Resilient Load Frequency Control of Islanded AC Microgrids Under Concurrent False Data Injection and Denial-of-Service Attacks

Due to malicious cyber attacks, the frequency regulation of an islanded microgrid (MG) with load changes and wind/solar power fluctuations may not be guaranteed and the overall system may even be destabilized. The MG frequency control thus faces new challenges. In response to these challenges, this paper addresses a resilient load frequency control (LFC) problem for islanded AC-MGs under simultaneous false data injection (FDI) attacks and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Toward this aim, a new piecewise observer is constructed to provide the real-time estimates of the unavailable system state and the unknown FDI attack signal. Furthermore, a resilient <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathcal {H}_{\infty }$ </tex-math></inline-formula> LFC scheme is developed to suppress the attack impacts. The novelty of this study lies in the development of an attack-parameter-dependent time-varying Lyapunov function approach to achieve stability analysis and resilient observer/controller design against concurrent FDI attacks and intermittent DoS attacks. Specifically, a tractable observer design criterion is first derived such that the estimation error is exponentially stable under a specified <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathcal {H}_{\infty }$ </tex-math></inline-formula> performance level. Then a design criterion on the existence of the resilient controller is presented to guarantee the exponential stability of the resulting closed-loop system in the presence of the attacks, while preserving the anticipated <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathcal {H}_{\infty }$ </tex-math></inline-formula> performance level. Finally, comparative simulation studies in various attack scenarios and different parameter settings are presented to verify the efficiency of the obtained theoretical results.