WRITTEN QUESTION E-2384/99 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Commission. Shutdown of the unsafe nuclear reactor in Bohunice (Slovakia).
3. 10. 2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 280 E/37 Answer given by Mr Nielson on behalf of the Commission (25 January 2000) A detailed study, funded by the Commission, has been undertaken by the Botswana institute for development policy analysis (BIDPA) to assess the likely impact of the Community/Southern Africa (SA) free trade agreement (FTA) on the economies of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) and to put forward recommendations which will enable BLNS states to maximise the expected benefits whilst also minimising any potential adverse effects. The average annual revenues (as a % of GDP) derived from the common revenue pool by the BLNS countries are: Botswana: 17,1 %, Lesotho: 41,7 %, Namibia: 27,6 % and Swaziland: 44,8 %. The estimated effects of the trade development and co-operation agreement (TDCA) (diminishing common revenue pool because of lower tariffs) on the total revenues of BLNS countries are: Botswana: -5,3 %, Lesotho: -12,9 %, Namibia: -8,6 % and Swaziland -13,9 %. In reality the loss of revenue should be far less because many sensitive products have been excluded from liberalisation on the SA side, and there is no reason to believe that there will be a lasting shortfall. The Community is ready to assist the BLNS countries in implementing fiscal reform, necessary to diversify their sources of income and needed independently from the TDCA. There will be gains for consumers and entrepreneurs alike. The business community will have access to a cheaper, better quality and more diversified range of supplies for their inputs and capital goods. They will thus stand better prospects for investing, exporting and hiring additional staff. Job creation and investment drive in the Southern African Customers Union (SACU) are expected to be the main positive effects of the FTA. This will result in a distributional gain within the BLNS economies and allow their ministries of finance to collect revenue through a different system of taxes. The relationship between SADC and the FTA is more difficult to deal with in practical terms, because SADC has yet to become a structured entity on the trade front, through the negotiation of its own FTA. The general Community policy, to encourage economic integration at a regional level, ensured that it did not gain a better access to the SA market than the SADC countries; for example SA reserved certain trade concessions in the textile sector to its SADC partners. Furthermore, any trade concessions obtained by the Community under the FTA with SA have to be extended, according to the SADC trade protocol, to all SADC members. This ensures that SADC countries will secure better access to the SA market. (2000/C 280 E/035) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2384/99 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Commission (16 December 1999) Subject: Shutdown of the unsafe nuclear reactor in Bohunice (Slovakia) The Commission originally said that Slovakiaís accession to the European Union depended on the extremely unsafe nuclear reactor in Bohunice being shut down by next year. However, in mid-October the Commission said it would be satisfied with a shutdown in the period 2006-2008. Considerable opposition has been prompted by this decision. 1. Why has the Commission gone back on its original position that the extremely unsafe reactor should be shut down next year? Does the Commission feel that shutting down the extremely unsafe reactor is no longer a prior 2. condition for accession? If so, why does it consider that the shutdown is no longer necessary? C 280 E/38 Official Journal of the European Communities EN 3. 10. 2000 3. What is the justification for postponing the shutdown of this reactor? 4. What time limit does the Commission now propose for shutting down the reactor? Answer given by Mr Verheugen on behalf of the Commission (17 January 2000) The Commission has never stated that Bohunice V1 reactors should be closed down in 2000 as a condition for Slovak accession to the Community. In Agenda 2000, the Commission called upon the candidate countries operating non-upgradable reactors to close them at the earliest practical dates. Although Bohunice V1 belongs to this category, it is to be noted that western experts have acknowledged the progress made since 1996 in improving Bohunice V1 safety levels. The Commission considers that the commitment made by the Slovak authorities to close down Bohunice V1 in 2006 (unit 1) and 2008 (unit 2) is realistic and balanced, taking into consideration the economic, social and political implications for Slovakia of the early closure of these reactors, as well as the safety improvements recently made at this plant. The Slovak commitment on the closure of Bohunice V1 will be carefully monitored in the framework of the accession process. The Commission will make every effort to ensure that the closure dates announced by the Slovak authorities are met. (2000/C 280 E/036) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2386/99 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council (13 December 1999) Subject: German assistance in constructing a laboratory for chemical weapons The German Ministry of Defence has recently admitted that it intends to help Turkey build a laboratory for chemical weapons. The project is allegedly ápurely defensive in natureí. However, the Kennzeichen Dí programme on the ZDF television channel recently quoted military sources as claiming that on 11 May 1999 the Turkish army was using chemical weapons against the Kurdish PKK movement. Apparently twenty Kurds were killed. Research carried out by the University of Munich also shows that the heads on the Turkish chemical shells were supplied by the German firms Buck and Depyfag. 1. Is the Council aware of German help in building a laboratory for chemical weapons in Turkey? Is this German-Turkish cooperation in line with international and European obligations and under- 2. takings on disarmament and arms control, with particular regard to chemical weapons? 3. Will the Council oppose German help in building a new laboratory for chemical weapons in Turkey now that it is aware of the facts? If so, in what way will it make its opposition known to the German government? If not, why not? 4. Is the Council aware that on 11 May 1999 the Turkish army used chemical weapons against the PKK movement? If not, why is the Council not aware of this violation of the UN convention on chemical weapons by a candidate Member State? 5. Has the Council made known to Turkey its displeasure at this violation? If so, what was the Turkish governmentís response? If not, will the Council do so, now that it has been informed of this fact? If not, why not?