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: supposed to do The theory that the consumer pays in the first instance, renders the proposition more complex, and will require, in order to understand where the burden in reality ultimately falls, that supposltion, to consider the protective, as it's friends call it the American System under its three fold aspect of taxation, of protection and of distr button; or as performing at the same time the seve- ral functions Of giving a revenue to the Government, of afordlng protection to certain branches Of do- mestic industry, and furnishing the means to Con gress of distributing large sums through itsappropria tions; all of which so blended in their effects, that it is impossible to understand its true operation, without taking the whole into the estimate.

 Admitting then, as supposed, that he who con sumes the article pays the in the increased price, and that the burden falls wholly on the consumers, without affecting the producers class, which, by the bye, is far from being true, except in the single case, if there be such one, where the producers have monopoly of an article indispensable to life, that the quantity consumed cannot be affected by any increase of price, and that considered in he light of tax merely, the impos duties fall eqully every section, in proportion to its popuatlon till when combined with it's other effects, the burden it imposes tax, may be so transferred from one section to the other, to take it from and pace it wholly on the other. Let us apply the remark first to its operation a system of protection. | The tendency of the tax or duty on the imported article is not only to raise its price, but also in the same proportion, that of the domestic article of tn,

  protection, it Is in fact laid; and of course Tn deter mining where the system ultimately places the bur den in reality, this effect must also be taken into the estimate. If of the sections exclusively pro- tuces such domestic articles and the other purchases 1 praei is he hent tax that S & 1b on ths sumption fthe foreign articles would be transferred

 from the section producing the domestic articles, to the one that purchased and consumed them, unless the latter in turn be ndemnfed by the increased d. Il, n venture to assert to be the with the great staples of the country, which form the basis of our exports the price of which is regulated by te foreign and not domestic market. To those who grow them tue increased price of the foreign and domestic articles both in consequence of the duty on the former, is reality and in the strctest sense tax, while il il clear that the increased price of the latter acts as bounty to the section producing them, and that a4 the amount of such increased prices on what it sells to the other section is greater less than the dutr 1t pays on the imported articles, the system will il fact operate tax; if greater, the difference would be bounty if less, tax.

 Again, the operation may be equal in every other respect and yet the pressure of the system relatively on the two sections, be rendered very unequal by th5 appropriations or distribution If each section re, ceives back what it paid into the treaury the equal, ity, if previously existed will continue; but if one receives back less, and the other proportlonably more than 1t paid then the difference in relation 10 the sec,

 

 gan and the system in this aspect would operate i'd the amount of the difference, a contribution from the one receiving less than it paid to the other that receives Such would be incontcstbly its gem eral effects, taken in all its different aspects even o1 the theory supposed to be most favorable to prove th equal action of the system, that the consumer pays il the rstinsance the whole amount of the tax

 To shew how, on this supposition, the burden and advantages otthe system would actually disri. bute themselves between the sections would carry me too far into details but feel myself assured a ter full and careful examination that they are spcl as to explain, what otherwise would seem inexplca. be, that section should consider it's repeal q ca calamity, and the other blessing and that such opposite views should be taken by them, as to place them m state Of determined conflict in relation 10 the great fiscal and commercial interests of the conn try Indeed, were there no satisfactory explanation the opposite views that prevail, in the two sections as to the effects of the system, ought to satisfy all olis unequal action. There can be no saero more certain rule, than to suppose each portion of the country equally capable of understanding their re- specve interest and that each is amuch betteriudpe of the effects of any system of measures its pecu- | liar interest, than the other can possbIybe.

 | But whether the opinion of its unequal action be correct nothing can be more certain than that the impression ;gwdely extending itself that the system, under all its notifications is essentially un- equal and if to that be added, conviction still deep CT, and more univ versa that every duty imposed for the purpose of protection, is not only unequal, but also unconstitutional it would be fatal error so SUD- pose, that any remedy short of that which have stated, can heal our political disorder

 In order to understand more fully the difficulty of adjusting this unhappy contest on any other ground, it may not be improper to present general view of the constitutional objection, that it may be clearly how hopeless it is to expect that it be yield ed, by those who have embraced it.

 They believe that all the powers, vested by the | in nnlV asfricf tad hv the limitations expressly imposed. but also by tbe ture and object of the powers themselves. Thus though the power to impose duties imports be granted in general terms, without any other express limitations, but that they shall be equal and pre- ference shall be given to the ports of State those of another, yet as being portion of the taxing power, given with the view of raising revenue it is from its nature restricted to that object as much so as if the Convention had expressly limited it; and that to it to effect any other purpose, specif ed in the Constitution, is infracton of the nstru- ment, in its most dangerous form; infracton by perversion more easily made and more difficult to re- sist, than any other. Ike same view is believed to be applicable to the power of regulating commerce, | as well all the other powers. To surrender this important principle it is conceived, would be to sur render all power, and to render the government un-

 limited and despotic; and to yield it up, in relation to the particular power in question, would be in fact to surrender the control of the whele industry and capital of the country to the General Government; and would end in placing the weaker section, in colonial relation with the stronger. For nothing are more dissimilar in their nature, may be more un- equally sfected by the laws, than different de. scrPtons of labor and property; and ftaxes, by in creaslng the amount and changing the intent only may be perverted, in fact into system of penalti5s and rewards, it would give all the power that corld be desired, to subject the labor and property of Inc minority to the will of the majority. to be regulsted without regarding the interests olthe former, in sub serviency to the will of the latter Thus thinking 1t would seem unreasonable to expect that any ad- insiment based nn the nnilinn of the cnrrnct