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No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War. Stanford, 2017.About the authors: Michael R. Fenzel is an active duty Brigadier General in the U.S. Army, currently serving as a Deputy Commanding General in the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He most recently served as a Senior Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team and then Chief of Staff for the 82nd Airborne Division. He is the founder of the Council for Emerging National Security Affairs (CENSA), a life-member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a former Director on the National Security Council Staff in the White House.CONTENTS AND ABSTRACTS1 Introduction2 The Soviet Failure in Afghanistan3 Setting the stage: Evolution of Party-military Relations4 Getting In: Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Decision to Invade Afghanistan5 No retreatNo miracles: Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko in Afghanistan (1980 – 1985)6 Gorbachev's Quest for "Reluctant, Silent Agreement" to Withdraw from Afghanistan (1985)7 Getting Out: Gorbachev and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (1986-1989)8 Losing Afghanistanhttp://sup.org/books/title/?id=25002