WRITTEN QUESTION No. 1640/97 by Undine-Uta BLOCH von BLOTTNITZ to the Commission. Euratom, monitoring of MOX fuel elements
10. 2. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 45/69 (98/C 45/83) WRITTEN QUESTION E-1640/97 by Undine-Uta Bloch von Blottnitz (V) to the Commission (14 May 1997) Subject: Euratom, monitoring of MOX fuel elements The use of MOX fuel elements in nuclear power stations raises various problems since it involves (in line with safeguard categories) weapons-grade fissile materials, and moreover because the fuel rods cannot be distinguished from uranium fuel. 1. 2. How does the Commission assess the particular problems connected with MOX-fuel safeguards? How does the Commission ensure the monitoring of MOX fuels in the various European nuclear plants? Answer given by Mr Papoutsis on behalf of the Commission (2 July 1997) 1. The Commission would recall that, regarding mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, one has to distinguish between the fabrication, transport and storage of fresh fuel elements and the irradiated spent fuel elements after use in a reactor. Spent fuel elements always contain plutonium regardless whether they stem from fresh uranium or MOX elements. Thus, the Euratom verification activities are equal for both categories. For the fabrication and storage of fresh MOX fuel elements (which are different from those containing uranium only) specific safeguards concepts had to be identified to implement the strict safeguards goals defined for nuclear material containing such fresh plutonium. The increasingly complex and automated MOX fuel fabrication plants require high inspection effort for continual inspections and the wide use of unattended measurement equipment to achieve these goals. 2. Based on the safeguards goals, the Euratom approach for safeguarding MOX fabrication plants in the Community is specifically tailored to the design and throughput of the particular installation. Frequent or continual inspections and a comprehensive system of measurement equipment which is specially designed, calibrated and optimised for the type of measurements and the materials that are handled in such plants form the important elements of Euratom safeguards in this installation type. The finished MOX fuel elements are routinely measured at the fabrication plant due to the optimal measurement conditions compared to the situation at reactors. During shipment to the reactor and storage there, the continuity of knowledge on the MOX fuel assemblies is preserved by seals and/or safeguards surveillance systems. (98/C 45/84) WRITTEN QUESTION E-1643/97 by Undine-Uta Bloch von Blottnitz (V) to the Commission (14 May 1997) Subject: Environmental samples, Euratom-IAEA The IAEA is trying to ensure that taking environmental samples at EU nuclear plants becomes routine. Environmental samples were already taken in Rossendorf in 1996. There are reports that Euratom is refusing to allow the IAEA to take such samples in other European nuclear plants until detailed analysis results become available. Is it true that Euratom is allowing no further environmental samples until analysis results become 1. available? If so, how does Euratom justify refusing to allow such samples?