WRITTEN QUESTION E-2335/99 by Rolf Linkohr (PSE) to the Commission. Nuclear reactors in the applicant countries.
C 225 E/106 Official Journal of the European Communities EN 8. 8. 2000 The Italian Governmentís decision to designate one private company for each product was criticised by: ü the Italian anti-trust authority in the notification/opinion of 6 March 1998 published in Bulletin No 8/98 ü number 12 in the notification series; ü the Lazio Regional Administrative Court in injunction No 2038/1998. Furthermore, in that injunction the Lazio Regional Administrative Court states that the Italian version of the EEC Regulation does not correspond to the other language versions, which it considers to be absolutely clear in establishing, as a principle, that there should be several private inspection bodies. Can the Commission therefore say: 1. whether it is aware of the opinions expressed by the Italian anti-trust authority and the Lazio Regional Administrative Court; 2. whether it agrees with the views expressed by the Italian judicial and supervisory authorities: 3. what steps it intends to take in this context? See page 27. (1) (2) OJ L 208, 24. 7. 1992, p. 1. Answer given by Mr Fischler on behalf of the Commission (13 December 1999) The Commission was never officially informed either of the opinion of the Italian antitrust authority, or of the ruling by the Lazio administrative court, although it heard of them unofficially. It is not the habit of the Commission to comment on decisions of this kind, which fall within the exclusive competence of the Member States. In the light of its replies to the Honourable Memberís written questions P-1845/99 (1) and E-2066/99 (2), the Commission does not feel the need to adopt any measures in this respect. (1) (2) See page 27. See page 46. (2000/C 225 E/108) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2335/99 by Rolf Linkohr (PSE) to the Commission (13 December 1999) Subject: Nuclear reactors in the applicant countries 1. What is the Commissionís position with regard to nuclear reactors in the applicant countries? Does the Commission intend that the reactors should be shut down ahead of schedule and if so, 2. what is its timetable for this? Does the Commission agree with the closure plans for reactors contained, 3. national energy plans of Lithuania and Slovakia? in particular, in the 4. Can the Commission say whether and when nuclear reactors in Lithuania are due to be inspected? 8. 8. 2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 225 E/107 Answer given by Mr Verheugen on behalf of the Commission (11 January 2000) 1. The Commission has always accorded particular attention to nuclear safety in the context of enlargement. This area will be subject to continued scrutiny and supportive action by the Commission in the pre-accession period. The Commission has entered into close co-operation with the safety authorities of the candidate countries in order to strengthen their resources and their independence and thereby to further extend the nuclear safety culture which has developed within the Community. 2. The Commissionís policy on these issues is clearly outlined in Agenda 2000 of July 1997, where the reactors of the nuclear power plants in the candidate countries are divided into three categories: reactors of Western design, Soviet-designed plants which can be upgraded to meet international safety standards, and Soviet-designed units which can not be upgraded at a reasonable cost. The Commission has repeatedly stated that the third category nuclear power plants operating in candidate countries should be closed at earliest practical dates, in the framework of a comprehensive energy strategy. This applies to Bohunice V-1 in Slovakia and to the Ignalina nuclear power plant (NPP) in Lithuania, as well as to units 1-4 of the Kozloduy NPP in Bulgaria. The Commission has had intense and fruitful discussions on this issue with the authorities of the 3. candidate countries. In the second regular reports on progress of candidates toward accession of 13 October 1999, the Commission welcomed the decisions of the Lithuanian and Slovak authorities on early closure of the Ignalina and Bohunice V-1 reactors. The Commission also welcomes the recent understanding with Bulgaria with regard to early closure of Kozloduy 1-4. The Commission regards these decisions as an expression of the countriesí commitment to integration and as an important contribution to nuclear safety in Europe. The Commission will certainly continue the dialogue on this issue with the authorities concerned. 4. The Lithuanian safety authority ensures on a regular basis that the operator of the nuclear reactors implements the safety provisions of the safety improvement programme. Granting of operation permits is conditional on the results of these safety revisions, the safety evaluation reports. The Commission supports the Lithuanian safety authority and its work with resources from the PHARE programme. (2000/C 225 E/109) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2337/99 by Anna Karamanou (PSE) to the Commission (13 December 1999) Subject: Potentially fatal health hazards arising from exposure to microwave radiation from mobile telephones Recent research by Swedish scientists and other public health experts have shown that exposure to radiation from the use of mobile telephones causes serious damage to the human organism for example the development of carcinogenic tumours on the brain and the acoustic nerve, together with functional genetic disorders. What measures and policies will the Commission launch with a view to ensuring the safe use of mobile telephones and the protection of public health in general? Answer given by Mr Byrne on behalf of the Commission (17 January 2000) The Commission has taken due note of concerns on possible harmful effects on health of electromagnetic fields. On 9 March 1999, the Council and the Parliament adopted a Directive 1999/5/EC on radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment and the mutual recognition of their conformity (1). This lays down the requirements that radio transmitters need to meet in order to be placed on the market and be operated. It envisages that Member States may restrict operation for health reasons, e. g. by imposing certain minimum distances between the transmitter and the public