WRITTEN QUESTION E-1869/99 by Maria Martens (PPE-DE) to the Commission. Suspension of subsidies to Dutch companies under the ESF programme.
C 219 E/40 Official Journal of the European Communities EN 1. 8. 2000 Information available to date shows that radiation levels monitored at the boundary of the site rose to over one thousand times normal background during the period of criticality, but returned to or near back- ground levels the following day. Almost 100 people have been identified as having received enhanced exposure to gamma and neutron radiation. With a few exceptions, they are employees of the plant or emergency personnel. It is reported that very small quantities of radionuclides were released from the site and that none have been detected in local farm products. The Commission will continue to examine carefully the reports on the accident, in particular to see what lessons can be learned to improve further nuclear safety in Europe. It appears that inadequate training and poorly qualified personnel were important factors in this accident. The Commission is preparing a study to examine the level of training in nuclear safety for operators and other workers in nuclear facilities in the Community. It is important to be sure that lack of knowledge of the hazards associated with nuclear technology will not put at risk the health of Europeans and that the situation is in conformity with relevant Community directives on the basic safety standards. In addition, research on the organisation and management of safety in the nuclear sector is included in the research and training part of the Communityís fifth framework programme (1). Research on nuclear reactor safety is also included in the programme. (1) OJ C 173, 7. 6. 1997. (2000/C 219 E/047) WRITTEN QUESTION E-1869/99 by Maria Martens (PPE-DE) to the Commission (14 October 1999) Subject: Suspension of subsidies to Dutch companies under the ESF programme In recent months I have been alerted to problems regarding ESF subsidies for projects in the Netherlands. During the check made in Rijnmond and Gelderland (April 1999) shortcomings were discovered in the accounts and the Commission intends to halt the subsidies to the Dutch projects. Does the Commission really intend to halt subsidies to all projects under the ESF programme in the Netherlands? If so, why? Given that the Commission cannot intend that good projects should suffer as a result of bad ones, can the Commission ensure that not all projects fall victim to two possible instances of carelessness in a single project? Can the Commission make an exception for the majority of the subsidised projects where it is certain that the accounts definitely satisfy the requirements? The shortcomings often arise as a result of the complexity of the procedures and the Commissionís slowness in making payments. How does the Commission intend to make the financial responsibility with regard to projects simpler and more transparent? Answer given by Mrs Diamantopoulou on behalf of the Commission (26 November 1999) An audit on the implementation of the European social fund (ESF) during the period 1994-1997 was carried out in the Rijnmond and Gelderland regions of the Netherlands by the Commission in April 1999. The audit was requested by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) on the basis of findings during previous audits conducted by the Commission. the accounting records and statements of expenditure related to ESF projects of six of the eight promoters audited (representing 95 % of the funds audited) proved to be incorrect. It was discovered that On the basis of these findings, advance payments for ESF objectives 1, 2, 3 and 5b and the Community initiative employment have been reduced in order to safeguard the financial interests of the Community, on the basis of Article 21 of the Co-ordination Regulation Council Regulation (EEC) No 2082/93 of 1. 8. 2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 219 E/41 20 July 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 laying down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards co-ordination of the activities of the different Structural Funds between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments (1) and Article 2 of the Financial Regulation Council Regulation (EC, Euratom, ECSC) No 2335/95 of 18 September 1995 amending the Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977 applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, with regard to the special provisions applicable to research and technological development appropriations (2) until, for all projects, the frequency of occur- rence and the size of the error could be determined (based on a sufficiently large number of projects). Subsequent to the Commission audit, the Dutch authorities have audited 83 % of the 1997 ESF projects for the above mentioned objectives. In the Dutch report on these additional checks, the erroneous amount has been calculated at HFL 58,4 million (€ 26,5 million) which represents 22 % of the amount of the projects audited and 17,5 % of the ESF funding for 1997. An estimate of the amount of the irregularity for the years 1994, 1995 and 1996 still has to be finalised. In reducing the ESF payments for the Netherlands, the Commission is unable to make a distinction between projects that comply with the European and Dutch ESF regulations and those that do not. Indeed, on the basis of the subsidiarity principle and the partnership between the Commission and the Member State, it is the Member State which draws up the record of all expenditure incurred and certifies it. Since the Dutch authorities have not yet produced a final payment claim for 1997 with corrected amounts, the Commission cannot, according to Article 21 of the Co-ordination Regulation and Article 2 of the Financial Regulation make advance final payments related to the subsequent annual instalments to the Netherlands. Together with the Dutch authorities, the Commission is striving to find an appropriate and rapid solution for this payment problem. (1) OJ L 193, 31. 7. 1993. (2) OJ L 240, 7. 10. 1995. (2000/C 219 E/048) WRITTEN QUESTION P-1870/99 by Ewa Hedkvist Petersen (PSE) to the Commission (12 October 1999) Subject: Ensuring the safety of nuclear power stations on the Kola Peninsula The Swedish Agency for Administrative Development has delivered a report to the Swedish Government on the risks and need for action to safeguard important public services by the conversion of data- processing systems to operate into the millennium. In respect of power station safety in Sweden, all systems bearing on safety had been made safe by 1 July 1999. On the other hand, we know that risk assessments are not available for nuclear power stations in several countries in the former Soviet Union. Some 300 miles from Norrbotten where I live, the Polyarny Zori nuclear power station produces 63 % of the electricity used on the Kola Peninsula; it is regarded as one of the ten most dangerous nuclear power stations in the world. If there is an accident there at the millennium the impact on human life and the environment in the Barents area could be catastrophic for an incalculable period. What action is the Commission taking to ensure that Russia has acted or will be acting to prevent accidents in its nuclear power stations?