pIRLIC DOCUMENT.
{"newspaper_name": "The Arkansas banner.", "edition": "01", "page": "p4", "byline": "MR. cALHoUN re MIR. KING.\n\n DEPARTMENT OF STATE,\n\nWashington, .iagRSt IF, I644. ]"}
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known to you that he has read Il Wlth miicn pleasure. especially the portion which relates 10 vour cordial reception by the King, and his assurance of friendly feelings towards the United States. The President, in partic- ular, highly appreciates the declaration of the King, that in no event would any steps be taken by his government ill the slightest degree hostile, or which would give to the Uuited States just cause of complaint. Il was the more gratifying from the fact tha our previous information was calculated to make the impression that the government o France was prepared to unite with Grea Britain ill joint protest against the annexa- ton of Texas, and d joint effort to induce her government to withdraw the proposition to annex, on condition that Mexico should he made to acknowledge her independence. He is happy 10 infer from your despatch that the information, as far as il relates to France, Is, ia all probability, without foundatlon.--

 You did not go further than you ought in assuring the King that the object of annexa- ton would be pursued with unabated vigor,

 and in giving your opinion that decided

 majority of the American people were in its favor, and that it would certainly be annexed at no distant day. feel confident that your anticipation will be fully realized at no dis iant period. Every day will tend to weaken that combination of political causes which led to the opposition of the measure, and to strengthen the conviction that Ii was not only exrcdient, but just and necessary.

 You were right in making the distinction between the interest of France and England, in reference to Texas; or rather, would say, the apparent interests of the two countries. France cannot possibly have any other than commercial interest i'll desiring to sec her preserve her separate independence; while it Is certain that England looks beyond, to po- litical interests, to which she apparently at taches much importance. But, Ill our opln- ion, the interest of both against the measure Is more apparent than real, and that neither France, England, nor even Mexico herself, has any in opposition to 1t, when the sub ject is fairly viewed and considered ln its whole extent and all it's bearings. Thus viewed and considered, and assuming that peace, the extension of commerce, and secu- rty, are objects of primary policy with them, 1t may, as it seems 10 me, be readily shown that the policy on the part of those powers which would acquiesce in a measure so strongly desired by both the United States and Texas, for their mutual welfare and safe ty, as the annexation of the latter, to the for mer, would be far more promotiye oi these great objects than that which would attempt to resist II.

 IL Is impossible to cast look at the map of the United States and Texas, and to note the long, artificial, and inconvenient lne xyhf oh ditttff fh ial+a consideration the extraordinary increase of population and growth of the former, and the source from which the latter must derive its inhabitants, institutions, and laws, without coming 10 the conclusion that it is their des- tiny to be united, and, of course, that annex atlon IS merely question of TIME and MODE. Thus regarded, the question to be decided would seem to be, whether 1t would not be better to permit it to be done now, with the mutual consent of both parties, and the ac- qulescenee ot these powers, than to attempt to resist and defeat 1t. Ii the former course be adopted, the certain fruits would be, the preservation of peace, great extension of com merce by the rapid settlement and improve ment of Texas, and increased security, es- pecially to Mexico. The last, in reference lo hcAiCo, nay DG uOuDlStl, Dul UOlu II not less clear than the other two.

 It would be great mistake to suppose that this government has any hostile feelings towards Mexico, or any disposition to az grandlze itself at her expense. The fact Is ihe very reverse. It wishes her well, and desires to see her settled down in peace and security; and is prepared, in the event of the annexation of Texas, if not forced into con iiict with her, to propose to settle with her the question of boundary, and all others growing out of the annexation, on the most liberal terms. Nature herself has clearly marked the boundary between her and Tex as by natural limits too strong to be mista- ken. There are few countries whose limits are so distinctly marked; and it would be our desire, if Texas should bc united to us, to see them firmly established, as the most certain means of establishing permanent peace between the two countries, and strengthening and cementing their friendship.

 Such would be the certain consequence of permitting the annexation to take place now, with the acquescence of Mexico, but very different would be the case, if 1t should be attempted to resist and defeat it, whether the attempt should be successful for the present or not. Any attempt of the kind would, not jmprobably, lead to a conflict between us and Mexico, and involve consequences, in refer ence to her and the general peace, long to be deplored on all sides, and difficult to be re- paired. But should that not be the case, and the interference of another power defeat she annexation for the present, without the interruption of peace, 1t would but postpone the conflict, and render 1t more fierce and bloody whenever 1t might occur. It's defeat would be attributed to enmity and ambition on the part of that power by whose interle- renee 1t was o casioned, and excite deep iea- lousy and resentment on the part of our peo- pie. who would be ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to effect by force what was prevented from being done peaceably by mutual consent IL is not difficult to see how greatly such conflict, come when it might, would endanger the general peace. and how much Mexico might be the loser by ii.