WRITTEN QUESTION E-1286/00 by Hiltrud Breyer (Verts/ALE) to the Commission. Indirect aid to coal and nuclear sectors.
C 89 E/20 Official Journal of the European Communities EN 20. 3. 2001 2. Does the Commission agree: ü that as a result of the Administrationís decision of 2 December 1999, which was merely forwarded by e-mail, the organisation of the current competitions for permanent posts is flawed by serious errors of form and substance and that this procedure is incomprehensible in terms of the policy of transparency to which the Commission has committed itself? ü that candidates who are incapable of filling in a complicated but precisely worded application form correctly are unsuitable to be employed as officials? Answer given by Mr Kinnock on behalf of the Commission (6 June 2000) The Commission can inform the Honourable Member that only the jury members need to certify that they have no parental link with any of the candidates. The Commission does not request such information from the candidates themselves. The Director General explained the reasons for his decision to the juries concerned as well as to the Joint Committee and agreed to re-examine the number of successful candidates for each competition. The juries thereafter resumed their work in January 2000. Regarding the further questions the Honourable Members are referred to the replies already given to Written Questions E-216/00 by Mr Ferri (1), P-832/00 by Mr Turco (2) and oral question H-125/00 by Mr Turco during question time at Parliamentís February 2000 part-session (3). (1) OJ C 374 E, 28. 12. 2000, p. 37. (2) OJ C 26 E, 26. 1. 2001, p. 116. (3) Debates of the European Parliament (February 2000). (2001/C 89 E/018) WRITTEN QUESTION E-1286/00 by Hiltrud Breyer (Verts/ALE) to the Commission (19 April 2000) Subject: Indirect aid to coal and nuclear sectors The White Paper on renewable energies commits the Commission to taking action against subsidising of the coal and nuclear-energy sectors. 1. (a) How many complaints has the Commission received in the last two years relating to the coal and nuclear-energy sectors, with reference to possible aid? (b) What did the Commission decide in each case? (c) In which countries did the complaints originate and what electricity undertakings were concerned in each case? (d) How many complaints are now being investigated by the Commission in this connection and in which countries do those complaints originate? (e) What is the substance of each complaint? 2. (a) How does the Commission identify indirect, unnotified aid to coal and nuclear energy in the Member States? (b) Has the Commission developed a systematic approach to detecting indirect aid to this sector? (c) If so, is that approach effective in preventing possible competitive advantages from accruing to particular supply undertakings? 20. 3. 2001 EN (d) Official Journal of the European Communities C 89 E/21 Is it, for example, suitable for preventing nuclear-sector reserves from being used for internal financing and/or to purchase other undertakings? If not, will the Commission make it so? (e) How soon? 3. (a) Does the Commission agree that a Commission database for the targeted monitoring of the market in the electricity sector is necessary on a European scale? (b) If not, why not? (c) If so, what action will the Commission take to establish such a database? Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission (16 June 2000) 1. The Commission has received fifteen complaints and eight appeals against Commission decisions that have been lodged with the Court of Justiceís Court of First Instance concerning the subsidies granted to the coal industry since 1997. Moreover, two anti-dumping complaints concerning imports of coal and coke have been lodged with the Commission. The Commission dealt with the complaints laid before it in accordance with the principles of Community law. It took Decision1999/184/ECSC of 29 July 1998 on aid granted by Germany to the companies Sophia Jacoba GmbH and Preussag Anthrazit GmbH for 1996 and 1997 (1). That decision responded to four complaints. Two other complaints were put on file. The Commission has served notice on the German Government to supply the information concerning the possibility that state support might have been granted as part of the RAG AG/Saarbergwerke AG (2) merger operations. The other complaints are being processed via the procedures intended for such cases. The complaints have mainly been made by coal producers in the United Kingdom, but also by French, Italian and Spanish undertakings. One of the appeals to the Court of Justice was made by an electricity generator. The precise aim of the complaints concerns possible distortions of competition resulting from discrimination and granting assistance to the coal industry. Only one complaint concerning nuclear power has been introduced recently. That complaint, concerning the sums set aside by nuclear undertakings for their future decommissioning costs is currently being investigated by the Commission in accordance with Community law. Commission decision No 3632/93/ECSC of 28 December 1993 establishing Community rules for industry is based on principles of transparency and must be given credit for 2. state aid to the coal eliminating any system of indirect aid for coal (3). go 27 The Commission has a system for monitoring production costs and service prices of the various coal producers and, if necessary, of the production units of various companies. The Commission also analyses the management reports of the coal undertakings and takes steps to ensure that the Member States do not fail to meet the obligations applying to them under the ECSC Treaty. That method has proved to be effective and the Commission intervenes where necessary. The provisions of the Euratom Treaty, as provided for by Article 305 (former Article 232) paragraph 2 of the EC Treaty apply to the nuclear industry. There is thus no systematic method of identifying state assistance to the nuclear industry. In general terms the Commission, however, monitors the electricity market via the instruments made available to it by the directives on the internal market. The implementa- tion of Community law, and in particular the EC Treaty, gives the Commission scope for examining any instance brought to its attention of distortions of competition in electricity generation. 3. Setting up a data base encounters major difficulties in terms of the cost of creating and updating on the basis of the information from companies as regards their supplies, and which is likely to have an impact on the competition among them. C 89 E/22 Official Journal of the European Communities EN 20. 3. 2001 Conversely, the Commission has available to it instruments enabling it to maintain an awareness of movements in the various parts of the internal market and in particular the electricity industry. Moreover, in order to improve transparency, the Commission publishes its decisions concerning state aid on the Internet and in the Official Journal. The Commission publishes regular reports on the harmonisation requirements of the internal market for electricity. (1) OJ L 60, 9. 3. 1999. (2) State aid 2000/C101/03, OJ C 101, 8. 4. 2000. (3) OJ L 329, 30. 12. 1993. (2001/C 89 E/019) WRITTEN QUESTION E-1288/00 by Alejo Vidal-Quadras Roca (PPE-DE) to the Council (27 April 2000) Subject: The new European defence policy According to an official report drawn up by the Commission mission which visited the US in January, substantial reservations exist within the US defence-related organs ü the National Security Council, the Pentagon, the State Department and the relevant committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate ü with respect to the European Security and Defence Identityí (ESDI). These reservations, as expressed to the participants in that mission by their US partners, include: (a) insufficient budgetary efforts by the EU Member States under the heading of defence; (b) the risk that the ESDI will weaken unified analysis and decision-making within NATO; (c) (d) concern at the possibility of the EU undertaking, unilaterally and without prior coordination within the NATO structure, crisis resolution and management actions; scepticism concerning the effective capacity of the ESDI, which, rather than being an operationally useful structure, could become a bureaucratic apparatus which would slow down NATOís response speed and impair the smooth running of the decision-making mechanisms. What is the position of the High Representative for the common foreign and security policy on each of the above concerns expressed by the US authorities in their contacts with the mission sent by the Commission to the US in January to discuss defence matters? Reply (23 October 2000) 1. The reinforcement of the European pillar in the North Atlantic Alliance goes in parallel with the development of a European security and defence policy. This will enhance the European security and defence policy. This will enhance the European capacity to respond to crises both through contribution to international organisations (UN, OSCE) and through actions led by NATO and on the other hand, autonomous actions. 2. This can only be seen as a positive development. There is no risk of slowing down or impairing NATOís decision-making process or of the EU undertaking unilaterally and without prior coordination with NATO, crisis management operations. that modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO. The work to establish the abovementioned modalities is well in progress in the appropriate EU instances and the Portuguese Presidency reported to the European Council in Feira on the progress made, including proposals on principles for consultations with NATO on military issues and recommendations the European Council agreed in Helsinki Indeed,