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Why Finance Ministers Favor Carbon Taxes, Even if They Do not Take Climate Change into Account / Max Franks, Ottmar Edenhofer, Kai Lessmann. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 2015, 52 p. (nota di lavoro ; 2015.037)Authors's abstract : Fiscal considerations may shift governmental priorities away from environmental concerns: Finance ministers face strong demand for public expenditures such as infrastructure investments but they are constrained by international tax competition. We develop a multi-region model of tax competition and resource extraction to assess the fiscal incentive of imposing a tax on carbon rather than on capital. We explicitly model international capital and resource markets, as well as intertemporal capital accumulation and resource extraction. While fossil resources give rise to scarcity rents, capital does not. With carbon taxes the rents can be captured and invested in infrastructure, which leads to higher welfare than under capital taxation. This result holds even without modeling environmental damages. It is robust under a variation of the behavioral assumptions of resource importers to coordinate their actions, and a resource exporter's ability to counteract carbon policies. Further, no green paradox occurs - instead, the carbon tax constitutes a viable green policy, since it postpones extraction and reduces cumulative emissions.Key Legal Issues in the 2015 Climate Negotiations / Daniel Bodansky and Lavanya Rajamani. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, June 2015, 6 p. (C2ES policy brief)In fashioning the new international climate change agreement to be adopted later this year in Paris, parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)1 must address a range of legal issues. This brief outlines some of the key issues and concludes that: The Paris outcome arguably must include a core legal agreement constituting a treaty under international law; the exact title of the core agreement is legally irrelevant; the agreement can contain both binding and non-binding elements ; the legal nature of parties’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs) is independent of where they are housed; and consistency with the UNFCCC does not require that the agreement adopt the same structureAddressing Adaptation in a 2015 Climate Agreement / Irene Suarez and Jennifer Huang. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, June 2015, 6 p. (C2ES policy brief)With the adverse effects of climate change becoming more frequent and intense, all countries face increasing climate risks and adaptation needs. The negotiations toward a new climate agreement in 2015 present an unparalleled opportunity to elevate and advance climate adaptation both within countries and under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The 2015 agreement could establish a clearer global vision for adaptation under the Convention; provide a framework for presenting national adaptation contributions to catalyze adaptation action; streamline and enhance UNFCCC institutions; and mobilize resources to help particularly vulnerable developing countries cope with climate impacts. This brief provides an overview of: 1) UNFCCC provisions and institutional arrangements addressing adaptation, and 2) issues and options in addressing adaptation in the new agreement due at the 21st session of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris. (Issues and options related directly to the provision of finance for adaptation are beyond the scope of this brief.)Differentiation in a 2015 Climate Agreement / Lavanya Rajamani. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, June 2015, 6 p. (C2ES policy brief)A central issue in the ongoing negotiations towards a new international climate change agreement this year in Paris is how the agreement will differentiate obligations among developed and developing countries. Differentiation among parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, based on their “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,” is a defining feature of the international climate change regime. This policy brief outlines the basis for and forms of differentiation in the climate regime, and the key areas where differentiation has arisen in the negotiations for a 2015 agreement. The brief then presents a range of design options, drawn from the climate regime as well as other multilateral environmental agreements, for differentiation in the 2015 agreement. It concludes that the most feasible approach is likely to be a hybrid one that tailors the manner of differentiation to the specific elements of the agreement.Addressing Finance in a 2015 Climate Agreement / Anthony Mansell. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, June 2015, 6 p. (C2ES policy brief)A central issue in the Paris climate negotiations is how the new global climate agreement to be reached this year can help strengthen climate finance for developing countries. Developed countries have committed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to help developing countries reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change. The new agreement will build on steps already taken and define an approach to climate finance for the post-2020 period. This brief provides an overview of: existing finance commitments, institutions and mechanisms under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol; current climate finance flows; potential finance-related objectives in a 2015 climate agreement; and options for addressing finance in the 2015 agreement.National adaptation is also a global concern / Alexandre Magnan, Teresa Ribera &#38; Sébastien Treyer. Paris : Iddri, June 2015,  (working paper n° 4/2015) Présentation(© Iddri) : Although national to subnational levels have a key role to play in adaptation, the international community dealing with climate has also a role to play, beyond raising awareness and providing funds. A central argument is that there is risk that countries will not be able to adapt to the current climate change trajectory, and so that non-adaptation will have impacts beyond national boundaries. This paper thus claims that national adaptation is also a global concern. It then argues for the development of a post-2015 Global Adaptation Goal framework allowing monitoring progress and better sharing experiences and, more importantly, building both a collective understanding of what adaptation means and shared tools to capture adaptation efforts and limitations on the field.