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VENDREDI 10 OCTOBRE              Virginia Valian (Hunter College &#38; CUNY Graduate Center, New York, NY)&#34;The Logic of Innateness&#34;Abstract: The talk will address the following 3 questions: (1) Is there a middle ground between nativism and empiricism? (2) What empirical data, if any, can argue for innateness of syntax? Relatedly, what different types of entities or processes are candidates for innateness? (3) Is either position easier to argue for on logical grounds, such as parsimony?             JEUDI 23 OCTOBRE de 10h &#224; 12h  Felix Warneken (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig &#38; Dept of Psychology, Harvard University)&#34;Shared collaborative activities in children and chimpanzees&#34;             VENDREDI 7 NOVEMBRE de 10h &#224; 12h             John Kulvicki (Department of Philosophy Dartmouth College)&#34;Heavenly sight and the nature of seeing-in&#34;Richard Wollheim famously understood pictures to be distinct from other kinds of representation in virtue of eliciting a special kind of experience: seeing-in. What a picture depicts is determined in large part by what appropriate observers can see in it. Many agree that pictures often evoke experiences of seeing something in a marked surface, even if they do not assign seeing-in such a central place in their theories of depiction or characterize it in exactly the way Wollheim does. This talk proposes a new way to understand seeing-in that is motivated by a curious renaissance discussion of vision after death: heavenly sight (Baxandall 1988, 104-105).             Vendredi 28 novembre              Benjamin Spector (CNRS - Institut Nicod)L'interpr&#233;tation des num&#233;raux et la d&#233;marcation entre s&#233;mantique et 'pragmatique'.             Vendredi 12 d&#233;cembre &#224; 10h :             Chris Viger (University of Western Ontario)&#34;The Acquired Language of Thought Hypothesis&#34;I am investigating how the acquisition of a natural language augments our innate cognitive capacities, in the context of Jerry Fodor's arguments for an innate language of thought. I posit the notion of an interface as a precise connection between distinct modules so that, for example, percepts of a dog will activate memories of dogs, dog-related behaviours and inferences, etc. (This notion of interfaces is similar to Larry Barsalou's notion of concepts, who is developing Antonio Damasio's notion of a convergence zone.) I suggest that the neural encodings of natural language terms project to the interfaces of what the terms stand for, allowing a term to activate the same neural activity as what it stands for. I consider how this architecture is relevant to long-standing philosophical problems, such as the naturalization of content and the nature of central cognition. This talk is an overview of my research plan for my sabbatical at IJN.             23 janvier             Augustin Rayo, Linguistics MIT&#34;Lexical Meaning from a Philosopher's Point of View&#34;             9 F&#233;vrier (exceptionnellement Lundi de 15h30 &#224; 17h30)             Annalisa Coliva (University of Modena)Which key to all mythologies about the self? A note on where the illusions of transcendence come from and how to resist themAbstract: Philosophical reflection on the self is often revisionary of our commonsensical intuition that the self is identical to a living human being with both physical and psychological properties. Recently, Christopher Peacocke has suggested that revisionary positions depend on misguided attempts to account for the phenomenon he dubs &#8220;representational independence&#8221;. He also claims that this is the only and real feature of first person thought behind the revisionary tendency. I contend, first, that this isn&#8217;t the only motivation for revisionary conceptions of the self and that other reasons can be identified. I then characterise another possible source of these views, viz. logical immunity to error through misidentification. Secondly, I argue that representational independence isn&#8217;t a real phenomenon and that that has implications on how to understand logical immunity to error through misidentification. Thirdly, I propose a dilemma for Peacocke: either he holds on to representational independence but he can&#8217;t explain the rationality, from the firstpersonal point of view, of self-ascriptions of occurrent mental states; or else, he explains the latter but forsakes the former. Finally, I close by showing how logical immunity to error through misidentification of some psychological self-ascriptions doesn&#8217;t lead to any revisionary position about the self and connect these ideas with the suggestion that the best policy for non-revisionists is to adopt a somewhat quietist strategy.             27 f&#233;vrier             Bart Geurts, Department of Philosophy(Linguistics and Semantics),University of Nijmegen&#34;Putting intentions first again: free choice and the proper treatment of implicature&#34;                          6 marsPaul Roth (Department of Philosophy, University of California Santa Cruz)&#34;The Pasts. Reflections on the Epistemology of History&#34;.             13 marsJean Louis Dessalles (ENST)&#34;Une nouvelle th&#233;orie de la pertinence argumentative&#34;             3 avrilMiranda Fricker (Philosophy, Birckbeck College, London)&#34;Can There Be Institutional Virtues?&#34;             22 maiMario De Caro (Universit&#224; Roma 3 and Harvard University)&#34;Emergentism and Naturalism&#34;             5 juinMarc Fleurbaey (CNRS, CERSES)&#34;What good is happiness?&#34;&#160;