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KANT: MORAL PROGRESS, POLITICS, AND THE HIGHEST GOOD A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED ON THE THIRTIETH DAY OF MAY, 1997 TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF TULANE UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY DAVID LINDSTEDT APPROVED: (DR. JOHN GLENN, JR., CHAIRMAN DR. BRUCE BROWER DF ER Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 9816774 Copyright 1997 by Lindstedt, David Paul All rights reserved. UMI Microform 9816774 Copyright 1998, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. © Copyright by David Lindstedt, 1997 All Rights Reserved Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGMENT I dedicate this work to my wife and my parents. I would like to acknowledge Dr. John Glenn, Jr. for his laborious work and many helpful comments. I would also like to thank Dr. Brower and Dr. Burger for being on my committee. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the Eberhard-KarlsUniversitat in Tubingen, Germany, for allowing me to use their research materials. ii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table of Contents Section One Introduction................................................................................................................................... 2 Overview to the Critique of Pure Reason............................................................................. 10 Teleology and the H ighest Good in the First Critique......................................................28 A F irst Look a t the "Idea for a U niversal History with a Cosmopolitan In ten t" 56 K ant's Moral Philosophy an d the H ighest Good................................................................77 An Overview to the Critique of Judgment...........................................................................99 Limits of Teleology and the F irst Link between the N atu ra l and Moral W orld ...... 116 The Highest Good and Two Additional Links between N atu re and M orality...........145 The Principle of Purposive M echanism s Reexamined.....................................................160 The "Idea" Reexamined: M oral Progress as a Postulate of Practical Reason...........168 Evaluation and T ransition .....................................................................................................183 Section Two Defense of the H ighest Good.................................................................................................210 Problems with the H ighest Good: W orthiness and Conceivability............................ 251 Morality and Politics...............................................................................................................289 The Five Stages of Moral P ro g ress..................................................................................... 320 Importance of the H ighest G ood..........................................................................................355 Is the Existence of God a Necessary Postulate?...............................................................377 Conclusions................................................................................................................................400 Bibliography............................................................................................................................. 412 iii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SECTION ONE Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Introduction T he genesis of th is book cam e ab o u t th ro u g h a tho roug h an a ly s is of K a n t's a rtic le , "Id e a for a U n iv e rsa l H isto ry w ith a C osm opolitan In te n t ." T h is a rtic le w as w ritte n sh o rtly a f te r th e p u b lic a tio n o f th e Critique o f Pure Reason, a n d m ak es som e seem in g ly g ra n d c la im s a b o u t th e course o f h u m a n h is to ry . H ow g ra n d a re th e s e c la im s? T he a rtic le focuses on th e n ecessa ry p ro g re ss of h u m a n b e ings th ro u g h h isto ry , p a r t ic u la r ly moral p ro g ress th ro u g h h is to ry . B u t w hy is su c h p ro g ress n ecessa ry ? How stro n g ly does K a n t w ish to advance th is c la im ? A nd, im p o rtan tly , how does such a c laim f it w ith th e r e s t o f h is ph ilosophy? T h is a rtic le is a lso in te re s t in g b ecause o f th e s tro n g lin k K a n t m ak es b e tw een m o ra lity a n d po litics. K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t m o ra l p rog ress is n o t to be h a d w ith o u t p o litica l p ro g ress , a n d th a t w o rk in g n a tio n a l a n d in te rn a - t io n a l co n stitu tio n s a re n e c e ssa ry to e n su re th e se c u rity betw een p e rso n s a n d n a tio n s . C e rta in ly w e know from K a n t's Metaphysics of Morals t h a t th e fo r- m a tio n o f law s is a m o ra l q u estio n , since bo th h a v e to do w ith th e exercise o f freedom in a w orld w h ere o th e r peop le ex is t a s w ell. B u t th is connection is m a d e s tro n g e r in th e "Id e a " d u e to th e n e c e ss ita tin g o f ju s t p o litica l in s t i tu - t io n s in o rd er to e n su re n o t on ly leg a lity b u t a lso m orality . A t le a s t po litics seem s to be a n ecessa ry fo u n d a tio n fo r th e m o ra l p ro jec t. A gain, w h a t a re w e to m a k e o f th e se s tro n g c la im s? T he secondary l i te ra tu re is ex trem ely lim ite d on th is sub ject, th o u g h th e re a re tw o g e n e ra l schools o f th o u g h t re g a rd in g th e "Idea ." T he f i r s t ta k e s K a n t a s try in g to en g en d e r a p ro jec t w hich is s im ila r to H egel's, nam ely , som e so r t of s tro n g s tan ce on th e n ecessa ry d ev e lo p m en t of rea so n in th e w orld . T he com m en ta to rs th e n a rg u e th a t K a n t (n a tu ra lly ) fa ils in th is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 a tte m p t, for h e h a s no p h ilo so p h ic a l fram ew ork w hich a llow s h im to say a n y th in g ak in to th e m a n ife s ta tio n o f th e "A bsolute" o r o f "M in d ." I f th is is re a lly K a n t's p ro ject, s u re ly th e co m m en ta to rs' e v a lu a tio n is co rrect. T he o th e r school o f th o u g h t is to a rg u e t h a t th e "Id e a " re p re se n ts a n e a r ly a tte m p t to w re s tle w ith th e q u e s tio n o f teleology. T h ey m a in ta in th a t K a n t is try in g to w ork o u t th e c h a ra c te r is tic s of n a tu r a l d ev e lo p m en t in th e w orld , a n tic ip a tin g th e Critique o f Judgment. H ow ever, K a n t's no tion o f te leo logy is e v a lu a te d a s b e in g in co m p le te h ere , a n d c o m m e n ta to rs su rm ise t h a t K a n t h a s n o t y e t a d e q u a te ly m a d e th e d istinc tion b e tw e e n th e re g u la - tiv e a n d co n stitu tiv e u se o f teleo logy. K a n t's s ta te m e n ts r e g a rd in g p rog ress a re ta k e n a s b e in g s im p ly too s tro n g , th o u g h i t is c la im ed t h a t h e w ill rec tify th is p rob lem w ith th e th i r d Critique. S u re ly i f K a n t is a c tu a lly try in g to u se te leo logy a s a c o n s titu tiv e p rin c ip le , h e h a s overs tepped th e l im its of th e f i r s t Critique, a n d i f in s te a d h e h a s in m in d th e u se of teleo logy a s a m ere ly re g u - la t iv e p rin c ip le , h e o u g h t to h a v e a p p lie d i t m ore carefu lly . In add ition , in h e r e n t in m a n y com m en ta to rs' a n a ly se s is th e b e lie f t h a t K a n t is rea lly t ry in g to te l l u s ab o u t how to in v e s tig a te h is to ry , th a t is , th e b e lie f th a t K a n t is co n ce rn e d w ith a speculative q u e s tio n a b o u t h isto ry . M o s t com m en ta to rs a ssu m e t h a t K a n t's w ritin g s ab o u t h is to ry a re of th e sa m e n a tu re as h is w ritin g s a b o u t m a th em a tic s , geom etry , o r p h y sics th a t is, th e y concern th e q u e s tio n of h o w w e a re to s tu d y h is to ry i ts e l f a s a science. T h is p roposition is n o t a rg u e d for; i t is m ere ly a ta c it a s su m p tio n . I re jec t th e se tw o m a in l in e s o f in te rp re ta tio n , p a r t ic u la r ly a s th e y co n ce rn th e "Id ea ." A s th e s e b e lie fs re p re se n t w h a t seem to b e th e m ajo rity of th e few co m m en ta ries c o n ce rn in g th is a sp ec t of K a n t's p h ilo so p h y , a m ajo r t a s k o f th is book w ill be to p o in t o u t th e prob lem s w ith su c h an a ly se s . W e m ig h t ca ll th is th e "n e g a tiv e " a sp e c t o f th is work, a n d "S ec tio n O ne" is la rg e ly d ev o ted to a rg u in g a g a in s t th e s e in te rp re ta tio n s , bo th d irec tly a n d ind irec tly . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. t \ T h e overa ll p ro jec t of S ec tio n O n e is to ex am in e K a n t's d iscussion in a ll o f h is w ritin g s re g a rd in g th e (m oral) p ro g ress o f th e h u m a n species. Two concep ts becom e m ost im p o rta n t, n a m e ly K a n t's concep tion o f p rogress (Fortschritt ) and. o f "th e h ig h e s t good" (das hochste Gut o r th e summum bonum). T h e re a re tw o im p o rta n t fin d in g s in su c h a n an a ly sis . T h e f i r s t is th a t K a n t in te n d s th e re to b e two lo ca tions fo r th e h ig h e s t good, n a m e ly one in a a f te r - life , a n "o therw orld ly" h ig h e s t good, a n d o n e in th e n a tu r a l w orld , an "e a r th ly " h ig h e s t good. W h a t th is , in tu rn , in d ica te s , is t h a t m o ra l p rog ress in th is w o rld is a n e ce ssa ry a ssu m p tio n , a "p o s tu la te o f p ra c tic a l reason ," fo r b a r r in g th is possib ility , we sh o u ld h a v e to a b an d o n th e q u e s t fo r th e h ig h e s t good, a q u e s t w hich K a n t th in k s i s m a n d a te d by rea so n . T h is le a d s to K a n t's co ncep tion o f p rog ress, a n d h is d isc u ss io n of teleology. T h e o th e r im p o rta n t th in g w e d iscover is t h a t K a n t does, in fac t, sp e a k o f p ro g re ss in h u m a n h is - to ry n o t a s a specu la tive p rob lem , b u t a s a p ra c tic a l p rob lem . K a n t is con- c e rn e d n o t w ith th e s tu d y o f h is to ry , b u t w ith th e in v e s tig a tio n o f h is to ry in o rd e r to f in d clues th a t th e h u m a n ra c e is in d ee d p ro g ress in g . K a n t u ses la n g u a g e w h ich sp e a k s of p ro g re s s in h is to ry as a n o tio n from a p rac tica l p o in t o f v iew , b a s in g h is a n a ly s is o n d u ty a n d m orality . T h e o u tlin e o f th e f i r s t se c tio n is a s follows: C h a p te r O n e tak es a b r ie f overv iew of th e Critique o f Pure Reason in o rd e r to e s ta b lis h the p a - ra m e te rs w h ich K a n t s e ts for a n y m e ta p h y s ic a l d iscussion . T h is ch ap te r is s tra ig h tfo rw a rd a n d u n co n tro v e rs ia l. C h a p te r Two ex am in es K a n t's u n d e rs ta n d in g o f te leo logy an d h is i n - tro d u c tio n o f th e h ig h e s t good. M o st im p o rta n tly , I show t h a t K an t, a lread y in th e f i r s t Critique, u n d e rs ta n d s t h a t te leo logy m u s t be u s e d a s a reg u la tiv e p r in c ip le only . T h is allow s u s to lo o k a t th e "Id e a " from a n e w perspective: i t seem s d e a r t h a t K a n t know s fu ll w e ll th e l im ita tio n s o f th e n o tio n of te leo l- ogy, so e i th e r h e h a s sim ply fo rg o tte n h is s ta n c e from th e f i r s t Critique, or h e h a s a d iffe re n t k in d o f p o in t to m a k e w ith th e "Id ea ." K a n t's in tro d u c tio n of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. th e h ig h e s t good h e re is b rief, b u t I w ill look a t i ts conception. Also, I t ry to show , in p a r t , how th e "Id ea " is th e n a tu r a l r e s u l t of K a n t's s tru g g le w ith th e in h e re n t te n s io n b e tw een th e a n sw ers to th e questions of, W h a t c an I know ? an d , W h a t c a n I hope? C h a p te r T h ree th e n ta k e s a f ir s t im p o r ta n t look a t th e "Id e a for a U n iv e rsa l H is to ry w ith a C osm opolitan In te n t ." A fter a n overv iew o f th e piece, I ex am in e th e n a tu re of th e l in k b e tw ee n politics a n d m o ra lity . H e re I show w hy K a n t th in k s po litics to be so im p o r ta n t as a fo u n d a tio n fo r m o ra l- ity . I also t r y to h e a d off a n objection re g a rd in g th e n a tu re o f th is lin k b y in - tro d u c in g a n a rg u m e n t th a t po litica l in s t i tu t io n s a re n e ce ssa ry b u t n o t su ff i- c ien t cond itions o f m o ra l developm ent. In C h a p te r F o u r I p re s e n t a b r ie f acco u n t o f K a n t's m o ra l theory , fo - cu sin g m a in ly on th e Critique o f Practical Reason. O f ch ie f in te r e s t to u s h e re is K a n t's a rg u m e n t fo r th e h ig h e s t good a n d h is d iscussion of how so m e- th in g becom es a p o s tu la te o f p u re p ra c tic a l rea so n . In th e f i r s t sec tion I g ive a b r ie f overv iew of K a n t's m o ra l philosophy; in th e second I give K a n t's a r - g u m en t for th e h ig h e s t good; in th e th ird I d iscuss th e n e ce ssa ry p o s tu la te s o f God a n d im m o rta lity ; in th e fo u rth I d iscuss th e location of th e h ig h e s t good; a n d in th e l a s t I b rie fly p o in t o u t K a n t's s tru g g le w ith th e q u es tio n of th e "ex p an sio n " o f p ra c tic a l rea so n . T h is c h a p te r show s th e fu r th e r im p o rtan ce of p o s tu la te s o f p ra c tic a l rea so n , a s w ell a s o p en ing up th e p o ss ib ility of tw o loca tions for th e h ig h e s t good. C h a p te rs F ive th ro u g h E ig h t a ll d e a l w ith th e Critique o f Judgment. T his w ork o f K a n t's is im p o rta n t because o f i ts dealings w ith teleology. I t r y to show th a t w h ile K a n t c e rta in ly m ak es g re a t co n trib u tio n s to h is no tion o f teleology in th is book, h e does n o t go beyond th e o rig ina l p a ra m e te rs w h ich h e e s ta b lish e d in th e f i r s t Critique. Teleology re m a in s a re g u la tiv e no tion , w hich a g a in o u g h t to le a d u s to su sp ec t t h a t K a n t w as q u ite a w a re of th e lim its to teleology w h en h e w ro te th e 'I d e a ." In fact, w hile co m m en ta to rs Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 seem to th in k th a t th e th i r d Critique involves m ajo r c h an g e s from th e "Id ea ," I a rg u e t h a t i t a c tu a lly su p p o r ts a lm ost a ll th e c la im s from th e "Id e a ." In h is w ork ing o u t o f th is Critique, K a n t discovers fu r th e r re a so n s to be lieve in the p ro g ress o f h u m a n k in d , th o u g h h e never v io la tes th e f i r s t Critique by th in k - in g th a t teleo logy is in h e re n t in n a tu re or is c o n s titu tiv e o f ex p erien ce . In th is w ork, K a n t c o n tin u es h is ta lk abou t p rog ress, th e h ig h e s t good, a n d even h is concep t o f a n ta g o n ism o r "u n so c ia l sociability" w h ich h e be liev es to be the d riv in g force b e h in d p o litic a l developm ents. C h a p te r N ine looks a t th e "Id ea" a g a in in l ig h t o f th e p rev io u s a rg u - m en ts . I a rg u e , finally , t h a t th e "Id e a " is b e s t th o u g h t o f in te rm s o f a p o s tu - la te o f p ra c tic a l reason , a n e ce ssa ry be lief fo r th e p u r s u i t of th e h ig h e s t good. H ence, th e "Id e a " is n o t in te n d e d by K a n t to be so m e th in g lik e H egel's devel- op m en t o f th e "A bsolu te ," c an n o t m is tak e teleology as a c o n s titu tiv e p rin c i- ple, a n d does n o t deal w ith h is to ry a s a sp ecu la tiv e questio n . W hile p rog ress is c e r ta in ly a reg u la tiv e id e a , i t is by no m ean s merely reg u la tiv e , in th e sam e w ay th a t G od a n d im m o rta lity a re n o t mere id e a s o f rea so n . K a n t is con- ce rn ed w ith m o ra l p ro g re ss a n d o f th e conditions o f th e p u r s u i t o f th e h ig h - e s t good. T hose co nd itions invo lve po litica l in s t i tu t io n s a s w ell a s p ra c tic a l p o s tu la te s . C h a p te r T en is a t r a n s it io n betw een th e tw o "S ec tions" o f th is book. I m ak e som e su m m ary re m a rk s concern ing S ection O ne, a s w ell a s m a k in g som e a d d itio n a l com m en ts on th e secondary l i te ra tu re . H a v in g re jec ted th e s e g e n e ra l app roaches to K a n t's p o sitio n , I w a n t to say so m e th in g m ore co n cre te a b o u t K an t's n o tio n o f p ro g re ss a n d th e h ig h - e s t good, a n d hence "S ec tio n Two" is o f m ore o f a "p ositive" a n a ly s is . W h a t is th e n a tu re o f th e l in k b e tw e e n m o ra lity a n d politics? W h a t i s th e e x ac t n a - tu re o f th e h ig h e s t good? H ow w ill p rog ress ta k e sh a p e in th e w orld? T hese a re th e ty p es o f q u estio n s w h ich I add ress . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C h a p te r O ne is an in te n s iv e a n a ly s is o f K a n t's no tion of th e h ig h e s t good a n d i ts recep tio n in th e seco n d a ry l i te ra tu re . I t r y to sa y w h a t th e h ig h - e s t good is a n d w h a t i t is no t. T h e re a re m an y c ru c ia l p o in ts h e re , a n d I t r y to e s ta b l is h th e p a ra m e te rs o f f u tu re d iscussions co n ce rn in g th e h ig h e s t good. M a n y o f th e p o in ts I ta k e to b e se ttle d , w h ile m a n y rem ain c o n tro v e r- s ia l. C h a p te r Two deals w ith w h a t I ta k e to be se r io u s p rob lem s w ith K a n t's fo rm u la tio n o f th e "o th erw o rld ly " h ig h e s t good. O ne m a in p ro b lem h a s to do specifica lly w ith K a n t's in s is te n c e t h a t v ir tu e be rew ard e d w ith proportionate h a p p in e ss . N o t on ly does th e re seem to be no rea so n w h y w e sh o u ld acc ep t th is equation , b u t i t a lso seem s to b e in v io la tion of m a n y o f K a n t's o th e r te n e ts . I a rg u e t h a t w e o u g h t to re jec t th e eq u a tio n , a n d in s te a d be co n ce rn e d on ly w ith h a p p in e ss w h ich is e ith e r m in im a lly n e c e ssa ry a s a fo u n d a tio n fo r m o ra l action, o r w h ich is m ere ly p e rm itte d a n d n o t d ese rv ed . I t ry to sh o w t h a t th is h a rm o n izes b e t te r w ith th e r e s t o f K a n t's p h ilo sophy , even th o u g h K a n t h im se lf in s is ts on th e n ecessity o f th is eq u a tio n th ro u g h - o u t h is w ritin g s . In add ition , I e x am in e K a n t's no tio n o f h a p p in e ss i ts e lf , a n d t ry to sh o w t h a t th e re a re se rio u s p ro b lem s w hen w e t r y to conceive o f h a p p i- n e ss in a n a fte rlife . I t is s im ply n o t conceivab le t h a t h a p p in e ss cou ld b e a re w a rd fo r m o ra lity in a n a fte rlife . I n C h a p te r T h ree I look a t th e l in k b e tw een m o ra lity a n d po litics . I a rg u e d (in p rev io u s c h ap te rs ) th a t th e r e a re tw o lo ca tio n s for th e h ig h e s t good; i f w e a re to ta k e th is se riously , th e n we m u s t b e concerned w ith th e q u e s tio n o f how th is h ig h e s t good on e a r th is to com e ab o u t. T h is is la rg e ly a p o litica l q u e s tio n . I exam ine K a n t's p o litica l w ritin g s , a n a ly z in g th e m in ch rono log ica l o rder. I try to s u b s ta n t ia te th e fo llow ing c la im s w ith th is c h a p - te r : 1) K a n t does p o s it th e n e ce ssa ry b e lie f in th e m o ra l p ro g ress o f th e s p e - cies, 2) th is b e lie f concerns h is to ry , th o u g h i t is a b e lie f b a se d on m o ra l e n d s a n d is n o t m e a n t to be a (m erely) re g u la tiv e id e a fo r th e s tu d y o f h is to ry a s a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. science, a n d 3) c e r ta in po litica l o rg an iz a tio n s a re n e ce ssa ry (bu t no t su ffi- c ien t) fo r m o ra l p ro g re ss to occur. In th e la s t sec tion , I a lso d iscuss K a n t's seem ing ly s t r a n g e c la im th a t n a tu re a lo n e m u s t be th e g u a ra n to r o f peace. I a rg u e t h a t th i s is a p e rfec tly u n d e rs ta n d a b le c la im , a n d fu rth e rm o re is a n ecessa ry one, g iven th e re q u is ite co n d itio n s fo r th e m o ra l p ro ject to beg in in e a rn e s t. In C h a p te r F o u r I o u tlin e w h a t I ta k e to be K a n t's u n d e rs ta n d in g of how m o ra l p ro g re s s is to ta k e p lace. K a n t se em s to o u tlin e five specific s tep s to w a rd m o ra l p e rfe c tio n of th e h u m a n species: 1) to ta l s ta te of n a tu re , 2) n a - tio n a l/in te rn a l c o n s titu tio n , 3) fed e ra tio n o f n a tio n s , 4) c u ltu re a n d ecclesias- tic a l fa ith , a n d 5) th e h ig h e s t good on e a r th . A g a in , th e l in k betw een m o ra l- i ty a n d p o litic s w ill be ex am in ed a n d e s ta b lish e d . I t ry to show how th e s ta g e s in te r a c t a n d to ex p la in w h a t th e n a tu r e o f e ac h o f th e se s tag es m ig h t be. In C h a p te r F iv e I a tte m p t to ju s tify w h y a b e lie f in th e h ig h e s t good is n ecessa ry . T h is f a r in th e w ork, I h a v e a rg u e d on ly th a t K a n t in d ee d ta k e s th e h ig h e s t good to b e th e a p p ro p ria te ob ject o f m o ra l w illing , w hile now I p re s e n t a rg u m e n ts a s to w hy b e lie f in i ts p o ss ib ility m ig h t be necessary . I t is a n a tte m p t to a n sw e r th e q u estio n of, W h a t w o u ld th e consequences be i f w e re jec ted th e p o ss ib ility o f th e h ig h e s t good? I th in k th e re a re six possib le re a so n s fo r i ts n e c e ss ita tio n , th o u g h th e y v a ry g re a tly in s tre n g th . U lti- m ate ly , I th in k th e b e s t ju s tif ic a tio n is one w h ich seem s to be v ir tu a lly ig - n o red in th e se c o n d a ry l i te ra tu re , n am e ly t h a t th e b e lie f is n ecessa ry i f th e w o rld is to h a v e a n y m e a n in g or v a lu e . K a n t's d e ta ile d ex am in a tio n of te le - ology in th e th i r d Critique le a d h im to th re e s tro n g a rg u m e n ts fo r th e l in k b e tw een th e w o rld a s a possib le c rea tio n a n d th e m o ra l vocation of h u m a n be ings. K a n t b e liev es t h a t i f h u m a n k in d c a n n o t p ro g ress , th e n th e w orld is a c ru e l joke. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C h a p te r S ix deals w ith th e q u estio n o f w hy God m ig h t re m a in a s a n e c e ssa ry p o s tu la te of p rac tic a l re a so n . T he p ro b lem a rises th ro u g h th e re - jec tion , in C h a p te r Two, of th e e q u a tio n of h a p p in e ss a s a p ro p o rtio n a te r e - w a rd fo r m o ra lity . I f God is no lo n g e r n eeded to d is tr ib u te p ro p o rtio n a te h a p p in e ss , w h y is a be lie f in G od necessary? I b eg in by e x am in in g c la im s by S h a ro n A nderson-G old a n d C h a rle s R ossi th a t G od is necessary fo r in d i- v id u a ls to overcom e th e ir n a tu r a l e n v y o f each o th e r, a n envy w h ich le a d s p e rso n s to w a rd ev il. I a rg u e th a t , w h ile th is is in d e e d a p rob lem w h ich n e - c e s s ita te s a b e lie f in God, I do n o t th in k th a t A nderson-G old's a n d R ossi's in - te rp re ta t io n s re a lly get to th e ro o t o f th e p rob lem o f evil, a n d h en ce th e y do n o t so lve a ll th e p roblem s w hich th e y th in k a re solved. I a rg u e in s te a d th a t w e m u s t s t i l l be lieve in God b ecau se w e m u st be lieve in th e p o ss ib ility o f th e m o ra l re sp o n siv en e ss of n a tu re . I f n a tu r e does n o t ex is t w ith som e b e n t to - w a rd m o ra lity , th e n th e hope for p o litic a l p rog ress w ould h a v e to b e a b a n - doned, a n d , su b seq u en tly , m o ra l p ro g re ss as w ell. N a tu re m u s t b e th e g u a r- a n to r o f p eace , a n d peace is n e c e ssa ry fo r th e m o ra l project. In th e f in a l p a g es o f th is c h a p te r , I exam ine th e difference b e tw een n a tu re a s e x is tin g a n d n a tu r e a s h a v in g been c re a te d by a m oral a u th o r. C h a p te r S even is th e conclusion . I m ake som e su m m ary re m a rk s an d try to show th e a d v an tag e s o f m y in te rp re ta t io n of K an t. O ne su ch a d v a n - ta g e is t h a t w e a re r id of H egel's p ro b lem of p ro v in g th a t n a tu re is , in fac t, te leo log ical. A n o th e r is th a t w e re m a in free to d iscuss a n d p u rsu e "everyday" po litics , n a m e ly p roblem s of how to p rov ide (m in im al) services fo r p e rso n s , how to a d m in is te r law a n d ju s tice , a n d how to in te ra c t w ith o th e r c o u n trie s . T he so lu tio n s to th e se po litica l a n d so c ie ta l p rob lem s m u st u ltim a te ly involve e m p iric a l know ledge of people a s c re a tu re s of n a tu re , n o t only ra t io n a l b e - in g s . In a d d itio n to p rov id ing w h a t I ta k e to be a m ore accu ra te a n a ly s is o f K a n t's ph ilo so p h y , I hope m y in te rp re ta t io n frees b o th K a n t a n d o u rse lv es from th e p ro b lem s encum bered by a H egelian accoun t of n a tu re a n d h is to ry , a n d a llow s u s to p u rsu e a b e tte r w o rld m ore effectively. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I Chapter One Overview to the Critique o f Pure Reason L In h is 1784 piece, "Id e a fo r a U n iv e rsa l H isto ry w ith a C osm opolitan I n te n t ," Im m a n u e l K a n t d iscusses m o ra l p rog ress, p o litica l in s t itu t io n s , a n d , in d ire c tly , th e "h ig h e s t good." K a n t m a k e s som e ex trem ely c ru c ia l c la im s in th is r a th e r sh o rt piece, l in k in g th e s e th re e concepts to g e th e r a n d p ro v id in g a fo u n d a tio n for h is la te r m oral, po litica l, a n d relig ious w ritin g s . W hile only a few c h a p te rs o f Section O ne o f th is book d e a l d irectly w ith th e "Id e a ," K a n t's a r t ic le a n d th e concepts invo lved a re th e m o tiv a tin g forces b e h in d th is book. V e ry few com m enta to rs h av e fo cu sed on th is a rtic le o r on th e im p lica tio n s i t h a s fo r K a n t's ph ilosophy a s a w hole . W e w a n t to u n d e rs ta n d how K a n t e n - v is io n e d a n d u tilized th e no tion o f m o ra l p rogress, w hy h e m a d e i t d ep en d en t u p o n po litics , a n d how i t is l in k e d w ith th e h ig h es t good. In o rd er to beg in th is in v e s tig a tio n , w e m u st beg in w ith K a n t's f ir s t "c ritic a l" w ork , th e Critique of Pure Reason. T h is w ork is im p o r ta n t for u s b e c a u se i t is h e re th a t K a n t g ives u s th e n ecessa ry p a ra m e te rs o f a n y su b se - q u e n t d iscussion of m orality , re lig io n , po litics , o r th e self. I n ad d itio n , m an y o f th e k ey id e a s a n d concepts fo u n d in th e "Id e a " a re a lso d isc u sse d for th e f i r s t t im e in th e Critique, a n d a re r e ta in e d in th e second e d itio n .1 W hile m u c h is n ew in the 'Id e a ," esp ec ia lly th e com bination o f po litics w ith m o ra l- ity , a su rp r is in g am o u n t is a lre a d y m e n tio n e d in th e f ir s t Critique. 1 The "Idea for a Universal History for a Cosmopolitan Intent" was published between the first and second editions of the first Critique. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 In th e n e x t tw o c h ap te rs , I w ill e x am in e th e n e ce ssa ry p rin c ip le s a n d c r i te r ia fo r o u r d iscussion of m ora lity , re lig io n , a n d po litics as th e y a re p re - se n te d b y K a n t in h is f ir s t m a jo r ("c ritic a l") w ork . In th is c h ap te r, I w ill b rie fly d isc u ss K a n t's m a in conclusions in th e f i r s t Critique a s th e y p e r ta in to o u r la te r d isc u ss io n of m orality . T h is c h a p te r is n o t m e a n t to b e c o n tro v e r- s ia l, n o r i s a n y d efen se a ttem p ted , b u t o n ly s e ts a basic , th o u g h n ecessa ry , g ro u n d fo r l a te r d iscussion . T hose m ore fa m ilia r w ith th e f ir s t Critique m ay w ish to sk ip th is c h a p te r . In th e n e x t c h a p te r , I w ill d iscu ss th o se p a r t ic u la r concep ts w h ic h K a n t in tro d u c es in th e "Id e a l o f P u re R eason" a n d th e "T ra n s c e n d e n ta l D octrine o f M ethod" th a t a re e x p o u n d ed upon in la te r w r it- in g s, p a r t ic u la r ly in th e "Id ea ." T h is seco n d c h a p te r offers new , i f n o t con tro - v ers ia l, in te rp re ta t io n s . I w ill t r y to show t h a t m u ch o f th e la te r m o ra l a n d re lig io u s w r it in g s a re a n tic ip a te d h e re , th o u g h th e y w ill u n d erg o im p o r ta n t c h an g e s a s K a n t's th e o rie s develop. n . In g e n e ra l, th e Critique o f Pure Reason is K a n t's a tte m p t to f in d th e fo u n d a tio n s fo r h u m a n experience a n d know ledge. K a n t tr ie s to a n sw e r th e b ro a d q u e s tio n s o f how experience i ts e lf is p o ss ib le a n d w h a t k in d o f k n o w l- edge is a t ta in a b le . K a n t ta k e s m a th e m a tic s a n d geom etry to be th e p r im e ex am p les o f th e ach iev em en ts o f h u m a n re a so n . K a n t w a s c e r ta in o f th e t r u th s o f th e s e sc iences, a n d w as im p re sse d a t th e i r a p p lica tio n to n a tu r a l science, e sp ec ia lly th e d iscoveries o f N ew ton . B u t w hy a re w e m o st c e r ta in of th e k now ledge fo u n d in th e se a re a s o f s tu d y ? W h a t a llow s for th e ju s tif ic a - tio n o f su c h k now ledge a n d in w h a t w ays c a n w e be c e r ta in of it? E sse n tia lly , K a n t concludes t h a t th e re a re tw o e le m e n ts w h ich allow fo r ex p erien ce a n d fo r know ledge b a se d on th e s e experiences . T he f i r s t e le - m e n t is th e "in tu i t io n " of space a n d tim e. I n o rd e r to h a v e a n experience of a n object, w e m u s t h a v e som e in it ia l s e n sa tio n o f th e object, since "in tu it io n Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12 ta k e s p la c e on ly in so f a r a s th e object is given to u s ."2 B u t th is s e n sa tio n a l- w ay s com es to u s in specific w ays, nam ely , a s o c cu rrin g in sp ace a n d in tim e. T h ro u g h a se r ie s o f a rg u m e n ts ,3 h e con tends t h a t i t is th e n a tu r e o f th e h u - m a n m in d to in tu i t a ll ob jects in accordance w ith th e fo rm s o f space a n d tim e. S p a c e is th e fo rm o f e x te rn a l in tu itio n , w hile tim e is th e fo rm o f in te r n a l as w e ll a s e x te rn a l in tu itio n . In d ee d , K a n t a rg u e s t h a t w ith o u t space a n d tim e, w e4 w o u ld n o t be ab le to ex p erien ce objects a s s e p a ra te from each o th e r a n d a s s e p a ra te from o u rse lv es in th e f i r s t place. T h u s space a n d tim e , K a n t m a in ta in s , a re tw o g u a ra n to r s o f th e pos- s ib ili ty fo r know ledge. T h is i s b e ca u se we, a s h u m a n b e in g s , a re c e r ta in th a t i f w e a re to h a v e a n y ex p erien ce o f a n object w h a tso ev e r, w e w ill experience i t i n sp a ce a n d tim e . T h e p ro p o sitio n s of geom etry , th e n , a re t r u e b e c a u se of th e n e c e ssa ry c h a ra c te r o f o u r in tu it io n s of space;5 re g a rd le s s o f w h a t k in d of ob ject is in tu i te d , w e c a n k n o w tr u e p ropositions o f geom etry , b e ca u se o u r in - tu it io n s o f sp ace a n d tim e e x is t p r io r to an y in tu i te d object.6 T h ese t r u th s a re g e n u in e d iscoveries, b u t th e y a re d iscoveries on ly i f w e re a liz e t h a t sp a c e an d tim e a re n o t som ehow "o u t th e re ," som ehow e x is tin g a p a r t fro m th e in tu itio n ; "sp a ce does n o t re p re se n t a n y p ro p e rty of th in g s in th em se lv e s , n o r does i t r e p re s e n t th e m in th e ir re la tio n to one an o th e r... S p ace is n o th in g b u t th e 2 A19 = B33. All citations from the Critique o f Pure Reason will give the first and second edi- tion Akademie page numbers and come from: Immanuel Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965). 3 See especially in the "Aesthetic" and the "Antinomies." 4 At least we as human beings. Other beings might be able to differentiate objects without in- tuiting them through space and time, though we could not conceive how. See: Isabel Cabrera, "Two Ori- entations for Kant's Transcendental Arguments: An Example," in Proceedings o f the Eighth Interna- tional Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson 2, pt. 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 164*5. 5 Kant, of course, thought this space to be necessarily Euclidean in character. Several commen- tators have written on this fact. See: P.F. Strawson, "Imagination and Perception," in Kant on Pure Rea- son (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 82-99; James Hopkins, "Visual Geometry," Philosophi- cal Review, 82 (1973): 3-34; and Norman Kemp Smith, Commentary to Kant's "Critique o f Pure Rea- son" (New Jersey: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1992), 117-120. 6 It seems we would have to have some experience or other before we could be aware of the forms of the intuitions, though there are sections where Kant seems to think we might have a direct expe- rience of the forms themselves. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13 fo rm o f a ll ap p ea ran ces o f o u te r s e n se ."7 A t le a s t in th e case o f m a th e m a tic s a n d geom etry , K a n t c an show th e fo u n d a tio n for experience a n d know ledge. K a n t m a in ta in s th a t i t w as n o t u n til th e m a th e m a tic ia n s a n d geom e- te r s o f o ld ch an g ed th e ir w ay o f th in k in g abou t th e ir d isc ip lin e t h a t th e y w e re a b le to discover im p o r ta n t t r u th s . In th e "P reface" to th e second e d itio n o f th e Critique, K a n t c la im s t h a t th e s e m en h a d to m ove from th in k in g ab o u t w h a t co u ld be deduced from th e n a tu r e o f th e m a th e m a tic a l objects th e m - se lves , to th e rev o lu tio n a ry a t te m p t to bring out w hat was necessarily implied in the concepts th a t he had himself formed a priori, and had p u t into the figure in the construction by which he presented it to himself... [H]e m ust not ascribe to the figure anything save w hat necessarily follows from w hat he has himself se t into it in accordance w ith his concept.8 In th is w ay, th e focus sh if ts fro m ho w th e objects m u st b e in th em se lv es, to h o w th e y m u s t be fo r u s, how th e h u m a n m in d gives th e m sh a p e a n d p ro p e r- tie s . W e app ly concepts o f m a th e m a tic s a n d geom etry to o u r in tu it io n s , a n d w e a re th u s able to p ro cu re n e w know ledge, b u t only by d iscovering th e n a - tu r e o f o u r own in tu it io n s o f sp a ce a n d tim e, n o t by d iscovering th e n a tu re th e objects them selves. Im p o rta n tly , K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t th is m e th o d a p - p lie s n o t on ly to objects o f m a th e m a tic s a n d geom etry, b u t to th e objects o f sc ience a s well. T h is edict th a t w e m u s t n o t co n sid er ou r know ledge a s con fo rm ing to ob jects, b u t r a th e r t r e a t ob jects o f th e n a tu r a l w orld a s con fo rm ing to o u r in - tu it io n a n d u n d e rs ta n d in g , h a s com e to be know n as K a n t's "C o p em ican 7 A26 = B42. Kant argues for this assertion not only in the "Aesthetic," but also particularly in the "Antinomies," where he asserts that space and time must necessarily be understood only as forms of intuition, because if they are taken to exist "out there" apart from our intuitions, many incongruities exist which can not otherwise be resolved. 8 B xii. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14 R evo lu tion ."9 In th e sa m e w ay th a t C opern icus rep laced th e E a r th w ith the S u n a t th e cen te r o f th e so la r system , K a n t now rem oves th e n a tu r a l object from th e cen te r of know ledge, rep lac in g i t w ith h u m a n reaso n : By nature, in the em pirical sense, we understand the connection of appear- ances as regards th e ir existence according to necessary rules, th a t is, according to laws. There are certain laws which first make a nature possible, and these laws are a priori. Em pirical laws can exist and be discovered only through ex- perience, and indeed in consequence of those original laws through which ex- perience itself first becomes possible.10 T h is le a d s u s to th e seco n d o f tw o e lem en ts w h ic h allow fo r ex p erien ce a n d fo r know ledge b a se d on th e s e experiences. K a n t's in v es tig a tio n in to th e d is- c ip lin es o f m a th e m a tic s a n d geom etry le a d u s to th e discovery o f in tu it io n s of space a n d tim e. K a n t's in v e s tig a tio n in to th e fo u n d a tio n s w h ich a llow fo r ex p erien ce of th e n a tu r a l w o rld lead s u s to com bine th e p u re in tu i t io n s w ith p u re concepts. T h ese concep ts K a n t ca lls "c a teg o rie s" or "p u re concep ts o f the u n d e rs ta n d in g ." W hile in tu it io n s give h u m a n b e ings th e n e ce ssa ry ra w d a ta of em p irica l se n sa tio n , th o u g h on ly a s re p re se n te d in space a n d tim e , th e ca teg o ries allow u s to th in k a b o u t th is d a ta . K a n t d iv ides h u m a n cognitive capacity , to be u n d e rs to o d b road ly , in to in tu it io n a n d u n d e rs ta n d in g .11 In an o ften c ite d q uo ta tion , K a n t say s th a t , "w ith o u t se n s ib ility no ob ject w o u ld be g iven to u s , w ith o u t u n d e rs ta n d in g no object w o u ld be th o u g h t. T h o u g h ts w ith o u t c o n te n t a re em p ty , in tu itio n s w ith o u t concep ts a re b lin d ."12 In o th e r w ords, w ith o u t se n sa tio n s , w e w ould, a t best, h a v e only em p ty concepts, w ith 9 Though there is at least one additional understanding of Kant's "Copemican Revolution" which takes it to be the abandonment of the theoretical project for the practical project. 10 A216 = B263. First italics mine. See also A116 and A126-7. 11 Certainly there is some question about just how many faculties Kant gives us in the first Cri- tique, but this is beyond the scope of this chapter. There may also be the faculty of reason, though this may simply be the understanding in its transcendent, unschematized employment. There may also be the faculties of judgment and imagination. 12 A51 =B75. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. n o th in g to app ly th em to, a n d w ith o u t u n d e rs ta n d in g , w e w ould h a v e som e ju m b le o f im press ions to w h ich w e cou ld give no o rd e r o r sign ificance. H u m a n be ings n eed m a te r ia l in o rd e r to th in k , a n d th u s K a n t ag rees, in p a r t , w ith H um e's conclusions t h a t th e re could be n o know ledge w ith o u t f i r s t h a v in g experience. B u t w h ile som e experience is n e c e ssa ry to fu rn ish th e h u m a n m in d w ith e le m e n ts o f th o u g h t, "th o u g h a ll o u r know ledge b eg in s w ith experience, i t does n o t fo llow t h a t i t a ll a r is e s o u t o f experience ."13 S pace , tim e, a n d th e c a teg o rie s e x is t a priori in th e m in d in o rd e r th a t th e ob jec ts o f experience m ig h t b e a b le to be th o u g h t in th e f i r s t p lace. N ow K a n t is ab le to a t te m p t a n an sw er to th e q u e s tio n of know ledge in th e n a tu r a l sciences. B e ca u se ob jec ts m u s t conform to o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g , a n d b ecau se th e ca tego ries o f th e h u m a n u n d e rs ta n d in g a re u n iv e rsa l, w e c a n be a s su re d th a t w h a te v e r ob ject is a n object o f p o ss ib le experience, i t w ill h a v e to conform to th e c a teg o ries . C oncep ts o r c a teg o rie s o f th e u n d e rs ta n d - in g , th o u g h em p ty ,14 ex is t a priori, in o rd e r th a t th e m a te r ia l fu rn ish e d by th e se n se s can be th o u g h t. T h e p a r t ic u la r e m p iric a l law s o f n a tu re , su c h a s t h a t o f th e accelera tion of g ra v ity o r th e m otion o f th e p la n e ts , w ill b e b a se d on th e s e ru le s .15 N a tu ra l sc ien ce is se cu re d a s a body o f know ledge b ecau se a n y n a tu r a l object we m ig h t e x p e rie n c e m u s t conform to space , tim e, a n d th e la w s o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g , w h ic h a re n ecessa ry a n d u n iv e rs a l for a ll h u m a n b e in g s : "w e th e n a s se r t t h a t th e co n d itio n s o f th e possibility o f experience in g e n e ra l a re likew ise co n d itio n s o f th e possibility o f the objects of experience, a n d th a t for th is rea so n th e y h a v e objective v a lid ity ..."16 H ence in tu it io n a n d 13 Bl. 14 "Thus the function of the categorical judgment is that of the relation of the subject to predi- cate... But as regards the merely logical employment of the understanding, it remains undetermined to which of the two concepts the function o f the subject, and to which the function of predicate, is to be as- signed... Similarly with all the other categories" (B128-9). See also A.C. Ewing, A Short Commentary on K ant's Critique of Pure Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 132-75. 15 "...all empirical laws are only special determinations of the pure laws of understanding, un- der which, and according to the norm of which, they first become possible" (A 127-8). 16 A158 = B197. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16 u n d e rs ta n d in g a re th e two e le m e n ts w h ich allow fo r e x p erien ce a n d for k n o w led g e b a s e d on th e se experiences . S u c h a p o s itio n h a s tw o (im m ed ia te ) im p o rta n t co nsequences. T h e f i r s t is th e fa c t t h a t w e m ay h a v e know ledge only o f th o se ob jec ts w h ich s e n - s a tio n p rov ides: Objects are given to us by m eans of sensibility, and i t alone yields us intui- tions', they are thought through the understanding, and from the understand- ing arise concepts. But all thought m ust, directly or indirectly, by way of cer- ta in characters, relate ultim ately to intuitions, and therefore, w ith us, to sen- sibility, because in no o ther way can an object be given to u s.17 H en ce , p u re "ra t io n a l" ph ilosophy , l ik e t h a t o f L eibn iz a n d W olff, is ru le d o u t b y K a n t, b e ca u se th e on ly objects a b o u t w h ich we m ay h a v e kn o w led g e a re ob jec ts o f p o ss ib le experience, a n d ex p e rien ce req u ire s e m p iric a l in p u t th a t con fo rm s to th e se n s ib le in tu it io n s o f sp ace a n d tim e . T h e ca teg o ries , ta k e n by th e m se lv e s a n d n o t a p p lied to th e in tu it io n s (u n sch em atized ), a re em pty . T h e y p o ssess on ly log ical form s, a n d h a v e no co n ten t. T h u s , n o n e w im p o r- t a n t k now ledge c a n b e g a in ed by th e m ere a n a ly s is o f concep ts. B ecause h u m a n s a re f in ite in te llig en ces , w e c a n n o t c re a te th e ob jects th ro u g h th o u g h t a lo n e fo r w h ich w e m ig h t h a v e a concept; G od w ould be a b le to do su c h a th in g , i.e ., b r in g in g so m e th in g in to b e in g th ro u g h th o u g h t a lone , b u t w e c a n - n o t .18 S u b se q u e n tly , how ever, th is a lso n e c e ss ita te s th a t w e c a n d iscover n o th in g a b o u t m e tap h y s ic s sav e fo r w h a t c a n be g iven to u s a s a n object o f ex p erien ce . T he seco n d co n sid erab le consequence o f K a n t's p o s itio n i s t h a t i t p u ts a n in c re d ib le l im it on w h a t w e c a n k n o w in sp ecu la tiv e p h ilo so p h y ; w e c a n n e v e r g e t to th e "th in g in itself* (die Sache an sich selbst o r das Ding an sich), 17 A19 = B33. 18 We can, of course, bring geometrical objects "into being" through the construction of con- cepts, but such objects have to be constructed in space, which means for Kant that they too are not known analytically. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. [ S 17 a n d a re th e re fo re re leg a ted to d e a lin g w ith m ere a p p e a ra n c e s (Erscheinung). B ecau se a n y object m u st f ir s t be sy n th e s iz e d th ro u g h th e in tu it io n s of space a n d tim e in o rd e r to be th o u g h t, w e a re n e v e r ab le to h a v e a n experience o f a n ob jec t a p a r t from exp erien c in g i t in sp ace a n d tim e. H ence , w e a re only ab le to th in k a b o u t ap p ea ran ces, n o t th in g s in them selves: Since we cannot trea t the special conditions of sensibility [space and time] as conditions of the possibility of things, b u t only of their appearances, we can in- deed say th a t space comprehends all th ings th a t appear to us as external, bu t no t all th ings in themselves, by w hatever subject they are intuited, or whether they be in tu ited or not.19 T h u s , th e ob jec ts we h av e to th in k a b o u t, a n y object of poss ib le experience, m u s t n o t b e th in g s in them se lves, b u t on ly a p p ea ran ces , t h a t is , objects a l- re a d y in tu i te d th ro u g h space a n d tim e . As N o rm an K em p S m ith su m m a- rizes: "E x is te n c e tak e s a th ree fo ld , n o t a m ere ly d u a l form . B esides rep re - s e n ta t io n s a n d th in g s in th em se lv es, th e r e e x is t th e objects o f o u r rep re se n - ta t io n s - th e e x te n d ed w orld o f o rd in a ry experience a n d o f sc ience."20 The p rice fo r th e t r u th s of science is t h a t k n o w led g e of th e n a tu r a l w orld m u s t be u n d e rs to o d a s know ledge only o f a p p e a ra n c e s , n o t o f th in g s in them selves. T h e d iscoveries o f science a re in d e e d s e c u re d a s know ledge, b u t only as kn o w led g e o f th in g s as th ey a p p e a r to u s in space a n d tim e . H u m a n s , ac- co rd in g to K a n t, h av e no access to th e re a lm o f th in g s a s th e y a re a p a r t from o u r e x p e rien ce o f them , no experience o f w h a t h e te rm s th e "n o u m en a l" re a lm . W e c a n on ly h ave know ledge o f w h a t w e can experience , a n d we can only e x p e rien c e w h a t is g iven to u s a s in tu i te d th ro u g h sp ace a n d tim e an d th o u g h t b y th e categories. 19 A27 = B43. 20 Smith's Commentary, pp. 248-9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18 m . T he h u m a n se lf is also su b je c t to su ch a re s tric tio n of sp e c u la tiv e know ledge. T h is re s tr ic tio n is e sp ec ia lly im p o rta n t in th is book b e c a u se o f o u r fo rth co m in g d iscussion o f freed o m a n d im m o rta lity . A s H u m e a rg u e d so conv incing ly in A Treatise o f Human Nature, w e sim ply h a v e no e x p erien ce of a u n if ie d "se lf." W e h a v e experiences o f th is a n d th a t th o u g h t o r som e p a r - t ic u la r se n sa tio n , b u t nev er of a self; "fo r m y p a r t , w h en I e n te r m o s t in t i - m a te ly in to w h a t I ca ll myself, I a lw ay s s tu m b le on som e p a r t ic u la r p e rc e p - tio n o r o th e r... I n e v e r ca tch myself at a n y tim e w ith o u t a p e rcep tio n , a n d n e v e r can observe a n y th in g b u t th e p e rc ep tio n ."21 O n one h a n d , K a n t m u s t d isa g ree w ith H u m e 's conclusion t h a t th e re is no u n ified self. W h ile th e a r - g u m e n t for th i s p o sitio n is m uch too d e ta ile d to cover h e re , i ts m a in p re m ise is in tu itiv e ly s im p le : th e re m u s t be a u n i ty o f experience in v o lv ed i f w e a re to experience ob jects a s objects, t h a t is , to be ab le to d iffe ren tia te b e tw e e n id en tica l, c h an g in g , o r d iffe ren t ob jects. W ith o u t such a u n ity of ex perience , w h ich K a n t c a lls th e "tra n s c e n d e n ta l u n i ty o f appercep tion ," th e re w ou ld on ly be f le e tin g im p ress io n s of th e m an ifo ld o f experience, i f even th a t ; "th e re can b e in u s n o m odes o f know ledge, n o connection o r u n ity o f one m ode of know ledge w ith a n o th e r , w ith o u t t h a t u n i ty o f consciousness w h ich p reced es a ll d a ta o f in tu itio n s , a n d by re la tio n to w h ich re p re se n ta tio n o f ob jec ts is a lone possib le ."22 O n th e o th e r h a n d , how ever, K a n t ag rees w ith H u m e t h a t w e c a n h a v e no ex p erien ce of a self, n o r c a n w e h a v e a n y specu la tive kn o w led g e o f it. T h is is p r im a r ily due to th e fac t th a t , a s se e n above, w e can only h a v e k n o w l- edge o f ob jects a s th e y a re g iven to u s , a n d th e se lf a s g iven is o n ly g iven th ro u g h th e in tu i t io n o f tim e: 21 David Hume, A Treatise o f Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), Book 1, Part IV, Section vi, pp. 252. ~ A107. See especially A107-8. A119. and B157-9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19 Consciousness of se lf according to the determ inations of our s ta te in inner per- ception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in th is flux of inner appearances... W hat h as necessarily to be represented as num erically identical cannot be thought as such through empirical data .23 T he se lf can only be k n o w n by u s as a n y o th e r ob jec t o f poss ib le experience, n a m e ly a s i t is p re s e n te d to u s th ro u g h th e in tu it io n . T h is is n o t th e se lf a s th in g i t itse lf, b u t on ly s e lf a s a p p ea ran ce . T h is is th e s e lf w h ich is n o t only g iven in tim e, b u t a lso th o u g h t th ro u g h th e ca teg o ries , a n d h e n c e m u s t b e sub jec t to th ese ca teg o ries . W e a re ig n o ra n t o f th e t ru e n a tu r e o f th e se lf a s i t m ay b e a p a r t from ex p erien ce .24 As K a n t concludes, b e ca u se th e categories or concepts o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g a re fo rm s on ly a n d invo lve n o c o n te n t per se, "th o u g h t ta k e s no acc o u n t w h a tso ev er o f th e m ode o f in tu it io n , w h e th e r i t be sensib le o r in te lle c tu a l. I th e re b y re p re s e n t m y se lf to m y se lf n e ith e r a s I am n o r a s I a p p e a r to m yse lf. I th in k m y se lf o n ly a s I do a n y ob jec t in gen- e ra l from w hose m ode o f in tu i t io n I a b s tra c t."25 W e c an n o t k n o w th e se lf as su b s tan ce . W e c a n h a v e no experience o f th e s e lf a s i t is in itse lf . W e are only p riv y to receive e m p iric a l im p ress io n s w h ich h a v e b e en in tu i te d th ro u g h tim e a n d th o u g h t th ro u g h th e categories. W e c a n n o t say w ith specu la tive rea so n w h e th e r th e so u l is a sim p le su b s tan ce , w h e th e r i t w ill e x is t e te rn a lly , o r w h e th e r i t c an m a in ta in a p e rso n a lity over t im e .26 A n a tu r a l c o n s id e ra tio n a fte r th is lin e o f th in k in g is to in q u ire w h e th e r sp ecu la tiv e p h ilo so p h y , w hile p ro v id in g u s w ith no p o sitiv e know ledge of th e self, m a y n e ce ss ita te som e p ro h ib itio n s re g a rd in g th e self. T he specific concern o f K a n t's is w h e th e r sp e cu la tiv e p h ilo so p h y ru le s ou t th e p ossib ility of freedom , d u e to i ts in s is ten ce on th e law s o f m ec h an ica l 23 A107. See also A350-1 and A381-2. 24 See especially A398-402, B409-413, and B421-2. 25 B428-9. 26 Such a position may lead to even more radical conclusions regarding the self, but we need not discuss them here. See: Smith's Commentary, pp. 248-84. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20 c a u sa tio n . K a n t can a n sw e r th is q u e s tio n on ly a f te r h is d iscussion o f th e "T h ird A n tinom y ." T h e p ro b lem o f th e "T h ird A ntinom y" co n ce rn s freedom a n d m e c h a n i- c a l c a u sa lity , a n d a r is e s in th e fo llow ing w ay: r e a s o n h a s a n in te re s t in s e a rc h in g o u t th e u n c o n d itio n ed , th e "entire sum o f conditions, and conse- quently the absolutely unconditionedF fo r a n y g iven co n d itio n ed .27 T h e re a re tw o p o ss ib ilitie s w h e n c o n s id e rin g a co n d itio n ed o c c u rr in g w ith in a se r ie s of e v e n ts in tim e: e i th e r th e re is a f i r s t cau se , a n u n c o n d itio n e d w hich b e g in s th e s e r ie s (i.e., freed o m 28), o r no su c h u n c o n d itio n ed e x is ts , in w hich case th e re i s a n in f in ite s e r ie s . N ow K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t su c h a n an tin o m y a ris e s n a tu r a l ly a n d u n a v o id a b ly fo r re a so n b ecau se i t m u s t a ssu m e th a t both th e se p o ss ib ilitie s a re co rrec t. O n th e one h a n d , th e th e s is (freedom ) m u st b e a s - s u m e d t r u e becau se o th e rw ise w e w ou ld h av e th e p ro b lem of a n effect w ith no c au se , only a n in f in ite c h a in o f effects. As L ew is W h ite B eck exp la ins: in a series of conditions and conditions of conditions, there is never a first con- dition; bu t the law of na tu re is th a t nothing occurs w ithout a condition th a t is a priori sufficient. Hence... the law of nature is self-contradictory when taken in unlim ited generality .29 O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e a n ti th e s is m u s t h o ld t r u e i f w e a re to m a in ta in th e co n cep t o f m ech an ica l c a u s a lity fo r th e experience o f n a tu r e . B eck su m m a - rizes: I f there is a spontaneous cause or an absolute beginning in the natural causal series, the la te r m em bers of the series are independent of the earlier, and thereby the "unity of experience," which depends upon the lawfulness of events 27 A409 = B436. See also: A409-21 = B435-49. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter when dealing with the "Ideas of Reason." 28 "By freedom... in its cosmological meaning, I understand the power of beginning a state spontaneously. Such causality will not, therefore, itself stand under another cause determining it in time, as required by the law of nature." A533 = B561. 29 p. 184. Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Midway reprint. 1984). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21 in tim e, is made impossible, and thereby no criterion of em pirical tru th or ob- jectivity is possible.30 T h u s re a so n is u n av o id ab ly le a d in to a n an tinom y, a n d K a n t t h i n k s th a t i t is a b so lu te ly c ru c ia l for re a so n to f in d a so lu tio n to th is a n tin o m y b e ca u se i t is o f re a so n 's ow n m ak ing .31 T h e so lu tion to th is p ro b lem , o f course, is t h a t th e n a tu r a l w orld, w h ile objective, is only th e w o rld in tu i te d th ro u g h space, tim e , a n d sub ject to th e c a teg o rie s , a n d th u s is o n ly th e em p irica l rea lm of a p p e a ra n c e . T h is is n o t th e on ly rea lm , for K a n t h a s a lre a d y a rg u e d for th e d iv is io n b e tw e e n ap - p e a ra n c e s a n d th in g s in th em se lv e s . T h u s, if appearances are things in them selves, freedom cannot be upheld. Nature will th en be the complete and sufficient determining cause of every event. If, on the o ther hand, appearances are not taken for more th an they actually are; if they are viewed not as th ings in themselves, bu t merely as representations, connected according to em pirical laws, they m ust them selves have grounds which are not appearances... While the effects are to be found in the series of em pirical conditions, the intelligible cause, together w ith its causality, is out- side the series. Thus the effect m ay be regarded as free in respect of its intel- ligible cause, and a t the sam e tim e in respect of appearances as resulting from them according to the necessity of na tu re .32 I f one co n sid e rs a p p ea ran ces a s th in g s in them selves, th e n one m u s t e lim i- n a te th e p o ss ib ility of freedom , b u t a s one tak e s th em to b e m e re a p p e a r - ances, K a n t concludes t h a t freed o m is n o t incom patib le w ith n a tu r a l c au sa l- ity . W h ile w e n ecessa rily a p p ly th e ca tego ry o f c a u sa lity to ob jec ts o f possible ex perience , a s ap p ea ran ces , th e s e ob jec ts h ave a "cau se" w h ich m a y n o t u lti- m a te ly b e t h a t o f an o th e r a p p e a ra n c e ; a s h e says, a p p e a ra n c e s "m u s t have g ro u n d s w h ich a re n o t a p p e a ra n c e s ." W e h av e n o id e a how , u ltim a te ly , ap - p e a ra n c e s com e to be p e rce iv ed b y u s , fo r we c an only ex p erien ce a n y th in g 30 Beck's Commentary, p. 185. 31 Cf. A476-85 = B504-13. 32 A536-7 = B564-5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I 22 th ro u g h space a n d tim e. T h u s , th e an tin o m y is so lved b e ca u se m echan ica l c a u sa lity is n e ce ssa ry for ob jec ts of possib le experience, w h ile freedom a s an u n co n d itio n ed cau se is p o ss ib le fo r th in g s in th em se lv es; b o th th e s is a n d a n - ti th e s is a re n e e d e d fo r rea so n . The so lu tio n to th is a n tin o m y c lears th e w ay fo r h u m a n freedom as w ell. K a n t r ig h tly n o tes t h a t a w o rld u n d ers to o d a s o p e ra tin g com pletely u n d e r th e ru le s o f m ec h an ica l c a u sa tio n is in co m p atib le w ith th e possib ility o f h u m a n freedom . B u t th e d iv is io n be tw een n o u m e n a a n d p h e n o m e n a also a p p lie s to th e p e rso n . In th i s re sp ec t, w e m ay r ig h tly th in k b o th th a t a n ef- fec t in th e w orld w as s im p ly o n e cond itioned am ong a ch a in o f cond itions a n d t h a t th e effect w a s b ro u g h t a b o u t a s th e re s u lt o f a co m p le te ly sp o n tan eo u s a n d u n co n d itio n ed cause . T h u s , freedom a n d c a u sa lity a re n o t con trad ic to ry no tions, for one h a s to do w ith th e s e lf a s a n o n -em p irica l re a lity , w hile th e o th e r h a s to do w ith a p p e a ra n c e s in th e world; th e in te llig ib le cau se o f th e a p p ea ra n c e m ay b e re g a rd e d a s free , w hile th e se rie s o f a p p e a ra n c e s m ay be c a u se d according to th e law s o f n a tu re . IV. H av ing se en how th e s e lf a n d freedom a re e x a m in e d in th e f irs t Critique, we h a v e fin a lly to d isc u ss K a n t's co n sid e ra tio n o f G od.33 K a n t gives on ly tw o possib ilities fo r know ledge o f God, b o th of w h ich h e re jec ts , n am ely know ledge b a sed on reaso n , a n d know ledge b a se d on re v e la tio n .34 In "T he Id e a l o f P u re R eason ," K a n t m a in ta in s th a t th e re a re o n ly th re e possib le proofs fo r th e ex is ten ce o f G od,35 a ll o f w hich fa il. T h e f i r s t is th e "ontologi- ca l" proof, w hich h a s i t t h a t G od e x is ts because th e co n cep t o f G od in c lu d es ev ery possib le perfec tion , o f w h ich one am ong th e m is "e x is ten ce ." K a n t 33 Kant maintains that "Metaphysics has as the proper object of its inquiries three ideas only: God, freedom, and immortality..." (B395 n.). 34 A631 =B659. 35 A590 = B618. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23 c o u n te rs th is a rg u m e n t by c la im in g th a t th is on ly h o ld s tru e i f we excep t th e e x is ten ce o f th e object b e fo re h an d as i t h a s b e e n defined; th is is lik e o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g o f a tr ia n g le , fo r "to p o s it a tr ia n g le , a n d ye t to re jec t i t s th re e an g le s , is se lf-con trad icto ry ; b u t th e re is no c o n tra d ic tio n in re je c tin g th e t r ia n g le to g e th e r w ith i ts th re e ang les. T h e sa m e h o ld s t ru e o f th e co n cep t of a n a b so lu te ly n e ce ssa ry b e in g ."36 B ecause w e define th e concept o f God, to p o s it i t s ex istence b u t to th e n re jec t one o f th e c h a rac te ris tic s w ould be co n trad ic to ry ; b u t re je c tin g th e ex istence o f th e ob ject o f th e concept to g e th e r w ith i ts c h a rac te ris tic s is p e rm itte d . To do o th e rw ise w ould b e to a ssu m e th e v e ry object to be p roved .37 T h e o th e r tw o p o ss ib le proofs, K a n t c la im s, a re th e "cosm ological" a n d th e "physico-theological"38 p roofs. H e a rg u e s th a t w h ile b o th of th e m begin w ith d iffe ren t p rem ise s , n a m e ly som e type o f experience o r o th e r , th e key to th e i r p ro o f a lw ays re d u c e s to th e ontological a rg u m e n t above, a n d a re b o th th e re fo re in co n s is te n t.39 K a n t c la im s th a t a ll o th e r a t te m p ts a t such a p ro o f a re on ly d iffe ren t v e rs io n s o f th ese th re e m is ta k e n a rg u m e n ts . G iven th e d iscussion above, i t sh o u ld b e c le a r th a t th e on ly p o ss ib le knowledge o f God h a v e w ou ld h av e to com e fro m th e experience of G od a s a n e m p iric a l object: w e c a n n o t know G od from th e a n a ly s is of concepts, a s m a n y th in k e rs h a v e a tte m p te d , b ecau se concep ts a re e m p ty a n d w ith o u t c o n te n t u n t i l t h a t co n ten t is su p p lie d b y th e in tu it io n s . B u t w h a t possib le c o n te n t co u ld be p rov ided t h a t cou ld disclose a t r a n s c e n d e n t God? A ny experience or "re v e la tio n " w ould b e su b jec t to space, tim e , a n d th e categories, a n d concern on ly a p p ea ran ces . T h u s K a n t concludes t h a t 36 A594-5 = B622-3. 37 A595 = 623. 38 We might call this the "teleological proof." 39 On this reduction see: A590 = B618. A607 = B635. and A625 = B653. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24 all a ttem p ts to employ reason in theology in any m erely speculative m anner are a ltogether fruitless and by the ir very nature null and void, and th a t the principles of its employment in the study of nature do not lead to any theology whatsoever... All synthetic principles of reason allow only of an im m anent employment; and in order to have knowledge of a suprem e being we should have to p u t them to a transcendent use, for which ou r understanding is in no way fitted .40 W e c a n n o t d e riv e know ledge o f G od e i th e r from ra t io n a l in q u iry o r from som e experience o f th e d iv in e . T he c a teg o rie s a re th em se lv e s em p ty , w h ile re v e la - tio n can on ly d isc lose know ledge o f th e re a lm o f a p p e a ra n c e s . V. W ere i t n o t fo r a few h in ts a lo n g th e w ay, w e m ig h t th in k th a t K a n t h a s m ad e i t im p o ssib le fo r u s to k n o w a n y th in g ab o u t G od, freedom , o r th e self. A nd, s tr ic t ly sp e ak in g , th is is t ru e . B ecau se k n o w led g e m u s t d ea l w ith objects o f p o ss ib le experience , w e c a n n o t h a v e know ledge o f God, freedom , o r th e self. B u t a s K a n t's fam ous s ta te m e n t, "I h a v e th e re fo re fo u n d i t n eces- sa ry to d en y knowledge, in o rd er to m a k e room for faith (Glaube),"41 in d i- ca tes , K a n t is k e e n ly a w a re of th e l im ita tio n s h e h a s p la c e d on m etaphysics, a n d looks fo r a so u rce o th e r th a n sp e c u la tiv e rea so n in w h ic h to in v e s tig a te th e se m e ta p h y s ic a l q u estio n s . T h is sou rce , o f course, is p ra c tic a l reaso n , a n d i t is w ith p ra c tic a l re a so n th a t K a n t fee ls w e c a n h av e a r a t io n a l b a s is for b e lie f re g a rd in g God, freedom , a n d th e self, th o u g h w e c a n n o t be a s su re d o f know ledge. A s K a n t's d iscussion in th e "T h e Id e a l o f P u re R easo n ," th e "A ppend ix to th e T ra n sc e n d e n ta l D ia lec tic ," a n d th e "T ra n sc e n d e n ta l Doc- tr in e o f M eth o d " in d ic a te s , h e be lieves i t is o n ly th ro u g h a n in v es tig a tio n in to m o ra lity t h a t w e c a n a sp ire to a n sw e r th e m e ta p h y s ic a l q u estio n s; But w hen all progress in the field of the supersensible h as th u s been denied to speculative reason, it is still open to u s to enquire w hether, in the practical knowledge of reason, da ta m ay not be found sufficient to determ ine reason's 40 A636 = B664. 41 Bxxx. See also A745 = B773. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25 transcendent concept of the unconditioned, and so to enable us, in accordance w ith the wish of m etaphysics, and by m eans of knowledge th a t is possible a priori, though only from a practical point of view, to pass beyond the lim its of all possible experience.42 T h o u g h K a n t's c ritica l p ro je c t h a s p ro h ib ited a n y k n o w led g e o f m etaphysics th ro u g h specu la tive re a so n , i t a lso h a s th e p o sitiv e e ffec t o f n o t p lac ing a n y d e fin ite re s tric tio n s u p o n th e possib le n a tu re o f G od, freedom , or th e self. In o th e r w ords, w hile w e c a n n o t be su re th a t th e se th r e e m e tap h y s ica l objects e x is t,43 n e ith e r can w e b e c e r ta in th a t th e y c an n o t. T h u s , K a n t h a s m ade room fo r fa ith . Specifically, room is m ad e av a ilab le b y th e fa c t th a t , w hile w e c a n - n o t d ed u ce a n y th in g from th e m ere form o f th e c o n cep ts o f th e u n d e rs ta n d - in g , w e c a n u tilize th em i n th in k in g . As K a n t e x p la in s , w h ile I can only k n o w a n object th ro u g h ex p erien ce or a priori th ro u g h rea so n , "though w e c a n n o t know th ese objects a s th in g s in th em se lv es, w e m u s t y e t be in a p o si- tio n a t le a s t to think th e m a s th in g s in them se lv es; o th e rw ise w e shou ld be la n d e d in th e ab su rd conclu sio n th a t th e re c an b e a p p e a ra n c e w ith o u t a n y - th in g t h a t a p p ea rs ."44 "I c a n think w h a tev e r I p le a se , p ro v id ed only th a t I do n o t c o n tra d ic t m yself..."45 K a n t's th ree -fo ld d iv is io n o f re a l ity in to re p re se n - ta t io n s , ap p ea ran ces , a n d th in g s in them se lves, n e c e s s i ta te d b y th e re s u lts o f th e Critique, allow s u s to th in k abou t th e n o u m e n a l re a lm , th o u g h we c an n o t k n o w a n y th in g ab o u t it. In Section Two o f "T h e C anon of P u re R e a so n ," K a n t m akes h is fa - m o u s s ta te m e n t th a t , "a ll th e in te re s ts of m y re a so n , sp e cu la tiv e as w ell a s p ra c tic a l, com bine in th e th r e e follow ing q u estio n s: 1. W h a t c an I know? 42 Bxxi. 43 This is not an entirely accurate statement, since Kant believes freedom can indeed be known to be certain, as a necessary foundation for the known moral law, though he seems to refrain from calling this knowledge per se since it is not discovered through speculative reason. 44 Bxxvi-vii. 45 Bxxvi n. See also B146. A287-8 = B344. and A771-2 = B799-800. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26 2. W h a t o u g h t I to do? 3. W h a t m ay I hope."46 Above, w e h a v e a lre ad y seen K a n t's a n sw e r to th e f i r s t q u estio n , a n d seen th a t w e a re q u ite l im ite d in w h a t w e c a n ta k e to b e know ledge per se. T he a n sw e r to th e second question concerns th e m o ra l la w a s sp e lle d o u t in th e ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e ; th is q u estio n is p a sse d over fo r th e m o st p a r t in th e f i r s t Critique, K a n t a ssu m in g h e re t h a t th e re is a m o ra l law , th a t w e h ave access to i t , a n d th a t i t is n o t in - c o n s is ten t w ith sp e cu la tiv e re a so n . I t is to th e th ird q u e s tio n th a t w e m u st now tu rn . As K a n t w ill e x p la in in g re a te r d e ta il in th e Critique of Practical Reason, th o u g h w e c a n n o t k n o w God, freedom , a n d a n im m o rta l self, i f th ese a re n e ce ssa ry c o rre la te s to th e m o ra l law , w e m u s t postulate th e ir existence. In th e f i r s t Critique, K a n t s im p ly ta k e s i t for g ra n te d t h a t w e do h a v e access to th e m o ra l law , th e "ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e" o f th e Grundlegung. F rom th is po in t, h e a rgues: Now if it is indubitably certain th a t something is or th a t som ething ought to happen, bu t this certain ty is a t the same time only conditional, then a certain determ inate condition of i t can be absolutely necessary, or can be an optional and contingent presupposition... Now since there are practical laws which are absolutely necessary, th a t is, the moral laws, it m ust follow th a t if these nec- essarily presuppose the existence of any being as the condition of the possibil- ity of their obligatory power, th is existence m ust be postulated... At some fu- ture time we shall show th a t the moral laws do not m erely presuppose the ex- istence of a suprem e being, b u t also, as them selves in a different connection absolutely necessary, justify us in postulating it, though, indeed, only from a practical point of view.47 T hus, K a n t in tro d u ces th e n e ce ss ity o f p o s tu la te s o f p u r e p ra c tic a l reason . I f a cond ition is n e c e ss ita te d fo r obey ing th e m o ra l law , th e n w e m u s t p o s tu la te th e ex is tence o f th is cond ition , th o u g h we can n o t k n o w i t to ex is t. A s w e w ill see in g re a te r d e ta il below , freedom is necessita ted , b e c a u se o th erw ise we 46 A804-5 = B832-3. 47 A633-4 = B661-2. See also A818 = B846. and A823-29 = B851-57. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27 w ould be su b je c t only to th e law s o f n a tu re , a n d cou ld n o t be p ra is e w o rth y or b lam ew o rth y fo r o u r actions. A n im m o rta l self, c o n ta in in g a c o n s is te n t p e rso n a lity , is p o s tu la te d so th a t w e c a n co n tin u e th e p ro jec t o f becom ing in c re a s in g ly p e rfe c t m o ra l c re a tu re s , a s th e m o ra l la w com m ands; o th e rw ise , ou r lives o n e a r th a lone w ould be too sh o rt, a n d th e m o ra l law a b su rd . A nd, finally , w e m u s t p o s tu la te th e ex is ten ce o f God, a b e in g w ho c a n re w a rd o r p u n ish u s in accord w ith o u r leve l o f m o ra l perfection o r o u r good w ill. T hese p o s tu la te s a re th e a n sw e r to th e th i r d q u estio n , "W h a t m a y I hope?" a n d a re m a tte rs fo r b e lie f o r f a i th (glaube), a n d n o t know ledge. W ith th is l a s t q uestio n in m in d , a n d h a v in g e s ta b lish e d som e c ru c ia l p a ra m e te rs fo r o u r d iscussion o f m o ra l p ro g ress , le t u s tu r n now to th e n e x t c h a p te r w h e re w e w ill exam ine K a n t's u n d e rs ta n d in g o f teleology, a n im p o r- ta n t concep t fo r th e in v es tig a tio n o f n a tu r e a n d h isto ry . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I Chapter Two Teleology and the Highest Good in the First Critique I. W ith o u r la rg e r in te r e s t in K a n t's concep tion o f m o ra l p ro g re ss a n d th e "Id e a for a U n iv e rsa l H is to ry w ith a C osm opo litan I n t e n t " specifica lly in m in d , th e re a re a n u m b er of in te r e s t in g p o in ts to b e m a d e re g a rd in g th e Cri- tique o f Pure Reason a n d K a n t's a n sw e r to th e q u e s tio n , "W h a t m ay I hope?" I n th is c h a p te r , th e re a re fo u r c e n tr a l q u e s tio n s w h ich w ill h e ex am in ed : 1. W h a t is th e n a tu r e of a n "id ea ," a n d w h a t is th e n a tu r e o f i t s a p p lica tio n to experience? 2. W h a t is th e n a tu r e o f K a n t's con cep tio n o f teleology? 3. Is th e r e a conflict b e tw een th e a n sw e rs to th e th r e e q u e s tio n s p o se d b y th e i n - te r e s t o f re a so n ? 1 4. W h a t is th e h ig h e s t good a n d w h e re is i t located? A ll fo u r q u estio n s a re in te rre la te d . A s w e sh a ll see , i f w e c a n h a v e som e in d ic a - t io n a s to th e a n sw e rs to th e se q u e s tio n s in th e f i r s t Critique, w e s h a l l b e in a b e t te r p o sitio n to assess th e c la im s K a n t m ak e s in th e "Id e a ," a n d in h is la te r w o rk s . In ad d itio n , i t is im p o r ta n t fo r u s to u n d e r s ta n d h o w K a n t conceives o f th e a n sw e rs to th e se fo u r q u e s tio n s a t th is p o in t, m a n y y e a rs befo re th e w r i t in g o f th e th i r d Critique. T h is o f p a r t ic u la r im p o r ta n c e b e ca u se m a n y co m m en ta to rs th in k th a t K a n t's id e a s o f teleo logy a re v a s t ly u n d e rd e v e lo p e d a t th is s tage , a n d th a t th ey a re n o t so lid ified u n t i l th e l a s t Critique. I n th e p re s e n ta tio n o f th e above issu e s in th is c h a p te r , e sp e c ia lly th e q u e s tio n o f K a n t 's concep tion o f teleology, i t sh o u ld becom e a p p a r e n t t h a t K a n t h a d a 1 What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? Discussed briefly in Chapter One above. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29 v ery c le a r no tion o f th e lim ita tio n s of th e u se o f teleological id eas, a n d t h a t h e does n o t dev ia te from th e p a ra m e te rs h e h im sp lf recogn izes a n d e s ta b - lish e s . H ence , i f K a n t is a w a re o f th e n e c e ssa ry lim ita tio n s , w hich I t h in k h e is, th e n w e ough t n o t a t t r ib u te a "m ere o v e rs ig h t" to h is th in k in g in h is s u b - s e q u e n t p o litica l w ritin g s ( th e "Id e a " a n d "T h eo ry a n d P rac tice ," fo r e x am p le ) i f w e f in d a claim w hich s tr ik e s u s a t f i r s t a s possib ly too s tro n g . I f K a n t is c le a r in h is conception o f th e co rrec t em p loym en t of teleo log ical id e a s i n th e f ir s t Critique, th e n w e o u g h t to g ive h im th e b en efit o f th e d o u b t w h en , in la te r c h a p te rs , we an a ly ze th e s e a d d itio n a l w ritings . F o r now , le t u s a t - te m p t to a n sw e r th e fo u r q u e s tio n s I h a v e ou tlined . n . Id e a s a re n ecessa ry , K a n t a rg u es , fo r th e sy s tem iza tio n of th e u n d e r - s ta n d in g . J u s t as th e u n d e rs ta n d in g d e a lt on ly w ith th e in fo rm a tio n g iv en to i t by th e in tu itio n s , sy n th e s iz in g a n d o rg an iz in g th is in fo rm atio n , re a so n d ea ls o n ly w ith th e u n d e rs ta n d in g , o rg an iz in g i t a n d g iv ing i t s tru c tu re ; the transcendental concept of reason is directed always solely towards absolute to ta lity in the synthesis of conditions, and never term inates save in w h a t is absolutely, th a t is, in all relations, unconditioned... Reason concerns itse lf ex- clusively with absolute to tality in the employment of the concepts of th e un - derstanding, and endeavours to carry the synthetic unity, which is though t in the category, up to the completely unconditioned.2 [Transcendental ideas] are concepts of pure reason, in th a t they view all knowledge gained in experience as being determined through an absolute to- ta lity of conditions.3 In th e "F i r s t Book o f th e T ra n sc e n d e n ta l D ia lec tic" a n d in "T h e Id ea l o f P u r e R easo n ," K a n t a rg u es for th e ex is tence o f th r e e ideas, b a se d u p o n th e th r e e c a teg o rie s o f R ela tion . E ac h id e a gives th e u n d e rs ta n d in g a to ta lity to w a rd s w h ich i t c a n d irec t i ts actions, th o u g h su ch a to ta lity cou ld n e v e r be th e 2 A326 = B382-3. 3 A327 = B384. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 30 object o f a n experience. T he f i r s t is th e id e a o f t h a t w h ich is a su b je c t a n d n e v er a p re d ic a te , th e second is t h a t w hich is u n co n d itio n ed in th e se r ie s of cond itions o f ap p ea ra n c e , a n d th e la s t is th e id e a o f th e "ens realissimum ," o r th a t w h ich is th e su m o f a ll po ssib le p red ic a te s . T h ese th re e id ea s o f rea so n p rov ide th e u n d e rs ta n d in g w ith to ta litie s , id e a s of th e uncond itioned , com pelling th e u n d e rs ta n d in g to m ove beyond p a r t ic u la r g e n e ra liza tio n s to give to ta l i ty to experience. B u t th e s e id ea s m u s t be ta k e n a s re g u la tiv e only, a n d n o t c o n s titu - tive, fo r th e y a re only gu ides t h a t re a so n a p p lie s to th e u n d e rs ta n d in g , a n d do n o t c o n s titu te an y object of p o ss ib le experience . T h e (schem atized ) c a te - gories o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g a llow fo r ex p erien ce o f objects in th e f i r s t p lace, a n d a re th u s c o n s titu tiv e of experience. T he id e a s , w h ile o rg an iz in g th e u n - d e rs ta n d in g a n d g iv ing u s a b a s is fo r th e in v e s tig a tio n o f n a tu ra l sc iences, do n o t c o n s titu te th e objects of experience: I accordingly m aintain th a t transcendental ideas never allow of any constitu- tive employment... On the o ther hand, they have an excellent, and indeed in- dispensably necessary, regulative employment, namely, th a t of directing the understanding towards a certain goal upon which the routes m arked out by all its rules converge, as upon the ir point of intersection. This point is indeed a m ere idea, a focus imaginarius... This illusion... is indispensably necessary if we are to direct the understanding beyond every given experience...4 W e c a n n o t m e e t th e u n co n d itio n ed o r to ta lity i n experience, y e t th e s e id e a s a re n e c e ssa ry i f u n d e rs ta n d in g is to m ove b e y o n d a ran d o m co n g lo m era te of ru le s in to th e fo rm u la tio n of a sy s te m a tic sc ience. T h u s K a n t say s t h a t th e id e a is b e s t th o u g h t o f n o t as a n object given, b u t r a th e r a s a p ro b lem to be solved, fo r "a lth o u g h w e can n o t h a v e a n y k now ledge o f th e object w h ich co rre sp o n d s to a n idea , w e y e t h a v e a p ro b lem atic concep t of i t ."5 "I f th e co n d itio n ed is given, a reg ress in th e se rie s o f a ll i ts cond itions is set u s as a 4 A644-5 = B672-3. 5 A339 = B397. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31 ta sk"6 R eason g u id es th e u n d e rs ta n d in g to sy s te m a tize i ts know ledge th ro u g h i ts a p p lic a tio n of th e ca tego ries . I f w e ta k e th e m to be m ore th a n m ere ly reg u la tiv e , w e e n d up w ith th e p a ra lo g ism s , th e an tin o m ies, a n d th e th re e m is ta k e n p roo fs fo r th e ex is tence o f God. B u t a lo n g w ith id eas w hich a llow fo r th e fu r th e r in g o f th e s tu d y o f n a tu re , K a n t m a in ta in s th a t th e re e x is t id e a s w hich a llow o f an in flu e n ce in th e sp h e re o f p ra c tic a l reason . T h ese in c lu d e th e id e a o f God, freedom , a n d im m o rta lity o f a p e rm a n e n t soul, i.e., th e sa m e th re e ca teg o ries o f R e la tio n a p p lie d now to p ra c tic e , a s w ell as, K a n t m a in ta in s , th e id e a of th e h ig h e s t good, a n d o f a p e rfe c tly o rgan ized a n d e ffe c tu a l c o n s titu tio n . T he fu n c tio n of re a so n is th e o rd e r in g o f ends, fo r b o th th e sp ecu la tiv e a n d th e p rac tic a l sp h e re , "and a s su c h [reason] is n o t b o u n d dow n to n a tu r a l conditions, i t is ju s t if ie d in e x te n d in g th e o rd er o f en d s, a n d th e re w ith o u r ow n ex istence , b e - y o n d th e lim its o f experience a n d of life ."7 A s w e saw in C h a p te r O ne above a n d w ill see a g a in below , rea so n m ay e x te n d i ts e lf th u s b ecau se th e n e ce s- sa ry cond itions fo r a d h e rin g to th e m o ra l la w m u s t be p o s tu la te d i f th e m o ra l la w is tru e . T h e se id e a s a re n o t m a tte r s fo r know ledge, y e t a re n o t m ere op in ions or h y p o th es is . T hey a re p ro p e rly te rm e d "p o s tu la te s" of p u re p r a c t i - c a l rea so n , o r "be lie fs ." R eason gives ru le s a s id e a s for th e o rd erin g o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g , a n d is here, indeed, exercising causality, as actually bringing about th a t which its concept contains; and of such wisdom we cannot, therefore, say disparagingly it is only an idea. On the contrary, ju s t because it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible ends, it m ust as an original, and a t least restrictive condi- tion, serve as s tandard in all th a t bears on the practical.8 6 A497-8 = B526. See also A287 = B344, A328 = 384-5, and A499 = B527. 7 B425. 8 A328 = B385. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 32 J u s t b ecau se th e id ea s a re n o t to be m e t w ith in experience, t h a t does no t m e a n th e y a re "m ere" id eas , fo r K a n t d eem s th em n e ce ssa ry fo r th e u n d e rs ta n d in g a n d fo r p ra c tic a l re a so n , fo r "i t is only by m e a n s o f th is id e a t h a t a n y ju d g m e n t a s to m o ra l w o rth o r i t s opposite is p o ss ib le ."9 T h e id e a s o f r e a s o n a re a p ro ject. A s such , th e y o rd e r th e u n d e rs ta n d in g in th e in v e s tig a tio n of n a tu re , b u t a lso o rd e r th e u n d e rs ta n d in g to w a rd s th e m o ra l e n d s o f rea so n . In th is w ay , re a so n c a n h e lp to b rin g ab o u t i t s ob ject, th o u g h o n ly in p a r t , a n d only a s a p ro jec t.10 T h e id e a s give u s a to ta lity , a "u n ity o f a ll p o ss ib le ends," a n d o rd e r th o se e n d s a p p ro p ria te ly , th o u g h w e c a n n e v e r k n o w th e ex istence o f su ch a to ta lity . In th is w ay, id ea s a id p ra c t ic a l re a so n in th e in s tru c tio n o f th e co rrec t e n d s fo r m o ra lity . G iven our in te r e s t in th e "I d e a fo r a U n iv e rsa l H is to ry w ith a Cosm o- p o lita n In te n t ," i t is in te re s tin g t h a t th e v e ry f irs t id ea th a t K a n t p ro v id es in th e f i r s t Critique a s a n ex am p le is t h e id e a o f a perfec t c o n s titu tio n . In r e - c o n s tru c tin g P la to 's concep tion o f a n id e a , p a r tic u la r ly a p ra c tic a l id e a as p re s e n te d in th e Republic, K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t a constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance w ith laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all oth- ers - I do not speak of the g rea test happiness, for this will follow of itself - is a t any ra te a necessary idea, which m u st be taken as fundam ental not only in first projecting a constitution b u t in all its law s.11 K a n t goes on to c la im in th is sec tion , m u c h in th e sam e w ay a s in th e second book o f th e Metaphysics o f Morals, t h a t th e o rg an iza tio n o f p o litic a l in s t i tu - t io n s m u s t be e s tab lish ed in acco rdance w ith o u r ideas, a n d c a n n o t b e b a se d on ex p erien ce . T his w ou ld be m u ch th e sa m e a s th e e rro r of t r y in g to d isce rn th e n o tio n o f perfec t v ir tu e from e x a m p le s o f experience. I t i s on ly b ecau se 9 A315 = B372. See also A569 = B597. 10 A328 = B384-5. 11 A316 = B373. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 33 th e id e a s o f re a so n a re n o t to be m e t w ith in experience th a t th ey a re ab le to fu n c tio n a s g ro u n d s fo r m ora l ju d g m e n t a n d com parison . C o n stitu tio n s m u s t be c re a te d w ith th e m o ra l law a n d th e id e a o f th e g re a te s t possib le rec ip ro ca l freedom a n d n o t c re a te d from "a d v e rse experience. S u c h experience w o u ld n e v e r h a v e e x is te d a t all, i f a t th e p ro p e r tim e those in s t itu tio n s h a d b e e n e s - ta b lish e d in acco rdance w ith id e a s ..."12 K a n t a rg u es t h a t we h a v e id e a s o f p e rfec t v i r tu e a n d a perfec tly fu n c tio n in g society, a n d i t is th ese id e a s w h ich allow fo r p ra c tic a l re a so n to h av e c a u s a l efficacy. T h re e p o in ts a re im p o r ta n t to n o te abou t K a n t's d iscussion o f th e p e r - fec t c o n s titu tio n . F ir s t , th is d iscu ssio n occurs w ith in a d iscussion o f th e p o s- sib le m o ra l p e rfe c tio n o f h u m a n b e in g s , a n d th u s p ro v id es u s w ith o u r f i r s t c lue th a t m o ra l p e rfec tio n is som ehow l in k e d to p o litica l in s titu tio n s . B efore th e ex am p le , K a n t ta lk s a b o u t v ir tu e a n d th e "ap p ro ach to m oral p e rfe c - tio n ."13 A fte r th e exam ple , he m a in ta in s th a t: in a perfect s ta te no punishm ents w hatsoever would be required. This perfect s ta te m ay never, indeed, come into being; none the less this does not affect the rightfulness of the idea, which, in order to bring the legal organization of m ankind ever nearer to its g rea test possible perfection, advances th is m axi- mum as an archetype. For w hat th e highest degree m ay be a t which m a n k i n d may have to come to a stand, and how great a gulf m ay still have to be left be- tween the idea and its realization, a re questions which no one can, or ought to, answ er.14 In su ch a s i tu a t io n , th e po litica l a n d le g a l in s titu tio n s w ou ld be so efficacious th a t p e rso n s , w h ile h a v in g th e g re a te s t poss ib le freedom , sim ply w o u ld n o t im p in g e o n th e freed o m of o th e rs . T h is i s re q u ire d b y th e m o ra l la w a t i ts perfection , a t le a s t in i t s e x te rn a l a p p lica tio n , a n d no p u n ish m e n t w o u ld be n e ce ssa ry b e c a u se no one w ou ld ac t (ex te rn a lly ) in opposition to th e m o ra l law . I t s h o u ld be no ted , o f course, t h a t in su ch a S ta te , p e rso n s w ou ld n o t 12 A316-7 = B373. 13 A315 = B372, quoted above. 14 A317 = B373-4. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 34 n ecessa rily be m orally perfec t, for th ey cou ld in d ee d b e a c tin g legally w ith o u t h a v in g a good w ill o r a tte m p tin g to ac t from d u ty a lo n e .15 H ence, K a n t is n o t c la im in g h e re th a t a S ta te o rgan ized in com plete accordance w ith th e id e a o f freedom w ould sim p ly be a s i tu a tio n in w h ich in d iv id u a ls a re m orally p e rfec t. B u t th e re is a n im p o r ta n t lin k , th e n a tu re o f w hich w e c a n n o t d iscern fo r c e r - ta in in th is context a lone , be tw een th e p ro jec t o f m o ra l perfection , a n d th e p ro jec t of political a n d le g a l perfection . T he second im p o r ta n t p o in t can on ly b e m en tio n ed h e re , to be ex - p la in e d la te r , b u t is in a s im ila r vein a s th e f i r s t p o in t. In th e p a ra g ra p h follow ing th e f irs t ex am p le o f a n idea, K a n t w rites: It is, however, in regard to the principles of morality, legislation, and religion, where the experience, in th is case of the good, is itself made possible only by the ideas -incomplete as their empirical expression m ust always rem ain -th a t Plato's teaching exhibits its quite peculiar m erits... For whereas, so fa r as na ture is concerned, experience supplies the rules and is the source of tru th , in respect of the m oral laws it is, alas, the m other of illusion!16 W h a t is of in te re s t h e re is th e lin k in g o f th e m o ra l law n o t on ly w ith m o ra lity a n d relig ion, b u t ag a in w ith leg isla tion . W e can sa y l i t t le h e re ab o u t th e n a - tu re o f th is link , b u t i t sh o u ld be n o ted t h a t K a n t is m a in ta in in g th a t i t is on ly w ith th e id eas of re a so n th a t th e re c a n be som e ju d g m e n t re g a rd in g th e s e th re e a reas. T he th ird im p o r ta n t p o in t to no te is th a t K a n t i s c lea rly concerned w ith th e id ea of po litica l, i f n o t m oral, p ro g ress from th e s ta n d p o in t of p ra c tic a l a n d no t sp e cu la tiv e reaso n . O ccu rrin g a fte r th e f i r s t exam ple o f a n id ea , w hich we n o ted above concerned a p o litica l c o n s titu tio n , K a n t w rite s a s a tra n s itio n : "B u t i t is n o t on ly w here h u m a n rea so n e x h ib its gen u in e 15 See Kant's Metaphysics o f Morals. 16 A318 = B37S, italics added for emphasis. "If we set aside the exaggerations in Plato's meth- ods of expression, the philosopher's spiritual flight from the ectypal mode of reflecting upon the physical world-order to the architectonic ordering of it according to ends, that is, according to ideas, is an enter- prise which calls for respect and imitation." (A318 = B375). See also A314 = B371 and A569 = B597. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. cau sa lity , a n d w h ere id ea s a re opera tive c au ses (o f ac tio n s a n d th e ir objects), n am ely , in th e m o ra l sp h e re , b u t a lso in re g a rd to n a tu r e itse lf, th a t P la to r ig h tly d iscerns c le a r p roofs o f a n orig in from id e a s ."17 H ere w e see t h a t th e p ro g ress o f th e h u m a n species, p a r tic u la r ly th e c re a tio n o f c o n tin u a lly im prov ing p o litica l in s t i tu t io n s , is a n id ea w h ich K a n t d iscusses in connection w ith "th e m o ra l sp h e re " before h e p ro ceed s to d iscuss th e teleo logy o f n a tu re . W h a t th is show s i s t h a t th e d iscussion o f po litica l p ro g ress in h is to ry o rig in a te s w ith p ra c tic a l considera tions, a n d n o t sp ecu la tiv e ones. K a n t considers n a tu r a l te leo logy a f te r h is d iscu ssio n o f po litica l p ro g ress , show ing, a t le a s t in th e Critique o f Pure Reason, t h a t p o litica l p ro g re ss a n d th e g re a te s t possib le h u m a n freedom are m a tte rs o f concern fo r p ra c tic a l re a so n an d hence fo r th e in te re s ts o f m o ra lity .18 T h is top ic is n o t a m a t te r o f th e specu la tive concern o f h o w to m ak e a science o f "h is to ry ," n o r w ith h o w to co m p reh en d th e d ev e lo p m en t o f po litica l in s t i tu t io n s a s a m a tte r o f specu la tive in te re s t. T h is i s c o n tra ry to m an y c o m m en ta to rs' c la im s t h a t su c h a d iscussion o f h u m a n p ro g re s s a n d th e d ev e lo p m en t o f po litica l in s titu tio n s , bo th h e re a n d in th e "Id ea ," is s im p ly a p rim itiv e v ers io n o f K a n t's view of teleo logy w h ich w ill m a tu re in th e Critique o f Judgment. B efore we c an say m ore a b o u t th is , w e n eed to sa y so m e th in g f i r s t a b o u t K a n t's spe lling o u t o f th e n o tio n o f teleology in th e f i r s t Critique. UL K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t th e id e a of teleology is n e ce ssa ry fo r u s to o rg a n - ize th e categories a n d to h a v e a science of n a tu re in th e f i r s t p lace. W hy th is is so m ay be seen w ith a re la tiv e ly sim ple exam ple . Im ag in e d issec tin g a frog a n d try in g to fig u re o u t i ts n a tu re , how i t fu n c tio n s. I f w e ignore th e id e a s o f rea so n , th e only (m en ta l) m a te r ia ls w e h av e to w o rk w ith a re space, tim e , a n d th e categories. S p ace a n d tim e a re n ecessa ry fo r u s to experience th e 17 A317 = B374. 18 See also the ending transition of this paragraph. A318 = B375. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. fro g a s a n a p p ea ra n c e . T h e ca tegories le t u s t h in k o f su b s ta n c e , com m unity , a n d o f c a u se a n d effect. B u t th e s e a re on ly th o u g h ts a b o u t "b lin d " m a te r ia l c a u sa lity . T h is is on ly th e concep t of "b ill ia rd b a lls " o f p h y s ic a l su b stan ce (co rpuscles, a tom s, q u a rk s , etc.) knock ing in to o ne a n o th e r a n d effecting e ac h o th e r . T h e q u estio n is , h o w co u ld such b lin d m a t te r se lf-o rgan ize?19 H ow c o u ld a ll th e p a r ts a n d o rg a n s o f a frog w ork to g e th e r to k eep a w hole frog a live? M ore p recisely , th e q u e s tio n is, how co u ld o u r h u m a n m e n ta l m a te r i- a ls o f in tu i t io n a n d th e ca teg o rie s alone le a d u s to h a v e a n experience o f a se lf-o rg a n iz in g o rgan ism ? T h is is th e q u estio n t h a t co n ce rn s K an t, th o u g h i t w ill co n ce rn h im a g a in in th e Critique o f Judgment. H is a n sw e r is th a t , in o rd e r to h a v e a n a tu r a l sc ience, p a r tic u la r ly one co n ce rn e d w ith liv ing o rg a n - ism s, w e m u s t a t l e a s t th in k o f o rg an ism s a s c re a te d in accord w ith a concept. T h is is re a so n 's id e a o f teleology. Teleology is th e id e a t h a t liv ing b e in g s a re o rg a n iz e d according to a concep t, t h a t th e concept p la y s a c au sa l ro le in th e com ing to b e of th e being . F o r ex am p le , w hen a w a tc h m a k e r m ak es a w a tch , th e concep ts s/he h a s o f a w a tch , n a m e ly th e w ay a ll th e p a r t s in te ra c t in o rd e r fo r th e w atch to keep p ro p e r tim e , is p a r t of th e c a u se in e x p la in in g h o w th e w a tch cam e in to ex is- ten c e .20 T h e sam e is t ru e w h e n w e th in k a b o u t l iv in g o rg an ism s. We m u s t e x a m in e th e m as i f th e y w ere c re a te d in accord w ith a concept. We m u st th in k o f th e m as i f a ll th e p a r t s w ere o rg an ized fo r a p a r t ic u la r end, a n d th u s th e teleological a sp ec t of th e id e a . T he on ly w ay w e c a n do th is , K a n t m a in - ta in s , is to th in k o f th in g s a s h a v in g been c re a te d b y a n in te llig e n t au th o r, m u c h in th e sam e w ay as w e m u s t th in k o f th e w a tc h m a k e r w h en exa m in in g a w a tc h . H ence , K a n t a rg u es: The speculative in terest of reason makes it necessary to regard all order in the world as if it had originated in the purpose of a suprem e reason. Such a 19 Cf. A625 = B653. :o Cf. A626 = B654. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. * 37 principle opens out to our reason, as applied in the field of experience, altogether new views as to how the things of the world m ay be connected according to teleological laws, and so enables it to arrive a t the ir greatest system atic unity.21 T h e id e a of teleology, a n d w ith i t th e id e a of a su p rem e in te llig en c e a s a u th o r o f th e w orld , e n a b le s us to b e g in o u r in v e s tig a tio n o f n a tu re , a n d to b r in g th e u n d e rs ta n d in g in to a h ig h e r le v e l o f o rg an iza tio n . T h e id e a o f te leo logy h e lp s u s to s tru c tu re o u r s tu d y o f n a tu r e , p a r t ic u la r ly of th o se o rg an ism s w h ich e x h ib it w h a t w e ta k e to be a se lf-o rg a n iz in g s tru c tu re . H ow ever, th is is n o t to s a y t h a t w e a re ju s tif ie d in s ta t in g t h a t th e o rg a n ism s a c tu a lly a re o rg a n iz e d acco rd in g to a concept. K a n t's p o in t is on ly to m a in ta in t h a t w e m u st h a v e th i s id e a o f teleology i f w e a re ev er to b eg in su c h a n in v e s tig a tio n in to n a tu r e , fo r w e w ould h av e no o th e r w ay o f o rg an iz - in g th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o r th e sc ien ce p ro p erly .22 W ith o u t th e id e a o f te leo l- ogy, i t seem s u n lik e ly th a t w e c o u ld h a v e a n experience o f a n o rg an ism w h ich a p p e a rs o rg an iz ed for a p a r t ic u la r p u rp o se . In fac t, th e a ssu m p tio n t h a t th in g s ac tu a lly h a v e b e e n o rg an iz ed b y a n a u th o r o f th e w orld goes d ire c tly a g a in s t th e pu rp o se o f th e teleo log ica l id e a , n am ely , to sea rch o u t th e mechanical cau ses b e h in d w h a t looks lik e a te leo log ica l o rgan ism . T he id e a e x is ts o n ly so th a t we c a n b eg in o u r in v e s tig a tio n o f n a tu re , a n d to p o s i t th e id e a as be ing m ore th a n m ere ly re g u la tiv e is to e n d th e in v e s tig a tio n befo re i t even b eg in s .23 So w e c a n see w h y th is n a tu ra l ly leads to w h a t K a n t th in k s is a n in e v ita b le "d ia lec tic" o f re a so n , fo r re a so n needs to p o s it t h e ex is ten ce o f such id ea s , th u s le a d in g th e u n d e rs ta n d in g in to th e re a lm o f th e tra n sc e n d e n t, b u t th e u n d e rs ta n d in g c an 21 A686 = B714. See also especially A623 = B652 and A651 = B679. 22 There is a fair amount of current writing on this subject of teleology. While writers differ as to the degree of r e a lity which we must assign teleology to nature, many agree that we simply could not have an experience of a living organism if we did not have an idea of teleology. The notion of simple mechanical causation, while it may be adequate, finally, to explaining the actual operations of the organ- ism, may not be sufficient for our experience of the organism as a self-organizing whole. 23 This is discussed again below and with further citations. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38 leg itim ate ly fu n c tio n only w ith in th e re a lm o f ap p ea ran ces. T h e re is a ten s io n b e tw een re a so n a n d u n d e rs ta n d in g , b u t a necessa ry a n d n a tu r a l one. I t is im p o r ta n t to be c e r ta in t h a t K a n t p ro h ib ited a co n s titu tiv e u s e o f teleology a n d p e rm itte d only a re g u la tiv e em ploym ent; m an y co m m en ta to rs h a v e a lleged t h a t th e "Idea fo r a U n iv e rsa l H isto ry" functions on ly a s a p rim itiv e n o tio n o f teleology, a n d th a t K a n t is con fused abou t th e reg u la tiv e em ploym ent o f teleo logy in th is a rtic le . A llegedly, h e th e n co rrec ts th is defec t in th e th ird Critique. C e rta in ly i t is t r u e th a t K a n t's u n d e rs ta n d in g o f te leo l- ogy is n o t com plete in th e f ir s t Critique,24 b u t n e ith e r is h e u n c e r ta in a b o u t th e m erely re g u la tiv e n a tu re o f teleo logy. T h e re a re a b u n d a n t c ita tio n s in th e f irs t Critique to show th a t K a n t w a s q u ite a w are o f th e n e ce ssa ry l im ita - tio n s of th e teleo log ical idea. Does K a n t w a it only u n t i l th e Critique of Judgment to a rg u e th a t p u rp o siv en ess i s n o t ac tu a lly to be fo u n d in th e organism s? I th in k th e a n - sw er is c learly n e g a tiv e . K a n t m ak e s m a n y s ta te m e n ts to th is effect, m a n y of w hich a re to b e fo u n d in th e "A ppend ix to th e T ran sc en d e n ta l D ia lectic ." B e- c au se th is is su c h a n im p o rta n t p o in t, I w ill quo te sev era l of th e se p a ssa g e s h e re , a n d c ite th e re s t: Reason could never be justified in abandoning the causality which it knows for grounds of explanation which are obscure, of which it does not have any knowledge, and which are incapable of proof.25 Now since every principle which prescribes a priori to the understanding thoroughgoing unity in its employment, also holds... of the object of experience, the principles of pure reason m ust also have objective reality in respect of th a t object, not, however, in order to determine anything in it, b u t only in order to 24 We see nothing in the first Critique like the antinomy of teleology, nothing like the attempt to unite the two faculties and "worlds" of reason and understanding, and Kant here seems confused as to how to judge the teleological notion where several different organisms may interact together to bring about some effect. 25 A626 = B654. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 39 indicate the procedure whereby the empirical and determ inate employment of the understanding can be brought into complete harm ony with itself.26 ...if instead of looking for causes in the universal laws of m ateria l mechanism, we appeal directly to the unsearchable decree of suprem e wisdom, all those ends which are exhibited in nature , together with the m any ends which are only ascribed by us to nature, m ake our investigation of the causes a very easy task, and so enable us to regard the labour of reason as completed, when, as a m a tte r of fact, we have merely dispensed w ith its employment... W hat we may presum e to do is to follow out the physico-mechanical connection in accordance w ith universal laws, in the hope of discovering what the teleological connection actually is.27 Moreover, the principle of such an hypothesis would a t most serve only for the satisfaction of reason, not for the furtherance of the employm ent of the under- stand ing in respect of objects. O rder and purposiveness in na tu re m ust them - selves be explained from n a tu ra l grounds and according to n a tu ra l laws.28 I t seem s q u ite d e a r th a t K a n t is n o t con fused a s to th e p ro p e r lim ita tio n s for th e em p lo y m en t of th e teleological id ea . I ts p u rp o se is to o rg an ize th e u n d e r - s ta n d in g a n d th e n a tu r a l sciences, a n d to p o s it th e re a lity of te leo logy is to b r in g to a d o s e a n in v es tig a tio n w h ich h a s y e t to beg in . T he f in d in g s a n d logic o f th e e n tire Critique o f Pure Reason w ou ld be v io la ted i f w e w ere to a s - su m e t h a t teleology could be d iscovered in n a tu re .29 T he sec tio n s w h e re h e m ig h t appear to ta k e th e id e a o f teleo logy to b e co n s titu tiv e occur in K a n t's d iscu ssio n o f th e h ig h e s t good, a n d I s h a l l a rg u e below th a t th is is p e rfec tly u n d e rs ta n d a b le . B efore m oving on, th e re is o ne teleo log ical-type p r in d p le o f K a n t's w h ich d eserv es s p e d a l considera tion . T h is is th e p r in d p le t h a t no fa c u lty or o rg an is to be fo u n d in n a tu re w h ich does n o t h av e i ts u se . T h is p r in d p le is 26 A665-6 = B693-4. 27 A691-2 = B719-20. Italics added for emphasis. 28 A772 = B800. 29 For additional citations of Kant on teleology, see: A317-8 = B374-5, A626-9 = B654-7, A649-51 = B677-9, A663-5 = B691-3, A671 = B699, A687-8 = B715-6, A694 = B722, A698-701= B7269 , and A772-3 = B800-1. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40 m en tio n ed in five d iffe ren t p laces in th e Critique.30 I ts m o st p recise s ta te - m e n t is: If we judged according to analogy with the nature of living beings in th is world,... reason m ust necessarily accept the principle th a t no organ, no faculty, no impulse, indeed nothing w hatsoever is e ither superfluous or disproportioned to its use, and th a t therefore nothing is purposeless, b u t everything exactly conformed to its destiny in life...31 S u ch a p rin c ip le is in c lu d ed n o t on ly in th e f i r s t ed ition , b u t a ll refe rences a re k e p t in th e second ed ition a s w ell. T h e q u o te above is fo u n d on ly in th e second ed itio n . T h e re seem to b e a t le a s t th re e v e rs io n s o f th is p rin c ip le . I w ill h en ce fo rth c a ll th e m th e "s tro n g ," "m ed iu m ," a n d "w eak " vers io n s o f th e "p rin c ip le o f p u rp o s iv e m ech an ism s." T h e s tro n g v e rs io n m ig h t ta k e i t a s a fac t o r la w a b o u t n a tu r e th a t ev ery m ec h an ism h a s som e p a r t ic u la r p u rp o se . I t s im p ly w o u ld be a fac t, like th e N e w to n 's p rin c ip le s o f m otion , w hich w e cou ld d iscover a n d p ro v e regard in g n a tu re . T h is seem s to b e th e im p lied v e rs io n o f th e q uo te above, w h ere "e v e ry th in g [is] ex ac tly conform ed to i ts d e s tin y in life ..." T h is m ay n o t be a co m p le te s u rp r is e to u s , for as A.C. E w - in g p o s its , "K a n t, th o u g h he liv ed befo re th e sc ien tific e s ta b lish m e n t of th e doc trine o f evo lu tion , w a s very in te re s te d in th e n o tio n of evo lu tion a s a p o s- sib ility ..."32 T he m e d iu m vers ion o f th e p r in c ip le o f p u rp o siv e m ech an ism s w ou ld ta k e i t to b e a la w o f n a tu re th a t every m e c h a n ism c a n h a v e some purpose or other. T h is v e rs io n w o u ld say t h a t w e c a n d iscover in n a tu r e th e fac t th a t e v e ry th in g c a n be p u t to som e u se o r o th e r . T h is seem s to b e im p lied w h en K a n t w rite s th a t : "E v e ry th in g w h ich n a tu r e h a s i ts e l f in s t i tu te d is good for 30 B425-6, A688 = B716, A743-4 = B771-2, A747-8 = B775-6, and A800-1 = B828-9. 31 B425. 32 A.C. Ewing. .4 Short Commentary. p. 258. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. i 41 some purpose. E ven p o iso n s h a v e th e ir u se . T h ey se rv e to co u n te rac t o th e r p o iso n s g e n e ra te d in o u r b o d ily h u m o u rs , a n d m u s t h a v e a p lace in every co m p le te p h a rm aco p o e ia ."33 T h is m ed ium v e rs io n w ou ld m ere ly ta k e i t to be t ru e t h a t w e c an fin d a u se fo r e v e ry th in g in n a tu r e . T h e w eak version w o u ld h a v e i t th a t s u c h a p rin c ip le is m ere ly r e g u - la tiv e . T h is version com es to th e fore w h en K a n t w rite s : m edical physiology... [resorts] to a principle for which pure reason has alone been responsible: and i t carries this principle so fa r as to assume confidently, an d w ith general approval, th a t everything in an anim al has its use, and sub- serves some good purpose. If th is assum ption be trea ted as constitutive it goes m uch fu rther than observation has th us far been able to justify; and we m u st therefore conclude th a t it is nothing more th a n a regulative principle of rea - son...34 T h is v e rs io n a sse r ts on ly t h a t th e "p rin c ip le o f p u rp o s iv e m echan ism s" is u s e - fu l fo r th e o rd e rin g o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g a n d th e s tu d y o f n a tu re . I t a llow s u s to f in d connec tions b e tw e e n th e m ech an ism s w ith in o rgan ism s, a n d p e r - h a p s to f in d connections b e tw e e n o rg an ism s th e m se lv e s .35 A re w e ab le to decide b e tw een th e se th r e e v e rs io n s of th e p rinc ip le? B ased o n K a n t's w ritin g s a lo n e , i t w ould be d ifficu lt, p a r tic u la r ly because K a n t k e e p s th is p rin c ip le in b o th ed itions, even in tro d u c in g th e s tro n g v e r - sion in th e second ed ition a lo n e . H ow ever, i t se e m s w e m u s t ru le o u t a t le a s t th e s tro n g v e rs io n of th e p rin c ip le , even i f in opp o sitio n to K an t, for i t seem s too m u ch to c la im th a t ev e ry o rg a n or m ech an ism is d e s ig n ed for a specific u se . W e se em to be ab le to com e u p w ith ex am p les w h e re th is sim ply does n o t h o ld t ru e . T he w eak v e rs io n , on th e o th e r h a n d , sq u a re s w ell w ith th e r e s t of K a n t's Critique, a n d s e e m s to be b o m o u t a s a re g u la tiv e id e a for th e s tu d y o f n a tu re . B u t w h a t o f th e m ed ium vers ion? T h is version does no t 33 A743 = B771. Italics added for emphasis. 34 A688 = B716. 35 See: A Short Commentary, p. 258. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 42 seem to b e incompatible w ith th e w eak version , for i t could be th e case th a t th e w e ak v e rs io n shou ld be ta k e n a s a reg u la tiv e idea, w hile th e m ed iu m v e rs io n ju s t h a p p e n s to be a fac t a b o u t n a tu re . In fact, K a n t cou ld sa y th a t th e s tro n g v e rs io n shou ld be ta k e n a s a reg u la tiv e idea, th u s making i t th e w eak v e rs io n , b u t th a t th e m ed iu m v e rs io n is a n a posteriori fac t a b o u t th e w orld o f a p p e a ra n c e . T he su b se q u e n t q u estio n , how ever, w ould b e a s to how fa r w e sh o u ld ta k e th is no tion o f "som e p u rp o se or o ther" im p lied in th e m e- d ium v e rs io n . C e rta in ly w e cou ld u se o u r sp leen for a p a p e rw e ig h t, b u t w ould th is q u a lify as purposive? T h e m ed iu m version m ay sim p ly tu r n o u t to be r a th e r tr iv ia l . W hile th e w eak v e rs io n seem s to be acceptable, I do n o t th in k w e a re y e t in a position to decide a b o u t th e m edium version . N o r does i t seem t h a t K a n t h a d a firm g rasp o f ex ac tly how to spell o u t th is p rin c ip le . S im ila rly , th e re is a n a d d itio n a l p u zz le reg a rd in g how th e fa c u lty of rea so n i ts e l f is to be th o u g h t o f u n d e r th is "p rin c ip le of pu rposive m e c h a - n ism s." A ga in , K a n t gives u s con flic ting v ers ions. A t A800 = B 828, K a n t w rites: The whole equipm ent of reason... is in fact determined... yet further, namely, to the problem of what we ought to do, if the will is free, if there is a God and a fu ture world. As this concerns our a ttitude to the supreme end, i t is evident th a t the ultim ate intention of n a tu re in her wise provision for us has indeed, in the constitution of our reason, been directed to moral interests alone.36 T h is p a s sa g e a p p e a rs to a rg u e th a t , ta k in g som e version o f th e "p rin c ip le of pu rp o siv e m ech an ism s" as a fac t, w e can th e n deduce th a t th e fa c u lty of r e a - son m u s t b e th o u g h t to h a v e b een g iven to u s b y n a tu re in o rd er to p ro m o te m o ra l e n d s . H ow ever, a t B 425 K a n t w rites : if we judged by such an analogy [of living beings] we should have to regard man, who alone can contain in him self the final end of all this order, as the only creatu re th a t is excepted from it. M an's natural endowm ents - not merely his ta len ts and the impulses to enjoy them, but above all else the moral 36 A800-1 = B828-9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 43 law w ithin him - go... far beyond all the utility and advantage which he may derive from them in this p resen t life....37 T h is too seem s to ta k e som e v e rs io n o f th e "p rin c ip le o f p u rp o siv e m ech a- n ism s" a s tru e , b u t seem s to in d ic a te th a t h u m a n s a r e th e excep tion to th e ru le a n d sh o u ld b e exem pted fro m th e p rincip le . T h is seem s to be because th e re is n o th in g in th e w orld w h ich re a so n is p a r t ic u la r ly s u ite d for, a n d is b e t te r s u ite d to a n en v iro n m en t o th e r th a n th is world..38 A s th e s e a re th e on ly tw o p a ssa g e s w e h av e to w o rk w ith , I th in k a decision b e tw ee n th e m is im possib le . T he "Id ea" su p p o rts th e fo rm er s tance , b u t th e above second edi- t io n v e rs io n m u s t h av e been w r i t te n a f te r th e "Id ea ." W e m u s t p o stpone ou r ju d g m e n t o f th is p rin c ip le u n t i l la te r . B efore m oving on, w h ile som e o f th e issu e s in v o lv e d in teleology are le f t u n reso lv ed h e re , we h av e a t le a s t e s ta b lish e d som e im p o r ta n t p o in ts . I h a v e tr ie d to a rg u e above th a t K a n t is w ell aw are o f th e l im its o f th e notion o f teleo logy a s ap p lied to n a tu re : h e recognizes th a t i t is a re g u la tiv e idea, a n d also recogn izes th e d a n g e r in h e re n t in ta k in g i t to be a c o n s titu tiv e con- cep t. As I s h a l l a rg u e in C h a p te r S ix below , th e re a re no s ig n if ic a n t changes in th is lin e o f th in k in g b e tw een w h a t K a n t a rg u es in th e f i r s t Critique a n d h is conclusions in th e Critique o f Judgment. C e r ta in ly th e re is a d eep er ex- p lo ra tio n o f th e concept o f teleology, a n d m an y im p o r ta n t conclusions a re d ra w n from th is ,39 b u t th e c e n tra l lim ita tio n s re g a rd in g te leo log ica l concepts fo u n d in th is w ork do n o t v a ry fro m th e f ir s t Critique. I f w e accep t th is fact, th e n I th in k we m u s t ta k e K a n t's e a r ly (as w ell a s la te r ) w ritin g s re g a rd in g th e p ro g re ss o f th e h u m a n rac e se rio u sly . T h ere - fore, I ta k e i t t h a t th e re is no prim a facie reaso n th a t w e sh o u ld th in k K a n t 37 B425-6. 38 This may well be some sort of leftover premise in an older argument for immortality. Such an argument is traced out by Rolf George in: "Immortality," in Proceedings o f the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, pt. 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 669-677. 39 These conclusions will, however, only serve as further support for my thesis. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 44 sim ply con fused a b o u t h is ow n concept o f te leo logy a n d how i t sh o u ld be u tilized . I f K a n t is c le a r in h is no tion o f teleo logy , a s I h a v e a rg u ed h e is, th e n th e re is e v e ry re a so n to th in k th a t h is w r it in g s concern ing th e p ro g re ss of p o litica l in s t i tu t io n s a n d of h u m a n m o ra lity sh o u ld b e ta k e n a t face v a lu e a s c o n s is ten t w ith h is u se o f teleology. I f w e c a n su g g e s t a n in te rp re ta tio n for th e s e w ritin g s w h ich leav es K a n t c o n s is te n t, in s te a d o f d ism issing th e m o u trig h t, th e n I th in k su c h a n in te rp re ta t io n o u g h t to be favored . I w ill s u g - gest su ch a n in te rp re ta t io n in th e c h a p te rs t h a t follow. IV. In te re s tin g ly , n o t on ly can w e now se e w h y K a n t c la im s th a t th e re is a n a tu ra l d ia lec tic o f rea so n , b u t w e c an now o b se rv e th a t th e re is a con flic t betw een th e q u e s tio n s o f "W h a t can I know ?" a n d "W h a t m ay I hope?" T h e an sw e r to th e f i r s t q u e s tio n w as d iscussed in C h a p te r O ne above, n am e ly th a t one can k n o w on ly a b o u t objects o f p o ss ib le ex p erien ce a n d th e t r a n - scen d e n ta l s t ru c tu re w h ich m u s t m ak e th e m p o ss ib le . T h e an sw er to th e th ird q u e s tio n in th e f i r s t Critique h a s to do ( a t le a s t) w ith th e p o s tu la te s o f freedom , im m o rta lity , a n d God.40 N otice, h o w ev er, t h a t th e p o sitin g o f a n y of th e se n o tio n s a s ob jec ts o f know ledge o r a s c o n s titu tiv e o f experience w ould d irec tly in te rfe re w ith th e p ro jec t o f th e f i r s t q u e s tio n . B y p re su m in g k n o w l- edge o f th e se ob jects o f hope, a p h y sico -m ech an ica l science is te rm in a te d .41 L et u s look a t e a c h o f th e th re e id eas to see w h y th is m ig h t be. I f w e e x p la in a p e rso n 's action a s s im p ly a n ex p ress io n of freedom , w e stop try in g to d e te rm in e th e in f lu e n tia l m e c h a n ic a l a n d psychological c a u se s o f action; 401 say "at least" here because it may also involve the postulating of the possibility of the high- est good, both on earth and in another world. 41 This is a main point in each of Kant's discussion in the "Antinomies," "Paralogisms," and "The Ideal of Pure Reason" respectively. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 45 if we could exhaustively investigate all the appearances of m en's wills, there would not be found a single hum an action which we could not predict w ith cer- tain ty , and recognize as proceeding necessarily from its antecedent conditions. So far, then, as regards th is em pirical character there is no freedom; and yet it is only in the light of th is ch arac te r th a t m an can be studied...42 T h is is p a r t ic u la r ly im p o r ta n t i f w e rem em b er K a n t's d iscu ssio n o f P la to 's p e rfe c t S ta te . W e see h e re t h a t th e n o tio n of freedom w ou ld e n d a n in v e s ti- g a tio n w h ich , a t i ts fu lle s t, c o u ld r e n d e r th e ac tio n s o f p e rso n s k n o w ab le a n d p re d ic ta b le . P resu m ab ly , th e n , w ith su c h in fo rm ation , co m b in ed w ith th e id e a o f th e p e rfe c t c o n s titu tio n a n d i ts law s, th e p e rfe c t S ta te w o u ld be pos- sib le , a t le a s t in c o n tin u a l a p p ro x im a tio n . Second , w hile th e p o s it in g o f a n a fte rlife w ou ld n o t d irec tly h in d e r sc ien tif ic in v es tig a tio n , th e p o s it in g o f a sim p le su b s ta n c e a s so u l h a s th e sa m e p ro b lem s a s th a t o f freed o m . I f w e m ak e th e a ssu m p tio n th a t th e re is a s in g le sou l, a know ab le T b e h in d th e "I th in k ," th e n n o t o n ly a re w e m ak in g th e m is ta k e o f th e p a ra lo g ism s, b u t w e a lso s h u t ou rse lves o ff from possib le a v e n u e s o f p h ysico -m echan ica l e x p la n a tio n s . T a k in g th e so u l fo r sim p le , or ta k in g th e r e to be som e C a r te s ia n E go w hich ex is ts th ro u g h w h ich a l l s e n sa - tio n s o f th e b ra in m u s t p a ss , th w a r ts m a n y possib le in te rp re ta t io n s o f th e ac- tu a l fu n c tio n in g o f th e b ra in o r o f psychology.43 Scien tific s tu d y w o u ld be l im ite d to a se a rc h for th e c e n te r o f th e m e n ta l u n iv erse , a n d p h ilo so p h ic a n d p sycho log ica l en d eav o rs w o u ld b e l im ite d in a s im ila r fash io n . F in a lly , a s w e saw in se c tio n th re e above, th e a ssu m p tio n o f th e e x is te n ce o f G od a s w ise a u th o r o f th e w orld is a n id e a w hich , i f ta k e n to be c o n s titu t iv e a n d n o t m ere ly re g u la tiv e , w ou ld a lso h in d e r sc ien tific in v e s tig a tio n . I f th is id e a is ta k e n a s co n stitu tiv e , w e Mull n o lo n g e r look for 42 A550 = B578. 43 This can be seen especially with the question of personal identity. Explanations such as those given by Derik Parfit or Daniel Dennett which focus on the absence of any possible single center for experience would be eliminated. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 46 ex p la n a tio n s o f n a tu r e w h ich a re physico-m echan ica l, th e only k in d of ex p la n a tio n w hich is ju s tif ie d by th e n a tu re o f th e h u m a n m ind .44 H ow ever, n o su c h conflict is n ecessa ry b e tw ee n th e an sw er to th e sec- ond q u estio n a n d th e f i r s t a n d th ird questions , b ecau se w h a t I o u g h t to do is th e co rrec t m o ra l a c tio n re g a rd le ss o f th e cond itions o f experience. D esp ite lim its o n w h a t I m a y a c tu a lly be ab le to do in a g iven s itu a tio n , a n d desp ite th e fa c t th a t I m ay b e g re a tly ig n o ra n t a s to th e possib le effects, I am a lw ays com m anded to do w h a t th e m o ra l la w req u ire s . A n d th is is so despite th e fac t t h a t su c h an ac tion m a y w ell be ex p la in ed entirely by em p irica l a n d psycho- logical m ean s . As th e "A n tinom ies" h a v e show n, th e re is no conflict b e tw een th e p o s tu la te o f freed o m a n d a com pletely physico -m echan ica l ex p lan a tio n .45 T hese p o in ts a re im p o rta n t to keep in m in d a s w e m ove to th e d iscussion of th e h ig h e s t good. We see h e re in th e f i r s t Critique a conflict in a d d itio n to th e n a tu r a l d ialectic . I t is th e conflict b e tw een w h a t K a n t deem s to be n e ce ssa ry for th e p ro jec t o f th e f ir s t q u estio n a n d th e an sw er to th e th ird q u estio n a sk e d b y rea so n . T he th in g s t h a t w e c a n know w ill a lw ays be lim ite d to physico -m echan ica l ex p lan a tio n s, d u e to th e n a tu re of in tu itio n a n d th e ca tego ries o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g . B u t th o se th in g s for w hich w e m u s t n e ce ssa rily hope46 w o u ld g re a tly h in d e r o u r know ledge i f th ey w ere ta k e n to be tru ly descrip tive o f n a tu r e a n d th e w orld of a p p e a ra n c e . A nd vice versa , for ta k in g th e re a lm o f a p p e a ra n c e to be th e on ly possib le re a lity w ould 44 This might also have the unintended effect, spelled out in the Critique o f Practical Reason, of actually doing great harm to the moral law. Kant maintains that if we were to actually know of God and the inescapable necessity of rewards and punishments in proportion to our virtue, then we would no longer act out of duty, but out of fear, and thus "the conduct of man... would be changed into mere mechanism, where, as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but no life would be found in the figures." See Chapter Two, Section Two below. 45 Thus, freedom only enters into the explanation of how the carrying out of the moral law is possible, and is not the answer to the question of, "What ought I to doT The answer to this question is, of course, "Do what the moral law commands." Hence, I believe I am not contradicting myself when I say that though freedom is involved in the explanation of the answer to the second question, the second ques- tion is not in conflict with the first or third question. 46 We shall see more precisely below why such hopes are actually, according to Kant, necessary. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47 u n d e rm in e th e possib ility o f hope . T h ere is a d irec t conflict b ecau se reaso n is c o n s tra in e d to posit th e n e ce ss ity o f b o th th e se id eas . S u ch a conflict is b ro u g h t to ex trem es in p a ssa g e s w h e re K a n t cla im s t h a t th e objects o f hope m u s t n e c e ssa rily u n ite w ith sp e cu la tiv e reason; th is occurs in K a n t's d iscu ss io n o f th e h ig h e s t good. V. K a n t ex p la in s th e co n cep t o f th e "h ig h e s t good" in th e "C anon o f P u re R easo n " in th e f ir s t Critique in th is w ay: Happiness, taken by itself, is, for our reason, far from being the complete good. Reason does not approve happiness (however inclination m ay desire it) except in so far as it is united w ith worthiness to be happy, th a t is, w ith moral con- duct. Morality, taken by itself, and with it, the mere worthiness to be happy, is also far from being the complete good. To make the good complete, he who be- haves in such a m anner a s not to be unworthy of happiness m ust be able to hope th a t he will participate in happiness.47 T h e h ig h e s t good, th e n , is th e com bina tion o f th e se tw o goods, th e good of h a p p in e s s a n d th e good o f m o ra lity . T h u s, h a p p in e ss "in e x a c t p ro p o rtio n w ith th e m o ra lity o f th e r a t io n a l b e in g s who a re th e re b y re n d e re d w orthy of i t, a lo n e c o n s titu te s th e su p re m e good o f th a t w orld w h e re in , in accordance w ith th e com m ands o f a p u re b u t p ra c tic a l reason , w e a re u n d e r ob liga tion to p lace o u rse lv es ."48 K a n t c la im s t h a t th is is a n ecessa ry p o s tu la te o f reason , for "ev en th e rea so n t h a t is f re e from a ll p r iv a te p u rp o ses, sh o u ld i t p u t its e lf in th e p lace o f a b e in g t h a t h a d to d is tr ib u te a ll h a p p in e ss to o th e rs , can n o t ju d g e o th e rw ise ."49 T h is is a n e c e ssa ry id ea o f reason , a n d a n e c e ssa ry p o s tu - la te fo r p ra c tic a l reaso n . W h ile th e d e ta ils of th e h ig h e s t good w ill change so m e w h a t in th e course o f K a n t's w ritin g s , th e m a in concep t o f th e p ro p o r- tio n in g o f h a p p in e ss to w o rth in e ss re m a in s th e sam e. 47 A813 =B841. 48 A814 = B842. 49 A813 = B841. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48 P rac tica l rea so n , K a n t c la im s, c a n n o t p o s tu la te th e h ig h es t good w ith o u t God; I t is necessary th a t the whole course of our life be subject to moral m axim s; b u t it is impossible th a t th is should happen unless reason connects w ith the m oral law, which is a mere idea, an operative cause which determines for such conduct as is in accordance w ith the moral law an outcome, either in th is or in another life, th a t is in exact conformity w ith o u r suprem e ends. Thus w ithout a God and w ithout a world invisible to us now b u t hoped for, the glorious ideas of m orality are indeed objects of approval an d adm iration, bu t not springs of purpose and action.50 T h e h ig h e s t good is a n id e a o f re a so n , g iv ing u s a n "estimation of m o ra lity , in r e g a rd to i ts p u r i ty a n d consequences,"51 b u t w e c a n see no n ecessa ry c a u s a l m e c h a n ism w hich w ou ld b r in g su c h a s ta te a b o u t. W e see l i t t le ev idence in th is w o rld t h a t t ru ly m o ra l a c ts a re re w a rd e d b y a p p ro p r ia te h a p p in e ss . T h e p o s tu la te o f G od is n e ed e d in o rd e r to se cu re su c h a n a p p ro p ria te cause ; the alleged necessary connection of the hope of happiness with the necessary endeavour to render the self worthy of happiness cannot therefore be known through reason. I t can be counted upon only if a Supreme Reason, th a t gov- erns according to moral rules, be likewise posited as underlying natu re as its cause."52 T h e on ly th in g th a t c a n b r in g a b o u t th e h ig h e s t good i s a G od th a t is ra t io n a l a n d m o ra l, om niscien t, a n d po w erfu l e n o u g h to b r in g a b o u t a fu tu re w o rld in w h ic h h a p p in e ss is p ro p o rtio n ed to m o ra lity .53 W e w ill h a v e o p p o rtu n ity to d iscu ss th e com ponen ts o f th e h ig h e s t good a n d th e i r com plete ju s tif ic a tio n in l a te r c h a p te rs , b u t fo r now w e m u s t m ove on. 50 A812-3 = B840-1. 51 A812 = B840. 52 A810 = B838. 53 For a more complete presentation of the nature of the Highest Good in the first Critique. see "The Ideal of the Highest Good, as a Determining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 49 I t is w ith in th is d iscussion o f th e h ig h e s t good t h a t K a n t ta lk s a b o u t th e objects o f h o p e u n i t in g w ith th e re g u la tiv e id e a s o f sp ecu la tiv e rea so n . Im p o rta n tly , K a n t m e n tio n s th is con junc tion on ly in th e section on th e h ig h - e s t good. K a n t m a in ta in s in a p a ra g ra p h im m e d ia te ly follow ing a d iscu ss io n o f th e th re e q u e s tio n s o f re a so n th a t " the th i r d q u e s tio n ... is a t once p ra c tic a l a n d th eo re tic a l, in s u c h fa sh io n th a t th e p ra c tic a l se rv es only a s a c lue t h a t le a d s u s to th e a n s w e r to th e th eo re tic a l q u e s tio n , a n d w h e n th is is fo llow ed ou t, to th e sp e c u la tiv e q u estio n ,"54 a n d la te r w rite s : I m ain tain th a t ju s t as the m oral principles are necessary according to reason in its practical em ploym ent, i t is in the view of reason, in the field of its theo- retical em ploym ent, no less necessary to assum e th a t everyone has ground to hope for happiness in the m easure in which he has rendered him self by his conduct w orthy o f it, and th a t the system of m orality is therefore inseparably -though only in th e idea of pure reason -bound up w ith th a t of happiness.55 K a n t conceives o f m o ra lity h e re a s w o rth in ess to b e h a p p y ; "...th a t law , i f th e re is su c h a law , w h ic h h a s no o th e r m o tive t h a n worthiness o f being happy, I te rm m o ra l (law o f m orality )."56 T h u s K a n t conceives th a t th e sy s - tem o f m o ra lity m u s t in e v ita b ly be in te r tw in e d w ith th e sy stem o f sp e c u la tiv e rea so n , w h ich c la im s to d e te rm in e th e t r u th a b o u t re a l i ty a n d th u s a b o u t h a p p in e ss ; w e c a n n o t k n o w w h a t m ak e s u s h a p p y o r th e m ea n s to a n y p a r - t ic u la r p le a su re w ith o u t th e know ledge w h ich sp e c u la tiv e rea so n can p ro - v ide. H ence , th e p ra c t ic a l a n d specu la tive s ta n d p o in ts m u s t bo th be b ro u g h t to b e a r on th is q u e s tio n a b o u t th e en d s o f h u m a n b e in g s . B u t K a n t h e re seem s to b e s ta t in g t h a t th e a n sw e r to th e q u e s tio n o f hope , b ro u g h t on b y th e q u e s tio n o f w h a t I o u g h t to do, m ig h t som ehow h a v e a th eo re tic a l e m - p lo y m en t p e rh a p s above a n d beyond a re g u la tiv e id ea . 54 A807 = B833. 55 A809 = B837. 56 A806 = B834. See also the rest of this paragraph at A806 = B834. and the discussion at A809-15 = B837-43. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50 K a n t g ives a s im ila r p ic tu re a few p a g es la te r . H ere h e w rites: B ut th is system atic unity of ends in this world of intelligences -a world which is indeed, as m ere nature, a sensible world only, b u t which, as a system of freedom, can be en titled an intelligible, th a t is, a m oral world... -- ... thus un ites the practical w ith the speculative reason. The world m ust be repre- sen ted as having originated from an idea if it is to be in harm ony with th a t em ploym ent o f reason without which we should indeed hold ourselves to be unw orthy of reason, namely, with the m oral employm ent...57 K a n t c a lls th is u n i ty a "tra n s c e n d e n ta l e n la rg e m e n t o f o u r know ledge" an d c la im s t h a t i t "is n o t to b e reg a rd e d a s th e cau se , b u t m ere ly a s th e effect of th e p ra c tic a l p u rp o s iv e n e ss w h ich p u re re a so n im p o ses u p o n u s ."58 K a n t h e re se e m s to be m a in ta in in g th a t , in re g a rd to th e th i r d q u estio n posed by rea so n , th e re is a c tu a lly a n ex tension o f o u r knowledge o f th e w o rld o f a p - p e a ra n c e s b ecau se o f th e c e r ta in ty o f th e m o ra l law . B ecause m o ra lity is h e re conce ived o f a s w o rth in e ss to be h ap p y , th e n o u m e n a l a n d p h en o m en a l re a lm a re co m bined a t th is p o in t, a n d a re b o th u n d e r co n sid era tio n a s possi- b le ob jec ts fo r h ope . W e c a n know th e m o ra l law , a n d i t in d ic a te s th a t we a re p u rp o s iv e b e ings , s tr iv in g to ach ieve m o ra l p e rfec tio n . I t a lso te lls u s th a t m o ra lity is co n n ec ted w ith h a p p in e ss , a n d th e re fo re w e a re a t l e a s t p e rm itte d to hope fo r a w o rld w h e re m o ra lity w ill be re w a rd e d b y h a p p in e ss . B u t since h a p p in e s s is a m a t te r co n ce rn in g specu la tive rea so n , i t seem s th a t K a n t is h e re c la im in g t h a t p ra c tic a l rea so n is d ic ta tin g so m e th in g to sp ecu la tiv e re a - son w h ic h m u s t b e a p p lie d to th e rea lm o f a p p e a ra n c e s a n d ta k e n a s know l- edge. W h a t a re w e to m a k e o f th ese s ta te m e n ts? O n th e one h a n d , th ey m ay s im p ly b e too s tro n g to b e adm issib le . G iven K a n t's p ro fessed k now l- edge a s to th e p ro p e r l im its o f ap p ly in g teleo log ical id e a s ,59 h e m ay sim ply be 57 A815-6 = B843-4. 58 A817 = B845. 59 See section three above. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1I 51 o v e rs tep p in g h is bounds in th is ch ap te r, n o t k eep in g to th e e s ta b lish e d lim its h e h im s e lf se t. I th in k th e re is a good a rg u m e n t th a t K a n t goes too fa r in c a llin g fo r a "tra n s c e n d e n ta l e n la rg e m e n t o f o u r know ledge," th o u g h p e rh a p s h e h a s n o th in g m ore in m in d th a n th e s im p le n e ed to s a y so m e th in g ab o u t objects w h ich w ould be n e c e ssa ry or p e rm iss ib le en d s o f o u r w illing .60 B u t w h ile th is m a y b e tru e , I t h in k th e re is so m e th in g im p o r ta n t h a p p e n in g in th is c h a p te r o f th e Critique. W h a t I w a n t to a rg u e is t h a t i t i s no su rp r ise th a t th e te n s io n w hich I ta lk e d ab o u t in sec tio n fo u r above com es to i ts g re a t- e s t s t r a in in th e d iscussion o f th e h ig h e s t good, a n d t h a t i t i s on ly h e re th a t K a n t m a k e s s ta te m e n ts a b o u t teleology w h ich seem to v io la te h is ow n p re - sc rib ed lim ita tio n s . K a n t is s tru g g lin g w ith a question , consciously o r no t, w hich h e w ill co n tin u e to t r y to spe ll o u t sa tis fac to rily fo r y e a rs to come. I f th e h ig h e s t good is possib le on this earth, i f K a n t th in k s t h a t th e re is som e n e c e ssa ry re a so n to p o sit su c h a possib ility a s h a p p e n in g in th e realm of a p - p e a ra n c e s , th e n th e ten s io n s b e tw een w h a t I c a n know a n d w h a t I c an hope becom e fo cu sed on th e h ig h e s t good. A ll d ie conflicting in te rp re ta t io n s w hich I d isc u sse d above, from th e n a tu r e of th e ap p lica tio n of te leo log ica l id eas , to th e th re e v e rs io n s of th e "p rin c ip le of p u rp o s iv e m ech an ism s," to th e ro le th e fac u ltie s o f re a so n p lay in t h a t p rinc ip le , to th e n a tu ra l d ia lec tic a n d th e conflict b e tw e e n th e f ir s t a n d th ir d q u estio n o f reason , com e in to p la y a t p re - cisely th is p o in t ab o u t th e h ig h e s t good. K a n t w ill c o n tin u e to w rite ab o u t th e p ro g re s s of th e h u m a n ra c e u n til h is d e a th , a n d th e s e d iffe ren t s t ra in s of h is th o u g h t w ill co n tin u e to f lu c tu a te . I t w ill b e one p u rp o se o f th is book to t ry to s o r t o u t th e se s tra in s , a n d come to som e conclusion ab o u t th em . O n e q u estio n w e m ay w ish to a sk a t th is p o in t is , w h e re does K a n t th in k th e h ig h e s t good w ill b e located? Is i t to ta k e p lace only in "H eav en " a n d h a v e th e n a tu re o f b e in g on ly n o u m en a l o r "o therw orld ly"? O r w ill i t ta k e p lace on e a r th in th e fu tu re ? U n fo rtu n a te ly , th is too is a q u estio n 60 This may be true in this Critique especially, since at the time of its writing Kant still believed the study of morals to involve some empirical evidence, and thus not to be "purely" a priori. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52 f ra u g h t w ith conflic t. K a n t m a k e s m a n y s ta te m e n ts in th e f ir s t Critique, m o st o f w h ich a re to be fo u n d in "T h e C anon o f P u re R e aso n ," to su p p o rt bo th in te rp re ta t io n s ; a g a in , th is m a y n o t su rp r ise u s g iven K a n t's seem ing u n c e r ta in tie s d isc u sse d above. S u p p o rtin g th e "o therw orld ly* in te rp re ta tio n , K a n t w rites: Now since we are necessarily constrained by reason to represent ourselves as belonging to such a[n intelligible] world, while the senses present to us nothing bu t a world o f appearances, we m ust assume th a t m oral world to be a conse- quence of o u r conduct in the world of sense (in which no such connection be- tween w orthiness and happiness is exhibited), and therefore to be for us a fu- ture world. T hus God and a fu ture life are two [necessary] postulates...61 This world [of happiness in exact proportion to morality] is indeed an intelligi- ble world only, since the sensible world holds out no promise th a t any such system atic un ity of ends can arise from the na tu re of th ings.62 T h is la s t s ta te m e n t is q u ite d e fin ite ab o u t th e p o ss ib ilitie s o f a h ig h es t good on e a r th , th o u g h th e f ir s t s ta te m e n t is am biguous. K a n t m a in ta in s th ro u g h - o u t a ll h is w r it in g s t h a t m o ra lity is n o t n a tu ra lly re w a rd e d b y h ap p in ess , a n d often th e re v e rs e occurs. N a tu re does n o t seem to c a re ab o u t m orality , a n d th e re is n o th in g w e can do to ch an g e th e law s o f n a tu r e to m ake i t o th - e rw ise .63 K a n t a lso co n tin u es to be lieve th a t m o ra lity i s n o t i ts own rew ard , i t is a duty ; h a p p in e s s is th e p ro p e r re w a rd fo r m o ra lity , b u t th is is only to be fo u n d w ith th e h ig h e s t good. S u p p o r tin g th e h ig h e s t good on e a r th in te rp re ta t io n , K a n t w rites: Pure reason, then, contains... in th a t practical em ploym ent which is also moral, principles of the possibility of experience, nam ely, of such actions as, in accordance w ith m oral precepts, might be m et with in th e history of m ankind... Consequently, a special kind of system atic unity, nam ely the moral, m ust likewise be possible.64 61 A811 = B839. 62 A814 = B842. 63 Cf. A810 = B838. 64 A807 = B835. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 53 ...[the idea of a moral world] really can have... an influence upon the sensible world, to bring that world, so far as may be possible, into conformity with the idea. The idea of a moral world has, therefore, objective reality... as referring to the sensible world, viewed, however, as being an object of pure reason in its practiced employment... so far as the free will of each being is, under moral laws, in complete systematic unity with itself and with the freedom of every other.65 But this systematic unity of ends [the highest good] in this world of intelli- gences - a world which is indeed, as mere nature, a sensible world only, but which, as a system of freedom, can be entitled an intelligible, that is, a moral world... -leads inevitably also to the purposive unity of all things...66 W hile th e s e s ta te m e n ts se em to su p p o r t su c h a n in te rp re ta t io n o f th e h ig h e s t good on e a r th , p e rh a p s th e s tro n g e s t a rg u m e n t w e h av e fo r su ch a n in te rp r e - ta t io n is K a n t's w r it in g s on P la to 's id e a o f th e p e rfe c t S ta te . R ecall, a s d is - c u sse d above, K a n t c la im s t h a t th e id e a o f "a c o n s titu tio n a llow ing the great- est possible human freedom in accordance w ith law s by w h ich the freedom o f each is made to be consistent with that o f all others - I do n o t sp e a k o f th e g re a te s t h a p p in e ss , fo r th is w ill follow o f i t s e l f - is a t an y ra te a n e c e ssa ry id ea ..."67 T h is is a s i tu a t io n w h ich is v e ry c lose to th e h ig h e s t good, th o u g h i t c a n n o t be th e h ig h e s t good itse lf , since w e a r e on ly concerned w ith e x te rn a l a c tio n s h e re , a n d th e effect o f n a tu r a l e v e n ts on h u m a n h a p p in e ss is le f t o u t o f co n s id e ra tio n . S u c h a S ta te w ould be, how ever, a v a s t im p ro v e m e n t over th e c u r r e n t s ta te o f society , a n d le t u s n o t fo rg e t t h a t th o u g h th is co n ce rn s leg a lity , su c h q u e s tio n s a re moral q u e s tio n s fo r K a n t, since th ey h a v e to do w ith freedom . I f w e h a v e a s i tu a tio n w h e re th e freedom o f each is m ax im iz e d w h ile s t i l l n o t in te r fe r in g w ith th e freedom o f o th e rs , a n d K a n t is r ig h t to a s - su m e t h a t th e g re a te s t h a p p in e s s "w ill fo llow o f itse lf ,"68 th e n th is is a g re a t s tep to w a rd th e h ig h e s t good on e a r th . 65 A808 = B836. 66 A815 = B843. 67 A316 = B373. 68 In fact I do not think that this is a warranted assumption, particularly given Kant's defini- tion of happiness in the first Critique as: "the satisfaction of all our desires, extensively. in respect of their Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. [; 54 W e sh o u ld a lso n o te t h a t th e s e two possib le p o s itio n s of K a n t's a re n o t n ecessa rily in co n g ru o u s . I f w e h o ld th a t th e h ig h e s t good on e a r th is im - p o ss ib le in its complete p e rfec tio n , th e n th e re is no necessary conflict. In th is case , w e h av e th e id e a o f a p e rfe c t S ta te a n d o f p e rfe c t in d iv id u a l m o ra lity , b o th o f w hich c a n a n d do se rv e a s id e a s for m o ra l co m p ariso n , as w ell a s h a v in g a cau sa l in flu en ce o n o u r ac tio n s . N e ith e r a re , s tr ic t ly speak ing , p o ss ib le goals to achieve, th o u g h th e y m ay b o th be c o n tin u a lly ap p ro x im ated . H ence , K a n t is co rrec t to c la im th a t , s tr ic tly sp eak in g , " th e sensib le w orld h o ld s o u t no p rom ise t h a t a n y su c h sy s te m atic u n ity o f e n d s c a n a rise from th e n a tu r e of th in g s ," y e t a lso c la im t h a t we h a v e a d u ty to ap p ro x im ate th e id e a a s b e s t we c an .69 W e w ill h a v e o p p o rtu n ity to sp e ll o u t th is possib ility in m ore d e ta il below, b u t i t s h o u ld b e k e p t in m ind . VL A few su m m ary r e m a rk s a re in o rder. Above, w e h a v e exam ined se v e ra l d iffe ren t ten s io n s ru n n in g th ro u g h th e f ir s t Critique, m ost o f th e m h a v in g to do w ith th e id e a o f te leo logy a n d how to a n sw e r th e th re e q u e s tio n s n e c e ssa r ily posed a s th e in te r e s ts o f rea so n . T hese te n s io n s a re re la ted , a n d th e y a p p e a r to b e m ost a m p lifie d in th e d iscussion o f th e h ig h e s t good. W hile th e s e ten s io n s w ill n o t b e re so lv ed sa tis fac to rily in th e " Id ea ," i t is n o n e th e le s s no t su rp r is in g t h a t K a n t a tte m p te d to w o rk o u t som e of th e se p ro b lem s in th is essay ; th e "Id e a " does n o t sim ply "com e o u t o f now here ," b u t is a n a tu r a l ou tg row th o f th e te n s io n s fo u n d in th e f i r s t Critique. We sh o u ld a n tic ip a te th a t a n y a tte m p t to sp e ll o u t a version of th e h ig h e s t good manifoldness, intensively, in respect of their degree, and protensively, in respect of their duration," A806 = B834. 69 If we further maintain that we ourselves have no control over the outcome of our attempt to approximate the idea, so that we must hope that God will be able to make it real, then this seemingly strong statement of Kant's as to the impossibility of the highest good on earth no longer forbids the im- possibility, but only points to the fact that we need a God to bring about the hoped for result. See below Section Two, chapters One and Six. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. occu rring o n e a r th w ould ru n in to se rio u s d ifficu lties a n d lim ita tio n s . W hy K a n t s h o u ld w a n t to do th is , a n d how i t m ig h t be possib le , a re q u estio n s for la te r c h a p te rs . F o r now, le t u s p ro ceed to th e "Id e a " in o rd er to ge t a ru d im e n ta ry u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th is e ssay . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56 Chapter Three A First Look at the "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent" L I n th is c h a p te r w e w ill ta k e a n in tro d u c to ry look a t K a n t's "Id e a fo r a U n iv e rsa l H is to ry w ith a C osm opo litan In te n t ," w r it te n th re e y e a rs a f te r th e f i r s t e d itio n o f th e Critique o f Pure Reason a n d th e sam e y e a r a s "W h a t is E n lig h te n m e n t? " H e re I w ish on ly to o u tlin e th e m a in p rem ises o f th e "Id e a ;" la te r w e w ill h a v e occasion to ex am in e i t in m o re d e ta il, a n d I w ill a rg u e t h a t th is p iece is c ru c ia l to K a n t's ph ilo sophy . n. K a n t's in tro d u c tio n a n d n in e "th e s e s" in th e "Id e a for a U n iv e rsa l H isto ry " a t te m p t n o t only to show t h a t th e h u m a n species is p ro g ress in g to - w a rd s a n e n d w h ere a ll o f i ts r a t io n a l c ap ac itie s w ill be p e rfec ted a n d h u - m an s w ill u n ite in to a m o ra l w hole, b u t a lso en d ea v o rs to show how th is te leo log ica l p rocess m ig h t o p era te . K a n t m a in ta in s th a t h is to ry o p e ra te s ac - co rd ing to la w s w hich , concern ing th e "freedom o f the wilF a s i t is m a n ife s te d in th e "appearances" of h u m a n ac tion , a llow one to hope that if we examine the play of the human will's freedom in the large, we can discover its course to conform to rules as well as to hope that what strikes us as complicated and unpredictable in the single individual may in the history of the entire species be discovered to be the steady progress and slow development of its original capacities. C e rta in ly h is to ry c an n o t be co n cern ed in an y w ay w ith th e s tu d y of n o u m e n a l "freedom of the will in a m e ta p h y s ic a l co n tex t,"1 fo r obviously i t is 1 Ak. 17. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. V I ji i im possib le to k n o w a n y em p irica l t r u th s a b o u t p e rso n s in th e i r in te llig ib le , tra n s c e n d e n t re a l ity . N o r is K a n t's "h is to ry " th e s tu d y o f th e liv e s a n d w ills o f one o r se v e ra l im p o r ta n t p e rso n s o r e v e n ts a n d th e ir im p a c t o n o th e rs . N o te th a t , from th e v e ry b e g in n in g o f th e "Id e a ," K a n t i s co n ce rn ed w ith ru le s a n d law s of th e h u m a n w ill's ac tion w h ich w o u ld d e te rm in e th e "s te a d y p rog ress... o f i ts o r ig in a l c ap ac itie s ," a n d i s n o t co n ce rn ed w ith d isco v erin g ru le s a n d law s w h ic h w o u ld allow one to g ive a h is to ry o f p e rso n s , is su e s , or even ts; th is is a n im p o r ta n t p o in t to c o n s id e r w h e n e v a lu a tin g th o se c o m m en ta to rs w ho m a in ta in th a t th e "Id e a " is a n in i t ia l a t te m p t a t a reg u la tiv e co n cep t to b e a p p lied to h is to r ic a l s tu d y . R a th e r , w h a t is of concern in th e e x a m in a tio n o f h is to ry a s th e d ev e lo p m en t o f th e h um an species is th e in te ra c t io n o f h u m a n w ills i n g e n e ra l, en masse. N a tu re , K a n t a sse r ts , h a s a p la n o f i t s ow n for th e h um an species, a n d th is p la n c a n be seen in h isto ry . W h a t is n a tu r e 's p la n a n d how does i t o p e ra te? K a n t m a in ta in s th a t n a tu re m oves p e rs o n s to in te ra c t w ith e a c h o th e r, w h ile s im u lta n e o u s ly im - p e llin g th em to s e e k so litu d e . K a n t e x p la in s th a t , I understand antagonism to m ean m en's unsocial sociability (ungesellige Geselligkeit ), i.e., th e ir tendency to en te r into society, combined, however, w ith a thoroughgoing resistance th a t constantly th rea tens to sunder th is society... M an has a propensity for living in society... [H]e also has, however, a great tendency to isolate himself, for he finds in him self the unsociable characteristic of w anting every th ing to go according to his own desires, and he therefore an- ticipates resistance everywhere...2 In d iv id u a ls w a n t to e n te r in to social re la tio n s w ith one a n o th e r fo r i t is n a tu - r a l fo r th em to be w ith one a n o th e r . H ow ever, by ob se rv in g th e ir ow n d es ire for h a v in g th in g s go th e w ay th e y w a n t, a n d re a liz in g th a t o th e rs w ill h a v e in te n tio n s a n d d e s ire s d iffe re n t from th e i r ow n, in d iv id u a ls a re a lso d isposed 2 Ak. 20-1. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 58 to m ove aw ay from one a n o th e r fo r fe a r of opposition . T h is is th e unsocial so c iab ility o f persons. K a n t cla im s th a t th is d u a lis tic m ovem ent, how ever, is n a tu re 's w ay o f a llo w in g th e h u m a n species to develop, reg a rd le ss o f th e in te n tio n s of in d i- v id u a l w ills . K a n t w rites: while each according to his own ways pursues his own end often at cross purposes with each other - they unconsciously proceed toward an unknown natural end, as if following a guiding thread (Leitfaden); and they work to promote an end they would set little store by, even if they were aware of it.3 In d iv id u a ls a re involved w ith th e p u r s u i t a n d a t ta in m e n t o f th e ir ow n goals, re g a rd le s s o f w h e th e r th e se goa ls a re opposed to th o se o f o th ers . In th e face o f su ch opposition , one is fo rced to im prove a n d a d v an c e th e sk ills a n d ta l - e n ts one h a s in o rder to ach ieve one's goals. B y le a d in g m a n in to a re la tio n - sh ip o f te n s io n a n d opposition w ith o thers , " th is re s is ta n c e a w ak e n s a ll o f m a n 's pow ers, [and] b rin g s h im to overcom e h is te n d e n c y to w ard s laz in ess ..."4 B u t b e ca u se th e in d iv id u a l is a lso sociable, su c h s tru g g le s w ill a lw ays ta k e p la c e w ith in a society, a co llection o f in d iv id u a ls w ho fee l a n e e d to s ta y to - g e th e r . T h is re su lts in th e c o n s ta n t im p ro v em en t o f th e ta le n ts o f in d iv id u - a ls in a society .5 3 Ak. 17. 4 Ak. 21. 5 Here, I think, Kant has in mind those capabilities which would contribute to culture, though it is difficult to spell out explicitly what Kant understood both of these terms to entail. Given that, as shall be shown below, Kant thought the use of reason to be something which could be perfected only over time and with practice, it seems that "talents" may refer firstly to those capacities which aid reason, and which might help everyone in their improvement o f their use of reason. Secondly, Kant also speaks of talents in a moral sense, such as improving the ability and desire to will in accordance with the categorical impera- tive. These two ways of thinking about talents seem to be borne out in Kant's discussion of culture in section 83 of the Critique o f Judgment. Lastly, however, "talents" may refer to any type of ability which might somehow move a person in any way to strive toward morality and toward creating a moral whole. Painting, for example, might be a talent which should be improved, for a nation may be motivated towards peace if only, in part, to protect the work of this admired artist, or an individual may be influenced enough by a painting to change, even if slightly, his/her moral disposition towards the better. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. \ 59 T he goal o f th is c o n tin u a l p ro g ressio n , th e e n d to w hich th e spec ies is m ov ing w ith th e im p ro v e m e n t of i ts ta le n ts , is th e e s ta b lish m e n t o f a com - m u n ity in w hich each p e rso n 's ra tio n a l c ap a c itie s a re perfected . K a n t w rite s : all man's talents are gradually developed... and through progressive enlight- enment he begins to establish a way of thinking tha t can in time transform the crude natural capacity for moral discrimination into definite practical princi- ples and thus transform a pathologically enforced agreement (pathologischeabgedrungene Zusammenstimmung) into a society and, finally, into a moral whole (moralisches Ganz).s I n h is "First Thesis," K a n t a s se r ts th a t , uall o f a creature's natural capacities are destined to develop completely and in conformity with their en d "7 T h e n a tu r a l e n d of p e rso n s a s in te llig ib le , n o u m e n a l b e in g s , th o u g h e x is tin g in th e n a tu r a l w orld, is re a so n , a n d i t is re a so n a n d th e cap ac ity for p e rfe c t m o- r a l i ty w hich is to develop com pletely. H ow ever, K a n t c la im s in th e "Second Thesis" th a t uin man (as th e sole ra t io n a l c re a tu re on e a r th ) those natural capacities directed toward the use of his reason are to he completely developed only in the species, not in the individual."8 T h e ju s tif ic a tio n for su ch a n a s - se r tio n is th a t , "re a so n i ts e l f does n o t o p e ra te on in s tin c t, b u t re q u ire s t r ia l.. . in o rd e r g rad u a lly to p ro g ress ... T herefo re , e ac h in d iv id u a l m a n w ou ld h a v e to liv e excessively lo n g i f h e w ere to m ak e com plete u se o f a ll h is n a tu r a l c a - p a c itie s ."9 T he d ev e lo p m en t o f th e cap ac ity fo r re a so n a n d m o ra lity ta k e s tim e , p e rh a p s "co u n tle ss g en era tio n s ."10 E a c h in d iv id u a l m u s t s tru g g le w ith h im o r h e rs e lf a n d w ith o th e rs in society i f s /h e is to m ove beyond a n im a l i n - s t in c t a n d in to h ig h e r lev e ls o f ra tio n a l p roficiency . 6Ak. 21. 7 Ak. 18. 8 Ak. 18. 9 Ak. 19. 10 Ak. 19. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 60 In ad d itio n , i t is th e e n d o f n a tu r e to m ove th e h u m a n species to w ard a society "in w h ich one w ill f in d th e h ig h e s t possib le d eg ree o f freedom under external laws..."11 B ecause a n ta g o n ism i s n e ce ssa ry fo r th e d ev e lo p m en t of h u m a n re a so n , n a tu re m u s t h a v e a s i ts e n d a society in w h ich th e re m ig h t re m a in a n ta g o n ism b u t n o t w ar, a c o m m u n ity i n w hich each p e rso n w ou ld h a v e th e freed o m to p u rsu e one's ow n e n d s a n d com pete w ith one a n o th e r as long a s s u c h com petition d id n o t d irec tly in te r fe re w ith th e freedom o f a n - o th er. T h is w o u ld be a n a tio n w ith a p e rfe c t c o n s titu tio n t h a t w o u ld allow people to b e free th ro u g h coercion, a llo w in g a n ta g o n ism to develop ta le n ts w ith o u t in v a l id a t in g th e freedom o f a n o th e r . S u ch a n "in te rn a l" c o n s titu tio n o f a n a tio n w o u ld be inefficacious, how ever, i f th e re w ere no "e x te rn a l" consti- tu tio n b e tw e e n n a tio n s to re g u la te su c h freed o m . H ence, K a n t m ain tains th a t th e g o a l o f m a n k in d is, "an internally, and fo r th is purpose, also an ex- ternally perfect national constitution, as the sole state in which all o f human- ity's natural capacities can be developed."** N a tio n s a t w a r becom e econom i- cally d ra in e d a n d physica lly d ev as ta te d , p la c in g a t r is k th e ir a b ility to func- tion in te rn a l ly . B o th th e in te rn a l a n d e x te rn a l c o n s titu tio n s , th e n , a re d es ir- ab le in o rd e r to p e rfec t th e ta le n ts o f th e sp e c ie s ,13 a n d a re b o th b ro u g h t ab o u t in th e sa m e w ay as above, n a m e ly th ro u g h a n tag o n ism o r u n so c ia l so- ciab ility . T h e c o n s ta n t f ig h tin g o f m a n a g a in s t m a n a n d n a tio n a g a in s t n a - tion , K a n t m a in ta in s , w ill ev en tu a lly le a d to a s ta te o f peace, a cosm opolitan w orld in w h ic h p e rso n s w ill b e ab le to p u r s u e th e i r ow n h a p p in e ss w ith o u t in fr in g in g u p o n th e freedom o f a n o th e r . T h e e n d of th e h u m a n be ing , th e n , is th e ex erc ise o f p e rfec t reason , a n d th is e n d c a n only be ach iev ed in a cos- m o p o litan w o rld a n d only th ro u g h th e p ro g re s s o f th e h u m a n species a s a whole. " Ak. 22. 12 Ak. 27. 13 We shall see in our discussion of "To[ward] Perpetual Peace" the more exact nature of such an external constitution. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 61 m . As th is c h a p te r is m e re ly a n overv iew o f th e a rtic le , le t m e p ro v id e h e re on ly a few su m m ary re m a rk s . T he f i r s t r e m a rk is to no tice t h a t K a n t a g a in a s se r ts t h a t e v e ry th in g in n a tu r e h a s a p u rp o se , a n o th e r re c u rre n c e o f th e "p rin c ip le o f p u rp o siv e m e c h a n ism " a s I h a v e te rm e d i t . To quo te in fu ll: All of a creature's natural capacities are destined to develop completely and in conformity with their end. This is confirmed in all animals, both by external and internal, analytical observation. In the teleological theory of nature, an organ that is not intended to be used, an organization tha t does not achieve its end, is a contradiction. If we stray from tha t fundamental principle, we no longer have a lawful but an aimlessly playing nature and hopeless chance takes the place of reason's guiding thread.14 T h is is a p a rtic u la rly s tro n g , a n d so m e w h a t n e w th e s is , a t le a s t th e a s s e r tio n t h a t ev ery capac ity is to develop completely. H ow a re w e to ta k e th is? F o r e x am p le , ta k e th e frog's in s t in c tu a l a b ility to sh o o t o u t i ts to n g u e in o rd e r to c a tc h flies. A re w e to su p p o se th a t , over tim e , fro g s ev ery w h ere w ill g e t p ro - g ress iv e ly b e tte r a t th is , to th e p o in t w h e re th e y w ill n e v e r m iss w h e n th e y t r y to ca tch fiies? P e rh a p s w e a re on ly to ta k e th is to m e a n th a t s ince th e n a tu r a l e n d o f a frog is to k eep i ts e l f a live b y c a tc h in g flie s i t s n a tu r a l i n - s t in c t w ill be d irec ted on ly to t h a t en d , a n d n o t to som e o th e r e n d .15 O r p e r - h a p s w e sh o u ld ta k e th is to m e a n t h a t th is is h o w w e a re to s tu d y a ll th e o r - g a n s a n d in s tin c ts w hich w e f in d in a frog, n a m e ly w ith i ts n a tu r a l e n d o f s u rv iv a l th ro u g h e a tin g flies . T h is w o u ld m a k e se n se , b u t i t seem s d ifficu lt to ju s t ify K a n t's a sse rtio n t h a t a n y in s t in c t o r o rg a n w ill develop completely. 14 Ak. 18. Also: "Nature does nothing unnecessary and is not prodigal in the use of means of her ends" (Ak. 19). 15 Though it is hard to imagine what this other end might be; catching rides on airplanes or licking postage stamps? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. T he only in te rp re ta t io n w h ich m igh t save K a n t o n th is score is to su g g e s t so m eth in g lik e th e "s u rv iv a l o f th e f i tte s t" ev en o f in d iv id u a l in - s t in c ts a n d o rgans. O n th is in te rp re ta t io n , K a n t m ig h t b e th o u g h t to be s a y in g th a t i t is sim ply a fa c t o f n a tu r e th a t in s tin c ts o r o rg a n s w h ich do n o t c o n tr ib u te to th e en d o f a n o rg a n ism a re w eeded o u t o v er tim e . T h u s, i f w e e n c o u n te re d a frog w h ich a tte m p te d to k ill flies by h o p p in g on to p o f them , w e m ig h t w ell observe t h a t th i s p a r t ic u la r b ehav io r is ineffec tive , a n d such frogs w ill n o t live long e n o u g h to rep roduce, th u s th e t r a i t w ill n o t be p a sse d dow n a s such . In th is w ay , o v e r tim e , a ll such o rg an s a n d in s t in c ts w ould c o n tin u e to develop toward p e rfe c tio n , since th e m ore e ffe c tu a l su c h a n o rgan o r in s ta n c e w ould be in p re s e rv in g th e species, th e m ore t h a t ty p e o f an im a l w o u ld co n tin u e to exist. H ow ever, ev en th is w e ak e r th e s is seem s too strong , fo r w e seem to h av e ex am p les w h e re in a n o rg an sim p ly h a s no u se w hich w e c a n find , exam p les of o rg an s o r in s t in c ts w hich, w hile n o t h in d e r in g th e o r- g an ism , seem to h av e evolved on th e "coa tta ils" of o th e r t r a i ts . A nd, in a d d i- tio n , i t is d ifficu lt to see how th e s e m ig h t develop completely. T h is p a r tic u la r is su e o f com plete developm ent a s id e , th e r e s t of K a n t's q u o ta tio n is q u ite te l l in g o f a n im p o rta n t p o in t, n a m e ly t h a t such a p rin c ip le is n ecessa ry to em ploy, a t le a s t as a reg u la tiv e p rin c ip le , i f we a re to conceive o f som e o rder in n a tu r e . T h is is a th e s is w h ich w e s h a l l see m uch m o re fu lly developed in th e t h i r d Critique, b u t w h ich seem s a t l e a s t to be su g g e s te d h e re . We sa w above t h a t th e id ea of teleology m a y b e n ecessa ry e v en to conceive of a n o rg a n ism to b eg in w ith . B u t in a d d itio n to th is , w h a t po ssib le science could develop i f o rg a n s h a d no co m p reh en s ib le p u rp o se , o r i f o rg an ism s d id n o t h av e "goals"? H ow cou ld w e conceive o f a n a tu r e w hich e x h ib ite d no o rderly dev e lo p m en t, b u t only p roduced o rg a n s w h ich h a d p u r - po ses fo re ign o r co n tra ry to th e e n d s o f th e organism ? A ra n d o m o r p lay fu l n a tu r e w ou ld be one w h ich w o u ld b e im possib le to su b jec t to r e g u la r law s of science. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63 H ence, again , a s tro n g th e s is re g a rd in g th e "p rin c ip le o f p u rp o siv e m ech an ism s" seem s to be ex trem e ly d ifficu lt to defend, th o u g h i t seem s n ec - e s sa ry a s a reg u la tiv e id ea . A n d w e see h e re fu r th e r su g g e s tio n s a s to w hy su ch a reg u la tiv e id ea w ou ld b e n ecessa ry . N otice also th a t a non-te leo log ica l n a tu re w ould be opposed to o u r in - te re s ts in m orality , p a r t ic u la r ly w ith r e g a rd to th e h u m a n species. K a n t h e re is co n ce rn ed w ith th e a p p a re n t p ro b lem t h a t th e h is to ry of th e h u m a n race seem s c o n tin u a lly f ra u g h t w ith p e ril, a n d seem s to be p u rp o se le ss . K a n t also n o tes t h a t w e do have th e fac u lty o f rea so n , a n d th e re b y access to m o ra lity .16 T he q u e s tio n th e n n a tu ra lly a rise s , W h a t good is th e fa c u lty o f re a so n i f i ts effects in th e h is to ry o f h u m a n ity seem to be negligible? One cannot resist a certain [feeling of] indignation when one sees men's ac- tions placed on the great stage of the world and finds that, despite some indi- viduals' seeming wisdom, in the large everything is finally woven together from folly and childish vanity and often even childish malice and destructive- ness.17 S uch a h is to ry devoid o f a p u rp o se w o u ld be a "sense less co u rse o f h u m a n a f- fa irs ."18 T h is is p a rtic u la rly a p ro b lem since n a tu re seem s to h a v e g iven u s th e fa c u lty o f reason for no p u rp o se . R easo n seem s so m u ch m o re in e ffec tu a l th a n in s t in c t a t p rov id ing u s w ith h a p p in e ss ; "n a tu re seem s h e re to h a v e ta k e n d e lig h t in th e g re a te s t fru g a lity ... [and] i t a p p e a rs t h a t n a tu r e is u t - te r ly u n co n ce rn ed th a t m a n live w ell..."19 W ell m ig h t w e d e sp a ir a n d th in k th a t th e w o rld is only a p lace fo r m ise ry i f o u r facu lty o f re a so n is in e ffec tu a l 16 Of course, the moral law is not yet conceived of as it will be in the Grundlegung or the sec- ond Critique. 17 Ak. 17-8. 18 Ak. 18. Also see Kant's comments at Ak. 30. 19 Ak. 19-20. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64 bo th in th e p u r s u i t o f h a p p in e ss a n d in a w orld w h ich o p e ra te s unconcerned w ith m o ra l en d s . T h e seco n d re m a rk w hich sh o u ld be m ade is to ex am in e how K a n t in te n d s su c h a h is to ry to be conceived; does th is id e a o f a cosm opolitan h is - to ry se rv e ch ie fly fo r a sp ecu la tiv e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f h u m a n h isto ry , a s m an y c o m m en ta to rs h a v e asserted? I th in k t h a t th e a n sw e r to th is is negative . C e rta in ly K a n t does claim t h a t "w e w ill leav e i t to n a tu r e to p roduce th e m an who is in a p o s itio n to w rite [a h is to ry ]. In th is w ay s h e p ro d u ced a K epler, w ho in a n u n e x p e c te d w ay su b jec ted th e eccen tric p a th s o f th e p la n e ts to d e fin ite law s, a n d a N ew ton..."20 K a n t hopes to sk e tch a "a g u id ing th re a d for such a h is to ry ,"21 w hich w ould be sp e lle d o u t by som e o th e r p e rso n in g re a te r d e ta il a n d in accordance w ith law s. B u t w h a t k in d o f h is to ry is th is "su ch a h is to ry "? K a n t's "gu id ing th re a d " fo r th is h is to ry seem s to h a v e l it tle to do w ith e v e n ts a n d in v en tio n s of th e p a s t , b u t r a th e r h a s to do from th e s ta r t w ith "th e s te a d y p rog ress a n d slow developm en t of i t s [ th e h u m a n species] o rig in a l c a p a c itie s ,"22 in o th e r w ords, to do w ith a m o ra l h is to ry . T h is is th e h is to ry o f n a tu r e 's p la n to b r in g a b o u t a n in te rn a l a n d e x te rn a l co n stitu tio n exclusively fo r th e reason th a t i t is "the sole state in which all o f humanity's natural capacities can be developed."23 T h is is h is to ry fro m p rac tic a l p o in t of view . W e se e reco n firm atio n o f th is in K a n t's c losing p a ra g ra p h s ("N in th T hesis"). T h e m o st decisive s ta te m e n t o f th is is: I t would be a m isunderstanding of my point of view to [believe] th a t I w ant th is idea of a world history th a t is to a certain ex ten t led by an a priori guiding th read to take the place of history as such, whose composition is wholly 20 Ak. 18. 21 Ak. 18. Italics added for emphasis. 22 Ak. 17. 23 Ak. 27. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65 empirical. This idea is only a reflection of w hat a philosophical mind... could a ttem pt to do from another perspective.24 K a n t a p p e a rs to be in d ic a tin g t h a t h is conception o f h is to ry a s d isc u sse d in th e "Id e a " is n o t one concerned , a t l e a s t in th e m a in , w ith e m p iric a l in fo rm a - tio n o f th e p a s t b e in g u n if ie d in to a th eo re tica l science. K a n t is co n ce rn ed w ith th e s e ev en ts on ly in so fa r a s th e y show "w h a t p eo p les a n d g o v e rn m e n ts h a v e done to c o n tr ib u te to o r im p a ir th e objective o f co sm o p o litan ism ."25 In fac t, i f w e ta k e K a n t's rec o m m e n d a tio n s seriously a b o u t h o w to c o n s tru c t a th e o ry o f em p irica l ev en ts , th is w o u ld seem to b e a r a th e r im p o v e rish e d h is - to ry in d eed ; K a n t's ex am p le s h a v e on ly to do w ith "fo cu sin g e v e ry w h e re only o n c iv il c o n s titu tio n s a n d th e i r la w s a n d on th e re la tio n s a m o n g n a tio n s ."26 T h is is a h is to ry w ith o u t sc ience, w ith o u t in v en tio n s, w ith o u t l i te ra tu re , w ith o u t a r t , a n d p re su m a b ly ev en w ith o u t g re a t in d iv id u a ls .27 I t is a h is to ry o f p o litic s a n d g eo g rap h ica l e x p lo ra tio n , a n d only th e s e b e c a u se th e y a re th e d r iv in g fac to rs b e h in d th e p ro g re ss o f th e h u m a n ra c e to w a rd m o ra l p e rfec - tio n . A gain , th is is a n im p o r ta n t p o in t to m ake a g a in s t th o se c o m m en ta to rs w ho ta k e th e "Id e a " to be p r im a r ily concerned w ith th e a t te m p t to g ive n eces- s a ry concep ts fo r th e s tu d y o f e m p iric a l h is to ry .28 I th in k t h a t w e m ay con- c lu d e , th e n , th a t K a n t h a s a d iffe re n t p u rp o se in m in d th a n th e s tu d y o f em - p ir ic a l h is to ry . T he th ird r e m a rk to be m a d e is to sim ply b r in g to o u r a t te n t io n th e n e c e ssa ry connection b e tw e e n m o ra lity a n d po litica l sy s te m s. A fte r h a v in g 24 Ak. 30. Incidentally, I take this other perspective to be a practical one. 25 Ak.31. 26 Ak. 30. 271 include the last because Kant's focus is on "the play o f the human will's freedom in the large" (17), and thus seems to exclude important individuals. However, it is possible that they would have to be included in descriptions of wars, politics, and constitutions; it is likely, for instance, that Kant would want to include King Frederick William n as an important instigator of enlightened reforms. 28 Friedrich Kaulbach. for example. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66 c la im ed in th e "F o u r th T hesis" th a t th e n a tu r a l en d fo r h u m a n s is to form "in to a moral w hole ," in th e "F if th T h es is ," K a n t m a in ta in s th a t thus must there be a society in which one will find the highest possible degree of freedom under external laws combined with irresistible power, i.e., a per- fectly rightful civil consitution,29 whose a t t a in m ent-, is the supreme task nature has set for the human species; for only by solving and completing it can nature fulfill her other objectives with our species.30 W e c a n see th is e sp ec ia lly in th e s e v e n th a n d e ig h th "T h eses ." K a n t c la im s t h a t n a tu r e 's "su p re m e objective" is "a u n iv e rs a l cosmopolitan state, th e wom b in w h ich a ll o f th e h u m a n species' orig in al cap ac itie s w ill be devel- oped."31 K a n t c le a r ly s ta te s th a t m o ra lity c a n only occur w ith in a p o litica l sy s tem in w h ic h th e re is bo th a n in te r n a l c o n s titu tio n a n d a "cosm opolitan s ta te in w h ich th e se c u rity of n a tio n s is p u b lic ly acknow ledged ."32 In d eed , in th e s ta te m e n t o f th e "F if th T hesis" itse lf , im m e d ia te ly a f te r a rg u in g th a t th e n a tu r a l e n d o f h u m a n b e ings is th e p e rfe c t deve lopm en t o f th e ir rea so n , a n d th e re b y th e i r m o ra lity , K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t "the greatest problem" fo r u s is th e uachievefment of] a universal civil society j"33 th is is a s tro n g th e s is g iven th a t m o ra lity i s s ta te d a s our f in a l end . K a n t m ig h t h a v e sa id th a t a good will w as o u r n e c e ssa ry end , b u t h e specifica lly s ta te s t h a t i t is a cosm opolitan s ta te o p e ra tin g u n d e r th e law s of R igh t, a n d th a t th is is th e "hardest and the last [problem] to be solved."** T his in d ic a te s n o t only t h a t th e re is a d e fin ite l in k b e tw een p o litic s a n d m orality fo r K a n t, b u t also t h a t th e ach iev em en t of 29 This misprint occurs in the translation. 30 Ak. 22. 31 Ak. 28. 32 Ak. 28. 33 Ak. 22. 34 "Sixth Thesis." Ak. 23. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67 a u n iv e rs a l civil society is ou r n e c e ssa ry object of w illing a s m o ra l (sensuous) c re a tu re s .35 A n e ce ssa ry co rre la te to th is d iscussion m u s t be th e fa c t t h a t th e w ill can b e in flu e n ce d by su rro u n d in g co n d itio n s. T his c o rre la te is b o rn e o u t in a ll o f K a n t's w ritin g s , a n d we w ill h a v e o p p o rtu n ity to e x am in e i t in m ore de- ta i l below . B u t fo r now we c a n a t l e a s t n o te th a t th e w ill i s in d e e d in flu en ced by e x te rn a l c ircum stances. A n d c le a rly K a n t is concerned w ith su c h in f lu - ence; o therw ise , h e w ould s im p ly h a v e w r it te n th a t a good w ill is th e f in a l object o f a l l o u r w illing , a n d h is w ritin g s a b o u t perfec t c o n s titu tio n s w ould h a v e b e e n r a th e r in c id e n ta l d e ta ils , d e a lin g only w ith R ig h t o r p e rh a p s w r i t- te n only w ith a n eye to w ard h a p p in e ss . T h e q u estio n n a tu ra lly a r is e s a s to w hy th e fu ll p e rfec tio n o f m o ra lity sh o u ld be lin k e d w ith a p erfec t c o n s titu tio n a n d a cosm opo litan w orld? To beg in w ith , w e m u s t n o te th a t K a n t, l ik e H obbes, be lieves t h a t th e s ta te of n a tu re is n o t conducive to th e b e tte rm e n t o f persons, a n d t h a t peop le n eed ed to e n te r in to a civ il society before th e y c o u ld have h a d th e sa fe ty to in v e s t th e ir tim e a n d im prove th e ir ta le n ts . K a n t ap p ea rs to ta k e su c h a c la im fu r - th e r , in d ic a tin g t h a t i t is only w ith in su c h a society th a t one h a s th e ab ility to becom e m o ra lly b e tte r . We w ill see th e n a tu r e of th e re la tio n sh ip b e tw een R ig h t a n d m o ra lity a g a in in h is Metaphysics of Morals, b u t w e c a n a t le a s t m a k e som e in tu it iv e sen se of th is belief: in a S ta te w h e re one's p e rso n a n d one's w ell b e in g is co n tin u a lly u n d e r d ire c t th re a t of a tta c k , i t is d ifficu lt i f n o t im possib le to ac t in accordance w ith th e categorical im p e ra tiv e . H ow 35 We will have to wait to say more about why Kant thinks that this is our necessary end, but let me give a brief indication of why I think this is. The main reason is that Kant takes the highest good to be necessary object of all our (rational) willing. The highest good concerns not one individual, but all indi- viduals. And it concerns both morality and happiness. So, if our goal is to achieve the highest good on earth, we want to maximize morality, and (Kant believes) reward that morality with happiness. While we cannot directly make others more virtuous, we can attempt to bring about those conditions under which the cultivation of their rational nature can begin in earnest. And, for Kant, such cultivation occurs only with a perfect internal constitution and a cosmopolitan world. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68 cou ld one beh av e p e rfec tly m orally a n d y e t su rv ive? W h a t d em an d o f R ig h t cou ld be a d h e re d to in su c h a s ta te o f law lessn ess? K a n t d raw s a n a n a lo g y b e tw een th e s ta te of n a tu r e p rio r to e n te r in g in to a n y civil society a n d a s ta te of n a tu re p r io r to e n te r in g in to a c iv il r e la - tio n sh ip am ong n a tio n s : What the lawless state did to savages -namely, hold back all of our species' natural capacities until the evil that this placed them under compelled them to leave this state and enter into a civil constituion,36 in which all those seeds can be developed -barbarous freedom will also do to already established nations.37 T h is in d ica te s t h a t K a n t be lieves a s im ila r s ta te o f n a tu r e to ex is t b e tw ee n n a tio n s w hich, lik e th e o r ig in a l s ta te o f n a tu re , h a m p e rs th e deve lopm en t o f m o ra lity . H e m a in ta in s t h a t w e m u st "lea v e th e law le ss s ta te of sa v a g e ry a n d e n te r in to a fe d e ra tio n o f peoples,"38 "m u s t force n a tio n s to ju s t th e sam e decision ... to w hich sa v a g e m e n w ere so u n h a p p ily forced, nam ely , to give u p th e i r b ru ta l freedom a n d to se ek calm a n d s e c u rity in a law -governed co n sti- tu tio n ."39 A gain , su ch a s i tu a tio n of law le ss sa v ag e ry b e tw een n a tio n s is a n e x te rn a l s itu a tio n w h ich o b s tru c ts th e deve lopm en t o f m ora lity . K a n t's re a so n in g concern ing th e so u rce of su ch o b stru c tio n s i s t h a t h e be lieves th a t h u m a n s c o n tin u a lly w a n t to h a v e th in g s th e i r own w ay, re g a rd - le ss of w h a t h a rm i t m ig h t c a u se o thers, a n d i t is only th ro u g h th e coercion of a S ta te th a t p e rso n s w ill b e h av e in accord w ith R igh t. E a c h in d iv id u a l n eed s to b e coerced, since although as a rational creature he desires a law that establishes boundaries for everyone's freedom, his selfish animal propensities induce him to except 36 Again, this misprint occurs in the translation. 37 Ak. 25-6. 38 Ak.24. 39 Ak. 24. We will encounter a fuller discussion of the requirement of nations to move out of a "state of international nature" in Section One, Chapter Nine and Section Two, Chapter Four below. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69 himself from them wherever he can. He thus requires a master who will break his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will...40 As se n su o u s c re a tu re s , p e rso n s h a v e a n a tu r a l in te r e s t in h ap p in ess , a n d h e n ce m a n y tim es th e y w ill to h a v e th e i r dow er)41 d e s ire s sa tis fied re g a rd le s s o f o th e rs ' w ish es to do th e sam e. B e ca u se o f th is fac t, p e rso n s behave b e t te r w h e n coerced in acco rd w ith R ig h t,42 a n d since s u c h R ig h t is sim ply th e g re a te s t freedom o f e a c h in d iv id u a l w ith o u t t r a n s g re s s in g th e freedom o f a n - o th e r , i t is le g is la te d from th e m o ra l la w .43 A s K a n t su m m arize s in a foo tno te in "T o[w ard ] P e rp e tu a l Peace:" a man (or a people) who is merely in a state of nature denies me... security and injures me merely by being in this state. For although he does not actively (facto) injure me, he does so by virtue of the lawlessness of his state (statu iniusto), by which he constantly threatens me, and I can require him... to enter with me into a state of civil law...44 A gain , fo llow ing th e analogy , w e c an in tu it iv e ly conceive o f w hy i t is n e ce s- s a ry fo r n a tio n s to e n te r in to a cosm opo litan w ho le , n a m e ly b ecause c o n s ta n t w a r, th e th r e a t o f w a r, a n d p re p a ra tio n fo r w a r le a v e n a tio n s econom ically d e v a s ta te d , t ra d e d is ru p te d , a n d p eo p le fe a r in g fo r th e i r w ell being . K a n t s im p ly ta k e s i t a s fa c t t h a t w a r a n d th e th r e a t o f w a r is a s itu a tio n w h ich is 40 Ak. 23. Herder in his Ideas on the Philosophy o f the History o f Mankind rebukes Kant for his assertion that humans require a master. Kant attempts to reply to this charge in: Immanuel Kant, "Reviews of Herder's Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind," in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 201-220. 41 Cf. Kant's distinction between the "lower" and "higher" faculty of desire in the second Cri- tique. 42 And, of course, this is not some completely foreign and arbitrary constraint, because Kant claims that Right is simply what we do will as rational creatures. When we put the moral law above selflove in the formulation of the categorical imperative, we rationally will for such a society to be formed. In addition, such a society is one of our Ideas of reason. 43 See the Metaphysics o f Morals for a more detailed discussion of this. 44 Ak. 350. Immanuel Kant, "To[ward] Perpetual Peace: A philosophical Sketch," in Perpet- ual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Moral Practice, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1983), 107-143. All citations refer to Akademie page numbers. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70 in co m p a tib le , n o t w ith th e d ev e lo p m en t of a ll c u ltu re , b u t w ith th e develop- m e n t o f so m e asp ec ts o f c u ltu re w h ich allow fo r th e p ro m o tio n of a m o ra l ed u ca tio n . O n e re a so n w hy su c h a s ta te o f n a tu re b e tw ee n n a tio n s is co n trad ic - to ry to m o ra lity is b ecau se i t is co n trad ic to ry to th e f in a l e n d o f h u m an ity . As K a n t e x p la in s in , "T o[w ard] P e rp e tu a l Peace:" Just as we view with deep disdain the attachment of savages to their lawless freedom - preferring to scuffle without end rather than to place themselves under lawful restraints..., consequently preferring a mad freedom to a rational one -... so also should we think [this of] civilized peoples (each one united into a nation).45 W hile w e w ill see such e n d s d isc u sse d a g a in w ith th e th i r d Critique, w h a t w e see w ith th is q u o ta tio n is t h a t w a r does n o th in g (d irec tly ) to p rom ote m ora l en d s. W a r a n d th e p re p a ra t io n fo r w a r do n o t te a c h p e rs o n s ab o u t how to be m oral; a t m o st, w a r a n d th e th r e a t o f w a r a re "th e g re a te s t obstacle to m o ra lity ... w h ic h c o n s ta n tly r e ta r d s th is a d v an c em en t"46 ev en a t best, w a r does n o t c u lt iv a te p e rso n s' w illin g n e ss to ad h e re to th e com m ands o f th e m o ra l law , te a c h in g th e m th e a r t o f k illin g in s te a d o f a r t itse lf . T he f in a l e n d o f h u m a n b e in g s a s r a t io n a l c re a tu re s is a S ta te in w h ic h everyone h a s th e m ax im u m a m o u n t o f freed o m w h ile n o t im p ed in g on th e freedom of o th e rs .47 T h is f in a l e n d a lso e n ta ils th e m o ra l perfec tion o f a ll p e rso n s , above a n d beyond a p e a c e fu l cosm opo litan w hole. A s ta te o f w a r v io la te s th e f in a l en d o f h u m a n k in d . K a n t is d e a r in a ll h is w ritin g s t h a t w a r is th e sing le m ost 45 Ak. 354. Italics added for emphasis. 46 Conflict o f the Faculties, p. 169. 41 Incidentally, we can also see that war does little to improve the happiness of persons. And, of course, there is nothing like the proportionality of happiness to morality in the spoils of the victor, since "the concept of the right of nations as a right to go to war is meaningless (for it would then be the right to determine the right not by independent, universally valid laws that restrict the freedom of everyone, but by one-sided maxims backed by force)" ("To[ward] Perpetual Peace," Ak. 357). And, finally, this is recon- firmation that the question about a cosmopolitan whole is a question asked with moral considerations in mind, not simply a concern for happiness. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71 th re a te n in g obstacle in th e w ay of p eace , a n d b ecause such peace is n ecessa ry for th e im p ro v em en t o f o u r c ap ab ilitie s , i t is a th r e a t to m ora lity itse lf . N one the less , K a n t is also d e a r t h a t a n tag o n ism is a n e c e ssa ry e le- m en t in th e cu ltiv a tio n o f m orality . P e rh a p s th e b e s t ind ica tion o f th is com es from K a n t's d iscussion o f w h a t w ould h a p p e n i f no an tagon ism e x is te d am ong persons. In th is case , "m an w o u ld liv e a s a n A rcad ian sh e p h e rd , in perfec t concord, co n te n tm e n t, a n d m u tu a l love..."48 T h is sounds l ik e a w on- d erfu l id ea l, b u t K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t in th is s itu a tio n , "a ll ta le n ts w ou ld He e te rn a lly d o rm a n t in th e i r seed; m en docile a s th e sheep th ey te n d w ould h a rd ly in v e s t th e ir ex is ten ce w ith a n y w o rth g re a te r th a n th a t o f c a ttle ; a n d as th e p u rp o se b e h in d m a n 's c rea tio n , h is r a t io n a l n a tu re , th e re w o u ld r e - m ain a void ."49 H ere w e m u s t a n tic ip a te K a n t's a sse rtio n in th e seco n d a n d th ird Critique, th o u g h th is is easily e n o u g h done, th a t w h a t m a k e s p e rso n s v a lu ab le is th e ir ra tio n a l n a tu re ; i t is b e c a u se in d iv id u a ls a re m em b ers o f th e in te llig ib le , m o ra l rea lm , a n d n o t m e re ly p a r t ic ip a n ts in th e n a tu r a l rea lm , th a t th e y a re "en d s in th em se lv es." A n e x ce llen t su m m ary of th is p o in t oc- cu rs in K a n t's "R eview s o f H e rd e r's Id e a s on th e Philosophy of th e H is to ry of M an k in d " w h ere h e re b u k e s H erder, say in g : Does the author really mean that, if the happy inhabitants of Tahiti, never visited by more civilized nations, were destined to live in their peaceful indo- lence for thousands of centuries, it would be possible to give a satisfactory an- swer to the question of why they should exist at all, and of whether it would not have been just as good if this island had been occupied by happy sheep and cattle as by happy human beings who merely enjoy themselves?50 T hus, w hile p e rso n s m ig h t be h ap p y w ith o u t an tag o n ism ,51 th ey w o u ld n o t h ave an y m ore v a lu e th a n a n y o th er c re a tu re on E a r th , for th e y w o u ld n o t be 48 Ak. 21. 49 Ak. 21. 50 "Reviews o f Herder's Ideas," p. 219-20. 51 This is different than Kant's other claim that persons would have been happier without the interference of reason (see especially the "Speculative Beginning of Human History ." Ak. 111 and Ak. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72 c u ltiv a tin g th e u se of th e i r reaso n , a n d th e re fo re w ould n o t be p ro g re ss in g to w a rd th e ir n a tu r a l , m o ra l end .52 O ne n e e d s an tag o n ism , b u t n o t w a r ,53 a s i tu a tio n o ccu rrin g "on ly in society - a n d , indeed , only in one th a t com bines th e g re a te s t freedom , a n d th u s a th o ro u g h g o in g a n ta g o n ism am ong i t s m em - b e rs , w ith a p rec ise d e te rm in a tio n a n d p ro tec tio n o f th e b o u n d a rie s o f th is freedom , so t h a t i t c a n coex ist w ith th e freedom of o th e rs ."54 O ne im p o r ta n t p o in t w e n e ed to m a k e h e re is to n o te th e e x ac t n a tu r e o f th is re la tio n sh ip b e tw ee n a po litica l w ho le a n d m o ra lity . P u t s im p ly enough , m o ra lity d e p en d s on a cosm opolitan w orld, b u t a cosm opolitan w o rld does n o t d e p e n d on m o ra lity . A cosm opolitan w orld is a n e ce ssa ry b u t n o t a su ffic ien t con d itio n fo r th e ach iev em en t o f m orality . T h is is a p o in t w h ic h w ill le a d to confusion , a s i t h a s led m a n y com m en ta to rs , i f n o t p ro p erly u n - ders to o d a n d s tr ic tly a d h e re d to.55 W e w ill h a v e m ore to s a y ab o u t th is in S ec tion Two, C h a p te r T h re e below, b u t i t is d e a r t h a t K a n t s ta te s th is r e la - tio n sh ip , i f n o t d e a r ly , th e n a t le a s t co n sis ten tly . T he cosm opolitan w h o le is th e "wom b" from w h ich o u r c a p a d tie s c a n b e perfected . I t i s th e fo rm a tio n of 115); it is a claim that individuals would not have any value if they did not cultivate their rational abili- ties. 52 Heinz Wichmann maintains that this indicates "daB Kant keinen anderen Weg aus der rein tierischen Existenz des Menschen hin zu hOheren Existenz sieht als den des gegenseitigen Kampfes der Menschen untereinander. Nur der soli Progression and positive Entwicklung garantieren," (873-4). See: Heinz Wichmann, "Zum Problem des ewigen Friedens bei Kant," in Proceedings o f the Eighth Interna- tional Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, p t 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 873-9. 53 Thus, I think that Laberge goes too far in his analysis on the need for "external war," for it does not seem necessary that there always be the threat of war in order 1) to continually motivate persons to develop culture and not be lulled into the life of an Arkadian shepherd, and 2) to secure the threat of a world despotism. As Schuler says, "because unsocial sociability is the source of creativity as well as de- struction, its presence must somehow be felt within a state of perpetual peace," (p. 903); Jeanne Schuler, "Reasonable Hope: Kant as Critical Theorist," in Proceedings o f the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, pt. 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 901-7. See also: Pierre La- berge, "Von der Garantie des ewigen Friedens," trans. Michael Walz, (French to German], in Immanuel Kant: Zum ewigen Frieden, ed. Otfried HflfFe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag GmbH, 1995), 149-70. 54 Ak. 22. 55 It is perhaps this lack of differentiation which leads Laberge to attempt to make a rather strange and unconvincing split between ends which "nature sets for herself' and the more rational ends that humans set for themselves of which "nature has no knowledge." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73 a S ta te w h ich c an th e n be tran sfo rm e d "in to a moral w hole ." I t is th e "sole state in which all o f humanity's natural capacities can be developed." K a n t's d iscussion o f th e A rcad ian sh ep h erd , n o te d above, a lso show s a s ta te in w hich th e re i s peace a n d even love, b u t n o t a m o ra l w ho le , n o t a s i tu a t io n in conform ity w ith th e f in a l e n d of h u m a n b e in g s . W e h a v e la te r co n firm atio n o f th is in "T o [w ard ] P e rp e tu a l P eace" w h e re K a n t s ta te s p la in ly : One can see that although the inner core of morality is certainly not its cause, presently existing but still very imperfectly organized nations have in their foreign relations already approached what the idea of right prescribes (so that a good national consitution56 cannot be expected to arise from morality, but, rather, quite the opposite, a people's good moral condition is to be expected only under a good constitution).57 K a n t be liev es t h a t th e developm ent o f m o ra lity , th e c u ltiv a tio n of o u r r a - tio n a l n a tu re , c a n n o t develop p ro p erly u n d e r th e th r e a t o f w ar. W hile i t does seem to r e q u ire a n ta g o n ism , i t a lso re q u ire s a la s tin g p eace , so th a t c itiz e n s can devote th e m se lv e s to developing th e s e ta le n ts in s te a d o f develop ing th e sk ills o f w ar. T h is fa c t sa v e s K a n t from a n o th e rw ise s ig n if ic a n t problem . W e sh a ll see th is p ro b lem m o re c learly below, b u t w e c a n see i t h e re a lread y a n d offer a so lu tion . I f a p e rfec tly cosm opolitan w o rld sim p ly was th e m oral p e rfec tio n o f th e h u m a n rac e , a n d i f such a w orld w a s b ro u g h t a b o u t b y n a tu re despite th e ac tions o f th e h u m a n race, th e n p e rso n s w ou ld a t t a in m o ra lity w ith o u t h a v in g w illed i n accordance w ith th e m o ra l law , n am e ly , t h a t w illing w h ich gives th e m m o ra l w o rth in th e f i r s t p lace. I n fact, th e ty p e o f actions u su a lly invo lved in b r in g in g ab o u t th e cosm opo litan w hole K a n t u n d e rs ta n d s to be u su a lly d ia m e tr ic a lly opposed to th e m o ra l law . B u t th is p rob lem is so lved i f th e cosm opo litan w o rld is m erely th e "w om b" o f m o ra lity , i f i t is a n e c e ssa ry b u t n o t su ffic ie n t cond ition of tru e m o ra l ach iev em en t. I f w e h ave 56 Again, misprint occurs in the original translation. 57 Ak. 366. iI Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74 u n d e rs to o d K a n t correctly , h e a p p e a rs to in d ic a te th a t a cond ition o f la s t in g p e ac e is a cond ition w h ich w e m u s t h a v e in o rd e r to u n d e r ta k e in e a rn e s t th e p ro jec t o f u n iv e rsa l m o ra l s tr iv in g . W a r a n d th e th r e a t of w a r p lace th e in d iv id u a ls o f d iffe ren t n a tio n s in a co n d itio n s im ila r to th e s ta te o f n a tu r e o u t o f w h ich th e y o rig ina lly m oved, a n d su c h a cond ition K a n t be lieves to be a d v e rse to th e cu ltiv a tio n o f m o ra lity . T h u s , w e m u s t hope t h a t th is co n d itio n c a n b e overcom e, a n d t h a t w e c a n m ove to w ard a cosm opo litan w o rld in o rd e r to su b seq u e n tly m ove to w a rd a m o ra l w hole. T h is a lso solves a r e la te d p ro b lem . I f i t is o u r d u ty a s m em b ers o f th e h u m a n rac e to m ove to w a rd a m o ra l w hole , a n d i f i t is t ru e t h a t su c h m ove- m e n t c a n on ly occur w ith in th e sp ace o f cosm opo litan ism , th e n i t is o u r d u ty to s tr iv e to w a rd th is cosm opo litan ism . B u t does th is give u s a carte blanche for v io lence? D oes K a n t's p ic tu re o f a n a n ta g o n is tic w orld le a d u s to th e j u s - tif ic a tio n o f w a r a n d v io lence in th e n a m e o f m ov ing th e h u m a n rac e fo rw ard ? I th in k su c h a n in te rp re ta tio n w ou ld b e a se rio u s m isco n s tru a l of K a n t's p o - sitio n , a n d p ro b ab ly one on ly p oss ib le th ro u g h d e lib e ra te ex ag g e ra tio n . T h e e n d o f th e h u m a n race, a s K a n t sees i t , is th e fo rm a tio n of a m o ra l w hole , n o t s im p ly a p eacefu l w orld. A n d w h a t h in d e r s th e developm en t o f o u r r a t io n a l c a p a c itie s to beg in w ith a re co n d itio n s o f v io lence, b o th be tw een p e rso n s a n d b e tw e e n n a tio n s . C e rta in ly K a n t's w e ll-k n o w n s ta n c e a g a in s t rev o lu tio n ("Argue a s m u ch as you w a n t a n d a b o u t w h a t you w an t, but obey/")58 a n d ev en a g a in s t m a n y form s o f p ro te s t, s p e a k s to w a rd th e p ro h ib itio n b o th o f d i- re c t v io lence a s w ell a s a n y ac tio n w h ic h m ig h t jeo p ard ize th e a u th o r i ty o f th e S ta te . W e m u s t a lw ays w ill in acco rd w ith th e m o ra l law , a lw ay s t r e a t o th e r peop le a s en d s in th em se lv es; th is is th e on ly w ay in w h ich w e h a v e t r u e au to n o m y .59 58 Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment," Ak. 37. In: Per- petual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Moral Practice, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1983), 41-8. All citations refer to Akademie page numbers. 59 See the following chapter for more on this. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75 C o m m en ta to rs a re r ig h t to p o in t ou t th a t K a n t does n o t h a v e th e sam e fra m e w o rk in p lace a s H eg e l does for th e p u rp o se of d escrib in g how the species m ig h t p rog ress to w a rd ra tio n a lity . B u t th is i s good. H egel's descrip - tio n o f th e w o rld a s be ing c o n s titu tiv e ly (i.e., n o t m ere ly reg u la tiv e ly ) d ialec- tic le a d s to p h ilo soph ica l p ro b lem s (n o t be ing ab le to su rv iv e a c r itiq u e o f "M o d ern ity "), p rac tic a l a tro c itie s ( th e v io len t a c tio n s o f p e rso n s a g a in s t one a n o th e r in th e hopes th a t th e ir "th e s is a n d a n ti th e s is " w ould le a d to som e "sy n th e s is"), a s w ell as a b su rd itie s (S ta lin 's a tte m p t, I h av e h e a rd , to p la n t rice in th e n o r th e rn reg ions o f th e Sov ie t U nion in th e hope th a t i t w ou ld p ro d u ce a su p e r io r s tra n d ). F o r K a n t, w e a re n e v e r c e r ta in t h a t th e h ig h e s t good c a n be ach ieved , fo r i ts p o ss ib ility is n ev er so m e th in g w hich cou ld be ta k e n a s k n o w n . In add ition , th o u g h w a r m ay le a d h u m a n b e in g s to th o se p o litica l s t ru c tu re s n ecessa ry fo r th e b eg in n in g o f a m o ra l com m unity , th e en d o f h u m a n k in d is th is moral com m un ity itse lf, a n d actions w h ich d e tra c t from i ts c re a tio n a re decidedly v io la tio n s of th e m o ra l law . T he e n d s n ev er ju s tify th e m e a n s , th o u g h p rov idence m ay help u s to ach ieve d e s irab le en d s even th o u g h w e do n o t seem to d e s ire th em o u rse lves.60 H ence, w e c an n o t 60 While Susanne Weiper is certainly right to argue, as I do, that war can never be utilized as a means to peace (p. 915), I think she read too great a conflict between the ends of nature and the ends of human beings. In this regard, she argues that this conflict "should be interpreted as an antinomy," (p. 915, all translations mine), particularly that there is an antinomy between the positions of the "teleological historian" and the "philosopher of Right," (p. 915). But this hardly seems like a real thesis and antithesis. There is nothing incompatible between the facts that Providence will lead us to a condition of perpetual peace and either 1) that we can ourselves contribute to this process, or 2) that moral progress must come from our own endeavors. See: Susanne Weiper, "Eine Idee zwischen Politik and Moral: Der Friedensgedanke bei Kant and Scheler," in Proceedings o f the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, p t 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 909-918. Similarly, Eckart von Sydow writes: "The difficulty [namely, an "Antinomie der Geschichtskonstrucdon"] concerning the meaning of history can be stated through the contradictory sentences: 1. History promotes morality and hence weakens natural capacities; 2. history promotes natural capacities and hence weakens morality," (p. 380). Obviously, if what I have argued is correct, von Sydow is simply wrong. To begin with, though we might be able to conclude that history does help develop natural abilities, we can never know, as a fact, that history promotes morality. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, natural capacities are in no way ipso facto in conflict with morality; this not only goes against Kant's writings on moral progress and cul- ture, where the skills of individuals aid morality, but also against his moral writings and his belief in the free choice to be evil. All these points will be discussed further below, though I shall not bring up Eckart von Sydow specifically again. See: Eckart von Sydow, "Der Gedanke des Edeal-Rechts bei Kant," in Materialien zu Kants Rehctsphilosophie, ed. Zwi Batscha (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 1976). 379-389. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76 choose "a n y m ean s n ecessa ry " to re a c h th e goal of th e cosm opolitan w orld. T h e in te rp re ta t io n I h a v e given w ould , o f course, allow a n d even n e c e ss ita te a n ta g o n ism , b u t a s I h a v e tr ie d to a rg u e above, su ch a n ta g o n ism is s im p ly th e n a tu r a l a n tag o n ism w hich occurs w h e n h u m a n be ings h av e d iffe ren t e n d s re g a rd in g h a p p in e ss , a n d i t sh o u ld occur w ith in a society w ith a p e rfec t c o n s titu tio n a n d can occur w ith o u t v io la tin g th e m oral law . W e s h a l l see th is in f u r th e r d e ta il below. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 77 Chapter Four Kant's Moral Philosophy and the Highest Good L I n th is c h a p te r I w ill p re s e n t a b r ie f accoun t o f K a n t's m o ra l th eo ry , focusing m a in ly on th e Critique o f Practical Reason. O f c h ie f in te r e s t h e re is K a n t's a rg u m e n t for th e h ig h e s t good a n d h is d iscussion o f how so m e th in g becom es a p o s tu la te o f p u re p ra c tic a l rea so n . In th e f i r s t sec tion I w ill give a b r ie f overv iew o f K a n t's m o ra l ph ilo sophy , in th e second I w ill give K a n t's a r - g u m en t fo r th e h ig h e s t good, in th e th i r d I w ill d iscuss th e n e c e ssa ry p o s tu - la te s o f G od a n d im m o rta lity , in th e fo u r th I w ill d iscuss th e lo ca tio n o f th e h ig h e s t good, a n d in th e l a s t I w ill b rie fly p o in t ou t K a n t's s tru g g le w ith th e q u estio n o f th e "expansion" o f p ra c tic a l reaso n . n. I n th e Grundlegung, K a n t is in te re s te d in th e n a tu r e o f m o ra l com - m an d s. Specifically , K a n t w a n ts to k now i f w e can f in d a s in g le p r in c ip le for m orality . H e u tilize s w h a t h e te rm s th e "an a ly tica l" m e th o d in w h ich h e s ta r ts w ith e th ic a l p rin c ip le s w h ic h everyone w ill ag ree a re t r u e a n d th e n a t - tem p ts to a rg u e from th e se acc ep ted p rin c ip le s to th e n e c e ssa ry g ro u n d fo r th e ir t r u th . T h e Prolegomena is a n o th e r exam p le of K a n t's a n a ly tic a l m ethod , s in ce i t b eg in s w ith th e accep ted law s o f geom etry a n d p h y sic s a n d a rg u e s to w h a t m u s t be a priori n e ce ssa ry i f th e se la w s a re to h a v e a fo u n d a - tion , n a m e ly in tu it io n s a n d th e ca tego ries . In th e Grundlegung, K a n t m oves from a ccep ted te n e ts o f e th ic s a n d m o ra lity in a n a tte m p t to f in d a s in g le u n i- fy ing p r in c ip le fo r m orality . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. L i is 78 K a n t re a so n s t h a t th e b a s is fo r e th ic a l a c tio n c a n n o t be g ro u n d e d in th e d e s ire fo r h a p p in e s s . T h is is fo r ( a t le a s t) th r e e re la tiv e ly sim p le re a so n s . T h e f i r s t is t h a t w e a ll a g re e (K an t p resu m es) t h a t ta le n ts , benefits , w e a lth , pow er, in te llig en ce , e tc ., a re only good i f th e y a re co m b in ed w ith a good w ill; su c h b e n e fits c a n "becom e ex trem ely b a d a n d h a rm fu l i f th e will... is n o t good."1 H ence, a "good w ill seem s to c o n s titu te th e in d isp e n sa b le co n d itio n o f b e in g even w o rth y o f h a p p in e ss ."2 T h e second re a s o n is t h a t h a p p in e ss i s n o t a n e n d o f w hich w e c a n co n sis ten tly conceive: "m e n c a n n o t form a n y d e fin ite a n d c e r ta in co n cep t o f th e su m of sa tis fac tio n o f a l l in c lin a tio n s th a t is c a lle d h a p p in e ss ."3 H a p p in e s s is a co n tin u a lly f lu c tu a tin g concep t, an d even i f w e ach iev e m o m e n ta ry h a p p in e ss , a d iffe re n t d e s ire soon a r is e s .4 T he th i r d r e a - son , a n d p e rh a p s th e m o st im p o rtan t, is t h a t K a n t n o te s t h a t an ac tio n do n e in acco rd w ith m o ra lity is a n action th a t w e sa y "o u g h t" to h av e b een done. T h e p rin c ip le a cco rd in g to w hich th e ac tion w as d e te rm in e d is th e re fo re u n i - v e rs a l a n d n e c e ssa ry . W e do no t s a y th a t th e a c tio n sh o u ld be done i f the p e rso n w a n te d so m e e n d o r o ther, b u t t h a t th e a c tio n sh o u ld be done in d e - p e n d e n tly of th e e n d a n d th e outcom e. T h u s, K a n t re a so n s th a t s ince th e w illin g o f h a p p in e s s d e a ls w ith specific a n d c o n tin g e n t e n d s , th ese e n d s c a n - n o t possib ly se rv e a s g ro u n d s for m o ra lity . S uch co n clu sio n s le a d K a n t to th re e p ro p o sitio n s , w hich th e n le a d h im to th e fo rm u la o f th e m o ra l law . T h e th re e p ro p o s itio n s are: a n ac tio n m u s t b e done from d u ty a n d d u ty a lo n e to h a v e m o ra l w o rth ,5 "an ac tio n done 1 Ak. 393. All quotations come from: Immanuel Kant, Grounding fo r the Metaphysics o f Morals, in Ethical Philosophy, trans. James Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., Third Printing, 1988), 1-69. All citations refer to the Akademie page numbers. 2 Ibid., Ak. 393-4. 3 Ibid., Ak. 399. 4 With the (hypothetical) imperative of skills, once one has chosen the end, the means follow necessarily, so that it is in the form of an imperative. But there can be not even a corresponding (hypothetical) imperative for prudence, since "the concept of happiness is such an indeterminate one that even though everyone wishes to attain happiness, yet he can never say definitely and consistently what it is that he really wishes and wills," {Grundlegung, Ak. 418). See also: Ak. 417-8. s As the translator notes, this proposition is "implicit" in the discussion found at Ak. 397-9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 79 from d u ty h a s i ts m o ra l w o rth , n o t in th e p u rp o se th a t is to be a tta in e d by it, b u t in th e m ax im accord ing to w h ich th e ac tion is de te rm in ed ,"6 a n d "du ty is th e n ecessity o f a n ac tio n done o u t of re sp ec t fo r th e law . I can in d ee d hav e a n in c lin a tio n fo r a n ob ject a s th e effect o f m y p ro p o sed action; b u t I can n e v e r h av e re sp e c t fo r su c h a n object, j u s t b ecau se i t is m erely a n effect a n d is n o t a n ac tiv ity o f th e w ill."7 T hese p ropositions le a d K a n t to th e conclusion th a t i t m u s t be th e fo rm o f la w i ts e l f w h ich can g ive u s th e n ecessa ry condi- t io n s for a n e th ic a l action ; th e fo rm a b s tra c ts from a ll em p irica l in te n tio n s , g rounds, a n d en d s. B u t w h a t so r t of e th ica l p r in c ip le cou ld give u s such a form ? K a n t's d iscovered p rin c ip le is, o f course, th e m o ra l law g iven in th e fo rm o f a "ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e ." K a n t gives u s th re e fo rm u la tio n s of i t in th is w ork: Hence there is only one categorical imperative and it is this: Act only accord- ing to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should be- come a universal law.8 Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a univer- sal law of nature.9 Act in such a way tha t you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.10 In th is respec t, th e object w h ich w e w ill is th e on ly object w hich is good in a n d o f itse lf, a n d is n o t em p irica l, n am e ly a good w ill. B u t K a n t concludes t h a t su ch w illin g is s im p ly th e w illingness to w ill in accord w ith th e m oral law . T h u s i t is th e form o f th e law , a n d n o t i ts m a te r ia l, w hich p rov ides a n 6 Grundlegung, Ak. 399. 7 Ibid., Ak. 400. 8 Ibid., Ak. 421. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., Ak. 429. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f k 80 ac tio n w ith w orth . A nd, o f course , su ch a n action is s im p ly w illin g in accord w ith d u ty . The w ay in w h ich w e check t h a t any p a r t ic u la r m ax im conform s w ith th e m oral la w is to see i f w e cou ld u n iv ersa lize i t . I f w e c a n co n sis ten tly w ill t h a t th e m ax im be u n iv e rsa liz e d , th e n i t is in accord w ith th e m o ra l law . T he m a te r ia l o f th e Grundlegung is w ell w orn , a s i s m o st o f th e Cri- tique o f Practical Reason. A s such , le t m e now m ove on to th e second Cri- tique in o rder to give a b r ie f sk e tch o f i t s backg round com ponen ts . T he Critique o f Practical Reason, p robab ly w ritte n w ith in th e course o f one c a len d a r y e a r a n d p u b lis h e d on th e heels o f th e second e d itio n of th e Critique of Pure Reason, u tiliz e s th e "sy n th e tic" m ethod . T h is m e th o d is p ro p e r fo r a "c ritiq u e ," a n d a rg u e s fo r th e v a lid ity o f a priori p rin c ip le s w ith a s l i t t le reference to ex p erien ce a s possib le . As th e f ir s t Critique a tte m p te d to d iscover those p r in c ip le s a n d law s n ecessa ry fo r th e k now ledge o f n a tu re , th e second Critique a tte m p ts to d iscover th o se p rin c ip les a n d la w s necessa ry fo r m o ra l action a n d ju d g m e n t. T he m a in th r u s t o f th e Critique o f Practical Reason i s "m ere ly to show t h a t th e re is a p u re p ra c tic a l re a so n ,"11 in o th e r w ords, t h a t p u re rea so n c a n be p rac tica l. W e sa w in th e f i r s t Critique th a t rea so n h a s a specu la tive fu n c tio n , b u t K a n t a rg u e s h e re th a t i t h a s a p rac tica l fu n c tio n a s w ell. A gain in th e second Critique, K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t no p rin c ip le th a t c o n ta in s em p irica l c o n te n t c a n ta k e th e fo rm of a law , t h a t is , i t c an n o t c o m m an d from u n iv e rs a lity a n d n ecessity . T h is is because , f irs t , w e c an n o t k n o w a priori w h a t ob jects w ou ld give u s p lea su re , a n d th u s (even i f h a p p in e s s w ere c o n sis ten t) i t w ou ld b e a m erely c o n tin g en t fa c t a n d n o t ab le to p rov ide u s w ith a u n iv e rs a l a n d n e c e ssa ry object fo r w illin g ,12 a n d second, su c h m a tte r s of p le a su re a re d iffe ren t fo r each person , a n d th u s c an n o t be 11 Ak. 3. All references come from: Immanuel Kant, Critique o f Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1956). 12 Ibid., Ak. 21. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81 u n iv e rs a l .13 H ow ever, even i f ob jects o f p le a su re w ere k n o w n a priori a n d even i f a ll p e rso n s ag reed on th em , "even th e n th e y cou ld n o t se t up th e p rin c ip le o f self-love a s a p ra c tic a l law , fo r th e u n a n im ity i t s e l f w ould be m ere ly c o n tin g e n t,"14 a n d th u s be on ly sub jec tive ly n e ce ssa ry . T h u s K a n t a g a in a rg u e s t h a t i f th e re is a m o ra l law , th e n i t m u s t co m m an d d u e on ly to i ts form , b e ca u se no m a te r ia l is a llo w ed in a u n iv e rs a l a n d n e c e ssa ry im p e ra tiv e ; " th e so le p rin c ip le of m o ra lity c o n sis ts in in d e - p en d en ce from a ll m a te r ia l o f th e la w (i.e., a d e s ired object) a n d in th e ac- co m p an y in g d e te rm in a tio n o f choice by th e m ere fo rm o f g iv in g u n iv e rsa l law w hich a m ax im m u s t be cap ab le o f h a v in g ."15 T h is le a d s K a n t back to th e fo rm u la tio n o f th e ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e , th e co m m an d to a c t so " th a t th e m ax im o f y o u r w ill cou ld a lw ay s h o ld a t th e sam e tim e a s a p rin c ip le e s ta b - lish in g u n iv e rs a l law ."16 N ow K a n t h a s a rg u e d th a t w e c a n th in k o f su c h a law , a n d w e c an fo rm u la te i t a p p ro p ria te ly . T h u s h e concludes t h a t w e h a v e consciousness of th e m o ra l law . B u t since th e m o ra l la w exp resses n o th in g b u t th e freedom of th e w ill to give la w s to i ts e lf a p a r t from em p irica l in flu en ce , th e m oral law im p lies th e n e c e ss ity of a free w ill: I t is therefore the moral law, of which we become im m ediately conscious as soon as we construct maxim s for the will, which first p resen ts itself to us; and since reason exhibits it as a ground of determ ination which is completely inde- pendent of and not to be outweighed by any sensuous condition, it is the m oral law which leads directly to the concept of freedom.17 13 Ibid., Ak. 25 and 36. 14 Ibid., Ak. 26. We can also always ask, given that one person likes such a thing, or that eve- ryone likes such a thing, why should this thing be a necessary possession? And should it be necessary for everyone to desire it? 15 Ibid., Ak. 33. 16 Ibid., Ak. 30. 17 Ibid.. Ak. 29-30. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82 T he m o ra l law , of w hich w e c a n b e conscious, com m ands th a t w e w ill on ly th o se e n d s w h ich can be n e c e ssa ry a n d u n iv e rsa l, a n d th u s w ill f re e ly a n d w ith o u t r e g a r d to se n su o u s n a tu r e . B u t su c h w illing is free w illin g , th e le g is - la tio n o f r e a s o n to itse lf. R e c a ll t h a t th e w ill, a s K a n t d e fin es i t , is "a facu lty e i th e r o f b r in g in g fo r th o b jec ts c o rre sp o n d in g to co n cep tio n s o r o f d e te rm in in g itse lf , i.e ., i t s c a u s a lity to effect su ch objects..."18 S u ch b r in g in g fo r th o f ob jects is a la w - lik e b e h a v io r ; "ev e ry th in g in n a tu r e w o rk s accord ing to law s. O n ly a r a t io n a l b e in g h a s th e pow er to a c t a cco rd in g to h is conception o f law s, i.e ., acco rd ing to p r in c ip le s , a n d th e re b y h a s h e a w ill."19 B u t w h a t fac u lty co n tro ls th e fo r- m a tio n o f law s? R eason , a s w e l e a r n e d fo rm th e f ir s t Critique, is t h a t fa c u lty w h ich is a b le to d ra w conclusions i n a law -lik e fash ion , a s w ell a s s e t i t s ow n en d s. A n im a ls p re su m ab ly do n o t h a v e freedom , do n o t h a v e th e a b ility to s e t e n d s fo r th em se lv es a n d th e n to p u rs u e th o se p u rp o ses in a law -lik e fa sh io n . T h u s a n im a ls c a n n o t b e m o ra l. Im p o rta n tly , K ant, concludes though freedom is certainly the ratio essendi of the m oral law, th e la tte r is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom. For had not the m oral law already been dis- tinctly thought in our reason, we would never have been justified in a s s u m in g any th ing like freedom... B ut if there were no freedom, the m oral law would never have been encountered in us.20 K a n t d ra w s th e im p o rta n t co n clu sio n th a t w e w ould n o t even be conscious o f th e m o ra l la w i f i t w ere n o t fo r th e p o ss ib ility o f freedom . F reed o m a s th e a b ility o f r e a s o n to give law s to i ts e lf , in d e p e n d e n t o f sen su o u s n a tu r e , is e x - a c tly w h a t th e m o ra l law ex p resses , a n d to h a v e consciousness o f th e m o ra l la w is to h a v e a n e n co u n te r w ith o u r ow n freedom .21 18 Ibid., Ak. 15. 19 Grundlegung, Ak. 412. 20 Second Critique, Ak. 4, n. 21 Though, o f course, freedom is something "we can neither know immediately, since our first concept o f it is negative, nor infer from experience, since experience reveals us only the law o f appear- ances and consequently the mechanism of nature, the direct opposite of freedom." (Ibid.. Ak. 29). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83 T h u s, K an t co n c lu d es t h a t th e poss ib ility w h ich th e Critique o f Pure Reason o p en ed up fo r freed o m , is now filled in a n d co n firm ed by th e Critique of Practical Reason. F reed o m , w h ile i t c an n o t b e m e t w ith a s a n in tu itio n , is n e c e ss ita te d by th e m o ra l la w , a la w of w hich w e w o u ld n o t be conscious in th e f i r s t p lace i f freedom w e re n o t possible. B u t th is freedom is n o t m ere ly th e n e g a tiv e freedom w h ich w a s exp ressed in th e f i r s t Critique, i.e., s im ply th e a b ility to beg in a co m p le te ly n ew c a u sa l c h a in from a n uncond itioned . W e now h a v e a positive freedom : The sole principle of m orality consists in independence from all m aterial of the law... T hat independence, however, is freedom in the negative sense, while th is intrinsic legislation o f pure and thus practical reason is freedom in the positive sense. Therefore, the moral law expresses nothing else th an the autonom y of the pure practical reason, i.e., [positive] freedom.22 T h e p o ss ib ility of freedom is no w given a s a n ecessity , th o u g h on ly from a p ra c tic a l p o in t o f view , so t h a t w e a re led to m ove b ey o n d a n eg a tiv e freedom to p o s it a positive freedom .23 W ith th e m oral law , re a so n g ives a law to itse lf, s e ts i t s ow n p u rposes, a n d i s th u s au tonom ous. As K a n t says, in c lu d in g a n y (em pirical) m a te r ia l w ith in a law re su lts in h e te ro n o m y , a n d "heteronomy o f choice... n o t o n ly does n o t e s tab lish an y o b lig a tio n b u t is opposed to th e p rincip le o f d u ty a n d to th e m o ra lity o f th e w ill."24 N o t m ere n eg a tiv e free d o m is ex p ressed b y th e m o ra l law , b u t posi- tiv e freedom , freedom o f th e w ill from sen su o u s in c lin a tio n s . T h rough th is , w e m u s t u n d e rs ta n d t h a t i f w e a re no t w illing in acco rd w ith th e m o ra l law , a n d th u s n o t g iv ing th e la w to ourse lves, th e n w e a re w illin g in accord w ith 22 Ibid., Ak. 33. 23 "[EJven in that [first] Critique it was emphasized that the supersensible was not mere fancy and that its concepts were not empty. Now practical reason itself... provides reality to a supersensible ob- ject of the category of causality, i.e., to freedom. This is a practical concept and as such is subject only to practical use; but what in the speculative critique could be thought is now confirmed by fact," (Ibid., Ak. 6). 24 Ibid.. Ak. 33. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 84 self-love, a n d su c h w illing is n o t on ly h e te ronom ous, i t is w illin g to give up one's freedom ; "w h e n one's ow n h a p p in e s s is m ad e th e d e te rm in in g g ro u n d of th e w ill, th e r e s u l t is th e d irec t o p p o site o f th e p rin c ip le o f m o ra lity ."25 "[T|t is h e te ro n o m y b e ca u se th e w ill does n o t g ive i ts e l f th e law b u t on ly d irec tions fo r a re a so n a b le obedience to p a th o lo g ica l law s."26 B y p u tt in g m a te r ia l in to th e fo rm o f th e m o ra l law , b y h a v in g self-love as th e g u id in g p r in c ip le (even i f th e r e s u l t o f su c h a p rin c ip le con fo rm s to lega lity ), h u m a n b e in g s fo rfe it th e ir freedom , a n d th u s forfe it a n y c la im to w o rth th e y m ig h t h a v e ;27 K a n t a s s e r ts t h a t th e fa c t one "h a s re a so n does n o t in th e le a s t ra is e b im in w orth above m e re a n im a lity i f rea so n o n ly se rv es th e p u rp o ses w hich , am o n g a n i- m a ls , a re ta k e n c a re of b y in s t in c t ."28 F in a lly , th e n , because m o ra l w illin g , freedom , a n d (non-em pirically d e te rm in e d ) re a so n a ll ex p ress e x ac tly th e sam e th in g , K a n t m a y conclude t h a t p u re re a so n is p rac tic a l a s w ell; "p ra c tic a l rea so n h a s th e sa m e cognitive fac u lty fo r i ts fo u n d a tio n a s th e sp e cu la tiv e , so f a r a s th ey a re b o th p u re re a - son ."29 W ill a n d rea so n a re n o t tw o d iffe re n t th in g s , fo r "th e w ill is th o u g h t of 25 Ibid., Ak. 35. 26 Ibid., Ak. 33. 27 As an aside, this should help us to understand why, in Kant's political writings, he insists that, even in matters of Right, we must give the law to ourselves. It is not enough to follow the dictates of the State; we must be co-legislators of the State. If we are not, then we are not free, not autonomous, and thus not of worth. 28 Second Critique, Ak. 61. Kant changes his opinion on this matter of the forfeiture of free- dom somewhat in his Religion. By that time, Kant realizes that if natural inclinations are to blame for immorality, then humans are not really responsible for such actions. Hence, Kant introduces the impor- tant concept of "disposition" (Gesinnung), and maintains that the propensity one has toward evil results from the freely chosen disposition in which the moral law is subjugated to the desire for happiness. Thus, as Silber summarizes on page cxiv of his "Introduction," "the evil man is one who freely decides to sub- ordinate the demands of the law to the demands of his sensible nature. By expressing no more of his per- sonality than is expressed in its abnegation, he foils as a free person and is evil." John R. Silber, "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," in Religion Within the Limits o f Reason Alone, by Im m anuel Kant, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), lxxix cxxxiv . Thus, one freely abnegates one's freedom, and freely wills heteronomy. Thus, one is free, but one still abnegates one's freedom Silber seems to think that this is quite a different position than the second Critique, while Lewis White Beck seems to think that Kant's conclusions are essentially the same. Cf. Silber, pp. lxxx-xcvi, ciii-cxvii and Beck's A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 117-125. 29 Ibid.. Ak. 89. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 85 a s a fac u lty o f d e te rm in in g i ts e l f to ac tio n in acco rdance w ith th e r e p re s e n ta - tio n o f c e r ta in law s, a n d su c h a fa c u lty c an be fo u n d only in r a t io n a l b e - in g s ."30 E v en w h en th e se e k in g o f o n e's ow n h a p p in e s s is th e p ra c tic a l p r in - c ip le o f th e w ill, re a so n s t i l l g e n e ra te s m ax im s fo r th e object o f s u c h w illing ; "th e w ill is n e v e r d e te rm in e d d ire c tly b y th e ob ject a n d our concep tion o f it; r a th e r , th e w ill i s a facu lty w h ich c a n m ak e a n ob ject re a l."31 B u t re a so n can give law s to itse lf, a n d th u s i t c a n b e au to n o m o u s. T h u s, p u re re a s o n in i ts la w g iv ing c ap a c ity can a lso b e p ra c tic a l, g iv ing th e m o ra l la w to i ts e l f a n d th u s ex em p tin g i ts e l f from se n su o u s d e te rm in a tio n w hich w ou ld o th e rw ise e lim in a te freedom . L e t m e qu ick ly add , h e re , t h a t w e now see th e im p o rtan ce o f K a n t's (a n d m y) d iscu ssio n o f th e "Id e a s o f re a so n " from th e Critique o f Pure Reason. A s K a n t p o in ts o u t in th e second Critique: Thus reason [itself], which w ith its ideas alw ays became transcenden t when proceeding in a speculative m anner, can be given for the first tim e an objec- tive, although still only practical, reality; its transcendent use is changed into an im m anent use, whereby reason becomes, in the field of experience, an effi- cient cause through ideas.32 R eca ll th a t , a s seen in C h a p te r Two above, re a so n possesses se v e ra l Id e a s w h ich , w h ile n o t co n s titu tiv e fo r experience , a re n e ce ssa ry for tw o re a so n s . T h e f i r s t is fo r th e o rg an iz a tio n o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g . B u t second, reca ll, reason is here, indeed, exercising causality, as actually bringing about th a t which its concept contains; and of such wisdom we cannot, therefore, say dis- paragingly it is only an idea. On the contrary, ju s t because it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible ends, it m ust as an original, and a t least re- strictive condition, serve as s tan d ard in all th a t bears on the practical.33 30 Grundlegung, Ak. 427. 31 Second Critique, Ak. 60. 32 Ibid., Ak. 48. 33 A328 = B385. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I W e sa w a lso th a t th e a t te m p t to f in d ev e ry "u n co n d itio n ed " in a se rie s of co n d itio n s o f a p p e a ra n c e w a s "set u s as a task"34 a s a n "id e a o f re a so n " a n d t h a t th e s e "id e a s" a re "th e in d is p e n s a b le cond ition o f a l l p ra c tic a l em ploy- m e n t o f re a so n ."35 N ow , p e rh a p s , w e c a n se e th e fu ll force o f th is p o sitio n . I f re a so n is b o th sp e c u la tiv e a s w ell a s p ra c tic a l, th e n i t is a fa c u lty o f b r in g in g objects in to e x is te n ce . T he id e a s o f sp e c u la tiv e rea so n w h ich se rv e to g u id e th e u n - d e rs ta n d in g in i ts q u e s t fo r sp e c u la tiv e know ledge w ill a lso g u id e re a so n i t - s e lf i n i t s p ra c tic a l ap p lica tio n ; th e "tw o" rea so n s a re th e sam e , a n d K a n t h a s t r ie d to sh o w th a t p u re re a so n c a n in d e e d be p rac tic a l. T h is , o f course , is th e o th e r w a y o f conceiv ing o f K a n t's "C o p e m ica n R ev o lu tio n ," n a m e ly th a t r e a - son , once th o u g h t to b e b e s t s u i te d fo r d iscoveries o f sc ience a n d ( tra n sc e n d e n t) m e tap h y s ic s h a s no w b e e n ju d g ed r a th e r in a d e q u a te fo r such a n e n d e a v o r, a n d K a n t now c la im s t h a t re a so n 's p ro p e r fu n c tio n is p rac tica l, i.e ., m o ra l; "ev ery in te r e s t is u l t im a te ly p rac tica l, e v en t h a t o f sp ecu la tiv e re a so n b e in g only co n d itio n a l a n d re a c h in g p e rfec tio n o n ly in p ra c tic a l u se ."36 H en ce w e k n o w th a t th e id e a s o f re a so n a re to se rv e a s s ta n d a rd s fo r m o ra l a c tio n a n d ju d g m e n t, in c lu d in g th e id e a ls o f th e p e rfe c tly m o ra l p e rso n a n d of th e p e rfe c tly fu n c tio n in g S ta te . W e c a n see, th e n , t h a t w h a t K a n t c lea red th e w ay fo r in th e f i r s t Critique h a s b e e n confirm ed b y th e second, a n d K a n t h a s , i n p a r t , k e p t h is e a r l ie r p ro m ise t h a t th e "concep ts o f re a so n m ay p e r - h a p s m a k e p o ss ib le a t r a n s i t io n fro m th e concepts o f n a tu r e to th e p rac tic a l concep ts ... A s to a ll th is , w e m u s t a w a it e x p la n a tio n in th e seq u e l."37 34 A498 = B526. 35 A328 = B385. 36 Second Critique, Ak. 125. 37 A329 = B386. I say, of course, "in part" because we have no real mention in the Critique o f Practical Reason o f a perfect constitution. Presumably this is because the "sequel" of which Kant spoke was probably intended to be the Metaphysics o f Morals, published much later in Kant's career. On this see Lewis White Beck's discussion in his. Commentary. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87 L e t m e also quick ly p o in t o u t h e re so m e th in g w h ich sh o u ld be uncontro v e rs ia l a n d read ily a p p a re n t , b u t p e rh a p s is n o t. T h is is th e fac t t h a t th e se n su o u s w orld a n d one's co n d itio n in i t c an in flu en ce th e w ill. P u t sim ply, since K a n t h a s a rg u e d th a t p u re rea so n is p rac tic a l, a n d t h a t p ra c tic a l re a so n is th e sa m e a s th e w ill, i t se e m s t h a t we w ould a lw ay s a c t in accord w ith th e m o ra l la w w ere i t n o t for th e fa c t t h a t o th e r in ce n tiv e s in flu e n ce ou r w ill, p a r t ic u la r ly ou r desire fo r h a p p in e s s .38 T he m o ra l la w offers i ts own in ce n - tive , i t s ow n com m and, b u t n a tu r e also offers in c e n tiv e s to w a rd p lea su re . C e r ta in ly w e can n o t be completely overw helm ed b y th e in ce n tiv e s , for w e a re a lw ay s com m anded to be f re e no m a tte r w h a t th e s itu a tio n . B u t K a n t is also c e r ta in ly concerned ab o u t s u c h in flu en ces a n d s itu a tio n s ; th e v e ry fac t th a t th e ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e n e e d s to command in d ic a te s th is fac t. W e f in d th e fo llow ing a s a c o n s ta n t th e m e in K a n t's w ritin g : "To se - c u re o n e's ow n h a p p in e ss is a d u ty (a t le a s t in d irec tly ); fo r d isco n ten t w ith o n e's co n d itio n u n d e r m an y p re s s in g cares a n d a m id u n sa tis f ie d w an ts m ig h t ea s ily becom e a g re a t te m p ta tio n to tra n sg re s s one's d u tie s ."39 P u t an o th e r w ay , "m a n fee ls w ith in h im s e lf a pow erfu l c o u n te rw e ig h t to a l l th e com- m a n d s o f du ty ...; th is c o u n te rw e ig h t consists o f h is n e ed s a n d in c lin a tio n s , w hose to ta l sa tis fac tio n is su m m e d up u n d e r th e n a m e o f h a p p in e ss ."40 K a n t k e e p s to th is p rem ise , from th e second Critique to th e Metaphysics of Morals: [the conflict between happiness and morality is] a practical conflict, and, were the voice of reason with respect to the will not so distinct, so irrepressible, and so clearly audible to even the commonest m an, it would drive morality to ru in .41 38 Hemy E. Allison, in fact, takes this to be the condition which explains the possibility of "radical evil." See: Henry E. Allison, "Kant's Doctrine of Radical Evil," in Akten des Sibenten Intemationaler Kant-Kongresses, ed. Gerhard Funke, Band I (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1991), 51-72. 39 Grundlegung, Ak. 399. 40 Ibid., Ak. 404. 41 Second Critique, Ak. 35. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 88 It can even be a duty in certain respects to provide for one's happiness, in part because... it contains means to the fulfillment of one's duty and in p a rt because the lack of it (e.g., poverty) contains tem ptations to transgress against duty.42 the cu ltu re of discipline... is negative and consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires, a despotism th a t rivets us to certa in natu ra l things and renders us unable to do our own selecting...43 Adversity, pain, and want are g rea t tem ptations to violate one's duty... [T]he end [of prom oting the happiness o f another] is not the subject's happiness but his m orality, and happiness is m erely a m eans for removing obstacles to his m orality...44 T hese a re o n ly a few o f m an y p o ss ib le q u o ta tio n s. S u ch q u o ta tio n s , a s w ell a s th e n a tu r e o f K a n t's en tire d iscu ssio n o f th e "incen tives" o f n a tu r e , sh o u ld suffice to m a k e th e p o in t th a t p e rso n s a re in flu en ced b y n a tu re .45 m. All th r e e Critiques h a v e a t le a s t one an tinom y . K a n t c la im s th a t th e an tinom y to b e so lved in th e second Critique is th a t o f th e h ig h e s t good. K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t w e hav e tw o n a tu r a l c an d id a te s fo r "good," n a m e ly h a p p in e ss , b y v ir tu e of ou r c re a tu re ly n a tu re , a n d pe rfec t m o ra lity , b y v ir tu e of o u r in te llig ib le n a tu re . W hile K a n t h a s a rg u e d before th a t v i r tu e is th e on ly good in itse lf , h e also c o n s is ten tly s ta te s th a t i t does n o t i ts e l f p ro v id e h a p p in e ss . W hile h e explicitly s ta te s t h a t w e receive som e "se lf-c o n ten t- m e n t"46 w h e n w e w ill in accord w ith th e m o ra l law , "th is com fort i s n o t h a p p i- n ess , n o t ev en th e sm a lle s t p a r t o f h a p p in e ss ... T his in n e r sa tis fa c tio n is 42 Ibid., Ak. 93. 43 Ak. 432. Immanuel Kant, Critique ofJudgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). 44 Ak. 388. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics o f Morals, trans. Mary Gregor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 45 See also Wike's discussion of this in chapter four of her book: Victoria S. Wike, Kant on Happiness in Ethics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994). 46 Second Critique. Ak. 117. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 th e re fo re m erely n e g a tiv e w ith reference to e v e ry th in g w h ich m ig h t m a k e life p le a s a n t ."47 K a n t s ta te s t h a t "h a p p in e ss a n d m o ra lity a re tw o specifically d if fe re n t e lem en ts o f th e h ig h e s t good a n d th e re fo re th e i r com bination c a n n o t be k n o w n ana ly tica lly ... T h e h ig h e s t good is a synthesis o f concepts."48 T h is is re a ff irm e d in K a n t's d isc u ss io n o f th e S toics, w ho w ere w rong to th in k t h a t p e rfe c t m o ra lity sim ply b ro u g h t ab o u t h a p p in e s s o f i ts ow n accord. N ow K a n t h a s a lre a d y a rg u e d (in th e "A n a ly tic ") th a t v ir tu e is th e "su p re m e " a n d u n co n d itio n ed good. B u t h e a rg u e s (in th e "D ialectic") th a t , these tru ths do not imply th a t virtue is the en tire and perfect good as the ob- ject of the faculty of desire of rational finite beings. For this, happiness is also required, and indeed not m erely in the partia l eyes of a person... bu t even in the judgm ent of an im partia l reason... for to be in need of happiness and also worthy of it [i.e., to be virtuous] and yet not to p a rtak e of it could not be in ac- cordance with the complete volition of an om nipotent rational being...49 W hile m o ra lity a n d h a p p in e ss a re no t th e sa m e th in g , K a n t c la im s th a t a h ig h e s t good w ould u n ite th e tw o, an d th a t "th is c o m b in a tio n is know n a s a p r io r i a n d th u s as p ra c tic a lly necessa ry ... I t is a p r io r i (m orally) n e ce ssa ry to b r in g fo r th th e h ig h e s t good..."50 T hus, th e re m u s t b e som e connection b e - tw e e n th e s e tw o e lem en ts , som e connection of "g ro u n d a n d consequence."51 T h is , th e n , is th e an tin o m y o f p rac tic a l rea so n , n a m e ly to f in d a n e ce ssa ry connec tion be tw een tw o goods w h ich a re th em se lv e s w holly h e te ro g en eo u s a n d show no (ap p a ren t) co n n ec tio n in th e w orld o f n a tu r e .52 47 Ibid., Ak. 88. For more on the exact nature of "happiness" as Kant conceives it, see Section Two, Chapter Two below. 48 Ibid., Ak. 112. 49 Ibid., Ak. 110. 50 Ibid., Ak. 113. 51 Ibid., Ak. 110. 52 Beck is right to claim that "it should be obvious that we do not have here an antinomy in any strict sense," (Commentary, p. 247). This is because, one of the theses is simply false, and, subsequently, rejected. Compare this with the third antinomy where both thesis were necessary and both affirmed. See Beck's discussion, pp. 247-8. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 90 B ecau se h ap p in ess c a n n o t b e a c o n d itio n o f v irtu e , a n d b ecau se th e h ig h e s t good is a necessary ob ject o f m o ra l vo lition , K a n t concludes t h a t v i r - tu e m u s t b e th e condition for h a p p in e s s . T h e f i r s t is ru le d o u t b y b o th th e "A n a ly tic" a s w ell a s th e Grundlegung, s in c e h a p p in e ss a s th e b a s is fo r w ill- in g a n ac tio n p roduces h e te ro n o m y a n d c a n n o t p roduce t ru ly m o ra l com - m an d s . B u t th e second, w hile a p p a re n t ly n o t ev idenced in n a tu re , is "fa lse on ly i f I a s su m e ex istence in th is w o r ld to b e th e only m ode o f ex is ten ce ..."53 K a n t's so lu tio n , th e n , is to r e a s s e r t t h a t h u m a n b e ings a re m em b ers o f tw o "w orlds" a n d to conclude th a t "i t is n o t im p o ss ib le th a t th e m o ra lity o f in te n - tio n sh o u ld h a v e a n ecessa ry re la tio n a s c a u s e to h a p p in e ss a s a n effect in th e se n su o u s w orld ; b u t th is r e la t io n i s in d ire c t , m e d ia te d by a n in te llig ib le A u th o r o f n a tu r e ."54 T hus,55 i t is a n in te llig ib le A u th o r o f n a tu re , n a m e ly th e m o ra l God, w h ich m u s t be a ssu m e d to p ro v id e th e connection b e tw ee n v ir tu e a n d h a p p in e ss , th u s u n itin g th e tw o in to a h ig h e s t good, happiness in exact proportion to m orality (as the worth of a person and his w orthiness to be happy)... w herein... happiness, though som ething alw ays p leasan t to him who possesses it, is not of itse lf absolutely good... b u t alw ays presupposes conduct in accordance w ith the m oral law as its condition.56 U n fo rtu n a te ly , th is is ab o u t th e e x te n t o f K a n t's a rg u m e n ts fo r w hy th e h ig h e s t good is a necessa ry object o f o u r w ill i n th e f ir s t p lace; to t ry to ju s tify th is c la im , w e s h a l l have to f u r th e r a n a ly z e i t below . In la te r c h a p te rs I w ill a rg u e t h a t th e h ig h e s t good m u s t in d e e d b e th e p ro p e r object o f o u r w illing , b u t I w ill a lso a rg u e th a t th e re a re se r io u s f law s in K a n t's concep tion o f th e S3 Second Critique, Ak. 114. "Ib id ., Ak. 114. 55 As an aside, I think we can already see a possible inconsistency here, of the kind Andrews Reath talks about in: "Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant," Journal o f the History ofPhiloso- phy 26, no. 4 (October 1988): 593-619. The "antinomy" of the highest good does not seem to be solved by this solution, for Kant himself maintains that this world does not reward morality with happiness. We would have to have a future life or a future world. 56 Second Critique. Ak. 110-11. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. h ig h e s t good a n d i ts co rresp o n d in g an tin o m y . F o r now , le t u s ta k e th is c la im a s given, a n d m ove on to K a n t's d iscussion o f th e n ecessa ry p o s tu la te s w h ich a re needed to su p p o rt i t. IV. I f th e h ig h e s t good is th e n e ce ssa ry ob ject o f m o ra l w illing , w e m u s t a lso n ecessa rily p re su p p o se th o se cond itions w h ich w ou ld m ak e i t p ossib le . K a n t calls su ch p re su p p o s itio n s "p o s tu la te s o f p ra c tic a l reaso n ." T h ese p o s - tu la te s , as n o ted in "C h a p te r Two" above, a re freed o m (b u t h e re in th e p o s i- tiv e sense), im m o rta lity , a n d God, i.e., th e p o s itiv e a sse rtio n s from p ra c tic a l re a so n of id eas o f p u re re a so n . N ow K a n t is c le a r to in s is t th a t su ch p o s tu - la te s a re n e ith e r "know n" in a n y s tr ic t se n se n o r a re th e y "objectively" n e ce s- sa ry . T hey a re n o t th e fo rm er b ecau se n o n e o f th e m c a n be g iven to u s in a n in tu itio n , a n d th u s a re n o t ob jec ts of know ledge a s d efin ed in th e f i r s t Cri- tique. K a n t a rg u e s th a t th e y a re n o t th e l a t t e r b e c a u se th ey a re n o t g ro u n d s fo r th e possib ility o f th e m o ra l la w itse lf, on ly fo r i ts h o p ed outcom e; i t is "n o t a n ecessity k n o w n b y th e re fe ren c e to a n object. I n o th e r w ords, i t is a n e ce s- s a ry assu m p tio n , ra th e r , w ith refe rence to th e su b je c t a s conform ing to th e objective p rac tic a l law s o f re a so n ."57 In sh o rt, i t is n ecessa ry for th e m o ra lly w illin g ag en t to p o s tu la te th e s e objects in o rd e r to be co n s is ten t in th e ir w illing ,58 "a th eo re tic a l p ro p o sitio n w hich is n o t a s su c h dem onstrab le , b u t w h ich is an in se p a ra b le co ro lla ry of a n a p r io r i u n co n d itio n a lly v a lid p ra c t i - c a l law ."59 B efore w e a tte m p t a fu lle r e x p la n a tio n o f th is , le t u s ex am in e e ac h o f th e se p o s tu la te s in d iv id u a lly . O f th e th re e p o s tu la te s , K a n t th in k s "freedom " to be th e only one w h ich is in d eed a "fac t" a n d is n o t in q u estio n a s to i t s necessity , even th o u g h w e c an n o t experience i t a s a n in tu itio n . T h is i s b eca u se , a s w e n o te d above, 57 Ibid., Ak. 12. 58 We shall analyze this claim in detail below. Section Two, Chapter Five. 59 Second Critique. Ak. 122. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 92 K a n t th in k s t h a t we w ould n o t h a v e consciousness o f th e m o ra l law i f w e d id n o t h av e p o sitiv e freedom , h e n ce "w ith th e p u re p ra c tic a l facu lty o f reaso n , th e re a lity of tra n s c e n d e n ta l freedom is a lso con firm ed ,"60 tho u g h w e c an n o t h av e a n in tu i t io n o f i t a s su ch . F reedom i s a "fa c t o f rea so n , since one c a n n o t fe r re t i t o u t fro m an teced en t d a ta o f rea so n , su c h a s th e consciousness o f freedom (for th is is n o t a n te c e d e n tly given), a n d s in ce i t forces i ts e lf u p o n u s a s a sy n th e tic p roposition a p r io r i..."61 D esp ite th is , K a n t som etim es re fe rs to freedom a s one o f th e th re e p o s tu la te s o f p ra c t ic a l re a so n , "freedom a ffirm a - tive ly re g a rd e d (as th e c a u sa lity o f a b e in g so f a r a s h e be longs to th e in te l li- gible w orld)..."62 T h is seem s accep tab le e n o u g h , fo r th o u g h freedom is a "fact," i t is a v e ry d ifferen t so r t o f fac t th a n th a t w h ich w e n o rm ally th in k , n am ely a n in tu it io n su b su m e d u n d e r space , tim e , a n d th e categories. F re e - dom in th e n e g a tiv e sense h a s a lre a d y b e e n n e c e ss ita te d b y th e so lu tion to th e "th ird an tin o m y ," b u t freed o m in th e p o s itiv e se n se is n ece ss ita ted by th e m oral law . F reed o m is th e re fo re a n e ce ssa ry p o s tu la te b ecau se i t is a s tra n g e type o f fac t, a n d a fac t w hich is n e e d e d i f th e re is to b e m o ra lity a t a ll.63 T h e n e x t n ecessa ry p o s tu la te is im m o rta li ty o f th e soul. K a n t exp la in s th a t th e m oral law co m m an d s "co m p le te f itn e ss o f in te n tio n s to th e m oral law ,"64 b u t such fitn e ss is "h o lin e ss"65 w h ich is n o t possib le for c re a tu re s w ith f in ite in te llig en ces in th e w o rld o f sen se . Y et such com plete f itn e ss is com m anded , for th e m o ra l law s im p ly s ta te s t h a t every action m u s t be m ora l, m u s t b e such th a t i t co u ld be w illed b y ev ery p e rso n a n d in c lu d ed in th e law s o f n a tu re . T hus, w h ile com plete p e rfec tio n is n o t possible, "an 60 Ibid., Ak. 3. 61 Ibid., Ak. 31. 62 Ibid., Ak. 132. 63 See also Beck's discussion in the Commentary, pp. 207-8 and 251-5. 64 Second Critique, Ak. 122. 65 Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. L t \ 93 e n d le ss p ro g ress to t h a t com plete f i tn e s s"66 is possible, a n d i t is th is t h a t we m u s t ta k e to be t r u e . K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t th is solves th e p ro b lem b e ca u se the Infinite Being, to whom the tem poral condition is nothing, sees in this se- ries, which is for us without end, a whole conformable to th e m oral law; holi- ness... is to be found in a single intellectual intuition of th e existence of ra - tional beings.67 S u ch perfection is "a p rac tic a l id e a l w h ich m u st n ecessa rily s e rv e a s a m odel w h ich a ll f in ite r a t io n a l be ings m u s t s tr iv e to w ard even th o u g h th e y c a n n o t re a c h i t ."68 B u t s u c h a n en d less p ro g re ss is im possib le i f w e u n d e r s ta n d o u r- se lv es to be l im ite d in ou r life sp a n , th u s "in fin ite p ro g ress is p o ss ib le ... only u n d e r th e p resu p p o sitio n o f a n in f in ite ly e n d u rin g ex istence a n d p e rso n a lity o f th e sa m e ra t io n a l being; th is is c a lle d th e im m o rta lity o f th e sou l."69 T h u s im m o rta lity of th e so u l is a n e ce ssa ry p o s tu la te to e n su re th e p o ss ib il i ty of "u n e n d in g p ro g ress" to w a rd m o ra l pe rfec tion . T h e f in a l p o s tu la te th a t K a n t a s s e r ts is th e ex is tence o f G od a s th e (m oral) a u th o r o f th e w orld. T he h ig h e s t good is th e sy n th e s is o f m o ra lity w ith p ro p o rtio n a te h a p p in e ss . H ow ever, "th e poss ib ility o f su c h a connec tion o f th e cond itioned w ith its cond ition be longs w holly to th e s u p e rse n su o u s re - la tio n s of th in g s a n d c an n o t b e g iven u n d e r the law s of th e w o rld o f se n se ."70 K eep in g th e f irs t Critique in m ind , K a n t is in d ic a tin g h e re t h a t th e la w s of n a tu re , a s u n d e rs to o d th o u g h th e c a teg o rie s of th e u n d e rs ta n d in g , h a v e n o th in g to do w ith m o ra lity , a n d w e o ften w itn ess n a tu re 's a p p a re n t ob liv i- o u sn e ss to th e consequences of m o ra l ac tions . H ow can m o ra lity b e r e - w ard ed , th e n ? S u ch a so lu tion "c a n occur only c o n tin g en tly in a sy s te m o f " Ibid. 67 Ibid., Ak. 123. 68 Ibid., Ak. 32. 69 Ibid., Ak. 122. 0 Ibid.. Ak. 119. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 94 n a tu r e ,"71 a n d c a n n o t b e b ro u g h t ab o u t b y p e rso n s, s in ce "n o t b e in g n a tu r e 's cau se , h is w ill c a n n o t b y i ts ow n s tre n g th b r in g n a tu r e , a s i t to u ch e s on h is h a p p in e ss , in to com plete h a rm o n y w ith h is p ra c tic a l p rin c ip le s ."72 T h e so lu - tio n is on ly to be h a d th ro u g h "th e su p p o s itio n of a su p re m e cau se o f n a tu r e w h ich h a s a c a u sa lity co rresp o n d in g to th e m o ra l in te n tio n ."73 As su c h , th e h ig h e s t good "is th e K ingdom o f God, in w h ic h n a tu r e a n d m o ra lity com e in to a h a rm o n y , w hich i f fo re ig n to each a s su c h , th ro u g h a h o ly A u th o r o f th e w orld , w ho m ak e s p o ss ib le th e de riv ed h ig h e s t good. T h e h ig h e s t good is th e n e c e ssa ry object o f th e m o ra l law , a n d a s su c h i t m u s t be possib le ; th e re fo re , w e m u s t a ssu m e th e ex is ten ce o f a G od w h o w ou ld co n n ec t m o ra lity w ith p ro p o r tio n a te h a p p in e ss . V. A gain , i t is im p o r ta n t to ask: W h ere is th e h ig h e s t good th o u g h t to be loca ted? I th in k i t is v e ry c le a r in th e Critique o f Practical Reason t h a t K a n t w as r a th e r d iv ided on th e is su e , w ith th e r e s u l t b o th t h a t th e re a re te n s io n s , i f n o t in co n s is ten c ie s , b e tw e e n h is s ta te m e n ts , a n d t h a t th e h ig h e s t good se em s to h a v e tw o lo ca tio n s. W hile I w ill s a v e a d iscu ssio n o f p o ss ib le in c o n - s is te n c ie s u n t i l la te r , l e t m e a d d re ss th e q u e s tio n s o f loca tion , a n d s ta te a g a in m y b e lie f t h a t th e re ex is ts for K a n t b o th a n "o th erw o rld ly " a n d a n "e a r th ly " h ig h e s t good. K a n t's ta lk o f im m o rta lity of th e s o u l c e r ta in ly seem s to p la c e a n e m - p h a s is o n a n "o th erw o rld ly " in te rp re ta t io n o f th e h ig h e s t good. I f th e so u l m u s t p ro g re ss en d le ss ly to w a rd p erfec t m o ra lity , th is m u s t ta k e p la c e in som e re a lm beyond th is w orld .74 A nd i f su c h a p e rso n is to be re w a rd e d , th e n 71 Ibid., Ak. 115. 72 Ibid., Ak. 124. 73 Ibid., Ak. 125. 74 I think Kant's clearly Christian approach to questions of morality would rule out an interpre- tation of reincarnation, though whether such an interpretation could remain consistent itself is another question. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. i t seem s th is m u s t also ta k e p lac e in th e n ex t w orld . H en ce w e e n d up w ith s ta te m e n ts su ch as: The holiness of morals is prescribed to them even in th is life as a guide to con- duct, bu t the well-being proportionate to this, which is bliss, is thought of as attainable only in eternity. This is due to the fact th a t... the latter, under the nam e of happiness, cannot... be reached in this life and therefore is made only an object of hope.75 [RJeason certainly has an inescapable responsibility from the side of his sensu- ous nature to attend to its in te res t and to form practical maxim s with a view to the happiness of th is and, where possible, of a fu ture life.76 [A person who strives for m orality] may very well have the comforting hope... th a t he will be steadfast in these principles in an existence continuing beyond th is life... [H]e can have prospect of a blessed future. For "blessed" is the word which reason uses to designate a perfect well-being independent of all contin- gent causes in the world.77 I th in k th e se s ta te m e n ts a re su ff ic ie n t to e s ta b lish K a n t's p o sitio n of an "o therw orld ly" h ig h e s t good. H ow ever, su rp ris in g ly , th e m ajo rity of th e s ta te m e n ts fo u n d in th e seco n d Critique su p p o rt a n "e a r th ly " in te rp re ta tio n . In d ee d , th e e n tire q u e s- tio n o f G od a ris e s because n a tu r e in th is w orld is n o t re sp o n s iv e to m orality , a n d w e m u s t p o s tu la te a n in te l l ig e n t a u th o r of n a tu re ; th e d iscussion con- c e rn s p ro p o rtio n a lity "in th is w o rld " a n d "in th e w o rld o f se n se ." T hus: [I]t is not impossible th a t th e m orality of intention would have a necessary re- lation as cause to happiness as an effect in the sensuous world...78 In fact, the impossibility m entioned is merely subjective, i.e., our reason finds it impossible to conceive, in th e m ere course of na tu re , a connection so exactly proportioned and so thoroughly adapted to an end betw een natu ra l events which occur according to law s so heterogeneous. But, as w ith every other pu r- posive th ing in nature, it still cannot prove th a t it is impossible according to 75 Second Critique, Ak. 129. Ibid., Ak. 61. Ibid., Ak. 123 n. Ibid.. Ak. 115. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96 universal laws of na ture [only], i.e., show this by objectively sufficient reasons. But now a determ ining factor of another kind [namely practical reason] comes into play to tu rn the scale in this indecision of speculative reason.79 [T]he existence is postulated of a cause of the whole of nature, itself distinct from nature, which contains the ground of the exact coincidence of happiness with morality... Therefore, the highest good is possible in the world only on the supposition [which we do make] of a suprem e cause of nature which has a causality corresponding to the m oral in tention [of hum an beings].80 All th a t here belongs to duty is the endeavor to produce and to fu rther the highest good in the world, the existence of which m ay thus be postulated though our reason cannot conceive it except by presupposing a highest intelli- gence.81 [T]he Kingdom of God... [is th a t hoped for condition] in which na tu re and mo- rality come into a harmony... through a holy A uthor of the world...82 [I]f we inquire into God's final end in creating the world, we m ust name not the happiness of rational beings in the world b u t the highest good...83 T hus, aga in , I b e liev e th a t K a n t a s se r ts th e n ecessity o f a h ig h e s t good on e a r th . Now, p re su m a b ly K a n t cou ld v e ry w ell h a v e sa id th a t th e so lu tio n to th e an tin o m y o f th e h ig h e s t good is to a ssu m e t h a t a ll ac tio n s w ill be su ita b ly re w a rd e d or p u n is h e d in the next life. S in ce one of th e tw o m ain p ro b lem s of th e h ig h e s t good in th e f ir s t p lace is th e u n re sp o n s iv e n e ss o f n a tu re in th is w orld, th e r a th e r obvious so lu tion fo r K a n t w ou ld h av e b e en to sa y th a t p ro - p o rtio n a lity ta k e s p lace in a d iffe ren t w orld . K a n t cou ld h a v e e as ily w ed th e no tion o f p ro p o rtio n a te h a p p in e ss s tr ic tly to th e no tion o f a n en d le ss p ro g ress in th e n e x t life. B u t K a n t does no t, a n d h e em p h asize s th a t such p ro p o r- tio n a lity m u s t b e conceivable in th is w orld . I ta k e th is to be p a rtic u la rly te lling . I sh a ll a t te m p t to show in la te r c h a p te rs w hy, exactly , K a n t m ig h t 79 Ibid.,, Ak. 145. 80 Ibid., Ak. 124-5. 81 Ibid., Ak. 126. 82 Ibid., Ak. 128. 83 Ibid., Ak. 130. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97 th in k th a t th is is n ecessa ry , b u t fo r now le t m e only in d ic a te th a t i t seem s th a t K a n t th o u g h t a w o rld w h ich w as com pletely im p e rv io u s to m orality w ould m ak e th is w o rld a fa rce , a pu rpose less w orld w h ic h in w h ich n a tu re seem s to he lp every o th e r c re a tu re except h u m a n b e ings . I th in k K a n t h a s c le a r m otives fo r th e n e c e ss ita tio n o f two locations fo r th e h ig h e s t good. VL H ere I w a n t on ly to m e n tio n briefly th a t w e f in d a g a in in th e second Critique K a n t's concern a b o u t th e n a tu re of a possib le "ex p an sio n " o f know l- edge w hich p ra c tic a l re a so n h a s ta k e n from sp ecu la tiv e rea so n . T h is is a concern m uch lik e th e o ne w e n o te d above re g a rd in g th e f i r s t Critique. W hile K a n t in s is ts th a t "re a so n is n o t h e re b y ex tended , how ever, in i ts th eo re tica l know ledge" by th e ob jects g iven in p o s tu la te s o f p ra c tic a l re a so n ,84 "th e th eo - re tic a l know ledge o f p u re re a so n does ob ta in a n accession ... [and] th eo re tica l rea so n is, th ere fo re , ju s t if ie d in a ssu m in g [these objects]."85 K a n t su m m a- rizes: Theoretical knowledge not of these objects b u t of reason in general was ex- tended so far that, by the practical postulates, object were given to those ideas [of reason], and a m erely problematical thought thereby obtained objective reality. I t was therefore no extension of knowledge of given supersensuous objects, b u t still an extension of theoretical reason and of its knowledge with respect to the supersensuous in general, inasmuch as knowledge is compelled to concede th a t there are such objects without more exactly defining them...86 K a n t th e re fo re rea ch e s th e im p o r ta n t conclusion th a t: Now no object in in tu ition can be given to the categories so far as they are applied to these ideas; b u t th a t such an object really exists and th a t here the category as a mere form of thought is not em pty bu t has significance -this is 84 Ibid., Ak. 4-5. 85 Ibid., Ak. 134. 86 Ibid., Ak. 135. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98 sufficiently dem onstrated by an object which practical reason indubitably pre- sents in the concept of the highest good...87 N ow K a n t in th e se sections w h e re h e i s concerned w ith th e possib le e x p a n - sio n o f th e o re tic a l know ledge seem s to be m ostly concerned w ith su ch k n o w l- edge a s i t concerns freedom , th e sou l, a n d God, a n d n o t a s m u ch w ith th e w o rld a s such . B u t w h a t is im p o r ta n t to n o te is th a t i f w e m u s t a ssu m e a h ig h e s t good on e a r th , th e n w e w ill h a v e th e fu r th e r ten s io n b e tw een w h a t re a so n can p o s it re g a rd in g n a tu r e a s m ere ly m echan ica l, a n d n a tu re a s pur- posive, a s teleo logical. T hus, w h ile w e m u s t w a it a few c h a p te rs to an a ly ze th is , i t sh o u ld be no w onder to u s t h a t K a n t fe lt th e n e ed fo r a n o th e r m a jo r w o rk d evo ted p rec ise ly to th is is su e ; th u s th e re su ltin g Critique of Judgment. 87 Ibid., Ak. 136. Italics added for emphasis. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. i. Chapter Five An Overview to the Critique o f Judgment L O n th e one h a n d , th e Critique o f Judgment goes a lo n g w ay tow ard e lu c id a tin g som e o f th e con flic ts t h a t we observed in th e f i r s t Critique a n d in th e "Id e a ." T h is Critique co n ce rn s a very d e ta ile d e x a m in a tio n o f th e facu lty o r pow er o f ju d g m e n t itse lf , w h ich is v irtu a lly a b se n t from th e o th e r Cri- tiques. H ere , K a n t g ives m u c h a tte n tio n to th e concep t a n d possib ility of teleo logy in n a tu re w ith h is a n a ly s is of "p u rp o ses ." H e d irec tly ad d resses th e q u e s tio n o f w h a t w e a re to s a y a b o u t n a tu re a c tin g in acco rdance w ith p u r - po ses, a n d w h a t conclusions w e c a n d raw from th is , e sp ec ia lly reg a rd in g God a n d th e "f in a l p u rp o se" o f th e h u m a n species. I t w ill t u r n o u t t h a t an an a ly - s is o f p u rp o ses can give u s som e p a r t ia l con firm ation o f th e p o ss ib ility of a ch iev in g th e h ig h e s t good. W e a lso get a fa ir ly good in d ic a tio n o f how to so lve th e q uestion o f th e "p rin c ip le o f pu rposive m ec h an ism s ."1 O n th e o th e r h a n d , K a n t a d h e re s to th e g e n e ra l g u id e lin e s se t ou t in th e f i r s t Critique in h is d iscu ss io n o f th e "id ea s" o f re a so n a n d o f teleology,2 a n d w e receive no n ew ra d ic a l d e p a r tu re s h o rn th e se g u id e lin es . K a n t a d - h e re s to h is m ain p rem ise t h a t th e no tion of teleology is n e c e ssa ry for u s to u n d e rs ta n d a n d in v e s tig a te n a tu re . T hough h e sp e lls o u t th is necessity a n d th e ex ac t n a tu re o f te leo logy i n f a r g rea te r d e ta il h e re th a n in th e f irs t Cri- tique, h e s ti ll a rg u es t h a t i t is on ly a necessa ry id e a fo r o u r cogn ition a n d ex- a m in a tio n o f c e r ta in a sp ec ts o f n a tu re , a n d n o t a fac t a b o u t n a tu r e itself. In 1 See Chapter Two and Four above. 2 See Chapter Two above. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. iI ia 100 o th e r w ords, i t rem a in s on ly a reg u la tiv e a n d n o t a c o n s titu tiv e concept. T herefo re , w e re m a in sa fe to a d h e re to th e conclusions w hich w e d rew abou t teleo logy in "C h a p te r Two" above, a n d we re m a in s a fe to a ssu m e th a t K a n t w a s n o t sim p ly confused a s to h is ow n stance on teleo logy w h en h e w ro te th e "Id e a ." T h is is ex trem ely im p o r ta n t because, a s w e s h a l l see in la te r c h ap - te rs , i f teleology is only a re g u la tiv e p rincip le , i t m e a n s th a t m o ra l p rog ress m u s t be, for K a n t, a p o s tu la te o f p rac tic a l reaso n . In th is ch ap te r, I s h a l l b eg in w ith a b r ie f o v e ra ll su m m a ry o f th e Cri- tique o f Judgment, w hich i s a n ecessa ry b a ck g ro u n d to m ore specific po in ts . I n so doing, i t w ill becom e c lea r, a s W ern er S. P lu h a r a rg u e s in h is "In tro d u c tio n " to h is re c e n t tra n s la tio n o f th is Critique, w hy w e ca n n ot, sim - p ly th in k of m ech an ica l c a u sa lity a s a m erely re g u la tiv e id ea , a s so m an y c o m m en ta to rs on K a n t h a v e c la im ed . T h is is th e on ly possib ly c on troversia l c la im I in te n d to m ake in th is section , b u t i t is im p o r ta n t, a s w e sh a ll see la te r . T hose re a d e rs w ho a re m o re fa m ilia r w ith th e co n te n ts o f th e th ird Critique, a n d w ho a re w illin g to accep t th a t m e c h an ica l c a u sa lity rem a in s a c o n s titu tiv e p rin c ip le a t th e e n d o f th e th ird Critique, m ay w ish to sk ip th is r a th e r laborious chap ter. In th e n e x t th re e c h a p te rs , I w ill a d d re ss m o re specific concerns a n d p ro b lem s, m an y of w hich h a v e b e en in tro d u c ed in th e p rev io u s fo u r c h a p te rs o f th is p ap er. I n th e n e x t c h a p te r , I w ill a d d re ss th e g e n e ra l concern re g a rd - in g j u s t w h a t to sa y ab o u t th e n a tu r e of teleology a n d how m uch i t is sa id to a c tu a lly ex is t in n a tu re . I s h a l l a rg u e th a t K a n t s ta y s w ith th e conclusions of th e Critique o f Pure Reason in m a in ta in in g th a t te leo logy is a reg u la tiv e p rin c ip le only. T h is is im p o r ta n t i f w e a re to a d h e re to th e d ic ta te s o f th e f i r s t Critique, i f w e a re to k e ep w ith a conception o f n a tu r e w hich is s tric tly physio -m echan ica l, a n d i f w e a re to u n d e rs ta n d w h y th e ex istence o f po litica l o rg an iz a tio n s a re so im p o rta n t. N ext, I w ill a g a in d isc u ss th e q u estio n of, W h ere is th e h ig h e s t good th o u g h t to be located? I w ill a rg u e th a t we h av e Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. tI 101 ab so lu te ly conclusive evidence in th e th ird Critique t h a t K a n t conceives of a h ig h e s t good on e a r th , a n d th a t h e ta k e s such a b e lie f to b e in som e sense n e ce ssa ry . I w ill d iscuss how i t is t h a t th e th ird Critique g ives u s ad d itio n a l h o p e fo r th e p o ssib ility of ach iev in g th is h ig h es t good on e a r th . In th e la s t c h a p te r o f th is se t, I sh a ll a g a in a d d re s s th e question o f th e "p rin c ip le o f p u r - p o siv e m ech an ism s," show ing h o w K a n t in te n d s th is to b e a n e ce ssa ry p r in - cip le , b u t only a reg u la tiv e one. L e t u s beg in , how ever, w ith a n overview of K a n t's th ird Critique. IL T he m a in concern of th e Critique o f Judgment m ig h t be s ta te d as follow s: K a n t concluded in th e Critique of Pure Reason t h a t th e ca tegories p ro v id e th e law s to w hich n a tu re m u s t conform to be ex p erien ced , a n d th u s w e c a n know th e se law s (cau sa lity , fo r in stance) a priori. H ow ever, w hile th e s e law s a re n ecessa ry fo r n a tu r e in genera l, e.g., th e re m u s t b e a (m echan ica l) cau se a n d effect fo r n a tu r e a s ap p ea ran ce , th e r e is n o th in g to in d ic a te th a t su ch law -like b e h a v io r m ig h t be expected in th e p a r tic u la r . In o th e r w ords, n a tu re in i ts o rg a n iz a tio n o f p a r tic u la r p re s e n ta tio n s o r objects is contingent a s f a r a s we c an see. W hile n a tu re in g e n e ra l m u s t be ab le to be cogn ized accord ing to basic u n iv e rs a l law s, th e re is no g u a ra n te e t h a t n a tu re w ill ex h ib it co n sis ten t, re liab le , a n d u n d e rs ta n d a b le la w s w ith re g a rd to specific in s tan c es : the universal supplied by our (hum an) understanding does not determ ine the particular; therefore even if different things agree in a common characteristic, the variety of ways in which they m ay come before our perception is contin- gent. For our understanding is a power of concepts... so th a t it m ust indeed be contingent for it as to w hat th e character and all the varie ty of the particular m ay be th a t can be given to it in na tu re and th a t can be brought under its con- cepts.3 3 p. 290 = Ak. 406. All quotations come from: Immanuel Kant, Critique o f Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). I will cite both the translation's page number and the Akademie page number, respectively. "The point is this: Our understanding has the peculiarity that when it cognizes, e.g.. the cause of a product, it must proceed from the analytically Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I ! 102 W hy s h o u ld th e m otion of ev ery p la n e t, fo r exam ple, be ab le to be ex p la in ed w ith a few sim p le m a th e m a tic a l eq u a tio n s? W hy sh o u ld chem ica l reac tio n s re m a in a lw ay s th e sam e a n d b e ab le to b e ex p la in e d m a th e m a tic a lly ? As fa r a s w e h u m a n be ings w ith o u r p a r t ic u la r cognitive a b ilitie s c a n see, th e re is no re a s o n w h y n a tu re sh o u ld b e re g u la r w ith re g a rd to i t s m ore specific c h a ra c te r is tic s .4 A s th e tw o Critiques b efo re i t , th is Critique a lso d e a ls w ith a n a n tin - omy5 w h ic h c a n only b e so lved b y re fe ren ce to th e "su p e rse n s ib le ." T h e a n - tin o m y b e g in s w ith th e ju d g m e n t t h a t a n object (of n a tu re )6 is b e a u tifu l. O f- ten , w e b e h o ld a n object or scen e w hich , u p o n reflection , w e co n sid er to be b e a u tifu l. T h is occurs w hen w e h a v e a fee lin g o f p le a s u re w h ile beho ld ing so m e th in g o f n a tu re , a n d w e w a n t to m a k e a ju d g m e n t a b o u t t h a t feeling . B u t K a n t c la im s th a t a ju d g m e n t o f b e a u ty c an n o t be m a d e th ro u g h re fe r- ence to a concep t. T he ju d g m e n t t h a t so m e th in g is b e a u tifu l m u s t n o t only be d is in te re s te d , b u t m u s t be free o f concep ts. T h is is b e ca u se "from concepts th e re is n o tra n s it io n to th e fe e lin g o f p le a su re o r d isp le a su re (except in p u re universal to the particular (i.e., from concepts to the empirical intuition that is given); consequently, in this process our understanding determines nothing regarding the diversity of the particular" (p. 291 = Ak. 407). 4 This should hearken us back to the writings of David Hume. How could we possibly know a priori that the flame of the candle will bum us? How could we know the way a certain product of nature operates without an experience of it? Thus, while Kant argues against Hume that there must be some laws of nature which we can know a priori to be valid and universal, namely the ones we give nature through the categories, he agrees with Hume that the particular rules of nature must be utterly contingent as far as we can judge. 5 While Kant presents an "aesthetic" and a "teleological" antinomy, Pluhar argues that there is really only one antinomy of the third Critique, much in the same way as there is only one antinomy of the first Critique though it has four aspects. I am inclined to agree with him. See: Pluhar, pp. xciii-xciv in the "Translator's Introduction" to Critique o f Judgment, by Immanuel Kant, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). 6 The more traditional interpretation of Kant is that he indicates that an object must be found in nature for it to be truly judged beautiful; but this may not be an accurate assessment. See: Theodore Gracyk , "Art, Nature, and Purposiveness in Kant's Aesthetic Theory," in Proceedings o f the Eighth Interna- tional Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, pt. 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995). 499507 . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. tI j iH 103 p ra c tic a l law s; b u t th e s e c a rry a n in te re s t w ith th e m , w h ile none is co n n ec ted w ith p u re ju d g m e n ts o f ta s te ) ."7 K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t th e re is no concept a v a ila b le to u se fo r th e ju d g m e n t t h a t so m eth in g is b e a u tifu l. H ow ever, th o u g h th is is a ju d g m e n t o f ta s te , K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t i t is e sse n tia l to th e ju d g m e n t t h a t so m e th in g is b e a u tifu l to say n o t only t h a t w e, ourselves, f in d th e object b e a u tifu l, b u t th a t everyone e lse sh o u ld ju d g e th e sam e w ay. W e w a n t to sa y t h a t everyone sh o u ld f in d th is object b e a u t i - fu l, "for he m u s t n o t c a ll i t beautiful i f [he m eans] o n ly [th a t] he lik es it. M a n y th in g s m ay be c h a rm in g a n d ag reeab le to h im ; no one cares ab o u t th a t . B u t i f h e p rocla im s so m e th in g to b e b e au tifu l, th e n h e req u ire s th e sam e l ik in g from o th e rs ..."8 T h u s , K a n t say s , such a ju d g m e n t resem bles a log ical ju d g m e n t of a t t r ib u t in g th e p re d ic a te o f "b eau tifu l" to a n object. B u t th is c a n n o t be w h a t w e a re doing, s in ce w e w ould h av e to u se a concept fo r su c h p red ica tio n , a n d no co n cep t is av a ila b le . T h is ra is e s th e problem , th en , o f ju s t how i t is t h a t w e c a n m a k e su c h a u n iv e rsa l ju d g m e n t w ith o u t a p p e a lin g to a concept. W h at is th e n a tu r e o f th is p le a su re th a t g ives r ise to th e (u n iv ersa l) ju d g m e n t of ta s te ? K a n t e x p la in s i t a s follows: i f w e c a n n o t appea l to con- cep ts , th e n th e b a s is o f su c h a ju d g m e n t can be nothing o ther th an the m ental sta te th a t we find in the relation be- tween the p resentational powers [imagination and understanding] insofar as they refer a given presentation to cognition in general. When this happens, the cognitive powers brought into play by this p resentation are in free play, because no determ inate concept restricts them to a particu lar rule of cognition. Hence the m ental s ta te in this presentation m ust be a feeling, accompanying the given presentation, of a fine play of the presentational powers directed to cognition in general.9 7 p. 54 = Ak. 211-2. 8 pp. 55-6 = Ak. 212-3. 9 pp. 61-2 = Ak. 217. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104 T h is free p la y o f th e facu lties is a "q u ick en in g of th e tw o p o w ers (im ag in a tio n a n d u n d e rs ta n d in g ) to a n ac tiv ity t h a t is in d e te rm in a te b u t, a s a r e s u l t o f th e p ro m p tin g o f th e given p re se n ta tio n , n o n e th e le ss accordan t: th e ac tiv ity re - q u ire d fo r cognition in g en era l."10 W e c a n n o t de te rm ine a h e a d o f tim e th a t a n y p a r t ic u la r object m ig h t c a u se su c h a free p lay o r q u ick e n in g w h ich th e n w ould c a u se a fee ling o f p le a su re in u s . T h is free p lay is th e p le a s u re w e feel w h e n o u r tw o facu ltie s of im a g in a tio n a n d u n d e rs ta n d in g a re in h a rm o n y . H ence, w h a t we receive a fee lin g o f p lea su re from a re th e cond itions w h ich m a k e possib le th e ab ility to m a k e ju d g m en ts at all. W ith th e b e a u ti- fu l, w e a re m a k in g a ju d g m e n t a b o u t o u r ab ility to ju d g e . R eca ll th a t , accord- in g to K a n t, a ju d g m e n t is a su b su m p tio n o f a p a rtic u la r u n d e r a u n iv e rsa l. T he u n d e rs ta n d in g prov ides th e u n iv e rsa l, in te rm s of th e ca teg o rie s , ju d g - m e n t su b su m e s a p a rtic u la r u n d e r th e u n iv e rsa l, a n d th e n re a s o n d raw s th e log ical co n c lu sio n s.11 B u t in o rd e r to m a k e su ch ju d g m en ts a t a ll, th e re m u s t be th e a b ility o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g to g ive law s to th e in tu i te d m an ifo ld , a n d th u s a h a rm o n y betw een th e p o w ers o f im ag in a tio n a n d u n d e rs ta n d in g is n eeded . A b e a u tifu l th in g is so m e th in g w h ich is p a rtic u la rly good a t a llow - in g fo r th e h a rm o n y of th ese tw o p ow ers. T h u s we ju d g e n o t t h a t th e object is b e a u tifu l, a s i f b e a u ty w ere a p re d ic a te , b u t w e judge th a t th is p a r t ic u la r ob- jec t g ives r is e to th e free p lay o f th e cogn itive facu lties, a n d s in c e a ll su ch fa c u ltie s o f h u m a n beings m u s t n e c e ssa rily b e th e sa m e ,12 w e a lso ju d g e th a t th e object m u s t be ju d g ed a s b e a u tifu l b y a ll people. T h is is a u n iv e rs a l ju d g m e n t, b u t on ly a sub jective one, a n d n o t a n objective one. 10 p. 63 = Ak. 219. 11 This may be a quite general judgment about cause and effect, in accordance with the a priori categories of the understanding, or an even more specific judgment, using empirical concepts of the un- derstanding, such as, 'This is a dog." In this case, the judgment subsumes a particular manifestation of the manifold (taken up through intuition and schematized by the imagination) under the empirical con- cept of "dog," given by the understanding. Reason then draws the necessary conclusion. 12 This is argued for in the first Critique. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. E \ 105 T h is is how th e an tin o m y sh a p e s up in "P a r t O ne" o f th e th ird Critique, n a m e ly th e q u estio n o f ho w i t is t h a t w e c a n reconcile th e d isp a ra te c la im s th a t a ju d g m e n t of b e a u ty is a ju d g m e n t o f ta s te m ad e w ith o u t concep ts a n d y e t t h a t i t is a ju d g m e n t t h a t is u n iv e rsa l. B u t th is so lu tio n is n o t y e t a d e q u a te , fo r in o rd e r to p ro p e rly solve th is an tin o m y , K a n t b rin g s in th e concep t o f "p u rp o s iv e n ess ," a n d th is e v e n tu a lly le a d s h im to h is d iscu ss io n s o f o rg an ism s in "P a r t Tw o." In m a k in g a ju d g m e n t th a t so m e th in g is b e a u tifu l, we ju d g e t h a t th e th in g h a s "p u rp o siv en ess ," n a m e ly th e p u rp o s iv e n ess o f b e in g ab le to be in tu i te d a n d th e n ta k e n up by th e im a g in a tio n , a n d a lso to be o rg an iz ed acco rd ing to th e concepts o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g . T h is is n o t a p u rp o s iv e n ess t h a t is for so m e th in g p a r tic u la r , no t, say , fo r th e p u rp o se o f p ro v id in g n o u r ish m e n t fo r a n im a ls or for th e p u rp o se o f fly ing . I t is w h a t K a n t c a lls "p u rp o siv e n ess w ith o u t a p u rp o se ." B u t th e q u es tio n a rise s a g a in , "W hy sh o u ld th is be?" W hy sh o u ld th e re be objects in n a tu re w h ich a re p a r t ic u la r ly w ell s u ite d for h u m a n cog- n itio n ? T h e on ly w ay th a t w e can ju d g e th e se ob jects is to judge th a t th e y h a v e th e p u rp o s iv e n ess of being able to be judged by human cognition,13 W e ju d g e th a t a n object is b e a u tifu l b ecau se of i ts su b jec tiv e pu rposiveness, a n d ju d g e th a t o th e rs sh o u ld ju d g e th e sa m e w ay b ecau se o f th e u n iv e rsa lity o f h u m a n cognition . W e sh o u ld be qu ick to add , how ever, th a t K a n t in te n d s th is to be a re g u la tiv e a n d reflec tive p rin c ip le o f ju d g m e n t a n d n o t a co n stitu tiv e o r d e - te rm in a te one. K a n t concludes th a t th e re is, f in a lly , no w ay th a t we cou ld p o ss ib ly k now w h e th e r so m eth in g in n a tu re cou ld b e c a u se d a n d e x p la in ed th ro u g h a n e n tire ly p h y sio -m ech an ica l account: 13 As Pluhar summarizes: "the principle of judgment is the assumption that nature manifests a cognizable order not only in its (transcendental and metaphysical) universal laws (which are based on the categories) but in terms of its particular (and contingent) laws as well: Nature makes its universal laws specific (Ak. 186) in such a way that the particular laws will not be too 'heterogeneous' (Ak. 180) for us to have coherent experience even in terms of them (Ak. 180)" (p. Mi). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106 natu re shows in all of its free formations a g rea t mechanical tendency to pro- duce forms th a t seem made, as it were, for the aesthetic employment of our power of judgment; and na tu re gives us no grounds whatever for supposing th a t [the production of such forms] requires anyth ing more th an n a tu re 's m echanism ...14 In th e f in a l a n a ly s is , i t is n o t p o ss ib le for u s a s h u m a n b e in g s w ith on ly o u r l im ite d ca teg o ries o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g to ev er conc lude w h e th e r so m e th in g is p o ss ib le on ly th ro u g h m e c h a n ic a l law s, o r w h e th e r a concept is n e ed e d fo r i ts fo rm a tio n .15 We a re n o t a llo w ed to sa y t h a t n a tu r e 's p u rp o siv en ess w ith - o u t a p u rp o se h a s b een g iven to u s a s specifically d e s ig n ed fo r ou r possib le cogn ition , o r w h e th e r th is is a h a p p y coincidence. W e c a n n o t say th a t b e a u ti- fu l ob jec ts h a v e been p re s e n te d to h u m a n b e in g s fo r th e p u rp o se o f c a u s in g th e fre e p la y o f th e fac u ltie s . W e c a n only ju d g e t h a t su c h objects a p p e a r to u s as i f they w ere so d e s ig n e d ,16 b u t th is is on ly a p r in c ip le w hich w e n e e d fo r th e c o rre c t ju d g in g o f objects o f b e au ty , for a u n iv e rs a l b u t sub jective ju d g - m e n t. T h e a n tin o m y of th e f i r s t p a r t of th e Critique is s t i ll n o t q u ite a d e - q u a te ly solved, how ever, w ith o u t th e fu ll e x p la n a tio n g iven in "P a r t Two." T h is is b e ca u se th e so lu tio n to th e an tin o m y o f "P a r t O n e" involved th e in d e - te rm in a te concept o f n a tu re 's p u rp o siv en ess w ith o u t a p u rp o se . B u t w e see ev en h e re t h a t w e a re n o t a b le to sa y w h e th e r n a tu r e is ab le to cau se su ch p u rp o s iv e n e ss th ro u g h m ec h an ism only, o r w h e th e r a concept is tru ly in - volved. In fac t, w e w ill n e v e r be a b le to m ak e su c h a ju d g m e n t, for w e w ill n e v e r g e t b eyond th e cogn itive l im its se t by th e f i r s t Critique. B u t th is s till 14 p. 222 = Ak. 348. 15 "It is however quite undetermined, and for our reason forever indeterminable, how much the mechanism of nature does as a means toward each final intention in nature" (p. 300 = Ak. 414-5). More on this below. 16 "The diverse rules whose unity... arouses this admiration are one and all synthetic and do not follow from a concept of the object, e.g., that of a circle, but these rules require that this object is given in intuition. But that makes it seem as if the rule of this unity had an empirical basis outside us and distinct from our presentational power... and hence possible only through a purpose that aimed expressly at this harmony [of imagination and understanding]" (p. 242 = Ak. 364-5). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. leaves u s th e a n tin o m y th a t w e a re n o t ab le to t h in k of such a p u rp o s iv e n e ss in n a tu re , b ecau se , a s fa r a s w e c a n see , su c h a o rd e rin g o f th e p a r t ic u la r is com plete ly c o n tin g e n t. We a re sa y in g both t h a t th e p a r t ic u la r is co n tin g en t, a n d th a t i t is n ecessa ry ; i t is c o n tin g e n t b e ca u se o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g c a n n o t conceive o f th e p a r t ic u la r a s b e in g n e c e ss ita te d , a n d n ecessa ry b ecau se o f th e sub jec tive b u t u n iv e rs a l ju d g m e n t t h a t is m a d e a b o u t th e b e au tifu l. C o n tin - gency o f th e p a r t ic u la r im p lies p h y sio -m ec h an ica l c au sa lity , w hile n e c e ss ity o f th e p a r t ic u la r im p lie s p u rp o siv e c a u sa lity . T h is is th e re a l a n tin o m y o f th e th ird Critique. S u c h a n an tin o m y is n o t s im p ly so lvab le b y ch an g in g th e once c o n s ti- tu tiv e p rin c ip le o f (m echan ica l) c a u s a lity in to a reg u la tiv e p rin c ip le , a n d th u s c a llin g teleo logy a n d m ech an ica l c a u s a lity m ere ly reg u la tiv e , fo r w e a re s t i l l le f t w ith com ple te ly a n ti th e tic a l a s se r tio n s a b o u t one a n d th e sa m e p re s e n - ta tio n a s re g a rd s i ts c a u sa lity .17 "C o n tingency" i ts e l f im p lies th e fa c t t h a t w e a re forced to conceive o f n a tu re in te rm s o f p h y sio -m ech an ica l law s, w h ile "p u rp o s iv e n ess" im p lie s th a t w e m u s t th in k in te rm s o f p u rposive c a u sa lity . T h u s w e n e e d a so lu tio n w hich a llow s u s to cognize th e p oss ib ility o f su c h a n e c e ss ita te d con tingency , m u ch in th e sa m e w ay t h a t we n eed ed a so lu tio n to th e a n tin o m y o f freed o m a n d c a u sa lity w h ich a llow ed u s to u n d e rs ta n d how b o th cou ld b e a s s e r te d to coexist. T h is p ro b lem is b ro u g h t to th e fo re in "P a r t Two" o f th e book, w h e re K a n t m oves from p re s e n ta tio n s w h ich a re b e a u tifu l, to th e p re s e n ta tio n o f o rg an ism s. O rg a n ism s a re th o se ob jec ts in n a tu r e w hich a re "self- o rg a n iz in g " ob jects w h ich h a v e th e p e c u lia r ity o f h a v in g each of th e p a r t s se rv in g fo r th e p u rp o se of th e w hole, i.e ., w h e re th e concept o f th e w hole d ic- ta te s w h a t th e d es ig n o f each o f th e p a r t s m u s t be. K a n t ca lls th is a "n a tu r a l pu rp o se :" "a th in g e x is ts as a n a tu r a l p u rp o se i f i t is both cause and effect o f 1 This point will become clearer below. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ! 108 itself..."18 H e re w e en co u n te r n a tu re a s n o t on ly o rganized , b u t self- o rg an ized . H e re w e seem to ju d g e c e r ta in ob jec ts a s h a v in g pu rp o siv en ess w ith specific p u rp o ses , a n d h ence w e e n c o u n te r "n a tu r a l p u rposes" o v er a n d above th e "sub jec tive pu rp o siv en ess ." W hen re a so n en co u n ters such a n ob- ject, i t a tte m p ts to com prehend th e fo rm atio n o f th is object, a n d i ts n ecessity . B u t w h a t i t concludes is th a t , in th e case o f o rg an ism s, th e ir fo rm ation is so u t te r ly co n tin g en t, t h a t "th a t v e ry con tingency o f th e th in g 's form is a b a s is for r e g a rd in g th e p ro d u c t a s i f i t h a d com e a b o u t th ro u g h a c au sa lity t h a t only re a s o n c a n h a v e ."19 Yet, fo r su ch a th in g to be a natural pu rpose , a se lf- o rg a n iz in g o rg an ism fo u n d in n a tu re , w e m u s t a lso ju d g e th a t "i t is to be p o ss ib le on ly a s a n a tu r a l p u rp o se [per se], w ith o u t th e cau sa lity of concep ts, w h ich ra t io n a l b e in g s ou tside i t h a v e ."20 In c a llin g so m eth ing a n a tu r a l p u r - pose, w e m u s t sa y th a t w hile i t a p p e a rs to h a v e b een cau sed according to a concep t, w e know th a t n a tu re i ts e lf c a n only o p e ra te by m echan ica l c au sa lity , a n d th u s w e m u s t ju d g e th a t , th o u g h i t is u t te r ly co n tingen t, som ehow th e p a r ts a l l a c t to g e th e r th ro u g h m ech an ica l c a u sa lity in o rder to form th e w hole.21 O th e rw ise i t w ould be a n u n -n a tu ra l p u rp o se , a n object o rg an ized acco rd ing to a concept. T hus, w e see how th e an tin o m y w hich developed in th e e n c o u n te r w ith b e a u ty (subjective p u rp o siv en ess) is in ten sified in th e e n - c o u n te r w ith o rg an ism s (n a tu ra l pu rposes). A ga in , th e prob lem is th a t w e a re u n a b le to ju d g e w h e th e r or n o t i t is possib le fo r th e o rg an ism s to h av e com e a b o u t by m ere m echanism . O n th e one h a n d , "i t is q u ite c e r ta in th a t in te rm s o f m ere ly m echan ica l p rin c ip le s of n a tu re w e c a n n o t even a d eq u a te ly becom e fa m ilia r w ith , m uch less ex p la in , o rg an iz ed b e in g s a n d how th ey a re in te rn a lly possib le ."22 Indeed, K a n t o ften 18 p. 249 = Ak. 371. 19 p. 248 = Ak. 370. 20 p. 252 = Ak. 373. 21 p. 252 = Ak. 373 and p. 254 = Ak. 374-5. 22 p. 282 = Ak. 400. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109 sp e ak s a s th o u g h w e n eed a te leo log ica l p rin c ip le even fo r th e very cognition o f such o rg an ism s .23 O n th e o th e r h a n d , g iven th e n a tu r e o f o u r d iscursive u n d e rs ta n d in g , n e ith e r can w e sa y t h a t i t w ould be im p o ssib le for n a tu re to se lf-o rgan ize u s in g o n ly m ech an ica l c au sa lity : it would also be too presum ptuous for us to judge tha t, supposing we could penetra te to the principle in term s of which natu re m ade the fam iliar univer- sal laws of na tu re specific, there simply could not be in n a tu re a hidden basis adequate to m ake organized beings possible w ithout an underlying intention (but through the mere m echanism of nature).24 In effect, w e s im p ly c an n o t ju d g e w h e th e r such c a u sa tio n m ig h t be possib le w ith o u t a n accom pany ing concept. T h e on ly w ay o u t of th is a n tin o m y is to a p p e a l to th e su p e rsen s ib le in o rd er to th in k o f n a tu re i ts e l f a s b e in g created by som e a u th o r . B u t we m u s t th in k o f th is in te llig en ce a s o rg a n iz in g n a tu re u s in g o n ly m echan ica l c a u sa lity to ach ieve th e p u rp o ses w h ich w e encoun ter; h en ce , "how ever ra s h a n d im p ro v ab le i t w o u ld be for determinative judgment," in o rd e r to reso lve th e an tin o m y , w e m u s t n o n e th e le ss "th in k a c a u sa lity d is tin c t from m echa- n ism - viz., th e c a u sa lity of a n (in te llig en t) w orld cau se t h a t a c ts according to p u rp o ses ."25 T h u s , th e an tin o m y is reso lved b ecau se w e ju d g e b o th th a t n a tu re i ts e l f a c ts on ly m echan ica lly , a n d t h a t n a tu re h a s b e e n c re a te d w ith p u rp o se s in m in d . L e t u s exam ine th is m ore thorough ly . To b e g in w ith , reason , by n a tu r e o f i ts desire a lw ay s to f in d th e u n - cond itioned , is n a tu ra l ly m oved to th o u g h ts of th e su p e rse n s ib le in th e hopes of f in d in g a su ffic ien t cause fo r n a tu r e lo ca ted in th is s u b s tr a te o f n a tu re . 23 See: p. 254 = Ak. 375, 263 = Ak. 383, 266 = Ak. 385, 266-7 = Ak. 386, 281 = Ak. 398, 297-8 = Ak. 412-3, 308 = Ak. 421-2, and 313 = Ak. 426. 24 p. 283 = Ak. 400. 25 p. 269 = Ak. 389. "[T\he peculiar character o f my cognitive powers is such that the only way I can judge [how] those things are possible and produced is by conceiving, [to account] for this pro- duction, a cause that acts according to intentions, and hence a being that produces [things] in a way analogous to the causality of an understanding" (p. 280 = Ak. 397-8). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I 110 R easo n f in d s a n a tu r a l analogy b e tw ee n th e o rg a n is m s in n a tu r e a n d th e ob jects t h a t i t i ts e lf p roduces: b o th g e o m e trica l objects, w h ic h i t p ro d u ces ab - s tra c tly in accordance w ith a concept, a n d w ith m ore te c h n ic a l ob jects su ch as w a tch es , w h e re th e p a r t s m u s t a ll w o rk to g e th e r fo r th e w hole , a w hole w hich com es a b o u t on ly b e ca u se of a n a n te c e d e n t concept. R easo n h a s a w ill, a n d can (a t l e a s t a tte m p t to) cau se n a tu r e to coincide w ith i ts w ill. H en ce th e re is a n a tu r a l an a lo g y b e tw een su ch p ro d u c in g a n d w illing on o ne s id e a n d th e concep t o f a n in te llig e n t a u th o r of th e w o rld on th e o th e r. R e aso n c a n th in k of th e in te llig e n c e b e h in d n a tu re a s b e in g lik e itself, w illin g n a tu r e to a c t in acco rdance w ith concepts, a n d u til iz in g n a tu r e th ro u g h m e c h a n ic a l law s. T h is is , o f co u rse , on ly a reg u la tiv e p r in c ip le .26 T h o u g h such a n id e a is n a tu r a l fo r reaso n , i t does n o t y e t p rec ise ly solve th e an tin o m y , fo r th e u n d e rs ta n d in g s t i l l sees p a r t ic u la r em p iric a l law s a n d o rg a n ism s a s co n tin g en t. T he u n d e rs ta n d in g , g iven o n ly th e ca tego ries fo r th e co g n itio n o f n a tu re , c an n o t cogn ize a n a tu re t h a t c o u ld o rg an ize i ts e lf by a n y o th e r m ea n s th a n p h y sio -m ech an ica l c au sa tio n . A f in a l co m p o n en t is n eeded , n a m e ly th e n o tio n th a t th e in te l l ig e n t a u th o r o f th e w o rld m a k e s or in tu i t s su c h co n tin g en c ies a s necessities. K a n t a rg u es t h a t "th e d is tin g u ish - in g f e a tu re o f th e id e a o f a n a tu r a l p u rp o se concerns a p e c u lia r i ty o f our (h u m an ) u n d e rs ta n d in g in re la tio n to th e p o w er of ju d g m e n t a n d i ts reflec- tio n on th in g s in n a tu re ."27 T h is is a n e x tre m e ly im p o rta n t p o in t. W h a t i t in d ic a te s is th a t , for K a n t, th e p ro b lem o f "n a tu r a l p u rp o se s" only arises in the first place fo r a n u n d e rs ta n d in g w h ic h is lik e ours, b e c a u se on ly w ith th is u n d e rs ta n d in g is th e re th e p rob lem o f a n em p irica l o rg a n iz a tio n w h ich is u t - te r ly c o n tin g e n t a s f a r a s w e c a n te ll. W e h a v e only th e c a teg o rie s o f th e u n - d e rs ta n d in g to c o n s titu te n a tu re , a n d , in fac t, th is is w h a t n a tu r e is for u s, n a tu r e a s a p p e a ra n c e b ecau se i t h a s a lre a d y b een in tu i te d a n d le g is la te d to 26 See Section Two below. 27 p. 289 = Ak. 405. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I l l by th e u n d e rs ta n d in g . A nd th is u n d e rs ta n d in g c a n n o t give a n y re a so n w hy c o n tin g en c ies sh o u ld be o rgan ized , or, p a rtic u la rly , be se lf-o rg an iz in g .28 B u t w h a t th is also show s, K a n t a rg u e s , is t h a t th is co n cep tio n o f o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g a lre a d y in d ic a te s th e p o ss ib ility o f a d iffe ren t u n d e rs ta n d in g : But if th a t is so, [namely, the peculiarity of our understanding,] th en we m ust here be presupposing the idea o f some possible understanding different from the hum an one... Only by presupposing th is idea can we say th a t because of the special character of our understand ing must we consider certa in n a tu ra l products, as to [how] they are possible, as having been produced intentionally and as purposes.29 T h is is th e id e a of a n u n d e rs ta n d in g w h ich is d iffe ren t from o u rs , th e id e a of a n o n -d isc u rs iv e in te lligence . W h e re a s o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g is o n ly rec ep tiv e to in tu it io n s , th is o th e r u n d e rs ta n d in g w o u ld a c tu a lly be sp o n ta n e o u s , n o t w o rk in g from on ly u n iv e rsa l a priori ca teg o ries . W e can th in k o f a n in te l l i - gence fo r w h ic h i t w ou ld be n e c e ssa ry fo r th e p a r t ic u la r law s o f n a tu r e to be o rg a n iz e d su c h th a t w e can c o m p re h en d th e m th ro u g h th e u n d e rs ta n d in g , a n e v e n t w h ich w ill a lw ay s rem ain c o n tin g e n t fo r us, a n d w h ich w e c a n "conceive of... on ly a s m ed ia te d b y p u rp o se s ."30 S uch a n in te llig e n c e is not discursive b u t intuitive, and hence proceeds from the synthetically univer- sal (the intuition of a whole as a whole) to the particular, i.e., from the whole to the parts . Hence such an understand ing as well as its p resen ta tion of the whole has no contingency in the com bination of the parts in order to m ake a determ inate form of the whole possible.31 O u r u n d e rs ta n d in g c a n only p reced e from th e p a r ts to th e w hole , v iew in g su c h w ho les a s "consequences."32 28 "So what matters here is how our understanding relates to judgment: we must find in this relation a certain contingency in the character of our understanding, so that we can take note of this pecu- liarity as what distinguishes our understanding from other possible ones" (p. 290 = Ak. 406). 29 p. 289 = Ak. 405. 30 p. 291 = Ak. 407. 31 p. 291= Ak. 407. 32 p. 292 = Ak. 407. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f I 112 B u t a non -d iscu rsive in te llig en ce w ou ld th in k th e w hole a s a whole, a n d th u s e lim in a te th e con tingenc ies o f th e p a rtic u la r , th o u g h th e on ly w ay we c a n possib ly ju d g e su c h a n o rg an ized object in n a tu re is th ro u g h ju d g - m e n t's concept o f p u rp o siv en ess , on ly th ro u g h th e id ea of a b e in g u tiliz in g concepts. In o th e r w ords, w h ile w e c a n th in k of a n in te lligence d iffe re n t th a n ou rs , w e c a n n o t a c tu a lly co n cep tu a lize i t, a n d th u s we m u s t s t i l l th in k a n d ju d g e in d iv id u a l p re se n ta tio n s o f n a tu re a s i f th e y h a d b een c a u se d according to a p u rp o se ; i t is on ly by th e p rin c ip le o f a p u rp o se th a t w e a re a b le to con- ceive a n d ju d g e such objects. T h is , th en , is th e f in a l so lu tio n to th e an tinom y. I t is n o t po ssib le to so lve i t m ere ly by re le g a tin g b o th ty p es o f c a u sa lity (m echan ica l a n d p u r - posive) to re g u la tiv e id eas , fo r w e w o u ld s t i l l b e ju d g in g one a n d th e sam e object a s possib le accord ing to e n tire ly co n trad ic to ry e x p la n a tio n s . P lu h a r e x p la in s th is well, so I w ill quo te h im a t le n g th : [we judge an object] in term s of m echanism insofar as the object is a product of nature , in term s of final causes insofar as it is a purpose. Now m echanism in- volves the necessity implicit in the principle of causality which is based on the categories; on the other hand, we cannot th ink of an object as a purpose with- out thinking of it as contingent, viz., contingent in term s of the universal na tu - ra l laws (Ak. 39S).33 Hence it seem s th a t we are judging as both necessary and contingent "one and the sam e product" (Ak. 413), indeed, even th e sam e causal connections within th a t product (Ak. 373, and cf. 372-73). Hence we are con- tradicting ourselves (Ak. 396) unless we can reconcile the two principles... The fact th a t we are using these principles as m ere maxims, as m erely regulative, does not resolve the conflict as all: if the concepts th a t the two m axim s use contradict each other, then we have not even a concept of a n a tu ra l purpose; for the concepts and m axim s will cancel each other, so th a t we shall not be "judging" a t all.34 M ere ly p o s itin g th e two concep tions o f c a u sa lity a s be ing re g u la tiv e does no t solve th e an tinom y . C e rta in ly th e y re m a in re g u la tiv e for a n y p o ss ib le f in a l 33 This is Kant's point, discussed above, that it is only for our peculiar understanding that con- tingencies of nature are a problem in the first place. 34 p. xc. For Pluhar's complete discussion, see: pp. lxxxvi-cix. See also especially: pp. 297-8 = Ak 412-3. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f 113 judgment a s to w h e th e r a p a r tic u la r object is f in a lly p o ssib le according to p h y sio -m ech an ica l c au sa tio n , b u t th is n e ith e r reso lv es th e an tinom y, n o r does i t change th e conclusions o f th e Critique o f Pure Reason; m ech an ica l c a u sa lity is s t i l l c o n stitu tiv e fo r th e u n d e rs ta n d in g , th o u g h i t is re g u la tiv e for ju d g m e n t. N or is i t en o u g h to th in k o f a n in te llig e n t a u th o r o f th e w orld in a n a l- ogy w ith th e h u m a n w ill, for w e a re s ti l l le f t w ith th e p ro b lem of th e c o n tin - gency of n a tu re , a n d o f how to ju d g e su ch o rg an iz ed objects: a re th e y c re a te d by a n in te llig en ce a s a r t , th a t is to say , by a m e re ly p u rp o s iv e cause, o r can th e y be e x p la in e d th ro u g h m echan ism ? In th e e n d , K a n t argues, w e m u s t conceive o f n a tu r a l p u rp o ses a s th e p ro d u c t o f a n o n -d iscu rs iv e in te lligence , in w hich case w h a t seem s to u s as c o n tin g en t is a c tu a lly n e c e ss ita te d by th e w hole , a w hole o f w h ich th is in te llig en ce can conceive w ith o u t b u ild in g i t up from th e p a r ts . W e s t i l l req u ire th e concept o f p u rp o s iv e n ess , how ever, in o r- d e r to judge, a n d , to som e ex ten t, even cognize o rg a n iz e d a n d se lf-o rgan ized p re se n ta tio n s o f n a tu re : [T]he fact th a t we present [certain] products of na tu re as possible only in term s of a kind of causality th a t differs from the causality of the natural laws per- taining to m atte r, namely, the causality of purposes and final causes, is merely a consequence of the special character of our understanding. Therefore, this principle does not pertain to [how] such things them selves are possible through this kind o f production..., bu t pertains only to the way our understanding is able to judge them .35 T h is is a n im p o r ta n t s ta te m e n t. H ere , K a n t is p o in tin g to th e fac t th a t th e so lu tio n to th e a n tin o m y is ac tu a lly com plete ly in d e te rm in a te w hen w e t ry to conceive o f i t concre te ly . We c a n h av e a b so lu te ly n o co n cre te conception of su c h a n o n -d iscu rs iv e in te lligence excep t to sa y h o w i t w o u ld be d iffe ren t a n d u n lik e ours. H ence , w e still n e e d th e concept o f p u rp o s iv e n ess , su p p lied by 35 p. 292 = Ak. 408. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 114 ju d g m e n t, to ju d g e o rg an iz ed p re s e n ta tio n s o f n a tu re 36. T h is is th e sp e c ia l fu n c tio n o f th e p o w er o f ju d g m en t, a n d w hy K a n t th o u g h t a Critique w as n e e d e d to beg in w ith . T h e only w a y w e c a n cognize such objects is b y th in k - in g o f th e m as c a u se d fo r a p u rp o se .37 T h is is how we m u s t ju d g e th e m , b u t th is c a n n o t be th e so lu tio n to th e a n tin o m y per se. m. T h is su m m a ry is im p o r ta n t p r im a r ily because i t p rov ides a n e c e s sa ry b a c k g ro u n d for th e n e x t sev era l c h a p te rs . H ow ever, le t m e h e re a n tic ip a te th e a rg u m e n ts o f th e se c h a p te rs , a n d b rie fly l is t som e im p o rta n t p o in ts to k eep in m ind . F irs t , th e Critique o f Judgment show s th a t w e c a n n o t k n o w w h e th e r n a tu re a c tu a lly b eh av es te leo log ica lly . T hus, th e id e a o f te leo logy re m a in s reg u la tiv e w h ile th e ca tego ries , in c lu d in g (physio -m echan ica l) c a u sa lity , re m a in c o n s titu tiv e o f ex p erien ce . Second, th e conclusion t h a t w e m u s t n e ce ssa rily ju d g e in accord w ith teleo logy , i.e., we m u s t conceive of n a tu r e as i f i t w ere c re a te d for a p u rp o se , a llow s K a n t to m ak e a v e ry po w erfu l a rg u m e n t l a t e r in th e th i r d Critique t h a t i f n a tu re h a s a p u rp o se , i ts u l t im a te p u rp o se is to p rom ote th e f le e (m oral) w illing of h u m a n b e in g s . T h is , in tu rn , su p p o rts th e no tion o f th e h ig h e s t good on e a r th . T h ird , K a n t's d iscu ssio n of b e a u ty g ives u s a n in d ic a tio n , th o u g h in d ire c t a n d n e v e r c e r ta in , t h a t n a tu re w a s in d ee d c re a te d fo r u s . T h a t is, b ecau se th e c o n tin g e n t often e x h ib its law -like b e h a v io r a n d w e experience fee lin g s o f p le a su re , i t w ou ld seem a s i f n a tu re w a s c re a te d w ith th e specific fa c u ltie s o f h u m a n b e in g s in m in d . T hese im p o r ta n t p o in ts w ill allow fo r th e p o ss ib ility 36 When we try to reconcile the two types of causality, "since the basis for this reconcilability lies in what is neither the one nor the other (neither mechanism nor connection in terms of purposes), but is nature's supersensible substrate that we cannot cognize at all, [it follows that] our (human) reason can- not fuse these two ways of conceiving how such objects are possible. We can only judge them as based... on a supreme understanding..." (pp. 299-300 = Ak. 414). 37 "[W]e must. .. conceive of a different understanding: without as yet attributing any [concept of a] purpose to this understanding, we can then present this harmony between the [particular] natural laws and our judgment as necessary relative to that understanding, [even though] our own understanding can conceive of this harmony only as mediated by purposes" (p. 291 = Ak. 407). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of m o ra l p ro g ress a n d th e h ig h e s t good on e a r th , show w h y th e h ig h e s t good can on ly be a p o s tu la te o f p ra c tic a l reaso n , in d ic a te w hy p o litica l in s t i tu t io n s a re l in k e d to m o ra l p ro g re ss , a n d show w hy a b e lie f in G od is rationed . W ith th is in m in d , le t u s m ove on to th e n e x t c h a p te r . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 116 Chapter Six Limits of Teleology and the First Link between the Natural and Moral World L I th in k th a t i t is a b so lu te ly d e a r in th e Critique o f Judgment th a t th e te leo log ica l p rin c ip le w h ich w e n eed fo r th e ju d g m e n t o f c e r ta in p re se n ta tio n s o f n a tu r e is n o t in a n y w ay th o u g h t by K a n t to be co n stitu tiv e . K a n t m ak es a b u n d a n t s ta te m e n ts to th is fac t. To ex am in e th is , w e m u s t se p a ra te t h i s c h a p te r in to tw o sections. T h e f irs t sec tion w ill d ea l w ith in tr in s ic teleology a n d th e p ro b lem o f how to ju d g e a n o rg an ism w hich is a n a tu r a l p u rp o se . T h e te leo log ica l ju d g m e n t a llow s u s to conceive of th e p a r ts o f th e o rg a n i s m a s o rg a n iz e d by th e w hole. T h e second sec tion w ill d ea l w ith ex trin s ic o r "re la tiv e " teleology, a n d th e p rob lem o f how to ju d g e th e re la tio n sh ip betw een d iffe re n t a sp e c ts o f n a tu re ; "b y ex trin sic p u rp o siv en ess I m ean a p u rp o siv e - n e ss w h e re one th in g o f n a tu re se rves a n o th e r a s a m e a n s to a p u rp o se ."1 W hile i t is d e a r t h a t K a n t in te n d s such teleology to fu n c tio n m ere ly a s a re g u la tiv e id ea , K a n t a lso th in k s th a t i t is a n id e a w hich is n o n e th e le ss to be u sed , a n d m u s t b e ex am in ed carefu lly , a s i t le a d s u s to th in k of n a tu re a s a sy s te m o f p u rp o se s , a n d to th in k of h u m a n b e in g s a s th e f in a l p u rp o se o f n a - tu re . K a n t's d iscussion o f th e "u ltim a te " a n d "fin a l" p u rp o ses o f n a tu re a re so m etim es confusing . I sh a ll t ry to spell o u t th is a rg u m e n t m ore d e a r ly , a n a rg u m e n t w h ich seem s to h a v e been overlooked in th e secondary m a te r ia l.2 T he d iscu ss io n in th is c h a p te r w ill give u s th e n e ce ssa ry m a te r ia ls to solve m a n y o f th e p ro b lem s w h ich h a v e a lre ad y b e en in tro d u c ed in th is p a p e r, a s 1 p. 312 = Ak. 425. 2 With the notable exception of: Yirmiahu Yovel. Kant and the Philosophy o f History. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1980). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 117 w ell as sh e d d in g lig h t on how to re a d K a n t concern ing teleo logy a s a re g u la - tiv e id ea a n d h u m a n b e in g s a s th e f in a l p u rp o se of n a tu re . I n a d d itio n , th e d iscussion o f th e u ltim a te a n d f in a l p u rp o ses o f n a tu re w ill g ive u s one of th re e a rg u m e n ts l in k in g te leo logy a n d m orality , to be f u r th e r d isc u sse d in th e n ex t c h a p te r . IL O nly a few sec tions in th e Critique m ay give r is e to u n c e r ta in ty a s to h o w we a re to th in k o f th e p u rp o s iv e n ess o f in d iv id u a l o rg an ism s , th e re b y c au s in g u s to q u estio n th e s ta tu s o f physio -m echan ica l e x p la n a tio n s a s con- s ti tu tiv e . T h ese sec tions occu r w h e re K a n t sp e ak s of th e "su b o rd in a tio n " of m ech an ica l c a u sa lity to p u rp o s iv e cau sa lity . In section 78, K a n t w rite s th a t , concern ing th e in a b ility o f h u m a n be ings to reconcile th e tw o ty p e s o f c a u sa l- ity , "a ll we c an do is su b o rd in a te th e one type of p ro d u c tio n (m ech an ism ) to th e o th e r (an in te n tio n a l techn ic ); th e tra n sc e n d e n ta l p rin c ip le o f th e p u r - posiveness o f n a tu re c e r ta in ly p e rm its th a t ."3 Section 80 i t s e l f is tit le d , "O n th e N ecessary S u b o rd in a tio n o f th e P rin c ip le of M ec h a n ism to th e T eleologi- c a l P rinc ip le in E x p la in in g a T h in g [C onsidered] a s a N a tu ra l P u rp o se ," a n d K a n t w rites th a t , in ju d g in g th in g s w h ose con cep t a s n atu ra l purposes does u n d ou b ted ly h ave a b a sis (i.e., in ju d g in g o rg a n ized beings), w e m u st a lw a y s p resu p p ose som e original organ iza tion th a t it s e l f uses m echanism , e ith er to produce o th er or- gan ized form s or to develop th e th in g 's ow n organ ized form in to n ew sh apes (though th ese sh a p e s too a lw a y s resu lt from th e purpose an d conform to it).4 T h ese s ta te m e n ts a n d o th e rs lik e i t seem to in d ica te th e p o ss ib ility b o th th a t m ech an ica l c a u sa lity is to b e re le g a te d to th e position o f on ly a re g u la tiv e p rin c ip le , a n d t h a t i t is a lso n o t even th e p re fe rre d reg u la tiv e p rin c ip le of ex p lan a tio n , b e in g in fe rio r to a pu rposive ex p lan a tio n . 3 p. 299 = Ak. 414. 4 p. 304 = Ak. 418. Italics added for emphasis. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118 W hy sh o u ld i t seem th is w ay? To p u t i t b riefly , th e re a so n fo r th e su b o rd in a tio n h a s to do w ith th e a n sw e r to th e a n tin o m y o f te leo log ica l ju d g m e n t, d isc u sse d in th e c h a p te r above. G iven t h a t th e a n tin o m y c a n on ly be so lved by a p p e a lin g to th e su p e rse n s ib le in o rd e r to reconcile th e tw o ty p es o f c a u sa lity , a n d g iven t h a t h u m a n b e in g s c an n o t conceive of th e su p e rs e n - sib le ex cep t to th in k o f a n u n d e rs ta n d in g w hich is n o n -d iscu rs iv e a n d w h ich w e c a n on ly ju d g e by th in k in g o f i t a s u s in g m ec h an ism fo r i ts p u rp o se s , th e n p u rp o s iv e c a u sa lity becom es m ore im p o rta n t th a n m ech an is tic c a u s a lity for judgment.5 P u rp o s iv e c a u sa lity is im p o rta n t becau se , a s w e sa w above, d u e to th e p e c u lia r ity o f h u m a n u n d e rs ta n d in g w e m u s t ju d g e o rg an ism s as i f th e y w ere c re a te d in acco rd w ith a concept, fo r w e c a n conceive o f b o th s u b - jec tive p u rp o s iv e n ess a n d n a tu r a l p u rp o se s in no o th e r w ay. In o th e r w ords, we m ust keep to the above principle of teleology - viz., the principle th a t, in view of the character of hum an understanding, the only cause th a t can be as- sum ed [in order to account] for the possibility of organic beings in n a tu re is a cause th a t acts intentionally, and th a t the m ere mechanism of n a tu re cannot a t all suffice to explain these products of nature. B ut we are no t try ing to use th is principle to decide any th ing about how such things them selves are possi- ble.6 W h a t K a n t concludes a b o u t th e su b o rd in a tio n o f m ech an ica l to te leo log ica l c a u sa lity is t h a t i t is n e c e ssa ry in o rd e r to m ak e a ju d g m e n t a b o u t n a tu r a l p u rp o ses . W hen i t com es to th e q u e s tio n o f w h a t ro le th is p rin c ip le sh o u ld p la y in th e in v e s tig a tio n of n a tu r e a s a science, K a n t's a n sw e r does n o t s t r a y from th e f i r s t Critique. T h u s , K a n t w rite s , "w ith o u t m ec h an ism w e c a n n o t g a in in s ig h t in to th e n a tu re o f th in g s . E v en i f i t w ere g ra n te d th a t a su p re m e a r - ch itec t d irec tly c re a te d th e fo rm s o f n a tu re as th e y h a v e a lw ays b een ... s t i l l 5 Specifically, for the judgment about how the existence of an organism is possible. 6 p. 298 = Ak. 413. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 119 n o n e o f th is ad v an c es ou r cogn ition o f n a tu r e in th e le a s t . . ."7 In sec tion 79, K a n t a d d re s s e s th e q u estio n specifica lly , a n d s ta te s q u ite d e fin itiv e ly th a t , n a tu ra l science requires determ inative and not m erely reflective principles in o rder to indicate objective bases for n a tu ra l effects. Indeed, since the theory of n a tu re explains na tu ra l phenom ena in m echanical term s, through their effi- cient causes, there would be no advan tage for it if we considered them accord- ing to... purposes... [Purposive explanations give] us no inform ation w hatever about the origin and inner possibility o f these forms, while th a t is exactly w hat theoretical n a tu ra l science is concerned w ith.8 K a n t m a k e s th e d is tin c tio n b e tw e e n th e p rin c ip le o f teleo logy a s i t is n eed ed fo r ju d g m e n t, a n d a s i t is n e e d e d fo r sp e c u la tiv e science a n d ph ilo sophy . T he p r in c ip le o f te leo logy is n e ce ssa ry fo r th e so lu tio n o f th e an tin o m y , b u t th is p r in c ip le s a y s on ly th a t reco n c ilia tio n is p o ss ib le w ith th e su p e rse n s ib le . W hen i t com es to a n a c tu a l e x p la n a tio n a n d u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e w ork ings o f n a tu re , a ll w e h a v e a re in tu it io n a n d th e ca teg o ries o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g . H ence , w e a re le f t w ith a s im ila r s i tu a t io n as a t th e e n d o f th e Critique of Pure Reason. A s in th e f i r s t Critique, K a n t h e re s tre s se s th e n e e d fo r teleo logy as a n a id to n a tu r a l in v es tig a tio n . A g a in , h ow ever, K a n t c la im s t h a t i f teleology is a s su m e d fro m th e b e g in n in g to b e c o n s titu tiv e in s te a d o f re g u la tiv e , su ch a p rin c ip le w o u ld d e fe a t i ts ow n p u rp o se , a n d th e in v e s tig a tio n o f n a tu r e in ac- co rd w ith sc ience w ou ld n e v e r b eg in . T h u s K a n t a rg u e s w e m u s t u ltim a te ly u se e m p ir ic a l la w s , fo r i t is "in te rm s o f th e s e law s th a t n a tu r a l sc ience m u s t ju d g e i ts ob jec ts ... H ence n a tu r a l sc ien ce m u s t n o t le a p o v er i ts b o u n d a ry in o rd e r to ab so rb ... so m e th in g to w h o se co n cep t no ex p erien ce w h a te v e r can be a d e q u a te ..."9 K a n t concludes d e fin itiv e ly : 7 p. 295 = Ak. 410. 8 p. 302 = Ak. 417. 9 p. 262 = Ak. 382. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120 [W]e are not try ing to introduce [into physics] a special causal basis, bu t are trying to introduce only another method for our use of reason in investigation - a m ethod different from the one in term s of mechanical laws -in order to compensate for the inadequacy we find in the la tte r method when we search even em pirically for all the particular law s of nature... But in speaking this way we do no t tu rn nature into an in telligent being (since th a t would be ab- surd), nor a re we so bold as to posit a different, intelligent being above nature as its architect, since th a t would be presum ptuous.10 hl K a n t m a in ta in s th a t in tr in s ic te leo logy n a tu ra lly le a d s u s to q u e s- tions ab o u t e x tr in s ic , re la tiv e teleology. W h en w e exam ine a n o rg an ism , we try to u n d e rs ta n d h o w each p a r t o r o rg an w o rk s fo r th e sak e o f th e w hole. W hy does th is o rg a n ex ist? W h a t does i t do? W e c a n th e n ta k e th is q u estio n one step fu r th e r , a s k in g ab o u t th e o rg an ism itse lf . W hy is i t h e re? W h a t does i t do? T h is l in e o f in q u iry c a n be e x te n d e d indefin ite ly , th u s "th is con- cep t o f a n a tu r a l p u rp o se lea d s u s n e c e ssa rily to th e id ea of a ll o f n a tu r e a s a system in te rm s o f th e ru le o f p u rp o se s ."11 H e re w e exam ine a ll o f n a tu r e as i f i t w ere a sy s tem , a n d we in q u ire a s to w h a t good each of th e p a r t s m ig h t be to th e o th ers , a p a r t b e in g "c a lled e ith e r u se fu ln e s s (for h u m a n b e in g s) or benefit (for a n y o th e r c re a tu re ) ."12 K a n t m a in ta in s th a t th e reco g n itio n of n a tu ra l p u rp o se s au to m a tica lly ra is e s q u e s tio n s a b o u t how to ju d g e n a tu re as a sy s te m .13 K a n t sp en d s th e second h a l f o f 'T a r t I F w ondering w h a t w e m ig h t be ab le to conclude i f w e a ssu m e th a t n a tu r e o p era tes a s a sy s tem . B u t how v a lid is s u c h a n assu m p tio n ? O n w h a t g ro u n d s sh o u ld w e m a k e it? U ltim a te ly , K a n t's a n sw e r ab o u t e x tr in s ic teleology is close to h is conclusions a b o u t in tr in s ic teleology: i t is a u se fu l tool, a re g u la tiv e p r in c i- ple, a n d n o th in g m ore . In fact, ex trin s ic te leo logy is even m ore d isp e n sa b le th a n in tr in s ic , fo r 10 pp. 263-4 = Ak. 383. 11 p. 258 = Ak. 379. 12 p. 245 = Ak. 367. See also: p. 314 = Ak. 427. 13 See also: p. 322 = Ak. 434. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 121 extrinsic p u rposiveness o f n a tu r a l th in g s does n o t give u s a d e q u a te ju s tifica - tio n for also considering th e m to be p u rp o ses o f n a tu re so a s to ex p la in th e ir e x is ten ce , a n d for tre a t in g in th o u g h t -th e ir co n tin g en tly purposive effects a s th e b a se s [responsible] for th e ir ex istence in te rm s o f th e p rincip le o f final c a u s e s .14 In o th e r w ords, w hile w e n e e d th e concept o f p u rposive c a u s a lity in o rd e r to conceive o f th e u tte r ly c o n tin g en t a n d to th in k o f n a tu r a l p u rp o se s to begin w ith , w e n e e d n o t th in k th a t one th in g w a s c re a te d fo r th e s a k e o f an o th e r. W h ereas w e c a n n o t u n d e rs ta n d h o w a sin g le o rg an ism c o u ld b e selfo rg an iz in g w ith o u t th e concept o f teleology, fo r th e re la tio n s b e tw een o rg an - ism s, w e "fin d th a t n a tu ra l c a u se s a re fu lly a d e q u a te to m a k e [th ings] come o u t th is w ay ..."15 W e c an ex p la in th e r ise a n d fa ll o f c e r ta in o rg an ism s a n d e n v iro n m e n ts w holly w ith in m ech an ica l c au sa lity , a n d w ith o u t a p p e a lin g to a n y p u rp o se w h ich m ig h t ex is t b e tw ee n o rg a n ism s .16 T h u s, K a n t concludes defin itive ly , " th e u n iv e rsa l id e a o f n a tu re a s th e su m to ta l o f s e n se objects gives u s no b a s is w h a tev e r [for assu m in g ] t h a t th in g s o f n a tu r e se rv e one a n - o th e r a s m e a n s to pu rp o ses..."17 a n d th a t "i t goes w ith o u t s a y in g th a t th is p r in c ip le h o ld s on ly for reflective b u t n o t fo r d e te rm in a tiv e ju d g m e n t, th a t i t is re g u la tiv e a n d n o t co n stitu tiv e . I t se rv es on ly as a g u id e ..."18 G iven th a t such teleo log ical ju d g in g is only re g u la tiv e , w hy p u rsu e su ch in q u iry in to a possib le sy s tem o f n a tu re ? K a n t an sw ers : once w e h av e d iscovered th a t n a tu re is ab le to m ak e p ro d u c ts th a t can be th o u g h t o f on ly in te rm s o f th e concept o f fin a l causes, w e a re th e n e n title d to go fu r th e r ; w e m ay th e re u p o n ju d g e p ro d u c ts a s b e lo n g in g to a sy stem of 14 p. 257 = Ak. 377. 15 p. 247 = Ak. 369. 16 p. 315 = Ak. 428. 17 p. 235 = Ak. 359. See also: pp. 246-7 = Ak. 368-9. 18 p. 259 = Ak. 379. Also: "while that maxim of [teleological] judgment is useful when ap- plied to the whole of nature, it is not indispensable there, since the whole of nature is not given us as or- ganized (in the strictest sense of organized as given above)." (pp. 280-1 = Ak. 398). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122 purposes even if they... do not require us, for the ir possibility, to look for a different principle beyond the mechanism of blind efficient causes. For the idea of nature as a system of n a tu re already leads us, as concerns its basis, beyond the world of sense, so th a t the unity of the supersensible principle m ust be considered valid no t m erely for certain species o f n a tu ra l beings, bu t ju s t as m uch for the whole of na tu re as a system .19 In th is im p o r ta n t p a ssa g e , a n d a s e lsew h ere in sec tio n 67 , K a n t's p o in t seem s to b e th is : we h av e a lre a d y se e n t h a t i t is n ecessa ry to a p p e a l to th e su p e r- se n s ib le in o rd er to so lve th e a n tin o m y o f ju d g m e n t. T h is so lu tio n forces u s to th in k o f n a tu ra l p u rp o se s a s b e in g cau se d by a d iv in e a u th o r in accord w ith a concept. B u t i f a s in g le o rg a n ism is c au se d in th is w ay , a n d n a tu re is com posed o f su ch o rg an ism s, th e n w e seem e n tit le d to v iew n a tu re its e lf a s a sy s tem . A n d i f we a re e n ti t le d to v iew i t a s such , th e n w e a re e n tit le d to a s k th e q u e s tio n o f w h a t th is sy s tem is for. W hy w as i t c re a te d a t all? B ecause o f th e p e c u lia r ity o f h u m a n u n d e rs ta n d in g , i t is n e c e ssa ry to v iew th e w orld in te rm s o f pu rp o ses, a n d in so d o ing w e h a v e already s u b o rd in a te d m echan ica l to p u rp o s iv e cau sa tio n . In th is w ay , w e a re e n tit le d to w o n d e r w h a t possib le f in a l p u rp o se th e re m ig h t be in h a v in g c re a te d n a tu re . T h is , th e n , is th e q u e s tio n K a n t is co n cern ed h e re to a n sw e r. I f w e a re n o t c a re fu l in o u r re a d in g , K a n t's d isc u ss io n o f n a tu ra l, u l - t im a te , a n d fin a l p u rp o se s in sec tio n s 82 th ro u g h 84 o f th e Critique o f Judg- ment m ay seem a s im p le re s ta te m e n t o f h is p a s t a rg u m e n ts fo r th e m oral w o r th o f h u m a n s a n d th e i r goal o f th e h ig h e s t good. B u t u p o n closer ex am i- n a tio n , w e see th a t th is i s a n ew ty p e o f a rg u m e n t.20 K a n t seem s to be try in g to s a y th a t , g iven th e so lu tio n to th e a n tin o m y o f ju d g m e n t, h e c an now a rg u e fro m n a tu r a l p u rp o ses in n a tu re to th e u ltim a te a n d th e n th e f in a l p u rp o se o f n a tu re . In o th e r w ords, h e a tte m p ts to m ove from th e ex is ten ce o f o rgan ism s, w h ic h w e m u s t conceive o f a s b e in g c re a te d , to th e n e ce ss ity o f c u ltu re as 19 pp. 260-1 = Ak. 380-1. 20 Also. cf.. Kant's Lectures on Philosophical Theology. pp. 139-141. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. promoting th e f in a l pu rpose , to h u m a n s a s th e u ltim a te p u rp o se , a n d th e n to h u m a n b e in g s (as free ly w illin g a g e n ts ) a s th e f in a l p u rp o se . T h is is a v e ry d iffe ren t ty p e o f p ro o f th a n K a n t p r e s e n ts e i th e r in th e f i r s t o r seco n d Cri- tique, a n d i s d iffe ren t from th e ty p ic a l p ro o f K a n t u ses in a rg u in g fro m th e ex is tence o f freedom a n d th e m o ra l la w to h u m a n s a s a n e n d in th em se lv es . T h is a rg u m e n t is n o t p a r tic u la r ly c le a r , n o r is K a n t's u se o f th e te rm s "u ltim a te '' a n d "f in a l," a n d I h a v e fo u n d n o th in g p a r tic u la r ly h e lp fu l in th e seco n d ary l i te ra tu re . H ence, 1 w ill t r y to sp e ll o u t th is a rg u m e n t a s c lea rly as possib le , a n d I w ill a rg u e th a t , a s i t s ta n d s , su ch a p ro o f does n o t accom - p lish w h a t i t in te n d s , b u t w ith a few m in o r changes, i t m ay su cceed . S u c h a rec o n stru c tio n is ex trem ely im p o r ta n t fo r th re e reasons: th is "u p w a rd " p roo f is u n iq u e to th is Critique, i t is v i r tu a l ly ig n o re d in th e se co n d a ry l i te ra tu re , a n d i t g ives K a n t a s tro n g re a so n to p o s tu la te th e n ecessity o f m o ra l p ro g ress of th e h u m a n species. I t m a y seem s tra n g e t h a t K a n t b e g in s w ith th e e x a m in a tio n o f sp e - cific n a tu r a l p u rp o se s a n d th e n a t te m p ts to a rg u e h is w ay "u p " to a f in a l p u rp o se . P e rh a p s h e believes t h a t th i s is a n a tu r a l w ay fo r h u m a n b e in g s to th in k ab o u t th e issu e , n am e ly t h a t e n c o u n te rs w ith o rg an ism s e v e n tu a lly le a d u s to th in k a b o u t f in a l p u rp o se s , a n d fee ls h e needs to m a k e a n a rg u - m e n t w h ich w o u ld also p roceed a lo n g th e s e lin e s . A m ore l ik e ly re a s o n m ay be K a n t's a t te m p t to un ify th e th r e e Critiques in th e Critique o f Judgment, a n d h e m ay th in k t h a t th is a t te m p t w ill b e s tre n g th e n e d if, b e g in n in g m ere ly w ith th e re a lm o f n a tu re , h e cou ld m ove in to th e rea lm o f th e s u p e rse n s ib le a sp ec t o f h u m a n b e in g s (h u m a n s a s n o u m en o n ); in o th e r w ords, i t m a y b e a n a tte m p t to re a s o n from th e co n c lu sio n s o f th e f i r s t to th e co n c lu sio n s o f th e second Critique v ia th e conclusions o f th e th ird . H ence, in t ry in g to sp e ll o u t th is proof, w e sh o u ld try to accep t a s v a lid on ly th o se p re m ise s w h ic h h a v e been a rg u e d fo r in th e f irs t o r th i r d Critique, a n d see how f a r in to th e second Critique K a n t c a n get. A p ro o f o f th is ty p e cou ld only be a t te m p te d in th e Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. IIE. ji 124 th i r d Critique, th ro u g h th e in i t ia l a ssu m p tio n t h a t w e h a v e a leg itim a te r e a - son fo r v iew ing th e w o rld in a teleological m a n n e r .21 K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t q u estio n s ab o u t th e c re a tio n o f n a tu re le a d to th e q u estio n o f th e "u l t im a te " a n d "fin a l" p u rp o se s (letzter Zweck a n d Endzweck ) o f n a tu re . W h en w e e n c o u n te r a n a tu r a l p u rp o se , K a n t c la im s th a t w e w a n t to know w h e th e r i t is a n e n d in itse lf, o r w h e th e r i t is only a m ea n s to a n o th e r end . N ow K a n t's d e fin itio n of a n u ltim a te p u rp o se is r a th e r v ag u e . B ecau se K a n t w ill f in a lly p lace lim ita tio n s on th e u l t im a te pu rpose in te rm s o f a n ad d itio n a l p u rp o se , n a m e ly th e "fin a l" p u rp o se (a s w e sh a ll see below ), w e m u s t consider th e u l t im a te pu rp o se a s i ts e lf b e in g a n o th e r m ean s to a n end , a n d c an n o t s im p ly b e th e la s t step in a c h a in o f p u rp o ses: "we c a n ev en p rove a p rio ri t h a t w h a t m ig h t p e rh a p s be a n ultimate purpose for n a tu re c a n s till, in so fa r a s i t is a n a tu r a l th in g , n ev er be a final purposef22 K a n t's n e x t m ove in th is p roo f seem s to occu r in section 82, w h ere K a n t a tte m p ts to ru le o u t th e poss ib ility t h a t th e q u e s tio n o f th e u ltim a te p u rp o se cou ld be a n sw e re d b y m ere ly looking a t n a tu r e itse lf . K a n t seem s to m ak e th e follow ing a rg u m e n t: le t u s assu m e t h a t th e r e is a n objective p u rp o siv en ess in n a tu r e . Now , w hen we ex am in e n a tu re , w e find th a t h u m a n ity , w hich w e m ig h t th in k a s th e u ltim a te p u rp o se o f n a tu re , is "one o f th e m a n y a n im a l species, a n d n a tu re h a s in no w ay e x em p te d [it] from i ts d e s tru c tiv e forces a n y m o re th a n from its p ro d u c tiv e fo rces, b u t h a s su b je c ted e v e ry th in g to a n a tu r a l m ech an ism w ith o u t a p u rp o se ."23 K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t w e see n o t on ly th e ra n d o m d estru c tio n o f a ll ty p e s o f o rgan ism s, in c lu d in g h u m a n s , b u t a lso t h a t th e e n v iro n m en t w h ich h u m a n s n e ed in o rd e r to su rv ive , "th e h a b i ta t o f a ll th ese c re a tu re s , th e n a tiv e soil... an d ... th e sea ... p rov ides no in d ic a tio n o f h av in g b e en p ro d u c e d by any b u t a w holly 21 But of course, as always, only regulatively and not constitutively. 22 p. 313 = Ak. 426. While it is hard to see how this might be done a priori, it may be possible to make this point at least a posteriori. See below. 23 pp. 314-5 = Ak. 427. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ! » 125 u n in te n t io n a l m echan ism ."24 N a tu re , K a n t concludes, seem s to be in d iffe ren t to th o se p la n t a n d a n im a l o rg a n ism s w h ich h u m an b e in g s n e e d to su rv ive , d e s tru c tiv e o f m any now e x tin c t species, a n d also seem s to in d ic a te th e p o ss ib ility o f ex p la in in g th e d ev e lo p m en t o f h u m a n b e ings a n d th e ir n e c e ssa ry h a b ita t th ro u g h b lin d m ech an ism . B u t h av in g re a c h e d th is conclusion , K a n t th in k s w e h a v e com e to a n a b su rd ity . H e argues: This argum ent, however, seem s to prove more than it was intended to prove: not merely tha t m an cannot be an u ltim ate purpose of nature , and th a t by the sam e token the aggregate of organized natu ra l things on e a rth cannot be a system of purposes, bu t even th a t the na tu ra l products we earlier considered n a tu ra l purposes originate from nothing bu t the m echanism of na tu re .25 I f w e re a so n in line w ith th e o r ig in a l a ssu m p tio n , n am e ly t h a t objective e x te rn a l p u rp o siv en ess ex ists , w e re a c h th e conclusion th a t n o n a tu r a l p ro d u c t c a n be th o u g h t of a s h a v in g a p u rp o se . B u t th is is im p o ssib le to p rove, s in ce w e a lread y saw in th e a n tin o m y o f ju d g m e n t t h a t w e a re n e v e r ab le to p ro v e w h e th e r a n o rg an ism h a s b e e n cau sed b y m ec h an ica l c a u sa lity a lone . H en ce w e h ave a reductio ad absurdum, a n d w e m u s t re je c t th e o r ig in a l a ssu m p tio n . A nd th is is w h a t K a n t a rg u es fo r in th e n e x t p a ra g ra p h .26 H e a rg u es th a t w h ile w e a re "ce rta in ly p e rm itte d to s tr iv e a s h a r d a n d ev en a s boldly a s p o ss ib le to e x p la in such b e in g s m ech an ica lly ,"27 th e so lu tio n to th e an tin o m y (w h ich i ts e l f a rise s because of th e p e c u lia r n a tu r e o f o u r u n d e rs tan d in g ) d ic ta te s t h a t w e m u st th in k o f o rg an ism s a s n a tu r a l p u rp o ses. T he conclusion o f th is sec tion is to show t h a t th e q u estio n o f th e u l t im a te pu rpose of n a tu r e c a n n o t b e solved by look ing a t n a tu r e a s 24 p. 315 = Ak. 428. " p. 316 = Ak. 428. 26 p. 316 = Ak. 428. 27 p. 316 = Ak. 428. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 126 h a v in g objective e x te rn a l p u rp o siv en ess , b u t also rem in d s u s t h a t we are s till c o n s tra in e d to exam ine n a tu r e w ith a b e n t to w ard s teleology. T h is does n o t seem to be a p a r t ic u la r ly conv incing a rg u m e n t. W hy a re w e c o n s tra in e d to d ra w th e conclusion th a t th e d e s tru c tio n o f som e spe- c ies a n d o f som e h u m a n b e in g s m a k e s i t im possib le fo r h u m a n b e in g s to be th e u lt im a te p u rp o se o f n a tu re , le t a lone m a k e i t im possib le fo r u s to conceive o f a n y th in g a s be in g a n a tu r a l p u rp o se? M an y th in k e rs h a v e u s e d a s im ila r a rg u m e n t a b o u t th e d e s tru c tio n o f e a r l ie r species a n d th e f ra g il i ty o f th e nec- e s sa ry h a b i ta t of h u m a n b e in g s to a rg u e fo r p rec ise ly th e o p p o sin g conclu- sion . A nd, m ore im p o rtan tly , w hy, i f w e a ssu m e a n objective e x tr in s ic p u r - p o siv en ess , a re we fo rced to d ra w th e conclusion th a t th e o rig in o f o rgan ism s c a n be e x p la in e d th ro u g h m ec h an ica l c au sa lity ? K a n t sa y s t h a t th is is be- c au se w e c a n exp la in th e o rig in o f th e habitat of orga n ism s acco rd in g to m e- c h a n ic a l c au sa lity , th u s , "i f t h a t is so, how c a n we, a n d w h a t r ig h t do we h av e , to d e m a n d a n d a s s e r t t h a t th o se c re a tu re s [w hich n e e d th e h a b ita t to su rv ive] h a v e a d iffe ren t o rig in?"28 W hile i t m ay be t r u e t h a t w e c an n o t say for c e r ta in t h a t o rg an ism s c o u ld n o t b e e x p la in e d by p u rp o s iv e c au sa lity , th is d e fin ite ly does n o t le a d u s to th e opposite conclusion , n a m e ly t h a t su ch or- g a n ism s m u s t be e x p la in e d th ro u g h m ech an ica l c au sa lity . I f th is w ere tru e , K a n t w ou ld n o t h av e a Critique of Judgment to beg in w ith . H ow ever, w hile i t a p p e a rs t h a t su c h a s tro n g c la im c a n n o t b e m ade, i t does n o t a p p e a r th a t K a n t n e e d s to m a k e th is p o in t w ith a reductio ad absurdum . K a n t seem s in te re s te d in , a n d on ly to need , th e fo llow ing tw o p o in ts : f irs t , t h a t we c a n n o t a ssu m e objective ex trin sic te leo logy to ex ist, a n d second, t h a t w e can n o t re a c h a n y conclusions ab o u t th e u l t im a te p u rp o se of n a tu r e th ro u g h a m ere e x am in a tio n o f n a tu re , i.e., com plete ly w ith o u t re fe r- ence to som e ad d itio n a l fac ts o r p rin c ip le s . P o in t one, I th in k , is p ro v ed ade- q u a te ly e lsew h ere in th e th i r d Critique, e spec ia lly w ith th e d iscu ssio n a t th e 28 pp. 315-6 = Ak. 428. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127 b e g in n in g o f section 82 a n d in sec tio n s 63 a n d 67, d iscussed above. K a n t n e e d o n ly p ro v e th a t th e re e x is ts n o n e e d fo r h u m a n s to conceive o f n a tu r e as a c tin g in accord w ith th is c o n s titu tiv e p r in c ip le o f re la tiv e te leo logy .29 P o in t tw o is s im ila r ly p ro v ed in th e s e sec tio n s , b u t p e rh a p s is b e s t s e t o u t i n K a n t's p re s e n ta tio n o f L in n a e u s ' p osition . W h ile w e m a y th in k t h a t h u m a n s a re th e n a tu r a l c a n d id a te fo r be ing th e u l t im a te p u rp o se o f n a tu re , L in n a e u s ' p o s i- t io n is t h a t h u m a n s ex is t on ly to h e lp r e g u la te th e a n im a l k in g d o m , w h ich , in tu rn , r e g u la te s th e vegetab le k ingdom . T h is seem s a p erfec tly a ccep tab le p o sitio n , a n d th e re seem s to b e no w a y to choose b e tw een a sy s te m o f n a tu r e w h ich su p p o r ts on ly h u m a n s a n d one w h ic h su p p o r ts th e c o n tin u e d ex is ten ce o f th e v e g e ta b le k ingdom . In th is re sp e c t, K a n t seem s to b e ab le to p ro v e w h a t h e n eed s . Y et, w h ile th is line o f a rg u m e n ta t io n m a y ru le o u t a n ob jective so lu - tio n from th e m ere ex am in a tio n o f n a tu r e , i t s t i l l h a s n o t so lved th e o r ig in a l p ro b lem o f d iscovering an u ltim a te p u rp o se . N ow K a n t does h a v e a v e ry le - g itim a te a rg u m e n t to m ake in fav o r o f m a n a s th e u ltim a te p u rp o se , n a m e ly one w h ich w o u ld beg in w ith th e m o ra l la w . C o m m en ta to rs seem to ta k e th is m ore s ta n d a r d lin e o f th o u g h t a s K a n t's a rg u m e n t in th is sec tion .30 Y e t th is is n o t th e a rg u m e n t K a n t m ak e s h e re . I n th e f i r s t sen ten ce o f sec tio n 83, K a n t c la im s t h a t h e h a s "show n in th e preceding sec tion th a t [ce rta in ] p r in - cip les o f re a so n give u s su ffic ien t g ro u n d s fo r ju d g in g m a n - th o u g h re flec - tive ly r a th e r th a n d e te rm in a tiv e ly -... to b e th e ultimate p u rp o se o f n a tu r e h e re on e a r th ."31 H ow does h e th in k h e h a s o b ta in e d th is conclusion? I f th e re is su ch an a rg u m e n t in se c tio n 82, p e rh a p s i t is th is : i t is only h u m a n b e in g s w ho can th in k o r m a k e n a tu r e in to a system in th e f i r s t p lace, a n d th u s h u m a n beings m u s t b e th e u l t im a te p u rp o se o f n a tu r e 29 Of course, the need does exist for it as a regulative principle. 30 This includes Pluhar. See his "Translator's Introduction" to the Critique o f Judgment: p. lxxxiv. 31 p. 317 = Ak. 429. First italics added for emphasis. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 128 b e c a u se th e re w ould be no n a tu r e as a sy s tem w ith o u t th e m . K a n t s ta te s t h a t "m a n " is th e u lt im a te p u rp o se "because h e is th e on ly be in g on e a r th w ho c a n form a concept o f p u rp o se s a n d u se h is re a so n to tu r n a n a g g re g a te o f p u rp o s iv e ly s tru c tu re d th in g s in to a sy s tem o f p u rp o se s ."32 L a te r h e m a k e s a s im ila r s ta te m e n t, q u o te d above, th a t i f h um an b e in g s a re n o t th e u l tim a te p u rp o se o f n a tu re , th e n "by th e sam e to k en th e a g g re g a te of o rg an ized n a tu r a l th in g s on e a r th c a n n o t b e a system o f p u rp o se s ."33 A nd in th is f i r s t se n te n c e o f section 83, K a n t d e fin es h u m a n b e in g s a s th e u ltim a te p u rp o se as, "th e p u rpose by re fe ren c e to w hich a ll o th e r n a tu r a l th in g s c o n s titu te a sy s te m o f pu rp o ses."34 T h is a rg u m en t, ho w ev er, s till seem s u n co n v in c in g a s i t s ta n d s . H ow is i t t h a t h u m a n be ings c a n tu r n n a tu re from a n a g g re g a te in to a system ? Is i t th ro u g h cognition? B u t w h y sh o u ld n a tu re h a v e to b e cognized (by h u m a n b e in g s) a s h a v in g a p u rp o se in o rd e r for th e re to be a p u rp o se? M an y o rg a n s o f o rg a n ism s a re ju d g ed b y u s to ex is t fo r th e sa k e o f th e w hole o rgan ism , b u t c e r ta in ly n e ith e r a re th e y cogn ized by th a t o rg an ism , n o r do th ey fu n c tio n ju s t b ecau se h u m a n b e in g s c a n cognize th em . I t seem s p o ss ib le for n a tu r e to be a sy s te m w ith o u t a n y o n e b e in g able to cognize i t , e sp ec ia lly g iven K a n t's a rg u m e n ts th a t th e u l t im a te p u rp o se c an n o t s im p ly b e d e te rm in e d from ex - a m in in g n a tu re . M aybe H e id eg g e r is ab le to m ak e a p o in t lik e th is , b u t n o t K a n t. A nd, indeed , K a n t h im s e lf re jects th is p o ss ib ility in section 86: "i t is n o t b y reference to m a n 's cogn itive pow er ( th eo re tica l rea so n ) th a t th e ex is- te n c e o f e v ery th in g e lse in th e w o rld f ir s t ge ts i ts v a lu e , i.e ., i t is n o t [because] (say) th e re is so m eo n e to contemplate th e w o rld ."35 32 p. 314 = Ak. 426-7. More on this below. 33 p. 316 = Ak.429. 34 p. 317 = Ak. 429. 35 p. 331 = Ak. 442. Kant's claim in section 82 that "man" is the ultimate purpose because of the "diverse uses to which his understanding teaches him to put all those creatures" may also be telling, p. 314 = Ak. 426. Italics added for emphasis. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 129 P e rh a p s K a n t is in d ic a tin g th a t th e u ltim a te p u rp o se is a q uestion of w hich species in a sy s te m is th e m ost im p o rta n t, th e l a s t "fo r th e sa k e of w hich ." In itia lly , K a n t m a in ta in s th a t m a n is th e u l t im a te p u rp o se . B ut, f irs t, w hy sh o u ld th is sp ec ie s be h u m a n beings?36 In d eed , K a n t recognizes in section 82 th a t a c o u n te r a rg u m e n t is possib le , n a m e ly L in n a e u s ' position th a t th e vegetab le k in g d o m is th e u ltim a te p u rp o se o f n a tu r e . Second, w hy sh o u ld th is p u rp o se be a s s u m e d to be a sin g le species a t a ll? I f w e m ak e th e analogy be tw een a n o rg a n ism a n d n a tu re a s a w hole, w h y sh o u ld w e t h in k th a t n a tu re ex is ts fo r th e s a k e of one p a r t ic u la r species? W hy sh o u ld n a tu re n o t ex is t for n a tu re itse lf , in th e sam e w ay t h a t one p a r t o f a n o rg an ism ex- is ts n o t sim ply fo r a n o th e r p a r t ic u la r p a r t , b u t ex is ts fo r th e sa k e o f th e w hole? W hy n o t n a tu r e a s a se lf-o rgan iz ing w hole itse lf? F ro m w h a t we can te ll in section 82, i t does n o t seem th a t K a n t c a n conclude t h a t h u m a n s a re th e u ltim a te p u rp o se o f n a tu r e . H ence, w hile w e now h a v e a c lue t h a t th e u ltim a te p u rp o se o f n a tu r e h a s so m eth in g to do w ith th e a b ility to o rgan ize o th e r pu rposes in to a sy s tem , w e do n o t y e t h a v e a n a rg u m e n t. B u t p e rh a p s h e does n o t h a v e to m ak e th e a rg u m e n t in th is w ay. A t th is stage, K a n t is try in g to m a k e th e p o in t th a t h u m a n s a re th e u ltim a te p u rp o se of n a tu re . S u c h a s tro n g position does n o t seem n e ce ssa ry , how ever. A s w ill m ake m ore se n se below , th e p o in t t h a t K a n t seem s to n e e d to m ak e in th is s tep of th e p ro o f is so m e th in g like: m an is th e on ly p o ss ib le candidate fo r a n u ltim a te p u rp o se o f n a tu re . Now, cou ld K a n t m a k e th is p o in t? T his a p p e a rs to be possib le a lo n g th e follow ing lin e s . F irs t , K a n t h a s a rg u e d th a t, "w e can even p rove a p r io r i t h a t w h a t m ig h t p e rh a p s be a n ultimate purpose fo r n a tu re can s till, in so fa r a s i t is a n a tu ra l th in g , n e v e r b e a final pur- pose."37 W hile th is seem s u n lik e ly a s a n a priori proof, th i s r a th e r s tro n g p o in t h a s a lre ad y b een m a d e w ith K a n t's d iscussion o f e x tr in s ic teleology a n d 36 Recall that, in accord with this "upward" proof, we are not allowed to cite the noumenal na- ture of persons as a premise of the proof. 37 p. 313 = Ak. 426. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 130 h is de fin itio n o f a f in a l pu rpose . W hen o b se rv in g an y o rgan ism (or species), K a n t c la im s th a t th e re ex is t tw o options: We can say th a t the purpose of the existence of such a n a tu ra l being is in th a t th ing itself, i.e., the thing is not m erely a purpose bu t also a final purpose. Or we can say th a t the final purpose is outside the thing and in other n a tu ra l be- ings, i.e., th a t although the thing exists purposively it is not a final purpose: rather, it is necessarily a m eans as well.38 So, i f K a n t is co rrec t to a rg u e th a t w e c an a lw ay s conceive o f an y o rg a n ism o r species o f n a tu r e a s e x is tin g for th e sa k e o f a n o th e r , a n d i f w e accep t h is d e fin itio n o f a f in a l p u rp o se , i t seem s to follow t h a t n o th in g w e cou ld f in d which exists entirely in nature cou ld b e s a id to e x is t a s a f in a l p u rp o se . Second, g iven th is , K a n t seem s ju s t if ie d in h is s ta te m e n t t h a t "w e can ... p rove... t h a t w h a t m ig h t p e rh a p s be a n ultimate purpose for n a tu r e c an s till, insofar as it is a natural thing, n e v e r be a final purpose."39 W h en w e d iscover so m e th in g in n a tu re , w e a lw ays a p p e a r to be in a p osition to con - ceive o f i t a s a m e a n s to som e o th e r end . H ence , "in so fa r a s i t is a n a tu r a l th in g '' w e c a n n e v e r s a y decisively t h a t i t i s a n e n d in itse lf. A r e s ta te m e n t o f th is is: "th e f in a l p u rp o se is uncond itioned , an d ... n a tu re w ould th e re fo re be in ca p ab le o f ach iev in g i t a n d p roducing i t in accordance w ith th e id e a o f th is p u rp o se . F o r n o th in g in n a tu re (considered a s a b e in g o f sense) h a s , w ith in n a tu re itse lf, a b a s is d e te rm in in g i t t h a t is n o t a lw ay s cond itioned in tu r n ."40 L e t u s ca ll th is th e "p rin c ip le o f n a tu re 's ex c lu sio n ."41 T h ird , th is le a d s to th e conclusion t h a t i f n a tu re is to h a v e a n u ltim a te pu rp o se , th is p u rp o se cou ld o n ly b e fo u n d in reference to a f in a l p u rp o se . I f a f in a l p u rp o se of n a tu re c a n n o t be fo u n d s im p ly b y look ing a t " p. 313 = Ak. 426. 39 p. 313 = Ak. 426. Italics added for emphasis. 40 p. 322 = Ak. 435. 41 "The final purpose, [that is, an unconditioned purpose] however, we must not seek within nature at all," p. 318 = Ak. 431. See also: p. 329 = Ak. 440-1. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 131 n a tu re , th e n i f th e re is to b e a n u ltim a te p u rp o se , i t m u s t be d isco v ered on ly in re fe ren ce to so m eth in g "o u ts id e " o f n a tu re . T h is m ay n a tu ra l ly le a d u s to th e q u e s tio n o f w h e th e r th e re e x is ts so m e th in g w h ich is not e n tire ly a n a tu r a l th in g w hich m ig h t th e n b e a f in a l p u rp o se . O f course, fo u r th , K a n t h a s a lre a d y a rg u e d in th e f i r s t Critique t h a t a h u m a n b e in g is th is ty p e o f th in g , n a m e ly a c re a tu re w h ic h is p a r t n a tu re a n d p a r t noum enon ; th e so lu tio n to th e th ird a n tin o m y a llow s th a t h u m a n s cou ld be e n tire ly su b je c t to m e c h a n is tic cau sa lity , y e t s t i l l r e ta in th e p o ss ib ility o f g e n e ra tin g a p u re ly sp o n ta n e o u s a n d u n c o n d itio n e d seq u en ce of e v e n ts . H ence, K a n t se em s to be a b le to d ra w th e conclusion t h a t i f th e re is to b e a n u ltim a te p u rp o se o f n a tu re , th e n h u m a n s a re a t le a s t a c a n d id a te fo r b e in g th a t p u rp o se . T h is conclusion a llow s u s to a n sw e r tw o p ro b lem s p osed above. T h e f i r s t is th e p rob lem o f th e c lu e t h a t th e u ltim a te p u rp o se of n a tu r e h a s som e- th in g to do w ith th e a b ility to o rg an iz e o th e r p u rp o se s in to a sy s te m . W e c a n n o t see w h y an y p a r t o f n a tu r e sh o u ld be a n e n d in itse lf. T h u s w e c a n n o t see w h y n a tu r e sh o u ld be a sy s te m w ith o u t re fe ren c e to so m e th in g e lse . B u t i f w e cou ld d iscover a f in a l p u rp o se , then n a tu re cou ld b e fo rm ed in to a sy s- tem . A n d i f t h a t f in a l p u rp o se h a s so m e th in g to do w ith h u m a n b e in g s , th e n i t is h u m a n be ings w hich fo rm n a tu r e from a co llection o f m ere a g g re g a te s in to a sy s tem . T h u s K a n t w rite s (w ith a n eye to th e f in a l pu rpose): if we regard nature as a teleological system, th en it is m an's vocation to be the u ltim ate purpose of na tu re , b u t always subject to a condition: he m ust have the understanding and the will to give both n a tu re and him self reference to a purpose th a t can be independent of nature, self-sufficient, and a final p u r- pose.42 K a n t th in k s th a t we now h a v e th e le g itim a te conclu sion th a t h u m a n s a re th e u l t im a te p u rp o se o f n a tu re , as long as a t som e p o in t l a te r in th e proof, w e can d ed u ce th e f in a l p u rp o se to w h ich w e can re fe r th e u ltim a te p u rp o se . 42 p. 318 = Ak. 431. Italics added for emphasis. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. T h e second problem from above is th e defin ition o f a n u ltim a te p u r - pose. W hile K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t th e f in a l p u rp o se c an n o t b e fo u n d in n a - tu re , i t se em s t h a t th e u ltim a te p u rp o se m u s t be. I f th e f in a l p u rp o se is o u t- side o f n a tu r e , b u t we a re in te re s te d to know w h y n a tu re w as c re a te d , th e n th e u l t im a te p u rp o se of n a tu re w o u ld b e th e la s t th in g in n a tu r e w h ich p ro - m otes th e f in a l pu rpose . A w o rk in g d e fin itio n o f u ltim a te p u rp o se m ig h t be: th e la s t "fo r th e s a k e o f w h ich" o r m e a n s to th e e n d o f th e f in a l p u rp o se w hich is a p a r t o f n a tu r e . We w ill h a v e o p p o rtu n ity below to confirm th is d e fin i- tion . B u t w h ile K a n t m ay h a v e re a so n to be lieve th a t h u m a n s a re a c an d i- d a te for th e u l t im a te pu rp o se o f n a tu re , a re h u m a n s th e only c an d id a te? T he concern se em s to re m a in th a t w h ile w e cou ld n o t n ecessa rily p o in t to a c e r- ta in species o f p u re n a tu re a s a c a n d id a te fo r th e u ltim a te p u rp o se , w h a t ab o u t th e p o ss ib ility of n a tu re i ts e l f a s th is p u rpose? T h is seem s to d e p en d on w h e th e r w e co u ld fin d a f in a l p u rp o se in re fe ren ce to w h ich n a tu r e a s a w hole w o u ld b e th e n ecessa ry u ltim a te p u rp o se . B u t th e n w e w ou ld h a v e to re fe r to so m e th in g like "th e p le a su re w h ich G od ta k e s in h is /h e r c re a tio n ," or "n a tu re a s a m a n ife s ta tio n of th e A bso lu te in th e w orld." H ow ever, i t is d iffi- c u lt to see w h y w e w ould n e e d to be lieve in a f in a l p u rp o se su ch a s th is . I f w e could a rg u e co h eren tly a n d decisively for a f in a l pu rp o se lik e th is , th e n K a n t m ig h t h a v e to concede th e u lt im a te p u rp o se of n a tu re , b u t su c h a n a r - g u m en t w o u ld h a v e to be m ade. In sec tio n 83, w ith h u m a n s a s th e se lec ted c a n d id a te fo r th e u ltim a te pu rpose , p e n d in g th e deduction o f th e f in a l pu rp o se , K a n t a sk s th e follow ing question : "w h a t is i t , w ith in m a n h im se lf, t h a t is a p u rp o se a n d t h a t h e is to fu r th e r th ro u g h h is connection w ith n a tu re ? "43 H e re i t m ig h t seem as i f K a n t is look ing fo r th e u ltim a te p u rp o se a g a in . B u t, d esp ite K a n t's r a th e r sloppy w ord ing in th e s e sections, I th in k h e h a s a lre ad y decided on h u m a n b e in g s to 43 p. 317 = Ak. 429. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. fu lfill th is ro le, since in th e sen ten ce p re c e d in g th is question h e n a m e s h u - m a n s a s th e u ltim a te purpose. N or does i t seem from the w ay th a t h e a n - sw ers th is q u estio n th a t h e cou ld be a s k in g h e re on ly a fte r th e f in a l p u r - pose .44 I t seem s as i f he is a sk in g a f te r th e f in a l pu rp o se by way o f som e "p e n u lt im a te "45 pu rpose o f n a tu re . H en ce , th is q u estio n m u s t be p o s in g so m e th in g like : "W h at is th e f in a l p u rp o se o f h u m a n beings, a s th e u ltim a te p u rp o se , which is to be assisted by som e a sp e c t o f n a tu re a s a sy s tem ?" A gain , K a n t's w ord ing is con fusing a t b e s t, b u t l e t u s accept m y w o rd in g o f th e q u e s tio n fo r now. K an t is n o t sa tis f ie d w ith "m a n " h im se lf b e in g th e f in a l p u rp o se , b u t on ly som eth ing w ith in h u m a n b e in g s . T his is lik e ly to be d u e to th e fac t t h a t p a r t o f th e h u m a n c o n s titu tio n is m a d e up of n a tu re , a n d p a r t is n o t, a n d h e is concerned to exclude th e n a tu r a l p a r t from th e f in a l p u rp o se . T h e la rg e r q u estio n to keep in m ind , th e n , is ho w c a n K a n t m ove from h u - m a n ity 46 a s a possib le c an d id a te for th e u l t im a te p u rpose to th e d ed u c tio n of th is f in a l p u rpose? T h e qu estio n K a n t seem s to w a n t to a sk , th e n , m igh t be r e s ta te d as, "H ow does n a tu re become a sy stem in o rd e r to p rom o te som e asp ec t ( th e "p e n u lt im a te " purpose) in h u m a n b e in g s ( th e u lt im a te purpose) w h ich , in tu rn , a s s is ts som e aspect (fo rthcom ing a n sw e r: freedom ) w h ich is th e f in a l p u rp o se?" T h u s , th is is n o t a q u estio n a b o u t th e "u ltim a te " p u rpose , b u t r a th e r w h a t w e m ig h t call e ith e r s im p ly th e "p u rp o se of n a tu re " or, th e te rm I w ill u se , th e "p e n u ltim a te " p u rp o se o f n a tu re . I t is a question o f w h a t p u rp o se n a tu r e p u rsu e s in o rd e r to fa c il i ta te th e f in a l p u rpose o f th e u lt im a te p u rp o se . To a n sw e r th is question , K a n t o u tlin e s tw o possib ilities re g a rd in g th is p e n u lt im a te purpose: e ith e r i t "c a n b e fu lfilled by n a tu re i ts e lf in i ts 44 Kant's answer to his question is "culture." Hence, because this is a part of nature, it Mis un- der the "principle of nature's exclusion," and simply cannot be a final purpose. Nor, despite his calling it "nature's ultimate purpose" can it be the "ultimate purpose" since he has already concluded this is human beings. 45 See the following paragraph. 46 Kant, of course, does not use the term "humanity." but "man." .1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 134 beneficence, or e lse [m ust] be m a n 's a p ti tu d e a n d sk ill for [pursu ing] v a rio u s p u rp o ses fo r w h ich h e c an u se n a tu re ."47 In o th e r w ords, i t m u s t e ith e r be so m e th in g w h ich n a tu r e can accom plish e n tire ly b y itse lf, or so m e th in g w h ich n a tu re c a n p ro m o te . T h is m ay seem lik e a fa lse a lte rn a tiv e . P e rh a p s w h a t K a n t i s in d ic a tin g is th a t i f n a tu re is to b e th o u g h t o f a s a system , n a tu re m u s t e i th e r b e ab le to ach ieve th e p e n u lt im a te "fo r th e sa k e o f w h ich " by i ts e lf18 o r n a tu r e m u s t a t le a s t be a n e c e ssa ry lin k in th is c h a in to a p u rp o se w h ich w o u ld b e ach ieved in som e o th e r w ay. In th e f i r s t o f th e se tw o a lte rn a tiv e s , K a n t d e s ig n a te s th e p u rp o se a s h a p p in e ss , a n d in th e la t te r , a s cu ltu re . K a n t, o f co u rse , re jec ts h a p p in e ss a s th e p e n u ltim a te p u rp o se o f n a - tu re , ju s t a s in th e second Critique a n d in th e "Id e a fo r a U n iv e rsa l H is to ry w ith a C osm opo litan In te n t ." H ere , K a n t a rg u e s t h a t h a p p in e ss is only a n idea , a n d "since [a h u m a n 's] u n d e rs ta n d in g is t ie d to im ag in a tio n a n d th e senses, h e fo rm u la te s th e id ea so d iversely ..., ev en i f [natu re] w ere su b jec ted com plete ly to m a n 's choice, s ti ll [m an] cou ld n o t p ossib ly adop t a d e fin ite a n d fixed u n iv e rs a l la w t h a t w ou ld [keep] i t i n h a rm o n y w ith th a t w av erin g con- cep t..."49 K a n t a g a in m a k e s th e p o in t t h a t h u m a n s a re sim ply n o t desig n ed to receive la s tin g h a p p in e s s from n a tu re , fo r n o t on ly a re th e ir conceptions o f h a p p in e ss c o n s ta n tly ch an g in g , n o t only does n a tu r e o ften tu r n h o stile on h u m a n s , b u t h u m a n s a re also c o n s ta n tly f ig h tin g w ith one an o th e r. N ow b e - cau se K a n t c la im s t h a t h a p p in e ss is n e v e r v e ry fo rthcom ing to h u m a n b e - ings, and , fu r th e r , b e ca u se h u m a n s w ou ld n e v e r be ab le to leg is la te a sy s tem w hich w ould le a d to su c h h a p p in e ss (due to th e fa c t th a t h u m a n s c an n e v e r conceive o f a p o ss ib le s ta te of h a p p in e ss ), th e p e n u lt im a te pu rp o se of n a tu re c a n n o t be to m ak e h u m a n s hap p y ; i t w ou ld s im p ly n e v e r be successful. 47 p. 317 = Ak. 430. 48 It cannot be the ultimate "for the sake of which" for this would be the last purpose in the chain, and we have already seen that this purpose must be outside of nature. 49 p. 317 = Ak. 430. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. T h is a lso le a d s to th e conclusion th a t th e f in a l p u rp o se can n o t be e i- th e r th e h a p p in e s s o f h u m a n s o r th e w illin g o f h u m a n s to be h a p p y u n d e r a n y c irc u m s ta n c e s (i.e., ig n o rin g m o ra l c o n sid e ra tio n s). O f course, th is is n o t to sa y t h a t h u m a n s c a n n o t w ill to be h ap p y , s in c e w e k n o w th a t th e h ig h e s t good c a lls fo r h a p p in e s s in p ropo rtion to m o ra lity , b u t on ly to say t h a t h u - m a n s c a n n o t w ill fo r h a p p in e ss w ith o u t cond itions; h a p p in e s s "is th e m a tte r o f a ll h is p u rp o se s on e a r th , a n d i f h e m a k e s i t h i s w ho le p u rp o se i t m ak e s h im u n a b le to s e t a f in a l p u rp o se for h is ow n e x is te n ce a n d to h arm o n ize w ith th is f in a l p u rp o se ."50 T his c a n n o t b e th e f in a l p u rp o se because i t c an n o t be c o h e re n tly w illed ,51 s ince K a n t be lieves t h a t i t s im p ly is n o t achievable, n o t ev en in p rin c ip le . A p p a re n tly , th e re is a n a d d itio n a l re a so n to re je c t th e w illing o f h a p p in e s s a s th e f in a l pu rpose . H a v in g a lre a d y re je c te d h a p p in e ss , K a n t w rite s t h a t "w e m u s t f in d ou t w h a t n a tu re c a n accom plish in o rder to p re p a re m a n fo r w h a t h e h im s e lf m u s t do in o rd e r to be a f in a l p u rp o se , a n d [then] s e p a ra te t h a t fro m a ll th o se p u rp o ses w hose a c h ie v a b ility r e s ts on cond itions t h a t w e c a n ex p ec t n a tu r e to fu lfill a lone ."52 K a n t seem s to be w ritin g th is w ith th e "p r in c ip le o f n a tu r e 's exclusion" in m in d . I f th o se th in g s w hich a re c o n s titu te d b y n a tu r e a lo n e c an n o t be a f in a l p u rp o se , a n d i f h a p p in e ss could be a ch iev e d b y n a tu r e a lone ,53 th e n w e m u s t e lim in a te th is a s a f in a l p u rp o se to b eg in w ith . I f h u m a n s a re ju s t a n o th e r p a r t o f n a tu re , th e n th ey cou ld n o t be a f in a l p u rp o se o f n a tu re . K a n t w a n ts to ta k e m a n o u t o f th e ch a in of p u rp o ses . W ith th is a im in m ind , K a n t c la im s th a t w e a re le f t w ith c u ltu re as th e on ly p o ss ib ility fo r th e p e n u ltim a te p u rp o se o f n a tu re . I f n a tu re is a 50 p. 319 = Ak. 431. 51 This may give us another clue to the reason why Kant thinks the highest good must be pos- sible to be achieved, and why God and immortality are necessary postulates of practical reason. 52 pp. 318-9 = Ak. 431. 53 In theory, for we have already seen Kant's argument that this is not. in fact possible. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 136 system , i f so m e th in g in h u m a n s ( th em se lv es b e in g th e u ltim a te p u rp o se ) is to be th e f in a l p u rp o se , a n d i f n a tu re c a n n o t p rov ide h a p p in e ss , th e n th e on ly p o ss ib ility le f t fo r th e p e n u ltim a te p u rp o se o f n a tu r e is som eth ing w h ich n a tu re cou ld p ro m o te fo r h u m a n s . N ow K a n t h a s e lim in a te d th e p o ss ib ility th a t th e f in a l p u rp o se is th e w illin g o f h u m a n h a p p in e ss , w ith h a p p in e ss defined a s "s u m to ta l o f a ll th o se o f h is p u rp o se s th a t can [be achieved] th ro u g h n a tu r e o u ts id e a n d w ith in h im ."54 K a n t th u s a rg u e s th a t culture is th e p e n u lt im a te p u rp o se of n a tu re . T h is is b ecau se i t is th e u n d e rs ta n d in g a n d th e a b ility to s e t one's ow n goals w h ic h s e ts h u m a n s a p a r t from th e r e s t o f n a tu re , t h a t is , th e a b ility to w ill f ree ly .55 H u m a n s , a s spe lled o u t c lea rly in th e th ir d a n tin o m y o f th e Critique o f Pure Reason, a re n o t n ecessa rily com plete ly su b je c t to m ech an ica l c a u sa lity , b u t h a v e th e freedom to s e t th e ir ow n p u rp o se s . A ga in , K a n t seem s co n ce rn e d to ta k e h u m a n s ou t o f th e ohain o f p u rp o ses . T h u s , h u m a n s a re th e u l t im a te p u rp o se on th e condition t h a t "h e m u s t h a v e th e u n d e rs ta n d in g a n d th e w ill to give b o th n a tu re a n d h im se lf re fe ren c e to a p u rp o se t h a t c an b e in d e p e n d e n t o f n a tu re , selfsu ffic ien t, a n d a f in a l p u rp o se ."56 W h a t K a n t concludes is th a t th e p e n u ltim a te p u rp o se o f n a tu re is n o t to m a k e h u m a n s happy , b u t to m a k e th e m ab le to p ro d u ce a n d p u rsu e th e ir ow n p u rp o ses; c u ltu re is a form al and subjective condition, namely, m an's aptitude in general for setting him self purposes, and for using na tu re (independently of [the elem ent 54 p. 319 = Ak. 431. 55 This is a rather strange move again. We might have expected something along these lines: if Kant has eliminated the things which humans can will with the intent that nature fulfill them, then we are still left with those things which humans can will freely, i.e., in complete unconcern for the outcome. Do humans have this ability to will without concern for the compliance of nature? Certainly they do; they can will to will in accord with the categorical imperative. While this seems to be a strong move here, it also seems to take more for granted that Kant apparently desires, namely several of the conclusions of the Cri- tique o f Practical Reason. Kant makes a different move, and this supports the original premise here that Kant is attempting to reach many conclusions of the second Critique through the first and third. 56 p. 318 = Ak. 431. Indeed, as we learn in the Religion, a person who subjugates the moral law to the principle of happiness voluntarily chooses to abdicate his/her freedom, and act as if they were merely an animal, merely subject to natural laws. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 137 of] nature in m an's determ ination of purposes) as a m eans [for achieving them] in conformity w ith the m axim s of his free purposes generally.57 T h is accords w ell w ith K a n t's s ta te m e n ts in sec tio n 82 b o th th a t th e f in a l p u rp o se canno t be fo u n d in n a tu re , a n d th a t th e u ltim a te pu rpose c a n n o t be g iven w ith o u t re fe rence to th e f in a l purpose .58 N a tu re , i t seem s, h a s tw o p a r ts w hich m a k e u p th e p e n u ltim a te p u r - pose. T he f ir s t is th e c u ltu re o f sk ill. T his is "a n a p titu d e to p rom o te p u r - poses generally ."59 T h is seem s to be n o t so m u ch th e ab ility to ach ieve p u r - p oses once th ey h a v e b een se t, b u t r a th e r w h a t m ig h t be ca lled th e "m otiva tion" to s e t p u rp o se s to b eg in w ith . T h is is b e s t accom plished by n a - tu r e th ro u g h th e un so c iab le so c iab ility of h u m a n s w h ich lea d to a n in te rn a l a n d e x te rn a l c o n s titu tio n .60 U n d e r th e co n stan t co nd ition of an tag o n ism , q u ite v io len t a t f i r s t b u t re se m b lin g som eth ing l ik e fr ien d ly com petition in th e la s t stages, h u m a n s a re m o tiv a te d to se t th em se lv e s pu rposes; h u m a n s a re n o t designed fo r h a p p in e ss , b u t r a th e r for th e developm en t o f u n d e r- s ta n d in g . T he second e le m e n t o f th e p e n u ltim a te p u rp o se is th e c u ltu re o f d isc ip line . T h is is th e a s s is t in g o f "th e will in th e d e te rm in a tio n a n d se lec- tio n o f i ts p u rposes,"61 in o th e r w ords, "th e p u rp o se o f m ak in g room for th e developm ent o f o u r h u m a n ity , n am ely , by m a k in g ev er m ore h e ad w a y a g a in s t the c ru d en ess a n d v ehem ence of those in c lin a tio n s th a t be long to u s p r im a rily as a n im a ls a n d th a t in te r fe re m ost w ith o u r ed u ca tio n for o u r 57 p. 319 = Ak. 431. Also: "Hence the only [thing] which can give man's existence an absolute value, and by reference to which the existence of the world can have a final purpose, is... the value that he can only give himself, and that consists in what he does, how and on what principles he acts, not as a link in nature, but in the freedom of his power of desire..." (p. 332 = Ak. 443). 58 Also: "But suppose even there were rational beings [in the world], but that their reason were able only to posit the value of the existence of things in nature's relation to these beings (their well-being), but not able to procure that value originally on its own (in its freedom): then there would indeed be pur- poses in the world (relative ones), but no final (i.e., absolute) purpose..." (p. 339 = Ak. 449). 59 p. 319 = Ak. 431-2. 60 p. 320 = Ak. 432-3. See also: "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent." 61 p. 319 = Ak. 432. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 138 h ig h e r vocation ..."62 W h a t seem s to be th e p a r t ic u la r ly im p o r ta n t ro le of th e c u ltu re o f d isc ip line is once ag a in p u llin g h u m a n s o u t o f th e c h a in o f n a tu re , m a k in g "g re a t h e a d w a y a g a in s t th e ty ra n n y of m a n 's p ro p e n s ity to th e se n se s , a n d so p re p a r[ in g ] h im for a sovere ign ty in w h ich re a so n a lone is to d o m in a te ,"63 i.e., a s s is t in g th e ir ab ility to w ill free ly .64 T h ese a re th e two p a r t s o f n a tu re w h ich p ro m o te h u m a n s' ab ility b o th to c re a te a n d to p u rsu e p u rp o se s in g en era l.68 I f K a n t h a s a rg u e d leg itim ate ly up to th is p o in t, th e n K a n t m ay be ab le to m ak e th e l a s t s te p to w ard th e deduction o f th e f in a l p u rp o se . K a n t h a s a rg u e d th a t n a tu r e p rom o tes h u m a n s' "a p ti tu d e in g e n e ra l" fo r se ttin g a n d ach iev in g p u rp o se s . B u t K a n t h a s also a rg u e d t h a t i f su ch p u rp o ses a re only th e p u rs u i t of h a p p in e s s , h u m a n s w ill fa il in th i s p u rs u i t . So i f th ese a re th e on ly p u rp o se s o f h u m a n s , n a tu re cou ld n o t b e th o u g h t o f a s a system , a n d th e re could be n o f in a l purpose. B u t K a n t h a s a lre a d y a rg u e d in th e so- lu tio n to th e a n tin o m y o f th e th ird Critique t h a t w e m u s t th in k o f n a tu re as a sy s te m o f p u rposes. H ence , because h u m a n s c a n n o t ach iev e h a p p in e ss , a n d b e ca u se n a tu re does p ro m o te th e ab ility of h u m a n s to fo rm u la te p u rposes no t n e c e ss ita te d by n a tu re , th e f in a l pu rpose m u s t b e th e fo rm u la tio n o f freely w illed pu rp o ses. T h is le a d s K a n t to conclude, f in a lly , t h a t if things in the world, which are dependent beings w ith regard to their exis- tence, require a suprem e cause th a t acts in term s of purposes, then m an is the final purpose of creation. For without m an the chain of m utually subordinated purposes would not have a complete basis. Only in m an, and even in him only as a moral subject [i.e., as a freely willing creatmre], do we find unconditioned 62 p. 321 = Ak. 433. 63 p. 321 = Ak. 434. 64 See also: pp. 231-2 = Ak. 356-7. 65 We may well wonder why such a specific conclusion is necessary, i.e., why Kant does not simply conclude that the purpose of nature is to create and support human existence. The answer seems to be that mere human existence is always subject to the possibility of being simply a means; there always remains the question of why humans had to exist in the first place. And while human existence is a nec- essary prerequisite for human free willing, it is not the final prerequisite. See especially: p. 372 = Ak. 477. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 139 legislation regarding purposes. It is this legislation, therefore, which alone en- ables m an to be a final purpose to which all of n a tu re is teleologically subordi- nated .66 K a n t se em s to h av e su ccessfu lly p roved th a t free w illin g is th e f in a l p u rp o se o f a ll o f c rea tio n , t h a t h u m a n s a re th e u ltim a te p u rp o se o f n a tu re , a n d th a t th e p e n u lt im a te p u rp o se o f n a tu re is th e d ev e lo p m en t o f c u ltu re . W hile w e m a y th in k i t r a th e r m ore th a n fo r tu ito u s t h a t K a n t's a rg u - m e n t fro m n a tu r a l p u rp o se s le a d s h im to th e conclusion t h a t free (m oral) w illin g is th e f in a l p u rp o se , i t does n o t seem c irc u la r . C e r ta in ly K a n t h a s h u m a n b e in g s a lre a d y in m in d a s th e u ltim a te p u rp o se o f n a tu r e a n d th e ir a b ili ty fo r free w illing a s th e f in a l pu rpose , b u t i t is n o t uncom m on to h av e th e conclu sion in m in d befo re b eg in n in g th e p roof. Y e t w h a t is p e rh a p s of m o re specific concern is th e v e ry connection b e tw ee n th e u lt im a te a n d fin a l p u rp o se s ; even th o u g h K a n t is w o rk in g "u p w a rd " in h is p ro o f o f a f in a l p u r - pose , h e m a in ta in s t h a t w e c a n n o t decide on a n u lt im a te p u rp o se u n le ss i t c a n b e fo u n d in re fe ren ce to a n f in a l pu rp o se . B u t th is too seem s acceptab le . S in c e w e h a v e a lre ad y a s su m e d t h a t th e re is a f in a l p u rp o se to be found , due to th e so lu tio n o f th e a n tin o m y , K a n t m ay s im p ly sa y t h a t w h a te v e r th e u l- t im a te p u rp o se is, i t w o u ld s im p ly n o t be a n u l t im a t e p u rp o se i f i t d id n o t le a d to or a t le a s t p rov ide p a r t o f th e fo u n d a tio n fo r th e f in a l p u rp o se ; th is is s im p ly w h a t i t means to b e a n u lt im a te p u rp o se . A n d K a n t seem s r ig h t to su s p e c t t h a t h u m a n s a re a good c a n d id a te fo r th is p u rp o se , b ecau se o f th e ir su p e rse n s ib le n a tu re , a lre a d y g iven in th e f i r s t Critique. I f so m e th in g a p - p e a r s a m iss in th e proof, th is connection does n o t seem to be it. In add ition , g iven t h a t K a n t h a s a lre a d y s ta te d t h a t th e cond ition for a t te m p tin g su ch a p ro o f in th e f i r s t p lace is th e m ere ly regulative s ta tu s of e x tr in s ic teleology, i t does n o t seem th a t K a n t h a s p ro v en too m uch . K a n t c a n n o t a n d does n o t c la im t h a t h u m a n s a re objectively th e u ltim a te p u rpose 66 p. 323 = Ak. 435. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. o f n a tu re , or th a t f re e w ill is objectively th e f in a l p u rp o se , b u t m ere ly th a t if a ll o f n a tu re w as c re a te d by a d iv ine a u th o r, a n d i f w e a re le a d to a sk th e re a so n w hy i t w as c re a te d , th e n free w ill m u s t b e t h a t f in a l pu rp o se . In fact, K a n t sp ends a ll o f th e n e x t section e x p la in in g w h y su c h a p roof does n o t a n d cou ld no t le a d to k n o w led g e of God. T h e re a re se v e ra l s ta te m e n ts in section 85 m a in ta in in g t h a t w ith re g a rd to th e f in a l p u rp o se , "n a tu re does n o t te ll u s an y th in g , n o r ev e r w ill, w h ile yet, a p a r t from th is f in a l in te n tio n , w e can form no com m on re fe re n c e p o in t for a ll th e se n a tu r a l pu rp o ses, no a d e q u a te teleological p r in c ip le ..."67 Also, g iven K a n t's b e lie f in th e possib ility o r p rob - a b ility of life on o th e r p la n e ts , i t does n o t se em t h a t K a n t's a rg u m e n ts sh o u ld b e th o u g h t to be too species-cen tric . K a n t's a rg u m e n t m ig h t ap p ly to a n y c re a tu re o f f in ite in te llig e n c e w h ich is c o n s titu te d a s p a r t n a tu re a n d p a r t rea so n . K a n t seem s to h a v e g o tten r a th e r f a r in to th e conclusions o f th e sec- o n d Critique th ro u g h th e f i r s t a n d th ird , a n d g iv en h is conclusion th a t free w ill is th e f in a l p u rp o se , K a n t seem s free to m ove o n to ad d itio n a l re la te d a r - g u m en ts . In th e conclu sion to section 84, K a n t f i r s t a llu d e s to th e fac t th a t a fre e w ill is su ch t h a t "th e la w in te rm s o f w h ich th e s e b e in g s m u s t d e te rm in e th e i r p u rp o ses is p re s e n te d by th e se v e ry b e in g s a s u n co n d itio n ed a n d in d e - p e n d e n t of co nd itions o f n a tu re , a n d y e t n e c e ssa ry in its e lf ."68 W hile th is p o in t is no t a rg u e d fo r h e re , i t is , o f course, th e conclu sion to K a n t's a rg u - m e n t fo r th e n e ce ss ity of th e ca tego rica l im p e ra tiv e h e sp e lls ou t in th e Grundlegung. S u ch a conclusion f its n icely w ith K a n t's cla im th a t th e f in a l p u rp o se m u s t be u n c o n d itio n e d by n a tu re , y e t n e ce ssa ry , th o u g h th e conclu- s io n c an n o t be a rg u e d fo r w ith o u t th o se p re m ise s in th e Grundlegung. In a d d itio n , K a n t a lso a llu d es to th e f a c t t h a t th e n ecessa ry object of h u m a n free (m oral) w illin g is th e h ig h e s t good, "th e object th a t th is b e in g can 67 p. 329 = Ak. 440. 68 p. 323 = Ak. 435. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 141 se t befo re i ts e l f a s its h ig h es t p u rp o se ."69 T h is is a rg u e d fo r in th e f irs t an d seco n d Critique, a n d K a n t gives a v e ry b r ie f re s ta te m e n t o f su ch a n a rg u - m e n t in a foo tno te to section 84. A g a in , th is seem s to f i t n icely w ith K a n t's a rg u m e n t a b o u t th e f in a l p u rp o se , b u t i t c an n o t be a d e q u a te ly su p p o rte d w ith o u t a d d itio n a l p rem ises .70 T h is p o s itin g of th e h ig h e s t good th e n gives K a n t a f u r th e r m ea n s to w a rd th in k in g a b o u t God: in referring natu ra l purpose to an intelligent world cause, as the character of our reason forces us to do, we now have a principle th a t allows us to conceive of the n a tu re and properties of th is first cause, i.e., the supreme basis of the kingdom of purposes, and hence allows us to give determ ination to the concept of th is cause.71 G iven th e "lin k in g " n a tu re o f th e th i r d Critique, K a n t u n d o u b ted ly t h in k s t h a t th e a rg u m e n t from n a tu r a l p u rp o se s to th e f in a l p u rp o se , w h ich th e n a llow s fo r su b se q u e n t a rg u m e n ts fo r th e h ig h es t good a n d th e n a tu re of God, le n d s f u r th e r c re d it to h is p h ilo so p h ica l system . IV. K a n t's conclusion a b o u t th e f in a l p u rp o se of n a tu r e lea d s to som e in - te re s t in g consequences. T he f i r s t i s t h a t th e "Id ea fo r a U n iv e rsa l H isto ry w ith a C osm opo litan In te n t" is n o t re je c te d by th e th ird Critique, a s m an y c o m m e n ta to rs h a v e claim ed, b u t i s in s te a d supported . F re e (m oral) w illing is th e f in a l p u rp o se . N a tu re as a sy s te m is designed to su p p o r t su ch w illing , th o u g h i t c a n n o t cause i t d irec tly . T h e w ay th a t n a tu re su p p o rts su c h w illing is to p ro v id e th e conditions n e ce ssa ry fo r i ts fo rm ation a n d exercise. A nd th is su p p o r t is c u ltu re . B u t c u ltu re a s "t h a t co n stitu tio n o f h u m a n re la tio n s w h e re th e im p a irm e n t to freedom w h ic h re su lts from th e m u tu a lly conflicting 69 p. 323 = Ak. 435. 70 These premises are given in the Critique o f Pure Reason (A 804-19 = B 832-47), the Cri- tique o f Practical Reason, later in the third Critique, and modified slightly again in the Religion within the Limits o f Reason Alone. 71 p. 333 = Ak. 444. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 142 freedom [of th e in d iv id u a ls] is c o u n te re d by law fu l a u th o rity w ith in a w hole ca lled civil society"72 a n d c u ltu re a s "a cosmopolitan w hole, a sy s te m o f a ll s ta te s t h a t a re in d a n g e r o f a ffec tin g on a n o th e r d e trim e n ta lly "73 s im p ly is th e "u n so c iab le sociability" w h ich K a n t sp e lls o u t in th e "Id e a ." K a n t even re p e a ts h is n o tio n from th e "Id e a " h e re in th e th ird Critique t h a t "th is s h in - in g m ise ry h a s to do w ith th e d ev e lo p m en t o f m a n 's n a tu r a l p red isp o sitio n s , a n d [so] n a tu r e s t i l l ach ieves i ts ow n p u rp o se , even i f that purpose is not ours."7A H u m a n s re q u ire a n ta g o n ism , a lth o u g h , ev en tu a lly , p e a c e fu l a n - tag o n ism , in o rd e r to c u ltiv a te th e ir a b il i ty to s e t them se lves p u rp o se s . H ence, i t i s n a tu r e 's resp o n sib ility to p ro m o te th is condition o f an ta g o n ism , even th o u g h th is s ta te m ig h t n o t b e o f o u r ow n choosing.75 A lso, i f free w illing is th e f in a l p u rp o se , a n d K a n t is r ig h t to m a in ta in t h a t th e h ig h e s t good is th e p ro p e r ob jec t o f su ch a will, th e n w e h a v e fu r th e r su p p o r t o f th e im p o rtan ce o f th e h ig h e s t good. W e m ig h t ca ll th e h ig h e s t good th e "f in a l object" since i t i s w h a t a f re e w ill is ob liga ted to w ill. A n d if th is is so, th e n w e h a v e m ore re a so n fo r th e ra tio n a l hope (glaube) fo r th e ex is ten ce o f God. I f w e m u s t w ill th e h ig h e s t good, th e n w e m u s t a lso w ill for 72 p. 320 = Ak. 432. 73 p. 320 = Ak. 432. 74 p. 320 = Ak. 432. Italics added for emphasis. Kant writes that the final purpose, which makes nature into a system, "[assists physical teleology by] directing our attention to the purposes of na- ture and by [inviting us] to investigate the unfathomably great art that lies hidden behind nature's forms, so that the ideas that pure practical reason supplies may find incidental confirmation in natural purposes," (p. 334 = Ak. 445). 75 While the following discussion (in this footnote) could be placed in a number of places, let me place it here. Holly L. Wilson points out two important things in a footnote to her "A Gap in Ameri- can Kant Scholarship: Pragmatic Anthropology as the Application of Kantian Moral Philosophy," in Akten des Siebenten Intemationalen Kant-Kongresses, ed. Gerhard Funk, Band n.2 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1991), 403-419. She notes that Auxter's discussion of moral teleology (in Kant's Moral Teleol- ogy) is "dissatisfying since his notion of teleology is limited to human volition, and seems to mean little more than intentional behavior, using means for ends. Human teleology [however] is lived out in all of its natural predispositions. He also claims nature is adequately described by mechanism, and that nature has no teleological order which is conducive to human morality," (407, fn.). But Auxter must be wrong, for as we have seen, and as Wilson concludes, "This contradicts Kant's explicit claim that nature has an ulti- mate end for the human species which contributes to the development of morality in human beings; it can produce the formal subjective condition of morality, which is the aptitude for arbitrary purposes," (407. fn.). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 143 th e cond itions in w h ich th e h ig h e s t good cou ld com e in to being ; th is cond ition is th e ex is tence o f a m o ra l c re a to r o f th e w orld . Aga in , i t is no coincidence th a t K a n t m oves from sec tio n 84 to h is e x p la n a tio n t h a t th is p roo f does n o t p rove th e ex istence o f God, a n d from th e re to a d isc u ss io n o f th e m oral p ro o f fo r th e ex is tence o f God. W hile th e p ro o f fo r th e f in a l p u rp o se does n o t p ro v e th e ex istence of God, i ts im p lica tio n s a re w elcom e co n firm a tio n o f th e u n ity o f a ll th re e Critiques. F in a lly , w h ile w e c a n on ly h in t a t i t s im p o rta n c e h e re a n d save a fu ll d iscu ssio n for a la te r c h a p te r , w e see in K a n t's d isc u ss io n o f c u ltu re th e im - p o r ta n t p rin c ip le n o t on ly t h a t th e w ill c a n be in flu e n ce d , b u t t h a t th e re a re co n d itio n s u n d e r w h ich fre e w illin g is b e tte r p ro m o ted . P e rh a p s th e m ost im p o r ta n t cond ition is a co llection of in d iv id u a lly so v e re ig n n a tio n s w ith r e - p u b lic a n c o n s titu tio n s t h a t a re n o t a t w a r w ith one a n o th e r , fo rm in g a cos- m o p o litan w hole, "fo r on ly in th is c o n s titu tio n o f h u m a n re la tio n s can ou r n a tu r a l p red isp o sitio n s develop m ax im ally ."76 A s w e sa w w ith th e "Id ea " a n d a s is re in fo rced in th is Critique, K a n t su rm ise s t h a t h u m a n s a re sim ply n o t so c o n s titu te d to b e c o n te n t w ith th e i r s i tu a tio n fro m m o m e n t to m om ent, a n d th is le a d s to u n re s t b o th w ith in a n d b e tw een p e rso n s a n d n a tio n s . U n d e r th e se conditions, p e rso n s a re n o t n a tu ra lly co n te n t, a n d a re fo rced to se t p u r - poses fo r them se lves, b o th to w a rd th e e n d o f h a p p in e s s a n d th e e n d o f m o ra l- ity , a n d to a tte m p t to ach ieve th o se p u rp o ses in th e w orld . In add ition , K a n t m a in ta in s th a t th e fin e a r t s a n d th e sciences c a n in c lin e u s aw ay from th e d e m a n d s o f ou r n a tu r a l in c lin a tio n s or a t l e a s t le s se n th o se dem ands, m a k - in g u s "n o t in d ee d m o ra lly b e t te r fo r society, b u t s t i l l c iv ilized fo r it ."77 W ith K a n t's d iscussion of th e c u ltu re o f sk ill a n d o f d isc ip lin e , th e w ill can be in - fluenced , a n d th e re e x is t b e t te r a n d w orse co n d itio n s fo r th e p rom otion of fre e w illing . 76 p. 320 = Ak. 432. This is an additional confirmation of the harmony between the third Cri- tique and the "Idea." 77 p. 321 =Ak. 433. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 144 In a d d itio n , a n d by w ay o f t r a n s i t io n to th e n ex t ch ap te r, w e m ay also no tice t h a t th e S ta te a n d teleology a re b o u n d up to g e th e r in a in te rd e p e n d e n t w ay. W hile a fu r th e r d iscussion o f th is is g iven below , m en tio n o f th is is de- s ira b le h e re , w ith K a n t's d iscussion o f c u ltu re f re sh in o u r m in d A s w e saw espec ia lly in th e "Id e a ," th e fo rm a tio n o f a n in te rn a l c o n stitu tio n fo r a S ta te a llow s i ts in h a b i ta n ts to b e t te r p u r s u e th e i r ow n pu rposes, w ith o u t th e th re a t of u n re s tra in e d d e v as ta tio n . U n so c iab le soc iab ility lead s to th e fo rm a tio n of a S ta te . A n ta g o n ism w ill a lw ays e x is t, how ever, since no one p e rs o n c a n sa tis fy a ll h is /h e r n a tu r a l d e s ire s fo r h a p p in e s s w ith o u t in te r fe r in g w ith th e fu lf illm e n t o f th e d esires o f a n o th e r . A s th e fo rm a tio n of a S ta te a llow s for p e rso n s to s e t th em se lv es p u rp o se s m o re effectively a n d m ore free ly , p e rso n s w ill th e re b y b e in a p osition to w ill m o re a n d m ore in accord w ith th e m o ra l law . As th e y a re in c re as in g ly f re e d fro m th e th r e a t of violence, th e y c a n w ill m ore free ly a n d effectively. T h is is , o f co u rse , no g u a ra n te e th a t p e rs o n s w ill in fa c t becom e m ore m oral, b u t th e s i tu a t io n h a s opened its e lf u p fo r th is g re a te r p o ss ib ility . F ina lly , i f p e rso n s a re w illin g m ore in accord w ith th e m o ra l law , in c re a s in g ly w illin g a n d a c t in g from du ty , th e n th e y w ill h a v e th e h ig h e s t good a s th e i r f in a l object. B u t s in ce p a r t o f th e h ig h e s t good in c lu d es th e concep t t h a t th e freedom o f each p e rs o n sh o u ld be m ax im ized a s lo n g as i t does n o t in te r fe re w ith th e freed o m o f o th e rs , a n d since th e S ta te is th e m o st e ffic ien t m e a n s o f se cu rin g s u c h freed o m betw een p e rso n s a n d b e tw een n a tio n s , th e n th is n a tu ra lly le a d s to p e o p le w illin g for a n effective S ta te a n d a co sm opo litan w orld . H ence th e in te rd e p e n d e n c e o f m ora lity a n d th e p o li- tics, a n d th e l in k b e tw een teleology a n d th e S ta te . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I i 145 Chapter Seven The Highest Good and Two Additional Links between Nature and Morality L In. C h a p te r S ix above n o t on ly d id we secu re th e concep t of teleology as a re g u la tiv e one, w e also e n c o u n te re d th e f ir s t o f th re e a rg u m e n ts w hich lin k s th e n a tu r a l w orld to th e m o ra l w orld, i.e., w h ich l in k s h u m a n s in th e ir m oral c ap a c ity b o th w ith h u m a n s in th e ir n a tu ra l c ap a c ity a n d w ith n a tu re as a w hole. T h e f ir s t a rg u m e n t w a s th e "u p w ard " p ro o f o f h u m a n s a s th e fi- n a l p u rp o se o f n a tu re , o ccu rring i s sections 82 th ro u g h 84, a s w ell a s th e suggestion in K a n t's d iscussion o f c u ltu re th a t civ il society m ay o p era te teleologically . B u t th e re a re tw o a d d itio n a l a rg u m en ts . T h e second a rg u - m en t is f a m ilia r to bo th th e f i r s t a n d second Critique, a n d re a so n s from h u - m an s a s m o ra l ag en ts to G od a n d th e n to n a tu re a s th e locus fo r th e h ig h es t good. A fte r sp e llin g o u t th is a rg u m e n t, w e sh a ll ta k e a m o m e n t to a g a in a d - d ress th e q u e s tio n of th e location o f th e h ig h es t good, befo re p roceed ing to th e n ex t a rg u m e n t. T he th ird a rg u m e n t is a lso u n iq u e to th e Critique o f Judg- ment, a n d a rg u e s th a t th e ex p erien ce o f b eau ty a n d n a tu r a l p u rp o se s gives u s a t le a s t th e hope th a t th e w o rld h a s b een c re a te d w ith a m o ra l p u rp o se in m ind. O f cou rse , none o f th e se a rg u m e n ts for a te leo log ica l l in k betw een h u m a n s a n d n a tu r e can give p ro o f th a t such a lin k m u s t ex is t. n. N ow K a n t's a rg u m e n t in sec tio n s 82 th ro u g h 84 seem s to be a specific a tte m p t to re a so n "u p w a rd " from n a tu r a l p u rp o ses to th e f in a l pu rpose , be- g in n in g w ith th e a ssu m p tio n of n a tu r e as a system . B u t in sec tions 87 a n d 88, K a n t a tte m p ts a p roo f w hich m oves in th e opposite d irec tion , n am ely Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f I, 146 "d o w nw ard ," b eg in n in g w ith free ly w illing ag en ts a s th e s ta r t in g p re m ise a n d m o v in g b ack th ro u g h h u m a n s , to God, a n d f in a lly to w a rd n a tu re . As K a n t says: There is a physical teleology; it provides us with a basis th a t gives us sufficient proof... for assum ing the existence of an intelligent cause of the world. But we also find in ourselves, and even more so in the general concept of a rational being endowed w ith freedom (of its causality), a m oral teleology. S tr ic tly sp eak in g , K a n t's "u p w a rd " p roo f cou ld n o t le a d to a p ro o f o f God, sin ce su c h a p re m ise h a d to be a ssu m e d in o rd e r fo r th e re to be th e poss ib ility o f e x tr in s ic teleo logy to b e g in w ith . W ith th e "dow nw ard" p ro o f o f m o ra l te leo logy , K a n t ho p es to g ive a ra t io n a l p roof fo r th e b e lie f in th e ex is ten ce of G od, a n d a f te r th a t , to sh o w th a t i f th e w orld w as c re a te d , th e n i t m u s t be teleo log ical, su p p o rtin g th e h ig h e s t good. K a n t is now m o v ing aw ay from th e e x a m in a tio n o f w h a t c a n b e g a in e d from a p h y sica l teleology, to w h a t c a n be d isco v ered by u s in g a m o ra l teleology. T his is a p ro o f s im ila r to th e ones g iv en in th e f i r s t a n d seco n d Critiques, a n d seem s to b e p re fe rre d b y K a n t ov er th e "u p w a rd " proof. T he f i r s t p rem ise in th e a rg u m e n t is th a t h u m a n s h a v e a free w ill, th e a b ili ty to sp o n ta n eo u s ly g e n e ra te uncond itioned p u rp o se s . As su ch , th is free w ill is sub jec t to th e c a teg o rica l im p era tiv e , so t h a t i t is n o t s im p ly free, b u t a lso b o u n d by m o ra l n ecessity . T h is is a rg u e d fo r m o st ex ten siv e ly in th e seco n d Critique a n d th e Grundlegung.1 B ecause th e m o ra l law is n e ce ssa ry a n d n o t s im p ly a m e a n s to a n y th in g e lse, th is a u to m a tic a lly m ak e s h u m a n s a n a tu r a l c a n d id a te fo r b e in g th e f in a l p u rp o se o f c rea tio n , since "m o ra l law s... p re sc r ib e so m e th in g to re a so n a n d th e y p rescribe i t a s a p u rp o se n o t su b jec t to a cond ition , a n d h en ce j u s t a s th e concept o f a f in a l p u rp o se re q u ire s ."2 Im p o rta n tly , th is is n o t to sa y th a t h u m a n b e in g s are th e f in a l pu rp o se , b u t 1 See also: p. 362 = Ak. 468. : p. 339 = Ak. 449. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 147 r a th e r "t h a t i f th e re is in d e e d to b e a final purpose th a t re a so n h a s to in d ic a te a p rio ri, th e n i t c a n on ly be man (or a n y ra tio n a l b e in g in th e w orld) under moral laws."3 T h u s, K a n t m a in ta in s w e h av e th e fac t t h a t h u m a n b e in g s a re m o ra l ag en ts , b u t on ly th e a ssu m p tio n th a t h u m a n s a re th e f in a l p u rp o se o f c rea tion : "i f th is is n o t so, th e n th e ex istence o f th e w o rld is e ith e r b a se d on no p u rp o se a t a ll in th e c au se , o r on ly on p u rp o ses w ith o u t a f in a l p u rp o se ."4 S u ch a p o ss ib ility is a d ep lo rab le b u t possib le s itu a tio n . H u m a n s , co n sid ered h e re a s o r ig in a to rs o f a n u n c o n d itio n ed series, a re n o t d e te rm in e d by n a tu re , a n d a re o u ts id e o f n a tu re in th is re sp ec t. H ence , K a n t w rite s th a t w e a re no lo n g e r concerned w ith "a p u rp o se o f (i.e., w ith in ) n a tu re , so f a r a s n a tu r e [a lready ] ex is ts , b u t w ith th e p u rp o se o f th e [very] ex is ten ce o f n a tu re a n d a ll i t s a rra n g e m e n ts . In o th e r w ords, w e a re co n ce rn ed w ith th e u ltim a te purpose o f creation..."5 I f h u m a n b e in g s w ere co n ce rn ed on ly w ith "th e ir w ell-being" b u t w ere n o t ab le to free ly c re a te v a lu e fo r th em se lv e s , "th e n th e re w o u ld in d e e d be p u rp o ses in th e w orld ... b u t no fin a l... p u rp o se , b ecau se th e ex is ten ce o f su c h ra t io n a l b e in g s w o u ld s t i l l a l- w ays b e p u rp o se less ."6 N ow K a n t could h a v e b e g u n th is p ro o f in th e sam e w ay a s h e b eg an th e "u p w a rd " proof, n a m e ly w ith th e a ssu m p tio n o f (reg u la tiv e) e x tr in s ic teleo logy w h ich au to m a tica lly b r in g s in th e re fe rence o f n a tu r e to a d iv ine a u th o r , but the principle that [allows us to] refer the world to a supreme cause, as de- ity, because some of the beings in it are morally destined for a purpose, does not do this by merely supplementing the psysicoteleological basis for proving 3 p. 338 = Ak. 448. 4 p. 339 = Ak. 450. 5 p. 332 = Ak. 443. This too should give us reason to consider Kant's discussion in sections 82-84 as something different from the more standard "downward" proof. 6 p. 339 = Ak. 449. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 148 [the existence of th is deity], in which case it would necessarily presuppose th a t basis. Rather, it is sufficient even by itself to provide th is reference...7 In o th e r w ords, w h ile e x tr in s ic teleology n e c e ss ita te s th e re fe re n c in g of n a - tu r e to a d iv ine a u th o r a s a n o rig in a l p rem ise , a m o ra l te leo logy does no t n e e d to m ak e su ch a m ove, s in ce i t can f in d th e co n n ec tio n b e tw e e n th e w orld a n d a d iv in e a u th o r w ith o u t su c h a n assu m p tio n . T h is is w h y K a n t's m ore com m on "dow nw ard" p ro o f is s tro n g e r, a n d w hy K a n t does n o t u se ex trin sic te leo logy a s a p rem ise . T h e n e x t s te p in th e p ro o f is th e p rem ise t h a t th e n e c e s sa ry object o f h u m a n free w illing is th e h ig h e s t good. T he h ig h e s t good, a s p re s e n te d in a ll th r e e Critiques is p e rh a p s b e s t d escrib ed a s th e co m p le te p ro p o rtio n in g of h a p p in e s s to v ir tu e . K a n t w r ite s t h a t th e m o ra l la w "also d e te rm in e s for us, a n d a p rio ri, a f in a l p u rp o se , a n d m ak es i t o b lig a to ry fo r u s to s tr iv e tow ard [ach iev ing] it; a n d th a t p u rp o se is th e highest good in the world t h a t w e can ach iev e th ro u g h freedom ."8 K a n t does n o t give a le n g th y a rg u m e n t h e re as to w h y th is sh o u ld be, b u t w e c a n ta k e such a n a rg u m e n t a s u n d e rs to o d from th e f i r s t a n d second Critique. K a n t only re i te ra te s t h a t th e h u m a n be ing 's n a tu r a l p u rp o se is h a p p in e s s , a n d th a t w e c an o n ly th in k t h a t su c h h a p p i- n e ss m u s t be "su b jec t to th e ob jective condition t h a t m a n b e in h a rm o n y w ith th e la w o f morality..."9 T h is lea d s K a n t to p o s i t th e necessity o f G od. T h e h a rm o n y betw een m o ra lity a n d h a p p in e ss is th e n ecessa ry object o f th e h ig h e s t good, b u t we c a n observe n o th in g in n a tu r e w h ich in d ica te s t h a t m o ra lity a n d h a p p in e ss m ig h t a c tu a lly be lin k e d . T h u s w e can n o t see h o w su c h a h a rm o n y w ould be p o ss ib le "i f th e c a u sa lity o f n a tu r e is th e only c a u s a lity (of a m e a n s [for 7 pp. 333-4 = Ak. 444. 8 p. 339 = Ak. 450. 9 Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. {I 149 ach iev in g th e h ig h e s t good]) t h a t w e [necessarily] connec t w ith o u r f re e - dom ."10 B u t b ecau se th e h ig h e s t good is th e n ecessa ry object o f free w illin g, in order to se t ourselves a final purpose in conformity w ith the m oral law, we m ust assum e a moral cause of the world (an au thor of the world); and to the ex ten t th a t setting ourselves a final purpose is necessary... i t is also necessary th a t we assum e [that there is] a m oral cause of the world: in other words, that there is a God.11 I n o th e r w ords, b ecau se th e m o ra l la w n e ce ss ita te s th e w illin g o f th e h ig h es t good, a n d b e ca u se th e re is no in d ic a tio n th a t n a tu re a lone w o u ld b r in g abou t th e h ig h e s t good, w e m u st p o s tu la te th e ex is tence o f a m o ra l b e in g w h ich w o u ld co n n ec t h a p p in e ss w ith m o ra lity in th e w orld . O f cou rse , K a n t is q u ick to p o in t o u t t h a t th is is on ly a p o s tu la te , a n d "is n o t m e a n t to p rov ide a n objectively v a lid p roof of th e ex is ten ce o f God."12 N ow i f h u m a n beings a re th e u ltim a te p u rp o se , a n d i f G od ex is ts and se cu re s th e p o ss ib ility of th e h ig h e s t good, th e n n a tu r e w ill b e teleo log ical be- c a u se G od w ill h a v e c rea ted i t in th is w ay . K a n t h e re is m ore in te re s te d in th e (sub jec tive) p ro o f for th e ex is ten ce o f G od a n d e s ta b lis h in g th e n a tu r e of G od a s a m o ra l in te lligence th a n h e is in te re s te d in p ro v in g th a t n a tu r e is te leo log ica l. B u t su re ly su ch a conclusion is w a rra n te d . K a n t w rite s e a rlie r in sec tion 87 t h a t w h ile th e m o ra l la w does no t n e e d re fe ren ce to G od in order to acco u n t fo r itse lf , on the o ther hand, this m oral teleology does deal w ith us as beings in the world; and those same moral laws enjoin us to direct our judging to those other th ings [regarded] either as purposes or as objects for which we ourselves are the final purpose. This moral teleology, then, deals w ith the reference of our own causality to purposes...13 10 p. 340 = Ak. 450. 11 p. 340 = Ak. 450. 12 p. 340n. = Ak. 450n. 13 p. 337 = Ak. 447. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. H ence, persons a re n a tu ra l ly concerned w ith th e effects of m o ra l ac tio n in n a tu re , a n d p a r tic u la r ly concerned w ith th e p o ss ib ility o f ach iev ing th e h ig h e s t good in th e w orld . By s ta r tin g w ith h u m a n b e in g s u n d e r th e m o ra l la w a s th e f in a l p u rp o se , a n d w ith th e p o s tu la te o f th e ex is ten ce o f God, i t m u s t b e possib le fo r n a tu r e to be c re a te d su c h th a t th e h ig h e s t good is possib le . As K a n t w rite s a t th e e n d of sec tion 86: the inner moral destination of man's existence for a purpose has compensated for the deficiency in our knowledge of nature, by directing us to add something to the final purpose of the existence of all things... to add, [namely,] the thought of the supreme cause... as having properties that enable it to subject all of nature to th a t single intention (with nature merely as the instrument for achieving this intention).14 I f n a tu r e is th e c re a tio n of a m o ra l in te lligence , th e n n a tu r e w ill co n ta in th e p o ss ib ility for th e h a rm o n y be tw een m o ra lity a n d h a p p in e ss , th o u g h w e c a n - n o t see th is n ecess ity th ro u g h a n e x am in a tio n o f n a tu re . As such , n a tu re m u s t b e teleological, a sy s tem o f p u rposes c re a te d w ith th e f in a l p u rp o se o f th e m o ra l law in m in d . L est we ta k e su c h a p ro o f to be co n s titu tiv e , a n d th u s too s trong , K a n t gives u s se v e ra l w a rn in g s in th e n e x t few sec tions t h a t such a p ro o f te lls u s n o th in g ob jectively t r u e e ith e r ab o u t th e n a tu r e o f G od or o f n a tu re itse lf . T his is m ost c le a r ly se en in th e "R estric tio n o f th e V a lid ity o f th e M o ra l Proof," "O n W h a t K in d o f A ssen t T h e re I s in a T eleological P ro o f o f th e E x is ten ce of God," a n d "O n W h a t K in d o f A sse n t R e su lts from a P ra c tica l F a i th ," tho u g h th e re a re se v e ra l o th e r p laces w h e re K a n t a d d re sse s th is .15 P e rh a p s th e m ost decisive s ta te m e n ts are: 14 p. 336 = Ak. 447. 15 In addition to these sections and the quotations to follow, see also: p. 327 = Ak. 439 and pp. 329-30 = Ak. 440-1. j Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 151 can we not establish the objective reality of the concept of a final purpose of creation in a way th a t would satisfy pure reason's theoretical demands?... Yet even this, little though it is, is far more th an speculative philosophy can ever accomplish.16 And y e t [the concept of a] final purpose is merely a concept of our practical reason; we cannot infer it from any d a ta of experience, so as to judge nature theoretically [in term s of it], nor can we apply it to cognition of n a tu re .17 the existence of things in conformity w ith a final purpose... requires us to m ake two assum ptions: first, th a t there is, as au thor of the world, an intelligent being;... but, second, th a t [this] being is not merely in telligent b u t also moral, and hence a God. We can see from the character of th is second inference th a t we m ake it only for [the use of] judgm ent in accordance w ith concepts of prac- tical reason, and hence for reflective ra th e r th a t determ inative judgm ent.18 A gain , I t a k e i t to be in co n tro v e rtib le t h a t teleology is in te n d e d to b e a m ere reg u la tiv e id e a , a n d n o t a c o n s titu tiv e one, a n d th a t in ju d g in g t h a t th e w orld ac ts te leo log ica lly a n d th a t i t w ill e v e n tu a lly conform to th e n e cess itie s o f th e h ig h e s t good, th is ju d g m e n t is m a d e from a p ra c tic a l p o in t o f v iew only. m. H a v in g focused so m u ch a t te n t io n on th e h ig h e s t good, th is seem s a good p lace to d iscuss th e re c u r re n t is s u e o f w h e re th e h ig h e s t good is to be located . W h e re a s bo th th e f i r s t a n d second Critique seem to re v e a l K a n t's a m b ig u ity a s to th e location o f th e h ig h e s t good, I th in k t h a t th e Critique of Judgment c e r ta in ly p laces th e e m p h a s is on i t o ccu rring in th is w orld , on e a r th . In d eed , th e d iscussion o f th e h ig h e s t good a ris e s in th e f i r s t p lace w ith th e q u e s tio n o f w h e th e r n a tu r e a s a w ho le co u ld be te leo lo g ica l o r w h e th e r "a ll o f c re a tio n w ould be a m ere w a s te la n d , g ra tu ito u s a n d w ith o u t a f in a l p u rp o se ."19 K a n t says th a t "in re fe ren ce to th e highest good* G od m u s t be th o u g h t to b e "omnipotent, so t h a t i t [God] c a n m ak e a ll o f n a tu r e accord w ith 16 p. 344 = Ak. 454. 17 p. 345 = Ak. 455. 18 pp. 345-6 = Ak. 455. 19 p. 331 = Ak. 442. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 152 t h a t h ig h e s t p u rpose ," a n d a lso be "omnibenevolent a s w ell a s just... th e con- d itio n s u n d e r w hich a su p re m e cau se o f th e w orld c a n be th e cause o f th e w o rld [tak en ] as th e h ig h e s t good u n d e r m o ra l law s ."20 W e see th is in th e "C om m ent" to section 86 a n d ag a in in th e "C om m ent" to sec tion 88, w h ere K a n t m a in ta in s th a t ev en th e th o u g h t o f th e ex is ten ce o f C od cam e from a d issa tis fa c tio n w ith th e la c k o f re w a rd fo r v ir tu o u s p e rso n s in th e w orld, " th e su b jec tiv e p rin c ip le n o t to s e t t le fo r co n sid erin g th e w orld in te rm s o f th e p u rp o s iv e n e ss i t h a s th ro u g h n a tu r a l causes, b u t to re g a rd th e w orld as b a s e d on a su p rem e cau se t h a t ru le s n a tu re in te rm s o f m o ra l p rin c ip le s ,"21 a n d th e th o u g h t th a t " th is is n o t how i t sh o u ld be."22 T h e m o ra l p roo f fo r th e e x is te n ce o f G od is f ra m e d b y a d iscussion o f n a tu re , a n d n a tu r e 's possib le re sp o n se to m oral action . T im e a n d tim e a g a in , K a n t p re s e n ts th e q u es tio n o f th e h ig h e s t good in te rm s o f th is w orld. In th e "In tro d u c tio n ," K a n t sa y s t h a t "th e effect [a t w h ich w e a re to aim ] acco rd ing to th e concept o f freedom is th e f in a l p u rp o se w h ich (or th e ap p ea ran ce o f w h ich in th e w orld of sen se ) o u g h t to ex is t...,"23 a n d t h a t th e "fin a l p u rp o se ... c a n be ac tu a lized on ly in n a tu re a n d in accor- d a n ce w ith i ts law s."24 K a n t w rite s th a t "w h a t re a so n m ak e s th e f in a l p u r - p o se is th e fu r th e ra n c e of h a p p in e s s in h a rm o n y w ith m o ra lity . Now th e m o ra l la w com m ands u s to f u r th e r th a t f in a l p u rp o se (with regard to the be- ings o f the world) as fa r a s w e can ..."25 a n d th a t th e m o ra l la w provides us in addition w ith a principle th a t is subjectively constitutive: the concept of an object th a t only reason can th ink [the final purpose] and th a t we 20 p. 333 = Ak. 444. This occurs again at p. 354 = Ak. 461-2. 21 p. 335 = Ak. 446. 22 p. 350 = Ak. 458. 23 p. 36 = Ak. 195-6. 24 p. 37 = Ak. 196. 25 p. 341 = Ak. 451. Italics added for emphasis. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 153 are to actualize in the world through our acts... [R]eason determines us a pri- ori to strive to the utmost to further the highest good in the world.26 H u m a n b e in g s a re th e on ly c a n d id a te s fo r th e f in a l p u rp o se of c re a tio n b e - cause th e y c a n "cognize th e [m oral] la w a n d th e object of th is c au sa lity , th e object th a t th is b e in g can s e t before i t s e l f a s i ts h ig h e s t pu rp o se (the h ig h e s t good in th e w orld )."27 In th e l a s t p a ra g ra p h of th e book, K a n t w rite s th a t from th e p ra c tic a l p o in t o f v iew w e m u s t a t t r ib u te som e p ro p e rtie s to God "w hen th is a t t r ib u te of i t s c a u sa lity c o n ce rn s a n effect [to be achieved] in th e w orld w h ich invo lves a n a im th a t is m o ra lly necessa ry ..."28 B etw een th e fac t th a t th e d isc u ss io n of G od a n d th e h ig h e s t good a lm o st a lw ays occurs w ith in a d iscussion o f th e (possible) te leo log ica l c o n s titu tio n of n a tu re , a n d th e n u - m erous re fe ren c es by K a n t to th e h ig h e s t good "in th e w orld," I th in k th a t th e Critique o f Judgment does e m p h asize th e loca tion of th e h ig h e s t good on e a rth . H ow ever, th is is n o t to say t h a t th e th i rd Critique is solely concerned w ith th e h ig h e s t good on e a r th . W hile K a n t does n o t specifically m en tio n th e h ig h es t good occu rring in a n a fte rlife , h e does ta lk a b o u t th e n ecessity o f im m o rta lity a s one of th e p o s tu la te s n e c e ssa ry to su p p o rt th e m o ra l law . T his d iscu ssio n occurs p r im a rily in "O n W h a t K in d o f A ssen t R esu lts from a P rac tica l F a i th ." In th is d iscussion , K a n t n e v e r p re se n ts a n a rg u m e n t a s to w hy im m o rta lity is a n ecessa ry p o s tu la te o f p ra c tic a l reason ; h e m en tio n s bo th God a n d im m o rta lity o f th e so u l a s n e ce ssa ry p o s tu la te s se v e ra l t im e s in th is section , b u t no a rg u m e n t is g iven fo r w hy im m o rta lity is n ecessa ry . I t is likely t h a t K a n t ta k e s th is p ro o f to be ta k e n from th e second Critique. How ever, w h a t th is in d ic a te s is th a t e v en th o u g h th is d iscussion b eg in s w ith "th e highest good in th e w orld ,"29 ta lk o f im m o rta lity is n ecessa rily ta lk o f th e 26 p. 343 = Ak. 453. 27 p. 323 = Ak. 435. 28 p. 380 = Ak. 484. 29 p. 362 = Ak. 469. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 154 afte rlife . T he rea so n th a t K a n t needs to b r in g in im m o rta lity in connec tion w ith th e h ig h e s t good is so t h a t one c an b e re w a rd e d or p u n ish e d in acco rd w ith one's v ir tu e , even i f su ch a co rre la tio n w as n o t found d u rin g o ne's life tim e. T h is m u s t b e th e "o th e r w orldly" h ig h e s t good, for th e im m o rta li ty o f a n in d iv id u a l m u s t ta k e p la c e in th e a fte rlife . H ence, w hile I be lieve a ch an g e in e m p h a sis a s b een m a d e in th is Critique, I do no t ta k e th is to in d ic a te a n y ra d ic a l sh if t in K a n t's p o s itio n re g a rd in g th e locus o f th e h ig h e s t good. IV. T he th ir d a rg u m e n t fo r a l in k b e tw ee n th e n a tu ra l a n d m o ra l w o rld s is p a r tic u la r ly u n iq u e to th e th i r d Critique. T h is l in k is f irs t a llu d e d to in sec tio n 59 o f "P a r t I." K a n t n o te s th a t th e re a re c e r ta in s im ila ritie s b e tw e e n th e ju d g in g of a b e a u tifu l object, in w h ich ju d g m e n t reflects free ly u p o n a n ob jec t a n d g ives i ts e lf i ts ow n ru le fo r ju d g in g , a n d th e (m oral) free w ill, w h ich free ly p rov ides a law to i ts e l f fo r ac tio n . K a n t h e re is p r im a r ily c o n - c e rn e d w ith th e w ay in w hich th e th re e fa c u ltie s o f th e m in d a re ab le to h a r - m on ize to g e th e r. W h a t K a n t n o te s in th is sec tion is th e w ay in w h ich ju d g - m e n t's concept o f p u rp o siv en ess is a n a tu r a l m e d ia to r be tw een th e o th e r tw o facu ltie s . T h is is because th e u n d e rs ta n d in g a n d th e im ag in a tio n h a rm o n iz e to g e th e r in th e ju d g m e n t o f b e a u ty , a n d b e c a u se re a so n can m ak e th e a n a l - ogy b e tw een p u rp o siv en ess a n d i t s own s e t t in g o f pu rposes. A s K a n t e x - p la in s in th e "In tro d u c tio n ," the spontaneity in the play of the cognitive powers, whose harmony with each other contains the basis of this pleasure, makes that concept of purposiveness suitable for mediating the connection of the domain of the concept of nature with that of the concept of freedom, as regards freedom's consequences, inas- much as this harmony also promotes the mind's receptivity to moral feeling.30 30 p. 38 = Ak. 197. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. i 155 Ju d g m e n t is th e n a tu r a l m ed ia to r b e tw e e n reason a n d u n d e rs ta n d in g , a n d b ecau se o f th e s im ila r it ie s be tw een i t a n d p rac tic a l reaso n , re fle c tio n u p o n th e b e a u tifu l c a n m o re easily p re p a re th e m in d for m o ra l th in k in g .31 N o t only th is , b u t th e m ore im p o r ta n t p o in t K a n t m a k e s i s t h a t a ll th re e pow ers o f th e m in d m u s t n e c e ssa r ily a p p ea l to th e su p e rse n s ib le in o r- d e r to solve th e ir an tin o m ies; u n d e rs ta n d in g ap p ea ls to so m e th in g t h a t u n - d e rlie s n a tu re w h ic h m a k e s ou r in tu i t io n o f i t possible, ju d g m e n t a p p e a ls to a n in te llig e n t a u th o r o f th e w orld w ho th in k s non-d iscursively , a n d m o ra lity a p p e a ls to th e su p e rse n s ib le bo th to sh o w t h a t freedom a n d m a te r ia l c a u s a l- i ty a re n o t in co m p a tib le a n d to show t h a t G od is a n ecessa ry p o s tu la te fo r th e object o f th e m o ra l law , n am e ly th e h ig h e s t good. K a n t e x p la in s i t in th e "In tro d u c tio n :" The understanding, inasmuch as it can give laws to nature a priori, proves that we cognize nature only as appearance, and hence a t the same time points to a supersensible substrate of nature; but it leaves this substrate wholly un- determined. Judgment, through its a priori principle of judging nature in terms of possible particular laws of nature, provides nature's supersensible substrate (within as well as outside us) with determinability by the intellectual power. But reason, through its a priori practical law, gives this same substrate determination. Thus judgment makes possible the transition from the domain of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.32 T h is p a r tic u la r ly d e n se q u o ta tio n is th e r e a l f ru i t of th e th ir d Critique. W h a t i t sa y s is th is : th e f i r s t Critique sh o w ed t h a t o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g o f n a tu r e w as m ere ly n a tu r e a s ap p ea ran ce , a n d th u s ap p ea led to a su p e rse n s ib le a b o u t w h ich n o th in g co u ld be sa id , i.e ., a n u n d e te rm in e d s u b s tr a te o f n a tu r e . T h e second Critique sh o w ed th a t th e h ig h e s t good w as th e n e c e ssa ry ob jec t o f 31 Note, however, that beauty is only a symbol o f morality, and also that Kant presents several differences between the power o f judgment and the power o f practical reason in legislating to themselves. See p. 229 = Ak. 353-4, Pluhar's discussion, pp. bri-lxvii, and Sidney Axinn, "On Beauty as the Symbol o f Morality," in Akten des Siebenten Intemationalen Kcmt-Kongresses, ed. Gerhard Funk, Band H.1 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1990), 615-621. 32 p. 37 = Ak. 196. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 156 m o ra l w illing , a n d th a t w e m u s t p o s tu la te w h a te v e r co n d itio n s a re necessary fo r th e p o ss ib ility of i ts ach iev em en t. In th is resp ec t, th e su p e rse n s ib le w as d e te rm in e d , th o u g h on ly from a p rac tic a l p o in t o f view , in re s p e c t o f God's m o ra l n a tu r e a n d God's a b ili ty to c rea te a m o ra l w orld . B u t h o w is i t possible to l in k th e s e tw o "w orlds"?33 I t is th e so lu tio n to th e an tin o m y o f ju d g m e n t t h a t a llo w s u s "to th ro w a b rid g e from one d o m ain to th e o th e r ."34 As w e sa w above, ju d g m e n t d e m a n d s th a t w e conceive o f a non -d iscu rsive in te llig en ce th a t , a s P lu h a r de- sc rib es, "w o u ld necessitate e v en th e p a r t ic u la r" a n d th u s p e rm it "u s to think o f th e "contingency' of th e p a r t ic u la r a s b e in g on ly a seeming con tingency ... b u t a s in fac t b e in g a necessity.n35 H ow ever, s in ce th e u n d e rs ta n d in g canno t conceive o f su c h a possib ility , w e m u st f in a lly th in k o f th e w o rld a s created by a n in te llig en c e , in analogy w ith h u m a n re a so n 's a b ility to b r in g a b o u t c h a n g e s in n a tu re . B u t su c h a so lu tion te lls u s m ore a b o u t n a tu r e th a n w as o b ta in e d from th e f ir s t Critique, a n d w h ile th is does n o t te l l u s a n y th in g cons t i tu t iv e ly a b o u t th e su p e rse n s ib le , i t does a llow fo r th e su p e rse n s ib le to be d e te rm in a te , to h a v e u deter minability by the intellectual pow er"36 P lu h a r su m m a riz e s th is ex trem e ly w ell: th e so lu tio n to th e a n tin o m y o f ju d g m e n t g ive u s th e concep t of a n o n -d iscu rs iv e in te llig en ce , but our understanding... instead thinks of the supersensible basis of nature's purposiveness as an intelligent cause of the world in terms of purposes... [This] makes determinable the concept of the supersensible as mere basis of nature... and thus "mediates" between this latter concept and the concept of the supersensible which is determined practically... Through this mediation judgment's concept of the supersensible basis of nature's... purposiveness... unites the "three" supersensibles into one. For the substrate of nature was 33 In many respects this is the "possible 'expansion' o f knowledge which practical reason has taken from speculative reason" which I alluded to at the end o f Chapter Four above, and we may now be able to see why Kant felt an entire Critique was necessary in order to address this issue. 34 p. 36 = Ak. 195. 35 Pluhar, p. xciii. 36 p. 37 = Ak. 196. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 157 merely made determinate enough to be nature in itself as the "purpose" brought about by an intelligent cause, and then to be nature itself as caused by a moral author, a God.37 To sim plify th is som ew hat, we m ig h t say t h a t i f w e m u s t th in k o f n a tu re a s b e in g c au sed by a n in te lligence , a n d if w e m u s t th in k t h a t th is in te llig en ce is a m o ra l God, th e n w e can th in k o f n a tu re a3 teleo log ica l (th e possib ility of w h ich w as o p en ed up by th e fac t th a t th e f i r s t Critique show ed u s th a t w e c a n n o t know th e su p e rsen s ib le side of n a tu re ) , b ecau se G od w ill h a v e c re a te d i t to su p p o rt th e f in a l object o f o u r free (m oral) w illing . Now w h e re a s th is l in k be tw een th e m o ra l a n d n a tu r a l "w orlds" c a n - n o t b e p roven th eo re tica lly , K a n t fin d s w elcom e co n firm atio n in th e fa c t th a t w e o ften do d iscover in s ta n c e s w h ere n a tu r e a p p e a rs o rd e re d ju s t fo r o u r u n - d e rs ta n d in g . T h is occurs w ith b eau ty , a s w e ll a s w ith teleology. W hen w e b eh o ld a b e a u tifu l object, th e h a rm o n y t h a t i t p ro v id es be tw een th e im a g in a - t io n a n d u n d e rs ta n d in g le a d s u s to th e ju d g m e n t t h a t n a tu re w as c re a te d w ith h u m a n fac u ltie s in m ind . S im ila rly , w h e re a s "w e c a n conceive o f r a - t io n a l be ings f in d in g them selves su rro u n d e d b y a n a tu r e th a t show ed no d is - t in c t trac e o f o rg an iza tio n , b u t only th e effects o f a m ere m echan ism o f c ru d e m a tte r ,"38 w e o ften f in d th a t th e m an y d iv erse law s o f n a tu r e a re a c tu a lly u n d e rs ta n d a b le , a n d "we rejoice... w hen, j u s t a s i f i t w ere a lucky ch an ce fa - v o rin g o u r a im , w e do fin d such sy stem atic u n i ty am o n g m ere ly em p irica l law s, even th o u g h w e n ecessa rily h a d to a s su m e t h a t th e re is such u n ity even th o u g h we h a v e n o in s ig h t in to th is u n ity a n d c a n n o t p ro v e it ."39 W e recog- n ize t h a t th e re is no rea so n for n a tu re to p ro v id e b e a u tifu l th in g s fo r u s, n o r is th e re an y re a so n w hy th e u t te r ly c o n tin g e n t m ig h t be o rgan ized in accor- d an ce w ith re g u la r ity a n d (p a rticu la r) sc ien tific law s. 37 Pluhar, pp. ci-cii. 38 p. 373 = Ak. 478. 39 pp. 23-4 = Ak. 184 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 158 In th e ju d g m e n t th a t w e m u s t su b o rd in a te m ech an ica l c a u sa lity to te leo log ica l c au sa lity , we fin d fu r th e r c o n firm a tio n th a t th e w o rld m ay in - d e ed conform to o u r m o ra l n eed s. As K a n t exp la in s: the fact that the actual world offers the rational beings in it a wealth of ma- terial for physical teleology (which indeed would not have to be so) does serve the moral argument as welcome confirmation, as far as nature is able to offer something analogous to the (moral) ideas or reason. For this [confirmation] provides the concept of a supreme cause tha t has understanding...40 T h e w o rld c e r ta in ly does n o t h a v e to offer u p b e a u tifu l objects, n o r do specific n a tu r a l la w s h a v e to be sy s tem atizab le . B u t n a tu r e does g ive u s th e se p re s - e n ta tio n s . W hile we b r in g su ch a p r in c ip le o f ju d g m e n t to ob jec ts o f n a tu re , b e a u tifu l objects p rove ab le to h a rm o n iz e w ith o u r h u m a n fac u ltie s . Such p re s e n ta tio n s allow u s to ju d g e th e m a s i f th e y w ere c re a te d fo r u s by a n in - te l l ig e n t a u th o r fo r th e h a rm o n iz in g o f o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g . T h o u g h w e can - n o t p ro v e th is fo r ce rta in , since i t is m e re ly a reflective ju d g m e n t, i t does offer u s a d d it io n a l h o p e th a t th e w orld w as in d e e d c re a te d w ith o u r m e n ta l pow ers in m in d , a n d i f th is is so, th e n i t m ay h a v e b e e n c re a te d fo r th e f in a l pu rpose of h u m a n b e in g s a s m o ra l ag en ts . A n d i f th is is so, n a tu re w ill e v e n tu a lly be a b le to conform to th e h ig h e s t good. T h is i s th e second a rg u m e n t fo r th e l in k b e tw e e n n a tu r e a n d m o ra lity p a r t ic u la r to th e Critique of Judgment. V. T h e reg u la tiv e n a tu re o f th e id e a o f te leo logy com bined w ith th e th ree p roofs w h ich K a n t offers u s l in k in g th e n a tu r a l a n d m oral "w orlds" in th e Critique o f Judgment p rov ide u s w ith a s tro n g fo u n d a tio n fo r o u r in v e s tig a - tio n s . M o st im p o rtan tly , i t show s ju s t h o w v i ta l K a n t co n sid ered th e possib il- i ty o f m o ra l p rog ress: i f th e re is no m o ra l a u th o r o f th e w orld , o r i f h u m a n 40 p. 374 = Ak. 479. Also: "if we combine our cognition o f physical purposes w ith that of the moral purpose, then, because o f pure reason's maxim to strive to unify principles as much as we can, physical purposes are very important, since they support the practical reality of the idea of God by the re- ality that from a theoretical point of view it already has for judgm ent," (p. 347 = Ak. 456). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 159 rea so n c a n n o t im prove over tim e , th e n th e re c an be no f in a l p u rp o se to th e w orld . A w o rld w ith o u t m o ra l p ro g re s s h a s , fo r K an t, l ite ra lly no pu rp o se , a n d h a s no v a lu e . M oral p ro g re ss a n d th e object o f m o ra l w il l in g, th e h ig h e s t good, m u s t b e a ssu m e d (p o s tu la ted ) to b e poss ib le on e a r th . M oreover, we a lso see th a t th e re is good re a so n to p o s tu la te th is possib ility , s in ce K a n t h a s g iven u s th re e specific re a so n s w h y th e w o rld seem s to confirm to h u m a n n eed s . T he l in k b e tw een th e m o ra l a n d n a tu r a l w orlds su g g ests t h a t n a tu re m a y in d eed a s s is t u s w ith th e p ro m o tio n o f th e h ig h e s t good; th e h ig h e s t good is a ve ry ra t io n a l b e lie f fo r K a n t. I n a d d itio n , g iven th e th re e p roofs a n d K a n t's d iscussion o f c u ltu re , w e a re a g a in b ro u g h t back to th e q u e s tio n of th e em p irica l co n d itio n s n e ce ssa ry fo r m o ra l im p ro v em en t, a n d th e re fo re b ro u g h t b a c k to a d iscu ssio n of po litics . N a tu r e is re sp o n sib le w ith p ro m o tin g th e a b ility o f h u m a n s to w ill free ly , a n d i t does th is th ro u g h a n ta g o n ism a n d u n - soc ia l sociab ility . T hough K a n t does n o t d iscu ss po litica l in s t i tu t io n s a t le n g th in th e th i r d Critique, h e does m e n tio n a "civil society" a n d "a cosmo- politan w hole, a sy stem o f a ll s ta te s " i n h is b r ie f d iscussion o f c u ltu re , th u s in d ic a tin g th e k ey position o f p o litic s i n n a tu r e 's p rom otion of a "m o ra l b a - s is ."41 As we s h a l l see in th e c h a p te r a f te r n ex t, i t is th e "Id e a " w h ic h allow s u s to m ak e s e n se o f a ll o f th e se co n ce rn s o f K a n t's; th e "Id e a " a n d o th e r of K a n t's po litica l w ritin g s a llow u s to ex am in e , o rgan ize, a n d h a rm o n iz e th e is su e s of m o ra lity , politics, a n d th e h ig h e s t good. 41 p. 320 = Ak. 433. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 160 Chapter Eight The Principle of Purposive Mechanisms Reexamined L I n th is (brief) c h ap te r, I w a n t only to a d d re s s th e q u estio n o f th e "p rin c ip le o f p u rp o s iv e m ech an ism s" ra is e d in c h a p te r s Two a n d F o u r above. I th in k t h a t w ith th e Critique o f Judgment w e c an f in a lly a n sw e r th is q u es- tio n sa tis fa c to r ily . In th e f in a l a n a ly s is , I b e lieve t h a t i t is K a n t's p o sitio n th a t su c h a p r in c ip le m u s t be accep ted only a s a re g u la tiv e id ea , b u t t h a t i t m u s t be a p p lie d to in te rn a l a s w ell a s e x te rn a l p u rp o siv en ess . n. R e c a ll t h a t th e p rob lem o f th e "p rin c ip le o f p u rp o s iv e m ec h an ism s" w as a s follow s: in se v e ra l p laces th ro u g h o u t K a n t's w ritin g s h e sp e a k s o f th e n ecess ity o f a s su m in g th a t o rgans, m ech an ism s, a n d o rg an ism s h a v e b een m ad e fo r som e p u rp o se or o th er. T h is is n o t th e o v e ra ll p rob lem o f teleology, i.e ., n o t th e q u e s tio n o f w hen w e a re to say t h a t so m e th in g h a s b e e n created for a p u rp o se , b u t r a th e r th e q u e s tio n o f w h e th e r a ll m ech an ism s o r o rg a n - ism s in n a tu r e a r e good for som e m o re o r le ss specific ta s k . K a n t sp e a k s of th is in d if fe re n t w ay s a n d in d iffe rin g s tre n g th s . S om etim es i t se em s th a t th is is a m e re ly re g u la tiv e id ea , w h ile a t o th e r t im e s i t seem s to b e s im p ly a fac t a b o u t n a tu r e . S om etim es i t seem s a s i f e a c h o rg a n o r m ec h an ism sh o u ld be th o u g h t to h a v e a p a r t ic u la r a n d d e fin itiv e p u rp o se w hich w ill c o n tin u a lly m ove to w a rd p e rfec tio n , w hile a t o th e r tim es i t se em s th a t th e y m u s t on ly be th o u g h t to b e a b le to be p u t to som e p u rp o se o r o th e r . A ccordingly, I o u tlin ed "s tro n g ," "m e d iu m ," a n d "w eak" v e rs io n s of th is p rin c ip le . How a re w e to de- cide am o n g th em ? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 161 In essence, I th in k th e Critique of Judgment g ives u s a r a th e r sim ple a n s w e r w hich w as, how ever, im p o ssib le for K a n t to h a v e g rasp ed before i ts w ritin g . In essence, th e so lu tio n seem s to be th a t te leo logy is only a re g u la - tiv e id ea , b u t one w hich w e m u s t t r y to u tilize in all i t s app lica tions. As we s a w above, K a n t's so lu tion to th e an tin o m y o f th e th i r d Critique ca lled fo r th e n e c e ss ita tio n o f th in k in g o f a l l n a tu r e a s i f i t h a d b e e n c a u se d in accord w ith a p u rp o se . H ence, i t is a t l e a s t d e a r th a t we m u s t th in k in te rm s o f p u r - p o ses, a n d h e re is th e ju s tif ic a tio n fo r th e ex istence o f th e "p rincip le o f p u r - p o siv e m echan ism " in som e fo rm o r o th er. T h is is a lre a d y a n im provem ent, b e c a u se i t show s th a t w e a re a b le (forced, actually ) to re ly on th is p rin c ip le e v en in cases w h e re w e c a n n o t d isc e rn an y co n firm ation d irec tly from n a tu re . B u t w hich form o f th e p r in c ip le shou ld w e accep t? To begin w ith , we h a v e a lso seen t h a t th e n o tio n o f p u rp o siv en ess can n ot b e ta k e n as c o n s titu - tiv e o f n a tu re a s a w hole, fo r K a n t a rg u e s th a t th is b a s ica lly v io la tes th e p a - ra m e te r s o f th e Critique of Pure Reason. H ence, w e a re le f t w ith tw o a l te r - n a tiv e s : e ith e r th e p rin c ip le is a reg u la tiv e one, or i t j u s t h a p p e n s to (also) be a "fa c t" abou t n a tu re . In o th e r w ords, i t c e rta in ly is a reg u la tiv e p rincip le , b u t i t m ay tu rn o u t th a t i t a lso describes som eth ing w e c a n know ab o u t n a - tu re . H ence, we m u s t a sk w h e th e r i t is a fac t ab o u t n a tu re . I a rg u ed above th a t , w ith reg a rd to th e whole o f n a tu re , th e "s trong" v e rs io n seem s m is- ta k e n , since th e re seem to b e c a se s w h e re organs or m ec h an ism s h av e no p u rp o se , p e rh a p s h a v in g developed on ly on th e "c o a tta ils" o f a n o th e r t r a i t , w h ile th e "m edium " version seem s to b e r a th e r tr iv ia l, g iven th a t we could a lw ay s th in k of som e tr iv ia l p u rp o se o r o th e r fo r a n y g iven object. I n a d d i- tio n , w e m u st rec a ll K a n t's a s se r tio n t h a t an a c tu a l "e x p la n a tio n " of th e w ay so m e th in g w orks m u s t a lw ay s b e u ltim a te ly g iven th ro u g h m echan ica l c a u - sa lity . T h is is n o t to say , how ever, t h a t som e o rg an s o r m ech an ism s m ig h t n o t re a lly have a pu rpose , a n d I th in k w e can say th is physio -m echan ica lly . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 162 A p a r t ic u la r gear on a w a tch does h a v e th e p u rp o se o f k e e p in g trac k of sec- onds. T h e h e a r t does h a v e th e p u rp o se of c irc u la tin g b lood th ro u g h o u t a body's c ircu la to ry sy s tem . Im p o rta n tly , n e ith e r o f th e s e d iscoveries could h a v e b e e n m ade in th e f i r s t p lace w ith o u t a te leo log ica l p rin c ip le . A nd i t se em s th a t we re a lly c a n ta lk a b o u t p u rp o ses h e re b e c a u se w e c an exp la in th e m , u ltim a te ly , u s in g ph y sio -m ech an ica l c a u sa lity . T h e d ifference be tw een th e w a tc h a n d th e body, how ever, o u g h t to rem in d u s o f th e d ifference b e - tw e e n th e g en era l q u e s tio n of te leo logy a n d th e q u e s tio n o f th e "princip le o f p u rp o s iv e m ech an ism s" w h ich w e a re a d d re ss in g h e re : th e g e a r w as de- s ig n e d teleologically , i.e ., th e concept o f th e w hole ( th e w a tch ) w as p a r t o f th e com ing-to-be of th e p a r t ( th e gear), w h e re a s we w ill n e v e r be ab le to know i f th e sa m e is tru e of th e h e a r t . H ence th e teleo log ical n o tio n does quite splendidly in certain areas: Of what use are the things in the world to one another? What good is the manifold in a thing to that thing itself? In- deed, we even seem to have grounds for assuming th a t nothing in the world is gratuitous, but that... everything is good for something or other in nature...1 T eleology in a ll i ts a sp ec ts is to be u s e d a s a gu ide fo r f u r th e r scien tific study , a g u id e fo r p hy sio -m ech an ica l ex p la n a tio n s . To re tu rn to th e q u es tio n o f w h ic h form o f th e "p rin c ip le o f purposive m ec h an ism s" we sh o u ld accept, I th in k th e a n sw e r i s th is : w e m u s t re g a rd th e p r in c ip le as reg u la tiv e , b u t w e m u s t t ry to a p p ly i t in every possible way to e v e ry th in g in n a tu re . T h a t is, w e m u s t re g a rd th e p r in c ip le a s being "w e ak " b u t a tte m p t to a p p ly i t in "s tro n g " a n d "m e d iu m " ap p lica tio n . W here co u ld w e d ra w th e lin e in o rd e r to s a y w h e th e r o r n o t so m e th in g h a s a p u r - pose? W e m u s t u se th e p rin c ip le o f teleo logy in o u r ju d g m e n ts , a n d th e re seem s to be no w ay w e co u ld d iscern lim ita tio n s one w a y o r th e o ther. U n fo rtu n a te ly , K a n t says v e ry l i t t le re g a rd in g specific app lica tions of th is concep t a n d I do n o t be lieve h e re a liz e d th a t th is specific m a tte r needed 1 p. 325 = Ak. 437-8. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 163 to b e d e a l t w ith a s a sp ec ia l a sp ec t of th e is su e o f teleology. H e does seem to in d ic a te t h a t i f w e w e re e v e r to fo rb id th e u se o f th e p rin c ip le in one a rea , th e n th is w ould le a d to a "s lip p e ry slope" w h ich w ou ld e v e n tu a lly e lim in a te th e p rin c ip le . In a d iscu ss io n on th e n e e d to ju d g e every h e re d i ta ry t r a i t w h ich h a s been p a s s e d dow n a s h a v in g a p u rp o se , h e w rites: For if we depart from this principle, then we cannot [even] be certain as to whether some of the other features we now find in a species did not have an equally accidental and purposeless origin. And so we could no longer with any reliability apply the principle of teleology: the principle of judging nothing in an organized being as unpurposive if it is preserved in the being's propagation. G iven t h a t w e m u s t in d e e d a p p ly th e p rin c ip le in o u r ju d g in g , K a n t's p o in t seem s e sse n tia lly to b e th is : once we m a k e a re s tr ic tio n as to th e cases w h e re th e te leo log ica l p rin c ip le c a n b e app lied , th e n th is b eg in s a c h a in , th e r e s u l t o f w h ic h is th e e lim in a tio n o f th e p rincip le . In o th e r w ords, i f w e th in k we h a v e fo u n d a m ech an ism w h ich h a s a b so lu te ly n o pu rpose , a n d w e accept th is a s a fac t, th e n w e seem to b e able to d o u b t w h e th e r o th e r m ech an ism s w h ich w e th o u g h t h a d a p u rp o se m ig h t n o t a c tu a lly h a v e a p u rp o se , a n d so on. H ow ever, i t is n o t c le a r a s to th e e x ac t n a tu r e o f th is p rob lem , a n d h e re i t a p p e a rs to be m ore o f a m o tiv a tio n a l th a n a log ica l p rob lem . K a n t h a s a lre a d y h in te d a s so m e th in g l ik e th is in th e "Id e a ," th o u g h only v ag u e ly . In d isc u ss in g th e u se o f th e "p rin c ip le o f p u rp o siv e m echan ism h e m a in ta in s th a t "i f w e s t r a y from th a t fu n d a m e n ta l p rin c ip le , w e no lo n g er h a v e a la w fu l b u t a n a im le ss ly p la y in g n a tu re a n d hope less c h an c e ta k e s th e p lace o f re a so n 's g u id in g th re a d ."2 W hile i t a p p e a rs t h a t K a n t's s ta te m e n t t h a t every m ech an ism o r o rg a n m u s t h a v e a p u rp o se 3 is too s tro n g , I th in k h is o v e ra ll p o in t is c lear: i f w e c a n n o t u se th is p r in c ip le in ou r a t te m p t to in v e s- tig a te a n d u n d e rs ta n d n a tu re , th e n w e w ou ld so c o n s tru e n a tu r e th a t w e 2 "Idea," Ak. 18. 3 Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 164 w o u ld be le f t w ith com plete chaos, u n p red ic ta b ility , a n d inconceivab ility . A n a tu r e w h ich w ould c re a te o rg a n s a n d m ech an ism s w h ich h a d no p u rp o se w o u ld be a n a tu r e so i r r e g u la r t h a t w e w ould be u n a b le to u n d e rs ta n d it. H en ce , K a n t c a n be ta k e n a s in d ic a t in g t h a t w e m u s t u s e th e p rin c ip le i f we a re e v en to b eg in ou r in v e s tig a tio n in to n a tu re , a n d t h a t w e m u s t a tte m p t to u se i t w ith a s w ide a ra n g e a s p o ss ib le . T h e on ly o th e r c lue w e h a v e a f te r th e w ritin g o f th e th ir d Critique is th is sec tio n h o rn th e Lectures on Philosophical Theology'. In the whole of organized nature it must be assumed as a necessary maxim of our reason that in every animal and plant there is not the least thing which is useless and without purpose; on the contrary, it must be assumed that every- thing contains a means best suited to certain ends. This is a principle taken for granted in the study of nature, and every experiment made has confirmed it. Setting these experiments aside, the field of discoveries would be closed to the anatomist. Hence the cultivation of our own reason urges us to assume and use this maxim.4 A gain , K a n t re a so n s th a t w e m u s t a p p ly th e concept o f te leo logy to "the w hole o f o rg an iz ed n a tu re ." T h e ju s tif ic a tio n seem s to b e th a t , since th e re is no prim a facie rea so n to lim it th e scope o f (regu la tive) te leo log ica l e x p la n a - tio n s , a n d since th e a rtif ic ia l l im itin g o f som e p a r t of a te leo log ica l e x p la n a - tio n m ig h t c u t off sc ie n tis ts fro m c e r ta in discoveries, th e p r in c ip le sh o u ld be a p p lie d to th e w hole of o rg an iz ed n a tu re . T hus, th e so lu tio n to th e prob lem seem s to b e th a t , w h ereas th e "s tro n g '' ve rsion is too s tro n g fo r th e w hole of n a tu re , a n d th e "m ed ium " v e rs io n is r a th e r spu rious, th e re do a p p e a r to be case s o f p u rp o s iv e m ech an ism s a n d o rg a n s in n a tu re , c ase s in w h ich a p h y sio -m ech an ica l e x p la n a tio n fo r th e p u rp o se c a n be g iven , a n d su ch cases se rv e to f u r th e r enforce th e a p p lic a tio n o f th e p rin c ip le o f te leo logy to a ll p o ss ib le a sp ec ts o f n a tu re . U ltim a te ly , th e no tion m u s t b e re g u la tiv e , b u t t h a t does n o t d e tra c t from i ts im p o rtan c e . 4 Lectures on Philosophical Theology, Allen W. Wood and Gerturde M. Clark, trans. (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1978). p. 138. S Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 165 in. W ith re g a rd to th e specific question c o n ce rn in g th e a p p lica tio n o f th e p rin c ip le to th e facu lty o f re a so n , o u r conclusion seem s to re m a in th e sam e, n a m e ly th a t w e c an n o t s a y fo r c e r ta in w h e th e r o r n o t re a so n w as c re a te d on accoun t of a p u rp o se . H ow ever, a s we saw in th e l a s t tw o c h a p te rs , th e re a re s tro n g e r rea so n s to th in k th a t , in fact, reaso n m ay in d e e d h a v e b e en c re a te d w ith a p u rp o se in m in d . F ir s t , i f a ll of n a tu re h a s b e e n c re a te d , o f w hich th e re is no c e rta in ty , th e n i t is rea so n w hich is th e f in a l p u rp o se o f creation . So, i f n a tu re w as in d e e d c re a te d , th e n reaso n w as c re a te d in accord w ith a p u rp o se . Second, th e re a re h in ts to be found in n a tu r e t h a t i t w as in d ee d c re a te d for h u m a n be ings. S u c h h in ts a re th e ex is ten ce o f b e au ty , th e con- t in g e n t b u t s ta b le p a r t ic u la r law s, a n d th e a b ility o f th e th re e facu ltie s of h u m a n cognition to h a rm o n iz e so w ell together. So, w h e re a s w e c an n o t know fo r c e rta in t h a t o u r re a so n w a s c re a te d w ith a p u rp o se in th e m in d o f th e c rea to r, a n d th u s K a n t se e m s to step too f a r in th o se p lac es w h e re w h en h e in s is ts th a t re a so n 's n a tu r a l e n d m u s t be m o ra lity s in c e i t w as designed a n d since i t fu n c tio n s so poorly in f in d in g h ap p in ess , n o n e th e le ss w e c an n o t lim it th e ap p lica tio n o f th e te leo log ica l p rincip le to rea so n . H ence, r e tu rn in g fo r a m om en t to th e "Id e a ," I th in k w e m u s t u l t i - m a te ly re jec t K a n t's "F i r s t T h es is ." Recall t h a t th is th e s is is th e s tro n g e s t v e rs io n of th e "p rin c ip le o f p u rp o s iv e m echan ism s" w h ich is to b e found , an d s ta te s th a t "All o f a creature's natural capacities are destined (s in d bestim m t) to develop completely and in conformity with their e n d "* I t h in k th a t th is m u s t be re jec ted , fo r i t se em s s im p ly too strong : i f i t i s ta k e n to be a fac t a b o u t n a tu re , th e n i t re m a in s unconfirm ed "by e x te rn a l a n d in te rn a l , a n a - ly tica l o bserva tion"6 a n d th e r e a p p e a r to be c o u n te rex a m p le s to w h ich we cou ld po in t. I t seem s im p o ssib le to say constitu tive ly , a s K a n t seem s to w an t to do h e re , t h a t every n a tu r a l cap ac ity will develop to perfec tion . 5 "Idea," Ak. 18. 6 Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 166 K a n t u se s th is "F i r s t T hesis" a s a r a th e r im p o r ta n t f irs t s tep in th e "Id ea ." B ecause in d iv id u a ls h av e th e fa c u lty o f rea so n , th e n th is facu lty m u s t be th o u g h t to develop to perfection . T h u s , K a n t's n e x t tw o th e se s a re th a t reaso n is to develop to perfection , b u t o n ly in th e species, a n d th a t h u - m a n k in d m u s t h a v e b e e n designed for m o ra l p u rp o se s since h u m a n re a so n is so in e p t a t th e p u r s u i t o f h ap p in ess . I t seem s t h a t i f w e re ject th e "F ir s t T hesis" w e h a v e p la c e d m u ch of th e "Id ea " i n jeo p a rd y . H ow ever, h a v in g rem oved th is th e s is a s K a n t p re se n te d it, I th in k w e c a n rep lace i t w ith th e s tro n g e r conclusions from th e Critique o f Judgment, th u s im prov ing th e a rg u m e n t. Two im p o r ta n t conclusions w ere d raw n from th e Critique, b o th o f w h ic h I d iscussed above. T h e f i r s t w as th a t w e a re forced by th e "p e c u lia r ity o f h u m a n u n d e rs ta n d in g '' to t h in k of th e w orld a n d n a tu re a s h a v in g b e e n c re a te d , tho u g h w e c a n n e v e r know th is fo r c e rta in . B ecause o f th is , w e a re m o re th a n ju s tif ie d i n u s in g th e teleological p rin c ip le w h en in v e s tig a tin g n a tu re ; w e a re re q u ire d to do so. T he second conclusion dea ls w ith th e re la tio n b e tw een n a tu re a n d h u m a n beings. K a n t gives th re e a rg u m e n ts a s to th e lik e lih o o d th a t n a tu re w ill b e responsive to m o ra l con- sidera tions: th e "u p w a rd " a n d "dow nw ard" p ro o fs ,7 a n d th e fac t th a t n a tu re conform s so w ell to th e h u m a n facu lties o f im a g in a tio n a n d u n d e rs ta n d in g . O f th ese th re e a rg u m e n ts , th e f irs t tw o seem th e m o st im p o rtan t. T he f i r s t leaves u s w ith th e fa c t t h a t i f th e w orld w as c re a te d , th e n i t w as c re a te d fo r h u m a n be ings a s r a t io n a l , m o ra l agen ts. T h e second a rg u e s from th e m o ra l law to th e n ecess ity o f God, a n d th e reb y to a n a tu r e w hich w as c re a te d by a m o ra l au th o r. A ll o f th e s e considera tions g ive s tro n g su p p o rt for th e p ro g ress o f h u m a n re a so n a n d m o ra lity . So, th e "F i r s t T h e s is" can be rep la ce d by th e s e tw o g ran d conclusions from th e th ird Critique. F irs t , K a n t can a rg u e t h a t w e a re n e c e ss ita te d in o u r th in k in g o f n a tu r e a s c rea ted , a n d m u s t th in k o f each o rgan or 7 See above: Chapters Six and Seven respectively. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 167 m ec h an ism a s h a v in g a p u rp o se , th o u g h we can n e v e r sa y th is constitu tive ly . G iven th is conclusion, K a n t c a n a rg u e th a t we can ta k e h um an rea so n to be p u rp o se fu l, a n d w e can go on to s e a rc h for w h a t t h a t p u rp o se m ig h t be. B u t m o re s trong ly , K a n t can now a rg u e t h a t h u m a n re a so n in particular o u g h t to b e conceived a s h a v in g th e p u rp o se o f p ro g ress in g to w a rd p e rfe c t m o ra lity b e ca u se o f th e s tro n g lin k s a p p a re n t be tw een n a tu r e a n d h u m a n b e in g s a s r a t io n a l c re a tu re s . M oving e i th e r from n a tu re a s d esigned , know ledge o f th e m o ra l law , th e fee lin g of th e b e a u tifu l, o r th e c o n tin g e n t b u t r e g u la r law s of n a tu re , K a n t h a s p re se n te d s tro n g ca se s for th e h u m a n species a s h a v in g b e e n d esig n ed fo r m orality . I f w e re p la c e th e "F ir s t T h es is" w ith th e se tw o conclusions, K a n t c an be sa v e d from a s ta r tin g p re m ise w h ich is too s tro n g to b e u sed , a n d h is a rg u m e n t c a n b e g iv en a s tro n g e r fo u n d a tio n . F rom th is p o in t, K a n t can c lea rly m ove on to h is su b seq u e n t c o n s id e ra tio n s , th e second a n d th ir d "T h eses" fa llin g n ice ly in lin e . T h ese tw o conclusions fro m th e Critique, o f cou rse , c a n n o t be p ro v en c o n s titu tiv e ly . H ow ever, a s I w ill t r y now to a rgue , th e "Id e a " o u g h t n o t to be th o u g h t o f a s a sp ecu la tiv e a n a ly s is o f n a tu re o r h is to ry , b u t is b e t te r th o u g h t o f a s th e o u tlin e of a n e ce ssa ry p o s tu la te of p rac tic a l rea so n ; g iven i t s n a tu re a s a p o s tu la te , th e conclusions o f th e th i r d Critique m ak e i t a very , b u t n o t excessively , s tro n g one. t Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 168 Chapter Nine The "Idea" Reexamined: Moral Progress as a Postulate of Practical Reason L I t h a s b e e n d ifficu lt fo r co m m en ta to rs to d ec id e w h a t to m ak e o f K a n t's w ork , "Id e a fo r a U n iv e rs a l H is to ry w ith a C osm opo litan In te n t ." T h is a rtic le , w ritte n th re e y e a rs a f te r th e C ritiq u e o f P u re R eason , b u t a lm o st te n y e a rs befo re "O n th e P ro v e rb : T h a t M ay be T ru e in T heory , B u t is o f No P ra c tic a l U se," p re s e n ts a p ic tu re o f a w orld h is to ry , so m ew h at like H eg e l's, in w h ich th e ac tio n s o f h u m a n a g e n ts w ill in e v ita b ly le a d , o ften tim es d e sp ite th e w ills a n d in te n tio n s o f th e se lfin te re s te d p a r t ie s , to a b e tte r cond ition , a w o rld o f h illy r a t io n a l a g e n ts a c tin g to g e th e r in a p e rfe c tly m o ra l w hole. S om e h a v e c la im ed t h a t su c h a teleo log ical n o tio n o f p ro g re ss is a p re c u rso r to H eg el, a n d fu n c tio n s a lo n g s im ila r lines. O th e rs , m o re convincingly, h a v e m a in ta in e d th a t th is p a r t ic u la r fo rm u la tio n o f te leo logy is a c ru d e no tio n o f a r e g u la tiv e idea , fu n c tio n in g in g e n e ra l for th e a s s im ila tio n of em p irica l d a ta in to a co n cep tu a l w ho le a n d , specifically , fo r th e b e t te rm e n t of th e s tu d y o f h is to ry , th o u g h th is n o tio n g e ts im proved a n d f in a liz e d in th e Critique o f Judgment. I n th is c h a p te r , I w ill a rg u e th a t th is te leo log ica l no tion of p ro g ress is , in s te a d , a p ro p o sitio n d e m a n d e d b y p rac tic a l re a so n , a n d one w hich sh o u ld b e re g a rd e d a s d isc re d ite d b y em p irica l ev id en ce on ly i f such ev idence is co m p le te ly conclusive. I w ill a rg u e th a t th is id e a a lm o s t p rec ise ly p a ra lle ls K a n t's position in th e Critique of Practical Reason r e g a rd in g th e n ecessity o f p o s tu la t in g God a n d im m o rta lity fo r th e e te rn a l im p ro v e m e n t of ra tio n a l Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 169 a g e n ts . H ow ever, because one h a s m o re ex p e rien tia l d a ta to d e a l w ith w h e n ta lk in g a b o u t th e p ro g ressio n o f th e h u m a n species on e a r th th a n w hen d e a lin g w ith th e p ro g ressio n o f th e h u m a n in d iv id u a l in a n afterlife , K a n t m u s t a t te m p t to give a m ore th o ro u g h a n d em pirica l e x p la n a tio n as to how th is "h ig h e s t good on e a r th " m ig h t com e about; a n d th is i s w h a t th e "Id ea " does. I w ill conclude b y a rg u in g t h a t a good w ay to u n d e rs ta n d how th is p o s - tu la te o f p ra c tic a l rea so n o p e ra te s is to p lace i t w ith in th e c o n tex t of K a n t's e ssay , "O n th e Proverb: T h a t M a y b e T ru e in T heory, B u t is o f N o P ra c tica l U se ." T h is c h a p te r is a co n seq u en ce o f th e foregoing c h a p te rs , a n d th u s m a n y o f th e n ecessa ry p o sitio n s h a v e a lre a d y b een a rg u e d for. I h av e a l- re a d y d isc u sse d th e m a in te n e ts o f th e "Id e a " above. I h a v e p re s e n te d K a n t's d iscu ss io n re g a rd in g th e p o s tu la te s o f p rac tic a l reaso n , a n d th e rea so n for th e ir n ecess ity . I h a v e im p ro v ed th e f i r s t "T hesis" of th e "Id e a " by rep lac in g i t w ith th e conclusions of th e t h i r d Critique. F in a lly , I h a v e a lso tr ie d to a r - g ue above b o th th a t K a n t a s s e r ts th e n ecessity fo r a n "e a r th ly " h ig h e s t good, a n d t h a t a c o n s ta n t ten s io n in h is w ritin g s h a s b een h is concern reg a rd in g how th is p o ssib ility m ig h t occur i n th e w orld. T h e "Id e a " is K a n t's in it ia l a t - te m p t to a n sw e r th is q u estio n . I t s m a in te n e ts w ill re m a in th ro u g h o u t th e r e s t o f K a n t's w ork. T h is la te r a ssu m p tio n w ill h a v e to be a rg u e d for la te r , th o u g h w e c an see a lre a d y i t is t r u e in "T heory a n d P rac tice ." n . S e v e ra l in te rp re ta tio n s fo r su c h s tra in s o f th o u g h t in K a n t's ph iloso- p h y h a v e b e e n offered by sch o la rs , e i th e r d irec tly o r in d ire c tly a d d re ss in g th e "Id e a " itse lf . A com m on e x p la n a tio n fo r th e se no tions, a s m en tio n e d above, is t h a t th e y a re a c rude p rec u rso r to a sy s te m of th o u g h t w h ich w o u ld la te r be e x p lica ted a n d g rea tly im proved b y H egel. K an t, i t m ig h t b e a rg u ed , is s e a rc h in g fo r a w ay to u n ite th e m o ra l la w w ith em p irica l in s titu tio n s of ju s tic e . K a n t's an sw er to th is , th e n , is, in p a rt , to sk e tch a p ic tu re of such a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 170 p rog ression o f p o litica l in s titu tio n s in th e "Id e a ," w here g o v e rn m en ts com e ab o u t th ro u g h n a tu re , w ith o u t th e u se o f re a so n an d in a n i r ra t io n a l , em p irica l w orld . H egel, th en , is s a id to im prove on th is p ic tu re , fo r h e is ab le to m a in ta in n o t on ly th a t th e w orld i s ra tio n a l, b u t th a t th e A b so lu te is w ork ing to w a rd s th e rea liza tio n o f re a so n in th e world. As W illiam s ex p la in s in Kant's Political Philosophy, "H egel, o f course , affords a n im p o r ta n t con- t r a s t to K a n t in th is respect. H e be lieves t h a t rea so n can be fu lf illed in p ra c - tice, a n d th is is done in th e ac tiv ity o f th e loyal c itizen w ith in th e m o d ern s ta te ".1 O n su c h a n in te rp re ta tio n , th e n , in th e "Id ea ," K a n t d e s ire s to exp la in how i t is t h a t h u m a n s can a p p ro a ch a n e ar-p erfec t g o v e rn m en t, one w hich w ill acco rd w ith th e m o ra l law b u t w h ich w ill be co n ce rn ed w ith em p irica l in s t i tu t io n s , b u t h e does n o t h a v e th e b ack g ro u n d p h ilo so p h ica l concepts n e c e ssa ry to ju s tify su c h a p ro g ressio n , a n d i t is n o t u n t i l H egel a n d h is "E th ic a l L ife" t h a t h u m a n ity a n d th e S ta te c a n bo th be fu lly r a t io n a l in th e em p iric a l w orld . A seco n d in te rp re ta tio n , p e rh a p s m ore p o p u la r a s w ell a s p la u s ib le , is th a t su c h n o tio n s a s found in th e "Id e a " fu n c tio n a s reg u la tiv e concep ts for th e im p ro v e m e n t o f th e system o f sp e cu la tiv e rea so n in g e n e ra l a n d , specifi- cally, th e b e tte rm e n t o f th e s tu d y of h is to ry . S u ch a basic p o sitio n m ig h t ru n som eth ing lik e L ew is W hite B eck's in h is "E d ito r's In tro d u c tio n " to Kant: Se- lections, w h e re h e w rites: The word Idea... here is a kind of a priori model or paradigm for w riting his- tory. The facts of history are questions for historical research by historians, b u t the long-range meaning of the facts and their significance for our under- standing of hum an nature and destiny are not questions to be answ ered by em pirical historical investigation. They are philosophical questions the 1 p. 57. Howard Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy (Oxford: Basic Blackwell Publisher Limited, 1983). See also: Manfred Buhr and Gerd Irrlitz, "Immanuel Kant," in Materialien zu Kants Rehctsphilosophie. ed. Zwi Batscha (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 1976), 102124 . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 171 answ ers to which, though conjectural, can guide research and give significance to the facts discovered by the historian... Thus the Idea is a regulative con- cept.2 In o th e r w o rd s , th e "Idea" e s tab lish es co n cep ts a b o u t th e te leo log ica l p ro g re s - sion o f h is to ry w h ich w ill allow one to b e t te r co m p reh en d e m p iric a l e v e n ts by p lac in g th e m in a correct a n d u se fu l f ra m e w o rk fo r th e a ch iev em en t o f a com plete sy s te m o f th o u g h t. T he F re n c h R ev o lu tio n or th e in v e n tio n o f th e s te am e n g in e , fo r exam ple, m ig h t be b e t te r u n d e rs to o d i f one p lac es th e s e ev en ts in a p a t te r n o f teleological p ro g re ss io n in w h ich h u m a n ity is m ov ing from p r im itiv e b eg in n in g s to th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a w orld com m unity; su ch a n a rc h ite c tu re , th e n , w ill allow one to b e t te r co m p reh en d th e o rd e rlin e ss , in fluence , a n d sign ificance of th e se e v en ts . S u c h reg u la tiv e n o tio n s a re n o t to be fo u n d in , o r v e rified by, th e p h e n o m e n a l w orld , fo r th e y a re a priori concepts e n a b lin g one to b r in g to g e th e r a m y r ia d o f d a ta w h ich w o u ld o th - erw ise re m a in a con fusing a n d d is in te g ra te d m an ifo ld . T hus, on th is ty p e of in te rp re ta t io n , th e "Id ea " fun c tio n s a s a k in d o f tem p la te , a se t o f re g u la tiv e concepts w h ic h a llow one to s tu d y h is to ry to a fu lle r ex ten t. T h e re a re sev era l v a ria tio n s o f th is ty p e o f in te rp re ta tio n to be fo u n d in th e l i te r a tu r e . Y irm iah u Yovel in h is Kant and the Philosophy o f History, for exam ple , s im ila r ly a rgues t h a t th e "Id e a " in tro d u c e s reg u la tiv e concep ts for th e in te g ra t io n o f one's sp ecu la tiv e re a s o n ,3 b u t ad d s t h a t su c h re g u la tiv e concepts a re n o t y e t fu lly u n d e rs to o d b y K a n t a t th e tim e of w r it in g th e 2 p. 413. Lewis White Beck, "Editor's Introduction,'' to Kant: Selections, ed. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing company, 1988), 413-414. 3 Cf. pp. 3-25, where Yovel is concerned with the "architectonic unity of reason." See also Chapters 3 and 4. Interestingly, Yovel also makes the link between Hegel and Kant, writing that, "It may well be that Hegel not only presented a more comprehensive and developed, but also a more coherent the- ory [than Kant]" (Kant and the Philosophy o f History, p. 24). Williams also makes such an analogy be- tween the way the "Idea" functions for history and the way other regulative concepts function for biology (p. 21), and maintains that "Kant's Critique o f Judgment sheds a great deal of light on why he thinks it important to look at history from a teleological point of view" (p. 20). See also: Friedrich Kaulbach, "Der Zusammenhand zwischen Naturphilosophie und Geschichtsphilosophie bei Kant," Kant-Studien 56, Heft 1 (1965): 430-451, and "Welchen Nutzen gibt Kant der Geschichtsphilosophie?" Kant-Studien 66 (1975): pp. 65-84. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I I. 3 172 "Id e a ." Yovel a rg u e s t h a t i t is n o t u n t i l th e w r it in g of th e Critique o f Judg- ment t h a t K a n t is a b le to s e t o u t a n d co m p le te ly co m p reh en d th e n a tu r e of re g u la tiv e concep ts in g e n e ra l, a n d te leo log ica l concepts in p a r t ic u la r ; th e "Id e a " is a ro u g h p ic tu re o f w h a t is to be p e rfe c te d on ly in th e th i r d Critique. A s Yovel p o in ts o u t, "h is to ry i s co n cep tu a lly d is t in c t from m ere ch rono logy or a chao tic a g g re g a te o f fac ts . I t s concep t p re su p p o se s a p a tte rn o f u n i ty o r to - ta liz a tio n ...," a n d h e m a in ta in s th a t i t is on ly th e th ir d Critique w h ic h p ro - v id es th e c o rre c t so r t o f e x p la n a tio n for th is fram ew o rk .4 Yovel concludes, th e n , th a t n a tu r e 's p ro v id en ce , thus becomes an a priori principle in the explanation of history, founded by pure reflection on em pirical history and on its relation to reason... Among other things, we will have the rules for selecting relevant topics for historical research, for sifting ou t contingent and incidental particulars, and no less im- portant, for discovering additional causal factors by which to supply the m iss- ing links in the chain .5 T h e "Id ea " is th e b e g in n in g o f a no tion o f re g u la tiv e concepts w h ich a re to h e lp one in th e u n if ic a tio n o f rea so n a n d th e s tu d y o f h isto ry , b u t su c h con- c ep ts a re on ly ro u g h ly c o n cep tu a lized h e re . O n accoun ts s im ila r to B eck a n d Y ovel, th e n , i t i s a rg u e d t h a t in th e th i r d Critique K a n t f in a lly u n d e rs ta n d s t h a t su ch n o tio n s fu n c tio n on ly as re g u la tiv e concepts, th a t w hile b e in g a priori, th e y on ly in s t r u c t o ne in th e p o ss ib ilitie s fo r th e o rg an iz a tio n o f 4 Yovel, Philosophy o f History, p. 166. s Ibid., p. 168. Such a quotation, and several others in the work which are similar, show, then, that even though Yovel often seems to take a position which is similar to mine, he finally concludes that Kant's notions in the "Idea" are too strong, and, when corrected and spelled out fully in the third Critique, function to help one with the study of history and the unification of reason. Yovel writes that "the Idea seems to commit a major dogmatic error. It ascribes to nature as such a hidden teleological plan, by which the to ta lity of empirical history is to be explained and predicted; but this stands in conflict with the Critique o f Pure Reason..." (pp. 154-5), and goes on to claim that the only way we can "explain that Kant so bluntly adhered to a dogmatic principle of purpose three years after the publication of the first Cri- tique" (p. 156) is to suggest that Kant simply forgot what he had earlier argued. This is rather unfortu- nate, since I think much of Yovel's work is completely on target. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 173 know ledge a n d th e sy s te m a tiz a tio n o f re a so n .6 T h ere is a n o th e r possib le a n d , indeed , m o re p ro b ab le a lte rn a tiv e , how ever. m . The ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e d e m a n d s th a t we t ry to b r in g a b o u t th e h ig h e s t good on e a r th ,7 b u t o u r d a ily ex p erien ce w ith th e w o rld su g g e s ts th a t su c h a tte m p ts w ill b e f ru s tra te d . Y e t th e h ig h e s t good is d e m a n d e d b y re a - son a n d m orality . H en ce th e h ig h e s t good m u s t in d ee d be possib le . M oreover, th e h ig h e s t good m u s t b e th o u g h t to be possib le in this w orld , no t s im p ly in som e a fte rlife . T h is, in tu rn , im p lie s th e n ecessity o f p o litica l o rg an iza tio n s8 w h e re h u m a n s ' freed o m a n d p u rs u i t o f h a p p in e s s c a n be p e rfec tly in s t i tu te d . Now , p e rh a p s , o n e m a y be in a p o sitio n to u n d e rs ta n d w hy i t is a n e c e ssa ry p o s tu la te o f p ra c t ic a l rea so n to a ssu m e t h a t th e h u m a n species w ill p ro g re ss to a p o in t o f p e rfe c t ra tio n a lity , a n d also to see w h y th is p roposition w ill n e e d to b e sp e lled o u t i n a s lig h tly d iffe ren t w ay fo r th is w orld th a n i t w o u ld b e fo r a w o rld o f im m o rta l souls. I f i t is a d u ty to p u rsu e th e h ig h e s t good in th is w orld , w e m u s t a s k a fte r th e cond itions u n d e r w hich 6 Pierre Laberge seems to offers us a third possibility, namely that Kant did indeed understand and adhere to the limits set by himself in the first Critique, and even anticipated much of the third Cri- tique, but ultimately concludes that the "Idea" concerns only a "theoretical, reflective judgment," and that it outlines only "a special instance of the development of natural aptitudes of all organized beings," (p. 151, all translations mine). But Laberge contradicts himself, for he later cites the "Idea" several times as supporting and even predating important aspects of "To [ward] Perpetual Peace" which he specifically indicates are tied with the "duty" to promote peace, and thus tied with practical and not merely theoretical reason. Thus, if we opt for his latter statements, he seems to support an interpretation of the "Idea" where it no longer deals only with speculative teleology. See: Pierre Laberge, "Von der Garantie des ewigen Friedens," 149-170. 71 have tried to argue throughout this work that there are two locations for the highest good. For additional supportive material, see: Andrews Reath, "Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant"; Philip J. Rossi, "The Final End of All Things: The Highest Good as the Unity of Nature and Freedom," in Kant's Philosophy o f Religion Reconsidered, ed. Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), 77-102; Victoria S. Wike, Kant on Happiness in Ethics, Chapters One and Six; and Yirmiyahu Yovel, "The Interests of Reason: From Metaphysics to Moral History," in Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1986), 135-148. 8 This was discussed in Chapters Three. Four, and Seven above, and will be argued for again in greater detail below. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 174 th is is possible, i f i t is p o ss ib le a t a ll. O ne m ig h t a sk , W hy sh o u ld I a tte m p t to p u rsu e th e h ig h e s t good in th is w orld i f n o t on ly w ill I n o t be ab le to achieve perfec t m o ra lity in th is lifetim e, b u t, im p o rtan tly , n a tu r e a lso does n o t re w a rd m o ra l p e rso n s w ith p ro p o rtio n a te h a p p in e ss? I f th is q u estio n c an n o t be p ro p erly a n sw e re d , K a n t b e lieves t h a t a co n trad ic tio n w ill occur w ith in th e m o ra l law . I t can be se e n in m a n y of K a n t's w ritin g s , from th e "Id ea " th ro u g h The Conflict o f the Faculties, t h a t h e b e liev ed in th e necessity o f av o id in g su c h a con trad ic tion . F o r in s tan c e , in th e "Id ea" K a n t w rites : For w hat use is i t to laud and recommend observing the m ajesty and wisdom of creation in the nonrational realm of nature , if th a t p a rt of the great theatre of supreme wisdom th a t contains the purpose of all the res t - the history of the hum an race -should rem ain an endless reproach to it, the sight of which com- pels us against our wills to tu rn our eyes aw ay from it and, since we despair of ever finding a perfectly rational objective in it, brings us to the point o f hoping for that end only in another worldT9 I n "W h a t is O rie n ta tio n in T h in k in g ," w r it te n in 1786, K a n t s ta te s t h a t th e m o ra l law s lead... to the idea o f the highest good th a t is possible in the world... and on the other hand, they also lead to something which depends not ju st on hum an freedom, b u t also on n a tu re -namely the g rea test happiness, in so far as its distribution is proportionate to th a t of m orality. Now reason needs to assum e [this]... in order... to prevent the [highest good], along w ith m orality as a whole, from being regarded merely as an ideal...10 F in a lly , a s a la s t ex am p le , K a n t w rites, in 1798, in The Conflict o f the Facul- ties, t h a t " i t is a v a in a ffa ir to h av e good so a l te rn a te w ith ev il th a t th e w hole tra ffic o f o u r species w ith i ts e l f on th is globe w ou ld h av e to be c o n sid e red a s a m ere farc ica l com edy, fo r th is c a n endow o u r species w ith no g re a te r v a lu e ... 9 Ak. 30. Italics added for emphasis. 10 pp. 242-3. Immanuel Kant "What is Orientation in Thinking?" in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1991). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 175 th a n th a t w hich o th e r a n im a l species possess..."11 T h e q u e s tio n a b o u t th e possib le fu til i ty o f a l l m o ra l ac tio n s m u s t be an sw e red , a n d th is a n sw e r m u s t ta k e th e form of p o s tu la te s o f p ra c tic a l rea so n i f re a so n is n o t to be p lag u e d w ith doub ts a n d c o n tra d ic tio n .12 Two p o s tu la te s , th e n , a re needed , w h ich a re an a lo g o u s to th e p o s tu - la te s o f im m o rta lity a n d God. T h e f irs t, n a tu re a s w o rk in g p ro v id en tia lly , fu n c tio n s an a lo g o u sly to th e p o s tu la te o f th e ex is ten ce o f G od in th e second Critique. I t is n o t G od per se w h ich allow s th e h u m a n sp ec ies to develop th e ir cap ac itie s to th e fu lle s t, b u t p ro v id e n tia l n a tu r e ,13 u til iz in g m a n 's u n so c ia l sociab ility to develop m a n 's ta le n ts ; "such a justification o f n a tu r e -o r b e tte r , o f providence - is n o u n im p o r ta n t m otive fo r a d o p tin g a p a r t ic u la r p e rsp ec - tiv e in observ ing th e w orld ."14 B u t a second p o s tu la te , sim ila r to th e im m or- ta l i ty o f th e in d iv id u a l, i s n e e d e d so th a t one m a y ho p e fo r th e ach iev em en t o f pe rfec t m o ra lity . C lea rly , a p e rfe c t w illing obedience to th e m o ra l la w is n o t possib le fo r th e in d iv id u a l in a sing le life. H ow ever, i t m a y b e possib le fo r th e h u m a n species a s a w hole, a n d i t is th is a ssu m p tio n w h ich p ra c tic a l re a so n adop ts. T a lk in g a b o u t th e sacrifices one g e n e ra tio n m a k e s fo r th e n ex t, K a n t w rites , "no m a t te r how p u zz lin g th is is , i t is n o n e th e le ss eq u a lly a s n ecessa ry once one a s su m e s th a t one species o f anim al s h o u ld h a v e rea so n a n d th a t a s a c la ss o f ra t io n a l b e in g s -each m em b er o f w h ic h d ies, w h ile th e species is im m o rta l -i t i s d e s tin e d to develop i ts c ap a c itie s to p e rfec tio n ."15 W h erea s one c a n n o t becom e p e rfec tly m o ra l o n e se lf in a life tim e , th e h ig h e s t 11 p. 147. Immanuel Kant, The Conflict o f the Faculties, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Lincoln: Uni- versity of Nebraska Press, 1979). 12 We will have opportunity to discuss the exact nature of this "contradiction" of reason below, in Section Two, Chapter Five. 13 See Section Two, Chapter Six below. 14 "Idea," Ak. 30. For more on the possible attributes of providence, see: Leslie A. Mulholland , "Freedom and Providence in Kant's Account of Religion: The Problem of Expiation," in Kant's Philosophy o f Religion Reconsidered, ed. Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen, (Bloomington and Indian- apolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), 77-102. 15 Ibid. Ak. 20. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 176 good c an be c o n tin u a lly a p p ro x im a te d i f p ro v id e n tia l n a tu re b r in g s i t a b o u t t h a t society ap p roaches a s ta te w h e re th e sp ec ies is p e rfec tly r a t io n a l a n d m o ra l, a n d each p e rso n is ab le to p u rs u e h is o r h e r ow n h a p p in e ss w ith o u t in f r in g in g u p o n th e freedom o f o th e rs . As K w a n g -S a e L ee ex p re sse s it, K ant conceives a definite analogy betw een m oral progress... a t the level o f the individual and th a t a t the level o f world history tow ards the h ighest good... If a t the individual level, the h ighest good is (or projects) the synthesis of th e in - tention and the hope of th e m oral man, a t the level of the en tire hum an spe- cies, it embodies (or projects) th e total m obilization of hum an history th rough the cumulative efforts of generations of hum an ity .16 M o ra lity , a s d iscussed above, n e c e ssa r ily im p lie s p o litics , a n d p o litics le a d s to th e p u r s u i t o f th e h ig h e s t good fo r a l l p e rso n s in a society . P e rfec t m o ra lity c an on ly occur in a w o rld w ith a j u s t co m m o n w ealth , a p e rfec t n a tio n a l co n - s t i tu t io n , a n d a cosm opolitan a sso c ia tio n o f n a tio n s . In f in ite p ro g ress io n is in d e e d possib le in th is w orld , th o u g h n o t fo r th e in d iv id u a l, a n d su c h a cos- m o p o litan w orld "is th e re fo re th e h a rd e s t t a s k o f a il, in d eed , i t s p e rfec t so lu - tio n is im possib le; from su ch w a rp e d wood a s is m a n m ad e , n o th in g s t r a ig h t c an b e fash io n ed . N a tu re on ly e n jo in s u s to th e a p p ro x im a tio n o f th is id e a ."17 T h e question soon a r is e s , n o n e th e le ss , a s to h o w th e p o ss ib ility o f th e s e tw o p o s tu la te s o f p ra c tic a l re a s o n m ig h t b e a t te s te d to in th e w orld , how th e perfec tion o f re a so n in th e species is conceivab le , espec ia lly g iven th a t n a tu r e seem s to b e u n c o o p e ra tiv e in re w a rd in g v ir tu o u s b eh av io r. H e re , K a n t can , o r p e rh a p s m u s t, o ffe r a m o re d e ta ile d a cc o u n t re g a rd in g th is p o ss ib ility th a n h e cou ld w ith th e p o s tu la te o f im m o rta l i ty o f th e in d iv id u a l; g iven th a t one se t o f p o s tu la te s c o n ce rn s th e re a lm o f e m p irica l n a tu r e a n d t h a t th e o th e r se t, a s e m p h a s iz e d in th e second Critique, concerns som e 15 p. SS3. Kwang-Sae Lee, "Some Reflections on the Idea of the Highest Good as a Regulative Idea of Pure Practical Reason," in Akten des Siebenten Intemationalen Kant-{Congresses, ed. Gerhard Funke, Band II.2 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1990), 551-561. '' "Idea." Ak. 23. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 177 d o m ain o f w hich p e rso n s h av e h a d a n d w ill hav e no p o ss ib le experience , i t is poss ib le to f le sh o u t th e p o ss ib ility o f p rogression of th e h u m a n species w ith m ore d e ta il th a n th e im m o rta lity o f th e soul. H e m u st, how ever, a n sw e r th is q u e s tio n u s in g on ly n a tu r a l la w s a n d em p irica l d a ta , in o rd e r to re m a in tru e to th e f i r s t Critique. A s d iscu ssed above, K a n t's d e ta ile d accoun t o f how th is p ro g ressio n m ig h t b e possib le is p re s e n te d in th e "Idea" a n d h a s to do w ith th e u nsoc ia l so c iab ility o f in d iv id u a ls a n d th e p ro v id en tia l m ovem en t o f n a tu re . O n e c an - n o t e x p la in how a p e rso n (or t r a n s c e n d e n ta l ego) re m a in s im m o rta l, b u t one c an give som e con jectu res a s to h o w h u m a n rea so n m ig h t p ro g re s s to w a rd p e rfec tio n . W h a t is im p o rta n t to n o te , how ever, is t h a t th e p o s tu la t in g o f th is p ro g re ss io n s tem s from th e a u th o r i ty o f th e m ora l law , a n d is n o t a c la im of sp e cu la tiv e re a so n .18 S ee in g th is connection b e tw een m o ra lity a n d politics, a n d th e p lac e th a t th e p u r s u i t o f th e h ig h e s t good occupies in K a n t's ph iloso- ph y , i t m a y now be firm ly p o s ite d t h a t the progress o f the hum an raze is a necessary postulate o f practical reason. IV. O ne m ay conclude, th e n , t h a t th o u g h K a n t does n o t s a y so explicitly , th e a c tu a l d e ta ils o f how th e p ro g re ss io n of th e species is p o ss ib le m a y in d eed be m is ta k e n , b u t th e fa c t t h a t th e h u m a n species is p ro g re s s in g is a p o s tu la te n e c e ss ita te d b y p u re p ra c tic a l re a so n . In o rder to a d d re ss th is is su e m ore th o ro u g h ly , I w a n t to ex am in e a w o rk w hich K a n t p u b lis h e d n in e y e a rs a fte r th e "Id e a ," n am e ly "T heo ry a n d P ra c tic e ,"19 especially th e t h i r d e s sa y w hich 18 Kant writes in the Grundlegung: "Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends; morals regards a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In the former the kingdom of ends is a theo- retical idea for explaining what exists. In the latter it is a practical idea for bringing about what does not exist but can be made actual by our conduct, i.e., what can be actualized in accordance with this very idea" (Ak. 436 n.). 19 Immanuel Kant, "On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, But Is of No Practical Use," in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Moral Practice, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Inc.. 1983). 61-92. All citations refer to Akademie page numbers. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 178 deals specifica lly w ith "th e w e ll-b e in g of th e human race a s a w ho le ."20 T he id ea o f th e c o n tin u a l p ro g ress io n o f th e h u m a n species ag a in com es to th e fore a s K a n t a tte m p ts to d ia lo g u e w ith M oses M en d e lsso h n re g a rd in g th e n a - tu re of th e developm en t of h u m a n h is to ry , a n d one m a y be ab le to g e t an even c le a re r p ic tu re as to how K a n t in te n d s u n iv e rs a l h is to ry to f i t w ith th e re s t o f h is ph ilo sophy . K a n t b e g in s th e th i r d sec tio n o f "T heo ry a n d P rac tice" by in d ic a tin g th a t th e a ssu m p tio n of a u n iv e rs a l h is to ry is m ad e fo r m o ra l re a so n s . M en- de lssohn w a s o f th e opin ion t h a t th e h um an species n e v e r p ro g ressed , th a t no m a tte r how h a r d i t m ig h t a t te m p t to ac t v irtu o u sly , h is to ry s ta c k e d th e deck a g a in s t h u m a n ity . K a n t m a in ta in s th a t su ch a supposition , for a while m ay perhaps be moving and instructive, bu t the cu rta in m ust fi- nally fall. For in the long ru n i t becomes a farce... To be sure, if it is only a play, the punishm ent th a t comes a t the end can m ake up for the unpleasant sensations experienced along the way. But allowing vice to m ount upon end- less vice in the real world (even w ith an occasional virtuous act interjected) so th a t in days to come there can be plenty to punish is, to say the least, contrary to our conception of the m orality of a wise creator and governor o f the world.21 N ote th a t ev en i f in th e a fte rlife , o r ana logously a f te r th e p lay is over, a ll im - m o ra l ac tio n s a re p u n ish ed , K a n t m a in ta in s th a t th is is n o t e n o u g h to ju s tify a llow ing vice to m o u n t upon vice, n o r is i t a n a d e q u a te reaso n fo r p u rsu in g th e h ig h e s t good on e a rth . A s w a s a llu d e d to above, K a n t b e liev ed th a t i f h is - to ry is s a id to a c t a lw ays re g a rd le s s o f m o ra l actions, even i f one's m o ra lity is rew ard e d in th e a fterlife , life in th is w orld w ould be fa rc ica l.22 T h is is im por- t a n t b ecau se i t show s ag a in t h a t K a n t is n o t only concerned w ith th e possib il- i ty o f w illing a m o ra l life for oneself, fo r sim ply ac tin g v ir tu o u s ly o n one's ow n w ith th e r a t io n a l hope t h a t su c h actions w ill be re w a rd e d in d iv id u a lly in 20 "Theory and Practice," Ak. 277. 21 Ibid., Ak. 308. 22 See also the "upward" proof of the third Critique discussed in Chapter Six above. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 179 th e a fte rlife . K a n t is a lso concerned w ith th e im p ro v em en t o f th is w orld , w ith th e p o ss ib ility o f b r in g in g ab o u t th e h ig h e s t good on th is p la n e t, a n d for su ch a good to occur, one m u s t p resu m e m ore th a n one's ow n re w a rd in th e a fte rlife . K a n t follow s th is im p o r ta n t p a ra g ra p h w ith a n o th e r . H e w rite s : I will thus perm it m yself to assume th a t since the h u m a n race's n a tu ra l end is to m ake steady cultural progress, its m oral end is to be conceived as pro- gressing tow ard the better... I t is not necessary for me to prove th is assum p- tion... For I res t my case on my innate duty - a duty belonging to everyone in the sequence of generations to which... I belong,... the duty so to affect poster- ity th a t it will become continually be tter (something th a t m ust be assum ed to be possible)...23 In th is p a ra g ra p h , K a n t c lea rly re fe rs n o t to som e p re m ise of th e o re tic a l o r sp ecu la tiv e know ledge fo r th e ju s tif ic a tio n o f h u m a n p ro g ress , b u t to m o ra l p rin c ip le s a n d p u re p ra c tic a l reason . K a n t "re s ts h is ca se " on du ty , n o t on theo ry . H e even concludes th a t , however uncertain I m ay always be, and may rem ain, as to w hether we m ay hope any th ing b e tte r for the hum an race, yet this uncertain ty can d e trac t nei- ther from the maxim th a t from a practical point of view it is a tta inab le , nor from the presupposition of its necessity.24 P ro g ress is a m ax im w hich , w ith o u t com plete ly conclusive evidence to th e co n tra ry , m u s t be ju d g e d a s "a tta in a b le " a n d is a n e ce ssa ry "p re su p p o s itio n " "from a p ra c tic a l p o in t o f v iew ." T hese s ta te m e n ts seem to m ak e i t c le a r t h a t K a n t is b a s in g th e p ro g ress io n of h u m a n perfec tion on p ra c tic a l re a so n a n d th o se p o s tu la te s w h ich a re n ecessa ry for f a i th in th e m o ra l law . In d e e d , in th e n e x t p a ra g ra p h , K a n t goes on to c la im th a t w ith o u t su ch a su p p o s itio n one cou ld n o t "ra t io n a lly h ope" for en lig h ten m en t, a n d w rite s th a t , 23 "Theory and Practice." Ak. 309. 24 Ibid., Ak. 309. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 181) empirical argum ents against the success of these resolutions, which are based on hope, fail here. For the argum ent th a t som ething h as until now been unsuccessful and therefore shall never be successful does not justify abandoning even a pragm atic or technical in ten tion (for exam ple, travel by aerostatic ba l- loons), m uch less a morally obligatory one, unless, o f course, its a tta in m en t is dem onstrably impossible.25 H e re K a n t s t r e s s e s m o ra lly ob liga to ry in te n t io n s over p ra g m a tic a n d te c h n i- c a l ones, a n d n o te s a g a in th a t su c h a p ro g re ss io n is a h o p e , p re su m a b ly a r a - t io n a l hope o f p u r e p ra c tic a l reason . I t is o f im p o r ta n c e to n o te t h a t i t is o n ly h e re , a f te r s ta t in g th e p lace a n d n ecessity o f p o s tu la tin g th e p ro g re ss io n o f h u m a n m o ra l p erfec tion , t h a t K a n t a tte m p ts to e x p la in how su c h a p ro g re s s io n m ig h t b e possib le . H e e x - p la in s , in th e s a m e v e in as th e "Id e a " th a t , I f we now inquire as to the m eans by which th is e te rn a l progress tow ards b e t- term ent can be m aintained and perhaps even sped up, one soon sees th a t th is im m easurably d istan t result depends no t so m uch on w hat we do... nor on w hat m ethod we adopt so as to b ring it about; instead, it depends on w hat hum an nature does in and with us so as to compel us onto a path that we our- selves would not readily follow.26 In th is p a ra g ra p h a n d th e two th a t follow , K a n t se ts o u t a n accoun t o f ho w th e h u m a n sp ec ie s m ig h t p rog ress w h ic h fo llow s a lo n g m u c h th e sam e l in e s a s th e e x p la n a tio n in th e "Idea ." B asica lly , m a n 's u n so c ia l soc iab ility w ill le a d h im to c u lt iv a te h is sk ills a n d ta le n ts , b u t th e c o n s ta n t a n d in c re a s in g ly v io le n t s tru g g le b e tw e e n persons a n d n a t io n s w ill le a d m a n to seek a p e rp e t- u a l peace . T h is c o n tin u a l m ovem ent is a g a in s a id to b e e n a c te d th ro u g h selfco n ce rn a n d n o t n e ce ssa rily a d esire to b r in g a b o u t a m o ra l com m unity . A fter e x p la in in g a n d sp e llin g o u t h o w p ro g re ss io n m ig h t ta k e p lace , K a n t e n d s b o th th e sec tion a n d th e n th e a r t ic le b y s ta t in g exp lic itly t h a t h is e x p la n a tio n m a y b e m is tak en . H e b e g in s th e l a s t p a ra g r a p h o f h is th i rd 25 Ibid., Ak. 309-10. 26 Ibid.. Ak. 310. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. \ -t 181 section o f "T h eo ry a n d P rac tice" by w ritin g : "M eanw hile , th is is only op in ion a n d m e re hypo th esis a s u n c e r ta in a s a ll ju d g m en t c la im in g to se t o u t th e slow a p p ro p r ia te n a tu ra l c a u se fo r a n in te n d e d effect th a t is n o t e n tire ly in o u r po w er."27 T h is quo ta tion , a lo n g w ith o th e rs in th is piece, seem s to su p p o r t th e above h y p o th esis t h a t K a n t is try in g to give a n accoun t o f ho w th e p e rfe c tio n o f th e h u m a n sp ec ies m ig h t be possible, one w hich c an be m u ch m o re d e ta ile d th a n th e a cc o u n t o f im m o rta lity fo r th e in d iv id u a l, b u t a n acco u n t w hich , no n e th e le ss , s te m s from a p o s tu la te o f p ra c tic a l re a so n a n d w h ic h cou ld be m is ta k e n in th e d e ta ils , th o u g h th e concept m u s t be re ta in e d . In th e fin a l p a ra g ra p h o f th e w ork h e m a in ta in s th a t , for my own part, I place my tru s t in the theory about w hat the relation am ong m en and nations ought to be th a t derives from the principle of right and th a t recommends to the earth ly gods the maxim always so to proceed in th e ir con- flicts th a t such a universal cosmopolitan nation will thereby be introduced, and th u s to assum e tha t it is possible (in praxi) and tha t it can exist.2* O nce a g a in i t seem s th a t K a n t is m a k in g th e fin a l ap p ea l to m o ra lity to j u s - tify h is b e lie f in th e h u m a n species a n d i ts h isto ry . H e h a s a fa i th in p ro - g ress io n fo r rea so n s of w h a t o u g h t to be, for w h a t shou ld be possib le in p ra c - tice. H is acco u n t of how th is p ro g re ss io n is in s ta n tia te d m ay b e m ere h y - p o th es is , b u t th e be lief in i t s p o ss ib ility is a p o stu la te o f p ra c tic a l re a so n .29 V. Conclusion: I b e lieve th a t K a n t's "Id e a fo r U n iv e rsa l H isto ry w ith a C osm opo litan In te n t" i s a n e sse n tia l co m p o n en t in K a n t's ph ilosophical system , a n d t h a t i t gives n e w d e p th a n d u n d e rs ta n d in g to K a n t's m oral a n d po litica l ph ilo sophy . 27 Ibid., Ak. 311-12. 28 Ibid., Ak. 313. 29 "Here, therefore, is a proposition valid for the most rigorous theory, in spite of all skeptics, and not just a well-meaning and practically commendable proposition: the human race has always been in progress toward the better and will continue to be so henceforth." Conflict o f the Faculties, p. 159. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 182 "T heo ry a n d P rac tice" p ro v id es a n ex ce llen t ex am p le of how K a n t expects h is concepts of a u n iv e rsa l h is to ry to be in te g ra te d in to h is ph ilosophy , th o u g h o th e r te x ts su ch a s "W h a t is o rien ta tio n in T h in k in g?" a n d "Is th e H u m a n R ace C o n tin u a lly Im prov ing?" also affo rd one in s ig h ts in to th e p lace a n d fu n c tio n K a n t in te n d s th e concep ts in v o lv ed in th e "Id ea" to h av e . As w as show n above, in h is d e b a te w ith M endelssohn , K a n t does n o t a p p ea l p r im a r - ily to n a tu re , reg u la tiv e id e a s , o r em p irica l h is to ry in o rd er to ju s tify h is p o s i- tion . R a th e r , tim e a n d tim e a g a in h e m a k e s a n a p p e a l to m o ra lity , a n d to th e fu til i ty w hich w ould r e s u l t fro m th e re jec tio n o f th e id ea o f th e p ro g ress of h u m a n beings. R ecall a lso t h a t h e m ak e s su c h a c la im d esp ite th e fac t th a t im m o rta lity fo r th e in d iv id u a l h a s been p o s tu la te d , a n d th a t one m ay in d e e d expect re w a rd fo r v ir tu e in a n afterlife . I t is im p o r ta n t for K a n t's sy s tem to p o s it a p rog ression so t h a t p e rso n s m ay p u r s u e th e h ig h e s t good fo r th is w orld . I t is only a fte r su c h ju s tif ic a tio n h a s b e e n m ad e th a t K a n t a tte m p ts to sp e ll o u t how a p ro g ressio n m ig h t occur, a f te r w h ich h e m a in ta in s th a t such a d escrip tio n is m ere h y p o th es is . T he "Id e a " seem s b est accoun ted for in th e m a n n e r p re se n te d above, n a m e ly th a t i t i s a p o s tu la te of p u re p rac tica l r e a - son, one th a t m u s t be e n d o rse d i f one is to p u rs u e th e h ig h e s t good in th is w orld, b u t one th a t m ig h t b e sp e lled o u t in d iffe ren t w ays. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I 183 Chapter Ten Evaluation and Transition L T h e tra d itio n o f K a n t sc h o la rsh ip h a s te n d e d to s e p a ra te a n d iso la te se v e ra l a sp ec ts o f K a n t's ph ilo so p h y , k e e p in g m o ra l, teleological, po litica l, an d , often , re lig io u s c o n s id e ra tio n s a p a r t fro m one an o th e r. P e rh a p s th e y a re try in g to sav e som e a sp ec ts o f K a n t 's p h ilo so p h y by c u tt in g o u t o th e r p a r ts w h ich m ay n o t be a s p a la ta b le . M o ra lity m ay be m o re a p p e a lin g i f i t is n o t b o u n d u p w ith re lig ious im p lic a tio n s . T eleology m ig h t be m ore accep t- ab le a s a m ere a id to science th a n a n in d ic a tio n th a t th e h u m a n species m ay h a v e b een c re a te d fo r a f in a l p u rp o se b y a m o ra l a u th o r. A n d w ho w a n ts to a s s e r t th e p ro p o sitio n th a t h u m a n b e in g s a re m o ra lly im p ro v in g in f ig h t of su ch tra g ic e v en ts a s th e H o locaust? I t is p o ss ib le , how ever, t h a t su ch iso la - tio n is m ere ly a r e s u l t o f th e n e e d fo r specific a re a s of re se a rc h in K an t. R eg ard le ss o f th e m o tiv a tio n b e h in d tra d itio n a l K a n t sch o la rsh ip , I h av e tr ie d to a rg u e above th a t m a n y a sp e c ts o f i t seem to be m is ta k en , a n d th a t K a n t b e liev ed th e re to b e s tro n g c o n n ec tio n s b e tw een a ll a sp ec ts o f h is ph ilosophy . I f m y a n a ly se s h a v e b e e n co rrec t, K a n t in te n d s h is m o ra l p h i- losophy to su p p o r t a n d h a rm o n ize w ith a ll o th e r "m etap h y sica l" c o n s id e ra - tions. T h ro u g h o u t a ll o f h is w ritin g s , K a n t w a s concerned w ith th e d ig n ity o f th e h u m a n c re a tu re a n d th e p lace o f re a so n in th e world. T h is c h a p te r p ro v id es a t r a n s i t io n b e tw e e n Section O ne a n d Two, a n d is d iv id ed in to th re e p a r ts . I n th e f i r s t p a r t , I t r y to briefly su m m arize th e im p o rta n t p o in ts o f th e above c h a p te rs , a n d m en tio n th e ir d ifference to som e Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ii?■fc 184 tra d itio n a l a sp ec ts o f K a n t sc h o la rsh ip . A ll o f th e se th em es w ill be su p p o r te d a g a in in S ec tion Two, th o u g h w ith m o re specific co nsidera tions. In th e second p a r t , I d irec tly en g ag e w h a t I ta k e to b e m is ta k e n p o sitio n s in th e secondary l i te ra tu re w ith r e g a rd to th e conclusions I h av e re a c h e d so f a r in th is section . I th in k th is is im p o r ta n t n o t on ly b ecause i t m ay h e lp to co rrec t w h a t seem to b e m is in te rp re ta tio n s o f K a n t's ph ilosophy , b u t a lso b ecau se , in so doing, m y ow n po sitio n w ill be c la rif ied . F in a lly , in th e th ird p a r t , I s a y a few w ords in tra n s it io n to S ection Two. n. L et m e beg in by e m p h a s iz in g som e p o in ts w hich o u g h t to be c le a r a t th is s ta g e in th e w ork. F irs t , I a rg u e d t h a t K a n t h a d a c lea r concep tion a s to th e lim its of th e em p loym en t of te leo log ica l id e a s . K a n t is d e a r on th is from th e f i r s t th ro u g h th e th ird Critique, th o u g h , o f course, th e th ird Critique of- fe rs m an y n ew in s ig h ts . A ssoc ia ted w ith th is fac t is th e a p p a re n t te n s io n in th e Critique o f Pure Reason b e tw een w h a t c a n be considered a s knowledge a n d w h a t K a n t th in k s w e o u g h t (m orally ) to h o p e for. I c an n o t k n o w t h a t n a - tu re w ill be resp o n siv e to m o ra l w illin g a n d action , b u t I hope th a t i t w ill. Second, I a rg u e d in m y d iscussion o f each o f th e th re e Critiques t h a t th e re a re tw o loca tions for th e h ig h e s t good. T h e f i r s t is a n "o therw orld ly" loca tion , co rre sp o n d in g to th e p o s tu la te s of G od a n d im m o rta lity . T he second is a n "e a r th ly " loca tion . T hese d iffe ren t a sp e c ts seem to h a rm o n ize w ell in th e follow ing po w erfu l s ta te m e n t by K an t: Teleology considers n a tu re as a kingdom of ends; morals regards a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of na tu re . In the former the kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea for explaining w hat exists. In the la tte r it is a practical idea for bringing about w hat does not exist b u t can be made actual by our conduct, i.e., w hat can be actualized in accordance w ith this very idea.1 1 Grundlegung. Ak. 436 n. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 185 T h ese th re e a sp ec ts o f K a n t's th in k in g , teleology, th e ten s io n betw een know ledge a n d hope, a n d th e tw o locations of th e h ig h e s t good com bine for a p o w erfu l new in te rp re ta t io n o f th e "Id e a for a U n iv e rsa l H isto ry w ith a C osm opolitan In te n t ." A s I s ta te d above, in it ia l ly i t m ay seem d ifficu lt to know how to a n a - lyze th e "Id ea ." B u t i f w e accep t K a n t's u n w a v e rin g b e lie f in a n d defense of th e m o ra l law a n d th e m a je s ty o f reaso n , a n d we c o n s id e r th e above th re e a s - p ec ts o f K a n t's th in k in g , I th in k a n in te rp re ta t io n em erg es . I f K a n t be lieved t h a t th e m o ra l la w w as t h a t a sp ec t o f h u m a n ex is ten ce w h ich alone b ro u g h t v a lu e to th e h u m a n species, i f h e h o ped th a t n a tu r e m ig h t in d eed su p p o rt m o ra l w illing a n d action , a n d i f h e believed in a n e a r th ly h ig h e s t good a s th e n e c e ssa ry object o f a ll m o ra l w illing , th e n i t w ould seem t h a t th e "Id ea " is a n a tu r a l fo rum for K a n t to b r in g th e se aspec ts to g e th e r . K a n t h a s to defend m o ra l p ro g ress a n d th e p o ss ib ility o f th e h ig h es t good on e a r th , a n d h e h a s to do so w ith in th e lim its o f th e f i r s t Critique. H e does th is w ith h is n in e "T h e se s ." L e t u s a d d m ore b a c k g ro u n d to th is em erg in g p ic tu re . I a rg u e d above t h a t m o ra l w illing c an be in f lu e n c e d b y em pirica l con d itio n s. T his is n o t to sa y t h a t i t can be d e te rm in e d by th e se conditions, fo r m o ra l w illing is a lw ays free , b u t only to say th a t K a n t ag rees w ith th e com m on in tu it io n th a t ad v erse co n d itio n s som etim es m a k e i t d ifficu lt to w ill in acco rd w ith th e m o ra l law . B u t i f th is is so, a n d i f w e a re to hope for a c o n tin u a l im p ro v em en t o f every p e rso n 's m orality , th e n i t seem s w e h av e a d u ty to e lim in a te those cond itions w h ich m o st h in d e r th e p o ss ib ility of m o ra l im p ro v em en t. K a n t is d e a r in a ll o f h is w ritin g s th a t th is is th e re sp o n sib ility o f p o litica l in s titu tio n s . I t is th e fo rm a tio n of a S ta te w ith a p e rfe c t (in te rn a l) c o n s titu tio n w hich , in tu rn , p a r t ic ip a te s in a cosm opo litan w hole o f rep u b lican n a tio n s th a t allows fo r th e m o ra l p ro jec t to beg in in e a rn e s t . I sh a ll d iscuss th is ro le o f po litica l in s t i tu - tio n s in m uch g re a te r d e ta il below . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. II \ 186 I f th is w ere n o t en ough , K a n t's d iscussion o f th e u ltim a te a n d f in a l p u rp o se o f n a tu re in th e Critique of Judgment show s u s w hy K a n t is so a d a m a n t ab o u t th e n e e d fo r m o ra l p rog ress. H u m a n ex istence on e a r th would, b e com plete ly w ith o u t v a lu e if m o ra lity c o u ld n o t im prove. N ot s im p ly th e e x is ten ce of th e m o ra l law , b u t th e ab ility o f th e h u m a n species a s a w ho le to m orally im prove th ro u g h o u t h is to ry is w h a t gives existence i ts w o rth . T h u s , m oral p ro g ress o f th e h u m a n species in h is to ry is c ruc ia l for K a n t, e v e n th o u g h w e c a n n e v e r h av e c e r ta in know ledge o f such p ro g ress . H ow ever, K a n t believes t h a t th e conclusions o f th e th ir d Critique offer u s in c re a s e d h o p e for th is possib ility ; th e "u p w a rd " proof, th e s ta n d a rd "d o w n w ard " proof, a n d th e d iscussion o f b e a u ty a ll give fu r th e r con firm ation of th e p o ss ib le l in k b e tw een th e m o ra l a n d n a tu r a l "w orlds." T hese conclusions, com bined w ith h is d iscussion o f "c u ltu re ," allow for a ra t io n a l hope t h a t n a tu re w ill a id u s in o u r m oral en d eav o rs . W h ile th e n e e d for m o ra l p rog ress is e sp ec ia lly c le a r in th e th ird Cri- tique, K a n t's d iscussion o f A rc ad ian sh e p h e rd s a n d T a h itia n v illagers b r in g s h is p o in t ho m e forcefully. W hile h u m a n b e in g s a re p a r t o f n a tu re , th e y w ere n o t m e a n t to live lik e th e r e s t o f n a tu re , t h a t is, co n ten ted ly . P rovidence "h a s m a rk e d o u t fo r u s so to ilsom e a ro a d th ro u g h th is e a r th ly w orld"2 b u t w ith good rea so n : an tag o n ism a n d n o t h a p p in e ss is m o re h e lp fu l to m oral c re a - tu re s . K a n t a rg u es th a t c u ltu re , an tag o n ism , a n d u n so c ia l sociability a ll fo s- te r o u r a b ili ty to w ill free ly a n d m orally . N a tu re c a n n o t b r in g abou t m o ra l im p ro v e m e n t itself, b u t th e re a re conditions w h ich m ay m ore or le ss a id o u r r a t io n a l ab ilitie s . A nd w ith o u t m o ra l im p ro v em en t, w e w ould be b u t w o rth - le ss sh e p h e rd s . T h u s , I believe th a t K a n t's "Idea" is a n e x tre m e ly im p o rta n t p iece in h is p h ilo so p h ica l w ritin g s . F o r th e f irs t tim e w e se e specifically how K a n t m ay h a v e conceived o f th e l in k be tw een m orality , po litics , a n d relig ion, th e 2 "Conjectural Beginnings." Ak. 121. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 187 l in k b e tw een m o ra l p ro g ress , po litica l in s t itu tio n s , a n d th e h ig h e s t good. I have a rg u e d th a t , fo r K a n t, th e re m u s t e x is t th e p ossib ility o f a h ig h e s t good on e a r th a n d t h a t m o ra l p ro g ress is a n e c e ssa ry p o s tu la te o f p ra c tic a l rea so n . A gain, th e p ro b lem t h a t K a n t faces th ro u g h o u t h is e n tire life a n d w ritin g s is th e defense o f th is p o ss ib ility . W hile K a n t d id n o t h av e th e H o lo cau st to con- te n d w ith , h e d id h a v e th e d e v a s ta tin g L isb o n e a r th q u a k e , m a n y in te r n a - tio n a l a n d c iv il w ars , a n d th e g row ing cyn ic ism o f m an y o f h is c o n te m p o ra r- ies re g a rd in g a n y p o ssib le h u m a n im p ro v em en t. K a n t re fu se d to accep t even M endelssohn's s ta tic , cyclical m odel o f h is to ry . T h u s, K a n t fe lt com pelled to give som e acco u n t a s to h o w h u m a n p ro g re ss m ig h t be possib le d e sp ite so m uch ev idence to th e c o n tra ry . K a n t's a n sw e r, to be re p e a te d a n d e x p o u n d ed so often in a ll o f h is p o litic a l w ritings , is g iven to u s in th e "Idea ." m . In th e l a s t c h a p te r , I p re se n te d tw o g e n e ra l schools o f th o u g h t r e g a rd - in g how to in te rp re t th e "Id e a ," a n d I a rg u e d t h a t th ese in te rp re ta t io n s w ere flaw ed. L e t u s ta k e a look a t a few in te rp re ta t io n s w hich d e a l w ith th is topic of p rogress, th o u g h n o t n e ce ssa rily w ith th e "Id e a " itse lf. In th is w ay, I hope n o t only to co rrec t som e com m on m is ta k e s , b u t p e rh a p s m y ow n p o s itio n w ill th e re b y becom e c le a re r . F irs t , le t u s look a t M igum i S a k a b e 's artic le , "F reedom as a R e g u la tiv e P rinc ip le : O n Som e A spects o f th e K a n t - H e rd e r C ontroversy on th e P h ilo so p h y o f H is to ry ,"3 w h ich concerns K a n t's a r tic le on th e "C o n jec tu ra l B e g in n in g o f H u m a n H is to ry ." To beg in w ith , S a k a b e 's a r - ticle is c e r ta in ly a n im p ro v em en t over m a n y o th e rs , for, a s th e t it le show s, i t a lread y accepts K a n t to b e u s in g re g u la tiv e concep ts in h is e a rly e x a m in a - tions of h is to ry . S a k a b e m a in ta in s th a t , 3 Megumi Sakabe, "Freedom as a Regulative Principle: On Some Aspects of the Kant - Herder Controversy on the Philosophy of History," in Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1986). 183-195. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 188 contrary to the generally accepted view as to the development of K ant's philo- sophical reflections on the teleological principle, I strongly em phasize the im- portan t, indeed definitive role played by his deliberations on the s ta tu s of this principle in "Conjectural Beginning of H um an History": the s ta tu s of this principle as a regulative principle has its origin [here].4 S a k a b e goes on to l in k K a n t's a rtic le to h is l a te r artic le , "O n th e U se o f T eleo log ical P rin c ip le s in P h ilo sophy ," a n d a s s e r ts th a t th e re is a c le a r l in e of d ev e lo p m en t fro m h e re to th e th ir d Critique. A s f a r as th is a rg u m e n t goes, I th in k S a k a b e is co rrec t in h is in s is te n c e t h a t K a n t is n o t co n fu sed a s to th e basic p a ra m e te r s fo r h is u se o f th e n o tio n o f teleology, t h a t h e looks a t h is to ry from a re g u la tiv e a n d no t c o n s titu tiv e p o in t o f v iew , a n d th a t th is is precisely th e re a so n t h a t K a n t objects so s tre n u o u s ly to H e rd e r's Ideas for a Philoso- phy o f the History o f Mankind in th e f i r s t p lace . H a v in g s a id th is , w h ile S a k a b e se e m s to u ltim a te ly re je c t th e t r a d i - tio n a l a n in te rp re ta t io n of th is p iece, S a k a b e is u n w illin g to see th is a s a q u estio n fo r p ra c tic a l philosophy. S a k a b e se em s to th in k th a t , in K a n t's a n a ly s is o f h is to ry , K a n t h a s in m in d so m e ty p e o f reg u la tiv e p rin c ip le , th o u g h h e m a in ta in s th a t K a n t "m a k e s i t c le a r t h a t th e ph ilo so p h y o f h is to ry is a n in te rm e d ia te dom ain b e tw een th e o ry a n d p ra x is or, from sm o ther p o in t o f view , b e tw e e n im ag in a tio n a n d re a so n ."5 S a k a b e a p p ea rs to v iew K a n t a s u s in g a co n cep t to in te rp re t h is to ry t h a t som ehow "occupies a n in te rm e d ia te p o sitio n b e tw e e n know ledge a n d ac tio n (o r th e o ry a n d p rax is )..."6 U ltim a te ly , p e rh a p s S a k a b e is sim ply try in g to a rg u e t h a t K a n t is h e re co n ce rn ed w ith so m e th in g lik e th e facility o f ju d g m e n t w h ic h h e in v e s tig a te s in th e th i r d Cri- tique. H ow ever, reg a rd le ss o f th e s ta tu s o f th is reg u la tiv e no tion , S a k a b e q u ite p la in ly s ta te s : 4 Ibid., p. 192. 5 Ibid., p. 183. 6' Ibid.. p. 193. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 189 In his controversy w ith H erder as to the problem of Averroism, K ant explicitly qualifies his vision of hum an history as a regulative principle (in contrast, perhaps, to the postulate o f the im m ortality of the soul as a quasi-constitutive principle).7 N ow , i f m y a n a ly s is o f K a n t's p o s itio n re g a rd in g h is to ry is correct, th e n S a k a b e is w ro n g on exactly t h i s p o in t, fo r K a n t's a n a ly s is o f h is to ry h a s to do w ith a p ra c tic a l p o s tu la te t h a t is p rec ise ly lik e t h a t o f th e im m o rta lity o f th e sou l. I th in k th a t S ak ab e , l ik e m a n y o th er co m m en ta to rs , fa ils to sa tis fa c - to r ily a n sw e r th e follow ing q u e s tio n : W hy is K a n t so concerned to ex am in e th e q u e s tio n o f th e p ro g ress o f h u m a n reaso n in h is to ry ? S a k a b e 's a n sw e r is r a th e r am b ig u o u s, a n d seem s to u ltim a te ly to re fe r to so m e th in g lik e K a n t's in te r e s t in th e ex am in a tio n o f th e concep t of teleology. W hile th is m ay be in p a r t t ru e , K a n t's an sw ers in "C o n je c tu ra l B eg inn ing" a re m uch m ore s tr a ig h t fo rw ard : I t is of the greatest im portance, however, to be content with providence (even though it has m arked out for us so toilsome a road through this earth ly world), partly so th a t we can always take courage under our burdens and... fix our eyes on th a t fact and not neglect our own obligation to contribute to the b e t- term ent of ourselves.8 So th is is the outcome of a philosophical attem pt a t se tting out m an's prim or- dial history: Contentm ent w ith providence and w ith the course of hum an th ings as a whole, which do not progress from good to bad, but gradually de- velop from worse to better; an d in th is progress n a tu re herself has given eve- ryone a p a rt to play th a t is bo th his own and well w ith in his powers.9 C le a r ly K a n t's concern is n o t h is to ry fro m a sp ecu la tiv e p o in t of view , n o t a p h ilo so p h y o f h is to ry per se. B u t n e i th e r is K a n t's specific concern th e w o rk - in g o u t o f th e p ro p e r use o f th e n o tio n o f teleology. K a n t, i t seem s c lear, is 7 Ibid., p. 183. 8 "Conjectural Beginning," Ak. 121. 9 Ibid.. Ak. 123. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 190 concerned w ith tw o th in g s : a n in te rp re ta t io n o f h is to ry th a t w ould a llow for th e likelihood o f m o ra l p rog ress a n d t h a t w ould, in tu rn , keep in d iv id u a ls from being d isc o u rag e d a n d th u s becom ing s la ck in th e i r efforts to c o n tr ib u te a s m uch to th is p ro g re ss a s m ay be w ith in th e ir pow er. K a n t is concerned w ith the p o ss ib ility o f m o ra l p rog ress. W hile S a k a b e seem s w illing a t le a s t to acknow ledge K a n t's concern for a "teleological sp ace o f 'u n d e rs ta n d in g ' a n d h o p e ' w h ich is s i tu a te d b e - tw een k n o w led g e ' a n d 'action',"10 a n d w h ile th is is c e r ta in ly to be c o n sid e red a n im provem en t o v er m a n y o th e r co m m en ta to rs , I do n o t believe h e goes f a r enough. In th e en d , w e a re le ft w ith th e fee lin g t h a t th is is a "m ere" re g u la - tive id ea .11 O n th e o th e r h a n d , F ried rich K a u lb a c h goes too f a r in th e o th e r d i- rec tion w ith h is w ritin g s , a tte m p tin g to re c o n s tru c t a ph ilo sophy of h is to ry in w hich K a n t is in te r e s te d in h is to ry from a th e o re tic a l a n d specu la tive p o in t o f v iew .12 A gain , th is is a n im p ro v em en t over som e com m en ta to rs , s in ce a t le a s t th is sp e cu la tiv e p o in t of v iew is c o n s tru c te d o u t o f leg itim a te re g u la tiv e id e a s a n d does n o t c h a rg e K a n t w ith a "s lip " b a ck to h is p re -c ritica l th in k in g . K au lbach c la im s t h a t th e "Id ea" concerns "th e a tte m p t to an sw er th e q u e s- tio n of how h is to ry a n d ph ilosophy o f h is to ry is poss ib le a s a science."13 W hile K au lbach n o te s t h a t K a n t's w ritin g s co n ce rn in g su c h a n a tte m p t a re "m eager," h e h o p e s to "reco n stru c t" su c h a sc ience .14 K au lb ach 's suggestion is to rep la ce K a n t's c a teg o ry of "c au sa lity " w ith "probab ility ."15 H e r ig h tly no tes th a t th e m a in p ro b lem in a tte m p tin g a 10 Sakabe, "Regulative Principle," pp. 191-2. 11 In this respect Sakabe is similar to Laberge. 12 Friedrich Kaulbach, "Der Zusammenhand zwischen Naturphilosophie und Geschichtsphilosophie bei Kant," and "Welchen Nutzen gibt Kant der Geschichtsphilosophie?" All translations mine. 13 "Nutzen," p. 65. 14 Ibid., p. 66. 15 Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 191 science o f h is to ry is K a n t's d iv is io n b e tw een th e w orld a s a p p e a ra n c e , a n d th u s su b je c t to th e law o f c a u sa lity , a n d th e w orld a s n o u m e n a l, w here h u m a n a c tio n s o rig in a te in co m p le te freedom . H ow can one h a v e a science o f h is to ry w h e re i t s cau ses o r ig in a te in freedom ? T h is is e sp ec ia lly p ro b lem atic c o n s id e rin g a n a tu re w hich i ts e l f m a y be th o u g h t to h a v e i ts ow n in te n tio n s o u ts id e o f th e w ill o f in d iv id u a ls .16 K a u lb ac h 's so lu tio n is th a t , s in ce a ll (free) ac tions m u s t m a n ife s t th e m se lv e s a s a p p ea ra n c es , su ch a p p e a ra n c e s a re su b jec t to th e categories, a n d th u s m a y b e sub jec t to som e g e n e ra liza tio n s a n d p red ic tio n s . K au lbach p o in ts o u t K a n t's in te r e s t in m a th e m a tic s a n d s ta tis tic s , a s w e ll a s K a n t's re fe ren c es to K ep ler a n d N ew to n in th e "Id ea ," a n d c o n c lu d es t h a t a science o f h is to ry c a n be c o n s tru c te d o u t o f p ro b ab ility th e o ry .17 T o q u ick ly su m m arize a n o th erw ise d e ta ile d th eo ry , K au lb ach m a in ta in s t h a t w e a re p e rm itte d to u tiliz e th e concep t o f "p u rp o s iv e n ess" as a re g u la tiv e id e a fo r th e u n if ic a tio n o f a ll o u r know ledge, a u n if ic a tio n req u ire d by th e "a rc h ite c to n ic of rea so n ;" th u s , th is allow s u s to u n i te th e e v en ts o f h is to ry th ro u g h th e no tion o f p u rp o s iv e n e ss in o rd e r to e re c t a science, a n d to u tiliz e th e co n cep t o f p ro b ab ility in o rd e r to in v e s tig a te n a tu r e a n d th e reb y fu r th e r in g th e a rch itec ton ic o f rea so n . K au lb ach recogn izes t h a t th is w ould n o t r e s u l t in know ledge per se, a n d th u s th e se n o tio n s w o u ld n o t b e c o n s titu a tiv e o f experience, b u t w o u ld a llow fo r a sy s te m a tic in v e s tig a tio n of n a tu re . In re sp o n se to th e se w ritin g s , w h a t I w a n t to a rg u e is t h a t th e y a re a n e x ce llen t a t te m p t a t su c h a reco n stru c tio n , s ta y in g v e ry t r u e to K a n t's c ritic a l w r it in g s , b u t th a t su c h a reco n s tru c tio n is a n o n -s ta r te r . L e t m e p re - s e n t on ly a g e n e ra l a rg u m e n t h e re , b u t one th a t o u g h t to b e obv ious from th e above c h a p te rs . T h e sim ple q u e s tio n w h ich o u g h t to be a s k e d is: d id K a n t re a lly h a v e su c h a specu la tive th e o ry o f h is to ry in m in d w h e n h e w ro te h is 16 Kant often speaks in his political writings of nature as having its own "intentions" which differ from our own. 17 Kaulbach. "Nutzen." p. 67. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 192 a r tic le s re g a rd in g h is to ry ? I th in k a n e x a m in a tio n o f a ll of K a n t's w rit in g s w ill show th a t K a n t h a d n o th in g lik e a "p ro b a b ility th eo ry " in m in d. A s w as sh o w n above, in h is d e b a te w ith M e n d e lsso h n in "T h eo ry a n d P rac tice ," K a n t does n o t a p p ea l p r im a r ily to n a tu re , re g u la tiv e id ea s , o r em p irica l h is to ry in o rd e r to ju s tify h is p o s itio n . R a th e r , t im e a n d tim e a g a in h e m ak es a n a p p e a l to m o ra lity , a n d to th e fu tility w h ich w o u ld r e s u l t fro m th e re jec tion o f th e id e a o f th e p ro g re ss o f h u m a n b e in g s . K a n t a p p e a rs to be in d ic a tin g t h a t h is concep tion o f h is to ry i s n o t one concerned , a t le a d in th e m ain , w ith e m p iric a l in fo rm a tio n o f th e p a s t b e in g u n if ie d b y a n d fo r th e arch itec ton ic . K a n t is co n ce rn ed w ith th e s e e v e n ts only in so fa r a s th e y show "w h a t peop les a n d g o v e rn m en ts h a v e d o n e to c o n tr ib u te to o r im p a ir th e objective o f cosm opol- i ta n is m ."18 In fac t, a s I n o te d above in C h a p te r T h ree , i f we ta k e K a n t's re c - o m m en d a tio n s se rio u s ly ab o u t h ow to c o n s tru c t a th e o ry of em p irica l e v en ts , th is w ou ld seem to b e a r a th e r im p o v e rish ed h is to ry indeed ; K a n t's e x am p le s h a v e on ly to do w ith "fo cu sin g e v e ry w h ere on ly on c iv il c o n s titu tio n s a n d th e i r law s a n d on th e re la tio n s a m o n g n a tio n s ."19 T h is is a h is to ry w ith o u t sc ience , w ith o u t in v e n tio n s , w ith o u t l i te ra tu re , w ith o u t a r t , a n d p re su m a b ly ev e n w ith o u t g re a t in d iv id u a ls .20 I t is a h is to ry o f po litics a n d ex p lo ra tio n , a n d on ly th e se b e c a u se th e y a re th e d r iv in g fac to rs b e h in d th e p ro g re ss o f th e h u m a n race to w a rd m o ra l perfec tion . K a u lb a c h is r ig h t to no te th a t K a n t's w r it in g s on a sc ience o f h is to ry w ere "m ea g e r" a n d t h a t K a n t o ften re m a in e d "s i le n t" re g a rd in g th e p ro b lem how to m ove from freed o m to p ro b ab ility ; I do n o t th in k th is w as u n in te n t io n a l on K a n t's p a r t . T h ere is a n o th e r concern re g a rd in g K a u lb a c h 's position . H a v in g e s ta b lis h e d th is sp e c u la tiv e th eo ry o f h is to ry , K a u lb a c h a rg u e s th a t i t c a n be 18 "Idea," Ak. 31. 19 Ibid., Ak. 30. 201 include the last because Kant's focus is on "the play o f the human will's freedom in the large" (17), and thus seems to exclude important individuals. However, it is possible that they would have to be included in descriptions of wars, politics, and constitutions; it is likely, as I noted above, that Kant would want to include King Frederick William II as an important instigator of enlightened reforms. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 193 fu r th e r u se d a s a w ay o f o rien tin g o n ese lf fo r p rac tic a l ends. H e b e g in s by describ ing K a n t's th o u g h t ex p erim en t re g a rd in g th e ab ility to te s t a n y p a r tic u la r m ax im b y th in k in g of i t a s b e in g im p le m e n te d a s a la w o f n a tu re . K au lbach m a k e s a n a n a lo g y be tw een th is w a y o f th in k in g a b o u t a poss ib le n a tu re a n d th e sp e c u la tiv e th in k in g o f a h is to r ic a l a n d p u rp o siv e n a tu re , s ta tin g th a t th e re is "a lso a n analogous fu n c tio n in th e sk e tch (Entwurf) o f a ph ilosophy o f h is to ry d esc rib in g n a tu re fo r p o litic a l actions, w h ich sh o u ld an d w a n ts to w o rk w ith [h u m an s] to w ard s th e e s ta b lish m e n t o f a w orld-w ide co n stitu tio n (weltbiirgerlischer Verfassung)"21 I f w h a t K au lb ach m e a n s by such a n an a lo g y a n d su c h a n o rien ta tio n fo r p ra c tic a l ac tiv ity is s im p ly th a t th e p o ss ib ility o f a p u rp o s iv e n a tu re a llow s u s to hope th a t a s ta te o f peace could com e a b o u t e v en i f i t is n o t o u r d irec t goal, th a n th is seem s accep tab le . B u t i t a p p e a rs a s i f K au lbach w a n ts to go fu r th e r , to c la im t h a t w e som ehow o u g h t to u s e th e ac tions of n a tu re a s a m odel for o u r ow n ac tio n s .22 I f th is is th e case , i t se em s th a t th e an a lo g y is d an g ero u sly m is lead in g , a n d lead s u s to a p o s itio n s im ila r to H egel. T he re a so n fo r th is concern is t h a t i f n a tu re 's u se o f w a r, h o s tili ty , a n d a n ta g o n ism is som ehow to se rv e a s a m irro r fo r b eh av io r, th e n o u r actions w ou ld n o t v e ry likely be m o ra l a t a ll, b u t p rec ise ly im m o ra l. S im p ly s ta ted , i f w e m ir ro r n a tu re 's u se o f in d iv id u a ls , th e n w e w o u ld u se o th ers a s m e a n s a n d n o t ends, w e w o u ld be in c lin ed to w age w a r in th e hope o f a r e s u l t in g b e t te r co n stitu tio n , w e w ould be v io len tly a n ta g o n is tic , a n d we w ould n o t b e im m ed ia te ly co n ce rn ed w ith m o ra l ends. T h e p o ss ib ility t h a t a n ta g o n ism w ould , u ltim a te ly , le a d to a s ta te o f p e rp e tu a l p e ac e is m ere ly a hope t h a t a s ta te of R ig h t w o u ld em erge 21 "Nutzen," p. 76. 22 This seems to be what Kaulbach intends, given 1) the strength of the analogy between an imagined moral world and the pseudo-knowledge of a purposive nature with regards to political institu- tions, 2) his insistence that it is nature's handling of individuals and politics which gives us our practical orientation, 3) his analogy between the "three questions" of metaphysics and the three sections of his pa- per, and 4) the fact that the following section deals specifically with hope and therefore not with an orien- tation for action but rather a hope that progress may be brought about despite our actions. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 194 th o u g h w e ou rse lv es have n o t w o rk ed d irec tly to w a rd i t ;23 i t is in no w ay a m odel fo r m o ra l behavior, b u t on ly a hope th a t w h a t a p p e a rs a th r e a t to m o ra l p ro g re s s w ill actually t u r n o u t to h e lp i ts p ro m o tio n . W hile K a u lb ac h h a s s ta y e d t r u e to th e f ir s t Critique, I th in k h e h a s m o v ed fa r aw ay from th e sp ir i t o f th e r e s t o f K an t's w ritin g s co n cern in g h is to ry . F in a lly , h a v in g sk e tch e d o u t h is rec o n s tru c tio n o f a science o f h is to ry , K a u lb a c h concludes th a t i t c an b e u s e d "to a llow a prognosis"2* re g a rd in g th e fu tu re . H e a rg u e s th a t , u tiliz in g th e science o f h is to ry , th e no tion o f p u r - po siv en ess , a n d p robab ility th e o ry a s a priori g u id es , w e can hope th a t p ro g - re ss w ill h a p p e n on e a r th .25 H ow ever, K au lb ach in s is ts t h a t "th e p o ss ib ility o f p ro g n o sis re q u ire s th a t h is to ry a s a science h a s fo u n d i ts ph ilo soph ical ju s tif ic a tio n ,"26 in o th er w ords, t h a t h o p e can only b e fo u n d ed on sp e cu la tiv e th eo ry . F u r th e r , w hile K au lb ach is co rrec t to in s is t t h a t h u m a n b e in g s do in d e e d h a v e a n a tu r a l in te re s t in th e outcom e o f th e i r w illin g a n d th u s a n e ed fo r hope, h e w rites specifically t h a t "p ro g ress in h is to ry c an n o t be m a in - ta in e d in th e fo rm o f a p o s tu la te o f re a so n ."27 H e p ro v id es only two b r ie f ex - p la n a tio n s fo r th is im possib ility o f p ro g re ss b e in g a p o s tu la te : "H is to ry is n o t a T dngdom o f G od,' b u t in s te a d a k ingdom of m en ,"28 a n d , "th e q u estio n o f th e p o ss ib ility o f th e ^highest good' o f h is to ry c an n o t be a n sw e re d w ith re g a rd to a Tdngdom o f G od,' b u t in s te a d m u s t f in d i ts a n sw e r from th e s ta n d p o in t o f h is to ry itse lf ..."29 A p paren tly K a u lb a c h believes, a s m a n y com m enta to rs , th a t th e h ig h e s t good m u st occur in a n "a fte rlife ," o r a t le a s t believes t h a t i t h a s l i t t le to do w ith political in s t i tu t io n s . 23 This will be discussed further in Section Two, Chapter Six below. 24 "Nutzen," p. 79. 25 Given Kaulbach's position regarding the use of nature as a point of practical orientation, and given the discussion to follow, it is unclear how much Kaulbach considers this progress moral progress. 26 "Nutzen," p. 82. 27 Ibid., p. 78. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid.. p. 81. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 195 I find th is p o sitio n v e ry d ifficu lt to h a rm o n ize w ith th e re s t o f K a n t's w ritin g s . W hile i t seem s t r u e t h a t concrete ex am p les from h is to ry w ould b o ls te r one's hope in th e p o ss ib ility fo r (m oral) p ro g re ss , I th in k i t goes a g a in s t m uch of K a n t's p h ilo so p h y to d em an d t h a t h o p e be b a se d on sp e cu la tiv e a n d n o t p ra c tic a l re a so n . P e rh a p s i f K a u lb a c h th o u g h t th a t a h ig h e s t good on e a r th w e re p ossib le , a n d i f h e b e liev ed in th e connection b e tw e e n m orality a n d po litics , h e w o u ld be m ore w illin g to consider p ro g ress a s a p o s tu la te .30 H ow ever, to b a se b o th hope a n d ac tio n on a s ta tis t ic a l a n a ly s is of h is to ry seem s m isg u id e d a t best, a n d d a n g e ro u s to th e K a n tia n p ro jec t a t w orst. M oving on to o th e r co m m en ta to rs , s im ila r ty p e s o f m is in te rp re ta tio n s do n o t stop w ith K a n t's e a r l ie r w orks. L e t u s tak e , fo r ex am p le , a re c e n t a r - tic le by Irm g a rd S ch e re r, "K a n t's E schato logy in Zum ewigen Frieden: T he C oncep t o f P u rp o s iv en ess to G u a ra n te e P e rp e tu a l P e a ce ."31 I n th is piece, S c h e re r m a in ta in s th a t e v en "P e rp e tu a l Peace" is p r e m a tu re to th e id e a s o f th e th i r d Critique, a n d m a in ta in s t h a t "th e concept o f p e rp e tu a l peace... is in te llig ib le only th ro u g h th e concep t o f p u rp o siv en ess in th e Critique of Judgment."32 S ch e re r c o n tin u e s to m a k e a n e rro r w ith "P e rp e tu a l P eace" t h a t m a n y com m en ta to rs m a k e w ith th e "Id ea ," n am e ly , h e poses th e follow - in g q u estio n a n d expects a n e ith e r /o r an sw er: "is th e re in n a tu re a n objective r e a l i ty for p ro v id en tia l p ro cesses , o r a re 'p u rposes o f n a tu r e ' c o n s tru c ts o f th e m in d ?"33 In o th e r w ords, S c h e re r w a n ts to know , g iven K a n t's epistem ologic a l b ack g ro u n d from th e Critique o f Pure Reason, h o w co u ld w e possib ly ob- se rv e a teleological p rocess in n a tu re , su ch a s th e one g iven in "To[w ard] 30 In addition, Kaulbach seems to overlook Kant's direct insistence in the Religion of the vic- tory of the good over the evil principle which results in the kingdom of God on earth. 31 Irmgard Scherer, "Kant's Eschatology in Zum ewigen Frieden: The Concept of Purposive- ness to Guarantee Perpetual Peace," in Proceedings o f the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, pt. 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 437-43. 32 Ibid., p. 437. 33 Ibid.. p. 440. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 196 P e rp e tu a l P eace," su c h t h a t we cou ld say w e know i t ex is ts? C learly th e a n - sw er is th a t w e co u ld n e v e r say fo r c e r ta in t h a t su c h teleology ex ists , a n d S c h e re r ju m p s to th e conclusion a lo n g w ith m o s t o th e r com m en ta to rs , t h a t p ro g re ss is b e s t u n d e rs to o d a s a m ere ly re g u la tiv e id e a . A nd, w e see th e fa m ilia r conclusion t h a t K a n t m u s t b e m is u s in g th is n o tio n of teleology h e re in "P e rp e tu a l P eace ," w h ic h he w ill f in a lly u s e co rrec tly in th e th ird Critique. B u t I h a v e t r ie d to a rg u e specifica lly a g a in s t su c h a conclusion, a s w ell a s a g a in s t su c h a n e ith e r /o r p oss ib ility . R e g a rd in g th e f irs t, I h a v e t r ie d to show th ro u g h o u t S e c tio n O ne th a t K a n t u n d e rs to o d th e g en era l n a tu r e o f teleo logy all along, f ro m th e f ir s t Critique o n w a rd s . T h u s , th e n a tu r a l q u e s - tio n w h ich sh o u ld b e r a is e d is why, g iven th is u n d e rs ta n d in g , w ould K a n t in s is t on w ritin g a b o u t p ro g ress a n d n a tu r e 's g u a ra n te e o f peace for h is e n - t ire "c ritic a l pe riod"? K a n t m u s t be g iven th e b e n e f it o f a n ex am in a tio n , i f n o t th e b en efit o f th e d o u b t, a n d th a t is w h a t I h a v e t r ie d to do, w ith th e of- fe re d conclusion t h a t K a n t w as c o n s is te n tly in te r e s te d to m a in ta in su ch a p o sitio n b ecause o f h is co n cern w ith th e m o ra l p ro g re s s o f th e species. T h u s , r e g a rd in g th e second conclusion , I h a v e a rg u e d t h a t th e re is n o t a d e fin ite e ith e r /o r possib ility w h e n i t com es to th e q u e s tio n o f m o ra l teleology. I t i s n o t m ere ly a question o f s a y in g th a t teleology is , o r is n o t, know n fo r c e r ta in in n a tu re , fo r th e th ir d p o ss ib ility ex is ts th a t m o ra l te leo logy is a p o s tu la te o f p ra c tic a l reason . I f t h i s is so, as I h a v e a rg u e d t h a t i t is , th e n K a n t is faced w ith th e ad d itio n a l p ro b le m o f how to explain the mechanism by w h ich su c h p ro g ress m ig h t ta k e p la c e , o r a t le a s t h e fee ls c a lle d to g ive th e skep tics a d u e th a t th is in d e e d m ig h t be th e case. F o r th is p u rp o se , K a n t tu rn s to u n - social sociab ility in i t s m a n y form s. B u t, a s I h a v e t r ie d to argue , look ing e s - p ec ia lly a t "T heory a n d P ra c tice ," K a n t k now s fu ll w e ll t h a t h e cou ld be w ro n g in th e ex ac t w a y t h a t h e h a s sp e lled o u t su c h p ro g ress . T h is is K an t 's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 197 b e s t guess, a s i t w ere, a n d p e rh a p s w e a re in c lin ed to agree w ith h im , b u t i t is on ly a guess. T h e p o stu la te , n o n e th e le ss , re m a in s .34 T h e su b je c t o f th e F ren ch R ev o lu tio n a lso seem s to be c au se fo r sev - e ra l m isconcep tions o f K a n t's v iew o f teleology. P e te r B urg , fo r exam p le , seem s s im p ly w ro n g to a sse r t in h is book a b o u t th e F re n ch R evo lu tion th a t , causality an d finality of history can be an object of hum an knowledge. In the prediction of the unforgettability of the [French] revolution, the claim is in- cluded, th a t knowledge concerning the course and goal of history exists. The knowledge o f history is founded on a knowledge of man, because historical de- velopment is founded on the fact th a t m an is moving toward a goal.35 T h is seem s w ro n g n o t only because , a s K a n t in s is ts tim e a n d tim e a g a in , p ro g ress c an n e v e r be a "fact" o r a n ob jec t o f know ledge, b u t also b ecau se K a n t is m ore co n ce rn ed w ith th e attitudes o f th e observers, n o t w ith th e ac - tu a l, p re d ic ta b le course o f h isto ry . K a n t's o ften q u o ted observation co n ce rn - in g w h a t is im p o r ta n t abou t th e R ev o lu tio n is th a t: This event consists neither in m om entous deeds nor crimes com m itted by men... I t is simply the mode of th ink ing of the spectators which reveals itself publicly in th is game of great revolutions... Owing to its universality, th is mode of th inking dem onstrates a charac ter of the hum an race... which not only perm its people to hope for progress tow ard the better, bu t is already itself pro- gress...36 T h u s, w e see t h a t i t is n o t even th e re v o lu tio n itself n o r so m eth in g a b o u t th e p a r t ic ip a n ts o f t h a t revo lu tion w h ich g ives u s a clue t h a t th e h u m a n species is p ro g ressin g , b u t , r a th e r , th e d u e is re v e a le d m ere ly in th e a t t i tu d e o f th e 34 See my concluding chapter of Section Two, below. 35 p. 38. Peter Burg, Kant und die FranzOsische Revolution (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1974). All translations mine. I shall remind the reader of this again in Chapter Three of Section Two. 36 p. 1S2. Immanuel Kant, "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" in On History, trans. Lewis Beck, Robert Anchor, and Emil Fackenheim, copyright ©1975. The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1968 by The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., reprinted by permission of the publisher in Conflict o f the Faculties. by Immanuel Kant, trans. Mary J. Gregor. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992) 139-71. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 198 spectators. T hus, i t concerns n e ith e r th e p a rtic ip a n ts n o r th e outcom e of th e F re n c h revo lu tion . S im ila rly , B u h r a n d I r r l i tz a lso seem to ta k e too m u ch from K a n t's re flec tio n s of th e R evo lu tion .37 A t som e po in ts , i t so u n d s lik e th e y a re a rg u - in g fo r m y position exactly , w riting ; K ant aims a t a universal m oralization (higher development, perfection) of hu- m ankind -society should become a "moral whole."38 K ant knew th a t his thoughts on the philosophy of history were more likely hy- potheses and practical-moral orders (Aufforderungen) th an scientifically grounded and confirmed through experience... In th is respect, he searched world history for incidents and evidence which could prove the views of his philosophy history.39 C e rta in ly th is so u n d s s im ila r to m y co n ten tio n th a t K a n t's th o u g h ts on h is - to ry h a d to do w ith p ra c tic a l c o n s id e ra tio n s a n d th a t h e on ly looked to em - p ir ic a l s i tu a tio n s a s (p a rtia l, b u t n o t fac tu a l) co n firm atio n o f p ro g ress . H ow ever, B u h r a n d I r r li tz fo llow th e above s ta te m e n t b y w ritin g th a t : In his old age he [Kant] came to the conclusion th a t a t least one event in re- cent history could be mentioned, which shiningly and irrefutably confirms the theses of continual progress of the hum an race and w ith i t the prim ary insight of his philosophy of history: the French Revolution.40 In su p p o r t of th is a rg u m e n t th e a u th o rs c ite K a n t's q u o ta tio n (g iven in th e p a ra g ra p h above) re g a rd in g th e p o s itio n o f th e sp ec ta to rs . H ow ever, su ch a re flec tio n on th e R evo lu tion in no w a y "sh in in g ly a n d i r re fu ta b ly " confirm s a 37 Manfred Buhr and Gerd Irrlitz, "Immanuel Kant," in Materialien zu Kants Rehctsphilosophie , ed. Zwi Batscha (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 1976), 102-124. All trans- lations mine. 38 Ibid., p. 188. 39 Ibid., pp. 118-9. 40 fbid.. p. 119. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 199 th e s is o f a n y ty p e o f p rogress, m o ra l o r po litica l. S u c h p rogress, a s w e h av e seen , c a n n e v e r be confirm ed. W h a t K a n t (p resum ab ly ) in te n d s w ith h is s ta te m e n t is ex ac tly w h a t he s ta te s a n d no m ore: t h a t th e a tt i tu d e o f th e sp e c ta to rs re v e a ls a n a p titu d e a n d p ro p e n s ity of in d iv id u a ls to w a rd w h a t is r ig h t a n d w h a t is m ora l, even th o u g h th is s i tu a tio n m ay be h a rm fu l to th e sp e c ta to rs th em se lv es . W olfgang R od s ta te s i t w ell: K an t did not w ant to leave th is general observation [of progress] a t tha t, and searched for a clue in experience which could indicate a tendency tow ard de- velopm ent. He found it in the reaction of m ost individuals to the French Revolution -not in the revolution itself! -nam ely in the participation of the observer a t the efforts of the French to construct a good, tha t is, a republican constitution.41 K a n t does see a n in d ica tio n of p ro g re ss su r ro u n d in g th e F ren ch R evo lu tion , b u t th is i s to b e fo u n d precise ly in th e a t t i tu d e s o f th e specta to rs , a n d sa y s n o th in g f a c tu a l a p red ic tab le fu tu re . F ro m a d iffe ren t perspective , G eo rg C a v a lla r in h is book Pax Kantiana42 d o es a n exce llen t job of d e fe n d in g K a n t's b e lie f in th e p ro g ress o f R igh t, b u t seem s to go too fa r in h is d e fe n se by w ay o f c u ttin g ou t th e n e ce s- s ity o f th e b e lie f in m o ra l p rog ress.43 I w ill sp en d som e tim e d iscu ssin g h is book, s in c e h e is th e only w rite r b e s id es Yovel to d iscu ss th e "Id ea" in d e p th . T o b eg in w ith , le t u s no te se v e ra l p o in ts in com m on betw een C avalla r 's th e s is a n d m y ow n. T he f i r s t p o in t is t h a t C a v a lla r ag rees th a t , acco rd - in g to K a n t , w e c a n n o t see in to th e p u rp o se s of n a tu re , a n d th u s can h a v e no 41 p. 140. Wolfgang R6d, "Die Rolle transzendentaler Prinzipien in Moral und Politik," in "Zum ewigen Frieden:" Grundlagen, Aktualitdt und Aussichten einer Idee von Immanuel Kant, eds. Reinhard Merkel and Roland Wittmann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996), 125-141. All transla- tions mine. 42 Georg Cavallar, Pax Kantiana: Systematisch-historische untersuchung des Entwurfs "Zum ewigen Frieden " (1975) von Immanuel Kant (Wein: Bdhlan Verlag, 1992). All translations mine. 43 It is my belief that they are so concerned to make a palatable defense of the seemingly overoptimistic claim of political progress that they try to divorce themselves (and Kant) from any thought of moral progress for the human race. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. k n ow ledge per se reg a rd in g p ro g re ss . H e also n o te s t h a t "above all, h u m a n s c a n n o t fo resee th e free ac tio n s o f h is to r ic a l ac to rs ,"44 s in c e "h u m a n s a s h o m o n o u m e n o n ,' a s m o ra l beings, a re u n k n o w n u n d e r th e co n d itio n s o f ex p eri- ence ."45 H e w rite s th a t, "th e co u rse o f h is to ry c a n b e d e te rm in e d 'a p rio ri' re g u la tiv e ly th ro u g h th e m o ra l c e r ta in ty of d u ty ... [but] la y s no c la im [to b e - ing ] a p rio ri."46 H e also m a k e s th e in te re s t in g p o in t th a t , s in ce w e c an n o t k n o w w h e th e r n a tu re h a s p u rp o se s o r no t, i t is e q u a lly d o g m atic to a ssu m e t h a t i t does n o t, a s i t is to a s su m e th a t i t does.47 Second, C av a lla r a g re e s t h a t K a n t's d iscu ssio n o f h is to ry h a s n o th in g to do w ith a th e o re tic a l in v e s tig a tio n o f h is to ry , b u t , a s I h a v e a rg u ed , h a s to do w ith n e c e ssa ry m oral a ssu m p tio n s . C a v a lla r w rite s v e ry p la in ly th a t: K ant's philosophy of history is dependent on prem ises of m oral teleology. He develops it within the scope of a theory of culture as a "final end of na tu re ," which should close the gap betw een freedom and na tu re . The necessity of the assum ption th a t ethical ends m ust be established in the world, is only a moral necessity. Moral teleology asks, w hether and how ethical ends in the world are possible. Hence, nature m ust itself be purposeful in its em pirical m anifesta- tions: Moral teleology desires a n a tu ra l teleology. K ant's philosophy of history "in praktischer Absicht" (Frieden A 65) is founded on m oral principles. The certain ty th a t hum ankind is progressing tow ards the b e tte r is grounded not in history... b u t in duty.48 The coercion towards peace m ay not be understood in the sense of a merciless, na tu ra lly caused necessity. Not a prophesy from a philosophy of history, bu t instead a "duty" "to work tow ard th is goal" of perpetual peace exists in the ex- p lanation of the guarantee [of nature] in the first place. This [duty] first w ar- ran ts the hope "in praktischer Absicht" th a t the n a tu ra l h a lf of m an will not lead to destruction.49 44 Cavallar, Pax Kanticma, p. 266. 45 Ibid., p. 267. 46 Ibid., p. 292. See also 290. 47 Ibid., p. 290 and 292. 48 Ibid., pp. 268-9. 49 Ibid.. p. 286. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 201 K eep ing a ll th is in m ind , we c a n ap p rec ia te C a v a lla r's conclusion th a t th e no tion o f "th e 'c u n n in g o f n a tu r e '50 is a reg u la tiv e p rin c ip le o f reflective ju d g m e n t,"51 a n d th ere fo re a ssu m e th a t h e m e a n s a re g u la tiv e p rin c ip le n o t m ere ly fo r th e th e o re tic a l s tu d y o f h isto ry , b u t reflec tive fo r p ra c tic a l p u r - poses.52 T h ird , C a v a lla r ag rees t h a t th e re is no b re a k b e tw een K a n t's e a r l ie r a n d la te r w ritin g s on h is to ry a n d teleology. N o t on ly is th e "Id e a " n o t a n i n - com plete a n d o v e rs ta te d p ic tu re o f teleology w h ich ge ts im p ro v ed w ith th e Critique o f Judgment, b u t C a v a lla r a rg u es t h a t th e "Id e a " is co n s is ten t w ith a ll o f K a n t's l a te r w ritings . K ant's tra in of thought in the explanation of the guarantee [of n a tu re in "Perpetual Peace"] follows th a t in the "Idea [for a Universal History]."53 The m aintained break betw een the writings before and after the appearance of the th ird Critique (1790) is... not available. Ultim ately, there is no ground to assum e th a t K ant had been moved from the political events of 1789 to a revi- sion of his philosophy of history.54 C a v a lla r a lso a rg u es , a s I have , t h a t th is is t ru e ev en o f th e th ird Critique, w hich "offers no p rin c ip a lly new conception of th e ph ilo sophy o f h is to ry "55: The "Idea [for a Universal History]" could be in tegrated w ith every paragraph of the Critique o f Judgment where K ant moves from the view of n a tu ra l products to the history of the hum an race. There he changes the teleological reflection, and now no longer asks about the form of organized n a tu ra l 50 Several authors use the term "cunning of nature," taken from Hegel, in place of Kant's own term "providence" or providential nature. 51 Cavallar, p. 281. 52 Many other citations on such conclusions are possible. See chapters nine and ten from Cavallar's book. 53 Cavallar, p. 282. 54 Ibid., p. 270. ss Ibid.. p. 320. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 202 productions as ends, bu t instead asks about the end of na tu re's existence and ultim ately about the ultim ate end.56 F o u r th , a n d la s t, I w ill s im p ly a d d t h a t C a v a lla r also ag rees t h a t p o - litic a l p ro g re s s c a n ta k e p lace w ith o u t re q u ir in g m o ra l p rog ress; "a m o ra l rev o lu tio n in th e w ay of th in k in g is in no w a y n e c e ssa ry fo r th e e s ta b lish - m e n t o f a c o n d itio n of R igh t."57 H ow ever, w hile C a v a lla r's conclusions a g re e w ith m y own in m a n y w ays, i t seem s th a t C av a lla r is so in te re s te d to d e fen d th e possib ility o f p o - litic a l p ro g re ss t h a t h e is n o t w illin g to in c o rp o ra te th e n o tio n of m o ra l p ro g - ress . T h e w a y C a v a lla r a llow s fo r th is p o ss ib ility , i t seem s, is to co n s tru c t a b re a k b e tw ee n K a n t's w ritin g s on h is to ry a n d h is w ritin g s on religion; "th e in w a rd e d u c a tio n (Bildung) o f e th ic s re la te s to th e h is to ry o f religion, w h ich K a n t leav es o u t o f h is po litica l h is to ry ."58 C a v a lla r c e r ta in ly does n o t w a n t to d eny a p lace fo r re lig ion a n d theo logy in K a n t's th in k in g,56 b u t he a p p e a rs to w a n t to m a in ta in th a t K a n t's re lig io n h a s to do w ith in te rn a l a n d m o ra l g row th w h ile K a n t's h is to ry h a s on ly to do w ith po litics a n d th e e s ta b lish - m e n t o f R ig h t; "K a n t excludes [co n s id era tio n s o f m o ra l p rogress! h o rn h is p h ilo sophy o f h is to ry , w hich co n cern s th e h o p e o f R ig h t a n d lega lity ."60 C a v a lla r is co n ce rn ed th a t K a n t's s t r ic t v iew s o f au to n o m y a n d rad ica l ev il cou ld n o t a llow u s to say a n y th in g a b o u t th e p o ss ib ility o f m o ra l p rog ress, a n d "th e m a in q u e s tio n is, how th is conviction [of m o ra l p rogress] is co n sis- te n t w ith th e p rin c ip le o f m o ra l au tonom y ."61 56 Ibid., p. 272. 57 Ibid., p. 281. See also 314 and 319. 58 Ibid., p. 267. 59 See especially sections 10.1 and 10.2. 60 Cavallar, p. 322. See also 296. 61 Ibid., p. 294. See also 295. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 203 A second of C a v a lla r 's objections seem s to be th a t th e s tru g g le to achieve p eace m ay m ak e o n e m ore clever, "b u t n o t m orally b e t te r ,"62 in o th e r w ords, t h a t R ig h t does n o t d irec tly p rom o te m o ra lity . L ikew ise , a th i r d ob- jec tion seem s to be th a t w e c a n "d iffe ren tia te b e tw een 'm o ra l s te p s ' a n d 's tep s to w ard m o ra lity '," w hich th e n allow s u s to n o te th a t po litica l p ro g re ss is m ere ly t h a t la te r , a n d n o t th e fo rm er.63 H e s ta te s f in a lly t h a t "th e develop- m en t o f m o ra l p ro p en s itie s h a v e no "p lace" in th e ph ilo sophy o f h is to ry .64 L e t m e try to a d d re s s th e se objections in o rder. R e g a rd in g th e m a in objection, t h a t th e re e x is ts som e s tro n g d iv is ion be tw een K a n t's re lig io n a n d politics as it concerns history, I th in k th a t C a v a lla r u ltim a te ly c o n tra d ic ts h im self. To p u t i t sim ply , i f C a v a lla r be liev es t h a t K a n t's p h ilo so p h y of h i s - to ry re s ts on moral concerns, a n d th a t i f h is a ssu m p tio n s r e g a rd in g p o litica l p rog ress a re ju s tif ie d only in reference to K a n t's m o ra l theo ry , th e n I th in k C av a lla r c a n n o t m ak e a d iffe ren tia tio n b e tw ee n po litica l a n d m o ra l im - p ro v em en t in history. T h a t is to say, c e r ta in ly th e re is a d iffe rence b e tw een m oral a n d m ere ly po litica l o r leg a l im provem en t, b u t i f th e p o ss ib ility o f po- litica l im p ro v em en t is only a ssu m e d b e ca u se of th e n eed fo r m o ra l ac tions to h av e a n effect in h isto ry , th e n C a v a lla r ca n n ot c u t o u t th e p o ss ib ility of a s - sum ing m o ra l p ro g ress b a s e d on th e sam e n e e d o f m orality . C a v a lla r h im se lf w rites th a t "th e ph ilo sophy o f h is to ry is g ro u n d ed n o t in theo logy , b u t both [are g rounded] in th e m o ra l la w a n d m o ra lity ."65 B u t C a v a lla r ca n n o t h av e i t bo th w ays: i f hopes a n d p red ic tio n s for fu tu re h is to ry a re b a se d on th e m o ra l n e ed to h a v e good actions h a v e good effects, i.e., th e hope th a t n a tu r e is n o t com pletely u n co n cern ed w ith m orality , a n d i f th is hope is n o t b a s e d on an y 62 Ibid., p. See also 293 and 331-2. 63 Ibid., p. 294. 64 Ibid., p. 293. For the whole of Cavallar's objections, see esp. pp. 293-9, 313-4, 319, 322, and 331-5. 65 Ibid.. p. 334. Italics added for emphasis. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. : 1 i 204 kn o w led g e of n a tu re itse lf, th e n h o p e fo r a re a l m o ra l (n o t m ere ly legal) p ro g - re s s m u s t be spoken a b o u t w ith in h is to ry a s well. P e rh a p s th is c o n trad ic tio n c a n b e s t be seen in C a v a lla r 's d iscussion o f th e th re e possib le in te rp re ta t io n s o f h is to ry a s K a n t e n v is io n s th em . R eca ll t h a t th e s e th re e p o ss ib ilitie s , w h ich K a n t d iscu sses i n re s p o n se to M en - d e lsso h n , a re th a t h is to ry is p ro g re ss in g , reg re ss in g , o r cyclical. C a v a lla r w r ite s t h a t "b e tw een th e se th re e p o ss ib ilitie s , th e o re tic a l (anschauende) r e a - so n c a n m ak e no decision ... T he p h ilo so p h y o f h is to ry h a s to do w ith 'free ly a c tin g a g e n ts ', a b o u t w hom one c a n n o t p re d ic t 'w h a t th e y w ill do' (A 139) "66 H ow a re w e (or, p a rtic u la rly , K a n t) to decide b e tw een th e s e in te rp re ta t io n s o f h is to ry ? A s C a v a lla r concludes, "n a tu ra l ly , K a n t does n o t re m a in agnostic . H e goes fu r th e r a n d decides on moral grounds for th e m o d e l o f p rog ress... K a n t a rg u e s a g a in s t M en d e lsso h n above a ll m oral-ph ilo soph icaU y . A cyclical m o d el o f h is to ry cau se s (errege) m o ra l d isg u s t, a n d is th e re fo re re jec ted ."67 T h e q u e s tio n to a sk , th e n , is: H ow c a n C a v a lie r go from th is conclusion a b o u t m o ra l p ro g ress in h is to ry to th e mere p ro g ress o f R ig h t a n d lega lity? H ow c a n p o litica l p ro g re ss be a s su m e d on th is m o ra l b a s is w ith o u t m ak in g s im ila r a ssu m p tio n s re g a rd in g m o ra l p ro g ress? P re su m a b ly , i t c an n o t. I f p o litic a l p ro g ress is a n ecessa ry a ssu m p tio n from th e s ta n d p o in t o f m o ra lity , a n d i f th e re ex is ts "no p ro o f'66 fo r su c h p o litica l p ro g ress , th e n su re ly m o ra l p ro g re s s s ta n d s o r fa lls on th e sa m e co n sid e ra tio n s . F u r th e r , does th e p o ss ib ility o f "ra d ic a l evil" s p e a k a g a in s t m o ra l p ro g re s s in h isto ry? C a v a lla r's p o s itio n co u ld ru n one o f tw o w ays. F irs t , i t c o u ld b e a concern over th e im p o ss ib ility o f p re d ic tin g a f u tu r e o f fu lly au to n o m o u s c re a tu re s . B u t th is c a n n o t b e a le g itim a te c o n c e rn on C a v a lla r's p a r t , s ince th e e s ta b lish m e n t o f R ig h t w o u ld involve s im ila r concerns, a n d 66 Ibid., p. 290. 67 Ibid., p. 291. Italics added for emphasis. 68 Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. *r f 205 C a v a lla r is correct to th in k t h a t i t is n o t a question a b o u t p re d ic ta b ility from n a tu r e itse lf , b u t a q u e s tio n a b o u t m o ra l be liefs. Second, how ever, C a v a lla r cou ld b e concerned over th e im p o ssib ility o f m o ra l p e rfec tion given K a n t's conv ic tion in th e Religion o f th e p resen ce o f "rad ic a l ev il in h u m a n n a tu r e ." D oes th i s ra d ic a l ev il p re c lu d e th e p o ssib ility o f m oral p ro g ress? In resp o n se to th is , l e t m e su m m arize th e position o f H e n ry E A llison in h is h e lp fu l, a n d I th in k m o stly correct, a rtic le , "K a n t's D oc trine o f R a d ic a l E v il."69 A llison reaso n s t h a t ra d ic a l ev il c a n n o t come h o rn th e n a tu r a l in c li- n a tio n s , s ince K a n t re p e a te d ly in s is ts t h a t th e y a re n o t bad. in th em se lv es , a n d c a n ev en be good. N o r c a n i t be th o u g h t to ex ist som ehow a p a r t fro m th e free w ill o f th e ind iv id u a l, so m e th in g th a t th e in d iv id u a l s im p ly c a n n o t h e lp , for i t w o u ld m ak e th e a t t r ib u t io n of g u ilt o r resp o n sib ility im possib le . A llison concludes t h a t th e n a tu re o f ra d ic a l evil "m u s t be u n d e rs to o d a s th e m a x im to give p r io r ity to th e n o n -m o ra l in cen tiv e , even in those case s w h ere i t con flic ts w ith th e d ic ta te s o f m o ra lity ,"70 in o th e r w ords, to w illing ly su b o rd in a te m o ra l m a x im s to m ax im s o f n a tu r a l in c lin a tio n . In ad d itio n , such a "p ro p e n s ity " to evil m u s t b e th o u g h t o f a s m ere ly th e fa c t t h a t "fin ite , s e n s u - ously a ffe c te d ra tio n a l b e in g s a re n o t on ly au tonom ous m o ra l ag en ts b u t a lso c re a tu re s o f desire a n d in c lin a tio n , w hich , a s re s tin g on n a tu r a l c au ses , a re n e i th e r com plete ly in th e i r c o n tro l n o r n ecessa rily in a g re e m e n t w ith th e d ic- ta te s o f m o ra lity ."71 W h at th is m e a n s is th a t , to rem a in t r u e to K an t, w e c a n n o t sa y t h a t th e re is so m e e x te rn a l rea so n fo r th e h u m a n rac e to h a v e a p re d isp o s itio n tow ards ev il, b u t r a th e r w e m u s t say th a t th is p red isp o s itio n ex is ts o n ly in th e fac t t h a t th e m o ra l s ide o f h u m a n be ings c o n tin u a lly 69 Henry E. Allison, "Kant's Doctrine of Radical Evil," in Akten des Siebenten Intemationaler Kant-Kongress, ed. Gerhard Funke, Band I (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1991), 52-72. 70 Ibid., p. 57. 1 Ibid.. p. 65. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 206 s tru g g les a g a in s t th e se n su o u s s id e w hich is in c lin ed s im p ly to follow n a tu ra l in s tin c ts re g a rd le ss of m o ra l co n sid era tio n s.72 T h u s , C a v a lla r's concern over rad ic a l ev il se em s m isp laced . C e rta in ly K a n t does th in k th a t "ra d ic a l ev il" ex ists, a n d th a t h u m a n s a re n e v e r like ly to ach ieve m o ra l pe rfec tion . B u t th is in no w ay ex c lu d es th e p o ss ib ility of c o n tin u a l m o ra l im p ro v em en t. R ad ica l ev il does n o t e x is t som ehow o u ts id e of th e in d iv id u a l's au tonom y, th u s p rec lu d in g a n y m ove to w a rd m o ra l pe rfec tion .73 I t ex is ts in th e fac t t h a t people a re a lw ay s te m p te d to su b o rd in a te th e m ora l la w to co n sid era tio n s o f h a p p in e ss . B u t th is is a n au to n o m o u s decision, a q u e s tio n ab o u t m o ra l w illing , a n d th is b e in g th e case, th e re i s n o theoretical ju s tif ic a tio n for choosing a p ro g re ss iv e , reg ress iv e , o r cyclical m odel o f h is to ry . W ho is to say w h a t w ill h a p p e n in a s ta te o f p e rp e tu a l p e ac e w here th e focus o f c u ltu re w ill b e d ev o ted to m o ra l im p ro v em en t?74 "No o n e ," is th e a n sw e r from th e p o in t o f v iew o f theo ry , th o u g h K a n t a rg u e s th a t , from th e p o in t o f v iew o f m o ra lity , w e h a v e every r ig h t to a ssu m e th a t m o ra l p ro g re ss is possib le . M oreover, w h a t a b o u t K a n t's d iscussion of "T h e V ic to ry o f th e Good over th e E v il P rinc ip le , a n d th e F o u n d a tio n o f a K ingdom o f G od on E a r th " from th e Religion? C e r ta in ly th is t it le a lone seem s a n e x ce llen t prima facie rea so n to th in k n o t on ly t h a t m o ra l p rog ress is possib le , b u t m ore im p o rta n tly fo r th is d iscu ssio n o f C avalla r, t h a t su ch p ro g re s s w ill h a p p e n on e a r th , a n d th e re fo re in history. W hile we can in d e e d s e p a ra te a d iscussion o f p o litica l a n d re lig ious p ro g re ss , i t seem s th a t b o th n e c e ssa r ily ta k e p lace in h isto ry , a n d t h a t b o th a re b a se d u p o n m ora l c o n sid e ra tio n s . I f th e re is a 72 "The very feet that we are never beyond the possibility of temptation, which for Kant means that we only obey the law reluctantly (ungem), indicates not merely a lack of holiness but also an actual propensity to subordinate moral considerations to our needs as sensuous beings..." (Ibid., p. 66). 73 If this were the case, it would throw more into question than merely the possibility of moral progress in history. 4 See Chapter Four below. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 207 re a so n to igno re K a n t's ow n in sis ten ce th a t a k ingdom of God on e a r th is possib le , C a v a lla r h a s c e r ta in ly n o t p ro v id ed it . I th in k th e b asic in co n sis ten cy in C a v a lla r's position sp e a k s a g a in s t a ll o f h is objections, b u t le t m e say a few a d d itio n a l w ords a d d re s s in g th e m ore specific objections. C e rta in ly C a v a lla r is r ig h t to d iffe ren tia te b e tw e e n "m oral s te p s" a n d "steps to w a rd m o ra lity ," a n d c e r ta in ly m ere le g a lity a n d R ig h t a re th e la t te r , s ince a ll im m o ra l p e rso n s c o u ld behave lega lly . B u t, a s I h a v e a rg u e d above,75 K a n t be lieves t h a t t ru e s te p s to w a rd m o ra l p ro g re s s c an on ly b e ta k e n in th o se cond itions of in te rn a l a n d e x te rn a l R igh t. M o ra lity re q u ire s th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a sy s tem o f R ig h t n o t on ly because i t i s th e p ro p e r w ay to e x p re ss freedom , b u t also b ecau se su c h a condition is n e c e ssa ry i f th e m o ra l p ro jec t is to be ta k e n on in e a rn e s t. I n add ition , a s w e sa w above w ith th e d iscussion o f th e Critique of Judgment, i t is c lear t h a t K a n t conceived of n a tu r e a s b e in g ab le to in d ire c tly p ro m o te m o ra lity th ro u g h c u ltu re , th a t sk ill a n d d isc ip line cou ld a id p e rso n s in m oral w illing . W h a t H o lly W ilson s a id w ith re g a rd to a n a rtic le by T h o m as A ux ter co u ld b e a p p lie d to C a v a lla r h e re : C a v a lla r's p o sitio n "co n trad ic ts K a n t's ex p lic it c la im th a t n a tu r e h a s a n u ltim a te e n d fo r th e h u m a n species w h ich c o n tr ib u te s to th e d ev e lopm en t of m o ra lity in h u m a n beings; i t c an p ro d u ce th e fo rm al sub jec tive cond ition o f m o ra lity , w h ich is th e a p titu d e fo r a rb i t r a ry p u rp o se s ."76 W hile w e o u g h t to d iffe re n tia te be tw een "m o ra l s te p s" a n d m ere "steps to w a rd m o ra lity ," th is in no w ay a llow s us to exclude th e f irs t . IV. W hereas S ec tion O ne h a s d e a lt w ith som e r a th e r b ro ad th e m e s , th e fo llow ing S ection w ill d e a l exclusively w ith m o ra l p rog ress, po litics, a n d th e 75 And as I shall argue below. 76 Holly L. Wilson, "A Gap in American Kant Scholarship: Pragmatic Anthropology as the Application of Kantian Moral Philosophy." p. 407 fn. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 208 h ig h e s t good. In th e above sec tion , I h a v e c leared th e w ay fo r th is second sec tion w ith th e a n a ly s is o f K a n t's u n d e rs ta n d in g o f te leo logy a n d b y a rg u in g t h a t m o ra l p ro g ress is a n e c e ssa ry p o s tu la te of p ra c tic a l re a so n . In th is way, I h a v e tr ie d to give su p p o rt to K a n t's seem ing ly g ra n d c la im s in o rd e r th a t we m ig h t a tte m p t to an a ly ze th e m se rio u s ly . B u t, g iven th is b ro a d c le a rin g , how a re w e specifically to u n d e rs ta n d th e p o s tu la te of m o ra l p ro g re s s o f th e species? W h a t is th e p rec ise n a tu r e o f th e h ig h e s t good w h ic h is th e n e c e ssa ry object o f a ll m o ra l w illing? Is K a n t c o n s is ten t in h i s conceptions? A n d how does th e p o s tu la te o f m o ra l p ro g ress function? W hy is i t s b e lie f n ecessa ry ? W h a t is th e e x ac t l in k b e tw ee n m o ra lity a n d po litic s? W e saw above t h a t e x te rn a l fac to rs c a n in f lu e n c e m o ra l w illing , b u t w h a t ro le m u s t po litics p la y in p ro m o tin g a m o ra l fo u n d a tio n ? A nd how does K a n t env is ion m o ra l p ro g ress to ta k e p lace? W h a t a re th e fac to rs w h ich p ro m o te a n d d e tra c t su ch progress? W h a t is th e u lt im a te p ic tu re w h ich h e en v is io n s? A n d how a re w e to e v a lu a te su c h c la im s? I t is to q u estio n s su c h a s th e s e th a t w e now tu rn . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Section Two Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 210 Chapter One Defense of the Highest Good I. T ho u g h i t seem s in co n tro v ertib le th a t K a n t w a n te d th e concep t o f th e h ig h e s t good, o r summum bonum, to p la y a n im p o rta n t ro le in h is e th ics a n d p h ilo sophy , th is concept h a s b e en ta k e n by som e K a n t co m m en ta to rs to be p ro b lem atic . T he m a in is su e h a s to do w ith w h e th e r th is concep t is e ssen tia l, u n n e c e ssa ry , o r fla tly in co m p atib le w ith th e re s t o f K a n t's p h ilo so p h ica l sy s- tem in g en era l, a n d h is m o ra l th e o ry in p a rtic u la r . B eg in n in g w ith Lew is W h ite B eck's a tta c k on th is co n cep t1 a n d Jo h n S ilb e r's defense ,2 se v e ra l c o m m en ta to rs h ave offered c o n tr ib u tio n s on how one is to b e s t u n d e rs ta n d th e h ig h e s t good. In th is c h a p te r I hope to p re s e n t w h a t I ta k e to be th e m ost im p o r ta n t p o in ts of th is debate ; I s h a ll b e g in w ith th o se p o in ts w hich a re m o st l ik e ly to be se ttle d a n d u n co n tro v e rs ia l, a n d p roceed w ith in c reas in g ly c o n tro v e rs ia l e lem en ts w hich I w ill a rg u e to be n ecessa ry b u t w hich a re no t lik e ly to be read ily accepted . W ith o u t g iv ing a specifically h is to ric a l account o f th e d e b a te ,3 I hope to c o n tr ib u te to th e d ialogue in tw o w ays: by show ing w h ich is su e s a re m ost like ly to b e a lre a d y se ttled , or a t le a s t by a rg u in g for som e n e c e ssa ry p a ra m e te rs to th e d eb a te , a n d by g iv ing som e o rig in a l in te r - p re ta tio n s a n d conclusions w h ich follow from m an y o f th e se im p o r ta n t po in ts . 1 Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. 2 See especially: John R. Silber, "Kant's Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent," Philosophical Review 68 (October 1959): 469-492; "The Importance of the Highest Good in Kant's Ethics," Ethics (April 1963): 179-197; and, "The Metaphysical Importance of the Highest Good as the Canon of Pure Reason in Kant's Philosophy," Texas Studies in Literature and Language (Summer 1959): 233-244. 3 For such an account see: Lance Simmons. "Kant's Highest Good: Albatross, Keystone, Achilles Heel." History o f Philosophy Quarterly 10. no. 4 (October 1993): 355-368. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 211 n. /. One can have the duty to strive for the highest good even if one cannot, in fact, achieve it T h is p o in t is m a d e especially w ell in J o h n R . S ilb er's fam ous p iece, "K a n t's C onception o f th e H ig h est Good a s Im m a n e n t a n d T ra n sc e n d e n t." T he p rob lem is th is : K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t th e n e ce ssa ry object of th e m o ra l law is th e h ig h e s t good, a n d th a t one is th e re fo re com m anded to p u rs u e th e h ig h e s t good. B u t h e a lso c la im s th a t i t is im p o ssib le for h u m a n b e in g s to achieve th e h ig h e s t good, or, a t le a s t, t h a t i t is im possib le for h u m a n b e in g s to b rin g i t a b o u t th e m se lv e s .4 In ad d itio n , K a n t h a s a rg u e d th a t so m e th in g c an n o t be co m m an d ed o f a pe rson i f i t is im p o ssib le for th a t p e rso n to p e r - form su ch a d u ty ( th is is p a r t of h is a rg u m e n t fo r th e necessity of freed o m in th e second Critique). O n th is account, i f one a tte m p ts to b r in g ab o u t th e h ig h es t good in th e w o rld and , p red ic tab ly , fa ils , one th e n m u s t be c o n s id e re d b lam ew orthy , s ince i t w a s one's d u ty to ach iev e th e h ig h e s t good. H ence , how c an i t b e one's d u ty to p u rsu e th e h ig h e s t good i f i ts a tta in m e n t is im - possible?5 S ilb e r's a n sw e r is to posit th a t th e h ig h e s t good m u s t be c o n sid e red a s a m odel fo r ac tion . W h a t K a n t sh o u ld h a v e b e en c lea re r in say ing , a rg u e s S ilber, is th a t "m a n is o b lig a ted n o t to a t ta in in fu ll, b u t r a th e r to a p p ro x i- m a te th e h ig h e s t good to th e fu lle s t possib le deg ree ."6 I t c a n n o t be one's d u ty to achieve th e h ig h e s t good, b u t i t is su re ly w ith in one's pow er to a t te m p t to p rom ote th e h ig h e s t good, a n d one c an be ju d g e d b lam ew o rth y i f one fa i ls to m ak e su ch a n a tte m p t. T hough one c a n n o t m a k e o th e rs m ore v irtu o u s , one 4 The importance of making such a distinction will become clear later in this chapter. s It should be noted that, as Silber points out ("Kant's Conception," pp. 473-479), Kant needs to keep these premises in order to keep his proof for the existence of God. If he denies the highest good as the final object of the moral law, the necessity of the possibility of achieving what is one's duty, or the impossibility of man to bring about the highest good on his/her own. then Kant must reject the need for God and immortality. 6 "Kant's Conception." p. 478. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21 2 can w o rk on becom ing a b e tte r m o ra l a g e n t oneself, a n d can also , S ilb e r m a in ta in s , m a k e oneself a n d o th e rs h a p p y to th e degree th a t one ju d g es th e a g e n t to b e d e se rv in g .7 In th is w ay, one c a n p rom o te th e h ig h e s t good w ith - o u t b e in g co m m an d ed to ach ieve it, a n d i t se rv es th e im p o r ta n t fu n c tio n of g iv ing one a m odel fo r action: The idea of the highest good as transcenden t -th a t is, the idea of the highest good as the object which m an is obligated to a tta in in full - is the m easure th a t m an uses in assessing the lim its of his capacity. This is the only norm which can assure him th a t he does not sell him self and his freedom short, th a t he does not become insensitive to his capacities and hence to w hat m ay be his duties... While Kant insists on representing the highest good as transcendent in its em ploym ent as the ideal m easure for hum an striving, he also insists on represen ting it as im m anent in its em ploym ent as the m easure of moral ac- countability.8 W ith th e h ig h e s t good as a n id e a l or m odel fo r action , i t e n su re s t h a t one w ill n o t s im p ly a c t b a se d upon w h a t one h a s d o n e o r h a s b een c ap a b le o f doing in th e p a s t. G iven th e n a tu re of h u m a n b e in g s a s free beings, o n e sh o u ld no t re ly on p a s t ac tio n s a s p red ic tions a s to w h a t is possib le fo r th e fu tu re , an d th e h ig h e s t good a s th e id ea l e n d o f th e m o ra l la w e n su re s t h a t one w ill no t u n d e re s t im a te o ne's p o ten tia l fo r action . B u t K a n t c an n o t re q u ire t h a t th e h ig h e s t good a c tu a lly be ach ieved in one's life tim e , hence a s f a r a s cu lp ab ility is concerned , o n e is only b lam ew o rth y i f o n e does n o t s tr iv e to ach ieve th e h ig h e s t good.9 2. One cannot will without an object or one cannot simply will a good will To b e g in w ith , i t is im p o rta n t to k e ep in m in d t h a t w h e n K a n t ta lk s ab o u t th e m o ra l la w a n d i ts ca teg o rica l c o m m an d s to hum an b e in g s , h e is 71 will argue below that this second element of making ourselves and others happy based on our judgment of desert or worth needs modification. 8 "Kant's Conception," pp. 484-5. 9 See also: Kwang-Sae Lee, "Some Reflections on the Idea of the Highest Good as a Regulative Idea of Pure Practical Reason." in Akten des Siebenten Intemationalen Kant-Kongresses. Band II. I (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag. 1990). 551-561. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. i li 213 a lre a d y c o n ce rn ed w ith h u m a n b e in g s as fin ite ra tio n a l c re a tu re s , a n d no t s im p ly any p o ss ib le ra t io n a l b e in g , su c h as God. H u m a n b e in g s a re no t holy, s ince th e y a re f in ite a n d h a v e a se n su o u s side to th em as w e ll a s a ra tio n a l s ide . In d e e d , th e ca tegorica l im p e ra tiv e canno t command a w ill t h a t is holy, for su c h a w ill to ta lly u n in f lu e n c e d b y a sensuous or f in ite n a tu r e w ould a lre a d y a c t in accord w ith th e m o ra l la w because i t w ou ld b e w holly r a t io n a l .10 K a n t ex p la in s in th e se co n d Critique th a t, though we cam suppose th a t m en as rational beings have a pure will, since they are affected by w an ts an d sensuous motives we cannot suppose them to have a holy will, a will incapable o f any maxims which conflict w ith the moral law. The moral law for them [hum an beings], therefore, is an imperative, com m anding categorically because i t is unconditioned.11 A ho ly w ill, th e w ill of God, s im p ly w o u ld w ill in accord w ith th e m o ra l law , a n d th e re fo re th e law w o u ld n o t co m m an d per se. Human b e in g s a s f in ite r a t io n a l c re a tu re s , th o u g h th e y h a v e a p u re will, also h a v e a se n su o u s n a - tu re , a n d do n o t a lw ays fo rm u la te m ax im s in accord w ith th e m o ra l law . T h u s, su c h c re a tu re s a re "in n e e d o f th e m oral c o n s tra in t o f th e re s is ta n c e offered b y th e p rac tic a l re a so n , w h ic h m ay be called a n in n er b u t in te lle c tu a l com pulsion ."12 T h e re seem to b e tw o good a rg u m e n ts , th en , fo r th e p o s itio n th a t one n e ed s a n ob ject fo r th e w ill to e n g a g e in the ac t of w illing . W e s h a l l leav e th e second a rg u m e n t fo r p o in t n u m b e r th re e below, b u t th e f i r s t com es from M a ry -B a rb a ra Z eld in 's a rtic le , "T h e S um m um B onum , th e M o ra l L aw , a n d 10 Certainly a holy will by mere definition is only a will which would be incapable of being de- termined by sensuous inclinations, and thus a holy will could be sensuously impressed. However, it seems clear from Kant's discussion of a holy will in the second Critique that he has in mind a will which is, in fact, uninfluenced by sensuous inclinations. Cf. Ak. 32, 33, 84, 122, and 123n. Regardless, it is certainly clear that human beings cannot become holy, but can only approximate a holy will, and this is all I need for my current point concerning the command of the moral law. " Critique o f Practical Reason. Ak. 32. 12 Ibid.. Ak. 33. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ! ) .1 214 th e E x is ten ce of God,"13 a d irec t response to B eck's a t ta c k on th e h ig h es t good. Z eld in w rites: any being whose practical reason can be impure and for whom, consequently, the m oral law is a law of duty which commands, m u st understand, not merely logically through unschem atized categories, b u t as an object, the moral law as a command, and m ust therefore be able to schem atize it by some schema both as to its m eaning and as to its complete object... T hus no rational being whose will is not holy can be commanded what cannot really be, because he would then simply not be aw are of the command and it would thus not be a command for him. To be commanded the production of a something-I-know-not-what is tan tam ount to being aw are of something which m eans nothing and is thus not a som ething.14 As w as d iscu ssed above, th e m o ra l law com m ands f in i te ra t io n a l c re a tu re s only, n o t c re a tu re s w hose w ills a re holy. As such , h u m a n b e in g s m u s t find som e c o n te n t fo r th e form o f th e m o ra l law . I f h u m a n b e in g s h a d ho ly w ills, th e form o f th e m oral law w o u ld be enough, since th e y s im p ly w ould w ill in accord w ith th is law . B u t p e rso n s m u s t w ill so m e th in g o r o th e r in th e ir w illing , e lse th e y h av e only th e em p ty form o f th e la w w ith n o th in g th a t th ey c a n concep tualize; as K a n t ex p la in s , pure practical reason is a capacity for ends generally, and for it to be indiffer- en t to ends, th a t is, to take no interest in them , would therefore be a contra- diction, since then it would not determine m axim s for actions e ither (because every maxim of action contains an end) and so would not be practical reason.15 R ecall from o u r d iscussion o f th e second Critique above t h a t K a n t defines th e w ill a s "a facu lty e ith e r o f b r in g in g fo rth objects c o rre sp o n d in g to conceptions o r o f d e te rm in in g itself*16 in a law -lik e fash ion , a n d th u s a s a facu lty of 13 Mary-Barbara Zeldin, "The Summuxn Bonum, the Moral Law, and the Existence of God," Kant-Studien 62, no. 1 (1971): 43-54. 14 Ibid., p. 46. 15 The Metaphysics o f Morals, trans. Mary Gregor, Ak. 395. See also: Immanuel Kant, Relig- ion Within the Limits o f Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), 3-6. 16 Second Critique. Ak. 15. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. d esire , i t is a facu lty o f re a liz in g a n object (in p a rt) th ro u g h th e re p re se n ta tio n o f it. F o r re a so n to be p rac tica l i t m u s t act, a n d in o rd e r to act in f in ite ra t io n a l agen ts, i t m u s t h a v e som e end, som e c o n te n t fo r w illing . L e t u s p roceed to th e n e x t sec tion , s in ce i ts d iscussion is in te r tw in e d w ith th is one. 3. The highest good is the proper object o f moral willing. T h is is p e rh a p s too c o n tro v e rs ia l a po in t to a d d re ss so h ig h u p th e lis t, b u t I th in k i t is b e st d isc u sse d h e re n ev erth e less . W e can th e n a lso give th e second re a so n m en tio n ed above a s to w hy w illin g n e ed s a n object. K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t th e h ig h e s t good is "th e object w h ich is g iven to [the m o ra lly d e te rm in ed will] a p rio ri,"17 a n d "is a sy n th e tic p ra c tic a l p ro p o - s itio n a priori (a n d in d ee d ob jectively p rac tica l) g iven by p u re re a so n ."18 A n "object o f p ra c tic a l reaso n " is, fo r K an t: the idea of an object as an effect possible through freedom. To be an object of practical knowledge as such signifies, therefore, only the relation o f the will to the action whereby it or its opposite is brought into being. To decide w hether or not something is [such] an object... is only to discern the possibility or im- possibility of willing the action by which a certain object would be m ade reed, provided we had the ability to bring it about...19 O n th e one h a n d , K a n t concludes t h a t th e object o f free w illin g sh o u ld be free w illin g itse lf. O n th e o th e r h a n d , K a n t a lso c learly s ta te s th a t "i t is c e r ta in ly u n d e n ia b le th a t every v o lition m u s t h a v e a n object a n d th e re fo re a m a te - r ia l ."20 In d eed , th is is th e b a s is fo r K a n t's rejection o f W olffs a n d B a u m g a r- te n 's u se o f "perfection" as th e fo u n d a tio n o f m orality , fo r n o t only i s i t "em p ty , in d e te rm in a te , a n d h e n c e o f no u se for f in d in g in th e im m e a su ra b le 17 Ibid., Ak. 4. 18 Religion, p. 6 n. 19 Second Critique, Ak. 57. 20 Ibid.. Ak. 34. See also: Religion, pp. 3-6. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f ie ld o f possib le re a lity th e m ax im u m sum s u ita b le fo r u s ,"21 i t is also sim p ly "tau to lo g ica l."22 B u t th is a lso seem s tru e of th e n e c e ss ity o f w illing a free w ill. By defin ition , w illin g to h a v e a good w ill co n ce rn s m ere ly th e form o f w illing , a n d th e re fo re is e m p ty o f co n ten t. T h u s K a n t w rite s th a t "in th e a b - sence o f a ll re fe ren ce to a n e n d no d e te rm in a tio n o f th e w ill can ta k e p lace in m an , since su ch d e te rm in a tio n c a n n o t be fo llow ed b y no effect w h a tev e r."23 I f w e n ecessa rily n e e d m a te r ia l fo r a n y type o f w illing , th e n K a n t m u s t p rov ide a su ita b le co n ten t. T he m o ra l la w s ta te s t h a t th e m ere form o f th e w ill m u st be th e de- te rm in in g g ro u n d o f th e w ill, b u t th is does n o t ru le o u t th e necessity for w illin g so m e th in g o r o th er; "th e m a te r ia l o f th e m ax im c a n in d eed rem a in b u t c an n o t b e i t s cond ition ."24 A s long as w e do n o t m a k e desire for som e ob- je c t th e fo u n d a tio n of w illing , a n d a s long a s i t is n o t p ro h ib ite d w ith th e ap p lica tio n o f th e m o ra l law , su c h a n object is a llow ab le ; though the highest good m ay be the entire object o f a pure practical reason, i.e., of a pure will, it is still not to be taken as the determining ground of the pure will; the m oral law alone m ust be seen as the ground for making the highest good and its realization or promotion the object of the pure will.25 K a n t is co n s is ten t in te ll in g u s t h a t so m eth in g o r o th e r m u s t be th e object o f o u r w illing , t h a t th e good w ill is n o t i ts e lf su ch a n object, a n d th a t th is n e e d is n o t p ro h ib ited b y th e fa c t t h a t th e m o ra l la w m u s t b e free of con ten t, so lo n g a s th e object does n o t p ro v e to be th e d e te rm in in g g ro u n d o f th e w ill. T he h ig h e s t good a s th e "to ta lity o f th e ob ject o f th e p u re p rac tica l re a so n "26 is th e p ro p e r object o f o u r m o ra l w illing , th o u g h i t is n o t th e 21 Grundlegung, Ak. 443. Ellington translation. 22 See Kant's Lectures on Ethics, pp. 24-26, and 29. 23 Religion, p. 4. 24 Second Critique, Ak. 34. 25 Ibid., Ak. 109. 26 Second Critique. Ak. 108. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f 217 d e te rm in in g g ro u n d . T h o u g h th is p o in t m ay s till b e co n sid ered con troversia l, I th in k i t h a s b een w ell a rg u e d for in th e p a s t, a n d m u s t be accep ted a s one of th e p a ra m e te rs o f th e d e b a te concern ing th e h ig h e s t good. B eck, M urphy , F rie d m a n , and , to som e e x te n t, A u x te r h a v e a ll a rg u e d th a t "no fo rm u la tio n o f th e ca tegorica l im p e ra tiv e c o n ta in s a n y re fe ren c e to th e h ig h e s t good,"27 th a t th e fo rm al m o ra l la w c o n ta in s n o co n ten t, a n d th a t th e h ig h e s t good c a n n o t p rov ide th is co n te n t. B u t S ilber, P ack er, A nderson-G old , Rossi, and , im p o rta n tly , M a ry -B a rb a ra Z eld in h a v e a ll d e fe n d ed th e v iew th a t one can d ed u ce th e h ig h e s t good from th e m o ra l law . L e t u s see how a defense m ig h t b e possib le . To beg in w ith , a good prima facie re a so n fo r th in k in g th a t th e concept m ig h t be in fe rre d fro m th e m o ra l la w is K a n t's th i r d fo rm u la tio n of th e c a te - g o rica l im p era tiv e , n am ely , "a c t in su c h a w ay t h a t you t r e a t h u m an ity , w h e th e r in your ow n p e rso n o r in th e p e rso n o f a n o th e r , a lw ays a t th e sam e tim e a s a n e n d a n d n e v e r s im p ly a s a m e a n s ,"28 w h ic h h e la te r m odifies, s ta tin g : The concept of every rationed being as one who m ust regard him self as legislat- ing universal law by all his will's maxims... leads to another very fruitful con- cept, which depend on the aforementioned one, viz., th a t of a kingdom of ends. By "kingdom" I understand a system atic union of different rational beings through common laws... [T]herefore,... it will be possible to th ink of a whole of all ends in system atic connection (a whole both of rational being as ends in themselves and also o f the particular ends which each may set for himself);..."29 H e re , in K a n t's n o tio n o f th e k ingdom o f ends, one f in d s n o t on ly a collection of ra t io n a l ag en ts , b u t a lso th e i r specific, "p a r t ic u la r e n d s w h ich each m ay s e t 27 Jeffrie G. Murphy, "The Highest Good as Content for Kant's Ethical Formalism: Beck ver- sus Silber," Kant-Studien, 56 (1965): 104. 28 Grundlegung, Ak. 429. 29 Ibid. Ak. 433. Italics added for emphasis. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. *I i 218 for h im se lf."30 As Zeldin su m m arize s , "th e kingdom of e n d s is , how ever, id e n tic a l w ith th e id ea o f a m o ra l w o rld a s described in th e Critique of Pure Reason a n d th e la tte r , in tu rn , is th e summum bonum. T h u s , th e com m and to p rom o te th e summum bonum , a s th e k ingdom o f ends, is fo u n d in th e th ird fo rm u la tio n of th e categorica l im p e ra tiv e ."31 W ith th e h ig h e s t good a s th e collection o f a ll ends w hich a re w ille d by ra tio n a l a g en ts in acco rd w ith th e m o ra l law , th is is eq u iv a len t to th e k ingdom of en d s a n d th e summum bo- num. I f th e m oral law com m ands one to w ill u n iv ersa lly , a n d to t r e a t o th e rs a n d o n ese lf as ends in th em se lv es , a n d since th e law co m m an d s f in ite r a - tio n a l a g e n ts as c re a tu re s w ith a se n su o u s n a tu re a s w ell a s a r a t io n a l n a - tu re , i t th ere fo re com m ands one to ta k e th e p a rtic u la r e n d s o f a n o th e r as one's ow n ends, though o f co u rse o n ly i f th e se p a r tic u la r e n d s a re p e rm iss i- b le .32 L e t u s defend th e h ig h e s t good a s th e n ecessa ry ob ject o f m o ra l w ill- in g from a n o th e r d irection , w ith th e questio n : W h at is th e co nnec tion be- tw e en v ir tu e a n d h ap p in ess? I h a v e t r ie d to show above t h a t th e m o ra l law a lre a d y concerns h u m a n b e in g s a s f in ite c rea tu re s , b ecau se th e la w com- mands. W e also know th a t , a s c re a tu re s , h u m an be ings h a v e a n a tu r a l con- c e rn w ith th e ir happ iness: "to b e h a p p y is n ecessa rily th e d e s ire o f every r a - tio n a l b u t fin ite being, a n d th u s i t is a n unavo idab le determ in an t o f i ts fac- u l ty of d esire ,"33 and , "m a n is a b e in g of needs, so fa r a s h e b e lo n g s to th e 301 find it interesting that while Auxter believes the notion of the highest good to have to philo- sophical value, he himself recognizes the importance of Kant's discussion of "particular ends." See: Thomas Auxter, "Kant's Theory of Retribution," in Akten des Siebenten Intemationalen KantKongresses , Band II.2 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1990), 307-315, (especially p. 313). 31 Zeldin, "The Summum Bonum," p. 49. 32 This does not, it should be mentioned, present a problem of motivation for Kant As Zeldin explains: "heteronomy is not, however, involved [even though the relation of the summum bonum to the moral law is synthetic and not analytic]... since the summum bonum as the goal is not the determining factor... [Sjince the summum bonum is in fact no more than the moral law brought 'nearer to intuition,' [that is, "schematized"] it would, as the kingdom of ends and the goal of a pure but finite practical reason, involve a heteronomous element only insofar as is required for such a reason to have a moral end at all" (Ibid., p. 50). 33 Second Critique. Ak. 25. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. s 219 w orld o f sen se , a n d to th is e x te n t h is re a so n ce rta in ly h a s a n in escap ab le re - sp o n s ib ility from th e side of h is s e n su o u s n a tu re to a t te n d to i ts in te re s t a n d to form p ra c tic a l m axim s w ith a v iew to... h a p p in e ss ..."34 N ow i f w e accept th is , th e n p e rso n s h av e b o th th e n e e d to b e m o ra l a n d th e n e e d to b e h ap p y , a n d re a so n , w h ich h a s b een p ro v ed b y th e second Critique to be p rac tic a l i t - self, m u s t th e n be necessarily co n ce rn e d w ith bo th . O f course, th is gives rise to th e p ro b lem th a t "hap p in ess a n d m o ra lity a re tw o specifically d iffe ren t e le m e n ts o f th e h ig h e s t good a n d th e re fo re th e ir com bination c a n n o t be k n o w n an a ly tic a lly ,"35 a n d th is le a d s K a n t to h is so lu tion of th e "an tin o m y " of th e second Critique. T h u s th e h ig h e s t good sim p ly a rise s o u t o f th e fac t th a t p ra c tic a l re a so n h a s a n ecessa ry co n ce rn w ith th e h u m a n b e in g b o th a s a m o ra l a g e n t a n d a s a b e in g of n e ed s . A n o th e r app roach is possib le . K a n t ca lls th e h ig h e s t good th e "to ta lity o f th e object of th e p u re p ra c tic a l rea so n ,"36 "th e [sum of] in ev itab le consequences o f m axim s ad o p ted a s conform able to [m orality]"37 a n d "th e concept o f a f in a l e n d o f a ll th in g s (h a rm o n y w hich , w hile n o t m u ltip ly in g m en 's d u tie s , y e t p rov ides th em w ith a sp ec ia l p o in t of focus for th e u n ific a - tio n o f a ll e n d s)."38 Now c e r ta in ly th e m o ra l la w com m ands som e actions, p ro h ib its som e, a n d p e rm its o th e rs . M a n y of th e se re q u ire d ac tions a re sp e lled o u t in K a n t's Metaphysics o f Morals, th e h a p p in e ss of o th e rs (as a w ide du ty ) a n d a c e rta in form o f re p re s e n ta tiv e governm ent, fo r exam ple. T h ere a re n e ce ssa ry objects of th e w ill a n d o f p rac tic a l reaso n , fo r th o u g h one c an n o t b eg in w ith such en d s a n d th e n f in d th e n ecessa ry m ax im s fo r th e ir a tta in m e n t, "in e th ics th e concept o f duty w ill le a d to e n d s a n d w ill h a v e to e s ta b lish maxims w ith resp ec t to e n d s w e ought to se t ou rse lves, grou n d in g 34 Ibid., Ak. 61. 35 Ibid., Ak. 113. 36 Ibid., Ak. 108. 37 Religion, p. 4. 38 Ibid.. p. 5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 220 th em in accordance w ith m o ra l p rinc ip les;"39 "fo r th is rea so n e th ics can a lso be d e fin e d as th e sy s te m o f th e ends o f p u re p ra c tic a l rea so n ."40 T h u s, I ag ree w ith R e a th 's s ta te m e n t: One can view the H ighest Good as a final end w ithout t hinking th a t it is sup- posed to provide a m ateria l content th a t com plem ents the otherwise purely form al character of th e Moral Law... (T]he H ighest Good is a system atization of the content of the M oral Law, which can be generated by individuals apply- ing the Moral Law to the ir conduct. If the M oral Law could not generate any content, there could be no place for [the] H ighest Good in Kant's theory...41 H u m a n b e in g s m u s t w ill so m e th in g o r o th e r , a n d i t is th e concept o f th e h ig h e s t good as th e to ta l i ty o f a ll m ora l m ax im s w h ich p rov ides th e a p p ro p ri- a te c o n te n t for th e w ill.42 T h is lead s, f in a lly , to th e second re a so n , m e n tio n e d in th e q u estio n above, w h y one c a n n o t s im p ly w ill to h a v e a good w ill, th o u g h th is rea so n is co n n ec ted w ith th e w illin g o f th e h ig h e s t good. T h is a rg u m e n t com es from Jo h n S ilb e r 's a rtic le , "T h e Im p o rtan ce of th e H ig h e s t Good in K a n t's E th ic s ." S ilb e r b e g in s by ru lin g o u t p o ss ib ilities fo r c o n te n t o th e r th a n th e h ig h e s t good. In s te a d o f sim p ly w illin g to w ill in acco rdance w ith th e m o ra l law , w hich w a s show n above to b e void o f n e c e ssa ry c o n te n t, one possib ility fo r a n e n d o f p ra c tic a l re a so n m ig h t be to w ill to h a v e a good w ill, to b r in g th e w ill to m o ra l perfection . H ow ever, th is w ill n o t w ork , S ilb e r a rg u es, b ecau se "in a n ac t o f vo lition one does n o t sim ply w ill a good d isposition . R a th e r one ex - p re sse s a good d isp o sitio n b y w illing so m e th in g m ore concrete ."43 T h e w illin g o f a good w ill does n o t a d d a n y co n ten t to th e m o ra l la w a n d does n o t in fo rm one a s to w h a t to do i f o n e w a n ts to w ill in acco rdance w ith th e m o ra l law . 39 The Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 382. 40 Ibid., Ak. 381. 41 Reath, p. 604 n. 42 See also Zeldin. "The Summum Bonum." p. 51. 43 Silber. "The Importance o f the Highest Good." p. 186. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. S ilb e r m a in ta in s th a t in K a n t's a tta c k on W olff a n d B a u m g a rte n h e w as "w e ll aw are o f th e n e e d to sa y m ore," a n d d eem ed a n y eth ics a s u se le ss w hich g av e th e tau to lo g ica l p ro p o sitio n th a t i t w a s good to do w h a t w as good.44 A n- o th e r possib ility fo r c o n te n t o f th e m o ra l la w is th e w illing o f th e p e rfec tio n of o n e 's n a tu ra l capac itie s. B u t, sis S ilb e r p o in ts ou t, e ith e r th is is ju s t a n o th e r w a y o f w illing to h a v e a good w ill, in w h ich case i t is aga in a m ere tau to logy , o r i t is w illing a n uncond itioned , n a tu r a l good, in w hich case th e w ill is b e in g d e te rm in e d by a n object a n d n o t th e m o ra l la w .45 I t is only th e h ig h e s t good, S ilb e r concludes, w hich can p rov ide th e n e c e ssa ry m a te r ia l fo r th e m o ra l law . S ilb e r a rg u e s th a t th e h ig h e s t good, a s th e com bination o f v ir tu e a n d p ro p o rtio n a te h a p p in e ss fo r a ll, is th e o n ly e n d possib le for th is ro le . As w as sh o w n above, e th ics is concerned w ith e n d s . T h e h ig h e s t good as a sing le "id e a " encom passes a ll o f th e e n d s w h ich a re in conform ity to th e m o ra l law ; Kant's theory is well prepared, of course, for the extension of reason to the conditions of m an since it has its foundation in the hum an situation. K ant builds his ethics on the foundation of th e experience of obligation, which is the experience, not of a pure rational being, b u t of man, a rational-sensible be- ing.46 A s a h u m a n being , one sh o u ld w ill t h a t o n e s tr iv e tow ards m o ra l perfection , t h a t one do w h a te v e r one can to b r in g one's w ill in to conform ity w ith th e m o ra l law . B u t a s a h u m a n being , one m u s t a lso ta k e in to co n sid e ra tio n th e n a tu r a l e n d o f h a p p in e ss ; hence , th is seco n d a sp ec t o f th e h ig h e s t good n ec - e s sa r ily follows from K a n t's concern w ith a ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e w h ich com m ands n o t a ho ly b u t a h u m a n w ill. O f cou rse , one can n o t w ill on ly one's ow n h a p p in e ss , n o r c a n one w ill one's h a p p in e s s w h e n i t is opposed to th e m o ra l law . As S ilb e r su m m arizes: 44 Ibid., p. 186. 45 Ibid, pp. 187-190. 46 Ibid. p. 191. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Now a m ateria l object of volition tha t can inform and direct the will in the act of volition is supplied. And yet, remarkably, th is m aterial stands under the determ ination of law because it is a dem and of the law and not of inclination th a t one m ust seek the happiness of others...47 B ecause th e w illin g c re a tu re u n d e r c o n s tra in ts o f th e ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e is a h u m a n be ing , n o t a ho ly be ing , an d b ecau se a n y m axim m u s t b e u n iv ersa lizab le , th e h ig h e s t good a s th e collection o f a ll en d s o f ra t io n a l b u t h u m a n c re a tu re s i s th e a p p ro p ria te e n d to supp ly th e n ecessa ry m a te r ia l fo r th e m o ra l w ill.48 4. Questions o f morality are a priori concerned with man as a natural creature, Le., not as the possessor o f a holy will T h is p o in t sh o u ld be c le a r ho rn th e above d iscussion , a n d is d iscussed in m ore d e ta i l by S tev en G. S m ith a n d R.Z. F r ie d m a n ."49 T h e c a teg o rica l im - p e ra tiv e , a s n o te d above, c an o n ly com m and i f i t w ould n o t be obeyed n a tu - ra lly , t h a t is , i t c a n n o t c o m m and a holy will; a s F rie d m a n e x p la in s , ne ither is it correct to suggest th a t reason in its critical or self-reflective func- tion h as before it m an as a rational creature 'undiluted' by a n a tu ra l dimen- sion... We m ust remind ourselves tha t in K ant's analysis a... creature subject to the m oral law m ust be both natural and rational, directed by inclination to happiness yet possessed of a disinterested respect for the m oral law.50 47 Ibid., pp. 191-2. 48 Kant gives us a possible third argument for the highest good as the necessary material of the moral will in the Metaphysics o f Morals when he writes: "But ethics goes beyond this [concern only with the formal condition of outer freedom] and provides a matter (an object of free choice), an end of pure reason that it presents as an end which is also objectively necessary, that is, an end which, as far as men are concerned, it is a duty to have. For since men's sensible inclinations tempt them to ends (the matter of choice) that can be contrary to duty, lawgiving reason can in turn check their influence only by a moral end set up against the ends of inclination, an end that must therefore be given a priori, independently of inclinations," (Ak. 380-1). 49 Steven G. Smith, "Worthiness to be Happy and Kant's concept of the Highest Good," KantStudien 75 (1984): 168-90; and R.Z. Friedman, "The Importance and Function of Kant's Highest Good." Journal o f the History o f Philosophy 22 (1984): 325-342. 50 Friedman. "Kant's Highest Good." p. 341. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. T h u s , n o t on ly does one again see th a t som e c o n te n t is n ecessa ry for m oral w illing , b u t a lso t h a t m orality , s in ce i t com m a n ds h u m a n b e in g s , m u st say so m e th in g a b o u t h a p p in e ss a priori', a s S m ith no tes , "reason in tro d u c es th e id e a o f h a p p in e ss , i t is tru e , b u t on ly b e ca u se w e a re n a tu ra lly c o n s titu te d to d e s ire n a tu r a l goods... I t [the ru le to se e k h a p p in e ss ] is co n d itio n a l on a n e m p irica l fa c t o f h u m a n ex istence, a lb e it a n em p irica l fac t k n o w n a priori."51 As h u m a n b e in g s , w e seek h a p p in e ss . T h is is a fac t a priori. B u t a s h u m a n b e in g s , we a lso h a v e a du ty to b e m o ra l, in d ee d , w e can only re a lly be free i f re a so n gives th e m o ra l law to itse lf . P ro p o s itio n s o f m o ra lity m u s t, therefo re , sa y so m e th in g a b o u t b o th th e q u e s t fo r v ir tu e a n d h a p p in e ss . S m ith a rgues: The merely formal moral law does not hang in the air, enjoining universality of practical judgm ent in the abstract; it appears to us as a condition of our already -ongoing quest for happiness. H um an m orality is structured a priori by the fact th a t we are hum an beings and not angels. Therefore, if we cannot be moral human beings if the h ighest good is demonstrably unattainable be- cause its component parts are irreconcilable then we cannot be moral a t all.52 T h e m o ra l la w m u s t ad d ress th e q u e s tio n o f p e rso n s ' q u est for h a p p in e ss . K a n t's a n sw e r to th is question , o f course , is t h a t h a p p in e ss m u s t b e allow ed on ly in p ro p o rtio n to v irtu e , s ince th e re a re m a n y th in g s ( ta le n ts , in te lli- gence, m oney, etc .) w h ich m ig h t e i th e r b e good or ev il d ep en d in g upon how th e y a re p u t to u se , t h a t is, d e p e n d in g u p o n th e w ill o f th e p e rso n p u rsu in g th e se ends. B u t th e im p o rta n t conclusion , th e n , is t h a t h a p p in e ss is no t som ehow a d d e d h o rn th e ou tside, som e e x tra n e o u s concept w h ich h a s no p lace in th in k in g a b o u t m oral issu e s ; h a p p in e s s is p a r t a n d p a rc e l w ith th e m o ra l law b e ca u se th e law can o n ly c o m m an d f in ite ra tio n a l c re a tu re s . T he m o ra l la w m u s t s a y som eth ing a b o u t h a p p in e s s , a n d th is is in co rp o ra te d in to th e e n d of th e h ig h e s t good. 51 Smith, "Worthiness," p. 171. 52 Ibid.. p. 172. Second set of italics added for emphasis. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 224 5. One cannot observe anyone's worthiness or virtue, and hence cannot reward an- other in proportion to virtue. T h is p o in t is ab so lu te ly e s s e n tia l to th e is su e o f th e h ig h e s t good, th o u g h i t m a y be a d ifficu lt p ill fo r som e p ro p o n e n ts of th e h ig h e s t good to sw allow . I t seem s to be v e ry c le a r t h a t K a n t in s is ts one s im p ly c a n n o t ob- se rv e w h e th e r a n o th e r is w illin g com ple te ly o u t o f a sen se o f d u ty , o r w h e th e r in c lin a tio n h a s a p a r t in th e m o tiv a tio n fo r a n y m axim . I t a lso seem s c le a r t h a t K a n t d id n o t th in k one co u ld b e s u re o f th e p u r ity ev en o f one's ow n w illing : In fact there is absolutely no possibility by m eans of experience to m ake out w ith complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of action th a t m ay in o ther respects conform to duty has rested solely on moral grounds... I t is in- deed som etim es the case th a t after the keenest self-examination we can find nothing except the moral ground of duty th a t could have been strong enough to move us to th is or th a t good action and to such great sacrifice. But there can- not w ith certainty be a t all inferred from th is th a t some secret impulse of selflove , m erely appearing as the idea of duty, was not the actual determ ining cause of the will.53 O n e c a n n o t k now w h a t a n o th e r is th in k in g or w h a t so rt of m ax im th e y m ig h t h a v e in m in d w h en p e rfo rm in g som e action . O n e c an n o t know w h e th e r o n e 's ow n w ill i s p u re , or i f i t h a s b een in f lu e n c e d in som e w ay b y in cen tiv es. H ence, i t seem s th a t i t is s im p ly im p o ssib le to re w a rd anyone, in c lu d in g o n e - self, w ith h a p p in e s s w hich w ou ld b e p ro p o rtio n a te to v irtu e . S u c h a n im possib ility is a rg u e d fo r m o st c learly b y J e ffr ie G. M u rp h y in , "T h e H ig h e s t Good a s C o n ten t fo r K a n t's E th ic a l F o rm alism ."54 I f one i n - te rp re ts th e d u ty to p rom ote th e h ig h e s t good a s th e d u ty to re w a rd p e rso n s w ith h a p p in e s s in p ro p o rtio n to th e i r v ir tu e ,55 th e n i t seem s im possib le to 53 Grundlegung, Ak. 407. 54 Murphy, pp. 102-110. 551 shall argue below, in defense of the highest good, that this is not precisely how we are to interpret such a duty. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 225 prom ote th e h ig h e s t good, since o n e c a n n o t k n o w th e v ir tu e o f a n o th e r or of oneself; the good act, occurring as it does in the phenomenal world, would be the only datum which we could use in a ttem pting to determine a m an's virtue of moral worth -a datum which is (since true virtue of disposition occurs noumenally) totally insufficient. Thus we a re m et w ith an insurm ountable epistemological problem: we can never know if ano ther person is, in fact, virtuous.56 A ll one can observe w ith r e g a rd to o th e rs is th e i r actions, b u t th is te lls u s n o th in g d efin itiv e re g a rd in g th e m ax im w h ich w as u sed to p ro d u ce su ch a n action . B ecause m o ra l w o rth co n ce rn s th e n o u m e n a l rea lm , one c a n n o t even a ccu ra te ly a sse ss one's ow n m o ra l w o rth . H ow th e n , a s M u rp h y a sk s , c an i t be possib le to p ro p o rtio n h a p p in e s s to w o rth i f one can h a v e no w ay to ob- se rv e an y o n e's d isposition? S ilb e r i s s im p ly w rong , i t a p p ea rs , in h is r a th e r in fam o u s a s se r tio n t h a t "in r e a r in g c h ild ren , se rv in g on ju r ie s a n d g rad in g p a p e rs"57 w e a re ab le to ap p o rtio n h a p p in e s s to w o rth in ess , a n d w ro n g in th in k in g th a t "a lth o u g h th is ta s k [of a p p o rtio n m en t] is G od-like in d im en - sion, i t does n o t to ta lly tra n s c e n d th e pow ers o f c itizens a n d leg is la to rs ."58 R e a th is th e re fo re a lso w rong, in h is o th e rw ise o u ts ta n d in g a rtic le , to th in k th a t "one cou ld c o n s tru c t th e id e a o f a h is to r ic a l s ta te o f a ffa irs in w h ich so- c ia l in s t i tu t io n s w ere a r ra n g e d to p ro m o te h a p p in e ss in p ro p o rtio n to v ir - tu e ."59 O ne c a n n o t k n o w a p e rso n 's v ir tu e , th u s one c an n o t ap p o rtio n h a p p i- n ess to i t .60 56 Murphy, p. 107. 57 Ibid, p. 109. 58 Silber, "Importance of the Highest Good," p. 195. 59 Reath, p. 602. 60 This is why I think it must be concluded that Beversluis' solution to the problem of the high- est good, namely that we can promote it through rewarding legality and not morality, though perhaps ap- pealing, is fundamentally flawed. It seems clear that one may be very far from having a good will, though (as Kant pointed out) one may act completely in accord with Right. See: John Beversluis. "Kant on Moral Striving." Kant-Studien 65. no. 1 (1974): 67-77. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. O ne sh o u ld be carefu l, how ever, n o t to conclude too m u ch from th is ep istem ological problem . T h o u g h one can n o t know th e m o ra l w o rth o f in d i- v idua ls, one c a n know a t le a s t th re e im p o r ta n t th in g s . F irs t , one can know w h en th e ac tio n o f a n o th e r is n o t leg a l, th a t is, w h en i t is n o t in accord w ith R igh t. K a n t is v e ry c le a r in th e "M e tap h y s ica l F ir s t P rin c ip les o f th e Doc- tr in e of R ig h t" t h a t one c an conclude th a t c e r ta in e n d s a re one's d u ty to p ro - m ote, th a t c e r ta in fo rm s o f g o v e rn m e n t a re n o t in con fo rm ity w ith th e m o ra l law , a n d th a t som e actions a re in d irec t v io la tion o f th e ca teg o rica l im p e ra - tive . T hough o n e c an n o t coerce a n o th e r to h a v e c e r ta in en d s, one c a n coerce th e m to b e h av e in c e r ta in w ays. Second, one can im prove one's ow n m o ra l perfection . K a n t is a lso v e ry c le a r in h is w ritin g s , p e rh a p s m ost c le a rly in "M etap h y sica l F i r s t P rin c ip le s o f th e D octrine o f V irtu e ," th a t one can id e n - tify those a sp e c ts o f o u r liv e s w h ich one can w ork on to b e tte r o n e se lf m o r- a lly . G ra n te d t h a t one can n e v e r know th a t one is w illin g on ly fo r th e sa k e of d u ty , b u t one c a n know on occasion (p e rh a p s q u ite o ften) th a t one h a s w illed so m eth in g on ly b ecau se of o ne's in c lin a tio n s to h a v e t h a t object, a n d one can also know som e ac tiv itie s w h ich w ill he lp to s tre n g th e n one's m o ra l c h a ra c te r ("to be a u se fu l m em b er o f th e w orld ," fo r exam ple, a n d n o t laz ily id lin g th e d ay s aw ay61). T h ird , a n d p e rh a p s m ore con troversia lly , one c a n id e n tify a la c k of co nd itions w h ich h e lp to p ro m o te m o ra l v ir tu e i n o th e rs . K a n t is ce r- ta in ly concerned w ith th e n a tu r a l s id e o f h u m a n be ings, a n d m a in ta in s over a n d over a g a in t h a t th e h u m a n w ill is so m eth in g th a t can go a s t r a y from th e m o ra l law i f th e lu re o f in c lin a tio n s is s tro n g . T ho u g h one c a n n o t d irec tly m ak e a n o th e r m o re v irtu o u s , th e re a re conditions, p o v e rty fo r exam ple , w h ich d e tra c t fro m th e ease w ith w h ich th e w ill can w ill in accord w ith th e m o ra l law . M ore w ill be s a id on th is below , b u t for now one sh o u ld n o t p re - c lude th e p o ss ib ility th a t p ro m o tio n o f th e h ig h e s t good is possib le , n o r sh o u ld one conclude m ore th a n is n e ce ssa ry from M u rp h y 's an a ly s is . 61 Metaphysics o f Morals. Ak. 446. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I\ I 227 6. Pure practical reason needs no sensible motivation. T h is is th e lesso n o f th e second Critique, th ough m an y c o m m en ta to rs se em n o t to tak e th is conclu sion a s se rio u sly a s th ey m ig h t w hen try in g to e x p la in w hy one n eed s a g u a ra n te e o f th e possib ility o f th e h ig h e s t good. In th e second Critique K a n t is a s k in g w h e th e r o r n o t "pure" rea so n is also "p ra c tic a l," th a t is , w h e th e r re a s o n c a n m o tiv a te a p e rso n to action or w h e th e r reaso n m u s t b e th o u g h t to b e p r im a rily specu la tive o r m ere ly p r a g - m a tic i n i ts function ing . T h is , o f cou rse , le a d s K a n t to w h a t h a s b e en c a lle d h i s "C o p em ican revo lu tion" in e th ic s , n a m e ly th a t th e p r im a ry a n d fu n d a - m e n ta l sp h e re of rea so n m u s t b e p rac tic e in s te a d of theory . O ne's know ledge o f th e m o ra l law lea d s to th e d iscovery o f freedom , a n d freedom e n ta ils th e p o ss ib ility an d , consequen tly , th e n e ce ss ity of ac tin g in accord w ith th e la w .62 In d e e d , i t seem s to be K a n t's c la im th a t one c an only be tru ly au to n o m o u s i f o n e w ills in accord w ith th e ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e .63 H ence, rea so n is p ra c t i - ca l, a n d th o u g h one can n e v e r h a v e a n in tu it io n of au tonom ous freedom , one does k n o w th a t rea so n n eed s no e x te rn a l c a u se o r m o tiva tion to w ill in acco rd w ith th e m o ra l law . G ra n te d t h a t K a n t does m a in ta in th a t th e re c a n be a su b je c tiv e side of m o tiv a tio n o f th e m o ra l law , th a t th e m o ra l law does offer a "m o ra l fee lin g " of c o n te n tm e n t fo r a c tin g in accord w ith th e m o ra l law ,64 b u t th is is n o t a necessa ry in ce n tiv e to a c tin g m o ra lly .65 O ne m u s t be c a re fu l to 62 Second Critique, Ak. 29-31. 63 Second Critique: "Subordinate to reason as the higher faculty of desire is the pathologically determinable faculty of desire, the latter being really and in kind different from the former, so that even the slightest admixture of its impulses impairs the strength and superiority of reason," (Ak. 23). See also especially: Ak. 28-9 and Ak. 33. 64 Ibid., see especially Ak. 73-77. For more on the nature of "contentment," see the following chapter. 65 In this respect, I think that Packer's conclusion that the highest good is needed because it provides an end which is necessary to the motivation of a person is fundamentally flawed. See: Mark Packer, "The Highest Good in Kant's Psychology of Motivation," Idealistic Studies 13 (Mav 1983): 11019 . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. » 228 ta k e th is in to co n sid e ra tio n w h en try in g to a rg u e for th e n e c e ss ity o f the g u a ra n te e o f th e h ig h e s t good.66 7. Virtue is not its own reward -orcontentment is not happiness. T h is is a n o th e r p o in t w h ich seem s v e ry c le a r i n K a n t, b u t is often fo rg o tten o r d is re g a rd e d b y c o m m en ta to rs . K a n t's d isc u ss io n o f h a p p in e ss a n d o f th e S to ics in th e second Critique show s th a t v i r tu e a n d h a p p in e ss a re "w ho lly he te ro g en eo u s... h a p p in e s s a n d m o ra lity a re tw o specifica lly d iffe ren t e le m e n ts o f th e h ig h e s t good a n d th e re fo re th e i r co m b in a tio n can n o t be k n o w n a n a ly tic a lly (as i f a p e rso n w ho... fo llow ed v i r tu e fo u n d him self ipso facto h a p p y in th e consc iousness o f th is conduct)."67 K a n t specifically a d d re sse s th e p roposition th a t k now ledge o f a v ir tu o u s d isp o s itio n is, in fact, h a p p in e s s w ith h is rep ro ach o f th e S toics. T h e S to ics w e re w ro n g n o t only to th in k th a t v ir tu e w as th e sam e a s h a p p in e ss , a n d th u s n o t reco g n iz in g th a t v ir tu e a n d h a p p in e s s a re h e te ro g en eo u s, b u t a lso in th in k in g t h a t one's n a tu r a l in c e n tiv e s w ere b ad . K a n t's m a tu re p o sitio n 68 i s to a rg u e th a t "n a tu r a l in c lin a tio n s , considered in themselves, a re good, t h a t is , n o t a m a tte r o f rep ro ach , a n d i t is n o t on ly fu tile to w a n t to e x tirp a te th e m b u t to do so w o u ld also b e h a rm fu l a n d b lam ew o rth y ."69 T he h ig h e s t good n o t only co m m an d s th e p e rfec tion o f one's v ir tu e , b u t a s th e p e rfe c t good a n d n o t ju s t th e su p re m e good,70 i t com m ands h a p p in e ss a s w ell. H a p p in e s s is n o t v irtue , n o r is h a p p in e ss considered in i ts e l f a b a d th in g . H a p p in e s s is m ere ly th e sa tis fa c tio n o f n a tu ra l , h u m a n in c lin a tio n s , w h ich is th e e n d o f e v e ry h u m a n b e in g a s a c re a tu re ex is tin g in th e p h e n o m e n a l rea lm . T h u s , i t seem s th a t 66 Victoria S. Wike, I think, is careful to do this even though she argues that it is acceptable to have the concept of an end as part of the determining ground for an action. See: Kant on Happiness in Ethics, Chapters 3, 5, and 6. 67 Second Critique, Ak. 112-3. 68 There may be some debate as to whether Kant holds this belief before the Religion. 69 Religion, p. 51. 0 For this distinction see: second Critique. Ak. 110-11. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. \ ! 229 an y d e fen se o f th e h ig h e s t good w h ich e q u a te s v ir tu e w ith h a p p in e ss , o r w h ich c la im s v i r tu e to be i ts ow n re w a rd , s im p ly m isco n s tru es th e h e te ro g en e o u s n a tu r e o f v ir tu e a n d h a p p in e s s a s w ell as th e aim o f th e h ig h e s t good.71 8. Reason has a necessary "interest" in the outcome o f its witting. T h is i s a n im p o rta n t, b u t r a th e r n eg lec ted , p o in t m ad e p a r t ic u la r ly in th e w ritin g s o f S ilb e r , R ossi, a n d Yovel,72 b u t i t o u g h t to be r a th e r in tu it iv e ly c le a r g iv en K a n t 's in s is te n c e th a t ( th e sa m e ) re a so n h a s b o th th e o re tic a l a n d p ra c tic a l a p p lic a tio n s , w ith th e p ra c tic a l c o n ce rn s ta k in g p recedence. S ilb e r, Rossi, a n d Y ovel m a in ta in th a t rea so n , a s p u re b u t fu n d a m e n ta lly p ra c tic a l, h a s a "w o rld -co n s tru c tin g " c h a ra c te r , a n d t h a t re a so n h a s a n "in te re s t" i n th e ou tcom e o f i t s c o n s tru c tio n . As R ossi e x p la in s , "I ta k e 'w o rld -co n stru c tin g ' to b e one w ay o f u n d e rs ta n d in g K a n t's c h a ra c te r iz a tio n o f rea so n a s a fa c u lty w h ich se e k s to e s ta b l is h th e to ta lity o f th e u n co n d itio n ed ."73 K a n t w rite s in th e f i r s t Critique: Now the transcenden tal concept of reason is directed always solely tow ards ab - solute to ta lity in the synthesis of conditions... Reason concerns itself exclu- sively w ith absolute totality in the em ploym ent of the concepts of the under- standing... Reason accordingly occupies itself solely with the em ploym ent of understanding ... in order to prescribe to the understanding its direction to- w ards a certa in unity of which it h as itse lf no concept, and in such a m anner 71 Thus, I think that both Packer's approach in "The Highest Good in Kant's Psychology of Motivation," and Auxter's conclusions in Kant's Moral Teleology are flawed because of this equation of virtue and happiness. See: Thomas Auxter, Kant's Moral Teleology (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1982). For more on the exact nature of "happiness," see the following chapter. 72 See: John R. Silber, "The Metaphysical Importance of the Highest Good as the Canon of Pure Reason in Kant's Philosophy," Texas Studies in Literature and Language (Summer 1959): 233-44; Philip Rossi, "Moral Interest and Moral Imagination in Kant," The Modem Schoolman 57, no. 2 (Spring 1980): 149-58; Philip Rossi, "Autonomy and Community: The Social Character of Kant's 'Moral Faith'," The Modem Schoolman 61 (March 1984): 169-186; Philip Rossi, "Kant's Doctrine of Hope: Reason's Interest and the Things of Faith," New Scholasticism 56 (Spring 1982): 228-238; and Yirmiyahu Yovel, "The Interests of Reason: From Metaphysics to Moral History," in Kant's Practical Philosophy Recon- sidered, ed. Yimiyaho Yovel (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1986), 135-148. See also KwangSae Lee, pp. 551 and 559-61. 73 Rossi, "Moral Interest and Moral Imagination." p. 150 n. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ► 1 230 as to unite all the acts of the understanding, in respect of every object, into an absolute whole.74 T h is w orld -construc ting fu n c tio n o f rea so n m ig h t a lso be c a lle d th e "arch itec ton ic" n a tu re o f re a so n . W e h a v e seen th is in d e ta il in S ec tion O ne above, p a r tic u la r ly th o se c h a p te r s d ea lin g w ith th e "id e a s o f re a so n " w hich a re s e t to u s "a s a ta s k ." R e aso n d irec ts one to f in d th e sy n th e s is , th e u n ity of th e uncond itioned ; in d eed , th is is w hy, K a n t says, re a so n o ften le a d s i ts e lf a s t r a y in to th in k in g t h a t i t is a b le to give sp ecu la tiv e a n sw e rs to m e ta p h y s i- c a l q u estio n s ab o u t ob jects o f w h ich one can h a v e no ex p erien ce . B u t reaso n n o t on ly p o in ts to th e lim its o f w h a t w e can know , i t a lso in s is ts in p u sh in g to w a rd th e to ta lity o f th e u n co n d itio n ed , to w ard th e f in a l a n d u ltim a te en d of re a so n . T h u s rea so n h a s a n in te r e s t in th e outcom e o f i t s w illing , a n d th is is w h y S ilb e r m a in ta in s th a t th e h ig h e s t good m u s t be se e n a s th e can o n even o f p u re reaso n . R eason se e k s a u n ity . R eason is a lso ab le to a c t sp o n ta n e - ously , t h a t is, i t can p ropose i t s ow n objects to itself; reason produces of its own spontaneity ideas which are its own necessary ob- ject to which no corresponding objects can be given in sense experience... These ideas, as the necessary objects which reason imposes on itself, are the ends of reason which guide it in practice, th a t is, in all the reasoning processes. Having projected these ideas as its necessary ends, reason reveals additional spontaneity in its striv ing tow ard their realization. This striving of reason takes place in all of its em ploym ents.75 H e re one sees th a t re a so n is p ra c tic a l n o t only in i ts im p o r ta n t m o ra l fu n c - tio n , b u t also p rac tic a l in t h a t i t g u id es th e u n d e rs ta n d in g 's se a rc h for th eo - re t ic a l t ru th s a n d sp e cu la tiv e u n i ty a s well. 74 Critique o f Pure Reason, A 326-7 = B 382-3. Rossi also points to A 409-10 = B 436-7 and A 462-85 = B490-513. 5 Silber. "Metaphysical Importance." p. 234. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 231 W e see th is especially w ell in K a n t's d iscussion as to th e n a tu re of "ph ilo so p h y " in th e Critique of Practical Reason. H e u rg es t h a t we u n d e r - s ta n d p h ilo so p h y a n d "w isdom " in a w ay s im ila r to how th e G reek s u n d e r - stood i t , n a m e ly "in s tru c tio n in th e concep t w h e re in th e h ig h e s t good w a s to be p la c e d a n d in th e conduct by w h ich i t w a s to be o b ta in ed ."76 N ot on ly th is , b u t K a n t a lso m a in ta in s th a t w e sh o u ld t ry to "b r in g i t [the h ig h e s t good] to [the lev e l of] sc ience" a n d "c o m p reh en d u n d e r th e n a m e o f ph ilo sophy th e love o f science, a n d th u s of a ll sp e cu la tiv e ra t io n a l know ledge, so far as it is serviceable to reason [in defining] t h a t concep t a n d th e p ra c tic a l d e te rm in in g g ro u n d ."77 G iven th is d iscussion , a s w e ll a s K a n t's re m a rk s in "O n th e P r i - m acy o f th e P u re P ra c tic a l R eason ..." a n d "E x te n d in g P u re R easo n in a P ra c - tic a l R espec t...", i t sh o u ld be no s u rp r is e t h a t even "p u re " re a so n h a s a n in - te re s t. F o r Yovel, K a n t is concerned w ith a "u n ity o f p u rp o se" o f w hich m orality, politics, religion, and th e ir encompassing domain of moral history, are to provide hum an reason w ith a legitim ate field in which to satisfy the m etaphysical in te rest in its u ltim ate and totalizing thrust... In consequence, the u ltim ate objective of m etaphysics is no longer T ru th or Being as such but the Good, more precisely, the H ighest Good, taken as a historical ideal.78 K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t p u re rea so n is th e sa m e a s p ra c tic a l rea so n , a n d th ese , in tu rn , a re th e sa m e as th e (au tonom ous) w ill. As such , w ith K a n t's "C o p em ican R evo lu tion ," reaso n m u s t h a v e a n in te re s t in th e outcom e o f i ts w illing . I t is re a so n w h ich "p resc rib es to th e u n d e rs ta n d in g i ts d irec tio n ," a m ovem en t n o t on ly a im ed a t a sy n th e tic u n i ty o f specu la tive know ledge, b u t, m ore fu n d a m e n ta lly , a u n ity o f a ll e n d s o f p ra c tic a l reaso n : a m o ra l w hole. As S ilb e r ex p la in s , 76 Second Critique, Ak. 108. 7 Ibid.. Ak. 108. Second italics added for emphasis. 8 Yovel. "The Interests of Reason." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 232 the realization, however, th a t reason is not only practical and active in the projection and realization of ideas b u t also is active in several employments sim ultaneously, leads to the conclusion th a t reason m ust have some suprem e or comprehensive end. There m u st be some general idea in term s of which reason itself can be directed so th a t all its ideas and in te rests are capable of realization in a way th a t satisfies the demands of its to ta l nature ... All o ther aim s and ideas of reason are re la ted as means to the end of morality which is the h ighest in terest of hum anity and of reason itself.79 R eason is sp o n tan eo u s in i ts a b ili ty to p ropose a n d p u r s u e ob jec ts of i ts ow n c rea tio n . T h is sp o n ta n e ity n a tu r a l ly le a d s , how ever, to th e q u e s tio n o f w h a t so rt o f e n d re a so n sh o u ld p u rsu e , w h a t s o r t of w orld re a so n sh o u ld c rea te ; take a m an who, honoring the m oral law, allows the thought to occur to him (he can scarcely avoid doing so) o f w h a t sort of world he would create, under the guidance of practical reason... He would not m erely m ake the very choice which is determ ined by th a t m oral idea of the highest good... he would also will th a t [such] a world should by all m eans come into existence (because the moral law dem ands th a t the highest good possible through our agency should be real- ized)...80 T h u s, th e sp o n ta n e ity of re a so n in i t s m a n y p rac tic a l a p p lic a tio n s lea d s one to th e c o n s id e ra tio n a n d th e n e c e ss ity o f th e h ig h e s t good. R e aso n is w orldc o n s tru c tin g in i ts v e ry n a tu re , a n d i t n a tu ra lly a sk s w h a t s o r t o f w orld i t sh o u ld c re a te . W ith th e know ledge o f freedom a n d th e a u to n o m y o f th e will, th is le a d s to th e necessity o f w illin g in accord w ith th e m o ra l law , b u t i t a lso le a d s to th e n ecessa ry p ro jec tion o f a w o rld w hich w ou ld b e th e a p p ro p ria te object o f th e m o ra l law . R eason , b e c a u se o f i ts in te re s t i n th e outcom e of i ts w illing , show s th a t i t is n o t en o u g h to th in k of th e h ig h e s t good; one m u s t try to b r in g i t in to ex istence a s well. R ossi ta k e s su ch a n a rg u m e n t to p o in t to th e n e c e ss ity o f t h in k in g th e h ig h e s t good to be a social good. If, h e reasons, "K a n t's o v e ra ll account of 79 Silber, "Metaphysical Importance," p. 235. 80 Religion. p. 5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f i 233 th e fu n c tio n s o f h u m a n re a so n ... p re s e n ts h u m a n re a so n a s fu n d a m e n ta lly o rd e re d to re p re se n tin g a n d to fa sh io n in g th a t to ta l ity o f in te rc o n n e c te d co n d itio n s w h ich c o n s titu te th e id e a o f a 'w orld',"81 th e n the highest good is the represen ta tion th a t reason appropriately m akes of the to tality and interconnectedness th a t can be hoped for as the outcome of the ex- ercise of hum an m oral freedom. This outcome is a shared and sharable world of abiding good... This ordering of freedom to m utuality th u s can be under- stood as the fundam ental w ay in which the "world-constructing" character of reason m anifests itself in the practical use of reason.82 B ecau se o f th e w o rld -co n s tru c tin g n a tu r e o f rea so n , re a s o n h a s a n in te re s t in th e ou tcom e o f i ts w illing , a n ou tco m e ta k in g p lace , th o u g h n o t exclusively , in th e p h e n o m e n a l rea lm . A s su c h , re a so n 's p r im a ry ta s k m u s t b e to u n ify its sp e c u la tiv e know ledge, b u t th i s c a n n o t b e se en a s th e m o s t im p o r ta n t ta sk of re a so n . R a th e r , reaso n 's p r im a ry ta s k is th e u n if ic a tio n a n d o rd e r in g of all e n d s , th e m o st im p o rta n t fu n c tio n o f w h ich is to s u b o rd in a te o th e r e n d s to re a s o n 's m o ra l ends. So, in a s k in g w h a t so r t o f w o rld re a so n sh o u ld create , i t m u s t b e a m o ra l world, b u t a lso a w o rld in w h ich one h a rm o n iz e s w ith o th - e rs . In so doing, one m u s t "im a g in e " h o w one's w illin g w ill a ffec t th e world, w o n d e rin g w h a t so rt of s t ru c tu re s w o u ld develop a s a r e s u l t o f m axim s w illed to b e u n iv e rsa lly accep ted a s "n a tu r a l" law s. K a n t e x p la in s th a t , re g a rd in g th e fo rm u la tio n of every m ax im , w e m u s t "a lw ay s in q u ire in to w h a t i t shou ld be i f i t w ere to ho ld a s a u n iv e r s a l la w o f n a tu re ,"83 a n d th u s q u e s tio n w h e th e r i t "cou ld no t c o n s titu te a p e rm a n e n t n a tu r a l o rd e r ."84 I f i t is g ran te d t h a t re a so n h a s a w o rld -co n s tru c tin g n a tu re , a n d t h a t i t th e re fo re h a s a n in - te r e s t in th e outcom e of i t s o rd e r in g a n d c o n stru c tio n o f e n d s , th e n i t seem s 81 Rossi, "Autonomy and Community," p. 171. 82 Ibid, pp. 179-80. 83 Second Critique, Ak. 45. 84 Ibid, Ak. 44. See also especially: Rossi, "Moral Interest and Moral Imagination." p. 153. Rossi is right to note that his conception of how to formulate and evaluate maxims of the categorical im- perative is similar, though not identical, to Onora O'Neil's interpretation in Acting on Principle. 1975. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 234 t h a t re a so n m u st a lso be co n ce rn ed a b o u t th e concrete , s ta b le , a n d e n d u rin g re la tio n s th a t i t w ou ld w ill b e tw ee n i ts e lf an d o th ers . T h is , th e n , is th e h ig h - e s t good, a n ecessa rily social good, a n d a good w hich o n e m u s t ta k e p a in s to p rom ote . m. In th is section , I w a n t to o ffer th re e m ore p o in ts w h ich w ill be e lab o - r a te d in th e follow ing c h a p te rs . I c a n a t le a s t offer a p a r t i a l de fen se of th e m h e re , w h ile a fu ll defense c an be h a d th ro u g h th e c o n te n t o f th e n e x t se v e ra l c h a p te rs . 9. The moral law does not only pertain to ourselves; it commands action in a physical world, one inhabited by other human beings. T h is is p e rh a p s s t i l l a c o n tro v e rs ia l p o in t in K a n t sch o la rsh ip , b u t one th a t I th in k h a s b een w ell a rg u e d for, especially by A nderson -G o ld a n d R ossi. F rie d m a n , for exam p le , is s im p ly w rong to s ta te th a t , "th e m o ra l la w co m m an d s n o t th a t one m a k e th e w orld b e tte r , th a t is , h a p p ie r , b u t th a t one m a k e o n e se lf b e tte r , t h a t is m ore w o rth y ... T he focus o f K a n t's e th ic a l th e o ry is th e in d iv id u a l a n d h is choosing ,"85 a n d th a t, "m o ra lity fo r K a n t is n o t con- c e rn e d w ith th e p ro d u c tio n of b en efic ia l consequences o r co n d itio n s in th e w orld . M o ra lity is co n cern ed w ith th e in d iv id u a l a n d h is goodness. T he dy - n a m ics of K a n tia n m o ra lity a re p la y e d o u t in th e w ill, n o t in th e w orld ."86 To d e fen d a g a in s t su ch a n in te rp re ta t io n , th e a rg u m e n ts n e e d e d a re s im ila r to th o se fo r p o in ts th re e a n d fo u r above, n am e ly to show t h a t o th e r p e rso n s a re o f im m e d ia te concern in th e c a teg o rica l im p era tiv e , a n d t h a t a s e n d s in th em se lv es , one m u s t a lso ta k e th e i r specific, p h e n o m e n a l e n d s a s one's ow n. To p o sit th a t m o ra lity sh o u ld , accord ing to K a n t, on ly be concerned w ith o u r ow n w ill a n d v ir tu e , seem s m u ch too s tro n g a c la im , a n d in f la t 85 Friedman, "Kant's Highest Good," p. 336. 86 Ibid. p. 339. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. con trad ic tion w ith m uch o f K a n t's w ritin g s . A gain , th e prima facie a rg u m e n t a g a in s t su ch a p o sitio n w ould be K a n t's th i r d fo rm u la tio n o f th e c a teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e a n d h is su b se q u e n t com m ents o n th e k ingdom of ends. In d eed , th e m oral la w a d d re sse s u s a s be ings w ho a re already in re la tio n to o th e r fin ite ra t io n a l c re a tu re s . T h is re la tio n to o th e rs is p re se n t from th e v e ry b eg in n in g o f th e m o ra l law . As K a n t w rite s in a n o ften quo ted p a ssa g e fro m th e Religion, "th e species o f ra tio n a l b e ings is objectively, in th e id e a o f reason , destined , fo r a soc ia l goal, n am ely , th e p ro m o tio n of th e h ig h e s t good a s a social good."87 T he categorica l im p e ra tiv e e n jo in s one to w ill u n iv e rsa lly , to t r e a t o th e rs a s en d s in them selves, a n d to ta k e th e i r ends a s one's ow n. As R ossi exp la in s: w hat the textbook picture fails to capture... is the fact th a t K ant quite clearly... characterizes such elevation [of m an as noum enal] as an introduction into a "realm " or "world", i.e., into a connected and ordered totality of relations to the moral agency of all o thers who constitute th e hum an moral community. Thus, moral decision... is the precise point of contact w ith and full participation in the hum an m oral community[,]... placing us in a world constituted by persons in m utual m oral relation...: m utual respect and m oral interdependence am ong persons.88 T he m oral law im m e d ia te ly p laces one in a re la tio n sh ip w ith o th ers , a r e la - tionsh ip of co n cern a n d respec t, a n d one w h ich is in th e p h en o m en a l a s w ell a s th e n o u m e n a l w orld. 87 Religion, p. 89. Many passages of Kant's, especially those in the Religion, seem to speak against Friedman's claim that, though the notion of a perfect, moral world is an ideal in a sense, "...this does not mean that the moral world does not exist, that it is merely a goal to be aimed at, a target for our moral activity. It is an already existent world which we discover in the awareness of ourselves as agents subject to the moral law" ("Kant's Highest Good," pp. 329-30). In one respect, certainly it is correct that we are already related to others as a noumenal being in a noumenal realm (another reason it is odd Fried- man insists that the moral law is only about willing my own virtue), but it seems mistaken to think that we already have a moral commonwealth, given that the moral law can command us only as finite rational beings and not beings with a holy will. 88 Philip Rossi, "Kant as a Christian Philosopher: Hope and the Symbols of Christian Faith." Philosophy Today 25 (Spring 1981): 28. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 236 F rie d m a n is r ig h t, I th in k , n o t to w a n t th e h ig h e s t good to p re sc rib e d u tie s above a n d bey o n d those g iven by th e m o ra l law , d u tie s w hich w ou ld s im p ly n o t be encom passed by th e m o ra l law ;89 b u t i t does no t seem t h a t th is h a s to be th e case . V ic to ria S. W ike p rov ides a good d iscussion o f th is p o in t,90 m a in ta in in g am ong o th e r th in g s th a t , K ant's writings argue th a t the highest good is not foreign to, separate from, or o ther th an the m oral law though it is not the sam e as the moral law. I t is the object of the m oral law, the necessary, final object, though not the law itself... I t is special, it is sui generis. While th is account is difficult and complex, it does not seem to be contradictory. There is no contradiction if som ething which is not separate from a th ing is yet different from the th ing and such is the case with the highest good and the m oral law.91 P e rh a p s th e b e s t w ay to su m m arize su ch a p o ss ib ility is K a n t's s ta te m e n t t h a t "i t c a n n o t be a m a t te r of unconcern to m o ra lity a s to w h e th e r o r n o t i t fo rm s fo r i ts e l f th e concept of a f in a l e n d o f a ll th in g s (h arm o n y w ith w h ich , w h ile n o t m u ltip ly in g m en 's du ties, y e t p ro v id es th e m w ith a sp ec ia l p o in t o f focus fo r th e u n ific a tio n o f ends)."92 P e rh a p s th e m o st im p o r ta n t fu n c tio n of th e h ig h e s t good is to focus one's p rac tic a l rea so n , a re a so n w hich fo rm u la te s m ax im s for th e a t ta in m e n t of c e r ta in objects w h ich a re to be p u rsu e d , focused aw ay from a s tr ic tly in d iv id u a l ap p ro ach to th o se e n d s w hich a re socia l in n a tu re ; in o th e r w ords, to p rev e n t su c h a n in te rp re ta t io n as F r ie d m a n 's. T h o u g h i t m a y be a so m ew h at co n tro v ersia l c la im , I th in k th a t one could fo rm u la te m ax im s w ith in th e b o u n d s of th e m o ra l la w w hich h a v e l i t t le to do w ith concern for o th ers ; th is m ig h t be ta k e n a s su b je c t m ere ly to th e n e g a tiv e co m m an d sim p ly n o t to t r e a t a n o th e r a s a m e a n s to one's own end . H ow ever, 89 And, indeed, in taking such a stance on the formal qualities of the moral will, I think Fried- man is stuck with the moral law as simply the command to "will a good will" (c.f., "Kant's Highest Good," p. 330), a violation of point number two above. 90 See: Wike, Kant on Happiness, Chapter 5, especially pp. 138-48. 91 Wike, Kant on Happiness, p. 146. 92 Religion, p. 5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 237 th e re seem s to be a positive c o m m an d a s w ell t h a t w o u ld be m issed i f th e h ig h e s t good d id n o t "focus" o n e 's w ill to w ard s th e c o n ce rn s o f o thers . P e rh a p s K a n t w as concerned to av o id a n a tt i tu d e l ik e t h a t o f th e S to ics w ho w ere so concerned on ly w ith th e i r ow n v ir tu e t h a t th e y s a t id ly by w h ile R om e w e n t to ru in s . M ore n e e d s to b e sa id re g a rd in g su c h a possib ility , b u t th e p o in t sh o u ld a t le a s t be a n in tu it iv e ly accep tab le o n e .93 Also, consider th e follow ing: W h a t o f th e "M e ta p h y s ic a l F ir s t P r in c i- p les o f th e D oc trine o f R ig h t"? W hy w o u ld K a n t in c lu d e a p a r t ia l t r e a t is e on g o v e rn m e n t in th e Metaphysics o f Morals i f one's c o n ce rn w ith m o ra lity sh o u ld on ly b e w ith one's v ir tu e ? W hy, fo r th a t m a t te r , s h o u ld K a n t in s is t t h a t p o litic a l questions, even q u e s tio n s ab o u t w h a t s o r t o f g o v e rn m en t sh o u ld be e s ta b lish e d , a re p ro p erly c o n s id e re d moral q u e s tio n s? A n d w hy in c lu d e th e seco n d p a r t o f th e M e ta p h y s ic a l F i r s t P rin c ip le s o f th e D octrine o f V ir- tu e ," n a m e ly th e "D u tie s o f V ir tu e to O th e rs ," specifica lly d isc u ss in g o u r d u ty to w a rd s th e h a p p in e ss of o th e rs , in th is t re a tis e on m o ra ls? A n d w hy is th e m o ra l la w a n d th e h ig h e s t good m e n tio n e d or a llu d e d to n o t only in w o rk s lik e th e second Critique a n d th e Religion b u t a lso in m o s t o f K a n t's p o litic a l w ritin g s? T he a n sw ers to th e s e q u e s tio n s seem to a rg u e i n fav o r o f th e p o in t th a t th e m o ra l law com m ands a c tio n in th e p h y s ic a l w orld , a n d a g a in s t F r ie d m a n 's c la im s th a t "m o ra lity fo r K a n t is n o t co n ce rn e d w ith th e p ro d u c - tio n o f b en efic ia l consequences o r cond itions in th e w o rld ." 93 In her excellent article, "Kant's Ethical Commonwealth: The Highest Good as a Social Goal," International Philosophy Quarterly 26 (March 1986): 23-32, Sharon Anderson-Gold presents a strong case for a very similar interpretation. Space prevents me from discussing it here, but it is Anderson -GoId's position that "the concept of the highest good is reformulated by Kant in the Religion as a so- cial goal as a consequence of his introduction in this work of the concept of radical evil," and claims that, "if virtue is... primarily an orientation toward others, then the duty to promote the ideal of social union is inseparable from the goal of individual moral perfection" (p. 24). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LK I 238 10. Though reason is interested in bringing about the highest good, it is ultimately helpless to do so. T h is m ay be a d ifficu lt p re m ise to a sse n t to, b u t I th in k i t is a neces- s a ry one, a n d one th a t w ill n o t s t a n d in th e w ay of o u r a b ili ty to p ro m o te th e h ig h e s t good ( in te rp re te d in a n ew , n o n tra d itio n a l m a n n e r) . I th in k w e m u s t ta k e K a n t se riously in h is c la im s th a t , a lth o u g h i t is one's d u ty to p rom o te th e h ig h e s t good, w e do n o t h a v e c o n tro l over w h e th e r h a p p in e s s co u ld be p ro p o rtio n e d exactly to v ir tu e ; in d e e d , th is is w hy K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a n e th ica l co m m o n w ealth can only h a v e th e s ta tu s o f a hope . A s R ossi exp la ins , "K an t h a s p lac ed a lim it upon a u to n o m y 's ro le in d e te rm in in g th e e sse n tia l c h a ra c te r o f h u m a n m oral p e rsonhood . T h is lim it, m oreover, is no t a n acc id en ta l one; i t h a s i ts g round in th e c h a ra c te r o f au to n o m y a s an exercise o f re a so n in i ts p ro p e r h u m an m odality : f in ite r e a - son ."94 F ro m th e f ir s t Critique ("su c h a R u le r to g e th er w ith life in su c h a w orld , w h ich we m u s t re g a rd a s a fu tu re w orld, reaso n f in d s i ts e lf con - s t r a in e d to assum e... since w ith o u t th is p o s tu la te th e n e c e ssa ry consequence w h ich i t i ts e l f connects w ith th e s e law s cou ld no t follow"95), to th e "an tin o m y " o f th e seco n d Critique ("i t is n o t im p o ssib le th a t th e m o ra lity o f in te n tio n s h o u ld h a v e a necessa ry re la tio n a s c a u se to h ap p in ess a s a n effect in th e se n su o u s w orld; b u t th is re la tio n i s in d ire c t, m ed ia ted by a n in te llig ib le A u th o r o f n a tu re "96), to h is Religion ("th e id e a of a h ig h e s t good in th e w orld fo r w hose possib ility w e m u s t p o s tu la te a h ig h er, m oral, m o s t ho ly a n d om - n ip o te n t B e in g w hich a lone c an u n i te th e tw o e lem en ts o f th e h ig h e s t good"97), K a n t a sse rts t h a t th o u g h one know s th a t one h a s freedom , one does n o t k n o w i f h a p p in e ss w ill b e th e r e s u l t o f one's m oral w illing . S e v e ra l m ore 94 Philip Rossi, "Moral Autonomy, Divine Transcendence and Human Destiny: Kant's Doc- trine of Hope as a Philosophical Foundation for Christian Ethics," The Thomist 46 (1982): 446. 95 First Critique, A 811 / B 839. 96 Second Critique. Ak. 115. 9' Religion, p. 4-5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 239 p a ssa g e s from K a n t cou ld be p re s e n te d h e re , b u t as th is p o in t h a s been a r - g u e d a t len g th by R ossi,98 th e re seem s no n eed to do so h e re . T h ere is a f u r th e r re a so n to th in k th a t th is p o in t sh o u ld be ta k e n se - rio u sly . T here a re a n u m b e r o f su g g estio n s m ade b y K a n t t h a t even i f every s in g le p e rso n reso lved to w ill in accord w ith th e m o ra l la w from th is p o in t on, th e e th ic a l com m unity w o u ld n o t sim p ly come in to b e in g a t t h a t po in t. Two p ro p o sitio n s a re n e ed e d to p e rce iv e th is possib ility . T h e f i r s t is K a n t's in s is - ten c e t h a t th e perfec tion o f re a so n , a n d th e re b y m o ra l p e rfec tio n , ta k e s tim e, in fac t, a n in fin ite a m o u n t o f tim e . As K a n t describes th e s itu a tio n , "rea so n i ts e l f does n o t o p era te o n in s t in c t , b u t re q u ire s tr ia l, p rac tic e , a n d in s tru c tio n in o rd e r g rad u a lly to p ro g re ss from one s ta g e of in s ig h t to a n o th e r . T h e re - fore, e ach in d iv id u a l m a n w o u ld h a v e to live excessively lo n g i f h e w ere to m ak e com plete u se of a ll h is n a tu r a l capac ities."99 I t is th is fa c t abou t rea so n w h ich le a d s K an t to p o s tu la te th e n ecessity of th e b e lie f in im m o rta lity ; the utmost that finite practical reason can accomplish is to make sure of the unending progress of its m axim s toward this model and o f the constancy of the finite rational being in m aking continuous progress... One can never, in fact, achieve moral perfection, only infinite approximation is possible. This is vir- tue, and... it can never be perfect.100 B u t th is sh o u ld le a d one to th e co n sid era tio n th a t i t is n o t lik e ly , a t le a s t from K a n t's po in t o f view , t h a t even i f everyone in th e w o rld m ad e th e deci- s io n to fo rm u la te m ax im s in acco rd w ith th e m oral law , th e e th ic a l com m u- n ity , th e p erfec ted k ingdom o f en d s, w ou ld th ereb y com e a b o u t. R eason ta k e s tim e to perfec t, a n d a lth o u g h i t seem s th a t K a n t th in k s w e h a v e m ade p ro g - re s s in th is respect, "i ts p e rfe c t so lu tio n is im possible; fro m su c h w arp ed 98 See especially: Rossi, "Moral Autonomy," pp. 441-458. See also Anderson-Gold, "Kant's Ethical Commonwealth." 99 "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent," Ak. 19. See especially also: sec- ond Critique, Ak. 32-3, 121-4, and Religion, p. 62. 100 Second Critique, Ak. 32-33. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ( 240 w ood a s is m a n m ade, n o th in g s t r a ig h t c an be fash io n ed ."101 T h e perfec tion o f re a so n c a n only ta k e p lace by in f in ite p rog ress a n d ap p ro x im atio n . T h e second p roposition n e e d e d to conceive o f th e p o ss ib ility t h a t th e e th ic a l com m un ity m ig h t n o t com e in to b e in g even i f ev ery in d iv id u a l so w ille d i t com es from A nderson-G old . S h e a rg u es th a t , w ith K a n t's so lu tio n to th e p ro b lem of rad ic a l ev il in th e t h i r d book of th e Religion, v ir tu e m u s t now fu n d a m e n ta lly be seen as a n a p p ro p r ia te m ora l a t t i tu d e to w a rd s o thers , th e re b y avo id ing th e p ro p en s ity o f re a s o n to fa ll in to self-love; "action in ac - co rd an ce w ith th e m o ra l law , good c h a ra c te r , is fu lly co m p a tib le w ith th e c o n tin u e d dom inance o f th e p r in c ip le o f self-love. W h a t is a t s ta k e is a re o r i- e n ta t io n o f th e self, a positive a c t o f id en tific a tio n w ith o th e rs w h ich m oves bey o n d th e o rd in a ry social co n d itio n ."102 T h e p e rh a p s s u rp r is in g conclusion th is le a d s to , how ever, is: The problem of virtue as developed by Kant in the Religion is not reducible to the fulfillment of duties of benevolence as characterized by Kant's exam ples in the Groundwork, that is, of providing material assistance to someone in need... The development of an ethical com munity goes beyond questions of the redis- tribution of material possessions. It entails minimally the abandonment of aggressive and competitive attitudes toward others, and maximally the adop- tion of cooperative and supportive networks .103 A m ong th e in te re s tin g conclusions w h ic h c an be d raw n from th is lin e of a rg u m e n ta tio n is th a t , w hen co m b in ed w ith th e f ir s t p ro p o sitio n above a b o u t th e im p erfec tio n of reason , th o u g h ev ery o n e m ay decide to t ry to be v irtu o u s , th e n e c e ssa ry system s o f "cooperative a n d sup p o rtiv e n e tw o rk s" m ay be a lo n g tim e in com ing.104 T he h ig h e s t good a s th e g re a te s t p o ssib le v ir tu e for 101 Kant, "Idea," p. 34/23. 102 Anderson-Gold, "Kant's Ethical Commonwealth," p. 28. 103 Ibid., p. 30. 104 There has been a fair amount of debate in the last few years, this being the 200th anniversary of Kant's article "Towards Eternal Peace," about how to understand Kant's notion of historical progress, especially as it relates to politics. I will discuss this in full below. However. I think that some of the answers to these questions can be found in examining this 10th (and forthcoming 11th) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a ll h u m a n beings, th e n , w ill d e p e n d u p o n s tru c tu re s a n d re la tio n s h ip s of in te rco m m u n ic a tio n w h ich s im p ly m a y n o t be possib le to b r in g in to ex is ten ce by j u s t decid ing to do so; in o th e r w ords, v ir tu e c an n o t be forced, e sp ec ia lly a s i t r e la te s to th e h ig h e s t good. 11. Though there are limits to one's ability to promote the highest goody one can im- prove those structures that make it easier fo r all to strive to be virtuous. G iven th e d iscussion above, w h a t can th e d u ty to p ro m o te th e h ig h e s t good a m o u n t to? I t can n o t, I h a v e a rg u e d , be th e d u ty to re w a rd v i r tu e w ith p ro p o rtio n a te h a p p in e ss ; h e re I a m in ag re em e n t w ith B eck a n d M u rp h y . N e ith e r , I th in k , c a n i t b e th e p ro p o rtio n a te re w a rd in g o f m ere ly le g a l a c ts ;105 th is m a y b e a te m p tin g so lu tio n , b u t I th in k i t ru n s c o n tra ry to K a n t's d is - cu ssio n in h is p o litica l w ritin g s , e sp ec ia lly The Metaphysics o f Morals, o f one w ho a c ts w ith in th e b o u n d s o f le g a lity b u t does n o t h a v e a good w ill. A lso, I do n o t th in k th a t th e d u ty c a n be to t ry a n d m axim ize h a p p in e s s fo r a ll, in - c lu d in g oneself, re g a rd le ss o f v ir tu e ; w h ile th is m ay be so m e th in g m o re u n - d e r th e in d iv id u a l's d irec t con tro l, K a n t c lea rly th in k s t h a t a good l ik e h a p - p in e ss c a n only be co n sid ered a good i f i t is in accord w ith th e m o ra l law , th a t is, a co n d itio n a l good, a n d h a p p in e s s o u g h t only to be g iven in c o rre sp o n - dence w ith w orth . N o r do I th in k t h a t th e p u rs u i t o f th e h ig h e s t good is th e on ly w a y to u n ite w h a t w ou ld o th e rw ise be sim ply a se rie s o f "im m e d ia te m o ra l ac tio n s ," th e on ly w ay to h a v e a "m o ra l life" a s T e rry F . G odlove, J r . point in more detail. For example, when Kant writes that, "if we now inquire as to the means by which this eternal progress towards betterment can be maintained and perhaps even sped up, one soon sees that this immeasurably distant result depends not so much on what we do (e.g. on the education we give the world's children), nor on what method we adopt so as to bring it about; instead, it depends on what human nature does in and with us so as to compel us onto a path that we ourselves would not readily follow. Only from nature, or rather only from providence... can we anticipate a result that will affect the whole..." ("Theory and Practice," p. 310), and when Kant insists, in many places in his writings, that culture is to play such an important role in the progression of the species. I think he must have something in mind like this 10th point, namely that the highest good and even our own moral perfection is not as much up to us as we would perhaps be inclined to think. los See Beversluis. "Kant on Moral Striving." for this suggestion. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 242 a rg u e s .106 O n th e o th e r h a n d , I th in k A nderson-G old's acco u n t o f th is d u ty to p ro m o te th e h ig h e s t good, th o u g h correct in su m a n d su b s ta n c e , does no t ta k e in to accoun t th e m a n y concrete acts t h a t K a n t gives a s exam p les for a id in g in th e p e rfec tio n o f v ir tu e . G iven a ll th e p o in ts above, w h a t conclusion o u g h t to b e d raw n? W h a t one's d u ty m u s t be, finally , is n o t on ly to s tr iv e to im prove one's ow n v ir tu e , b u t is a lso th e e s ta b lish m e n t of th e n e ce ssa ry s tru c tu re s for i n - te ra c tio n , w orld peace , a n d con tro lled com petition ("a n ta g o n ism ") w hich w ill a llow everyone to p u r s u e th e perfection o f th e ir ow n v ir tu e ; in o th e r w ords, w ork fo r v ir tu e a n d h o p e fo r h a p p in e ss .107 As a s ta r t in g p o in t fo r th is a rg u - m en t, i t sh o u ld be k e p t in m in d th a t K a n t w as in d ee d co n ce rn ed w ith th e m a n y in flu en ces u p o n th e w ill, com ing bo th from n a tu r a l in c lin a tio n s for e m p iric a l objects a n d fro m th e social a n d econom ic s i tu a tio n s in w hich one w as im m e rse d .108 I t c a n n o t be sa id th a t K a n t w as n a iv e a b o u t th e d ifficu lties in v o lv ed in th e p u r s u i t o f th e m o ra l w ill o r invo lved in s e t t in g u p m ore e n - lig h te n e d sy stem s o f g o v e rn m en t. K a n t's m a in concern, e sp ec ia lly in h is po - litic a l w ritin g s , is t h a t th e re a re c e rta in social a n d econom ic s tru c tu re s w hich in h ib i t th e in c re a s in g p e rfec tio n of v irtue . W ar w ould be th e fo rem ost ex- am p le o f su ch a n im p ed im en t: But we Eire a long w ay from being able to regard ourselves as moral. For the idea of morality belongs to culture... So long, however, as nations expend all their energies on their vain and violent designs, thus continuously inhibiting their citizens' plodding efforts to shape internally their w ay o f t h in k in g, even withholding all support for it, no progress of this sort is to be expected, because 106 Teriy F. Godlove, Jr., "Moral Actions, Moral Lives: Kant on Intending the Highest Good," The Southern Journal o f Philosophy 25, no. 1 (1987): 49-63. I think that Godlove's distinction between the kind of life an atheist can live versus the kind of "moral life" which only the religious person can live ultimately falls flat, particularly given the points above, Kant's discussion of "character" in the Religion, and a conception of the highest good which seems to have little to do with the unity of one's actions. 107 For Kant, of course, this happiness would have to be "proportionate." But I think there are problems with this picture; see the following chapter. 108 It is for this reason that I am in some, though perhaps only slight, disagreement with Ander- son-Gold's account. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I 243 the formation of citizens requires a long process of preparation... The human race will likely remain in th is state until... it has worked itself out o f this cha- otic state of national relations .109 O ne's ab ility to p u rs u e m oral p e rfec tio n does d e p en d on one's c u ltu ra l e n v i- ro n m en t. In a s ta te o f w ar, h u m a n b e in g s c an n o t c o n tin u e th e d ifficu lt ta s k o f p u rsu in g th e i r m o ra l p e rfec tio n w ith o u t severe h in d ran c es . In o rd e r to p roperly d e fen d th is v iew t h a t o n e 's ab ility to w ill m ora lly c an be effected b y e x te rn a l c ircu m stan ces , i t is n e c e ssa ry to tu rn o u r a t te n - tio n to th e "M e tap h y sica l F i r s t P rin c ip le s of th e D o c trin e of V irtu e" in th e Metaphysics o f Morals. In th is w ork , K a n t a rg u e s t h a t we do in d ee d h av e v ir tu o u s d u tie s to w a rd o thers , th e d u tie s of "love" a n d "respect." T he d u ty of re sp ec t a s "th e m ax im th a t l im its o u r se lf-esteem b y th e d ign ity of h u m a n ity in a n o th e r p e rso n ... [is] a c tu a lly on ly n eg a tiv e (no t to ex a lt o n ese lf above o th - e rs)..."110 B u t th e d u ty of love is positive , p a r tic u la r ly th e d u ty o f "b en efi- cence," a n d is th u s of p a r t ic u la r in te r e s t to u s h e re . L et u s b e g in by a sk in g h o w th is d u ty of love com es about. In te re s t - ingly , K a n t a rg u e s th a t i t com es a b o u t b ecause w e ourselves o ften f in d o u r- selves in p o s itio n s o f need: For every m an who finds him self in need wishes that he might be helped by other men. But if he should make known his m axim of not wanting to give assistance in turn to others in their need... then everyone would likewise ref- use him assistance when he was in need... Thus the selfish maxim conflicts with itself w hen it is made a universal law . ..111 T h u s, b ecau se I m ig h t f in d m y se lf in n eed , a n d w o u ld there fo re w a n t som e- one to a s s is t m e, I m u s t m ake i t a m ax im th a t I sh o u ld he lp o th e rs in need , le s t m y m ax im c o n tra d ic t itse lf. P u t succinctly , "I w a n t every o th e r p e rso n to 109 Kant, "Idea," Ak. 26. 110 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 449. 111 Ibid.. Ak. 453 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I ? 244 h a v e benevolence... fo r m e; I shou ld th e re fo re be b en ev o len t to every o th e r p e rso n ."112 Now, b e ca u se w h a t I desire is "h a p p in e ss ," "w elfa re ," o r "w ell-being ," w e m ig h t be te m p te d to in te rp re t K a n t in th e follow ing w ay. B ecau se I w a n t to be h ap p y , th is is a llo w ab le only u n d e r tw o conditions: 1) i ts w illin g does n o t invo lve a m ax im w h ich is c o n tra ry to th e m o ra l law , 2) I co u n t m y se lf as p a r t o f h u m a n k in d a s a w hole, a n d a m allow ed to be b en ev o len t o r b en eficen t to m y se lf b ecause I a m b en ev o len t o r b en eficen t to ev eryone .113 T h u s , w h a t K a n t is concerned w ith , accord ing to th is in te rp re ta tio n , is a n in te re s t in m a n y d iffe ren t so r ts o f h a p p in e ss w h ich w e a ll d e s ire a s c re a tu re s o f n a tu re . H ow ever, w h ile th is in te rp re ta t io n m ay be a llow able, I do n o t th in k th is is w h a t K a n t h a s in m in d h e re in th e Metaphysics o f Morals. I t seem s th a t K a n t is m ore co n ce rn e d h e re w ith case s w here anyone (m yse lf inc luded) is in need o f h a p p in e ss , i.e ., n o t a case w h e re one desires, say , a (perm issib le) lu x u ry item , b u t r a th e r a case w here o n e h a s a g re a t n e e d o f a n object, m ost lik e ly food, sh e lte r , a n d th e like. Two fac to rs in d ic a te th a t th is is , in fact, w h a t K a n t h a s in m in d . T h e f irs t in d ic a tio n o f K a n t's t r u e concern is t h a t in th e few p laces w h e re h e a c tu a lly d iscu sses th e d u tie s o f "beneficence" K a n t a lw ay s sp e a k s of one b e in g in "n e ed ," a n d n o t one s im p ly d esirin g h a p p in e ss . In th e "In tro d u c tio n ," K a n t s ta te s th a t th e d u ty o f beneficence concerns o u r n e e d "...to o b ta in help fro m th e m ["o th ers"] in case of n eed ."114 In th e f i r s t p a r a - g ra p h w h e re K a n t d iscu sses th e "D u tie s to O th e r People C o n sid ered S im ply as M en ," h e n o tes t h a t "w e acknow ledge ourse lves o b lig a ted to be b eneficen t to a poo r m an ."115 L a te r , in section 29, h e m en tio n s th e "d u ty t h a t everyone 112 Ibid, Ak. 451. 113 Though, of course, "one person may be closer to me than another, and I am the one closest to myself as far as benevolence in concerned" {Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 451). 114 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 393. 115 Ibid. Ak. 448. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 245 w ho h a s th e m e a n s show beneficence to th o se w ho a re n eed y ."116 I n sec tion 30 h e ta lk s a b o u t o n e b e in g "in need" a n d re g a rd in g "fellow m en ... a s n eed y ra t io n a l b e in g s ."117 F in a lly , in section 31 h e is concerned w ith th e "r ic h m a n " a s s is tin g "th e n e e d y ," a s i tu a tio n w hich, K a n t c la im s, "is fo r th e m o s t p a r t a r e s u l t o f th e p a tro n a g e o f v a rio u s m en ow ing to th e in ju s tic e of g o v e rn m en t, w hich in tro d u c es a n in e q u a li ty o f w ea lth t h a t m a k e s beneficence n e c e s - sa ry ."118 Now, p re s u m a b ly K a n t could h a v e h a d in m in d b o th h e lp in g th o se in d ire s t r a i ts a s w e ll a s m ere ly h e lp in g o th e rs to ach ieve p e rm iss ib le e n d s o f p le a su re a n d h a p p in e s s ; b u t h e m en tio n s on ly th e fo rm er, a n d re se rv e s a ll ta lk o f th e l a t t e r fo r h is d iscu ssio n of "(p u re ly m o ra l) fr ie n d sh ip ."119 T he second in d ic a tio n com es from a close e x a m in a tio n o f th e concept of "avarice ." To b e g in w ith , l e t u s exam ine w h a t K a n t's ta k e s a v a r ic e to be. C onsidered a s a d u ty to oneself, i t is "one's re s tr ic tin g h is ow n en jo y m en t o f th e m e a n s of l iv in g w e ll to a p o in t below th e m e a su re o f h is t ru e n e e d [an d th u s] conflicts w ith h is d u ty to h im self."120 K a n t a lso sp e a k s o f "p o ssess in g th e m ea n s to a ll k in d s o f en d s , b u t w ith th e p rov iso o f n o t w a n tin g to u se an y of th e m fo r o n e se lf a n d so o f robb ing o n ese lf o f th e a g re ea b le en jo y m en t of life; su c h a th in g is ... d ire c tly opposed to one's d u ty to h im se lf."121 W hile w e m ig h t b e in c lin e d to in te r p r e t th e s e s ta te m e n ts a s in d ic a t- in g th a t K a n t is c o n c e rn e d w ith th e m ere en jo y m en t o f life, w h en w e ex am in e exac tly w hy a v a rice is opposed to ou r d u ty to ou rse lves, we see th is is n o t 116 Ibid., Ak. 452. 117 Ibid, Ak. 453. 118 Ibid, Ak. 453-4. 119 Ibid, Ak. 469-474. There may be a further indication in the feet that Kant not only main- tains that the duty of love "at the same time obligate[s]" the recipient, but that "this kindness also... hu- miliates him," (Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 448). This is not definitive, however, because "this" kindness may be a specific type of beneficence. On the other hand because beneficence always obligates the recipi- ent, this lends itself to thinking about cases of real need. 120 Ibid, Ak. 432. 121 Ibid. Ak. 432-3. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 246 t ru e . W hy is th is "m iserly a v arice ," "s t in g in e s s ," a n d "m in u te exac tness in sp e n d in g " c o n tra ry to du ty? K a n t re p lie s th a t : M iserliness is not mere m isunderstood th rif t bu t is the slavish resignation of oneself to the goods of fortune, ra th e r th an the m astering of them ... [M ]iserliness is opposed to the principle o f being independent of everything else except the moral law, and it is, accordingly, a fraud which the subject commits aga in st himself.122 I t se em s t h a t th e rea so n th a t a v a rice is o p p o sed to v ir tu e is t h a t in b e in g m ise rly , one h a s v io la ted th e m o ra l p r in c ip le by su b o rd in a tin g m o ra l con- c e rn s to e m p iric a l ones, re s ig n in g o n e se lf to n a tu r a l in c lin a tio n s . T h is m ir - ro r s a n o th e r p a ssa g e in th e Metaphysics o f Morals'. Adversity, pain, and w ant are great tem ptations to transgress one's duty... It is not directly a duty to seek affluence for itself; bu t indirectly it m ay very will be a duty, namely, in order to guard ag a in st poverty, which is a great tem pta- tion to vice. But then it is not my happiness, bu t the preservation of the in- tegrity of my morality, th a t is my end and a t the same tim e my duty.123 H e re , K a n t i s concerned to re je c t th e p o ss ib ility th a t se e k in g m y ow n h a p p i- n e s s c o u ld b e a du ty . K a n t sa y s t h a t th is c a n n o t be a d u ty re g a rd in g h a p p i- n e s s per se, b u t c an be a d u ty b ecau se som e m in im a l leve l o f h a p p in e ss is n e c e ssa ry to p re v e n t u n d u e in flu en ce from th e sen su o u s s id e of h u m an ex is- ten c e . T h o u g h i t is a lw ays one's d u ty to a c t in accord w ith th e ca tegorica l im p e ra tiv e , th e re a re d e fin ite e x te rn a l in f lu e n c e s w hich m a y m ak e i t h a rd e r fo r one to do so. N ow , so fa r , th is is a d u ty to oneself. W h a t does th is h a v e to do w ith o u r d u ty to w a rd o thers? I t concerns o th e rs b ecau se , in fo rm u la tin g th e m a x im s o f th e w ill, I m u s t co n sid er m y se lf a s p a r t o f h u m a n ity W h a t is av a rice ? I t is a s i tu a tio n in w hich I h a v e th e m e a n s (w hich I do n o t u tilize ) to 122 Ibid., Ak. 434. 123 Ibid., Ak. 388. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 247 provide m y se lf h a p p in e ss . B u t, co n sid ered from a u n iv e rsa l p o in t of view , w h a t is th is b u t a case w h e re one p e rso n (m yself as m o ra l be ing) h a s a d u ty to a n o th e r p e rso n (m y se lf a s h u m a n being) to be beneficen t, to p rov ide a n - o th e r w ith h ap p in ess? I t is th e sam e s itu a tio n , th o u g h co n sid ered from dif- fe re n t p o in ts of view . T h ere fo re , i f I h a v e a d u ty to p rov ide m y se lf w ith h a p - p iness, w h en I c o n sid e r h u m a n k in d in g e n e ra l (though "one p e rso n [i.e., m y- self] m ay b e closer to m e th a n a n o th e r"124), I h av e a d u ty to t r y to p rom ote th e h a p p in e ss o f o th e rs a s w ell. In d ee d , i t is p rec ise ly because I w a n t h a p p in e ss in th e f i r s t p lace, p rec ise ly b e ca u se I am concerned w ith m y ow n needs, th a t I m u st consider th e h a p p in e s s o f o th e rs . T herefore , th o u g h K a n t m a in ta in s th a t "ad v ersity , p a in , a n d w a n t a re g re a t tem p ta tio n s to t ra n s g re s s one's duty" only in re la tio n to a d u ty one h a s to oneself, su re ly th is is app licab le to o u r d u ty of beneficence to w a rd o th ers . T h u s I th in k t h a t w e m ay conclude th a t one's d u tie s o f love, p a r t ic u - la r ly beneficence, a n d o n e 's d u tie s o f re sp ec t a re a ll a im ed a t c u r ta il in g pos- sible effects w hich m ig h t n e g a tiv e ly in flu en ce th e p u rsu it o f m o ra l perfection . C e rta in ly i t is p e rm iss ib le to f u r th e r th e specific ends of o th e rs , a n d th u s prom ote th e ir h a p p in e ss on se v e ra l d iffe ren t (m orally p e rm iss ib le ) levels, w hen K a n t ta lk s in th e Metaphysics o f Morals abou t th e duties we h a v e to - w ard s o th e rs , h e seem s a lw ay s concerned w ith th e o ther's a b ility to w ill m orally . R e g ard in g love, n o t on ly beneficence b u t also g ra t i tu d e a n d sy m p a- th y a re a ll d u tie s n o t on ly b e ca u se g ra ti tu d e is "a du ty w hose v io la tion ... can destroy th e m o ra l in c e n tiv e fo r beneficence in i ts very p rin c ip le "125 a n d b e - cause "m alice , w hich is d ire c tly c o n tra ry to sym pathy ... w o u ld destroy th e g en era l good of th e w orld ..."126 In ad d itio n , th e "negative" d u tie s of re sp ec t w hich w e "owe" to o th e rs ,127 th e opposite of w hich a re "p rid e ," "ca lum ny ," a n d 124 Ibid., Ak. 451. 125 Ibid, Ak. 455. 126 Ibid, Ak. 459-60. 127 Ibid, Ak. 488. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. * 248 "m ockery," a re n ecessa ry b e ca u se w ith o u t th em , in th e ex trem e case , "every given sc a n d a l w eak en s th is re sp e c t [the respec t "ow ed h u m a n ity in g e n e ra l"] a n d m ak e s i t in cred ib le ; y e t u p o n th is resp ec t dep en d s th e im p u lse to w h a t is m ora lly good."128 T h u s , th e e n tir e d iscussion a n d to n e invo lved in K a n t's d is- cussion o f o u r d u tie s to w a rd o th e rs in d ic a te s th a t K a n t's concern h e re is w ith th o se s tru c tu re s w h ich a re im p e d im e n ts to th e a b ility o f o th e rs to w ork on th e ir v ir tu e . T h u s, b r in g in g u s b a ck to ou r o rig in a l topic, I th in k th is gives u s a d d itio n a l rea so n s w hy th e p rom o tion of th e h ig h e s t good o u g h t to be con- ce rn ed w ith th e d u ty to p ro m o te th o se in s titu tio n s a n d o rg an iz a tio n s w hich he lp o th e rs to becom e in d e p e n d e n t from "th e goods o f fo rtu n e ." M oving on from th e Metaphysics of Morals, g iven th e specific p re m - ises t h a t re a so n ta k e s tim e to p e rfec t, th a t th e in d iv id u a l is u l tim a te ly u n - ab le to e n s u re th e ou tcom e o f h is /h e r m o ra l w illing , a n d t h a t th e re a re e x te r- n a l, s t ru c tu r a l in flu en ces u p o n one's p ro p en s ity fo r m o ra l w illing , i t seem s o u r d u ty to p u rs u e th e h ig h e s t good m u s t be n o t only to w ork on o u r ow n v ir - tu e , b u t im p o r ta n tly to t ry to rem ove a s m an y o f th o se im p e d im e n ts to th e p u rs u i t o f o th e rs ' v ir tu e a s possib le . C e rta in ly K a n t is r ig h t to in s is t th a t th e a c tu a l im p ro v em en t o f th e v ir tu e o f a n o th e r c an n o t be one's d u ty . B u t he also in s is ts t h a t im p e d im e n ts to su c h im provem en ts, p o v erty a n d w a r for ex- am ple, do e x is t a n d c a n be le ssen ed . In add ition , i f A nderson-G old a n d Rossi a re co rrec t in th e ir an a ly s is , th e n one's own m o ra l perfection s im p ly c an n o t ta k e p lace w ith o u t in c re a se d p e rfec tio n in o thers ; v ir tu e , th e y a n d I h a v e a r - gued, is n o t u p to th e in d iv id u a l. T h e re is also th e su g g estio n in K a n t's "Id e a fo r a U n iv e rsa l H isto ry " t h a t one s im p ly cou ld n o t im prove one's ta le n ts , th o se im p o rta n t fo r th e in - c re a s in g p e rfec tio n o f re a so n a n d su b se q u e n t m orality , i f one d id n o t e x is t in society. T h e h u m a n s i tu a tio n is d escribed as one o f "u n so c ia l soc iab ility ," 128 Ibid. Ak. 466. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 249 a n d i t is on ly su ch a n tag o n ism w h ich w ill a id in th e d ev e lo p m en t o f one's ta l- e n ts a n d , su b seq u e n tly , one's rea so n : In th is way,... all m an's ta len ts are gradually developed, his ta s te is cultured, and through progressive enlightenm ent he begins to establish a way of th ink- ing th a t can in time transform the crude n a tu ra l capacity for m oral discrimi- na tion into definite practical principles and th u s transform a pathologically en- forced agreem ent into a society and, finally, into a moral whole. W ithout those characteristics of unsociability... m an would five as a A rcadian shepherd, in perfect concord, contentm ent, and m utual love, and all ta len ts would he e ter- nally dorm ant in their seed;...129 T h u s, one m u s t p rom ote th e ty p e o f society, n a m e ly one w h e re th e r e is in te r - ac tio n b u t n o t w a r b e tw een a ll p e rso n s o f th e w orld , in w h ich o n e is ab le to in te r a c t a n d be a n ta g o n is tic w ith o u t in fr in g in g on o th e r's r ig h ts , a n d a w orld in c re a s in g ly f ree from poverty , s ick n ess , w ar, a n d o th e r d e tr im e n ts to th e c u ltiv a tio n o f v ir tu e for a ll p e rso n s . In one resp ec t, th is m ay be a m ore "p o litica l" view o f K a n t's m o ra l p h ilo so p h y th a n is u su a lly ta k e n . I n p ro m o tin g th e h ig h e s t good, o n e m ain ta rg e t o f moral concern m u s t be th e social s t ru c tu re s w hich in f lu e n c e u s all; w a r m u s t b e e lim in a ted , p o v e rty abo lished , a n d s tru c tu re s o f t r u e c a re a n d co m m itm en t e s tab lish ed . I n a n o th e r respec t, th is is also a m o re "re lig io u s" v iew o f K a n t's ph ilosophy . H u m a n b e in g s a re u ltim a te ly u n a b le to b r in g a b o u t th e h ig h e s t good, even i f e v e ry sing le p e rso n im m e d ia te ly dec id ed to t ry to w ill in accord w ith th e m o ra l law : Therefore, we shall seek to estab lish the grounds of th a t possibility prim arily w ith respect to w hat is im m ediately in our power, and secondarily in th a t which is beyond our power b u t which reason holds out to us as the supplem ent to our impotence to [realize] the possibility of the highest good, which is neces- sa ry according to practical principles.130 129 Kant, "Idea," Ak. 21. 130 Second Critique. Ak. 119. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 250 T he p o s tu la te s o f p ra c tic a l re a so n , p a r t ic u la r ly G od a n d im m o rta lity , p lay a la rg e ro le in th is p ic tu re o f K a n t's sy s tem , for th e y a re so re ly n eed ed to g u a r- a n te e th e outcom e o f o u r m o ra l s tr iv in g . I t sh o u ld n o w b e c le a r, how ever, w h y su c h p o s tu la te s a re n e c e ssa ry , a n d w hy th e h ig h e s t good provides such a n im p o r ta n t focus to o u r m o ra l en d eav o rs . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. i 251 Chapter Two Problems with the Highest Good: Worthiness and Conceivability I. In th e la s t c h a p te r I a rg u e d t h a t K a n t's no tion of th e h ig h e s t good w as com patib le w ith th e r e s t o f h is w ritin g s , a n d th a t i t w as a concep t w hich co u ld be defended from w ith in th e s ta n d p o in t o f K a n t's p h ilo so p h ica l system . E s se n tia lly I a rg u e d th a t th e concept o f th e h ig h e s t good is n a tu ra l ly an d n e c e ssa rily g e n e ra te d from th e fa c t th a t th e m o ra l law a s a ca teg o rica l im - p e ra tiv e commands. As su ch , i t a lre a d y d ea ls w ith h u m a n b e in g s a s c rea - tu re s w ith n e ed s a n d a d e s ire fo r h a p p in e ss . A nd since th e q u e s tio n of m o- ra l i ty w ou ld n o t even a ris e in th e f i r s t p lace i f th e re ex is ted on ly a sing le in - d iv id u a l in com plete iso la tio n , th e m o ra l law m u s t com m and in d iv id u a ls w ith in a com m unity , i.e., a k in g d o m o f ends. H ence, th e concept o f th e h ig h - e s t good flow s n a tu ra lly from th e s e tw o fac ts, since th e m o ra l la w m u s t say so m e th in g a b o u t "objects" o f w illing , b o th fo r m yse lf a n d fo r o th e rs , p a rtic u - la r ly since K a n t believes w e c a n n o t s im p ly w ill to h av e a good w ill. I tr ie d to a rg u e , th e n , t h a t we h av e a d u ty to p rom ote th e h ig h es t good, th o u g h no t ach ieve it , b u t th a t th is d u ty c a n n o t be t ra n s la te d in to h u m a n s rew ard in g th e v ir tu e of o th e rs th ro u g h h a p p in e s s o r in to v ir tu e i ts e lf b e in g h ap p in ess . W e s h a l l h a v e to w a it a few c h a p te rs to see exactly w h a t th is d u ty en ta ils , th o u g h I t r ie d to h in t in th e la s t c h a p te r th a t i t is e sse n tia lly th e com m and to im p ro v e m y ow n m o ra lity w h ile p ro m o tin g th o se s tru c tu re s w h ich allow for o th e rs , i f th e y so will, to im p ro v e th e ir ow n m orality . In th is c h a p te r I w a n t to d iscu ss tw o p rim a ry objections to K a n t's fo rm u la tio n of th e h ig h e s t good, bo th o f w hich I tak e to be va lid . T he f irs t Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 252 co n ce rn s K a n t's a sse rtio n th a t v ir tu e (m o ra lity ) is "w o rth in ess to be h a p p y ."1 T h is is a c e n tra l te n e t w hich o p e ra te s in th e b a c k g ro u n d of a ll d iscu ssio n s o f th e h ig h e s t good, a n d needs to b e ex am in ed . N o t on ly th is , b u t K a n t a lso sa y s t h a t w o rth in ess e n ta ils "h a p p in e ss in exact proportion to m o ra lity (a s th e w o rth o f a p e rso n a n d h is w o rth in ess to be h a p p y )..."2 U ltim ate ly , I b e - lie v e t h a t th is eq u a tio n o u g h t to be re jec ted , a t le a s t w ith an y u n d e rs ta n d in g o f "w o rth in e ss" a s desert. I th in k K a n t i s co rrec t to a s s e r t th a t w e sh o u ld n o t d e n y o u rse lv es h a p p in e ss i f w e h a v e a good w ill, b u t th is is n o t th e sa m e a s th in k in g t h a t w e deserve su ch h a p p in e ss . M y conclusion goes a g a in s t K a n t's ex p lic it a s se r tio n of th is eq u a tio n . In th is re sp ec t, I a m argu in g d irec tly a g a in s t K a n t's s ta te d position . H ow ever, I th in k th is is co n sis ten t w ith th e r e s t o f K a n t's w ritin g s . I w ill d e a l w ith th e s e co n sid era tio n s in th e f i r s t p a r t o f th is c h a p te r . Second, a n d m ore p rob lem atic , how ever, is w h a t I te rm th e "conce ivab ility" prob lem of th e h ig h e s t good. T h is p rob lem p e rta in s m a in ly to a n "o th erw o rld ly " h ig h es t good, b u t I th in k is p ro b lem atic for b o th v e rs io n s. I a rg u e th a t , a s K a n t h a s sp e lled i t out, th e h ig h e s t good is sim ply inconceiv - ab le , a n d th u s c an n o t leg itim a te ly be th e ob ject o f o u r w illing. T hese in c o n - c e iv ab ility p rob lem s hav e to do w ith th e n a tu r e o f h a p p in e ss a s K a n t h a s d e - f in e d i t, p a r t ic u la r ly a s i t re la te s to h u m a n s a s in te llig ib le . A gain , th e n , I am a rg u in g d irec tly a g a in s t K a n t's s ta te d p o sitio n , th o u g h I th in k a p a r t ia l r e - c o n s tru c tio n is possible, one w h ich I w ill p re s e n t. I w ill deal w ith th e se co n - s id e ra tio n s in th e th ird p a rt. n. O n e of th e m ost s ig n ifican t p ro b lem s w ith th e h ig h e s t good is K a n t's r a th e r b la n k e t a sse rtio n th a t m o ra lity c a n b e in te rp re te d as "w o rth in ess to 1 "That virtue (as the worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of whatever appears to us to be desirable... [has] been proved in the Analytic." Critique o f Practical Reason, Ak. 110. Italics added for emphasis. 2 Ibid.. Ak. 110. Italics added for emphasis. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 253 be h ap p y ." H ow is th is to be ta k e n , a n d how is i t g ro u n d ed ? I f K a n t in te n d s th is to be a fac t w hich is a n a ly tic a priori, th is s im p ly seem s im possib le . C e r- ta in ly a n ac tion m ay be w o rth y , b u t th is is b ecau se i t h a s m o ra l w orth , a n d su ch w o rth seem s to h a v e n o th in g to do w ith h a p p in e ss . K a n t co m m en ta to rs a re r ig h t to th in k th a t th e re is no re a so n th a t th is e q u a tio n can be m a d e an a ly tica lly . B u t is th is in i ts e l f a p rob lem fo r K a n t? D oes K a n t a c tu a lly th in k th a t th is c an be kn o w n a n a ly tic a lly a priori? G iven th a t th e p r im a ry d iscu ssio n o f th e w e d d in g o f h a p p in e ss a n d m o ra lity occurs on ly a f te r th e "A n a ly tic" of th e seco n d Critique, a n d g iven th a t K a n t exp lic itly w rite s t h a t "h a p p in e ss a n d m o ra lity a re tw o specifica lly d iffe ren t e lem en ts o f th e h ig h e s t good a n d th e re fo re th e i r com b ination c a n n o t b e know n a n a ly tic a lly ,"3 i t seem s c le a r th a t K a n t d id n o t expec t th e tw o com - p o n e n ts to be l in k e d a n a ly tica lly ; "since ["th is c o m b in a tio n "] c an n o t be a n a - ly tic , a s h a s b een show n, i t m u s t b e th o u g h t sy n th e tic a lly ..."4 B u t, u n fo r tu - n a te ly i t is n o t c le a r ju s t why th e tw o a re linked , a n d K a n t n e v e r gives u s a n exp lic it an sw er. U ltim a te ly , I do n o t believe th a t K a n t c a n p rov ide a c o h e r- e n t a rg u m e n t a s to w hy v ir tu e a n d h a p p in e ss a re l in k e d o r w hy m o ra lity im p lies w o rth in ess . A. I h a v e fo u n d on ly one co m m en ta to r w ho a d d re s s e s th is q u e s tio n d i- rectly , a n d th is is S te v en G. S m ith in h is a rtic le "W o rth in e ss to be H a p p y a n d K a n t's C oncep t o f th e H ig h e s t Good."5 S m ith in d ic a te s t h a t K a n t a p p ro a ch e s th e w o rth in ess e q u a tio n from tw o s ta n d p o in ts , t h a t o f h a p p in e s s a n d m o ra l- ity . F rom th e s ta n d p o in t o f h a p p in e ss , "th e h u m a n q u e s t fo r h a p p in e ss , w hich is c o n s titu tiv e o f h u m a n n a tu re , is m ocked i f m o ra lity b a rs th e door to 3 Ibid., Ak. 112. 4 Ibid, Ak. 113. 5 Steven G. Smith. "Worthiness to be Happy and Kant's Concept of the Highest Good." KantStudien 75 (1984): 168-190. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 254 h a p p in e ss ,"6 a n d from m orality , "h u m a n e ffo rts in b e h a lf o f th e m o ra l law a re m ocked, i f v i r tu e is n o t a t le a s t id e a lly p ro p o rtio n e d to h a p p in e ss ."7 In o th e r w ords, S m ith a s s e r ts th a t th e re a re tw o d irec tio n s from w h ich to d e fe n d a n ecessa ry l in k b e tw ee n m o ra lity a n d h a p p in e ss . L e t u s ta k e S m ith 's d isc u s- sion from th e s ta n d p o in t o f h a p p in e s s f irs t. S m ith a rg u e s th a t th e re a re tw o re a so n s fo r su ch a lin k s te m m in g from th e n e e d s o f h a p p in e ss . T h e f i r s t h e ca lls "th e p rob lem o f m o tiv a tio n ," w hich s te m s fro m K a n t's d iscussion in th e "C an o n o f P u re R easo n " o f th e f i r s t Critique t h a t th e id e a s o f m o ra lity c o u ld b e ob jects o f ap p ro v a l "b u t n o t sp rin g s o f p u rp o se a n d action ."8 N ow S m ith r ig h tly n o tes t h a t th is n e e d is e lim in a te d b y K a n t h im se lf w ith th e c la im in th e second Critique t h a t th e m oral la w c a n i ts e l f m o tiva te . H ow ever, S m ith a lso c la im s th a t "a p ro b lem re m a in s c o n ce rn in g m a n 's su sce p tib ility to m o ra l m o tiva tion , w h ich is on ly solved b y th e p o ss ib ility of th e h ig h e s t good."9 S m ith says l i t t le a b o u t th is , b u t p e rh a p s h e is a llu d in g to K a n t's m a n y s ta te m e n ts th a t w e sh o u ld believe in m o ra l p ro g re s s so a s no t to be o v e rly d isc o n te n t w ith life. B u t th is does n o t show u s w h y th e w o rth in ess e q u a tio n sh o u ld ex is t. I f th e re is a n a rg u m e n t h e re , i t is o n ly t h a t a n in d iv id u a l o u g h t n o t to becom e too d is illu s io n e d by h a rd sh ip . S m ith 's second rea so n for th e l in k is "th e p rob lem o f th e u n i ty of r e a - son."10 S m ith e x p la in s th a t th is is "th e is su e o f p e rso n a l s a n ity itse lf . T he sp lit b e tw ee n p h e n o m e n a l a n d n o u m e n a l h u m a n ity, w hich p ro d u ces th e 'n a tu r a l d ia lec tic ' [Grundlegung, A k. 405]... is fe lt by K a n t to be in to le r - able."11 In o th e r w ords, in d iv id u a ls a s r a t io n a l c re a tu re s h a v e tw o in te re s ts , 6 Ibid., p. 174. 7 Ibid. 8 Critique o f Pure Reason, B 841. 9 "Worthiness," p. 175. 10 Ibid., p. 176. 11 Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f 255 o ften tim e s in opposition to one an o th e r, a n d th e re is a n e ed of re a so n to f in d som e w ay of o rd e rin g th e s e d isp a ra te in te re s ts . As S m ith ex p la in s , a p a r t from th e h a rm o n iz in g concep t of th e h ig h e s t good, w hich p rov ides a n o rd e r fo r th e s e tw o concepts, "th e in te re s ts of re a so n rem a in m ere ly h e te ro g en eo u s, a n d re a so n 's v e ry n a tu re , w hich is to sy s te m a tiz e is v io la ted ."12 I th in k S m ith is on to so m eth ing h e re , b u t I th in k th a t h is a rg u m e n t is n o t n e a r ly com plete . H e b rin g s up K a n t's concept in th e Critique o f Judg- ment o f th e "f in a l p u rp o se ," a n d a llu d es to th e fa c t th a t th e h ig h e s t good is n e c e ssa ry to secu re th is f in a l pu rpose . B u t w e a re s till la c k in g a n a rg u m e n t a s to w h y th is is so, a n d w h y i t sh o u ld be t h a t "m ora lity h a s i ts ow n in te re s t in h a p p in e ss , a n d th e re fo re i ts own in te re s t in p a rtic ip a tin g in th e m e d ia tin g so lu tio n o f th e concep t o f th e h ig h es t good."13 T h is is th e v e ry q u e s tio n a t i s - su e . I a lso th in k t h a t S m ith is ap p ro ach in g this p a r tic u la r a rg u m e n t from th e w ro n g side , n am ely a s a n e e d of h a p p in e ss . H e cla im s th a t "is seem s to be th e in te re s t in h a p p in e ss , a n d no t m o ra lity , t h a t is u rg in g [th is] reco n c ilia - tio n ,"14 a n d th is does n o t q u ite seem to be t ru e , fo r i t a p p e a rs th a t i t is re a so n a n d i t s "in te re s t" in sy s te m a tiz a tio n w h ich u rg e s such reconcilia tion . W e s ti ll do n o t seem to h av e a ju s tif ic a tio n for th e e q u a tio n w hich n e ce ssa rily l in k s m o ra lity w ith (p ro p o rtio n a te ) h a p p in e ss .15 T he only re a l a rg u m e n t to be fo u n d in S m ith 's e ssa y fo r m o ra lity 's (positive) in te re s t in h a p p in e ss , a n d th u s fo r th e "w o rth in ess" e q u a tio n , is 12 Ibid., p. 176-7. This is similar to Silber's point about the "interest" of reason. 13 Ibid., p. 177. I shall try to offer my own argument in the next chapter. However, given that Smith seems to reject the necessity of a moral author of the world (God), his failure to embrace an argu- ment from moral teleology may be intentional. 14 Ibid. 15 It is not clear how much Smith is interested to prove from his discussion of the two stand- points addressing the highest good. On the one hand, he does seem to think that we can deduce some- thing about the nature of this "worthiness" link from the standpoint of morality's interest in happiness (though I fail to find any conclusive arguments for this). On the other hand, it does not seem that Smith really thinks we can address such a question until he comes to the next section of his paper, for he writes that "we have not yet seen... why there should be a ratio between virtue and happiness, or why the latter should issue from the former." (p. 183-4). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I i 256 S m ith 's s im p le a sse rtio n th a t a w o rth y a c t is n o t m ere ly w o rth y b u t "p ra is e - w o r t h y 16 S m ith 's p o in t com es dow n to th e following: w e a re involved w ith o th e rs in a com m unity , a n d w h en som eone (else) a c ts m o ra lly , w e n a tu ra lly feel th e n e e d to re sp o n d in som e w ay; his role in this case is not to act immediately on the m axim th a t has been ex- hibited by his virtuous neighbor, b u t ra ther to use the only timely means available to him of expressing his assen t to the maxim: he m ust in some sense repea t the other's adoption of it, ratify it, consummate the universalizing of the m axim th a t the other willed, if he willed morally - "rew ard" it by praise.17 W hile S m ith seem s r ig h t to ta k e in to accoun t th a t th e in d iv id u a l is a lre ad y d irec tly invo lved w ith o th e rs i f th e q u e s tio n of m o ra lity is to a rise , ho rn w h ere does h e d raw th e conclusion th a t w e hav e a n e e d to re sp o n d e x te rn a lly to a n y o r a ll m orally w orthy actions? H e m ay be r ig h t to a s s e r t th a t w h en we h a p p e n to w itn ess a m orally w o rth y act, w e w ill feel a re sp e c t fo r th e m ora l law . B u t w h y sh o u ld th e re by a n y n e e d to externalize su c h a fee ling of r e - spect. S m ith s ta te s th a t the sense of this moral approval is connected w ith universalization. He who approves, will[sl th a t everyone should act on the maxim adopted by the one of whom he approves. By so willing, he acknowledges th a t he too should adopt th e maxim to govern his own behavior...18 T h is se em s rea so n ab le enough , b u t h ow th e n do w e get to th e fac t th a t su ch a n ack n o w led g m en t m u s t b e ex te rn a lize d , a n d th a t th is sh o u ld also ta k e th e fo rm o f a "re w a rd "? T here seem s l i t t le ju s tif ic a tio n fo r th is , p a rtic u la rly from an y o f K a n t's w ritings. T h e re a re tw o ad d itio n a l p ro b lem s w ith su ch a d e fen se o f th e h ig h e s t good. T h e f i r s t is th e problem , s ta te d in th e la s t c h ap te r , t h a t w e cannot 16 Ibid., p. 187. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. j 257 know w h e n a n ac tio n h a s been w illed fro m d u ty alone. W e c a n n o t know th is ev en fo r o u r ow n w illing , le t a lone fo r som eone else's. So, a re w e to re w a rd th o se a c tio n s w h ich seem m ost m oral? O r on ly those w h ich a re m ere ly legal? N e ith e r o f th e s e seem to be le g itim a te p o ss ib ilitie s . S m ith 's d iscu ssio n of k n ig h ts a n d d rag o n s is n o t p a r t ic u la r ly h e lp fu l. T he second p ro b lem is a lo- g is tic a l one , ev en g ra n tin g th a t th e f i r s t p ro b lem could b e so lved . How cou ld w e p ra is e o r r e w a rd every observed a c tio n t h a t w as m oral, e sp ec ia lly i f su ch re w a rd h a d to be th e d is tr ib u tio n o f happiness? To p u t i t s im p ly , i t seem s im possib le to e n v is io n how w e w ou ld b e a b le to co n tin u a lly re w a rd a ll su ch ac tio n s fo r ev e ry s in g le p e rso n we o b serv e , a n d how we c o u ld p o ss ib ly p ro - duce th e r e q u is ite h a p p in e ss in o th e rs . Y e t S m ith seem s to in d ic a te th a t th e re m u s t be a positive rew ard , n o t m e re ly th e re fra in in g fro m do ing som e- th in g b a d to th e v ir tu o u s person . E v e n i f w e g ra n te d a ll o f th is , S m ith 's fu r th e r d e fen se o f th e n e e d fo r th e h ig h e s t good seem s m isgu ided a s w ell, i f S m ith even in te n d s fo r i t to be a defense . N ow , b e ca u se S m ith h a s d e fe n d e d th e "w o rth in ess" e q u a tio n from th e s ta n d p o in t o f th e com m un ity a n d th e n e e d for a n y o b se rv e r o f a m o ra l ac tio n to "p ra is e " o r "rew ard " th a t a c tio n , S m ith a rg u es t h a t th is in n o w ay e n ta ils th e n e e d fo r a God. S m ith w r ite s t h a t God is on ly e x p ec ted to re w a rd m o ra l ac tio n s i f th e re is a God, for in th is ca se God w ou ld be a n o b se rv er a s w ell. I t is a n "object o f hope, a n ex p ec ted rec ip ro ca tin g g e s tu re , on ly on th e su p p o s itio n th a t G od is a m em ber o f th e m o ra l com m unity ,"19 a n d th u s "p u rp o se le ssn e ss is m o ra lly offensive o n ly i f G od is ta k e n to b e th e a u th o r o f i t ."20 S m ith a rg u e s t h a t w e c a n conv ince th e a th e is t o f God's e x is te n ce "only if, p re su p p o s in g th e av a ila b ility of im m o rta l b liss, w e w ish to c o n tro l th e d is - p e n sa tio n th e re o f w ith m oral c o n s id e ra tio n s ."21 O f cou rse , th is cou ld n e v e r 19 Ibid., p. 188. 20 Ibid., p. 189. Given his views, Smith probably should have written: "...morally offensive only if God is taken to be the moral author of it." 21 Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I: | 1 258 convince a n a th e is t o f G od's ex istence , because, a s S m ith h a s a lre ad y in d i- c a ted , only i f th e a u th o r o f th e w orld is a moral b e in g , a n d th u s is a lre ad y in - vo lved in th e co m m u n ity o f m o ra l ag en ts , is th e re a n y d u ty to "p ra ise " or "re w a rd " h a p p in e ss , h e re o r in th e afterlife . N ow th is v iew o f th e h ig h e s t good a n d G od is n o t in co n s is te n t, b u t i t seem s to b e ex trem e ly u n -K a n tia n . O ne re a so n fo r th is I n o te d above, n a m e ly th a t th e re does n o t seem to be a n y th in g in K a n t's w ritin g s w hich in - d ica te s th e n e ce ss ity o f e x te rn a lly p ra is in g o r re w a rd in g th e m o ra l actions of o th e rs ; in d ee d , th is seem s n o t on ly n o t like ly , b u t im possib le . B u t in a d d i- tio n , i f v ir tu e o r m o ra lity re a lly is w o rth in ess to b e h a p p y , th e n I th in k S m ith h a s n o t co n sid ered ju s t h o w se rio u s th e consequences o f th is eq u a tio n a re , or a t le a s t how se rio u s K a n t ta k e s th em to be. I f S m ith re a lly ta k e s th e w o rth i- n e s s e q u a tio n to be t ru e , th e n th e re a l p rob lem o f th e w orld seem s to be th is : n a tu r e seem s w holly u n c o n c e rn e d w ith th e ou tcom e o f w o rth y actions. A p e rso n w ho p e rfo rm s a n a c tio n s tr ic tly h o rn d u ty m a y o r m a y n o t ga in h a p - p in e ss . T h is m ay b e b e c a u se th e consequences o f th is ac tio n m ay go com - p le te ly aw ry , fo r ex am p le th e m oney we give to a p o o r w om an m ay be s to len befo re sh e c a n b u y food, o r b e ca u se th e action goes d irec tly a g a in s t w h a t w o u ld m ak e u s h a p p y , fo r in s ta n c e re tu rn in g som eone e lse 's m oney w h en we a re v e ry poor. T he p ro b lem is t h a t n a tu re is seem in g ly u n co o p era tiv e w ith th e outcom e o f m o ra l w illing . A n d th is p rob lem does n o t seem to be solved by s im p le "p ra is e ." W hile p ra is e m ig h t be a n ice c o n firm a tio n t h a t w e h a v e done o u r du ty , i t is n o t lik e ly to so lve th e se ty p es o f p ro b lem s, a n d p ro p o rtio n a lity seem s u t te r ly im possib le . W h a t k in d of h ig h e s t good co u ld S m ith 's h ig h e s t good be? K a n t's h ig h e s t good th u s req u ire s God, fo r on ly G od c a n c re a te th e co nd itions n e c e ssa ry fo r th e re a l i ty of th e "w o rth in e ss" e q u a tio n . T h u s S m ith h a s ta k e n se rio u s ly n e i th e r th e re q u ire m e n ts a n d c o n seq u en ces o f th is e q u a - tio n n o r th e fa c t t h a t K a n t's h ig h e s t good sh o u ld h a v e a r e a l ch an ce of con- v in c in g th e a th e is t a t le a s t o f th e necessity o f p o s tu la t in g G od's existence. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 259 R S m ith 's in te rp re ta t io n of th e "w o rth in ess" e q u a tio n seem s u n sa tis fa c - to ry , a n d s in c e i t is th e on ly one av a ilab le , I m u s t t r y to p ropose m y ow n. I ta k e i t to b e im p o ss ib le t h a t th e e q u a tio n c a n be p ro v en a n a ly tic a lly a priori. B u t c an i t b e d e fe n d e d a s a sy n th e tic a priori p roposition? I do n o t th in k th a t i t can , even i f w e ta k e i t to be a conclusion o f K a n t's, in s te a d o f a p rem ise , as K a n t seem s to u se i t . I n o rd er to a rg u e a g a in s t th is e q u a tio n , le t m e give w h a t I ta k e to b e th e s tro n g e s t possib le a rg u m e n t t h a t one could m a k e in f a - vor o f th is e q u a tio n , a n d th e n I w ill show w hy i t i s u n sa tis fac to ry . T he r e a l p ro b lem seem s to be how to g ro u n d th e lin k b e tw een m o ra l- i ty a n d h a p p in e s s , a n d w h a t I w a n t to a rg u e is t h a t th e lin k b e tw ee n th e se tw o d isp a ra te in g re d ie n ts m ig h t be g ro u n d ed in th e n a tu r e of h u m a n beings; th e tw o e le m e n ts a re n ecessa rily l in k e d on ly b ecau se w e fin d th e m b o th e x is t- in g a s n e e d s fo r h u m a n be ings. In essence , p e rh a p s K a n t co n sid ers th e eq u a tio n n e c e s sa ry b e ca u se th e low er fa c u lty o f d e s ire is a desire fo r th e e n d s of h a p p in e ss (p lea su re ) , w h ile th e h ig h e r fac u lty o f d e s ire is a "d esire" fo r th e e n d s o f m o ra lity , b u t b o th a re concerned w ith b r in g in g ab o u t a n object in ac- cordance w ith law s. B o th facu ltie s a re , in fac t, one. R eca ll th a t "th e faculty of desire is th e fa c u lty su c h a be ing h a s o f cau sin g , th ro u g h its id ea s , th e re a lity o f th e ob jec ts o f th e s e id eas,"22 a n d t h a t "th e cap ac ity to se t o n ese lf a n e n d a n y e n d w h a tso e v e r - is w h a t c h a ra c te riz e s h u m a n ity ..."23 B u t th e w ill a s th e "fa c u lty e i th e r o f b rin g in g fo rth objects co rresp o n d in g to concep- tio n s or o f d e te rm in in g itse lf , i.e., i ts c a u sa lity to e ffect su ch objects..."24 is th e sam e a s d e s ire a n d b o th a re e q u a te d w ith p ra c tic a l rea so n . A nd th e p ra c tic a l n a tu re o f re a so n is on ly one aspec t o f p u re rea so n , so t h a t th e sa m e rea so n is 22 Second Critique, Ak. 9 n. 23 Metaphysics o f Morals, Gregor trans., Ak. 392. 24 Second Critique, Ak. 15. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 260 bo th sp e c u la tiv e a n d p rac tica l. T h e u p s h o t o f a ll th is is t h a t p u re rea so n , a s th a t w h ich p ro v id es law s a n d sy n th e s is , m u s t n ecessarily p rov ide a sy n th e s is for a ll p o ss ib le e n d s of th e w ill. H en ce , reaso n is n a tu ra lly a n d n e ce ssa rily concerned w ith th e o rd e r- in g of e n d s w h ic h a re possib le ob jec ts o f w ilting . So, w h a t en d s sh o u ld be w illed? O f co u rse , K a n t concludes t h a t "th e re is no possib ility o f th in k in g of a n y th in g a t a l l in th e w orld, or ev en o u t o f i t , w hich can be re g a rd e d a s good w ith o u t q u a lifica tio n , excep t a good w ill"25 a n d th is le a d s u s to th e c a teg o ri- ca l im p e ra tiv e . B u t w h a t o f th e e n d s o f h a p p in e ss? R eason m u s t sa y som e- th in g a b o u t th e m , since th e y a re ob jec ts o f d e s ire for every h u m a n being: "c e r ta in ly o u r weed a n d woe a re v e ry im p o r ta n t in th e e s tim a tio n o f o u r p ra c tic a l re a so n ."26 R eason m u s t so lve th e "n a tu r a l d ialec tic" b e tw ee n th e d em an d s o f m o ra lity a n d th e "p o w erfu l co u n te rw eig h t" o f th e in c lin a tio n s of h a p p in e ss .27 K a n t concludes th a t p le a su re s , w hile som etim es good "can also becom e e x tre m e ly b ad a n d h a rm fu l i f th e w ill... is n o t good."28 O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e re is no reason th a t h a p p in e s s n e e d be th o u g h t o f a s b a d o r ev il in itse lf: "th e g ro u n d of... evil... c a n n o t b e p laced , a s is so com m only done, in m a n 's sensuous nature a n d th e n a tu r a l in c lin a tio n s a r is in g th e re fro m ."29 T h ere is n o th in g w rong w ith th e d e s ire fo r h ap p in ess , as long a s i t does n o t in te rfe re w ith th e d ic ta tes of th e m o ra l law , a n d as long a s i t is h a d by one w ith a good w ill. H ence, b ecau se a sy n th e s is is necessary , K a n t a rg u e s th a t th e only one o f w h ich rea so n could conceive is th a t "a good w ill seem s to con - s t i tu te th e in d isp en sab le cond ition o f b e in g ev en w orthy o f h a p p in e ss ,"30 in 25 Grundlegung, Ak. 393. 26 Second Critique, Ak. 61 11 Grundlegung, Ak. 405. 28 Ibid., Ak. 393. 29 Religion, Ak. 30. 30 Grundlegung. Ak. 393. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 261 o th e r w ords, t h a t a good w ill i s th e "su p re m e "31 good, a n d "h a p p in e s s , th o u g h so m e th in g a lw ay s p le a sa n t to h im w ho p o ssesses it, is n o t o f i t s e l f ab so lu te ly good in ev ery re sp ec t b u t a lw ay s p re su p p o se s conduct in acco rdance w ith th e m o ra l la w a s i t s condition ."32 C W hile th is seem s to b e th e s tro n g e s t c la im for th e "w o rth in e s s" e q u a - tion , I th in k th a t i t is u ltim a te ly u n sa tis fa c to ry . T he re a l p ro b lem is th a t K a n t b e g in s w ith th e p rem ise t h a t b o th v ir tu e a n d h a p p in e ss a re l in k e d in th e concep t o f th e h ig h e s t good, a n d th e n s e ts ab o u t to d iscover th e n a tu re o f th is lin k . T h e n h e in v e s tig a te s th e n a tu r e o f th is link , co n c lu d in g t h a t v ir tu e m u s t f in a lly be th e cond ition fo r h a p p in e s s ,33 a n d th u s th e r e s u l t in g "w o rth in e ss" eq u a tio n , w ith s u b s e q u e n t "p ro p o rtio n a lity " c la u se . P re su m a b ly K a n t co n c lu d es th a t h a p p in e ss sh o u ld b e re w a rd e d "p ro p o rtio n a lly " p rec ise ly b e ca u se v ir tu e is th e cause o f h a p p in e s s . B u t th e o rig in a l p re m ise o f th e nec- e s sa ry l in k seem s ten u o u s , a n d th e co n c lu sio n th e re fo re c irc u la r . I f K a n t c a n n o t g ive u s a reaso n w hy th e tw o a re n ecessa rily l in k e d in th e concep t of th e h ig h e s t good in th e f i r s t p lace , th e n th e re seem s to be no le g itim a te w ay to conclude t h a t (because th e y axe n e c e ssa r ily linked ) th e y m u s t b e in a re la - tio n sh ip o f g ro u n d a n d consequence , a n d th u s v ir tu e m u s t be w o rth in e s s to be h a p p y . A s I s ta te d above, th e o n ly l in k be tw een th e se tw o co n cep ts seem s to be t h a t th e y a re lin k e d a s u n iv e rs a l e n d s o f h u m a n be ings. B u t th is lin k does n o t seem to be s tro n g en o u g h to su p p o r t conclusions w h ich K a n t w ishes to d raw . To b eg in w ith , th e on ly l in k t h a t seem s to ex is t b e tw een th e tw o h e t- e ro g en eo u s e le m e n ts is th a t th e y b o th h a p p e n to be objects o f d e s ire fo r h u - m a n b e in g s . B u t th is seem s m u ch too c o n tin g e n t to be th e g ro u n d s fo r th e 31 Second Critique, Ak. 110. 32 Ibid., Ak. 111. 33 Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 262 conclusion t h a t v ir tu e is w o r th in e s s to be h ap p y . P a r t ic u la r ly , w h a t is m iss- in g is a n a rg u m e n t to th e e ffec t t h a t h u m a n s h a v e a right to h a p p in e ss . C er- ta in ly w e c a n ag ree w ith K a n t t h a t v ir tu e i ts e lf is n o t h a p p in e s s , t h a t h a p p i- n ess is n o t good in i ts e lf , a n d t h a t th e e n d s o f h a p p in e s s o u g h t to b e s y n th e - sized by re a s o n a lo n g w ith i t s o th e r (m oral) en d s . B u t u n le s s h u m a n s h a v e a r ig h t to h a p p in e ss , w e a re le f t o n ly w ith th e conclusion t h a t i f th e re is to be any h a p p in e ss , i t sh o u ld o n ly b e h a d w hen i t is perm iss ib le ,' h a p p in e s s is no t evil, b u t i t is n o t good in a ll c ircu m stan ces , th u s i t is o n ly p e rm iss ib le to p u r - su e it. B u t th is is f a r f ro m s a y in g th a t h u m a n s h a v e a r ig h t to h a p p in e ss , a n d fa r fro m a conclu sion t h a t v ir tu e is w o rth in e ss to b e h a p p y . T h e p ro b lem se e m s to lie in K a n t's ju s tif ic a tio n o f th e lin k , w hich , as fa r a s I c a n see , re a lly c o n s is ts o f on ly tw o p o in ts : f irs t, t h a t p ra c tic a l rea so n is c e r ta in ly co n ce rn e d w ith o u r w e a l a n d woe,34 a n d second , t h a t "to be in n e e d of h a p p in e s s a n d a lso w o rth y o f i t a n d y e t n o t to p a r ta k e o f i t co u ld n o t be in acco rdance w ith th e co m p le te vo lition o f a n o m n ip o te n t r a t io n a l being , i f w e a ssu m e su ch o n ly fo r th e s a k e o f th e a rg u m e n t."35 A ssu m in g God, th en , w h a t K a n t is in d ic a tin g is t h a t th e re is no re a so n w hy a p e rs o n w ith a good w ill sh o u ld d ep riv e h im /h e rs e lf o f h a p p in e ss . B u t th is is o n ly a n a rg u m e n t for p e rm iss ib ility , fo r i n th is case , th e e n d o f h a p p in e s s is n o t c o n tra ry to du ty . I f a p e rso n w ills in acco rd w ith th e m o ra l law , th e n K a n t seem s r ig h t to in s is t t h a t th e re is n o re a s o n w h y such a v ir tu o u s p e rs o n sh o u ld n o t p a r - ta k e in h a p p in e ss . B u t to in s i s t t h a t a v ir tu o u s p e rso n is som ehow entitled to h a p p in e ss , t h a t som ehow th e y a re deserving o f h a p p in e s s re q u ire s a n a rg u - m e n t w h ich is n o t g iven . A g a in , th e re is no ju s tif ic a tio n fo r w h y v ir tu e a n d h a p p in e ss a re n e c e ssa r ily l in k e d . As T heodore M . G re en e su m m a riz e s K a n t's p rob lem : 34 Ibid., Ak. 61. 35 Ibid.. Ak. 110. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 263 In order to secure hum an freedom he has analyzed mein into two irreconcilable natures; the one abstractly rational and noumenai, the other phenomenal and purely sentient. The former is completely severed from the empirical world and all empirical motives, desire and impulses, and... [t]he la tte r is em pty of all m oral reasonableness and is concerned solely w ith irrational sensuous sa t- isfaction.36 W hile G re en e 's s ta te m e n t a n d p o s itio n a re s tro n g e r th a n n e ce ssa ry fo r o u r c u rre n t a rg u m e n t, i t does in d ic a te a p rob lem w ith in K a n t's ph ilo sophy w ith w hich w ere a re h e re co n ce rn ed . In sh o rt, in o rd e r to free h u m a n s from d e - te rm in a te n a tu r a l c a u se s , K a n t h a s p o s ited a w ill t h a t c an be (u ltim ate ly ) free from th e in c lin a tio n s o f lo w er d esire . T h a t b e in g sa id , K a n t m u s t te ll u s w h ere th e (necessa ry ) l in k b e tw ee n v ir tu e a n d h a p p in e ss re a p p e a rs , a n d th is m u s t b e m o re th a t th e m ere ly c o n tin g e n t l in k of tw o d isp a ra te e n d s o f p ra c ti- ca l rea so n . T h is e n ta ils a n a d d itio n a l p rob lem . K a n t seem s ju s tif ie d in s ta t in g th a t h u m a n s do in d e e d n e e d some h a p p in e ss , b u t w hy proportionate h a p p i- ness? W e sh o u ld a g re e w ith K a n t t h a t th e re e x is t e x te rn a l c ircu m stan ces a n d s ta te s o f a ffa irs in w h ich a p e rso n w ould be u n d e r g re a t s t r a in s to ac t m o ra lly ( th o u g h i t w o u ld s t i l l be a du ty ), conditions su ch as ex trem e p o v erty or w ar; "to secu re o n e 's ow n h a p p in e s s is a du ty (a t le a s t ind irectly ); fo r d is - c o n te n t w ith one's co n d itio n u n d e r m a n y p re ss in g c a re s a n d am id u n sa tis f ie d w a n ts m ig h t eas ily becom e a g re a t te m p ta tio n to tra n s g re s s one's fu tu re d u - tie s ."37 H ence , i t se em s a s th o u g h th e re is in som e se n se a "r ig h t" to th is m in im a l h a p p in e ss , a n e e d fo r h a p p in e s s from th e s ta n c e o f m orality , a n e e d to be free from p o v erty a n d w a r so t h a t one w ill n o t b e s tro n g ly te m p te d to v io la te th e m o ra l law . B u t is th e re a n e e d for m ore h a p p in e ss th a n th is? Is th e re a n e e d fo r a m o re v ir tu o u s p e rso n to receive m ore h a p p in e ss , a n d on ly 36 Theodore M. Greene, "The Historical Context and Religious Significance of Kant's Relig- ion" "Introduction" to Religion Within the Limits o f Reason Alone, by Immanuel Kant, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row. 1960). lxii. 3 Grundlegung. Ak. 399. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f I 264 in exac t p roportion? A gain, K a n t seem s w a rra n te d in m a in ta in in g th a t h a p p in e ss is n o t to be avo ided by th e m o ra lly good person , b u t w hy shou ld th a t p e rso n b e deserv ing o f a p a r t ic u la r p ropo rtion? T h e on ly a d d itio n a l a rg u m e n t w h ich K a n t seem s to offer fo r th e e q u a tio n is a n o th e r b la n k e t s ta te m e n t t h a t p e rso n s w ith o u t a good w ill sh o u ld n o t be h appy . Now, w e m ay in d e e d be r ig h t to ag ree w ith th e q u o ta - tion (above) t h a t som e p le a su re s c an b e "e x tre m e ly b ad a n d h a rm fu l i f th e will... is n o t good." B u t th is is a n a rg u m e n t a s to th e effects o f a p e rso n w ith a b a d w ill, fo r in s tan c e t h a t "th e coo lness o f a v illa in m a k e s h im ... m uch m ore d an g ero u s..."38 H ere w e a re co n cern ed w ith ac tio n s w hich m ig h t h u r t o thers , cause w a r, o r genera lly im p ed e th e p ro g re ss o f o th e rs ' m o ra l developm ent, t ra n s g re s s in g n o t only th e m o ra l la w b u t p ro b ab ly th e leg a l code a s well. B u t th is is n o t a n a rg u m e n t th a t , fo r in s ta n c e , a law -ab id in g p e rso n o u g h t n o t to be h a p p y , th o u g h such a p e rso n m ay n o t h a v e a good w ill. T h e on ly such ju s tif ic a tio n is K a n t's m ere a sse r tio n t h a t "th e s ig h t of a b e in g w ho is n o t g raced b y a n y touch of a p u re a n d good w ill b u t w ho y e t en joys a n u n in te r - ru p te d p ro sp e r ity can n e v e r d e lig h t a r a t io n a l a n d im p a r tia l sp ec ta to r,"39 a n d th is "n o t m ere ly in th e p a r t ia l eyes o f a p e rso n w ho m akes h im s e lf h is en d b u t even in th e ju d g m e n t o f a n im p a r tia l rea so n ..."40 P e rh a p s w e c an sy m p a- th ize w ith K a n t's a sse rtio n th a t i t p a in s u s to see (ap p aren tly ) im m o ra l p e r- sons w ho a re happy , b u t is i t unreasonable t h a t su ch p e rso n s m ig h t be happy? C e rta in ly I m ay w ell feel d isco u rag ed i f m y m oral w illin g h a s k ep t m e from g re a t h ap p in ess , b u t is th e re som e offense to rea so n itse lf? W hile th is m ay b e a fin e a n d com m on se n tim e n t, i t be longs m ore to p a r t one of th e Grundlegung th a n i t does to a t r a n s c e n d e n ta l deduction o f th e objects of th e m oral law . A gain , w hy m u s t h a p p in e ss be l in k e d w ith v ir tu e ? W e n eed m ore 38 Ibid., Ak. 394. 39 Ibid., Ak. 393. 40 Second Critique, Ak. 110. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 265 th a n th e seem ing ly com m onsense a s se r tio n th a t th is is th e case , especially w h e re ac tio n s a re leg a l b u t n o t b a se d on d u ty a lone .41 W e seem left, th e n , w ith th e ju s t if ia b le option th a t re a so n a n d th e re b y m o ra lity sh o u ld s im p ly b e unconcerned, w ith a n y th in g m ore th a n th e basic n e e d s o f h a p p in e ss . N ow th is conclu sion seem s to be w a r ra n te d by th e re s t o f K a n t's w ritin g s , th o u g h i t is in co n tra d ic tio n to h is b e lie f in th e "w o rth in e s s" equation ; th u s , w h ile i t m a y v io la te th e "le t te r " o f K a n t's project, I th in k i t is e n tire ly w ith in th e "sp ir it ."42 T o b eg in w ith , th e re is K a n t's s tro n g a sse r tio n th a t "fo r his own happiness is a n e n d th a t e v e ry m a n h a s (by v ir tu e o f th e im p u lse s o f h is n a tu re ) , b u t th is e n d can n e v e r w ith o u t selfco n tra d ic tio n be re g a rd e d a s a d u ty ... H e n ce i t is se lf-con trad ic to ry to say th a t h e is under obligation to p ro m o te h is ow n h a p p in e ss ..."43 T h u s h a p p i- n ess a n d th e p u rs u i t o f h a p p in e ss is n o t a d u ty , th o u g h i t is a n e n d t h a t is u n iv e rs a lly d e sired by h u m a n be ings. O f co u rse rea so n c a n n o t be u n co n - c e rn e d w ith th e im p u lse s fo r p le a su re , fo r th e rea so n th a t th e m o ra l law is a n im p e ra tiv e fo r u s is p rec ise ly b e ca u se su c h im p u lse s m u s t b e overcom e a n d p la c e d in a p o sitio n w h ich is seco n d a ry to m o ra lity . P e rh a p s th e position is b e s t s ta te d in "T heory a n d P ra c tice ": I d id n o t fa il to re m a rk th a t m a n is n o t ex p ec ted to renounce h is n a tu ra l end , h a p p in ess , w hen th e issu e o f obey ing h is d u ty arises; for h e c a n n o t do th a t... Y e t h e m u s t com pletely abstract from su c h consid era tio n s w h e n th e com m and o f d u ty a rises , a n d he m u s t n e v e r m a k e h a p p in e ss th e condition o f obeying th e law t h a t re a so n p rescribes for h im .44 41 This conclusion is also offered by Andrews Reath in his "Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant," though he presents little by way of defense. He simply states that "no explicit arguments are given for taking a proportionality of virtue and happiness, either as an end, or as a way of ordering different ends or interests" (p. 611), and concludes that, as such, it "represents a departure from Kant's basic principles" (p. 613). 42 In addition, I think that by weeding out this equation we will actually make Kant's claim that it is a duty to promote the highest good stronger. 43 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 386. Also: Second Critique, "Remark IT' to "Theorem IV," Ak. 35-41. 44 "On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, but is of No Practical Use." Ak. 278-9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ii 266 R eason m u s t be concerned w ith h a p p in e s s on ly in o rd e r to keep th e in c e n - tiv e s of p le a su re from d e te rm in in g th e w ill a n d to e n s u re t h a t one w ill n o t be s tro n g ly te m p te d to v io la te th e m o ra l law ; it can even be a duty in certa in respects to provide for one's happiness, in part because (since it includes skill, health , and riches) it contains m eans to the fulfillment of one's duty an d in p a r t because the lack of it (e.g., poverty) con- tains tem ptations to tran sg ress against duty. B ut to fu rther one's happiness can never be a direct duty ...45 T h u s , th e p u r s u i t o f som e h a p p in e s s is necessa ry , b u t on ly a s a n in d ire c t d u ty a n d only in o rd e r to a v o id c o n d itio n s w hich m ig h t th re a te n th e p u re u se o f o u r w ill.46 In ad d itio n , i f we a g re e to a (n y ) ve rs ion o f th e "p rin c ip le o f p u rp o siv e m ech an ism s,"47 K a n t u ses th i s to conclude p rec ise ly t h a t h u m a n s w ere n o t d e s ig n ed b y n a tu r e fo r h a p p in e s s , a n d th a t on ly a good w ill is good in itse lf: "i f t h a t be ing 's p re se rv a tio n , w e lfa re , o r in a w ord i t s h a p p in e ss , w ere th e r e a l e n d of n a tu r e in th e c a se o f a b e in g h a v in g re a so n a n d w ill, th e n n a tu re w o u ld h av e h i t u p o n a v e ry p o o r a r ra n g e m e n t..."48 K a n t is c o n s is te n t in h is w ritin g s to in d ic a te th a t i f h u m a n s w e re d esig n ed b y n a tu r e fo r th e ach ieve- m e n t of h a p p in e ss th ro u g h re a so n , th e n w e w ere p o o rly d e sig n ed in d eed . I t w o u ld h av e b een m u ch b e t te r i f h a p p in e s s w ere a ch iev a b le th ro u g h in s tin c t. B u t, i f we a re c re a te d , a n d i f o u r re a s o n is to h a v e som e p u rp o se , th e n th is 45 Second Critique, Ak. 93. See also: Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 388, where Kant clearly states that such concerns for happiness are "merely a means for removing obstacles to his morality - a permitted means..." 46 "An action which is neither commanded nor prohibited is merely allowed... and therefore also no duty," Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 223, Ellington trans. Victoria S. Wike discusses precisely this point in her article, "Kant on the Indirect Duty to Pursue Happiness" inAkten des Siebenten Intemationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band II. 1 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1990), 599-611. She concludes, as I do, that Kant thought we ought to be concerned with happiness in a minimal sense, but that, "in short, the seeking of happiness becomes an indirect duty only because of the relationship of happiness to an end which it facilitates and to which we have a direct duty," (p. 606, italics added for emphasis). 47 On the "principle of purposive mechanism" see: Section One, Chapter Eight. 48 Grundlegung. Ak. 395. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 267 p u rp o se can n o t be th e p u r s u i t of h a p p in e ss , th o u g h su ch a p u r s u i t is p e r - m issib le . K a n t even goes so fa r as to s a y th a t "h a p p in e ss c an ev en be r e - d u ced to le ss th a n n o th in g , w ith o u t n a tu r e 's fa ilin g th e re b y in h e r p u rp o se [th e "e s ta b lish m e n t o f a good w ill"]."49 F a r from b e in g a du ty , h a p p in e s s is b a re ly a co n sid era tio n fo r th e p u re w ill. W e get a s im ila r p ic tu re o f th is p o sitio n o f h a p p in e ss in K a n t's sp e - cific d iscussion in th e Critique o f Practical Reason o f th e d ifference b e tw een das Gute a n d das Wohl, w h e re h e concludes th a t w hile re a so n h a s a n a tu r a l in te r e s t in h a p p in e ss , "h e h a s rea so n fo r a y e t h ig h e r pu rp o se , n a m e ly , to co n sid er a lso w h a t is in i ts e l f good o r ev il, w h ich p u re a n d se n su o u s ly d is in - te re s te d rea so n a lone c a n ju d g e , an d ... to d is tin g u ish th is e s tim a tio n from a se n su o u s estim atio n ..."50 I n th is section , "T h e C oncept o f a n O b jec t o f P u re R eason ," K a n t m ak e s th e d iv ision b e tw ee n w ell-being (h ap p in e ss) a n d th e good (th e m oral) e x trem e . S o m eth in g w h ich is u n p le a sa n t m ay w e ll be good, su c h a s a n ecessa ry o p e ra tio n , a n d v ice -versa . In fact, K a n t m a k e s th e bo ld a sse r tio n th a t "th e concep t o f good a n d ev il is n o t d e fined p r io r to th e m o ra l law ..."51 T hus, K a n t w rite s : Though one m ay laugh a t the Stoic who in the worst paroxysm of gout cried out, "Pain, however thou torm entest me, I will never adm it th a t thou a r t any- th ing bad...!" he was nevertheless right. He felt it w as an evil, and he be- trayed th a t in his cry; b u t th a t anything [morally] evil attached to him he had no reason to concede...52 T h e p o in t o f th is q u o ta tio n , a s w ell a s th is section, is to show th a t th e m o ra lly good a n d th e m ere ly p le a s a n t a re com p lete ly d isp a ra te objects o f w illin g , a n d th a t on ly th e m orally good is a n e ce ssa ry a n d w orthy object o f th e w ill o f r a - tio n a l c re a tu re s . C e r ta in ly one is a llo w ed to seek h a p p in e ss , b u t o n ly i f i t 49 Ibid., Ak. 396. 50 Second Critique, Ak. 62. 51 Ibid., Ak. 62-3. 52 Ibid., Ak. 60. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51 268 does n o t conflict w ith th e m o ra l law ; o th e rw ise h u m a n s w ou ld b e no b e tte r th a n a n im a ls . K a n t seem s to h a v e done a m o re effective th a n in te n d e d job of s e p a ra tin g das Gute from das Wohl. T h u s , th e option w hich seem s le g itim a te ly le f t open to u s a s ra tio n a l c re a tu re s i s s im p ly to deny th a t h a p p in e ss h a s a n y th in g b u t a m in im a l p lace in m orality , excep t w here a la c k o f h a p p in e ss m ig h t be a th r e a t to m oral w illing.53 I t seem s th a t th e sk e p tic can a g re e to a ll o f th e fo llow ing po in ts , w ith o u t h a v in g a n y n eed fo r G od54: h u m a n s h a v e a n a tu r a l a n d n ecessa ry in te re s t in th e e n d s of bo th v ir tu e a n d h a p p in e ss , som e h a p p in e ss is neces- sa ry i f h u m a n s a re to beg in th e d ifficu lt p ro jec t o f c u ltiv a tin g th e i r v irtu e , h a p p in e ss (in th e form o f ta le n ts , riches, etc.) c a n be d an g ero u s i f g iven to persons w ith a b a d (evil) d isposition , rea so n h a s a n e e d to o rd e r a ll o f th e ends of th e w ill, th e en d o f h a p p in e ss a n d th e n a tu r a l in c lin a tio n s to w ard h a p p in e ss sure n o t b a d or evil, a n d h a p p in e ss c a n r ig h tly be p u rs u e d a s long a s i t n e ith e r c o n ta in s th e g ro u n d s for w iltin g n o r is c o n tra ry i ts e l f to th e m oral law . I t seem s th a t one m ig h t ag ree to a l l th e s e p rem ise s a n d s ti ll n o t believe in th e n ecessity of v ir tu e a s w o rth in ess fo r p ro p o rtio n a te h ap p in ess ; "th e m a jes ty o f d u ty h a s n o th in g to do w ith th e en joym en t o f life ..."55 C er- ta in ly th e (K a n tia n ) skep tic m ig h t say th a t , sp e a k in g from com m on-sense, i t w ould be n ice i f v ir tu o u s p e rso n s w ere re w a rd e d , or a t le a s t n o t seem ingly p u n ish e d o u tr ig h t b y n a tu re ; b u t in w h a t w ay w o u ld such com m on-sense se rve a s a n a rg u m e n t, especially a n an a ly tic o r sy n th e tic a priori p roposi- tion? P e rh a p s su ch a skep tic m ig h t even b e a b le to ag ree th a t , since th e re 53 As to the question of what is left of the duty to promote the highest good, this will have to be postponed. But as to the question of the "worthiness" equation, I would be glad to know if there exists a better argument as to why it is necessary. Perhaps one could be fashioned negatively, from the concept of "punishment" instead of reward. The immediate problem with this, of course, is that punishment deals only with legality, thus leaving morality out of the question, as well as failing to say anything about posi- tive reward. Perhaps an analysis of the concept of "worthiness" or "desert" itself might lead to a possible defense, but I do not see how. 54 The need for God here would be in reference to the need of proportionate happiness. I will argue later that there are other needs for a belief in God. 55 Second Critique, Ak. 88. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a re tw o goods in w hich h u m a n s a re in te re s te d , th e h ig h e s t good w ould be m ax im a l h a p p in e ss a n d m a x im a l v ir tu e . B u t th e q u estio n is one o f th e link b e tw een th e se tw o concepts, a n d th e sk e p tic does n o t seem obliged to be lieve it. m. T he o th e r m ajo r p ro b lem w ith th e h ig h e s t good is one o f conceivability , a n d h a s p r im a rily to do w ith th e n a tu r e o f h a p p in e ss a s i t re la te s to h u - m a n be ings. In th is section, I a d d re ss fo u r such p rob lem s o f conceivab ility . T hese a re p rob lem s espec ia lly w ith th e "o therw orld ly" h ig h e s t good, b u t ov e rlap p in g p ro b lem s w ith t h e "e a r th ly " fo rm u la tio n c a n be se en a s w ell. A. In essence , th e f ir s t m a jo r p ro b lem is th is : K a n t c la im s t h a t a ll h u - m a n b e in g s d esire h a p p in e ss , a n d th a t w e can hope th a t o u r v ir tu o u s d ispo - sitio n w ill be re w a rd e d in th e n e x t life . H ow ever, g iven K a n t's sp lit b e tw een th e n o u m en a l a n d p h e n o m e n a l rea lm s , a n d given th e u n k n o w ab le n a tu r e of th e n e x t life, i t seem s a t le a s t p o ss ib le t h a t w e w ill n o t h a v e th e re q u is ite n a - tu re n ecessa ry for th e ex p erien ce o f h a p p in e ss , no r w ould w e d esire it. As G reene su m m arize s th is p rob lem : The Summum Bonum a rgum ent rests on the assum ption th a t the happiness m an craves now, and will continue to desire after death, is exclusively sen tien t in character and unrelated to his h igher nature in any in ternal or organic way. But he has previously show n th a t m an's sentient nature is phenomenal, th a t is, temporal, and not e ternal. He cannot, therefore, consistently m aintain now th a t this phenomenal self will continue after death or th a t in the next life m an will continue to desire the happiness which he craves in th is.56 A ccording to K a n t's ph ilo sophy , a p e rso n h a s v a lu e b ecau se s /h e is a m em b er of th e in te llig ib le w orld , b e c a u se o f t h a t p e rso n 's in d ep en d en ce from th e 56 Greene, "Historical Context," p. lxiv. See also: Kwang-Sae Lee, "Some Reflections on the Idea of the Highest Good as a Regulative Idea of Pure Practical Reason." pp. 555-6. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 270 p h e n o m e n a l w o rld th ro u g h th e m o ra l law . A p e rso n is a lso free fro m sp ace a n d tim e, a n d th u s is p ro p e rly n o u m en a l. T hus, i t seem s d ifficu lt to a s s e r t t h a t h u m a n s w ill d e s ire h a p p in e s s in a "n o u m en a l" a fte rlife , a n d se e m s u n lik e ly th a t th e y w ou ld h a v e th e sen so ry a p p a ra tu s to e x p erien ce i t . S u c h a conclusion , i f i t is to b e d ra w n , r e s ts on th e p rem ise t h a t h a p p in e s s c a n n o t b e in te llig ib le , t h a t is , t h a t K a n t co n sid e rs h a p p in e ss to b e a p h e n o m e n o n w h ich is p h y s ic a l a n d s e n s u a l in n a tu r e , a n d th e p rem ise th a t th e n a tu r e o f h u m a n b e in g s w ill n o t re m a in th e s a m e in th e n e x t w orld a s i t i s i n th is w o rld . L e t u s co n sid er th e s e tw o p re m ise s . T he f i r s t n e ce ssa ry p re m ise is th a t K a n t co n sid ers h a p p in e s s to b e a p h e n o m e n a l s ta te , a n d th a t h a p p in e s s is n o t to be e q u a te d e ith e r w ith con - te n tm e n t w ith m o ra l w illin g ("se lf-co n ten tm en t"57) or w ith com ple te in d ep en d en ce from se n su o u s in c lin a tio n s ("b liss"58). N ow V ic to ria S . W ike h a s devo ted a n e n tire book to th e s tu d y o f th e n a tu re o f K a n t's u n d e rs ta n d in g o f h a p p in e ss i n h e r exce llen t w ork: Kant on Happiness in Ethics,59 so I n e e d on ly re fe r to h e r conclusions re g a rd in g h a p p in e s s , w h ich I ta k e to b e correct. I n th e f i r s t c h a p te r o f h e r book, sh e e x a m in e s th e th re e d iffe ren t concep ts o f se lf-c o n ten tm en t, b liss , a n d h a p p in e ss , conc lud ing : "K a n t co n sid ers h a p p in e ss to in v o lv e a ph y sica l s ta te in th e n a tu r a l w orld . T h ere is a connec tion b e tw een h a p p in e s s a n d p lea su re , in c lin a tio n , a n d se n sa tio n ... T h is n o tio n o f w h a t h a p p in e ss is a n d w h a t h a p p in e s s in v o lv es t r e a ts h a p p in e ss a s a se n sib le s ta te ."60 H ap p in ess , for K a n t c a n n o t b e co n sid ered a s e i th e r th e sa tis fa c tio n o f know ing t h a t one w ills so le ly fro m th e m o ra l la w o r a s th e freedom fro m a ll se n su o u s in c lin a tio n s .61 H a p p in e s s 57 Second Critique, Ak. 117. 58 Ibid., Ak. 118. 59 See also: "Kant on the Indirect Duty to Pursue Happiness," 599-611. It is a shame that Wike, while addressing the question of the highest good in several chapters, never addresses the question of virtue as "worthiness to be happy." 60 Kant on Happiness, p. 13. 61 Ibid.. pp. 21-23. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f ifA 271 involves th e p o s it in g o f a m a te r ia l end, th e o b ta in in g o f th a t end , a n d a p le a su re w h ich is d e riv e d from th is end .62 T he n a tu re o f h a p p in e ss , a s K a n t u n d e rs ta n d s i t , is p h y s ic a l a n d sensuous in n a tu re , a n d is n o t e i th e r se lf- c o n te n tm e n t o r b liss . In te re s tin g ly , W ike su b seq u e n tly d raw s th e sam e conclusion th a t I have , n a m e ly t h a t th e re is a p rob lem w ith K a n t's in s is ten ce th a t h a p p in e s s is th e n e ce ssa ry re w a rd in th e n e x t w orld. W ike w rites th a t: if the h ighest good is to be realized out of the world, then th is definition of happiness does not m ake sense. How can we speak of the satisfaction of our needs and inclinations in an intelligible world? In this case, a new definition of happiness is needed and so happiness in the intelligible world should perhaps be understood to be m oral happiness, self-contentment, or bliss.63 H ence, a s K a n t h a s fo rm u la te d th e h ig h e s t good, i t seem s inconceivab le a s a n object o f hope, a n d seem s im possib le for c re a tu re s o f a p u re ly in te llig ib le n a - tu re . T h is does lea v es u s , how ever, w ith th e possib ility th a t w e a re co n fu sed on e ith e r o f tw o p o in ts : h a p p in e ss m ay n o t be w h a t K a n t in te n d s a s th e r e - w a rd in th e n e x t w orld , a n d o u r ex istence in th e n ex t w orld m ay n o t be a s "in te llig ib le" a s w e h a v e co n sid ered i t here . T he f i r s t p o ss ib ility I th in k is easily d ism issed . As W ike p o in ts ou t, K a n t is n e v e r in c o n s ta n t in h is u se of th e te rm h ap p in ess , a n d th ro u g h o u t h is w ritin g s h e ta k e s h a p p in e ss to be of a p h y s ic a l n a tu re . In d eed , th is is w hy h a p p in e ss is excluded from p u re m o ra lity in th e f ir s t p lace, a n d w h a t le a d s to th e d isc u ss io n o f th e an tin o m y of th e second Critique. A p a r t ic u la r ly good exam ple o f th is is a p a ssa g e in th e second Critique w h ere h e d isc u sse s se lf-co n ten tm en t, b liss , a n d h a p p in e ss a ll w ith in th re e p ag es .64 H ere , K a n t could w ell h a v e u s e d a n y of th e se th re e concepts as th e re w a rd fo r v ir tu e , 62 Though it may also involve that "consciousness" that one is happy, but this is uncertain. See Kant on Happiness, pp. 3-4. 63 Kant on Happiness, p. 25. 64 Second Critique. Ak. 117-119. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 272 especially g iven h is ex p lic it s ta te m e n t t h a t a ll in c lin a tio n s , even good ones, a re "b u rd en so m e."65 K a n t could easily h a v e in s is ted 66 th a t w e sh o u ld h o p e for se lf-co n ten tm en t o r b lis s in th e n e x t w orld , lea v in g h a p p in e ss to t h i s w orld alone, b u t in s te a d h e concludes "t h a t h a p p in e ss , th o u g h i t in d e e d co n stitu tes th e seco n d e le m e n t of th e h ig h e s t good, does so only a s th e m orally cond itioned b u t n ecessa ry consequence o f th e fo rm er."67 T h is does le a v e u s w ith th e possib ility , how ever, t h a t K a n t does n o t in te n d u s to be p u re ly n o u m en a l in th e "o th e r w orld;" th is is a lso th e seco n d p rem ise (above) w e w ish e d to exam ine. T h e re is som e in d ica tio n t h a t K a n t m ay in d eed believe t h a t th e n ex t w orld w o u ld n o t be e n tire ly in te llig ib le . L e t u s beg in by a sk in g , w hy , in fact, does K a n t n o t sim ply hope to be re lie v e d o f a ll in c lin a tio n s a lto g e th e r , a n d th u s hope fo r w h a t he te rm s "b liss"? In d e e d , i f we w a n t to be m o ra l, a n d i f we f in d all in c lin a tio n s to be "b u rd en so m e ,"68 why shou ld w e n o t h o p e fo r th e freedom from a ll sensuous in c lin a tio n s? T h e answ er, I th in k , b r in g s u s b ack to K a n t's "w o rth in ess" eq u a tio n . In p a r t ic u - lar, beyond th e n e e d K a n t feels for v ir tu e to be rew ard ed , K an t also w a n ts th e evil p e rso n to be p u n ish e d . P u n ish m e n t, h e says, is "m ere h a rm in its e lf ," "involves a fo rfe itu re o f h a p p in e ss a le a s t i n p a r t ," a n d "is p h y sica l h a rm w hich, even i f n o t b o u n d a s a n a tu ra l consequence to th e m ora lly b ad , o u g h t to be b o u n d to i t a s a consequence acco rd ing to p rin c ip le s o f m o ra l le g is la - tion ."69 T hus, w e see b o th t h a t evil p e rso n s o u g h t to be p u n ish e d a n d t h a t such p u n ish m e n t invo lves a "physica l h a rm ." T h is seem s to in d ic a te t h a t i f we ag ree th a t n o n -v ir tu o u s pe rsons o u g h t to be p u n ish ed , even in th e a f te r - life, th e n w e c an n o t s im p ly hope for b liss fo r everyone; i f everyone s im p ly 65 Ibid, Ak. 118. Kant seems to reject this notion of "burdensome" inclinations in the Relig- ion, but he certainly could have alluded to it here, since he brings it up in the middle of this discussion. 66 Though not, perhaps, given his belief in the necessity of reward and punishment; see below. 67 Second Critique, Ak. 119. 68 As I noted above, Kant did not always hold this view. See: Religion, p. 51. 69 All three quotations: second Critique. Ak. 37. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. r u 273 d ied a n d w ere su b seq u en tly only in te llig ib le c re a tu re s , th e n th o se deserv in g of p u n is h m e n t w ould escape it, n o t to m e n tio n th a t th e re w o u ld be no p ro - p o r tio n a te rew a rd in g of v ir tu e w ith h a p p in e s s . K a n t in s is ts in th e Religion t h a t "n o re lig io n can be conceived o f w h ic h invo lves no b e lie f in a fu tu re life... a n d th e re fo re in a h eav en a n d hell; fo r th is b e lie f au to m a tica lly o b tru d es i t - se lf u p o n everyone by v ir tu e o f th e u n iv e r s a l m o ra l d isposition ..."70 a n d w rite s in th e Metaphysics of Morals t h a t "th e b e lie f in a fu tu re life does no t, s tr ic tly sp e ak in g , come f ir s t in o rd e r t h a t p e n a l ju s tice m ay b e se e n to have a n e ffect u p o n th a t fu tu re life; b u t, converse ly , th e in fe ren ce to a fu tu re life is d ra w n fro m th e necessity for p u n is h m e n t ."71 H ence, K a n t in s is ts t h a t a ll r e - lig ions n e e d a b e lie f in p u n ish m e n t, a n d b e ca u se p u n ish m e n t is a p h y sica l n e g a tio n o f h ap p in ess , p u n ish m e n t c o u ld n o t occur in a p u re ly in te llig ib le fu - tu re life .72 T h e re is fu r th e r rea so n to c o n s id e r th is possib ility . W h en K a n t sp e - cifically a d d re sse s th e n a tu re of t im e a t th e "e n d of th e w orld ," h e seem s to in d ic a te t h a t o u r ex istence n e c e ss ita te s e x is tin g in tim e . I w ill on ly ad d re ss th is p o in t b riefly , as K a n t's d iscussion is r a th e r difficult, b u t th is d iscussion occurs in "T h e E n d of A ll T h ings."73 H e re , K a n t is concerned w ith "judgment day" a n d "passing from time to eternity," a n d w ith th e q u es tio n of w h a t i t m ig h t m e a n to h av e a n e n d of tim e. K a n t a rg u e s , b rin g in g up th e n e e d for 70 Religion, p. 117. 71 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 490 n. Ellington translation. 72 Victoria Wike, in her article "Another Look at Kant's Arguments for Immortality," also notes this strain in Kant's thinking. She then uses this strain in an attempt to prove the necessary (moral) belief in an afterlife: "Practical reason requires immortality not because persons need an infinite amount of time to become worthy of happiness but because reason requires a reckoning of happiness with worth," (p. 666). I think there are problems with this argument, namely the "worthiness equation" and the need of reason to believe "that actions done for the sake of the moral law have consequences" (p. 666), but at least Wike recognizes this aspect of Kant's thinking. See Wike in: Proceedings o f the Eighth Interna- tional Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson 2, pL 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 661668 . 73 Immanuel Kant, "The End of All Things," in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 1983). 93-105. All citations refer to Akademie page numbers. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 274 p u n ish m e n t a g a in , t h a t from a p rac tic a l p o in t o f v iew we c a n n o t b e liev e in a "monistic v iew o f e te rn ity ,"74 fo r th is w ould n o t le n d credence to re a so n 's n o - tion o f "a n e te rn ity in w h ich th e re w ill be consequences g o v e rn ed by a good o r b ad p rin c ip le c o m m e n su ra te w ith th is m e r it o r t h a t g u ilt."75 H ow ever, in a d d itio n , K a n t a rg u e s t h a t re a so n m u s t th in k o f i t s e l f a s occurring in time. T h is a s se r tio n is r a th e r s u rp r is in g . K a n t g ives u s tw o rea so n s fo r th is a s se r tio n . F irs t , p ra c tic a l re a so n s tr iv e s to w a rd a n end, b u t "since w h e re th e re is no tim e , th e re c an a lso b e no end," w e m u s t re je c t th e p ro spec t t h a t e te rn ity w o u ld b e tim eless , a n d in s te a d "th in k a n unending d u - ra tio n ."76 Second, K a n t a rg u e s th a t th e re p re se n ta tio n of e te rn ity a s o u ts id e of tim e, offends the im agination. For then, surely, na tu re in its en tire ty will be fixed and, as it were, petrified; the las t thought, the last feeling will come to a standstill... For a being who is able to be conscious of its existence an d its ex- ten t (as duration) only in time, such a life, if it can be called ano ther life, m ust appear the sam e as [this] life's annihilation, for in order to th ink its w ay into such a sta te , a being such as ourselves m ust in general th ink of som ething, bu t thinking includes a [process of] reflection, which can itself only happen in tim e.77 T hus, b ecau se w e a re d u ty b o u n d to p u rsu e a n e n d th a t w e c a n n e v e r fu lly achieve, a n d becau se , K a n t a rg u es, th in k in g re q u ire s ex is tence in tim e , "n o th in g re m a in s , th e n , fo r rea so n excep t to th in k o f s te ad y p ro g re ss to w a rd i ts u ltim a te p u rp o se th ro u g h a (tem porally) u n e n d in g p rocess o f c h an g e , in w hich in s ta n c e i ts character... re m a in s p e rm a n e n tly th e sa m e ."78 R e g a rd le s s o f th e p la u s ib ility o f th is a rg u m e n t, i t does in d ic a te a n o th e r re a so n w h y K a n t m ay th in k o f th e a fte r life a s o ccu rring in a no t-w h o lly in te llig ib le re a lm . 74 Ibid., Ak. 328. 75 Ibid., Ak. 330. 76 Ibid., Ak. 334. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. I Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 275 T h e re is even a fu r th e r re a so n to consider th is p o ss ib ility . K a n t in d i- c a te s i n a ll o f h is w ritin g s t h a t w e cou ld n ever m e a su re u p to th e m o ra l law; th e m o ra l la w d em an d s fu ll subm ission , a n d i t is c le a r t h a t ev en th e b est of u s h a v e tra n sg re ss io n s . In d eed , i t is th is p o in t w h ich le a d s to K a n t's problem (an tin o m y ?) in th e Religion b e tw een fo rg iveness (a to n e m e n t) a n d p u n ish - m e n t, n e c e s s i ta t in g a G od w ho is "benevo len t," n o t m ere ly ju s t : I f now it is adm itted tha t, though indeed all m en are guilty of sin, some among them m ay be able to achieve m erit, then the verdict of Him who judges from love becomes effective. In the absence of th is judgm ent [i.e., justice without benevolence], only a verdict of rejection could follow, whose inescapable conse- quence would be the judgment of condemnation...19 T h is le a d s to th e follow ing co n sid era tio n : p e rh a p s w e sh o u ld h o p e fo r e te rn a l "p ro g re s s" to w a rd p u re m o ra lity b ecau se any ju d g m e n t w h ic h w e or God co u ld m a k e w ith re g a rd to o u r m o ra l s ta tu s w ould be one o f condem nation , s in ce w e c a n n o t m a k e up for p a s t tran sg re ss io n s ; th u s , w e sh o u ld h o p e for p ro g re s s p rec ise ly b ecause w e w ill a lw ay s come u p s h o r t o n a n y ju d g m e n t w h ich w o u ld be "fin a l." K a n t w rite s in th e second Critique: on the basis of his previous progress from the worse to the m orally better... he m ay hope for a further unin terrup ted continuance of th is progress... But he cannot hope here or a t any foreseeable point of his fu ture existence to be fully adequate to God's will, w ithout indulgence or remission which would not har- monize w ith justice. This he can do only in the infinity o f his duration which God alone can survey.80 H ence , i t is p o ss ib le th a t w e sh o u ld on ly hope for p ro g ress , t h a t is , hope for a n e n d u r in g ex is ten ce in tim e , in s te a d o f hop ing for a n e x is te n ce a p a r t from tim e , fo r o th e rw ise w e sh o u ld rig h tly be ju d g ed in a d e q u a te to th e m o ra l law , a n d th u s d e se rv in g o f som e p u n ish m e n t. 79 Religion, p. 137. Kant's full discussion of the attributes of a judging God: pp. 131-138. 80 Second Critique, Ak. 123-4. Italics added for emphasis. See also: Religion, pp. 60-72 and Lectures on Philosophical Philosophy, p. 163. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. r < 276 D e sp ite th e se th re e possib le re a so n s fo r K a n t to th in k th a t th e n e x t w orld w ou ld b e one in w hich we e x is ted in tim e a n d in n a tu re , K a n t m ak es o th e r s ta te m e n ts w h ich seem to in d ic a te t h a t th e n ex t w orld is p u re ly in te l- lig ib le. O u r in i t ia l rea so n for th in k in g th is is , o f course, K a n t's in s is ten c e on th e in te llig ib le n a tu re o f h u m a n be ings, a n d th e i r be ing c o n s titu te d as au tonom ous o n ly a s th e y a re m em bers o f th e n o u m en a l rea lm . H ow ever, th e re a re o th e r re a so n s to th in k th is a s w ell. I n th e Religion K a n t w rites t h a t "rea so n c a n n e ith e r ta k e a n in te re s t in d rag g in g along, th ro u g h e te rn ity , a body..."81 I n th e f i r s t Critique K a n t m a in ta in s th a t th e w o rld o f th e h ig h e s t good "is in d e e d a n in te llig ib le w orld only , s ince th e sensib le w o rld ho lds o u t no p rom ise t h a t a n y su ch system atic u n i ty o f e n d s can a ris e ..."82 T here is a lso K a n t's in s is te n c e th a t th e t ru e m o ra l c h a ra c te r o f p e rso n s is u n ch an g in g , th a t one's p a r tic ip a tio n in th e in te llig ib le re a lm is, from th e so lu tio n to th e th ird a n tin o m y o f th e f i r s t Critique, free from cau se a n d effect, a n d K a n t's p re s e n ta tio n s o f im a g es of a n e te rn ity in w h ich one's se lf-co n ten tm en t (or lack thereof), i.e ., so -called "m oral h a p p in e ss ," w ou ld re m a in in effect. P e r - h a p s th e s tro n g e s t a rg u m e n t is K a n t's a sse r tio n , p a rad o x ica lly enough oc- c u rr in g a g a in in "T h e E n d of All T h in g s ," t h a t in the m oral order of purposes, th is end [of all time] is a t the same time the beginning of the supersensuous survival of these same tem poral beings, conse- quently th e beginning of their existence as beings th a t do not stand under conditions of time, and thus their beginning as beings whose sta te is such as to allow nothing o ther th an a moral evaluation of their na ture .83 T h is s ta te m e n t c e r ta in ly in d ica tes a w holly su p e rse n su o u s ex is ten ce in th e n e x t w orld . H en ce , i f w e are , m ost im p o rta n tly , in te llig ib le c re a tu re s , i t 81 Religion, p. 119 n. This is not necessarily a good indication of his views, since this passage concerns "the hypothesis of the spirituality of rational world-beings" though Kant does say that "this hy- pothesis is more congenial to reason" than a "materialism of personality." 82 First Critique, A814 = B842. 83 "End of All Things." Ak. 327. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. se em s s tra n g e to be d en ied access to th is rea lm o f p u re ly m o ra l ex istence a f- t e r th e d e a th of o u r bodies. I n th e end, th e re se em s to b e no w ay to m a k e a conclusion re g a rd in g e i th e r K a n t's opinion on th e n e x t life , or th e n e ce ssa ry n a tu r e o f th is fu tu re ex is ten ce . T he f irs t seem s im p o ssib le since K a n t m a k e s so m a n y v a rie d s ta te m e n ts b u t does n o t d isc u ss th e is su e d irec tly . T h e second is im possib le g iv en th e d ic ta te s o f th e Critique o f Pure Reason t h a t no know ledge of th e su p e rse n s ib le is possible. N e i th e r does th e re seem a re so lu tio n possib le from a m e re p ra c tic a l p o in t o f v iew , s in ce deny ing a se n su o u s a fte rlife seem s to p re c lu d e th e possib ility o f p u n is h m e n t, w hile th e a s se r tio n o f a sen su o u s a f- te r life seem s to rob u s o f th e p o ss ib ility of ev er p a r t ic ip a tin g in a n ex istence w h ic h w ou ld be p u re ly moral. T h is is c e rta in ly a p ro b lem in K a n t's th o u g h t, w h ic h m a y be m ore or le ss se rio u s . A t le a s t i t seem s to force th e conclusion t h a t th e h ig h e s t good is in co n ce iv ab le in th e sense t h a t w e c a n n o t im ag in e w h a t th e n a tu re of o u r f u tu re ex is ten ce m ig h t be, e sp ec ia lly in th e sense r e - q u ire d fo r a n experience o f h a p p in e s s w hich w ould a llow fo r p ro p o rtio n a te re w a rd s o r p u n ish m en ts . N o r do w e seem to h a v e a n y ra t io n a l a rg u m e n ts to p re fe r one conception to th e o th e r . L e t m e m en tion one a d d itio n a l p rob lem w ith K a n t's co n sid era tio n s on tim e a s th e y p e r ta in to th e h ig h e s t good. T h is is a p ro b lem ra is e d by Jo h n R. S ilb e r in h is "T he E th ic a l S ig n ifican ce of K a n t's Religion."** T h e problem is t h a t w h ile K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t th e c h a ra c te r of one's d isposition (Gesinnung) is to re m a in u n c h a n g in g , "m o ra l vo lition is in e lu c ta b ly tem poral. T h e w ill is tem p ted in tim e , d ec id es in tim e, and , d e p en d in g on i t s decision, fee ls g u ilty o r sa tis fied in tim e ... K a n t ag a in a n d a g a in re fe rs in tem p o ra l te rm s to th e p rob lem s of m o ra l vo lition , im provem ent, a n d decline ."85 P u t 84 John R. Silber, "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," introduction to Religion Within the Limits o f Reason Alone, by Immanuel Kant, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), Ixxix-cxxxiv. 85 "Ethical Significance." pp. xcviii-xcix. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 278 b lu n tly , w h a t good is th e p h e n o m e n a l w o rld i f th e c h a ra c te r o f o ne 's d isposi- tion is a lre a d y decided a n d does n o t change? I f th e re is no re a l p ro g re ss , no re a l s tru g g le in th is w orld, th e n o u r ex is ten ce in i t seem s p u rp o se le ss . In - deed, th e command o f th e ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e m u s t ta k e p lace i n a p h e - n o m en a l w orld . S ilb e r considers th is su ch a p ro b lem th a t h e fee ls o b lig a ted to re c o n s tru c t m u c h of K a n t's p h ilo so p h y re g a rd in g th e n o u m e n a l re a lm .86 R A seco n d p rob lem is th e q u e s tio n o f h o w to sq u a re K a n t's tw o a p p a r- en tly co n flic tin g c la im s th a t p ro g re ss is re q u ire d a n d th a t one's m o ra l d ispo- s itio n re m a in s u n c h an g in g . O n th e one h a n d , w e h a v e seen above t h a t p rog - re ss is r e q u ire d o f h u m a n b e in g s in th e ir m o ra l endeavo r. O n th e o th e r h a n d , e sp ec ia lly in K a n t's Religion, th e n a tu r e o f o u r (m oral) d isp o sitio n seem s u n a b le to p ro g ress fo r tw o re a so n s . T h e f irs t , a lso d iscu ssed above, is th a t o u r m o ra l n a tu r e is n o t su p p o sed ly lo c a te d in tim e, u n le s s w e re je c t K a n t's d iv is io n o f th e n o u m en a l a n d p h e n o m e n a l re a lm a lto g e th e r. Indeed , K a n t even s ta te s t h a t "a good o r a n ev il d isp o sitio n a s a n in b o rn ... c o n s titu - tion ... h a s n o t b e e n acq u ired in tim e ."87 T h e second reason , m ore im p o r- ta n tly , is K a n t's d e sc rip tio n o f th e n a tu r e o f o u r d isposition (Gesinnung). In o rd er to a v o id th e p rob lem o f a t t r ib u t in g o u r m o ra l fa ilu re s m ere ly to th e in - fluence o f n a tu r e , w h ich w ou ld th e n re s u l t in th e s e fa ilu re s n o t b e in g attrib- utable to u s , K a n t exp licitly concludes in th e Religion88 th a t ev il in th e w orld com es from th e su b o rd in a tio n o f th e m ax im s o f th e m o ra l la w to th e m ax im s o f h a p p in e ss . N a tu re is n o t to b lam e , b u t h u m a n s them se lves, for fre e ly se t- tin g th e in te r e s ts o f h a p p in e ss above th e m o ra l law . H ow ever, w h a t th is in - d ica tes is t h a t th e r e is no m idd le g ro u n d b e tw ee n th e m orally good a n d th e 86 See "Ethical Significance," pp. xcvii-ciii. I do not have space to assess his reconstruction here. 87 Religion, p. 20. 88 Though this may be implicit as early as the Grundlegung. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. m o ra lly b a d p erso n ; e ith e r th e y h a v e w illed to w ill in accord w ith th e m o ra l law , o r th e y w illed to su b o rd in a te m o ra l m ax im s to desire . C o m m en ta to rs o ften re fe r to th is as K a n t's "rig o rism ." H ence , K a n t w rites th a t a p e rso n 's "d isp o sitio n in re sp ec t to th e m o ra l la w is n e v e r ind iffe ren t, n e v e r n e ith e r good n o r ev il. N e ith e r c an a m a n b e m o ra lly good in som e w ays a n d a t th e sa m e tim e m o ra lly evil in o th e rs . H is b e in g good in one w ay means t h a t h e h a s in c o rp o ra te d th e m o ra l la w in to h is m ax im ."89 T hus, w h ile K a n t o ften ta lk s a b o u t p ro g re ss a n d even a r a n g e o f p o ss ib ilitie s for m o ra l d isp o sitio n ,90 i t se e m s t h a t o u r d isposition is a lso i n som e w ay rig h tly co n sid e red to be e i- th e r good o r evil, w ith on ly a n "im m e a su ra b le gulf" in betw een , fo r "th e d is - p o sitio n , i.e., th e u ltim a te su b jec tiv e g ro u n d o f th e adoption of o u r m ax im s, c a n b e one on ly ..."91 T hus, i f th e h ig h e s t good is ta k e n to be th e re w a rd in g o f p ro p o r tio n a te h a p p in e ss to v ir tu e , a n d i f th e re c an be only a good o r a n ev il w ill, th e n th e r e seem s to be only a s e t a m o u n t o f h a p p in e ss for good p e rso n s , a n d a s e t a m o u n t o f p u n ish m e n t fo r ev il p e rso n s . K an t's in s is te n c e on "rig o rism " o f m o ra l c h a ra c te r a n d h is d e s ire fo r p ro p o rtio n a te d eg rees o f r e - w a rd a n d p u n is h m e n t seem to be a t odds w ith each o ther. W hile th is does n o t m a k e th e h ig h e s t good inconceivab le per se, i f we accept K a n t's rigo rism , i t c e r ta in ly s t r a in s th e defin itio n a n d n o tio n o f a h ig h es t good w h ich is a sy s- te m o f "p ro p o rtio n a te " consequences fo r v ir tu e . 89 Religion, p. 20. Italics added for emphasis. See also Kant's discussion in a footnote to p. S3 regarding the "immeasurable gulf" between moral goodness and evil. 90 Ibid., pp. 24-27, and "Ethical Significance," p. cxxvi. This specific range, however, might not conflict with an "all or nothing" interpretation of the good will: the individual subject to the "frailty" of human nature has already willed to take the moral law into his/her disposition, and although having occasional problems, still has a will which is good. Indeed, there does not exist, for Kant, a good person who is not in some way frail. Those who have "impurity" of human nature are ultimately evil, for they have not willed to take the moral law for their own, and thus are subject to the whims of nature. Thus, "perhaps, every time" the person takes the quest for happiness as his or her ultimate disposition, and are thus evil. John R Silber., "Ethical Significance," Ixxix-cxxxiv. Certainly several commentators have ad- dressed this issue. Henry E. Allison, as a notable example, suggests that these "stages" in the Religion can be made coherent with Kant's rigorism by bringing in the concept of "self-deception;" Henry E. Alli- son, "Kant's Doctrine of Radical Evil," 51-72. 91 Religion, p. 20. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 280 c W hile K a n t m ay h a v e a w ay to escape th e above prob lem s, th o u g h p e rh a p s on ly by p u t t in g in c red ib le s tra in s on th e r e s t o f h is ph ilo sophy , th e n e x t p rob lem w ith th e conceivab ility o f th e h ig h e s t good I ta k e to be severe . I t is th is : in a ll o f K a n t's w ritin g s , he m a in ta in s th a t i f w e w ere to h a v e p ro o f th a t a ll o u r a c tio n s w ou ld be rew ard ed w ith p ro p o rtio n a te h a p p in e ss o r p u n - ish m en t, th e n th e r e s u l t w ou ld b e th e d e a th of m o ra lity , for w e (u ltim ate ly ) cou ld n o t fa il to ta k e c o n sid e ra tio n s of h a p p in e ss a s th e u ltim a te in c e n tiv e s for ou r m ax im s. I w ill te rm th is th e "p u p p e t" p rob lem , fo r K a n t w rite s t h a t i f "God a n d e te rn ity in th e ir aw fu l m ajes ty w ould s ta n d u n ceasin g ly befo re o u r eyes,"92 th e n because the disposition from which action should be done cannot be instilled by any command, and because the spur to action would in this case be always present and external, reason would have no need to endeavor to ga ther its strength to resist the inclinations by a vivid idea of the... law. Thus m ost ac- tions conforming to the law would be done from fear, few would be done from hope, none from duty. The m oral worth of action... would not exist a t all. The conduct of m an, so long as his nature rem ained as it now is, would be changed into mere m echanism ... as in a puppet show...93 B ecause w e co u ld n o t b u t h e lp be in fluenced by th e e x te rn a l s itu a tio n a ro u n d u s a n d o u r (n a tu ra l a n d n o t in tr in s ic a lly evil) concern fo r h ap p in ess , i f we could be conv inced o f th e ex is tence of God, th e r e s u l t w ou ld be r a th e r paradox ica l: w ith th e p ro o f o f G od (or even God's p resen ce) w ould com e th e fac t of God's r e w a rd o r p u n ish m e n t, a n d we w ou ld be so (n a tu ra lly ) concerned for o u r w ell-be ing t h a t w e w ould s im p ly n o t be able to w ill m orally . A ll o u r ac tions w o u ld (p resum ab ly ) be legal, b u t th e y cou ld n o t be m o ra l p rec ise ly b ecau se one cou ld n o t w ill th ese ac tio n s in accord w ith d u ty a lone . T hus, w ith th e know ledge o f God, "a ll ou r m o ra lity w ou ld b re a k dow n. In h is 92 Second Critique, Ak. 147. 93 Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. t •4i 281 every ac tio n , m a n w ould re p re se n t G od to h im s e lf as a re w a rd e r o r av en g er. T h is im a g e w o u ld force i ts e lf in v o lu n ta r ily on h is soul, a n d h is hope fo r re w a rd a n d fe a r o f p u n ish m e n t w ou ld ta k e th e p lace of m o ra l m o tives."94 K now ledge o f in ev itab le consequences fo r m o ra l a n d im m oral ac tio n s w ould le a d to th e com plete b reakdow n o f th e m o ra l law .95 O bviously , i f th is is tru e , th e n , p a rad o x ica lly , th e ex is tence o f th e h ig h e s t good a s a p ro p o rtio n a te re w a rd in g fo r v ir tu e w ould c re a te th e dem ise o f v ir tu e . O r, m o re precisely p u t, existence in a w orld in w hich v ir tu e w as know n to b e re w a rd e d by p ro p o rtio n a te h a p p in e s s w ould d estro y one's ab ility to follow th e ca teg o rica l im p era tiv e , ev en th o u g h a ll of one's ac tio n s co u ld be lega l. I f o n e e x is te d in a w orld in w h ich one's v ir tu e w as v isib ly re w a rd e d , by K a n t's ow n ad m iss io n , one w ou ld u l t im a te ly be in cap ab le of w illin g in accord w ith th e m o ra l law . The only s itu a tio n in w h ich th is m ig h t n o t h a p p e n seem s to b e a s ta te in w hich p e rso n s w e re already m orally p erfec t, w illin g in fu ll accord w ith th e m oral law . B u t, a s w e sa w above, we m u s t a lw ay s ju d g e ou rse lves to b e s h o r t of th is id ea l. A nd, w h ile K a n t a t tim es h in ts t h a t i t m ig h t b e p o ss ib le fo r th e h u m a n race to e v e n tu a lly achieve th is s ta te o f m o ra l p e rfe c tio n , th e re a re a lso s ta te m e n ts b y K a n t th a t w e w ill on ly b e ab le to a p p ro x im a te th is goal, a n d n e v e r re a c h i t . T herefo re , w illing to e x is t in a s ta te w h e re v ir tu e w as know n to be re w a rd e d b y (p roportionate) h a p p in e s s cou ld n o t p o ss ib ly b e com m anded by th e m o ra l law , since i t w ould le a d to th e v e ry o p p o site in te n d e d by th e m o ra l law , n a m e ly i ts own dow nfall. N o r cou ld th is be a s ta te com m anded by re a so n to b e b ro u g h t abou t by u s . T h u s , th e h ig h e s t good is , i n th is sense, s im p ly inconceivab le . 94 Kant, Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 121. 95 For further confirmation of Kant's belief in the "puppet" problem, see: second Critique, Ak. 38 and 84, Lectures on Philosophical Theology, pp. I l l and 121, and Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 377-8. Such a possibility is also suggested in the Religion in Kant's discussion of the " im p u rity " of the human heart (pp. 23-25 and 32-3), in which case mere legality happens to be the easiest and happiest thing to will, which leads to what Silber calls "the quiet death (euthanasia) of morality [(Silber himself gets the term "euthanasia" from Kant, Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 378)J through his confusion of moral and nonmoral incentives" ("Ethical Significance." p. cxxii). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 282 D. T h e f in a l p rob lem w ith th e h ig h e s t good a s p ro p o rtio n a te h a p p in e ss re la te s to K a n t's s ta te m e n ts t h a t h u m a n beings a re sim ply n o t d e s ig n ed for h a p p in e ss . I do n o t th in k t h a t th i s p ro b lem ren d e rs th e h ig h e s t good com- pletely inconceivab le , b u t I th in k i t m u s t be a t le a s t a s tu m b lin g block. W e m ig h t s ta te th e p rob lem as th is : K a n t m a in ta in s n o t only th a t n a tu r e is of- te n u n p re d ic ta b le co n cern in g th e ou tcom e of w illin g, even w illin g h a p p in e ss , b u t t h a t e v en i f n a tu r e w ere completely cooperative, h u m a n s w ou ld s ti ll n o t be ab le to be h a p p y . K a n t n o te s t h a t th e te rm "sensuous c o n te n tm e n t," even th o u g h synonym ous w ith a d e fin itio n o f h a p p in e ss a s "co n te n tm e n t w ith o u r ex is ten ce"96 o r a s "co n ten tm en t w ith one's physical state (freedom from evils a n d e n jo y m en t o f e v e rin c re a s in g p le a su re )"97 is "im p ro p erly so ca lled " a "c o n te n tm e n t" b ecau se "in c lin a tio n s v a ry ; th ey grow w ith th e in d u lg e n ce w e allow th e m , a n d th e y leave b e h in d a g re a te r void th a n th e one w e in te n d e d to fill."98 H u m a n s a re never, K a n t se e m s to in d ica te , c o n te n t w ith th e i r s e n su - ous s itu a tio n . In th e "Id ea " K a n t w rite s t h a t "i t a p p e a rs t h a t n a tu r e is u t - te r ly u n c o n ce rn e d th a t m a n five w e ll,"99 in th e Grundlegung th a t "th e concept o f h a p p in e s s is su c h a n in d e te rm in a te one th a t even th o u g h everyone w ishes to a t t a in h a p p in e ss , y e t h e c a n n e v e r sa y defin ite ly a n d c o n s is ten tly w h a t i t is t h a t h e re a lly w ishes a n d w ills ,"100 a n d goes so fa r in th e Critique o f Judg- ment to a s s e r t t h a t h a p p in e ss is an idea to which he tries to m ake th a t sta te adequate under m erely empirical conditions (which is impossible)... [S]ince his understanding is tied to imagi- nation and the senses, he form ulates the idea so diversely and even changes the concept so often th a t na tu re , even if it were subjected completely to m an's 96 Second Critique, Ak. 25. 97 Religion, p. 61. 98 Second Critique, Ak. 118. 99 "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent." Ak. 20. 100 Grundlegung. Ak. 418. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 283 choice, still could not possibly adopt a definite and fixed universal law that would [keep] it in harm ony with th a t wavering concept an d so with the pur- pose th a t each person chooses to se t himself... [I]t is not his na tu re to stop possessing and enjoying a t some point and be satisfied.101 H ence , h u m a n s a re n o t d e s ig n e d fo r h a p p in e ss n o t on ly b e c a u se th e y h a v e no in s t in c t fo r i t, b u t a lso b e c a u se th e y a re n e v e r c o n te n t fo r m o re th a n m o- m e n ts a t a tim e w ith th e ir s t a te o f w ell-being . E v en i f n a tu r e w ere a lig n ed w ith h u m a n s ' w ishes, K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t h a p p in e ss is too "w av erin g " a concep t to a llow th a t h u m a n s w o u ld be sa tis f ie d w ith th e i r c o n d itio n o f w ell- be in g . A s K a n t su m m arize s : "even i f n a tu re o u ts id e u s w e re u t te r ly benefi- cen t, i t s p u rp o se w ou ld n o t b e ach ieved ... i f th a t p u rp o se a im e d a t th e h a p p i- n e s s o f o u r species, b e ca u se n a tu r e w ith in u s is n o t rec ep tiv e to i t ."102 N ow th is d o c trin e a lo n e m ay n o t pose a se rio u s th r e a t to th e h ig h e s t good, th o u g h th e h ig h e s t good se em s sa v e d only i f K a n t b r in g s in th e no tion o f God. K a n t seem s to in d ic a te t h a t h u m a n s a re s im p ly n o t d e s ig n ed for h a p p in e ss . T h is seem s to b e t r u e , even o n a m ore m o d est d e fin itio n o f h a p p i- n e ss th a n K a n t's o rig in a l o n e .103 T h e re s u ltin g p ro b lem is t h a t h u m a n s seem to b e in c a p a b le o f e x p e rien c in g m u ch h a p p in e ss , le t a lo n e a c o n tin u a l s ta te of h a p p in e s s w h ich w o u ld b e e x a c tly p ro p o rtio n a te to th e i r v i r tu e . A t le a s t th is sh o u ld ru le o u t once a n d fo r a l l a n y n o tio n th a t h u m a n s c o u ld do th is fo r one a n o th e r .104 B u t, i f h u m a n s sire n o t ab le to do th is th em se lv e s , K a n t m ay le - g itim a te ly b e ab le to b r in g in a G od w ho can , for K a n t h a s a lr e a d y in s tru c te d u s o f th e n e e d for a G od w ho c o u ld u n ite th e "cause" o f v ir tu e w ith th e "effect" of p ro p o rtio n a te h a p p in e ss . So w h ile a s in g le p e rso n h im /h e rs e lf cou ld n o t b r in g a b o u t h is /h e r ow n h a p p in e s s , even i f a ll o f n a tu re w a s cooperative , 101 Critique o f Judgment, Ak. 430. 102 Ibid. 103 "Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires, extensively,... intensively,... and protensively ..." A806 = B834. And: "a rational being's consciousness of the agreeableness of life which with- out interruption accompanies his whole existence is happiness," second Critique, Ak. 22. 104 This, I think, is another reason to reject those commentators, including Silber and Reath. who assert that we could bring about the highest good on earth ourselves. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ( ► 4| 284 p e rh a p s K a n t could a rg u e th a t G od w ho is om n isc ien t, m oral, a n d allpow erfu l cou ld know enough a b o u t n a tu re a n d eac h in d iv id u a l's n eed s to be ab le to re w a rd th a t p e rso n p ropo rtiona lly . K a n t often ta lk s a b o u t th e im - possib ility of k n o w in g how G od m ig h t b r in g th is abou t, b u t t h a t w e ju s t h ave to do o u r d u ty a n d hope. H ow ever, i f w e com bine th is in c a p a b ility o f in d iv id u a ls to be co n tin u - ously h a p p y w ith a n o th e r o f K a n t's te n e ts , th e h ig h e s t good seem s to be th re a te n e d again. T h is second te n e t is K a n t's in d ic a tio n t h a t hum an beg in s a re a lso n o t h a p p y w ith w h a t is g iven to th e m , a n d th a t th e y w ill on ly be h a p p y i f th ey b r in g th e h a p p in e ss ab o u t th em se lv e s . H ence, K a n t te lls u s in one o f th e n in e th e s e s o f th e "Id e a " th a t "Nature has willed that man, entirely by himself, produce everything that goes beyond the mechanical organization of his animal existence and partake in no other happiness or perfection than what he himself, independently o f instinct, can secure through his own rea- son."105 H u m a n s , m u ch to th e ir ch ag rin , m u s t a tte m p t to f in d h a p p in e ss th ro u g h reaso n , a s i tu a tio n of n a tu re w h ich seem s ill-su ited to h a p p in e ss a n d c a n even le a d to a h a t r e d o f re a so n .106 K a n t seem s to in d ic a te in th e second Critique t h a t h a p p in e ss on ly occurs w hen h u m a n s give a n ob ject to th e m - selves, seek to b r in g ab o u t th e object, a c tu a lly b r in g abou t th e object, a n d th e n see w h e th e r th e object b rin g s th em th e a n tic ip a te d p le a su re . T h is p ic tu re seem s to be in tu itiv e ly co rrec t: w hile a t f i r s t i t m ig h t be w onderfu l to h a v e a n y th in g w e w a n t g iven to u s w h en ev er w e w a n t it , o r even s im p ly to receive re w a rd s fo r w h ich w e h a v e n o t w orked, I th in k u l t i - m a te ly th is s i tu a tio n w ould n o t b r in g u s h a p p in e ss , a s so m a n y sto ries , r e - p o rts , a n d even fo lk ta le s seem to in d ica te . T h is seem s to be w h a t K a n t in d i- ca te s by w riting : ,os "Idea," Ak. 19. 106 Grundlegung, Ak. 395-6. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the determ ining ground o f choice consists in the conception of an object and its relation to the subject, whereby the faculty of desire is determ ined to seek its realization. Such a relation to the subject is called pleasure in the reality of an object, and it m ust be presupposed as the condition of the possibility of the de- term ination of choice.107 K a n t w rite s t h a t "no m an a sk s , w h en h e is concerned only w ith th e a g re e - ab len ess o f life , w h e th e r th e ideas a re from th e se n se or th e u n d e rs ta n d in g ; h e a sk s on ly h o w m uch a n d h o w g re a t is th e p le a su re w h ich th e y w ill a ffo rd h im over th e lo n g e s t tim e."108 T h is seem s to in d ica te , aga in , t h a t h u m a n s m u s t fo rm u la te th e id ea o f th e ob ject t h a t w ill (perh ap s) m ak e th e m (m om en tarily ) h a p p y , a n d th e n t r y to b r in g ab o u t th e ex istence of th is object. In h is Lectures on Philosophical Theology, K a n t a s se r ts th a t "th e n o v e lis t is q u ite conscious o f th e fac t t h a t h e c a n n o t describe h a p p in e ss a s m ere enjo m en t. R a th e r , i t is labor, d ifficu lty , effo rt, th e p ro spec t of tra n q u ill i ty , a n d th e s tr iv in g to w a rd th e a ch iev e m e n t o f th is id ea w hich is h a p p in e ss fo r u s ..."109 T h u s, i t a lso seem s fro m K a n t's w ritin g s th a t w e a re n o t h a p p y w ith th o se th in g s g iv en to u s from w ith o u t, o r those (m ate ria l) th in g s w h ich do n o t com e a b o u t th ro u g h re a so n .110 T he th r e a t to the conce ivab ility o f th e h ig h e s t good is th e p o ss ib ility t h a t n o t even G od could m ak e u s h a p p y , even i f G od k new w h a t w ould , in fact, m a k e u s h a p p y in th e n e c e ssa ry p ro p o rtio n to v ir tu e . I f h a p p in e ss fo r h u m a n b e in g s i s th e s tr iv in g a f te r a n d ach iev in g o f ends w hich th e y s e t them se lves, a s K a n t seem s to in d ic a te t h a t i t is, th e n i t seem s G od c a n n o t s im p ly give a p e rso n th e h a p p in e s s w h ich th ey w ou ld m erit. I do n o t th in k w e could im a g in e a w ay for G od to give u s h a p p in e ss w hich w ould seem lik e 107 Second Critique, Ak. 21. See also: Ak. 8 n. and Ak. 22. 108 Ibid., Ak. 23. Italics added for emphasis. 109 Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 119. 110 See also: Kant's discussion of "the empty longing... for the golden age" in the "Speculative Beginning of Human History." Ak. 120, as well as his objections to Hobbes' father-like ruler in "Theory and Practice," Ak. 290-1. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I i f 286 we w ere s tr iv in g a f te r i t a n d a c h ie v in g i t on o u r ow n w ith o u t a se rio u s e n - c ro ach m en t on o u r free w ill. H en ce , I th in k th a t b e tw een th e fa c t th a t , a s K a n t in d ica te s , h u m a n s a re s im p ly n o t d e s ig n ed to en joy h a p p in e s s fo r an y g re a t le n g th o f tim e , a n d th e fa c t t h a t h a p p in e ss com es from th e s tr iv in g a f- te r a n d ach iev in g o f c e r ta in e n d s , I th in k th a t th e h ig h e s t good a s a p ro p o r- tio n a l sy s tem o f h a p p in e s s is inconceivab le , on K a n t's ow n te r m s .111 IV. In th is c h a p te r , I h a v e t r ie d to a rg u e t h a t K a n t's concep tion o f th e h ig h e s t good a s th e re w a rd in g o f v ir tu e w ith p ro p o rtio n a te h a p p in e s s is a n e n d w hich is inconceivab le . I t i s inconceivab le , fo r th e fo llow ing re a so n s : 1) th e re a p p e a rs to b e no n e c e ssa ry connec tion b e tw een th e d is p a ra te e le m e n ts of v ir tu e a n d h a p p in e ss , 2) w e c a n n o t conceive (from a n y p o in t of view ) o f th e n a tu re of h u m a n b e in g s in a f u tu r e w orld , o r w h y h a p p in e s s w o u ld b e d e s ir - ab le in th is s ta te , 3) th e n a tu r e o f o u r "c h a ra c te r" le a d s to a n e ith e r /o r s i tu a - tio n o f b e in g good o r evil, a n d t h u s a llow s o f no p ro p o rtio n a l re w a rd s o r p u n - ish m en ts , 4) e x is tin g in a w o rld w h e re v ir tu e is re w a rd e d w ith h a p p in e s s w ould le a d to a "p u p p e t" e x is te n c e a n d w ou ld u n d e rm in e m o ra lity , a n d 5) h a p p in e ss does n o t seem to be so m e th in g w h ich h u m a n s a re d e s ig n ed to e n - joy, p a r tic u la r ly in a n "a fte r life ." T h e h ig h e s t good a s K a n t h a s d ep ic ted it, w h ile h a rm o n iz in g w ell w ith th e r e s t o f K a n t's sy s tem , m u s t u l t im a te ly b e re jec ted a s a concep tion o f r e w a rd in g o f v ir tu e w ith h a p p in e ss . S u b seq u en tly , i t fo llow s t h a t i t c an n o t be o u r duty to p ro m o te o r o u r duty to b r in g a b o u t th e h ig h e s t good. H ow a re w e to b r in g a b o u t a n object w h ich is inconceivable? H ow c o u ld w e, even i f w e co u ld k n o w th e m a x im w hich a n o th e r is u s in g for a n a c tio n (w h ich w e c a n n e v e r know ), possib ly 111 Kant does write in a footnote in the Religion (p. 24 n.) about "delight" which one would ex- perience before one willed it or even knew of its existence, for example, a hitherto unsampled intoxicant. Perhaps the highest good could be saved by conceiving of it as each person being (proportionally) re- warded by continually differing "delights," but I think this conception would be radically different from the highest good as Kant conceives it and I think we would find such a condition eventually unsatisfac- tory. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 287 re w a rd a n o th e r w ith p ro p o rtio n a te h a p p in e ss , given th a t h u m a n s a re no t d e s ig n e d to en joy o r receive h a p p in e ss? H ow cou ld we h a v e a d u ty to b rin g a b o u t a sy s tem o f im m e d ia te a n d u n a v o id a b le consequences fo r v ir tu e i f K a n t b e liev es su c h a sy s te m to in e v ita b ly d e s tro y th e v e ry fo u n d a tio n o f m o ra lity itse lf? T h is h ig h e s t good sim p ly c a n n o t b e th e object of o u r w ill. H ow ever, h a v in g sa id th is , l e t m e qu ick ly a d d th a t i t is o n ly this v e r- s io n o f th e h ig h e s t good w hich I th in k i s inconceivab le , w h ile th e r e is a n o th e r v e rs io n w h ich I th in k does se rv e a s a n e c e ssa ry e n d o f m o ra l w illing . P e r - h a p s I h a v e a lr e a d y given en o u g h c lu es a s to w h a t th is v e rs io n m ig h t be. I in d ic a te d above t h a t th e re a l p ro b lem w ith th e h ig h e s t good is K a n t's neces- s a ry in s is te n c e on th e sy n th e tic a priori co m b in a tio n of v ir tu e a n d h a p p in e ss , fo llow ed b y a d d it io n a l p rob lem s re g a rd in g th e fa c t t h a t h um ans a re n o t de- s ig n e d fo r h a p p in e s s in a n a fte rlife . H ow ever, i f w e can se v e r th e (positive) co n n ec tio n b e tw e e n v ir tu e a n d h a p p in e s s , I th in k th e h ig h e s t good w ill r e - m a in on firm foo ting . We h a v e se en t h a t th e re is in d ee d a n im p o r ta n t con- n e c tio n b e tw ee n h a p p in e ss a n d v ir tu e , b u t t h a t th is connection is m ere ly n e g a tiv e : "h a p p in e s s is m ere ly a m e a n s fo r rem o v in g obstac les to [one's] m o- r a l i ty -a permitted m ean s, s ince no one e lse h a s a r ig h t to re q u ire o f m e th a t I sac rifice m y e n d s i f th ese a re n o t im m o ra l."112 H a p p in ess is necessary w hen i t s ab sen c e is d e tr im e n ta l to th e m o ra l p ro jec t; th is is th e n e g a tiv e connec- tio n . T h ese co n ce rn s m o tiva te th e d u tie s I h a v e re g a rd in g h a p p in e s s fo r m y- s e lf a n d o f o th e rs , a s c la rified in th e Metaphysics o f Morals. A n d h a p p in e ss i s permitted w h e n th e a g en t p u rs u in g h a p p in e s s know s t h a t th e re i s no con- flic t b e tw ee n w h a t s /h e is w illin g a n d th e m o ra l law ; in th is case , th e r e is no connec tion , w h ich i s w hy h a p p in e ss is p e rm itte d . H ence th e d u ty to p rom o te th e h ig h e s t good o u g h t to be p r im a rily co n ce rn e d w ith th e m o ra l im p ro v em en t o f a ll o f h u m a n k in d . W h a t w e a re le f t w ith a f te r th e above an a ly s is is th e ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e 's u n re le n tin g 112 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 388. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. i i 288 com m and th a t each p e rso n is to im prove h is /h e r m oral willing As K a n t says in th e Religion, "th e f in a l p u rp o se even of rea d in g ... ho ly sc r ip tu re s , or of in - v e s tig a tin g th e ir co n ten t, is to m ak e m en b e tte r ... [T]he m o ra l im p ro v em en t o f m en ... c o n s titu te s th e r e a l e n d o f a ll re lig io n of reason ..."113 T h is is th e com m and o f th e m o ra l law , a n d , according to K a n t, a s f a r a s w e c a n te ll, th e re is no re a so n to th in k t h a t i t s com m and c a n n o t be obeyed. In add ition , how ever, b ecau se th e ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e already com m ands u s from a s ta n d p o in t o f e x is tin g w ith o th e r h u m a n b e in g s , th e m o ra l la w com m ands u s to a id th o se a ro u n d u s in th e i r m o ra l im p ro v em en t as w ell. T h is , in m an y resp ec ts , is a "b ro ad " d u ty to w a rd o thers , s in ce w e can h a v e no specific com - m a n d s re g a rd in g how to a id a n o th e r person . H ow ever, th e re is a lso th e sp e- cific d u ty to b r in g a b o u t a g o v e rn m en t w hich o p e ra te s in acco rd w ith rea so n 's conception o f R igh t. O n ly a sy s te m o f g o v ern m en t w hich o p e ra te s w ith in cer- ta in p a ra m e te rs is c o n s is te n t w ith th e freedom o f a ll hum an b eings. A nd, in ad d ition , su ch a g o v e rn m en t m u s t u ltim a te ly b e concerned w ith th e in te rn a - t io n a l com m unity , a n d e s ta b lis h i ts e lf in su ch a w ay th a t p e ac e m ay be ob- ta in e d . P eace is n e ce ssa ry so t h a t th e m o ra l p ro jec t m ay n o t be h a m p e re d by o u tsid e in fluences. H ence, w e m ig h t fo rm u la te th e d u ty to p ro m o te th e h ig h - e s t good as: th e d u ty to p ro m o te v ir tu e in a ll p e rso n s , b o th b y c o n ce n tra tin g on m o ra l v a lu e s (a fu n c tio n o f "c u ltu re ")114 a n d by e lim in a tin g a ll e x te rn a l obstacles to th e p rom otion o f v ir tu e . In th e fo llow ing c h a p te rs w e w ill now tu r n o u r focus to th is v e rs io n o f th e h ig h es t good, d iscu ssin g th e m o ra l p ro g - re s s o f th e h u m a n race, th e connec tion b e tw een p rog ress a n d po litics , a n d how K a n t en v is io n s su c h m o ra l p rog ress as occurring . 113 Religion, p. 102. 114 We shall discuss this further below, but let me say at least this to block an early objection. Certainly Kant does indicate that it is not possible to make another virtuous. This is why, in the Meta- physics o f Morals, we have only the duties to increase our own virtue and to help others in their well- being. But Kant surely also indicates that we can help others to "hear'' the call of the moral law which they give to themselves (the incentive stemming from the " Wille"). Kant writes a great deal both on the correct pedagogical method for teaching ethics, as well as the role of "Kultur" in the promotion of the virtue of humankind. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Chapter Three Morality and Politics I. M ost K a n t c o m m en ta to rs s im p ly igno re K a n t's in s is ten ce t h a t th e re is a n im p o r ta n t connection b e tw een m o ra lity a n d p o litica l in s titu tio n s . T h a t th is connec tion receives su c h a la c k o f a tte n tio n is p robab ly d u e to one of th re e rea so n s . F irs t , fo llow ing S c h o p e n h au e r's cue a n d w o rk in g m ostly from th e Grundlegung, m a n y c o m m en ta to rs s t i l l co n sid er K a n t's e th ics to b e e n tire ly fo rm al in n a tu re . B u t I h a v e a rg u e d th a t th e fa c u lty o f reaso n is p rac tica l, a n d K a n t re a so n s th a t i t m u s t n e ce ssa rily h a v e a n object i f i t is to w ill, for "e th ics goes b eyond th is [R ight] a n d p rov ides a matter (an object o f free choice), a n e n d o f p u re re a so n t h a t i t p re se n ts a s a n e n d w hich is a lso objec- tive ly n ecessa ry , th a t is , a n e n d w hich , a s fa r a s m e n a re concerned, i t is a d u ty to h a v e ."1 Second, co m m en ta to rs be lieve th a t in d iv id u a ls h ave a d u ty to obey th e ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e , re g a rd le ss of th e e x te rn a l s itu a tio n , th u s a d is- cussion o f p o litica l in s t i tu t io n s is su p e rflu o u s . W h ile i t is c e rta in ly t ru e th a t p e rso n s m u s t obey th e m o ra l la w no m a tte r w h a t th e i r condition, th is cer- ta in ly does n o t exclude th e p o ss ib ility th a t w e sh o u ld t ry to im prove condi- tio n s so t h a t m o ra l im p ro v em en t is m ad e eas ie r. W e c an see K a n t's concern for th is p ro b lem in h is d iscu ssio n s ab o u t w ar, th e d u ty to prom ote th e h a p p i- n e ss of o th e rs , n e ce ssa ry fo rm s o f g o v e rn m en ta l o rg an iza tio n , pedagog ica l 1 Metaphysics o f Morals. Gregor trans.. Ak. 380. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. [ 290 m eth o d s, c u ltu re , as w ell a s h is m an y a s id es . K a n t w as c learly co n ce rn ed w ith how to a s s is t m o ra l p ro g ress . T h ird , co m m en ta to rs h a v e a rg u e d t h a t o u r m o ra l d u ty on ly co n ce rn s o u rse lves, a n d th a t b ecau se w e sh o u ld (o r c a n be) concerned only w ith th e im p ro v e m e n t o f o u r ow n w ill, th e re is no d u ty to w a rd o th ers . Again , I h a v e t r ie d to show t h a t th is is fu n d a m e n ta lly m is ta k e n . T he q u estio n o f m o ra lity o n ly com es up in th e f i r s t p lace in re la tio n to o u r invo lvem en t w ith o th e rs , a n d w e a re lin k e d to th e m th ro u g h a m o ra l a n d n a tu r a l community. In a d - d itio n , a s w e can see e sp ec ia lly in th e Critique o f Judgment a n d th e Religion, K a n t a lso m a in ta in s t h a t w e h a v e a d u ty a s h u m a n b e ings to m o ra lly im - p ro v e o u r species; o therw ise , w e a re w ith o u t p u rp o se a n d h a v e no m o re w o rth them an im als . In th is c h ap te r , I w a n t to e s ta b lis h th is l in k b e tw een m o ra lity a n d p o litic s a s a c e r ta in te n e t o f K a n t's ph ilo so p h y . I h a v e a rg u e d th a t th e re a re tw o loca tions for th e h ig h e s t good; i f w e a re to ta k e th is se riously , th e n w e m u s t b e concerned w ith th e q u e s tio n o f how th is h ig h e s t good on e a r th is to com e ab o u t. T h is is la rg e ly a p o litica l q u e s tio n . W e h a v e a lre ad y e x a m in e d th is id e a before, n am e ly in o u r d iscu ss io n s o f K a n t's "Id ea ," "T h eo ry a n d P ra c tice ," a n d th e Critique o f Judgment. M uch o f K a n t's w ritin g on th e m o ra l im p ro v em en t of h u m a n k in d is to b e fo u n d in h is po litica l w ritin g s . H e re , I sh a ll exam ine K a n t's p o litica l w ritin g s , an a ly z in g th em in ch rono log i- c a l o rd er. I w a n t to s u b s ta n t ia te th e fo llow ing c la im s th ro u g h o u t th is c h a p - te r : 1) K a n t does posit th e n e ce ssa ry b e lie f in th e m o ra l p ro g ress o f th e sp e - c ies, 2) th is b e lie f concerns h is to ry , th o u g h i t is a b e lie f b a se d on m o ra l e n d s a n d is n o t m e a n t to be a (m erely) re g u la tiv e id e a fo r th e s tu d y o f h is to ry a s a sc ience, 3) th a t K a n t co n sid ers th is b e lie f to b e n ecessa ry i f w e a re n o t to c o n s id e r th e w orld a n d a ll c re a tio n as a m e re farce , 4) th e m e a n s w h ich n a - tu r e u se s to d rive u s to w a rd p e rfec tion is "u n so c ia l sociab ility ," a n d 5) c e r ta in p o litic a l o rg an iza tio n s a re n e ce ssa ry (b u t n o t su ffic ien t) for m o ra l p ro g re ss to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 291 occur. In th e la s t section , I w ill a lso d iscuss K a n t's seem in g ly s tra n g e c la im t h a t n a tu r e a lone m u s t be th e g u a ra n to r of peace. I w ill a rg u e t h a t th is is a p e rfec tly u n d e rs ta n d a b le c la im , a n d fu r th e rm o re a n e c e ssa ry one, g iven th e re q u is ite cond itions fo r th e m o ra l p ro jec t to b e g in in e a rn e s t. n. A. Speculative Beginning o f Human History(l 786) In th is essay , K a n t u s e s th e s to ry of G en es is a s h is "g u id in g th re a d " to p ro d u ce a h is to ry o f th e b e g in n in g o f th e u se o f re a so n . S h o w in g t h a t th is is n o t m e a n t to be u se d fo r th e sc ien tific s tu d y o f h is to ry per se, h e n o te s th a t h is "sp e cu la tio n s" "c a n n o t co m p are w ith th o se h is to r ie s th a t , a s a c tu a l r e - p o r ts w hose v e rif ica tio n r e s ts on g ro u n d e n tire ly d iffe re n t f ro m th e m ere p h ilo so p h y o f n a tu re , s e t o u t th e v e ry sam e e v en ts a n d a re to b e b e liev ed a s su c h ."2 W h a t in te re s ts u s h e re is K a n t's ta lk o f p ro g ress . K a n t m a in ta in s th a t , a s th e "fo u r th s te p " o f re a so n , h u m a n s re a liz e d t h a t th e y w ere "to be th e t ru e end of nature"3 A fte r d isc u ss in g ju s t how m u ch re a so n in te r fe re s w ith p le a s u re a n d h a p p in e s s (so t h a t w e a re n o t c o n fu sed a n d w ro n g ly ta k e h a p - p in e s s to be o u r u ltim a te end ), K a n t w rites: W hether m an has gained or lost as a result of this change [from instinct to reason] can no longer be asked, a t least if one looks to the vocation of his spe- cies, which consists of nothing other than progress tow ard perfection... [T]his p a th th a t for the species leads to progress from the worse to the b e tte r does not do so for the individual.4 2 "Speculative Beginning," Ak. 109. At the close of the essay Kant again states that "such a picture of man's history [as we have here] is useful and conducive to his instruction and betterment..." (Ak. 123). 3 "Speculative Beginning," Ak. 114. 4 Ibid.. Ak. 115. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f * 292 T h is q u o ta tio n s confirm s m an y o f o u r above po in ts . K a n t a rg u e s th a t th e h u m a n rac e is th e "end of nature," b u t on ly because o u r "vocation" is "progress to w a rd perfec tion ." A nd, b e c a u se K a n t a sse r ts th a t "p a ra d is e " a n d "b liss" a re "a c rea tio n o f h is im a g in a tio n - w h ere he could d ream or tr if le a w ay h is ex is tence in peacefu l in a c tiv ity a n d p e rm a n e n t peace" a s w e ll a s a n "im a g in e d p lace,"5 we a re c e r ta in t h a t "perfec tion" h e re does n o t m e a n o u r a b ility to ach ieve h a p p in e ss , b u t r a th e r o u r m o ra l perfection . A n d w e se e a g a in t h a t such perfec tion (a t l e a s t in th is w orld) is n o t m e a n t fo r th e in d i - v id u a l, b u t for th e species. W e also see K a n t g iv ing th e sa m e ex p lan a tio n fo r how th e sp ec ies is to e n g e n d e r su ch a m o ra l p ro g ress io n . K a n t h e re ta lk s ab o u t "c u ltu re " in - s te a d o f "unsoc ia l sociab ility ,"6 b u t th e d esc rip tio n is e sse n tia lly th e sa m e . K a n t a s se r ts th a t c u ltu re w ill "p ro g re ss so a s to develop capac itie s b e lo n g in g to m a n k in d 's vocation a s a moral sp ec ie s ..."7 a n d th a t w hile n a tu ra l im p u lse s seem to do n o th in g b u t co n tr ib u te to vice, su ch im pu lses are, in themselves and as n a tu ra l capacities, good and serve a purpose. But since these na tu ra l capacities were given m an in his na tu ra l state , they will conflict with culture as it proceeds, ju s t as it will conflict with them un til a rt so perfects itself as to be a second na tu re , which is the final goal of the hum an species' moral vocation.8 A gain , w e see th a t n a tu r a l im p u lse s , w h ile o ften lead in g in d iv id u a ls to t r a n s g re s s th e m o ra l law , a lso se rv e fo r th e developm ent of th e ir cap ac itie s , a n d se rv e a s a s tim u lu s to c u ltu re fo r th e c o n tin u a l hon in g o f th e sk ills n e c - e s sa ry fo r m o ra l perfection . s Ibid., Ak. 115. 6 Though Kant did use the term "Kultur" in the "Idea" as well, saying that "the idea of morality belongs to culture," (Ak. 26). 7 "Speculative Beginning," Ak. 116. 8 Ibid.. Ak. 117. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 293 We see th is need for conflict r e i te r a te d in K a n t's d iscussion of th e s e tt l in g o f nom ad ic tr ib e s in to fa rm e rs . K a n t c la im s th a t th e b eg in n in g of fa rm in g n e c e ss ita te d th e e s ta b lish m e n t o f com m un ities , a n d culture and the beginning of art, o f entertainm ent, as well as o f industrious- ness... m ust have sprung from this; but above all, some form of civil constitu- tion and of public justice began... a form of government... From this first, crude structure, all human arts, o f which sociability and civil security are the m ost worthwhile, could gradually develop... Inequality among men - that source of so many evils, but also o f everything good -also began during this period and increased later on .9 H ere w e see fa m ilia r them es; th o u g h se c u rity is n ecessa ry , conflict is a s well; soc iab ility is n ecessa ry for th e in te ra c tio n o f in d iv id u a ls w h ich th e re b y c au se s conflict; conflict le a d s to th e h o n in g o f re a so n 's sk ills ; a n d governm en t is n e c e ssa ry a s a fo u n d a tio n for m o ra l im p ro v em en t. Indeed , w e sh o u ld ta k e K a n t's in s ta n c e on th e n ecess ity o f conflict for m o ra l p rom o tion seriously , fo r h e goes on to p re s e n t a case w h ere a ll h e rd s - m en f in a lly s e t tle d down, a p p a re n tly w ith o u t a n y conflict, le a d in g to a s ta te w h ere a scarcely begun culture [was] abandoned in slavery to a soulless opulence, ac- companied by all the vices o f m an's crude state [of existence], and, on the other hand, the human race's irresistible urge to depart from the path marked out by nature toward developing its capacities for goodness. And it was thus that m an made him self unworthy of existing as a species designated to rule over the earth, and not as one designated to five in bovine contentm ent. . .10 9 Ibid., Ak. 119-20. 10 Ibid., Ak. 120. There is a strange tension in this article between Kant's statement that "even now the danger o f war is the only thing that tempers despotism, because wealth is required if a nation is to be powerful, and without freedom none o f the industriousness that produces wealth will arise" (Ak. 120), and his statement that "one must understand that the greatest evil that can oppress civilized peoples de- rives from wars, not, indeed, so much from actual present or past wars, as from the never-ending and constantly increasing arming for future war," (Ak. 121). I think this tension is easily explainable, how- ever, by the fact that, while able to make some contributions to the development o f culture (especially in the initial stages), and while a t times being the (perhaps) only thing which keeps the human race from stagnating, war is, ultimately, a hindrance to the development of a true morality. This will be discussed further in the next chapter. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 294 H ence, m ere c o n te n tm e n t w ith life a n d lack o f con flic t a p p a re n tly , for K a n t, le a d s to a s ta te in w h ic h m o ra l developm ent does n o t ta k e p lac e ,11 a n d in w hich h u m a n s a re a g a in "u n w o rth y " o f h a v in g b e e n c re a te d , th u s fo rfe itin g th e ir p lace a s th e "e n d o f n a tu re ." A nd, a g a in , w e se e K a n t's in s is ten c e t h a t i t is n a tu re 's p la n t h a t th e h u m a n race p ro g ress m o ra lly . A fin a l c o n firm a tio n o f ou r m ajo r concerns i s K a n t's "C onclud ing R e- m a rk " in w hich h e d isc u sse s th e fee lin g o f "g r ie f t h a t th e un reflec tive do n o t know , a g rie f t h a t c a n w ell le a d to m o ra l ru in a tio n : th is is a d isco n ten ted - n e ss w ith th e p ro v id en ce t h a t governs th e e n tire c o u rse of th e w orld."12 K a n t sp e a k s ab o u t th e n e c e ssa ry "hope for so m e th in g b e t te r ," a n d how "i t is o f th e g re a te s t im p o rtan ce ... to be content with providence... so t h a t w e can a lw ays ta k e courage u n d e r o u r b u rd e n s and ... fix o u r eyes on t h a t fa c t a n d n o t n e - glect o u r own o b lig a tio n to c o n trib u te to th e b e t te rm e n t o f ou rse lves."13 C lea rly i t is im p o r ta n t fo r K a n t to hope for (p o s tu la te ) m o ra l im p ro v em en t o f th e species in th e w orld , i f on ly to keep u s from a b a n d o n in g th e m o ra l p ro j- ect. A nd, again , K a n t in s is ts th a t "th e g re a te s t e v il t h a t c an opp ress c iv ilized peoples derives from wars,"14 a n d h e also d isc red its th e hope a n d th e "em p ty longing ... for th e golden age..." o r for a s ta te l ik e "Robinson Crusoe," b ecau se su ch a w ish is "s tim u la te d ... by th e w e a rin ess t h a t a re flec tive m a n fee ls r e - g a rd in g th e c iv ilized life w h e n h e seeks i ts w o rth so le ly in enjoyment, a n d w h en rea so n p e rh a p s re m in d s h im to give h is life m e a n in g th ro u g h ac tion h e co u n te rac ts th a t re m in d e r by fa llin g b ack in to id le n e s s ."15 A ll th e com po- n e n ts of ou r h y p o th e s is a re h e re : p ro g ress o f th e h u m a n species in th is w orld 11 This hearkens back to K ant's discussion o f his disapproval o f the Arcadian shepherd and the Tahitian villagers. 12 "Speculative Beginning," Ak. 120-1. 13 Ibid., Ak. 121. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid.. Ak. 122. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. as a p o s tu la te o f re a so n (a t le a s t h e re for m o tiv a tio n a l reaso n s), th e u se fu l- n e ss o f conflict, w a r a s (u ltim ate ly ) a n im p e d im e n t to m o ra l developm ent, a n d h u m a n k in d a s th e e n d o f n a tu re . R The End o f All Things (1794) W e h a v e b rie f ly m en tio n ed th is e s sa y befo re , so w e s h a l l only sp e n d a l i t t le tim e on i t . W h ile K a n t specifically is sp e a k in g a b o u t th e p roposed e n d of th e w orld w h ich is to h a p p e n on " ju d g m en t d a y ," th e re is a lso th e lu rk in g q u e s tio n a b o u t w h a t th e cond ition o f h u m a n k in d m ig h t be on th a t day, a n d th u s th e q u e s tio n o f p ro g ress . K a n t n o tes t h a t th e id e a t h a t a ll p e rso n s w ill be co n d em n ed to h e ll w o u ld give "no a d e q u a te re a so n to ju s tify w hy in g en - e ra l p e rso n s h a d b e e n c re a te d " a n d th e id e a t h a t G od w ou ld s im ply d estroy God's c re a tio n "w o u ld in d ic a te a flaw ed in te llig e n c e ."16 K a n t concludes t h a t we m u s t th in k a b o u t o u r possib le fu tu re ex is ten ce , a s w ell a s th e fa te o f th e species in te rm s o f i t s u se o f p ra c tic a l rea so n . A ga in , w e see th e id ea th a t "re a so n te lls th e m t h a t th e d u ra tio n o f th e w o rld h a s a w o rth only in so fa r a s th e u lt im a te e n d s o f th e ex is ten ce o f r a t io n a l b e in g s c a n be m e t w ith in i t " a n d "i f th e s e sh o u ld n o t be a tta in a b le , c rea tio n i ts e l f w o u ld a p p ea r... as p u rp o se - less a s a p la y t h a t h a s no u p sh o t w h a tso ev e r..."17 K a n t sp e a k s of a "u n iv e rsa l fee lin g o f n e e d to c u lt iv a te i ts m o ra l cap ac ity ."18 K a n t a g a in affirm s h is b e lie f in th e n e e d n o t to d o u b t t h a t p rov idence h a s a c tu a lly p ro v id ed a good a r - ra n g e m e n t fo r th is w o rld a n d o u r m o ra l dev e lo p m en t, fo r even th o u g h i t m ay n o t seem th is w ay, no m atter how difficult to believe it may be, where it is absolutely impossible to see with certainty in advance the result o f particular m eans that are ac- cepted on the basis of all human wisdom (which, if it is to be true of its name, m ust proceed solely toward morality), one m ust in a practical way believe in a 16 Immanuel Kant, "The End o f All Things," Ak. 329. 17 Ibid., Ak. 331. 18 Ibid.. Ak. 336. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I \ 296 concurrence between divine wisdom and the course of nature, if one is not to give up one's cherished ultim ate purpose.19 A gain , a s w e sa w above w ith "T h e o ry a n d P rac tice ," w h e re th e evidence is u n c e r ta in , "one must in a p ra c tic a l w ay believe" in p ro v id en ce 's gu idance for o u r m o ra l p rog ress . C To [ward] Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795) T h e follow ing tw o a r tic le s a re p e rh a p s th e b e s t fo r a co rrobora tion of m y th e s is . T h e f irs t is "P e rp e tu a l P eace ," in w hich K a n t o u tlin e s h is position a g a in s t w a r a n d in tro d u ces w a y s in w hich w a r c an be p re v e n te d . K a n t is co n ce rn ed w ith "a c e r ta in D u tc h sh o p k eep er's s ig n " on w h ich "To [ward] P e r - p e tu a l P eace" w as in sc rib ed o v e r a p ic tu re of a g ra v e y a rd .20 K a n t is con- c e rn e d to show th a t p e rp e tu a l p e a c e is no t to be h a d o n ly w ith d e a th , b u t can a n d m u s t b e ach ieved on e a r th . W hile th e f ir s t h a lf o f th e p iece deals w ith th e specific a rtic le s t h a t g o v e rn m e n ts ough t to ab ide b y in o rd e r to e lim in a te w ar, th e la t t e r section d ea ls w ith th e lin k b e tw een peace , po litics , a n d m o ra l- ity . K a n t te lls u s in th e l a t e r p o rtio n th a t w a r is to b e e lim in a te d for moral concerns, no t ju s t for h a p p in e ss ; th e ca tego rica l im p e ra tiv e "is th e p r in c ip le o f th e moral politician ,21 fo r w hom i t22 is a moral task..., a n d its m e th o d of p u rs u in g p e rp e tu a l p e a c e -w hich one now d e s ire s n o t m erely as a p h y s ic a l good, b u t also as a c o n d itio n th a t a rise s from acknow ledg ing one's d u ty - is com plete ly d is tin c t [b ecau se i t is d e rived from th e m o ra l law 19 Ibid., Ak. 337. 20 Immanuel Kant, "To[ward] Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," Ak. 343. 21 Kant makes the distinction in "Perpetual Peace" between "a moral politician, i.e., one who so interprets the principles of political prudence that they can be coherent with morality," and "a political moralist, i.e., one who forges a morality to suit the statesman's advantage," (Ak. 372). 22 It is somewhat unclear what "it" refers to in this sentence. It may mean "perpetual peace" or "the problem of civil, international and cosmopolitan right." both of w hich are mentioned before it. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 297 alone]."23 As h e w ill exp la in in m ore d e ta il in h is Metaphysics o f Morals, K a n t a rg u e s t h a t th e n a tu re o f g o v e rn m e n t is n ecessa rily a q uestion fo r m o- ra lity , fo r i t concerns th e ac tions o f free a g e n ts in a com m unity , a n d on ly th e m o ra l la w c a n give u s th e law for th e r ig h t u se o f freedom . T hus, "a d h e re n c e to p o litica l m ax im s m u s t n o t be b a s e d on th e b e n efit o r h a p p in e ss t h a t each n a tio n a n tic ip a te s ...; in s tea d , a d h e re n c e m u s t derive from th e p u re concep t o f th e d u ty o f r ig h t (from th e ought, w hose p rin c ip le is g iven a priori th o u g h p u re rea so n ), le t th e p h y sica l consequences be w h a t th e y m ay."24 I t is c le a r from th e e s sa y t h a t p e rp e tu a l peace is n e ce ssa ry n o t only for th e sm oo th w ork ing o f a c o n stitu tio n , b u t, a s w e sa w w ith th e "Id ea ," also b ecau se i t is a m oral n ecessity . H en ce , K a n t gives u s tw o re a so n s to accep t th e lin k be tw een m o ra lity an d po litics: p o litica l o rg an iza tio n s a re co n cern ed w ith th e freedom o f com - m u n a l a g e n ts , "th u s , t ru e po litics c a n n o t p ro g ress w ith o u t p ay in g h o m ag e to m orality ,"25 a n d p e rp e tu a l peace is a m o ra l goal w hich can only be ach iev ed if th e n e c e ssa ry p o litica l o rg an iz a tio n s a n d co n s titu tio n s a re in p lace, fo r "a people's good m o ra l condition is to b e ex p ec ted on ly u n d e r a good c o n s titu - tion ."26 T h u s i t is a m oral im p e ra tiv e t h a t n a tio n s ev en tu a lly e n te r in to (cosm opolitan) re la tio n sh ip s w ith o n e a n o th e r in o rder to se ttle th e ir d iffe r- ences by la w in s te a d of w ar, since "re a so n ab so lu te ly condem ns w a r a s a m ean s o f d e te rm in in g th e r ig h t a n d m a k e s se ek in g th e s ta te of peace a m a t- te r o f u n m it ig a te d du ty ."27 23 "Perpetual Peace," Ak. 377. See also: Heinz Wichmann, "Zum Problem des ewigen Friedens bei Kant," in Proceedings o f the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, pt. 2 (Milwaukee: M arquette University Press, 1995), 876; Pierre Laberge, "Von der Garantie des ewigen Friedens," pp. 151 and 153; Otfried Hdffe, "Einleitung: Der Friede - ein vernachlSssigtes Ideal," pp. 910 , 15, and 21; and Otfried Heffe,"V6lkeibund Oder Weltrepublik," pp. 112 and 118-9, all in: Immanuel Kant: Zum Ewigen Frieden, Otfried Hdffe, ed. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995). 24 "Perpetual Peace," Ak. 379. 25 Ibid., Ak. 380. 26 Ibid., Ak. 366. 2 Ibid.. Ak. 356. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I T I 298 W e ag a in see K a n t su g g e s tin g t h a t b e lie f in p rov idence, w h ich m ig h t e s ta b lis h th e n ecessa ry cond itions fo r m o ra l p ro g ress , a n d th e b e lie f in m ora l p ro g re ss o f h u m a n beings, a re be liefs n e c e s s i ta te d by p ra c tic a l re a so n , a n d th u s se em to be a type of p o s tu la te o f p ra c tic a l rea so n . K a n t m e n tio n s p rov i- dence s e v e ra l t im e s in th is essay , p a r t ic u la r ly in h is in s is ten c e t h a t "p e rp e tu a l p eace is insured (g u a ra n te e d ) b y n o th in g less th a n t h a t g re a t a r t - i s t nature..."28 K a n t w rites th a t , r e g a rd in g th is in su ra n c e b y n a - tu re /p ro v id en ce : the relationship of objects to and their conformity with the purposes that rea- son itself sets out for us (the end o f morality) can be represented from a theo- retical point o f view as a transcendent idea, but from the practical point of view (where, e.g., it is employed in relation to our concept o f duty regarding perpetual peace), it is represented as a dogmatic idea and it is here that its reality is properly established .29 T hus, i t is from a p rac tica l p o in t o f v iew th a t th e id ea o f n a tu r e 's g u a ra n te e o f p e rp e tu a l p eace is posited , a n d w h ile p ro v id en ce is c lea rly th e m o re accu- r a te te rm to u se fo r a descrip tion o f n a tu r e 's g u id in g h an d , K a n t fee ls th a t "th e te rm nature is le ss pretentious t h a n a te rm conno ting t h a t th e r e is a providence o f w h ich we c an h a v e cogn itive know ledge..."30 H e in z W ichm an in h is a rtic le , "Z um P roblem des ew igen F r ie d e n s b e i K a n t," a lso a rg u e s th a t su ch a g u a ra n te e m u s t be seen a s s te m m in g from a p rac tic a l p o in t o f view , co n clu d in g th a t : [perpetual peace] remains therefore as a postulate, which can never be proven... The guarantee of peace is a precondition for the possibility, given by 28 Ibid., Ak. 360. Laberge attempts to make a distinction between what Kant means by "nature" and "providence" here, but I think that even i f Laberge is correct (which I do not believe, unless it is only the difference between the connotations which these terms conjure up), this distinction does not play a significant role in our present concerns. 29 Ibid., Ak. 362. In this essay the term "dogmatic" is not used by Kant in his usual sense, and connotes nothing negative, unexamined, or purely transcendent. 30 Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I i 299 practical reason, th a t the concept of Right can be moved completely through politics to reality .31 N a tu re 's g u a ra n te e of peace is n o t kn o w n by sp e c u la tiv e rea so n , b u t is p os- ite d b y p ra c t ic a l rea so n . A nd , a s K a n t a rg u e d in th e "Id ea ," n a tu r e e n s u re s p eace th ro u g h th e a n ta g o n ism b e tw e e n in d iv id u a ls . R e g a rd in g th e "moral objective" of p e rp e t- u a l p e a c e ,32 K a n t te lls u s (as in th e "Id e a ") t h a t i t is b ro u g h t a b o u t in th re e w ays: th ro u g h a p e rfec t in te r n a l co n s titu tio n , "so lv ab le ev en fo r a people co m p rised of d ev ils (if on ly th e y p o ssess u n d e rs ta n d in g ) ,"33 th ro u g h p eace b e - tw e en n a tio n s , "p ro d u ce d a n d se c u re d by a n e q u ilib riu m o f th e liv e lie s t com - p e tin g p o w ers ,"34 a n d fin a lly th ro u g h a n active d e s ire to in te ra c t w ith one a n o th e r in a co sm opo litan w hole , fo r "th e spirit o f trade c a n n o t coexist w ith w ar, a n d so o n e r o r la te r th is s p i r i t d o m in a tes ev ery p eo p le ."35 A gain, w e see K a n t's in s is te n c e on a n e c e ssa ry p o litic a l cond ition fo r th e p rom otion o f m o- ra lity , a co n d itio n b ro u g h t a b o u t th ro u g h w a r a n d conflic t, w hich , u ltim a te ly , e lim in a te s w a r fo rev er,36 w h ile m a in ta in in g a sa fe a r e n a o f com petition , so th a t in d iv id u a ls do n o t la p se in to a s ta te o f "bov ine" ex is ten ce . K a n t a lso m en tio n s th e n e ce ss ity o f b e liev in g in a m o ra l p ro g ress o f th e species. W hile th is is im p lied , I th in k , b o th in K a n t's d iscussion of h is d isa p p ro v a l o f th e in n k e e p e r's s ig n , a n d by th e fa c t t h a t h e believes 31 "Es [perpetual peace] bleibt jedoch auch hier bei dem Postulat, der Beweis wird wiederum nicht angetreten... Das aber ist die Voraussetzung dafur, dafl der von der praktischen Vemunft geforderte RechtsbegrifF vollstdndig durch Politik in die Wirklichkeit umgesetzt werden kann,... dann auch den Frieden fur immer zu garantieren imstande sind," ("Zum Problem des ewigen Friedens bei Kant," p. 876. Above translation mine). 32 "Perpetual Peace," Ak. 365. 33 Ibid., Ak. 366. On the forming of the constitution see: Ak. 365-7. 34 Ibid., Ak. 367. 35 Ibid., Ak. 368. 36 Hdffe considers this to be an advantage in Kant's thinking, namely that he "abandons the [impossible] ideal of freedom from all conflict" in favor of an international peace which comes about through conflict. See: Hoffe Otfried "Einleitung: Der Friede -ein vemachlassigtes Ideal." 18-19. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. fr 300 p e rp e tu a l peace to be a n ecessa ry m o ra l goal because i t a lo n e can p rov ide th e fo u n d a tio n fo r m o ra l im provem en t, h e a lso w rites: the course of world events justifies providence. For the m oral principle in man never dies out, and with the continuous progress of culture, reason, which is able pragm atically to apply the idea of right in accordance w ith the moral principle, grows through its persistence in doing so...37 H e re a g a in is K a n t's id ea t h a t re a so n w ill a lw ays p ro g ress , a n d t h a t i t w ill im p ro v e w ith tim e a n d w ith p rac tice . A nd , K a n t concludes t h a t w h ile b e lie f in m o ra l p ro g re ss o f th e species c a n n o t b e p ro v en th eo re tica lly , i t m u s t be p o s tu la te d p rac tica lly : UJt seem s impossible to be able to use a theodicy to provide any justification w hatsoever for creation, namely, th a t such a race of generally corrupt beings should have been put on earth . We will be unavoidably driven to such skepti- cal conclusions, if we do not assum e th a t pure principles of right have objective reality...38 H e re w e a lso see th e recu rren ce o f K a n t's b e lie f th a t , i f p e rso n s w ere c rea ted , th e n w e c a n on ly ju s tify th e ir ex is ten ce th ro u g h m o ra l rea so n s , a n d t h a t w e m u s t a ssu m e m o ra l p rog ress in o rd e r n o t to be d riv en to w a rd skep tic ism . P e rh a p s th e fo llow ing quo ta tion p ro v id es a n accep tab le su m m a ry of K a n t's position : na tu re guarantees perpetual peace by virtue of the m echanism of m an's incli- nations themselves; to be sure, it does not do so with a certain ty sufficient to prophesy it from the theoretical point of view, bu t we can do so from a practical one, which m akes it our duty to work tow ard bringing about th is goal (which is not a chimerical one).39 37 "Perpetual Peace," Ak. 380. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.. Ak. 368. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. D. An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing? (1798) T h is a rtic le , one o f K a n t's la s t p u b lish e d w orks, m a k e s m an y o f th e sam e a rg u m e n ts a s "T h eo ry a n d P rac tice ," th o u g h w e do e n co u n te r a second (new ) fo u n d a tio n on w h ich K a n t b a s is h is p red ic tio n s o f th e fu tu re . As w ith h is d iscu ssio n of M en d e lsso h n in "T heory a n d P rac tice ," K a n t is concerned h e re w ith th e th re e possib le fu tu re s of th e h u m a n race : reg re ss io n , s ta g n a - tion , a n d im provem en t. K a n t m a in ta in s th a t w e a re a s k in g a m o ra l q u es- tion , n o t one reg a rd in g th e science of h is to ry , for in a s k in g th e question , "th e im p o r ta n t th in g is no t th e n a tu r a l h is to ry of m an ..., b u t r a th e r h is m o ra l h is - to ry a n d , m ore precisely , h is h is to ry n o t a s a species acco rd in g to th e generic n o tio n (singulorum), b u t a s th e to ta lity o f m en u n ite d soc ia lly on e a r th a n d a p p o rtio n ed in to peoples (universorum)."40 S ince K a n t specifica lly sp eak s of th e "to ta l i ty of m en (dem Ganzen der gesellschaftlich aufE rden vereinigten)," th is g ives u s fu r th e r ev idence o f a d u ty n o t on ly to o u rse lv es , b u t to th e h u - m a n ra c e a s a whole, a n d sh o u ld reca ll u s to th e "sui generis" d u ty of th e Re- ligion*1 K a n t recognizes, i n a som ew hat new ad m iss io n o f th e d ifficu lty of th e q u estio n , th a t a h is to ry o f th e fu tu re is m ad e a ll th e m o re d ifficu lt by th e fac t th a t w e a re d ea lin g w ith p e rso n s a s free ag en ts , a n d th u s o f w hom "w h a t th e y o u g h t to do m ay be d ic ta te d in advance, b u t of w hom i t m ay n o t be p re - d ic ted w h a t th e y w ill do."42 W h ereas w ith th e f irs t Critique K a n t w as con- c e rn e d w ith th e possib ility t h a t a ll h u m a n actions m ig h t one d ay be en tire ly p red ic tab le , h e re h e seem s to be concerned w ith th e o pposite possib ility , n a m e ly th a t w e m igh t n e v e r be ab le to p red ic t w h a t in d iv id u a ls a s freely a c tin g a g e n ts m ig h t do. K a n t concludes, a p p a re n tly fo r se v e ra l reasons , th a t 40 "Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?' p. 141. 41 See also: "Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" p. 151. 42 Ibid.. p. 149. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. \ri U 302 "T h e P roblem o f P ro g re ss I s N o t to Be R esolved D irec tly th ro u g h E xperi- ence,"43 i.e., w e c an n o t s im p ly te ll from a n in v e s tig a tio n w h e th e r h u m a n s a re im prov ing o r w ill im prove in th e fu tu re . H ow ever, K a n t n o te s th a t "if th e course of h u m a n a ffa irs seem s so sense less to u s, p e rh a p s i t lie s in a poor choice of p o sitio n from w h ich w e re g a rd i t ,"44 a n d th u s w h ile w e can n o t say fo r c e r ta in s im p ly th ro u g h o b se rv a tio n th a t th e h u m a n ra c e is im prov ing m orally , fo r w e a re d e a lin g w ith free beings, p e rh a p s w e c a n f in d a clue w h ich w ould a llow u s to m a k e a p red ic tion : "th e re m u s t be som e experience in th e h u m a n rac e w hich , a s a n even t, p o in ts to th e d isp o s itio n a n d capacity o f th e h u m a n rac e to be th e c a u se o f its ow n ad v an ce to w a rd th e b e tte r ..."45 K a n t f in d s h is d u e in th e "mode o f th in k in g o f th e sp e c ta to rs"46 o f th e F re n c h R evo lu tion . T h is is s lig h tly d iffe ren t th a n th e e x p la n a tio n of h u m a n p ro g ress th ro u g h conflict. K a n t h e re no tes th a t th e sp e c ta to rs o f th e R evolu- tio n a re g rossly in te re s te d in th is event, ev idenc ing "a w ish fu l p a rtic ip a tio n th a t bo rders d o se ly on e n th u s ia sm , th e v e ry e x p re ss io n o f w h ich is f ra u g h t w ith danger; th is sy m p a th y , th e re fo re , can h a v e no o th e r c a u se th a n a m o ra l p red isp o sitio n in th e h u m a n rac e ."47 K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t th e sp ec ta to rs a re t ru ly in te re s te d in th is m o v em en t to w a rd a civil a n d re p u b lic a n c o n s titu - tio n ,46 even th o u g h su ch e n th u s ia s m m ig h t n o t be in t h e i r b e s t in te re s t, a n d ev en tho u g h th e R evo lu tion m ig h t n o t succeed. T h u s K a n t c o n d u d e s th a t "g en u in e e n th u s ia sm a lw ay s m oves only to w a rd w h a t i s id e a l an d , indeed , to w h a t is p u re ly m oral, su ch a s th e concept o f r ig h t, a n d i t c a n n o t be g rafted onto se lf-in te re s t."49 I t is th e e n th u s ia sm itself o f th e sp e c ta to rs w hich K a n t 43 Ibid., p. 149. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid., p. 151. 46 Ibid., p. 153. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid.. p. 155. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. t« 5i 303 ta k e s a s h is c lue for th e m o ra l p ro g re ss o f h u m a n k in d , th e d e s ire o f th e h u - m a n ra c e to h a v e a ju s t c o n s titu tio n , one w h ich th e y th e m se lv e s w ould w ill a n d w h ich e lim in a te s th e p o ss ib ility o f w ar; th is "n o t o n ly p e rm its people to ho p e fo r p ro g re ss to w ard th e b e tte r , b u t is already itself progress in so f a r as i ts c a p a c ity i s su ffic ien t fo r th e p re s e n t ."50 T h u s , a s a n e x ce llen t su m m ary , K a n t m a in ta in s : Now I claim to be able to predict to the hum an race -even w ithout prophetic insigh t according to the aspects and om ens of our day, the a tta inm en t of this goal. T h a t is, I predict its progress tow ard the b e tte r which, from now on, tu rn s out to be no longer completely retrogressive. For such a phenomenon in h um an history is not to be forgotten, because it has revealed a tendency and faculty in hum an na tu re for improvement..., and one which n a tu re and free- dom alone, united in the hum an race in conformity w ith inner principles of right, could have promised. B ut so far as tim e is concerned, it can promise th is only indefinitely and as a contingent event.51 S e v e ra l fa m ilia r th e m e s a p p e a r in th is e ssay . H e re , p o litic a l o rg an i- za tio n is c le a r ly a n d c o n s is te n tly l in k e d w ith th e p o ss ib ility o f m o ra l p rog - ress . I t is a co n s titu tio n a n d , specifically , a re p u b lic a n c o n s titu tio n w hich allow s fo r th e re to be peace a n d th e b e g in n in g s o f m o ra l p ro g re ss ; "i t th u s e s - ta b lish e s th e cond ition w h e reb y w a r (the sou rce o f a ll e v il a n d c o rru p tio n of m orals) is d e te rred ; an d , a t le a s t neg a tiv e ly , p ro g re ss to w a rd th e b e tte r is a s - s u re d h u m a n ity in sp ite o f a l l i t s in firm ity ..."52 T h is "P la to n ic Id e a l (respublica noumenon), is n o t a n e m p ty c h im era , b u t r a th e r th e e te rn a l n o rm for a ll c iv il o rg an iza tio n in g e n e ra l, a n d a v e rts a ll w a r."53 A lso, a s in "T heory a n d P rac tice ," K a n t a llu d e s to th e fa c t t h a t p ro g - re s s is a n a ssu m p tio n we c a n m a k e , re g a rd le ss o f w h a t th e ou tcom e o f th e R evo lu tion w ill be a n d even (som ew hat) re g a rd le ss o f w h a t h a p p e n s in th e 50 Ibid., p. 153. Italics added for emphasis. 51 Ibid., p. 159. 52 Ibid., p. 155. 53 Ibid.. p. 165. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. s 304 fu tu re . T h e fo rm er is n o t a concern b ecau se K a n t is c o n ce rn ed w ith th e w ay of th in k in g o f th e sp e c ta to rs o f th e R evo lu tion , a n d th is is a ph en o m en o n w h ich is i ts e lf "n o t to b e fo rg o tten ," th u s no m a tte r w h a t h a p p e n s , "th a t p h ilo so p h ica l p ro p h esy s ti ll w o u ld lose n o th in g of i ts force."54 T h e la t te r is n o t a co n ce rn because w e a re d e a lin g w ith free ag en ts , a n d i f th e h u m a n race seem s to b e declin ing , if it is moving backwards, and in an accelerated fall into baseness, a person m ay not despair even then of encountering a juncture (punctum flexus contrarii ) where the moral predisposition in our race would be able to turn anew tow ard the better... for [we have seen cases where people]... when things disin- teg ra te altogether, know how to adopt a strengthened motive for m aking them even b e tte r th an they were before th a t sta te .55 I t se em s th a t , for K an t, w e m u s t h o ld on to th is th e s is "p ro v id e d a t le a s t th a t th e re does n o t, by som e chance, occur a second epoch of n a tu r a l revo lu tion w h ich w ill p u s h aside th e h u m a n ra c e to c le a r th e s ta g e fo r o th e r c re a - tu re s ..."56 W e a lso see th e c o n tin u a l th e m e th a t th e a n ti th e t ic a l h y p o th es is w o u ld b e "a su b v ersio n o f th e u l t im a te p u rp o se of c re a tio n i ts e lf ,"57 a n d even th e th e s is t h a t th e re ex is ts n e i th e r p ro g re ss n o r decline is s t re n u o u s ly re - jec ted , fo r "i t is a v a in a ffa ir to h a v e good so a lte rn a te w ith e v il t h a t th e w hole tra ff ic o f ou r species w ith i ts e l f on th is globe w ould h a v e to be consid- e re d a s a m e re farc ica l com edy, fo r th is c a n endow o u r sp ec ie s w ith no g re a te r v a lu e in th e eyes o f re a so n th a n th a t w hich o th e r a n im al species pos- sess ..."58 54 Ibid., p. IS9. I pointed out in a footnote in Chapter Ten of Section One above that Peter Burg in his book about the French Revolution seems simply wrong to assert that we could have (theoretical) knowledge of progress in human history. I take the present discussion to be further refutation of Burg's argument 55 Ibid., p. 149. 56 Ibid., p. 161. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid.. p. 147. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105 A nd, finally , d e sp ite K a n t's re lia n c e on th e a t t i tu d e o f th e sp e c ta to rs o f th e R evo lu tion to g ro u n d h is h y p o th es is , we m ay s t i l l ta k e no te th a t th e way in w h ich persons w ere le a d to e n th u s ia sm fo r su c h a rep u b lican co n sti- tu tio n w as th ro u g h conflict: "a civil socie ty o rg an ized conform ably to th is [P la ton ic] id ea l... can on ly b e p a in fu lly a cq u ired a f te r m u ltifa rio u s h o s tilitie s a n d w a rs ..."59 Hence, K a n t concludes a g a in : "h e re , th e re fo re , is a p ro p o sitio n v a lid fo r th e m ost rigo rous theo ry , in sp ite o f a ll sk ep tic s , a n d no t ju s t a w ellm e a n in g a n d p rac tica lly com m endab le p roposition : th e h u m a n race h a s a l- w ay s b e e n in progress to w a rd th e b e t te r a n d w ill c o n tin u e to be so h en ce - fo r th ."60 m. A second ap p ro ach to th e l in k b e tw een m o ra lity a n d po litics is to be h a d b y w ay o f considering th e "pu b lic" n a tu re o f re a so n . T h is ap p ro ach is fo u n d p a r tic u la r ly in "W h a t is E n lig h ten m en t? " a n d "W h a t is O rien ta tio n in T h in k in g ? " W hile m uch o f K a n t's w r it in g s e m p h asize th e n e e d for freedom o f p u b lic exp ression , th ese tw o a rtic le s a r t ic u la te th is n e e d th e m ost c learly . T h e l in k b e tw een m o ra lity a n d p o litica l o rg an iz a tio n s is n ecessa ry h e re , n o t for th e avo idance o f w ar, b u t so t h a t p e rso n s m ay d ia logue w ith each o th e r in o rd e r to b e t te r the u se o f th e i r rea so n . W hile su ch d ia lo g u e is n ecessa ry for rea so n , i t is a lso e sse n tia l fo r an y a t te m p t to form a m o ra l com m u n ity as such . A. An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? (1784)61 T h is is p e rh a p s th e m ost w ell k n o w n of K a n t's p o litica l w ritings, a n d i ts m a in p o in t is th e n e ed o f p e rso n s to em erge from th e i r "self-imposed 59 Ibid., p. 165. See also: pp. 165-167 and p. 169. This is also implied in Kant's discussion of Hume, pp. 169-71. 60 Ibid., p. 159. 61 Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Moral Practice, trans. Ted Humphrey' (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.. 1983). 41-48. All citations refer to Akademie page numbers. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 306 immaturity,"62 K a n t h e re ca lls for a ll h u m a n b e in g s to th in k for them selves, to e n lig h ten th em se lv e s , a n d "n o th in g is re q u ire d fo r th is en lig h ten m en t, how ever, excep t freedom', a n d th e freedom in q u e s tio n is th e le a s t h a rm fu l of all, nam ely , th e freed o m to u se rea so n publicly i n a ll m a t te r s ."63 T h is lead s K a n t to h is fam o u s su p p o r t o f th e d ic ta te o f F re d e r ic k II , "Argue a s m uch as you w a n t a n d a b o u t w h a t you w an t, but obey? 64 a s w ell a s h is d iv ision be tw een th e "p r iv a te " a n d "public" u se o f rea so n , w h e re p e rso n s m u s t do an d tea ch as th ey a re ex p ec ted in th e ir ro les a s civ il s e rv a n ts o r re lig io u s lead e rs ("p r iv a te u se"), w h ile th e y sh o u ld be a llow ed to voice th e i r t r u e opin ions in p r in t, ad d re ssed to th e "literate worldI"65 ("p u b lic u se "). K a n t a rg u e s th a t th e b a n n in g o f th e u s e o f p u b lic rea so n "w ould be a c rim e a g a in s t h u m a n n a tu re , w hose e sse n tia l d e s tin y l ie s p rec ise ly in su ch p ro g re ss [in th e u se of reason],"66 a n d "to re n o u n c e i t [en ligh tenm en t] fo r h im se lf, or, even m ore, for su b seq u e n t g e n e ra tio n s , is to v io la te a n d tra m p le m a n 's d iv in e r ig h ts underfoo t."67 E sse n tia lly , K a n t a rg u es t h a t i t is u p to th e g o v ern m en ts to allow th e ir c itiz e n s (or, in th is case, sub jects) to h a v e freedom o f relig ion as w ell as freedom to c ritic ize (in p rin t) th e ir g o v e rn m en t. K a n t m ak e s th e ta c it a ssu m p tio n s b o th t h a t e n lig h te n m e n t is i ts e lf so m e th in g to be desired , a n d th a t a governm en t (k ing ) w hich allow s i ts c itizen s (sub jects) freedom of th o u g h t w ill be re sp e c te d a n d obeyed; in th is re sp ec t, th e n e x t e ssay m ay be a n im provem ent, so le t u s tu r n to it. 62 Ibid., Ak. 35. 63 Ibid., Ak. 36. 64 Ibid., Ak. 37. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid., Ak. 39. 67 Ibid.. Ak. 40. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I 307 B. What is Orientation in Thinking? (1786)6* T h is a rtic le w as w ritte n by K a n t d u r in g th e Jaco b i-M en d e lsso h n co n - tro v e rsy over L essings' a lleged S p inoz ism , a n d c o n c e rn s b o th th e connec tion b e tw e e n rea so n a n d m o ra lity as w ell a s th e p u b lic u s e o f rea so n . K a n t's g e n - e ra l a im h e re is b a s ica lly a re ite ra tio n o f h is co n c lu s io n s in th e f ir s t a n d sec- o n d Critique, from th e perspec tive o f th e q u e s tio n o f h o w w e a re to o r ie n t o u rse lv es in th in k in g . H e concludes th a t , w h ile r e a s o n is p ra c tic a l a n d i t h a s a "n e e d " to a ssu m e th e possib ility o f th e h ig h e s t good s in c e "i t is n o t ju s t a m a t te r o f in d iffe rence w h e th e r one w ish e s to m a k e [such] a defin itive ju d g - m e n t...",69 su ch a b e lie f is only a "postulate o f r e a s o n "70 a n d is b a sed so lely o n re a s o n 's p ra c tic a l n eed s, n o t a "basic p rin c ip le o f z e a lo try ."71 T hough i t m ay be im p o r ta n t to n o te t h a t th is is a n o th e r o f K a n t's d e fe n se s o f th e h ig h e s t good, w h a t in te re s ts u s h e re is th e l in k b e tw ee n m o ra l i ty a n d politics. H a v in g d e fen d ed th e n e ed to o r ie n t o u rse lv e s m o ra lly a n d ra tio n a lly in o u r th in k in g , K a n t goes on to a rg u e t h a t th is c a n o n ly b e ach ieved u n d e r c e r ta in e x te rn a l cond itions. K a n t m a k e s th e fo llow ing b o ld asse rtion : We do adm ittedly say that, w hereas a higher au tho rity m ay deprive us of free- dom of speech or of writing, it cannot deprive u s of freedom of thought. B ut how much and how accurately would we think if we did no t think, so to speak, in community with others to whom we communicate ou r thoughts and who communicate their thoughts to us!72 H e re K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t ou r ab ility to th in k a n d re a s o n is d irec tly h in d e re d by a s i tu a t io n w h ere th e governm en t w o u ld c e n su re free d o m o f speech. 68 Immanuel Kant, "What is Orientation in Thinking?" in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 237-249. 69 Ibid., p. 240. 70 Ibid.. p. 245. 71 Ibid., p. 238. 2 Ibid.. p. 247. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 308 M o ra lity , a s we h a v e seen , com es from th e p ro p e r u se of re a so n , a n d is n o t s im p ly a m o ra l fee ling . H ence, w h ile every p e rso n h a s im m e d ia te access to th e m o ra l law w ith o u t sch o la rly in te rp re ta t io n , th e re a re (a t le a s t) th re e im p o r ta n t rea so n s w h y re a so n needs to be exercised . F irs t, a s K a n t te lls us in th e Grundlegung, "o rd in a ry u n d e rs ta n d in g " is ab le to be m o ra l a n d "innocence is in d e e d a glo- r io u s th in g ; b u t u n fo r tu n a te ly , i t does n o t keep v e ry well a n d is e a s ily le d a s tra y . C o n seq u en tly , ev en w isdom w h ich co n s is ts m ore in d o ing a n d n o t d o in g th a n in k n o w in g - n e e d s science... in o rd e r th a t w isdom 's p recep ts m ay g a in accep tan ce a n d p e rm a n e n c e ."73 Second, g iv en th a t c e r ta in po litica l s t ru c tu re s a re n e c e ssa ry fo r th e m o ra l p ro jec t, a n d given t h a t th e ac tu a l m a n ife s ta tio n of su c h sa tis fa c to ry s tru c tu re s in th e w orld is a m a t te r for em - p ir ic a l so lu tio n s , w e m u s t b e ab le to d ia logue w ith one a n o th e r in o rd er to com e u p w ith th e b e s t g o v e rn m e n ta l s tru c tu re s . T h ird , th e re a re m an y m o ra l p ro b lem s in th e w orld w h ich a re d ifficu lt to solve, a n d K a n t g ives u s a m y r- ia d o f su c h "c asu is tic a l" ex am p les in th e Metaphysics of Morals.1* T h e m o ra l la w is s in g u la r , b u t o u r choice o f how w e a re b e s t to m a n ife s t th e m o ra l la w in o u r d a ily lives c a n be a n sw e re d in m an y d iffe ren t, th o u g h leg itim a te , w ays, fo r "th e m ax im s o f a g e n ts m ay be v e ry d iffe ren t w ith r e g a rd to th e sam e la w s ."75 T h u s, th e exerc ise o f rea so n is n e c e ssa ry for m o ra l im prove- m e n t, a n d th is exerc ise c a n n o t ta k e p lace w ith o u t public d ia logue . K a n t be lieves t h a t e n lig h ten m en t, t h a t is , th e ab ility to th in k for o n e se lf in accordance w ith th e n a tu r a l c o n s tra in ts o f reason , is n e ce ssa ry for th e m o ra l p ro ject, b e ca u se m o ra lity is t ie d so in tr ic a te ly to re a so n . W ithou t 73 Grundlegung, Ak. 405. Recall also Kant's discussion of "wisdom" in the second Critique. 74 There is also a fourth important reason for this, though we can only anticipate it, which is the need for us to find a "pure religious faith" which would allow the entire world to come together in a king- dom of God; however, this cannot come about on its own, and will require finding an "ecclesiastical faith" which would be acceptable to all and which could act as "vehicle." For more on this, see the next chapter. 75 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 225. Ellington translation. See also Ak. 397. 433 n.. and "The Diadactics of Ethics." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 309 freedom of ex p ress io n , K a n t be lieves th e re to be no freedom of th o u g h t. W ith o u t freedom o f th o u g h t, th e re is no im provem en t of reaso n , a n d th u s , no im p ro v em en t o f m o ra lity . P e rh a p s th is re m a rk of R eiss' re g a rd in g K a n t's e s- sa y is a p p ro p ria te : The essay th u s shows how, in K ant's view, epistemology and ethics are closely interlinked w ith politics as well as how, in his opinion, rational inquiry and moral conduct can be practiced properly only in a society governed according to principles of politics based on the Idea of freedom. In o ther words, K ant's th e - ory of politics, as th is essay shows, is not an unim portant appendix to his criti- cal philosophy, b u t a necessary consequence of it.76 IV. In th is c h a p te r , I h a v e a rg u e d t h a t th e re is a n im p o r ta n t l in k b e - tw een po litica l o rg a n iz a tio n s a n d m orality . T h ro u g h o u t th is w ork I h a v e a lso a rg u e d th a t m o ra l p ro g re ss is in flu en ced by e x te rn a l cond itions, a n d t h a t i t is a d u ty to try to b r in g a b o u t th o se e x te rn a l cond itions w h ich w ou ld a llow fo r th e m o ra lity o f a ll to p ro g ress u n h in d e re d . T h e m a in cond ition w h ich K a n t a s se r ts to be th e m o s t d e tr im e n ta l to m o ra lity is w ar. N ow K a n t h a s a s s e r te d t h a t i t w ill be n a tu r e a n d n o t in d iv id u a ls a s m o ra l ag en ts w h ich w ill be th e g u a ra n to r of p e rp e tu a l peace. K a n t also a s s e r ts th a t su ch peace w ill com e a b o u t regardless o f th e w ills o f in d iv id u a ls , t h a t is, re g a rd le ss o f m o ra l i n - te n t. W hy sh o u ld th is be? K a n t's th in k in g , I believe, can b e sp e lle d ou t a s follow s. To b eg in w ith , m oral p ro g re s s is a n e ce ssa ry p o s tu la te o f p rac tica l rea so n , i.e ., i t is n ecessa ry to b e liev e t h a t h u m a n s a re in d e e d p ro g ress in g in o rd e r to av o id a con trad ic tion w ith in p ra c tic a l re a so n .77 T herefo re , th o se s tru c tu re s w h ich 76 p. 236. Hans Reiss, "Introduction to What is Orientation in Thinking?" in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 235-6. For more on the relationship between reason and freedom see: Onora O'Neill, "Reason and Politics in the Kantian Enterprise," in Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Howard Williams (Chicago: Univer- sity of Chicago Press), 15-80, and "Vindicating Reason." in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 280-308. 7 For more on this contradiction, see Chapter Five below. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 310 w ould allow fo r su c h m o ra l p rogress to occur m u s t b e th o u g h t to be possib le them se lves. N ow K a n t a rg u e s th a t bo th a p e rfe c t e x te rn a l a n d in te rn a l con- s ti tu t io n a re n e c e ssa ry befo re m oral p ro g ress c a n b eg in in e a rn e s t.78 T hus, w e see a rg u m e n ts t h a t b o th of th ese c o n s titu tio n s a re in d e e d possible, b o th th e "P la to n ic Id e a l" o f a perfec tly fu n c tio n in g g o v e rn m e n t a s w ell a s a fed - e ra tio n o f so v e re ig n n a tio n -s ta te s w hich a re d ev o ted to peace. H ow ever, a s we sa w w ith "Is th e H u m a n Race C o n sta n tly P ro g re ss in g ?", K a n t know s fu ll w ell t h a t w e a re d e a lin g w ith a h is to ry of a sp ec ie s w h ich is free, a n d th u s w hich w ou ld be f re e a t a n y p o in t to ch an g e th e i r m in d s a b o u t an issu e . T h is la s t p o in t is c ru c ia l to u n d e rs ta n d in g K a n t's n e e d o f n a tu r e a s th e g u a ra n to r o f peace, for i f p eace w ere n o t som ehow g u a ra n te e d by n a tu re , th e n th e re w ould always be th e th r e a t of w ar, fo r h u m a n s a re free to a c t as th e y see fit, a n d a c o n tin u a l th r e a t o f w a r is p rec ise ly th e con d itio n w h ich K a n t is con- c e rn ed to e lim in a te . O n th e one h a n d , th e a c t o f w a r is a v o lu n ta ry ac t com m itted by h u m a n b e in g s , a n d th u s seem s to concern on ly a m oral p ro b - lem , i.e ., th a t once ev ery o n e a t som e tim e d ec id ed or w illed th e re to be no m ore w ar, th e p ro b lem o f w a r w ould be solved. B u t, on th e o th er h a n d , p re - cisely b ecau se w a r is a free act, we a re a w a re th a t , w ith o u t som e e x te rn a l g u a ra n te e of peace , th e re w ould a lw ays be th e p o ss ib ility o f som eone c h a n g - in g th e ir m in d s a b o u t th e peace, a n d th e w o rld b e in g p lu n g e d in to w a r a g a in . T hus, i f K a n t cou ld n o t give u s som e in d ic a tio n a b o u t how peace m ig h t be ach ieved perpetually, th e n w e w ould n ev e r e sca p e a "s ta te o f in te rn a tio n a l n a tu re ," a n d w e s h o u ld th e n h ave rea so n to d o u b t t h a t c o n tin u a l m o ra l im - p ro v em en t is possib le . B u t how can n a tu re g u a ra n te e th is? L e t u s b e g in a n a n sw e r to th is q u es tio n by e x a m in in g K a n t's co n tro v e rsia l c la im in "P e rp e tu a l P eace" t h a t "th e p ro b lem o f o rg an iz in g a n a tio n is so lvab le e v en fo r a people com prised o f dev ils ( if on ly th ey possess 8 1 will argue for this further in the next chapter. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I * 311 u n d e rs ta n d in g ) ."79 W e h av e seen in th e f i r s t a n d second Critique a s w e ll a s in h is p o litica l w ritin g s th a t K a n t b e liev es th e p ro b lem of a successfu l p o litica l o rg an iza tio n "m u s t be solvable."60 T h e p rob lem , as K a n t d escrib es it, is how to organ ize a group of r a t io n a l b e in g s to b e h a v e in accord w ith R ig h t, "th o u g h each is sec re tly in c lin ed to e x e m p t h im s e lf from such law s."81 K a n t a s s e r ts t h a t th e so lu tion to th is p ro b lem does not require the moral im provem ent of m an, it requires only th a t we know how to apply the mechanism of na tu re to m en so as to organize the conflict of hostile attitudes present in a people in such a way th a t they m ust compel one another to subm it to coercive law s and th u s to en ter into a state of peace, where laws have power.82 As e a r ly a s th e f ir s t Critique, K a n t a s s e r ts t h a t "th e m ore leg isla tion a n d g o v e rn m e n t a re b ro u g h t in to h a rm o n y w ith th e above id e a [of th e id e a l con- s titu tio n ] th e r a r e r w ould p u n ish m e n ts becom e, a n d i t is therefo re q u ite r a - tio n a l to m a in ta in ... t h a t in a p e rfe c t s t a te no p u n ish m e n ts w h a tso ev er w ou ld be re q u ire d ,"83 w ith th e obvious im p lica tio n b e in g t h a t th e re w ould be no p u n is h m e n ts b ecause no one w ou ld t r a n s g re s s th e p rin c ip le s o f R igh t. T h o u g h K a n t believes th a t th e co rrec t fo rm o f g o v e rn m en t can only be con- ceived on th e b asis o f th e m o ra l law , h e does n o t be lieve th a t such a govern - m e n t c a n only come ab o u t th ro u g h a d h e re n c e to th e m o ra l law . K a n t c a n n o t r ig h tly b e accused o f th in k in g too m u c h o f h u m a n n a tu re , for th ro u g h o u t h is p o litica l w ritin g s , h e in s is ts th a t R ig h t w ill em erg e p rec ise ly from h u m a n s ' te n d e n c ie s o f se lf-inc lina tion ; th is is th e p r im a ry th r u s t b eh in d a ll o f "T h eo ry a n d P ra c tice ." 79 "Perpetual Peace," Ak. 366. This passage has received a good deal of commentary, espe- cially at the recent, Eighth International Kant Conference. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 First Critique. A317 = B373. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 312 W h at a llow s fo r a so lu tio n to th e p rob lem of a p e rfe c t co n stitu tio n ? T hough K a n t does n o t a rg u e fo r i t explicitly , a p ro p e r d e fen se w ould lik e ly concern th e c la u se "i f o n ly th e y possess u n d e rs ta n d in g ." W h a t th is suggests , g iven th a t K a n t c o n tin u a lly em p h asizes th a t (po litical a s w e ll a s m oral) p ro g - re ss com es a b o u t th ro u g h se lf-in te re s ted ag en ts , is th a t th e m o re a n a tio n ap p ro x im ates th e fo rm o f R ig h t, th e m ore a ll se lfin te re s te d a g e n ts w ill see a n a d v a n ta g e to su ch a n o rg an iza tio n , as long as th ey a re n o t com pletely i r - ra tio n a l. T h is l a s t c la u se is in te n d e d to ru le o u t th o se in d iv id u a ls who, th o u g h th e y w ou ld recogn ize a s itu a tio n as b e in g a d v an tag e o u s , w ould e n - d a n g e r th e s i tu a t io n a n y w a y . T h u s , som eone w ith o u t u n d e rs ta n d in g , som e- one re a lly ir ra t io n a l , m ig h t jeo p a rd ize h is /h e r ow n a d v a n ta g e o u s s itu a tio n even th o u g h th in k in g s a id s i tu a tio n h e lp fu l to p rom o te h is /h e r ow n h a p p i- ness .84 B a rr in g su ch a n occurrence, i f K a n t is co rrec t in h is an a ly s is , even com pletely s e lf in te re s te d a g e n ts w ould p re fe r a n d u p h o ld a S ta te based on R ig h t becau se th e y w o u ld co rrec tly u n d e rs ta n d i t to be th e m o s t a d v a n ta - geous fo r th em . O bviously , th e q u e s tio n a rise s a s to w h e th e r su ch "dev il" agen ts rea lly w ould be lieve t h a t a s ta te o f R igh t w ould b e a d v a n ta g e o u s to them , a n d in h is a rtic le , "A C o n s titu tio n for a R ace o f D evils," W illiam C lohesy a r - gues th a t th e y w ould .85 C lohesy a sk s th e question , "W h at s o r t o f governm en t w ould a r ro g a n t a n d c y n ic a l dev ils form am ong them selves?"86 a n d con tends th a t i t w ou ld be a re p u b lic a n fo rm of governm ent. C lohesy concludes: 84 This is consistent with Kant's examination of evil in the Religion. There, the truly wicked person is just that individual who, while still hearing the call of the moral law, subjugates it to a general maxim whereby the agent's own happiness is of the highest value. Thus, the moral law is not trans- gressed simply for the sake of transgressing it, but rather for the sake of happiness. Thus, the "devil" as long as s/he had understanding, would be willing to maximize his/her own happiness, and thus act in ac- cord with Right (though not will in accord with the moral law). 85 William Clohesy, "A Constitution for a Race of Devils," in Proceedings o f the Eighth Inter- national Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, pt. 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 733-41. See also: Peter Laberge, "Von der Garantie des ewiges Friedens," pp. 162-3, and Otfried HOfFe, Den Staat braucht selbst ein Volk von Teufeln: philosophische Versuche zur Rechts (Stuttgart: Reclam. 1988). 86 "Constitution for a Race of Devils." p. 738. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 313 fearful of one another, unwilling and unable to take upon them selves the task of assuring good government, they m ight well decide th a t such a rule of law would best protect th e ir in terests while allowing m any unsavory private pur- suits and associations. T hat is, they would accept a rule of law grounded in practical reason because their prudential calculations would suggest th a t it would b e tte r suit their in terests than any other system . T h a t is, the devils would be persuaded by their understanding to accept a system despite the fact th a t it w as derived from the m oral reason of a ju s t lawgiver.87 T h u s C lohesy a rg u e s th a t dev ils w ould desire a re p u b lic a n form o f govern- m en t, one w h ic h recognized th e r ig h ts of in d iv id u a ls w h ile s t i l l e s ta b lish in g a sy stem w h ich w ould lim it th e possib ility of one p a r ty g a in in g th e u p p e r h a n d o f se lf-in te re s t, because i t w ou ld b e s t sa feg u a rd th e ir ow n in te re s ts . A nd C lohesy b r in g s u p th e im p o r ta n t p o in t th a t th is n e c e ssa rily re q u ire s "u n d e rs ta n d in g 7' on th e p a r t o f th e devils to recognize t h a t th is is in d ee d the b e s t s itu a tio n fo r them ; a n i r r a t io n a l devil w ho m isc o n s tru e d th e s itu a tio n m ig h t n o t b e w illing to a g re e to th e te rm s o f th is c o n tra c tu a l governm ent. T h is p rob lem aside, th e re seem s to be no prima facie re a s o n to th in k th a t K a n t is w ro n g in h is b e lie f t h a t a rep u b lican n a tio n a l c o n s titu tio n c a n arise in w hich a g e n ts w ill w illing ly p a rtic ip a te even i f on ly th ro u g h se lf-in te re s ted m otives.88 L e t u s r e tu rn to th e q u estio n of p e rp e tu a l peace g u a ra n te e d by n a tu re a lone. W e have a lre a d y seen how K a n t describes th is g u a ra n te e in th e "Id ea ," n a m e ly th a t th e u n so c ia l sociab ility o f h u m a n b e in g s w ill le a d th em to im p ro v e them selves, a n d "unconsciously p ro ceed to w a rd a n unknow n n a tu r a l en d , a s i f follow ing a g u id in g th rea d ... p ro m o tin g ] a n e n d th e y w ould se t l it t le s to re by , even i f th e y w ere aw are of i t ."89 H e re K a n t ta lk s ab o u t "th e 87 Ibid., p. 739. 88 Such an argument is similar to Rawl's take on the 'Veil of ignorance" method of thinking about government. 89 "Perpetual Peace." Ak. 17. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 314 in ev itab le outcom e"90 o f p ro g ress a n d a s ta te o f peace w hich - "p a rt ia l ly th ro u g h th e b e s t p o ss ib le in te r n a l o rgan iza tion ..., p a r tia lly th ro u g h com m on e x te rn a l a g re em e n t a n d leg is la tio n a s ta te s im ila r to a c iv il com m onw ealth is e s ta b lish e d a n d c a n m a in ta in its e lf automatically."91 B ecau se th is is g u a ra n te e d by a p la n o f n a tu re , K a n t ev en s ta te s in a foo tno te t h a t "th e ro le o f m an is th u s q u ite a rtif ic ia l."92 We see th is a g a in in "T h eo ry a n d P rac tice ," w here K a n t m ak e s th e bo ld s ta te m e n t th a t , re g a rd in g "e te rn a l p ro g ress ," one soon sees th a t th is im m easurably d istan t result depends not so much on w hat we do... nor on w hat method we adopt so as to bring it about; instead, it depends on w hat hum an nature does in and with us so as to compel us onto a path that we ourselves would not readily follow. Only from nature , or ra th e r only from providence..., can we anticipate a result th a t will affect the whole and, as a consequence, the parts.93 T hus, in a ll o f K a n t's po litica l w ritin g s ,94 i t is n a tu re a n d th e selfin te re s te d n a tu re o f in d iv id u a ls w hich a llow fo r th e g u a ra n te e o f peace, n o t m ere m o ra l w illing , a n d th e re a so n for th is n e ed seem s m o st l ik e ly to be th e n ecessity o f se cu rin g a p e rp e tu a l peace in th e face o f h u m a n freed o m .95 T h ro u g h w a r a n d u n so c ia l sociability , h u m a n s f in a lly com e to re je c t v iolence a n d w ar, fin a lly e n te r in g in to a rep u b lican c o n stitu tio n a n d a n in te rn a t io n a l 90 Ibid., Ak. 24. 91 Ibid., Ak. 25. 92 Ibid., Ak. 24 n. 93 "Theory and Practice," Ak. 310. 94 This is true even of the "Idea." See: Ak. 23n. and Ak. 25. 95 Thus, I think that Aleksander Bobko in his article, "The Problem of Evil and the Idea of Eternal Peace in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant" in Proceedings o f the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, p t 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), pp. 857-863, has simply misunderstood the nature of perpetual peace as it relates to moral issues. Bobko asks, "What char- acter then has the foundation which makes the basis for Kant's project of eternal peace? The answer to this question lies in the way we understand and solve the problem of evil," (p. 862). Bobko concludes that the foundation for perpetual peace is the elimination of evil (and thus is a problem solved by the estab- lishment of a moral community). But this seems completely wrong, for evil is the subordination of the moral law to the principle of happiness, and as such it is totally compatible with Right and with peace. Kant insists that peace is not a matter of morality, but only a matter of behavior, i.e., a question not of virtue but of Right. Thus, we simply do not require the elimination of evil for the establishment of peace. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 315 fed era tio n , even i f from e n tire ly se lf-in te re s ted m o tives. I th in k th a t K a n t be lieves such a g u a ra n te e to b e n ecessa ry because , a s n a tu r a l c re a tu re s , h u - m a n s a lw ays d e s ire to e x em p t th em se lv es from c o n s tra in ts w h ich re s tr ic t h a p p in e ss (n am e ly R igh t) a n d m a n ife s t a p ro p e n s ity to w a rd s violence. In d i- v id u a ls m u s t be utterly convinced t h a t w a r is u n d e s ira b le , conv inced beyond a m ere in te lle c tu a l belief, a s i t w ere. T h is is , o f course , n o t to sa y th a t w e a re h e lp le s s to p rom o te su c h a s itu a tio n ; in fac t, I h a v e t r ie d to a rg u e th a t w e h a v e a d u ty to do so. K a n t also p rov ides u s w ith th e n e c e ssa ry room fo r th is in te rp re ta t io n , w ritin g th a t peace d epends "n o t so m u ch " on u s , and , s ta tin g in "P e rp e tu a l P eace ," th a t ev en th o u g h n a tu r e "does i t [b rings abou t peace] h e rse lf , w h e th e r or n o t we w ill i t ,"96 g o v e rn m en t "is a moral task..., a n d i ts m e th o d o f p u rs u in g p e rp e t- u a l peace... is com plete ly d is t in c t [from m ere ly e m p iric a l co n sid era tio n s]."97 K an t, how ever, in s is ts th a t to try to w ork fo r p eace d irec tly a n d b y co n sid erin g i t a s a "m ere technical task" is in e ffe c tu a l. H e c la im s th a t peace "re q u ire s co n sid erab le n a tu r a l know ledge so t h a t one c a n u se n a tu r e 's m ech an ism to a t ta in th e d e s ire d end ; ye t i t is u n c e r ta in how th is m ech an ism w ill fu n c tio n a s f a r a s i ts con seq u en ces for p e rp e tu a l p eace a re concerned ; a n d th is is so in a ll th re e a re a s o f pub lic r ig h t."98 T h u s H offe w rite s th a t "for concrete , p o litica l ju d g m e n ts , a p h ilo so p h er is no m o re co m p e ten t th a n a n y o th e r w ell in fo rm e d a n d th in k in g citizen . K a n t does w e ll to le a v e su ch ju d g - m e n ts to p o litica l re p re s e n ta tiv e s a n d specia lized adv ice to law y ers ."99 K a n t is h e re u rg in g so m e th in g w h ich is analogous to h is w rit in g s a b o u t h a p p in e ss , 96 "Perpetual Peace," Ak. 365. 97 Ibid., Ak. 377. This is why, to repeat a point, I think that Susanne Weiper is wrong in her insistence in "Eine Idee zwischen Politik and Moral: Der Friedensgedanke bei Kant and Scheler" that the ends of nature and the ends of human beings should be considered as an antinomy, and, for the same rea- sons, Eckart von Sydow, in his "Der Gedanke des Ideal-Reichs bei Kant." 98 Ibid., Ak. 377. See also: Religion, pp. 113, 123-4, and 130 n. 99 Otfried H6flfe, "Einleitung: Der Friede - ein vemachlSssigtes Ideal." pp. 8-9. translation mine. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. i.e ., w e k n o w w h a t i t is o u r d u ty to do, b u t, conversely , w e a re q u ite u n ce r- t a i n a b o u t bow to b r in g a b o u t a n e n d w h ich belongs to a n u n sp ec ified con- c ep t. H a p p in e ss a n d p eace a re a lik e in t h a t th e y a re " ideas" a n d th e ir sp e - c ific c o n te n t is u n k n o w n to u s; i t is u n c e r ta in exactly how to b r in g ab o u t a s i tu a t io n in th e n a tu r a l w o rld in w h ich ev e ry n a tio n cou ld w o rk to g e th e r to e n s u re p eace . T hus, re a so n "cau tio n s u s n o t to em ploy p o w er in d irec t p u r - s u i t o f i t (peace], b u t r a th e r to a p p ro a c h i t in d ire c tly th ro u g h th o se conditions p r e s e n te d b y favo rab le c irc u m sta n ce s ... [T ]he less i t m ak e s co n d u ct depend on th e p ro p o sed end ... th e m o re c o n d u c t w ill in g e n e ra l h a rm o n iz e w ith m o- ra l i ty ."100 W h a t th is show s is th a t , u ltim a te ly , th e m o ra l la w com m ands w h a t i t a lw a y s h a s : obey th e ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e a n d ac t in acco rd b o th w ith R ig h t a n d w ith v ir tu e . W e m ay n o t k n o w exac tly how to fo rm a n in te rn a - tio n a l fed e ra tio n o f in d e p e n d e n t s ta te s ,101 b u t w e know th a t w e m u s t e s ta b - l is h a n in te rn a l c o n s titu tio n in accord w ith R ig h t a s w ell a s o rg an ize o u r n a - tio n in to a R epublic so t h a t a co sm o p o litan w orld can be m ore eas ily e s ta b - l is h e d a n d w a r can be avoided . K eep in m in d th a t th e u ltim a te hope is n o t s im p ly p eace , b u t to "tra n s fo rm a pathologically enforced a g re e m e n t in to a so c ie ty a n d , finally , in to a moral w hole ."102 L e t m e p a u se a m o m en t a n d in c lu d e som e re le v a n t o b se rv a tio n s from J e a n n e S ch u le r, since h e r a rtic le , "R e aso n ab le H ope: K a n t a s a C ritica l T h in k e r ," n ice ly a d d re sse s th is p ro b lem b e tw ee n h is to rica lly s itu a te d , con- c re te p o litic a l n eed s a n d K a n t's v is io n o f a u to p ia n fu tu re .103 S c h u le r ag rees 100 "Perpetual Peace," Ak. 378. 101 Though if Hdffe is correct in his arguments concerning the formation of a "Minimalstaat," and I think that he is, we may have more specific content than originally thought See: Otfried Hdffe, "Eine Weltrepublik als Minimalstaat: Zur Theorie internationaler politischer Gerechtigkeit," in Zum ewigen Frieden, eds. Reinhard Merkel and Roland Wittmann (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1966), 154-171, and Hdffe, "Vdlkerbund oder Weltrepublik." 102 "Idea," Ak. 21. 103 Jeanne Schuler, "Reasonable Hope: Kant as Critical Theorist," in Proceedings o f the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, pt. 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. 1995). 901-7. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 317 t h a t p ro g ress in h isto ry concerns "a le a rn in g process w hich lead s ... to in s t i - tu tio n s a n d policies req u ire d fo r h u m a n m o ra l developm ent,"104 a n d th u s th a t p o litic a l in s titu tio n s a re n e ce ssa ry b u t n o t su ffic ien t for m o ra l p ro g ress , since "a c a lc u la te d peace fa lls sh o r t o f e n lig h te n e d cu ltu re ... As h is to ry m oves from h o t to cold w ar, so peace b o m o f p ru d e n c e evolves tow ard m o ra lity ."105 B u t in a d d itio n to th is im p o rta n t p o in t, sh e a lso d iscusses th e in te rp la y b e tw e e n th e env isioned , m o ra l en d on one h a n d , a n d th e h is to rica lly s itu a te d , concre te ta s k s on th e o th e r. As sh e describes i t , th e re ex is ts a d ialectic b e tw ee n th e u to p ia n e n d a n d th e h is to rica l p rocess: the first provides a yardstick and direction; the second probes actual tenden- cies toward the ideal. Both offer perspectives on human nature in term s of its realization and its fumbling formation... Im m anent analysis w ithout utopia is blind. Utopia without im m anent analysis is em pty.106 In th is respec t, th en , i t is w ell t h a t K a n t in s is te d upon th e n e ed o f each side o f th is d ialectic , fo r n o t only w ou ld a p u re u to p ia be ra th e r fan c ifu l w h ile p u re po litics w ou ld be w ith o u t R ig h t, b u t a lso th e "end o f h is to ry " w o u ld h a v e b e en e ith e r com pletely non -defm ab le , or, conversely , m uch too specifica lly defined . T h e re is also no rea so n to th in k t h a t a n en lig h ten ed ru le r co u ld n o t h e lp sp e ed th is process along. R ecall, fo r in s ta n c e , th a t K a n t in s is ts th a t c h a n g e s in co n stitu tio n s , w hile n ecessa ry , sh o u ld be done slowly, so a s n o t to c h an g e too m u ch too fa s t a n d th u s r i s k reb e llio n .107 D ue to K a n t's a rg u m e n ts in th e f i r s t sec tion of th e Metaphysics of Morals t h a t th e ru le r or r u le r s m u s t h a v e com plete executive pow er, c o n s titu tio n a l change m u s t come fro m th e top dow n; le a rn e d people h av e a r ig h t a n d p e rh a p s a du ty to p u b lis h th e ir 104 Ibid., p . 912. 105 Ibid., p. 904. 106 Ibid., p. 906. i°7 C f ~ p erp etu a l P eace •• ^ 3 4 7 a n d 3 7 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 318 reco m m en d atio n s fo r c h an g es , b u t u ltim a te ly som e sovereign m u s t ta k e r e - sp o n sib ility fo r sen sib le a n d tim e ly reform s. T h u s C lohesy w rite s th a t although citizens and officials need not be m otivated by moral reason in their political action, reform will be best furthered by those who recognize its moral import. These m oral reform ers should be the ru lers themselves who a ttem pt gradually to change th e ir regimes by preparing th e ir subjects to become citi- zens. They should be the well-born, accustomed to participation in public af- fairs, who recognize the plight of the "great m asses" for the injustice th a t it is.108 G o v ern m en t is u ltim a te ly co n ce rn ed w ith th e r ig h ts o f p e rsons, w ith in d i- v id u a ls as e n d s in th em se lv e s . T h e ru le r w ho w ish e s to fu r th e r th e c a u se of R ig h t m u s t h a v e a n eye to th e n a tu re of th e m o ra l la w a n d of h u m a n b e in g s in bo th th e ir m o ra l a n d e m p iric a l n a tu re s . As K a n t m a in ta in s , "po litics says, 'B e ye w ise a s s e rp e n ts ,' to w h ich m o ra lity ad d s... 'a n d in n o cen t as doves'."109 C lohesy no tes t h a t "th e fo u n d in g of good g o v e rn m en t h a s a lw ays b een re c - ogn ized as one o f th e g re a te s t o f h u m a n accom plishm en ts. T he w isdom a n d lea d e rsh ip n e ed e d to b r in g to g e th e r frac tious, fr ig h te n e d , a n d n eed fu l peop le h a s b e en h e ld as a lm o s t d iv in e ."110 T he ex istence o f o u r ow n co u n try a n d c o n s titu tio n sh o u ld be a p r im e exam ple: w h a t w ou ld th e U n ite d S ta te s look l ik e w ith o u t people lik e F r a n k - lin , A dam s, Je ffe rso n , M ad ison , o r H am ilton? A nd, a s a rep u b lic d raw s i ts p o w er from th e peop le a s th e y give th e la w to th em se lv es , th e c o n tin u ed m a in te n a n c e a n d im p ro v e m e n t o f th e rep u b lic w ill fa ll u p o n th e sh o u ld e rs o f a ll, a n d th e ir a b ility to w o rk to g e th e r to fo rm n ew id e a s a n d reco m m en d a - tio n s . A s w e n o te d above, so lu tio n s to p a r t ic u la r p rob lem s, e n d in g poverty , fo r exam ple, w ill re q u ire e m p iric a l so lu tions, a n d w h ile th e m o ra l la w is th e fo u n d a tio n fo r su ch m ax im s, th e m ax im s th em se lv e s m u s t ta k e a p a r t ic u la r 108 "A Constitution for a Race of Devils," p. 737. 109 "To[ward]Perpetual Peace," Ak. 370. 110 "Reasonable Hope." pp. 738-9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. i 319 form . T h e fo rm th e y sh o u ld ta k e w ill b e u p to u s to decide, a n d th e com m u- n ity to e n a c t. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 320 Chapter Four The Five Stages of Moral Progress L In th is c h a p te r I w a n t to d iscuss K a n t's v is io n o f h o w th e m oral im - p ro v e m e n t o f th e h u m a n sp ec ie s is to p rogress. I b e liev e t h a t K a n t h a s in m in d five d is tin c t s ta g e s fo r th e h u m a n race , b e g in n in g w ith a s ta te o f n a tu re a n d le a d in g up to th e m o ra l K ingdom of God. I t se em s t h a t th e f irs t a n d la s t s ta g e e x is t in d ep e n d en tly , w h ile th e m idd le th re e s ta g e s a p p e a r to develop a t th e sa m e tim e . I w ill t r y to sp e ll o u t th e n a tu re , th e n e c e s s i ta te d du ties, a n d th e d a n g e rs in h e re n t in e a c h o f th e five s tag es . B ecau se K a n t does n o t sp e a k sp ec ifica lly o f th e re b e in g five s ta g e s or w h a t th e exc lu sive c h a ra c te ris tic s of e a c h s ta g e m ig h t be, I w ill do m y b e s t to m ak e a n o th e rw ise con fusing c h a r - a c te r iz a tio n d e a r , p e rh a p s u n n a tu ra l ly so. II. A. State o f Nature T h is is th e b e g in n in g s ta te o f h u m a n ex istence , a n d one ou t o f w hich w e h a v e a lre ad y p a sse d , i f w e w e re ever re a lly in it. T h is i s H obbes' s ta te of n a tu r e w h e re th e re is no la w , no R igh t, a n d no o rg a n iz a tio n o f in d iv id u a ls . T h is is th e o rig in a l co n d itio n w h ich gives r is e to K a n t's a g re e m e n t w ith H o b b es t h a t e n te r in g in to a c iv il society is a m a tte r o f c o n tra c t. T he p r im a ry d u ty o f p e rso n s in th is s ta te is s im p ly to leav e it, a n d e n te r in to civil society. T h e re a re ( a t least) th re e re a s o n s fo r th is . F irs t, as d isc u sse d before, i t w ou ld b e obv iously im possib le to a c t m o ra lly for a n y le n g th o f tim e in a society devo id o f a n y secu ritie s. Second , a n d re la ted ly , w e a re co m m an d ed to a c t in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 32! accord w ith th e m oral law , a n d th is m ea n s no t only a tte m p tin g to will m orally , b u t also m ean s th a t w e m u s t b eh av e in accord w ith R igh t, for only th e p r in c ip le s of R ig h t c an in s t ru c t u s on th e correct m a n ife s ta tio n of freedom . T h ird , w e m u s t e n te r in to a society in o rd er to s t im u la te an d im prove o u r ta le n ts of sk ill a n d o f d isc ip line . W ithou t a c iv il society, we w ould b e te m p te d to rem a in h u n te r s a n d g a th e re rs , to be R obinson Crusoe, o r s im p ly to b e con ten t. C o n ten tm en t, how ever, p laces u s b a c k on th e level of o th e r a n im a ls , a n d c an n o t be c o n s is te n t w ith our f in a l e n d a s m o ra l agen ts. T h u s, w e m u s t leave th is s ta te o f n a tu re , a s we a lread y h a v e , in o rder to e n te r in to a society. R National/Internal Constitution K a n t m ak es i t c lea r th a t th is s ta g e a n d th e n e x t a re codependen t upon e a c h o th er, fo r a pe rfec t in te rn a l a n d ex te rn a l c o n s titu tio n a re both n e c e ssa ry to sa fe g u a rd each o th e r . O rig in a lly , how ever, th is s ta g e beg ins (a n d p e rh a p s for a long tim e c o n tin u es) w ith som e type o f in te r n a l co n stitu - tion , w h ile th e re re m a in s a s ta te o f n a tu r e betw een n a tio n s . T h is ex ternal, in te rn a t io n a l s ta te of n a tu re c o n tin u es to th re a te n each n a tio n 's in te rn a l com position because of a c tu a l w a rs a s w ell a s th e m e n ta l a n d f in a n cial r e - sou rces d ra in e d th ro u g h th e p re p a ra tio n o f w ar. W hile w e a re a lw ays com- m a n d e d to w ill in accord w ith a ll a sp ec ts o f th e m oral law , th e focus a n d th e e m p h a s is a t th is s tage , i f only fo r th e sa k e o f clarification , is on R ight. T h e m ost u rg e n t concern is to e s ta b lish a rep u b lica n form of govern- m e n t so t h a t in te rn a tio n a l peace c a n be prom oted . As w e h a v e seen , K a n t in s is ts t h a t a rep u b lican form o f g o v e rn m en t h a s th e b e s t ch an c e fo r p rom ot- in g p eace , s in ce th e people o u g h t to be c o n su lted before a w a r w ould be pos- s ib le .1 I f w orld ly s itu a tio n s c an effect th e ab ility o f p e rso n s to ta k e on th e 1 Though I think Kant is ultimately correct in this belief, there are possible objections to this: 1) that nations with republican governments have a history of war equal to those without a republican government, 2) that the people are not, in fact directly consulted regarding the decision to go to war, and 3) that many wars are fought not for monetary gain, as Kant seems to emphasize, but instead fought for revenge, prestige, or a host of other possibilities. On these objections see (respectively): Michael W. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 322 m o ra l pro ject in e a rn e s t, th e n K a n t seem s r ig h t to u rg e th a t ou r im m ed ia te co n cern s ough t to be w ith co n tro lling th is s i tu a tio n . W ar, a s th e la rg e s t th r e a t to m orality by fa r , m u s t be e lim in a ted . C u ltu re , b o th as sk ill, th e a b ility to se t a n d p u r s u e en d s, a s w ell a s d isc ip line , th e a b ility to c o n s is ten tly choose m o ra l ends, is u ltim a te ly th re a te n e d a n d h a m p e re d by w a r a n d th e p re p a ra tio n for w a r.2 Y et, c u ltu re p lay s a n e s se n tia l ro le in th e p ro g ress io n o f th e h u m a n species. I t is c u ltu re w hich allow s u s to c o n tin u e to develop o u r ta le n ts in a s ta te o f conflic t w ith o u t b e in g in a s ta te o f w a r. T he fo rm atio n o f a rep u b lic co n tin u a lly ap p ro x im a tin g a p e rfec t c o n s titu tio n is n ecessa ry fo r th e sa fe g u a rd in g of c u ltu re a n d for th e e lim in a tio n o f w a r. In o th e r w ords, K a n t believes th a t a c e r ta in type o f in te rn a l c o n s titu tio n is n ecessa ry before a n e x te rn a l one can be c rea ted , hence, in th e in te re s t o f e lim in a tin g w ar, w e m u s t c re a te th is re p u b lic a n form o f g o v ern m en t to p u rs u e peace. In add ition to th is r a th e r n e g a tiv e need , th e re a re also sev e ra l p o si- t iv e a sp ec ts to th e re p u b lic a n system o f g o v ernm en t. O n e is th e sim p le fac t t h a t K a n t believes th is to be th e only o rg an iz a tio n for free ly w illing a g en ts t h a t is possib ly c o n s is te n t w ith th e m o ra l law , a n d h e n ce w e h av e th e m o ra l d u ty to prom ote th is o rg an iza tio n . K a n t's v e ry d e fin itio n o f R ig h t is: "A ny a c tio n is right i f i t c a n coex ist w ith everyone's freedom in accordance w ith a u n iv e rs a l law , or i f on i t s m ax im th e freedom of choice o f each can coexist w ith everyone's freedom in accordance w ith a u n iv e rs a l law ,"3 th u s n o t on ly m u s t I a c t in accord w ith R ig h t, b u t I am also a llow ed to coerce o th e rs in to th is sy s tem of R ig h t.4 T h e c a ll to R ig h t is "b a se d on ev ery o n e's consciousness Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (1983): 205-35 and 323-53; Otfried HOffe, "Ausblick: Die Vereinten Nationen im Lichte Kants," in Immanuel Kant: Zum ewigen Frieden, ed. Otfried HOffe (Berlin: Akedemie Verlag, 1995), 254-56; and Susanne Weiper, "Eine Idee zwischen Politik and Moral: Der Friedensgedanke bei Kant and Scheler," p. 914. 2 Cf.. "Idea," Ak. 27. 3 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 230. Gregor trans. 4 Cf., Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 230-33. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ? i 323 o f o b lig a tio n in acco rdance w ith a law ."5 S u ch a c o n s titu tio n is also n ecessi- t a te d b ecau se th e m o ra l la w is c o n s titu te d su c h t h a t th e in d iv id u a l m u s t re p - r e s e n t g iv ing law s to h im /h e rse lf , re p re se n tin g th e law n o t a s som eth ing w h ic h is foreign to h im /h e rse lf , th u s th e law s o f th e S ta te m u s t be such th a t th e y cou ld be ag re ed to by a ll p e rso n s a n d n o t s im p ly b e a rb itra ry .6 In ad d itio n , a re p u b lic a n c o n s titu tio n seem s s im p ly to be m ost desir- able, m o ra l is su e s a s id e . U n le ss one is p a r t o f th e ru l in g o r pow erfu l c lass, a c o n s titu tio n w h ich is in acco rd w ith E ig h t w ill le a d to a sy s te m o f govern- m e n t w h ich is m o st r e p re s e n ta t iv e o f th e r ig h ts 7 a n d d e s ire s o f h u m an be- in g s . T h is is th e th in k in g b e h in d th e c o n s titu tio n w h ich is possib le fo r a race o f dev ils . W e w ill a lw ay s b e m oved to w a rd a re p u b lic a n co n stitu tio n , fo r o u r n a tu r e a s m oral p e rso n s , a s w ell a s h u m a n b e in g s , w ill u rg e u s to s triv e for th is goal, th u s " n a tu re a n d freed o m alone" gu id e u s to th is end . A nd, in ad d itio n , th e re is a n o th e r su g g e s tio n from K a n t a s to w hy su c h a c o n s titu tio n is to b e s tr iv e d for, k eep in g in m in d o u r f in a l m oral end . T h is is fo u n d in th e "Id e a " w h e re K a n t, sp e a k in g a b o u t th e n e e d to m ove o u t o f th e s ta te of n a tu re , u se s th e fo llow ing analogy: I t is ju st as w ith trees in a forest, which need each other, for in seeking to take the a ir and sunlight from the others, each obtains a beautiful, straight shape, while those th a t grow in freedom and separate from one another branch out randomly, and are stun ted , bent, and twisted. All the culture and a r t th a t adorn man, as well as the m ost beautiful social order, are fruits of unsociable- ness th a t is forced to discipline itself and thus through an imposed a rt to de- velop nature's seed completely.8 5 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 232. 6 Cf., "Idea," Ak. 23, "Theory and Practice," Ak. 289 ff„ and "To[ward] Perpetual Peace," Ak. 379. 71 think that there is a possible non-moral use of this term, and I understand "rights" here in that respect. 8 "Idea." Ak. 22. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 324 H e re a g a in w e see K a n t's n o tio n o f an tag o n ism w ith o u t v io lence , conflict w ith o u t w a r. A c o n s titu tio n in accord w ith R ig h t is d e s ira b le b ecau se i t a llow s fo r t h a t s i tu a t io n in w h ich each p e rso n c a n m ax im ize th e i r freedom w ith o u t v io la tin g th e freed o m of o th e rs . A n d th is s i tu a t io n is d e s irab le b e ca u se i t f u r th e r s th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f c u ltu re , w h ich , in tu r n , fu r th e r s th e m o ra l en d .9 W hile I th in k th e e m p h a s is a t th is s ta g e m u s t be o n R ig h t, su re ly w e m u s t a lso c o n tin u e to t r y to p u r s u e those a d d itio n a l d u tie s o f v ir tu e . W e o u g h t to t ry to p ro m o te th e h a p p in e s s of o th e rs a s w e ll a s w o rk on ou r ow n m o ra l w illing . W e a lso o u g h t to w o rk on th o se e x te rn a l c o n s tra in ts w hich m ig h t h in d e r o th e rs b o th from b e h a v in g a n d w illin g in acco rd w ith th e m o ra l law ; th u s , w e o u g h t to t r y to e lim in a te poverty a n d to focus on th e develop- m e n t o f c u ltu re . H ow ever, th e p ro b lem w ith th is , a s I h a v e a rg u e d , is th a t , acco rd ing to K a n t, w a r w ill c o n tin u a lly th re a te n su c h p ro jec ts a s long a s i t re m a in s a th re a t . T h u s , le t u s sa v e a d iscussion o f su c h p o s itiv e d u tie s for th e sec tion on c u ltu re a n d ecc le s ias tic a l fa ith below . C Federation o f Nations O u r d u tie s h e re a re b a s ic a lly o u tlin ed b y K a n t in "To [w ard] P e rp e tu a l P eace ." O n th e n e g a tiv e side, i t is th e d u ty of ev e ry n a tio n to e n te r in to a n o rg an iz a tio n of a l l n a tio n s , "a n en d u rin g , e v e r e x p a n d in g federation t h a t p re v e n ts w a r a n d c u rb s th e ten d en cy of t h a t h o s tile in c lin a tio n to defy th e law ..."10 K a n t in s is ts t h a t n a tio n s canno t give u p th e ir in d ep e n d en c e a n d 9 There is one further suggestion made by Kant, but I am uncertain as to its exact nature or forcefulness. This is the suggestion in "To[ward] Perpetual Peace," especially at Ak. 354, 356-7, and 379, that because of the analogy between persons moving from a state of nature into civil society and nations moving from the international state of nature into a federation of nations, States would have to be republi- can in form because that is the only way they would be autonomous. It is clear in this essay that Kant believes that nations cannot give up their constitutions and their independence, and that the federation cannot be ruled by a single nation. Thus, the suggestion is something to the effect that because the fed- eration must consist of independent nation-states along the analogy of a nation organized in accord with Right, each nation must be free and autonomous, and the only condition under which this is possible is if each nation has a republican constitution. 10 "To[ward] Perpetual Peace." Ak. 357. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. » 325 e n te r in to one g ia n t a n d d esp o tic w o rld -n a tio n .11 T he fed e ra tio n m u s t keep e a c h n a tio n as in d e p e n d e n t. K a n t's suggestion seem s to be n o t only th a t a w o rld ru le d by a sing le d ic ta to r w ould be f r a u g h t w ith too m uch peril, b u t a lso th a t , in th e sa m e w ay t h a t in d iv id u a l p e rso n s c a n n o t be a sk ed to give up a l l o f th e i r freedom , no n a tio n c a n be a sk ed to g ive u p i ts r ig h t to se lf r u le .12 T h u s , th e fed e ra tio n "does n o t se e k an y pow er o f th e so rt p ossessed by n a tio n s , b u t only th e m a in te n a n c e a n d secu rity o f each n a tio n 's ow n freedom , a s w e ll a s th a t o f th e o th e r n a tio n s lea g u ed w ith it... [T ]his idea of federalism sh o u ld e v e n tu a lly in c lu d e a ll n a tio n s a n d th u s le a d to p e rp e tu a l p e ac e ."13 I t is a lso th e (n eg a tiv e ) d u ty o f each n a tio n n o t to engage in those p ra c tic e s , such a s s ta n d in g a rm ies , a ssa ss in a tio n , o r n a tio n a l deb t, w hich m ig h t provoke n a tio n s to e n g a g e in w ar. E ach n a tio n m u s t do a s m uch as p o ss ib le to e n su re th a t w a r w ill b e fo rever e lim in a te d . H ow ever, a s O tfr ie d H dffe p o in ts o u t in se v e ra l a rtic le s ,14 K a n t's po- s it io n re g a rd in g th e fe d e ra tio n o f n a tio n s is com p lica ted a n d even co n trad ic - to ry . O n th e one h a n d , a s m e n tio n e d above, K a n t m ak es th e analogy b e - tw e e n th e n eed o f in d iv id u a ls to m ove ou t o f a s ta te o f n a tu re a n d th e n e e d o f n a tio n s to move o u t of a n ( in te rn a tio n a l) s ta te o f n a tu re . T hus, som e consti- tu t io n is needed to p ro m o te p e ac e be tw een n a tio n s . O n th e o th e r h a n d , K a n t is c o n ce rn ed to p ro tec t th e so v e re ig n ty of each in d iv id u a l n a tio n , in th e sam e w a y t h a t th e sovere ign ty o f e v e ry in d iv id u a l o u g h t to b e p ro tec ted w ith in a n a tio n . H ow ever, K a n t ta k e s th is p ro tec tion to th e ex trem e, m a in ta in in g t h a t th e re la tio n sh ip m u s t b e "a fed e ra tio n of nations, b u t i t m u s t n o t be a 11 Cf., "Theory and Practice," Ak. 310-11, and "To[ward] Perpetual Peace," Ak. 354 ff. 12 Kant often uses the analogy between individual persons leaving a state of nature, and sepa- rate nations leaving an international state of nature. 13 "To[ward] Perpetual Peace," Ak. 356. 14 Otfried Hdffe, "Eine Weltrepublik als Minimalstaat: Zur Theorie intemationaler politischer Gerechtigkeit," pp. 154-171; "Volkerbund oder Weltrepublik." pp. 109-132; and Vernunft undRecht (1996). Chapter 5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 326 n a tio n co n sis tin g of n a tio n s ."15 H e a lso a sse rts th a t n a tio n s w ill n o t w a n t to e n te r in to a nation of peoples... because it does not conform to their idea of the right of na- tions... so (if everything is not to be lost) in place of the positive idea of a world republic they pu t only th e negative surrogate of an enduring, ever expanding federation... though there will alw ays be constant danger of th e ir breaking loose.16 T h u s , th e re is a ten s io n , i f n o t a co n trad ic tio n , in K a n t's e x tre m e p ro tec tion o f th e n a tio n -s ta te w hich is n o t e q u a lly ap p lied in th is an a lo g y to th e in d i- v id u a l. H ence, Hofife p o in ts o u t t h a t th e re is a con trad ic tion : i f w e follow the a n a lo g y l in k in g in d iv id u a ls a n d n a tio n s "th e V o lk e rs taa t [w orld repub lic] a n d n o t th e V o lkerbund [fed e ra tio n ] seem s to [logically] follow ."17 I t seem s in a d e q u a te for K a n t to in s i s t t h a t n a tio n s ough t to be ab le to a rb i t r a r i ly en - t e r a n d ex it th is fed e ra tio n o f n a tio n s , i.e., th is e s ta b lish m e n t o f a V o lker- b u n d w h ich is a m ere "n e g a tiv e su rro g a te ," for w ith o u t a n y p o w e r to enforce a p e ac e fu l u n ion , such a sc en a rio le a d s on ly to a tem p o ra ry p e a c e l ik e th e "h o u se o f Sw ift."18 J u s t a s in d iv id u a ls m u s t re lin q u ish som e o f th e i r freedom in o rd e r to e n te r in to a leg a l society , n a tio n s ough t to e n te r in to a re la tio n - sh ip w ith one a n o th e r in w h ic h th e y c a n n o t sim ply choose to b re a k th e law s a n d lea v e th e u n io n w h e n ev e r th e y w ish . K a n t is n o t ta k in g h is a n a lo g y se- rio u s ly enough , a n d sh o u ld re q u ire n a tio n s to u ndergo th e sa m e sacrifices as in d iv id u a ls in o rd e r to leav e th e s ta te o f (in te rn a tio n a l) n a tu re . B u t how c an K a n t r e q u ire t h a t n a tio n s leave th e s ta te o f n a tu r e w ith o u t v io la tin g th e ir so v e re ig n ty a n d w ith o u t fo u n d in g a w o rld despotism ? 15 "To[ward] Perpetual Peace," Ak. 354. "...ein Volkerbund, der aber gleichwohl kein Volkerstaat [1st]..." 16 Ibid., Ak. 357. 17 HOffe, "Volkerbund oder Weltrepublik?" p. 113. All translations of HOffe are my own. 18 "Theory and Practice." Ak. 312. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. HofFe's so lu tion is a n in s ig h tfu l, a n d I th in k correct, a n s w e r to th is p rob lem . S in ce "a ll" th a t is re q u ire d from a n in te rn a tio n a l o rg a n iz a tio n of n a tio n s is th e se c u r in g of (p e rp e tu a l) p eace , a V o lk e rs taa t cou ld b e fo u n d ed w hose on ly m iss io n w a s "th e co o rd in a tio n an d , above all, v io len t-free so lu tio n to conflicts [be tw een n a tio n s]"19 a n d "a w ell d e fin ed and , a t th e sa m e tim e , a s su re d leg a l p ro te c tio n (Rechtsschutzes) [for a ll in d iv id u a l n a tio n s ] ."20 In o th e r w ords, th e job o f th e w orld o rg a n iz a tio n w o u ld be th e se cu rin g o f so v e re ig n ty fo r each in d iv id u a l n a tio n . A n y th in g above a n d beyond th is p ro tec tio n , how ever, "w o u ld v io la te th e n a tu r a l r ig h t (Menschenrecht) o f n a tio n s , th e n a tio n 's r ig h t to (p o litica l a n d c u ltu ra l) se lf-d e te rm in a tio n ."21 In th is m a n n e r , th e sover- e ig n ty o f each n a tio n is p ro te c te d w h ile peace is p ro m o ted . U s in g th e a n a l- ogy b e tw ee n in d iv id u a ls a n d n a tio n s , H offe a rg u e s t h a t th e re m u s t be som e o fficial pow er to enforce th e so v e re ig n ty o f each n a tio n , to p ro tec t i t from e n - c ro a c h m e n ts from o th e r n a tio n s ; a m ere v o lu n ta ry o rg a n iz a tio n w ith no offi- c ia l p o w er o r an o rg a n iz a tio n n o t fo rm ed in accord w ith R ig h t w ill s im p ly n o t su ffice . T h u s, g iven th e r e s t o f K a n t's p o litica l w ritin g s , i t seem s H offe is r ig h t to a rg u e for th is s tro n g e r n e e d for a n a tio n o f n a tio n s . H ow ever, a n a d d itio n a l com m en t m ay be im p o r ta n t h e re , n am e ly to n o te t h a t Hoffe h im se lf seem s n o t to go fa r enough re g a rd in g th e n ecessity of th is re q u ire m e n t fo r th e fo rm a tio n o f a V o lk e rs taa t. H e a s s e r ts th a t , b ecau se w e m u s t accep t th e r ig h t o f se lf-d e te rm in a tio n of a ll n a tio n s a s so fu n d a m e n ta l , "one m ay n o t force a n in d iv id u a l n a tio n in to jo in in g a fe d e ra tio n o f n a tio n s n o r force i t s conversion in to a re p u b lic a n form o f g o v e rn m e n t."22 Y et th is does n o t h a rm o n ize w ith th e an a lo g y . I f w e consider th e co n d itio n of in d iv id u a ls w ith in a n a tio n , su re ly th e S ta te h a s n o t on ly th e r ig h t, b u t also th e re q u ire m e n t (in accord w ith R igh t) to force people in to a 19 "Eine Weltrepublik as Minimalstaat," p. 162. 20 Ibid., p. 163. 21 HOfife, "Volkerbund oder Weltrepublik?" p. 117. 22 Ibid.. pp. 117-8. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. f i 328 leg a l o rg an iz a tio n , a n d to force th e m to behave accord ing ly . As H offe h im sp lf w rites : "th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a d e fin ite society is a d u ty ... [and] c e r ta in ly p re s e n ts a c a teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e o f R ig h t."23 T ho u g h th e in d iv id u a l r e ta in s h is /h e r in d iv id u a l r ig h ts a t a ll t im e s (or a t le a s t o u g h t to) a n d r e m a in s th e u ltim a te fo u n d a tio n fo r a n y n a tio n a l o rg an iza tio n , t h a t in d iv id u a l does n o t re se rv e th e r ig h t to e x e m p t h im /h e rs e lf from th a t n a tio n . H ence, k e e p in g w ith th e an a logy , i t se e m s th a t a n in te rn a t io n a l o rg an iz a tio n w o u ld in d e e d h av e th e r ig h t to fo rce n a tio n s in to a fed e ra tio n o f n a tio n s , a V o lk e rs ta a t a n d n o t a m ere V o lk e rb u n d . G iven th e re q u ire m e n t o f R ig h t t h a t in d iv id u a ls a n d in d iv id u a l n a tio n s o u g h t to leav e th e i r s ta te o f n a tu re , a V o lk e rs ta a t o u g h t to h a v e som e r ig h t to a t l e a s t p u t p r e s s u re on o th e r n a tio n s to jo in th is o rg an iza tio n , e sp ec ia lly since i ts o n ly pow er w ould be to p ro tec t th e so v e re ig n ty o f e ac h n a t io n .24 M oving to m o re p o sitiv e c o n s id e ra tio n s c o n ce rn in g th is t h i r d s ta g e of m o ra l p ro g ress , K a n t in d ic a te s t h a t n a tio n s sh o u ld t r y to p rom o te in te ra c tio n b e tw een th e peo p le o f d iffe ren t n a tio n s , especially w ith a n eye to p ro m o tin g tra d e .25 K a n t m a k e s th e d is tin c tio n in "To[w ard] P e rp e tu a l P eace" n o t only b e tw een a n a tio n a l a n d in te rn a t io n a l co n stitu tio n , b u t also b e tw e e n "one con- fo rm ing to th e rights o f nations in re la tio n to one a n o th e r ... [and] o n e con- fo rm ing to th e rights o f world citizenship, so fa r a s m en a n d n a tio n s s ta n d in m u tu a lly in f lu e n tia l re la tio n s a s c itiz e n s o f a u n iv e rsa l n a tio n of m e n ."26 W hile th e fo rm er se em s to concern th e w ork of th e fe d e ra tio n to p re v e n t w ar, 23 p. 25. In: Otfried HSffe, "Einleitung: Der Friede - ein vemachlassigtes Ideal." 24 In a private discussion with HdfFe (Tubingen, Deutschland, November 1996), he admitted that this was indeed a problem, and indicated that what he should have stated more clearly in these arti- cles is not that a Volkerstaat could not try to compel other nations to join the federation, but only that they could not use violence in order to do so. HOfife said he would deal with this in a forthcoming book. It remains unclear, however, just how far a Volkerstaat could use its power in order to compel other nations to join i t Economic sanctions? Mere political pressure? 25 There remains the possibility that this is merely a negative duty, since trade is only one means among many for the elimination of war. However, I think that Kant would insist on the interaction of individuals for the mere sake of promoting cosmopolitanism, thus as a (positive) end itself. 26 "To[ward] Perpetual Peace." Ak. 348 n. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 329 th e la t te r se em s to be concerned w ith "u n iv e rs a l hospitality "2~ T hus, th is la t te r d u ty is n o t a d u ty b e tw een n a tio n s , b u t in s te a d b e tw ee n th e in d iv id u a l a n d fo re ign p e rso n s or n a tio n s . T h u s, K a n t co n sid ers i t a m a tte r even o f R igh t fo r in d iv id u a ls to be a llow ed to v is it o th e r c o u n tr ie s peacefully . T h e re seem to b e (a t le a s t) fo u r rea so n s w h y th is second d u ty m ig h t be n ecessa ry . T he f i r s t re a so n is th a t i t is n e ce ssa ry to b o ls te r trad e , a device w hich c o n tr ib u te s to peace .28 Second, "b ecau se a ... com m u n ity w idely p r e - vails am o n g th e E a r th 's peop les, a tra n sg re s s io n o f r ig h ts in one p lace in th e w orld is fe lt everywhere"29 T h is a p p e a rs to in d ic a te th e p ra g m a tic co n sid - e ra tio n t h a t w e ough t to t r e a t fo re ig n e rs in accord w ith R ig h t so n o t a s to th re a te n re la tio n s b e tw een n a tio n s . T h ird , i t is s im p ly a m a tte r o f R ig h t to t r e a t a ll p e rs o n s in th is m a n n e r . F o u rth , i f w e a re to ta k e K a n t's in s is ten c e o f th e d u ty to e s ta b lish a k ingdom o f G od on e a r th , c le a r ly w e h av e to be ab le to in te ra c t w ith each o th e r in te rm s of cosm opo litan (weltbiirgerlich) c itizens, in d iv id u a ls w ho, w hile a lw ay s be long ing to som e S ta te o r o ther, w ill h a v e to in te ra c t in o rd e r to active ly p rom ote a m o ra l w orld . W hile th is fo u rth re a so n w ill le a d u s in to th e n e x t s ta g e o f m o ra l developm en t, a t th is s tag e w e c a n th in k o f th is d u ty tow ards cosm opo litan ism a s th e d u ty to t r e a t p e rso n s from d ifferen t n a tio n s in accord w ith R igh t, a g a in s tre s s in g a t th is s tag e p o litica l a n d e x te rn a l d u tie s over th o se o f v ir tu e . B efore m oving on to th e n e x t s ta g e o f m o ra l developm en t, le t u s a d - d ress th e fo llow ing q u estio n for th e la s t tim e: Is a s ta te o f p e rp e tu a l p eace a moral cond ition? I h a v e t r ie d to a rg u e in sec tions above t h a t i t is not. K a n t in s is ts a g a in a n d again t h a t w a r w ill e v e n tu a lly b e e lim in a te d th ro u g h n a - tu re alone, a n d th a t w e w ill e n te r in to a fed e ra tio n e v en i f w e a re n o t w illin g 27 Ibid., Ak. 357. 28 Cf., ~To[ward] Perpetual Peace." Ak. 359 and 368. 29 ~To[ward] Perpetual Peace." Ak. 360. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 330 to do so.30 F rom th e f irs t to th e la s t o f K a n t's a rtic le s on peace a n d po litics, h e h o ld s th a t obedience to th e la w s of R ig h t "e v en tu a lly ... w ill also e x te n d to n a tio n s in th e ir e x te rn a l re la tio n s to w a rd one a n o th e r up to th e re a liz a tio n of th e cosm opolitan society, w ith o u t th e m o ra l fo u n d a tio n in m a n k in d h a v in g to b e e n la rg e d in th e le a s t..."31 P eace w ill be a ch iev e d th ro u g h se lf-in te re s t. Y ovel com es to e x ac tly th e sam e conclusion in h is Kant and the Philosophy of History w ritin g , am o n g o th e r th in g s , th a t : na tu re cannot produce the goal of history. I t reaches only as far as the stage of culture. As such, it can produce the political facet of the highest good, b u t even here it is only a sufficient, not a necessary condition. As for the ethical com- m unity, the core of the historical ideal... n a tu re can only prepare the external ground for it by ensuring a political order, guaranteeing life and property, re- fining the b ru tish instincts. But it cannot bring about the system of ethical dispositions itself.32 W olfgang R od a rg u e s fo r th e sam e conclusion , m a in ta in in g th a t , b e ca u se th e o rg an iz a tio n o f a l l n a tio n s in accord w ith R ig h t "is n o t th e la s t goal, b u t i ts e lf o n ly a m ean s, th is show s, th ere fo re , t h a t a cco rd in g to K an t, th e f in a l goa l of h is to ry ex is ts in th e m o ra liz in g o f h u m a n k in d , w h ich shou ld follow from th e i r c iv ilization a n d c u ltu ra liz a tio n ."33 L ew is W h ite B eck w rite s t h a t "m o ra lity is n o t a p ro d u c t of n a tu re , b u t o f a n e w b eg in n in g w hich, n e v e r th e - le ss , p resu p p o se s th e n a tu ra l p rocesses le a d in g up to civ ilization ,"34 a n d th a t 30 Pierre Leberge has worked out a very detailed version of how nature secures such peace even though we do not wish it, focusing particularly on war, differences in speech and religion, and trade. See: "Von der Garantie des ewigen Friedens," pp. 149-170. 31 "Is the Human Race Improving?" p. 167. Notice, however, that such phrasing does leave room for the possibility of our helping this peace along, for the thrust here, like all of Kant's writings on this issue, is that peace will occur whether or not we will it. Thus, it is possible that we do indeed will it, and perhaps can help to further i t 32 p. 196. Yirmiahu Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy o f History. Yovel's section, "Rational History Versus Natural Dialectic" is absolutely clear on this point. 33 p. 140. Wolfgang Red, "Die Rolle transzendentaler Prinzipien in Moral und Politik." Translation mine. 34 pp. 198-9. Lewis White Beck. Essays on Kant and Hume (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. m oral p ro g ress "is not a n e v e n t occu rrin g u n d e r th e m ech an ism o f n a tu r e ."35 F ina lly , J e a n n e S c h u le r sim p ly n o te s th a t "a c a lc u la te d peace fa l ls s h o r t of e n lig h te n e d c u ltu re . C o rd ia l t r a d e re la tio n s [for exam ple] d isc o u rag e J a p a n b a sh in g b u t do n o t c o n s titu te m u tu a l resp ec t."36 T h e re a re n u m e ro u s h in ts th ro u g h o u t K a n t's w ritin g s w h ich in d ic a te t h a t p e ac e is a n e c e ssa ry p re c u r- so r to m o ra l im p ro v em en t, b u t t h a t i t is n o t i ts e l f m o ra l. In a d d itio n to th e m a n y q u o ta tio n s I h a v e c ite d above, l e t m e offer a few m ore in o rd e r to secu re th is a rg u m e n t. In th e f if th "T h es is" o f th e "Id ea ," re g a rd in g th e e s ta b lish m e n t o f "a p e rfec tly rightful civil constitution," K a n t w rite s t h a t "on ly by so lv ing a n d co m p le tin g i t c a n n a tu re f u l f i l l h e r o th e r ob- jec tives w ith o u r species,"37 th u s g iv in g u s th e c lu e t h a t i t is m o ra lity , n o t peace, w hich is th e f in a l e n d o f n a tu r e a n d w h ich w ill occur a f te r th e e s ta b - lish m e n t o f peace. In th e "E n d o f A ll T h in g s ," K a n t ad d re sses a s im ila r them e, a n d g ives u s som e in d ic a tio n o f s e p a ra te s ta g e s of p ro g ress : In the n a tu ra l progress of the hum an race, ta len ts, skills, and tastes... become cultured before m orality develops, and this s ta te is precisely the m ost burden- some and dangerous one possible for morality... However, h u m a n it y 's moral capacity..., which always lags behind, will som eday overtake them (as one may hope to occur under a wise world ruler), though in its hasty course it becomes tangled in itself and often stum bles...38 I ta k e K a n t's d iscussion o f w ell-being , bo th in th e s e sections a n d in h is d iscussion of A rc ad ian sh e p h e rd s a n d th e T a h i t ia n is lan d s , to in d ic a te th a t peace is m ere w ell-be ing a n d m e re w ell-being is o n ly "g litte r in g m ise ry " i f i t is n o t "g ra f te d on to m o ra lity ."39 I n "T heory a n d P rac tice ," ta lk in g a b o u t how la te r g e n e ra tio n s w ill e v e n tu a lly d isco n tin u e w a r fo r m ere ly f in a n cia l 35 Ibid., p. 201. 36 p. 904. Jeanne Schuler, "Reasonable Hope: Kant as Critical Theorist," 901-907. 37 "Idea." Ak. 22. 38 "End of All Things," Ak. 332. Compare with "Idea." Ak. 26. 39 "Idea." Ak. 26. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. i r 332 rea so n s , K a n t w r ite s t h a t "succeed ing g e n e ra tio n s (u n b u rd e n e d by d eb ts th e y th em se lv e s h a v e n o t in cu rre d ) w ill be a b le e v e n in a m o ra l sense to m ak e ev e r m ore p ro g re ss to w a rd s b e tte r in g th e m se lv e s . A n d th e y w ill do th is n o t a s a r e s u l t o f a n y love o f th e ir a n c e s to rs fo r th e m , b u t r a th e r solely by v ir tu e of... self-love."40 I n "P e rp e tu a l P e a ce " K a n t w r ite s exp licitly : "a good n a tio n a l c o n s itu tio n 41 c a n n o t b e expected to a r is e f ro m m o ra lity , b u t, ra th e r , q u ite th e opposite, a p eop le 's good, m ora l co n d itio n is to b e ex p ec ted only u n d e r a good c o n s titu tio n ."42 H ence , g iv en th e overw helm ing n u m b e r o f q u o ta tio n s w hich a t te s t to K a n t's in s is te n c e t h a t h u m a n s w ill b e b ro u g h t to p eace m ere ly th ro u g h th e i r se lfin te re s te d n a tu r e , g iven h is a s se r tio n s t h a t w a r is th e la rg e s t h in d ra n c e to m o ra lity , g iven t h a t m e re w ell-be ing is o f te n a t c ro ss-pu rposes w ith m o ra l- ity , a n d g iven th e s e h in t s th a t m o ra lity is a p ro je c t w h ich m u s t occur a f te r peace, I th in k w e c a n conclude t h a t p eace is a n e c e ssa ry b u t su re ly n o t su ff i- c ie n t co nd ition fo r m o ra l p ro g ress .43 D. Culture and Ecclesiastical Faith A s re la tio n s a m o n g n a tio n s im p ro v e a n d th e p ro sp ec ts fo r a p e rm a n e n t p eace in c re a s e , espec ially s h o u ld th e tim e com e w here a ll n a tio n s 40 "Theory and Practice," Ak. 311. 41 Misspelling occurs in translation. 42 "To[ward] Perpetual Peace," Ak. 366. Thus, the dilemma which Aleksander Bobko presents in his article "The Problem of Evil and the Idea of Eternal Peace" is a false one, and his conclusions are flawed. Bobko's argument is this: Kant, in the first two books of the Religion, concludes that the reasons for the existence of evil must ultimately remain a mystery, and thus evil is an "invisible enemy." Thus, humankind as a whole is helpless in the face of evil. Bobko then concludes that Kant is wrong to think in "To [ward] Perpetual Peace" that peace can be achieved through reason, for we are helpless to overcome evil. This conclusion is based on the assumption that peace and evil cannot co-exist. But this assumption is wrong, for peace has to do with external action, while evil concerns non-adherence to moral maxims. Hence, the conflict Bobko presents is a false one, and his conclusion that "Kant, fascinated by rationality and motivated by dreams of eternal peace, seems to forget about the radical evil of human nature de- scribed earlier" (p. 862) is wrong. See: Aleksander Bobko, "The Problem of Evil and the Idea of Eternal Peace in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant," pp. 857-863. 43 Since the next section deals with a similar issue, it will offer even further evidence for this claim. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 333 w ould fin a lly jo in to g e th e r in one o rg an iza tio n , in every n a tio n th e focus can now sh if t to w a rd th e im p ro v em en t o f m o ra lity . T he p ro m o tio n o f m o ra lity w ill no lo n g er be h in d e re d b y w a r or th e p re p a ra tio n for w a r . M oney can a g a in be u se d for ed u ca tio n . T he p e rfec t o r in c re a s in g ly p e rfe c t c o n s titu tio n of each n a tio n w ill a llo w fo r free com petition , b o th am o n g in d iv id u a ls a s w ell a s n a tio n s , i.e., a n a n ta g o n is m w hich w ill fo s te r ta le n ts w ith o u t le a d in g to w ar. W hile th e re e x is ts th e d a n g e r th a t in d iv id u a ls w ill s lip in to a s ta te of w ell-being, u n co n ce rn e d w ith b e tte r in g th em se lv es m orally , th e s ta g e is se t for re a l m o ra l p ro g re ss to beg in , a n d K a n t g ives u s m a n y d iffe ren t w ays in w hich to focus on th is p ro jec t. 1 . T he f ir s t w a y t h a t m o ra l p ro g ress is p ro m o ted is sp e lle d o u t in som e d e ta il in th e second p a r t o f th e Metaphysics of Morals, n a m e ly th e "E lem en ts of V irtu e ." T hese c o n s is t o f th e d u tie s to w a rd o n ese lf a n d to w a rd o th ers . T he fo rm er se t o f o v e ra rch in g d u tie s concerns se v e ra l specific d u tie s . T he f i r s t is to avoid th e vices o f "se lf-m u rd e r, th e u n n a tu r a l u se w h ich an y o n e m ak es of h is se x u a l in c lin a tio n , a n d th e im m o d era te en joym en t of food a n d dr in k th a t w eak en s one's c ap ac ity to u se h is pow ers p u rp o siv e ly ."44 T h e second in c lu d es te llin g th e t ru th , k e e p in g o ne's self-esteem , a n d m o ra l se lf-know ledge.45 K a n t considers th e se f i r s t a n d second se ts o f d u tie s to be "sub jec tive" d u - tie s :46 th e f i r s t concerns a p e rso n co n sid ered a s a n "a n im a l b e in g ," a n d th u s concerns th e n e ed to k eep o n e se lf a n d th e species a live, w h ile th e second con- cern s a p e rso n "c o n s id e re d on ly a s a m o ra l b e in g ," a n d seem s to concern th e p re se rv a tio n o f th e fo u n d a tio n for th e p o ss ib ility o f m o ra l w illing . T he th ird a n d fo u rth se t o f d u tie s co n ce rn th e p rom o tion o f ta le n ts , th e th ir d b e in g th e 44 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 420. All following quotations of the Metaphysics o f Morals come from the Ellington translation. 45 Ibid., Ak. 429-442. 46 Kant's division between "objective" and "subjective." and "formal" and "material" is rather confusing, if it is even coherent, but this division itself is not important to our discussion. .I R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 334 "d u ty to h im se lf to develop a n d in c re ase h is n a tu r a l perfection , t h a t is, for p ra g m a tic rea so n s ,"47 w h ile th e fo u r th is th e "d u ty to h im se lf to h e ig h te n h is m o ra l p erfec tion , th a t is, fo r p u re ly m o ra l re a so n s ."48 T hese la s t tw o d u tie s c o rre sp o n d n ice ly w ith K a n t's o th e r d iscu ssio n s o f cu ltu re , h en ce l e t u s sav e a d iscu ssio n o f th e m for th e m om ent. T h e second o v e ra rch in g s e t o f d u tie s in th e Metaphysics o f Morals co n ce rn d u tie s to o th ers .49 O ne ty p e o f d u ty is m ere ly negative , "e x p re sse d o n ly in d ire c tly (by fo rb idd ing i ts opposite),"50 a n d co nsists in th e s t r ic t d u ty to r e f ra in from a n y action w h ich w ou ld v io la te th e re sp ec t w hich is n e ce ssa r ily g iv en to o th e r h u m a n be ings. T h e o th e r ty p e of d u ty K a n t spe lls o u t in ex - tre m e ly positive an d active te rm s . O u r c h ie f d u ty to w a rd o th e rs is love, b u t K a n t in s is ts t h a t th is "is n o t u n d e rs to o d h e re a s a fee ling ,"51 b u t in s te a d "th e love o f m a n k in d (ph ilan th ropy ) is h e re th o u g h t o f a s p rac tic a l a n d , conse- q u e n tly ..., i t m u s t be p laced in active benevo lence, a n d th u s co n ce rn s th e m ax im of ac tio n s ,"52 a n d "can a lso be e x p re sse d a s th e d u ty to m a k e th e en d s o f o th e rs (as lo n g as th ey a re n o t im m oral) m y ow n."53 P e rh a p s th e b e s t su m m a ry g iven by K a n t is: One soon sees th a t w hat is m eant here is not mere well-wishing, which is, strictly speaking, a mere com plaisant regard for the welfare of every o ther per- son w ithout one's having to contribute anything to it..., but, ra ther, an active practical benevolence, which m akes the welfare and happiness of o thers one's end...54 47 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 444. 48 Ibid., Ak. 446. 49 We have already discussed these duties in Chapter One above. 50 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 464-5. 51 Ibid., Ak. 449. 52 Ibid., Ak. 450. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid.. Ak. 452. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 335 K a n t em p h a size s th e n e e d for active d u ties , n o t m e re w ell-w ish ing , a n d th e d u ty n o t to do a n y th in g w hich w ould le a d a n o th e r to lo ss o f se lf-esteem as w ell a s th e d u ty to h e lp o th e rs bo th m e n ta lly a n d m a te r ia lly . Specifically, th e se positive d u tie s sire beneficence, g ra titu d e , a n d sy m p a th e tic fee ling .55 2 . A second m a in w ay th a t K a n t spe lls o u t h o w w e a re to p rom ote m o ra l p ro g ress is th o u g h h is m a n y d iscussion o f c u ltu re . T h e th e m e of c u ltu re r u n s th ro u g h o u t a ll o f K a n t's w ritings, b u t l e t u s h e re o n ly e x am in e th e "Id ea " a n d th e Critique o f Judgment. W e h av e a lre ad y se en a p a r t o f K a n t's d iscussion in th e "Id ea " s u r ro u n d in g c u ltu re w ith h is ta lk o f th e im p ro v em en t o f "a ll o f a c re a tu re 's n a tu r a l c ap ac itie s ." W e h av e se en how K a n t describes "th e f i r s t t ru e s te p s from b a rb a r is m to cu ltu re , in w h ich th e u n iq u e social w o rth of m a n consists ," a n d h ow "a ll m an 's ta le n ts a re g ra d u a lly developed, h is ta s te is c u ltu red , a n d th ro u g h p rogressive e n lig h te n m e n t h e b eg in s to e s ta b lish a w ay o f th in k in g t h a t c a n in tim e tran sfo rm th e c ru d e n a tu r a l capacity fo r m o ra l d isc rim in a tio n in to defin ite p rac tic a l p r in c ip le s ..."56 N ow K a n t gives u s se v e ra l d iffe re n t w a rn in g s in th e "Id ea ," r e i te r a te d in o th e r w ritings , t h a t c u ltu re is th e m a in m ech an ism for avo id ing th e o th e rw ise d angerous s ta te o f w h a t m ig h t be te rm e d "w ell-being" or "c o n te n tm e n t." A fte r d iscussing cu l- tu re , K a n t gives u s h is d iscussion of th e A rcad ian sh e p h e rd , a n d th e n w rite s th a t m an wills concord; b u t nature better knows w hat is good for the species: she wills discord. He wills to live comfortably and p leasantly ; bu t nature wills th a t he should be plunged from laziness and inactive comfort into work and h a rd - ship, so th a t he will in tu rn seek by his own cleverness to pull himself up from them .57 ss Ibid., Ak. 452-8. 56 "Idea," Ak. 21. 57 Ibid. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 136 K a n t w a rn s th a t a s ta te in w h ich w e a re concerned on ly w ith h a p p in e ss is "th e h a r s h e s t o f evils, w hich p a s s i n d isg u ise as e x te rn a l w e ll-b e in g ,"58 con- t in u in g o n to give u s h is s ta te m e n t a b o u t "g litte r in g m ise ry ." A s I h a v e p e r - h a p s d isc u sse d th is su b jec t en o u g h , I w ill leav e i t be. B u t K a n t's p o in t is c lear: c u ltu re does n o t p rom o te h a p p in e s s a n d w ell-being ; i t w o rk s to w ard th e d ev e lo p m e n t of a ll o f one's c a p a c itie s , b o th p ra g m a tic a n d m o ra l, so t h a t h u m a n s w ill co n tin u e to exercise t h e i r w ill a n d n o t b e lu l le d in to com pla- cency. T h is m essage is re in fo rced in th e Critique o f Judgment, w h ere K a n t's d iscu ss io n o f c u ltu re resem b les th e "Id e a " a n d p a ra lle ls th e p o sitiv e d u tie s to o n e se lf fo u n d in th e Metaphysics o f Morals. R ecall t h a t K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t "p ro d u c in g in a ra tio n a l b e in g a n a p t i tu d e fo r p u rp o ses g e n e ra lly (hence [in a w ay t h a t leaves] th a t b e in g free) i s culture," a n d t h a t c u ltu re , a s n a tu re 's p e - n u lt im a te pu rpose , p rom otes "m a n 's a p t i tu d e in g e n e ra l fo r s e t t in g h im se lf p u rp o se s ..."59 I t is in te re s tin g to n o te th a t , in k e ep in g w ith th e "Id e a ," K a n t a s s e r ts t h a t "i t is h a rd to develop s k i l l in th e h u m a n sp ec ies ex cep t by m e a n s o f in e q u a li ty am ong people," a n d m a in ta in s th a t i t is su c h in e q u a li ty th a t "...h as to do w ith th e deve lopm en t o f m a n 's n a tu r a l p re d isp o s itio n s , a n d [so] n a tu r e s t i l l ach ieves i ts ow n p u rp o se , e v en i f th a t p u rp o se i s n o t o u rs ."60 W hile th e c u ltu re o f ski]] a llo w s fo r th e p rom otion o f o u r w illing in g e n e ra l, o u r ab ility to conceive o f a n e n d a n d to follow th ro u g h w ith ou r a tte m p ts to secu re it, K a n t a lso w r i te s o f th e c u ltu re o f d isc ip lin e . T he c u ltu re o f sk ill does n o t te ll u s w h ich e n d s to choose, a n d th is le a d s u s to th e c u ltu re o f d iscip line, th e n e e d "to a s s i s t th e will in th e d e te rm in a tio n a n d se lec tio n o f i ts p u rposes."61 K a n t e x p la in s t h a t d isc ip line "is n e g a tiv e a n d c o n s is ts in th e lib e ra tio n of th e w ill f ro m th e despo tism o f d e s ire s , despo tism 58 Ibid., Ak. 26. 59 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 431. 60 Ibid., Ak. 432. 61 Ibid. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. [ i i i 337 th a t r iv e ts u s to c e r ta in n a tu r a l th in g s ..."62 T hus, w h ile th e c u ltu re o f sk ill a llow s u s to im prove th e fo rm u la tio n a n d p u rs u i t o f e n d s g en era lly , th e c u ltu re o f d isc ip line se em s to b e th a t w hich a id s u s i n f i lte r in g o u t th e ca ll of o u r a n im a l in c lin a tio n s so t h a t w e can be b e tte r tu n e d to th e m o ra l law . T he tools o f th is c u ltu re K a n t id e n tif ie s w ith educa tion , th e f in e a r ts , a n d science, for "th e y m a k e g re a t h e a d w a y a g a in s t th e ty ra n n y o f one's p ro p en s ity to th e sen ses, a n d so p re p a re h im fo r a sovereign ty in w h ich re a so n a lone is to d o m in a te ."63 T h u s c u ltu re fo rces u s n ev er to be m e re ly com placen t, a n d develops w ith in u s th o se co n d itio n s by w hich we c o u ld im p ro v e o u r m orality , sh o u ld w e so choose. W e sh o u ld b rie fly n o te t h a t K a n t's c h a ra c te r iz a tio n o f c u ltu re a g a in forces u s to conceive o f n a tu r e a s b rin g in g u s to a s ta te in w h ich w e could im prove o u r m orality , w ith o u t c u ltu re a c tu a lly m o ra lly im p ro v in g us. In o th e r w ords, n a tu re p ro v id es fo r those fo u n d a tio n s w h ich a re n ecessa ry for m o ra l im p ro v em en t b u t w h ic h a re no t them se lves m o ra l im provem en t. O u r o rig in a l in d ica tio n o f th is is to be h a d from K a n t's fra m e w o rk fo r h is d iscus- sion o f c u ltu re , nam ely h is se a rc h for som eth ing "w h ic h n a tu r e c an accom- p lish w ith a view to th e f in a l p u rp o se ou tside o f n a tu r e ." H e re K a n t is look- in g fo r w h a t n a tu re i ts e lf c a n do, n o t w h a t h u m a n b e in g s co n sid ered as r a - tio n a l a g e n ts can do. B u t l e t u s look a t th e tw o a sp e c ts o f c u ltu re . C learly th e c u ltu re o f sk ill does n o t p ro m o te m ora lity alone, fo r i t i s th e p rom otion of se t t in g a n d p u rsu in g any e n d w hatsoever. K a n t d esc rib es th is a s som eth ing "n a tu re herself* accom plishes, w ith or w ith o u t o u r conscious co n trib u tio n s . T h u s, c u ltu re can p re p a re u s fo r m ora lity w ith o u t in c re a s in g m orality . W hile a t f irs t g lan ce i t m ig h t a p p e a r th a t th e c u ltu re o f d iscip line w ou ld n e ce ssa rily d irec tly p ro m o te m orality , K a n t in s is ts t h a t "in th is re g a rd too w e f in d nature a c tin g p u rp o siv e ly ,"64 a n d th a t th e a r t s a n d sciences 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid.. Ak. 433. Italics added for emphasis. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 338 "...m ak e m an , n o t indeed m o ra lly b e tte r fo r [life in] society, b u t s till civilized for i t ."65 In d eed , K a n t says q u ite c lea rly th a t "n a tu re p u rsu e s th e p u rp o se of m a k in g room for th e developm en t o f o u r h u m an ity ,"66 no t th a t i t p rom otes such m o ra l developm ent itse lf . T h u s, a g a in , I th in k w e o u g h t to conclude th a t n a tu r e p rov ides th e fo u n d a tio n fo r m o ra lity w ith o u t a d d in g d irec tly to m o ra lity . N ow , w hile c u ltu re does n o t d irec tly p rom ote m o ra lity , th e tw o divi- sions o f c u ltu re do le n d th em se lv es to b e t te r m oral cu ltiv a tio n , a n d th u s we a re b ro u g h t b a c k to th e Metaphysics o f Morals. To beg in w ith , a s p o in te d o u t before, th e re is th e d irec t co m p ariso n b e tw een K a n t's d iscussion of c u ltu re in th e th i r d Critique a n d h is d iscu ssio n o f th e d u tie s to ou rse lves. O n th e one h a n d , th e c u ltu re of "sk ill" sh o u ld be co m p ared w ith th e "d u ty to h im se lf to develop a n d in c re ase h is n a tu r a l pe rfec tion , th a t is, fo r p ra g m a tic rea so n s ." T h is m irro rs K a n t's s ta te m e n t a b o u t sk ill, fo r th is d u ty of "p e rfec tio n " is "to c u ltiv a te h is n a tu r a l pow ers (of th e sp ir i t , o f th e m ind , a n d o f th e body) as a m ean s to a ll k in d s of possib le e n d s . M a n ow es i t to h im se lf (as a n in te l l i - gence) n o t to le t h is n a tu r a l p red isp o s itio n s a n d cap ac itie s 0which his reason can use some day) rem a in u n u se d , a n d n o t leave th em , as i t w ere, to r u s t ."67 O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e c u ltu re o f "d isc ip line" from th e th ir d Critique is a lso p a r t o f th e du ty in th e Metaphysics of Morals to in c re a se one's perfec- tion . W h ile K a n t a rgues th a t th e c u ltu re o f "sk ill" is th e c u ltiv a tio n o f th e m ean s o f p ro m o tin g a n y e n d w h a tso ev e r, K a n t s ta te s th a t w e o u g h t to c u lti- v a te su c h sk ills so th a t th ey m ig h t be u se d by rea so n for m o ra l p u rp o ses , "for a p a r t from th e necessity of se lf-p re se rv a tio n , w hich in i ts e lf c a n e s ta b lish no du ty , m a n ow es i t to h im se lf to b e a u se fu l m em ber o f th e w orld ..."68 T h is is, 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid., Ak. 444. Italics added for emphasis. 68 Ibid., Ak. 445-6. This is, in addition, further proof that Kant is concerned with the duty to promote a highest social good. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. o f course, n o t th e only a sp e c t o f p e rso n a l perfection , h e n ce th e re is also th e "d u ty to h im se lf to h e ig h te n h is m o ra l perfection , t h a t is , fo r p u re ly m oral rea so n s ."69 K a n t p ro v id es u s v e ry l i t t le in w ay of e x p la n a tio n o f th is du ty , b u t th is is for th e obv ious re a so n th a t th is d u ty concerns fu ll a d h e ren c e to th e m o ra l law a n d a ll i ts e n d s . T h u s , th is du ty com m ands u s to "B e holy" a n d consists "in a tta in in g t h e co m p le ten ess of one's m o ra l e n d ..."70 H ence, we h a v e a d u ty to c u ltiv a te o u r w illin g o f a ll ends, w h ich is a s s is te d by c u ltu re , b u t also th e d u ty to c u lt iv a te o u r p u re ly m ora l ends. 3. T h is le a d s u s to th e th i r d m a in type of p rom o tion o f m o ra lity , the pedagog ical concern. T h is is d isc u sse d p rim arily in th e "M ethodo logy of P u re P ra c tica l R eason" in th e second Critique, a n d in th e "M ethodo logy o f E th ics" in th e Metaphysics o f Morals, b u t is touched u p o n in m a n y o f K a n t's w ritings. In th e Metaphysics of Morals, K a n t gives a ve ry specific m e th o d fo r "teach in g " m orality , a s i t w ere , w h ich m u st concern i ts e l f o n ly w ith a ttu n in g th e in d iv id u a l to th e c a ll o f th e m o ra l law w hile in tro d u c in g n o o th e r consid- e ra tio n s . W hile th e in f lu e n c e o f th e m oral law is c e r ta in ly in n a te , "v irtu e m u s t be acq u ired (an d i s n o t in n a te ) ... for one c a n n o t s tra ig h tw a y do w h a t- ev er h e w ills i f h e h a s n o t t r ie d a n d exercised h is p ow ers b e fo re h a n d ."71 S e n - su o u s in c lin a tio n s w eigh h e a v ily on each in d iv id u a l, a n d th e y m u s t be over- come, or a t le a s t s u b o rd in a te d to th e m oral law . T h u s, "v ir tu e c an a n d m u st be ta u g h t,"72 since i t is o u r d u ty to w ill m orally a n d to h e lp o th e rs do th is a s w ell. K a n t recom m ends a tw ofo ld app roach to te a c h in g v ir tu e . F irs t , u s in g a m o ra l "catechism," th e te a c h e r a sk s questions of th e p u p ils w h ich m ak e th e p u p ils look "in sid e" th e m se lv e s a n d to th e m o ra l la w fo r th e a n sw ers; "th e 69 Ibid., Ak. 446. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid., Ak. 477. 72 Ibid. We must take this expression with a note of caution, since it cannot, according to Kant, be taught per se. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 340 te a c h e r se ek s in h is p u p il's re a so n w h a t h e w a n ts to te a c h h im ; a n d i f p e r - h a p s th e s tu d e n t does n o t know th e a n sw e r to th e question , th e n (d irec tin g h is s tu d e n t's reason ) h e su g g es ts i t to h im ,"73 K a n t h a s g iven u s a n ex am p le o f su ch a p ro ced u re in h is "F ra g m e n ts o f a M o ra l C a tech ism ."74 H e u se s th e an a lo g y o f th e te a c h e r a s "m idw ife fo r th e p u p il's th o u g h ts ."75 K a n t a d d s t h a t c a su is tic a l q u estio n s a re a lso im p o r ta n t, "g e n e ra lly sh a rp e n in g t h e u n d e r - s ta n d in g o f th e young" a s w ell a s e n liv e n in g th e i r m o ra l in te r e s t .76 A fte r su ch a ca tech ism , K a n t a d v ise s t h a t b o th th e s tu d e n t a n d th e te a c h e r en g ag e each o th e r in "S ocra tic d ia lo g u e ," e lic itin g h e lp fro m each o th e r . T h e on ly exam ple K a n t g ives u s seem s to be from th e se co n d Critique w h e re K a n t ta lk s a b o u t how m u ch peop le lik e to a rg u e a b o u t th e m o ra lity o f o th e rs .77 K a n t u rg es t h a t in a ll su ch te a c h in g s , w e o u g h t n o t a p p e a l to a n y a d v a n ta g e w hich m ig h t be h a d th ro u g h m o ra l w illing , b u t r a th e r s im p ly a p - p e a l to w h a t rea so n o u g h t to do, in d e p e n d e n t o f a n y m itig a tin g c irc u m - sta n ce s . T h u s, K a n t su m m arizes: the exhibition of pure virtue can have more power over the human mind, giv- ing a far stronger incentive to effectuate even that legality and to bring for- ward more powerful resolves to prefer the law to everything else merely out of respect for it, than all allurements arising from enjoyment and everything which may be counted as happiness or from al threats of pain and harm.78 K a n t gives u s tw o a d d itio n a l reco m m en d a tio n s for su c h pedagogy , n am ely , "th e ex p e rim e n ta l (techn ical) m e a n s fo r th e c u ltiv a tio n o f v ir tu e [w hich] is th e good exam ple o f th e te a c h e r h im s e lf (h is ow n co n d u c t b e in g 73 Ibid., Ak. 480. 74 Ibid., Ak. 480 ff. 75 Ibid., Ak. 478. 76 Ibid., Ak. 484. 77 Ibid., Ak. 153 ff. 8 Second Critique. Ak. 151-2. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. r 341 ex em p la ry ) a n d th e ad m o n ito ry exam ple of o th e r peop le ."79 T h u s, th e p u p il c an le a rn from im ita tin g th e te a c h e r , o r by ex am in in g "b io g rap h ie s of a n c ie n t a n d m o d e m tim es."80 K a n t m a k e s tw o w a rn in g s fo r each , how ever. R e g a rd in g th e firs t, h e w a rn s a g a in s t "h a b itu a tio n " w h ich "is th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a firm in c lin a tio n b y i ts m ore fre q u e n t g ra tif ic a tio n a n d w ith o u t th e u se of a n y m ax im s; su c h h a b itu a tio n is a m ec h an ism of sense r a th e r th a n a p rin c ip le o f th o u g h t..."81 As such , h a b itu a t io n seem s to be h e lp fu l on ly a s a fo u n d a tio n u p o n w h ich to im prove. O th e rw ise , i t is sim p ly a w a y o f ac ting , a n d th u s m a y le a d one a s tra y from w illin g in accord w ith m a x im s .82 R eg ard in g th e second, K a n t w a rn s t h a t th e e x am p le s g iven sh o u ld n o t b e "nob le (su p er-m erito rio u s) ac tio n s" for su ch "ro m an tic " ch a rac te rs , "w h ile p r id in g them selves o n th e ir fee ling o f t ra n s c e n d e n t g rea tn ess , re le a se th e m se lv e s from observ ing th e com m on a n d ev ery d ay re sp o n s ib ility a s p e tty a n d in s ig n if ic a n t."83 K a n t's c o n s is te n t them e is t h a t v ir tu e is to be ta u g h t by a p p e a lin g d irec tly to th e c a ll o f th e m o ra l law in each in d iv id u a l, w ith o u t m ix in g in cen tiv es . 4. A fo u r th type of p ro m o tio n of v ir tu e com es from th e e x am in a tio n of b e a u ty . T h is is ag a in fo u n d in m o st o f K a n t's w ritin g s , b u t is p a rtic u la rly o f focus in th e Critique o f Judgment. As th e l in k b e tw een b e a u ty a n d m ora lity h a s b e e n d iscussed by m a n y co m m en ta to rs , m u ch m ore a d e q u a te ly th a n w e h a v e sp a ce for here , I sh a ll on ly m en tio n it. In essence, th e l in k is a re s u lt of th e fa c t t h a t w e m u s t ju d g e n a tu r e a s i f i t h a d b e en c re a te d . T h is lead s to th re e d iffe re n t co n sid era tio n s, a ll o f w hich le n d th em se lv e s to m orality . T he f i r s t co n s id e ra tio n is th a t ob jects o f b eau ty , th o se objects w h ich w e judge to 79 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 479. 80 Second Critique, Ak. 154. 81 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 479. 82 Ibid., Ak. 407. See also Ak. 383-4. 83 Second Critique. Ak. 155. i R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. ->42 be b e a u tifu l a s i f b e au ty w ere a p red ica te , seem to h a v e b een d esig n ed espec ia lly for u s , especially fo r th e in te rp la y be tw een im a g in a tio n a n d u n d e rs ta n d in g .84 T h is le a d s to th e second co n sid era tio n , n a m e ly th e p o ss ib ility th a t n a tu re m ig h t b e responsive to m o ra l c o n sid e ra tio n s , a n d th u s m ay u ltim a te ly a ss is t in o u r m o ra l p ro ject. S im ila rly , th e th ird con sid era tio n com es from th e n ecessity o f v iew in g a ll o f n a tu re a s a system , a n d th u s th e p o ss ib ility th a t n a tu re w as c re a te d fo r u s, t h a t h u m a n b e in g s a re th e u ltim a te en d o f n a tu re w h ile m o ra lity is th e f in a l e n d o f c rea tio n . T h u s, for (a t le a s t) th e se th re e rea so n s , a n in te re s t in b e a u ty m a y h e lp to fo s te r m oral p ro g re ss .85 5. F ina lly , h a d K a n t n o t w r it te n th e Religion Within the Limits o f Rea- son Alone, we m ig h t w ell th in k th a t th is l is t covered a ll of th e w ay s in w hich a m o ra l w orld c a n be p rom oted . H ow ever, in th e Religion, K a n t in tro d u ces a v e ry d iffe ren t d iscussion , rev o lv in g a ro u n d w h a t h e te rm s th e "e th ic a l com- m o n w ea lth " a n d "ecc lesias tica l fa i th ." T his, th en , concerns a f if th ty p e of p rom otion . L e t u s beg in by lo o k in g a t th e e th ica l com m onw ealth . I f th e re re m a in e d a n y d o u b ts th a t K a n t b e liev ed th e re to b e tw o lo- c a tio n s fo r th e h ig h e s t good, th e Religion (alone) o u g h t to convince u s . In th is w ork, K a n t c learly d iscu sses tw o "k ingdom s of God": a n a fte rlife , lead in g K a n t to th e p rob lem (an tinom y) o f p u n ish m e n t a n d a to n e m e n t, a n d a un ion o f p e rso n s in th is w orld in to a n "in v is ib le chu rch ." R e g a rd in g th e la t te r , K a n t offers se v e ra l exp licit s ta te m e n ts , in c lu d in g th e fam o u s "sui generis" one, s ta t in g o u r d u ty to form "a u n io n o f such in d iv id u a ls in to a w hole to w ard 84 This was discussed in Section One, Chapter Seven. 85 There is, in addition, Kant's suggestion in the second Critique (Ak. 159-160) and his dis- cussion in the third Critique that there is something in the contemplation of beauty itself which inherently promotes morality. Kant proposes that, because objects of beauty stimulate the free play between the faculties of the imagination and understanding, such free play Anthers our moral abilities. The beautiful also has the feature that we make a (subjective) universal judgment, just as we make (objective) universal moral judgments. See especially Kant's discussion "On Beauty as the Symbol of Morality." in the third Critique. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 5 343 th e sa m e goal - in to a sy s tem o f w ell-d isposed m en , in w h ich a n d th ro u g h w hose u n ity a lo n e th e h ig h e s t m o ra l good c an com e to p a s s -. . . a whole, a s a u n iv e rs a l rep u b lic b a sed on la w s o f v irtu e ..."86 K a n t em p h a size s bo th th e fac t th a t " th e h ig h e s t m o ra l good c a n n o t be ach ieved m ere ly b y th e ex ertio n s of a s in g le in d iv id u a l to w a rd h is ow n m o ra l perfection ,"87 th u s ree m p h as iz in g th e n e e d fo r th e in d iv id u a l to w o rk w ith a n d for th e com m unity , a n d th e fact th a t re lig io n is a m a t te r o f action , i.e ., a g a in , no t a m a tte r o f m e re w ell-w ish ing or o f p ra y in g , b u t a question o f ac tiv e ly p ro m o tin g v ir tu e , fo r "th e m ax im o f ac- tion, w h ich in re lig ious fa i th (b e in g p rac tica l) is th e cond ition , m u s t ta k e th e lead , a n d th e m ax im of knowledge, or th eo re tica l fa ith , m u s t m ere ly b rin g a b o u t th e s tre n g th e n in g a n d co n su m m atio n o f th e m ax im o f ac tio n ."88 K a n t g ives u s im ag es o f a n "e th ic a l com m onw ealth ," a "kingdom o f G od on e a r th ," th e "w orld 's h ig h e s t good," a n d a "c h u rc h inv is ib le" w ith a "m o ra l re lig ion ." T he u n d e rly in g th em e re m a in s th e sam e: w e a re to "leave [our] Ethical State of Nature" in o rd e r to jo in a com m onw ealth w hich w ou ld b a se i ts e l f on m ora l p rin c ip le s a lone .89 W h a t is em phasized , how ever, is th e n ecess ity o f co m b in in g in to g ro u p s of in d iv id u a ls fo r th e p ro m o tio n of a m o ra l w orld , a n d th is lead s to a d iscu ssio n of c h u rc h a n d ecc le s ias tica l fa ith . N ow K a n t a s s e r ts t h a t th e c h u rc h in v is ib le is b a se d on re a so n a lone , a n d th u s is b a se d on a "p u re re lig - ious f a i th ." S u ch tru e a n d d e s ire d fa i th is no d iffe ren t from ad h eren ce to th e m o ra l la w itse lf . T he p rob lem , how ever, is th a t th e c h u rc h in v is ib le , th e e th i- ca l com m onw ealth , c an n o t m a n ife s t i ts e lf w ith o u t a "v isib le c h u rc h ," i.e., som e p h e n o m e n a l m an ife s ta tio n o r o th e r. T h e ch u rc h in v is ib le is "a m ere id ea ... a n id e a se rv in g a ll a s th e a rch e ty p e of w h a t is to b e e s ta b lish e d by 86 Religion, p. 89. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid., p. 109. See also: pp. 92. 95. and 123. 89 Ibid.. p. 88. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 344 m en ,"90 w h ile th e "visible church is th e a c tu a l u n ion o f m en in to a w hole w h ich h a rm o n ize s w ith t h a t id e a l."91 F u r th e r , w e a lso face th e p rob lem th a t , w h ile p u re re lig ious f a i th is th e u ltim a te e n d , i t too i s n o t to be fo u n d w ith o u t f i r s t m a n ife s tin g i ts e lf i n som e p h e n o m e n a l fo rm o r o th e r . T h u s, a "h is to rica l" o r "ecc le sias tica l" f a i th is th e "v eh ic le" fo r p u re fa ith . H ence, w h e rea s "p u re moral le g is la tio n , th ro u g h w h ich th e w ill o f God is p rim ord ia lly en g ra v ed in o u r h e a r ts , is n o t only th e in e lu c ta b le condition o f a ll t r u e re lig io n w h a tso ev e r b u t is a lso t h a t w hich re a lly c o n s titu te s su ch re lig io n ,"92 "a chu rch , on th e o th e r h a n d , a s th e u n io n o f m a n y m e n w ith su c h d isposi- t io n s in to a m o ra l com m onw ealth , req u ire s a public covenan t, a c e r ta in ec- c le s ia s tic a l fo rm d e p e n d e n t u p o n th e co n d itio n s o f experience ."93 As w ith a n y id e a l of rea so n , th a t w h ich re m a in s p e rfec t a s a n a rc h e ty p e can on ly b e a p - p ro x im a te d in experience . T h u s w e h a v e r a th e r a s tra n g e s itu a tio n : a lth o u g h rea so n g ives th e m o ra l law to itse lf, a n d th u s k n o w s fu ll w ell h o w i t o u g h t to act, "m en a re conscious o f th e ir in a b il i ty to k n o w su p e rse n s ib le th in g s ,"94 and , "by re a so n o f a p e c u lia r w e ak n e ss o f h u m a n n a tu re ,"95 in d iv id u a ls h a v e a lw ays a tta c h e d th em se lv es to som e p a r t ic u la r h is to ric a l (ecc lesias tica l) fa i th or o th er. K a n t w rite s th a t w h ile "in m e n 's s tr iv in g to w ard s a n e th ic a l com m onw ealth , ec- c le s ia s tic a l fa i th th u s n a tu r a l ly p recedes p u re re lig io u s fa ith ,"96 "m orally , th is o rd e r o u g h t to be rev e rse d ."97 T h u s, ecc lesias tica l f a i th rem a in s a n d m ay a l- w ay s re m a in th e veh ic le fo r p u re fa ith . As su ch , K a n t recognizes th a t "i t is 90 Ibid., p. 92. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid., p. 95. 93 Ibid., p. 96. 94 Ibid., p. 94. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid., p. 97. 97 Ibid., p. 97 n. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 345 a lso p o ss ib le th a t th e u n io n o f m en in to one re lig ion can n o t fea s ib ly be b ro u g h t a b o u t o r m ad e ab id in g w ith o u t a ho ly book a n d a n ecc le s ia s tic a l f a i th b a s e d u p o n it ."98 H ence, th o u g h w e w ish to s tr iv e to w a rd a m o re "p u re" fa i th , w e a re b e s t a d v ised to do so w ith in th e b o u n d a rie s o f a n "ecc lesiastica l" fa i th , n o t e n g e n d e rin g a rev o lu tio n ,99 b u t sim p ly w ork ing w ith in e x is tin g s t ru c tu re s to in te rp re t su c h fa i th a s c losely a s possib le to one b a s e d on th e m o ra l law . T h e object is n o t th e e lim in a tio n of ecc lesiastical fa i th , "n o t th a t i t i s to c ea se (for a s a veh ic le i t m a y p e rh a p s a lw ays be u se fu l a n d n ecessary ) b u t t h a t i t b e ab le to cease; w h ereb y is in d ic a te d m ere ly th e in n e r s ta b ili ty of th e p u re m o ra l fa ith ."100 K a n t's e m p h a s is is n o t on th e d e s tru c tio n o f h is to r i- c a l f a i th , b u t on th e b r in g in g o f su c h f a i th in lin e w ith th e m o ra l law . T h e re is no re a so n to th in k e v en th a t m a n y d iffe ren t f a i th s cou ld not be c o n s is te n t w ith a p u re m o ra l re lig io n , a s lo n g a s th e y rea liz e t h a t th e re is o n ly one re lig io n a n d a s lo n g a s th e y s tr iv e fo r th e e s ta b lish m e n t o f a m ora l co m m u n ity . K a n t h a s a s se r te d in m a n y o f h is w ritin g s th a t th e m o ra l law a w a k e n s th e id e a of God, a n d th a t p e rso n s h a v e found m a n y d iffe re n t w ays of r e la t in g to th is G od th ro u g h o u t h is to ry . As rea so n becom es s tro n g e r, how - ev er, th is re la tio n sh ip to G od m oves f a r th e r aw ay from a w o rsh ip o f ido ls (an c ien ts ) , a w orsh ip o f m ere law s (Ju d a ism ), a n d a w orship o f th e G od-M an (C h ris tia n ity ) , a n d fin a lly m ore closely a p p ro x im ate s n o t a w o rsh ip , b u t r a th e r p ra c tic a l actions w hich a re in accord w ith th e m ora l law . A s such , i t is th e t a s k o f th e p h ilo so p h er (and , p e rh a p s , th e e n lig h ten e d clergy) n o t so m u c h to e lim in a te th e se fa i th s a s to r e in te rp re t th e m in accord w ith th e m o ra l law , th o u g h "fre q u e n tly th is in te rp re ta t io n m ay, in th e l ig h t o f th e tex t (of re v e la tio n ), a p p e a r fo rced - [and] i t m ay o ften rea lly be forced ."101 98 Ibid., p. 123. 99 Ibid., pp. 112-3. 100 Ibid., p. 126 n. 101 Ibid., p. 101. This need for interpretation leads Kant to his defense of the necessary place of the philosophy faculty in comparison to the theological faculty in the first part of his Conflict o f the Fac- ulties. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. I i 346 I w ish to exam ine one p a r t ic u la r p a ssa g e before m ov ing on , in o rder to g e t a b e tte r idea of th is f if th w ay in w hich m o ra l p rog ress c a n b e prom oted . K a n t w rite s , reg a rd in g th o se w ho a re a t tu n e d on ly to a h is to r ic a l f a i th in - s te a d o f a ra tio n a l religion: Thus it happens th a t m en will regard neither union into a church, nor agree- m ent w ith respect to the form which it is to take, nor yet public institutions, as in themselves necessary for the promotion of the moral elem ent in religion, bu t only, as they say, for the service of their God, through ceremonies, confessions of faith in revealed laws, and observance of the ordinances requisite to the form o the church (which is itself, after all, only a means). All these obser- vances are a t bottom morally indifferent actions...102 K a n t seem s to be in d ica tin g t h a t w e h a v e th re e du ties , a ll of w h ich a re "n e c e ssa ry fo r th e p rom otion o f th e m o ra l e le m e n t": to u n ify to g e th e r in to a c h u rc h , to a g re e to a sing le fo rm of ch u rch , i.e ., n o t f ig h t ab o u t th e em pirica l fo rm w h ich a n inv isib le ch u rch is to ta k e , a n d to form public in s t i tu t io n s . T h ese th re e d u tie s reflect th e n e c e ss ity o f u n ify in g in o rd er to p ro m o te a m o ra l w orld , a social good. T h ey a lso reflec t K a n t's l is t o f fou r "re q u ire m e n ts" of th e "tru e (v isib le) c h u rch ."103 T h u s, R e a th seem s correct in sa y in g t h a t w e m u st act on the duty to promote the H ighest Good by working, collectively with oth- ers, to restructure existing social institutions in accordance w ith m oral princi- ples... [Also,] some system of social institu tions is needed as a stabilizing force - both as a source of moral education, bu t also to provide background condi- tions th a t are conducive to m oral conduct and the m aintenance of the moral disposition on the part of individuals.104 K a n t's p a ssa g e is also in te re s tin g b e ca u se i t in d ic a te s th a t th e f a u l t o f those o f a m ere h is to ric a l fa ith is n o t so m u ch in w h a t th e y do, b u t how th e y 102 Ibid., p. 97. 103 Ibid.. p. 92-3. 104 Andrews Reath. "Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant." p. 617. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 347 "re g a rd " th e n ecessa ry m o ra l d u tie s . K a n t seem s to in d ic a te , aga in , t h a t re f- o rm a tio n o f th e chu rch is a m a tte r o f a d iffe ren t focus, n o t o f e lim in a tio n or rev o lu tio n . T h e "observances" o f cerem onies, confessions, e tc . a re m orally in- different, n o t b a d , th o u g h th e y te n d to sh if t th e focus a w a y from w here i t sh o u ld be, n am ely , ad h eren ce to th e m o ra l law a n d th e fo rm a tio n of a u n iv e r- s a l ch u rch . T h u s, th e fifth m ea n s o f p ro m o tin g m o ra l p ro g ress , accord ing to K an t, i s th e d u ty to com e to g e th e r a s in d iv id u a ls fo r th e ex p re ss p u rp o se of a t - te m p tin g to u n ify in to a n e th ic a l com m onw ealth , fo rm in g "v is ib le ch u rch es" a n d "public in s t itu tio n s" fo r th e b e tte rm e n t of h u m a n k in d a n d th e m u tu a l s u p p o r t o f th e m o ra l law . E. The Highest Good on Earth R eg ard less of th e n a m e th a t w e give to it, th e f in a l s ta g e o f m oral p ro g re ss is a n id e a of rea so n w h ich w e can only a lw ays ap p ro x im a te . K a n t sp e lls o u t th is f in a l s ta te in m a n y d iffe ren t w ays in d if fe re n t w ritin g s , b u t i t r e m a in s e sse n tia lly th e sam e, n am ely , a s ta te in w hich m a x im a l v ir tu e a n d m a x im a l (allow able) h a p p in e ss coincide. As I h av e d isc u sse d i t so often a n d u n d e r so m a n y d iffe ren t topics, le t m e offer only a few c u rso ry re m a rk s a s to i t s n a tu re . T he m o st d e ta iled descrip tio n of th is f in a l id e a l s ta te w h ich K a n t o ffers is in th e Religion. F u n d a m e n ta lly , th is w ould be "a n ethico-civil s ta te [Zustand]... in w h ich th ey [all people] a re u n ite d u n d e r non-coercive law s, i.e., laws of virtue a lone."105 T h is w orld w ould be one in w h ic h every perso n a c te d in accord w ith m o ra l law s, each g iv ing th e m o ra l la w to h im or h e rse lf. A ll a c tio n s a n d in te n ts w ould be u n iv ersa lizab le . A p le a s a n t descrip tion of th is goal is "th e e s ta b lish m e n t a n d sp re a d of a society in acco rd an ce w ith , a n d fo r th e sa k e of, th e law s o f v ir tu e , a society w hose ta s k a n d d u ty i t is 105 Religion, p. 87. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. f i) 348 ra tio n a lly to im p re ss th e s e la w s in all th e ir scope upon th e e n tire h u m a n race ."106 T h is is la rg e r th a n a n y p o litica l com m onw ealth co u ld be, s in ce i t is to e x p a n d to th e e n t i r e w o rld a n d u n ite i t , a u n ifica tio n w h ich w ould be a g a in s t R ig h t i f i t w e re a t te m p te d for go v ern m en ts . T h e Religion e m p h a s iz e s th e n e e d fo r a public ack n o w led g m en t o f th e m o ra l law , a n d th u s "a n e th ic a l com m onw ealth m u s t r e s t o n public [bu t non-coercive] la w s a n d possess a c o n s titu tio n b a se d on th e s e law s ..."107 H ence, w hile w e c a n n o t coerce an y o n e to be m oral, w e m u s t m a k e th e m o ra l la w pub lic , a n d th u s e re c t a "c h u rc h ." A s e x p la in e d above, th e goal is a n "in v is ib le" c h u rc h w h ich m u s t, how ever, be m a n ife s te d in som e em p irica l fo rm . T he id e a l is "th e u n io n o f a ll th e r ig h te o u s u n d e r d ire c t a n d m o ra l d iv in e w o rld -g o v em m en t,"108 w h ile th e a c tu a l "v isib le" c h u rc h "is t h a t w hich e x h ib its th e (m oral) k ingdom o f G od on e a r th so f a r a s i t c a n b e b ro u g h t to p a ss by m en ."109 K a n t g ives u s fo u r c h a r - a c te ris tic s o f th e id e a l ch u rc h : i t m u s t in c lu d e a ll p e rso n s, th o u g h "v a ria n c e in u n e s se n tia l o p in io n s" is accep tab le ; i t m u s t h a v e "no m o tiv a tin g force o th e r th a n moral ones;" i t m u s t be free from c o n s tra in t a n d n o t c o n s tra in o thers; a n d i t m u s t h a v e a n e sse n tia lly u n c h an g e ab le c o n s titu tio n , a s e t o f "a priori... s e ttle d p rin c ip le s ."110 K a n t a s se r ts t h a t su ch a c o n s titu tio n does n o t resem b le a po litica l c o n s titu tio n , for i t "is n e ith e r monarchical (u n d e r a pope o r p a tr ia rc h ) , n o r aristocratic (u n d e r b ishops a n d p re la te s) , n o r demo- cratic..."111 A gain i t is a c o n s titu tio n w hich a id s p e rso n s in th e i r u n d e rs ta n d - in g of a n d com pliance to th e m o ra l law , b u t w h ich can h a v e n o coercive pow er. T h u s, th e c o n s titu tio n "could b e s t o f a ll b e lik e n e d to th a t of a h o u se - h o ld (fam ily) u n d e r a com m on, th o u g h in v is ib le , m o ra l F a th e r . . ." w h ere th e 106 Ibid., p. 86. 107 Ibid., p. 88. 108 Ibid., p. 92. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid., p. 93. 1,1 Ibid. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 349 fam ily m e m b e rs "accordingly h o n o r th e F a th e r .. . a n d so e n te r w ith one a n - o th e r in to a v o lu n ta ry , u n iv ersa l, a n d e n d u rin g u n io n of h e a r ts ."112 K a n t c a u tio n s u s, how ever, th a t th e u l t im a te form of su c h a s ta te m u s t n e c e ssa r ily re m a in a m y ste ry fo r u s . T h is se em s to be for th r e e r e a - sons. T h e f i r s t r e s ts o n K a n t's a sse r tio n a t th e b e g in n in g of "B ook T h re e " th a t envy, the lu st for power, greed, and the m alignant inclinations bound up with these, besiege his nature, contented w ithin itself, as soon as he is among men. A nd it is not even necessary to assum e th a t these are men sunk in evil and ex- am ples to lead him astray; it suffices th a t they are a t hand, th a t they surround him, and th a t they are men, for them m utually to corrupt each o ther's predis- positions and m ake one another evil.113 H e re w e see R o u sse a u 's in fluence once m ore, a s K a n t considers h u m a n b e - in g s to b e re la tiv e ly c o n te n t w ith th e ir w orld ly s i tu a t io n u n til th e y com pare th e m se lv e s w ith o th e rs . T hus, K a n t be lieves t h a t a re a l obstacle to th e for- m a tio n o f a c h u rc h is th e fac t t h a t in d iv id u a ls becom e envious and. g reedy sim p ly b y com ing in to co n tac t w ith o th e r in d iv id u a ls . How is th is to b e over- come? K a n t concludes, q u ite sim ply , t h a t th e so lu tio n is up to God. K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t th e d u ty to form a n e th ic a l co m m u n ity "w ill re q u ire th e p re - su p p o s itio n o f a n o th e r id ea , nam ely , t h a t o f a h ig h e r m ora l B e in g th ro u g h w hose u n iv e r s a l d isp e n sa tio n th e forces o f s e p a ra te in d iv id u a ls , in su ff ic ien t in th em se lv e s , a re u n i te d for a com m on en d ."114 K a n t a sse r ts t h a t w h ile "m a n is n o t e n ti t le d on th is accoun t to be id le in th is b u s in e ss a n d to le t P ro v id en ce ru le , a s th o u g h each cou ld ap p ly h im s e lf exclusively to h is ow n p r iv a te m o ra l a ffa irs a n d re lin q u ish to a h ig h e r w isdom a ll th e a ffa irs o f th e h u m a n ra c e ...",115 w e s t i l l h av e no id e a h ow G od m ig h t be ab le to so lve th e 112 ibid. 113 Ibid., p . 85. 114 Ibid., p. 89. See also p. 130. 115 Ibid.. p. 92. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 350 problem o f su ch an ad v e rse in fluence, a n d th u s canno t a c tu a lly p ic tu re th e fina l s ta te . T h e second re a so n fo r th e m y s te ry o f th e fu tu re s ta te is founded u p o n the p o ss ib ility of a n ew ecc lesiastica l fa i th . A t th is tim e, K a n t thinks th a t the b e s t w ay fo r us to w o rk to w ard a m o ra l relig ion is to u se th e (C hristian ) sc rip tu re s a n d in te rp re t th e m in acco rdance w ith th e m o ra l la w .116 H ow ever, because m o ra l relig ion a lw ay s rem ains th e sam e w hile th e veh ic le for su ch a relig ion cou ld tak e m a n y form s, th e re re m a in s th e p o ss ib ility th a t C h r is tia n - ity could b e rep laced by a n o th e r ecc les ias tica l fa ith . K a n t's g en e ra l th em e about th e necessity to in te rp re t an y f a i th to m ak e i t h a rm o n ize w ith th e m oral la w le a d s d irectly to th is conclusion . I n ta lk in g a b o u t th e p rog ress to - w ard a w o rk in g e th ica l c o n s titu tio n , K a n t in d ica te s th e p o ssib ility of "revo lu tions w hich m ig h t h a s te n th is p ro g re s s" though "th e y re s t in th e h a n d s o f P rov idence a n d c a n n o t be u s h e re d in according to p la n w ithou t dam age to freedom ."117 T h e n e ed fo r a n em p irica l m a n ife s ta tio n of th e in - visible c h u rc h leads to th e in a b ility to s a y fo r c e rta in how th is fu tu re ch u rch w ill be co n stitu ted . F in a lly , m oving aw ay from th e Religion, th e re is th e v e ry basic p ro b - lem of th e e s ta b lish m e n t o f peace. H ow w ill n a tio n s u ltim a te ly be ab le to e n - te r in to a fed e ra tio n w ith o n e an o th e r? H ow w ill governm en ts a n d o th e r so- cial in s t i tu t io n s solve th e p rob lem s o f p o v erty , education , a n d c u ltu ra l re - form s? H ow w ill w ar u ltim a te ly be a v e rted ? H ow w ill th e p a r tic u la r co n sti- tu tio n of a n a tio n be d ra f te d a n d how w ill th e governm en t opera te? As A n- drew s R e a th sum m arizes: [the highest good on earth] is an ideal by which to guide our conduct. I t tells us to aim a t bringing about a world in which individuals can develop a morally good character, and have the ability and m eans to achieve their permissible ends. Further concrete guidance would follow from determining w hat 116 See Kant's discussion, Religion, p. 121-6. 11 Religion. p. 113. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. arrangem ent of social institutions is needed for the realization of these ends, and how to best bring these arrangem ents into existence.118 T h ese a re ju s t a few o f m an y g ra n d qu estio n s w h ich h a v e y e t to be w orked ou t, a n d w hose e m p iric a l so lu tion w e c an n o t y e t d e te rm in e w ith a n y h ig h de- g ree o f c e rta in ty . P h ilip R ossi in h is a rtic le , "T he Social A u th o r ity of R eason : T h e T ru e C h u rc h ' as th e L ocus fo r M ora l P rog ress ,"119 fa u l ts K a n t for n o t b e in g m ore specific w ith r e g a rd to th is la s t po in t. R ossi w rite s t h a t K a n t "p ro v id es n e i- th e r a specific l i s t n o r a sy s tem atica lly d e ta ile d acc o u n t of th e k in d s o f e x te r- n a l conduct or soc ia l p rac tices th a t a re n o t th e m se lv e s d irec tly su b je c t to co- erc ive pow er...",120 a n d th a t w h ile K a n t does give u s som e n e g a tiv e re q u ire - m e n ts for such in s t i tu t io n s (freedom of speech b u t no coercive pow er) a n d a l is t o f fo u r re q u ire m e n ts for a m o ra l relig ion in th e Religion (p re se n te d above), "n e ith e r o f th e s e m odels th u s p rovides a n acco u n t of th e concre te in - s ti tu tio n s a n d so c ia l p rac tices th a t w ould en ab le a society [to fo rm in to a n e th ic a l com m onw ealth ]."121 Rossi's ob jec tions seem p a r t ly tru e , a n d p a r t ly false . W hile i t m ay be t ru e t h a t K a n t does n o t p re se n t a "specific l is t" o f th o se social p ra c tic e s w hich su p p o rt m o ra l w illing , I h av e tr ie d to show in p a r t fo u r above t h a t h e does in d e e d provide u s w ith sev e ra l exam ples. K a n t's m a n y w ritin g s a b o u t c u ltu re a n d h is sec tio n on "M ethodology" in th e Metaphysics of Morals seem s p a r tic u la r ly im p o r ta n t. I h av e tr ie d to o u tlin e m a n y o f th e se ex am p les above. W ith re g a rd to th e a c tu a l social in s titu tio n s th em se lv es , w hile c e r ta in ly i t is t ru e t h a t K a n t does n o t even give u s specific e x am p le s o f w h a t su c h 118 Reath, "Two Conceptions," p. 608. 119 Philip Rossi, "The Social Authority of Reason: The 'True Church' as the Locus for Moral Progress, in Proceedings o f the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, pL 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 679-685. 120 Ibid., p. 684. 121 Ibid. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. in s t i tu t io n s m ig h t be, how can th is be a fa u lt? I f a n y th in g, su c h re s t r a in t show s K a n t's r e a l u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e d ifficu lt p rob lem s in v o lv ed in b r in g in g a b o u t a h ig h es t good on e a r th . As w e sa w w ith o u r e x a m in a tio n of "W h a t is E n lig h ten m en t? " a n d "W h a t is O rie n ta tio n in T h in k in g ?" in C h a p te r T h re e above, i t seem s im p o ssib le to s a y w h a t form m o ra l, ra t io n a l th in k in g w ill t a k e in th e c e n tu r ie s to com e, fo r i t seem s th e re is n o e te rn a l fo u n d a tio n o r a lg o rith m for su ch th in k in g . B u t, th is aside, i t a lso seem s im p o ssib le to s a y w ith an y deg ree o f c e r ta in ty w h a t an y social in s t i tu t io n m ig h t lo o k l ik e in th e fu tu re . T he concre te so lu tio n s to th e p ro b lem s o f m o ra lity a n d w ell-being a re lik e ly to ta k e m a n y fo rm s. H ence, in s te a d of f a u l t in g K a n t fo r n o t be ing m ore specific, I th in k w e ou g h t to c re d it h im for h is r e s t r a in t . H en ce , fo r th e se fou r m a in rea so n s , th e ex ac t conditions o f th e e n d of m o ra l p ro g re s s on e a r th re m a in a m y s te ry to u s , th o u g h reaso n g ives u s a g e n e ra l o u tlin e . W e can im ag ine , b u t on ly im a g in e , w h a t su ch a w o rld w ou ld look lik e , a w o rld o f in te rn a tio n a l p eace a n d a w orld-w ide m o ra l com m unity . In th e e n d , a s K a n t h a s ad v ised u s a ll a long , w e c a n only do o u r d u ty , fay ing to im p ro v e o u rse lv es an d o u r co m m u n ity , h o p in g th a t God a n d p rov idence w ill see to th e re s t; "therefo re , w e s h a ll se ek to e s ta b lis h th e g ro u n d s of th a t p o ss ib ility p r im a r ily w ith re sp ec t to w h a t is im m e d ia te ly in o u r pow er, a n d se c o n d a rily in t h a t w hich is beyond o u r pow er b u t w hich rea so n h o ld s ou t to u s a s th e su p p le m e n t to ou r im p o ten ce to [rea lize] th e possib ility o f th e h ig h - e s t good, w h ich is n ecessa ry acco rd ing to p ra c tic a l p rin c ip les ."122 m. I w a n t to m ak e one com m en t befo re m o v in g on to th e n e x t c h a p te r . O n th e o n e h a n d , th is d iscussion re g a rd in g th e five s ta g es of m o ra l p ro g ress is im p o r ta n t b ecau se i t is new to K a n t ia n sc h o la rsh ip . G iven th a t l i t t le h a s b e en w r i t te n on K a n t's b e lie f in m o ra l p ro g ress , i t is n o t su rp r is in g th a t th is Second Critique. Ak. 119. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. ) 353 is su e h a s n o t b een ra is e d before. T h is d e ta ile d d iscu ss io n h e lp s to fu r th e r em p h asize th is s t r a in o f th o u g h t K a n t's ph ilo sophy , a n d a lso h e lp s to b rin g to g e th e r se v e ra l seem ing ly u n re la te d a sp ec ts o f h is p h ilo so p h ica l w ritings . I hope th a t i t g ives fu r th e r c redence to th e h y p o th es is t h a t m o ra l p rogress, po litics, a n d th e h ig h e s t good a re in ex tric a b ly in te r tw in e d for K an t. O n th e o th e r h a n d , I ta k e th is d iscussion to b e e x tre m e ly im p o rta n t for anyone in te re s te d in ap p ly in g K a n t's m o ra l th e o ry to p rac tice , a n d for anyone co n ce rn ed w ith ta k in g th e K a n tia n p ro jec t se r io u s ly . I f w e a re in te r - e s te d to ta k e K a n t's m o ra l th eo ry to h e a r t , a n d i f m y in te rp re ta t io n of K a n t's positio n re g a rd in g th e se five s te p s o f m o ra l p ro g re ss is co rrec t, th e n th e m a - te r ia l invo lved in th is c h a p te r c a n se rv e a s a gu ide to a c tio n in th e w orld. O bviously , w e a re lo ca ted som ew here in th e m id d le th r e e s ta g e s o f p rogress. T h is d iscussion is r ich w ith advice a n d p o ss ib ilitie s w h ich c an be fu r th e r ex- p lo red a n d an a ly zed . K a n t's w ritin g s on R ig h t a n d th e s e p a ra tio n o f pow ers coincide on m a n y levels w ith o u r ow n sy s tem o f g o v e rn m e n t. H is v isions a b o u t th e n e c e ssa ry rep u b lica n n a tu r e o f a su ccessfu l c o n s titu tio n seem s to h a v e b een b o m o u t in th e l a s t tw o h u n d re d y e a rs . W rite rs lik e O tfried Hoffe h a v e u se d K a n t's th eo ry o f in te rn a t io n a l re la tio n s a s a fo u n d a tio n for a n a n a ly s is o f th e U n ite d N a tio n s . T h ese a re b u t som e w a y s in w hich K a n t's w ritin g s c an be u tiliz e d a s a w ay o f a p p ro a ch in g im p o r ta n t issu e s in today's society. In ad d itio n , th e five w ays in w h ich m o ra l p ro g re s s c an be p rom oted w h ich I o u tlin e d in p a r t T>" a lone p rov ide ex trem e ly r ic h m a te r ia l for fu r th e r exp lo ra tion . T h is m a te r ia l h a s gone re la tiv e ly u n e x p lo re d . C ould we ta k e K a n t's su g g estio n s to h e a r t? I f w e be lieved m o ra l p ro g re s s to be possib le, a n d th a t w e h a d a d u ty to p rom ote it, a re K a n t's su g g e s tio n s th e b e s t possib le for p ro m o tin g m o ra l p rog ress? W h a t so r t o f n a tio n a l a n d in te rn a t io n a l o rg an iz a tio n s cou ld b e e s ta b lish e d to h e lp th is p rocess? W h a t so r t of m oral a n d re lig ious te a ch in g s cou ld be endo rsed? H ow m ig h t w e go ab o u t fo rm ing Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. to g e th e r a s a cosm opolitan whole o r e th ica l com m onw ealth? I h o p e th a t d iscu ssio n m ig h t open up a horizon fo r d ia logue ab o u t th e se q u estio n s . R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 355 Chapter Five Importance of the Highest Good L I h a v e a rg u e d above th a t th e h ig h e s t good is th e n ecessa ry object of m ora l w illing . In th is c h ap te r , m y in te r e s t co n cern s w h y K a n t th in k s t h a t we m u st believe in i ts possibility. In C h a p te r O n e above, a s in m uch o f th e l i t - e ra tu re , th e d eb a te seldom a d d re sse s K a n t's ow n w ritin g s on w hy h e th o u g h t b e lie f in th e h ig h e s t good to be necessa ry ; u s u a l ly a tta c k s a n d defenses o f th e h ig h e s t good concern w h e th e r i t is possible to accep t th is concept, d ea lin g w ith i ts coherence a n d i ts co m p a tib ility w ith th e r e s t o f K a n t's philosophy . H ow ever, th ro u g h o u t h is w ritin g s , K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t th e re is no objective n eed to believe in th e p o ss ib ility o f th e h ig h e s t good; r a th e r , th is is a sub jec- tive need , a n d one th a t c a n n o t be com m anded . W h at, th e n , is th e n a tu re of th is need , a n d how c an th e h ig h e s t good be ju s t if ie d a s a n object o f fa ith ? A no ther w ay to a d d re ss th is q u e s tio n is to a sk , W h a t w o u ld h a p p e n to th e m oral law (an d m orality ) i f th e h ig h e s t good w ere b e liev ed to be impossible? A ccordingly, th is is a lso th e q u estio n o f w h y th e p o s tu la te s o f p rac tic a l reaso n a re needed , for th e y a re p o s tu la te d p rec ise ly in o rd e r to secu re th e possib ility o f th e h ig h e s t good. S tra n g e ly , th o u g h su c h a ju s tif ic a tio n seem s to be o f ex- trem e im p o rtan ce to K a n t's ph ilo soph ica l p ro jec t, K a n t m ak e s a re la tiv e ly lim ite d n u m b er o f re m a rk s to offer su ch a ju s tif ic a tio n , a n d th e re h a s been litt le com m en ta ry in th e secondary l i te ra tu re . I w ill a rg u e th a t th e re seem to be s ix d iffe re n t ju s tif ic a tio n s w hich K a n t gives for a b e lie f in th e p o ss ib ility o f th e h ig h e s t good. F ou r o f th e se seem to be a t le a s t recognized in one w ay o r sm other in th e l ite ra tu re . T he R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 356 o th e r tw o ju s tif ic a tio n s I h a v e n o t e n c o u n te re d in th e l i te ra tu re , n o r does K a n t sp e ll th em o u t specifically in con n ec tio n w ith th e h ig h e s t good. K a n t does n o t seem to h a v e s e t t le d on a n y one o f th e se , a n d w e e n co u n te r r e a s s e r - tio n s o f each th ro u g h o u t a ll o f K a n t 's w ritin g s . In th e f i r s t section , I sh a ll look a t fo u r ju s tif ic a tio n s w h ich a re l ik e ly to be m ore w ell know n, b e g in n in g w ith th e m ost s tr in g e n t o f th e s e c la im s a b o u t th e h ig h e s t good, w o rk in g th ro u g h to th e w eak est. In te re s tin g ly , th is is th e sam e o rd e r in w h ich th e se ju s tif ic a tio n s f ir s t occur in K a n t 's w ritin g s . I n th e la s t section , I w ill e n d w ith w h a t I ta k e to be tw o r a th e r d if fe re n t ju s tif ic a tio n s . I w ill a rg u e th a t th e la s t is p e rh a p s th e b e s t ju s tif ic a tio n p o ss ib le .1 II. Traditional Defenses A. Rejection o f the Moral Law: Consequences and Inattainability K a n t's m ost e m p h a tic s ta te m e n ts w ith re g a rd to th e ju s tif ic a tio n fo r th e h ig h e s t good a re t h a t th e m o ra l la w w o u ld h a v e to b e re jec ted i f th e h ig h - e s t good w ere n o t possib le . T h e re seem to be tw o d iffe ren t a rg u m e n ts for th is , co rresp o n d in g to th e f i r s t a n d seco n d Critique. T he f i r s t seem s to con- c e rn th e a p p ro p ria te consequences o f m o ra l o r im m o ra l w illing . K a n t w rite s th a t : reason finds itself constrained to assum e [God and immortality]; otherw ise it would have to regard the m oral laws as em pty figments of the brain , since w ithout this postulate the necessary consequence which it itself connects w ith these laws could not follow. Hence also everyone regards the m oral laws as commands; and this the moral laws could not be if they did not connect a priori suitable consequences w ith their rules, and thus carry w ith them promises and threats.2 1 The sixth justification concerns an earthly highest good, and it is perhaps for this reason that it has been overlooked by commentators. 2 First Critique, A811-12 = B839-40. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 357 T h is a rg u m e n t seem s to s ta te th a t th e m o ra l law w ou ld h av e to be re je c te d if th e h ig h e s t good w ere n o t possib le b e c a u se 1) i t is th e h ig h e s t good w h ich a llo w s th e l in k in g o f rew ard s a n d p u n is h m e n ts w ith th e co rresp o n d in g type o f w illin g ,3 a n d 2) rew ard s a n d p u n is h m e n ts a re p a r t a n d p a rce l w ith th e m o ra l la w b e c a u se consequences a re n e c e ssa ry for th e m o ra l law to co m m an d . I n o th e r w ords, i t seem s K a n t w a n ts to a rg u e th a t th e m o ra l law (s) w o u ld h a v e to be deem ed "e m p ty fig m e n ts o f th e b ra in " i f th e h ig h e s t good w ere n o t possib le because th e m o ra l la w d e m a n d s "h a p p in e ss ... in exact p ro p o rtio n w ith ... m ora lity ..."4 N ow , a s I h a v e in te rp re te d it , th is f i r s t a rg u m e n t seem s too s tro n g to su cceed .5 K a n t w ou ld re jec t th is lin e o f a rg u m e n ta tio n in th e second Cri- tique. I n th e seco n d Critique, K a n t n o te s t h a t th e m o ra l law com m ands s im p ly b e c a u se o f th e form of th e law , a n d say s n o th in g ab o u t n e c e ssa ry con- se q u en c es . T h u s , i f no re w a rd cam e fro m m o ra l w illing , th is w ould n o t co u n t a g a in s t th e m o ra l law . I f p ro p o rtio n a te h a p p in e s s in acco rd w ith v ir tu e w as n o t p o ss ib le , th e m o ra l law w ould s t i l l c o m m a n d. T h e seco n d a rg u m e n t K a n t m a k e s fo r a possib le re jection o f th e m o ra l la w fo llow ing from th e re jec tion o f th e p o ss ib ility o f th e h ig h e s t good occu rs p r im a r ily in th e Critique o f Practical Reason. H e re K a n t re a so n s th a t i f th e m o ra l la w d ic ta te s th a t w e m u s t ach iev e th e h ig h e s t good, th e n e ith e r th is e n d is p ossib le , or th e m o ra l law is fa lse : Since, now, the furthering of the h ighest good, which contains this connection [of happiness to morality] in its concept, is an a priori necessary object of our will and is inseparably related to the m oral law, the impossibility of the high- e s t good m ust prove the falsity of the m oral law also. If, therefore, the highest 3 A810-11 =B838-9. 4 A814 = B842. 5 I may have interpreted it wrongly; it could be that Kant is really concerned here with a ques- tion of motivation, since at A813 = B841 we have his statement that "without a God and... a world in- visible to us now but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are indeed objects of approval and admira- tion, but not springs of purpose and action." This argument, of course, is rejected by Kant in the Critique o f Practical Reason because "pure" reason can be "practical" and thus provide its own motivation. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. good is impossible according to practical rules, then the moral law which com- m ands th a t it be furthered m ust be fantastic, directed to empty im aginary ends, and consequently inherently false.6 T h u s , i f th e m o ra l law com m ands u s to w a rd en d s w h ich w e know for c e r ta in a re im p o ssib le , th e n i t m u s t be re jec ted . Indeed , th is m u s t be o f p a r tic u la r co n ce rn fo r K a n t since h e h a s a lre a d y g iven u s m a n y s ta te m e n ts re g a rd in g b o th th e c o rru p te d n a tu r e o f p e rso n s a n d th e m o ra l u n resp o n siv en ess of n a - tu re . H en ce , th e m o ra l la w m ig h t seem q u ite f a n ta s t ic a l in i ts dem ands, g iven th e n a tu r e of in d iv id u a ls a n d th e w orld a s K a n t h a s a lre ad y p re se n te d th em , o r a s m o st people o rd in a r ily p e rh a p s view th em . A few pages la te r , K a n t gives u s a s im ila r a rg u m e n t, th o u g h a d d re ss - in g o n ly a concern ab o u t im m o rta lity . H ere , h e seem s concerned w ith two p o ss ib ilitie s : W ithout it ["the thesis of... an infinite progress tow ard complete fitness to the m oral law"], either the moral law is completely degraded from its holiness, by being m ade out as lenient (indulgent) and thus com pliant to our convenience, or its ceill and its dem ands are stra ined to an unattainab le destination, i.e., a hoped-for complete a tta inm en t of holiness of will, and are lost in fanatical theosophical dreams which completely contradict our knowledge of ourselves. In either case, we are only hindered in the unceasing striving toward the p re- cise and persistent obedience to a command of reason which is stem , unindulgent , tru ly commanding, really and not ju st ideally possible.7 I f im m o rta lity n o t a ssu m e d to be possib le , th e n th e re seem to be two p o ss ib ilitie s . F irs t , i f in d iv id u a ls d id n o t h av e th e re q u is ite tim e necessa ry fo r m o ra l p ro g ress , th e n th e m o ra l la w cou ld co m m an d only so m eth in g less th a n co m p le te m o ra l p e rfec tio n of th e in d iv id u a l, a n d w ou ld th u s be 'le n ie n t ." T h e second po ss ib ility seem s to be th a t i f th e m o ra l law is too s tr in g e n t, a n d com m ands so m e th in g w h ich we cou ld n o t possib ly a tta in , th e n i t is "s t r a in e d to a n u n a tta in a b le d e s tin a tio n ." In th e f i r s t case , th e m o ra l 6 Second Critique, Ak. 113-4. ' Ibid.. Ak. 122-3. Italics added for emphasis. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 359 law m u s t be re je c te d since i t does n o t com m and , b u t seem s m ere ly to recom m end, w h ile in th e second case , i t is re je c ted because i t com m ands som eth ing w h ich c a n n o t be achieved. W hile th is c ita tio n d e a ls w ith a question o f m o tiv a tio n ,8 i t a lso show s t h a t th e im possib ility o f o ne aspec t of th e h ig h e s t good le a d s to a fu ll re jec tion o f th e m o ra l law . W hile su c h s ta te m e n ts occur p r im a rily in th e Critique o f Practical Reason, w e see so m e th in g s im ila r even in "P e rp e tu a l P eace ," w h e re K a n t w rites th a t m orality is in itself practical, for it is the totality of unconditionally binding laws according to which we ought to act, and once one has acknowledged the authority of its concept of duty, it would be u tterly absurd to continue wanting to say th a t one cannot do his duty. For if th a t were so, then th is concept would disappear from m orality 0ultra posse nemo obligatur)...9 W hile th is p a s sa g e im p lie s th a t th e h ig h e s t good m u st be re je c te d a s a n ob- ject o f d u ty i f i t i s im possib le , th e rev e rse o f th is seem s e as ily in fe rre d , since K an t c la im s t h a t i t is a d u ty com m anded b y th e m oral law , a n d h en ce i f i t is im possible, th e n th e m o ra l law m u s t also be fa lse . T he im m e d ia te objection to th e se s tro n g fo rm u la tio n s o f th e problem of ju s tif ic a tio n seem s to be th a t i t is n o t a d u ty to achieve th e h ig h e s t good, only to strive fo r it . T h is is S ilber's a rg u m e n t, d iscussed above in C h a p te r O ne. T hus, th e m o ra l law only com m ands u s to p u rsu e th e h ig h e s t good, a n d th is is in d e e d so m e th in g w h ich we can do. T herefo re , even i f th e h ig h e s t good can n o t, in fac t, b e achieved, i t does n o t in v a lid a te th e m o ra l law . A second objection to th is s tro n g p o s itio n m ig h t be one sim ila r to Lew is W hite B eck's o rig in a l objection, n a m e ly t h a t th e m o ra l la w sim ply deals w ith one's ow n w illing , a n d say s n o th in g w ith re g a rd to h a p p in e ss , e i- th e r of o n ese lf o r o f o th e rs . I h ave tr ie d to a rg u e in C h a p te r O n e t h a t th is is 8 We will deal with the question of motivation below. 9 "To[ward] Perpetual Peace." Ak. 370. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 360 n o t e n tire ly tru e , since w e a re d e a lin g w ith a m o ra l la w w h ich commands, a n d su ch a law a lre a d y d e a ls w ith h u m a n b e in g s a s b o th c re a tu re s a n d r a - t io n a l ag en ts . H ow ever, p e rh a p s B eck's concern w ith p u re w illin g m a y le a d u s to a th i r d objection to K a n t's s tro n g ju s tif ica tio n . T h is w o u ld b e t h a t th e m ora l la w com m ands m o ra l w illin g re g a rd le ss o f th e outcom e o f su c h w illing , a n a rg u m e n t w h ich K a n t m a k e s in th e Grundlegung a n d th e Critique o f Practi- cal Reason. T h e m o ra l la w m u s t n o t be fo u n d ed on th e ou tcom e o f a c tio n s .10 I t is r a th e r su rp r is in g , th e n , t h a t th e b est a rg u m e n t a g a in s t h is ow n o rig in a l ju s tif ic a tio n o f th e h ig h e s t good com es n o t from e ith e r o f th e s e tw o w orks, b u t in s te a d from th e Critique o f Judgment. H ere , K a n t spec ifica lly ra is e s th e q u e s tio n of w h e th e r a p e rso n w ho can n o t be lieve in G od w o u ld th e n be re - le a s e d from th e m o ra l law , a n d concludes t h a t a ll t h a t w e would have to give up is our aiming a t th a t final purpose th a t we are to achieve in the world...; every rational being would still have to cognize him self as strictly bound by w hat m orality prescribes, because the m oral laws are for- m al and command unconditionally, w ithout regard to purposes (which are a m atte r of volition)... Fulfillm ent of duty consists in th e form of the earnest will, not in the in term ediate causes [responsible] for success.11 I n o th e r w ords, K a n t seem s r ig h t to a rg u e th a t th e m o ra l la w is concerned w ith th e co m m an d to w ill in acco rd w ith reaso n , a n d th e re b y w ith m orality , a n d th is co m m and com es from th e p u re form o f th e w ill. T h e success o f th e h ig h e s t good is on p a r w ith o th e r consequences o f m o ra l w illing , th u s I m u s t te l l th e t r u th re g a rd le ss o f w h e th e r th e outcom e w ill b e b e n e fic ia l o r not. W hile I h a v e a rg u e d th a t th e n a tu r a l (necessary) object o f su c h w illin g is th e h ig h e s t good, i t a lso seem s re a so n a b le to say th a t th e a t ta in m e n t o f th is 10 Although I have tried to argue that it is not thereby unconcerned with this outcome. This is the point in the last chapter about the interest of reason. 1 ' Critique o f Judgment. Ak. 451. See also especially the "Preface to the First Edition" of the Religion within the Limits o f Reason Alone. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 361 object c a n n o t be com m anded . O f a ll o f K a n t's ju s tif ic a tio n s fo r th e h ig h es t good, th is o n e m u s t be re je c te d o u tr ig h t. B. A conflict within reason would occur C e rta in ly , how ever, K a n t is r ig h t to recognize som e s o r t o f ten s io n w h ich w o u ld occur i f th e h ig h e s t good w ere th o u g h t to be im p o ssib le . I f th e fo reg o in g a n a ly se s h a v e b e e n co rrec t, th e n th e m o ra l c re a tu re n a tu ra lly w ills t h a t th e h ig h e s t good sh o u ld com e ab o u t, a n d n a tu ra lly does w h a t s/he c a n to fu r th e r t h a t s ta te . T he h ig h e s t good is th e n e ce ssa ry object o f th e m o ra l w ill. H ence , th e r e w o u ld be som e te n s io n w ith in a n a g e n t w ho h e e d e d th e ca ll o f th e m o ra l law , y e t a lso b e liev e d t h a t no h ig h e s t good w as p o ss ib le , th a t h u - m a n k in d w a s s im p ly n o t c a p a b le o f p ro g ress . B u t w e h a v e a lso se e n th a t th is te n s io n c a n n o t sim p ly r e s u l t in th e re jec tion of th e m o ra l law ; w e a re obli- g a te d to w ill m o ra lly r e g a rd le s s o f th e consequences. So w h a t is th e n a tu re o f th is te n s io n ? K a n t in d ic a te s in a few p la c e s th a t w e a re p e rh a p s b e s t to th in k of th is te n s io n a lo n g th e l in e s o f a m e re inconsistency . T h is does n o t a p p e a r to be a v ic ious o r ev en p e rh a p s illo g ica l inconsistency . T h e re c a n be no duty to be lieve in th e p o s tu la te s o f p ra c t ic a l rea so n , for "fa i th th a t i s co m m an d ed is a n a b su rd ity ,"12 so b e lie f is n o t com m anded . A nd, a s lo n g a s th e a g e n t con- t in u e s to do h is /h e r du ty , th e n th e r e i s no d irec t conflict w ith th e m o ra l law . In d eed , th e a ssu m p tio n is m a d e b e ca u se o f a n e ed o f p ra c tic a l re a so n , w hich is u l t im a te ly co n cern ed w ith w illin g a n d actions, a n d th e re fo re i f th e a g en t c o n tin u e s to w ill a n d a c t in acco rd an ce w ith th e m o ra l law , th e r e is no v io la- tio n o f d u ty . Y e t th e re does seem to b e som e k in d o f in co n sis ten cy in th e w illing of a n object a n d n o t b e liev in g in th e p o ss ib ility of i ts a t ta in m e n t . P e rh a p s i t is b e s t th o u g h t o f a s a psycho log ical inconsis tency , o r a s a con flic t w ith in th e "in te re s t" o f re a so n . K a n t a s se r ts : 12 Second Critique. Ak. 144. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. .■562 No, my conviction is not logical, b u t moral certainty; and since it rests on subjective ground (of the moral sentim ent), I m ust not even say, 'It is morally certa in th a t there is a God, etc.', b u t 'I am morally certain, etc.' In other words, belief in a God and in ano ther world is... interwoven with my moral sen tim en t...13 T h e p ro b le m is th a t , a s K a n t e x p la in s i t , "once a n e n d is accep ted , th e cond i- tio n s o f i t s a t ta in m e n t a re h y p o th e tica lly n ecessa ry ... [T]t i s sufficien t, ab so - lu te ly a n d fo r everyone, i f I know w ith c e r ta in ty th a t no one c an h av e k n o w l- edge o f a n y o th e r conditions w h ich le a d to th e p roposed en d ."14 R eason h a s s e t i t s e l f th e e n d o f b rin g in g a b o u t th e h ig h e s t good. T h ere fo re i t m u st con- s id e r th o se m e a n s w hich a re n e c e ssa ry fo r i ts ex istence to b e possib le. T h u s, w h ile b e lie f in th e se p o s tu la te s "is i t s e l f n o t com m anded ," K a n t h a s a rg u e d a ll a lo n g t h a t "i t r a th e r sp rin g s from th e m o ra l d isposition itse lf ."15 So, w ith th e case of a p e rso n w ho be lieves in th e v a lid ity o f th e m o ra l la w b u t n o t th e p o s tu la te s o f p ra c tic a l re a so n , th e re w ould n ecessa rily be a te n s io n w ith in rea so n itse lf. P ra c tic a l re a s o n is th e c re a to r o f th e p o s tu la te s , w h ich a re n e e d e d to achieve i ts en d s, y e t th e p e rso n w ould re je c t these v e ry sam e p o s tu la te s w hile s ti ll ack n o w led g in g th e m oral law . I t seem s th a t K a n t d id n o t b e liev e th is to be vicious, on ly t h a t th e p o s tu la te s sh o u ld be believed "from a p ra c t ic a l p o in t o f view , i.e., so t h a t h e c a n a t le a s t fo rm a concept of th e p o ss ib ility o f [achieving] th e f in a l p u rp o se th a t is m o ra lly p resc rib ed to h im ..."16 U n fo rtu n a te ly , K a n t te lls u s n o th in g a s to th e specific n a tu re o f th is ten s io n . H ow ever, th e re is one specific re a so n to ta k e th is te n s io n seriously . K a n t w r i te s in d iffe ren t p laces th a t th e id e a o f a God could n o t h a v e a risen in h is to ry w ith o u t th e developm ent o f p ra c tic a l reason . W e u n d e rs ta n d th e 13 A829 = B857. 14 A823-4 = B851-2. 15 Second Critique, Ak. 146. See also: Ak 12n. 16 Third Critique, Ak. 453. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. concep t o f G od today a s in c lu d in g om niscience, om nipotence, etc., b u t K a n t b e liev es t h a t th ese a t t r ib u te s w ere n o t a lw ays a tt r ib u te d to God. K a n t h a s a lso a rg u e d th a t th e n o tio n o f G od does n o t a rise from th e o re tic a l reaso n in g , fo r ev en n a tu r e a s te leo log ica lly conceived does n o t le a d to th e concept o f a m o ra l a u th o r of th e w orld , b u t a t m o st to a n "architect."11 T h u s, K a n t a rg u e s t h a t w h en , a t som e p o in t in th e p a s t , people had progressed fa r enough in their inquiries to deal philosophically even w ith m oral subjects, about which other peoples had never done more than talk, they found for the first tim e a new need, a practical need which gave them the definite concept of the F irs t Being. In this, speculative reason was only a spec- tator, or a t best it had the m erit of embellishing a concept which did not grow on its own ground...18 T h e concep t o f God as w e n o w u n d e rs ta n d i t w as n o t a lw ay s th e sam e a s i t is to d ay . I t took tim e to develop , tim e w hich p rac tica l re a so n n e ed e d in o rd er to becom e m o re m a tu re . T h e o re tic a l re a so n c an n o t t ru ly la y c la im to any p ro o f fo r th e ex is tence o f God, n o r , i t seem s, can i t lay c la im to th e g en esis of th e concep t o f God. I t seem s lik e ly t h a t th e sam e sto ry cou ld b e to ld ab o u t th e h ig h e s t good a n d th e (positive) n a tu r e of freedom , th o u g h p e rh a p s we h av e a lw ay s fe lt th e n eed for im m o rta lity . T h is o ugh t to le a d u s to th e co n sid era tio n th a t i t seem s r a th e r in co n g ru o u s for rea so n to re je c t a p o s tu la te w hich h a d a r is e n becau se o f i ts ow n n eed s . T he p o s tu la te a n d n a tu r e of God, (positive) freedom , a n d th e h ig h e s t good a ll a rose th ro u g h n e e d s of a m a tu r in g p ra c tic a l rea so n . T hey w ere n e e d e d for rea so n to p re s e n t a n accoun t to i ts e lf o f h o w i ts n a tu r a l a n d n e c e ssa ry e n d m ig h t be ach ieved ; "i t w ould be p rac tica lly im possib le to s tr iv e fo r th e object o f a concept, w h ich , a t bo ttom , w ould be e m p ty a n d w ith o u t a n ob ject."19 O ne a rg u m e n t h e re , th e n , seem s to be th a t th e re w ou ld n o t h av e 17 A627=B655. 18 Second Critique, Ak. 140. 19 Ibid.. Ak. 143. See also: third Critique. Ak. 454. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 364 b e e n th e no tio n of a G od o r h ig h e s t good to deny in th e f i r s t p lace i f i t w ere n o t a n e ce ssa ry n e ed o f p ra c tic a l rea so n . T he n e e d o f re a so n "h a s i ts g ro u n d ob jectively in th e c h a ra c te r o f th in g s a s th ey m u s t b e u n iv e rsa lly ju d g e d by p u re re a so n a n d is n o t b a se d on in c lin a tio n ... T h is is , th e re fo re , a n ab so lu te ly n ecessa ry n eed ..."20 T h ese concepts w o u ld h a v e b e en e n tire ly e m p ty to beg in w ith h a d n o t th e y b e en a n e ed o f re a so n . F o r re a so n i ts e lf to re je c t th e m seem s to b e in c o n s is te n t, th o u g h p e rh a p s th is specific defense co u ld be re p u d ia te d i f one re je c te d K a n t's b e lie f t h a t th e concep ts o f God a n d im m o rta lity a ro se th ro u g h n e e d s o f p rac tic a l rea so n . R e tu rn in g to th e m o re g e n e ra l defense for th e h ig h e s t good concern- in g th e "ten s io n " w h ich w o u ld e n su e , w hy sh o u ld re a s o n w ish to re jec t th e se p o s tu la te s? I t c an n o t be th a t re a s o n feels i ts e lf s tro n g en o u g h to c re a te th e h ig h e s t good on i ts ow n, fo r w e o u g h t to be w ell v e rs e d in exam ples o f m oral a c tio n s le a d in g to u n d e s ire d re s u l ts ; w e a re n o t th e m a s te r s o f a n a tu re w h ich is u n resp o n siv e to m o ra l n e e d s .21 So p ra c tic a l re a so n o u g h t n o t to r e - je c t th em . B u t p e rh a p s , w h ile p ra c tic a l rea so n gave r is e to th e se concepts, sp e cu la tiv e rea so n w ou ld f in d som e rea so n to re jec t th em ; b u t th is is also n o t possib le . W h a t a rg u m e n ts co u ld th e o re tic a l re a so n f in d to re jec t th e se p o s tu - la te s? God, freedom , a n d im m o ra lity a re n o t ob jects o f poss ib le experience, so i t is n o t possib le to h a v e som e ex p erien ce w hich w o u ld d isp rove th e i r ex is- ten ce . K a n t h a s c le a re d th e w a y fo r a ll th re e w ith th e f i r s t C ritiq u e . T he o n ly re m a in in g objection co u ld b e b a se d on th e a lle g e d la c k o f m o ra l p ro g ress in h u m a n h is to ry . B u t th is too is so m e th in g w h ich i t seem s im possib le to p ro v e o r d isp rove th ro u g h ex p erien ce , th o u g h K a n t h a s , a s w e h a v e seen , g iven th e sk ep tic p le n ty o f re a so n s to th in k th a t w e c a n f in d c lues to th e ra c e 's p ro g ress . G iven th a t K a n t h a s a lread y conceded t h a t th e se a re no t su p p o sed to be objects w hose e x is te n c e we could k n o w th eo re tica lly , a n d a re 20 Ibid. 21 For more on this, see the following chapter. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 365 m ere p o s tu la te s , th e re seem s no re a s o n to deny p ra c tic a l re a so n th e objects of i t s need . B u t th is b r in g s u s to th e n e x t section. C There is no reason not to believe, while there is a reason to believe T h is p o in t is a re la tiv e ly s im p le one, a n d sh o u ld b e obv ious from a ll o f K a n t's w rit in g s . I n essence, th is ju s tif ic a tio n fo r b e lie f in th e p o s tu la te s m ig h t b e s u m m a r iz e d by K a n t's a s s e r tio n th a t , "th e a ssu m p tio n o f i t s p o ss i- b ility is n o t a t a ll in n e e d of a co m m an d , fo r th e o re tic a l re a so n h a s n o th in g to sa y a g a in s t i t . "22 K a n t's p o in t is s im p le : th ese p o s tu la te s a re fo r th e u se of p ra c tic a l r e a s o n a lo n e , a n d a re n o t in te n d e d to be th e o re tic a l p ro o fs o f th e ex is tence o f th e s e ob jects, "b u t on ly fo r th e sa k e o f a p ra c tic a lly n e c e ssa ry end o f th e p u re r a t io n a l w ill, w hich does n o t h e re choose b u t r a th e r obeys a n in - exorab le c o m m a n d o f re a so n W23 T h u s , b ecause p ra c tic a l re a so n "tu r n s th e scale" in fa v o r o f th e i r u se ,24 a n d b e c a u se th e re is no re a so n fo rb id d in g th e ir u se , w e o u g h t to fee l f re e to do so. H en ce , b e tw een "p u re " a n d "p ra c tic a l" re a - son, "i t is n o t a q u e s tio n of w h ich m u s t y ield , for one does n o t n e c e ssa r ily conflict w ith th e o th e r ."25 T he on ly con flic t w hich seem s to e x is t is th e con- flic t w h ich w o u ld ta k e p lace w ith in re a s o n i ts e lf i f i t a tte m p te d to deny th e poss ib ility o f th e s e p o s tu la te s . H en ce , K a n t w rites , fo r ex am p le , t h a t th e d u ty to s tr iv e fo r th e h ig h e s t good is "b a se d on a n apod ic tic law ... w h ich is in - d e p e n d e n t o f th e s e p resu p p o sitio n s , a n d th u s n eed s no fu r th e r s u p p o r t from th eo re tic a l o p in io n s on th e in n e r c h a ra c te r o f th in g s , on th e se c re t f in a l e n d o f th e w o rld o rd e r , o r on a ru le r p re s id in g over it ..."26 T h e Critique o f Judgment g ives u s even fu r th e r re a so n fo r th is ty p e of ju s tif ic a tio n . I n fac t, th e conclu sion o f th is Critique is n o t o n ly t h a t i t is 22 Second Critique, Ak. 144. 23 Ibid., Ak. 143. 24 Ibid., Ak. 145. 25 Ibid., Ak. 120. 26 Ibid., Ak. 142-3. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 366 p e rm iss ib le fo r u s to th in k th a t th e re is a G od a n d th a t n a tu r e o p era tes teleo log ically , b u t th a t w e need to th in k th is , a n d w e n e e d to th in k i t in th e in te re s ts o f theoretical reaso n . T h u s , p ra c tic a l reaso n is n o t m ere ly a llow ed to p o s tu la te th e existence o f G od a n d teleology, as i f i t w e re a t odds w ith sp e cu la tiv e rea so n over th is is su e , b u t th e re is now a h a rm o n y o f rea so n con- c e rn in g th e s e issues: if we combine our cognition of physical purposes w ith th a t of the m oral pur- pose, then, because of pure reason's m axim to strive to unify principles as m uch as we can, physical purposes are very important, since they support the practical reality of the idea of God by the reality th a t from a theoretical point of view it already has for judgm ent.27 W hile th is concerns sp ecu la tiv e re a so n , g iv in g u s only a regulative idea , a n d th u s c a n n o t provide a n y s e p a ra te confirmation of th e p o s tu la te s o f p rac tica l rea so n , su c h a conclusion c e r ta in ly le n d s su p p o rt to th e ty p e o f ju s tif ic a tio n w e a re co n cern ed w ith in h e re . A s w e sa w in Section O ne above, th e re Eire th re e re a so n s w hy th e conclusions o f th e th i r d Critique le a d to a connection b e tw een m o ra lity and th e n a tu r a l w o rld a n d h en ce God. T h e n e e d for ju d g - m e n t to th in k in term s o f a m o ra l a u th o r o f th e w orld le n d s fu r th e r su p p o rt to th e p o ss ib ility of th e re sp o n siv en e ss o f n a tu r e to th e n e e d s of m orality . T h u s, conflic t c rea ted th ro u g h th e re je c tio n o f th e p o s tu la te s o f p rac tic a l r e a - son seem n o t .only u nnecessa ry , b u t a lso u n w a rra n te d . D. Motivation D esp ite th e fac t th a t K a n t in s is ts t h a t no m a te r ia l c a n be th e fo u n - d a tio n o f th e m o ra l law , a n d th u s th e h ig h e s t good c an n o t b e th e d e te rm in in g g ro u n d o f th e m oral w ill, K a n t is s u re ly n o t u n co n cern ed w ith th e q u estio n of m o tiv a tio n . I add ressed th is is su e in C h a p te r F o u r of S ec tion O ne above, w h e re I d iscu ssed K an t's concern w ith "in flu e n ce " o f th e w ill, a s w ell as in 27 Third Critique. Ak. 456. See also: Ak. 453. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 367 th o se p laces w here I ta lk e d a b o u t th e re la tio n sh ip o f b o th h a p p in e ss a n d po litics to m orality . K a n t does th in k th a t th e w ill i s in flu e n c e d by o u ts id e fac to rs, a n d such in flu e n ce s can le a d th e w ill a s tr a y .28 I f w e a d d th is to th e fac t th a t reason h a s a n in te r e s t in th e outcom e o f o u r w illin g a n d th a t th e h ig h e s t good is th e n a tu r a l ob jec t o f m oral w i l l i n g , th e r e s u l t is th a t b e lie f in th e h ig h e s t good is n e c e ssa ry i f w e a re n o t to lose f a i th in th e m oral law . A nd th is is a question of m o tiv a tio n . K a n t p re s e n ts u s w ith m a n y q u o ta tio n s re g a rd in g th is re la tio n sh ip , m a n y o f w hich (u n su rp ris in g ly ) com e from h is p o litic a l w ritin g s . H ere a re b u t a few o f th e m an y p o ss ib le c ita tions: [With the impossibility of the postulates] we are only hindered in the unceas- ing striving toward the precise and persistent obedience to a command of rea- son which is stern, unindulgent, truly commanding, really and not ju s t ideally possible.29 A need of pure practical reason, on the other hand, is based on a duty to make something (the highest good) the object of my will so as to promote it w ith all my strength.30 And so practical reason gives us a pure m oral basis for assum ing th is cause (since we can do so w ithout contradiction), even if only for the sake of avoiding the risk of [having to] regard th a t striving as wholly futile in its effects and of therefore allowing it to flag.31 [A person m ust postu late these notions if] he does not w ant his respect for the m oral law, by which th is law directly inspires him to obey it, to be weakened, as would result from the nullity of the one ideal final purpose th a t is adequate to th is respect's high dem and (such weakening of his respect would inevitably im pair his m oral a ttitude)...32 The reflective person feels a grief th a t the unreflective do not know, a grief th a t can well lead to m oral ruination: this is a discontentedness w ith the 28 They would not necessarily lead the will astray, of course, but a "weak will" might thereby be misguided. 29 Second Critique, Ak. 123. 30 Ibid., Ak. 142. 31 Third Critique. Ak. 446. 32 Ibid.. Ak. 453. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 368 providence th a t governs the entire course of the world... It is of the greatest importance... to be content with providence... so th a t we can always take cour- age under our burdens...33 T he u n d e rly in g th em e to a ll o f K a n t's a s se r tio n s is c lear, n a m e ly t h a t p ra c tic a l re a so n is n o t in s u la te d from e x te rn a l in flu e n ce s , a n d th a t th e p o s tu la te s a re n e ce ssa ry in o rd er for p ra c tic a l r e a s o n to se cu re i ts e ffo rts in b rin g in g a b o u t th e h ig h e s t good. C e rta in ly m a n y p eo p le m ig h t be te m p te d to give up h o p e in th e ach iev ab ility of th e h ig h e s t good, i f th e y h av e n o t a lre a d y g iven u p , i f th e y tru ly b e lieved th a t h u m a n k in d w a s n o t ab le to be im proved . T he m o ra l la w i ts e l f cou ld be th re a te n e d i f a p e rs o n w ere com pletely convinced o f th e im p o ssib ility of th e h ig h e s t good. K a n t is w e ll a w are th a t th e ca ll o f th e m o ra l la w is a lre ad y im p ed ed by th e e n tic e m e n ts of h a p p in e ss , a n d a d isb e lie f in th e p o s tu la te s c e rta in ly w ou ld n o t h e lp m a tte rs any . C e rta in ly i t ta k e s g re a t m o tiva tion to a tte m p t to c o n s is te n tly w ill in accord w ith th e m o ra l law , a n d th e possib ility t h a t a ll su c h w illin g w ould com e to n a u g h t w ou ld u n d e rm in e som e o f th a t im p o r ta n t m o tiv a tio n . HL Additional Defenses T he above fo u r ju s tif ic a tio n s for th e n e e d o f th e p o s tu la te s o f p ra c tic a l rea so n a n d th e b e lie f in th e possib ility o f th e h ig h e s t good a re r a th e r exp lic it in K a n t's w ritin g s , d e a lin g explicitly w ith su ch ob jects. A s fo r th e f i r s t ju s t i - fication , i t seem s to be too strong , a n d is la te r re je c te d by K a n t h im self. T he second seem s accep tab le , b u t given th e r a th e r am b ig u o u s n a tu r e of th e con- flic t invo lved , p e rh a p s i t is n o t p a rtic u la rly p e rs u a s iv e . H ow ever, I th in k som e ty p e o f con flic t w ou ld re s u lt from fo llow ing th e m o ra l la w w hile re je c t- in g th e p o ss ib ility o f th e h ig h e s t good. T he th ir d ju s tif ic a tio n , w hile p e rh a p s seem in g r a th e r tr iv ia l a t f i r s t glance, I th in k is r a th e r s tro n g . I f we accep t K a n t's a s se r tio n t h a t p ra c tic a l rea so n does in d e e d h a v e a n e e d to a s s e r t th e p o s tu la te s , th e n i t c a n offer u p a defense a g a in s t th e p e rso n w ho sim p ly fe lt 33 "Speculative Beginning of Human History." Ak. 120-1. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 369 a m b iv a le n t re g a rd in g th e p o ss ib ility o f th e h ig h e s t good. In o rd e r to p rove th e im p o ss ib ility o f th e p o s tu la te s o f p ra c tic a l re a so n a n d th e h ig h e s t good, one w o u ld h a v e to re ly on th e o re tic a l rea so n . H ow ever, K a n t h a s a lre a d y s e t th e fo u n d a tio n fo r th e im p o ssib ility o f su ch a n a rg u m e n t. In a d d itio n , K a n t offers som e good in d ic a tio n s t h a t th e re is a h in t o f m o ra l p ro g re s s in h is to ry a n d t h a t w e o u g h t to t h in k o f n a tu re a s h a v in g b e en d e s ig n e d b y a m o ra l a u th o r . I f th is is t ru e , th e n th e re is s im p ly no re a so n not to b e lieve in th e p o s tu la te s , th o u g h w e c a n n o t com m and th e ir belief. I n fac t, i t w o u ld seem r a th e r i r r a t io n a l to p o s it th e i r im p o ssib ility g iven t h a t th e re seem s no a d e - q u a te fo u n d a tio n to do so. F in a lly , re g a rd in g th e fo u r th ju s tif ic a tio n , w h ile i t seem s so m e w h a t w eak , i t su re ly m u s t be accep tab le . I t s re je c tio n w o u ld i n - volve p o s it in g th e a b ility o f th e p e rso n to be com plete ly u n in f lu e n c e d by h is /h e r se n su o u s n a tu re , a n a b ility w h ich seem s d o u b tfu l, o r by som ehow p ro v in g t h a t b e lie f in th e p o s tu la te s w o u ld b e s im p ly in c o n se q u e n tia l. T h e re a re tw o m o re defenses, how ever, w h ich se em a p p ro p r ia te . N e i- th e r o f th e m n a m e th e h ig h e s t good per se, a lth o u g h th e seco n d d e a ls d irec tly w ith th e "u ltim a te " a n d "f in a l p u rp o se o f c re a tio n " a n d th e re b y w ith th e h ig h e s t good. I h a v e fo u n d n o th in g in th e seco n d ary l i te r a tu r e l in k in g th e m d irec tly w ith th e p ro b lem o f ju s tify in g a b e lie f in th e p o s tu la te s o f p ra c tic a l rea so n . K The Moral Politician and the Political Moralist I ta k e m y c lu e a s to th is ju s tif ic a tio n from K a n t's d is tin c tio n b e tw ee n th e "m o ra l p o litic ia n " a n d th e "p o litica l m o ra lis t" in "T o[w ard ] P e rp e tu a l P eace ." R eca ll t h a t th e m o ra l p o litic ian is th e official w ho ta k e s th e m o ra l la w a s h is /h e r u l t im a te p r in c ip le for a ll ac tio n a n d le g is la tio n . T h e p o litic a l m o ra lis t i s th e p e rso n w ho a tte m p ts to m ak e h e r /h e r ac tio n s a n d leg is la tio n seem m o ra l, a p p e a lin g to R ig h t to ju s tify o th erw ise im m o ra l a n d ev en ille g a l ac tions . N ow K a n t m a k e s th e fo llow ing p o in t re g a rd in g th e s e tw o w ays to r u n a g o v ern m en t: R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 370 the moralizing politician attem pts, on the pretex t th a t hum an natu re is not capable of a tta in ing the good as prescribed in the idea of reason, to extenuate political principles th a t a re contrary to right, and thus these principles make progress impossible and perpe tuate the violation of right.34 H ere , K a n t m a in ta in s th a t th e p o litica l m o ra lis t w ou ld gu ide th e go v ern m en t in su ch a w ay th a t p ro g ress w o u ld b e im possib le a n d R ig h t w o u ld be v io la ted . W hy m ig h t th is be so? B ecau se th e po litica l m o ra lis t h a s a lre a d y decided th a t m o ra l p ro g ress is n o t p o ss ib le , a n d th u s (w rongly) feels t h a t s /h e is u n - d er no ob liga tion to a tte m p t to g u id e th e com m onw ealth to w a rd a b e tte r con- s titu tio n . W h a t is im p o r ta n t to n o te h e re is t h a t b y m a k in g su c h a n a s - sum ption , K a n t be lieves th e n a tu r a l consequence w ill be to a c tu a lly make p rog ress im possib le , th o u g h p re su m a b ly on ly fo r th e tim e b e in g . B y en ac tin g law s th a t a re c o n tra ry to R ig h t, a n d by ig n o rin g th e ca ll o f th e m o ra l law , th e po litica l m o ra lis t fa ils to b r in g a b o u t those s i tu a tio n s w hich a re n ecessa ry for R igh t a n d fo r th e m o ra l p ro jec t. In fact, i f w e a llow ed e i th e r p o litic ian h is /h e r b e lie f in th e im possib il- ity o f p ro g ress , th e n w h a t ju s tif ic a tio n could p o ss ib ly be g iven fo r fay ing to be a m o ra l po litic ian? O n e fo u n d a tio n 35 for th e m o ra l p o litic ian i s th e no tion th a t m o ra lity a n d po litics a re n o t incom patib le , a n d th a t g u id in g a govern- m en t in te rm s o f R ig h t is a c tu a lly th e b est w ay to leg is la te . T h is w as th e conclusion of "T h eo ry a n d P ra c tic e ." As K a n t a rg u e s in "T o[w ard] P e rp e tu a l Peace": Solving the first problem, namely, the problem th a t political prudence pro- poses, requires considerable n a tu ra l knowledge so th a t one can use na tu re's m echanism to a tta in the desired end; yet it is uncertain how this mechanism will function as far as its consequences for perpetual peace are concerned... By contrast, the solution to the second problem, the problem of political wisdom [i.e., the bringing politics in line with morality] impresses itself on us, as it 34 "Tofward] Perpetual Peace," Ak. 373. 35 The second foundation is the moral law itself. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 371 were, for it obviously puts all artificiality to sham e, and leads directly to the end.36 K a n t's p o in t h e re is th a t i t seem s im possib le to con tro l n a tu re en o u g h to be ab le to le g is la te h a p p in e ss , w h ile i t seem s a r u le r cou ld w ill to b r in g leg is la tio n in to accord w ith R ig h t. B u t i f n a tu r e is s im p ly u n resp o n siv e to m o ra l co n sid era tio n s , a n d th e re b y u n re sp o n siv e to th e a tte m p t to b r in g th e com m onw ealth in lin e w ith m o ra lity a n d R ig h t, th e n w h a t ju s tif ic a tio n cou ld be g iven fo r th e m o ra l po litic ian? A t le a s t th e p o litic a l m o ra lis t cou ld p o in t to som e h a p p in e s s w h ich w ould h a v e b e en o b ta in e d , even i f h is /h e r ow n. B u t th e m o ra l p o litic ian w ould h a v e n o th in g to p o in t to a n d lit tle ju s tif ic a tio n for ru lin g in a w ay th a t is no t lik e ly to sa tis fy th e im m e d ia te desires o f th e ru led . S /he cou ld in d e e d p o in t to th e m o ra l law , b u t i f n a tu r e is th o u g h t to b e u n resp o n siv e , th e n i t is like ly t h a t th is defense w o u ld n o t convince th e c o n s titu en ts . H ence , h e re is an o th e r ju s tif ic a tio n fo r th e b e lie f in th e p ro g re ss of th e h u m a n species, fo r w ith o u t i t , K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t p o litic ian s w ill n o t s te e r th e g o v e rn m en t in d irec tions n e ce ssa ry fo r im p ro v ed c o n stitu tio n s . T he im p lica tio n s a re obvious. I f th e p o litic ian does n o t e n a c t law s in accord w ith R ig h t (because s /h e h a s a lread y a ssu m e d no p ro g re ss to be possib le), th e n th e c o n s titu tio n s a re n o t im proved, th e s tru c tu re o f th e com m onw ealth is n o t b ro u g h t in to accord w ith R ight, a n d th e fo u n d a tio n o f social in s t itu t io n s is n o t la id fo r th e b eg in n in g s of t r u e m o ra l p ro g ress . C learly , w e m u s t ta k e th is to be a m ere ly tem p o ra ry se tback , since w e h a v e a lre a d y a rg u ed fo r th e u l t i - m a te n ecess ity o f m o ra l p rog ress. N o n e th e less , th is seem s to be a n im p o r ta n t ju s tif ic a tio n fo r b e lie f in th e h ig h e s t good, fo r w ith o u t it, po litica l m o ra lis ts w ou ld fee l no n e e d to e n ac t th e leg is la tio n n e c e ssa ry for m oving th e S ta te c loser to R igh t. 36 'To[ward]Perpetual Peace." Ak. 377-8. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 372 Also, i t se em s th a t th e re w o u ld lik e ly be a d a n g e ro u s s p ira l w hich w ou ld develop u n d e r th ese c irc u m sta n ce s . I f th e p o litic ian w ere convinced of th e im possib ility o f p rog ress a n d chose to e n a c t leg is la tio n w h ich is co n tra ry to R ig h t, th e n th e r e s u l t is a s t ru c tu re o f a com m onw ealth w h ich is like ly to be p ro n e to in ju s tic e , violence, a n d w a r. I f th is is th e re s u lt , th e n in d iv id u a ls a re a lso likely to becom e in c re a s in g ly d e sp o n d e n t re g a rd in g th e p ro sp ec ts for b e tte rm e n t o f th e h u m a n race . L ook ing a ro u n d , in d iv id u a ls see on ly c o u n te rex am p les o f m oral p ro g ress . H ence , th e y too lose f a i th in th e h ig h es t good. G iven su c h a po litica l c lim a te , i t is lik e ly t h a t th e n e x t ru le r w ill also h a v e lo st fa ith , a n d beg in to e n a c t d e fic ien t leg is la tio n . H ence , th e sp ira l.37 W ith o u t th e b e lie f in th e p o ss ib ility o f p ro g ress , i t w ou ld becom e in c reas in g ly d ifficu lt to p ro m o te th o se s tru c tu re s w h ich a llow fo r th e m o ra l p ro jec t to be ta k e n up in full. C oupled w ith a rejection o f th e m o ra l law , su c h a s i tu a t io n w ould be d e v asta tin g . K a n t w rites: To be sure, if ne ither freedom nor the moral law th a t is based on it exist, and if everything th a t happens or can happen is m ere m echanism of nature, then politics (as the a r t of using th a t m echanism to govern men) would be the whole of practical wisdom, and the concept of right would be a contentless thought.38 I f th e m oral law is re jected , th e n th e re c a n be no a p p e a l to R ig h t. A t th is p o in t, th e only g u id in g p rin c ip le a v a ila b le w o u ld b e w h a t is a n d n o t w h a t ought to be. In o th e r w ords, ru le r s w o u ld be fo rced to look on ly a t h is to rica l exam p les for h e lp in d ra ftin g le g is la tio n , a n d w o u ld h a v e no o th e r leg itim a te in te re s ts th a n h a p p in e ss . S u ch a s i tu a t io n w ou ld obviously b e v e ry d estru c tiv e for m o ra lity . I f b e lie f in th e p o ss ib ility o f th e b e tte rm e n t o f h u m a n k in d is a lso re jec ted , th e c u l tu r a l s i tu a tio n w o u ld be d e v a s ta tin g . N ot only w ould R ig h t p la y no p a r t in p o litic a l decisions, b u t th e re w ou ld be no 37 Perhaps this is one additional reason for Kant's support of the French Revolution. 38 'To[ward]Perpetual Peace," Ak. 372. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 373 m o tiv a tio n to a tte m p t to im prove th e s i tu a tio n o f th e m em b ers o f th e com m onw ealth . I f a r u le r w as im m o ra l a n d re je c te d th e poss ib ility o f p ro g re s s , s /h e cou ld fee l free to p u rs u e p e rs o n a l h a p p in e s s o r n a tio n a l g lory a t a n y expense . I t se em s like ly th a t K a n t's "P re l im in a ry A rticles fo r P e rp e tu a l P eace A m ong N a tio n s" w ou ld n o t b e a d h e re d to . T he s i tu a tio n w o u ld n o t im prove u n t i l t h a t p o in t a t w h ich r u le r s b e liev ed th a t th e re w a rd s o f con flic t w ere u ltim a te ly n o t w orth th e e x p e n d itu re . I t w ou ld ta k e a lo n g t im e before a n y th in g l ik e a p erfec t in te rn a l o r e x te rn a l c o n s titu tio n w o u ld com e to p a ss . F. No Final Purpose T im e a n d tim e a g a in , K a n t a rg u e s t h a t i f th e h ig h e s t good is u n a t - ta in a b le , th e n th e w o rld c an n o t h av e p u rp o se o r m e a n in g . T h is is la rg e ly s e e n in th e th ird Critique. I f th e ex is tence o f h u m a n s a s m o ra l a g e n ts is n o t th e f in a l p u rp o se o f c re a tio n , "th e n th e ex is ten ce o f th e w o rld is e i th e r b a se d on n o p u rp o se a t a ll in th e cause , o r only on p u rp o s e s w ith o u t a f in a l p u r - p o se ."39 T h is is K a n t's conclusion from th e "d o w n w a rd " p ro o f o f th e l in k b e - tw e e n n a tu r e a n d m o ra lity in th e Critique o f Judgment. K a n t's b e lie f is t h a t i f m o ra l w illin g is u n a b le to be perfected , th e n re a s o n is on ly (som ew hat) ef- fec tive a t p u rsu in g h a p p in e ss , a n d th u s is re d u c e d to th e lev e l of every o th e r a n im a l; "i t is only in so fa r a s we s tr iv e to w a rd t h a t p u rp o se [i.e., m o ra lity ], t h a t w e m a y ju d g e o u rse lv es as conform ing to th e f in a l p u rp o se o f a n in te l l i - g e n t w o rld cau se (if th e r e b e such a cause )."40 M e c h a n ic a l n a tu re i ts e l f is w ith o u t v a lu e i f i t c a n n o t be sy s tem atized b y th e ra t io n a l , m o ra l a g en t, "...for i f in d e e d c re a tio n h a s a f in a l purpose , th e n w e h a v e to conceive o f i t a s h a r - m o n iz in g w ith th e m o ra l f in a l pu rp o se ([since] o n ly th e m o ra l f in a l p u rp o se m a k e s th e concept o f a[ny] p u rp o se [of c rea tio n ] p o ss ib le )."41 B ut, g iven m y 39 Third Critique, Ak. 450. 40 Ibid., Ak. 446. 41 Ibid.. Ak. 453. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 374 a rg u m e n ts a s to th e p ro p e r n a tu re o f th e h ig h e s t good,42 th e f in a l p u rpose o f c rea tio n a s th e c o n tin u a l im p ro v em en t o f rea so n is s im p ly th e h ig h e s t good u n d e r a d iffe ren t n a m e . T h u s, K a n t be lieves th a t i f th e h ig h e s t good is n o t possib le , a t le a s t a s a n object o f c o n tin u a l p rogress, th e n a l l th e m em bers o f th e w o rld h a v e no p u rp o se : I t cannot satisfy reason th a t the ultim ate fined purpose for which the world and m an him self are there and were created is so th a t [mem can] enjoy [the world], or so th a t [he canj behold, contemplate, and adm ire [it] (which, if th a t is eill we do, is also nothing more th an enjoyment of a particu lar kind). For reason presupposes a personal value, one th a t mem can only give himself, as the condition under which edone he and his existence cem be [al final purpose.43 T h e consequence o f th is su pposition is th a t b e lie f in th e possib ility o f th e h ig h e s t good a n d th o se p o s tu la te s n ecessa ry for i ts co n d itio n a re neces- sa ry b ecau se w ith o u t th em , o u r own re a so n a n d h u m a n i ty becom e w orth less. I f th e h ig h e s t good is im possib le , we a re red u ced to th e lev e l o f an im als. W ith o u t th e p o ss ib ility o f a m o ra l end , "th e m o ra l law is com plete ly d eg rad ed from i ts h o lin e ss ."44 T he d e g ra d a tio n o f h u m a n k in d w h ich w ould re s u l t from th e im possib ility of th e h ig h e s t good is a th e m e w hich ru n s th ro u g h o u t K a n t's po litica l w ritin g s as w ell. In "Is th e H u m a n R ace Im prov ing?" w e fin d th e th em e th a t a n e g a tiv e a n sw e r to th is q u estio n w ould be "a su b v ers io n of th e u ltim a te p u rp o se of c re a tio n itse lf ,"45 a n d even th e h y p o th es is o f h u m a n s ta g n a tio n is s tre n u o u s ly re jec ted , for "i t is a v a in a f f a i r to h a v e good so a lte rn a te w ith ev il t h a t th e w hole traffic o f o u r species w ith i ts e l f on th is globe w ou ld h a v e to b e co n sid e red as a m ere farc ica l com edy, fo r th is can endow o u r species w ith no g re a te r v a lu e in th e eyes o f re a so n th a n th a t 42 See Section Two, Chapter One and Two above. 43 Third Critique, Ak. 477. 44 Second Critique, Ak. 122. 45 "Is the Human Race Improving?" p. 161. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 375 w hich o th e r a n im a l species possess..."46 W e h a v e a lread y seen K a n t's s ta te m e n t from "T heory a n d P rac tice" t h a t "a llow ing vice to m o u n t u p o n en d le ss vice in th e rea l w orld ... so th a t in d a y s to come th e re can b e p le n ty to p u n is h is, to s a y th e least, c o n tra ry to o u r concep tion of th e m o ra lity o f a w ise c re a to r a n d governor of th e w orld ."47 In "T h e E n d o f All T h in g s" K a n t a s se r ts th a t i f th e h ig h e s t good "sh o u ld n o t be a tta in a b le , c rea tio n i ts e lf w o u ld a p p ea r... a s p u rp o se less a s a p la y th a t h a s no u p sh o t w hatsoever..."48 T h e th e m e is c lear, n am e ly t h a t w ith o u t th e a b ility o f h u m a n be ings to im p ro v e th em se lv es m orally , bo th th e y a n d w orld w ill lo se a n y claim to m e a n in g or v a lu e . I th in k t h a t th is is a p a r tic u la r ly s tro n g ju s tif ic a tio n fo r th e n e ce ss ity o f a b e lie f in th e h ig h es t good a n d th e p o s tu la te s o f p rac tica l rea so n . S u ch a b e lie f c an n o t be com m anded; "one m u s t in a p ra c tic a l w ay believe in a concu rrence b e tw ee n d iv ine w isdom a n d th e cou rse of n a tu re , i f one is n o t to give up one's c h e rish e d u ltim a te p u rp o se ."49 I ts re jection m ig h t n o t r e s u l t in a conflict w ith in reaso n itse lf. H ow ever, th e re jec tion of th e p o ss ib ility o f m o ra l p ro g ress w ould n ecessa rily low er h u m a n k in d 's se lf-estim ation . T he re s u l ts could ra n g e from th e m in im al, m ere ly a le ssen ed desire to fo llow th e com m ands of th e m oral law in a ll c ircu m stan ces , to th e m ax im al, a com plete re jec tion of th e m o ra l law due to i ts p re sc rib in g a necessa ry co n d itio n w h ich is th o u g h t to be im possible. B u t one th in g is c e r ta in : th e re jection o f th e 46 Ibid., p. 147. 47 "Theory and Practice," Ak. 308. 48 "End o f All Things," Ak. 331. 49 Ibid.. Ak. 337. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 376 h ig h e s t good ru n s co u n te r to r a t io n a l se lf-esteem , a se lf-esteem w hich we a re com m a n d ed (Metaphysics o f Morals) to keep in ta c t. .1 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 377 Chapter Six Is the Existence of God a Necessary Postulate? L In C h a p te r Tw o above, I a rg u e d th a t th e r e i s no rea so n to be lieve in a "w o rth in e ss e q u a tio n ," i.e ., th e re seem s to be n o le g itim a te ju s tif ic a tio n fo r K a n t's a s se r tio n th a t v i r tu e o u g h t to be re w a rd e d b y p ro p o rtio n a te h a p p i- n ess. I a rg u e d th a t w e o u g h t to th in k o f m o ra lity a s u n co n ce rn ed w ith a n y - th in g b u t m in im a l h a p p in e s s . H ow ever, in m o s t o f K a n t's w ritin g s , h is a rg u m e n ts for th e m o ra l p ro o f o f th e ex is tence o f G od a re p rem ise d on ex ac tly th is po in t; K a n t a rg u e s th a t a b e lie f in God is n e c e ss ita te d because v ir tu e o u g h t to be p ro p o rtio n a te ly rew ard ed , a n d b e ca u se h u m a n be in g s a re u n a b le to b r in g th is a b o u t th e m - selves. H a v in g re je c te d th e "w o rth in ess e q u a tio n " does th e re re m a in a n e e d for th e ex is ten ce o f G od a s a p o s tu la te o f p ra c tic a l reaso n ? In th is c h a p te r , I w ill a rg u e th a t th is n e e d re m a in s , a n d t h a t w e c a n ju s tify i t from th e p o in t o f v iew o f an "e a r th ly " h ig h e s t good. In sh o rt, th e ex is tence o f G od n e e d s to be p o s tu la te d fo r tw o rea so n s . T he f i r s t is t h a t su ch a b e lie f is n e ce ssa ry i f d is p a ra te in d iv id u a ls a re to fo rm to g e th e r in to a n e th i- cal c o m m un ity , a m a n ife s ta t io n o f th e in v is ib le c h u rc h . T h is a rg u m e n t h a s b een s e t fo r th by S h a ro n A nderson-G old and , to som e e x te n t, P h ilip J . R ossi. I w ill ex am in e th e ir d e fense , a g re e in g w ith i ts n ecessity , b u t re je c tin g i t a s a com plete so lu tio n to K a n t's p rob lem of ev il a n d th e p rob lem of th e a t t a in m ent, of th e h ig h e s t good. T h e second reaso n fo r th e n e e d o f th is p o s tu la te o u g h t to be r a th e r obvious a t th i s p o in t in th e p re s e n t w ork , n a m e ly th e n e ce ss ity of n a tu re to be resp o n siv e to th e n eed s of m o ra lity . T h e m an ife s ta tio n of th e R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. fc 378 h ig h e s t good in th e w orld, th e cu lm in a tio n o f m o ra l p ro g re ss , is a m an ife s ta - tio n w h ich ta k e s p lace in n a tu re . G overnm en ta l, social, a n d re lig ious o rgan i- z a tio n s m u s t com e up w ith em p irica l so lu tio n s to e m p iric a l p rob lem s, an d t h a t r e q u ire s a know ledge o f n a tu re as w ell a s a n a tu re w h ich is responsive to so lu tio n s . T h e outcom es o f m o ra l w illing o u g h t to b e th o se w h ich a re re - flec tive o f o u r in te n tio n s . F o r th e se rea so n s th e re is a n e e d to p o s tu la te a m o ra l a u th o r . EL Anderson-Gold's and Rossi's Ethical Commonwealth A nderson-G old ta k e s a s h e r s ta r t in g p o in t for th is a rg u m e n t K a n t's d iscu ss io n o f th e prob lem o f jea lo u sy a n d r iv a lry in books O n e a n d T h ree of th e Religion. I n Book T h ree , K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t in d iv id u a ls h a v e th e du ty to m ove b ey o n d an "e th ica l s ta te o f n a tu re " in to a n "e th ic a l com m unity" w h e re each p e rso n w ould su p p o r t th e m o ra l en d eav o rs o f o th e rs . H ow ever, s ta n d in g in th e w ay of th is u n ifica tio n is th e com plica tion th a t , w h e reas in - d iv id u a ls ' "n e e d s a re b u t few a n d h is fram e o f m in d in p ro v id in g for th em is te m p e ra te a n d tra n q u il,"1 in d iv id u a ls becom e jea lo u s w h e n in th e com pany of o th ers : He [any individual] is poor (or considers him self so) only in his anxiety lest o ther m en consider him poor... Envy, the lu st for power, greed, and the malig- n a n t inclinations bound up w ith these, besiege his nature , contented within it- self, as soon as he is among men. And it is not even necessary to assume th a t these are m en sunk in evil...; it suffices th a t they are a t hand... for them mu- tually to corrupt each o ther's predispositions and make one another evil.2 H e re w e c a n c lea rly see R o u sseau 's in fluence on K an t. N a tu r a l in c lin a tio n s a re , in th em se lv es , good,3 b u t w h en in d iv id u a ls com e in to c o n ta c t w ith 1 Religion, p. 85. 2 Ibid., p. 85. 3 We receive a precise statement of this in on page 51 of the Religion, though this fact is one of the basic arguments of the Religion. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 379 o th e rs , "w e ju d g e ourselves h a p p y o r u n h a p p y on ly by m ak ing a com parison w ith o th e rs ."4 A nderson-G old m oves h o rn th e s e p a ssa g e s to a s se r t th a t th is is K a n t's g e n e ra l so lu tion to th e q u e s tio n o f th e ex is tence of rad ica l ev il in h u - m a n n a tu r e . S h e w rites th a t "th e p re fe ren c e w e d isp lay for th e se 'acq u ired d e s ire s ' [i.e., a good in com parison to som eth ing ] is th e very fo rm u la o f th e p ro p e n s ity to ev il w hich... is ... 'ro o te d in ' o u r h u m a n ity ,"5 a n d th a t "n a tu re p e r se is no lo n g er th e ta rg e te d c u lp r i t a n d th e h in d ra n c e s to th e re a liz a tio n o f th e h ig h e s t good are loca ted in th e n e x u s o f h u m a n re la tio n sh ip s ."6 T h u s , acco rd in g to A nderson-G old, ev il r e s u l ts from "th e exercice7 of re a so n a n d specifica lly a rea so n w hich com pares ,"8 t h a t is , ev il re su lts from th e n a tu r a l d ish a rm o n y w h ich we feel w hen , in o u r a sso c ia tio n s w ith o thers, w e fee l in - a d e q u a te o r u n h a p p y because of o u r com parison to o thers . T hus, "th e p ro - p e n s ity to evil, th en , is n o t so m e th in g t h a t is s im p ly 'w ith in m e' a n d 'w ith in you' b u t so m e th in g th a t o p e ra tes between u s ."9 M oving to a m ore in -d e p th e x p la n a tio n , A nderson-G old a rg u e s th a t th e so u rce o f ev il is no t sim ply self-love, b u t in s te a d a rise s from a n in co rrec t concep tion o f ourselves a s e sse n tia lly u n c o n n ec te d to o thers. S he a rg u e s t h a t i t is th e "m a n n e r in w hich th e se lf i s conceived t h a t th e co rrup tion o f th e w ill ta k e s p lac e a n d ev il a rises ."10 In essen ce , ra d ic a l ev il in h u m an n a tu re is a re s u lt o f a n im p ro p er w ay o f th in k in g o f o u r re la tio n sh ip to o thers: 4 Ibid., p. 22. 5 Anderson-Gold, "God and Community: An Inquiry into the Religious Implications of the Highest Good," p. 124. 6 "God and Community," p. 127. 7 Misprint occurs in original. 8 Anderson-Gold, "Kant's Ethical Commonwealth: The Highest Good as a Social Goal," p. 26. 9 "God and Community," p. 125. 10 "Kant's Ethical Commonwealth." p. 27. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 380 It is not the mere force of the external world or the raw attractiveness of ob- jects th a t underlies the subversion of the moral law... It is reason which be- stows upon us our social nature and leads us to "compare" ourselves w ith o th - ers... The propensity to evil is identified with the principle of self-love, not in- sofar as the self is a physical being w ith m aterial needs, bu t insofar as the self is a social being who refuses to recognize the intrinsic value of o thers.11 A ccord ing to th is p ic tu re , in d iv id u a ls , in th e u se o f th e ir "co m p ara tiv e r e a - son ," th in k o f o th e rs as m ere ly m e a n s th ro u g h w h ich th ey (them selves) can o b ta in h a p p in e ss . T h is com portm en t, how ever, m isco n s tru es th e e s se n tia l fac t t h a t "au tonom y , th e a ffirm a tio n o f th e se lf a s a n end, c an on ly b e ex- p re s se d th ro u g h th e k ingdom of e n d s ,"12 a n d th u s overlooks th e w ay in w hich each in d iv id u a l re lie s upon o th e r m o ra l a g en ts fo r th e rea liza tio n o f th e ir ow n au to n o m y a n d th e re a liz a tio n o f th e h ig h e s t good. K a n t em p h a size s th e n e ce ssa ry (m oral) connection b e tw een in d iv id u a ls , a n d th e fac t t h a t "th e id e a o f a 'm o ra l life' m u s t inc lude n o t on ly th e u n ific a tio n o f a ll o f one's 'ow n' ac ts /m ax im s b u t a lso a n e sse n tia l re fe ren c in g o f th e s e to th e ac ts /m ax im s o f o th e r m o ra l su b jec ts ."13 T h u s, in h e r la te r w ritin g s ,14 A nderson-G old a rg u es th a t b e lie f in God becom es n e c e ssa ry in o rd er fo r u s to overcom e th is "e th ica l s ta te o f n a tu r e ." E sse n tia lly , in o rd e r for u s to overcom e th e p rob lem s o f jea lo u sy a n d r iv a lry w h ich occur in o u r in te ra c tio n s w ith o th e rs , we re q u ire a w ay o f u n ify in g ou rse lv es in to a w hole. T h is u n ifica tio n , A nderson-G old a rg u es, c an on ly be h a d th ro u g h a n e th ic a l com m unity , a n d on ly th ro u g h God as a sym bol o f u n ifica tio n ; "b u t each [ind iv idual] b e in g in su ffic ien t to s ta n d a s su ra n c e for h is p led g e m u s t th in k or p resu p p o se th e ex is ten ce o f a perfect m o ra l b e in g through whom w e a re b o u n d each to each ."15 I f w e h a v e no p o in t fo r 11 Ibid., pp. 27-8. 12 Ibid., p. 27. 13 "God and Community," p. 123. 14 In "Kant's Ethical Commonwealth" Anderson-Gold seems content to have the idea of an ethical commonwealth (the highest good) itself be the point of unification. See: pp. 30-32. 15 "God and Community." p. 128. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 381 u n ifica tio n , w e w ill co n tin u e to act a t odds w ith e a c h o th e r, and , as K a n t say s, in d iv id u a ls w ill a c t "ju s t a s th o u g h th e y w e re instruments of evil."16 I f w e a re to u n i te in to a sing le , m oral co m m u n ity fo r th e p u rp o se of p rom o ting th e h ig h e s t good, th e n th e id e a of God a s m o ra l g o v e rn o r is necessary fo r u s to overcom e o u r n a tu r a l d is tan c e b e tw een one a n o th e r . T h is id e a co n ce rn in g th e n eed o f G od a s a sym bol fo r social u n ifica - tio n is su p p o r te d b y R ossi a s well. Rossi, l ik e A nderson -G o ld , em phasizes th e n e c e ssa ry soc ia l co m p o n en t o f m oral m ax im s. H e focuses on th e "w orld con- s tru c tin g " n a tu r e o f re a so n a n d , a s I d iscu ssed ab o v e ,17 a g re e s th a t th e n eces- s a ry object o f m o ra l w illin g is th e co n stru c tio n o f th e h ig h e s t good on e a r th . H e is in te re s te d in m o v in g beyond th e "'tex tb o o k picture*" w hich "h a s th e a g e n t in lo fty a n d lo n e ly m o ra l so litude" a n d w h ich "fa ils to cap tu re ... th e fa c t t h a t K a n t q u ite c le a r ly a lso ch arac te rize s ... [m o ra l w illing ] a s an in tro d u c tio n in to a 're a lm ' o r 'w o rld ', i.e ., in to a connec ted a n d o rd e re d to ta lity or re la tio n s to th e m o ra l a g en cy o f a ll o th e rs who c o n s titu te th e h u m an m o ra l com m u- n ity ."18 W e h a v e a d u ty , R ossi a rgues, n o t on ly to b r in g o u r w ill in to accord w ith th e m o ra l law , b u t a lso to p rom ote a n e th ic a l co m m u n ity for a ll h u m a n be ings . In th is re sp ec t, G od is th e a p p ro p ria te sy m b o l fo r m o ra l p ersons be- cau se the m oral fu tu re pictured under the form of com m unity through the represen- tation of the h ighest good stands in need of a fu tu re ground for its completion, which m ust also serve as ground for confidence th a t our own present moral endeavors, trunca ted though they m ay be, nonetheless will effect the a tta in - m ent of th a t fu ture. God is the effective symbol for the attainm ent of th a t fu- ture: represen ting him as the ground for ordering hum an moral purposes in 16 Religion, p. 88. 17 Section Two, Chapter One. 18 Philip Rossi, "Kant as a Christian Philosopher: Hope and the Symbols of Christian Faith," p. 28 . R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 382 harm ony through all tim e and a t any moment of tim e provides surety suffi- cient for the satisfaction of reason's in terest.19 R o ssi is n o t c lea r in a n y o f h is a rtic le s a s to w h e th e r th e "h a rm o n io u s o rd e r- in g o f m o ra l p u rp o ses"20 fu n c tio n s a s a n an a lo g y b e tw ee n G od a n d one's own o rd e r in g o f p u rp o ses or som ehow b e tw een G od a n d th e a b ility o f a n e th ica l co m m o n w ealth to o rd er th e i r co llective a n d a t tim e s d is p a ra te p u rp o ses to m o ra l co n sid era tio n s .21 H ow ever, w h a t R ossi m a k e s m a n ife s t is th e l im ita - tio n s o f o u r ab ility to u n i te w ith o th e rs in th e c o n s tru c tio n o f th e h ig h es t good, a n d , to th is e x ten t, G od becom es a n a p p ro p r ia te sym bol for m o ra l com - p o r tm e n t. m . Problems with Anderson-Gold's and Rossi's commentary I n g en era l, th e is s u e s w h ich A nderson-G old a n d R ossi h av e b ro u g h t to th e a tte n tio n of K a n tia n sch o la rsh ip a re ex trem e ly im p o rta n t. T h e ir in s is - te n c e on th e "social" n a tu r e o f m o ra l w illing a n d th e i r a rg u m e n ts a s to th e h ig h e s t good a s th e n e c e ssa ry object o f m o ra l w illin g h a v e allow ed u s to m ove b e y o n d th e "textbook" p ic tu re o f th e so lita ry a n d u n c o n ce rn e d m o ra l ag en t. I n a ccep tin g th e ir p ic tu re o f th e m o ra l ag en t, i t a llow s u s to m ove on to m ore in te re s t in g a n d , I believe, im p o r ta n t q uestions . H ow ever, I th in k th a t th e ir specific a rg u m e n ts a s to th e n a tu r e of evil a n d th e n e e d fo r a b e lie f in God a re in co rrec t. A ccording to m y in te rp re ta t io n of K a n t's Religion, A nderson-G old h a s v a s t ly m isco n s tru e d th e so u rce a n d n a tu re o f ev il a s K a n t sp e lls i t out. O n th e one h a n d , K a n t e lim in a te s n a tu r e or n a tu r a l in c lin a tio n s a s th e possib le 19 Rossi, "Kant's Doctrine of Hope: Reason's Interest and the Things of Faith," p. 237. For this need of God as symbol, see also Rossi's: "Kant as Christian Philosopher," pp. 28-29 and "Autonomy and Community: the Social Character of Kant's 'Moral Faith'," p. 171. 20 "Kant's Doctrine of Hope," p. 28. 21 In this respect, Rossi's later article, "The Final End of All Things: The Highest Good as the Unity of Nature and Freedom," brings this tension to the fore (pp. 148-151), and thus the lack of clarity may simply be inherent in Kant's formulation. Also, however, at times Rossi claims that God is necessary simply because of the need to apportion happiness to virtue. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. source. I f n a tu re w ere th e cau se o f ra d ic a l evil, th e n w e w ou ld n o t be r e - sp o n sib le fo r o u r evil. Evil, th e n , j u s t a s in th e Critique o f Practical Reason, r e s u lts from th e su b o rd in a tio n of th e m o ra l law to sen su o u s inc lina tions ,' "th e p roposition , M an is evil, can m e a n only, H e is conscious o f th e m o ra l la w b u t h a s n e v e r th e le s s adop ted in to h is m ax im th e (occasional) d e v ia tio n th e re - from ."22 M ore specifically, g iven K a n t's focus in th e Religion o n o u r "c h a ra c te r" (Gesinnung), evil is th e su b su m p tio n of individual m ax im s to a w illfu lly chosen o vera rch ing m ax im w h ich su b o rd in a te s th e m o ra l la w to n a tu r a l in c lin a tio n s . K a n t n o tes t h a t a ll h u m a n be in g s a lw ay s h a v e tw o in - cen tiv es o p e ra tin g on o u r will, t h a t is, m o ra l a n d sen su o u s in cen tiv e s , hence the distinction between a good m an and one who is evil cannot he in the difference between the incentives which they adopt into the ir maxim (not in the content of the maxim), b u t ra th e r m ust depend upon subordination (the form of the maxim), i.e., which of the two incentives he makes the condition of the other.73 T h u s, in th e case o f evil, we w illfu lly choose to ac t a s i f s e n su o u s in c lin a - tio n s co n tro lle d us. O n th e o th e r h an d , how ever, w h ile th is is K a n t's acco u n t o f th e n a - tu re o f evil, h e u ltim a te ly concludes t h a t why w e sh o u ld choose one o v e ra rch - in g m ax im over th e o th e r w ill forever remain a mystery. K a n t s ta te s th is very c learly : the rational origin of this perversion of our will whereby it m akes lower incen- tives suprem e among its maxims, th a t is, of the propensity to evil, rem ains in- scrutable to us... Evil could have sprung only from the morally-evil (not from mere lim itations in our nature); and yet the original predisposition... is a pre- disposition to good; there is then for us no conceivable ground from which the m oral evil in us could originally have come.24 22 Religion, p. 27. 23 Ibid., p. 31. 24 Ibid., p. 38. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 384 K a n t's conclusion follow s from h is an a ly s is o f w h a t i t w o u ld m ea n fo r h u m an b e in g s to h a v e a p ro p en s ity to w a rd evil. I f w e a re re sp o n s ib le fo r evil, th en n a tu r e c a n n o t be i ts cau se . A n d i f su c h resp o n sib ility is a free choice o f th e w ill, th e n w e m u s t h a v e m ad e th is choice ou rse lves. Y et, p rec ise ly because w e c a n n e v e r h av e access to th e g ro u n d s o f o u r freedom in g en era l, t h a t is, access to how freedom i ts e lf is p ossib le , w e c an n e v e r k n o w w hy w e h a v e th is "p ro p e n s ity o f th e w ill w h ich be longs to i t by n a tu r e (a lth o u g h a c tu a lly th e d isp o sitio n is g ro u n d ed in freedom )."25 In sh o rt, "th e su b jec tiv e g ro u n d or c a u se o f th is adop tion c a n n o t fu r th e r be know n..."26 "fo r i t is a q u estio n w holly tra n sc e n d in g th e sp e cu la tiv e capacity o f o u r re a so n ."27 T h u s , i f w e a re co n ce rn ed w ith K a n t's so lu tio n to th e p rob lem of evil, A nderson-G old c a n n o t b e co rrec t in h e r in te rp re ta tio n . W h erea s th e problem of je a lo u sy a n d r iv a lry is c e r ta in ly a h in d ra n c e to m o ra lity , i t c a n n o t b e the p ro b lem o f evil. I f K a n t is co rrect, th e n i t c an n o t be th e case t h a t ra d ic a l evil red u c es to th e p a r t ic u la r s i tu a tio n o f h u m a n be in g s com ing in to c o n tac t w ith one a n o th e r w hich su b se q u e n tly som ehow causes th e su b o rd in a tio n o f m oral in c lin a tio n s to se n su o u s in c lin a tio n s . O n th e one h a n d , w e c a n s t i l l question why i t is th e case t h a t su ch c o n tac t le a d s u s to th is su b o rd in a tio n , a n d th e a n sw e r to th is q u estio n h a s to do w ith a free choice an d , u ltim a te ly , th e g ro u n d s o f a n y free choice m u s t re m a in a m ystery . O n th e o th e r h a n d , th is c a n n o t be th e only c ircu m stan ce w h ich gives r ise to th e p ro b lem o f evil. I t seem s c o u n te r in tu itiv e to K a n t's p o sitio n to say th a t i f th is one s itu a tio n co u ld (hypo thetica lly ) be rem oved , th e n th e re w ou ld no lo n g e r be evil. K a n t's so lu tio n to th e p rob lem o f ra d ic a l ev il is to p o in t to a f re e choice w h ich can n e v e r be w itnessed , n o t s im p ly to sa y th a t ev il is a p ro d u c t o f a s e lf w hich 25 Ibid., p. 21. 26 Ibid., p. 20. 27 Ibid.. p. 108 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 385 fee ls in a d e q u a te o r u n h a p p y w h en i t com pares i ts (sen su o u s) s ta n d in g to o th e rs . T h e re a re sev era l a d d itio n a l p o in ts w hich c an be m a d e to s u p p o r t m y a rg u m e n t. T h e f i r s t is s im p ly to e x a m in e th e p a r t o f th e Religion in w hich th e ta lk o f "co m p ara tiv e" re a so n o rig in a te s . In th is sec tion o f Book O ne, th e ev ils o f je a lo u sy a n d r iv a lry a re on ly tw o m a in "s te m s" o f m a n y v ices. O n th e one h a n d , K a n t n o te s th a t je a lo u sy a n d r iv a lry a re in d e e d "in c lin a tio n s ."28 B u t, i f th e s e a re in d e e d inclinations, th is a lre ad y in d ic a te s t h a t th e y c an n o t b e th e so u rce of evil. E v il c a n n o t b e re d u c e d to a n in c lin a tio n , for, a s K a n t m a k e s c le a r, w e a lw ays h a v e tw o c o m p e tin g in c lin a tio n s (m o ra l a n d s e n s u - ous), a n d th e p u zz le is to d iscover w h y i t is th a t w e w illfu lly choose (a s a "d isp o sitio n ") to follow one se t a s o p p o sed to th e o th e r. T h is c a n n o t b e th e sou rce o f ra d ic a l evil. O n th e o th e r h a n d , K a n t s ta te s v e ry ex p lic itly t h a t "n a tu re , in d e e d , w a n te d to u se th e id e a o f such r iv a lry (which in itself does not exclude mutual love) on ly a s a s p u r to c u ltu re ."29 W h a t th is in d ic a te s is t h a t th e s e in c lin a tio n s , lik e a ll s e n su o u s in c lin a tio n s , a re n o t in th em se lv es ev il. I t is o n ly th e su b o rd in a tio n w h ic h is evil. In d eed , su c h in c lin a tio n s as a "s p u r to c u ltu re " c a n be ex trem ely u se fu l in th e ad v an ce o f o u r m o ra l p ro ject. T h is la s t q u o ta tio n re g a rd in g c u ltu re le a d s m e to th e second p o in t w h ich s u p p o r ts m y in te rp re ta tio n o f K a n t. P u t sim ply , A n d erson -G o ld 's ac- c o u n t w o u ld e lim in a te cu ltu re , w h ich , a s I h av e a rg u e d e x te n s iv e ly above, is a n e c e ssa ry co n d itio n of m o ra l p ro g re ss . S h e w rite s t h a t th e e th ic a l com - m u n ity , w h ic h is re q u ire d by u s to p ro m o te , "e n ta ils m in im a lly th e a b a n - d o n m e n t o f ag g ress iv e a n d com petitive a tt i tu d e s to w a rd o th e rs , a n d m a x i- m a lly th e ad o p tio n o f cooperative a n d su p p o rtiv e n e tw o rk s ."30 Now, w h ile I 28 The full passage reads: "vices, however, which really do not sprout of themselves from na- ture as their root; rather are they inclinations, aroused in us by the anxious endeavors of others to attain a hated superiority over us..." Ibid., p. 22. 29 Ibid.. p. 22. Italics added for emphasis. 30 "Kant's Ethical Commonwealth." p. 30. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 386 ag ree w ith th e la te r h a lf o f t h a t s ta te m e n t, I th in k w e m u s t re je c t th e f irs t h a lf. F o r w h ile i t c e r ta in ly m u s t be a d m itte d th a t i t is n e ce ssa ry fo r u s to jo in to g e th e r in th e p u rs u i t o f m o ra l p ro g ress , K a n t m ak es i t v e ry c le a r th a t w e m u s t in d e e d rem a in an ta g o n is tic . I ta k e th is to be p rec ise ly w h a t h e m e a n s b y h is s ta te m e n t t h a t r iv a lry "does n o t exclude m u tu a l love" a n d is a "s p u r to c u ltu re ." O n A nderson-G old's m odel, we seem to r u n in to a n ex trem e leve l o f coo p era tio n w hich, i f i t w ere ach ievab le , w ou ld m e a n th e d e a th o f cul- tu re a n d th e life o f th e A rcad ian sh e p h e rd . A th i r d p o in t o f co n ten tio n is s im p ly to n o te K a n t's s ta te m e n t th a t ra d ic a l ev il is a n "inv is ib le" enem y, th u s im p ly in g th a t we c a n n o t h a v e a n ex p erien ce o f i ts source. C o n cern in g th e source o f ra d ic a l evil, K a n t w rite s t h a t "i t is n o t s u rp r is in g th a t a n A postle re p re se n ts th is invisible enem y, who is know n o n ly th ro u g h h is o p e ra tio n s u p o n u s a n d w ho d estro y s b asic p r in - ciples, a s b e in g o u ts id e u s an d , in d e e d , a s a n evil sp irit"31 In a foo tno te on th is p a g e h e ad d s, ag a in , t h a t "re a so n 's ab ility to m a s te r a ll oppo sin g m o ti- v a tin g fo rces th ro u g h th e b a re id e a o f a la w is u t te r ly in exp licab le ; it is also inconceivable, therefore, how th e m o tiv a tin g forces o f th e se n su o u s n a tu re sh o u ld b e a b le to g a in th e a sce n d an c y over a rea so n w hich co m m an d s w ith su ch a u th o r i ty ."32 I ta k e th is a ll to in d ic a te th a t th e source o f ev il h a s to do w ith a n u t te r ly u n k n o w ab le d isp o sitio n o f th e w ill to su b o rd in a te m o ra l m ax im s, a n d is no t, th ere fo re , th e r e s u l t o f "com paring re a so n 's" in te ra c tio n w ith o th e r in d iv id u a ls . F in a lly , a s a la s t co u n te rex a m p le to A nderson-G old's p o sitio n , K a n t's claim th a t th is su b o rd in a tio n o f th e m o ra l la w does n o t occur in t im e show s th a t ev il c a n n o t be a ttr ib u ta b le to th e experience o f in te ra c tin g w ith o thers . K a n t m a in ta in s in sev era l sec tions o f B ook O ne th a t th is free d e te rm in a tio n of th e w ill occurs "n o t in tim e b u t m e re ly in ra t io n a l re p re se n ta tio n ... [an d 31 Religion, p. 52. 32 Ibid.. p. 52 n. Italics added for emphasis. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 387 h]ence i t is also a co n trad ic tio n to seek th e te m p o ra l o rig in o f m an 's m o ra l c h a ra c te r ."33 T h u s K a n t a rg u e s th a t th e re m u s t b e tw o se n se s of th e w ord "ac t" w h e n we ta lk ab o u t th is one ac t w h e re in w e choose a sing le overarch ing m axim : The term "act" can apply in general to th a t exercise of freedom whereby the supreme maxim... is adopted by the will, but also to the exercise of freedom whereby the actions them selves (considered m aterially...) are performed in ac- cordance with that maxim. The propensity to evil, then, is an act in the first sense... The former is intelligible action, cognizable by m eans of pure reason alone, apart from every temporal condition; the latter is sensible action, em - pirical, given in tim e ...34 T h u s, accord ing to K a n t, th is free ly chosen , o v e ra rc h in g m ax im w hich gu ides a ll ac tio n a n d is e q u iv a le n t to c h a ra c te r (Gesinnung) is n o t a n even t w hich ta k e s p lace in tim e, th o u g h th is p rov ides th e g ro u n d fo r a ll in d iv id u a l (phenom enal) acts o f w illing . T herefore , a g a in , I do n o t th in k th e source of ev il can b e a ttr ib u te d to o u r em p irica l d e a lin g s w ith o th e rs a s A nderson-G old w ould h a v e i t .35 F in a lly , th en , one m ig h t be concerned w ith how i t is t h a t I in te rp re t K a n t's s tro n g re m a rk s concern ing th e "ev il" w h ich occurs in th e in te rac tio n of in d iv id u a ls . To beg in w ith , n o te th a t K a n t w r ite s t h a t w h e n th e in d iv id u a l "looks a ro u n d for th e cau se s a n d c ircu m stan ces w h ich expose h im to th is d a n g e r a n d keep h im in it, he can easily convince himself t h a t h e is sub jec t to th e s e n o t because o f h is ow n g ross n a tu re ... b u t b e ca u se o f m an k in d to w hom h e is r e la te d a n d b o u n d ."36 A lready I ta k e th is to b e a good in d ica tio n th a t 33 Ibid., p. 35. 34 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 35 Let me simply mention one additional problem with Anderson-Gold's argument Kant writes that the proposition "He is evil by nature, means but this, that evil can be predicated of man as a species; not that such a quality can be inferred from the concept of his species (that is, of man in general) - for then it would be necessary..." (Religion, p. 27). Anderson-Gold's account would seem to violate Kant's prohibition, because it puts the cause of evil as a necessary condition of an individual simply by means of being a human being. 36 Religion. p. 85. Italics added for emphasis. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 388 th is is n o t, in fac t, th e sou rce o f evil. Now, c e r ta in ly su ch in te ra c tio n s do p rov ide a n occasion fo r ev il, b u t a s K a n t w rite s in a n e a r l ie r section , "th o se in c lin a tio n s m ere ly m ak e d ifficu lt th e execution o f th e good m ax im w h ich op- poses th em ; w h e re a s g e n u in e ev il consists in th is , t h a t a m a n does n o t will to w ith s ta n d th o se in c lin a tio n s w h e n th e y tem p t h im to tra n sg re s s ..."37 U lti- m a te ly w h a t I ta k e K a n t to b e sa y in g in th e se p a ssa g e s is t h a t th e in a b il i ty o f in d iv id u a ls to com e to g e th e r b ecau se o f jea lo u sy a n d r iv a lry is c e rta in ly a h in d ra n c e to th e m o ra l p ro jec t, b u t i t is no t th e source o f evil. K a n t is in d i- c a tin g th e n e ce ss ity a n d th e d ifficu lty involved in e s ta b lish in g th e e th ic a l com m onw ealth o r "k in g d o m o f G od o n e a r th ." A nd, w h ile w e re m a in in th e e th ic a l s ta te o f n a tu re , w e a re n o t ab le to su p p o rt each o th e rs ' s tru g g le s a g a in s t th e in v is ib le en em y o f evil. H e w rites t h a t only w ith th e e s ta b lis h - m e n t o f a society "in accordance w ith , a n d fo r th e sa k e of, th e law s o f v ir tu e ," "only th u s can w e h o p e fo r a v ic to ry o f th e good over th e ev il p rin c ip le ."38 I consider i t v ery te l l in g th a t K a n t does n o t w rite t h a t "on ly th u s can w e achieve a v icto ry ," b u t w rite s on ly t h a t we could th e n "hope" fo r a victory; th e im p lica tio n is t h a t th e e lim in a tio n o f jea lo u sy a n d r iv a lry is n o t in i ts e l f th e so lu tio n to th e p ro b lem o f ev il, b u t on ly a f irs t, th o u g h c ruc ia l, s tep . IV. Four Reasons for God as a Necessary Postulate W e a re le f t, th e re fo re , w ith o u r o rig ina l problem : is G od a n e ce ssa ry p o s tu la te o f p ra c tic a l rea so n ? I h a v e a rg u e d t h a t God's ex is ten ce c a n n o t be p o s tu la te d to re w a rd v ir tu e w ith h a p p in e ss . A nd, i f m y in te rp re ta t io n is co r- rect, th e n God's ex is ten ce c a n n o t be p o s tu la te d in o rd e r to overcom e evil. E v il is a re s u lt o f o u r ow n choosing , a n d we c a n n o t hope to be sa v ed by G od from th is choice. W hile A nderson -G o ld m ay h a v e g iven u s good re a so n s a s to w hy w e m u s t m ove o u t of o u r e th ic a l s ta te o f n a tu r e in o rd e r to form a n e th i- cal com m onw ealth , sh e h a s u ltim a te ly given u s no conv incing rea so n w hy 37 Ibid., p. 51 n. 38 Ibid.. p. 86. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 389 b e lie f in G od is th e on ly m e a n s w e h a v e o f u n i t in g to g e th e r .39 T h u s, A nderson -G old h a s n o t g iv en u s a c le a r re a so n fo r th e n e e d o f th is p o s tu la te . A nd, w hile R ossi's a rtic le s h a v e th e m a k in g o f a n a rg u m e n t, th e y do n o t p rov ide a n y th in g m ore th a n re a s o n s a s to w hy G od i s a n a p p ro p r ia te symbol for m o ra l w illing . P e rh a p s th is i s due to th e fa c t t h a t R ossi is n o t d irec tly a d - d ress in g God's e x is ten ce a s a p o s tu la te . D e sp ite th e rea so n s , w e s ti ll do n o t h av e a decisive a rg u m e n t a s to th e n e e d fo r su c h a p o s tu la te . B u t su re ly th e s e tw o w rite rs a re c o rre c t to n o te th e e sse n tia lly soc ia l a n d w orld ly n a tu r e o f m o ra l w illing . M ore ex ac tly , th e y a re r ig h t to n o te t h a t th e effects of m o ra l w illin g co n cern a g iven soc ie ty in tim e, a n d th u s th e se effects a re to b e m e t w ith in h is to ry . T h e h ig h e s t good, th e y a rg u e , is a goal w hich concerns th e e s ta b l is h m e n t o f a m o ra l co m m u n ity o f ra t io n a l a g e n ts on e a r th . B u t, p rec ise ly b e c a u se rea so n does h a v e a n in te re s t in i ts effects, th e re a re im p o rta n t fe a tu re s c o n ce rn in g th e ou tcom e o f th is w illin g w h ich a re b e - yond re a so n 's im m e d ia te co n tro l. I f G od's e x is te n c e is a n e ce ssa ry p o s tu la te , i t m u s t be th is f e a tu re o f th e m o ra l p ro jec t w h ic h m a n d a te s i t s a ssu m p tio n . I th in k th e re a re fo u r specific re a so n s fo r th e n e c e ssa ry p o s tu la te o f G o d s ex istence . In g e n e ra l, w e n e ed th is p o s tu la te b ecau se o f tw o fac ts, d iscussed a t le n g th above. T h e f ir s t is t h a t m o ra l w illin g c a n b e in flu en ced by ex te rn a l, e m p iric a l s i tu a tio n s . O n th e n e g a tiv e side , w h ile d ifficu lt s itu a tio n s do n o t p re c lu d e m o ra l w illin g, th e y m a y m a k e i ts execu tion m ore d ifficult. O n th e p o s itiv e s id e , c u ltu re a d v a n c e s s i tu a tio n s w h ich prom ote m o ra l w illing . T he se co n d g e n e ra l fa c t i s t h a t m o ra l w illing does a im a t c e r ta in h is to ric a l effects, b u t th e s e effects a re u ltim a te ly b eyond o u r con tro l. T he e s ta b lish m e n t o f p a r t ic u la r social, p o litica l, ed u ca tio n a l, a n d re lig ious in s titu tio n s is a n e m p ir ic a l p ro b lem w ith m a n y p o ss ib le so lu tio n s . In add ition , w e a re o ften m e t w ith ex am p les w h e n o u r sim ple , ev ery d ay 39 Indeed, as noted above, in her first article on this matter, Anderson-Gold altogether leaves out this need of belief in God, relying only on the idea of an ethical commonwealth to unite our disparate interests. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 390 a tte m p ts a t favorab le ou tcom es of m o ra l w illin g a re m e t w ith d isa p p o in tm en ts for a n y n u m b e r o f rea so n s . O bviously th e s e tw o fac ts a re co n n ec ted a n d in te r tw in e d , th o u g h for th e p u rp o se s of ex p lan a tio n , I w ill t ry to s e p a ra te th e m a n d m ake th e m m ore d is tin c t th a n they p e rh a p s a re . T hus, g iv en th e se tw o em p irica l fac to rs in - vo lved in m o ra l w illing, w e req u ire a n a tu r e , in c lu d in g a human n a tu re , t h a t is resp o n siv e to m ora l n eed s . In th e la s t section , I w ill a d d re ss th e connec- tio n b e tw een a m orally resp o n siv e n a tu r e a n d God qua m o ra l a u th o r o f th is n a tu re , b u t fo r th e p u rp o se o f th is sec tion , I w ill s im p ly e q u a te th e tw o. L e t m e th e n p re s e n t th e fo u r specific rea so n s fo r th e n e ce ss ity o f th e p o s tu la te of G od's ex istence . I w ill k eep th e se e x p la n a tio n s brief, a s th e y can la rg e ly be in fe r re d from m y d iscu ssio n s above. A. Empirical influences A s I h a v e a rg u e d a t le n g th above, m o ra l w illin g c a n be effected b y ex- te rn a l, em p irica l facto rs. O n th e "n e g a tiv e " side, som e s itu a tio n s can m a k e th e ex ecu tio n of m oral w illin g m ore d ifficu lt. T here seem to be th re e d e fin i- tiv e cases w h ere th is is t ru e : poverty , w a r, a n d n o n -rep u b lica n sy stem s o f g o v e rn m e n t (p a rticu la rly th o se w hich re s t r ic t th e "p r iv a te " u se of rea so n ). In e x trem e cases of th e se in s ta n c e s , basic m o ra l w illing becom es n early im p o s- sib le b e ca u se o f ce rta in n e e d s su rro u n d in g se n su o u s in c lin a tio n s . In le s s ex - tre m e cases, w e are a t le a s t te m p te d to forgo m o ra l w illing . O n th e "p o s itiv e " side , c u ltu re , u n d e rs to o d b road ly , p ro m o tes m o ra l w illin g in genera l, th ro u g h a n ta g o n ism , th e cu ltu re o f sk ill, a n d th e c u ltu re o f d isc ip lin e . As K a n t p o in ts o u t in "W h a t is E n lig h ten m en t? " we sh o u ld a lso consider th e need of re a so n to p e rfe c t i ts e lf th ro u g h p u b lic d ialogue, a fac to r w h ich c a n b e m ore o r le ss r e s tr ic te d by po litical in s t itu t io n s . E a c h o f th e se fac to rs in flu en ces m o ra l w illing . I t sh o u ld p e rh a p s be n o ted th a t th is p ic tu re o f th e a b ility o f th e w ill to be in f lu e n ce d by e m p iric a l c ircu m stan ces gives u s a v e ry s tro n g re a so n to R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 391 believe th a t th e m o ra l d e stin y o f e a c h in d iv id u a l is ac tu a lly in te r tw in e d w ith th e d e s tin y o f o th e rs . T h is concep tion m a y be ev en s tro n g e r th a n A ndersonG old a n d Rossi h a v e u n d e rs to o d i t , fo r i f fac to rs su c h a s p o litica l in s t i tu tio n s a n d soc ia l u n so c iab ility p lay a k e y ro le in th e fo rm atio n o f o u r m o ra l ab ili- tie s , th e n ou r ow n m o ra l c a p a b ilitie s a re c o n tin g en t u p o n a c e r ta in leve l o f society a ro u n d u s . W h ereas I m a y w ell b e ab le to ach ieve th e p ro p e r m o ra l c h a ra c te r (Gesinnung) th ro u g h th e ad o p tio n o f th e p ro p e r o v e ra rch in g m ax im , i t m ay be th e case th a t I c a n n o t ach ieve som e lev e ls o f m o ra l p e rfec - tio n th ro u g h th e sh e e r force o f m y w ill. W e sh a ll see th is fu r th e r in "B" b e - low. I n add ition , i t sh o u ld be re m e m b e re d th a t w e a re a ll v u ln e ra b le to a "f ra il ty "40 of th e w ill, a n d w e a ll m a k e poor ju d g m e n ts re g a rd in g m o ra l m a t- te rs . I n a ll th e se resp ec ts , m o ra l w illin g is connec ted w ith e m p iric a l s i tu a - tions. T hus, th e ex is tence o f G od a s th e m o ra l a u th o r o f th e w orld is a n e c e ssa ry p o s tu la te b ecau se th e s e fac to rs a re la rg e ly beyond o u r d irec t con tro l, y e t a re n e c e ssa ry for m o ra l p ro g ress . I f i t is t ru e t h a t co rrec t m o ra l w illin g is connected w ith em p irica l fac to rs , a n d th a t w e do n o t co n tro l a ll of th e se fac to rs, th e n w e m u s t b e liev e th a t , e v en tu a lly , n a tu r e w ill be resp o n siv e to m ora l n eed s . O n o n e h a n d , th is is a q u es tio n c o n ce rn in g n a tu re in g e n e ra l. C an we so lve th e p ro b lem s o f poverty? W ill d ro u g h t, fam in e , floods, a n d e a r th q u a k e s in c re a s in g ly d e v a s ta te p o p u la tio n s? H ow lo n g w ill th e h u m a n species b e allow ed to in h a b i t th e e a r th ? W ill c ru c ia l m o ra l le a d e rs live or die? O r, c o n sid erin g th e o th e r ex trem e , one w h ich is a n everin c re a s in g d an g er in th e se tim es i n f irs t-w o rld n a tio n s , w ill w e be lu lle d in to a s ta te o f com placency? W ill we, in effect, d isco n tin u e th e u se o f o u r rea so n to becom e A rcad ian sh ep h erd s? N a tu re m u s t w a lk th e n a rro w lin e b e tw een w a r a n d com placency, a lw ays p u s h in g h u m a n be in g s to a n ta g o n ism b u t n o t p u s h in g th em to a n n ih ila tio n . O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e c o n s titu tio n of 40 Religion, p. 24. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 392 n e c e ssa ry em p irica l fac to rs is m ore often th a n n o t a q u e s tio n ab o u t th e n a tu r a l , em p irica l s id e o f h u m a n beings. W ill h u m a n n a tu re ev er b e ab le to r e l in q u is h i t s th ir s t fo r w a r? W ill n a tio n a l le a d e rs a llo w th e ir c itiz e n s freed o m o f exp ression , ta k e up th e ta s k o f p e rfe c tin g th e c o n s titu tio n , a n d w o rk w ith o th e r le a d e rs fo r a n in te rn a tio n a l s ta te o f p eace? W ill h o rr ific e v e n ts l ik e e th n ic genocide im pact o u r se n s ib ilitie s to th e e x te n t t h a t w e lose (a lm o st)41 a ll o f ou r m o tiv a tio n for m o ra l w illing? B o th s e ts o f q u e s tio n s re q u ire f a i th in a n a tu r e w hich w ill a llow fo r th e m o ra l p ro jec t to c o n tin u e i ts p ro g re ss . B. Reason and Practice T h e second re a so n fo r th e p o s tu la te o f God's ex is ten ce h a s to do w ith th e fa c t t h a t K a n t sa y s t h a t rea so n ta k e s tim e a n d p ra c tic e to p e rfec t. In a ll o f h is w ritin g s , K a n t m a in ta in s th a t th e m o ra l u se o f re a so n ta k e s t im e to im prove . P u t sim ply, "one can n o t s tra ig h tw a y do w h a te v e r h e w ills i f h e h a s n o t t r ie d a n d exerc ised h is pow ers b e fo reh an d ."42 W e h a v e seen th is no tion a t se v e ra l p o in ts above, especially C h a p te r O ne. In th e "Id ea ," K a n t c la im s t h a t "re a so n i ts e lf does n o t opera te on in s tin c t, b u t re q u ire s tr ia l, p rac tice , a n d in s tru c tio n in o rd e r g rad u a lly to p ro g ress ..."43 I n th e Metaphysics o f Morals h e a rg u e s th a t th e v e ry concept o f v ir tu e n e c e ss ita te s th a t i t m u s t be a c q u ire d w ith p rac tice s in c e "th e m o ra l cap ac ity o f m a n w ould n o t b e v ir tu e i f i t w e re n o t a c tu a lize d b y th e s tre n g th o f one's re so lu tio n in conflict w ith pow - e rfu l opp o sin g in c lin a tio n s ;"44 in o th e r w ords, since o n e a sp ec t o f th e te rm "v ir tu e " m e a n s th e a b ility to dom inate or m a s te r (sen su o u s) in c lin a tio n s , a n d s in ce w e ta k e th is to b e so m e th in g w hich re q u ire s a s tru g g le of so rts , v ir tu e 41 Kant, of course, argues that the moral law as Wille always remains a source of moral motiva- tion. This is how "pure" reason can be "practical." Thus we can never lose all our motivation for moral willing. 42 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 477. 43 "Idea," Ak. 19. 44 Metaphysics o f Morals. Ak. 477. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 393 m u s t be so m eth in g w h ich is p e rfe c te d th ro u g h tim e . A ll of th is in d ic a te s th a t re a so n ta k e s tim e to develop. B u t su ch developm en t does n o t ta k e p la c e in a vacuum ; th u s , m uch of th is deve lopm en t d e p en d s on e m p ir ic a l su r ro u n d in g s . W ill one b e s p u r re d by c u ltu re to exercise one's reaso n , o r w ill o n e s lip in to a s ta te o f com placency a n d n o t a tte n d to th e perfec tion o f re a so n ? A n d w h a t leve l o f c u ltu re w ill be a v a ila b le to ch a llen g e one's th in k in g ? W ill o ne b e a b le to develop a n d disci- p lin e one's m o ra l ab ilitie s , o r w ill one b e sh ip p e d o ff to w ar? W ill m oney w h ich cou ld b e av a ila b le for e d u c a tio n b e w a s te d on th e w a r ch est? W ill ef- fo rt w h ich could be s p e n t on d ev e lo p in g a m o ra l re lig io n be sp e n t in s te a d on c ru sa d e s o r p e rh a p s w a s te d by w ra n g lin g o v er u n im p o r ta n t m a t te r s o f fa ith? T h ese q u estio n s a n d m a n y m ore c a n be a s k e d re g a rd in g th e co n d itio n s w hich in flu e n ce a n d gu ide th e d ev e lo p m en t o f re a so n . B ecause m a n y o f th e se c o n d itio n s a re n o t u n d e r ou r d ire c t con tro l, we m u s t h o p e th a t n a tu r e w ill be o f a s o r t t h a t a llow s fo r rea so n to c o n tin u a lly im prove . W e m u s t h o p e th a t n a tu r e w ill in d e e d c o n tin u e to m ove u s to w ard h ig h e r leve ls o f c u ltu re , to w ard in t r a a n d in te rn a t io n a l peace, a n d to w a rd a n e lim in a tio n of po v erty . Aga in , i t is c ru c ia l to k eep in m in d th e fa c t th a t , a s w e d iscu ssed in C h a p te r T h re e above, w h e re a s occurrences su c h a s w a r do seem to be p rim a rily e v en ts w h ich w e o u rse lv es con tro l, w e m u s t f in d a guar- antee t h a t th ey w ill n o t occur. R eca ll t h a t th is is d u e to th e fac t t h a t w e a re d e a lin g w ith h u m a n b e in g s as s e n su o u s a n d ra t io n a l , both sides o f which can cause a (tem porary ) reversal o f progress: o ne th e o n e h a n d , th e se n su o u s a s- p ec t o f h u m a n s can le a d u s a s t r a y b e c a u se o f in c lin a tio n s w hich, i f follow ed, can o b s tru c t m o ra lity , an d , on th e o th e r h a n d , th e r a t io n a l a sp ec t is p rec ise ly free , a n d th u s th e re a lw ay s re m a in s th e p o ss ib ility t h a t w e can c h a n g e ou r m in d s . T hus, w e n e e d a g u a ra n te e t h a t th e e m p ir ic a l cond itions re q u ire d as th e b a s is for m o ra l p ro g ress w ill in d e e d com e to f ru itio n . N a tu re is th e g u a r- a n to r o f peace b ecau se i t a lone c a n p ro d u ce th o se cond itions in w h ich w e R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 394 w ould n o t w a n t to go to w ar a g a in . N a tu re is a lso th e sp u r to c u ltu re , for w ith o u t i t, we w o u ld n a tu ra l ly d e s ire a s ta te of to ta l com placency; "m a n w ills concord; b u t n a tu re b e t te r k n o w s w h a t is good fo r th e species: s h e w ills d is- cord ."45 T hus, i t m u s t b e a p o s tu la te o f p rac tica l re a so n th a t n a tu r e w ill in - d eed cooperate w ith o u r m o ra l n e e d s to b rin g a b o u t th e h ig h e s t good. T h is a rg u m e n t seem s p a r t ic u la r ly im p o r ta n t since i t h a s th e follow - in g corollary: even i f every s in g le in d iv id u a l w illed to w ill in acco rd w ith th e m o ra l law , th is w o u ld n o t a u to m a tic a lly le a d to th e h ig h e s t good. W h a t th is show s is th a t, w h ile a la c k o f d e s ire to h av e a good w ill is c e r ta in ly a n im - m en se im p ed im en t to th e h ig h e s t good, i t is n o t th e on ly one. I t w o u ld tak e tim e a n d p rac tice to m ove to w a rd th e perfection o f each in d iv id u a l's rea so n a n d v irtu e , even i f a l l in d iv id u a ls chose th e p ro p e r o v e ra rch in g m ax im . W h a t is necessary , th e n , a re th e em p irica l s tru c tu re s w hich w ill e n a b le u s to m ove to w ard th is p ro g ressio n , to b eg in th e u n iv e rsa l m o ra l p ro jec t in ea rn es t. C Ecclesiastical Faith W hile th is does n o t n e c e ssa r ily deserve i t s ow n h e ad in g , i t is su ch a n im p o r ta n t fac to r in K a n t's acco u n t o f th e h ig h es t good th a t i t sh o u ld b e fu r - th e r d iscussed . R eca ll (from C h a p te r T hree) th a t K a n t in s is ts in th e Religion t h a t th e h ig h es t good in th e w o rld w ou ld tak e th e fo rm o f a n "in v is ib le c h u rc h ," a n e th ica l co m m onw ealth w ith God as th e law -g iver. T h u s , th is c h u rc h w ould be a "p u re re lig io u s f a i th " b ased on m o ra l law s. B u t, re c a ll also t h a t K a n t believes th is invisible c h u rc h to be im possib le , a n d "i t r e m a in s tru e once fo r a ll th a t a s ta tu to ry ecclesiastical faith is a sso c ia ted w ith p u re re lig - io u s fa i th a s i ts veh ic le a n d a s th e m e a n s of pub lic u n io n of m en ..."46 "because o f th e n a tu ra l n e e d a n d d es ire o f a ll m en for so m e th in g sensibly tenable, an d fo r a confirm ation o f som e s o r t fro m experience o f th e h ig h e s t concep ts a n d 45 "Idea," Ak. 21. 46 Religion, p. 97. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 395 g ro u n d s of re a so n ..."47 T h u s K a n t concludes t h a t w e m u s t a lw ays h a v e som e "v is ib le" ch u rch o r o th e r in o rd e r to u n ify p e rso n s in to a n e th ic a l com m on- w e a lth , th a t "som e h is to r ic a l ecc lesiastica l f a i th o r o th e r, u su a lly to be found a t h a n d , m u s t be u tiliz e d ."48 W h at th is in d ic a te s , th e n , is th e e x tre m e ly e m p irica l c h a ra c te r o f th e "veh ic le" w hich is to u n i te a ll in d iv id u a ls of s e p a ra te fa i th s . In fac t, K a n t goes so fa r as to s ta te t h a t "i t is also possib le t h a t th e u n io n o f m en in to one re lig io n c an n o t fe a s ib ly be b ro u g h t ab o u t o r m ad e a b id in g w ith o u t a holy book a n d a n ecc le s ia s tic a l f a i th b a sed u p o n i t ,"49 a n d goes on to c la im th a t i t is a n a c t of "a g rac io u s P rov idence"50 th a t w e h a v e su c h a book w h ich m ig h t accom plish th is goal. K a n t em p h asize s th a t , re g a rd in g th e e th ica l com m on- w e a lth , "a ll w e k n o w is th e d u ty w h ich d raw s u s to w a rd su c h a u n ion ; th e p o ss ib ility of th e a c h ie v e m e n t h e ld in v iew w h e n w e obey t h a t d u ty lie s w holly beyond th e l im its o f o u r in s ig h t."51 H ow w ill i t be possib le to f in d a n em p iric a l "vehicle" w h ich w ill be ab le to u n ite u s a ll? H ow w ill th e H in d u , B u d d h is t, C h r is tia n , a n d M u slim fa ith s a ll jo in to g e th e r? F o r K an t, th is is n o t s im p ly a q u e s tio n o f m o ra l w illing , fo r acco rd ing to h im , th e re w ill always be a n em p irica l co m p o n en t to relig ion ; w h ile th e in v is ib le c h u rc h o u g h t to be b a se d on p u re re a so n a lone , re lig io n a n d th e c h u rc h m u s t a lw ays m an ife s t i ts e lf em p irica lly i n one w ay o r a n o th e r. T hus, th e q u e s tio n re m a in s a s to w h a t th is em p iric a l m an ife s ta tio n m ig h t look like, a n d th u s w e look to n a tu re to p ro v id e th e a n sw er. T h e in - v isib le chu rch , "a m o ra l com m onw ealth , re q u ire s a public covenan t, a c e rta in ecc lesiastica l fo rm d e p e n d e n t u p o n th e cond itions o f experience . T h is form is 47 Ibid., p. 100. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid., p. 123. 50 Ibid., p. 98. 51 Ibid.. p. 130. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. >96 in i ts e l f c o n tin g en t a n d m an ifo ld ..."52 W e do n o t kn o w w h a t c o n tin g en t form i t sh o u ld ta k e , a n d "i t w ould b e a s g re a t self-conceit to d en y p e rem p to rily t h a t th e w a y in w hich a c h u rc h is o rg an ized m ay p e rh a p s be a sp ec ia l d iv ine a rra n g e m e n t, if, so f a r a s w e c a n see, i t is com plete ly h a rm o n io u s w ith th e m o ra l re lig io n ..."53 God's ex is ten ce a s th e m o ra l c re a to r o f n a tu r e is a neces- sa ry p o s tu la te fo r th is im p o r ta n t rea so n t h a t th e a ch iev e m e n t o f th e h ig h es t good d e p e n d s upon a n e th ic a l com m onw ealth , w h ich , in tu rn , d ep en d s upon a c o n tin g e n t ecc lesiastical f a i th th a t is of a n a tu r e w e c a n n o t env is ion . I t w ill be u p to n a tu re , w ork ing w ith m o ra l needs, to gu ide u s to th e co rrec t form of th is c h u rc h .54 D. Effects o f Moral Willing W hile th e f irs t th re e p o in ts focused m ore on th e cond itions o f m oral w illing , th is p o in t concerns th e effects o f su c h w illing , th o u g h , o f course , th e two a re o ften in fac t th e sa m e .55 In sh o rt, w h e re a s th e h ig h e s t good req u ire s c e r ta in e m p iric a l effects to com e abou t, n a tu r e m ay b e u ltim a te ly u n re sp o n s iv e to our w ill. F o r in s ta n c e , w e a re re q u ire d to d ra w up a re p u b lic a n co n stitu tio n . B u t w h a t form sh o u ld th is c o n s titu tio n tak e ? How w ill i t so lve a ll th e em pirica l p ro b lem s w hich n e c e ssa rily a rise? H ow w ill i t be p o ss ib le fo r a race o f devils? A n d w h a t o f a ll th e p ro b lem s co n ce rn in g a c o n s titu tio n w h ich w ould a llow fo r th e peacefu l coex istence of a ll n a tio n s . 52 Ibid., p. 96. 53 Ibid. 54 In connection with the discussion of ecclesiastical faith, there is also the suggestion in the Religion of an additional, fifth reason as to why God's existence may be a necessary postulate. In short, the suggestion is this. Kant makes the analogy between a "juridical" and an "ethical" commonwealth in that they are both a collection of individuals united in accord with laws and under a law-giver (p. 90). If we recall Kant's discussion in the "Doctrine of Right," we note that any juridical commonwealth must have a law-giver who is not him/herself directly subject to these laws; without this separation, Kant be- lieves the law-giver would not logically have any authority. Following this analogy, then, God is a neces- sary postulate because the ethical commonwealth needs a law-giver who is not directly subject to these laws, and "there must therefore be someone other than the populace capable of being specified as the pub- lic law-giver for an ethical commonwealth" (p. 90). This "someone" must be God. ss As I noted above, I have tried to separate the two aspects of conditions and effects for the purpose of elucidation whereas they do not seem to be quite so separable. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 397 C o n sid e r th e p ro b lem s w hich face th e U n ited N a tio n s . H ow is i t p o ss ib le to c o n s tru c t a n a g re e m e n t w hich w o u ld allow each n a tio n to m a in ta in i t s ow n, in d iv id u a l s e ts o f la w s w hile n o t on ly w ork ing to g e th e r in p eace , b u t p o ss ib ly also u n ify in g to enfo rce th is in te rn a t io n a l ag reem en t? T he p ro b lem s su c h a n o rg an iz a tio n faces a re m o n u m e n ta l. B u t, again , th e y m u s t n o t on ly b e faced , b u t solved. W h a t th e s e few exam ples sh o w is th a t n a tu r e m u s t be c o o p era tiv e i f so lu tio n s a re e v e n tu a lly going to b e fo rthcom ing . A n d th is in d ic a te s th e n e e d for a p o s tu la te o f p ra c tic a l rea so n . R e a th 's dep iction o f th is co n d itio n is h e lp - ful: in m any situations, it may become (or appear to become) irra tiona l for indi- viduals to act from w hat they recognize as their duty... It m ight be irra tional in the sense th a t individuals who act from moral principles leave them selves liable to being taken advantage of by others, or m anipulated so th a t th e ir ac- tions have consequences which they do not intend. Or it m ay sim ply be th a t m oral conduct, as a rule, is ineffective and fails to achieve any good results. The recognition of either kind of fact can be detrim ental to m oral m otivation and erode the individual's com m itm ent to the m oral life. Moral conduct will appear pointless, a t best, if nothing, or the wrong thing, comes of it m ore often th an not.56 D e sp ite R e a th 's e m p h a s is on th e p ro b lem of m o tiva tion , h is p o in t is w e ll ta k e n : n a tu re co u ld be o f such a c o n s titu tio n th a t th e consequences o f m o ra l w illin g w ould be e i th e r in effica tio u s or, a t w orst, d e tr im e n ta l. W e m u s t h o p e th a t n a tu r e is n o t c o n s titu te d in th is fash io n . T h us, w e m u s t p o s tu la te t h a t G od h a s c re a te d n a tu r e -a n d e sp ec ia lly h u m a n n a tu r e - in su c h a w a y t h a t i t w ill b e resp o n siv e to m o ra l w illing . 56 Reath, Andrews, "Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant," p. 618. For reasons I have argued in Chapter Five above. I think this statement is too strong as it stands, though it is helpful in this instance. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 398 IV. God or N ature? In th is l a s t sec tion I w a n t to ra is e a question to w h ich I do n o t see an im m e d ia te an sw er: g ra n te d th a t w e m u s t have fa ith in a n a tu r e t h a t w ill be responsive to m o ra l w illing , does th is re q u ire a b e lie f in G od per se? In o th e r w ords, does th is n a tu r e h av e to h a v e a m o ra l c rea to r? O r is i t po ssib le th a t n a tu re sim p ly is re sp o n siv e to h u m a n , m o ra l needs, a n d t h a t i t d id n o t have a m o ra l au th o r? W h a t, exactly , m u s t one postulate in o rd e r to c o n tin u e th e p u r s u i t o f th e h ig h e s t good w ith o u t e n co u n te rin g th e p ro b lem s d iscu ssed in C h a p te r F ive above? R ecall th a t , a s m ade e v id e n t in th e Critique o f Judgment, n a tu r e is n o t itself morel, i t is m ere ly re sp o n siv e to m oral w illin g (in a g re a te r o r le sse r degree). T hus, w h ile n a tu re m ay re q u ire a m oral a u th o r , c e r ta in ly i t does no t re q u ire su ch a n a u th o r because i t h a s , say , m oral c h a ra c te r is tic s . N a tu re can only p rom o te m o ra l w illin g in h u m a n beings, a n d p r im a rily th ro u g h a n tag o - n ism a n d cu ltu re , n e i th e r o f w h ich a re m o ra l tra its . I c an see no im m ed ia te w ay to reso lve th is q u es tio n sa tis fac to rily . T h e Critique o f Judgment does n o t seem to give u s a n a n sw e r. O n th e one h a n d , a s w e s a w above in S ec tio n O ne, C h a p te r F ive , th e so lu tio n to th e an tinom y57 o f th e th i rd Critique forces u s to "th in k " o f a n in te llig en c e dif- fe re n t th a n ou rs, a n o n -d iscu rs iv e in te llig en c e w hich w ou ld b e ab le to see th e necessity o f co n tin g en c ies . In th is re sp ec t, w e a re n o t fo rced to th in k o f n a - tu re a s c re a te d in o rd e r to u n d e rs ta n d w h a t we conceive o f a s a "p u rp o se " in n a tu re , for su ch p u rp o se s w ould d is a p p e a r for a n o n -d iscu rs iv e in te lligence . T h u s, i t w ou ld n o t se em n ecessa ry to th in k of a c re a to r o f th e w orld , l e t a lone a m o ra l c rea to r. O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e so lu tion to th e a n tin o m y also show ed th a t w h ile w e a re ab le to "th in k " o f such a n o n -d iscu rs iv e in te l l i - gence, w e a re n o t a b le to "conceive" o f i t , th u s we a re fo rced to tu r n to th e conception o f a c re a to r w ho w ou ld h a v e a pu rp o se in m in d In o th e r w ords, in S7 I am taking there to be only a single, underlying antinomy. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. o rd e r to m ak e a. judgment ab o u t n a tu re , w e m u st ju d g e as i f i t w e re c re a te d w ith a p u rpose in m ind . T hus, fro m th is p o in t of view , we m u s t ju d g e n a tu re a s h a v in g been c rea ted , a n d th is w o u ld re q u ire th a t th e p o s tu la te o f p u re p ra c tic a l rea so n concern God a s th e m o ra l a u th o r o f th e w orld. I c a n see no so lu tio n to th is q u a n d a ry , a n d lea v e i t a s a puzzle to be solved. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 400 Chapter Seven Conclusions L A p ro p e r a n a ly s is o f th e "Id ea for a U n iv e rs a l H is to ry w ith a Cosm o- p o lita n In te n t" i s a b so lu te ly e sse n tia l for u n d e rs ta n d in g K a n t's conception of th e re la tio n sh ip b e tw e e n m o ra lity a n d po litics. I t g ives u s th e necessa ry fo u n d a tio n for th e in te rd ep e n d en c e of m o ra l p ro g re ss a n d p o litica l in s t i tu - tio n s , a n d p re s e n ts u s w ith a r ich e r no tion of p o litic a l th eo ry th a n we receive from a n an a ly s is o f th e Metaphysics o f Morals a lo n e . T he "Id e a " rep re se n ts th e b eg in n in g o f a n e le m e n t o f K an t's ph ilo so p h y w h ich p e rs is ts th ro u g h o u t a ll h is la te r w ritin g s . I t h e lp s u s to fill in d e ta ils w h ich w ou ld o therw ise be u n c le a r , such a s w h y c o n s titu tio n s a re so im p o r ta n t, w hy peace needs to be g u a ra n te e d by n a tu re , how th e h ig h es t good on e a r th cam be defended , a n d how w e ough t to th in k ab o u t th e fu tu re o f h u m a n k in d . F a r from be ing an im m a tu re a n d u n e s s e n tia l p iece of K a n t's p h ilo sophy , i t o u g h t to be ree v a lu - a te d a s am im p o r ta n t fo u n d a tio n . S evera l t r a d i t io n a l in te rp re ta tio n s of K a n t o u g h t f in a lly be p u t to re s t . T he f irs t is th e d ism issa l o f th e "Id ea " a s in v o lv in g a s im p le a n d n a iv e conception o f te leo logy w h ich K a n t o v e rtu rn s in th e Critique o f Judgment. I h a v e ad d re ssed th is p ro b lem a t len g th in S ection O n e . T h e re is every reaso n to th in k th a t K am t k n e w th e lim ita tio n s o f th e n o tio n o f teleology before h e begam w ork on th is p iece, a n d th u s every rea so n to th in k K a n t is up to som e- th in g d iffe ren t in th e "Id e a ." W hen w e beg in to a s k q u e s tio n s w ith th is fraime n R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 401 o f m in d , I th in k w e w ill m ak e im p o r ta n t discoveries, som e o f w hich I h av e t r ie d to p o in t out. Second, I th in k w e o u g h t to accept, once a n d fo r a ll, th a t K a n t b e - l ie v e d th e re to be tw o lo ca tio n s fo r th e h ig h e s t good. I th in k i t is ab so lu te ly c le a r t h a t K a n t does n o t in te n d m o ra l p ro g ress fo r h u m a n ity to be ach ieved on ly in a n a fte rlife . In a d d itio n , K a n t g ives u s se v e ra l re a so n s w hy th is m ig h t b e so, ch ie f am ong w h ic h is h is b e lie f t h a t i f no p ro g re s s is possib le on e a r th , th e n th e w orld a s a c re a tio n c a n h a v e no v a lu e w h a tso ev e r. W hile th e n e x t w o rld m ig h t be a b e tte r w orld , th is is no excuse fo r "a llow ing vice to m o u n t u p o n en d less vice in th e r e a l w orld ." T h e w orld a s m o ra lly responsive , a b e lie f a lso ju s tif ie d by th e conclu sions o f th e th i r d Critique, m u s t e x is t sp e - c ifica lly fo r th e sa k e of m o ra lity i f i t is to h av e a n y m e a n in g o r va lue . T h ird , i f w e accep t tw o lo ca tio n s fo r th e h ig h e s t good, reg a rd le ss o f o u r a n a ly s is o f th e "a fte rlife" w e o u g h t to co n ce n tra te o n th e defense for i ts a c h ie v a b ility h e re on e a r th . A n d i f w e d esire su c h a d efense , how is i t to be sp e lle d ou t? W e o u g h t to recogn ize t h a t a defense w ill h a v e to involve p o s tu - la te s o f p ra c tic a l reaso n , fo r re a so n c a n n o t accep t t h a t m o ra l p ro g ress is im - p o ss ib le before we even beg in to try . W e o u g h t a lso to recogn ize th a t su c h a d e fe n se is going to h a v e to be m o re concre te th a n th e p o s tu la te s req u ire d fo r th e "o th er-w o rld ly " h ig h e s t good; w e w ill h a v e to sp e ll o u t in som e d e ta il how m o ra l p ro g re ss m ig h t ta k e p lac e in l ig h t o f possib le e m p iric a l ev idence to th e c o n tra ry . K a n t tac k le s one s id e o f th e d ilem m a b y m a in ta in in g th a t re a l m o ra l p ro g re ss on e a r th co n ce rn s th e species a lone, a n d b a r r in g n a tu ra l d is - a s te r s , w e o u g h t to th in k th a t i t is possib le . T he d e ta ils o f how i t m ig h t be p o ss ib le re p re s e n t th e o th e r s id e o f th e d ilem m a, a n d K a n t offers u s tw o ex - c e lle n t p o ss ib ilitie s fo r i ts so lu tio n , n a m e ly "social u n so c iab ility " a n d th e th in k in g o f th e sp ec ta to rs o f th e F re n c h R evolu tion . O f co u rse , th e se d e ta ils co u ld b e w rong: p e rh a p s a m e sse n g e r from God w ill com e to e a r th , a n d w ith w id e sp re a d te lev ision coverage o f h is /h e r m irac les, w e w ill a ll be convinced Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 402 n e v e r to w a r a g a in . T he p o ss ib ilitie s a re end less, o f course, b u t n o t like ly . T he b e s t e x p la n a tio n w e h av e fo r i ts poss ib ility is a n a tu re w h ich is re sp o n - sive to m o ra lity . B u t su ch a n e x p la n a tio n h a s to be g iven in o rd e r to accoun t fo r th e p o ss ib ility a n d to give re a so n th e necessa ry c le a rin g fo r e n th u s ia s t ic m o ra l w illing . F o u r th , I th in k i t is ab o u t t im e t h a t w e no t only re jec t th e in te rp r e - ta tio n o f K a n t's m o ra l p h ilo sophy a s a n em p ty form alism , b u t a lso re je c t a n in te rp re ta t io n o f i t a s concerned w ith on ly th e (good) w ill o f th e in d iv id u a l. W e o u g h t to re je c t in te rp re ta tio n s in w h ich o u r sui generis d u ty i s o v e r- looked, fo r e v en b a s e d upon a re a d in g o f th e Metaphysics o f Morals a lo n e i t o u g h t to be c le a r t h a t w e h av e a d u ty to b e concerned w ith th e w e ll-b e in g a n d c u ltu ra l e d u c a tio n o f o th e r people. I n fac t, w h a t w e le a rn from a n e x a m in a - tio n o f th e id e a o f m o ra l p rog ress is th a t , even being se lfish ly co n ce rn e d on ly w ith o u r ow n m o ra l co n stitu tio n , w e h a v e to be concerned w ith o u r n a tu r a l su rro u n d in g s , fo r th e re ex is ts a n im p o r ta n t reciprocal re la tio n sh ip b e tw e e n th e two. I f K a n t is r ig h t, a n d I b e liev e h e is , th en w e c an n o t ev en b e g in o u r ow n m o ra l p ro je c t in e a rn e s t i f th e e x te rn a l conditions a re n o t s e t up co r- rec tly . M o ra l p ro g re ss req u ire s a n ta g o n ism , b u t fo rb ids w ar. I f w e a re n o t to h av e ou r m o ra l, econom ic, a n d c u l tu r a l resou rces d ra in ed , w e m u s t e s ta b lis h th o se e x te rn a l co n d itio n s w hereby w a r is p reven ted . I f w e a re to a l l h a v e a n e q u a l ch an ce a t m o ra lity , we m u s t e lim in a te poverty a n d o th e r o v e rw h e lm in g in cen tiv es to v io la te th e m o ra l law . A n d i f w e axe n o t to fa ll in to a s ta te of bovine c o n te n tm e n t, w e h av e to m a k e s u re th a t (peaceful) a n ta g o n ism is r e - ta in e d a n d t h a t a n em p h a sis is p la c e d on m o ra l a n d c u ltu ra l e d u ca tio n . B e- yond th e fa c t t h a t o th e r in d iv id u a ls o u g h t to be ends in th em se lv es , a n d b e - yond th e co n clu sio n s o f th e Metaphysics o f Morals a n d Religion, o u r e n v i- ro n m en t, p a r t ic u la r ly o u r po litica l e n v iro n m en t, h a s a n im p a c t on m o ra l s triv in g . Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Ia t-< i 403 F ifth , we o u g h t to re ject K a n t's in s is ten ce th a t m o ra lity o u g h t to be re w a rd e d w ith p ro p o rtio n a te h a p p in e ss . T h ere seem s to b e no ju s tif ica tio n fo r th e c la im th a t m o ra lity o u g h t to b e rew ard e d a t a ll, n o r th a t som ehow we h a v e a r ig h t to h ap p in ess . C e rta in ly m o ra lity allow s u s to sy s tem a tize th e tw o e n d s o f v ir tu e a n d h ap p in ess , b u t th e conclusion s im p ly le a d s to p e rm is- sib le h a p p in e ss . A nd I th in k w e o u g h t to b e m orally co n ce rn ed w ith a m in i- m a l a m o u n t o f h a p p in e ss for a ll p e rso n s . B u t K a n t's e q u a tio n o u g h t to be re jec ted . S ix th , I th in k w e now h av e a s tro n g e r a rg u m e n t fo r a ju s tif ic a tio n of th e p o s tu la te s of p rac tic a l reason . I t is d ifficu lt to see w h y G od is n eed ed in th e a fte rlife , g iven o u r lac k of a n y k now ledge as to i ts n a tu r e . I th ink a n a r - g u m e n t is ce rta in ly possible, th o u g h i t w ou ld have to be fo u n d ed on som e- th in g o th e r th a n th e "w o rth in ess e q u a tio n ." H ow ever, co n ce rn in g th e h ig h e s t good on e a r th , we see th e im m ed ia te n e e d fo r p o s tu la te s . H e re , G od seem s to b e n e ed e d so th a t n a tu re can be resp o n siv e to a n d even p ro d u c tiv e for m o ra l- ity . N o t im m o rta lity o f th e in d iv id u a l, b u t o f th e species is need ed . And, th e s im p le p rem ise of som e ty p e o f im m o rta lity o f th e species i s n o t enough , for im m o rta lity w ith o u t p rog ress w ould re n d e r po in tle ss th e w o rld a s a c reation . T h u s , th e m o ra l p rog ress of th e species m u s t be p o s tu la te d a s w ell, a n d I th in k c an be ju s tif ie d a s a p o s tu la te o f p ra c tic a l reason . n . W ith th is accoun t o f K a n t's ph ilo sophy , I th in k som e b enefic ia l con- c lu s io n s can be d raw n , a n d th e ph ilo so p h y en riched . L e t m e p o in t o u t ju s t a few o f th ese . To beg in w ith , one re s u lt w h ich I ta k e to be a b e n e f it o f su ch an a n a ly s is is th a t w e a re b ro u g h t b ack to a lev e l of p o litica l d iscu ss io n a n d ac- tiv ity w h ich is fam ilia r a n d m ostly tra d itio n a l. T he co n cern w ith K a n t's po - lit ic a l p h ilo sophy m ig h t b e th a t i t is too fo rm alis tic or t h a t i t is too concerned w ith m o ra lity to be of m uch u se in "p ra c tic a l" app lica tions. T he "T heory a n d R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 404 P rac tice" a r tic le aside, I th in k we c a n p u t som e of th ese concerns to re s t . C e rta in ly , m o ra lity m u s t be th e fo rem ost co n ce rn o f a po litic ian . B u t le t u s keep tw o th in g s in m ind . F irs t, p o litic ian s o u g h t n ev er to leg is la te m o ra lity . T he se p a ra tio n o f ch u rch a n d S ta te , o f e th ic s a n d S ta te re m a in s com plete . O ne o u g h t n e v e r to a tte m p t to te ll a p e rso n ho w to th in k . T he S ta te co n ce rn s R igh t, n o t v ir tu e . Second, w ise p o litic ian s o u g h t to recognize t h a t slow c h an g e is to b e p re fe rre d to ra p id rev o lu tio n . O bviously h is to ry p re s e n ts u s w ith m a n y ex am p le s o f th is , th o u g h I r a n 's "W h ite R evolution" sp r in g s im - m ed ia te ly to m in d . E v en w h en th e p o litic ia n recognizes a deficiency in th e c o n s titu tio n , su c h ch an g es m u s t be m ad e slow ly so as n o t to overly u p s e t th e c o n s titu e n ts . T h u s , som e em p irica l kn o w led g e of people m u s t com e to b e a r on th is q u estio n . L ikew ise , m an y po litica l p ro b lem s m u s t h a v e empirical so lu tio n s . F o r exam p le , ta k e th e n e e d fo r a m in im a l s ta te o f req u is ite w ell-being . H ow can w e feed a n d c lo the a n a tio n of people? T h is is c learly a n em p irica l q u e s - tion . H ow do w e b a lance , say , th e n e e d fo r freedom of speech w ith th e n e e d to p ro te c t som e m em bers a n d in s t itu tio n s o f society in accord w ith R ig h t? O r w h a t a b o u t th e fed e ra tio n o f n a tio n s; how a re w e going to ge t a ll p a r t ie s to ag ree on som e form of leg a l o rg an iza tio n fo r th e aversion of w ar? T h is too c an on ly be so lv ed w ith som e know ledge o f n a tu re . Yovel p u ts i t th is w ay: since the political organization is the em bodim ent of morality in legality, there m ay be a considerable overlap betw een the political institutions advocated by the u tilita rian approach th a t K ant rejects, and those required by purely ra - tional motives. Indeed, the highest practical principle sta tes th a t reason m ust always also be an end in itself and not ju s t an instrum ent for increasing u til- ity; b u t th is does not exclude the possibility th a t these two approaches will produce partly sim ilar results on the level of empirical institutions.1 H ence, d e sp ite K a n t's e m p h a sis on th e n e e d to focus on m o ra lity a n d n o t h a p p in e ss , a n d d esp ite th e sh a rp c o n tra s t b e tw e e n th e m ora l p o litic ian a n d 'p. 173. Yirmiahu Yovel. Kant and the Philosophy o f History. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. i 405 th e po litica l m o ra lis t, I th in k th e r e is room fo r a t r a d i t io n a l u n d e rs ta n d in g of p o litic ian s , ru le rs , a n d s ta te s m e n w ho w ould h a v e to em ploy se v e ra l aspec ts o f em p irica l know ledge in o rd e r to b e effective le a d e rs . N ext, a s I m en tio n ed above, I th in k w e h a v e a n e n ric h e d conception o f K a n t's p o litica l theo ry . W e se e w h y i t is th a t in te rn a l a n d e x te rn a l consti- tu t io n s a re so im p o rta n t. W e se e th e exac t re la tio n sh ip b e tw ee n p o litica l in - s t i tu t io n s a n d m o ra lity . W e se e w h y n a tu re , n o t in d iv id u a ls , is to be th e g u a ra n to r o f th e fo u n d a tio n s fo r m o ra l p rog ress. W e see w h y po litica l in s t i- tu t io n s a re n e ce ssa ry b u t n o t su ff ic ie n t for m o ra l p ro g re ss . W e see how we c a n r e tu r n to o u r m ore "ev e ry d ay " conception o f p o litic a l ac tio n a n d leg is la - tio n . T he "c ritiq u e o f M o d e rn ity " h a s been p a r t ic u la r ly d e v a s ta tin g for th o se ph ilo soph ies w h ich e sp o u se w h a t we m ig h t c a ll th e "G ra n d N a rra tiv e " o f p ro g ress . A "G ra n d N a rra t iv e ," to u se th e te rm in o lo g y p ro v id ed b y K en - n e th J . G ergen in The Saturated Self, is typ ica lly c o n ce rn ed w ith science a n d technology, a n d o ften sees th e m a s a llow ing for a n im p ro v e d life -sty le . G er- g en e x p la in s t h a t "th e g ra n d n a r r a t iv e is one o f c o n tin u o u s u p w a rd m ove- m e n t - im provem en t, co n q u est, a ch iev em en t - to w a rd som e goal,"2 a n d c h a ra c te riz e s M o d ern ity a s th e p e rio d in w hich i t w as possib le to be lieve t h a t because rea so n a n d o b se rv a tio n c a n re ign s u - p erio r, a s in g le form o f g o v e rn m e n t -dem ocracy o r fasc ism -o r a s in g le econom ic sy stem -ca p ita lism o r c o m m u n ism - m ig h t fina lly so lve th e a c c u m u la tin g a n d in tra c - tab le p roblem s dogging th e s te p s o f th e species a s i t lu rc h e d th ro u g h h is to ry .3 T h e c ritiq u e of M o d ern ity a t ta c k s th e effectiveness o f sc ience a n d technology from sev e ra l d iffe ren t p o in ts o f v iew , a rg u in g , am o n g o th e r t h in gs, t h a t i t s im p ly h a s n o t im p ro v ed o u r w e ll-b e in g o r q u a lity o f life. 2 Gergen, Kenneth J., The Saturated Self: Dilemmas o f Identity in Contemporary Life, Harper Collins Publishers, 1991, p. 30. 3 Ibid.. p. 31. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 406 Now, i f w e a re r ig h t to re jec t th e "w o rth in e s s e q u a tio n " a s I th in k we a re , th e n w e se e t h a t K a n t re m a in s c le a r o f th is ob jection . I th in k w e ough t to re a d K a n t's p h ilo so p h y as b e in g u n c o n ce rn e d w ith a ll b u t th e m o st m in i- m a l accoun ts o f h a p p in e ss . A s f a r a s I u n d e rs ta n d K a n t, h u m a n s a re simply not designed for happiness. N o r sh o u ld th is b e o f p r im a ry concern to them . T he "C o p e m ica n rev o lu tio n " in e th ic s se ts th e s ta g e fo r a rea so n w h ich h a s a d u ty to im p ro v e m o ra lly , n o t a re a so n th a t c a n p e rfe c t th e o re tic a l know ledge o r p h y sica l w ell-be ing . I f th e fu tu re s ta te o f h u m a n ex is ten ce is one o f h igh tech b u ild in g s a n d devices, or i f i t is of s im p le r u r a l fa rm com m unities, th is is n o t im p o rta n t. O v e ra ll w ell-be ing is n o t im p o r ta n t . I n fac t, too m uch sa tis - fac tion w ith o u r p h y s ic a l cond ition can le a d e i th e r to a su b o rd in a tio n of th e m ora l la w to co n ce rn s o f h a p p in e ss , o r to th e d a n g e ro u s cond ition o f bovine co n ten tm en t. K a n t's m o ra l ph ilo sophy a n d h i s u n d e rs ta n d in g of p rog ress sh o u ld h a v e n o th in g to do w ith a n y b u t m in im al h a p p in e ss , a n d th a t h o rn a m ora l p o in t o f v iew . T h e c r i t iq u e o f M o d ern ity 's a tta c k on re a so n i ts e l f is o f m uch m ore concern. T h e "P o s tm o d e rn " in s is te n c e on "p e rsp e c tiv a lism " a n d "re la tiv ism ," i f accepted, w o u ld lik e ly m ean th e e n d o f m o ra l p ro g re ss a s K a n t u n d e r - s ta n d s it. I f th e r e c an b e no developm en t o f re a so n , th e n m o ra l p rog ress is th re a te n e d , d u e to th e fa c t th a t m o ra lity is p u r e p ra c tic a l reason . Indeed , postm odern c r i t iq u e s w o u ld deny th e v e ry n o tio n o f "p ro g re s s" i ts e lf because i t w ould d en y a n y p o ssib le know ledge o f a "b e tte r" o r "w orse" se t o f va lues w ith w hich to ju d g e p ro g ress . C lea rly th e se a r e is su e s w h ich w ould ta k e sm- o th e r book to in v e s tig a te in d e ta il. O f cou rse , som e o f th e se q u estio n s w e re a p ro b lem in K a n t's tim e as well, a n d le d to th e d e b a te b e tw een Jacob i, M e n d e lsso h n , a n d K an t, a n d th e ch a llen g es o f th e R o m an tic Sturm and Drang m o v em en t. O f im portance th e n , a s now , is th e q u e s tio n of w h e th e r a d isp o s itio n g iven over e n tire ly to rea so n w ill d e s tro y th e v e ry a sp ec ts o f life t h a t i t h o p e d to save. Does K a n t's R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. s 407 p e rh a p s overly -reasonab le app roach to life le a d u s to th e la n d o f th e H o u y h n h n m s in Gulliver's Travels, a p lace seem ing ly devoid o f fee ling , color, a n d m ean ing? A gain , th ese a re com p lica ted questions. B u t I do n o t believe t h a t i t is rea so n a lone w hich is c a u s in g o r h a s c au se d su ch p rob lem s. T ake, fo r exam ple , th e c u r re n t loss of p o p u la r ity o f C h ris tian ity . A p ro p e r (K a n tia n ) in te rp re ta tio n of C h r is tia n ity is h a rm o n io u s w ith th e n e ed s of p ra c tic a l reaso n . C h ris t a s th e m odel fo r h u m a n m o ra l p e rfec tio n a n d th e n e e d o f God as th e m o ra l c rea to r o f th e w o rld su p p o rt C h ris tia n ity . K a n t's conclusions from th e f ir s t Critique c le a r th e w ay for re lig ion , a n d h is conclu- sio n s from th e th i r d Critique force u s to th in k o f th e w orld a s c re a te d . P e r - h a p s a b e tte r u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e w o rk in g s of n a tu re h a s c o n tr ib u te d to th e dow nfa ll o f relig ion , b u t i t is h a rd to see how th is touches th e core o f C h ris - t ia n b e lie f or K a n t's philosophy. I f a n y th in g , th e p o s tu la te o f p ra c tic a l re a - son o u g h t to b o ls te r such fa ith . In m y opinion, i t is n o t re a so n w h ich is to be b la m e d fo r th e c u rre n t tre n d , b u t a n excess o f in fo rm ation : i t seem s to m e th a t th e p roblem lie s in m ass overexposure to so m an y d iffe ren t lifesty les, re lig io n s , fa ith s , in d iv id u a l choices, e tc . in too sh o rt o f a tim e a n d w ith few tools to d igest th is in fo rm ation . F ina lly , w e sh o u ld n o t try to m a k e K a n t in to a p re c u rso r o f H egel. W e h a v e good re a so n to th in k th a t n a tu r e m ay be responsive to m o ra lity . B u t th is is n o t to say th a t w e could kn o w th is , t h a t conflict le a d s to som e type o f sy n th e s is , or t h a t th e "w orld" is becom ing m ore ra tio n a l. L e t u s n o t c riti- cize K a n t for n o t h a v in g a s tru c tu re t h a t is u n d e s irab le in th e f i r s t p lace. I th in k K a n t's po sitio n saves u s bo th fro m a c ritiq u e w hich to p p le d H egel's p h ilo so p h y of R ig h t a n d a c ritique w h ich ta k e s K a n t a s sa y in g m ore th a n he does a b o u t th e p ro g ress o f reason . In add ition , a th o rough u n d e rs ta n d in g of K a n t's ph ilo so p h y sav es us from th e follow ing type of objection: one o u g h t to c o n s tan tly w age w a r in o r- d e r to b r in g ab o u t a condition w here peop le becom e sick of w ar, in o th e r R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. w ords, w age w a r to p re v e n t w ar. W hile so m e th in g lik e th is m ig h t p rove a good objection to H egel, I th in k i t is a g ross m is re a d in g of K an t. F irs t, w e do n o t know i f n a tu re w ill b e responsive to th is ty p e o f tac tic , for w e do n o t know i f n a tu re w ill u ltim a te ly cooperate w ith m o ra lity . N o r do we know th a t th e n a tu r e of h u m a n b e in g s is su ch th a t th e y w ill e v e r ac tu a lly becom e conv inced o f th e evils o f w ar. W e hope, b u t w e do n o t know . Second, th is p ro ced u re w ou ld destroy m a n y a re a s of positive , n o t n e c e ssa rily m oral, cooperation , p a r tic u la r ly tra d e . T h ird , i t w ill su re ly c re a te s i tu a tio n s w here th e m o ra l p ro jec t is overw helm ing ly d ifficu lt to p u rsu e , su c h a s poverty . F o u rth , i t w ou ld m ig h t m ak e i t m ore d ifficu lt to love o r re sp e c t o th e r pe rsons, a n d th u s w ou ld v io la te th e d u tie s o f v ir tu e to w a rd s o th e rs a s sp e lled o u t in th e Meta- physics of Morals. F if th , a n d p e rh a p s m o st im p o rta n tly , any ac tion of th is ty p e is in d irec t v io la tio n o f th e m o ra l law , a la w w h ich i t w as th e in te n t to a id in th e f i r s t p lace. K illin g is c lea rly a g a in s t th e m o ra l law , a n d i t is d iffi- c u lt to see how su c h a tra n sg re s s io n co u ld b e ju s tif ie d . E ven th e F re n c h R evolu tion , i ts success so hoped for by th e sp e c ta to rs , ca n n ot be so m e th in g w h ich is approved fo r each m o ra l agen t; w h ile th e outcom e m ay be a d v a n ta - geous, th e m ean s a re d ep lo rab le .4 I th in k a n y a rg u m e n t w hich v a lid a te s th e u s e of v iolence in th e n a m e of (K an tian ) m o ra lity is lik e ly to b e grossly m is - c o n s tru e d a n d p ro b ab ly in s in ce re . m. T he im m e d ia te concern w h ich m ay w ell re m a in is w h e th e r K a n t h a s p re s e n te d u s w ith a p o sitio n th a t is so d e p e n d e n t u p o n fa ith u n d e r so m a n y c ircu m stan ces th a t i t is im perv ious to c ritic ism . I am rem in d ed o f F re u d 's th e o ry o f th e unconscious w hich is, ipso facto u n a b le to be d isc red ited by m e re defin ition of b e in g unconscious. Is K a n t's p o sitio n lik e th is? In m a n y w ay s i t seem s th a t i t is . I t seem s u n lik e ly t h a t w e cou ld come up w ith v a s tly 4 And, of course, the final bloody and dictatorial outcome of the French Revolution only serves to prove Kant's belief that constitutional reform ought to be brought about slowly, and from the top down. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 0 9 ov erw h elm in g ev idence w h ich w ou ld show once a n d fo r a lw ays th a t m oral p ro g re s s is im possib le . I f m o ra lity "m ay w ell b e o ccasio n a lly interrupted, b u t... n e v e r be broken o f f"* a n d i f "w e a re d e a lin g w ith b e in g s who, from th e fe e lin g o f se lf-in flic ted evil, w h e n th in g s d is in te g ra te a lto g e th e r, know how to a d o p t a s tre n g th e n e d m o tive fo r m a k in g th e m ev en b e t te r th a n th e y w ere be- fo re t h a t s ta te ,"6 th e n i t seem s u n lik e ly th a t th e q u e s tio n cou ld even be given a f in a l ju d g m e n t. B u t is th is fa c t a problem ? I th in k w e m u s t k eep se v e ra l th in g s in m in d . T h e f ir s t is th a t , i f K a n t is co rrect in h is th in k in g t h a t rep u b lica n c o n s titu tio n s m u st be th e fo u n d a tio n for m o ra l p ro g re ss , th e n I th in k w e h a v e som e good rea so n s to be- liev e in th is p rog ress . I f w e r e a d th e tex ts c a re fu lly , K a n t say s th a t m ora l p ro g re s s c a n be "seen " th ro u g h p o litica l developm en t, re g a rd le ss o f how we ju d g e o u r m o ra l d ev e lo p m en t a lone. I f we accep t th is , th e n K a n t seem s to h a v e b e e n a good p red ic to r o f th e p o litica l c lim a te o f th e p a s t two cen tu rie s . W e h a v e in d e e d seen th e r ise , b u t, fo r th e m o st p a r t , a lso th e fa ll o f com m u- n ism . W e h a v e se e n n a tio n s t ry in g fo r peace. M o st im p o rta n tly , w e h a v e se e n a la rg e deve lopm en t o f re p u b lic a n c o n s titu tio n s . K a n t seem s to be cor- re c t in h is a sse ssm e n t o f th e sp e c ta to r's a tt i tu d e s re g a rd in g th e F ren ch R evo lu tion ; i t w a s in d e e d a n e v e n t t h a t w as n o t to b e fo rg o tten , a w ill for a c o n s titu tio n w hich m oved c lo se r to R ig h t a n d to re sp e c t. S ince th a t tim e, th e g ro w th o f su ch c o n s titu tio n s h a v e f a r ou tw eighed d ic ta to rsh ip s . W e o u g h t also keep in m in d w h a t K a n t sa y s re g a rd in g how f a r a long h e co n sid e rs th e h u m a n rac e . W hile th e re a re few s ta te m e n ts d irec tly con- c e rn in g th is issu e , K a n t does o ffer som e th o u g h ts . I n th e "Id e a " h e w rites , c o n ce rn in g a u n iv e rsa l c iv il society , t h a t its perfect solution is impossible; from such warped wood as is man made, nothing straight can be fashioned... That it is also the last task to be solved also follows from this: it requires the correct concept of the nature of a possible constitution, great 5 "Theory and Practice," Ak. 309. 6 "Is the Human Race Continually Improving?" p. 149. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 410 experience during much of the world's course, and above all else a good will prepared to accept that constitution;... when it happens, it will only be very late, and after many futile attempts.7 H e goes on to c la im th a t "h o w ev er fanc ifu l th i s id e a m ay seem to be - a n d i t w as la u g h e d a t a s su c h w h e n ad v an ced b y a n A bbe S t. P ie rre o r a R o u ssea u (p e rh a p s b ecau se th e y b e liev ed i ts re a liz a tio n w a s too n e a r) - i t is n o n e th e - le ss th e in e v ita b le outcom e..."8 Also in th e "Id e a " K a n t m a in ta in s t h a t "th is l a s t s te p ( th e fe d e ra tio n of n a tio n s) ... is no m o re th a n h a lfw ay in m a n k in d 's fo rm a tio n ..."9 C le a rly th is sh o w s th a t K a n t does n o t th in k th a t th e se c ru c ia l s ta g e s o f m o ra l p ro g re ss a re n e a r a t h a n d . T h is is p a r tic u la r ly so s in ce i t is th e p e rfe c t so lu tio n o f th e political p rob lem w h ich w ill ta k e su ch a lo n g tim e , n o t to m e n tio n th e m o ra l p ro b lem . A f in a l d e fin itiv e q u o ta tio n com es from th e Lecture on Philosophical Theology w h e re K a n t w rite s th a t h u m a n k in d "w ill p e rh a p s n o t a t t a in th is id e a for m illio n s o f y e a rs ."10 I th in k w e o u g h t to ta k e th is a s a f a i r s ig n of K a n t's som ew hat sk e p tic a l th in k in g . T h ese q u o ta - tio n s , co u p led w ith h is m an y s ta te m e n ts to th e e ffect t h a t "in th is e a r th ly w orld , th e re is on ly p ro g ress . H en ce in th is w o rld goodness a n d h a p p in e ss a re n o t th in g s to b e p ossessed , th e y a re on ly p a th s to w a rd perfection a n d c o n - te n tm e n t ,"11 o u g h t to p ro tec t K a n t from a n o v e rly o p tim is tic in te rp re ta tio n . F in a lly , le t m e p re s e n t th is in te re s tin g q u o ta tio n from "T h eo ry a n d P ra c tice ": One can also offer evidence showing that the cry over the irresistible growth in hu - man depravity is due to the fact that, when man attains a higher stage of morality, one can see further still and can make more rigorous judgments regarding what man is in comparison with what he ought to be; consequently, our self-censure will always be the more rigorous the more stages of morality have been ascended in the known course of the world.12 7 "Idea," Ak. 23. 8 Ibid., Ak. 24. 9 Ibid., Ak. 26. 10 Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 117. 11 Ibid., p. 117. 12 "Theory and Practice." Ak. 310. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 411 H ere , K a n t a rg u e s t h a t th in g s re a lly o u g h t to seem w orse a t exac tly th a t p o in t w h e n th e y a re g e ttin g b e tte r . A n in c re a se d c ritiq u e o f th e c u r re n t s ta te o f m o ra lity , a n d a ju d g m e n t t h a t th in g s a re n o t a s good a s th e y could be, in - d ica te a c e r ta in a w a k e n in g o f m o ra l ju d g m e n t, a n d a p rog ression o f re a so n 's a b ility to ta k e stock o f th e s itu a tio n . T h is is, o f course , a m u ch -d eb a ted issu e , w h e th e r th in g s h a v e a lw ay s b e en th is b a d or w h e th e r i t is ju s t th a t we a re w itn ess in g a n d recogn iz ing m ore o f i t now . U ltim a te ly , in e v a lu a tin g K a n t's position , th e qu estio n com es b a ck once a g a in to th e q u es tio n o f m o ra l p ro g ress in h is to ry a n d i ts fu tu re . W h a t c an w e say a b o u t th e m a n y bloody w a rs to w h ich K a n t w as n o t w itness? H ow c a n th is p oss ib ly re p re s e n t m o ra l p ro g ress? I t seem s th a t w e can say a n y one o f a n u m b e r o f th in g s . W e c a n ta k e e ith e r a sk e p tic a l or op tim istic ap p ro ach to th is q u estio n . U ltim a te ly , I 'm n o t su re w h a t k in d of experience w ou ld le t u s d e fin itive ly a n sw e r th is q u e s tio n from w ith in th e bounds o f know ledge rigo rously defined . B u t w h a t ought w e to say? T h is , i t seem s, is th e m ore im p o r ta n t q u e s tio n of th e tw o. I f K a n t is correct, w e seem to h a v e no w ay to decide th is q u e s tio n th eo re tica lly . C a n w e decide i t p rac tica lly? I th in k th a t K a n t gives u s m a n y re a so n s to th in k th a t we c an , a n d to th in k th a t we m ay h a v e so m e th in g lik e a d u ty to do so. M ora l p ro g ress m u st be affirm ed, i f only a s a p o s tu la te o f p ra c tic a l rea so n . J R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. t j J 412 Bibliography Allison, Henry E. "Kant's Doctrine o f Radical Evil." 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