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upper and the neither millstome. All this should have been fOreseen. It is idle to say that these evils might have been prevented by the Bank. if it had exerted itself to prevent them. That is mere matter of opinion; it may be true, or it may not; hut il was the business of those who proposed the removal of the DepOsites, tO ask themselves how it W as probable the Bank would act, when they should attack il, assaf Its credit, and allege the violation by it of it's charter; and thus compel tt tO take attitude, al least of stern defence. The community have certainly a right to hold those answerable, who have unnecessarily got into this quarrel with the Bank, and thereby occasiOned the evil. let the conduct 0f the Bank, in the course of the controversy, be ! what tt may.

 In my opinion, sir, the great source ofthe 2 EeviI is the shock which the measure has given | to eomfdence in the commercial world The credit of the whole system of the currency of the country seems shaken. The State Banks have lost credit, and lost confidence. They have suffered vastly more than the Bank of I the $. itself. at which the blow was aimed. [ The derangement of internal exchanges is one of the most disastrous consequences of the measure. By the origin ofits charter, by it's unqucstioned solidity. by the fact that II

 was at home every tehere. and in perfect credit |

 accomplished the internal exchanges of the

 country with vast facility, and at an unprece-

 dented cheap rate. The State Banks can

 never accomplish this for the reason given r in the Boston Resolutions, they cannot act l with the same concert, the same identity of purpose. Look at the Prices Current, and see the change in the value of the notes of distant banks in the great cities. Look at the depression of the stocks of the State Banks, deposite banks and all. Look at what must happen the moment the Bank the U. States, in its process of winding up. or to meet any other crisis, shall cease to buy domestic bills. especially in the Southern, Southwestern, and Western markets. Can any man doubt what would be the state of exchange when that takes place? or can any one doubt its neces- 1 sary effect on the price of produce ? The l Bank has purchased bills to the amount of sixty millions year, as appears by docu- lnents, heretofore laid before the Senate. great portion of these. no doubt, was pur- chased in the South and West, against ship l ments of the great staples ofthose quarters of the country. When the Bank shall cease to buy, as it must cease, consequences cannot I but be felt, much severer even than those now experienced. This is inevitable. But, sir, ! go no farther into particular statements. My l opinion, repeat, is, that the present distress

 is immediately accustomed. beyond alt doubt.

 by the removal of the deposites !; and that just

 such consequences might have been, and ought to have been foreseen from that meas

 ure, as we do now perceive & feel around us. l Sir, I do not believe, nevertheless, that

 these consequences were iOreseen. With

 such foresight, the deposites, think, would

 not have been touched. The measure has

 operated more deeply and more widely, than

 was expected. We all may find proof of this,

 in the conversations of every hour. No one'

 who seeks to acqnaint himself with the opin-

 ions ofmen, in and out of Congress. can doubl that, 1.-the act were now to be done, it would receive very lit!s encouragement @ M or support deposites has produced the pressure, as Its } immediate effect, not so much by withdraw

 ing large sum of money, as by alarming the

 confidence of the community. by breaking in

 on the well adjusted relations of the Govern

 ment and the Bank, agree again, with the Boston Resolutions. that the natural remedy is restoration of the relation in which the Bank has heretofore stood to Government. agree, sir, that this question ought to be settled, and to be settled soon. And yet. iii be decided that if the present state of things shall exist-ifit be the determination of Con- gress to do nothing in order to put an end to the unnatural. distrustful, half belligerent, present condition of the Government and the Bank, do not look for any great reliefto the { community, or any early quieting of the pub ! lie agitation. On the contrary. expect in- ! creased difficulty, and increased disquiet. The public moneys are now out of the Bank of the United States. There is no law regulating their custody, or fixing their place. They are at the disposal of the Secretary of the Treasury. to be kept where he pieases, as he pleases, and the places of their custody to be changed as often as he peases.

 Now, sir. do not think this is a state of things in which the country is likely to acqui- esce. <4s*

 Mr. President, the restoration of the de- posites is question distinct and by itself. It does not necessarily involve any other ques- ton. It stands clear of al! controversy and all opinion. about re-chartering the Bank, or creating any new Bank.

 | But wish, nevertheless, sir, to say few words of a bearing somewhat beyond that question. Being of opinion that the country is not likely to be satisfied with the present state of things. have looked earnestly for the suggestion of some prospective measure some system to be adopted as the future poli-

 cy ofthe country. Where are the public mo-

 neys hereafter to, be kept? In what curren- cy is the revenue hereafter to be collected T. What is to take the place of the Bank in our

 general currency system? How are we to preserve a uniform currency, uniform meas ure of the value of property, and the value oi