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tary influence on the system of paper credit
with which all banks are connected, and thus
aid those that are sound and we'll managed it
will at the same time sensibly check such as are
otherwise, by at once Withholding the means of
extravaganza afforded by the public funds. and
restraining them from excessive issues of notes
which they would be constantly called upon to
redeem


am aware that it has been urged that this
control may be best attained and exerted by
means of National Bank The constitutional
objections, which l am well known to entertain
would prevent me in any event from proposing
or asserting to that remedy but in addition to
thus. cannot, after past experience. bring my
self to think that it any longer be extensive
| ly regarded as effective for such purpose The
history of The late National Bank, through all
Its mutations, shows that it was nokso On the
contrary, it may, after a careful consideration Of
the subject be, think, safely stated that at eve
ry period OF banking excesses it took the lead ;
that IN 1917, l8l8 in 1929 in 1881 and in 1834
Its vast expansions, followed by distressing con-
fractions, led to those of the Stale Institutions Il
swelled and maddened the tides of the banking
system, but seldom aIlayed or safely directed
them. At a few periods only was 4 salutary con-
troll exercised, but an eager desire, on the con-
trary exhibited for profit in the first place; and if
aferward, its measures were severe towards other
|
PEELED it to adopt them 1t did not differ from
them in principle or in form, its measures ema-
mated from the same spirit of gain it felt the
same temptation to over-issues; it suffered from
and was totally unable to avert, those inevitable
laws of trade, by which it was itself affected e.
qualiy with them and at least on one OCCASION
at an early day, 1t was saved only by extraordi-
nary exertons from the same fate that attended
the weakest institution it proessed to supervise
In 1887 it failed, equally with others, in redeem
ing its notes, though the two years allowed by
Its charter Tor that purpose had not expired a
large amount of which remains to the present
time outstanding. 1t is true, that having so vast
a capital, and strengthened by the use of all the
revenues of the Government, it possessed more
power but while it was ITSELF by that circum-
stance, freed from the control which all Banks
require its paramount object and inducement
were LETT the same-to make the most for its
stockholders, not to regulate the currency of the
country. Nor has it, as far as we are advised
been found to be greatly otherwise elsew here
The national character given to the Bank OF En-
gland has not prevented excessive fluctuations in
their currency, and it proved unable to keep off
suspension OF specie payments, which lasted for
nearly quarter of a century. And why should
we expect it to be otherwise2 A national institu-
ton. though deriving its charter from differ rent
source than the State Banks, is yet constituted
upon the same principles; is conducted by men
equally exposed to temptation and is liable to
the same disasters, with the additional disadvan-
tage that its magnitude occasions an extent of
confusion and distress which the mismanag ge-
ment OF smaller institutions could not produce
1t can scarcely be doubted that the recent sus-
pension of the U. States Bank of PENNSYLVANIA.
OF which the effects are felt not in that State
alone, but over half the Union, had its origin in
course OF business commenced while it was a
national institution; and there is no good reason
tor supposing that the same consequences would
not have followed had it still derived its powers
from the General Government 1t is in vain,
when the influences and impulses are the same
to look for difference in conduct or results
| BY such creations, we do, therefore, but increase
the mass of paper credit and paper currency,
without checking their attendant evils and fuc-
tuations. The extent of power and the efficiency
OF organization which we give, so far from being
beneficial, are in practice, positively Injurious
They strengthen the chain of dependence throug gh
out the Union, sub bject all parts more certainly
to common disaster, and bind every Bank more
efectually, in the first instance, to those of our
commercial cities, and, in the end, 10 foreign
power. In a word, [ cannot but believe that,
with the full understanding of the operations Of
our banking system which experience has pro-
duced, public sentiment is not less opposed to
the creation OF a National Bank for purposes
connected with currency and commerce, than for
those connected with the fiscal operations of the
| Government.


| Yet the commerce and currency of the coun-
try are suffering evils from the perations of the
State Banks, which cannot and ought not to be
overlooked. By their means we have been food
ed with deprecated paper. which it was evil
denlly the design of the trainers of the Constitu-
ton to prevent, when they required Congress 10
"coin money, and regulate the value OF foreign
coins" and when they forbade the States ito
coin money, emit bills of credit, make any thing
but gold and silver tender in payment of debts, u
or pass any law impairing the obligation of con-
tracts" If they did not guard more explicitly
against the present state of things it was because
they could not have anticipated tina. the few
Banks then existing were TO swell to an extent
which would expeI to SO great degree the gold
and silver for which they had provided, from the
channels of circulation, and fill them up with a
currency that defeats the objects they had in
view, The remedy for this must chiefly rest
with the States from whose Legislation it has
sprung. No good that might accrue in a par
ticular case from the exercise of powers, not OBJ
viously conferred on the General Government,
would authorize its interference, or justify a
that hos 0hteSt danroo ;norooeo