macy i'll the exposition and execution of the law: nor to the destruction of all equipoise between the Federal Goyeril- ment and the State Governments, if, wbilst the functionaries of the Federal Government are directly or indirectly elected by and responsible to the States, and the iunctionaries of the States are il their appointment and responsibility whollyindependent of fthe United States, no constitutional control of any sort be- longs tso the | States over the States. Under saehan organization, it is evident that that ii would be in the power of the States, individually, to pass unauthori- Fed laws, and to carry them into com plete effect, any thing in tbe Censtita- ton and laws of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding. This would be q nullilying power in its nlen- ary character, and whether 1t had it's f- nal effect, through the Legislative, Ex- ecutlve, Or Judiciary organ of the State. would be equally fatal to the constituted relation between the two Governments.

 Should the provisions of the Consti- tuition as here reviewed be found not to secure the governments and rights oI the States, against usurpations and abn- ses on the part of the United States, the final resort within the purview of the Constitution lies in an amendment of the Constitution, according to pro- cess applicable by the States.

 And il the event of the failure of ev. cry constitutional resort, and an accu- mutation ofusurpations and abuses, ren- derlng passive obedience and non-re- sistance greater eVl1 than resistance and revolution, there cali remain but one resort; the last of allan appeal from the cancelled obligations of tic compact, to original rights and the law of self preservation. Thisis the aitima ratio un- der all governments, whether eonsolida- ted, confederatedor ora compound of both, and lteannot be doubted that a single member of the Union, in the extremity supposed, but in that only, would have a right, as an extra and ultra consiitu- tional right, to make the appeal.

 This brings us to the expedient late ly advanced, which claims for a single State a right to appeal against an exerz else of power by the Government of the United States decided by the State to be unconstitutional, to the parties to the constitutional compact; the decision of the State to have the effect of nullifying the act of the Government of the Unis- ed States, unless the decision of the State be reversed by three fourths ofthe parties.

 The distinguished names and high au- thoritics which appear to have assert ed and given a practical scope to this doctrine, entitled it to a respect which it might be difficult otherwise to feel for 1t.

 If the doctrine were to be understood as requiring the three fourths of the States to sustain, instead of that portion to reverse the decision of the appealing State, the decision to be without effect during the appeal, it would be sufficient to remark that this extra constitutional course might well give way to thatmark- ed out by the constitution, which author !ses two-thirds Of the States to institute and three-fourthsto effectuatean amend ment of the constitution, establishing a permanent rule of the highest authori- ty, in place of an irregular precedent of constitution only.

 But it IS understood that the nuliify- ing doctrine imports that the decision of the State is to be presumed valid, and that 1t overruies the law of the United States, unless overruled by three-fourths of theStates.

 Can more be necessary to demonstrate the inadmissibility of such a doctrine, than that 1t puts it in the power of the smallest fraction over one fourth of the United States, that is, of seven states out of twenty-four, to give the law and even the constitution to seventeen states, each of the seventeen having, as parties to the constitution, an equal right with the seven, to expound it, and to insist on the exposition? That the seven might, in particular instances, be right, and the seventeen wrong, is more than possible. But 10 establish positive and permanent rule, giving such a pow CT, to such a minority, over such a ma Ijority, would oveTturn the fl first Tst principle fof free government, and in practice ne cessarlly oyerturnthe government itself.