{"newspaper_name": "The Arkansas banner.", "edition": "01", "page": "p1", "byline": ""}
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 organized into those particular Governments; and, lastly, it means the people composing those political societies, in their highest sov- eregn'capacity. Althoughit might be wished that the perfection of language admitted less diversity in ihe signifcauoA oi tho same words, yet litlle inconvenience is produced by Il where the true sense can be collected with certainty from the different applications. In the present instance, whatever different constructions of the term 'sS;ae," in the res olution, may have been entertained, all will at least concur in the last mentioned; because in that sense the Constitution was submitted to the ''States;n in that sense the "StatesH ratified it: and in that sense of the term "Stateso they are consequently parties 10 the compact from which the powers of the Gedefal Government result.

 The next position is that the General is sembly views the powers of the Federal Gov ernment ''as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact" and ..as no farther valid thaa they are authorized by the grants therein cnumaf- aied.2 It does not seem possible that any just objection can lie against either of these clauses. The first amounts merely 10 a dec iaraton that the compact ought to have the interpretation plainly intend by the parties to it; the other, to declaration that ii ought to have the execution and effect intended by them. If the powers granted be valid, t is solely because they are granted; and, if the granted powers are valid, because granted, all other powers not granted must not be valid.

 The resolution having taken this view of the Federal compact. proceeds to infer, "tLtat, in case of deliberate, palpablc, and danger ous exercise, of other powers, hot granted by the said compact, the States who are par ties thereto have the right, and are in duty bound, 10 iuterpose for agresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties, appertaining 10 thom.''

 IL appears to your committee to be plain principle, founded in common sense, illus trated by common practice, and essential to the nature of eolnpaets-thal where resort can be had 10 no tribunal superior to the au- thority of the parties, the parties themselves must be the rightlul judges, n Ire last resort,

  or violated. The constitution ol the United States was formed by the sanction of the States, given by each in its sovereign eaPae- ity It adds 10 the stability and dignity, as well a5 10 the authority of the Constitution, thatitFests oil this legitimate and solid foHn7 dalton. The States, then, being the parties to the constitutional compact, and ill their sovereign capacity, il follows of necessity that there can be no tribunal above their au- thority, 10 decide, in the last resort, whether the compact made by them be violated; and consequently. that, as inc parties to it, they must themselves decide, io the last resort, such questions as may be of sufficient mag nitude 10 require their iHterposiiion

 It does not follow, however, that because the States, as sovereign parties 10 heiF con stltutienal compact, must ultimately decide whether it has been violated, that such de- cision oughtto be intefPosed either in a has ty manner or on doubtful aad inferior occa- sions. Even in the case of ordinary con- ventions between different nations, where, by the strict rule of interpretation, breach of part may be deemed breach of the whole-every part being deemed condition of every other part, and of the whole-it is always laid down that the breach must be both wiltul and material, to justify an appli- cation of the rule But in the case of an ia- innate and constitutional Union, like that of the United States, it is evident that the inter- position Of the parties, in thei. sovereign ca pacity, can be called for by occasions only, deeply and essentially affecting the vi al prin- ciples of their political system.

 The resolution has, accordingly, guarded against any misapprehension of is object, by expressly requiring for such an interpo- silion "the case Of deliberate, palpadia, and dangetoas breach of the constitution, by the exercise of pomers mol qranted by it." ltmust be case not of q light and transient nature, but of q nature daager0as 10 the great purposes for which the constitution was es- tablshed. It must be case, moreover, moi obscure or doubtful in it's construction, but plain and pa}pabic. Lastly, 1t must he d case not resulting from a partial considera- tioa, CT hasty determination bat a case stamped with a final consideration and dc{ib- erate adherence. It IS not necessary, be- cause the resolution does not require that the question should be discussed, how far the exercise of any particular power, un- granted by the constitution, would justify the interposition of the parties to fl. As ca ses might easily be stated, which none would contend ought to fall within that description; cases on the other hand might with equal ease, be stated, so fragrant and so fatal, as to unite every opinion in placing them within the description.

 But the resolution has done more than guard against misconstrucion, by expressly referring to cases of a aekiberafe, Palpable and dangerous nature. l. specifics the ob- iect of the interposiJion which it contem- plates, to be solely that of arresting the pro- gress of the erH of usurpalon, and of main- laining the authorities, rights, and liberties aPPertaiaing to the States, as parties to the Constitution.

 From this view of the resolution, 1t would seem inconceivable that 1t can incur any just disapprobation from those who, laying aside all momentary impressions, and recollecting the genuine source and object of the Feder- al Constitution, shall canddly and accurate ly interpret the meaning of the General As. sembly. If the deliberate exercise of dan gerous powers, palpably withheld by the constitution, could not justify the parties tc

 it in interposng, even so far as to arrest the progress of the evil, and thereby 10 preserve