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Gagner en performance et réussir le passage à l’écomobilité : petit guide de recommandations à l'usage des décideurs publics et privés. Angers : Ademe, juillet 2018, 48 p. https://www.ademe.fr/gagner-performance-reussir-passage-a-lecomobilite-decideurs-publics-privesCette plaquette fournit un éclairage aux décideurs, qui ont un rôle important à jouer dans le passage à l’écomobilité. Des clés y sont fournies pour agir sur les transports de la vie quotidienne dans les zones urbaines, rurales et périurbaines. Illustré par de nombreux exemples de coûts, de bonnes pratiques, d’outils disponibles, ce guide aidera les décideurs à faire évoluer les transports vers plus d’inclusion et de soutenabilité tant écologique qu’économique.International Environmental Agreements - Stability with Transfers among Countries / E. Diamantoudi, E. Sartzetakis, S. Strantza. Milan : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 2018, 39 p. (Nota di Lavoro 20.2018) https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/international-environmental-agreements-stability-with-transfers-among-countries/The paper examines the stability of self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) among heterogeneous countries, allowing for transfers. We employ a two-stage, non-cooperative model of coalition formation. In the first stage each country decides whether or not to join the agreement, while in the second stage countries choose their emissions simultaneously. Coalition members agree also to share the gains from cooperation in the first stage. We use quadratic benefit and environmental damage functions and assume two types of countries differing in their sensitivity to the global pollutant. In examining the impact of transfers on the coalition size, we apply the notion of Potential Internal Stability (PIS). Results show that transfers can increase cooperation among heterogeneous countries. However, the increase in the coalition size, relative to the case without transfers, comes only from countries belonging to the type with the lower environmental damages, which are drawn into the coalition by the transfers offered. Furthermore, the level of cooperation increases with the degree of heterogeneity. However, the reduction in aggregate emissions achieved by the enlarged coalition is very small leading to dismal improvement in welfare, which confirms the "paradox of cooperation".Recalculating the Social Cost of Carbon / Soheil Shayegh, Valentina Bosetti, Simon Dietz, Johannes Emmerling, Christoph Hambel, Svenn Jensen, Holger Kraft, Massimo Tavoni, Christian Traeger, and Rick Van der Ploeg. Milan : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 2018, 9 p. (Nota di Lavoro 19.2018) https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/recalculating-the-social-cost-of-carbon/Over the last few decades, integrated assessment models (IAM) have provided insight into the relationship between climate change, economy, and climate policies. The limitations of these models in capturing uncertainty in climate parameters, heterogeneity in damages and policies, have given rise to skepticism about the relevance of these models for policy making. IAM community needs to respond to these critics and to the new challenges posed by developments in the policy arena. New climate targets emerging from the Paris Agreement and the uncertainty about the signatories’ commitment to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are prime examples of challenges that need to be addressed in the next generation of IAMs. Given these challenges, calculating the social cost of carbon requires a new framework. This can be done by computing marginal abatement cost in cost-effective settings which provides different results than those calculated using constrained cost-benefit analysis. Here we focus on the areas where IAMs can be deployed to asses uncertainty and risk management, learning, and regional heterogeneity in climate change impacts.