{"word_count": 1097, "character_count": 7701}
 Africa's Oil &#38; Gas Scene After the Boom, Oxford Energy Forum, n° 117, January 2019, 31 p. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/oxford-energy-forum-africas-oil-gas-scene-boom-issue-117/All is not well on the Africa oil and gas scene. Falling global oil  prices in recent years have handicapped efforts to turnaround stagnating  output in major producers as well as slowed new producers from entering  the market. This issue of the Oxford Energy Forum brings  together contributors from industry, academia, and civil society to  offer multiple views of the bright-spots and challenges facing oil and  gas development on the African continent. It focuses on the politics and  economics of seasoned producers in sub-Saharan Africa and the birth of  new oil and gas producers and up-and-comers, and shows that while old  political and security challenges persist, new governance and regional  risks are also impacting the development of new oil and gas industries. La responsabilité civile du fait du dommage  nucléaire civil / Assia El Rherabi (touahri).  Thèse Gestion et management. Université de Limoges, 2018  https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01995195  L’énergie  nucléaire a toujours suscité la polémique. Alors que certains  considèrent qu’une énergie nucléaire « sûre » pourrait contribuer à  assurer à la fois une meilleure sécurité des approvisionnements  énergétiques et une réduction des émissions mondiales de gaz à effet de  serre, d’autres lui reprochent plusieurs types de risques et  particulièrement les accidents nucléaires, la gestion des déchets  nucléaires, la non-prolifération et les attaques terroristes ou même  militaires contre les installations nucléaires civiles. En réalité, le  retour d’expérience des accidents nucléaires les plus catastrophique de  l’histoire, Three Mile Island (États-Unis) en 1979, Tchernobyl (ancienne  URSS) en 1986 et Fukushima Daiichi (Japon) en 2011, a montré que des  accidents nucléaires graves peuvent avoir des effets divers d’une portée  potentiellement considérable, (très souvent transfrontières), à la fois  pour les personnes, les biens et pour[...]La dépendance aux métaux stratégiques : quelles solutions pour l’économie ? / Philippe Saint-Aubin. Conseil économique, social et environnemental, janvier 2019, 106 p. https://www.lecese.fr/travaux-publies/la-dependance-aux-metaux-strategiques-quelles-solutions-pour-l-economieLongtemps négligée, la dépendance française à des métaux essentiellement  importés s’est rappelée aux entreprises lors de crises successives :  terres rares, cobalt, aluminium ; la fréquence de ces dernières risque  fortement de s’accentuer, au fur et à mesure de l’augmentation de la  demande mondiale portée par la croissance de la population et du niveau  de vie. La solution ne viendra pas de l’acceptation fataliste de la  domination de pays étrangers, ni de l’externalisation des problèmes  environnementaux. Le métal le plus facile à obtenir étant celui qu’on ne consomme pas,  toutes les solutions d’économie circulaire doivent être mises en œuvre.  En cela, la dépendance aux métaux stratégiques n’est qu’un des aspects  de la question de la soutenabilité de notre mode de développement.  Au-delà, il faut également retrouver les conditions de sérénité qui  permettront d’augmenter les ressources minières nationales. Au final, il faut utiliser tous les moyens disponibles que cet avis a  cherché à esquisser. Plus qu’une question de matières rares, se libérer  de la dépendance aux métaux stratégiques est une question de matière  grise. Energy Transition, Uncertainty, and the Implications of Change in the Risk Preferences of Fossil Fuels Investors / Bassam Fattouh, Rahmatallah Poudineh and Rob West. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Jan. 2019, 13 p. (Oxford Energy Insight: 45) https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/energy-transition-uncertainty-implications-change-risk-preferences-fossil-fuels-investors/Energy transition risk is often viewed as a long-term risk, the  impacts of which will not be felt for decades to come. However, this  view is an imprecise presentation of reality. This is because although  completion of transition might take decades, the increased uncertainty  around the transition impacts the energy markets on a much shorter time  scale than the transition itself. This article presents the results of a  survey of institutional investors on hurdle rates for new energy  projects and compares it with information available in the public domain  about discount rates on completed projects.&#160; The survey shows that  uncertainties associated with energy transition have already started to  alter the risk preferences of investors in fossil fuel projects.  Investors are demanding a much higher hurdle rate in order to invest in  long cycle oil and coal projects. We contend that such changes in risk  preferences will have several key implications for fossil fuel markets.  First, the payback period of discounted investment costs is extended  dis-incentivising long cycle projects, therefore concentrating upstream  investment around short-term projects with shorter payback periods.  Second, it impacts asset valuation of fossil fuel companies with  consequences for firms’ cash flows and asset payoffs. Third, it  encourages the oil and gas companies to adopt a low risk operation  model, focus on the harvesting phase of their oil assets, and move away  from exploration, appraisal and development. Fourth, it could affect the  volume of available supplies if there is not enough investment into the  sector with potential consequences on prices depending on demand  projections. Fifth, it could affect the long-term price of oil when  energy markets start to price in transition related risks. Sixth, the  energy transition process could be accelerated as higher long-term oil  prices improve the economics of alternative resources.LNG Supply Chains and the Development of LNG as a Shipping Fuel in Northern Europe / Jack Sharples. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Jan. 2019, 60 p. (OIES PAPER: NG 140) https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/lng-supply-chains-development-lng-shipping-fuel-northern-europe/On the 1st of January 2020, the global shipping sector  will face a highly significant shift in the regulation of sulphur  emissions from the consumption of shipping fuel. In preparation for that  shift, ship owners have several options for achieving regulatory  compliance. These include switching to low-sulphur oil-based fuel,  installing ‘scrubbers’ to remove sulphur from exhaust gas, and switching  to LNG as a bunker fuel. Stringent limits on sulphur emissions from shipping have been in  place in northern Europe since 2006–07, and these limits were lowered in  2010 and 2015. This stepwise approach mirrors (and indeed foreshadows)  the approach seen at the global level, where limits on sulphur emissions  were introduced in 2005 and tightened in 2012. The shift in January  2020 will replicate, at a global level, the regional change experienced  in northern Europe in 2015. Northern Europe has seen the most substantial development of LNG as a  shipping fuel, in terms of supply (bunkering) infrastructure and the  growth of a fleet of vessels powered by LNG. This region therefore  represents a valuable case study, through which this paper identifies  the main drivers of the uptake of LNG as a shipping fuel, and the extent  to which the experience of northern Europe may be repeated at a global  level post-2020. The paper concludes that, with the global LNG market  expanding and the size of the global LNG-fuelled fleet set to double by  2022, global demand for LNG as a bunker fuel is set to grow  significantly.