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The Lessons of Erperience.-Look moment al the esssns of experience on the blessings of this kind of banks of large capital and large issues. Have

 they prevented, or rather did they not the ex- pansons of 1795, and the contracons and disasters

 that followed! Did they prevent the distress of 1907 and 1909, under the first United States Bank? DId they prevent the widespread ruin in 1919 to 1923 or l824 the very period selected by the chairman as i- frustrating the improved tmes-"the good old times'' produced by the second United States Bank?

 Not to dwell on these various pictures of wretched- ness and run that followed in the train of that bank, it is recorded fact, in the report to the other House

 in 1882, that quite five and half millions of the cap- tai itself of the bank rretrevably lost of which we owned one-seyenth and all the dividends for two or three years, soon after it commenced business

 Did the second bank again, in 1925, avert almost unexampled bankruptcies! Or, in 1854, did it mti- gate, or rather not produce, the panic and suffering which were represented to agonize the country? Or, in lS36 did it check, rather not stimulate the ex- pansions and overtracing which led to an excess of sixty millions imports over the prior year, and thus produced the revulson in credit, and the export of spece that caused most of the banks in 1887 to sus- pend, and the whole community to be overwhelmed with debt and insolvency!

 Now the delusion seems to be, that, by making an other bank-though the basis of that, yet in many respects more exposed to abse-we to get rid of all the evils in it's train-evils which have so recently closed it's tubd career; il feared in hopeless bank ruptcy; marred American credit abroad and covered numerous firesides with desolation.

 Of what use is it to denounce the officers of that institution charatans, or to exu that the connex- ion between them and the Government had been sev- cred before its final explosion, when we hasten now to reinstate their vicious system, of banking with some additional pers, and proclaim it not only as the great guide in forming this, but have repeated m it's favor here all the boastiu but exploded preten tions--as to it's equalizing exchanges, restoring uniform currency the whole country, and bring ing immediate relief to all elasses-which emanated so constantly from the vany the pertness, the rash ness that long psesded it's destinies, and even- tualy sowed the seeds of it's ruin!

 Another proud claim in behalf of the fermer national banks, as well as this one is their influence to pre- vent defaults and losses of the public money But in point of fact our records show that the last bank and the former one, so far from essenng the losses of which gentlemen talk often as connected with the subtreasury, or even the State bank system led to greater public losses from l797 to 1901, and again from 1909 to 1911, and from 1877 to 1921, and from 1921 to 1S24-all periods when United States Bank in full operation with all its guards and benefits -than have occurred in any similar length of time under the State bank system the independent treas. ury. Not one of any magnitude is known to have