Before the economic and agrarian reforms of 1990s, AgOs played the dominant role in gross agricultural output, and family holdings played a subsidiary role. In the course of the reform, the situation changed. By mid-1990s, the role of these two sectors has equaled, and by 1998, 60.8% of gross agricultural output was produced in family sector while agricultural enterprises produced only 39.2% of gross agricultural output.
After 1998, due to the changes in the general economic policy and the realization the of agrarian reform, the trends have changed. The output of agricultural enterprises begun to grow, and their share in the gross agricultural output tended to increase. However, in 2002 the AgOs’ share in gross agricultural output has decreased again.
As a result of reforms, the structure of the Russian agriculture has changed dramatically.
— The share of family holdings (peasant (farm) holdings and the plots of population, including individual subsidiary plots, orchards and gardens) in the gross agricultural output has increased.
From 1990 to 1998, it has increased form 26.3% to 60.8%. During this period, the output of large enterprises has decreased 2.8 times, and the output of individual subsidiary plots of population (individual subsidiary plots) has increased by 12.3%. From 1999 to 2001, the share of family holdings has decreased, but in 2002 the trend has changed again.
— During the period under the study, the share of family holdings in the output of agricultural products of all kinds grew. The most significant growth concerned vegetables (54%), meat (32.3%), milk (28.6%) and potatoes (28.2%).
— Specialization and the appearance of enterprises of various types took place. Collective enterprises maintained their dominant position in cereals and industrial crops production, while family holdings dominated in potatoes, vegetables, fruit and berries production.
— The share of family holdings in livestock production also grew (livestock, milk, and wool production increased by 59.4%, 52.2%, and 62.4%, correspondingly).
5. The Typology of Regional Agrarian Structures In the beginning of 1990s, the agrarian structure of all the regions of Russia was quiet similar.
During the reform period, the changes of agrarian structure of various regions also were similar.
In all the regions, the share of collective enterprises in gross agricultural output decreased and the share of family holdings (peasant (farm) holdings and the plots of population) grew. However, the rates of changes varied by regions. As a result, regional agrarian structures significantly differ.
Virtually one can determine three types of regional agrarian structures: corporate, mixed and family one. The corporate structure is typical for the subjects of RF in which the share of agricultural enterprises in gross agricultural output exceeds 50%. The mixed structure is typical for regions where their share constitutes 30-50%, and family structure is typical for regions where their share is less than 30% (correspondingly, the share of family holdings exceeds 70%).
The corporate enterprises dominate in only nine regions. In these regions, the share of AgOs in the gross agricultural output amounts 60%. The agrarian structure of family type has formed in 26 regions in which the share of AgOs in gross agricultural output amounted only 22.7%, and the share of family holdings exceeds 71%. In Ingushetiya, the share of family sector in gross agricultural output amounts 95.4%, and in seven regions it exceeds 80% (Dagestan, Buriatiya, Yakutiya, Astrakhan region, and others). In the rest of the subjects of RF, agrarian structure is of a mixed character and family farm sector prevails (its share in the gross agricultural output exceeds 60%).
For the subjects of RF in which the agrarian structure of family type has formed, not only the low share of AgOs in the gross agricultural output, but also small sizes of the maintained AgOs is typical. In these regions, collective enterprises include mainly small enterprises.
The most important factors that cause such a high differentiation of regional agrarian structures include natural conditions, the provision with land, ethnic factor, the efficiency of corporate enterprises, and regional agrarian policy.
Natural conditions. The regions in which the agrarian structure of family type has formed are characterized by worse bio-climatic potential (94 points), than regions with corporate type of agrarian structure (102 points).
On the contrary, the corporate enterprises survive in the regions with the most favorable natural conditions, such as Krasnodarskiy kray, Stavropolskiy kray, Belgorod region, Mocskow and Leningrad regions. In the last two regions, not natural but economic conditions play the key role.
The provision with land also seriously influence the type of agrarian structure. In the regions with family type of agrarian structure, the area of land used in commodity and family agricultural holdings per one employee (1.8 ha) is less than the same area in the regions with corporate type of agrarian structure (3.4 ha).
Ethnic factor. The detailed analysis of the impact of ethnic factor to the agrarian structure one can find in the brilliant study of T. Nefedova7. We shall only ascertain the evidence: in the “ethnic” subjects of RF, the family type of agrarian structure prevails. Thus, in six “ethnic” regions out of nine, the agrarian structure of family type has formed, only two regions out of “ethnic” republics and regions are characterized by corporate type of agrarian structure, and in regions agrarian structure of family type has formed.
The efficiency of corporate enterprises. The agrarian structures of family type are forming in those regions, where large agricultural enterprises are inefficient and unable to adapt to market conditions. In the regions where the enterprises of corporate type prevail, only 1/3 of agricultural enterprises are unprofitable, and in the regions with family type of agrarian structure, the share of unprofitable enterprises in the total number of agricultural enterprises is nearly 2 times higher.
Regional agrarian policies. Alongside with the above mentioned objective factors, agrarian structures are seriously influenced by regional agrarian policies. For example, the agrarian structure of family type which forms in Saratov and Samara regions are probably the result of regional agrarian policies oriented towards the support of family sector. On the contrary, the maintenance of collective enterprises in Tatarstan, Murmansk and Chukotskiy regions can be explained by the strong regional budgetary support of AgOs.
6. The State Policy of the Support of Large and Small Business As far back as in the beginning of the reform period, the policy of multi-structured agrarian sector and the equal economic conditions for all types of enterprises was declared. All the programs of the development of agro-industrial complex that have been adopted during the recent 15 years, included such statements. However, they has never implemented. The real policy and the major part of acting politicians are oriented towards the support of large and the restraints of small agricultural business.
The system of subsidies and compensations paid from federal budget is oriented only towards large agricultural producers. Individual subsidiary plots are deprived of such support, as they are not even mentioned in the budgetary code. In fact, budgetary cash resources are not available for individual subsidiary plots. In the beginning of the reform period, peasant (farm) holdings Нефедова Т. Г.. Сельская Россия на перепутье: географические очерки. М.: Новое издательство, 2003.-408с.
received budgetary credits designed for the support of holdings at the initial stage of development. Later on, the support was rejected.
Nominally, peasant (farm) holding are equal in right with other agricultural producers in gaining the partial compensation of interest rate for bank credits. However, only 1% of peasant (farm) holdings have used this possibility, because it is rather difficult for a them to get bank credit as banks are not interested in crediting micro-debtors. Besides, budget did not provided for the subsidies for credits gained from farm credit cooperatives.
Large and medium AgOs are the major recipients of subsidies and compensations, but the major share of these subsidies is received by the largest AgOs.
The distribution of subsidies among AgOs. In Russia, agricultural production is subsidized from regional and local budgets. In 2001, only 29.4% of subsidies has been paid to AgOs from federal budget. The thrusts of subsidizing are also significantly differ. Subsidies paid from federal budget are used mainly for the compensation of losses caused by natural disasters, for capital investment, for the support of cattle breeding and seed-growing. Small subsidies paid from regional agrarian budgets are used for livestock production, the increase of soil fertility, etc.
The recipients of subsidies. Both agricultural producers and intermediaries such as processing plants, suppliers, and traders have the right to get subsidies form agrarian budget. For example, in 2001, the federal agrarian budget constituted 20.8 billion rubles, of which only 5.4 billion rubles was transferred directly to agricultural enterprises. The rest funds were used for the maintenance of bureaucracy or distributed among intermediaries, suppliers, contractors, etc.
The availability of subsidies. The subsidies are not equally available for various AgOs: 15.2% of enterprises has not received subsidies at all, and 19.8% has received in average 45 thousand rubles. At the same time, 1.4% of enterprises received 22.5% of all the subsidies (each enterprises of this group has received more than 10 billion rubles in the form of subsidies and compensations). Some AgOs have received even greater amounts of subsidies. Three largest recipients have received nearly 200 billion rubles.
In many countries, the total amount of budgetary subsidies and compensations that an enterprise can receive is restrained. For example, in the USA, a farm can not receive from the budget more than $ 50,000. Thus, large corporations can not receive super-large subsidies and compensations from the budget. In Russia, there are no such restraints, so the Russian agrarian budget is used to the benefit of large business while the USA budget is used mainly for the support of small business.
7. The AgOs Impact to the Development of Family Holdings In Russia, collective enterprises and individual subsidiary plots are traditionally closely interconnected. In individual subsidiary plots, a part of work is accomplished with the help of machinery of collective enterprises. For example, the AgO’s machinery is used for plaguing, furrow cutting, hilling, and digging the most important crops produced by individual subsidiary plots, e.g., potatoes.
The role of collective enterprises in livestock production of individual subsidiary plots is even more serious. Usually, individual subsidiary plots acquire young animals (calves, piglets, and chickens) in collective enterprises which also helps in hay-making and hay transportation.
Collective enterprises distribute among the workers and sell them at a cut prices grain and grain wastes which are used for cattle and poultry feeding in their individual subsidiary plots.
Collective enterprises also support the sales of livestock products. In harvesting, transportation, and milk sales, their role is vitally important.
A lot of Russian economists and politicians share the opinion that there is a direct correlation between the level of the development of collective enterprises and individual subsidiary plots, i.e., the higher the level of the development of a collective enterprise, the higher the level of the development of and individual subsidiary plots allocated at the same territory. Family holdings are closely linked with collective enterprises as they use their resources, so they can not develop without the support of collective enterprises. This support is the basic condition of the survival of individual subsidiary plots.
But the opposite view also exist: family holdings allocated on a given territory become more developed as the collective enterprises weaken, because people loss their work in collective enterprise and have to spend more time in their individual subsidiary plots or create peasant (farm) holdings. The resources of weakening collective enterprises step by step pass to the hands of family holdings.
Finally, the third view exists: peasants’ plots existed during centuries, they existed before the appearance of collective enterprises, and they exist on the territory where there is no collective enterprises today. Thus, there is no direct correlation between these two forms of enterprises. For the efficient work of large agricultural enterprises, it is necessary to put their relations with individual subsidiary plots on a commercial basis, otherwise individual subsidiary plots will destroy collective enterprises, stealing their resources and using them in individual subsidiary plots.
For the testing of the hypothesis of the interrelation of the level of the development and efficiency of large AgOs and one of family holdings, the subjects of RF were grouped according to the share of unprofitable large and medium AgOs. The analysis of the results of the study let draw a set of important conclusions.
1. The output of the plots of population calculated per a family is rather sustainable and practically does not vary by regions. The variance coefficients are 1.5-2 times lower than ones of the output of AgOs and individual subsidiary plots (per one rural family). The variation of the output of the plots of population by the subjects of RF weakly correlates with the variation of AgOs’ output. By the regions, the volume of output in the plots of population does not correlate with the efficiency of AgOs.
2. The lower the efficiency of AgOs, the lower their role (and, consequently, the higher the role of family holdings) in agricultural production in the region. While in the first group AgOs produce 51.5% of the gross agricultural output, in the last group they produce only 26,1% of the gross agricultural output (Figure 17).
3. The change of the share of family holdings in gross agricultural output does not at all correlate with the change of the area of the used agricultural land. This most likely can be explained by the invalid statistical data concerning the area of land used by individual subsidiary plots and gross agricultural output.
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