group unifies African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) aswell as the African Union (AU) and Less Developed Countries(LDC) and comprises more than 90 countries.In a press statement of Australian Trade Minister Mark Vaile of 20February 2004 (http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2004/mvt011_04.html) the members of the Cairns group were listed as Argentina*, Australia, Bolivia*, Brazil*, Canada, Chile*, Colombia,Costa Rica*, Guatemala*, Indonesia*, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay*, Philippines*, South Africa*, Thailand* and Uruguay. However,during the Cancún Meeting the countries marked with an asteriskwere counted as members of G20+.
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Yet, these official reactions have to be interpreted as what theygenuinely are, namely playing the ‘blame game’: attempts to strategically put the blame for the collapse of Cancún on others. In fact,the unwillingness of the US to make concessions in the cottoncase,9 the inability of the EU to go beyond the positions of the modest EU-US-proposal, or the static position of Japan with respect toits rice farmers, just to mention a few examples, have been important stumbling blocs for a swift progress. On the other side, parts ofthe developing world widely misjudged the objectives and possibilities of the Cancún meeting. So, in sum, nearly all participatinggroups have their share in making this meeting a failure. However,although it is important to understand the reasons for such a failure,putting too much effort in playing the ‘blame game’ sharply reduces the chances for a fruitful continuation of trade negotiations,and then protectionism is a likely substitute.10B. Procedural Deficiencies and TacticsFar in advance it was known that the Ministerial Meeting in Cancúnwill be a huge event, with about up to 10 000 participants expected.Yet, this challenge was mainly taken on through attempts tostreamline the local organization, but far less, if at all, by thinkingabout the adequacy of the structures and procedures of the negotiation process itself.11Many countries have complained about information deficitsand a lack of time during the Cancún meeting.12 As an example,
9
10
11
12
The US may have underestimated the perception of damage done to alarge numbers of very poor farmers in some of the sub-Saharan African countries through its subsidies to less than 20,000 US cottonfarmers (Srinivasan 2003, 32).If the US actually goes back to bilateral trade deals it is unlikely thatthe EU will seek leadership in liberalizing trade within a multilateralframework, because without sufficient ‘external’ pressure domesticinterest groups, particularly in agriculture, would obstruct such acourse with all their power.‘In a body of 148 in which consensus is the norm for decision making, a long agenda with items on many of which there is no widespread agreement is a prescription for failure.’ Srinivasan (2003), 37.One notable example is the complaint of some developing countriesthat they did not get the information about the EU’s willingness to
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until the morning of the last day of the conference, there was nosubstantial discussion of the highly controversial Singapore issues.However, depending on the capacities available, evaluating theconsequences of new proposals and developing feasible counterproposals may take quite a lot of time, which further increases withthe complexity of the issues discussed. Another reason for timepressure may have come from the changes with respect to thecomposition of negotiation parties before and even throughoutCancún: new coalitions emerged (G20+, ACP-AU-LDCs) and,partly caused by this, the composition of established groupschanged.13 The necessary build-up of infrastructure and internallinks within these coalitions clearly slows down the process ofgetting information across or finding out who is an ally with respectto a particular issue.A more general argument, which was mainly brought forwardby developing countries in response to accusations they would behave hesitantly or at least seek too many tiered obligations,14 referred to the difference between the previous GATT framework andthe WTO setting: The old GATT functioned with less frictions onlybecause the obligations per se were not binding on everyone. Socountries could join or not join agreements without losing theirMFN rights. However, as all members must agree on all issues forthe Doha Round to be successful (‘single undertaking’), all members have to be able to participate and understand the consequencesbefore they are able to agree.15Some observers suppose that the demanding position of developing countries may have been induced by the impression that theyhave not got a fair return out of the UR.16 The implicit emphasis of
13
1415
16
drop some of the Singapore issues in the last stages of the negotiations in advance.The Cairns group, e.g., lost Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia,Philippines through their move into the newly established G20+group.European Commission (2003c), 2 et seq.Third World Network (2003). In recognizing this problem the EU hasproposed switching to a mode of ‘optional participation’ with respectto the Singapore Issues (European Commission (2003g), 5).For a detailed and quite balanced analysis of this problem area pleaserefer to Wang / Winters (1997).
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the Doha declaration on development, which was also corroboratedby the rhetoric of many participants, may have induced them toexpect that Cancún could function as a ‘donor conference’.17 Insharp contrast to such beliefs, the developed world arrived atCancún with the firm intention to negotiate trade interests.Many participants put the blame for the surprising end of theCancún negotiations on the inexperience of Chairman Derbez inhandling such a big international conference. This argument explains the unsatisfactory end of this meeting with a simple accident.However, for quite a few observers it is difficult to believe that thehost country Mexico would have acted without being sure of support from the United States.18A general strategic problem of this Ministerial meeting hasbeen the ‘contamination’ with geopolitical issues and interestswhich sometimes made international politics appear to dominate thegenuine objective, namely trade negotiations. A more specific obstacle for the future continuation of ‘business as usual’ trade negotiations within the WTO could emanate from the - sometimes distinctly demonstrated - scepticism of important US representativeswith regard to the efficacy of the current WTO procedures andprocesses.19 In sum, many participants agreed that some changeswith respect to the structures and the procedures of the WTO wouldbe necessary for a successful re-launch of the failed trade talks.C. EU’s Agricultural Approach for CancúnFocussing mainly on agricultural issues, EU Commissioner FranzFischler stressed that he does not directly blame particular instancesfor the failure, but would like to attribute responsibility for thisunsatisfactory outcome of Cancún to four more general factors:201. the specific approach taken by the Chairman,1718
1920
Schott (2003), 5.In fact, there have been rumors of some hidden conversation betweenMexican trade minister Derbez and US officials. The main argumentin this respect was that with an unsuccessful end the United States –at least temporarily - would get rid of uncomfortable issues like cotton, where it was quite isolated at this time (Third World Network(2003)).Schott (2003), 3.Agra Facts (2003), 1 et seq.
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2.3.
the inflexible way of negotiating by specific countries,the negative impact of NGOs (e.g. ‘no deal is better than a baddeal’), and4. a lack of proper preparation, where he obviously meant theWTO itself.Commissioner Fischler accentuated the fact that Cancún hasnot changed the attitude of the EU – or at least the Commission –with respect to the future course of negotiations, because ‘the principles have not changed’. He underlined this position by formallyrejecting recent suggestions – mainly linked to statements of USofficials – that bilateral agreements would be a viable alternative tothe WTO process.The main strategic lapse of the EU may have been trying to negotiate – starting from a well prepared position – important detailson a mainly technical level, without or at least too late recognizingthat the state of information of a substantial number of its tradingpartners was insufficient and in a few cases even purposely biased.Understandably, in a situation with acute problems in defining andorganizing its own position, the technical stance of the EU withready-made proposals and positions made it appear as an opponentfor many developing countries. In some cases this developmentmay have been supported by blunt arguments of some NGOs,which recognized this situation as a good chance for getting broadermedia coverage.21In putting together the evidence from a procedural viewpoint,the key drivers of this collapse quite certainly have been a politicaldeadlock between important players, which could not be resolved ina few days and, in the wording of Pascal Lamy, the ‘medieval’structure of negotiations imposed by the WTO.
21
Among other groups, ‘Food First’, an activist NGO, expressed thefailure of Cancún as a ‘victory to the people’ (Economist, 20 September 2003). However, as many NGOs are organized as private enterprises it should not come as a surprise that they also behave as suchin trying to serve their customers.
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III. Substance of NegotiationsA. Past Experience and Current ProblemsSo far, all previous rounds have been successful as in the end always the substance of the negotiations has prevailed over officiallydetermined procedures. Negotiations have gone as long as requiredto obtain results, which are acceptable for all groups involved. Theultimate compromise across the differing interests often came in theform of a last-minute balancing of concessions after a long periodof negotiations. The institutional design mainly determines the easeand thus the speed at which these results are obtained.22With respect to the substance of this meeting it is apparent thatthings have changed to some extent. Since the creation of theGATT in the late 1940s, trade negotiations have been dominated byadvanced industrialized countries. During this round, however, thecentre of gravity has shifted towards the divide between North andSouth. Compared to narrowly defined quarrels about mainly technical aspects of trade policies between the big players of the developed country group, this new focus brings in a much broader problem set.23 There is also an increased emphasis on ‘behind the border’ measures, mainly through the Singapore issues, and as a completely new feature the challenge of reconciling the traditional areasof trade negotiations with the promotion of development.24Depending on the boundaries of the eventual problem definition in the course of the current negotiations, the disputes couldbecome an intense and broad battle about North-South conflicts.However, such a scenario would clearly overload the whole proc22
23
24
Technically speaking such negotiations are repeated games withmany players. The negotiation process runs over an ex ante unknowntime period which is only structured by a number of official stages.Information gathering and transmitting, coalition building, reputationand trust, but also history does matter in repeated games. Once negotiations have officially started, in the course of time there is considerably increasing pressure on negotiators to produce useful results(Hoekman / Kostecki (1995), 79 et seq.).The politically agreed background of the Doha Round is a development perspective. The problem set in this respect is impressivelyframed by the seven so-called ‘Millennium Development Goals’ tobe achieved by 2015 (United Nations (2000)).Evenett (2003), 4.
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ess, as GATT/WTO-negotiations are merely a means to balancedifferences in country interests related to trade. In this case therecent positions of the various groups with respect to the hotly disputed farm subsidies or the so-called ‘Singapore issues’ could become a matter of secondary importance. Yet, shaking the veryfoundations of the current framework of multilateral agreementsregarding trade issues could end in more than less inequity, becausea faltering WTO would probably further shift the balance of globalpolitics from poor to rich countries.In sanguinely assuming that the current round will continuemore or less within the boundaries of the Doha declaration, thedefinition of the problems to be solved may remain unchanged.Hence, also the concessions of negotiating parties will remainwithin the boundaries of their current, long-term strategy. In thecase of the EU, these boundaries are set by the basic buildingblocks of the CAP as well as the political possibilities to changethem within a reasonable time span. The following sections mainlydeal with the basic interests of the EU concerning agriculture in theDoha Round, and the critical limits with respect to restricting theseinterests through the final results of these negotiations.B. CAP Reform Trends and Doha Development AgendaAlready the discussion with respect to the pros and cons of the CAPreform of 1999 (‘Agenda 2000’) took reference to Article 20 of theURAA. Another official justification was the pending decision onEastern Enlargement of the Union. Despite the fact that in the endthis reform mainly concentrated on rearranging the financial settingof the EU (‘financial perspective 2000-2006’), the agreed changesof the CAP can be considered as a modest step into the directiondemanded by the international authorities with respect to a moreliberal setting regarding agricultural trade.The period until the formal decision on 13 December 2002 toinclude ten new member states by 1 May 2004 was characterized bya lengthy dispute between the Commission and EU member stateswhether Eastern Enlargement could be realized without a furtherreform of the CAP and the Structural Policies. Again, a key issue inthis respect was the question of the availability of sufficient funds,mostly related to the current financial perspectives fixed by theAgenda Reform. In an attempt to strengthen the Commissions viewthat a further CAP reform would make Eastern enlargement easierand would also support the position of the Union in the upcoming
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trade negotiations, Commissioner Fischler presented his Mid-termReview of the CAP on 10 July 2002. With a formal decision onthese issues pending, the Member States agreed to include tencountries as new members by May 2004.Only half a year later, in June 2003, the Council of agriculturalministers made a decision for another reform of the CAP. As thismove partly changed the previously agreed setting for Easternenlargement, there was considerable perturbation among the newmember states. Although there was minor reference to internationaltrade issues during the decision process, these two important decisions were largely treated as internal affairs.25 This is remarkable,because WTO negotiations more or less took place in parallel.The negotiations began in early 2000 with reference to Article20 in ‘Special Sessions’ of the Agriculture Committee. This firstphase ended with a meeting on 26 – 27 March 2001, which tried toachieve some stock-taking. At this time, 126 member governmentshad submitted 45 proposals, which mainly described these countriesstarting positions for the negotiations. At this time, the differencesbetween the positions taken were considerable.In building on work carried out until then, on 14 November2001 the Doha Ministerial Declaration set a new mandate, whichmade objectives more precise and set a new timetable with cleardeadlines. The agenda agreed in November 2001 in Doha wasmainly based on the conclusions of the URAA, but added also somenew objectives, e.g.x to enable developing countries to effectively take account oftheir development needs, including food security and rural development;x to confirm that non-trade concerns will be taken into accountin the negotiations as provided for in the Agreement on Agriculture.
25
The press statement of 13 December 2003 related to the successfulconclusion of the negotiations to include ten new member states asfrom 2004 e.g. does not contain a single reference to the WTO issues(Enlargement and agriculture: Summit adopts fair and tailor-madepackage which benefits farmers in accession countries, IP/02/1882,Press Release, RAPID database, Brussels/Copenhagen 13 December2002).
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In the second phase, mostly informal meetings covered andcompared technical details of the member’s proposals in order tofinally reach a consensus about changes of rules and commitmentsin agriculture. This second phase ended in March 2002, however,without substantially narrowing down the gaps between countrypositions.According to the Doha Declaration, the deadline for the modalities in agriculture was 31 March 2003. This ‘modalities phase’was considered to be a very critical stage of the negotiations, asthese agreements are expected to widely determine the shape of thefinal outcome, which according to the Doha declaration is due by 1January 2005.With having ‘the aims of the Doha Declaration in mind’ theEU submitted a proposal with quantitative details of its startingposition for the upcoming negotiations in January 2003.26 The EC’sinitial proposal for modalities in the WTO Agriculture negotiationscontained the following objectives:27x Further substantial liberalization on fair and equitable basisby cutting trade-distorting domestic support by 55% from theURAA levels measured by the AMS,28 tariffs by 36% on average with a minimum per tariff line of 15%, budgetary outlayson export subsidies by 45% and a ‘substantial cut in the volume of export subsidies’, with a view to even phasing out export subsidies for certain products which are important for developing countries, provided ‘that others remove their subsidies for the same products’;x The special needs of developing countries should be adequately addressed by demanding duty free and quota-free access for all imports from the Least-Developed countries, zero26
2728
One can safely assume that the EU has proposed this offer with aclose look at the room to move provided by the Agenda reform 2000,but also the pending reform of June 2003.European Commission (2003a).The AMS (Aggregate Measure of Support) is the sum of the amountof market price support (based on a fixed, historic world price average), ‘non-exempt’ direct payments, and other subsidies not exemptfrom reduction, with levies or fees imposed on agriculture deducted.Details on the calculations of the AMS are specified in Annex 3 ofthe URAA.
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duty access for at least 50% of the developed countries importsfrom developing countries, and lower reduction rates as well asa longer implementation period for developing countries.x Recognition of a model of sustainable agriculture based onenvironmental protection, rural development, food safety andother consumer concerns by exempting domestic supportmeasures aimed at addressing these concerns from reductioncommitments, clarifying the use of the precautionary principlewith respect to the level of food safety chosen by individualcountries, and introducing mandatory labelling schemes withthe objective of informing consumers about the characteristicsand the production methods of agricultural products.Not surprising, the EU linked this offer to a number of conditions.29 Commissioner Fischler repeatedly criticized the de minimisrule as being a considerable loophole – primarily for US agriculture– in domestic support commitments, which must be closed.30 Similarly, export credits, State Trading Enterprises and the dumping ofsurpluses under the cover of food aid have to be brought underWTO disciplines similar to export subsidies. Last, but not least, dueto the restructuring of the CAP since 1992, non-trade concerns havebecome an important justification for agricultural support coming inthe form of direct payments. Hence, a very important point for theEU is the continuation of the blue and the Green Box. The Commission also maintains that the Peace Clause should be prolonged,as otherwise the sustainability of future WTO agricultural agreements would be jeopardized.31The EU offer does not contain any concessions with respect tothe more sensitive aspects of market access (high tariffs, tariffpeaks and tariff escalation), as well as for other WTO-related issuesin agriculture. The main reason for this may be that the EU expectsto extract the maximum concessions from its trading partners before29
3031
Probably also as a reaction to internal critics of his offensive WTOstrategy, Commissioner Fischler repeatedly emphasized that ‘therewill be no unilateral disarmament’ and also EU Trade NegotiatorCommissioner Lamy has stated that the EU will demand concessionsfrom its trading partners.European Commission (2003b), 2.European Commission (2003a); Steinberg / Josling (2003), 7 et seqq.
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it translates its reform efforts into WTO commitments. Though,compared to the positions in the UR, the January 2003 EU proposalhas to be seen as a step which indicates the willingness of the EU tomake contributions towards more liberalized agricultural trade, atleast within the boundaries of acceptance within the Union.32Despite intensive negotiations in February and March 2003 theMember countries were not able to find a compromise on the keyparameters for an agricultural framework accord. Hence, on 31March the chairman of the special (negotiating) session of the WTOCommittee on Agriculture, Stuart Harbinson, formally declaredthat Members had failed to agree on agricultural modalities.C. Approaching Cancún: the CAP Reform of June 2003In realizing that a consensus on modalities, including ‘hard’numbers, was very unlikely before and even in Cancún,33 the negotiating parties changed their strategy. They now tried to at leastagree on a modalities ‘framework’ in the form of an attachment tothe draft Cancún Ministerial Text. As a contribution to break thisdeadlock, on 13 August the EU and the US presented a ‘Joint Text’which also proposed parameters for a modalities ‘framework’34.This attempt initiated some activity in this area, as other countriesalso put forward own proposals.An important prerequisite for this joint offer on the side of theEU was the June 2003 decision to reform the CAP, because this‘historic’ reform brought about a fundamental conceptual shift inthe way subsidies are provided. The key elements of this reform arex a single payment for EU farmers, which is independent fromproduction (‘decoupling’) and leaves some few forms of limited coupled elements only to avoid abandonment of production (‘cross-compliance’),
32
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34
A simplified timeline with respect to internal as well as external drivers influencing the concrete way of the EU towards Cancún can befound in the Appendix (see Table A-1).According to the initial timetable, until the Cancún meeting countriesshould already have prepared their ‘schedules’, which means country-specific detailed commitments based on the ‘modalities’.ICTSD (2003), 11 et seqq.
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x
a reduction in direct payments (‘modulation’) for bigger farmswith the money retained being transferred to the ‘second pillar’(rural development programs);x a strengthened rural development policy with more money, andnew measures to promote environment, quality and animalwelfare;x an improved financial discipline to secure farm budget until2013;x some changes in market policy.35By breaking the link between subsidies and production forquite a few commodities, this reform is in line with long-term demands of international bodies with respect to the preferred way ofreducing trade-distorting support. Commissioner Fischler presentsthe CAP reform decision of June 2003 as a move towards a tradefriendly farm policy,36 which at the same time has positive consequences for the environment as well as for consumers. Indeed, the‘Fischler reform’ reduced producer support and thus made the CAPsignificantly less trade distorting.37 Commissioner Fischler stressesthat the cumulative effect of the last three reforms is a reduction ofthe most-trade distorting forms of agricultural support by 70%, andits export subsidies even by 75%.38 The perceivable impact of thesereforms is – among other facts – corroborated by a decline of thenet export position of the EU. The most visible effect occurredwithin the wheat market, where the EU’s world market share hasfallen from 22.4% to 12.8% over the last ten years.
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Among them, asymmetric price cuts in the milk sector for butter andskimmed milk powder, a reduction of the monthly increments in thecereals sector by half, and reforms in the market orders for rice, durum wheat, nuts, starch potatoes.European Commission (2003a), 3. ‘Europe has also shown that wenot only talk the talk, we are also ready to walk the walk towards atrade-friendly farm policy’, European Commission (2003f), 2. European Commission (2003e), 1.This holds at least under the assumption that it is indeed possible todistinguish between support measures with respect to their trade-distoring effects, as the various ‘boxes’ of the URAA suggest.Fischler (2003), 2.
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In influencing the potential to make offers in line with its Dohacommitments the CAP reform 2003 has a strong bearing on thenegotiating position of the EU. In fact, the shift of support criteriafrom output criteria to quality and standards (animal welfare, animal and plant health, food safety, environmental indicators) facilitates a move towards less trade distorting forms of support. Moreover, the EC stresses the fact that this reform will be beneficial fordeveloping countries, as it will lead to ‘substantial reductions in EUexports of subsidised production and, in any case, to less spendingon export subsidies.’39. Commissioner Fischler regularly points tothe EBA initiative40, which gives free market access for 49 of theleast developed countries of the world. Additionally, with the enhanced generalised system of preferences41 more than 140 countriesprofit from preferential market access arrangements.In general, the Commission sees the CAP on a clear paththrough its changes towards more transparent and non trade-distorting instruments in line with the Doha Declaration Agenda. Asmentioned above, based on the Luxembourg decision in June 2003the EU put forward its joint initiative with the US on 13 August2003. Among other things, this initiative called for a special safeguard for developing countries to protect sensitive products, suggested a system of preferential treatment, and urged other countries
3940
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European Commission (2003a), 5.The EU’s ‘Everything but arms’ initiative (EBA), introduced in2001, grants duty-free and quota-free access for all goods, exceptedarms, originating in least developed countries. Critics maintain thatthe benefits are relatively minor, because over 99 per cent of EU imports from the LDCs are in products with already liberalized EU access, while at the same time the removal of barriers for remainingkey products, rice, sugar and bananas, has been delayed (Cernat et al,(2003), 29). In some cases, increased market access for LDCs comesat the expense of other preference-receiving countries.The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was first introduced in1971 and allows industrialized countries to grant non-reciprocal tariffreductions to developing countries. The underlying motivation washelping the developing world to industrialize. The current version ofthe EU’s own GSP is effective from 1 January 2002 and – in thewords of Pascal Lamy – is the most generous GSP package ever putforward by the European Union.
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to also engage in duty-free access initiatives similar to the EBAinitiative.42In mainly following this EU-US-proposal, on 24 August WTOGeneral Council Chair Pérez del Castillo presented a revised draftfor a ‘Cancún Ministerial Text’ containing a framework for establishing modalities in agriculture in a separate annex. Yet, until theCancún Ministerial, the reaction of the various negotiating groupsto this text was modest. Mainly, countries reiterated previously heldpositions.D. The Derbez Draft – a Promising Compromise?This draft text was tabled by the Conference Chair, Luis ErnestoDerbez, on 13 September 2003. It was based on previous draftsprepared by Harbinson in early 2003 and Perez del Castillo shortlybefore Cancún43. During the conference quite a few negotiationparties expected that an agreement in agriculture would be possibleon the basis of this draft. The following Table 1 illustrates selectedimportant positions of the Derbez text:Table 1: Selected proposals of the ‘Derbez Text’TopicPosition held in Derbez TextDomestic… demands substantial reductions of both FinalSupportBound Total AMS as well as product-specificAMS, with members having ‘higher trade-distorting subsidies making greater efforts’ (1);… direct payments [Blue Box definition] shallnot exceed 5% of total value of agricultural production and shall be subject to linear reductions(1.3); Green Box criteria to be reviewed withrespect to trade-distorting effects (1.5).
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43
Yet, these steps can be and actually have been seen as an attempt toconduct ‘business as usual’ in coordinating interests with the US before an important Ministerial Meeting, which caused resistanceamong developing countries, mainly the G20+ coalition.The way in which the Derbez draft addressed the concerns of themajor participating groups is presented in detail in Matthews (2003),4 et seqq.
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Position held in Derbez Text… includes developing countries needs with respect to rural development, food security and/orlivelihood security, and de minimis domesticsupport (1.6); introduced by longer implementation periods and enhance provisions unter Art.6.2. and Green Box (1.7)Market Access … substantial improvements in market access(2.)Tariff Reduc- … mixed approach using both the Swiss formulation(2.1 (i)) as well as the UR formula (2.1 (ii))withsome additional flexibility possible for a ‘verylimited number of products’ on the basis of nontrade concerns (para 2.2)Tariff Escala- … clear formula to address this issue (rate oftiontariff reduction for the processed product isequivalent to that for the product in its primaryform times a factor of, at least, 1.3 (para 2.3)Tariff Rate… reduction of in-quota tariffs proposed, butQuotasconditions for further expansion of TRQ expansion remains open (2.4).Erosion of… retarded implementation of tariff reductionsPreferencesfor products being of high export importance fordeveloping countries (2.7).… duty-free access for a share of developingcountry imports still to be determinedSpecial Safe- … elimination of SSG is left to further negotiaguard Mecha- tion (‘subject