WRITTEN QUESTION No. 1642/97 by Undine-Uta BLOCH von BLOTTNITZ to the Commission. IAEA safeguard inspections in the EU
25. 2. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 60/33 (98/C 60/59) WRITTEN QUESTION E-1642/97 by Undine-Uta Bloch von Blottnitz (V) to the Commission (14 May 1997) Subject: IAEA safeguard inspections in the EU The United Kingdom allows IAEA inspections in plants such as Urenco. In the German nuclear power station at Unterweser comparable inspections are not wanted. Are there are national differences within the European Union on authorization of IAEA inspections? If so, what are those differences, what are the reasons for them and why does the Euratom authority not ensure a uniformly cooperative approach in the treatment of IAEA inspectors? Answer given by Mr Papoutsis on behalf of the Commission (22 July 1997) The Commission would inform the Honourable Member that the Urenco plant in the United Kingdom is an installation for the enrichment of uranium, whereas the German installation Unterweser is a power reactor. This means that, in a technical sense, the situation is different as far as safeguards verification activities are concerned. Enrichment plants require very frequent or continual inspections, whereas power plants are subject to fewer inspections but still several a year. At Unterweser, more than 10 inspections took place in 1996, most of them together with the International atomic energy agency (IAEA). The technical divergence with the IAEA is where mixed oxide (MOX) fuel should be measured. Whereas the Commission applying Euratom safeguards, thinks that the controls are most efficient if they are performed at the MOX fabrication plants (in this case in the United Kingdom), the IAEA prefers to make such measurements in a non-nuclear weapons state, even if such measurements at reactors need to be performed under water. The discussions on this issue are going on. There are indeed national differences in the Community concerning the IAEA safeguards verifications, depending on whether the country is a nuclear weapons state or not. Therefore, to implement IAEA safeguards in the Community, three different agreements were concluded between the European atomic energy community, its Member States and the IAEA: › INFCIRC/193: agreement between the Community, its non- nuclear weapon Member States and the IAEA, entered into force on 21 February 1977; INFCIRC/263: voluntary agreement between the Community, the United Kingdom and the IAEA for the application of IAEA safeguards in the United Kingdom, entered into force on 14 August 1978 (a fundamental difference from INFCIRC/193 is that routine IAEA inspections apply only to facilities designated by the IAEA from a facilities list provided by the United Kingdom, covering all the United Kingdom civil nuclear facilities); › INFCIRC/290: voluntary agreement between the Community, France and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in France, entered into force on 12 September 1981 (its scope is limited to materials specifically designated by France). However, all civil nuclear material in both France and the United Kingdom is subject to Euratom safeguards under the Euratom Treaty. (98/C 60/60) WRITTEN QUESTION E-1645/97 by Marlies Mosiek-Urbahn (PPE) to the Commission (14 May 1997) Subject: Public invitation to tender 228/96 of February 1996 After the contract was awarded to the Italian company Trentofrutta, why were the conditions of the 1. invitation to tender changed (from apples to peaches), and on what legal basis? 2. Why was there not a new invitation to tender since the product group was changed, thus giving rise to an entirely new basis?