Private Metropolis: The Eclipse of Local Democratic Governance

One of the most striking aspects of urban governance today is how little city governments are involved. A wide range of organizations and institutions compete to control what happens in cities—sometimes alongside, but other times in place of formal government. To date, sociologists and political scientists have largely focused on the role of private nonprofits, such as communitybased organizations and foundations. These organizations are shielded from public oversight yet play a significant role in developing and implementing public policy. The collection of essays in Private Metropolis: The Eclipse of Local Democratic Governance, edited by Dennis Judd, Evan McKenzie, and Alba Alexander, adds to this literature by focusing on quasi-public institutions, authorities, and special districts. Chapters cover various authorities that usurp municipal power ‘‘largely beyond public awareness and accountability’’ (p. 1). The problems are quite obvious: ‘‘Shadow’’ governments of appointed boards and other quasi-public bodies make decisions on behalf of the public without the public really even knowing what is happening. The implications for transparency, oversight, and local democracy are clear, important, and woven throughout the volume. Much of the consequential action relates to public finance and municipal budgets. For instance, Rachel Weber, Amanda Kass, and Sara Hinkley show how Chicago Public Schools uses ‘‘exotic’’ financial instruments to raise revenue, exposing the district to significant financial risk. Peter Eisinger documents the aftermath of emergency management in Detroit, a state takeover that ultimately reduced the city’s budget in favor of private financing for public projects. And James M. Smith describes special-purpose authorities, such as Chicago’s Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority, which relied on public funding like tax increment financing bonds to help fund private redevelopment. Other notable chapters focus on the management of public infrastructure like transportation and water systems. In all, appointed or otherwise unelected bodies exert significant control over localities while remaining one or two steps removed from local government and electoral democracy. The most memorable chapter, written by Evan McKenzie, concerns multi-function special districts (MFSDs). These ‘‘phantom governments’’ can issue bonds and tax residents while governing ‘‘largely free from electoral accountability’’ (p. 45). In one acute example, new developments in Florida called Community Development Districts— The Villages being the most well-known— are not controlled by residents at all. Instead, qualified electors are determined by land ownership. Under this ‘‘one acre, one vote’’ regime, private developers effectively control the governing boards that issue bonds and make other important financial decisions. McKenzie’s description brings to mind the classic company town—but without the benefit of a local employer. The editors make a strong claim that these various bodies are by and large undemocratic. Yet executive branches of cities and states still play a big role in many of the cases. With special assessment districts, for instance, ‘‘the parent government still has significant control and oversight’’ (p. 182). In other instances, boards are appointed by mayors, MFSDs are determined by state law, emergency managers are selected by governors, and so on. While these bodies may be less directly or exclusively democratically accountable to municipal residents, they are still more accountable than, say, a philanthropist attempting to influence education policy through her foundation. With the exception of extreme examples such as MFSDs in Florida, the concern presented in the volume seems to be as much about the absence of direct democratic control as the normative concern about transparency and oversight. Most municipal residents simply aren’t aware of what is happening—and that’s a problem. Reviews 53