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regards representation as the true measure of taxation; and it. will be found that the ten. dency Ot that departure will be to increase whatever inequalities have been supposed to attend the OperaliOm ot our ieJersl system m respect to it's bearing upon the different inter- esls of the Union. ln making the basis 0i re-

 presentation the basis of taxation, the iranI- CTS of tho Constitution intended io equalIZe the burdens which are necessary to support the Government; and the adoption oI that ra.

 liO, while t accomplished this object, was aI- SO the means Of adjusting other great topics arising out Of the conflicting vIews respecting the political equality 0r the various members ofthe conIederacy. Whatever therefore dis lurbs the liberal spirit of the compromises which esta blished rule of taxation 80 just and equitable, and which experience has pro. we'd to he so we'll adapted to the genius and habits of our people, should he received with the greatest caution and distrust.

 A bare inspection, in the annexed table, of the differences produced by the ratio used in the deposile ac:, compared with the results of distribution according to the ratio of direct mind that the former ratio contravenes the spirit of the constitution, and produces de- gree Of injustice in the operation of the iede. raj government which would be fatal to the hope of perpetuatng it. By the ratio of direct taxation, for example. the Staie of Delaware, m the collection of S3O,000,0 900 of revenue, would pay into the Treasury $1s3, ,7l6,-and in a distribution of S3O,OOO, ,OO0 she would receive back from the Government, accord ing to tho ratio of the deposite bill, the sum of $306, l22: and similar results would follow the comparison between the small and the large States throughout the Union: thus re- alizing to the small States an advantage that would doubtless be as unacceptable 10 them, as motive for incorporating the principle in any syctem which would produce t, as it would be inconsistent with the rights and ex- pectations of the large States. It was cer- lainly the intention of that provision of the nnposts and excses" shall be uniform thro' out the United States," 10 make the burdens of taxation fall equally upon the people, in whatever State of the Union they may reside But what would be the value of such an uni form rule if the moneys raised hy it could be immediately returned by different one which will give tn the people of some States much more, and to those of others much less, than the fair proportions? Were the federal govern products and manufactures fsome portions of the country from all duties, while it imposed heavy ones on others, the injustice could not he greater. It would be easy io show how, by the operation of such principle, the large States of ,he Union would not only have 10 contribute their just share towards inc sup port of the Federal Government, but also have 70 bear in some degree the taxes necessary to support the Government of their smaller sis. ters but II s deemed unnecessary 10 state the | details where the general principle is so obv OuS.

 A system liable to such objections can never be supposed to have been sanctioned by the framers of the constitution, when they conferred on Con- gress the taxing power; and feel persuaded that a mature examination of the subject will satisfy every one that there are insurmountable difficult. vised of collecting revenue for tho purpose ofds- nibuting it. Congress- is only authorized to levy taxes to pug the debts and prooide for the conn mon defense and general aoarfare cf Me United States" There is no such provision as would au- thorize Congress to collect together the property of the country, under the name of revenue, for the purpose of dividing it equally or unequaly among the States or the people. Indeed it is not probable that such an idea ever occurred to the States when they adopted the constitution. But however this may be, the only safe rule for us s iN interpreting the powers granted to the Federal Government is to regard the absence of express authority to touch subject so important and del. icate as this is, as equivalent to prohibition.

 Even if our powers were less doubtful in this respect, as the constitution now stands thore are considerations afforded by recent experience, which would seem to make it our duty, to avoid a resort to such system.

 All will admit that the simplicity and econnmy of the State Governments mainly depeMl on the fact that money has to be supplied to support them by the same men, or their agents, who vote it away in appropriations. Hence, when there are extravagant and was,eful appropriations, there must be a corresponding increase of taxes :; and the people, becoming awakened, will necessarily scrutinise the character of measures which tbus increase their burdens. By the wa,chfn eye of self interest," the agents of the people in the State Governments are repressed. and kept within tho limits of just economy. But if the necessity of levying the taxes be taken from those who make the appropriations, and thrown upon more distant and less responsible set of public agents