WRITTEN QUESTION E-2168/99 by Gerhard Schmid (PSE) to the Commission. Teleworking centres in Bavaria.
C 225 E/62 Official Journal of the European Communities EN 8. 8. 2000 Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission (7 December 1999) The Commission is aware of cases where the foreign exchange dealing costs between the euro and the pound sterling have risen following the introduction of the euro. The Commission understands that this has arisen for the following reasons. The bid/offer spread on foreign exchange markets is measured in ápipsí. Thus, if the bid price for sterling/ euro is 0,6397 and the offer price is 0,6399, there is a spread of two pips. The Commission understands that prior to the introduction of the euro, the bid/offer spread on the retail market for sterling/deutsch- marks was in the region of five pips for GBP 5 million. Following the introduction of the euro, the bid/ offer spread on the retail market for sterling/euro is in the region of three pips for € 10 million. Given the difference in value between the euro and the deutschmark, although the spread has gone down in absolute terms, the cost in percentage terms has increased significantly. The Commission understands that there is also currently a bid/offer spread of around three pips for sterling/euro on the interbank market. This apparently makes it difficult for banks to charge less than three pips on the retail market. These facts could suggest an absence of competitive pressure on providers of foreign exchange services to reduce their spreads, either at the retail level or at the interbank level or both. However, they are not evidence in themselves that infringements of Community competition law either have been or are taking place. So far as the application of Article 82 (ex Article 86) of the EC Treaty is concerned, there are many hundreds of banks which deal in sterling/euro and provide foreign exchange services to corporate customers. It seems unlikely therefore that any individual bank is in a dominant position or that there are a number of banks which could be considered to be in a joint dominant position. As regards the application of Article 81 (ex Article 85) of the EC Treaty, the Commission has no evidence that collusion has taken place. Indeed, in general terms, successful collusion to maintain or increase spreads would probably require two elements, both of which appear to be missing on this market. The first is that there would need to be a relatively small number of participants in the collusion. A cartel involving hundreds of participants would seem most unlikely. Secondly, successful collusion would require some degree of transparency of prices in order to allow for enforcement. However, on the retail market, the spread is in principle only known to the buyer and seller. For these reasons, it might be considered that a spreads cartel on the foreign exchange retail market would be unlikely to succeed. Finally, although the Commission has not received any formal complaint regarding the subject matter of the Honourable Memberís concern, it will continue to monitor the situation. (2000/C 225 E/062) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2168/99 by Gerhard Schmid (PSE) to the Commission (29 November 1999) Subject: Teleworking centres in Bavaria in all administrative The Bavarian land government wishes to establish so-called áteleworking centresí districts that are Objective 5b areas, as part of the átop-elevení programme. A total of 40 such centres are to be established in Bavaria. The amount of DEM 60 million is being contributed from public funds. The greater part of that amount consists of European aid allocations. The Objective 5 programme is contributing some DEM 17,8 million, and about DEM 7,5 million are coming from the European Social Fund. The Bavarian land contribution runs to about DEM 15 million. A brochure has also been prepared. It does not contain a single mention of the fact that the greater part of the funding has been allocated from the EU budget. Nor is any indication to be seen on the ground, on any of the projects known to me, that European funding has been provided. 8. 8. 2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 225 E/63 Are there any provisions requiring Member State authorities that administer EU-funded projects 1. publicly to acknowledge the source of such funding? If so, will the Commission reprimand the Bavarian land government on this occasion? If not, why not, and are any provisions to that effect in the pipeline? To my present knowledge, the objective associated with the establishment of these centres of creating 2. 600 new jobs in rural areas has fallen well short of its target. Has the Commission monitored this project for effective use of public funds, in relation in particular to job-creation? If so, with what results? If not, why not, and does it intend to do so? Answer given by Mr Fischler on behalf of the Commission (21 December 1999) Operational programmes in the framework of objective 5b and Leader II and co-financed by the structural funds are designed on the level of priorities and measures, not at project level. Therefore the Commission usually has no knowledge of individual projects. In the case of átop elfí (English: top eleven) the Bavarian authorities informed the Bavarian objective 5b and Leader II monitoring committee that the Bavarian concept for the integrated use of telecommunication in rural areas (átop elfí) fits into the measures of the operational programmes. It consists of a bundle of different projects which, for better visibility, were summarised in the concept átop elfí. These projects were connected with the European agriculture guidance and guarantee fund (EAGGF) and European social fund (ESF) measures of the objective 5b operational programme e. g. measure 7 áforestryí and átop elfí project áforestry information systemí. Neither Commission nor monitoring committee were informed of the detailed amounts of money intended to be spent under átop elfí. The Commission has contacted the German authorities in order to verify the figures the Honourable Member mentioned in his question. The Commission was not informed about the brochure, which was prepared by the Bavarian authorities on átop elfí. Point E of the áhorizontal clausesí, annexed to the Commission decisions on the operational 1. lays down that Commission Decision No 94/342/EC of 31 May 1994 (1) concerning programmes, information and publicity measures to be carried out by the Member States concerning assistance from the structural funds shall apply. The Commission is not in a position to confirm the Bavarian government did fulfil the requirements of the above mentioned publication in respect to the projects in question. The Commission is contacting the Member State in this connection. 2. As the operational programme is designed on measure level the Commission cannot carry out feasibility studies for projects. This is up to the Member State. In order to be able to deliver more detailed information the Commission is contacting the Member State. (1) OJ L 152, 18. 6. 1994. (2000/C 225 E/063) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2169/99 by Michl Ebner (PPE-DE) to the Commission (29 November 1999) Subject: Kerosene tax in civil aviation The 1944 Chicago Convention stipulates that kerosene used as fuel in international civil aviation may not be subject to taxation. At the same time, flights within the EU, but between different EU Member States, continue to be treated as áinternational flightsí, and thus to be covered by that exemption. The assumption