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Linking Heterogeneous Climate Policies (Consistent with the Paris Agreement) / Michael A. Mehling, Gilbert E. Metcalf, Robert N. Stavins. Milan : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, September 2017, 56 p. (FEEM nota di lavoro ; 2017.051) http://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/linking-heterogeneous-climate-policies-consistent-with-the-paris-agreement-/The Paris Agreement has achieved one of two key necessary conditions for ultimate success – a broad base of participation among the countries of the world. But another key necessary condition has yet to be achieved – adequate collective ambition of the individual nationally determined contributions. How can the climate negotiators provide a structure that will include incentives to increase ambition over time? An important part of the answer can be international linkage of regional, national, and subnational policies, that is, formal recognition of emission reductions undertaken in another jurisdiction for the purpose of meeting a Party’s own mitigation objectives. A central challenge is how to facilitate such linkage in the context of the very great heterogeneity that characterizes climate policies along five dimensions – type of policy instrument; level of government jurisdiction; status of that jurisdiction under the Paris Agreement; nature of the policy instrument’s target; and the nature along several dimensions of each Party’s Nationally Determined Contribution. We consider such heterogeneity among policies, and identify which linkages of various combinations of characteristics are feasible; of these, which are most promising; and what accounting mechanisms would make the operation of respective linkages consistent with the Paris Agreement.Climate Policy Commitment Devices / Sebastian Dengler, Reyer Gerlagh, Stefan T. Trautmann, Gijs van de Kuilen. Milan : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, September 2017, 38 p. (FEEM nota di lavoro ; 2017.049) http://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/climate-policy-commitment-devices/We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a ‘libertarian’ baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a costly commitment device or reduce climate threshold uncertainty reduce resource extraction. We also study two conditions to assess the underlying social preferences and the viability of ecological dictatorship. Our results suggest that climate-change policies that focus on investments that lock the economy into carbon-free energy sources provide an important commitment device in the intertemporal cooperation problemCan the Paris Deal Boost SDGs Achievement? An Assessment of Climate Mitigation Co-benefits or Side-effects on Poverty and Inequality / Lorenza Campagnolo, Marinella Davide. Milan : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, September 2017, 48 p. (FEEM nota di lavoro ; 2017.048) http://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/can-the-paris-deal-boost-sdgs-achievement-an-assessment-of-climate-mitigation-co-benefits-or-side-effects-on-poverty-and-inequality/The paper analyses the synergies and trade-offs between emission reduction policies and sustainable development objectives. Specifically, it provides an ex-ante assessment that the impacts of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), submitted under the Paris Agreement, will have on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of poverty eradication (SDG1) and reduced income inequality (SDG10). By combining an empirical analysis with a modelling exercise, the paper estimates the future trends of poverty prevalence and inequality across countries in a reference scenario and under a climate mitigation policy with alternative revenue recycling schemes. Our results suggest that a full implementation of the emission reduction contributions, stated in the NDCs, is projected to slow down the effort to reduce poverty by 2030 (+2% of the population below the poverty line compared to the baseline scenario), especially in countries that have proposed relatively more stringent mitigation targets and suffer higher policy costs. Conversely, countries with a stringent mitigation policy experience a reduction of inequality compared to baseline scenario levels. If financial support for mitigation action in developing countries is provided through an international climate fund, the prevalence of poverty will be slightly reduced at the aggregate level (185,000fewer poor people with respect to the mitigation scenario), but the country-specific effect depends on the relative size of funds flowing to beneficiary countries and on their economic structure.China's national carbon dioxide emission trading system : symposium. Dossier in Economics of Energy &#38; Environmental Policy, vol. 6, n° 2, September 2017 https://www.iaee.org/en/publications/eeepjournal.aspxContents : China's national carbon dioxide emission trading system. An introduction / L. H. Goulder, R. D. Morgenstern, C. Munnings, and J. Schreifels Lessons learned from China's regional carbon market pilots / J. Zhang, Z. Zang, and X. Du lnteractions between market reform and a carbon price in China's power sector / F.Teng, F. Jotzo and X. Wang Key issues in designing China's nalional carbon emissions trading system / M. Duan and L. Zhou lncentivizing firm compliance with China's national emissions trading system / V. Karplus and X. Zhang