From the Philadelphia Sentinel of July 13.
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From the Philadelphia Sentinel of July 1s

 The subjoined letter from MT Madison to C. J. lngersol Esq has been sentto us by the latter for publication,

 MONTPELIER, June 9, 1881.

 Dear Sir; have received your friendly letter of the 18th inst. The few lines which answered your former one of the 2lst of January last were written in haste and in bad health but they expressed though without the attention in some respects due to the oc casion, dissent from the views of the President, to Bank of the United States and substitute for it; to which cannot but adhere. The objections to the latter have appeared to me to preponderae great ly over the advantages expected from it, and the situtonay of the former still regard as sustained by tue considerations to which yielded in giving my assent to the existing Bank.

 The charge of inconsistency between my objec- ton to the eonstitutonality of such bank in 1791 and my assent in 1877, turns on the question, how far legislative Erecedents expoundng the constitu- ton, ought to guide succeeding legislatures land to over-rule individual opinions.

 Some obscurity has been thrown over the uues- ton. by confounding if with tho respect dne iron. one legislature to laws passed by preceding legs- latures. But the two essentially different.

 A constitution being derived from superior au- thority is to be expounded and obeyed, not control ed varied by the subordinate authority of legs. Eture. A law on the other hand, resting on no higher authority than that possessed by every sive legislature, it's expediency as well its ing is within the scope of the latter

 The case in question has it's true analogy in the obligation arising from judicial expositions of the law on succeeding Judges; the constitution being a law to the legislator, the law is rule of decision to the Judge.

 And why are judicial precedents, when formed on due discussion and consideration and deliberately sanctioned reviews and repetitions, regarded as of binding influence or rather of authoritative force, in settling the meaning of law It must be answered Is haCa hIar that the good of society requires that the rules of con- duct of it's members should be certain and known, which would not be the if any judge disregard ing the decision of his predecessors should vary the rule of law according to his individual interpretation of it. Misera est servtus ubi jus est aut vagum aut incogn'tum' 2d, because an exposition of the law publicly made and repeatedly confirmed by the con. stuted authority carries with it, by fair inference, the sanction of those who, having made the law through their legislative organ appear under such cir eumstances to have determined it's meaning through thelr Judiciary organ.

 Can't be of Tess consequence that the meaning of constitution should be fixed and known than that the meaning of law should be so7 Can indeed a law be fixed in its meaning and operation, unless the constitution be so? On the contrary, if particular legislature. differing in the construction of the con. stution from a series of preceding constructions. proceed to act that difference, they not only in- troduce uncertainty and instability in the constitution HI preceding the new construction and inconsistent with it, are not only annulled for the future but vir- tualy pronounced utilities from the beginning.

 1t IS said that the legislator having sworn to sup. port the Constitution, must support it in his own sructiOn of it, however different from that put on by his predecessors whatever be the consequence ofthe construction. And is not the Judge under the same oath to support the law7 yet has it ever been supposed that he was required at liberty to disre gard all precedents, however solemny repeated and regularly observed; and by giving effect to his oy, abstract and individual opinions, to disturb the tablshed course of practice in the business of the eommanity1 Has the wisest and most conscientious Judge ever scrupled to acquesce in decisions in which he has been ovenued by the matured opin ions of the majority of his colleagues; and subse quenty to conform himself thereto as to autborita tveexpositions ofthe law And not reasonable tc suppose that the view ofthe official oath should be taken by legislator, acting under the Consti tuition, which is his guide, is taken by Judge act ing under the law which IS his

 There IS in fact and in common understanding necessity of regarding of practice as above characterized, in the light of legal rule of interpret ing law: and there is like necessity of consider ing it constitutional rule of interpreting consttu ton.

 That there may he extraordinary and peculiar cir cumstances controlling the rule in both cases, ma, be admitted; but with such exceptions the rule wil force itself on the practical judgement of the most ar dent theorist. He will find it impossible to adher to- and act officially upon his solitary opinions as t the meaning of the law or constitution, in opposi ton to construction reduced to practice, during reasonable Period oi time; more especially wher, no prospect existed of change of construction h, the public or its agents. And if reasonable perio of time, marked with the usual sanctions would no bar the individual prerogative, there could be n limitation to it's exercise although the danger of CT TOT must increase with the increasing oblivion of es ,.sL changes in the import of words and phrases.

 Let it then be left to the decision of every ntell