On Side-Channel Analysis of Memristive Cryptographic Circuits

Memristive technologies offer fascinating opportunities for unconventional computing architectures and emerging applications. While memristive devices have received substantial attention as sources of entropy for security applications, security vulnerabilities of memristive technologies for implementing cryptographic circuits have been largely neglected so far. In this article, we provide the first in-depth analysis of power side-channel analysis against memristive cryptographic implementations based on both: physical experiments and simulations. We show that power consumption models developed for CMOS are not fully adequate for memristive circuits. In particular, the memory effect makes even input-independent initialization cycles vulnerable to attacks that would be fundamentally impossible in CMOS technologies. We propose a memristive-oriented Power Estimation Model (mPEM) integrated into the Stochastic Approach (StA) framework and demonstrate its effectiveness against larger-scale circuits. Finally, we demonstrate that attack countermeasures that were effective for CMOS fail for fundamental reasons in the memristive case.