ticuar adyantages therefrom al the COSTS of those
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ticuar advantages therefrom at the costs Of those
who did not concur or were absent.


Under the Influence OF those lessons Of history
and experience, and Of the principles before stated
the wise men OF the United States assembled 10 con
yention, proceeded TO frame a constitution Sin or
der TO form more perfect union, establish justice
ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general welfare and secure the
blessings OF liberty to ourselves and our posteri-
| y,n


The government proposed and adopted for the
United States spreads over vast territory, inclu-
ding diversity Of climates soils, and productions
the inhabitants within the great area having differ
ent pursuits, habits. and modes Of liyinghaying, In
many respects, different interests; and, to minor
part Of the inhabitants peculiar property belonged
These differences are marked by States and by sec
TONS, by natural and by artificial causes.
One consolidated government to legslate over the
whole, and TO regulate all those various interests,
nor domestic tranquility, nor the general welfare,
but would be an intoerable despotsm, and of short
duration


The federal government instituted by the eonsti-
tuition Of the United States is intended to be Of linn
tied powers, delegated by the States such sub
jeets as were deemed to be Of general concern the
proper regulation whereof would tend 10 promote
the welfare OF all, with special prohibitions TO the
powers Of the States respectively; whilst those pow
not delegated TO the federal government pro-
hibted TO the States are reserved TO the States
speeively, or 10 the people.


In the due observance Of the line Of partition be-
tween the powers delegated TO the federal govern
ment and prohibited 10 the States (for the purpose
Of consulting the welfare Of all) and those belong
ng 20 the States and the people thereof respective
y, flor the regulation Of their respective local and
particular interesis) the Of this experiment
by the people Of the United States TO attain the ends
proposed, mainly depends. Without a faithful OBJ.
nm he or A.. nd
on the part Of the States Of this division Of powers


of this compact OF union--there cannot be the de-
sired tranquility, tho desired justice, the desired
welfare, nor the desired perfection and perpetuity
Of the Union.


To fence against improvident legislation by the
Congress Of the United States in the exercise OF the
delegated powers 20 preserve due order and har-
mony between the legislative, executive, and judi
cary departments Of the federal government; TO
prevent the federal government from ranscending
the limits prescribed, and 10 secure against insta'
biliiy by frequent and unadyised amendments TO the
constitution, various cauiionary provisions are en-
grshed into the constitution: among these are the
differences in the modes Of election and constituency
Of the Senate, and Of the House Of Representatives
and Of the President Of the United States; the re-
quirement that, In certain instances, bare majority
shall not determine, but that two-thirds shall be
necessary.


To arrest at the threshold proposition for an
improper act Of legislation, whether in violation o
the constitution greatly inexpedient and mproyI-
dent Is far more convenient and proper than to pu
the people In agitation for repeal, or to compel
resort to the judiciary to declare the act repugnsnt
10 the constitution and void To prevent mischief
10 better than TO endure II until cured.
The participation Of the President of the United
States in the legislation provided for is peace
fol precauuon against improvident and improper
| legislation.


The oftener a proposed law is brought under
examination, the less the danger Of those errors
| which arise from want Of due deliberation, from
| fictitious majorities uniting from selfish considera.
tons, or from combination Of particular local In
| terests.


| The danger is especially lessened when the sew
era examinations and reconsiderations are entrusted
TO persons who elected in different modes, and
stand in a diversity Of responsibilities to different
| bodies as their constituents.


The mode OF electng a president Of the United
States, ordained by the constitution, by electors
equal in number to all the senators and representa-
lives, each State appointing in such manner as the
legislature thereof shall direct number Of election:
equal TO the whole number Of senator's and repre-
sentatiyes to which the State may be entitled in the
| Congress, majority Of the whole number OF eec


tors appointed being necessary to a choice, &C., Sc
the choice Of person Of high character for in
| tegrty and experience. -


He is elected upon ratio Of representation differ
ent from that required to elect senator, ora rep
resentatve, in the Congress. He is elected upon thu
basis OF representation compounded Of the equality
of the States as sovereignties, and of the fedora
ratio OF the population Of the States for choosing
members Of the House of Representatives; anC
being chosen by majority Of all, he is the repre-
sentative Of all the States and Of all the people ofth
States. He "a not representative of local interests
but Of all the interests OF the Union, and bound by
his oath Of Office "to preserve protect, and defend


the constitution of the United States" to the best
| his ability.


| When the President of the United States objects
to bill, the requirement of two-thirds of the Con
gress 10 overrule his objections is wholesome
wise provision for protecting the constitution, ant
for protecting the rights Of the minority against az
gression, spoliation, and opprcssion and emnently
| contrived TO perpetuate the Union.


| Considering the undivided responsibility Of tn
President, in case his objections to bill shall no
sustained by the votes Of one-thrd Of either OF tn
two houses Of the Congress, there greater reaso
to apprehend that this power will not be excrted by
him as often as the general welfare requires, thai
that he will abuse 1t. ., w.
| As the President does not personally attend tn
Congress- and mix in the process of preparing ant
debating bills, he is not liable to the conagion of
concreed majority insprated by local interests ant
/ the dictates OF their leaders.


This qualified power Of the President OF the UNI
ted States of obectng to the legislation of the Con
gress is necessary to defend himself against the en-
croachments Of the legislative department. Other
wse he might be gradually deprived Of his authori
ties by successive enaotments, or stripped by an
gle resolution ofthe two houses the Congress- tn
legislative and executive powers might become uni
ted in the same body. The known propensity o
the legislative body to invade the rights Of the othe
departments, renders this power Of sefdeence indis
pensable to the Office Of President Of the Unite'
States.


Il Without repetition Of the melancholy lessons o
experience derived from foreign governments, an,
forbearing TO enter upon a deta Of the trespnsse


which have been made by the Congress upon th
constitution, and intrusions upon the executive an
judiciary departments, II will suffice to say, tha
government is not founded in the supposition iha
n all men yirtuous nor that the rulers will b


more virtuous than other men; but upon the knowl
edge that men are frail, that legislative body
falliblej that power is great temptations that


spirit Of faction may enter the legislative assemblies
that Impressions hastily imbibcd may hurry OF


measures which matured reflection will con
denim ..t .. "...'
The reasons for conferring this qualified powe
Of objecting bills and resolutions the Pres


dent Of the United States, TO enable him TO de
al th.s txaaa