N, MISSISSIPPI, SATURDAY MARCH 81, ls4l.
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and strengthens, with the declining years of
its victim. If this is true, it is the part of wis
dom for a Republic to limit the service of that
officer, at least, to whom she has entrusted
the management of her foreign relations, the
execution of her laws, and the command of
her armies and navies, to period SO short as
to prevent his forgetting that he is the accoun-
table agent, not the principal; the servant not
the master. Until an amendment of The Con-
stitution can be effected, public opinion may
secure the desired object. give my aid TO it
by renewing the pledge heretofore given, that,
under no circumstances, will consent to serve
second term.


But if there is danger to public liberty from
the acknowledged defects of the Constitution
in the want of limit to the continuance of the
Executive power in the same hands, there is,
apprehend, not much less from miSconstruc-
| tion of that instrument, as il regards the pow
er actually given. | cannot conceive that. by
fair construction, any or either of its pro-
visions would be found to constitute the Pres
ident part of the Legislative power. team
not be claimed from the power to recommend,
since, although enjoined as duty upon him,
it is a privilege which he holds in common
with every other citizen. And although there
may be something more of confidence in the
propriety of the measures recommended in the
one case than in the other in the obligations of
ultimate decision there can be no difference.
In the language of the Constitution, "all legis-
lative powers which it grants ''are vested in
the Congress of the United States" 1t would
be a solecism in language to say that any por-
ton of these is not included in the whole.


1t may be said indeed, that the Constitution
has given to the Executive the power to annul
the acts of the legislative body, by refusing to
them his assent. So similar power has ne
cessariy resulted from that instrument to the
Judiciary, and yet the Judiciary forms no part
of the Legislature. There is, it is true, this
difference between these grants of power; the
Executive can put his negative upon the acts
ofthe Legislature for other cause than that OF
want of conformity to the Constitution
whilst the Judiciary can only declare void those
which violate that instrument. But the de-
cision of the Judiciaryis is final in such case,
whereas in every instance where the vote OF
the Executive is applied it may be overcome
by vote of two thirds of both houses of Con.
gress. The negative upon the acts of the Legis-
lative, by the Executive authority, and that in
the hands of one individual, would seem to be
an incOngruity in our system. Like some
ott,ers of similar character, however, it ap-
pears to be highly expedient; and if used only
with the forbearance and in the spirit which
was intended by its authors, it may be pro-
ductive of great good and be found one of the
best safeguards to the Union. At the period
of the formation of the Constitution, the prin-
l ciple does not appear to have enjoyed much
r favor in the State Governments. 1t existed in
but two, and in one of them there was plu.
raj Executive. five would search for the mo-


tives which operated upon the purely patriot
$ ic and enlightened assembly which framed the
, Constitution, for the adoption of provision
so apparently repugnant to the leading DEM
ocratic principle, that the majority should gov.
ern, we must reject the idea that they anticipa-
ted from it any benefit to the ordinary course
oflegislation. They knew too well the high
t degree of intelligence which existed among the
people, and the enlightened character of the
State Legislatures, not to have the fullest con-
4 fidence that the two bodies elected by them
t would be worthy representatives OF such con.
S stituentS, and, of course, that they would re-
; quire no aid in conceiving and maturing the
e measures which the circumstances of the coun


try might require. And it is preposterous tc
r suppose that a thought could for a momen
S have been ascertained, that the Presiden
f, placed at the Capitol in the centre of the coun
: try, could better understand the wants anc
e wishes of the people than their own immediate
5, Representatives, who spend a part of every
l. year among them, living with them, often la
e boring with them, and bound to them by th'
al triple tie of interest, duty and affection.
l. To assist or control Congress then in its or
l. dinary legislation could not, conceive, have
n been the motive for confering the veto powe
e on the President. This argument acquire
= additional force from the fact of its never hav
is ing been thus used by the first six Presidents
E. and two of them were members of the Con
r vention one presiding over its deliberations
h, and the othef bearing larger share in con
S, sumating the labors of that august body thai
j. any other person. But if bills were never re
t. tunrned to Congress by either of the Presi
It, dents above referred to, upon the ground {
" their being inexpedient, or not as well adopt
<, ed as they might be to the wants of the people