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Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneCentre de Philosophie Contemporaine de la Sorbonne (PhiCo)Composante  « Expérience &#38; Connaissance » (EXeCO)&#160;Séminaire de recherche 2014-2015 coordonné par Jocelyn Benoist : Le réalisme en questions&#160;Centre Sorbonne, 17 rue de la Sorbonne, Escalier C, 1er étage couloir droite, Salle Lalande&#160;Samedi 28 mars 2015, 10h30-12h30 :Markus Gabriel (Université de Bonn) : Réalisme ontologique&#160;Résumé: In my paper, I will first sketch some of the arguments underpinning the view that to exist is to belong to a domain of objects. In this context, I will introduce the notion of a “field of sense,” which serves the function of avoiding a set-theoretic, purely extentionalist account of domains of objects in terms of domains of (standard) quantification. I argue that there really are irreducibly many fields of sense (ontological pluralism). One might believe that this plurality is somehow due to conceptual activities carving reality/the world up in different ways. Yet, this threatens to amount to an untenable form of ontological antirealism according to which the very referent of the concept of existence (namely: existence) is only fully intelligible if we give an account of our use of that very concept. Against this idea I present a realist version of ontological pluralism, an intermediate position between metaphysical realism (as described and attacked by Hilary Putnam, among many others) and ontological antirealism paradigmatically represented by Kant and Frege.