tounderstand why the ETS is based on decentralized allocation of allowances. The EUinstitutional perspective helps us to understand why the allocation of allowances mustbe approved by the Commission and must follow certain guidelines, including beingon a path toward achieving the Kyoto targets. The international regime perspectivehelps us to understand why the EU ETS suddenly gained signiﬁcantly more supportin 2001, why the ET Directive did not go into conciliation between the Council andthe Parliament – and why it was adopted at all.
Chapter 6
Implementing EU Emissions TradingIn this chapter, we look into the similarities and differences in implementationthat were found in Chapter 3. In Chapter 2, we formulated various propositions onimplementation based on our three explanatory perspectives. The ﬁrst explanatoryperspective views implementation from the level of the member-states, focusing onhow domestic factors can explain variance in implementation. The ﬁrst propositionthus took as its point of departure a decentralized EU ETS, and stated that it wouldlead to low but varying levels of environmental ambitiousness, due to nationalcircumstances. A decentralized ETS would mean that each member-state was incharge of the cap-setting process, easily implying a ‘race to the bottom’.The second explanatory perspective views implementation from the EU level,with a centralized and harmonized EU ETS as its point of departure. It suggested thata centralized EU ETS would lead to generally high(er) environmental ambitiousnessdue to common EU criteria. This would provide the Commission and the ECJwith signiﬁcant powers to oversee the implementation process and hence induceambitious allocations.The ﬁnal perspective views implementation from the international level. Here itis proposed that a strong link between the EU ETS and the climate regime’s ﬂexiblemechanisms, as well as low exposure to international competition, would increaseenvironmental ambitiousness. This because the availability of relatively low-priceCDM credits would make it easier for industries to agree to ambitious allocations(although also decreasing the pressure on EU governments to take real action intheir own countries). Furthermore, low exposure to international competition wouldreduce industrial opposition to ambitious allocations.Member-states: Varying ImplementationAs the EU ETS turned out to be basically decentralized, we expected low but varyingdegrees of implementation. Our assessment in Chapter 3 was largely in line withthis expectation. We put forward a generally sobering assessment of implementationand ambition levels so far. It is also clear that the implementation process has beenmarked by signiﬁcant delays in the delivery of NAPs. However, within this overallpicture of only moderate success, there were striking differences in implementation.We singled out a group of four key EU countries and emitters, representing variationin implementation and geographical location: frontrunner UK, reluctant Germany,improving-laggard Spain and laggard Poland.Signiﬁcant variation in domestic implementation points towards differentnational circumstances and domestic-level explanations. Here we focus on ‘ﬁt’,
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‘need’ and ‘deed’ to explain variance in implementation. Institutional ﬁt emphasizesthe critical role of the pre-existing institutional context in which new policyinstruments (like emissions trading) are introduced. Institutional change rarely takesplace in a smooth and unproblematic way, due to existing institutions. According toKnill and Lenschow (2000, 30), ‘effective implementation is basically dependenton the degree of institutional ﬁt between existing institutional arrangements and theinstitutional implications emerging from European policies. Implementation is likelyto be ineffective if the institutional implications of EU policies contradict stronglyentrenched patterns of already existing institutions’.We distinguish between general institutional ﬁt and policy ﬁt. In this study, generalﬁt concerns the match between the portfolio of domestic climate policy instrumentsand emissions trading. In a broader sense, it also includes general national regulatorystyles. Speciﬁc policy ﬁt concerns the match between speciﬁc policy instruments(like domestic emissions trading) and the EU ETS. We are interested in both thesedimensions and will seek to bring out the speciﬁc type of ﬁt or misﬁt in each of thefour national cases studied.The second explanatory factor in focus is ‘need’ for the EU ETS. As noted inChapter 1, all EU countries have varying targets agreed to within the EU’s Burdensharing Agreement (BSA), and progress so far in relation to these targets varies. Inorder to measure need, we will sum up the country’s target within the BSA, progressmade in relation to this target so far and main prospects ahead, and on this basisassess the real need to implement the ETS ambitiously.Finally, we distinguish needs from deeds. The need to do something and thepolitical willingness to do so may well be two different things. We will thus assessprogress in climate policy and the basic ‘drive’ in each of the four countries in focus,and hence the apparent and probable willingness to match needs with climate policydeeds. Climate policy ‘drive’ is measured in terms of domestic targets and policyinstruments. We expect that high institutional ﬁt, need for the EU ETS, and climatepolicy ‘drive’ will lead to a frontrunner position, and, conversely, that low ﬁt, needand drive will lead to a laggard position.The UK: FrontrunnerAs concluded in Chapter 3, when NAP I and II are viewed in combination, the UKstands out as the main forerunner in EU ETS implementation. It has managed tomeet the deadlines quite well and was among the comparatively more ambitiousin NAP I, even though it fought a drawn-out battle with the Commission over itswish to increase its cap a little bit (as further discussed later). In NAP II, the UK’splan was the only one to be unconditionally accepted in the ﬁrst Commission NAPII ‘verdict’. When the veriﬁed 2005 emissions ﬁgures were put on the table in May2006, it became clear that the UK was one of the few countries on the short side– that is, with higher emissions than allowances distributed. On the one hand, thismeans that the UK certainly did not ‘over-allocate’, and that must be counted on thepositive side. On the other hand, higher emissions go in the wrong direction for asystem aiming for reductions.
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However, the interpretation of such ﬁgures depends upon the background for thehigher emissions. As noted in Chapter 3, one reason that has been indicated for theUK’s ‘short’ position in 2005 is a shift to greater use of coal for power generation asgas prices have risen while coal prices have been static or falling. Not least becausethe UK’s NAP II was the only one to gain unconditional acceptance in the ﬁrstCommission NAP II assessment round, the EU Commission seemingly supports a‘basically sound approach’ interpretation of recent events.Let us then see to what extent our three explanatory perspectives can shed lightupon this comparatively high implementation performance.Fit between UK ETS and EU ETS In the EU ETS initiation process, the UK wasa clear proponent of trading. It was apparently the only EU country positive toemissions trading during the Kyoto negotiations, and was the second EU country(after Denmark) to implement a domestic ETS. Britain’s domestic emissions tradingscheme created a certain institutional learning base with regard to the operation oftrading, within both government and industry. This included basic data collection,the establishment and operation of allowance registries, recognition of the pros andcons of allocation methods, and, of course, a certain trading experience for industry.In 2004, both the National Audit Ofﬁce (NAO) and the ENDS Report agreed thatthe creation of the allowance registry was an important ‘but often over-looked’institutional success.1 Moreover, a clear majority of participants in the UK ETSemphasized how participation in the system had improved their collection of data onenergy use and measurement of emissions (NAO 2004, 27). The general institutionalﬁt between British climate policy and the EU ETS was thus high.In Chapter 5, we saw that the UK ended up as one of the main opponents to amandatory ETS. The reason was that the design of the UK’s initial domestic tradingscheme, which started in March 2002, differed substantially from that of the EUETS, and this created tension between the EU and UK. Britain’s domestic systemcovered all six main greenhouses gases (EU: only CO2); it excluded electricityand heat generators, but included several sectors not covered by the EU ETS. Thescheme was voluntary (EU: mandatory), and the British government providedfunding support of 43 million pounds per year over a ﬁve-year period to encourageparticipation (EU: none).2 The industrial target groups were instrumental in designingthe scheme – indicating that the UK domestic scheme was more in accordance withtheir strategies than the EU ETS. Indeed, some of the patterns of interests created by1 NAO 2004; ENDS Report (April 2004), ‘Watchdog Fails to Bite on UK EmissionsTrading Scheme’, Issue 351, 27–30.2 In the UK ETS, 31 organizations (‘direct participants’) took on targets to reducetheir emissions against 1998–2000 levels, aiming to deliver close to 12 million tonnes ofadditional CO2 equivalent emission reductions over the period 2002–06. The scheme wasalso open to the 6,000 companies with Climate Change Agreements , the latter setting energyrelated targets. Companies that met their targets would receive an 80 per cent discount fromthe Climate Change Levy, a tax on the business use of energy. These companies could usethe scheme either to buy allowances to meet their targets, or to sell any over-achievement.UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [website], <www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/trading/>, accessed 18 June 2007.
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the scheme were clearly in conﬂict with the EU ETS. Moreover, due to differencesin coverage, the two schemes engaged and distributed regulatory burdens amongemitters differently (see also Sorrell 2003a and 2003b).Nevertheless, the UK trading experiences facilitated the country’s NAP Iimplementation in terms of timeliness. This was also conﬁrmed in our interviewswith British NAP decision-makers.3 It was probably also a factor positive forambitiousness, as the previous work provided some necessary data and modellingtools. In sum, although the general institutional ﬁt was good, the speciﬁc policyﬁt was more ‘medium’, due to design differences between Britain’s ETS and theemerging EU ETS.Reduction needs and climate policy drive The UK has one of the most ambitioustargets within the EU BSA. The UK’s target is to reduce GHG emissions by 12.5 percent by 2008–12. An even more ambitious domestic target of a 20 per cent reductionin CO2 emissions by the year 2010 had been adopted back in 1997. In 1998, UK CO2emissions were already 8.5 per cent below 1990 levels. According to the EuropeanEnvironmental Agency (EEA) 2004 progress report, emission trends until 2002, andprojections for 2010 on the basis of existing domestic policies and measures, the UKappeared on track in terms of meeting its BSA target. With regard to the more speciﬁclinear target-path towards the BSA 2010 target, in 2006 the UK was 7 percentagepoints below (ibid., 14).4 The UK was the only EU country besides Sweden to projectthat existing domestic policies and measures would alone be sufﬁcient to meet andeven exceed its BSA target. This picture remained basically unchanged in the 2006EEA report, with the UK 5.8 percentage points below the linear path (EEA 2006,20). This indicates that the actual need for the UK to implement the ETS ambitiouslywas not pressing.As to the more structural factors underlying these ﬁgures, energy liberalizationand the ‘dash-to-gas’ can shed light on Britain’s decreasing emissions in the 1990s(Collier 1997; Wettestad and Hals Butenschøn 2000). But also other factors andpolicies have come to complement and enhance the ‘dash-to-gas’ effects. As shownby Darkin (2006), the British Labour Party has actively promoted climate policysince coming to power in 1997, including the adoption of a comprehensive ClimateChange Programme in 2000. And policies and measures in the industrial sector havebeen delivering real reductions in emissions. On the other hand – and as in mostcountries – the transport and households sectors are lagging behind. Furthermore,although energy efﬁciency has improved in the UK, rising energy demand has morethan outweighed the efﬁciency gains (ibid., 266), and this development may alsoshed some light on the power sector’s overshooting of its ET allowances in 2005.We can draw two, somewhat differing, conclusions. On the one hand, goodprogress indicates that there has simply not been such a real need for the Britishgovernment to implement the ETS very ambitiously, so this element does not shedmuch light on why the UK was the comparative leader. On the other hand, good3 UK interviews, 16 February 2005.4 The only other countries with ‘scores’ below the linear target path were Germany,Sweden, France, Luxembourg and Belgium (EEA 2004, 14).
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progress was at least partly a result of an active climate policy. Policy drive emergesas a more important explanatory factor than the need to implement the EU ETS forunderstanding the UK frontrunner position.Germany: ReluctantGermany is of key ET importance and interest as the biggest EU emitter, accountingfor almost 25 per cent of total ET allowances. Moreover, it was the EU country withthe strongest objections to the ETS design proposed by the Commission. With regardto implementation, Germany must be placed somewhere in the middle, as a sortof key Northern intermediate. It has generally been on time, and ranks somewherein the middle with regard to comparative NAP I ambitiousness. Germany endedup with slightly lower emissions in 2005 than allocated cap (around 4.2 per cent)and hence as a potential slight ‘over-allocator’ in NAP I. Furthermore, its proposedNAP II cap was rejected and considerably adjusted down by the Commission. Asfurther discussed later, in NAP I, it had a long quarrel with the Commission over itssuggested ‘ex post’ adjustment rules, and there was talk about a new ﬁght with theCommission over its scaled-down cap in NAP II. However, Germany chose to backdown, but accompanied this with a planned increased use of CDM. On the whole, itshould be seen as a reluctant and cautious ETS player.Voluntary agreements and the EU ETS Compared to the UK, Germany seems tobe a clear case of both more general institutional misﬁt and more speciﬁc policymisﬁt in terms of emissions trading. As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, in the negotiationsleading up to the Kyoto Protocol, Germany was one of the leading sceptics withinthe EU to ﬂexible mechanisms, and it argued for a voluntary EU system until theend of 2002.The most intensive German lobbying towards the EU involved a proposal forallowing companies to form collective ‘pools’. This pooling proposal reﬂected thefact that the main instrument in German climate policy has been voluntary agreements(VAs) with industry.5 The targets in the agreements have referred entirely toassociations, not individual companies or sites. Agreements on CO2 reductions wereadopted in 1995, 1996, 2000 and 2002. As pointed out in a report from FraunhoferISI (Walz and Betz 2003), the pre-2000 agreements were unilateral commitments onthe part of industry, adding up to an overall target of cutting CO2 emissions by up to20 per cent by 2005 compared to 1987 levels.Since 2000, negotiated agreements have been established on a sectoral basis.The agreements covered the companies associated in the Bundesverband DeutscherIndustrie (BDI), which is the head organization of the German manufacturingindustry, electricity producers, as well as coal, gas and oil suppliers. About 80 per centof ﬁnal energy consumption in industry, and almost all electricity supply (industrialand utilities, private and public producers) were covered by the agreements. Theseapplied to 18 associations/sectors, including chemicals, non-ferrous metal industry,5 Other important German climate policy instruments have been the ecological taxreform and the Renewables Energy Sources Act. See Walz and Betz (2003).
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steel, oil reﬁning, gas and water utilities, and electricity suppliers. The overall 2012target was a 35 per cent greenhouse gas cut (ibid., 13).6However, the substance of the commitments was diffuse, and reporting ofemissions under the agreements was voluntary.7 Within the German government,the Ministry of Economy was responsible for the agreements. The dominantrole of these agreements in German climate policy indicated a potential misﬁt inrelation to the emerging EU ETS. With the voluntary agreements, the balance ofpower between industry and government was tilted in favour of industry, whichcontrolled the reporting of data. These data were primarily at the aggregate,sectoral level; targets were open to interpretation; and no sanctioning mechanismwas involved.8All this stands in contrast to the EU ETS, which is a mandatory system with anelaborate data collection and monitoring system reaching down to the individualcorporation level, and with a clear and explicit sanctioning and non-compliancemechanism. Most German industry was generally quite satisﬁed with the regulatoryregime based on VAs, and embraced emissions trading only very reluctantly andhesitantly. In September 2005 it was reported that more than two-thirds of Germaninstallations still had a negative attitude to emissions trading.9 In essence, Germanindustry anticipated higher abatement costs under the EU ETS than with the voluntaryagreements.The picture is not entirely bleak, however. Closer examination of thenegotiations on the German NAP I cap between mid-2003 and March 2004 showsthat the voluntary agreements came to represent one of four main focal points inthe complicated and contentious process of determining the total emissions cap(Matthes and Schafhausen forthcoming 2007; Mullins 2005, 188).10 In this speciﬁcprocess, the VAs functioned constructively. More generally, the skewedness in thebalance of power between industry and government represented may have served asa driver within the environmental agencies for effective implementation of the EUETS, since this instrument would provide the regulators with more power vis-à-visthe regulated.Compared to the case of the UK, both a general and a speciﬁc misﬁt seem toexplain why Germany has lagged somewhat behind.
6 This target was mainly a relative one, set in relation to a production index. See Walzand Betz (2003, 139).7 Interviews, Berlin 28–29 September 2005.8 According to Matthes and Schafhausen (2005, 38), this means that Germany’s NAPprocess has been complicated by ‘a poor data situation and very incomplete information’.9 Point Carbon (22 February 22, 2005), ‘Polish NAP Under Pressure’.10 The VA focal point was favoured by the German Ministry of the Environment (BMU).The other three focal points were a ‘proportional’ approach, a ‘non-ET stabilization’ approachand a ‘cost-efﬁciency’ approach. See Matthes and Schafhausen (2005, 12–13). Interviews inBerlin, 28–29 September 2005.
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Climate policy progress: good, but slowing down? Compared again to the UK, wewould also expect that either the need for ambitious allocation was lower in Germanythan in the UK, or that the German policy drive was less vigorous – or both.Germany has traditionally been a leader in climate policy within the EU andwould probably like to uphold this position, also in the age of emissions trading.The German BSA target is a 21 per cent reduction by 2008–12, the second mostambitious one within the EU (together with Denmark). Somewhat similar to the UK,according to the EEA (2006), emission trends until 2004 and projections for 2010indicate that the Germany has managed to stay basically on track to meet its BSAtarget by using additional domestic policies and measures. As noted in Chapter 4, thedevelopment of GHG emissions in Germany is related to the fall of the Berlin Walland subsequent re-uniﬁcation effects. The rate of emissions decrease was highestin the early 1990s. After that came a consistent, but slower, decline in emissionsthroughout the 1990s, and emissions became quite constant after 1999 (Walz andBetz 2003, 2; Matthes and Schafhausen 2005, 1). As to the more speciﬁc linear pathtowards the BSA 2010 target, in 2004 Germany was 2.8 percentage points below(ibid., 20).On the one hand, there seems to be no pressing need for drastic measures. Thisis quite similar to the situation in the UK and can hence shed little light on thecomparatively lower ambitiousness of Germany. On the other hand, we should notethat progress was less encouraging in 2006 than it was in 2004, although an increasein emissions may be caused various different factors.11 This immediate impressionof a decreasing climate policy drive in the recent years is strengthened by recentstatements by German ofﬁcials. In April 2007, Germany’s environment ministerSigmar Gabriel stated that it was ‘disappointing that Germany had fallen awayfrom that [the 21 per cent] target in recent years’, adding that ‘Germany, and othercountries, issued more certiﬁcates than necessary’.12 This may indicate that in recentyears the basic climate policy drive may have been less strong in Germany than inthe UK. Hence, Germany’s willingness to implement the ETS ambitiously may havebeen comparatively lower.Spain: an Improving LaggardAs concluded in Chapter 3, Spain occupies a sort of intermediate position in terms ofETS performance so far. Spain was initially very delayed in NAP I, but speeded upsigniﬁcantly from late spring 2005 on and ended up with a comparatively acceptableNAP. When 2005 emissions were put on the table, Spain proved to be among the fewcountries that had not handed out more allowances than the ETS industries neededand hence was on the ‘under-allocation’ side, further supporting the impressionof a certain NAP I soberness. Spain’s NAP II has been favourably received and
11 Here it should be noted that in the 2004 EEA assessment Germany was 6 percentagepoints below the linear target path (EEA 2004, 14).12 Reuters/Planetark (19 April 2007), ‘German Cabinet Accepts EU’s CO2 AllocationPlan’.
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– as was the case with only a few countries – its cap was basically accepted by theCommission at the ﬁrst attempt.Lack of climate policy rather than misﬁt Economic instruments have not ﬁguredcentrally in Spanish environmental policy, so general institutional ﬁt must becharacterized as being on the low side.13 With regard to more speciﬁc policy ﬁt,the case seems to be more a lack of previous policy and general policy foundationthan a speciﬁc mismatch. In 2003, Tabara (2003, 20) noted: ‘for a long time,Spanish politics have framed climate change either as a non-issue or as a burdenfor economic growth and competitiveness, and as a result still suffers from suchpassivity and inertia which are now very difﬁcult to overcome’. Spain has nothad an overarching climate change strategy. Domestic policies to mitigate climatechange have focused on the introduction of combined-cycle gas turbine plants tocover additional energy demand, a reduction of energy intensity, and an increase inrenewable energy policies (International Energy Agency 2005). In an environmentalperformance review from 2004, the OECD pointed out that climate change has notbeen among the top environmental issues in Spain; priority has traditionally goneto water quality. This can help to explain why Spain seems to have accorded lowpriority to the negotiations on the ETS directive from 2001 to 2003.14Thus, in the case of Spain, not only has general ﬁt been low, a speciﬁc policyfoundation for the ETS has also been lacking.Needs and climate policy progress: from inertia to action In 2004, with the EU’sNAP I deadline getting closer, a public debate developed in Spain, questioning thefairness of the country’s target under the BSA.15 Under that agreement, Spain, likeseveral other southern EU states, is allowed to increase its greenhouse gas emissions,but Spain’s target of a 15 per cent emissions increase has been characterized assomewhat stricter than other southern targets and national policy at the time (Ringius1999).By 2000, Spanish emissions had risen far more than the target (29 per cent above1990 level); by 2004, emissions were almost 45 per cent higher than 1990 levels.Furthermore, as pointed out in the 2004 EEA assessment, Spain was 30 percentagepoints above a linear Kyoto target path (EEA 2004, 14). According to the 2006EEA assessment, the situation has remained basically the same (EEA 2006, 20). Nowonder then that Spain has been included in a group of seven countries singled outby the European Commission as being at risk of not meeting their BSA targets.16 Insum, we must conclude that there has been a considerable need to squeeze also theindustries covered by the EU ETS. However, for quite a long period, Madrid failed
13 For instance, the OECD recommended to increasing the use of economic instrumentsin its 2004 Environmental Performance Review (OECD 2004, 17).14 Interviews in Madrid, 9–10 May 2005.15 ENDS Daily (28 January 2004), ‘Spain Wobbles on Kyoto Protocol Commitments’,Issue 1597.16 The six others are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Portugal. ENDSReport (December 2006), ‘Prospects for EU Emissions Worsen’, 3.
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to act on this need. This was much rooted in fundamental scepticism to climatepolitics and the Kyoto Protocol within Spain’s ruling conservative government.17It was only with the new socialist government in April 2004 that the Spanishimplementation process started to follow a completely different track. The newPrime Minister early on pledged to comply with the ET Directive whatever thecost, and was followed by the new Minister of the Environment harshly criticizingthe outgoing government for not following up on the Kyoto commitments. Acontribution to relaxing the opposition towards emissions trading in the businesscommunity came with the appointment of a former representative of industry (fromthe company Repsol) to Director of the Spanish Climate Ofﬁce.18 This new speedand political pressure in the implementation process resulted in a draft Spanish NAPI being published at the end of June 2004, considerably earlier than expected.19 And,as noted, the new drive in Spanish climate policy led to a NAP II that was applaudedand approved by the Commission at ﬁrst try in late February 2007. From the Spanishcase we see how a change in climate policy drive came about due to a change ingovernment, which in turn responded to the accumulated pressing need for action.Poland: StrugglingIt is hard to escape the conclusion that Poland must be counted as ﬁguring centrallyamong the ETS implementation laggards so far. Poland is the third largest emitter inthe EU and accounts for around 11 per cent of the allowances. Hence, its timelinessand performance is important for the developing market. It was seriously delayed inNAP I, and its cap indicated comparatively little ambition. When 2005 ﬁgures wereput on the table, Poland proved to be among countries that had been most generousin handing out allowances to the ET industry (emerging as a clear ‘over-allocator’).Although the country was on time in NAP II, its ambitiousness has again beenseriously questioned. This was conﬁrmed in late March 2007, when the Commissioncut Poland’s suggested NAP II by as much as 27 per cent (down from 284.6 millionallowances to 208.5).Lack of institutional ﬁt A look at the history of environmental regulation inthe Central and East European Countries (CEECs) shows that, prior to 1990,the overall regulatory style focused on national quality standards and pollutionpermits. In the 1990s, however, virtually all new environmental policy principleswere imported from the West, and the CEECs have shown a general preferencefor new policy instruments like market-based instruments and self-regulation(Jehlicka and Tickle 2002, 2004). However, as we have discussed in greater detailelsewhere (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2007), the general institutional capacity foreffective environmental policy development and implementation in the CEECs hasbeen characterized as weak. Ministries of the environment and their departments17 Interviews in Madrid, 9–10 May 2005.18 Interviews in Madrid, 9–10 May 2005.19 ENDS Daily (10 June 2004), ‘EU Urged to Take Hard Line on Emissions Plans’, Issue1684.
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of EU integration are understaffed and without appropriately trained experts.Environmental ministries often perform merely a coordinating and consultativerole and lack the administrative capacity to implement and enforce environmentalregulation (Homeyer 2001; Kramer 2002). Thus, in terms of general institutionalﬁt, including the capacity to implement so complex an instrument as the EU ETS,the picture was not encouraging.Poland has been described as a country with mixed attitudes towards emissionstrading (Fernandez Armenteros and Massai 2005, 440–442). However, climatechange did not constitute a major priority with the Ministry of the Environment, andthere has been resistance from politicians and decision-makers ‘which still preferother instruments already established and which present faster and more visiblepositive results on the national environment than a new system where there is not yetsufﬁcient experience’ (ibid., 441). Polish climate policy consists of various nationalpolicy plans emphasizing various measures, including renewable energy. Severalnew legal acts with relevance for climate policy have been adopted since 1997. Forexample, the 1997 Energy Act aims to stimulate the use of renewable energy sources.However, according to Warzaw Press, ‘the government is coming to the issue toolate, with no time, no funding, and almost no data’.20In sum, in addition to weak administrative capacity, the general ﬁt betweenemissions trading and Polish climate policy must be characterized as low. Sowhat about the actual need for effective implementation stemming from Kyotocommitments?Climate policy progress: comfortably numbing? As with other CEECs, Poland is aparty both to the UNFCCC and to the Kyoto Protocol, with status as ‘Economies inTransition’ (EITs). They are not part of the EU’s Burden-sharing Agreement, whichapplies only to the ‘old’ EU-15.From late 2002 on and with formal accession approaching, the CEECs weregranted more access to EU decision-making, including climate policy, through theestablishment of the ‘Interim Committee’.21 The process of gradually closerinvolvement was further strengthened by the important European Council meetingin April 2003 and the signing