{"newspaper_name": "The New York herald.", "edition": "01", "page": "p1", "byline": ""}
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risk OF necessity tor increased, or longer continu-
ed, taxation.


Would such apolicy be wise even in regard to
these improvemen n,s, and the citizens more imme-
diatey interested in them? The surplus which, as
yet, be so diverted, without an express infrac-
tion Of the provisions of the law of 1912 is entirely
too incoRsiderable to make any useful progress
with the works, and especially So if it must be d-
vlded among them. And it is not likely that those
interested in either will consent that the money
shall be diverted from the debt and also from the
favorlte improvement. In the mean time the ac-
cumuatons Of interest upon The present large debt
are exhausting the revenues whichshould be app-
ed 10 the construction OF further improvements and
nothing but payment OF the debt can discharge
them from this pr0ftless consumption. Will
it not be more wise, 10 hasten the payment OF
this debt, and thus discharge these revenues from
their encumbrances and place at the disposal OF the
Legislature some ten or twelve hundred thousand
dollars per annum, without res0rtto credit, with
out loss oil interest, and without the danger 6f in
creased taxation9 The recent experiment Of has
tening public works has certainly shown US that
such Efforts may be unsuccessful, even in relation
to enterprlzrs undertaken by States as powerful
ours, ano with credit strong and means as ample
as these We possessed at the time our former pru-
dent policy was abandoned


Your immediate predecessors originated, accord
ing to the forms and requirements OF the COnsitu-
tiOn, various amendments to that instrument,
which were duly published previous TO the late
election. These propositions will necessarily call
tor your further action in the constitutional form
Two of them bear particular relation to our fHan-
cal affsirs, and are therefore appropriate subjects
tor Consideration in connection with the present
discussion.


The first Of these amendments proposes to give
constitutional sanction to the pledges and guaran-
tees of the act of 1912 The second limits and re-
strains the power OF the Legislature, by requiring
that laws authorizing loans Of money upon the. Gre.
dit of the State, except within the narrow limit Of
one million OF dollars in the aggregate, or for the
specified objects OF repelllng INVASION or suppress


ing insurrection, shall be submitted to the people
force OF law. This amendment further provides
that every such law shall propose loan for single
object work only, to be distinctly specified there


In; shall impose ana provide for the collection OF
direct annual to pay the interest the loan pro-
posed asi falls due, and also to pay and discharge
the principal sum borrowed, within the period Of l6
years from the time the debt s contracted; shall be-
Hrept aable until the debt, interest," and principal
shall have been fully paid and discharged; and thai
the moneys loaned under II shall be applied to the
object or work named in the law, and to no other
purpose whatever. 1t further provides that when


debt shall be contracted to repel invasion, sup
press insurrection, the moneys borrowed shall be
applied to those Objects or to the payment OF the
debt so contracted, and to no other purpose what
ever. A A@N sWs


The recent free use of the public credit in over
Fastening loans for State works, and in lending to
irresponsible corporations, the embarrassed bond
ton of our finances, and the consequent call 70,
direct taxation to restore public confidence, have
doubtless given rise to these proposed amendments,
as they did give rise to the law Of 1872, which ths
first amendment proposes to surround by constr
tutional sanction.


ceived by the people, although imposing direc
tax upon all the taxable property as Its first prOv
sion, the sauary influences II SO promptly exerteG
upon public and private credit, and the triumphant
manner in which its provisions and policy have
been sustained by the people, whenever the wis
dom and soundness of either have been brough
In issue, at sany subsequent election, presents
more forcible argument in favor OF the first OF
shArA AumSn Al he ~
power to offer


The second is manifestly intended, as it appears
to me to be wisely framed, to secure the people
against like heard and loss for the future, and
their credit from further over use and const quen
depression. The provision requiring each law te
provide for loan for single object only, is ne ces
saTy to enable the treemen at the polls to form
distinct and satisfactory opinion upon The proprel
of the contemplated expenditure, and to express
that opinion In an intelh2lble and unequlvocal
manner It strikes also effectually at one OF the
most universal causes Of complaint and dssatlsfac
non growing out Of the recent appropriations tor
our works OF internal improvement. | refer to the
charge, whether well or ill founded, that combine
tlons OF local Interests are tormed on the part o.
the friends of different works having no natural OF
necessary connection with each oiher and that, 10
this way, loans are authorized and appropriations
secured, which the intrinsic merits and strength OF
no single work in the combination could command.


This amendment cannot fall to have strong
tendency also TO mitigate, or entirely remove, ano-
ther practical evil too often experienced in connec
tion with this legslation The Legislature ia aways
composed of members of the two great political


The majority in the Legislature is very naturally,
and to great extent very justly, held responsible
tor the action and measures OF that body. The
minority will not be over sollcitOus TO diminish this
responsibility, resting, as 1t does, upon their Poti-
cal opponents, and may, at some times, at least ar
far sense Of public duty will permit be willing
TO increase it. To such minority these applications
for local improvements and expenditures present a
vuh hA in1syna alo of
will show are not always resisted. The interests
Of section of the State are involved. The appl-
cation is pressed with the eanestness and feeling
which personal and local interests are too likely TO
lmpart on such occasions. The majority is looked
to as holding the power to make the grant desired,
and the majority pina facie at least, is responsible
tor the action: II defeat be certain, the minority,
by its favorable vote may conciliate and gain the
interest, without hazard or injury to the public
treasury. II the majority be divided, and the mi
norty hold the power, the same opportunity 10 pre-
sented to gain the party advantage by the favora-
when adopted, presumptively rests upon the majo,,
jority, and may, at the worst, be made matter Of
debate between the political parties.


intend no invidious reference to individuals, to
political partes TO particular measures, BY these
remarks. My sole obje lis TO point out what be-
lieve to be an evil tendency and temptation, con-
nected with legislation Of this character and TO re
amendments, as eminenuy calculated TO remove
them II it be adopted, NO contest can take place
offering party advantage, as to the objects OF ex
pendlture to be embraced IN any proposed law, or
az to the amount which n shall appropriate every
member will be required 10 meet and justify his own
vote, before his own constituents, whether ne be-
longs TO he majority or minority OF the body; be-
those constituents will be called upon direct
ly TO vote upon the same question, 81


The requirement that tax shall be imposed by
every such law sufficient to meet the interest upon
the loan to be made, il but preserving the same safe
precaution which marked our early legislation oi
this character Then the State possessed rich re-
venues which it it could spare, and they, to-
gether with certain specified taxes, were pledged
Now, a. has been seen, all its revenues applicable
to these objects, are encountered to their full ex-
tent by existing debts, and the only pledge it can
here proposed. This the citizen should under
stand at the time he votes upon such q law,
and to make it certain that he will under
stand IT,, he should be called to vote for the
tax as we'll as the loaa. Il may appear to some as
going too lar, TO require that the tax should be
sufficlen, to redeem the principal OF the debls