Dynamic Partisanship: How and Why Voter Loyalties Change. By Ken Kollman and John E. Jackson. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2021. 232p. $105.00 cloth, $35.00 paper.

department. While the circulation of state-held shares of SOEs has been made possible since 2005, various agencies have been loath to off-load their stakes into the secondary market because it could compromise state control. However, it is this commitment to assessing the striking similarities in collaborative governance across China and the United States that also makes this book distinctive. A critique of both the American politics and Chinese politics literatures is the underlying tendency to view their respective political dynamics as sui generis. Yet Eggleston, Donahue, and Zeckhauser convincingly show that in terms of the policy maker’s analysis of policy problems, assignment of responsibilities to collaborators, design of incentives, and assessment of outcomes, China and the United States employ a similar calculus, and face all too familiar pitfalls: China’s struggle to address payoff discretion in minban schools parallels problems in the United States with for-profit universities; both countries’ massive vaccine development programs in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic exemplify the promising potential of collaborative governance in research and development; and Business Improve Districts in the US real estate market resemble place-targeted inducements in China. It is important to remember that any study employing a Most-Different Systems Design will always invite critiques centering on variation, and at the very least, the Dragon, the Eagle, and the Private Sector will generate ample discussion exploring the institutional differences of collaborative governance in each country. Myprimary concernwith the book is that it seemswritten for a different moment in China’s policymaking evolution —a time before Xi Jinping took the helm of the Party State. Indeed, most of the authors’ observations on the collaborative schemes between state and nonstate actors sit well with the vast literature on policy experimentation in China, most notably scholarship by Sebastian Heilmann, and on state reliance on civil society organizations for the distribution of social goods (as captured by Jessica Teets, who is cited throughout the manuscript), and work on endogenous institutional adaptation, as described by Kellee Tsai. Since the 1990s, despite frequent waves of centralization and decentralization, one observes that both the central and local state have engaged with nonstate actors in policy development, public goods provision, and regulatory management. One could easily extend the authors’ analysis to environmental protection, agricultural production, food safety, financial management, and aviation. Under Xi Jinping, however, policy makers have moved swiftly toward a model of top-level design in which central actors have centralized power at the expense of nonstate actors. One observes increased limits to policy innovation, curtailment of private industry, and squeezing of civil society. Party leading small groups have been established at every level of the state hierarchy, imposing policy uniformity from the top down. Corporations both state-owned and private have been subject to increased oversight by the Party, with new Party committees being established even in foreign enterprises. Such changes increasingly render the distinction between state-owned and private corporations less analytically useful, giving rise to the term “state-adjacent” to characterize state-business relations. Most troubling has been the Party State’s recent crackdown on major technology giants, which have played a crucial role in collaborative schemes in finance, public transport management, and education. These changes are particularly relevant to the book because its conceptualization of collaborative governance rests on a notion of shared discretion between public and private actors. As a hierarchical mode of control is imposed throughout the system, collaborative governance schemes are increasingly on tenuous ground. The Dragon, the Eagle, and the Private Sector is cautiously optimistic that collaborative governance will take hold as China’s civil society matures, its private sector grows, and its leadership embraces the market.Whether or not one agrees with this view, the authors present a powerful toolkit for policy makers to better design collaborative schemes to create public value. Policy makers and scholars both inside and outside China alike will benefit from a close reading of this insightful book.