26 May 2004.
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in the Commission. Several aspects of da Silva’s background were favourablefor his ability to forge compromises between differing factions and groups in theParliament. He was elected from one of EU’s Southern countries (which helped tomute the idea that emissions trading was a ‘Northern conspiracy’) and representedthe central conservative/liberal group in the Parliament. On the other hand, he didnot succeed in keeping the EP’s focus directed to a few key issues. As the processdeveloped, the ‘90% good’ strategy faltered as the EP came to propose amendmentsto most key aspects of the proposed ET directive.Lobbying from industry and ENGOs affected the proposed amendments and thelevel of agreement. On the issue of the system’s mandatory nature, industries fromparticularly Germany and the UK (in tandem with governmental representativesfrom these countries) emerged as a signiﬁcant force pushing for the opt-out clausefor installations. On the issue of allocation, the strong call for auctioning voicedby important environmental NGOs went hand in hand with the Parliament’s ﬁrstreading stance on this issue. Both these proposed amendments were among the mostcontroversial ones that were adopted.The common position After the Parliament’s ﬁrst reading, the Commissionresponded quite quickly. At a Brussels conference on 15 October, EnvironmentCommissioner Wallström delivered a ‘passionate defence’ of the Commission’sinitial design, arguing strongly for unconditional participation by all countries’installations and no auctioning of allowances in the pilot phase. She warned that suchauctioning could jeopardize already equivocal support from industry, stating that‘any amount of auctioning, however small, will make it even harder for businessesto accept emissions trading’.98 This was followed by the Commission’s ofﬁcial andmain response to the Parliament’s ﬁrst reading, published on 27 November 2002.99It was here clariﬁed that the Commission fully accepted the general comments ofthe EP, such as that the EU’s climate change strategy should be built on a balancebetween emissions trading and other types of Community, domestic and internationalaction.100 Among the elements that the Commission accepted only in part or inprinciple were minor adjustments regarding the issues of transparency, reporting andreview.But many amendments were not accepted at all by the Commission – in fact,a total of 55 amendments. Among the amendments and suggestions not deemedacceptable were all the main proposed amendments (see Table 5.2):98 ENDS Daily (16 October 2002), ‘Commission Holds Firm on EU Climate GasTrading’, Issue 1309.99 European Commission (27 November 2002), COM(2002)680 ﬁnal, Amended Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Scheme forGreenhouse Gas Emissions Trading within the Community and Amending Council Directive96/61/EC (Brussels).100 Among other amendments that were accepted: ‘naming and shaming’ of noncompliers should be used sparingly, and the reference to a penalty level ‘twice the averagemarket price etc’ could be deleted; the review of the scheme should include additional elementssuch as the relationship between the EU ETS and international emissions trading and possibleneeds to adapt the scheme in light of EU enlargement.
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••••
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cap on total quantity of allowances to be allocated to each member-state;temporary exemption/opt-out of individual installations until 2007;inclusion of other gases than CO2 and inclusion of the aluminium andchemicals sectors;mandatory auctioning of 15 per cent in both the pilot and Kyoto commitmentperiod.101
The time had now come for the Council of Environmental Ministers to discussand adopt a common position on the ET proposal. As described earlier, the Danishpresidency played an important and constructive facilitating role in preparing aposition that would be acceptable to all member-states. In this process, importantsupport came from DG Environment and the BEST group, which helped in writingthe ﬁnal compromise proposal (Watanabe 2005, 20).102 Furthermore, the Commissionwas generally very active behind the scenes in the Council negotiations, explainingthe various elements of trading system design to the member-states.103 The positionsof some members were not ﬁxed; moreover, the fact that the BEST group had workedon emissions trading much longer than most member-states gave the Commission animportant role to play also in the decision-making process.The main outcome of the negotiations was that the Council chose to uphold thebody of the Commission’s design that had been put forward a year earlier.104 TheCouncil wanted:•
•
•
a mandatory but still decentralized system, with a right for the Commissionto approve National Allocation Plans, but no cap on total quantity ofallowances;a system initially covering only CO2 and with sectoral coverage in line withthe Commission proposal, organized into four main ‘activities’ as in theCommission proposal, excluding aluminium and chemicals (see Annex I ofthe common position);allowances allocated free of charge in the pilot phase 2005–07.
Hence, it is understandable that Environment Commissioner Wallström was‘extremely pleased’ that the architecture and main design of the European
101 As to other non-acceptable elements, these included references to allowances beingallocated in accordance with ‘best available techniques’ and CHP generation speciﬁcally;references to emissions trading ‘not replacing existing charges on energy and CO2 emissions’;explicitly mentioning that linking trading schemes with other Kyoto parties would encouragethe US to come back on board; and obligatory rewarding early action between 1990 and2004.102 Interviews in Brussels, January 12-13 and May 15-16 2006.103 Interviews in Brussels, January 12-13 and May 15-16 2006.104 The common position was formally adopted in March 2003. Council (18 March2003), 15792/1/02, Common Position Adopted by the Council on 18 March with a View to theAdoption of Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Schemefor Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and AmendingCouncil Directive 96/61/EC (Brussels: Council of the European Union).
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Commission’s proposal had remained in place. But also WWF and industriallobbyists were reported to be satisﬁed with the outcome.105Still, in comparison with the Commission proposal, changes allowing for ‘tradingpools’, ‘opt-in’, ‘opt-out of installations and sectors/activities’, auctioning and lowerpenalties were introduced in the common position. Of these, more auctioning can beattributed to the EP and the member-states favouring auctioning. The possibility formember-states to allocate up to 10 percent of allowances from 2008 by methods otherthan free of charge may be seen as a very watered-down version of the Parliament’sproposal in its ﬁrst reading (15 per cent auctioning from 2005 on). This inclusion wasin line with the position of ENGOs and some member-states, but against the positionsof the Commission, industry and a majority of the member-states. However, thecompromise allowed those member-states who preferred auctioning to auction upto 10 per cent of allowances, without forcing opponents to engage in any auctioningat all. The ‘opt-out’ was supported by the Parliament’s ﬁrst reading – but only forindividual installations, not whole sectors. This was a concession to the UK, as wellas Germany and Finland, in return for a mandatory system. In sum, we may saythat the ﬁrst reading in the EP led only to some minor changes in the Commission’sproposal that fully or partly can be traced back to EP proposals.The Parliament wanted far more radical changes than what was reﬂected in thecommon position – with regard to a cap on total quantity of allowances allocated toeach member-state, the scope of the system in terms of gases and sectors included,and the method of allocation. Why this gap between the Parliament’s wishesand the results? First, the formal and informal inputs from the Commission wasimportant. In its formal response to the Parliament, the Commission ﬁrmly rejecteda cap on total allocations, broader scope of the system, and a signiﬁcant role forauctioning in the allocation of allowances. In combination with work behind thescenes, the Commission seems to have made a signiﬁcant impact on the processin the Council. As can be recalled from Chapter 2, in order to get the amendmentsrejected by the Commission adopted in the Council, unanimous support is neededif there is to be a ﬁrst-reading agreement or in second reading. Second, the largenumber of amendments proposed by the EP probably weakened its impact. If theParliament had supported da Silva’s initial ‘90% good’ assessment and focused on afew core issues, the impact might have been greater. The level of agreement behindthe various proposals does not seem to be a potent explanatory factor. The wish formore auctioning had the smallest majority backing among the various proposals inthe EP, but this proposal actually did affect the common position somewhat.Second Reading and the ET DirectiveIn the second reading, the Parliament may propose new amendments to the Council’scommon position. If the Council and Parliament cannot agree on these amendments,a conciliation committee seeks agreement between the Council and Parliament. If
105 ENDS Daily (9 December 2002), ‘Ministers Agree EU Climate Gas TradingScheme’, Issue 1346.
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agreement on the ﬁnal text cannot be reached, the Parliament may vote to veto theadoption of the proposal.The immediate response from the Parliament’s ET rapporteur did not bode wellfor the ﬁnal spurt in this process. In a speech to a Brussels climate change conferenceon 10 December 2002, da Silva indicated that the Parliament was not likely to acceptthe common position among the member-states and that he expected the secondreading to be ‘quite difﬁcult’. He also expressed worries over the tight timetable.106These positions were further clariﬁed early in January 2003.107 At this stage, fourissues were singled out as contentious, since the Parliament still wanted:••••
a temporary opt-out only for installations, not sectors;the inclusion of other sectors (especially aluminium and chemicals) and othergases already from 2005;the auctioning of 15 per cent of the allowances already from 2005;linking the Kyoto mechanisms only from 2008, not from 2005.
In fact, da Silva was quoted as expecting the issue to go to a conciliation committee.108A conciliation process would have delayed the decision-making process and madethe 2005 start less certain (Lefevere 2005, 101).The next main ETS movement within the EU institutional machinery was anew formal response from the Commission, in the form of a Communication to theEuropean Parliament, published on 25 March 2003.109 The Commission underlinedthat the common position did incorporate many of the Parliament’s ﬁrst readingamendments: all the 18 amendments from the Parliament’s ﬁrst reading acceptedtotally or partly by the Commission had been incorporated in the common position.It also argued that other amendments not accepted by the Commission had beenincluded in the common position, such as the temporary exclusion of certaininstallations, the inclusion of additional sectors and gases, and revision in the methodof allocation.As to the relationship to the Kyoto Protocol’s ﬂexible mechanisms, it was pointedout that the Commission had made a statement for the minutes of the Council meetingabout ‘its intention to propose, by the ﬁrst half of 2003, a Directive for linking theKyoto mechanisms with the Community greenhouse emission trading scheme’.110106 Euractiv (13 December 2002), ‘Parliament Set for Fight against Council Agreementon Emissions Trading’.107 International Environment Reporter (15 January 2003), ‘Climate Change: FinalLegislative Approval of EU’s Plan for Emissions Trading Expected Around 2004’, 26:2, 80–81.108 Ibid.109 European Commission (25 March 2003), SEC(2003)364 ﬁnal, Communicationfrom the Commission to the European Parliament, pursuant to the second subparagraph ofArticle 251(2) of the EC Treaty, concerning the Common Position of the Council on theadoption of a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a schemefor greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending CouncilDirective 96/61/EC (Brussels).110 Ibid., 11.
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This decoupling of issues helped to lessen the complexity in the negotiations. Italso helped to reduce opposition to the proposed ET directive from the Parliament,as it was clear that the Parliament wanted more restrictions on linking than didindustry and a majority of member-states. The Communication ended by supportingthe common position, while emphasizing that ‘prompt ﬁnalization’ of the emissionstrading directive was necessary in order to keep the timetable and ensure Europeanleadership in the ﬁght against climate change.111The subsequent main step in the EU institutional procedure was the secondreading in the European Parliament. The Environment Committee debated the ETSin meetings on 29 April and 11 June. At the ﬁrst meeting, 14 amendments were puton the table. These included a re-tabling of ﬁrst reading proposals calling for optouts only for installations (not sectors), and broader coverage in terms of gases andsectors. The call for a cap on the amount of allowances available for distribution wasrepeated. On the issue of auctioning, the call was still for this to be included alreadyfrom 2005 on, but from 15 per cent down to 5 per cent.112It is clear that this second reading process took place in an atmosphere ofincreasing political urgency. The EU did not have much time to get the system inplace so as to be able to show ‘demonstrable progress by 2005’. As we shall see inthe next section, the EU ETS had by then become an important tool for saving theKyoto Protocol in a situation where the USA was out and there was uncertainty aboutRussian ratiﬁcation. On 22 May, the Parliament’s ET rapporteur da Silva stated: ‘Ifwe postpone a decision it will create enormous problems for national authorities andcompanies’.113 In such an atmosphere, the willingness to compromise increases. TheParliament is normally lobbied and encouraged by environmental groups to adoptamendments that are more ambitious than those on the negotiating table. At thisstage in the ETS process, according to Lefevere (2005, 101), the Parliament waslobbied by ‘a broad range of stakeholders, including industry, environmental NGOs,the European Commission and most member-states, to avoid proposing too manyamendments and accept the Common Position’ (emphasis added).In contrast to the 74 amendments adopted in the ﬁrst reading, on 11 June 2003 theParliament’s Environment Committee agreed to re-table 25 of the amendments putforward in the ﬁrst reading process – by 47 votes against 3, with two abstentions.114Among these 25 amendments were the inclusion of all six greenhouse gases and theinclusion of the chemicals and aluminium industries. Furthermore, recognizing thetime constraints involved, the Committee singled out four truly key issues for thisﬁnal phase (see Table 5.3).111 Ibid., 12.112 ENDS Daily (30 April 2003), ‘Call for Tougher EU Emission Trading Maintained’,Issue 1434.113 Reuters/Planetark (22 May 2003), ‘EU Assembly to Push for Greenhouse GasTrading Deal’.114 European Parliament (12 June 2003), Recommendation for Second Reading onthe Council Common Position for Adopting a European Parliament and Council DirectiveEstablishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Communityand Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (15792/2002-C5-0135/2003-2001/0245 (COD),A-5-0207/2003.
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Key changes suggested in the Parliament’s second readingType of system
Coverage/scope
CommissionproposalOctober 2001
Mandatorysystem butdecentralizedsetting ofemission caps
Start with CO2 onlyand four targeted‘activities’
Changessuggested inParliamentsecond reading
National ceiling/’cap’ for emissionallowances toprevent overallocations basedon a linear curveconsistent withthe memberstate’s Kyotocommitments;
Temporary andlimited opt-outsfor installationsshould be possibleunder three strictconditionsa
Method ofallocation
Free ofchargeallocation inpilot phase;Opt-in of additionalnext phase tosectors and activitiesbe decided infrom 2008 on2006 review
ComplianceandenforcementPenalty: either€50 (pilotphase)/ €100(Kyoto phase)or twicethe averagemarket price– ‘whicheveris higher’
No changesMethod ofsuggestedallocatingallowancesshould beharmonized,withallocationThe directive shouldfree of chargebe revised in 2006and 5%to include otherauctioningsectors, especiallyfrom 2008the transport sector
a
Installations should be subject to (a) equal emissions reductions as a result of other nationalpolicies; (b) equal monitoring, reporting and veriﬁcation; and (c) equal penalties. No opt-outsfor whole sectors as proposed by the Council.
In addition to these four issues, credits from the ﬂexible mechanisms under theKyoto Protocol could be linked to the EU ETS, but the MEPs wanted a guaranteethat priority would be given to domestic action.115 Two of these issues were reportedto be ‘verging on the non-negotiable’: the national ceiling and the opt-out issues.116The plenary discussion and vote in the Parliament were scheduled for early July.However, as noted earlier, negotiations between the EP and the Council wereinitiated rapidly after the vote in the Environment Committee, and had a deadline of20 June. They primarily involved the Parliament’s ET rapporteur, the Presidency and
115 ENDS Daily (11 June 2003), ‘MEPs Push for a Quick Deal on EU Climate Trading’,Issue 1460; Euractiv (12 June 2003), ‘Greenhouse Gas Trading: MEPs Hope to AvoidConciliation’; Europe Environment (13 June 2003), ‘Climate Policy: MEPs Stand Firm OverTrading of Greenhouse Gas Emission Rights’, 636, 22–3.116 Europe Environment, ibid., 23.
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the Commission, with the Rapporteur determined not to become ‘embroiled in thearcana of the Council. <and> a monster with 15, or even 25 heads’.117Following compromise proposals tabled on 23 June by EU member-staterepresentatives, the negotiations met with success on 25 June.118 This ﬁnal characterof the process has been characterized as unique, including the fact that ‘unlikevirtually all other major pieces of environmental legislation recently adopted by theEuropean Community under the co-decision procedure, the ET directive did not gointo conciliation’ (Lefevere 2005, 101).On the key and ‘almost non-negotiable’ issue of a national ceiling for allowances,the Parliament did not win through. Instead, the compromise outcome was that thetotal quantity of allowances should ‘not be more than what is likely to be neededfor a strict application of the relevant criteria’. Prior to 2008, the total amount ofallowances should be ‘consistent with a path towards achieving or over-achieving’Kyoto targets. With regard to the other really key issue of opt-outs, the Parliamentwas more successful. Here, the outcome was an opening up for temporary optouts only for installations, but not for whole sectors – just as emphasized by theParliament’s Environment Committee.As to the revision of the directive, the Commission was to produce a reporton the possible further broadening and development of the ETS, for submissionto the Parliament and the Council by 30 June 2006. On the method of allocatingallowances, the Parliament did not win through fully. The outcome was not that aspeciﬁc percentage of allowances would be auctioned after 2008. Instead, a moreindirect approach was chosen, whereby at least 95 per cent of the allowances wereto be allocated free of charge before 2008, and at least 90 per cent after 2008. Article30(2)(c) also anticipated further harmonization of the method of allocation, includingauctioning for the period after 2012.As to other issues, we should note that on the question of credits from theproject mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, the Parliament did not get its requested‘guarantee’ that priority should be given to domestic action. However, it was statedthat the use of the mechanisms should be ‘supplemental to domestic action’ and suchaction should ‘constitute a signiﬁcant element of the effort made’. The setting of acap on linking would become one major issue in the negotiations on the LinkingDirective (see next section). The Parliament was moderately successful with regardto the inclusion of other sectors and gases. A general broadening remained optionaland dependent upon the outcome of the subsequent review, but the chemicals,aluminium and transport sectors were at least explicitly mentioned as particularlyrelevant candidates for possible broadening.We can now sum up the main steps and outcomes in the process. Table 5.4 showshow the Parliament’s proposals became watered down over time:
117 Ibid., 22–23.118 Council (23 June 2003), Revised Council Proposal for Second Reading Agreementon Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading. Brussels; ENDS Daily (25 June 2003), ‘EU ClimateEmissions Trading Breakthrough, Issue 1470; Euractiv (27 June 2003), ‘EP and MemberStates ﬁnd compromise on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading’.
Table 5.4
ET proposal, Parliament proposals and ﬁnal outcome
Type of system
Coverage/scope
Method of allocation
Compliance and enforcement
CommissionproposalOctober 2001
Mandatory system, butdecentralized settingof emission caps
Start with CO2 only and fourtargeted ‘activities’
Free of charge allocation inpilot phase; next phase to bedecided in 2006 review
Penalty: either €50 (pilotphase)/ €100 (Kyoto phase) ortwice the average market price– ‘whichever is higher’
Changessuggested inParliamentﬁrst reading
Cap on total quantity ofallowances to be allocatedto each member-state
All six Kyoto gases
Mandatory auctioning of15% of allowances in bothpilot and Kyoto phases
No changes suggested
Method of allocating allowancesshould be harmonized, withallocation free of charge in pilotphase, and 5% auctioning from 2008
No changes suggested
At least 95% of the allowances tobe allocated free of charge before2008, and at least 90% after 2008
Penalty: €40 (pilot phase)/€100 (Kyoto phase)
Opt-in of additional sectors andactivities from 2008 on
Chemicals and aluminiumsectors also includedTemporary exemption/opt-outof individual installationsOpt-in of additional sectors andactivities already from 2005
Changessuggested inParliamentsecondreading
National ceiling/’cap’ foremission allowances toprevent over-allocations,based on a linear curveconsistent with the memberstate’s Kyoto commitments
Temporary and limited opt-outsfor installations should be possibleunder three strict conditions
Finaloutcome: theET directive
Total amount of allowancesTemporary opt-outs only for installations,should be ‘consistent withbut not for whole sectorsa path towards achieving orover-achieving’ Kyoto targets The Commission to produce report onfurther broadening and developmentof the ETS to the Parliament andthe Council by June 30 2006
The directive should be revisedin 2006 to include other sectors,especially the transport sector
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This outcome of the negotiations was then accepted by the Parliament in plenary on 2July, at which time 17 amendments, mostly minor clariﬁcations, were also adopted.119Only 4 votes were cast against the ET directive at this ﬁnal reading (Vis 2006a, 40).On the whole, the Parliament’s ET rapporteur da Silva was very satisﬁed with theoutcome: ‘With this agreement we both avoided a long conciliation procedure andwe improved the integrity of the Directive. The scheme is now environmentallymore ambitious, economically more efﬁcient, with less distortions of competitionand more compatible with national policies already being implemented’.120 TheCommission then expressed its formal opinion on the outcome on 18 July 2003,discussing and (not so surprisingly) accepting the 17 amendments adopted by theParliament on 2 July.121 The Council formally adopted the directive on 22 July 2003.As the ﬁnal step in this part of the story, the ET Directive became formal EU lawwhen it was published in the EU Ofﬁcial Journal on 25 October 2003.122The Linking DirectiveAs we concluded in the section on the member-state positions, the Linking Directivebecame noticeably inﬂuenced by member-state interests. The changes of the timingthat CDM could not be used until 2008, the quantitative cap on JI/CDM creditsas a percentage of the total quantity of member-state allowances, and to a lesserextent, the qualitative restrictions concerning sinks, nuclear and hydropower – allthese can largely be credited to the positions of the member-states. However, alsothe EU institutions affected the design of this directive, which was adopted by theco-decision procedure, as the EU ET Directive.The Commission’s proposal for a linking directive was issued on 23 July 2003.As mentioned, it set no explicit quantitative cap on the import of JI and CDM credits,but suggested that the Commission should monitor the import. Once 6 per cent of thetotal quantity of member-state allowances had been reached, the Commission wouldreview the situation and consider ‘a maximum of for example 8%’. Concerningtiming, the proposal allowed for CDM credits to be used in the ETS only from
119 European Parliament (2 July 2003), Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading,European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the Council Common Position with a View toAdopting a European Parliament and Council Directive Establishing a Scheme for GreenhouseGas Emissions Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Council Directive96/61/EC (15792/2002-C5-0135/2003-2001/0245 (COD), P5_TA/2003)0319.120 Point Carbon (27 June 2003), ‘Improved Integrity, says da Silva, Point Carbon,Carbon Market Europe, 2.121 European Commission (18 July 2003), COM(2003)463 ﬁnal, Opinion of theCommission pursuant to Article 251 (2), third subparagraph, point (c) of the EC Treaty, on theEuropean Parliament’s amendments to the Council’s common position regarding the proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme forgreenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending CouncilDirective 96/61/EC (Brussels).122 ENDS Daily (30 October 2003), ‘EU Emissions Trading Law Enters into Force’,Issue 1542.
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January 2008.123 With regard to qualitative restrictions, credits resulting from nuclearprojects were banned from use for an unspeciﬁed period, whereas the exclusion ofsinks would be limited to the ﬁrst Kyoto period. Credits from hydropower plants wereto be allowed as long as they took ‘account of environmental and social impacts’.The Parliament demanded that the directive should be at least as restrictive asin the proposal. It seems as if, not having achieved what they wanted during the ETprocess, some MEPs now sought ‘payback’ in the form of tighter restrictions onthe project mechanisms.124 The ENGOs strongly opposed any link with the KyotoProtocol’s ﬂexible mechanisms and would, as a second-best option, support anyfurther restrictions to the proposal. The main argument used against linking betweenthe EU ETS and the Kyoto Protocol’s ﬂexible mechanisms has been that it mightweaken the incentives to reduce GHG emissions inside the EU. In contrast, a majorityof EU member-states preferred less restrictions than proposed by the Commission,and industry generally preferred as few restrictions and as much linking as possible.The main argument for using CDM/JI for complying with targets under the EUETS has been that the project-based mechanisms can reduce compliance costs byproviding greater opportunities to reduce emissions outside the EU at lower costs.The Commission had hoped to secure an agreement on the proposal as early asDecember 2003, but this timeframe would soon prove overly optimistic.125 Not onlydid the proposal get a lukewarm reception from the Parliament and several memberstates, the Commission was also internally divided on the issue (Michaelowa 2004,13). The conﬂict was most apparent when an unﬁnished draft of the linking proposalwas leaked by the Environment Directorate in June, resulting in internal dispute inthe Commission, protests from industry and the delay of the ofﬁcial proposal.126This was hardly an ideal starting point for a Commission that wanted to exercise a‘smoothing’ role in the upcoming negotiations.The mood in the Council was quite different. Most ministers preferred establishinga link already from 2005, and they were against setting a quantitative limit altogether.As to qualitative restrictions, the ministers were more divided. France demandedacceptance for credits from nuclear projects throughout the process; and severalstates, particularly southern ones, wanted acceptance for sink credits. The differenceswere so severe that the linking negotiations basically stood still throughout 2003.Two factors seem to have been decisive in getting the ball rolling again. First,there was the tactic manoeuvre by the Parliament’s rapporteur Alexander de Roo. Atvarious meetings in December 2003 he indicated that he wanted agreement on theproposal before the 2004 elections to the EP; and, for such agreement to be reached,the Parliament could be ﬂexible on the cap if the qualitative provisions remainedsufﬁciently robust (Lefevere 2006, 127). In other words, if a Council majority could123 This despite of the fact that the Kyoto Protocol allowed the use of CDM creditsbefore 2008.124 ENDS Report (September 2003), ‘The Clean Development Mechanism: KyotoComes Home to Roost’, Issue 344.125 Ibid.126 Environment Finance (18 July 2003), ‘Commission Axes Credit Cap in “linkingdirective”’; Michaelowa 2004, 13.
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back restrictive rules on nuclear credits, sink credits and hydropower credits, a deal