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A bargaining experiment on heterogeneity and side deals in climate negotiations / Greer Gosnell and Alessandro Tavoni. August 2016, 23 p. (Centre for Climate Change ; Economics and Policy Working Paper No. 279 ; Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the EnvironmentWorking Paper No. 249) http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Working-Paper-249-Gosnell-and-Tavoni.pdfThe recent global climate change agreement in Paris leaves a wide gap between pledged and requisite emissions reductions in keeping with the commonly accepted 2°C target. A recent strand of theoretical and experimental evidence establishes pessimistic predictions concerning the ability of comprehensive global environmental agreements to improve upon the business-as-usual trajectory. We introduce an economic experiment focusing on the dynamics of the negotiation process by observing subjects’ behavior in a Nash bargaining game. Throughout repeated rounds, heterogeneous players bargain over the allocation of a fixed amount of profit-generating emissions with significant losses attached to prolonged failure to reach agreement. We find that the existence of side agreements that constrain individual demands among a subset of like countries does not ensure success; however, such side agreements reduce the demands of high-emission parties. Our results highlight the importance of strong signals amongst high emitters in reaching agreement to shoulder a collective emissions reduction target.The Influence of Political Pressure Groups on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements / Achim Hagen, Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera and  Hans-Peter Weikard. August 2016, 27 p. (Oldenburg Discussion Papers in Economics ; V – 391–16) https://www.uni-oldenburg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wire/fachgebiete/vwl/V-391-16.pdfThis paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on the emissions abatement decisions of countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists. We determine the influence of lobby-groups on the abatement decisions of countries. This influence affects members of an international environmental agreement as well as outsiders. However, in the case of agreement members, the effects of lobbying are not restricted to the lobby’s host-country but spill over to other member countries and have ambiguous effects on the agreement stability.The Efficiency Cost of Protective Measures in Climate Policy / Christoph Böhringer, Xaquin Garcia-Muros, Ignacio Cazcarro and Iñaki Arto. August 2016, 24 p. (Oldenburg Discussion Papers in Economics ; V – 392–16) https://www.uni-oldenburg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wire/fachgebiete/vwl/V-392-16.pdfAbstract: Despite recent achievements towards a global climate agreement, climate action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions remains quite heterogeneous across countries. Energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industries in industrialized countries are particularly concerned on stringent domestic emission pricing that may put them at a competitive disadvantage with respect to producers of similar goods in other countries without or only quite lenient emission regulation. This paper focuses on climate policy analysis for the United States of America (US) and compares the economic implications of four alternative protective measures for US EITE industries: (i) output-based rebates, (ii) exemptions from emission pricing, (iii) energy intensity standards, and (iv) carbon intensity standards. Based on simulations with a large-scale computable general equilibrium model for the global economy we quantify how these protective measures affect competitiveness of US EITE industries. We find that while protective measures can attenuate adverse competitiveness impacts measured in terms of common sector-specific competitiveness indicators, they run the risk of making US emission reduction much more costly than uniform emission pricing stand-alone. In fact, the cost increase is associated with negative income effects such that the gains of protective measures for EITE exports may be more than compensated through losses in domestic EITE demand.MRV 101: Understanding Measurement, Reporting, and Verification of Climate Change Mitigation / N. Singh, J. Finnegan and K. Levin. WRI, Aug. 2016, 28 p. (working paper) http://www.wri.org/publication/mrv-101-understanding-measurement-reporting-and-verification-climate-change-mitigationThe historic Paris Agreement brokered in December 2015 established universal and harmonized measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) provisions for climate change mitigation. A common system of transparency now applies to all countries. MRV is central to effectively implementing the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted under the Paris Agreement, which describe countries’ mitigation goals and policies. Measurement is needed to identify emissions trends, determine where to focus greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction efforts, track mitigation-related support, assess whether mitigation actions planned under NDCs or otherwise are proving effective, evaluate the impact of support received, and monitor progress achieved in reducing emissions. Reporting and verification are important for ensuring transparency, good governance, accountability, and credibility ofresults, and for building confidence that resources are being utilized effectively.Many countries have engaged in MRV to serve a variety of domestic and international purposes. This term is widely used in the climate change field, but often without a clear reference to the type of MRV being discussed. This often leads to confusion because the underlying nature of MRV-related activities differs according to their context and application. This working paper attempts to clarify the term as it is used in the context of climate mitigation, by describing different types of MRV and how they differ from one another.Quelles politiques énergétiques pour un développement durable ? dossier. Revue d'économie du développement, vol. 23, 2015 http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-du-developpement-2015-3.htmSommaire : Les défis énergétiques pour un développement durable : comment éviter l’effondrement ? / Gaël Giraud Energie et développement dans les pays émergents / John Reilly Garantir l’accès à l’électricité en Afrique : les défis à relever en matière de financement et de réformes / Anton Eberhard L’impact de l’électrification rurale : enjeux et perspectives / Maximo Torero Électrification rurale en réseau et hors réseau : réexamen des impacts et des considérations de coût / Jörg Peters, Maximiliane Sievert ; Commentaires sur « L’impact de l’électrification rurale : enjeux et perspectives »