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Ownership unbundling. The Commission practice in assessing the presence of a conflict of interest including in case of financial investors. Brussels, 8/05/2013, SWD(2013) 177 final, 11 p. (Commission staff working document)http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/interpretative_notes/doc/implementation_notes/swd_2013_0177_en.pdfIntroduction :The Electricity Directive and the Gas Directive of the Third energy package1 have introduced a structural separation between transmission system operator activities on the one hand, and generation, production and supply activities on the other hand. The aim of these provisions on "unbundling" of networks is to avoid conflicts of interest and to make sure that transmission system operators ("TSOs") take their decisions independently, ensuring transparency and nondiscrimination towards all network users. This is not only relevant for the day-to-day operational decisions of TSOs, but also for their strategic investment decisions.The present document highlights the Commission's practice in dealing with certain aspects of the rules on unbundling of TSOs, as laid down in the Electricity and Gas Directives. The focus is on the application of the rules on ownership unbundling. In particular, the issue is addressed how the rules on ownership unbundling as set out in Article 9 of the Directives are to be appliedin situations where a shareholder in a TSO also has participations in generation, production and/or supply activities, while it can be demonstrated that in the specific circumstances of the case there is no incentive for this shareholder to influence the decision making in the TSO with the intention to favour his generation, production and/or supply activities to the detriment of other network users...