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By Alicja CuranovićKatharina Bluhm and Mihai Varga, New Conservatives in Russia and East Central Europe (London, New York: Routledge, 2019) Conservatism seems to be the newblack among experts on East Central Europe. However, despite the abundance ofpublications dealing with this particular issue, it is not so easy to find one thatgoes beyond the empirical descriptions of what one of the usual suspects, i.e.Vladimir Putin (the president of the Russian Federation), Jaroslaw Kaczynski(the leader of the Law and Justice Party – the ruling party in Poland) orViktor Orban (the prime minister of Hungary), recently did. What should we thereforeread if we want to understand the change which is taking place in somepost-communist countries? The collaborative work “New Conservatives in Russiaand East Central Europe”, edited by Katharina Bluhm and Mihai Varga, just publishedby Routledge, is definitely worth recommending. Katharina Bluhm and Mihai Varga, New Conservatives in Russia and East Central Europe (London, New York: Routledge, 2019)This excellent study has a few strongpoints. First of all, it focuses on three cases which are rarely combined, i.e.Russia, Poland and Hungary. Comparing them not only allows us to spot their differencesand similarities (vide: the great conclusion chapter by the editors) but also enablesa deeper understanding of conservatism in the realities of the post-communistEast Central Europe. Secondly, in the twelve chapters the authors analyse avery broad spectrum of manifestations of conservatism, which is, as the authorsrightly argue, a multifaceted, multilayer and multilevel phenomenon. Readersget to know about the political landscape, moral aspects, economic factors,legal regulations, and gender and LGBT questions. This panoramic overview ofdifferent dimensions of conservatism is accompanied by a variety of methodsused by particular authors. And so readers learn about conservatism through theanalysis of rhetoric, legal acts, economic data, ethnographic studies, andsociological polls. This multi-method approach is the third strong point of thebook. As its fourth merit, I would name theclear, convincing and consequent manner in which the authors show thatconservatism in Russia, Poland and Hungary is not about the political leaders –Vladimir Putin, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, or Viktor Orban. Mihai Varga and AronBuzogany, Ewa Dąbrowska, Jochen Roose and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski in their chaptersprove that there is a complex “conservative infrastructure”, or a conservative“knowledge network”, which has been being carefully developed in thesecountries since the 1990s. This “conservative infrastructure” is a result of theagency of academic scholars and intellectuals (e.g. István Stumpf, Alexandr Dugin, AndrzejZybertowicz), businessmen acting as lobbyists (e.g. Konstantin Malofeev),opinion-forming journals (e.g. “Teologia Polityczna”), and think-tanks (e.g. Századvég, Izborski Club, Jagiellonski Club).Political parties come only to the top of this dense network and, in a sense,they act like “consumers” of the “conservative frame” created by other, oftennon-political, agents. This is an important contribution of this book becauseit reveals that conservatism in East-Central Europe is not merely a top-downproject, nor is it propaganda from the ruling elites. The current conservativeagenda promoted by the ruling parties is a result of wider processes takingplace within the societies. What’s more, as the authors show, all threeparties, i.e. the social groups promoting the conservative agenda, the politicalestablishment and the general public, have each been mutually influential. Thisplaces questions of agency and the causal relationship of conservativeentrepreneurs in a new light. As the study of Tobias Köllner shows, even in Russia, where thelocal autonomy is most limited, it is impossible to talk about a centrally-directedconservative project. Grass-root activists and local elites might have theirown take on conservative values.The authors commendably make effortto avoid reductionism and, in doing so, they pay much attention to uncovering theflow of ideas. Especially worth praising are the authors’ remarks on thedynamics of the diffusion of ideas and political learning. Ewa Dąbrowska, Aron Buzoganyand Mihai Varga provide readers with an excellent study of the case of Polishconservatives who, in a critical and selective way, learn from their Hungariancolleagues. Additionally, this Central-European case is combined with examplesfrom the post-Soviet region, namely Russia, Kirgizstan and Kazakhstan (chapterby Sebastian Schiek and Azam Isabaev). To add another strong point, theauthors refer to the rich empirical data that provides readers with thenecessary context. In the book there are plenty of overlooked, yet telling,details from this data, such as that it was Russian liberals who were the firstto use the conservative narrative of Russia’s unique path of development in the1990s (chapter by Irina Busygina and Mihail Filippov), or that Vladimir Putin’sadministration referred to conservative slogans only from as early as 2003 (chapterby Katharina Bluhm).Above all, it is remarkable that the bookavoids explaining the current phenomenon of conservatism in Russia, Poland andHungary with the “thin” tradition of democracy, or in accordance withpath-dependence. Instead, the authors approach East-Central Europeanconservatism as a reaction to the disappointment of the local elites and as a significantpart of society in transition under the ideological aegis of neoliberalism. Inmy opinion, this is a very accurate diagnosis. What’s more, using theseparticular optics provides a common conceptual framework for Russia, Hungaryand Poland. It also allows us to notice not only the reappearance of old motifscharacteristic to Russian and Polish conservatism (like the messianic motifsmentioned in the chapters by Paul Robinson and Ewa Dąbrowska), but also theappearance of quite new ones – such as the neo-colonial arguments in the chaptersby Katharina Bluhm and Ewa Dąbrowska. In the first introductory chapter,the editors name four main causes for the current “renaissance ofconservatism”. These are: (1) the socio-economic costs of transition; (2) the growingactivity of the civil society, which have resulted in the activity of citizenswith conservative mind-sets; (3) religious institutions’ efforts to establish theirposition anew in the public sphere after communism; and (4) “transitionaljustice”, connected to the sense that the former communists “were not punishedenough” and in fact were the main beneficiaries of the transition. All fourpoints are correct, but I would also add another one, which can be deduced (butis not explicit named) from many chapters of this publication. Namely, I tendto perceive the new conservatism as a part of the quest for a newpost-communist identity. I see this current wave of conservatism in connectionto an identity crisis and an eroded ontological security rather than loweredeconomic security. I agree with the authors’ diagnosisthat the so called “conservative turn” is a reaction to the disappointment withthe neoliberalism. I would therefore argue that it is counter-hegemonic, i.e.it is a reaction not only to the domestic issues but also to the externalpressure. In the case of Russia – a country with a status of a major power –this dimension can be easily observed. Russia’s conservatism is very much aboutdefining the Russian-Self by juxtaposing itself with the West. However, also inthe rhetoric of Hungarian and Polish conservatives, we can find mobilisation againstthe “dictatorship of Brussels”, the EU, “Germany’s hegemonic project” and“Soros’ schemes”. The arguments for connecting identity with conservatismappear in the conclusion. The editors make an interesting point about the flowof ideas and fruitful cooperation between Hungarian and Polish conservatives, whichis contrasted with no substantial cooperation of these two with their Russiancounterparts. The lack of cooperation between Central European and Russianconservatives can be explained by the “otherness” of Russia. Warsaw andBudapest aim towards building a model of an alternative ("true to itstradition") Europe within Europe (EU) and not outside it. MeanwhileRussia, being the Other, is not perceived as a part of the Europeancivilizational space. Dedicating a separate chapter to thedynamics of the self-identification processes of these three post-communistcountries would enrich the scope of the publication. It would be also worthadding a chapter that focuses on comparing the conservative agendas of the mainreligious institutions in these countries, namely the Catholic Church in Polandand Hungary and the Russian Orthodox Church. All of these institutions had todefine their status and roles anew in post-communist states. It would be ofutmost interest to see whether they used similar strategies in shaping relationswith the government, and whether there was any element of process-learningsimilar to the case of the states in terms of promoting conservative agenda. We know we have read a good book if we end up with new questions afterwards. This collaborative work definitely provides food for thought. The thesis about the primal role of disappointment with transition and its effect, namely post-communism, invites questions about the nature of post-communism. In the chapter by Aron Buzogany and Mihai Varga we find the observation that, in Hungary, “post-communism is understood as the continuation of communism”. This sentence indicates the possible problems we might face when pondering about how “post-communism” is today understood by conservative entrepreneurs and ruling elites. Is there any common, shared understating of this phenomenon in Poland or maybe even, more general, in Central Eastern Europe? Another question is triggered from the authors’ thesis that the new conservatives seek not institutional change but rather moral reorientation. But do we know exactly what their moral agenda is? This is an important issue for it is connected to another fundamental question: in the case of Hungary and Poland, what kind of change do these ruling parties want to achieve? Do they want to change the societies or do they want to replace the post-communist elite? Ewa Dąbrowska seems to think that, in the case of Poland, it’s about the latter, but this issue would require further investigation. We also can’t help but ask questions about the “sovereign”, i.e. the society. Regardless of the conservative rhetoric, these are secular, modern societies. To what extent can the conservative agenda therefore be attractive for them in the long term? And finally, if we consider the conservative turn a counter-hegemonic reaction connected to self-identification processes, what would this &#160;mean for the European integration project and the EU? Reading the book edited by KatharinaBluhm and Mihai Varga definitely helps to think about the questions posed above.I recommend it not only to experts on Central Europe or Russia but to all thosewho are concerned with the future of Europe. The book is a great contributionto the debate about contemporary European conservatism. Alicja Curanović&#160;is Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Relations at the University of Warsaw. She holds a PhD in political science (PhD thesis: "The Religious Factor in the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation"). Her articles appeared in academic journals, e.g. “Problems of Post-Communism”, “Politics and Religion”, “Nationalities Papers” or “Religion, State and Society”.Citation: Alicja Curanović, Book Review: New Conservatives in Eastern Europe, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 27.02.2019, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/18060