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rect, in which case the Secretary of the

 Treasury shall immediately lay before Congress, If in session, and if not, imme- diately after the commencement of the next session, the reason of such order and direction. :,

 The power of the Secretary of the Trea- snry over the deposites, is anguaiiGed.- The provision that he shall report his rea~ sons to Congress, IS no limitation. Had 1t not been inserted, ne would nave heen

 responsible to Congress had he made removal for my other than good reasons. and his responsibility now ceases, upon tine rendition of sufficient ones to Con- gress. The only object of the provision. l IS to make his reasons ace cess;hIc to Con

 eress, and enable the body th. more req duly 10 judge of their soundness and puri 1 ty, ana tberenpon to make such other pro-

 vision, by law, as the legislative power

 may think proper in relation to the depo- i site of the public money. Those reasons

 may be very diversified. It was asserted

 by the Secretary of the Treasury, without

 contradiction, early as IsI7, that he

 had power stto control the proceedIngan

 of the Bank of the United States at any

 moment, "by changing the deposites to the

 State Banks,o should it pursue an iiliber-

 al course towards those institutions; that

 "the Secretary of the Treasury will all ways be disposed to Support the credit of l the State Banks, and wiIlinyar;abIy direct transfers from the deposites of the pub.

 lie money in aid of their legitimate ex- l cr;ions to maintain their efadit;;' and

 he asserted right to employ the State Banks when the Bank ofthe United States

 should refuse 10 receive on deposite the

 notes of such State Banks as the public n-

 terest required should be received in pay

 menf of the public dues. In several in-

 stances he did transfer the public deposites

 to State Banks, in the immediate vicinity

 of branches, for reasons connected only

 with the safety of those Banks, the pub I lie convenience, and the interests of the 1 Treasury. If it was lawful for Mir. Crawford, tho

 Secretary of the Treasury, at that time,

 to act on these principles, it will be difi-

 cult 10 discover any sound reasons against I the application of similar principles in

 still stronger cases. md 1t IS matter of

 surprise that a pow CT wbich, in the inian-

 cy of the Bank, was freely asserted in one

 oi the ordinary and familiar duties of the

 Secretary of tine Treasury, should now ba

 graveIy questioned, and attempts made to l excite and alarm the public mind as if

 some new and uDheard of power was about l to be usnrped by the Executive branches of the Government.

 1t is but little more than two and a | half years to the termination of the char ter of the present Bank. II is considered l as the decision of tine country that it shall then cease to exist, and no man, the Presi- isdent believes, has reasonable ground for T expectation tina, any other 1anh of tine United States will be created by Congress

 To the Treasury Department is intrnsted the safe keeping, and faithful application

 of the public moneys. plan of collec- tion different from the present, must there i fore be introduced and put in complete l operation before the dissolution of the l present Bank. When shall 1t be com-

 menced? Shall no step be taken in this

 essential concern until the charter ex-

 pires, and the Treasury finds itself without an agent, its accounts in confusion, with

 no depository for it's funds, and the whole business of the Government derahgad L. l Or shall it be delayed until six months, or

 a year, or two years before the expiration | of the charter? It is obvious that any

 new system which may be substituted in

 the place ofthe Bank of the United States, could not be suddenly carried into effect

 on the termination of its existence, with

 out inconvenience to the Government and 1 the people. It's vast amount of notes are

 then to be redeemed and withdrawn from

 circulation, and its immense debt collect- I ed. These operations must be gradual,

 otherwise much suffering and distress will

 oe brought upon the community. 1t ought. 1 to be not a work of months only, but of | years and tho President thinks it cannot,

 with due attention to tie interests of the people, be longer postponed. It IS safer

 to begin it too soon, than to delay tt too long.

 It is for the wisdom of Congress to de-

 eide upon the best substitute to be adop-

 ted in the place Of the Bank of the United States and the President would have felt l himself relieved from a heavy and painful I responsibility If, in the charter to the 1 Bank, Congress had reserved to itself the 1 power of directing, at pleasure, the public l money to be elsewhere deposited, and had

 not deyolyed that power exclusively on one l of the Executive Departments. It is nsc- less now to inquire why this high and im- portant power was surrendered by those

 who are peculiarly and appropriately the guardians of the public money. Perhaps

 :. ,rss sn oversight Bnf as fhe Pr esident presumes that the charter Of the Bank is to be considered as a contract on the part l of the Government, it is not now in the I t,ons: and by the terms of that contract. l fhe public money is to be deposited in tue l Bank, during the continuance of its char l ter. unless the Secretary of the Treasury ] shall otherwise direct. Unless, therefore, the Secretary of the Treasury first acts, ] Congress have no power over the subject, for they cannot add new clause to the charter or strike one out Of tt, without the consent of the Bank; and, consequent. lly, ,.tbe public money must remain in that inssitution 10 the last hour ofits existence, unless the Secretary 1.-the Treasury shall | remove it at an earlierday The respon- l sibility is thus thrown upon the Executive 1 branch of the Government of deciding how | of tha oh