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forced, which will not absorb a considerable DO ton of the money to be distributed, in salaries commis sions to the agents employed in the proce' and in the various losses and depreciations whic arise from other causes; and the practical effect such an attempt must ever be to burthen the pet pie with taxes, not for purposes beneficial to then but to swell the profits of deposite banks and SUI port band of useless public officers.

 A distribution to the people is impracticable and unjust ia other respects. It would be taking one mans property and giving it to another. Such would be the unavoidable re- suit 0t rule of equality (and none other is spoken of, or would be likely to be adopted)

 lnasmuch as there IS TO mode by which the amount of the individual contributions of our citizens to the public revenue can be ascer-- tained. We know that they contribute une- qually, and a rule therefore that would dis tribute to them equally, would be liable to all the objections which apply to the principle of an equal division of property. To make the

 general government the instrument of carry

 ing this odious principle nto effect, would be

 at once 10 destroy the means of it's usefulness,

 ana change the character designed for it by

 the tramers of the constitution.

 But the more extended and injurious con-

 sequences likely 10 result from policy which

 would collect a surplus revenue for the pur-

 pose of distributing it. may be inrcihly' illus

 trated by an examination of the ects alrea-

 dy produced ny the present deposte acl.-

 This act, although certainly designed to SC. cure the safe keeping of the pubic revenue, is not entirely free in it's tendencies from ulany Of the objections which apply to this principle of distribution. The government had, with out necessity, received from the people a large surplus, which, instead Of being employ ed as relotore, and returned to them by means Of the public expenditure, was deposit- ed with Sundry banks. The banks proceeded 10 make loans upon this surplus, and thus converted i' into banking capital; and in this way it has tended to multiply bank charters, and has had great agency im producing spirit of wild speculation. The possession and use of property out of which this surplus was created, belong lo the people but the government has transferred it's possession te incorporated banks, whose interest and effort II IS 10 make large profits out of its use. This process need only be stated to show it's inius- tice and bad policy.

 And the same observations apply 10 the influence which is produced by the steps ne- cessary to collect, as well as to distribute such q revenue. About three-flihs of all the du- ties on imports are paid in the city of New York, but it is obvious the means 10 pay those duties are drawn from every quarter of ihe Union. Every citizen in every State. who purchases and consumes an article which has paid duty at that port, contributes to the accommodating mass. The surplus collected there must. therefore. be made up of moneys or property withdrawn from other points and elhhr states. Thus the wealth and business of every region from which these surplus, funds proceed, must be to some extent injured, while that "l the place where the funds are concentrated, and are employed in banking, are proportlonalIy extended. But both in making the transfer of the funds which are first necessary 10 pay the duties and collect the snrplus-and in making!lhe re-transfer, which becomes necessary when the time riveS for the distribution of that surplus ihere is a considerable period when the funds cannot be brought into use; and it is manifest that, besides the loss inevitable from such an operation, lis tendency is to produce f1uciua- tons in the business of the country, which are always productive of speculation, and detrimt nlal to the interests of regular trade. Argument Gan scarcely be necessary 10 show that a measure of this character ought not te receive further legislative encouragement.

 By examining the practical operation of lhe ratio for distribution, adopted in the dep0site bill of the last session, we shall diacover other features, that appear equally objectionable. Let t be assumed, for the sake Ol argument, thai the surplus moneys 10 be deposited with the States have teen collected, and belong to them, in the ratio of their fedral representa- tive populaiion--an assumption founded upon inc tact that any detcencles m our future revenue from imposts and public lands. must be made up by direct taxes, collected from the Sates in that ratio. It is proposed to distribute the surplus, say $3O,O0O, 900, not according 10 inc ratio in which 1t has been collected aud belongs to the people of the States, but in that Of their votes in the cole. ges of electors of President and Vice Presi- dent. The effect of distribution upon that ratio is shown by the annexed table, masked A.

 By an examination of that table, it will be perceived that in the distribution of SUP plus sof $3O, ,00O, ,OO0, upon that basis, shele