CONCLUSION or THE TREASURY REPORT.
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of keeping and diSbursing the public mon- eys, and also to the subject of the creation or employment of fiscal agent, to be charged with the performance of these and other du- ties. The subject is one of great importance both to the government and to the communl- ty. Such agent or depository ought to unlte in the highest practical degree the safety of 1 the public funds and convenience and econO- my in their administration, and it should # possible be so selected or framed as to exert a salutary influence over the business and currency of the country.

 The mode of keeping and disbursing the public money, provided by the act oI July 4th. lS4O, will be found on comparison with that heretofore chiefly used by the Govern ment, eminently deficient in all these essen- tial requisites. The financial history of the United States, especially for the last twelve years, furnishes abundant proof that the pub- lie money is unsafe in the custody of indl- vidMals, and that their official bonds arc not sufficient security for its safe keeping ana faithful application. Within the period above named many receiving officers con- nected with the Treasury Department have become dcfaulters to the Government. The aggregate loss from that cause within that period, as shown by the books of the Depart. ment, amounts to $2,62O,5OO, but a small part of which will, probably, be recovered from their bonds. It is true, that m any sys- tenn which can be adopted some part of the public money must in the process of coliec- ton pass through the hands of individuals and be subject to their defalcations, but the act of July 4th, l64l, extends and continues the risk beyond the period of ofcoliection, and it subjects large masses, which in the 1uctu- tlonS Of commerce sometimes accumulate 10 the same dangerous custody.

 | Not onlv iof fho pnhlic roonav in the hands of individuals more exposed to loss from or. dinary defalcations than when deposited in a well regulated Bank, but the Government is, also, liable to risk of fire, robbery and other casualties, occurring either in deposlte or transmission, from which it is entirely protected when we'll regulated Bank is the depository and the fiscal agent.

 The present sytem is also in many respects cumbrous and incoNvenient. It's tendency IS to center the disbursements of the public moneys at some of the eastern cities, chiefly at New York. That being the great com- mercial emporium of the United States, is the point at which funds are the most valua- ble, and therefore the most sought-hence those who are entitled to payments out of the public treasury claim them there. It is true, there is general discretion in tho head of the Department to refuse or grant the favor of such payments according to his conven- fence but when the currency is deranged and the premium on exchange high, this dis cretion involves discrimination to a large amount among creditors equally entitled.-- It then becomes dangerous discretion, and one that ought not to exist. But, under the present system it cannot be avoided, save in few cases, without discharging every lia- bility at the most favored point. This would at once center all the disbursements at a few of the Eastern cities, and involve the Treas ury in the risk and expense of transporting collection to the places of disbursement.

 An item of less importance, but still wor- thy of consideration, in settling on perma- nent and economical arrangement, is the di- rect expense of the present system, includ- ing the cost of the buildings for deposite of the public money, and the salaries of the of- ficers and their clerks, who receive and dis burse it. No portion of this risk, inconven- fence or expense, need to be incurred where a we'll regulated Bank is made the fiscal agent. |"

 But the present system is also, in the opin- ion of the undersigned, injurious to the busi- ness and currency of the country. Instead of permitting the credit and the finances of the Government to lend :heir indirect but eff fcient aid in sustaining the credit and regu- " into direct hostility those important interests. In the progress of the system sufficient amount of gold and silver to supply the wants of the Treasury must be withdrawn, leaving no representative in the general cir culation. A large amount also in the hands of those who pay to or receive from the Treasury is equally withdrawn from general circulation, and made to flow through those channels alone which lead into and out of the public coffers. The other avenues of commerce and intercourse are thus deprived of their proportion of the precious metals.

 Within the 52 years during which our Constitutional Government has existed, we have had for two periods of 20 years each Bank, chartered by Congress as a depository of the public moneys and as a fiscal agent. We have had also, at two intervals amount ing to about nine years, State Banks employ ed for like purposes, and during the relnuin- der of the time the funds of the Government have been kept and the finances administer ed partly by Banks and partly by individual officers and agents. The losses sustained by State Banks as Repositories during the first period of their employment, extending from 1911 to 1916, agreeable to statement prepared by the Secretary of the Treasury in 1883 and revised and republiShed in 1887, were $l ,OOO.O76. In the latter period, from l 1888 to 1887, though no actual loss is believ- ed to have occurred, yet the Treasury and the country suffered inconvenience and em- barrassment from the fiscal arrangements with those numerous and disconnected insti- tutions. But during the forty years that the two Banks of the United States were the de- positories of the public moneys and the fis- cal agents of the Government, no loss what ever was sustained, nor any delay, or ex- d s..h,