REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL ON THE APPLICATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS IN THE ANNUAL EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM SCHEMES
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Brussels, 09. 09. 1996 COM(96) 430 final REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL ON THE APPLICATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS IN THE ANNUAL EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM SCHEMES REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS IN THE ANNUAL EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM SCHEMES I. INTRODUCTION 2 II. THE NECESSARY CONTROL ON PRODUCTION AND COMMUNITY SPENDING a) b) Production Community expenditure 4 5 III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNCIL'S IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS WHICH FALL UNDER MEMBER STATE COMPETENCE The reference year and the initial allocation of rights The initial national reserves The system of quota transfers and leasing a) b) c) d) Management of the national reserves e) Sensitive Zones 5 6 7 7 8 IV. THE FUNCTION OF THE COMMISSION'S DETAILED RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS a) b) c) Individual limits Usage rules The transfer and leasing mechanisms 9 9 10 V. EVALUATION OF THE QUOTA REGIMES AND CONCLUDING REMARKS a) b) c) d) e) Controlling production and spending National reserves and their management Systems of quota transfer Sensitive Zones Concluding remarks 11 11 12 12 13 ANNEXES Beef and Sheepmeat Production and Consumption - EU15 (1986-1996) I. Suckler and Dairy Cow Numbers in EC-12 (1989-1995) II Community Expenditure in Ewe and Suckler Cow Premium (1980-1995) III. Application of Individual Producer Limits for Ewe Premium - EC 12 IV. Application of Individual Producer Limits lor Suckler Cow Premium - EC 12 V. Individual Producer Limits in the new Member States - Ewe and Suckler Cow Premium VI Individual Rights to Ewe and Goat Premium - EU15 VII. Individual Rights to Suckler Cow Premium - EU15 VIII. Evolution in Ewe and Suckler Cow Premium Claims (1992-1995) IX Operation of the National Reserve in 1993 - Ewe Premium X. Operation of the National Reserve in 1993 - Suckler Cow Premium XL XII. Operation of the National Reserve in 1994 - Ewe Premium XIII. Operation of the National Reserve in 1994 - Suckler Cow Premium Calendar for Ewe premium Application in 1995 - EU 15 XIV X I. INTRODUCTION Council Regulations (EEC) No 3013/89 and No 805/68 require that the Commission make a report, before 1 July 1996, on the application of the arrangements laid down in the individual producer limits in the annual ewe and suckler cow premium schemes respectively, together with, where appropriate, any necessary proposals. This report fulfills that obligation. The report is designed to look at the administrative experiences of applying the premium quota systems since the 1992 Reform. Its preparation began before the current BSE crisis and it does not represent the Commission's views over how the beef regime shall be adapted following the crisis. It does, nevertheless, form part of the background which will need to be taken into account when ideas for changing the beef regime are assessed. The origins of the premium quotas can be traced to the 1992 CAP Reform when solutions to two problems common to the Community's sheep and beef sectors were sought: the trend of increasing internal production coupled with escalating Community expenditure. In the sheep sector, rising production in the 1980*s, stimulated by readily available premiums, was undermining Community prices and, owing to the price compensatory method of calculation of the ewe premium, causing a dramatic growth in Community expenditure. In the beef sector, after several years of greater surpluses, the Reform provided the opportunity to shift policy, in the light of the necessary adjustments of production to internal consumption trends and export possibilities, in particular those relating to the approaching GATT commitments, away from beef price support through costly intervention mechanisms and more towards direct payments to producers as premia. In the sheep sector, the Commission's response to these pressures was to propose, in the context of the 1992 Reform, to replace the stabilizer, which had proved incapable of controlling production, with the requirement that a producer must hold a right to each Ewe Premium and to establish individual producer limits to the number of those rights, a policy more commonly known as the introduction of 'individual quotas'. The aim of this measure was to limit the number of animals kept by individual producers since stockrearing without premium, in most circumstances, is unprofitable. For the beef sector, the compromise on the whole of the 1992 Reform extended this idea of individual quotas to suckler cows. The reasons for this were that the Council compromise included a bigger increase on the Suckler Cow Premium than the Commission had already proposed and that Council wanted to ensure that this increase did not lead to an uncontrolled increase in the suckler cow herd. Furthermore, the introduction of limits on the eligibility to premia in the beef sector proved valuable in the final stages of the negotiation of the GATT agreement which followed the 1992 Reform. The basic regulations establishing individual quotas in the two sectors ' , similar in their main outline, laid down that the quotas be allocated to each active producer, on the basis of the number of premiums paid in a past "reference" year 2, particular to the sector involved. Member States were Articles 5a - 5d of Regulation (EEC) No 3013/89 for the sheep sector and Articles 4e and 4f of Regulation (EEC) No 805/68 for the beef sector. From 1995 onwards, in the sheep sector, owing to the introduction of individual quotas, the Council's former 'headage limit1 rule, by which the payment of ewe premium was made at the full rate for producers with no more than 1000 ewes in LFA's and 500 ewes in non-LFA's, became superfluous and was abolished. The net also given some latitude in choosing the reference year. General rules to accommodate the case of producers who did not claim premium in the reference year and the distribution of rights within producer groups were also made. As a consequence, the total sum of all the individual producer limits in each of these two sectors constitutes a virtual ceiling to their productive capacities and sets a maximum Community expenditure for their support. Furthermore, fixing a total number of ewe and suckler cow premium rights in each of the new Member States which entered the Union in 1995, decided as part of the Accession agreements, maintained the philosophy of limiting productive capacity in the two sectors. Council legislation also gave producers the opportunity to adjust each year the number of rights they hold to premium through the provisions for transfer and, should the Member State so choose, temporary leasing of quota. Member States were given the option of setting up a "commercial" system of transfers which allows producers to deal directly between themselves or an "administrative" system in which rights are transferred via the national reserve. Only one Member State, France, chose the latter option. Except for certain demarcated zones in each Member State out of which rights may not transferred because sheep or beef production is especially important, a producer is allowed to transfer rights to another producer, either with his holding or without. However, transfers without the holding must surrender up to 15% of the transferred rights to the national reserve, a procedure more commonly known as the 'syphon'. The national reserve of premium rights in each Member State was set up by retaining between 1 and 3% of the initial individual allocation of rights and was used to reallocate rights amongst suggested priority categories of producers, determined according to each Member State's own criteria. In addition, Council agreed to the creation of a non-forfeitary initial reserve equal to 1% of the sum of the rights in less-favoured areas (LFA's). Council subsequently instructed the Commission to make detailed rules for the application of the quota systems 3 which, due to the similarity between the sectors in the Council policy, followed a common philosophy in their initial conception and subsequent refinement. This report, within the limits already indicated above, addresses the production and budgetary consequences of the policy and the outcomes of the main Council provisions laid down in what has been a preliminary period of setting up the system. It is based on the information supplied to the Commission by Member States and any comments will be confined to those items on which data are available. 4 For the most part, the measures described only affected those Member States which were part of the Union before the CAP reform. However, where appropriate, new Member States will be included in the appraisal. In addition, a brief review of the detailed implementing rules, adopted by the Commission, is presented. effect on a producer's quotas was that those rights held above the 'headage limits' (on which the producer had been able to claim premium at half the full rate) were converted into full-rate rights at half the number. 3 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3567/92 for the sheep sector and Regulation (EEC) No 3886/92 for the beef sector. For example, since it is not a statutory requirement from Member States, the Commission is not in possession of any official data concerning aspects of quota trading such as the number of rights leased or the value of rights on the open market. II. a) THE NECESSARY CONTROL ON PRODUCTION AND COMMUNITY SPENDING Production Annex I shows the trends in sheepmeat and beef production in the 5 years prior to the 1992 Reform, and the evolution of those parameters subsequent to the introduction of the individual quota policy. It can be seen clearly that the quota policy has brought an effective stabilisation of Community sheepmeat production, at around 1. 15m tonnes/year, a result which would not have been achievable under the stabiliser mechanism operating previously for the same purpose. On the other hand, in the beef sector, the data do not show the same degree of curtailment in production. The Reform came into effect towards the end of a period with a downward trend in production (1991-1994). Production has now recovered again, and is set to continue upwardly because, although dairy cow numbers have fallen, there has been a sustained growth in the EU suckler cow herd in recent years (Annex II). This expansion in suckler cow numbers has occurred because, despite the introduction of individual quotas, there have been notable increases to the total number of premium rights fixed at the outset of the system, namely: i) ii) the increase in the total claims in 1992 witnessed in practically all Member States 5 who took the option available to them of fixing 1992 as the reference year (i. e. the same year as the introduction of the quotas themselves), as producers responded to the fact that premium rights were now in limited supply. The effect of this decision was tc raise premium claims by 1. 3 million, that is by 15%, in 1992 compared with 1991, in the Member States concerned, which added an equivalent number of rights to the EU total, and to create a situation where there was enough quota available across the Union to sustain an increase in suckler cow numbers of 9% between 1992 and 1995. the raising of the milk ceiling from 60. 000 to 120. 000 litres per holding in the mixed suckler/dairy cow enterprises responded to the request of certain Member States, made during the CAP Reform, to extend the quota scheme to medium-sized mixed herds. Acceptance of such holdings resulted in 821. 160 extra rights being created. Thus, the control ('maitrise') of production and expenditure that was expected from the introduction of individual producer limits for suckler cow premium can only begin to take effect once the EU suckler cow herd has approached the limit set by the total number of rights available (Annex ÎI). Given that around one million rights still remain unused and that the other support mechanisms which operate in the beef sector may allow producers to keep more stock than they have quota for, complete stabilization of the EU suckler cow herd, and the Community budget which supports it, is not likely to occur in the near future. 5 Only Greece did not choose 1992 as the reference year. b) Community expenditure The other principal objective of the introduction of individual limits in the ewe and suckler cow premium regimes was to control spending. In the sheep sector, this task was relatively straightforward: putting a limit to the potential number of ewes in the Community would limit total expenditure, save for those fluctuations which arise due to changes in average Community market price, a parameter used in the calculation of the annual ewe premium. Annex III shows that the quota regime has indeed had the desirable result of constraining spending in ewe premium to around 1. 700 MECU. For the beef sector, the introduction of individual quotas for suckler cow premium was part of an overall reform which brought a reduction in market price support measures (intervention), compensated by increases in the level of premiums and a revised export refund policy. Therefore, Annex III shows that expenditure in suckler cow premium has increased substantially in the past 15 years. The increase in the cost of the suckler cow premium regime is partly due to the increase in the level of the premium 6 and partly due to the increases in the number of rights available, in line with the argument on cow numbers already given, but expenditure could be expected, from current information, to stabilise at a maximum of 1. 800 MECU per year once the unused and additional rights mentioned in section (i) above have been taken up. III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COUNCIL'S IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS WHICH FALL UNDER MEMBER STATE COMPETENCE Within the Council's implementing rules, certain decisions concerning the application of the producer limits were delegated to Member States. This measure of flexibility operated in live main areas: a) The reference year and the initial allocation of rights. The reference year chosen in each Member State may be found in Annex IV for the sheep sector (for the most part, 1991) and Annex V for the beef sector, where 1992 was most generally adopted. In addition, Annex IV shows for the sheep sector a 'coefficient' calculated for those Member States where the total number of ewes decreased between 1989 and 1991 and where this coefficient was used to calculate an extra number of rights to be added to the individual limit of each producer. This was the case in Spain, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. The suckler cow premium was programmed in 1992 to rise from 70 ECU in 1993, 90 ECU in 1994 and to 120 ECU per head in 1995. Resulting from these calculations, Annex VII for the sheep sector, and Annex VIII for the beef sector, show the potential, or sum total, of premium rights available in each Member State for allocation to individual producers upon the introduction of the quota system. The figures presented have been verified for the sheep sector 7 by the Commission on the basis of the reference year chosen by each Member State. The figures for suckler cow premium rights await the Commission's approval. The potential rights for the new Member States are also included, these totals having been agreed upon Accession and incorporated into each sector's base regulation. Aside from the problem mentioned above concerning premium claims in 1992 in the beef sector and the notable administrative effort required in the exercise, no particular difficulties were encountered with this measure in most Member States. In general, the provisions made for producers who had not made claims or who had been penalised in the reference year were successful in their implementation because they permitted Member States to deal equitably with those hardship cases which arose. However, in the sheep sector, Italy and Greece did express to Council the problems which they had experienced in fixing individual limits amongst producers who, for various reasons, had underclaimed in the reference year and were not covered by the existing provisions. Consequently, in 1995, Council agreed that, subject to verification by the Commission,8 Italy and Greece should be allowed to distribute up to 600. 000 additional rights from the national reserve to accommodate those producers who had not received their correct initial quota. b) The initial national reserves. Annexes IV, V and VI again show the approach taken by each Member State, within the limits of the Council legislation, for the setting up of the initial national reserves in both sectors. While globally the measures taken supplied the national reserve in each Member State with 1 to 3% of the total sum of the individual limits, the tables illustrate that the percentage of rights forfeited in relation to the size of the individual producer limit varied appreciably. Annexes VII and VIII illustrate the numbers of rights which were available to establish the national reserves, including the extra rights resulting from the additional 1% LFA reserve. In this respect, it must be noted that, from the outset, the national reserves in the different Member States have been under varying pressure from the demand of producers. The limited United Kingdom national reserves, in both sectors, originally set at 1% of the total rights, have particularly high demand and considerable administrative difficulties have been experienced in satisfying applications from producers. On the other hand, the Netherlands, after fixing a relatively high percentage forfeit of rights to the national reserve (3%) under circumstances of low suckler cow premium demand, had to refix the forfeit at 1% and subsequently return the surplus rights to producers. Final verification still awaited for the figure for Germany and Italy (Sipjly). In the verification carried out in April 1996, the Commission agreed to an increase to the national reserves in Italy and Greece by 600. 000 rights. c) The system of quota transfers and leasing. In general terms, the operation of the system of quota transfer is uniform across the Community with most Member States opting for the direct producer-to-producer transfers while also permitting temporary leasing of rights. The two notable exceptions to this norm are to be found in France, which only allows direct transfers to occur between producers when the entire holding is also transferred, all other operations taking place as transfers from a producer to the national reserve and the Netherlands, where no temporary leasing is permitted. No insuperable problems in the operation of the transfer system have been experienced by Member States and producers appear to have adapted well to the obligations placed on them by the administrative procedures put in place to effect such transfers. The French authorities have registered the difficulties they have faced due to the extra effort and complications associated with the "administrative" system which they adopted. The Commission has responded to these requests with a series of adjustments to the detailed rules aimed at simplifying as far as possible the transfer procedures, 9 while at the same time avoiding an excessive divergence between the two systems. The level at which the 'syphon' is applied in each Member State may be seen, in Annexes IV, V and VI to vary between the 1% operating in the Netherlands to the 15% applied in the majority of Member States. In this respect, the 'syphon' has proven itself to be an acceptable and workable policy instrument for supplying a certain number of right to the national reserve which may be redistributed to priority groups by the Member States (see below). d) Management of the national reserves. In numerical terms, the supply of rights to the national reserve by the 'syphon' may be seen in Annexes X-XIII, which show the functioning of the national reserves in both sectors for 1993 and 1994. The data for 1995 have only been supplied by a few Member States. Although the 'syphon' was rather insignificant in the first year of the operation of the national reserves, in comparison with the initial number of rights, in 1994 it contributed around a third of the rights available from the national reserve to sheep producers each year, upon request to the national authorities. In the beef sector, the contribution of rights from the 'syphon' to the national reserve remains at a lower level (4% in 1994), though it makes an important contribution to the rights available in the national reserves in Belgium and Portugal. The relatively minor rôle of the 'syphon' is probably a reflection of the smaller number of transfers without holding which take place in the beef sector, in comparison to the sheep sector where transactions are, generally speaking, more mobile. The same tables (Annexes X-XIII) also illustrate the functioning of the national reserves in terms of the attribution of rights to producers. These measures, forming part of the 1994 Simplification Exercise of the CAP Reform, are described in Chapter IV below. In the sheep sector in 1993, over 90% of the initial reserve was allocated to producers though this percentage fell to around 38% in 1994, with Spain, Italy and the Netherlands having the lowest percentage allocations. Furthermore, the data in Annex XII suggest that, in 1994, several Member States (in particular Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland and Portugal) withdrew rights from producers as a result of transfers without holding (the 'syphon') and then 'recycled' those rights to other producers from the national reserve with respect to the same marketing year. In the beef sector, the demand on the initial national reserve was relatively low in 1993 (48%) but remained more constant the following year, a Community average of 53% of the rights being attributed to producers in 1994. Furthermore, an analysis of the data with respect to the 1994 calendar year indicate that the practice of 'recycling' rights is much less widespread in the beef sector than the sheep sector: only Belgium attributed to producers all the rights which were available in its 1994 national reserve. At the other end of the spectrum, Spain did not attribute any rights from the national reserve in 1994 because ofdifllcultics in making a fair allocation of rights which would satisfy the extremely high demand. In general terms, the management of the national reserves has not posed unsurmountable complications for national administrations, given the important extent to which decision-making was delegated to Member States in this area. However, in the United Kingdom, there has been a significant problem with some producers in both sectors of the so-called 'developers' priority category who, owing to the insufficient number of rights available in the 1993 national reserve, were not initially allocated all the rights they requested. Following a judgment in a national court, the UK authorities decided to reallocate part of the national reserve for this category of producers which has caused a delay in closing definitively the allocation exercise for 1993 and subsequent years. e) Sensitive Zones A further measure within the competence of Member States is illustrated in Annexes IV, V and VI which indicate the zones designated as particularly important for sheep and beef production and, therefore, out of which premium rights may not be transferred. This designation has been more colloquially known as 'ring-fencing'. Most Member States have 'ring-fenced' the LFA's of their territory, a decision which is coherent with their policy priorities for such areas. The two notable exceptions to this norm are found in France and the United Kingdom. Firstly, the French authorities have nominated the entire French territory a Sensitive Zone. Secondly, the United Kingdom authorities have divided their whole territory into seven Sensitive Zones, based on regional and LFA criteria. The only other exceptions are Belgium, divided for these purposes into two zones according to land classification, and Germany which specified the dykelands, as well as the LFA's of its territory, as a Sensitive Zone. The designation of these Sensitive Zones has widespread acceptance from all interested parties and the Commission has received no evidence, to date, to suppose that the measure, within the terms in which it was originally conceived, has been misused or misapplied. 10 However, some Member States have expressed their concern that within certain 'ring-fences' rights may be accumulating and having a negative impact of an environmental nature (see Evaluation below). 8 IV. THE FUNCTION OF THE COMMISSION'S DETAILED RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS The most pertinent rules in the Commission Regulations for applying individual producer limits in the sheep and beef sectors have the following basic structure: a) Individual limits In order to make the administration of the producer limits as workable as possible, for the ewe premium, only those producers with a minimum of 10 ewes were allocated an initial quota. In suckler cow premium, owing to the greater economic value of each animals, no lower limit was set. b) Usage rules Several rules were introduced in the regulations by which a producer would forfeit to the national reserve a certain proportion of his rights if he did not claim premium on those rights during determined periods. The aim of these rules was to increase the mobilization of rights by avoiding an excessive number of rights staying with producers who did not use themselves and, furthermore, did not choose to transfer or lease those rights to another producer. For this purpose, a general usage rule was defined whereby a producer, who has not made use of at least 50% of his rights during two consecutive years, would forfeit the part not used during the last year to the national reserve. Moreover, with the intention of deterring speculative acquisition of rights by producers who did not intend to use them immediately, a more stringent usage rule was placed on those producers who receive rights free of charge from the national reserve. At the outset of the quota system, if such a producer did not make use of all his rights during the three years following the receipt of rights from the national reserve, he would forfeit the part not used n. Furthermore, the same producer was not authorized to transfer or lease any rights during that three year period. The latest change to be made in the usage rules, which came into force in 1996 as part of the 1994 simplification exercise, unified these two rules into one, such that the minimum percentage usage has been raised to 70% each year. This measure aims to prompt producers to mobilize the rights which they could retain under the existing, relatively lenient, general usage rule. On the other hand, such a simplification of the rules was justified because the risk posed by speculative requests for rights from the national reserve had not been fulfilled. 1 ' A couple of years into the system, it became evident that producers who had received rights from the national reserve and, in the extreme case a small number, were under an excessively heavy obligation in having to use all the rights they owned during the following three years: even natural fluctuations in flock size could cause them to have to surrender part of their rights. Therefore, it was decided to relax the rule to an average usage of 90% over the same three year period. This relaxation was subsequently taken further in 1996 by the introduction of a single usage rule (70% every year). c) The transfer and leasing mechanisms For clarity and ease in the operation, the Commission legislation introduced a minimum to the number of rights which may be transferred or leased n at any one time, with both parlies involved having an obligation to notify the competent authorities of the transfer within a deadline, two months before the premium claim was made. However, once the transfer system was set up and running, Member States became aware that simplification in some of the associated procedures was necessary, particularly in France where the 'administrative' system is operated. In time for the 1995 premium claims, the minimum number of rights involved in a transfer without holding were simplified by rewording the previous formula which was based on percentages of the producer's quota. At the same time, the deadline for notification of a transfer was redefined so as to allow producers to notify the authorities up until the day on which they made their premium claim. It therefore gives producers and administrations more time to organize and to process transfers and reduces the confusion between the deadline for transfer notification and the deadline for premium claim which had arisen amongst producers. However, where the Commission legislation provided the most significant concessions to the rules on transfers has been on the opening of second trading periods in both sectors in both 1993 and 1994 '\ These derogations were justified because of transitional problems at the outset of the regime, in particular, producers across the whole Community experienced appreciable difficulty in trading quota or acquiring from the national rights sufficient rights to cover their premium claims within the deadlines originally set. Finally, as an example taken from the sheep sector, the various deadlines for applications and notifications which have resulted from the application of the Commission rules in each Member State, are summarized in Annex XIV for the 1995 marketing year. 12 In order to avoid a producer holding onto rights by leasing them out to another producer for an unlimited length of time, a rule was instituted which obliges producers to use all their rights during at least two consecutive years over a five-year period. Since this rule means that producers could lease out rights from the beginning of the quota system in 1993 for three years, 1996 is, in effect, the first year of its application. A second trading period was admitted for 1995 and 1996 but does not apply to all Member States: only Italy and Greece were given this provision to assist in the allocation of the 600. 000 extra ewe rights conceded by Council Regulation (EC) No 1265/95 and the UK may open a second period for 1995 in both sectors (and for 1996 in sheep) in order to accommodate those producers affected by delays in the distribution of the 1993 national reserve. 10 V. EVALUATION OF THE QUOTA REGIMES AND CONCLUDING REMARKS At what is still a relatively early stage in the implementation of the policy of individual producer limits in the ewe and suckler cow premium schemes, the Commission has a number of comments to make on the development of the regime and the progress made so far. a) i) ii) Controlling production and spending The most important consequence of introducing producer quotas for ewe premium has been the control effected on sheepmeat production and Community expenditure in the sector. In the beef sector, for the reasons indicated above, the same degree of control in production and expenditure has manifestly not been attained. b) National reserves and their management iii) The lighter pressure on the beef national reserves than on the sheep reserves, in the first two years of the operation, is consistent with the Commission's concern that, even before the BSE crisis, the current state of the suckler cow premium quotas is failing to exert the necessary control on production. The most important reasons why the beef national reserves are not under pressure is that most Member States adopted 1992 as the reference year for suckler cow quota, which meant that herd sizes did not evolve substantially by 1993 and that most producers had sufficient rights in 1993 based on their 1992 claim. Secondly, the obligations for quota usage placed on producers who receive rights from the national reserve and the introduction of the density factor in suckler cow eligibility may have dissuaded producers initially from applying. However, since census data show that suckler cow numbers arc increasing across the Union, information on the development of the national reserves in 1995, not yet made available to the Commission by all Member States, will be particularly indicative of the current state of the quota policy across the Union. iv) With regard to the management of the national reserves, in general terms, the system can be said to operate well. However, the data available to the Commission suggest that, particularly in the sheep sector, there is some divergence in the criteria for attribution of rights in that some Member States are operating a 'recycling' of rights, i. e. withdrawal and reallocation of rights to other producers in the same year while others are not. The reasons for this difference may be that in some Member States there is a known lack of demand from producers for rights and recycling would presumably not be necessary while other Member States may have chosen administrative procedures which result in the 'recycling' of rights being made in the year following withdrawal. v) For reasons of controlling production and reducing quota speculation, the Commission wishes to comment that, in its opinion, 'recycling' of rights can encourage inflated applications for premiums 14. The Commission recognizes that the current Council legislation In effect, with this approach, the number of rights to 'recycle' wiil only be known after the end of the application period for premium. Producers must therefore make their premium claim without knowing to what extent the Member State can meet their request for supplementary rights free from the national reserve. Certain U leaves the management of the national reserves largely in the hands of the Member States and that there are no provisions covering deadlines for the distribution of the national reserves. However, the Commission invites Member States to take the necessary implementing measures in order to distribute the national reserve before the end of the application period for premium, that is, before the end of the transfer and leasing period. c) Systems of quota transfer vi) vii) Notwithstanding the comments made above with reference to national reserves, the Commission draws Council's attention to the fact that the second trading periods, justifiably conceded to Member States in the past, are related to this issue in that they permitted producers to optimize, in effect, their quota usage in 1993 and 1994. Consequently, the Commission announces that, from now on, it will take a far harder line against second that the initial problems experienced by producers and trading periods, confident administrations with the setting up of the quota regime are now overcome. Concerning the national systems for the transfer of rights, the Commission emphasizes that major efforts have been made to accommodate the requests of Member States for more llexible transfer procedures but that measures which would lead to too great a divergence between the 'commercial' system and the 'administrative' system, have been refused. For this reason, the Commission has not been prepared to admit leasing of rights through the national reserve since, under the 'administrative' system, this would mean that individual quotas would tend to operate as regional ceilings, with all the inconveniences in terms of control ("maitrise") of production that such ceilings incur. viii) In relation to the same question of national systems for transfers, the Commission notes the fact that the low monetary value attributed to rights by the French administration is causing producers to retain unused rights. The Commission hopes that the changes made to the usage rules from 1996 onwards will help alleviate the problem of low quota availability. d) Sensitive Zones ix) x) The Commission reaffirms that the direct consequence of 'ring-fencing' of premium rights is to limit the transfer of rights within a Member State. However, the Commission remarks that, due to the different criteria which have been used to establish Sensitive /ones in each Member State, a practical consequence of this provision is that rights may not be transferred between all zones or all Member States of the Union. The Commission is aware that, in certain instances, it has been suggested that the 'ring- fencing' of quota within a Member State is beginning to exert a negative impact on the rural environment, by accumulating rights within their boundaries, which is an undesirable consequence of this provision. Therefore, the Commission draws Member States' attention to this topic, with a view to finding a better balance between the socio-economic objectives of this provision and certain objective criteria of environmental protection. producers, in the hope of receiving the supplementary rights they have requested, will tend to inflate their premium claim and therefore retain more animals than their individual quota. 12 e) Concluding remarks In view of the above evaluation, the Commission concludes that individual producer limits have so far been a successful policy tool for controlling production and expenditure in the sheep sector but not in the suckler cow segment of the beef sector. Therefore, given that changes in the ewe premium regime are not justified and that the whole beef regime is under review in the light of the current BSE crisis, the Commission considers that it is not an appropriate moment to make any proposals in respect of the quota regimes in either of the premium schemes. & ;t. j- 13 BEEF AND SHEEPMEAT PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION - EU15 (1986-1996) PRODUCTION ET CONSOMMATION DES VIANDES BOVINE ET OVINE - UE15 (1986-1996) ERZEUGUNG UND VERBRAUCH VON RIND- UND SCHAFFLEISCH - EUR15 (1986-1995) ANNEX 1900 4- 1800 4- 1700 4- 1600 4- 1500 g S E ¥ i4oo r 4- 1300 4- 1200 4-1100 m | JC CO • *— Beef Production • & • • Consumption —a—Sheepmeat Production 4-1000 --o--Consumption 900 Ko s: !. d* , Q" - - Q. •* a". ET -•' 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 9500 9000 8500-f 8000 4- c 7500 + c o % 7000 4- o m 6500 dr 6000 5500 4- 5000 1986 Source: DGVI SUCKLER AND DAIRY COW NUMBERS - EC12 (1989-1995) NOMBRES DE VACHES ALLAITANTES ET LAITIERES - CE12 (1989-1995) MUTTERKUH- UND MILCHKUHBESTANDE - EUR12 (1989-95) ANNEX II -*—Total cows -•— Dairy cows - - Potential rights -*•— Suckler cows 1996 35000 30000 4- Source: EUROSTAT 4500 4000 3500 4- 3000 + D U LU S 2500 2000 4- 1500 4- 1000 + 500 4- COMMUNITY EXPENDITURE IN EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM (1980-1995) DEPENSES COMMUNAUTAIRES POUR LES PRIMES A LA BREBIS ET A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE (1980-1995) GEMEINSCHAFTSAUSGABEN FUR MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERKUHPRAMIEN (1980-1995) ANNEX • Total Beef Sector Budget • Ewe and Goat Premium • Suckler Cow Premium Year ANNEX IV APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS FOR EWE PREMIUM - EC12 APPUCATION DE LIMITES INDIVIDUELLES POUR LA PRIME A LA BREBIS - CE12 ANWENDUNG DER ERZEUGERSPEZIFISCHEN OBERGRENZEN MUTTERSCHAFPRAMIE - EUR12 Belglque/BelgIS Danmark Deutschland Ellas Espafla France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nedertand Portugal United Kingdom 1991 1 1991 1 1991 1991 1990 1989 1991 1991 1991 1991 1989 1990 1 1 1,00239 1,02157. 1 1 1 1 1,06 1. 0116 no no no no yes partially no no no no partially partially Globally-1% < 33 rights • 0% > 33 rights «1. 5% < 13 right» « 0 rights 13-60 rights « 1 right >60rights«2rights • > 17 rights - 3% < 200 rights • 3% > 200 rights « 2% 2% 1% 10-100 rights « 0% 101-200 rights « 1% 201-300 rights - 2% 301-400 rights • 3% 501-1000 rights « 4% > 1000 rights «5% < 17 rights *0 > 3% 17 rights « 3S 3% 3% 1% 10% 10% 15% 15% 10% 15% 15% 15% 15% 1% 15% Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Via national reserve Between producers Between producers Via national reserve Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Not permitted Not permitted Between producers 15% • Between producers Between producers 2 zones None LFA's; dykes zone None LFA's The whole country I LFA's Not decided The whole country LFA's LFA's 7 zones covering the whole country Decision concerning a) Reference year b) Coefficient c) Supply of rights to National Reserve due to coefficient > 1 d) Percentage of rights retained for the initial National Reserve In relation to the size of the initial producer limit e) Percentage of rights !o be surrendered to National Reserve in case of transfer without holding ("syphon") f) Method of transfer of rights without holding g) Leasing of rights f) Definition of Sensitive Zones out of which rights may not be transferred SCVT~: Me"ibsr Steies APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS FOR SUCKLER COWS - EC12 APPLICATION DES LIMITES INDIVIDUELLES POUR LA PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE - CE12 ANWENDUNG DER ERZEUGERSPEZIFISCHEN OBERGRENZEN MUTTERKUHPRÂMIE - EUR12 Belglque/BelgiS Danmark Deutschland Ellas Espafla France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nederiand Portugal United Kingdom 1992 443. 588 1992 1992 1990 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 135. 937 651. 122 149. 778 1. 462. 527 3. 886. 366 1. 106. 528 787. 993 14. 765 98. 006 286. 554 1. 805. 323 ANNEX V 1% < 20 rights • 0 rights 20-49 rights «1 right > 49 rights • 2 rights 3% 2% 2% 3% 1% 3% 3% 1% 1% 1% 10% 10% 15% 5% 10% 15% 5-14% 15% 15% 1% 5% 15% Between producers Between producers Between producers DôtwBcn producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Via national reserve Between producers Between producers Via national reserve Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Not permitted Not permitted Between producers Between producers Between producers Whole country Whole country LFA's LFA's Decision concerning a) Reference year b) Potential rights c) Percentage of rights retained for the initial National Reserve in relation to the size of the initial producer limit 0 d) Percentage of rights to be surrendered to National Reserve in case of transfer without holding fsyphon") e) Method of transfer of rights without holding f) Leasing of rights g) Definition of Sensitive Zones out of whteh rights may not be transferred Sout»: Member States INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES - EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM 1 LIMITES INDIVIDUELLES DANS LES NOUVEAUX ETATS-MEMBRES - PRIME A LA BREBIS ET A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE 1 ERZEUGERSPEZIFISCHE OBERGRENZEN IN DEN NEUEN MITGLIEDSTAATEN - MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERKUHPRAMIEN 1 Ewe Premium Suckler Cow Premium Ôsterreich Suomi/Finland Sverige Ôsterreich Suomi/Finland Sverige ANNEX VI d) Percentage of rights retained for the initial National Reserve in relation to the size of the initial producer limit e) Percentage of rights to be surrendered to National Reserve in case of transfer without holding ("syphon") Rights remaining after attribution of individual limits were sufficient 1% Rights remaining after attribution of individual limits were sufficient Rights remaining after attribution of individual limits were sufficient 1% Rights remaining after attribution of individual limits were sufficient 15% 10% 15% f) Method of transfer of rights without holding Between producers g) Leasing of rights Under discussion Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers 15% • Between producers i | Under discussion j ; i 10% 15% Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Under discussion LFA's The whole country Under discussion ! LFA's The whole country f) Definition of Sensitive Zones out of which rights may not be transferred 11nformation as received from Member States INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO EWE AND GOAT PREMIUM - EU151 DROITS INDIVIDUELS A LA PRIME A LA BREBIS ET A LA CHEVRE - UE15 1 INDIVIDUELLE ANSPRÛCHE AUF MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERZIEGENPRÂMIE * EUR151 ANNEX VII A Premiums paid in reference year B Extra LFA reserve C Additional rights D=A+B+C Total potential rights3 E Initial individual limits F Initial National Reserve G Rights available (1993 and 1994) H I « G - (H/2) Of which: at 50% Conversion to full rights (1995)3 0 0 8 78 161 64 36 68 0 0 23 128 566 1 1 9 1 8 31 54 0 0 30 14 109 70 104. 1. 330 10. 990 19. 665 7. 850 4. 959 9. 561 4 866 2. 742 20. 028 69 101 1. 344 9. 564 18. 195 7. 100 4. 755 7. 381 4 839 2. 541 18. 985 1 3 98 877 1. 468 742 208 1. 706 0 92 169 826 70 104 1. 442 10. 441 19. 663 7. 842 4. 963 9. 087 4 931 2. 710 19. 811 0,10 0,50 19,30 7,70 530,10 0,14 13,80 193,40 0,00 2,40 40,30 639,00 69,95 103,75 1. 432,35 11. 037,15 19. 397,95 7. 841,93 4. 956,10 9. 590,30 4,00 929,80 2. 689,85 19. 491,50 258 78. 169 70. 878 6. 190 77. 068 1446,74 77. 544,63 206 80 180 78. 635 i I i i Rights X 1000 Member State Belglque/BelglS Danmark Deutschland 4 Ellas Espafla France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nederiand Portugal United Kingdom Ewes Goats Total* 69 103 1. 313 6. 585 17. 004 7. 581 4. 869 7. 861 4 836 2. 229 19. 791 0 0 0 3. 726 2. 492 174 0 1. 032 0 0 476 0 69 103 1. 313 10. 311 19. 496 7. 755 4. 869 8. 893 4 836 2. 705 19. 791 Sub-total EC-12 68. 245 7. 900 76. 145 Ôsterreich * Suomi/Finland * Sverigeb Total EU-15 1 Based on information supplied by Member States 2 Verified by the Commission with exception of Deutschland and Italy (Sicily) 3 Including 600. 000 additional rights for Italy and Greece 4 Excluding New Lander 5 Art 5e(1) of Reg. 3013/89 INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO SUCKLER COW PREMIUM - EU15 (1) DROITS INDIVIDUELS A LA PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE - UE15 INDIVIDUELLE ANSPRÛCHE AUF MUTTERKUHPRÂMIE - EUR15 ANNEX VIII A B C D E F Reference year total Additional rights (mixed herd)(3) Additional rights (non-payment) (4) Additions! fight* for oxtontfficstfon (*) Less favoured areas (Q1. %) (Addreserve) Total potential rights (A-E) O 1. Wtial Individual ceMngs (non-less favoured) H I J 2. Initial individual ceilings (less favoured) Additional rights sftocstod (ftibcod herd) (6) National initial reserve Total available rights (G+H+l+E) 403. 029 36. 080 3. 022 1. 457 443. 588 255. 495 145. 700 36. 080 4. 856 443. 588 Belgique/ Belgiê Danmark 121. 099 13. 320 1. 518 0 135. 937 134. 144 0 837 956 135. 937 Deutschland(2) Deutschland- NBL(7) 354. 931 111. 240 2. 674 2. 277 471. 122 119. 813 224. 174 31. 378 91. 207 468. 849 180. 000 180. 000 EHas (1990) 137. 775 10. 520 411 1. 072 149. 778 13. 353 107. 225 250 27. 878 149. 778 Esparla 1. 363. 610 84. 320 2. 462 12. 135 1. 462. 527 135. 475 1. 192. 906 9. 916 112. 095 1. 462. 527 France (8) 3. 616. 219 242. 480 3. 443 24. 224 3. 886. 366 1. 086. 431 2. 422. 477 242. 480 110. 754 3. 886. 366 Ireland 1. 024. 757 63. 400 10. 247 8. 124 1. 106. 528 212. 319 812. 438 18. 611 55. 036 1. 106. 528 Italia 690. 609 90. 160 2. 000 5. 224 787. 993 163. 097 506. 793 2. 968 107. 910 785. 992 Luxembourg 11. 648 3. 000 Nederland 67. 444 30. 560 0 0 117 14. 765 0 11. 592 2. 398 658 14. 765 2 98. 006 66. 587 183 6. 829 24. 405 98. 006 Portugal (9) 240. 099 17. 760 26. 741 1. 954 286. 554 23. 858 240. 875 517 20. 684 285. 934 UnHed Kingdom 1. 669. 538 118. 320 6. 382 11. 083 1. 805. 323 551. 639 1. 097. 217 11199 123. 776 1. 794. 914 TOTAL 9. 700. 758 821. 160 58. 900 67. 669 10. 828. 487 2. 762. 211 6. 761. 580 363. 463 - 680. 215 10. 813. 184 1 ) Except for those In column B, ad figures are provisionat; figures are besed on Information supplied by Member States (TO BE VERIFIED BY THE COMMISSION). 2) Former Lander only. 3) Regulation (EEC) 805/68, ArUd(6) and Annex II. 4) R (EEC) 805/68, Art. 4d(3) and R. (EEC) 3886/92. Art. 29. 5) Regulation (EEC) 3888/92, Art. 38(3). Estimated figures (in the case of FR •/-15. 000). 6) R. (EEC) 3886/92, Art. 29. 7) Not including rights resulting from the former German Lander switch. Régulation (EEC) 805/68 Art 4k(1 Xb). 8) Not including add'itional rights destined to DOM (fewer than 35. 000 rights). Regulation (EEC) 3763/91 Art. 5(3) as amended by R. (EC) 2598/95. 9) Not Including up to 78. 740 rights for extensive livestock after collectivisation. Regulation (EC) 1017/94 Art. 2 as amended by R. (EC) 1461/95. I I ANNEX IX EVOLUTION IN EWE A ND SUCKLER C OW PREMIA GRANTED - (1992-1995) EVOLUTION DES PRIMES OCTROYEES A LA BREBIS ET A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE - (1992-1995) ENTWICKLUNG DER GEWAHRTEN MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERKUHPRAMIEN - (1992-1995) Premfa x 1000 EWE AND GOAT PREMIA GRANTED SUCKLER COW PREMIA GRANTED Member State Potential Rights1 1992 1993 1994 1995* MS Potential Rights2 1992 1993 1994 1995* Belglque/BelgiS Danmark Deutschland Ettas Espafta France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nedorland Portugal United Kingdom fs. L 70 104 1. 330 10. 990 19. 665 7. 850 4. 959 9. 561 4 866 2. 742 20. 028 70 • * 106 1. 876 10. 972 19. 788 7. 393 5. 024 9. 737 4 854 2. 652 19. 543 69 85 1. 742 9. 640 17. 818 7. 292 4. 825 9. 541 4 735 2. 675 18. 526 • * « • • * 64 81 1. 721 11. 974 17. 009 7. 306 4. 656 10. 652 3 715 2. 840 20. 416 * • » * • • • * * 64 72 1. 753 11. 974 19. 232 7. 237 4. 674 11. 365 4 727 2. 695 20. 077 BE DK DE EL ES FR IR IT LX NL PT UK AAA 136 651 150 1. 463 3. 886 1. 107 788 15 98 287 1. 805 403 121 447* 132 1. 364 3. 616 1. 025 691 12 67 240 1. 670 435 102 413 126 1. 243 3. 603 884 674 13 50 226 1. 558 424 104 506 117 1. 171 3. 492 910 807 13 52 238 1. 552 427 101 535 120 1. 380 3. 600 955 783 15 60 286 1. 591 Subtotal EC-12 78. 169 78. 019 • 72. 952 • 77. 437 • 79. 874 EC-12 10. 830 9. 788 9. 327 9. 386 9. 853 ôsterreich Suoml/Flnland Sverige 206 80 180 160 64 152 OST SU SV 325 55 155 m Total EU-15 78. 635 80. 250 EU-15 11. 365 267 26 127 10. 273 4 information provided by Member States (figures in italics are provisional or estimated daim data) 1 From Annex VI 2 From Annex VII OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1993 - EWE PREMIUM FONCTIONNEMENT DES RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1993 - PRIME A LA BREBIS BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG DER EINZELSTAATLICHEN RESERVEN 1993 - MUTTERSCHAFPRAMIE ANNEX X (a) Transfers w/o holding Rights ceded to National Reserve due to (b) Insufficient usage (c) Total I Rights attributed free of charge from NR Of which: rights from supplementary LFA reserve* Balance of National Reserve (end 1993) Member State Initial National Reserve to Belglque/Belglô Danmark Deutschland Ellas Espafta France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nederland Portugal United Kingdom » 801 2. 576 98. 730 876. 775 1. 425. 329 742. 061 204. 581 1. 533. 633 444 58. 091 166. 065 815. 137 TOTAL EU-12 5. 924. 223 117. 293 192 1. 247 10. 264 17. 760 46. 076 0 6. 981 2. 647 0 0 4. 545 27. 581 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 192 1. 247 10. 264 17. 760 46. 076 0 6. 981 2. 647 0 0 4. 545 27. 581 972 2. 290 88. 948 817. 956 1. 462. 625 662. 958 188. 464 1. 404. 482 390 27. 614 169. 132 782. 137 99 0 6. 650 78. 597 152. 632 36. 513 25. 222 390 0 127. 940 - - 21 1. 533 20. 046 76. 579 8. 780 79. 103 23. 098 131. 798 54 30. 477 1. 478 60. 581 117. 293 5. 607. 968 428. 043 433. 548 1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 5 (2) of Reg. 3567/92 2 Derived from Art 5c of Reg. 3013/89 3 Figures liable to change as a resuit of reassessment of national reserve attribution OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1993 - SUCKLER COW PREMIUM FONCTIONNEMENT DES RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1993 - PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG DER EINZELSTAATUCHEN RESERVEN 1993 - MUTTERKUHPRÂMIE ANNEX XI Member State Initial National Reserve Belglque/BelgIS Danmark Deutschland4 Ellas Espafla France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nederland Portugal United Kingdom* 6. 313 956 93. 484 28. 950 124. 230 134. 978 63. 160 113. 134 775 24. 407 20. 684 134. 859 TOTAL EU-12 745. 930 Of which: LFA Reserve - 1. 457 2. 277 1. 072 12. 135 24. 224 8. 124 5. 224 775 2 1. 954 11. 083 68. 327 Rights ceded to National Reserve due to (b) Insufficient usage' (a) Transfers w/o holding ("syphon") * (c) Total Rights attributed free of charge fromNR Of which: righto from LFA reserve* Balance of National Reserve (end 1993) Of which: rights from LFA reserve - - - - - 376 1. 389 379 708 550 144 1. 943 5. 489 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - - 376 1. 389 379 708 550 144 1. 943 5. 489 6629 1. 372 38. 763 25. 646 74. 651 58. 925 20. 557 54. 777 172 7. 933 20. 308 50. 127 359. 850 - - - - 1457 480 1. 072^ 12. 135 43. 325 172 1954 16. 807 77. 402 60 973 55. 100 3. 304 50. 287 76. 053 43. 153 58. 357 603 16. 474 520 66. 675 - - - - - - - 1. 797,50 8. 124,00 5. 224,00 602,80 2,00 391. 559 ^_ 15. 750,30. 1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 30 (2) of Reg. 3886/92 2 Derived from Art 4e (1) of Reg. 805/68 3 Art 33 of Reg. 3886/92 4 Former Lander only 5 Figures liable to change follwoing reassessment of attribution OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1994 - EWE PREMIUM 1 FONCTIONNEMENT DE RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1994 - PRIME A LA BREBIS 1 BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG DER EINZELSTAATLICHEN RESERVEN 1994 - MUTTERSCHAFPRAMIE 1 ANNEX XII Balance of Rights ceded to National Reserve due to Rights attributed Of which: rights Balance of Member State National Reserve (end 1993) (a) Transfers w/o (b) Insufficient holding ("syphon") usage Belgique/Belglë l\i Danmark Deutschland Ellas Espafta France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nederland Portugal United Kingdom * 21 1. 533 20. 046 76. 579 8. 780 79. 103 23. 098 131. 798 54 30. 477 1. 478 60. 581 223 10. 199J 7. 594 18. 784 86. 589 37. 126 14. 751 7. 444 1. 025 2. 858 27. 184 - TOTAL EU-12 433. 548 213. 777 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 (c) Total free of charge from LFA National Reserve from NR reserve* (end 1994) ^ 244 7. 682 25. 758 91. 102 6. 297 41. 721 34. 741 0 3. 574 4. 308 27. 184 223 10. 199 7. 594 18. 784 86. 589 37. 126 14. 751 7. 444 - - - 1. 025 2. 858 27. 184 0 0 1. 308 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 4. 050 1. 882 4. 261 89. 072 74. 508 3. 108 139. 242 - 27. 928 28 60. 581 213. 777 242. 611 1. 308' 404. 660 1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 5 (2) of Reg. 3567/92 2 Derived from Art, 5c of Reg. 3013/89 3 Figures liable to change following reassessment of the national reserve attribution OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1994 - SUCKLER COW PREMIUM 1 FONCTIONNEMENT DES RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1994 - PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE1 BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG DER EINZELSTAATLICHEN RESERVEN 1994 - MUTTERKUHPRAMIE 1 ANNEX XIII Member State Initial National Reserve Belgique/Belgl5 Danmark Deutschland4 Ellas Espafta France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nederland Portugal United Kingdom ' N Of which: LFA Reserve 0,00 0,00 1. 797,50 - • - - 0,00 602,80 2,00 0,00 0,00 60,00 973,00 55. 100,20 3. 304,20 50. 287,00 76. 053,00 43. 153,00 58. 357,00 602,80 16. 474,10 520,10 86. 675,00 I Rights ceded to National Reserve due to (•) (b) Insufficient Transfers w/o usage1 holding ("syphon") * (c) Total Rights attributed free of charge fromNR Of which: rights from LFA reserve* Balance of National Reserve (end 1993) Of which: rights from LFA reserve 995,00 58,00 996,60 83,60 1. 799,70 11. 326. 00 660,00 219,60 31,60 31,50 292,40 2. 339,00 0,00 375,00 0,00 385,20 0,00 0. 00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 995,00 433,00 996,60 468,80 1. 799,70 11. 326,00 660,00 219,60 31,60 31,50 292,40 2. 339,00 1. 055,00 822,00 47. 391,20 3. 165,00 0. 00 68. 997,00 19. 096,00 42. 480,00 529,80 55,30 489,60 32. 215. 00 1. 064,40 0,00 0,00 - - - - - - - - - 0,00 584,00 8. 705. 60 608,00 52. 086. 70 18. 382,00 24. 717,00 16. 096,60 104,60 16. 450,30 322,90 56. 799,00 - - - - - - - 1797. 5 8124 5224 602,8 2 TOTAL EU-12 391. 559,40 2. 402,30 18. 833,00 760,20 19. 593,20 216. 295,90 1. 064,40 194. 856,70 15. 750 1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 30 (2) of Reg. 3886/92 2 Derived from Art 4e (1) of Reg. 805/68 3 Art 33 of Reg. 3886/92 4 Former Lander only 5 Figure liable to change following reassessment of 1993 attribution CALENDAR FOR EWE PREMIUM APPLICATIONS IN 1995 - EU15 CALENDRIER POUR LES DEMANDES DE PRIME A LA BREBIS EN 1995 - UE15 ZEUPLAN FUR DIE BEANTRAGUNG DER MUTTERSCHAFPRAMIE - EUR15 ANNEX XIV MEMBER STATE Deadlina for Parmanant Deadlina for Tamporary Pariod for Application for Deadline for attributing Period for Premium Retention Period Period for Application Tranafera(a) Leaalng (a) Right, from N Reserve rights from N reserve Application (b) (inclualve) for Fattened Lamb Premium Balglque/BalgIS 14 Oct 1994 14 Oct 1994 15 Dec-18 Jan 15 Dec 1994-16 Jan 1995 17 Jan-26 Apr 1995 15 Dec-16 Jan Danmark 31 Mar 1995 31 Mar 1995 31 Dec 1994 1 Mar 1995 1 - 31 Mar 1995 1 Apr - 9 Jul 1995 not applicable Deutschland 1 Jun - 31 Oct 1994 1 Jun - 31 Oct 1994 1-31 Jan 1994 none 1-31 Jan 1995 1 Feb-11 May 1995 Ellas Espafla Franca Ireland tV3 Italia 1 Feb 1995 1 Feb 1995 1 Dec 1994-15 Feb 1995 1 Doc 1994-15 Feb 1995 16 Feb-26 May 1995 1 Dec 1994-15 Feb 1995 31 Mar 1995 31 Mar 1995 before 31 Oct 1994 15 Jan 1995 1-31 Mar 1995 '1 Apr - 9 Jul 1995 1-31 Mar 1995 8 Jan 1995 31 Mar 1995 before 30 Nov 1994 6-31 Jan 1995 31 Jan-10 May 1995 6 - 31 Jan 1995 23 Jan 1995 23 Jan 1995 before 16 Dec 1994 31 Oct 1995 1) 3 -23 Jan 1995 1) 23 Jan - 2 May 1995 not applicable 2) 1-16 Mar 1995 (c) 2) 16 Mar-23 Jun 1995(c) 24 Mar 1995 24 Mar 1995 before 15 Feb 1995 16 Apr 1995 15 Feb-24 Mar 1995 25 Mar-2 Jul 1995 15 Feb-24 Mar Luxembourg 20 Jan 1995 20 Jan 1995 1 Feb-15 Feb 1995 15 Feb-25 May 1995 not applicable Nederiand Osterreich Portugal Suoml Sverige 14-DBC-94 not applicable 5 Dec-30 Dec 1994 20 Feb 1995 20 Feb -23 Mar 1995 23 Mar • 30 Jun 1995 not applicable not applicable not applicable not applicable not applicable 7 - 31 Jan 1995 1 Feb-11 May 1995 15 Dec 1994 15 Dec 1994 15 Jan-28 Feb 1995 7 Sep 1995 15 Jan-28 Feb 1995 1 Mar-8 Jun 19951 15 Jan -28 Feb 1995 not applicable not applicable not applicable not applicable 13-31 Mar 1995 1 Apr • 9 Jul 1995 not applicable 9 Mar 1995 9 Mar 1995 1 - 31 Jan 1995 20 Feb 1995 1 -31 Mar 1995 1 Apr-9 Jul 1995 1-30 Apr 1995 United Kingdom - 6B 20 Feb 1995 20 Feb 1995 1 Dec-31 Jan 1996 not yet known 1)15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 1)16 Dec 1994-25 Mar 1995 15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 2) 15 Jan-20 Feb 1995 2)21 Feb 1995-31 May 1995 •NI 20 Feb 1995 20 Feb 1995 1 Dec-31 Jan 1996 not yet known 1)15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 1)16 Dec 1994-25 Mar 1995 15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 2) 15 Feb-15 Mar 1995 2) 15 Mar 1995-23 Jun 1995 S'-'bser'çrts: s«or unta tha date of premium application; b=or up to 20 days later, with 1%/day reduction; c=second application period only for producers failing to receive rights from NR ISSN 0254-1475 COM(96) 430 final DOCUMENTS EN 03 Catalogue number : CB-CO-96-430-EN-C ISBN 92-78-08030-6 Office far Official Publications of the European Communities L-2985 Luxembourg 3o