WRITTEN QUESTION No. 3908/97 by Hiltrud BREYER to the Commission. HEU supplies for FRM II
C 196/34 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 22. 6. 98 Does the Commission agree with the Council groupsí interpretation that the decisions of Mantua City 3. Council constitute áinfringementsí? 4. What action does the Commission intend to take against these infringements, if they are confirmed? (1) OJ L 209, 24. 7. 1992, p. 1. (2) OJ L 199, 9. 8. 1993, p. 84. Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission (3 February 1998) 1. and 2. The Commission is currently examining in detail the cases referred to by the Honourable Member. The Commissionís appraisal of these matters will enable it to establish whether or not the Community rules 3. governing public service contracts have been infringed. The Commission will be certain to apply the procedure provided for in Article 169 of the EC Treaty if that 4. should prove necessary. (98/C 196/48) WRITTEN QUESTION E-3908/97 by Hiltrud Breyer (V) to the Commission (11 December 1997) Subject: HEU supplies for FRM II 1. Can the Commission confirm that the Euratom Supply Agency is negotiating with Russian organizations for the supply of highly enriched uranium for European research reactors? Do those negotiations involve supplies for the controversial FRM II reactor in Munich? 2. What stage have the negotiations reached? What has been agreed, and what issues are still outstanding? By what date are the negotiations likely to be completed? Can the Commission confirm that the Euratom Supply Agency has drawn up the draft of an agreement for 3. supplies for the FRM II reactor of highly-enriched uranium from Russia? Does the Commission not have any misgivings that the involvement of the FRM II reactor will constitute a 4. severe blow to the campaign to prevent the non-proliferation of highly-enriched uranium? If not, why not? Answer given by Mr Papoutsis on behalf of the Commission (2 February 1998) The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to the answer given to her written question E-2903/97 (1). Since then those in charge of certain research reactors in the Community have entered into negotiations with the Russian authorities. Any supplies of highly enriched uranium resulting from this would be made in compliance with the strict safeguard rules and the policy of non-proliferation. (1) OJ C 134, 30. 4. 1998, p. 33