WRITTEN QUESTION No. 1564/98 by Marie-Noëlle LIENEMANN to the Commission. Crédit Lyonnais
C 402/142 Official Journal of the European Communities EN 22. 12. 98 (98/C 402/188) WRITTEN QUESTION P-1550/98 by Marie-Noºlle Lienemann (PSE) to the Commission (8 May 1998) Subject: CrØdit Lyonnais How has the Commission felt itself able to make public statements which have seriously damaged and now seriously threaten a major European bank, namely CrØdit Lyonnais, and its plans to solve its problems by guaranteeing its survival and ensuring continuing employment? I am surprised by the Commissionís criticism of the increase in public aid (the amount of which is subject to divergent interpretations), when the offsetting elements which are customarily required in order to safeguard the rules of competition applicable to investments are more than double those in the original plan. The amounts proposed by the French Government and CrØdit Lyonnais are amply sufficient to offset the level of public aid, even if the high estimate of these made by the Commission (which is likely to be disputed) is accepted. (98/C 402/189) WRITTEN QUESTION E-1564/98 by Marie-Noºlle Lienemann (PSE) to the Commission (20 May 1998) Subject: CrØdit Lyonnais Is not the Commission exceeding its powers when it disputes the choices made by the French Government and CrØdit Lyonnais on the way in which compensation for public subsidies, needed to uphold its rules of competition, is implemented. The Commission must monitor the amount of compensation, and the fact that it is paid, but it has no say in the method by which this payment is implemented. It is particularly surprising that the Commission is calling for CrØdit Lyonnais to give up its European network, which amounts to dismantling CrØdit Lyonnais prior to its winding up, since the Commission ought to be seeking to preserve the permanence of this network. This is the rule which emerges from the case law in this area, but it is also essential in order to defend jobs. Is not the Commission going against one of the main principles of the European Union when it calls for the privatization of a firm, › and indeed suggests the forms which this should take › even though the Treaty of Rome clearly states that the capital of undertakings may be public or private and that the European institutions have no say in the matter? Joint answer to Written Questions P-1550/98 and E-1564/98 given by Mr Van Miert on behalf of the Commission (8 June 1998) Article 92 of the EC Treaty states that áaid to facilitate the development of certain economic activitiesí may be considered to be compatible with the common market áwhere such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interestí. The Community guidelines on restructuring aid (1) spell out the tests the Commission applies in order to determine whether aid to firms in difficulty, such as the aid now being granted by France to CrØdit Lyonnais, is compatible with the common market. One of the conditions laid down there is that measures must be taken áto offset as far as possible adverse effects on competitorsí. The Commission may impose áany conditions and obligations as may be necessaryí, such as a reduction in the recipientís commercial presence. Under Article 155 of the Treaty, it is the Commission rather than the Member State granting the aid which is to ensure that Article 92 is being applied properly and to determine the nature and scale of the quid pro quo needed to protect the common interest. CrØdit Lyonnais is being given a volume of aid unparalleled in the history of the Community, far in excess of the aid given to it with the Commissionís authorisation in 1995 and 1996, and the distortion caused in the banking sector is considerable. In the Commissionís judgment, the common interest requires that measures to compensate