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Which smart electricity service contracts will consumers accept ? The demand for compensation in a platform market / Laura-Lucia Richter and Michael G. Pollitt. Cambridge : Energy Policy Research Group, 16 May 2016, 46 p (EPRG Working Paper 1616) http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/1616-Text.pdfAbstract : This paper considers the heterogeneity of household consumer preferences for electricity service contracts in a smart grid context. The analysis is based on original data from a discrete choice experiment on smart electricity service contracts that was designed and conducted in collaboration with Accent and 1,892 UK electricity consumers in 2015. The results suggest that while customers are willing to pay for technical support services, they are likely to demand significant compensation to share their usage and personally identifying data and to participate in automated demand response programs. Based on these findings potential platform pricing strategies that could incentivise consumers to participate in a smart electricity platform market are discussed. By combining appropriate participation payments with sharing of bill savings, service providers could attract the number of customers required to provide the optimal level of demand response. We also examine the significant heterogeneity among customers to suggest how, by targeting customers with specific characteristics, smart electricity service providers could significantly reduce their customer acquisition costs.Strategic bidding, wind ownership and regulation in a decentralised electricity market / Darragh Walsh and Laura Malaguzzi Valeri and Valeria DiCosmo. 20 may, 2016, 26 p. (MPRA Paper No. 71502) https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71502/Market power often emerges in wholesale electricity markets. Regulators use several strategies to limit market power: adopting bidding rules, compulsory forward markets and enhancing demand response. We study the case of the Irish Single Electricity Market (SEM), where the market will eliminate strict bidding rules to comply with the European Target Electricity Model. Using the PLEXOS unit-commitment model, we simulate the price that emerges in Cournot competition and find that it is more than 60% higher than in perfect competition. We then study how much the price varies with three measures that influence market power. Limiting thermal generators’ ownership of wind generation does not affect prices. Forcing the largest firm to sell some of its output forward decreases prices, but keeps them well above competitive levels. The most effective measure is an increase in price elasticity of demand, although existing evidence shows that it is hard to achieve. We conclude that regulatory oversight of bids will have to continue, although the Target Model will be associated with limited transparency, creating further challenges.Argentine : la promotion des énergies renouvelables pour la production d'électricité / Germán Bersalli, Encyclopédie de l'énergie, en ligne mai 2016, 20 p. http://encyclopedie-energie.org/articles/argentine-la-promotion-des-%C3%A9nergies-renouvelables-pour-la-production-d%C3%A9lectricit%C3%A9Support policies for RETs in Argentina is an interesting case to analyse the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms in a context of high risk perception. Recent experience in the electricity sector shows that the application of several theoretically effectives instruments did not produce the expected results despite the large potential available. Could it be explained by a failure in the design and implementation of the main promotion tools or by an unfavourable economic and institutional context and the related barriers? This paper analyses the interactions between policy tools and barriers from an historic and evolutionary perspective. After a theoretical introduction, first it refers to the milestones in the national economic and energy context. Then, it analyses the main policy instruments, their implementation and the various barriers that may determine the success or failure of the promotion policy. To achieve this, several step were performed: a deep literature review, an analysis of promotion laws and interviews with key stakeholders (investors, policy makers, energy analysts).Campagne 2015 OPEN Travaux achevés en 2014 : synthèse / Observatoire permanent de l'amélioration énergétique du logement. Angers : Ademe, 2016, 31 p. http://www.ademe.fr/open-observatoire-permanent-lamelioration-energetique-logement-campagne-2015Résumé : L'observatoire OPEN permet de mesurer les évolutions du marché de la rénovation thermique des logements, apportant ainsi des données quantitatives inédites et mesurant la pénétration des équipements énergétiques performants dans les logements. Il étudie également l'impact des actions gouvernementales et professionnelles.