Reform of Complicity Precepts: New Pathways and Comparative Solutions

Within the contours of criminalisation, and the types of criminal conduct that should act as a juridical touchstone for liability, it is problematical in doctrinal and theoretical terms to de ﬁ ne and ascribe the true parameters of secondary participation. Complicity precepts, in general, provide a lodestar for when and why individuals other than the perpetrator of a crime should be inculpated, together and in asso-ciation with the actual and direct progenitor of the harm(s). In this Special Edition of The Journal of Criminal Law contributors address how complicity principles ought to be reformed to properly context-ualise the actus reus ingredient elements of complicity, and the debate extends to when liability should be negated by an overwhelming supervening event ascribed to D1, and to the nature of effective withdrawal. In the ﬁ rst article of the Special Edition Professor Matthew Dyson suggests that Complicity provides a perfect place from which to take steps towards doctrinally clear and coherent criminal law. In particular, by acknowledging in the complex mass of cases a requirement prevails that the accomplice contribute to the principal ’ s crime. That takes effect differently in assistance and encouragement compared to procur-ing: (1) an accessory ’ s assistance or encouragement must make a signi ﬁ cant contribution to the principal ’ s crime, but does not need to be a but-for cause; and (2) to procure an offence, an accessory must cause it in a but-for sense. This requirement ﬂ ows from how complicity can be justi ﬁ ed, and determines the linguistic form of complicity. It extends to the end point of complicity: overwhelming supervening events and withdrawal on the one hand, and sentencing on the other. Fidelity to how we express, and label, the wrongs within participation are important parts of the work we expect it to do. That includes what the wrong in complicity is (and how participants are labelled), the limits in what one can do through another or intend another can do, the causal claims we make in complicity and the differences between forms of complicity. Without even a signi ﬁ cant contribution