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a department of power, created by them for tteir
own benefit, and for certain specific purposes:
and to that end, endowed with certain powers:
few and we'll defined. And all who are entrust.
ed with its administration are chosen by thepeo,
pie themselves; owe allegiance and duty 10 the
laws. and are held to the most rigid accountable.
ty for their conduct in the exercise of these pow.
ers. Well, sir among these grants Of power, is
the power 'to lay and collect taxes, duties, i'm.
posts, and excuses, to pay the debts and provide
for the common defence and general welfare"
and as Limitation or restraint upon this power
| it is declared in the same instrument, tha. mo
money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in
consequence of appropriations made by law"


No one can fail to perceive the duties enjoined
by these provisions. They obviously command
that there shall be Treasury; the creation of
Congress; in which the public revenues shall
be kept, and they can only be collected for the
necessary purposes OF government, and as these
purposes to be fulfilled and carried into ere.
cuton by officers and agents. it must be conceded
that provision should be made by law for so
keeping the public money, that it may be readily
commanded for use whenever it may be wanted
for such purposes and that to efectthis the officers
must, in the very nature of things, not only have
access to the Treasury, but have the entire pes,
session and control of it, 10 the exclusion Of 9TH
ers. To attach to these clauses of the Constilu.
ton any other meaning would be the grossest





laws and practice of Government on the subject
of finance and public expenditure 10 these paLpA-
bic requisitions, and TO secure the strictest ac.
countabiIity in public officers, that the present
administration is so earnestly and lalsda6iy en-
gagged, in the good work of separating the Co
vernment from Banks and Bank influence by
the establishment of the Independent Treasury.
1t is the measure OF the people; the meaeuTe Of
the Constitution, and, in despite Of the influence
of Banks, Spectators, money dealers. ct i'd OmnS
genus, will become the settled policy of the whole
country. Sir, release your public servants from
responsibility. if you deny them the use of the
means for performing the duties required at their
hands. Obge not Congress and theother agents
employed in the General Government. 10 keep
the public money and to have it at all times
dy for prompt and emergent use if you demand
that it he deposited in Banks; not within their
jurisdiction not sub bject to their laws, and which
they can reach by no penalties. --.. r....- ..


Congress is commanded to raise money; to Asep
it safely; to guard e0rerHLty is use, and to pre-
vent its appropriation 10 any other objects than
those contemplated by the Constitution. | put
it, then. to the ca.dor and good sense of Senator'S
can Congress do these things, if those who hare
the custody and disbursement of the public mo-
ney are not under their control and subject 10
their laws7 One OF the plainest I'M unctions OF
the Constitution is, that the money of the people,
when collected, in the shape OF revenue or taxes
shall be applied 10 the uses and purposes Of the
Government only; to such uses and purposes as
are plainly comprehended within the meaning OF
the Constitution. "No money shall be drawn
! from the Treasury but in consequence of appro-
prialions made bv law" How, then, give it to
the use of Banks 7-how draw it from the Trea-,
sury for such use2 Taxes are collected for pub
lie and not p1irate benefit; for the of the Go
vernmeHt and not OF Banks or individuals and
any diversion of them to other objects, in the
form Of loans to Banks, or the customers of BaHkG,
would bea clear breach Of trust in derogation Of
the Constitution and the rights of the people
Sir, III our zeal for the elevation Of men in our
endeavors 10 set up and pull dotcn; we nre too
apt to lose sight ct principIe and are often be-
traved into excesses, which threaten the over.
throw of all the barriers Of public liberty.


| But, sir, if the requirements of the Constitu-
tion; if the claims of justice TO public servants
which demand that you should allow the means
before you exact the duty of performance; if the
object Of the trainers of the Constitution, in rela
tion to finance and the currency-to all of which
the plan of the Independent Treasury strictly
coEforms-are to be dsregarded, the strongest
reasons, nothing Short think, of political ne
cessity, should be at hand 10 justify such policy,
| In the resolution before us we furnished
with the argument of gentlemen, and they can
have no cause to complain, If take it as pre-.
senting the reasons for their opposition, and



other have they offered Well. sir what is the
Fargument2 1t presents three distinct, PROPOSE
tions. One is that the Independent Treasury
has tendency to unile the purse and the
sword in the hands of the Executive This
ghost is again conjured up and paraded before
the nation with the vain hope of alarming It's
fears. II is too old and hackneyed a device
The people we'll understand it. Whatever ter.
rors it once had, they have all vanished before
The lights of reason and common sense; and it
remains only as a monument Of one Of the shall
low expedients, to which the inventive faculty Of
man will sometimes resort to accomplish his
ends. 80. -fs.s-c q D..
Time was, when, on another theatre, and before
another people, this union constituted just grounds
OF apprehension for the safety Of public liberty.
1t was in the days of the faithful cOmmonsp Of
England, under the so called WalpoIe admins
tration; when that arch politician. by the COR
rup:ons and abuses of the paper system that
very system which seems to have so much Of
the regard of certain gentlemen; broke down.
the landed interest the only check upon the
Crown, by seducing the Commons from tbeiF,
allegiance and duty to the people, and invsigh-
a. ~, H., If