WRITTEN QUESTION E-0069/00 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council. Checks on data exchange and telecommunications in the EU Member States.
3. 10. 2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 280 E/169 must be approved by a complete assessment procedure similar to that for new applications for marketing authorisation and the assessment period (210 days) is exactly the same as that for new applications. Such changes are listed in Annex II. They include changes to the active substance(s), the therapeutic indications or the strength, pharmaceutical form and route of administration. However, it should be noted that even these are always variations to an authorisation which has already been granted for a given medicinal product. With regard to the examination of data, the same criteria of quality, safety and efficacy must be met in all cases. The same assessment criteria of quality, safety and efficacy apply to generic products. The applicant can be exempted from safety and efficacy trials only if he can show that the product for which the authorisation has been requested is essentially the same as another products which already has a marketing authorisa- tion. (1) OJ L 55, 11. 3. 1995. (2) OJ L 159, 3. 6. 1998. (2000/C 280 E/192) WRITTEN QUESTION E-0069/00 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council (24 January 2000) Subject: Checks on data exchange and telecommunications in the EU Member States As part of the annual Ilets (International Law Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar) consultation process the police forces of the fifteen Member States are working on the sophisticated interception practices of the National Security Agency (NSA), the American secret service responsible for telecommu- nications and data exchange. At the request of the NSA, Lotus, Microsoft and Netscape have lowered the security level of their Internet and e-mail programmes for users outside the United Status. The interception facilities are used mainly for industrial espionage. In the EU report Interception capabilities 2000í Duncan Campbell says that the result is that virtually every computer in Europe has, as a built-in standard feature, a system that enables the NSA alone to crack the userís code and to read secured messages. The messages are intercepted at US Internet nodes or are picked up by the Echelon espionage network of the US, UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia (the UKUSAí group). The NSA bases its interception practices on the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (Calea) which was adopted by Congress in 1994. Since then American telecommunications forms have been obliged to build interception facilities into all digital satellite and mobile communications media. In January 1995 the Council adopted a (non-binding) resolution which is virtually identical to Calea. Approval of the use of these radical measures has never been subject to any parliamentary scrutiny. 1. Can the Council give me a copy of the (non-binding) Calea resolution, as adopted in January 1995? If not: (a) why not, and (b) does this refusal not violate the principle of parliamentary accountability in a constitutional state governed by the rule of law? C 280 E/170 Official Journal of the European Communities EN 3. 10. 2000 2. Has the Council amended the (non-binding) Calea resolution over the years? If so: (a) what changes have been made, (b) when, (c) why, and (d) at whose request? 3. Does the Council not think it would be better to draw up a ápublicí directive in order to permit democratic accountability? If not, why does the Council not think that there is a need for such democratic accountability? Reply (13 March 2000) The Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 on the lawful interception of telecommunications has 1. been published in the Official Journal of the European Communities (1). 2. The Council has not amended the above-mentioned Resolution of 17 January 1995. If the development of new technologies makes adjustments necessary, the Council will examine the 3. possible adaptation of the requirements listed in the above Council Resolution. (1) OJ C 329, 4. 11. 1996, p. 1. (2000/C 280 E/193) WRITTEN QUESTION P-0070/00 by Gerardo Galeote Quecedo (PPE-DE) to the Commission (18 January 2000) Subject: EU relations with Libya Is there any truth in the European media reports to the effect that the President of the Commission has invited Mr Muammar Gadhafi to make an official visit to the Commission? If those reports are accurate, what strategy is being pursued by means of such a step? Answer given by Mr Patten on behalf of the Commission (8 February 2000) President Prodi held telephone conversations with Colonel Gaddafi over Christmas (when the possibility of a visit was first mooted) and on 21 January 2000. He was seeking to ascertain whether the political conditions could be met for a visit by Colonel Gaddafi to the Commission. President Prodi reaffirmed the established policy of the Union to seek to integrate Libya into the Euro-Med process, provided that Libya fully accepts the principles laid down in the Declaration of Barcelona. President Prodi reiterated that unless written unconditional acceptance of such principles was given, a visit could not take place. The Libyan authorities replied on 22 January 2000 confirming Libyaís deep interest in participating in the Euro-med process while stating at the same time that Libya is at present unable to give any formal commitment to the full acceptance of the Barcelona acquis. It was concluded that in these circumstances a visit at this stage would be inapppropriate. Discussions will continue in order to ascertain whether the conditions for a visit could be met