to conditions and for products to benismdetermined’) (para 2.9)Export Com- … reductions of, with a view to phasing out, allpetitionforms of export subsidies (3.)Forms of sub- … reduction commitments shall be appliedsidiesequally to export subsidies, export credits, exportstate trading enterprises, and food aid (3.4), withan ‘end date for phasing out’ remaining undernegotiations. (3.6)… longer implementation periods (3.8);Special and… after phasing out of export subsidies, develdifferentialoping countries shall continue to benefit fromtreatmentS&D provisions of Art. 9 of the AoA. (3.9).TopicSpecial anddifferentialtreatment
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TopicLeast Developed Countries
Position held in Derbez Text… exempt from reduction commitments (4.);… developed countries grant duty-free andquota-free market access from LDCs (4.).
Remarks: figures in brackets indicate the number of the relevant paragraphin the original text.
In general, the Derbez text is close to the EU-US-proposal.Hence, for the EU many points of the Derbez Text should not poseinsurmountable problems. Critical issues are the implicit threat tothe volume of the Blue Box44 as well as the possible problems emanating from a revision of the criteria of the Green Box, as bothboxes are of fundamental importance for the current setting of theCAP.Since 1992, the strategy of the EU in developing its agricultural policy concentrates on ‘box switching’, which stands formaking support less trade-distorting by moving subsidies from theAmber Box to the blue box and the Green Box.45 Hence, the proposed tightening of criteria and probably also the volume with respect to the Green Box could jeopardize the CAP reform of June2003 with its strong move towards decoupled payments.46 Also theremaining steps with respect to enlarging the EU will critically depend on room to move with respect to the blue and particularly theGreen Box. For the EU, it is also important that the AMS remainsnon-product specific, as otherwise the loss of flexibility could posesevere problems in meeting current WTO commitments. The Derbez text also does not support the EU in its efforts to achieve someprogress with respect to non-trade concerns (e.g. food safety, envi-
44
45
46
Shortly after Cancún, the G20 dropped the demand for the total elimination of the Blue Box, but suggested to limit this form of supportto 2.5 percent (instead of 5 percent) of all agricultural production‘with a view to phasing out’.In making agricultural support less trade-distorting another benefitcomes in the form of getting rid of reduction requirements, as withrespect to the Blue Box as well as the Green Box currently no reduction requirements exist.Currently, total support provided through the CAP budget is allocated to the Amber Box with approximately 20%, the Blue Box with70%, and the Green Box with 10%.
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ronmental protection, animal welfare, consumer protection).47Another problem area with a clear North-South-dimension is thequestion of how in detail to implement special and differentialtreatment for developing countries.48Despite these reservations, for the EU the Derbez text may be afeasible starting point for the continuation of the negotiations, because it contains a number of starting points for acceptable compromises. A very compelling argument in favour of the Derbezdraft is that no feasible alternative to this text exists, as the jointproposal of the EU and the US has been dismissed by developingcountries. Hence, dropping this text could push back the trade talksto the start, with risky consequences for the whole round.In summing up the previous analysis, it seems hardly correct toput the blame for the failure of Cancún on a particular topic orgroup. It has been a complex mix of negotiation accidents throughinformation deficits, shortness of time, ill-constructed strategies anddifferences with respect to the substance. Here, besides agriculturemainly the cotton conflict as well as the different approaches withrespect to the Singapore issues have been the main stumblingblocks. With increasing distance to the events in Cancún it becomesless useful to speculate about the possible routes of the negotiationsin Cancún if the talks would not have stopped on Sunday. As amatter of fact, the talks have stopped and the key question is aboutthe future prospects of this round.IV. Cancún and beyondAs already mentioned above, the events in Cancún went not theway the EU had expected. Although the Derbez draft at first hasbeen considered as an acceptable starting point, the assessment lateron changed and EU officials were anxious to stress that this draftwas never seriously discussed at any Cancún session and so cannotbe considered to be the latest state of discussions. A possible reasonfor this position could be not to loose too much ground before a4748
European Commission (2003d), 6 et seqq.In general, the EU insists on this is to be done by varyingimplementation periods and the extent of commitments, while developing countries would like to see a completely different set of rules(Matthews (2003), 13).
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formal restart of the negotiations, because other groups have indicated that the Derbez text still is too modest in order to meet theobjectives set out in the Doha declaration.49Depending on the future course of negotiations, the Fischlerreform of June 2003, despite some ambition towards trade liberalization, may be not sufficient to meet the requirements of upcomingWTO agreements. However, for the EU this reform has considerably narrowed the room to move in the forthcoming negotiations, asthe key elements of the CAP depend on particular minimum levelsof protection as well as the general acceptance of particular instruments, e.g. to support non-trade concerns.A key issue for European agricultural policy is the notion of‘multifunctionality’. This position sees agriculture as a provider ofpublic goods and positive external effects, which are not remunerated by markets. In order to provide these services, which are understood as demanded by society, often the public hand has to stepin. Hence, in being compensations for public good provision, theresulting payments should not be counted as trade-distorting subsidies. The obvious problem in this case is that internationally agreedrules, which allow differentiating between truly ‘multifunctional’activities and disguised protectionism, do not exist. Until now thisproblem has been solved mainly on a ad hoc case-by-case basis,and it remains an open question whether in the future this can bereplaced by accepted general rules.However, if core requirements of the CAP are at stake, the EUcould become a huge obstacle on the way to a successful conclusionof the Doha Round. The implicit threat in the wording of Commissioner Fischler with respect to the possibility of ‘dozens of panelsagainst the EU’ after the expiration of the Peace Clause highlightsthis view50. If in fact the EU gets into a position where only another49
50
In mainly reflecting the position of Australia, Podbury et al. ((2003),2) demand, among other things, the elimination of export subsidies aswell as the special safeguard mechanism for developed countries, anexpansion of the volumes under tariff quotas, and a changed methodology for calculation of the AMS in order to better reflect actual support.The Peace clause has already expired by the end of 2003 and thusprimarily the export subsidies of the EU may come under fire, as under the current legal framework no straightforward defence mecha-
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CAP reform makes it possible to agree to a new WTO Agreementin Agriculture, this round may last very long. But also the US isfacing a challenging year, with presidential elections taking place inNovember 2004, which may imply a reduced willingness to dealwith subtle trade problems.Despite the fact that the continuation of the negotiations in theDoha Round will not become easier in 2004, the odds for a constructive continuation of the round after the drawback of Cancúnappear to be fair. Certainly, the setback of Cancún will delay theround by at least one year.51 But this is neither a new experience intrade negotiations nor is it granted that without the failure ofCancún a conclusion of the Doha Round by the targeted date wouldhave been guaranteed.Nevertheless, one cannot completely exclude the possibilitythat Cancún has caused a structural break in the overall frameworkof upcoming trade negotiations. This break may come in the formof a heightened self-esteem of developing country groups and theirexperience that effective coalitions are an important means in orderto get a position through. In addition, developing countries may increasingly recognize that, at least in a relative perspective, whatindustrialized countries offer is much less than what is at stake forthemselves.52 This comprehension could severely influence themental framing of the negotiation object.In agriculture the question, whether the distinction betweentrade-distorting and least-trade distorting support really makessense, may become a key issue in future negotiations between theNorth and the South. This distinction was at the core of work of
51
52
nism is available. At present, the EU holds more than 80% of globalexport subsidies, with dairy, beef meat, and coarse grains being themost important positions.Even with an optimists view the next important step – the modalitiesframework – will not be concluded before summer 2004, as officialnegotiations will hardly continue before March or April.As an example, an offer to cut tariffs under the ‘blended’ approachwould allow developed countries to cut ‘import sensitive products’by only 15%, if the UR setting is to be repeated. However, as only afew percent of more than 1000 tariff lines of the US and the EU areindeed ‘import sensitive’ this flexible approach will hardly create anyadditional market access (Podbury et al. (2003), 9).
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influential international organizations in this field during the lastdecades. In the meantime, this distinction has also become thebackbone of agricultural reforms in the EU and other countries aswell. Implementing agricultural reforms relying on ‘box-switching’has allowed developed countries to become ‘less trade-distorting’without having to cut agricultural subsidies in total.Developing countries increasingly seem to question the rationale of this construction in maintaining that all forms of agriculturalsupport have significant trade effects.53 In this case, the south couldin fact start to insist on a full dismantling of all the traditional policies, which now for decades have supported and protected the farmlobbies of rich countries. Such a scenario, however, would make thecontinuation of the Doha Round in a ‘business as usual’ mode extremely difficult, as ‘box switching’ has become the key approachof agricultural reforms in many developed countries and in themeantime has also achieved broad acceptance among farm interestgroups. No matter how justifiable the claim for total support reduction may be from a welfare economic, environmental or equityviewpoint, such a setting could cause a detrimental deadlock ininternational trade talks, which would severely postpone any progress regarding the international trading system.54Given the extremely uneven distribution of political and economic powers between North and South, pressure through externalfactors will hardly be enough to induce significant changes of agricultural policies in developed countries. Domestic political pressureto remove trade-distorting policies is the other indispensable ingredient.55 Only in a scenario where non-agricultural interest groups inthe industrialized world see fundamental trade interests at stake,53
54
55
A very common channel linking decoupled payments and productionis the income effect of such support, which helps the farmer to raisemoney for further cost-reducing investments. At the same time suchpayments also reduce the effective risk of farmers with respect tomarket fluctuations.In discussing the difference of trade interest from a North-Southperspective it would be misleading to follow a pure ‘black andwhite’-perspective. It should not be overlooked that quite a numberof developing countries have policies in place, which are similarlytrade-distorting as those of particular developed countries.Hoekman (2003), 5.
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and thus exert strong pressure on agricultural decision makers togive in, a new order for domestic agricultural support in high-income countries could take force. However, at the time being thereare no signs of sufficient pressure from internal factors like budgetconstraints or civil society groups.V. Conclusion and OutlookThe reason for the failure of the 5th Ministerial Conference of theWTO in Cancún is a complex mix of tactical and strategic mistakesin combination with partly strong divergent positions with respectto the substance of important issues. Primarily the active role ofdeveloping countries, which was inspired by the Doha declaration,made these talks less straightforward in comparison to previousrounds. Given the insufficient on site capacity to analyse new proposals, the mass of issues on the agenda made it difficult for manycountries to position themselves appropriately in a setting of intensetime pressure. This problem was further aggravated by - in thewords of Pascal Lamy - the ‘medieval’ structure of negotiationsimposed by the WTO.Regarding the substance of this meeting, clearly the Singaporeissues as well as agriculture and the cotton dispute have played themost important role for the ‘Tequila sunset’ in Cancún.56 In agriculture, the joint EU-US approach of mid-August was dismissed bydeveloping countries due to its lack of ambition, mainly with respect to the elimination of export subsidies. In the end there was apolitical deadlock between important players, which could not beresolved in a few days.Compared to previous rounds, the European Union had approached this Ministerial meeting with a more open stance withrespect to trade liberalization and also a much better pre-meetingpreparation. Nevertheless, for the EU the costs of the failure ofCancún are modest, if they exist at all. Many observers from different camps agree that a successful conclusion of the Doha Roundwill primarily benefit the developing countries, at least if the label‘successful’ describes an outcome with improvements in marketaccess and sharply reduced export subsidies in agriculture.
56
Das (2003), 17.
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The worst case scenario after Cancún is that this breakdownwill weaken the WTO in a way which makes it widely irrelevant forthe conduct of trade policy in the future. Trade flows within thedeveloped world would increasingly be regulated in the form ofbilateral agreements between existing trade blocks, with the commitments of the UR waning in the course of time. In this case, thepoorest countries could be the main victims of the partly applaudedfailure of Cancún: for the wealthy nations there is no time pressureto eliminate their farm subsidies or their barriers for textile imports,while developing countries will have to bilaterally negotiate theneeded changes step by step, which may get a very cumbersometask. A likely result could be the creation of more solid coalitionsamong them, with positive effects for their negotiating authority.Nevertheless, the successful development of the international trading system since the creation of the GATT would very likely cometo a complete halt.At the beginning of the year 2004 there is some evidence thatthis worst case scenario will not come true, as countries seem torecognize the importance of a well-functioning international tradingsystem as one of the fundamental factors determining the well-being of the people living both in developing and developed nations.The immediate questions seem to be from what basis and when thetalks will resume. In the course of future negotiations within theDoha Round also more general questions – e.g. regarding the adequacy of the construction and the objectives of the WTO if a development mandate is adopted – will emerge. However, it is not aquestion that in future any advance in the existing internationaltrading regime will only be possible through a sincere recognitionof the problems of developing and least-developed countries.
ReferencesAgra Facts (2003), Cancún Outcome will not change EU approachto reform, says Fischler, No 81-03, 19 September 2003, Paris2003.Lucian Cernat / Sam Laird / Luca Monge-Roffarello / AlessandroTurrini (2003), The EU’s Everything But Arms Initiative andthe Least-developed Countries, Discussion Paper No. 2003/47,
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June 2003, World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki 2003.Dilip K. Das (2003), The Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Causal Factors behind the Failure of Cancún,(mimeo), Missisauga 2003.European Commission (2003a), EU Agriculture and the WTO,Doha Development Agenda, Cancún – September 2003, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development,September 2003, Brussels.European Commission (2003b), Commissioner Fischler calls forfair burden sharing in WTO farm talks, News Releases, No.07/03, Delegation of the European Commission to the UnitedStates, Washington, February 4, 2003.European Commission (2003c), Singapore Issues – Options postCancún, Directorate-General for Trade, Ref. 514/03, Brussels,30 October 2003.European Commission (2003d), Reviving the DDA Negotiations –the EU Perspective, Communication from the Commission tothe Council, to the European Parliament and to the Economicand Social Committee, Brussels, 26 November 2003.European Commission (2003e), CAP reform strengthens the EUposition in WTO talks, Newsletter, No 56, Brussels,July/August 2003.European Commission (2003f), EU is leading the way to a tradefriendly farm policy, September 2003, downloadable from:www.delmys.cec.eu.int/en/european_union/key_external_policies/eu_agricultural_trade/cap_reform_june_03.pdf.European Commission (2003g), The Doha Development AgendaAfter Cancún, Directorate-General for Trade, Brussels, 25 September 2003.Simon J. Evenett, (2003), The Failure of the WTO Ministerialmeeting in Cancún: What implications for future research onthe world trading system? mimeo, to be published in CESifoForum, Volume 4, No 3, Autumn 2003, 11-17.Franz Fischler (2003), From Cancún: The road ahead for the tradeand agriculture negotiations, Speech/03/413. Ontario Ministryof Agriculture and Food, Guelph, Canada, 16 September 2003,downloadable from: http://www.europaworld.org/week145/speechfischler19903.htm.
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Bernard Hoekman (2003), Cancún: Crisis or Catharsis? Paper presented at the Sept 17th meeting of the Brookings-GeorgeWashington Trade Roundtable, downloadable from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Hoekman-CancunCatharsis-092003.pdfBernard Hoekman / Michel Kostecki (1995), The Political Economyof the World Trading System, From GATT to WTO, OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford 1995.International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development(ICTSD) (2003), Agriculture Negotiations at the WTO: PostCancún Outlook Report, Geneva, November 2003 (availableat: http://www.ictsd.org/issarea/atsd/products/docs/AgricultureNegotiations9.pdf).Tim Josling (2001), WTO: Successes and Failures, Presentationprepared for the 1st International Agricultural Trade and PolicyConference, IFAS, University of Florida, downloadable fromhttp://www.iatpc.fred.ifas.ufl.edu/conference1/joslingpapaer.html, Gainesville, October 31-November 2, 2001.Allan Matthews (2003), Agriculture After Cancún, Trinity Economic Paper No. 17, 2003, Dublin 2003.Troy Podbury / Shirshore Hagi Hirad / Neil Andrews / WayneGordon (2003), WTO Agriculture Negotiations, The way forward from Cancún, Australian Commodities, Vol. 10, No. 4,December quarter 2003, 1-14.Jeffrey Schott (2003), Unlocking the benefits of world trade,Economist.com, Oct 30th 2003, Washington, DC.T. N. Srinivasan (2003), The Future of the Global Trading System –Doha Round, Cancún Ministerial and Beyond, Paper presentedat the conference ‘The Future of Globalization: Explorations inLight of Recent Turbulence’, Yale/NJ, October 10-11, 2003.Richard H. Steinberg / Timothy E. Josling (2003), When the PeaceEnds: The Vulnerability of the EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge, Comment, Bridges, No. 8,ICTSD, November 2003, 7-10 (available at: http://www.ictsd.org/issarea/atsd/products/docs/Steinberg_Josling.pdf).Third World Network (2003), Process and substance caused failureat Cancún, Geneva, 16 September 2003, downloadable fromhttp://www.ongd.lu/article.php3?id_article=360.
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United Nations (2000), A better world for all, Progress towards theinternational development goals, Washington 2000.Zhen Kun Wang / L. Alan Winters (1997), Africa’s Role in Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Past and Future, Working Paper,Economic Development Institute and Development ResearchGroup, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1997.
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Table A-1: Time line of internal and external factors determiningthe WTO-position of the European UnionPeriodInternal FactorsExternal Factors07/1999 ‘Agenda Reform’ of theCAP11/19993rd Ministerial Conference(Seattle, United States)03/2001WTO-Meeting on stocktaking regarding Art 20URAA11/20014th Ministerial Conference(Doha, Quatar) ‘DohaDeclaration’07/2002 Mid-term Review ofAgenda 2000 (‘Communication’ presented byCommissioner Fischler)12/2002 Copenhagen Decision on‘Eastern Enlargement’01/2003EU proposal for agricultural ‘modalities’06/2003 CAP Reform 2003(‘Fischler Reform’)08/2003US-EU joint proposalG16/22 proposal09/20035th Ministerial Conference(Cancún, Mexico)Source: own compilation.
Wolfgang Weiß*
GATS and Domestic Regulation –A Threat to Democracy?**I.
GATS and DemocracyA. National Regulation and the Peculiarities ofServicesB. Legitimacy in International LawC. Adjudicating NecessityD. Sovereignty and InterdependanceE. Liberalization, Democracy and Human RightsII. Some Remarks on GATS andDomestic RegulationA. Liberalization and Cross-borderTrade in ServicesB. Balancing Liberalization and Legitimate Interestsby Regulatory DisciplinesC. Questions Regarding the Application ofArt. VI GATS1. Legal Value of the Disciplines AdoptedAccording to Art. VI:4 GATS2. Applicability of the Disciplines AdoptedAccording to Art. VI:4 GATS3. Relationship between Disciplines and SpecificCommitments4. Regulatory Measures not IncludedD. Mutual RecognitionReferences
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370370371373375376376376377380380380381381381382
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Weiß, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg.This paper is a comment on the paper ‘GATS and Democratic Legitimacy’ by Rudolf Adlung that was presented at the Vienna conferenceand is published in Aussenwirtschaft 59 (2004) No. 2, 127-149.
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The paper presented here is a comment on the thoughts presentedby Rudolf Adlung and, furthermore, adds some general remarks onthe issue of GATS and domestic regulation. Mr Adlung discussedthe problem as to whether GATS is a threat to democracy. Inchoosing this topic, Mr Adlung spoke on one, maybe the most important particular aspect of the broader issue of GATS and domesticregulation. The issue of democracy and in particular the fear thatGATS threatens democracy is one of the concerns raised by opponents of the GATS.I. GATS and DemocracyA. National Regulation and the Peculiarities of ServicesOpponents to the GATS and to the WTO in general proclaim thatGATS restricted domestic regulation as it limited governments’ability to regulate the supply of service, in particular regardingstandards of qualification, licensing and standardization requirements. For this reason, GATS was a threat to the sovereignty of theWTO members and a threat to democracy.1Indeed setting international standards for regulating servicesgets closer to the heart of democratic decision making than it is thecase with trade agreements on goods. The potential threat to democracy is greater in GATS than in GATT, if there is any at all. Thereason for this lies in the peculiarities of services. Services aremuch more complex when compared to goods. Mr Adlung mentioned it. This can be seen from the fact that GATS defines andregulates the different modes of service supply. GATS knows fourmodes of supplying services (see Art. 1:2 GATS). Three of themare connected with the move of persons (Art. 1:2 b-d: consumptionabroad, commercial presence or presence of natural persons), andonly one mode refers to the service itself crossing the border (crossborder supply), see Art. 1:2a GATS.2 This highlights that the supplyof services usually does not meet border measures regarding theservice itself but regulations that regulate the pre- and side-conditions of the supply of services like qualifications, licensing, authorizations and standards. Thus, protectionism in services does not takethe form of border measures which apply to the trade in goods:tariffs and non-tariff border measures. But in contrast to goods,12
See e.g. Joy (2001) and Woodroffe (2001).See Matsushita / Schoenbaum / Mavroïdis (2003), 236.
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protectionism in services trade takes almost exclusively the form ofinternal regulatory interventions3 that provide for requirements forthe supply of services and not of border measures. As poor services,unlike goods, can not be taken back, governments have to protectthe consumer in the most appropriate way, i.e. by prior regulation.Additionally, there are some particular requirements which refer tothe supply of services from abroad and which restrict the servicesupply from abroad in case it is connected with persons crossing theborder: the requirements for entry and stay of foreigners.Thus, national regulation has a great importance for the supplyof services. This circumstance, first, means that in order to liberalize cross border service supply one has to focus on the internalregulation of service supply and, second, makes it much more complex to detect protectionism and to discern protective internal regulations from regulations that pursue legitimate social or environmental policy goals. Thus, the peculiarities of services make therelation between domestic regulation and international requirementsmuch more complex with regard to services than to goods.4 Aninternational agreement like GATS that was created for the liberalization of cross border service supply has to address the issue ofdomestic regulation and has to try to find common standards anddenominators for the domestic regulation of the supply of servicesby WTO members. This influences and restrains the regulatoryoptions of the WTO members and makes GATS particularly sensitive for democracy concerns as the national regulatory autonomycomes under greater scrutiny. Mr. Adlung dealt with the differentaspects of this discussion. In general, I agree with his view thatGATS is not a threat to democracy.B. Legitimacy in International LawThe background of this debate is the question whether decisionstaken in international fora are legitimate. When addressing thisissue one has to be aware that the requirements for legitimacy aredifferent in international settings. The debate on the constitutionalrequirements of the European Integration Process witnesses thesame concerns. International organs usually are not elected by people, but nevertheless their decisions are democratically legitimatealthough specialized international agencies like the WTO do not34
Djordjevic (2002), 305.Krajewski (2003), 2 et seq.
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and cannot derive their constitutional legitimacy in the same way asnation states.5First of all, we have to bear in mind that the WTO is the creation of states. Its legitimacy is derivative in character and based onstate sovereignty.6 In the established international order the statesare the primary actors. Therefore, the question of legitimacy canonly be discussed from the perspective of the individual government as Mr Adlung rightly mentioned. The WTO members haveagreed to the obligations enshrined in any of the WTO agreements,including those in GATS. Mr Adlung analyzed in a detailed way thepossible democratic deficits such agreement could face, like forexample the possibility of being outvoted by majority, the imbalances between WTO members and the pressure created by domesticpressure groups and lobbies. He rightly pointed out that the latterdangers are not a peculiarity of international policy making but area challenge to domestic regulatory processes as well.7 The challenges are the same, at least comparable. Therefore, there is no reason for blaming the GATS to be undemocratic as long as the statesare free to take up only those obligations they agreed to.Opponents to the GATS when raising concerns on the prevalence of the rich nations in the international trade negotiations pretend to speak in the interest of small nations and developing states.But they tend to forget that international organizations like theWTO are better than none. Multilateralism is always better thanunilateralism; multilateralism in particular favours small countries.The poor states will lose if the WTO is abolished and unilateralismis reintroduced. This deliberation, however, does not mean thatthere is no need to improve the rules and structures of the WTO. Anadditional remark on GATS and developing countries can be added:Opponents raise concerns because developing countries are at adisadvantage, as they, for example, do have only a limited negotiating capacity. From the point of view of democracy, this could bewelcomed, because many, maybe most of the developing countries567
Matsushita / Schoenbaum / Mavroïdis (2003), 608 et seq.Matsushita / Schoenbaum / Mavroïdis (2003), 609.Thus, when Krajewski (2001), 177 states that the WTO decisionmaking process does not meet the conditions of deliberation and rational discourse due to package deals and wrong type of compromises, one has to remember that this applies to national legislativeprocesses as well.
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are not really democratic states (the governments were not electedat all or the elections were manipulated; the political system is authoritarian or autocratic rather then democratic). Thus, it could beproclaimed that democratic legitimacy of the WTO would be weakened if the developing states had increasing influence.8 This argument highlights that the issue of legitimacy in international settingsis quite intricate.Second, legitimacy is not only an issue of democracy and election, but also an issue of values and citizens’ rights. The more anorgan