Cameron has raised some more issues with desire utilitarianism.
One of those issues began with:
If I were omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent . . .
I do recognize that this type of perspective is common in moral philosophy. However, I do not see how it makes any sense.
Imagine a group of people on a sinking ship in the middle of the Pacific. While they look at their situation and try to decide what to do, one of them says, "If I was omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent . . . ."
Stop. You're none of those things. We have a real-world problem here and we need a real-world solution.
Morality, at least as I discuss it, has to do with real people living real lives where they are confronted with real-world human limitations. Those limitations preclude omniscience and omnipotence.
The whole case concerning the promoting of 'good' desires is that, if I desire X, then I have reason to cause you to desire that which will contribute to bringing about X. And if you desire Y, then you have reason to cause me to desire that which will bring about Y. There is nothing magical or mysterious about this relationship. If you want something, then you have reason to act so as to bring about that which you desire - as do I. This includes reason to cause others to have those desires that are useful to us - and for them to cause us to have desires that are useful to them.
If everyone's strongest desire (to the exclusion of all other desires) was to sit, smile, and watch other people sit and smile, that world is just as "good" as the real world in which our desires for justice and freedom and security and community are fulfilled.
Yes, if everybody desired only to sit and smile and watch others sit and smile, then they have no reason to do anything but to sit and smile and watch others sit and smile.
If you do not like this state, then it is because you desire something other than a universe in which people sit and smile. However, if you desired only to sit and smile and watch others sit and smile, you would have no reason to complain about this state either.
If you wish to argue that such a state is intrinsically bad then you need to present me with some type of evidence that intrinsic badness exists. An argument to the effect that you have an aversion to a certain set of propositions being true is not evidence that they are false.
Herein lies my problem. With DU, there's no intrinsic difference between promoting good desires and promoting an aversion to bad desires.
Actually, the claim is that intrinsic values do not exist. There is no real-world entity corresponding to intrinsic value. Any who claim that one state is intrinsically better than another is making a false claim. The only true claims that one can make (at least regarding value or 'reasons for action' is that a state tends to fulfill more and stronger desires than an alternative state.
Questions about what does and does not exist are simply not the types of questions to be settled by determining whether we like or dislike conclusions. They are determined by asking whether theories that contain those entities better explain real-world observations than theories without those entities. The claim that desires are the only reasons for action that exist is a claim that no other entity is needed to explain real-world events. It is not a claim that everybody who thinks about such a universe will find it more pleasing to them than any other universe in which they can imagine.
Now, even though there is no intrinsic difference between promoting good desires and inhibiting bad desires. However, there may well be an important practical difference. Perhaps it is simply easier to promote a good desire than to inhibit a bad desire. Perhaps are desires are more malleable in the direction of promotion than inhibition. In these cases, we are well advised to put more emphasis into promoting good desires than inhibiting bad desires.
What’s to stop someone from going around and attempting to instill in people the best desires he can come up with?
Why stop him. If he is instilling people with good desires, then he is instilling people with desires that tend to fulfill other desires - which includes our desires. What 'reason for action' would we have to stop him if desires are the only reasons for action that exist, and he is bringing about that which we have the most and strongest reason to see brought about?
What’s to stop those people from being wrong (even with the very best of intentions and methods)?
Nothing at all. Of course, this fact is taken into consideration in the theory. One of the reasons that I argue that words should only be met with words and private actions, and that campaigns in an open society should only be met with campaigns, is because of the possibility of error and of corruption. To the degree that I control my own life, I will act so as to best fulfill my desires, given my beliefs. To the degree that you control my life, then you will be directing me to act so as to fulfill your desires given your beliefs. Even if you had a desire that my desires be fulfilled, this will be one desire among many, in competition with others, and cast aside when those other desires outweigh this one.
The best option for fulfilling the most and strongest desires is to allow each individual to decide how best to run his or her own life - to promote an aversion to one person directing the life of another, except in those rare instances where one person is clearly incapable of rational decision making (e.g., young children)
Finally, is the only reason that the idea of people doing that because I have a (malleable) aversion to the whole idea of someone else knowing what’s best for me?
I am not really sure what you intended to say in this sentence. However, in fact, for the vast majority of competent adults, we can direct our own lives more efficiently than others can direct our lives.
This is John Stuart Mill's argument for liberty in On Liberty. Decisions on which options to take should be made by those who have the best information and face the best incentives to making sure that the relevant desires are fulfilled. The person who knows most about how to fulfill your desires is you (again, unless you are suffering under some real significant mental impairment). You are also the least corruptible agent that can be found - the agent most interested in making sure that your acts fulfill your desires. For these reasons, desire utilitarianism argues for a desire for liberty, and an aversion to tyranny and oppression.