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0o0y Of men Jar removed from the people, in

 which the farming and mechanic interests would ually lose their purity as well as their indepen. dence; they would not dare to murmur at the proceedings of the General Government, lest they should lose their supplies; all would be merged In practical consolidation, cemented by widc- spread corruption, which could only be eradica. ted by one of those bloody revolutions which oc- casiOnaIly overthrow the despotic system of the old world.

 In all the other aspects in which have been able to look at the effect of such a principle of distribution upon the best interests of the country, can see nothing to compensate for the disadvan. tages to which have adverted If we consider the protective duties, which are, in great degree, the source of the surplus revenue, beneficial to one section of the Union, and prejudcial to another, there is no corrective for the evil in such plan of distribution. On the contrary, there is reason to fear that all the complaints which have sprung from this cause would be aggravated. Ev- cry one must be sensible that distribution ofthe surplus must beget a disposition to cherish the means which create it; and any system, there- fore, into which it enters, must have powerful tendency to increase, rather than diminish the ta- riff. If 1t were even admitted that the advanta- ges of such system could be made equal to all the sections of the Union, the reasons already so urgently calling for reduction of the revenue, would, nevertheless, lose none of their force it will always be impropable that an intelligent and vlrtuous community can consent 10 raise sur plus for the mere purpose of dividing it, diminished as 1t inevitably must be by the expences of the various machinery necessary to the process.

 The safest and simplest mode of obviating all the difficulties which have been mentioned, is to collect only revenue enough to meet the wants of the government, and let the people keep the bal ance of the property in their own hands, to be used for their own profit Each State will then support it's own Government, and contribute it's due share towards the support of tho General Government. Thers would be no surplus to cramp and lessen the resources of individual wealth and enterprise, and the banks would be left to their ordinary means. Whatever agitations and fluctuations might arise from our unfortunate paper !system, they could never be attributed, justly or unj justly, to the action of the Federal Government. There would be some guaranty that the spirit of wild speculation, which seeks to convert the surplus revenue into banking cap- ital, would be ehectually checked, and that the scenes of demoralization, which are now so prev. alent through the land, would disappear.

 Without desiring to conceal that the ex. perience and observation of the last two years, have operated a partial change in my views upon this interesting subject, it is never theless regretted that the suggestions made by me m my annual messages of 1899 and 1880, have been greatly misunderstood. At that time, the great struggle was against that alatit,,di. marian construction of the constitution, which authorizes the unlimited appropriation of the revenues of the Union to internal improvements within the States, tending to invest in the hands, and place under the control of the General Gov ernment, all the principal roads and canals of the country, in violation of State rights, and in de- rogaon of State authority. At the same time, the condition of the manufacturing interests was such as to create an apprehension that the duties on imports could not, without extensive mischief, he reduced m season to prevent the accumula- ton of a considerable surplus after the payment of the national debt In view of the dangers of such surplus, and ill preference to i,s applica- ton to internal improvements, in derOgaOn of the rights and powers of the States, the sugges. ton ot an amendment of the constitution to au- th0rlze its distribution was made. It was an alter native for whatwere deemed grea,er evils-a tenn. porary resort to relieve an overburdened Treas. nry until the Government coud without sud. den and destructive revnlsion in the business of the country, gradually return tO the just princi. pie ot raising no more revenue from the people, in taxes, than is necessary for it's economical sun. port. Even that alternative was not spoken of but in connection wthan amendment of the con. stitnlion No temporary inconvenience can ius- nty the exercise ofa prohibited power or d pow CT not granted by that instrument; and it was from conviction that the power to distribute even temporary surplus Of revenue is of that character, that it Was suggested only in connec. ton with an appeal to he son, ce of all legal DOW. er in the General Government, the States

 which have established it. No such appeal has

 been taken. and in my opinion distribution of

 .he surplus revenue by Congress, either to the

 States or the people, is 10 be consiicredas as among

 the prohibitions of the constitution. As already minated, my views have undergone change. soiar as to he convinced that no alteration of he constitution in this respect is wiso or expedient. The ini1rence of an accommodating surplus upon the lrgsls,on of the General Government and the States, it's effect upon the credit system of the country, producing dangerous extensions and rninons con,ractions, fluctuations in the price of property. rash speculation, idleness, ex.