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Articles récents repérés :Volume 7, Number 2 / juin 2008The body in action Thor Grunbaum1 (1) Center for Subjectivity Research &#38; Sect. for Philosophy, Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, DenmarkReceived: 14 May 2007  Accepted: 13 August 2007  Published online: 15 September 2007Abstract This article is about how to describe an agent’s awareness of her bodily movements when she is aware of executing an action for a reason. Against current orthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent’s experience of moving has an epistemic place in the agent’s awareness of her own intentional action. In “The problem,” I describe why this should be thought to be problematic. In “Motives for denying epistemic role,” I state some of the main motives for denying that bodily awareness has any epistemic role to play in the content of the agent’s awareness of her own action. In “Kinaesthetic awareness and control,” I sketch how I think the experience of moving and the bodily sense of agency or control are best described. On this background, I move on to present, in “Arguments for epistemic role,” three arguments in favour of the claim that normally the experience of moving is epistemically important to one’s awareness of acting intentionally. In the final “Concluding remarks,” I round off by raising some of the worries that motivated the denial of my claim in the first place.Keywords Bodily awareness - Intentional action - Epistemology of action - Sense of agency and ownershipVolume 7, Number 4 / décembre 2008Affective intentionality and the feeling body Jan Slaby1 (1) Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrueck, Albrechtstr. 28, 49076 Osnabrueck, GermanyReceived: 18 September 2007  Accepted: 23 November 2007  Published online: 12 December 2007Abstract This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling.          The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact is that the bodily feelings in question are not the regularly treated, non-intentional bodily sensations (known from Jamesian accounts of emotion), but rather crucial carriers of world-directed intentionality. Consequently, most theories of human emotions and feelings recently advocated are deficient in terms of phenomenological adequacy. This text tries to make up for this deficit and develops a catalogue of five central features of intentional bodily feelings. In addition, Jesse Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory is criticized as an exemplary case of the misconstrual of the bodily nature of affective experience in naturalistic philosophy          of mind.Keywords Emotion - Feeling - Affective intentionality - Experience - Body