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 The object intended is important The preservation of the relative weight of the States. as established by the Constitution in all the Departments, Is necessary to the suc- cess and duration of our system of Govern mapt; but 1t may be doubted, whether the provision adopted to ellectit in the Executive 1 department is not too refined for the strong, and may add, corrupt passions, which the Presidential election will ever excite. Ger tain il is, that if the practice of nominating candidates for the Preside icy, by conventions constituted as they are proposed, shall be- come the established usage, it will utterly de- feat the intention of the lramers of the Con- i stitution, and would be followed by a radio al and dangerous change, not only in the Executive Department, but in the govern ment itself

 This danger was early foreseen, and to avoid 1t, and some of the wisest and most experienced statesmen of former days SC strongly objected to Congressional eaucuses. to nominate candidates for the Presidency that they never could be induced to attend them; among these il will be sufficient to name Mir. Macon and Alr. Lowndes. Others. believing that this provision Of the Consttu- tion was too refined for practice, were soli- citous to amend 1t, but without iinpairing the influence of the smaller States in the election I ztf4t7fafts la ese rank myself With that ob- iect, resolutions were introduced, in 1928, in the Senate by Col. Benton, and in the House by Mir. McDuffie, providing for districtine States, and for referring the election back te the people, in case there should be no choice to eject one from the two highest candidates The principle which governedin the amend ment proposed, was to give fair conpensa- ton to the smaller States for the surrender ol their advantage in the eventual choice by the 1 House, and at the same time to make the mode of electing the President more strictly In conformity with the principles of our pop ular institutions and to be less liable to cor rupuon, than the existing provision. They received the general support of the party, but were objected to by few, as not being full l equivalent 10 the smaller States The prin- ciple embraced IS identical with that on which you proposed to constitute the Baltimore l Convention, but which has been so dictato- rlally objected to by some, who have taken I-so prominent part in it's lavor If you have i INV 2utNN1bNds tiCit in il ttdSl SDlllG cOnSO- laton in reAecting that if others have since changed, you now stand where you then did. in the purer and better days of the party. l was m favor of 1t then, as am now, not be- cause consider the resolutions as perfect. theoretically,a as the existing provisions of the Constitutions but because believe it would Tn practice more certainly accomplish what the powers of the Constitution intended.-- 1 But while the provision stands as 1t does, | would regard myself as little short of trait or to that sacred instrument, should I give my assent directly or indirectly to any prae- tlce which would have the least effect of diyestng the smaller states of the due weight It secures to them in the Presidential elec- ton, whether designed or not And here let me add, that as objectionable as think a Congressional caucus for nominating Pre- sldent, It IS in my opinion, far less so than a Convention constituted as is proposed. The former had indeed many things to recommend It. It's members consisting of Senators and Representatives, were the immediate organs of the State Legislatures, or the people; were responsible to them respectively, and were, Tor the most, of high character, standing and talents. They voted per capacity, and what IS very important, they represented fair y the relative strength of the party in their respective States. In all these important par uculars Ii was all that could be desired for nominating body, and formed a striking con- trast 10 the proposed Convention; and vet Il could not be borne by the people in the then purer days of the Republic l acting with General Jackson and most of the lead- CTS of the party at the time, contributed to put It down, because we believed it to be la- ble to be acted on and influenced by the pa- tronage ot the government-an objection far more applicable to Convention constituted as the one proposed, than to Congressional caucus Far, however, was it from my in- tentlon, in aiding to put that down, to sub stItute Tn It's place what regard as a hundred times more objectionable in every point of View. Indeed. if there must be an interme- dlate body between the people and the cleo lon, unknown to the Constitution, it may be well questioned whether better than the old plan of Congressional caucus can be devised

 In taking the ground l have, in favor of maintaining the right secured to the smaller States by the compromise of the Constitu- ton, am actuated by no partisan feeling or desire to concliate their good opinion If the case was reversed, and the rights of the larger, Instead of the smaller, were invaded. l would with equal readiness and firmness, stand up in their defence. am the partisan ot neither one nor the other, but simply a supporter of the Constitution, and what be- hcVe to be just andiar regard the Constitu- ton as the only ark of salty for all, and be- lleve that in defending it, defend the inter- est and safety of each and all-the greater as well as the smaller-the States invading the right of others, as we'll as the States whose rights are invaded.

 ! have laid down the principle on which rest the objection in question, with the limitation that the relative weight of the States should be maintained making allowance lortheirreatve party strength The proprety of the limitation is so apparent that but few words in illustration will be reaured.-f The Convention is party Convention and profess edly intended to take the of the party which cannot be done fairly, if States having but little par ty strength, are pat on equality with those which have much. Ifthat were done, the result mioht be