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the whole revenues of the country. The Con-
sttution has declared it to be the duty OF the
President TO see that the laws are executed,
andit makes him the Commander in Chief OF the
Armies and Navy of the United States. 1t the
opinion of the most approved writers upon that
species of mixed Government, which In mod
ern Europe, is termed Monarchy in contradis-
tinction 10 DeSpotiSn, is correct, there was wan
ting no other addition TO the powers of our
Chief Magistrate to stamp monarchlcal char.
acter on our Government, but the control oi
the public finances. And to me it appears
strange, indeed, that any one should doubt,
that the entire control which the President
possesses over the officers who have the custody
of the public money, by the power of removal,
with or without cause, does, for all mischiev-
Gus purpose at least, virtually subject the treas
ure also to his disposal. The first Roman En-
peror, in his attempt to seize the sacred
treasure, silenced the opposition OF the officer
to whose charge it had been committed, by a
significant allusion to his sword BY Selec-
ton of political instruments for the care of the
public money, reference to their commissions
bv president, would be quite as enectual an
argument as that of Caesar to the Roman
Knight.


am not insensible of the great difficulty
tlat exists in drawing proper plan for the
safe-keeping and disbursement 8 of the public
revenues, and know the importance whichhas
been attached by men of great abilities and
patriotism to the divorce, as 1t is called, of the
Treasury from the banking institutions. 1t is
not the divorce which is complained of, but
the unhalIowed union of the Treasury with the
Executive Department, which has created
such extensive alarm. To this danger to our
Republican institutions, and that created by
the influence given TO the Executive, through
the instrumentality of the federal officers,
propose to apply all the remedies which may
be at my command 1t was certainly great
error in the trainers of the constitution, not to
have made the officer at the head of the Treas
u"y Department entirely independent of the
Executive. He should at least have been re-
movable only upon the demand of the popular
branch of the Legislature. have determined
never to remove Secretary of the Treasury,
without communicating all the circumstances
attending such removal to both Houses of
Congress.


The influence of the Executive, in controll-
ing the freedom of the elective franchise
through the medium of the public officers, can
be effectually checked by renewing the prohi-
bition published by Mr. Jefferson, forbidding
their interference in elections further than





dence secured by an assurance of perfect i'm
munity, in exercising this sacred privilege of
freemen under the dictates of their own unb-
assed judgments. Never with my consent,
shall an officer of the people, compensated for
his services out of their pockets, become the
plant instrument of Executive will.


There is no part of the means placed in the
hands of the Executive which might be used
with greater effect, for unhalowed purposes,
than the control of the public press. The
maxim which our ancestors derived from the
mother country, that "the freedom of the press
is the great bulwark of civil and religious lib
erty," is one of the most precious legacies
which thev have left US. We have learned,
too, from our own as we'll as the experience of
other countries, that golden shackels, by whom
soever or by whatever pretence imposed, are
as fatal to it as the iron bonds of despotism.
The presses in the necessary employment of the
Government should never be used "to clear
the guilty, or to varnish crime" A decent
and manly examination of the acts of the Gov
ernment should be not only tolerated but en-
couraged.


Upon other occasions have given my opn
ion at some length, upon the impropriety o
Executive interference in tho legislation o
Congress. That the article in the constitution
making it the duty of the President TO commu
nicate information, and authorizing him t.
recommend measures, was not intended t.
make him the source in legislation, and, il
particular, that he should never be looked t.
for schemes of finance. 1t would be yer,
strange, indeed, that the Constitution sheul'
have strictly forbidden one branch of the legis
lature from interfering in the organization G
such bills, and that it should be considere
proper that an altogether different department
of the Government should be permitted to d
so. Some of our best political maxims an
opinions have been drawn from our parent Isle
There are others however, which cannot be in
troduced in our system without singular incor
gruity and the production of much mischief
And this conceive to be one. No matter i
which of the Houses of Parliament bill ma
ORIGINATE. nor hv whom introduced a nniste