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CALL FOR ABSTRACTS:CaEitS2011: CAUSALITY AND EXPLANATION IN THE SCIENCESwww.caeits2011.ugent.be19-21 SeptemberFaculty of Arts and Philosophy, Ghent UniversityBlandijnberg 2, Ghent, BelgiumThis is the sixth conference in the Causality in the Sciences seriesof conferences.KEYNOTE SPEAKERSHenk de Regt, Daniel Little, Michael Strevens, Mauricio Suarez andJames Woodward.INTRODUCTIONCausality and causal inference play a central role in the sciences.Explanation is one of the central goals of scientific research. Andscientific explanation requires causal knowledge. At least, these arewell-known tenets in present-day philosophy of science.In this conference, we aim to bring philosophers and scientiststogether to discuss the relation between causality and explanation.Even though the view that explanation requires causal knowledge iswidespread, some accounts of explanation present themselves as a-causal or even as non-causal. Kitcher’s unificationism had it thatcausal relations are epistemically dependent on explanatory relations,not vice versa. In the mechanistic framework, interlevel explanationis said to be constitutive, not causal. Other accounts of explanationare primarily functional. What is the precise relation between causaland a- or non-causal accounts of explanation?Relatedly, one of the close relatives of explanation is understanding.But what is the precise relation between explanation andunderstanding? And what is the role of causation herein?But wait a minute. There is no consensus as to what causation is.Probabilistic, mechanistic, interventionist, and other accounts areavailable on the market and it is still an interesting and openquestion how precisely they relate to each other and how this bearsupon the problem of scientific explanation.Are causality and explanation the same across scientific disciplines?Is causality in physics the same as in psychology? Is causal discoveryin biology the same as in economics? And is explanation in geology thesame as in chemistry? Mathematics seems to be devoid of causation.Does that mean that it is also devoid of explanation? And is there aplace for causation in technological explanation?Our explanatory practices are partly determined by pragmaticconsiderations. What precisely do we want to explain, and what do wewant to use our explanatory knowledge for? Do these pragmaticconsiderations influence our search for causal relations? Do they playa role, either implicitly or explicitly, in our algorithms forautomated causal discovery (such as algorithms based on causal Bayesnets)?We welcome contributions addressing these and other questions.EXAMPLE QUESTIONSHow is causality related to explanation? Is all explanation causal?Which accounts of causality best fit which accounts of explanation?Do different sciences demand different notions of causality andexplanation?Which case studies shed most light on the uses of causality andexplanation in the sciences?TIMETABLE15 May: deadline for submission of titles and abstracts of papers forpresentation* 500 words* To be emailed to CaEitS2011@UGent.be* Please write "ABSTRACT SUBMISSION" in the Subject header of yourmail* A notification of receipt will be sent shortly after 15th May* All abstracts will be carefully refereed15 June: notification of acceptance of papers for presentation.1 July: deadline for registration to attend the conference* Instructions for registration will be listed on www.caeits2011.ugent.bein due course* Please also send an email to CaEitS2011@UGent.be to say that youwill be attending(with "REGISTRATION" in its Subject header)19-21 September: conference