{"word_count": 1447, "character_count": 11518}
&#160; &#160; &#160; &#160; &#160; &#160; &#160; &#160; Michael Stricof, doctorant, Aix-Marseille UniversitéLe secrétaire américain à la Défense James MattisSecretaryof Defense James Mattis has one of the hardest jobs in Washingtontoday. This is not merely because he steers the largest bureaucracyin the government, managing over $700 billion, 2.87 million employeesand 4800 physical sites. The massive entity known as the Departmentof Defense works closely with others around the world. It maintains apresence in 164 countries according to its public facing materials.1This means working withothernations more often than fighting against them. And for the last twoyears the already difficult task of maintaining friendlyrelationships with allies has not been simple.Itis supposed to be easiest with Europe where old cultural tiesunderpin the most important US alliance, NATO. Rocky transatlanticrelations are nothing new, of course, but the last two years havebeen particularly tense. France’srecent push for “Strategic European Autonomy” (autonomiestratégique européenne)might not be the predominant thought in Mattis’ mind, but he isaware that allies have been balking ever since Trump took office.2Sothe Secretary of Defense took special care while in Brussels for theOctober NATO Defence Ministers Meeting to show that the United Statesremained committed to its main alliance. At his press conferenceafter the meeting, Mattis focused on the defense budget and thegeneral popularity that NATO maintains in Congress, withoutmentioning Trump, the White House or the executive branch ofgovernment. According to Mattis, this legislative support“demonstrates an enduring American bipartisan commitment inWashington to keeping the fabric of our trans-Atlantic alliancestrong and a clear recognition that NATO is central to Americannational security interests, a theme echoed across Europe andCanada.”3Thesecomments are nothing new. In the statement for his confirmationhearing by the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mattis made frequentpromises to work with allies, concluding, “Historyis clear: nations with strong allies thrive and those without themwither.”4Mattis has spent a considerable amount of time since then reassuringpartners while staying out of the media spotlight which hasfrequently been synonymous with Trump’s “You’re fired!”crosshairs.  Alliances have gained considerable ground in official USdefense strategy, a noteworthy development when the President and hisNational Security Advisor John Bolton tend towards rubbing the restof the world the wrong way. Rather than get caught up in the drama ofmoments like Trump’s cringeworthy performance at the United Nationsin September, a complex picture of US relations with the world needsto take into account the positive steps the Secretary of Defense hastaken to emphasize transatlantic ties.Thenewest National Defense Strategy (NDS) was released on 19 January2018. As has been noted elsewhere, Mattis very much claimed ownershipfor the document.5The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which it replaces wasunderstood to be a faceless “Pentagon” or “Department ofDefense” production, not owned nearly as directly by outgoingSecretary Chuck Hagel.6While the main idea of the NDS can be summed up as a return of greatpower conflict, it also serves a signaling role to allies that theDoD, if no one else, remains a steady force of American engagement inthe world.The2014 QDR makes frequent references to allies, but nearly always inpassing. “Wewill continue to maintain a strong military posture in the Gulfregion –onethat can respond swiftly to crisis, deter aggression, and assure ourallies and partners…” or “Given our deep and abiding interestsin maintaining and expanding European security and prosperity, wewill continue our work with allies and partners to promote regionalstability…” are typical examples.7“Allies and partners” appear at every turn, but the words addlittle meaning. Perhaps in 2014 American reliance on institutionslike NATO was so obvious that it needed no further focus. In2018, the highest defense authority in the nation very much thinksthat alliances should be in focus.“Strengthening alliances and attract new partners” is one of onlythree major strategic goals given its own heading in the NDS, and thetwo pages of explanation under this heading represent nearly 20% ofthe document.8“Defending allies from military aggression” is one of the primarydefense objectives explicitly outlined elsewhere in the document.9The fact that this is a short, public facing document onlystrengthens the case that Mattis is sending a message to otherbranches of government and allies who are likely to actually readthis text.Mattisis known to be an avid reader of history,10and his new NDS contained an important history lesson for his ownadministration and allies:Inthe decades after fascism’sdefeat in World War II, the United States and its allies and partnersconstructed a free and open international order to better safeguardtheir liberty and people from aggression and coercion. Although thissystem has evolved since the end of the Cold War, our network ofalliances and partnerships remain the backbone of global security.11Mattis,2018 National Defense Strategy,op. cit. 8, 2.Bygoing back to the end of the Second World War in particular, Mattiscan on the one hand rely on the moment when the US was most respectedin the world, and on the other pay special attention to the oldest USallies who need the most reassuring recently. In a quiet game ofpublic documents and foreign press conferences that generally goignored in the US, Mattis has become the nation’schief diplomat for consistently defending international securityties, especially with Europe. This has been underscored by the NDS’smore subtle request to “Be strategically predictable” and bystatements like Mattis’ unequivocal support for British and Dutchaccusations of Russian cyber-interference in Belgium.12Thereis a legitimate critique that has been leveled about the potentialdeterioration of civilian control over the armed forces if the US isrelying so heavily on military men for civilian leadership. This isconnected to a larger debate that has been gaining attention in theUS about weakening civil-military relations, often focused on thefailures of “thankyou for your service” to replace critical civilian oversight.13And it can been extended to diplomatic spheres by fears that “missioncreep” occurring as the military takes over more and more functionsabroad weakens diplomacy, makes the US more likely to resort tomilitary force, or distracts the Pentagon from its main missions.14Nevertheless,in a time when the president of the United States can in the same daycozy up to a hostile foreign leader and hang up on a friend or duringthe same trip insult an ally and then have a tête-à-têtewith that same enemy, when the State Department has been gutted,15and one of the most belligerent diplomats in the nation’s recenthistory holds the reigns at the National Security Council, there arefew signs that the US is maintaining its leadership in the world toassure the nations still numerous friends. Mattis is still there, theonly remaining member of the original “axis of adults” said to becomposed of him, former secretary of state Rex Tillerson and formerassistant to the secretary for national security H.R. McMaster.16In many ways he is running an independent diplomatic strategy viamilitary-to-military contacts like the NATO Minsters Meeting, whichhe clearly hopes will be enough of a sign that the US can still lead.Atthe end of his press conference in Brussels, Mattis described themeeting as “ashow that we stand quietly together in unity in terms of maintainingpeace and prosperity here in Europe.&#160;Andwe don't need any more misbehavior by anyone.”17He overtly was talking about Russian cyber attacks, but it is easy towonder if he didn’t have another misbehaver in mind that he has tokeep in check, all while keeping his own profile quiet. Mattis canonly hope that Europe and the world are getting his message ratherthan the one being shouted out by his boss.1Departmentof Defense website, accessed 5 October 2018https://www.defense.gov/our-story/.2NathalieGuibert, “Défense : Paris doute des intentions américaines enEurope,” Le Monde,12 September 2018, accessed 5 October 2018,https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2018/09/12/defense-paris-pousse-l-idee-d-une-autonomie-strategique-europeenne_5353959_3210.html?xtmc=otan&#38;xtcr=20;“Autonomie stratégique européenne,” Institutfrançais des relations internationales,accessed 5 October 2018,https://www.ifri.org/fr/recherche/thematiques-transversales/securite-defense/autonomie-strategique-europeenne.3JamesMattis, News Conference, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 4 October2018, accessed 5 October 2018,https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1654419/news-conference-by-secretary-mattis-at-nato-headquarters-brussels-belgium/.4JamesN. Mattis, “Senate Armed Services Committee Nomination HearingStatement,” 12 January 2017, Dirksen Senate Office Building,accessed 6 October 2018,https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Mattis_01-12-17.pdf,2.5MaraKarlin, “How to Read the 2018 National Defense Strategy,”Brookings Order from Chaos,21 January 2018, accessed 5 October 2018,https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/21/how-to-read-the-2018-national-defense-strategy/.6“DoDReleases 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review,” Arthur D. SimmonsCenter for Interagency Cooperation, 19 May 2014, accessed 5 October2018,http://thesimonscenter.org/dod-releases-2014-quadrennial-defense-review/;Gregory Sanders, David J. Berteau,Ryan Crotty, Samuel J. Brannen and Maren Leed, “The 2014 QDR adFY15 Defense Budget: What Are We Watching for,” CSISCommentary, 10 March 2014, accessed 5October 2018,https://www.csis.org/analysis/2014-qdr-and-fy15-defense-budget-what-are-we-watching.7Departmentof Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review2014, Washington, DC, 2014, 20.8JimMattis, Summary of the 2018 NationalDefense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening theAmerican Military’s Competitive Edge,Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018, 4.9Ibid.,8.10DexterFilkins, “The Warrior Monk,” NewYorker, 29 May 2017.11Mattis,2018 National Defense Strategy,op. cit. 8, 2.12Mattis,2018 National Defense Strategy,op. cit. 8, 6; Idrees Ali and Robin Emmot, “Russia Must Be HeldAccountable for Cyber Attacks: Mattis,” Reuters,4 October 2018, accessed 6 October 2018,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-russia-cyber-usa/russia-must-be-held-accountable-for-cyber-attacks-mattis-idUSKCN1ME1MV.13MaraE. Karlin and Alice Hunt Friend, “Military Worship Hurts U.S.Democracy,” Foreign Policy,21 September 2018, accessed 1 October 2018,https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/21/military-worship-hurts-us-democracy-civilian-trump/14GordonAdams and Shoon Murray, eds., MissionCreep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy? Washington:Georgetown University Press, 2014.15JackCorrigan, “The Hollowing Out of the State Department Continues,”Atlantic,11 February 2018, accessed 1 October 2018,https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/tillerson-trump-state-foreign-service/553034/.16IlanGoldenberg, “Here’s How Trump’s ‘Axis of Adults’ Weatheredthe First 100 Days,” Foreign Policy,28 April 2017, accessed 5 October 2018,https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/28/heres-how-trumps-axis-of-adults-have-weathered-the-first-100-days/17Mattis,News Conference, op. cit. 3.