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 Part of the TRAFO series “Reconstructing Neighborhoods of War” By Eric LobAfter the month-long war between Israel andHizbullah (The Party of God) in July 2006 decimated Lebanon’s Shiʿiterritories, the party was obligated to fulfill the promise of its secretarygeneral, Hassan Nasrallah, to make these territories more beautiful and betterthan before. As had been the case with previous conflicts against Israel, Hizbullah’sreconstruction and development organization, Jihad al-Binaʾ (JB) (ConstructionJihad), was technically in charge of the reconstruction. During the earlystages of the reconstruction, JB removed rubble and cooperated with the party’sthink tank, the Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation, to conductsurveys, produce maps, and collect data that assessed the damage.  Haret Hreik during the aftermath of the war in September 2006. © Eric LobOn 24 May 2007, Hizbullah established a non-profit and private planning agency called Waʿad (the Promise) – which was named after Nasrallah’s promise – to supervise and coordinate the reconstruction of demolished apartment buildings in the Haret Hreik neighborhood or municipality of Southern Beirut. Waʿad also undertook rebuilding operations in the areas of South Lebanon that were under Hizbullah’s political control. Hizbullah established Waʿad to complement and bolster JB’s resources and capabilities during this sizeable reconstruction. The party likely also did so in an attempt to circumvent the terrorist designations and economic sanctions that the United States had imposed on JB during the first year of the reconstruction on 20 February 2007 – even though Waʿad was subjected to the same designation and sanctions nearly two years later during the reconstruction on 6 January 2009. Despite facing US designations and sanctions, JBand Waʿad seemingly performed an impressive feat of engineering byreconstructing and renovating 270 buildings, 941 apartments, and 1,771 stores,warehouses, and commercial spaces in Haret Hreik between 2006 and 2012. Oneresident – who had his apartment reconstructed and renovated by JB and Waʿad –heaped unadulterated praise upon them while showing off his new residence,which, as Nasrallah had promised, was allegedly more beautiful and better thanbefore (author interview, 15 July 2012). In reality, JB and Waʿad hadreinstated the pre-war status quo for approximately 200 private property owners(including the abovementioned resident) – who ostensibly were members andsupporters of Hizbullah – in an attempt to advance its political and socialpriorities. They included controlling and taking credit for the reconstruction,preserving population density and preventing population displacement or outsideresettlement, reaffirming a mediator or interlocutor status between thecommunity and the state, renewing legitimacy among the community andmaintaining service provider credibility, reasserting dominance and exercisingpolitical sovereignty over the territory and constituency, and achievingspatial hegemony and further reducing the spaces of contestation.During the reconstruction, Hizbullah, JB, and Waʿadsidelined municipal officials and public authorities (even those who wereaffiliated with the party), architects and academics, and public dwellers(e.g., tenants, visitors, shoppers, mosque-goers, and churchgoers) and otherstakeholders in prioritization, planning, and decision-making. In the process,Hizbullah, JB, and Waʿad disregarded the preferences and aspirations of thesestakeholders regarding improved livability, including less population densityand traffic congestion as well as more public space (e.g., sidewalks,playgrounds, and parks), pedestrian circulation, natural lighting, ventilation,and privacy. In the end, the reconstruction was marked by a noticeable dearthor even absence of public debate, deliberation, participation, inclusiveness,consultation, consensus, transparency, and accountability, with the exceptionof a few minor superficialities, such as the selection of building finishes,tiles, and colors.Ultimately, the reconstruction constituted atop-down and exclusionary process that triggered local discontent among theabovementioned stakeholders and other residents. Despite Hizbullah’s attemptsto protect JB and Waʿad through their NGO status, they were exposed toheightened expectations and created a buffer for the party during thereconstruction. The fact that input and feedback on the reconstruction wereprimarily relegated to property owners and minor superficialities narrowed thescope of this process, but also raised its stakes and rendered it contentious,as revealed by Waʿad’s director general, Hassan Jechi, as quoted by ScarlettHaddad: Residentsat first were worried and skeptical, then enthusiastic, and in the endinsistent, demanding that [we] change the décor of the kitchens, the tiles inthe bathrooms, etc… [One of our biggest challenges was] obtaining the approvalof residents, who often changed their minds and with whom it was necessary toconstantly negotiate. Even after Hizbullah declared the official end ofthe reconstruction in May 2012, the popular dissatisfaction did not subside.One resident of Haret Hreik complained about “low-quality housing, un-cleareddebris, insufficient parking, and the lack of greenery and public space,notwithstanding mosques” (author interview, 26 July 2012). In response, themunicipality of Haret Hreik – which was affiliated with Hizbullah, but, aspreviously mentioned, had been sidelined by it during the reconstruction –launched a program in which youth volunteers planted trees around the area(author interview, 14 July 2012). While visiting the neighborhood on 14 July2012, the author witnessed groups of youth volunteers planting trees. Althoughthese activities may have partially resulted from grassroots pressure for moregreenery, they may have also been inspired by and implemented in cooperationwith JB’s environmental protection campaign. In addition to generating complaints aboutimplementation, the reconstruction created perceptions of favoritism. Coincidingwith Hizbullah’s ceremony and rally that announced and commemorated theofficial end of the reconstruction in May 2012, residents of South Lebanoncriticized the party for having dedicated greater resources to the reconstructionof Haret Hreik, the location of Hizbullah’s headquarters – a policy thatcorresponded to the government’s compensation scheme. In Haret Hreik, oneresident insisted that, “Waʿad had exclusively serviced the owners of apartmentsand excluded their renters” (author interview, 26 July 2012). Another resident allegedthat JB and Waʿad had mainly serviced individuals and families who joined andsupported Hizbullah – a common trend among its NGOs and service providers, notto mention those of other political and religious groups (author interview, 26July 2012). This accusation contradicted Jechi’s claim that Hizbullah had notinterfered in the reconstruction, except to assist with zoning and traffic.However, in reality, Jechi and Waʿad’s board reported directly to Hizbullah’spolitical authority or bureau without going through the agency. Furthermore,Hizbullah members and party cadres directed JB, and its employees wereaffiliated with the party, even if its Central Unit of Social Servicesattempted to present the NGO as autonomous.  Haret Hreik during the aftermath of the war in September 2006. © Eric LobAside from the criticism of the reconstruction’simplementation and favoritism, perceptions existed among Lebanese Shiʿaregarding the party’s corruption and embourgeoisement during this period. Jechihimself expressed concerns about the large sum of money totaling approximately$400 million that had been allocated to the reconstruction. The financialcooperation that tenuously existed and opaquely transpired during thereconstruction between the Lebanese government and Hizbullah further blurredthe distinction between the two – especially since the party sat on thegovernment’s reconstruction committee for Southern Beirut. Hizbullah claimedthat it had distributed the largest portion of the reconstruction costs in theamount of $280 million and relied on only $120 million from the state. However,the fact remained that Hizbullah and Waʿad had accepted and depended onpost-war funds, indemnities, and compensations from the state to partiallyfinance the reconstruction. This undeclared partnership made it difficult forHizbullah to disassociate itself from a government that was widely perceived assectarian, inefficient, and corrupt.One explanation for Hizbullah’s top-down and exclusionaryreconstruction model was that its military and political priorities supersededits socioeconomic and developmental goals. Hizbullah’s primary existence and raisond’être as a military organization and a political party – theself-proclaimed Islamic Resistance in Lebanon – meant that its socioeconomicand developmental objectives were subservient to its military and politicalones. Hizbullah’s war with Israel in 2006 and its battles against Syrian rebelsand Sunni extremists since 2011 have subjected Lebanese Shiʿa and othercitizens to continuous and intensified conflict and instability. So long asthis remains the case, Hizbullah will likely continue dedicating its resourcesto the immediate and pressing needs of post-war reconstruction. Moreover, asHizbullah continues its military operations and becomes increasingly integratedinto the state, the party will probably continue using reconstruction toadvance the strategic aims of maintaining a territorial and social base,reducing migration from target neighborhoods, and strengthening the support forthe Islamic resistance and its community.References and Further ReadingMonaFawaz, “The Politics of Property in Planning: Hezbollah’s Reconstruction ofHaret Hreik (Beirut, Lebanon) as Case Study,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38.3 (2014):922-34.Scarlett Haddad, “Promesse tenue: 270 immeubles à HaretHreik entièrement reconstruits à l’initiative de Waad,” Liban, 11 May 2012, accessed 23 June 2013,https://mplbelgique.wordpress.com/2012/05/11/promesse-tenue-270-immeubles-a-haret-hreik-entierement-reconstruits-a-linitiative-de-waad/.Eric Lob is an assistant professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University. His research focuses on the politics of development in the Middle East and beyond. He is currently completing a book manuscript entitled “Reconstruction Jihad: Rural Development and Regime Consolidation in Revolutionary Iran (1979–2017).” Based on ethnographic and archival research in Iran and Lebanon, the book examines how the Islamic Republic instrumentalized rural development as a soft-power mechanism to consolidate power at home and project influence abroad. The project is based on Lob’s dissertation at Princeton University that won awards from the Foundation for Iranian Studies and the Association for Iranian Studies. His articles have appeared in the International Journal of Middle East Studies, Iranian Studies, Middle East Critique, The Middle East Journal, Third World Quarterly, The National Interest, and The Washington Post, among other publications.Further articles in the series “Reconstructing Neighborhoods of War” on TRAFO:Birgit Schäbler,&#160;Introduction: The Importance of Being Earnest About Neighborhoods, 28 August 2019.Kevin Mazur,&#160;Not Just Neo-Liberalism: Spontaneous Settlement and Violent Conflict in Homs, Syria, 4 September 2019.Mazen Haidar,&#160;Neighbors at War in 1975-77 Beirut,&#160;11 September 2019.Piotr Korduba,&#160;The Reconstruction of Warsaw: Between Abhorrence and Acceptance, 18 September 2019.Paul Sigel,&#160;“More Beautiful than Ever Before!” Neighborhood-Rebuilding in Divided Germany as Political Propaganda during the Cold War, 25 September 2019.Allam Al-Kazei,&#160;Beyond the Atomic Bombing: The Revival of Hiroshima’s Neighborhoods, 2 October 2019.Mohammad Hassan Khani,&#160;War Emigration and its Impact on Post-War Reconstruction of Neighborhoods: A Case Study of Khorramshahr after the Iran-Iraq War, 17 October 2019.Namariq Al-Rawi,&#160;Baghdad Neighborhoods: Processes of Resilience against the Internally-reflected Conflict of 2006–2008, 24 October 2019.Kefah Ahmed M. Najjar,&#160;Youth Teams and Reconstruction, 7 November 2019.Zoya Masoud,&#160;A Treasure of Heritage for the Poor of Aleppo: Neighborhoods between the Hammer of Political Insecurity and the Anvil of Warlords, 14 November 2019.M. Wesam Al Asali, Majida Malo, and Iyass Shahin,&#160;Informality for Reconstruction: A Possible Partnership, 21 November 2019.Mamoun Fansa,&#160;Post-conflict Analysis and Post-war Reconstruction Strategies: Sociopolitical Considerations Using the Old City of Aleppo as an Example, 12 December 2019.Kai Vöckler,&#160;Post-Conflict Cities and Neighborhoods, 27 December 2019.Arshi Javid, Texture of Loss: Tapestry of a Withered Neighborhood from Kashmir, 9 January 2020.John Hanna, The Space of Literature and Lebanese Wars, 30 January 2020.Mona Fawaz and Nada Moumtaz, Neighborhoods as Propertied Landscapes: Lessons from Beirut’s Reconstructions, 4 February 2020.Citation: Eric Lob, The Promise and Politicization of Post-War Reconstruction in Haret Hreik, in: TRAFO  – Blog for Transregional Research, 18.02.2020,  https://trafo.hypotheses.org/22080. 