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is reared

 hold, in the next place, to be all indis- pensable principle, that the Convention should be so constituted, as to give to each State, in the nomination ol candidate, the same rel at.ve weight, which the Constitution secures to it in the election of the President, making due allowance for its relative party strength.

 By the election, mean the whole-the

 eventful choice when it goes into the House

 of Representatives, as well as the primary

 vote in the electoral college. The one is as

 much part of the election as the oher.-

 The two make the whole. The adoption of

 the one, in the Convention, which framed the

 Constitution. depended on the adoption eff

 the other. Neither could possibly be adopt

 ed alone. The two were the result of com

 promise between the larger and smaller States

 after d long and doubtful struggle, which threatened the loss of the Constitution itself The object of giving to the smaller States an equality with the larger in the eventful choice by the House, was to counterpoise the pre- ponderance of the larger, in the electoral col lege. Without this, the smaller would have voted against the whole provision, and its re- lection would have been the consequencc.- Even as II stands, Delaware votgd against it. In confirmation of what state, refer to Mr. Madison's report of the proceedings of the Convention.

 Having stated what mean by the election, it will require but few words toexplain my

 reasons for the principles have laid down

 They are few and simple, and rest on the

 ground, that the nomination is in reality the

 election, if concurred in, as far as the party

 is concerned It is so intended to be- The leading reason assigned for making it, is to prevent division of the party, and thereby prevent the eleetloni from going into the House, where the smaller States would have the ad- vantage intended to be secured to them by the Constitution, by being placed on an equal ity with the larger.

 Such being the intended object and effect,

 now submit to every candid mind, wheth- CT the Convention ought not to be so consti- tuted, as to compensate in the nomination for the important advantage in the election, which the smaller States surrender by going into Convention. Would 1t not be uniair-a pal pablo want of good faith and subversive of the compromise of the Consultation to with hold il Or, if demanded, would it be short of an insult to refuse it: Can it be thought, that the smaller States are so debased and ab- sorbed in the party politics of the day, as to permit themselves to be thus indirectly strip ped of right, which their high minded and patriotic ancestors held so dear, as even to prefer the loss of the Constitution itself, raih- CT than surrender it.

 object, then, to the proposed Conven- ton, In this connection, because it makes no compensation to the smaller States for the surrender of this unquestionable and impor- tant Constitutional right. Instead of that, it's advocates peremptorily and indignantly refuse any, and treat with seorn every. attempt to secure il, some have even gone so far, as to deny that the eventual choice of the Houae constitutes any portion of the election, and manifest open hostility against the provision of the Constitution, which contains it.

 If there was no other objection, the one under consideration would be insuoerable with me. differ utterly from the advocates of the proposed Convention, in reference to this provision. regard 1t as one of the first importance, not because desire the election to go into the House, but because believe it to be an indispensable means, in the hands of the smaller States, of preserving their just and Constitutional weight in the Presidential election, and through that, in the Executive Department and the Government itself, which believe to be essential to the preservation of our sublime federal system I regard the of the relative weight of the States m the Government to be the fundamental promise ofthe Constitution, and that on which our whole political system depends Its ad- usmcnt constituted the great difficulty in orming the Constitution. The principle on which 1t was finally effected, was, that, while due succession should be made to population, q provision should be also made, in some form, to preserve the original equality of the States in every department the government. The principle was easily carried out in con- stituting the legislative department, by pre- serving the equality of the States in one branch, {the Senate) and conceding to popu- lation it's full preponderance in the other But the great and difficult task of reducing il to the practice was, in the Executive Depart- ment, at the head of which there is but sin gle officer. So great was it, that it occupied the attention of the Convention, from time to lime, during the whole session, and was very lear causing failure at last. Itwould have been an easy task to constitute that depart nent, either on the principle of the equality l of the States in the Government, or that of population. To combine the two, in the election of a single officer, was quite differ ent affair, but however difficult, it had to be performed, at the hazard of losing the Con- 

 It was finally accomplished, by giving to the larger States nearly the same pgeponder- in the electoral college, as they have in the House. and to the smaller, in the event of choice by the House, the same equality they possess i, the Senate; thus following close Y the analogy of the Legislative department To make it as close as possible, it was at first proposed to give the eventual choice to the Senate, instead of the House, but it was altered and the present provision adopted, for reasons which did not affect the principle

 It was believed by the framers, the prac- tical operation of the provision would be, that the electoral college, in which the nfiu- ot the larger States preponderates, would mo-

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