{"character_count": 4976, "word_count": 878, "ccnet_language_score": [0.9376999735832214], "ccnet_perplexity": [2094.800048828125], "fasttext_language": ["en"]}

military aud naval commanders we're or.
defed 10 conquer and ho.d lLem. subject
to hr disposrd ol BY a treaty of peace.


These provinces are naw ia our undis.
puled occupation, aud have been so ior
many monlhs-all resistance on the pan oil
Mexico having ceased within their limits.
! am satisfied that they sbould never be sur.
rendered TO Mexico, Should Congress
concur with me in ills opinion, aud that
they should br retained by the United States
AS lndumnity, ! can perceive no good fea.
son why the civil jurisdiction ani the laws
ol the United States should not at once be
extended over them.


To wait Tor a treaty of peace, such as
we are willing TO make, BY which our 70.
laliuns 10 them would not be changed, can.
not bo good policy, whilst aur own inter-
esis and TINT ollhe people inhabliing them,
require that stable, responsible, and ffea
government, under our authority, should be
as soon a. possible established over them
should Congress, therefore, determine n
hold these Provinces permanently, that they
shall hereafter be considered constituent
parts Of the country, the early establish.
ment oil territorial Government over them
viii be important iot the more perfect pro.
lection oil persons and property; and
recommend that such territorial govern.
Inenl be eel ,bshed. twill promote peace
and tranquility among the inhabitants by
allayns all apprehension that they may
entertain oi being subjected again 10 the
jurisdiction Of Mexico. invite the early
aud favorable consideration of Congress 10
this important subject.


Besides New Mexico aud the Caliiofnias,
there are other Mexican provinces which
have been reduced TO our possession by
conquest. These other MeIican prov sinees
are governed by our military and naval
commanders, under the general authority
which Is conferred upon conqueror by the
laws Of war.


They sh,ud c0ntaue TO bc held as a
neans al eoercing Mexico 10 acceed 10 Just
terms oi peace. Civil Us well US military
officer. are required 10 ennduc, such Gov.
eminent. Adequate compensation to be
dawn from contribution levied on the en-.
crny, should be liked by law for such off.
GERS as may be thus eiaployed. Whalfur.
lher may become necessary, and what ii.
nal disposition Il my b. proper TO make
ol them must depend on the future progress
OF the war and the course Mexico may
think proper hereafter 10 pursue.


With The views | entertain cannot Ia.
yof the policy which has been suggested
either 10 withdraw our armies altogether,
or TO retire TO designated line, aud sim.
ply hold and defend II. 10 withdraw our
army altogether iram the eonquesis they
have made by deeds oiunparalleled bravery.
and al the expense OF so much blood aud
treasure, IN war just on our part, and ono
which, by the act Of the enemy, Wa could
not honofably have avoided. would be TO
degrade tho nation in ils own estimation
aud in that oi the world, To retire to
line aud simply hold and defend Il, would
not terminate the war. On the contrary, il
would encourage IeIco to perseyere and
tend 10 prolracl II indefinitely.


IL is not 10 be expected that Mexico, az
ter refusing TO establish such line as
permanen. boundary, when our victorious
armies are in possession Of her capital and
heart Of her country, would permit Us to
hold II without resistance. That she would
continue the war, aud that 10 the most ba.
RAISING aud aGaoying forms, there eau DO
no doubt.


A border warfare, Of a mos, savage
character extending over long limo,
would be increasingly waged. I, would 70.
quire large army 10 be kept continually
IN the field, stat oned at forts and garrisons
along such "a line, to project and defend il.
The enemy relieved from the presence 81
our arms ON his coasts and in the popu.
lous parts oi the interior, would direct, and,
selecting an isolated post for attack, would
concentrate bis force upon il. This would
be u condition oi affairs which tho Meri-
cans pursuing their favor,e system Of guer.
rilla warfare would probably prefer to any
other. Were we 10 assume defensive
attitude on such a line, all the advantages
OF such state vi war would be on The
side OF the enemy. We could levy 10 con.
trlbuIions upon HIN or in any other way
make MN ieel lhc pressure vi tue war;
but must remain inactive and await his ap.
proach, being in constant uncertainty a,
what point ol the line or at what time he
might make the assault. lie may Assem-.
bIe and organize an Overwhelming force
in the interior, ON bis own side of the line.
and conceai'ng his purpose, make sudden
assault upon some one of our posts so dis /.
Ianl from any other as 10 prevent the pos.
slbility OF succor or reihlorcemsnts; and
in this way cur gallant army would be ex.
posed 10 the dansoroi being cut off in de.
tail, or II, In their unriyaled bravery and
ProwesS everywhere exhibited during ih.
war, they should repulse the enemy, their
numbers stationed al any one point may bs
too small TO pursue him. Should the enc.
my be repulsed in an attack, he will have