EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 45/98/COL of 4 March 1998 on the 13th amendment to the procedural and substantive rules in the field of State aid
23. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 120/27 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION No 45/98/COL of 4 March 1998 on the 13th amendment to the procedural and substantive rules in the field of State aid THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY, has amended the procedural and substantive rules in the field of State aid (1), adopted on 19 January 1994 (2), as last amended on 17 December 1997 (3), as follows. The following rules on short-term export-credit insurance and list of marketable risk countries (for the purpose of application of the rules in Chapter 17A on short-term export-credit in- surance) shall be added to the State aid Guidelines as a new chapter, Chapter 17A, and a new Annex IX, respectively: ‘17A. SHORT-TERM EXPORT-CREDIT INSURANCE (1) 17A. 1. Introduction (1) Export subsidies directly affect competition in the market place between rival potential suppliers of goods and services. Recognising their pernicious effects, the European Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority have consistently condemned export aid in intra-EEA trade (2). However, although EEA States’ support for their exports outside the EEA can also affect competition within the EEA (3), neither the Commission nor the EFTA Surveillance Authority have systematically intervened in this field under the respective State aid rules of the EC Treaty (Articles 92, 93 and 94) or the EEA Agreement (Article 61 and Article 1 of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agree- ment). There have been several reasons for this. First, within the European Community this area is partly governed by the provisions of the EC Treaty relating to external trade (Articles 112 and 113). Secondly, it is not only competition within the Community or the EEA that is affected by aid for exports to third countries, but also the competitive- ness of EEA exporters vis- -vis those of the EEA States’ trading partners, which give similar aid. Finally, progress in controlling aid has been achieved in the OECD and WTO. (1) Hereinafter referred to as the State aid Guidelines. (2) OJ L 231, 3. 9. 1994, p. 1; EEA Supplement to OJ 32, 3. 9. 1994. (3) OJ C 38, 5. 2. 1998, p. 19; EEA Supplement to OJ 5, 5. 2. 1998, p. 214. L 120/28 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 23. 4. 98 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) While the Commission has, until the adoption of the communication corresponding to the present rules, refrained from exercising its State aid control powers in the areas of export credits and export-credit insurance, work by the European Council’s Export Credits Group (4) and cases before the Court of Justice of the European Communities (5) have, in the Commission’s opinion, shown that in one area at least, that of short-term export-credit the actual or potential distortions of competition in the Community may justify action by the Commission under the State aid rules without waiting for progress on other fronts. insurance, The EEA Agreement does not provide for a common trade policy vis- -vis third coun- tries and consequently does not contain provisions corresponding to those in Articles 112 and 113 of the EC Treaty. The Agreement therefore does not restrict the freedom of the EFTA States, in the same way as the EC Treaty does for EC Member States, to promote trade with third countries, provided such measures do not affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. However, as stated above, measures of this kind can affect competition and trade within the EEA. Furthermore, distortions of competition can occur not only between exporters in different EEA States in their trade within and outside the EEA, but also between export-credit insurers offering their services within the EEA. The Authority therefore considers that as concerns applic- ability of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement and Article 1 of Protocol 3 to the Surveil- lance and Court Agreement to short-term export-credit insurance, the situation is similar as for the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty. In other words the actual or potential distortion of competition and trade within the EEA calls for action by the Authority under the State aid rules. the export-credit The purpose of these rules is to remove distortions of competition due to State aid in that sector of insurance business in which there is competition between public or publicly supported export-credit insurers and private export-credit insurers. This commercial sector of export-credit insurance relates to the insurance of short-term export-credit risks on trade within the EEA and with many countries outside it. Such risks are termed “marketable” and will be defined in Section 17A. 2. The defini- tion currently comprises only so-called “commercial”, as opposed to “political”, risks in trade within the EEA and with the majority of OECD countries, listed in Annex IX to these guidelines. While EFTA States have made considerable efforts to eliminate aid from the commercial sector of export-credit insurance, the good functioning of the EEA Agreement requires safeguards to ensure a level playing field in all circumstances. The present rules do not deal with the insurance of medium and long-term export- credit risks which are largely non-marketable at the present time. In that area, the factors which have led the Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority to refrain from extensive use of its State aid control powers still militate against such action. Section 17A. 2 of these rules describes the structure of the export-credit insurance market. As for the commercial or market sector, in which private insurers operate and which is covered by these rules, it distinguishes between, on the one hand, private export-credit insurers and, on the other hand, public or publicly supported insurers. It also explains why and to what extent the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement apply. Finally, in Section 17A. 4, the Authority states what action it considers necessary to ensure that any remaining State aid of the types listed in Section 17A. 3 is removed from the market sector and requests the EFTA States pursuant to Article 1(1) of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement to take such action, if required. 23. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 120/29 17A. 2. Market and non-market sectors of short-term export-credit insurance (1) (2) (3) (4) The report of the Council’s Export-Credit Group referred to in a footnote to paragraph 17A. 1(2) (hereinafter referred to as “the report”), complaints to the Commission by private export-credit insurers and cases before the Court of Justice of the European Communities, have shown that in some Member States the same “official” export-credit agencies that insure the medium and long-term risks of exporters for the account or with the guarantee (6) of the State also operate for the account or with the guarantee of the State in parts of the short-term export-credit insurance market where they are in competition with private export-credit insurers that have no such links with the State. Preliminary examination by the EFTA Surveillance Authority indicates that this is also the case in two of the three EFTA States parties to the EEA Agreement, namely Norway and Iceland. The “official” export-credit agencies in question may be government departments, State-owned or State-controlled companies or wholly privately-owned and controlled companies. For the purposes of these rules, such agencies will be termed “public or publicly supported export-credit insurers”. As well as the “official” agencies operating in both the medium/long and short-term fields, some privately owned and controlled export-credit insurers that only provide short-term insurance may be supported by their governments through guarantees or equivalent reinsurance arrange- ments for some segments of their business. These insurers, too, must be categorised as “public or publicly supported”. On the other hand, export-credit insurers mainly or exclusively engaged in the short term that do not operate for the account or with the guarantee (7) of the State for any of their business will be termed “private export-credit insurers”. The report showed that when public or publicly supported export-credit insurers operated for the account of or with the guarantee of the State on parts of the short-term market where they were in competition with private insurers, they enjoyed certain financial advantages which could distort competition against private insurers. In no country did public or publicly supported export-credit insurers have a monopoly for short-term business. One of the most difficult areas dealt with by the report was the provision of reinsurance by the State, either directly or indirectly. The report identified reinsurance arrangements which provide 100 % cover and are equivalent to guarantees as a subsidy. It is now recognised that reinsurance facilities whereby the State only participates in or supple- ments a private-sector reinsurance treaty may also give insurers benefiting from them an advantage over private insurers not receiving such cover, thereby distorting competition. Despite the recent improvements made, with public or publicly supported export-credit insurers increasingly hiving off their short-term business to separate companies or intro- ducing separate accounting, it has been noted above that action is still needed to create the desired level playing field. The first task is to identify the sector in which a compet- itive market exists. The report used as the decisive criterion for distinguishing the market sector, whether or not private reinsurance was available generally, rather than only in individual cases. It was observed that the answer was generally “yes” for commer- cial risks on non-public buyers, but that for political risks (including risks on public buyers, currency transfer risks and non-commercial, catastrophe risks) the capacity available was so inadequate that cover for such risks was clearly not to be regarded as a market activity. On the basis of an analysis of the private reinsurance market by reference to the three criteria of duration, location and nature of risks insured, the report considered “marketable” risks to involve commercial risks with a risk period of normally a maximum of three years for exports worldwide. L 120/30 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 23. 4. 98 (5) (6) (7) (8) Subsequent comments from EC Member States, EFTA States, business associations and insurers indicated that generally speaking that definition was too broad. Most of those submissions agreed with the report that political risks should be excluded because the private reinsurance market was not large enough, and they preferred a maximum risk period of two years for commercial risks. Also, it appeared to be very difficult to reinsure on the private market the commercial risk of protracted default in non-OECD coun- tries. In view of the close links between protracted default and insolvency, protracted default risks being liable to turn into insolvency, and the resulting need to classify both risks in the same category (marketable or non-marketable), it is prudent to exclude all commer- cial risks on non-OECD countries from the definition of marketable risks and from the scope of these rules for the time being. Finally, it appears that at present there are still difficulties in obtaining private reinsurance of commercial risk in some OECD coun- tries. In view of the above, “marketable” risks are defined for the purposes of these rules as commercial risks on non-public debtors (8) established in the countries listed in Annex IX to these guidelines. For such risks the maximum risk period (that is, manufacturing period plus credit period with normal Berne Union starting point and usual credit term) is less than two years. All other risks (that is, political, catastrophe (9) risks and commercial risks on public buyers and on countries not listed in Annex IX) are considered not yet to be mar- ketable. (9) “Commercial risks” are defined for the purposes of these rules as: — arbitrary repudiation of a contract by a debtor, that is, any arbitrary decision by a non-public debtor to interrupt or terminate the contract without legitimate reason, — arbitrary refusal by a non-public debtor to accept the goods covered by the contract without legitimate reason, — insolvency of a non-public debtor or his guarantor, — non-payment by a non-public debtor or by a guarantor of a debt resulting from the contract, that is, protracted default. (10) The capacity of the private reinsurance market varies. This means that the definition of marketable risks is not immutable and may change over time; for example, it might be extended to cover political risks. The definition will therefore have to be reviewed regu- larly (namely, at least once a year) by the Authority. The Authority will consult the EFTA States and, if appropriate, other interested parties on such reviews. In so far as necessary, changes to the definition will have to take account of the scope of EEA legis- lation governing export-credit insurance, in order to avoid any conflict or legal uncer- tainty. 17A. 3. Factors distorting competition between private and public or publicly supported export-credit insurers (1) The factors that may distort competition in favour of public or publicly supported export-credit insurers insuring marketable risks include (10): — de jure or de facto State guarantees of borrowing and losses. Such guarantees enable insurers to borrow at rates lower than the normal market rates or make it possible for them to borrow money at all. Furthermore, they obviate the need for insurers to reinsure themselves on the private market, 23. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 120/31 — any difference in obligations, compared with private insurers, to maintain adequate provisions. It should be noted than when Council Directive 73/239/EEC (11) was amended by Directive 87/343/EC (12) it was understood that the exclusion of export- credit insurance operations for the account of or guaranteed by the State (Article 2(2) (d) of the original Directive) did not include operations in the field of short-term commercial risks which public or publicly supported export-credit insurers effected for their own account and not guaranteed by the State (13). This means that to insure short-term commercial risks, public or publicly supported insurers must have a certain amount of own funds (solvency margin, including guarantee fund) and tech- nical provisions (notably an equalisation reserve) and must have obtained authorisa- tion in accordance with Article 6 et seq. of Directive 73/239/EEC, — relief or exemption from taxes normally payable (such as company taxes and taxes levied on insurance policies), — awards of aid or provisions of capital by the State. With regard to the latter, the prin- ciple should be observed that, unless the State is acting as would a private investor in a market economy, capital injections involve State aid (14); provision by the State of services in kind, such as access to and use of State infrastructure, facilities or priv- ileged information (for instance, information about debtors gathered by embassies) on terms not reflecting their cost, and reinsurance by the State, either directly, or indirectly via a public or publicly-supported export-credit insurer, on terms more favourable than those available from the private reinsurance market, which leads either to under-pricing of the reinsurance or to the artificial creation of capacity that would not be forthcoming from the private market. (2) (3) (4) The types of treatment listed in paragraph 17A. 3(1) give, or may give, the export-credit insurers that receive them a financial advantage over other export-credit insurers. Such financial advantages granted to certain enterprises distort competition and constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Article 61(1) is applicable to all measures which grant a financial or economic advantage to certain enterprises or products and involve a charge on, or a loss to public funds, whether actual or contingent, and for which nothing or little is required from the bene- ficiary concerned, in so far as such measures affect trade between Contracting Parties and distort or threaten to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods (15). The financial advantages listed in paragraph 17A. 3(1) in respect of marketable risks as defined in paragraphs 17A. 2(7) to (9) affect intra-EEA trade in services. Moreover, they lead to variations in the insurance cover available for marketable risks in different EEA States, thereby distorting competition between companies in EEA States and having secondary effects on intra-EEC trade regardless of whether intra-EEA exports outside the territories of the Contracting Parties are concerned (16). The exceptions provided for in Article 61 of the EEA Agreement do not apply to aid for the insurance of marketable risks. The distorting effects of such aid within the EEA outweigh any possible national or common EEA interest in supporting exports. That view has been confirmed by the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case C-63/89, which was directly concerned with the issue addressed by the present rules. The Court held that although the Directive on partial harmonisation of equalisation reserves for insurance companies, L 120/32 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 23. 4. 98 which exempted export-credit insurance operations for the account of or guaranteed by the State, was not unlawful, the factors distorting competition between private and public or publicly supported export-credit insurers “might justify recourse to legal action to penalise infringement of the provisions” (i. e. of Article 92 of the EC Treaty) (17). In its judgment in Case C-44/93, the Court assumed that the advantages in question consti- tute State aid and confirmed that the Commission might take action to secure their withdrawal. 17A. 4. Actionrequiredtoeliminatedistortionsofcompetitioninshort-termexport- credit insurance with respect to marketable risks (1) (2) State aid of the types listed in paragraph 17A. 3(1), which is enjoyed by publicly supported export-credit insurers for the marketable risks defined in paragraphs 17A. 2(7) to (9), may distort competition and would therefore be ineligible for exemption under the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement. The EFTA States are therefore requested within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement to amend, where necessary, their export- credit insurance systems for marketable risks in such a way that the granting of State aid of the following types to public or publicly supported export-credit insurers in respect of such risks is ended before 1 January 1999: (a) State guarantees for borrowing or losses; (b) exemption from the requirement to constitute adequate reserves and the other requirements listed in the second indent of paragraph 17A. 3(1); (c) relief or exemption from taxes or other charges normally payable; (d) award of aid or provisions of capital or other forms of finance in circumstances in which a private investor acting under normal market conditions would not invest in the company or on terms a private investor would not accept; (e) provision by the State of services in kind, such as access to and use of State infra- structure, facilities or privileged information (for instance, information about debtors gathered by embassies), on terms not reflecting their cost; (f) reinsurance by the State, either directly, or indirectly via a public or publicly- supported export-credit insurer, on terms more favourable than those available from the private reinsurance market, which leads either to under-pricing of the rein- surance cover or to the artificial creation of capacity that would not be forthcoming from the private market. (3) However, pending the outcome of the review mentioned in paragraph 17A. 4(6), existing complementary State reinsurance arrangements remain permissible for an interim period, provided that: — the State reinsurance is a minority element in the insurer’s overall reinsurance package, — where the reinsurance treaties of the insurer combine marketable and non-mar- ketable risks, and any State reinsurance thus unavoidably attaches to marketable risk, the level of State reinsurance for marketable risks must not exceed that which would have been available from the private reinsurance market if reinsurance had been sought for those risks in isolation, — the State reinsurance does not act so as to enable the insurer to insure business on individual buyers beyond the limits set by the participating private-market rein- surers, — the premium for State reinsurance demonstrably reflects the risk, is calculated using commercial market techniques and, where an equivalent market premium rate is available, is at least equal to that rate, — the State reinsurance for marketable risks is open to all credit insurers who are able to satisfy the common eligibility criteria. 23. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 120/33 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) For the purposes of complying with paragraphs 17A. 4(2) to (3), public or publicly- supported export-credit insurers will, at the very least, have to keep a separate adminis- tration and separate accounts for their insurance of marketable risks and non-marketable risks for the account or with the guarantee of the State, demonstrating that they do not enjoy State aid in their insurance of marketable risks. The accounts for business insured on the insurer’s own account should comply with the act referred to in point 12b of Annex IX to the EEA Agreement (18). Furthermore, an EFTA State providing reinsurance cover to an export-credit insurer by way of participation or involvement in private sector reinsurance treaties covering both marketable and non-marketable risks will have to demonstrate that its arrangements do not involve State aid within the meaning of paragraph 17A. 4(2)(f). For this purpose the EFTA Surveillance Authority, in close liaison with the EFTA States, will continuously, as from the publication of these rules, monitor such arrange- ments on the basis of six-monthly reports submitted by EFTA States concerned and by February 1999 will carry out a complete review of such arrangements. The review will take into account all the knowledge and experience acquired in the mean time about the operation of the short-term export-credit insurance market, and EFTA States’ inter- vention therein, from the reports on implementation supplied under paragraph 17A. 4(14) from the first of the annual reviews to be undertaken under paragraph 17A. 4(15) and from any notifications of use of the escape clause under paragraphs 17A. 4(8) to (13). Should the review find that the arrangements in an EFTA State involve State aid, the EFTA State will be required to terminate them by the end of 1999 at the latest. The principle that export-credit insurance for marketable risks should be provided by public or publicly supported export-credit insurers only if the financial advantages listed in paragraphs 17A. 4(2), subject to paragraph 17A. 4(3), are withdrawn from them may be departed from in the circumstances set out in paragraphs (8) to (13) (escape clause). In certain countries, cover for marketable export-credit risks may be temporarily un- insurers or from public or publicly-supported available from private export-credit export-credit insurers operating for their own account, owing to a lack of insurance or reinsurance capacity. Therefore those risks are temporarily considered to be non-mar- ketable. In such circumstances, those temporarily non-marketable risks may be taken on to the account of a public or publicly-supported export-credit insurer for non-marketable risks insured for the account of or with the guarantee of the State. The insurer should, as far as possible, align its premium rates for risks with the rates charged elsewhere by private export-credit insurers for the type of risk in question. (10) An EFTA State intending to use the escape clause should immediately notify the EFTA Surveillance Authority of its draft decision. That notification should contain a market report demonstrating the unavailability of cover for the risks in the private insurance market by producing evidence thereof from two large, well-known international private export-credit insurers as well as a national credit insurer, thus justifying the use of the escape clause. Alternatively, evidence of unavailability of cover in the private insurance market may possibly be demonstrated by means of a market report by an independent consultant which the Authority considers reliable and impartial. The notification should, moreover, contain a description of the conditions which the public or publicly supported export-credit insurer intends to apply in respect of such risks. (11) Within two months of the receipt of such notification, the Authority will examine whether the use of the escape clause is in conformity with the above conditions and compatible with the EEA Agreement. L 120/34 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 23. 4. 98 (12) (13) (14) (15) If the Authority finds that the conditions for the use of the escape clause are fulfilled, its decision on compatibility is limited to two years from the date of the decision, provided that the market conditions justifying the use of the escape clause do not change during that period. Furthermore, the Authority may, in consultation with the EFTA States, revise the condi- tions for the use of the escape clause; it may also decide to discontinue it or replace it with another appropriate system. These rules will apply from 1 January 1998 until the end of the year 2002. The EFTA States are requested to inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority within two months of notification of these rules, whether they accept its recommendations. Furthermore, by 1 January 1999 at the latest, the EFTA States must inform the Authority of the action they have taken to comply herewith. Should it appear either through those reports or otherwise that the systems in operation in the EFTA States still involve State aid, the Authority will assess such aid pursuant to Article 61 of the EEA Agreement and Article 1 of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, in accordance with the policy set out above. In cooperation with the EFTA States and interested parties, the Authority will review the definition of marketable risks and the operation of the present rules in the light of market developments and possible EEA-relevant legislation. All information received by the Authority from EFTA States and interested parties in connection with such reviews will, with the permission of the supplier of the information, be made available to all the other participants in the review. (1) This chapter corresponds to the communication of the Commission to the Member States pursuant to Article 93(1) of the EC Treaty applying Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty to short- term export-credit insurance (OJ C 281, 17. 9. 1997, p. 4). (2) In its Seventh report on competition policy (1977), point 242, the European Commission stated that export aids in intra-Community trade “cannot qualify for derogation whatever their intensity, form, grounds or purpose”. (3) See judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-142/87 Belgium v. Commission [1990] ECR I-959. See also Case C-44/93 Assurances du Crédit v. OND and Belgium [1994] ECR I-3829, paragraph 30. (4) “L’assurance crédit et le marché unique 1992 (court-terme)”, report presented to the coordi- nation group, rapporteur P. Callut. (5) See Case C-63/89 Assurances du Crédit and Cobac v. Council and Commission [1991] ECR I-1799, and Case C-44/93 Assurances du Crédit v. OND and Belgium [1994] ECR I-3829. (6) In some cases, medium and long-term business may be conducted not under a guarantee, but under a comprehensive reinsurance agreement with the government. (7) Or with equivalent reinsurance arrangements. (8) Or non-public guarantors. A public debtor or guarantor is a debtor or guarantor who, in one form or another, represents the public authority itself and cannot either judicially or adminis- tratively be declared insolvent. For the purposes of these rules, publicly-owned or publicly- controlled companies resident in the countries listed in Annex IX to these guidelines as a marketable risk country and subject to the normal provisions of private company law are considered to be non-public debtors/guarantors. (9) That is, war, revolution, natural disasters, nuclear accidents, and so forth, not so-called “commercial, catastrophe risks” (catastrophic accumulations of loss on individual buyers or countries) which may be covered by excess of loss reinsurance and are commercial risks. 23. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 120/35 (10) The tying by a public or publicly supported export-credit insurer of insurance of non-marke- table risks to the acceptance of cover for marketable risks might infringe Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. Such action could both be the subject of proceedings by the EFTA Surveil- lance Authority or the Commission and challenged in the courts and before national compe- tition authorities. (11) First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance (OJ L 228, 16. 8. 1973, p. 3), see point 2 of Annex IX to the EEA Agreement. (12) Council Directive 87/343/EEC of 22 June 1987 amending Directive 73/239/EEC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance (OJ L 185, 4. 7. 1987, p. 72), see third indent of point 2 of Annex IX to the EEA Agreement. (13) See judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-63/89, Assurances du Credit and Cobac v. Council and Commission, cited in footnote 5, p. 1848 (paragraph 22). (14) See Chapters 19 and 20 of the present State aid Guidelines. (15) See judgments of the Court of Justice in Case 30/59 Steenkolenmijnen v. High Authority [1961] ECR pp. 1 to 19; Case 173/73 Italy v. Commission [1974] ECR, p. 709, Case 730/79 Philip Morris v. Commission [1980] ECR, p. 2671. (16) In its judgment in Case C-142/87 Belgium v. Commission, cited in a footnote to paragraph 17 A. 1(1), the European Court of Justice held that not only aid for intra-Community exports, but also aid for exports outside the Community can influence intra-Community competition and trade. Both types of operation are insured by export-credit insurers and aid with respect to both can therefore have effects on intra-Community competition and trade. (17) See paragraph 24 of the Judgment by the European Court of Justice in Case C-63/89 cited in a footnote to paragraph 17 A. 1(3). Advocate-General Tesauro, in his opinion in the case, considered that when there is competition between private and public or publicly backed export-credit insurers, “it is highly doubtful whether the States can legitimately provide financial backing for public operators. To do so might be incompatible with the rules on public aid. ” ([1991] ECR I-1835, point 15). (18) Council Directive 91/674/EEC of 19 December 1991 on the annual accounts and consoli- dated accounts of insurance undertakings (OJ L 374, 31. 12. 1991, p. 7), as adapted for the purpose of the EEA Agreement by EEA Joint Committee Decision No 7/94 (OJ L 160, 28. 6. 1994; EEA Supplement to OJ 17, 28. 6. 1994). ’ ‘ANNEX IX LIST OF MARKETABLE RISK COUNTRIES FOR THE PURPOSE OF APPLICA- TION OF THE RULES IN CHAPTER 17A ON SHORT-TERM EXPORT-CREDIT INSURANCE Countries which are Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement Austria Belgium Denmark L 120/36 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 23. 4. 98 Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden United Kingdom Iceland Liechtenstein Norway Other countries which are members of the OECD and which are considered to be marketable risk countries Australia Canada Japan New Zealand Switzerland United States of America’ Done at Brussels, 4 March 1998. For the EFTA Surveillance Authority Knut ALMESTAD The President