WRITTEN QUESTION P-2691/99 by Pernille Frahm (GUE/NGL) to the Commission. UN Convention on Refugees.
24. 10. 2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 303 E/91 Mr Rodríguez Mendoza was quoted as saying that the WTO certainly permitted the trade preferences that industrialised nations granted to developing countries and he strongly denied that there was a single WTO rule requiring preferential agreements to be converted into free trade agreements. Can the Commission comment on the above statements by the WTO Deputy Director-General and also say: 1. whether it will make the necessary adjustments to its position in the negotiations on a successor convention to LomØ and cease to insist on regional free trade agreements; 2. bearing in mind that LomØ Convention is due to expire on 28 February 2000, whether it has already applied to the WTO for renewal of the special exemption and if not, why not; 3. whether and to what extent it has been conducting a dialogue in previous years with the appropriate WTO bodies on the post-LomØ negotiations? Answer given by Mr Nielson on behalf of the Commission (3 February 2000) The statement attributed to the Deputy Director-general of the World trade organisation (WTO) misleading. is There is, indeed, no single WTO rule requiring preferential agreements to be converted into free trade agreements. In this, the statement is correct and the Commission has never claimed the opposite. It is also a matter of fact that WTO rules permit industrialised countries to grant trade preferences to developing countries. In this, the statement is also correct, but it needs to be added that this is only the case as long as these trade preferences do not discriminate between developing countries having the same level of social and economic development. The present, non-reciprocal trade preferences granted to the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) which introduce a discrimination between developing countries only on a geographical basis, are incompatible with the provisions of the WTO. They can only be maintained if a waiver is granted. In this context, there has been agreement since the Dakar Community-ACP ministerial meeting in March 1999 that the present, non-reciprocal trade preferences cannot be maintained indefinitely. A waiver will therefore be requested to continue the existing preferences. At that period, new trade arrangements will be introduced which should be fully compatible with the provisions of the WTO. The decision was also taken at the December 1999 Community-ACP ministerial meeting to prepare a formal request for a waiver which will be submitted to the WTO as soon as the text describing the proposed trade regime to be in force during the preparatory period has been finalised in the coming weeks. the end of The Commission has always held the view that a clear and unconditional commitment to introduce, after a preparatory period, a new WTO-compatible trade arrangement, would considerably increase the chances of obtaining a new waiver. This view has been confirmed in numerous contacts which the Commission has had during the negotiations with the WTO secretariat. The statement attributed to the Deputy Director general of the WTO does not contradict this view. (2000/C 303 E/083) WRITTEN QUESTION P-2691/99 by Pernille Frahm (GUE/NGL) to the Commission (11 January 2000) Subject: UN Convention on Refugees The conclusions of the Tampere Summit emphasised the Councilís intention of making the UN Convention on Refugees the basis for EU refugee and asylum policy. Will the Commission confirm that this decision means that the Member States are obliged to deal with applications for asylum regardless of the applicantís country of origin? C 303 E/92 Official Journal of the European Communities EN 24. 10. 2000 Answer given by Mr Vitorino on behalf of the Commission (3 February 2000) The Presidency conclusions from the Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999 include the following statements: The aim is an open and secure European Union, fully committed to the obligations of the Geneva Refugee Convention and other relevant human rights instruments í (paragraph 4); and The European Council reaffirms the importance the Union and Member States attach to absolute respect of the right to seek asylum. It has agreed to work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention, thus ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution, i. e. maintaining the principle of non-refoulement. í (paragraph 13). The Commission welcomes and endorses these statements. These political commitments will form the background of future legislative proposals in the field of asylum. As far as Member Statesí obligations in the field of asylum are concerned, it is appropriate to distinguish between their obligations under international law and their obligations under the Treaties. All Member States are parties to the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the status of refugees. That Convention imposes obligations on states in relation to refugees, including a prohibition on árefoulementí under Article 33 of the Convention, which apply irrespective of a refugeeís country of origin. Indeed, Article 3 of the Convention specifically provides that contracting states shall apply the provisions of the Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin. All Member States are also parties to the Dublin Convention, in Article 2 of which they reaffirm their obligations under the Geneva Convention as amended by the New York Protocol and their commitment to co-operating with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in applying these instruments. As far as obligations under the Treaties are concerned, at present there is no Community law in the field of asylum. Article 63(1) (ex Article 7K) of the EC Treaty requires the Council to adopt a series of measures on asylum which must be áin accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 on the status of refugees and other relevant treatiesí. The implementation of Article 63(1) will be the mechanism by which the Council gives effect to the conclusions of the Tampere European Council mentioned above. Two of the four subparagraphs of Article 63(1) envisage measures relating to nationals of a third country, whereas the other two subparagraphs do not specify the scope ratione personae of the measures to be taken. The Treaty of Amsterdam includes a protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States, which is annexed to the EC Treaty. This provides that an application for asylum made by a national of a Member State may be taken into consideration or declared admissible for processing by another Member State only when one of four conditions is met. Three of these conditions are concerned with derogations from human rights legislation or serious and persistent breaches of human rights principles in the Member State of which the applicant for asylum is a national. The fourth condition offers Member States the possibility of unilaterally deciding to process an asylum application from a national of another Member State. Declaration no 48 to the Treaty of Amsterdam states that: The Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the European Union does not prejudice the right of each Member State to take the organisational measures it deems necessary to fulfil its obligations under the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the status of refugees. í It is a matter for each state to determine what organisational measures it needs to take in order to comply with its obligations under the Geneva Convention whilst implementing the Protocol. Nothing in the Protocol prevents a Member State from considering all applications for asylum regardless of the applicantís country of origin. The Commission recalls that Belgium made a declaration to the effect 24. 10. 2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 303 E/93 that: In approving the Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the European Union, Belgium declares that, in accordance with its obligations under the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol, it shall, in accordance with the provision set out in point (d) of the sole Article of that Protocol, carry out an individual examination of any asylum request made by a national of another Member State. í (1) (1) See the Treaty of Amsterdam, Declarations of which the Conference took note No 5, declaration by Belgium on the Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member State of the European Union. (2000/C 303 E/084) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2699/99 by Ole Krarup (EDD) to the Commission (12 January 2000) Subject: Purposes of the ECBís currency reserves The Euro is a floating currency for which in relation to fixed currencies there is no need for intervention via buying or selling. The currency reserve the ECB is establishing on a decentralised basis via the national central banks therefore does not have the purpose of fixing the price of the Euro in relation to the US dollar for example. The ECB annual report for 1998 advances a number of other functions for the currency reserve (page 74). May it be assumed from this that, in addition to these functions, the only purpose of the currency reserve is to guarantee the financial standing of the ECB, or is there any reason to expect that parts of the currency reserve may also be used for non-conventional purposes, e. g. for financial equalisation between regions to offset an inadequate EU fiscal policy? If the latter is not the case, can the Commission then confirm that the currency reserve will be used only for purposes which have already been announced in the Treaties or by the ECB? Answer given by Mr Solbes Mira on behalf of the Commission (17 February 2000) The main objective of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is to maintain stable prices. Whether the euro has fixed or floating exchange rates, variation in its external value could have an impact on inflation. The European Central Bank must be able to intervene on the exchange market, which means that it must hold exchange reserves. Article 3(1) of Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank specifies that, among others, the task of the European System of Central Banks is to conduct foreign exchange operations consistent with the provisions of Article 109 of the Treaty. The Treaty does not make provision for the use of the reserve áfor non-conventional purposes. í (2000/C 303 E/085) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2707/99 by Ian Hudghton (Verts/ALE) to the Commission (12 January 2000) Subject: Fisheries: Fleet size and MAGPs Can the Commission provide a comparative analysis of the methods used to calculate fleet size and fulfilment of MAGPs in different Member States?