WRITTEN QUESTION No. 663/98 by Undine-Uta BLOCH von BLOTTNITZ to the Commission. Nuclear waste at Dounreay - reliability of safeguards
C 323/62 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 21. 10. 98 The Council would nevertheless point out that proceedings on the matters suggested by the Honourable Member are not among the priorities in the area of justice and home affairs set by the Council for the period between 1 January 1998 and the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam; Parliament was consulted on those priorities in accordance with Article K. 6 of the Treaty. (98/C 323/81) WRITTEN QUESTION E-0663/98 by Undine-Uta Bloch von Blottnitz (V) to the Commission (10 March 1998) Subject: Nuclear waste at Dounreay › reliability of safeguards In its answer to my Written Question P-3167/96 (1) the Commission explained the background to the warning which it had to issue to the operators of the Dounreay reprocessing facility on account of faulty accounting of radioactive materials. It stated that alone in 1995 the safeguards inspection effort invested in the Dounreay site was 619 man/days. Except for the breaches concerning the accounting system for fissile materials in respect of which sanctions were duly imposed, áthere were no anomalies detected with regard to safeguardsí. Having regard to the latest revelations in The Guardianí concerning a second waste shaft on the site of the Dounreay reprocessing facility in which at least 40 kg of uranium, plutonium and sodium in addition to other waste had been dumped in the very recent past, serious doubts arise about the effectiveness of safeguards inspections. How does the Commission explain the fact that, despite its many inspection visits to Dounreay, it failed to 1. acquire information about the disposal of radioactive fissile materials in a second shaft on the site of the reprocessing facility? How does it assess the reliability of its own inspections when it fails to notice the establishment of such a 2. waste dump in the course of such inspections? Did it notice during its inspections that such large quantities of plutonium and uranium were missing as are 3. now suspected to be present in the second shaft? 4. What changes will it be making to its inspection arrangements to avoid such shortcomings in the future? (1) OJ C 83, 14. 3. 1997, p. 124. Answer given by Mr Papoutsis on behalf of the Commission (5 May 1998) The Commission would like to inform the Honourable Member that some of the statements made in the press are at variance with the reality (see also the reply to the Honourable Memberís Written Question P-0661/98 (1)). The áunknown shaftí mentioned in the press is a disposal area named áintermediate solid waste siloí. The ounreay plant is under Euratom safeguards since the accession of the United Kingdom to the Community. In line with Commission Regulation Euratom No 3227/76 of 19 October 1976 concerning the application of the provisions on Euratom safeguards (2), the operator has provided the Commission, with the basic technical characteristics of this installation as well as updates thereto. In addition, the Commission is getting from the operator all the information required to perform the safeguards verification activities foreseen by the Euratom Treaty, including flows and inventories. As long as resources are available, the Commission will continue to perform continual inspections at the Dounreay site, which also cover the installation in question. Thus the Commission is not aware either of any shortcomings in its safeguarding operations or of any dumping of safeguarded materials at the Dounreay site. (1) OJ C 310, 9. 10. 1998. (2) OJ L 363, 31. 12. 1976