Reply: The Persistent Absence of Empirical Evidence for Free-Riding in Global Climate Politics


 Kennard and Schnakenberg (KS) raise three concerns regarding Aklin and Mildenberger (“Prisoners of the Wrong Dilemma: Why Distributive Conflict, Not Collective Action, Characterizes the Politics of Climate Change,” Global Environmental Politics 20 (4): 4–27). In this response, we delineate where we agree and where we disagree with KS. We then consider whether the model presented by KS changes our assessment that free-riding concerns are not currently the binding constraint on global climate politics. We conclude with a refined statement of our original claim. We are grateful to Kennard and Schnakenberg’s (this issue; henceforth KS) stimulating comment on our article published in Global Environmental Politics (“Prisoners of the Wrong Dilemma: Why Distributive Conflict, Not Collective Action, Characterizes the Politics of Climate Change,” 20 [4]: 4–27, 2020). We welcome the opportunity to clarify and refine our argument. In summary, KS raise three concerns: first, the collective action model should not be confused with a solution to the collective action problem; second, one shouldn’t focus on a single equilibrium, given the results from the folk theorem; and third, reciprocity is off the equilibrium path anyway. Herein, we offer responses to each of these claims, highlighting where we agree with their criticism and where we do not. We then reconsider whether the model KS present changes our assessment that free-riding concerns are not currently the binding constraint on global climate politics. We conclude by briefly restating our main aim and discussing some fruitful research questions that derive from it.