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 iorities or ninorities, must derive their rlgnt from the assent, expressed or implied, ot the governed. and be subject % such IlmitatiOsS Sa thev may impose. Where the interests are inc same. that is where the laws that may

 h.nefit one will benefit all, or the reverse, H

 i. ;uof and proper to place them under the

 control of inc majority but where they are

 are d;ssimilar. 50 that the law that may ben eff one portion may be ruinOus to another U

 would be on the contrary unjust and absurd to subject them to its will and such, con ceve to be the theory on which our Consu- tuition rests.

 That suck dissimilarity of interests may exist, it is impossible 10 doubt. They are IO be found in every community, in greater Or less degree, however small and homogeneous and they constitute every where the great alt- ficuIty of forming and preserving free Institu- lions. To guard against the unequal acton of the laws, when applied to dissimlIar ana

 opposing interests. is. in fact, what mainly

 renders a constitution indispensable; to over

 look which, in reasoning on our Constitution

 would be to omit the principal element, ny

 which to determine its character. were

 there no contrariety of interests, nothing

 would be more simple and easy than to form

 and preserve free institutions. The right oi

 suffrage alone would be sufficient guaranty

 It is conflict of opposing interests which rem

 ders it the most difficult work of man."

 "To realize its perfection, we must view the General Government and the States as whole. each in its proper sphere sovereign and independent, each perfectly adapted to their respective objects; the State acting sep arately, representing and protecting the in- terests of the whole: and thus perfec;lng ny an admirable, but simple arrangement, the great principle of representation and respon- sibility without which no government can be free or just. To preserve this sacred d'stri- button, as originally settled, by coercing each to move in it's prescribed orb. is the great and difficult problem, on the solution of which, the duration of our Constitution, of Union, and in all probability, our liberty depends.- How is this to be effected

 The question is new when applied to our peculiar political organization. where the sep arate and conflicting interests of society are by distinct, but connected GoV- but is in reality an old question under new form, long since perfectly solv- ed. Whenever separate and dissimiIar inter- ests have been separately represented in any Government whenever the sovereign power has been divided in its exercise, the experl- ence and wisdom of ages have devised but one mode, by which such political organlza- ton can be preserved the mode adopted in England, and by all governments. ancient and modern, blessed with constitutions deserving to be called free !; to give to each co'estate the right to judge of it's powers with nega- tive or veto on the acts of the others, m or der to protect against encroachments the ln- terests it particularly represents; pr'nclPie which ali of our Constitutions recognize Tn the distribution of power among their res

 Ae-. H.. afo- l0I In inc independence of each, but which, to all who will duly reflect on the subject, must ap- pear far more essential, for the same object, in that great aud fundamental distribution ot powers between the States and General Gov ernnent. So essential is the principle, that .o withhold the right from either, where inc sovereign power is divided, is, in fact, to annul the division itself, and to consolidate in the one left in the exclusive possession of the right, aH of the powers of the government for it is not possible to distinguish, practically between a government having all the power' and one having the right to take what powers it pleases. Nor does it in the least valy the principle, whether tue distribution of power between co-estates, as in England. or between distinctly organized but connected govern ments. as with us. The reason is the same in both cases, W hile the necessity is greater in Dur case, as the danger of conflict is greater where the interests of society are divided than in any other, as has al- ready been shown.

 These truths do seem to me to be incon- and am at loss to understand how any one, who has maturely reflected on the nature of our institutions, or who has read history, or studied the principles of free gov srnments to any purpose. can call them m question. The explanation must, it appears to me, be sought in the fact. that in every free State, there are those who look more to the necessity of maintaining power. than guard ing against it's abuses.s If such be the true case, l must think the fear of weakening, the government too much in this case to be in a great measure unfounded. or at least, that the danger is much less than the opposite side. I do not deny that power of so high na- ture may be abused by State; but when l reflect that the States unanimously called the general government into existence with all its powers, which they freely surrendered on their part, under the conviction that their common peace, safety and prosperity re- quired it that they are bound together by common origin, and the recollection of a common suffering and a common triumph in the great and splendid achievement of their in-

 dependence {; and the strongest feelings of our

 nature, and among them, the love of national

 power and distinction, are on the side of the

 Union; it does seem to me, that the fear

 which would strip the States of their sove-

 reignty, and degrade them. in fact, to mere