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not granted for such purposes and when
such are its results, reform should be the
watchword Of every Republican.


We are in favor of such changes in our f.
nancial system, as will, efectually prevent
the application of the public money to private


purposes. The means of accomplishing this
great reform, are of less importance than the
end to be obtained. We, however, perceive
no means so effective and certain, as to let
the Government keep its own money, by the
instrumentality of its own officers, who shall
be put under bonds, with heavy securities,
not to use or lend it and, in addition, max
ing it highly penal in them so to DO. It's not
perceived why the Government cannot make
its money as secure as bank. ALI the usual


means of security enjoyed by the banks are
within its reach; in addition to which; 1t has


absolute power over the persons OF Its agents,
which the banks have not. Banks cannot,
bv regulations, punish their cashiers and
clerks for faithlessness and crime with the pc


nitentiary or Otherwise bit the Government


can. 1t may command all the buildings,


walls, vaults, bolts, and other safeguards


which the banks can and, IN addition, may


dispose Of the personal liberty OF Its faltlhess


agents according toits will, expressed through


its legislative and judicial authorities. Why,





as the banks cam keep theirs, or that deposit


ed with them2 That it can do so, under pro


per regulations, is too obvious to be doubted.


Besides, at places where it might be more con-


wenient, the use of the bank buildings them


selves could be secured, still preserving the


public money from private uses. ss
| WHY. then. should not the Government


kept its own money? 1t is objected that the


keeping of its own money would dangerous


ly increase the patronage of the Executive
| Is it possible any one can believe that the ap-


pointment Of ten or twenty officers and clerks,
involves q more extensive and dangerous in


fuence than the power directly to affect the
Ipecuniary interests of the eightthousand two


hundred and ninety bank officers, the three
| hundred and seventeen thousand Stockhold-


ers, and the six hundred and fifty-three thou


sand debtors? That power the Executive
; has, so long as he is authorized to place the


public money in banks to be lent out for prl-


vate purposes. Although all the banks cam


not be depositories, all think they find their
Interest in an extension of the credit system,


by the aid of the public money; and in adj
dition thereto, all are subject, under such
system, to the influence of hope and fear from
the favors or frownS of the President or Sec
rotary of the Treasury. 1t is not by Keep
i2sg the public money that a Government ac-
quires influence or power, but by spending
or lending it. One man has million of dol
lars to lend; another has million to keep,
being forbidden to lend dollar of it. Which
will be the most courted, and have the most
influence among his neighbors? The answer
is too obvious to need suggestion, 1t IS thus
with the Executive. If you would eurtail
his influence in the most effectual manner,
require him inflexibly to Keep the public mo-
: ney for public purposes. If you would ex-
tend his influence in a manner the most a
t farming, authorize him to lend the public mo-
ney, OF cause it to be lent, by depositng it in
2 banks, or otherwise.


+ The idea that the actual custody OF the
r public money by public officers appointed un-
: der the authority of Congress would place 1t
: more under the control of the President than


has heretofore been, is wholly deceptive and
: fallacious.


e His power over it would not be at all in
J.; creased bv this measure. The President
S could not, under the old OF the proposed sys-
: tenn, draw from the Treasury single dollar,
S not even for the payment Of his own salary.
}. That operation is effected by the warrant OF
r the Secretary of the Treasury, upon the T'rea-
It surers check or order upon bank or other
e depository. ltis through these means that
S the President and every other executive Off
IL Ger IGC0lEcS SVCl1 LID SCliol y
: If the Treasurer had the actual custody Of
S the public money, instead of keeping it in


banks, the President would be obliged still to
It get a warrant from the Secretary of the Trea-
r, surY before he could receive his salary. 1T is
e said if the Treasurer had the actual custody
/, of the money, the President might eompcI
o him to put it into his possession BY the cxer
e else of his authority and power over an Off
s. cial dependant. But is it not just as easy, BY
e the exercise of the same authority and power
/, to compel the Treasurer to draw check or
i a bank! And could not the President or hi
10 instrument obtain the money from bank OF
is such check, just as easy as he could wres
d it from the Treasurer's actual possession ?
s. Would it not indeed, be a little easier Il


compel the Treasurer to draU u check, thai
j. to count out large sum Of nsOncy? Al
,e for the banks, they never have claimed tn
Id right to dispute the Treasurer's check, thei
le duty being merely to pay it. When ther


were thirty or forty millions of dollars in tn
e Treasury, there was nothing in the law, o
s. in the structure of the system, to prevent tn