The Myth of the Lone Judge: Comparing International Judicial Bureaucracies

In “Who Guards the ‘Guardians of the System’? The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement,” Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc describe, in rich detail, the pervasive involvement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Secretariat in the resolution of trade disputes.1 The authors conclude, rather emphatically, that the Secretariat “exerts more influence over dispute settlement proceedings than the staff of any comparable . . . tribunal.”2 In my view, this conclusion is somewhat misleading, as it portrays the WTO as “exceptional” or “sui generis”3 among international courts. In fact, the invisible army of legal bureaucrats (clerks, registry and secretariat lawyers, arbitral assistants, etc.) plays a “critically important”4 part across the whole field of international adjudication. What is missing is a comparative analysis of the power those bureaucrats wield in different judicial regimes. In this Essay, I outline a basic framework for the comparison, focusing on two main factors: first, the organizational and contractual arrangements that govern the relationship of international judges and bureaucrats; second, the relative distribution of expertise and capital between the two.