The Relationship Between Justification and Judgement in Usul Al-Fiqh

In Islamic jurisprudence, the issue of the relationship between the cause and the judgement, which is the main pillar of qiyas, which is accepted as the most common way of extending the ruling of the nass, is a subject that has a theoretical aspect as well as a practical aspect. Since the third century of Hijri, when the methodology of Islamic jurisprudence began to be codified, there have been different considerations regarding the nature of the cause. This issue, which was influenced by theological understandings, was subject to different evaluations from the period of classification to the seventh century of Hijri, the period of tahkik, and four different understandings of the nature of the cause emerged. Three different groups of concepts were used to express these understandings. The first of these is alem, alām, emāra, and muarrif; the second is dāî, muessir, and mūjib; and the third is bāris. There are some differences in the use of the second group. While some of the usul al-usūlīs used the concept of zātī together with the concepts of mūjib and mujtahir, others used the concept of ca'lī. As a result, four different ideas of cause have emerged, namely, the realm/alām/emāra/muarrif, the essential /mūjib, the ca'lī /mūjib, and bāis. The idea of emāra/indication/muarrif illa was defended by most of the mutakallimīn jurists from al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) to al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), as well as by Hanafi jurists except Alauddīn al-Samarqandī (d. 539/1144). According to them, the absence of a judgement despite the existence of a cause before the revelation indicates that the cause does not have any effect on the judgement, but only indicates the existence of the judgement. The idea of emāra/indication/muarrif illa was defended by most of the mutakallimīn jurists from al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) to al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), as well as by Hanafi jurists except Alauddīn al-Samarqandī (d. 539/1144). According to them, the absence of a judgement despite the existence of a cause before the revelation indicates that the cause does not have any effect on the judgement, but only indicates the existence of the judgement. The Ja'lī mūjib cause conception was favoured by jurists such as al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), al-Samarqandī, al-Usmandī (d. 552/1157) and al-Lāsmihī. They, like the previous ones, defended this view based on the connection of the cause to the judgement, but they argued that the effect of the cause on the judgement was created by God during the existence of the cause. The idea of bāis illaq was defended by al-Sayfuddīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233). Although this concept at first glance means the factor that prompts the Shāri'ī to issue a judgement, al-Āmidī gives it a different meaning as "the attribute that contains wisdom that is suitable for being the Shāri'ī's intention while issuing a judgement". What al-Āmidī takes into consideration in determining the nature of the cause is the main principle of Islamic law, which is maqāṣid al-shari'ah.