{"newspaper_name": "Mobile register and journal.", "edition": "01", "page": "p2", "byline": ""}
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n the sbfll yi ihib bi iiS adriliohal aAes bh hr eDthmerte of the country, preparing 'he way for sll hghet by combining inc indebted Stats with the ta- rii interest," 10 impose hea, fer burdens that i'm. porIanl but oppressed branch ol industry. Debts for winch the government is in no way res pons lbe came, be paid by any unnecessary tax On | either rIch or poor. without nlicIing gross viola ton upon the constilulon-hence the speciousness of proposed tax upon hlSuries will mol avail. The bill s objectionable in fuancial view--it IS still worse m a political IL is subversive of the constitution and the government, by placing the State and gent ral governments in antagonist relations on all subjects except that of collecting and distributing the revenue, defeating the objects for which the ge. neral government was instituted, reducing il 10 the odous capacIty ofa collector for the State governments.

 The money distributed would not go tn the people of the States individually but to the State legisla- iures the dOtnnan portion of the majority, ha vlng for the tune being the coniroul. Thus dstr- bnted, would be used 10 secure that ascendancy, l and give them the lions share oG ihe profit hey would be thus enlisted 10 continue and enlarge this disribuion-ihe sums expended m the States would embrace powerful local interests-the interests in favor of distributing the revenue would overpower that of expenditures of the general government even | on the most necessary objects. The system once | fairly commenced would go enarging itself until every branch of revenue would be absorbed, when lhe government, Invested of all it's consliiut onal lunctions, would expire under universal scorn and contempt.

 Distribution of surplus revenue from any source whether from lands taxes, s objectionable, IL would create il necessity for government expenses which could ony be sup lied by protective Idrin, 1 inevitably riveted upon the country.

 IL robs the people of a State without llieir know ing II IS densu ion, giving State one million in- to her treasury, when perhaps her people pay four millions out, in the shape of taxes upon goods i'm ported under tariff such that of 1928 and IS42 Congress has no Ight 10 api iopraie the whole or

 Il ntkHI of the principal interest of the Stale bonds Neither have they the right To give it to the States in be applied by them, because it cannot do that by agent indirectly, which il is constitutionally ] iu,bid io do directly by itself.

 Mi. Wehster comedies that congress has power to appropriate the revenue from taxes 10 other pur- poses than those "specifcally enumerated by the constitution He also rejects the general welfare principe" when applied to the money power, far as the may be derived from that source. How then can the revenue rom taxes vested in lands any other pro- er'y, when converted into revenue by saes, be entirely freed from all oi the constitutional ,estrittons to which they liable before the ItNestmen

 Messrs. Clay and Webster overlook the fact that the lands are lhe property of the United States in their united and federal capacty," which makes the government, instead of ihe absolute proprietor, nothing but an agent appointed to manage the joint concern. That ihe ''Slate governments" md the "United States" are separate in interests and nde- pendent m power of each olher is evident from the article of the constitution which expressly declares 'that the powers not delegated to the Umled States by the constit.oa, prohibited by il to the States, arc reserved D the States respectively or 10 the peo. ple.'

 Well then, nasmuch q the deed of cesson made by Virgiuia, sys that "the land should be consider ed il commtn fund for the and benefit of the States members of the confederation federal alliance, and br no other purpose or use whatever,

 the culcusioI is irresistible that, as "coinmon'' Mr sc th,t "aIhough the grant was to lhe common agent, the use whs for he States in their separate and ndivi- dual character" falls to the ground.

 |, is not com eient lor congress, the common agenl to dirbie the proceeds of the lands among the United States H. joint owners: The Union is joint concern for specific objects with d common agen, 10 cary il into eject, for the joint interest of the cern without any authority tp distribute the profits Hence both as and reason oppose the idea of the agen' 'sundeluking Co apply 10 the separate and in dIvldual use u the patrons, what was intended by lhem for the ioIGt concern, making that separate which hls principals intended tu be common.

 Cession and distribution are opposed in their in fuences: The first tends to union, the last 10 dls union: Bmse said, ''ibe revenue Is the State;'; il may be added, ''tlia 10 distribute the revenue in a conederaeC community among its members, is tt dissolve the community, or Gas with usl the Union because the cession common fund was made as deed of patriotism to consln,mate ihe Union and preserve the pubic faith.

 The power of distribution reverses the first p,ln cipIes of he old confederation The States in lheil eal0usy of puwer adopted Ihe plan oi requsliion as means supply the common treasury. This beng inefficient, he present gov rnnent adopiedEIhe 'ys tenn ol layIng taxes directly on individuals. Now the principle of requision IS restored. only in re- versed otuer, IL Is q requision of the State: on the Union instead of the Union on the States The founders oiour government thought il essen ia

 liberty that the people should grant supplies to the government. in order 10 keep it dependant un them whereas now the government me shape of distri button would grant supplies to the people.

 Are not the dangers of this patronage eminently dangerous7 Besides, how can the government which with all it's legislation does not produce cent grant supplies 10 those who are the producer, of all.

 Mir CIay's argument of"expediency" as reason for it's adoption IS equally unenabe. IL will not d, he supposes, "harmonize conflicting in,eresls," no, "restore kind feelings between the old and new States

 l. Because the new States will not consent to sec a mortgage their domain in order to secure the holders of State bonds which would be the result distribution. for then the holders would regard it Il, pledge, and for the government to withhold il when once made would be violation of fath 2. The staple growing States would not consent to be taxed in order 10 make up deficiency Of reve nue caused by distribution of the public funds - They will not be amused by the bal, of duties on lux uries--it is unimportant to them whether they fal on lhe producers the consumers of those articles nor whether they taxed Tor such purposes ticles going of their ports or return cargOes They will regard it n cunning scheme to pay the debts of others al their expense.

 8 The States free from debts will not consent io he taxed to pay the debts of those more Impruden than themselves