WRITTEN QUESTION E-1995/99 by Paul Rübig (PPE-DE) to the Commission. Guidelines on vertical restraints.
C 170 E/136 Official Journal of the European Communities EN 20. 6. 2000 book price-fixing agreement cannot be exempted unless the agreement or practice in question satisfies all the conditions laid down in Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty, and this presupposes, among other things, that the cultural benefits adduced are clearly shown to exist. (1) Cf. Article 1 of Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962 ü First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty (OJ 13, 21. 2. 1962), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1216/1999 (OJ L 148, 15. 6. 1999) and Commission Regulation No 1999/0063/EEC of 25 July 1963 on the hearings provided for in Article 19(1) and (2) of Council Regulation No 17 (OJ L 127, 20. 8. 1963); Regulation No 1999/0063/EEC has since been repealed and replaced by Commission Regulation (EC) 2842/98 of 22 December 1998 on the hearing of parties in certain proceedings under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 354, 30. 12. 1998). (2) Cf. the Commissionís decisions of 25 November 1981 in VBBB and VBVB (OJ L 54, 25. 2. 1982) and of 12 December 1988 in Publishers Association ü Net Book Agreements (OJ L 22, 26. 1. 1989) and the judgments of the Court of Justice of 17 January 1984 in Joined Cases 43 and 63/82 VBVB and VBBB v Commission [1984] ECR 17, of the Court of First Instance of 9 July 1992 in Case T-66/89 Publishers Association v Commission [1992] ECR II-1995 and of Justice of 17 January 1995 in Case C-360/92 P Publishers Association v Commission [1995] ECR I-23. the Court of (2000/C 170 E/163) WRITTEN QUESTION E-1995/99 by Paul Rübig (PPE-DE) to the Commission (9 November 1999) Subject: Guidelines on vertical restraints At the hearing in the EPís Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs the new Commissioner for competition emphasised the importance of transparency and clarity for the acceptance of EU legislation by the citizen. The draft guidelines on vertical restraints contain 225 individual points and highlight examples which cannot always be generalised. On the other hand,the extensive discussion of the relevant market still fails to include a clarification which would prevent producers in the smaller Member States from being disadvantaged. How does the Commission plan to create the greatest possible transparency in this area and to devise solutions which avoid the feared disadvantages? Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission (29 November 1999) The Honourable Member refers to the draft guidelines on vertical restraints that published, together with a draft block exemption regulation, on 24 September 1999 (1). the Commission The Commission considers that the new proposed policy will considerably simplify the rules applicable to vertical restraints and reduce the regulatory burden, as it will enable companies which lack market power (and most companies lack market power) to benefit from a safe harbour within which it will be no longer necessary for them to assess the validity of their agreements under the Community competition rules. In accordance with this new approach, the proposed block exemption regulation covers up to a market share threshold set at 30 % all vertical restraints concerning both intermediate and final goods, as well as services, except for a limited number of hardcore restraints and conditions. This removes certain major shortcomings in the three existing block exemption regulations concerning exclusive distribution, exclusive purchasing and franchising agreements, which have been widely criticised in recent years for being too narrow in scope, over formalistic in their approach and for imposing on industry a strait-jacket incompatible with the evolution of production and distribution methods. The simplification brought about by the new proposed policy will in particular benefit small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which will be largely covered by the new regulation. 20. 6. 2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 170 E/137 While companies with market shares above the 30 % threshold will not benefit from the safe harbour, it must be stressed that, pursuant to the new policy, their vertical agreements will not be presumed illegal but may require an individual examination under Article 81 (ex-Article 85) EC Treaty. The accompanying guidelines are designed to assist undertakings in carrying out such an examination and thus to increase the effectiveness of the competition rules. In drafting these guidelines, the Commission has tried to give a detailed and comprehensive overview of a technically complex matter. In particular, this text contains a chapter dealing with market definition issues, which is based on the general criteria provided in the Commissionís notice on market definition of 1997 and which is designed to offer companies more specific guidance on problems that arise in the context of vertical restraints. The guidelines have been published in the Official journal as a draft in order to give all interested parties the opportunity to present their comments, which will enable the Commission to introduce, where appropriate, possible improvements and clarifications. As to the issue of market definition, it should be recalled that the relevant anti-trust market does not necessarily coincide with a Member Stateís territory and can be assessed only on a case-by-case basis. The possible negative and positive effects of vertical agreements have to be assessed on the relevant market in question. Far from entailing a disadvantage for producers in smaller markets, the Community competition policy aims at protecting competition and consumersí interests no matter how wide or small the relevant market in geographic terms. (1) OJ C 270, 24. 9. 1999. (2000/C 170 E/164) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2013/99 by Antonio Tajani (PPE-DE) and Enrico Ferri (PPE-DE) to the Commission (9 November 1999) Subject: Breach of the rules on competition and on the freedom to supply services by Italian legislation on public and private health care It has come to our notice that certain associations representing private Italian healthcare institutions (Snubalp, FIOSP, URSAP) have lodged an appeal with the Commission asking it to determine whether Community rules on competition and on the freedom to supply services have been breached by Italian legislation on public and private health care, in the following areas: ü conflict of interest and abuse of dominant market position by the ASL (local health authorities), which combine market-regulation functions with the provision/supply and purchase/payment of services (legislative decrees No 419 of 30 November 1998 and No 229 of 19 June 1999); ü segmentation of the healthcare market and discrimination against non-Italian healthcare providers. Charges are set in an authoritative manner (ministerial decree 22. 7. 1996) and so low that it is effectively impossible for service providers from other EU Member States to enter the market and obtain reasonable profit margins. It is well known aware that healthcare services are not excluded from the regulations on the freedom to provide services. The interpretation provided by the above associations is also endorsed by the Italian Competition and Market Authority, which issued two opinions to that effect respectively on 25 June 1998 and 20 May 1999. In the light of the above, can the Commission say whether the appeal is being followed up appropriately, which departments and officials are dealing with the case and what stage has been reached in proceedings?