driven and ensuredbroad geographical participation. The chairmanship of the entire process, thesite of the negotiations themselves, as well as the chairs and vice-chairs of thevarious negotiating groups and other committees and groups, all rotate amongparticipating countries. Chairmanship of the negotiations rotates every18 months, or at the conclusion of each ministerial meeting. The followingcountries have been designated to serve as chair of the FTAA process forsuccessive periods: Canada; Argentina; Ecuador; as well as Brazil and theUnited States (jointly).The ministers responsible for trade exercise the ultimate oversight andmanagement of the negotiations. They meet every 18 months and, since thenegotiations were launched, do so in the country which is holding the FTAAchairmanship. The vice ministers responsible for trade, who act as members ofthe Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC), have a central role in managing theFTAA negotiations. The TNC guides the work of the negotiating groups andother committees and groups and decides on the overall architecture of theagreement and institutional issues. The TNC is also responsible for ensuringthe full participation of all the countries in the FTAA process and ensuringtransparency in the negotiations. The TNC also oversees the administrativesecretariat and implementation of business facilitation measures. TheCommittee meets as required and no less than twice a year at rotating sitesthroughout the hemisphere.Nine FTAA negotiating groups, which have specific mandates from theministers and the TNC, are responsible for negotiating text in their subjectareas. They were established for market access; investment; services;government procurement; dispute settlement; agriculture; intellectual propertyrights; subsidies, antidumping and countervailing duties; and competitionpolicy. The negotiating groups meet regularly throughout the year.Three committees and groups address horizontal issues related to thenegotiations. A Consultative Group on Smaller Economies follows theprogress in the negotiations with a regard to the concerns and interests of thesmaller economies and makes recommendations to the TNC. The group hassought to determine the needs of smaller economies for trade-related technicalassistance in their participation in the FTAA and to disseminate information
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about sources of such technical assistance. These databases have been madeavailable through the FTAA website homepage. In addition to these databases,the Tripartite Committee manages the Trade Education Database, which is ‘aninventory of training opportunities available in FTAA-relevant areas of tradepolicy and negotiation for both government officials and the private sector inthe region in order to facilitate access to technical assistance’ as mandated byministers at the Toronto ministerial meeting.As transparency in negotiations has remained a great concern, Ministerscreated the Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation ofCivil Society, with an objective of broadening public understanding, participation and support for the FTAA. The purpose of this committee is to facilitatethe input of the business community, labor, environmental, academic groups,and others who wish to present their views on the issues under negotiation andon trade matters in a constructive manner. The FTAA is the first major tradenegotiation where such a group has been established at the outset of thenegotiations.A unique feature of the FTAA negotiations is the involvement of civilsociety in the planning process. During the first phase of negotiations, theFTAA Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation ofCivil Society issued its initial ‘Open Invitation to Civil Society’. This calledon the interested parties to share their views on the FTAA formulation processin a constructive manner. The submissions were studied by the Committee ofGovernment Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society, whoforwarded executive summaries of these positions to ministers, and prepareda report outlining the range of views received in response to the openinvitation. At the Toronto ministerial meeting, ministers received this reportand requested that the committee ‘obtain ongoing input from Civil Society ontrade matters relevant to the FTAA’. A second open invitation was issuedafter the Toronto ministerial meeting, and the committee was again askedto summarize the range of views and forward this to the ministers. Thecommittee’s second report, including the executive summaries of thesubmissions received by civil society groups, was made publicly available onthe FTAA website after the Buenos Aires ministerial meeting, at which theMinisters urged ‘civil society to continue to make its contributions in aconstructive manner on trade-related issues of relevance to the FTAA’. TheOpen Invitation to Civil Society was again extended permanently.Another unique feature of the FTAA formulation process is the JointGovernment–Private Sector Committee of Experts on Electronic Commerce,established to study how to broaden the benefits to be derived from theelectronic marketplace in the hemisphere, and how to deal with this crosscutting issue within the negotiations. An ad hoc group of experts wasestablished to report to the TNC on the implementation of the customs-related
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business facilitation measures agreed upon in Toronto. These measures, whichdo not require legislative approval but can be implemented administratively,are designed to facilitate commercial exchange within the Americas, andindeed benefit all traders. The transparency-related measures and initiatives toincrease the flow of information about trade and trade-related issues amongthe countries of the Americas, are disseminated through the FTAA homepage.The Tripartite Committee, which consists of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UnitedNations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean(ECLAC) provides analytical, technical and financial support to the processand maintains the official FTAA website.21 The individual tripartite institutions also provide technical assistance related to FTAA issues, particularly forthe smaller economies of the hemisphere.As regard institutional developments, the FTAA Administrative Secretariat,located at the same site as the meetings of the negotiating groups, providesadministrative and logistical support to the negotiations. It keeps the officialarchives of the negotiations, and provides translation and interpretationservices. The secretariat is funded by a combination of local resources andthe tripartite committee institutions. Venues of the negotiations has beenestablished on a rotating basis.An important potential benefit of the FTAA is that it can serve as an anchorfor reform and liberalization endeavors for the developing membereconomies. In addition, it can provide credibility to national and regionalcommitments and energizes structural change through trade and investmentexpansion. During the period of economic distress, the industrialized partnerprovides an umbrella to the developing economy partner. The on-going FTAAnegotiations have begun to favorably affect the economic ambience of LatinAmerica. NAFTA provided this type of umbrella to Mexico during the crisisof 1994–95. The FTAA and comprehensive agreements with the EU raise theprospects of other umbrellas of this kind being extended to the other regionaleconomies.The launch of the EEC is almost half a century old and would,notwithstanding the dissimilarities, have some parallels and lessons for theFTAA. The trade regimes of the members of FTAA are as restrictive now asthose of the EEC economies in the late 1950s. Thus, the internal tradeliberalization foreseen in the FTAA is probably about the same magnitude asthat of the EEC’s original members, with many countries having initial tariffsof around 15 percent. The EEC adopted a common external trade policy andintegrated internally. It also liberalized its external trade significantly. It is tobe seen whether FTAA members would go the same way. Yet EU experiencesprobably provide an upper limit on the prospects for trade reorientationfollowing the launch of FTAA. Greater compactness and homogeneity of the
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EEC contributed to brisk growth of intra-industry trade, which may not be sorapid in the FTAA. Also, the EEC had been more hostile to internal barriers totrade than the FTAA is likely to be. The EEC eliminated the application ofcontingent protection measures internally and made little use of the ROO forthe purpose of obstructing intra-regional trade. It remains to be seen howFTAA handles these issues (Venables and Winter, 2003).
10. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARYLatin American economies have a longer history of regional integrationinitiatives than any other developing region. RIAs flourished in the early postwar era, but then they lost momentum. During the mid-1980s, this group ofeconomies began liberalizing unilaterally and a resurgence of regionalismfollowed. It coincided with the global phenomenon of ‘new regionalism’. TheUS strategy in this regard also underwent a radical transformation in the mid1980s. Growth of globalism and regionalism in Latin America during thisperiod progressed pari passu with brisk growth in global trade until the Asiancrisis in mid-1997. This was due to a decade-long trend according to which theintra-regional trade grew at almost twice the rate of exports to markets outsidethe region.The first group of RIAs in the region was formed in the 1960s, when theLatin American economies had adhered to the ISI strategy for growth.Therefore, the set of policies pursued included economic and industrialplanning, creating large public sector enterprises and large-scale governmentintervention in the markets, so much so that market forces were completelystifled. Policy makers were of the opinion that regional trading blocs fittedwell into the ISI regime because that way intra-regional trade barriers could beeliminated while maintaining a high level of external protection. Many ofthese regional accords were poorly or never implemented.The 1982 debt crisis was a serious blow to the economies in Latin Americawith even the larger regional economies being affected in an adverse manner.Trade in the regions including intra-regional imports, suffered a seriouscontraction in the post-crisis period. Acute recession in the region resulted inthe collapse of intra-regional trade. The regional economies, both small andlarge, were gripped with an economic paralysis. However, the new growthstrategy that evolved turned out to be an antithesis of the popular ISI strategyof the past. It was based on liberalization, deregulation, privatization, outwardorientation, correct relative prices, a market-friendly policy ambience.New initiatives on launching regional trading blocs began to appear in thelatter half of the 1980s. The principal driving forces behind the resurgenceincluded the search for additional policy tools to manage insertion into an
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increasingly globalized and competitive world economy. Various economiesand sub-regions in Latin America experienced a quickening of the pace ofintegration among themselves as well as with the global economy. Themeasures adopted for liberalization in the area of trade were swift andextensive. Economies became increasingly open, therefore the tradedcomponents of output and consumption as a share of GDP rose steadily.Adoption of neo-liberal strategy, ongoing regionalization and globalizationhas resulted in markedly intensified competition among the Latin Americaneconomies and sub-regions over the last two decades. The Latin Americaneconomies treated RIA formation as one of the tools for trade policyliberalization. The RIAs represented a third tier of trade policy reform. The oldagreements were renegotiated and new ones were initiated. The principal onesamong these were LAIA, CACM, MERCOSUR, AC, and CUSFTA. Of these,CUSFTA emerged as a different kind of FTA from the run of the mill FTAsnegotiated during this period. It became a pioneer by bringing the ‘new issues’into the fold of an FTA.After the completion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, a new generation ofRIAs covered Latin America. NAFTA was launched in the same year. Thenegotiations for MERCOSUR were in the final stage in 1994 and an initiativefor creating the most ambitious RTA, the FTAA, was taken in December1994, during the Miami Summit. This scenario highlights the recentdynamism in regional integration activities in Latin America. Economies andRIAs in this region also participated in extra-regional trading blocs. Althoughregional, intra-regional and intra-sub-regional trade recorded impressivegrowth during the decade of the 1990s, at least until the onset of the Asiancrisis, the early 2000s were lackluster in this regard.Five years after the implementation of CUSFTA, NAFTA was createdwhich was not only innovative but also historic from several perspectives.CUSFTA, which was regarded as highly imaginative and innovative, was theprototype used for crafting the NAFTA accord. NAFTA had an enormousdemonstration effect in Latin America. A network of RIAs that came intobeing in Latin America adopted the NAFTA model. The NAFTA set out rulesin areas such as investment, services, intellectual property, governmentprocurement, competition policy and temporary entry of business persons. Topromote the effective enforcement of each country’s labor and environmentallaws and regulations, separate agreements were negotiated.The Latin American economies have adopted new regionalism, whichentailed unilateral, multilateral and regional integration. The liberalization andstructural reform strategy linked to the new regionalism were reflected inunilateral slashing of tariff barriers, which were drastically reduced between1985 and 2000, when they were less than 12 percent on an average. Theaverage maximum tariffs in Latin America declined from more than
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80 percent in the mid-1980s to 40 percent in 2000. However, to avoid creatingan erroneous impression, it must also be indicated that there were still severaltariff peaks or ‘spikes’ in the regional economies. Approximately 22 percentof tariff lines were subject to rates above 20 percent. The new regionalismrelated strategies, coupled with the adoption of market-friendly outwardoriented strategies, enabled Latin America to be better integrated with theglobal economy and a more active participant in the global fora. However,new regionalism has so far failed to resolve some of the age-old problemsrelated to regional integration in Latin America.
NOTES1.
2.3.
4.5.6.7.
8.
9.10.
These twenty-two agreements were: (1) Caribbean Community and Common Market(CARICOM) (1973), (2) Chile–Mexico (1992), (3) Central American Common Market(CACM), (1961), (4) Chile–Venezuela (1993), (5) North American Free Trade Area(NAFTA) (1994), (6) Colombia–Chile (1994), (7) Southern Cone Common Market(MERCOSUR) (1995), (8) Costa Rica–Mexico (1995), (9) Group of Three or G-3Agreement between Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela (1995), (10) Bolivia–Mexico (1995),(11) Chile–Ecuador (1995), (12) Andean Community (1969), (13) Chile–MERCOSUR(1996), (14) Canada–Chile (1997), (15) Bolivia–MERCOSUR (1997), (16) Mexico–Nicaragua (1998), (17) Chile–Peru (1998), (18) CACM–Dominican Republic (1999), (19)CARICOM–Dominican Republic, (20) Mexico–European Union (2000), (21) CACM–Chile(2001), (22) Mexico–Northern Triangle (2001); source: (IDB, 2002b).CARICOM revised and up-dated its founding treaty in 2001.The Latin American Free Trade Area was launched in 1960 under Article XXIV of theGATT. In 1980 it was revived as Latin American Integration Association under the EnablingClause. Its membership includes Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.The Central American Common Market was launched in 1960, under Article XXIV of theGATT. It was revived in 1993. Its original membership included El Salvador, Guatemala,Honduras, and Nicaragua. In 1962, Costa Rica also became a member.The Andean Pact or Group was launched in 1969 under the Enabling Clause as a customsunion. Its membership was Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.Mexico declared a moratorium on its international obligations in July 1982, precipitating theLatin American debt crisis.The ‘statist’ strategy implies intervention of the state in a country’s economic activity.This strategy held sway during the 1950s and the 1960s. Subsequently, its failure toachieve any of its objectives made it unpopular. Its popularity began wilting away in the1970s.For a recent discussion of the Washington consensus refer to Speeches, Testimony, Papersby John Williamson. This volume was published by the Institute for InternationalEconomics, Washington DC, in 2002. Originally the concept of Washington consensus waspublished as Chapter 2 of Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?, editedby John Williamson. April 1990, by the same publisher.ECLAC (1994) and Ocampo (2003) provide a detailed account of the liberalization of tradepolicy regime in Latin American economies during this period.The acronym LAIA stands for Latin American Integration Agreement. The former nameof LAIA was LAFTA or the Latin American Free Trade Area, which was notified to theGATT in 1960 under the Article XXIV (refer to section 2). This is a case of dualmembership. All the members of the Andean Group and MERCOSUR are also the membersof LAIA.
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11. MERCOSUR stands for Mercado Comun del Sur or Southern Cone Common MarketAgreement. The Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay aremembers of MERCOSUR.12. It was called the Bogor initiative because it was announced during the Bogor presidentialmeeting in November 1994. Bogor is an idyllic holiday resort in Java, Indonesia.13. During the late 1990s and early 2000s several extra-regional agreements were beingnegotiated. The tally included: (1) MERCOSUR–EU, (2) Chile–EU, (3) Chile–US, (4)Chile–South Korea, (5) CARICOM–EU (post-Lomé-IV) and (6) APEC–Mexico–Japan.14. Refer to Estevadeordal (2002) and Estevadeordal et al. (2002a) for detailed accounts ofregionalism in Latin America during this period.15. These statistical data were compiled by Devlin and Estevadeordal (2001).16. Over the last two decades, China has become the most successful country in attracting FDI.17. The ACS has 25 Member States and three Associate Members. Eight other non-independentCaribbean countries are eligible for associate membership. The members states are: Antiguaand Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica,Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela.The Associate Members are: Aruba, France (onbehalf of French Guiana, Guadeloupe and Martinique) and the Netherlands Antilles.18. The heads of the government conference in CARICOM is something akin to the meeting ofheads of government in the EU, which is known as the European Council, or simply theCouncil. Most major decisions are taken in the Council, which holds regular bi-annualmeetings.19. The membership comprises: (1) Antigua and Barbuda, (2) Bahamas, (3) Barbados,(4) Belize, (5) Dominica, (6) Grenada, (7) Guyana, (8) Haiti, (9) Jamaica, (10) Montserrat,(11) St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, (12) St. Lucia, (13) St. Vincent and the Grenadines, (14)Suriname, (15) Trinidad and Tobago. Article 3 of the CARICOM Articles of Agreementrecognizes the Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago as ‘MoreDeveloped Countries’ and all the others as ‘Less Developed Countries’.20. These 34 democracies are: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic,Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,Montserrat, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincentand Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, the United States of America,and Venezuela.21. The FTAA has a large and informative website, which is one of the sources of informationpresented here. For greater details readers are referred to http://www.ftaaalca.org/View_e.asp.
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