{"word_count": 1153, "character_count": 7887}
Towards fossil-free energy in 2050.  Element Energy and Cambridge Econometrics, report commissioned by the European Climate Foundation, march 2019, 25 p.  https://europeanclimate.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Towards-Fossil-Free-Energy-in-2050.pdfBuilding the infrastructure to decarbonise the EU’s energy  system by 2050 through large amounts of green gas is projected to be up  to 36% more expensive than through energy efficiency and smart  electrification, even in European countries with a cold climate, according to this new report launched today...Le gaz renouvelable : état des lieux et perspectives économiques de la filière française / Côme Billard. Chaire économie du climat, mars 2019, 19 p. (Information et débats n ° 59) https://www.chaireeconomieduclimat.org/publications/le-gaz-renouvelable-etat-des-lieux-et-perspectives-economiques-de-la-filiere-francaise/Dans le sillage de la publication de la synthèse sur la Programmation  Pluriannuelle de l’Energie (janv. 2019), cet Information et Débats fait  un état des lieux général de la filière biogaz en France. Après la revue  à la baisse des objectifs de la filière par le gouvernement et avant la  mise en place de nouveaux outils, ce travail veut cerner les enjeux  économiques qu’implique la nouvelle PPE aux horizons 2023 et 2028. Dans  cette optique, une comparaison avec l’expérience allemande est proposée  en filigrane de cette analyse. Cette dernière a pour vocation de  clarifier les différentes approches et limites de celles-ci, dans un  contexte où le gouvernement français semble vouloir s’inspirer des choix  effectués Outre-Rhin. Gas Directive amendment: implications for Nord Stream 2 / Katja Yafimava. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, March 2019, 19 p. (Energy insight ; 49) https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/gas-directive-amendment-implications-nord-stream-2/In February 2019, the EU reached a political agreement to amend the  Gas Directive to extend its scope to apply to pipelines from third  countries to the EU. The proposal is aimed primarily at Nord Stream 2 – a  pipeline which would bring Russian gas to Germany and has been under  construction across the Baltic Sea since August 2018. This Insight  analyses several options under which Nord Stream 2 could proceed once  the amended Directive enters into force in July 2019 and is transposed  into member states’ law within the subsequent nine months. It argues  that the option leading to the least possible regulatory change and  uncertainty for Nord Stream 2 is the one under which the German  regulatory authority would confirm Nord Stream 2 compliance with the  amended Directive, subject to inter alia a transfer of  ownership and/or operatorship of the entire pipeline or its German  section to an existing or a new TSO, with subsequent certification. On  the other hand, the option under which Nord Stream 2 could be granted an  exemption from some of the Directive’s requirements would cause a  significant amount of regulatory uncertainty and operational delays due  to the significant discretion of the EC over the conditions that could  be imposed on it as part of the exemption. The option of concluding  intergovernmental (between Germany and Russia) or international (between  the EC and Russia) agreement on Nord Stream 2 operation is unlikely to  be at all workable. While the amended Directive is unable to halt construction of Nord  Stream 2 – as some EU member states hoped it would – it is capable of  delaying or suspending its operation. The amendment has created  significant regulatory uncertainty about the degree of utilization of  Nord Stream 2, and consequently of the EUGAL pipeline in Germany, to  which it is planned to be connected. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that a  significant cap – that is higher than the 20 per cent reservation quotas  already applied in respect of EUGAL capacity – would be imposed on  Gazprom’s utilization of capacity in Nord Stream 2 due to significant  legal constraints.Capacity vs Energy Subsidies for Renewables: Benefits and Costs for the 2030 EU Power Market / Özge Özdemir, Benjamin F. Hobbs, Marit van Hout, and Paul Koutstaal. Energy Policy Research Group, 2019, 40 p. (EPRG working paper n° 1911) https://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/eprg-working-paper-1911/Policy makers across Europe have implemented renewable support policies with several policy objectives in mind. Among these are achieving ambitious renewable energy targets at the lowest cost and promoting technology improvement through learning-by-doing. Although subsidy mechanisms based on energy out-put are cost-effective for achieving a certain renewable energy target in the short run, policies tied to capacity installation might be more effective in reducing technology costs in the longer term. We address the question of how policies that subsidize renewable energy (feed-in premia and renewable portfolio standards (RPSs)) versus capacity (investment subsidies) impact the mix of renewable investments, elec-tricity costs, renewable share, the amount of subsidies, and consumer prices in the EU electric power market in 2030. Our analysis is unique in its focus on the market impacts of capacity-oriented vs energy-oriented policies while considering a realistic landscape of diverse and time-varying loads and renewable resources (including existing and potential hydro, wind, and solar resources), as well as fossil-fueled generators and network constraints.OPEC Policy in the Age of Trump / Bassam Fattouh and Andreas Economou, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, March 2019, 6 p. (Oxford energy comment) https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/opec-policy-age-trump/President Trump’s tweet on  February 25 urging OPEC to ‘relax’ and to take it ‘easy’ with their  cuts, and that a ‘fragile’ global economy can’t tolerate a higher oil  price, did have an immediate price impact, with the Brent price  declining by 4 per cent on the day, from nearly $67/b down to $64/b. But  the ‘Trump tweet’ impact faded fairly quickly with oil prices gaining  again towards the end of the same week. A clear signal from the Saudi  energy minister Mr. Khalid Al-Falih in which he confirmed that OPEC and  its partners would continue with their output cuts with the objective of  achieving a more balanced market was a key factor behind the fast  recovery. Extrapolating Saudi Arabia’s behavior in 2018 into 2019 is  risky and the assumption that Saudi policy will reverse its current  strategy under Trump’s pressure does not reflect the shift in Saudi  thinking and the current uncertainties and weaknesses engulfing the oil  market. This Energy Comment sheds some light on the current market  uncertainties pertaining to the drivers and prospects of global demand  growth in 2019, the clearing of the stocks overhang and the dilemma that  OPEC and its partners currently face.Oil 2019: Analysis and Forecasts to 2024. Paris : International Energy Agency, March 2019 https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/energy/oil-2019_oil_mar-2019-enOil  2019, the International Energy Agency’s annual outlook for global oil  markets, examines the key issues in demand, supply, refining and trade  to 2024. This year, the report covers the following themes: A changed supply picture led by the rise of the United States inworld  markets thanks to rapidly-growing shale oil production, asit becomes a  net exporter of crude oil and products. Supply growth in the non-OPEC world, including Brazil, Canada,Norway and  Guyana; and a falling capacity for the OPECproducers. Demand growth underpinned by China and India and by thegrowing  importance of petrochemicals as the industry invests tomeet rising  consumer demand. And a detailed analysis of how the refining industry is grapplingwith  the International Maritime Organisation’s new marine fuelrules, growing  excess capacity, and the changing patterns ofglobal oil trade 