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o
side killed and forty-fye wounded Some of
the leaders in this scheme for general massacre who had
survived the several engagements by which the outbreak
suppressed, tried, convicted, and executed


Occasionally through the Of the last summer
of grazing parties along the line Of eastern settlements
attacked by Struggling bands of Mexicans and Indians
embodied for predatory purposes and some loss sustained
on both Sides


from the State of Missouri who engaged only twelve
months. The Of their service expired in August and
early April and May others engaged for the
ceped take their places making the present force in New
Mexico about three thousand six hundred and thirty men,
including battalion for service in the Indian country the
routes to Santa Fe and Oregon


On the 3ls of March call made the State of Mis-
souri, for regiment OF mounted volunteers part of which
directed be employed in establishing military posts on
the Oregon, pursuant the of the 10th of May
1896 and the remainder ordered Santa Fe supply
the place Of the twelve months whose of service
would expire in the summer Afterwards this direction
modified that the whole regiment pressed Santa
Fe, and battalion of similar troops from the State
assigned to the duty of establishing the Oregon posts


Upon full consideration of the subject, determined 10
conne the operations Of the year military stations
both this side Of the Rocky mountains Instructions
given and the necessary arrangements made for post
Grand Island, where the road Oregon strikes the Platte
river and another at Fort Laramie. As the former
in the region where Indian depredaons had been
mitted and force there would hold the Indians check
the earliest attention directed TO be given that work.
but the approach of winter has necessarily suspended it. Not
much progress has been yet made in its construction beyond
the collection Of materials and the needu preparations
1 ryng II on early in the spring.


Our Of success, dsasousto Mexico conquest
OF many Of her States and Territories the subugaon
occupation of her capital the defeat and dispersion of her
mics the capture of most of her maerl of war, and the
inhalation OF her foreign have not yet brought peace
the offer OF such terms could be accepted by United
States without national degradation The still continues
and is proper to present suggestions regard its
further prosecution In making these suggestions pass with
out remark, the proposition that should abandon all
acquisitions and withdraw troops from the enemys
try Such proposition could only be seriously entertained
If we IN reality the vanqushed party and convinc
ed of our inability poong the with reasonable hopes
| of success


in of the three following modes first to take and hold
indemnity lines 10 recede from all places and positions
occupied IN advance it, and from all aggressive ope
raons beyond that ne second, the whole coun-
try and hold all the principal places in it by permanent gar
risons and, d TO retain what possess open the
lines OF communication into the Interior and extend ope-
aons to other important places and the prospect
OF advantages shall ndicaekeepng disposable force al
ways ready within approachabe limits annoy the enemy
seize supplies, enforce contributions and Illustrate his efforts
to collect and assemble troops for the purpose pro-
tracing the


full discussion Of the comparative merits of these modes
of conducting military operations would extend this COM
munication 10 unwarrantable length shall, therefore,
conne my remarks to few prominent considerations relative
| to each.


With reference speedy peace with proper indemnity
and securiy-the only object of the war-he nepocy
garded Objectionable II present position cannot COM
mand acceptable terms of paccaon from Mexico retiring
indemnity line would certainly fail to produce such re
suit would weaken the inducements of the enemy TO put
end TO hostes Restored by voluntary surrender
to the possession OF his capital and important departments
and relieved from the pressure of and from all a


rehensons OF further conquest and annoyance beyond the
limits might select he would be left with abundant
than he possesses prepare leisure and
security to strike effective blow with concentrated forces
at our detached posts 10 hold these posts safely retain





within the policy and prevent ncusons the territories
which might choose TO appropriate to ourselves would
my opinion, require force large would suffice
tain what we occupy and carry operations still
further IN the interior OF the enemys country, and make him
feel the calames of best calculated to induce
him to seek for peace But in this mistaken, and the
linepocy should enable to reduce the number Of
troops still II will not conceive, thereby effect reduc
\ ton Of our actual expenditures for the war.


In consequence of the interruption Of intercourse between
the seaports IN our possession, and the central parts Of Mex
CO. the collections on imports have hitherto been nconsdea
be IL the hne-polcy adopted, this intercourse will


nue 10 be interrupted and consequently the receipts Of
enue from this source will he small


Under the operation Of the epocy all expectation Of les
senng the burden Of sustaining troops by deriving sup
Plies and contributions from the enemy would be disappoin
ed The supplies in the vicinity posts would be with
drawn from reach design seize and ap-
pIoprate them was ascerained suspected But, it
otherwise, posts would be from the wealth
and resources of the country the which could be OBJ
! taned would be inconsiderabe.


80 far from deriving advantage from the line policy by way
OF obtaining assistance from the Of the enemy
wards the support d our troops, Should apprehcnd
fer upon portion OF the people of Mexico direct benefit by
opening to them at posts market which should
become the purchasers of their products exoban price.
These considerations, without bringing into view Others have
led me to look to of the other modes Of operation have
mentioned preferable that Of occupying indemnity
line


lnegard to the second mode suggestedha OF occupying
the whole counyhe wide extent Of territory embraced in
the Mexican Republic the many important points TO be gar


soned and the long lines of communication be kept opeh
present difficulties of ordinary magnitude il occupancy
Il be OF such character supersede the Mexican
thoy, and require the temporary establishment Of civil go
Vernmen In carrying this plan into effect it would not be
reasonable TO rely upon the favorable disposition " neu-
iraity OF any considerable part Of the Mexican people, until
some assurance OF the stability Of power derived from
ITS continuance Our posts must therefore, be sirong and
our orces numerous in order the many and long
lines Of communication to dpee and chase the guerrilla
hands which would obstruct hem and suppress the
powerful upsngs Of the people, wherever they may be
tempted cannot safely estimate The force requisite
into full elect this plan less than seventy thousand
To ensure the presence of tina: number the cncmys
try and al places where they would be wanted, il would be
necessary to raise much larger force The great expense
OF raising organizing and sending their remote destination
so large body OF troops needed give effect
this plan would aPpehend, bring very heavy and perhaps
embarrassing demand upon the Treasury.


The third mode presented in my Judgment preferable
the others Beyond certain limits il admits Of expansion and
contraction but as fixed condition. all held he
retained, and part surrendered but compliance with treaty


puaons This plan also contempaes further acquisitions
,al.a-.a -