sas7 ssy EsEs sEg,TEeANTD A YEsDaEANS
less Government in the strict sense of tletern, within the sphere ofits power, than the Governments created by the constitutions of the States arc. within theirrespeetive spheres. Itis like them organized into Legislative, Executive tive, and Judiciary Departments. 1t oper- ates, like them, directly on persons and things. And, like them, 1t has at com .mand physical force for executing the powers committed to 1t. The concur rent operation in certain cases, is one oi the features marking the peculiarly of the system.

 Between these different constitution Ial Governments, the one operating in all the States, the others operating separ- ately in each, with the aggregate pow CTS of Government divided between them, it could not escape attention, that controversies would arise concerning the boundaries of jurisdiction; and that some provision ought to be made for such occurrences. A political system that does not provide for a peaeeable and authoritative termination of occur ring controversies, would not be more than the shadow of a Government; the object and end of real Govern ment being, the substitution of law and order, for uncertainty, confusion and violence.

 That to have left a fnal decision, in such cases, to each of the States, then thirteen, and already twenty four could not fail to make the constitution and laws of the United States different in different States, was obvious; and not less obvious. that this diversity of in- dependent decisions, must altogether distract the government of the Union, and speedily putan end to the Union it. self. An uniform authority Of the laws, IS in itself a vital principle. Some oi the most important tan lays could Eoe De partially executed. They must be ex- ecuted in all the States, ,or theY could be duly executed in none. An impost, oran excise, for example, ifnotin forceinsome States, would be defeated in others. + IS well known that this was among the lessons of experience. which had q pri- mary influence in bringing about tbe existing constitution. 4 loss of it's gen eral authority would moreover revive the exasperating questions between the States holding ports for foreign com merce, and the adjoining States without them; to which are now added, all the inland States, necessarily carrying on their foreign commerce through other States.

 To have made the decisions under the authority of the individual States, coordinate, in all cases, with decisions under the authority of the United States, would unavoidably produce collisions incompatible with the peace of society, and with that regular and efficient ad- ministration, which is of the essence of free governments. Scenes could not be avoided, in which ministerial off, Ger of the United States, and the cor respondent officer ofan individual State. would have rencounters ill executing conflicting decrees, the result of which would depend on the comparative force of the local posses attending them; and that, a casualty depending CT the polit- .ical opinions and party feelings in differ ent States.

 To have referred every clashing di- cision under the two authorities. for a final decision, to the States as parties to the Constitution, would be attended with delays, with inconyenienees, and with expenses, amounting to pro- hibition of the expedient; not to men, ton it's tendency to impair the salutary veneration for a system requiring such frequent interpositions, nor the delicate questions which might present them selves as to the form of stating the ap- peal and as to the quorum for deciding 1t.

 To have trusted to negotiation for adjusting disputes between the govern, ment of the United States and the state governments, as between independent and separate sovereignties, would have lost sight i,!.t altogether of 3 constitution and government for the Union; and 0 pened a direct road from failure of that resort, to the ultimate ratio between na- tions wholly independent of and alien to each other. If the idea had its ori- gin in the process of adjustment, be- tween separate branches of the same government, the analogy entirely fails,