WRITTEN QUESTION E-2386/99 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council. German assistance in constructing a laboratory for chemical weapons.
C 280 E/38 Official Journal of the European Communities EN 3. 10. 2000 3. What is the justification for postponing the shutdown of this reactor? 4. What time limit does the Commission now propose for shutting down the reactor? Answer given by Mr Verheugen on behalf of the Commission (17 January 2000) The Commission has never stated that Bohunice V1 reactors should be closed down in 2000 as a condition for Slovak accession to the Community. In Agenda 2000, the Commission called upon the candidate countries operating non-upgradable reactors to close them at the earliest practical dates. Although Bohunice V1 belongs to this category, it is to be noted that western experts have acknowledged the progress made since 1996 in improving Bohunice V1 safety levels. The Commission considers that the commitment made by the Slovak authorities to close down Bohunice V1 in 2006 (unit 1) and 2008 (unit 2) is realistic and balanced, taking into consideration the economic, social and political implications for Slovakia of the early closure of these reactors, as well as the safety improvements recently made at this plant. The Slovak commitment on the closure of Bohunice V1 will be carefully monitored in the framework of the accession process. The Commission will make every effort to ensure that the closure dates announced by the Slovak authorities are met. (2000/C 280 E/036) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2386/99 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council (13 December 1999) Subject: German assistance in constructing a laboratory for chemical weapons The German Ministry of Defence has recently admitted that it intends to help Turkey build a laboratory for chemical weapons. The project is allegedly ápurely defensive in natureí. However, the Kennzeichen Dí programme on the ZDF television channel recently quoted military sources as claiming that on 11 May 1999 the Turkish army was using chemical weapons against the Kurdish PKK movement. Apparently twenty Kurds were killed. Research carried out by the University of Munich also shows that the heads on the Turkish chemical shells were supplied by the German firms Buck and Depyfag. 1. Is the Council aware of German help in building a laboratory for chemical weapons in Turkey? Is this German-Turkish cooperation in line with international and European obligations and under- 2. takings on disarmament and arms control, with particular regard to chemical weapons? 3. Will the Council oppose German help in building a new laboratory for chemical weapons in Turkey now that it is aware of the facts? If so, in what way will it make its opposition known to the German government? If not, why not? 4. Is the Council aware that on 11 May 1999 the Turkish army used chemical weapons against the PKK movement? If not, why is the Council not aware of this violation of the UN convention on chemical weapons by a candidate Member State? 5. Has the Council made known to Turkey its displeasure at this violation? If so, what was the Turkish governmentís response? If not, will the Council do so, now that it has been informed of this fact? If not, why not? 3. 10. 2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 280 E/39 6. Will the Council conduct an inquiry into the use of German warheads for an assault using chemical weapons in Turkey, given that the equipment was supplied by an EU Member State and that this involves an act by a candidate Member State in violation of the UN convention on chemical weapons? If not, why not? Reply (13 March 2000) All EU Member States are States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction (CWC). Among the general obligations contained in Article I of that convention is the undertaking by each State Party ánever under any circumstances to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyoneí nor áto assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Conventioní. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) ensures the implementation of the provisions of the Convention, including those for international verification of compliance with it. All States Parties to the CWC are members of the OPCW. The sources referred to by the Honourable Member have not been brought to the attention of the Council. (2000/C 280 E/037) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2394/99 by Raffaele Costa (PPE-DE) to the Council (13 December 1999) Subject: The Tenda pass tunnel ü The Tenda pass tunnel is the only Alpine pass linking south Piedmont and France, ü over the last ten years the tunnel has been blocked on several occasions by landslides or landslide risk, caused mainly by subsidence of the roof, which is now worn and under tension, ü this has resulted in very long delays and hold-ups for traffic, ü the structure dates back to 1876 and it would be difficult to convert back to a normal, usable state, ü it is situated at a considerable height, posing an extremely high risk for road traffic and for evacuation in the event of accidents, ü passing through the tunnel obliges motorists to use routes which are difficult, particularly for heavy vehicles, and which climb to a great height, ü the numerous suggestions for faster links ü in the region ü between France and Italy have been delayed or put on hold, at times for several months, without any appreciable progress. In the light of the above, will the Council state its opinion and intentions with regard to the future of the Tenda tunnel and/or a road connection there (new tunnel, at what height, rebuilding of the existing tunnel) and, in more general terms, with regard to road connections on the route between France and Italy in south Piedmont?