Erkenntnis,	79,	pp.	909-941. A	constitutive	account	of	'rationality	requires' Julian	Fink1 ABSTRACT The requirements of rationality are fundamental in practical and theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, there exists no correct account of what constitutes rational requirements. This paper attempts to provide a correct constitutive account	of	'rationality	requires'.	I	argue	that	rational	requirements	are	grounded in	'necessary	explanations	of	subjective	incoherence',	as	I	shall	put	it.	Rationality requires	of	you	to	X	if	and	only	if	your	rational	capacities,	in	conjunction	with	the fact that you not-X,	explain necessarily	why you have a non-maximal degree of subjective	coherence. Keywords: rationality,	requirements,	constitutive	accounts,	necessary	conditions, normative	reasons,	objective	and	subjective	coherence Introduction It	is	widely	agreed	that	rationality	issues	norms,	rules,	or	requirements.	Like	the law,	morality,	prudence,	and	possibly	convention,	rationality	demands	things	of us.	For	example, if	you intend	to fly to	Rome	and	you	believe that	a	necessary means	to	fly	to	Rome	is	to	buy	an	airline	ticket,	and	yet	you	do	not	intend	to	buy an airline ticket, you will violate a requirement of rationality. You will not be entirely	as	rationality	requires	you	to	be. Moreover,	it	is	also	commonly	accepted	that	the	requirements	of	rationality play a fundamental role in a theoretical and a practical sense. Rational requirements	are	practically	fundamental	as	they	are	taken	as	providing	us	with a behaviour-guiding and justificatory standard of action and belief formation. 1 Department	of	Philosophy,	University	of	Bayreuth,	Germany Institute	of	Philosophy,	Slovak	Academy	of	Sciences,	Slovakia Centre	for	the	Study	of	Mind	in	Nature,	University	of	Oslo,	Norway 2 Requirements	of rationality are	often thought	of as contributing	extensively to answering	the	questions	'What	should	I	do?',	'What	should	I	believe?',	and	'How should	I	reason?'. Theoretically, requirements of rationality are fundamental in that they are employed in the reduction and explanation of	many philosophically significant concepts	or	phenomena.	Here	are	a	few	examples:	Michael	Smith	(1994)	reduces the concept of a normative reason to	what an agent	who satisfies all rational requirements would desire. Donald Davidson (2001) employs norms of rationality	to	show	that	mental	events	are	nomologically irreducible	to	physical events. Immanuel Kant (1788/1997) and subsequently Christine Korsgaard (1985)	have	sought	to	explain	immorality	as	a	breach	of	a	rational	requirement. David Gauthier (1986) premised his moral theory on rational requirements to keep agreements and to maximize utility in a constrained way. Christopher Cherniak	(1981;	1986)	treats	rational	requirements	as	playing	a	fundamental	role in	constituting	agency.	For	agency	to	be	ascribable	to	a	subject,	the	subject	must at	least	be	disposed	to	reliably	satisfy	some	basic	requirements	of	rationality. However,	despite	their	significance,	many	important	questions	about	rational requirements remain unanswered.	We lack a comprehensive theory about the demands of rationality. Ideally, a comprehensive theory would achieve two things.	On	the	one	hand,	it	would	answer	our	first-order	questions	about	rational requirements.	That	is,	what	exactly	does	rationality	require	of	us?	Can	I	believe	a contradiction	and	still	be fully rational? Is it	always irrational	not to intend the means	one	believes	to	be	necessary	to	one's	intended	end? On	the	other	hand,	a	comprehensive	theory	would	answer	our	second-order questions about rational requirements: what do we mean by saying that 3 rationality	requires	something	of	us?	In	virtue	of	which	of	our	properties	are	we subject	to	a	particular	requirement	of	rationality?	Do	we	have	normative	reasons to	satisfy	the	requirements	of	rationality?	What	can	we	say	about	the	motivation of	someone	who	judges	that	some	act	or	belief	would	be	rational	or	irrational? What	is	the	relationship	between	the	property	of	rationality	and	rationality	as	a system	of	requirements?	How	can	we	know	what	rationality	requires	of	us?	Do rational	requirements	the	set	the	standard	for	correct	reasoning? This	paper	aims	at	contributing	to	the	second	part	of	a	comprehensive	theory of rational requirements. I shall attempt to answer perhaps the most fundamental second-order question a comprehensive theory of rational requirements	should	answer: What	makes it	the	case	that	a	subject is	under	a particular	requirement	of	rationality? Let	me	clarify	this	question	by	example.	Suppose	rationality	requires	you	not to	believe	a	contradiction.	That	you	are	subject	to	this	requirement	must	hold	in virtue	of	some	particular	features	that	are	true	of	you.	For	instance,	whether	or not	you	had	a	haircut	yesterday	will	presumably	not	affect	the	application	of	this requirement. But which features do affect the application of this rational requirement?	Are	you	subject	to	this	requirement	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	were you	to	believe	a	contradiction,	you	would	not	be	fully	coherent?	Or	does	it	apply to you in virtue of some of your cognitive capacities? Asked differently: what would need to be false of you for you to escape being subject to this requirement? 4 This paper aims to answer these fundamental questions via providing a constitutive	account	or	analysis2	of	'rationality	requires'.	Section	1	sets	up	some of the apparatus necessary to provide such an analysis. In particular, I shall formulate a 'general requirement', i.e. the most abstract formulation of a rationality	requirement.	Sections	2	to	4	explore,	but	ultimately	dismiss,	the	idea of	analysing	'rationality	requires'	in	terms	of	necessary	conditions	for	attitudinal coherence.	Section	5	turns	to	another	idea	for	analysing	'rationality	requires'	in terms	of	normative	reasons.	However,	anticipating	some	recent	arguments	from John Broome and Niko Kolodny, I will argue that this type of analysis has no basis. Section	6	turns	to	the	core	of	this	paper:	what	I	proffer	as	a	correct	analysis of the requirements of rationality. Put roughly, I shall defend the view that 'rationality requires' is analysable in term of a necessary explanation: at a possible world	w, rationality requires you to X if and only if, if you were as capable of rationality as you are at w and you were not to X, then this conjunction	would	explain	necessarily	why	you	are	not	fully	coherent.	Section	7 2	I	shall	use	'constitutive	account'	and	'analysis'	synonymously	in	this	paper.	I	am	aware	that	this	may be	misleading. Analysing	X is often taken as setting out the	meaning of	X. However, I will not use 'analysis' in	this	sense.	Determining	the	meaning	of 'rationality	requires' is	not	part	of	my	agenda	in this	paper. I	also	do	not intend	to	give	a	full	constitutive	account	of the	requirements	of	rationality. That	is,	I	shall	not	try	to	give	an	account	of	what	a	requirement	of	rationality	is.	My	aim	here	is	more limited.	I	seek	to	provide	a	general	account	of	what	makes	it	the	case	that	one	is	subject	to	a	particular requirement of rationality. This is what I shall refer to as a 'constitutive account' or 'analysis'. In addition,	I	shall	refer	to	the	activity	of	establishing	a	constitutive	account	as	'analysing'. Furthermore, I will assume that a constitutive account or analysis can be stated in terms of necessitated	and	universally	quantified	bi-conditionals.	For	example,	a	constitutive	account	of	being	a brother	may	read	as follows:	necessarily, for	all	X,	X is	a	brother if	and	only if	X is	male	and	X	has	a sibling. Constitutive	accounts	or analyses can	be	circular or	non-circular. They	are	circular if and	only if the right-hand side of the bi-conditional refers to properties and relations that cannot be analysed without	referring	to	properties	or relations	used in the left-hand	side	of the	bi-conditional; they	are non-circular if	and	only if the right-hand	side	of the	bi-conditional refers to	properties	and	relations that	can	be	analysed	without	referring	to	properties	or	relations	used	in	the	left-hand	side	of	the	biconditional. If a correct constitutive	account	or	analysis	of	X is	non-circular, then	we	can say that it gives a reduction of	X. It is	my aim in this paper to draw up a non-circular constitutive account of 'rationality	requires'. 5 closes	this	paper	by	providing	an	understanding	of	attitudinal	coherence in the context	of	rational	requirements. 1 The	general	requirement Introducing this paper, I said informally that rationality issues requirements. First,	a	formal	expression	of	what	I	mean	by	this:	necessarily,	for	some	worlds	w, subjects	S,	and	attitude	proposition3	S	Xs,	at	w,	rationality	requires	of	S	that	S	Xs. Put	plainly,	by	saying	that	rationality	issues	requirements	I	mean	that	there	are contexts	in	which	rationality	requires	something	of	certain	subjects. This formal characterisation makes precise what I will call a 'general requirement'. General	requirement	(GR).	Rationality	requires	of	S	that	S	Xs. I call the GR a 'requirement', though, correctly speaking, the GR is not a 'requirement';	it	is	a	requirement	schema	that	can	be	turned	into	a	requirement by replacing the schematic letters. I take the GR to be the most general (or schematic) expression of a schema for rational requirements. For simplicity, though,	I	will	call	the	GR	a	requirement. The	chief	question	of	this	paper	is	this:	how	can	we	analyse	the	GR?	How	can we	analyse	the	claim	that	rationality	requires	you	not	to	believe	the	conjunction 'Oslo is the capital of Austria and it is not the case that Oslo is the capital of Austria'? 3 By 'attitude proposition' I	mean a proposition that ascribes a single attitude or a combination of attitudes	(or	their	absence)	to	a	subject.	Examples	are:	Ingo	wants	a	new	job;	Rainer	does	not	believe that	it	is	raining;	Janice	likes	ginger	if	she	believes	that	it	comes	from	ecological	farming;	Daniel	does not	want	to	make	plans	about	living	in	California	permanently	unless	he	believes	that	he	will	work	on	a vineyard;	etc. 6 Two	things	need	mentioning	before	I	can	outline	my	answer	to	this.	Note	that the	assertion	'Peter is	rational'	can	be	used	to	express	many	different	things. It may	express	that	Peter	possesses	(one	or	more	of)	the	properties	of	efficiency, effectiveness,	prudence,	sensibility,	consistency,	coherence,	etc.	Furthermore,	it may	also	express	that	Peter	is	capable	of	having	one	or	more	of	these	properties; that	is,	Peter	is	capable	of	being	efficient,	effective,	prudent,	etc. I	assume	that	these	properties	represent	different	types	of	rationality.	In	this paper, however, I shall only be concerned	with	one type of rationality and its requirements. One way to identify this type is by looking at the properties a subject must possess in order to have a maximal degree of this type of rationality. Picked out in this way, I shall be concerned with the type of rationality	one	possesses	if	and	only	if	one	displays	fully	coherent	attitudes.	With regard to the requirements of rationality, this is to say that I shall only be concerned	with rational requirements for which it holds necessarily that their satisfaction improves – in one way or another – the coherence among your attitudes.4,5 The	next	section	discusses	a	first	putative	analysis	of	the	GR.	From	now	on,	I will	assume	that	the	GR	expresses	a	general	requirement	for	a	'coherentist'	type of	rationality. 4 I say 'in one way or another' because X-ing may improve: (i) the overall coherence among your attitudes,	or	(ii)	the	coherence	among	a	specific	set	of	your	attitudes. 5	As I	explain in	detail in section	7, I	will assume that the type	of	attitudinal coherence relevant for rationality	based	on	rational	requirements	consists	in	manifesting	a	disposition	that	is	sensitive	to	the success conditions and constitutive aims of one's attitudes. For example, you are attitudinally incoherent if you have a pair of contradictory intentions despite your disposition to avoid contradictory	intentions	precisely	because	they	cannot	jointly	fulfil	their	success	conditions.	I	will	say more	on	this	type	of	coherence	in	section	7. 7 2 The	necessary-condition	analysis This section	explores (and rejects) the idea	of	analysing 'rationality requires' in terms of necessary conditions for possessing a particular property. I	will begin with	the	idea	of	analysing	the	GR	in	terms	of	a	subject	possessing	the	property	of full	rationality.6 Andrew	Reisner	(2009:	257,	n.	5). hints	at	such	an	analysis.	He	writes	that	'[...] rational requirements should express necessary [...] conditions for rationality.' One	way to employ this idea	within an analysis of the	GR is to say that	what determines	whether	S	Xs	is	rationally	required	of	S	is	whether	S	Xs	is	a	necessary condition	for	S	to	be	fully	rational.7	Or	more	formally: Necessary-condition-for-rationality analysis. Necessarily, for all S, S Xs, and	w,	at	w	rationality	requires	of	S	that	S	Xs	if	and	only	if,	at	w,	S	Xs	is	a necessary	condition	for	S	to	be	fully	rational. It is relatively easy to motivate this analysis. 'A requires B' often expresses exclusively that	B is a necessary condition for	A. John Broome (2007a: 9), for example,	claims	that	'"[s]urvival	requires	you	to	eat"	means	that	your	eating	is	a 6	For	a	brief	discussion	of	an	analogous	'necessary-condition	account'	of	'normative	requirements',	see Fink	(2012:	128-9). 7	There	is	a	quick,	yet	ultimately	unsuccessful,	attempt	at	rejecting	this	view.	To	say	that	requirements of	rationality	specify	necessary	conditions	for	full	rationality	seems	to	suggest	that	one	read	'requires' in	'rationality	requires'	as	expressing	the	mere	inverse	of	the	necessary-condition	relation.	That	is,	if	A requires	B, then	B is	a	necessary	condition for	A.	However, 'requires' cannot	be	used in this	way in 'rationality	requires'.	If	rationality	requires	Janice	to	have	another	shower	if	she	believes	she	ought	to have	another	shower,	we	cannot	express	this	by	turning	it into	a	binary	necessary-condition	relation such	as 'Janice	ought	to	have	another	shower if	she	believes	she	ought	to	have	another	shower is	a necessary condition for rationality'. This is semantic and syntactical nonsense.	Moreover, it is quite evident	why	this	does	not	work.	It	fails	to	account	for	the	fact	that	requirements	'belong'	to	someone (such	as	to	Janice	in	the	above	example).	In	fact,	ownership	turns	the	'requires	relation'	from	a	binary into	a	ternary	relation. This is not an argument against supposing that requirements of rationality specify necessary conditions for full rationality. The relation implied by a necessary condition does not have to be binary. It	may	be	ternary instead. It is relatively	unambiguous	how	to	construe	this ternary	relation. When rationality requires you not to believe a contradiction, then not believing contradiction is a necessary	condition	for	you	to	be	fully	rational.	In	general,	at	w,	if	R	requires	of	S	that	A,	then	for	S	to have	the	corresponding	property	of	R	at	w,	A	is	a	necessary	condition	at	w. 8 necessary	condition	for	your	possessing	the	property	of	survival. It	means	that, necessarily,	if	you	survive	you	eat.' However, there are good reasons to reject the necessary-condition-forrationality	analysis	as	inadequate.	First,	as	my	argument	towards	the	end	of	this section implies, the bi-conditional statement of the necessary-condition-forrationality	analysis is false.	Not	everything	that is	a	necessary	condition for full rationality	is	required	by	rationality.	Second,	the	bi-conditional	is	probably	unfit to represent a non-circular analysis of the GR. Arguably, there is no understanding	of	the	property	of	rationality	that	is	prior	to	an	understanding	of the	GR.8 The following analogy	may support this point.9 Like rationality, the law too allows us to construe a graded property. As you can be	more rational or less rational,	you	can	be	more	legally	compliant	or	less	legally	compliant. What makes it the case that one possesses the property of full legal compliance?	Whichever	answer	will	be	correct,	it	seems	inevitable	that	a	correct answer	will	rely	on	the	notion	of	a legal	requirement.	Thus, 'legal	requirement' seems to be a necessary part of a correct analysis of full legal compliance.	An understanding	of legal	compliance	cannot	be	prior	to	an	understanding	of legal requirements. If the same	holds true for the	property rationality and the requirements	of rationality, the necessary-condition-for-rationality analysis cannot serve as an appropriate	analysis	of	the	GR.	It	cannot	give	us	a	non-circular	analysis	of	the	GR. 8 I	would like to thank a number of anonymous referees for emphasising this point. It has led to a major	amendment	of	the	presented	arguments. 9	Many	thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	of	Erkenntnis	for	putting	forward	this	analogy. 9 Indeed,	I	know	of	no	quick	argument	that	rejects	the	circularity	of	necessarycondition-for-rationality	analysis.	Consequently, I shall	not	continue	to	examine it.	Instead,	will instead	focus	on	a	cognate	analysis	that	remains	immune	to	the charge	of	circularity. The present paper is about a particular type of rationality and its requirements. As stated in section 1, these requirements deal with attitudinal coherence: rationality requires you to X only if by X-ing you, in one way or another,	improve	the	coherence	among	your	attitudes.10	Let	us	account	for	this idea	in	creating	an	analysis	of	the	GR. Niko	Kolodny	(2005:	511)	alludes	to	such	an	analysis:	'[...]	it	is	relatively	clear how we might settle questions about what rationality requires; it requires whatever	is	necessary	for	coherence.'	In	short,	what	determines	whether	S	Xs	is rationally	required	of	S	is	whether	S	Xs	is	(a)	necessary	(condition)	for	coherence among	S's	attitudes	('attitudinal	coherence').	Or	more	formally: Necessary-condition-for-coherence analysis. Necessarily, for all S, S Xs, and	w,	at	w	rationality	requires	of	S	that	S	Xs	if	and	only	if,	at	w,	S	Xs	is	a necessary	condition	for	S	to	be	fully	attitudinally	coherent. This analysis avoids the charge of circularity. An understanding of attitudinal coherence does not presuppose an understanding of 'rationality requires'. Moreover,	this	analysis	satisfies	another	desideratum	of	rational	requirements.	It ensures that rational requirements remain 'local' and are not 'global' requirements.	That	is,	rationality	requires	us	'[...]	avoid	or	resolve	some	specific 10 Again, I say 'in one	way or another' because one's	X-ing	may improve: (i) the overall coherence among	one's	attitudes,	or	(ii)	the	coherence	among	a	specific	set	of	one's	attitudes. 10 conflict among one's attitudes – as opposed to, say, to satisfy some global constraint	on	all	of	one's	attitudes'	(Kolodny	2005:	516).11 Nonetheless,	the	necessary-condition-for-coherence	analysis	does	not	give	us a correct analysis of 'rationality requires'. What rationality requires is not necessarily	equivalent	to	a	necessary	condition	for	full	attitudinal	coherence. Various	philosophers	suggest	that	if	you	violate	a	requirement	of	rationality, then	this	will	have	'evaluative	consequences'	for	you.	For	example,	Tim	Scanlon (2007) suggests that by violating a requirement of rationality you display a functional	defect.12	Kolodny	(2005:	555-60)	advocates	the	view	that,	if	a	violation of	such	a	requirement	is	called	to	your	attention,	you	must	come	to	evaluate	that you	have	conclusive	reasons	not	to	fail	to	do	what	you	believe	you	ought	to	do.13 Personally, I am inclined to think that the violation of a requirement of 11 'Locality' is	a	desideratum	of rational requirements	because it	ensures that rational requirements reflect	our	ordinary	judgments	and	attributions	of	irrationality	(cf.	Kolodny	2005:	pp.	515-6).	To	show how	the	necessary-condition-for-coherence	analysis	preserves	locality,	considering	a	'preface-paradox' type	situation.	Suppose	you	believe	the	conjunction	of	all	assertions in	one	of	your	authored	books. Yet,	at	the	same	time,	you	also	disbelieve	this	conjunction.	You	thus	end	up	with	two	beliefs	whose conjoined contents form a contradiction. Avoiding the combination such beliefs is, I assume, a necessary condition for being fully attitudinally coherent. The necessary-condition-for-coherence analysis thus entails that rationality requires you not to have such a combination of contradictory beliefs. This	holds	even	when, for instance,	you	have	excellent	evidence for	both	beliefs.	Suppose	you	have checked	every	assertion	in	your	book	and	found	no	error.	Yet	knowing	about	your	fallibility,	you	also have	excellent	evidence	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	every	assertion	will	hold	true.	Given	your	evidential position, it might be	more (perhaps even most) coherent for you to continue believing the two contradictory	contents.	But	even	so,	the	necessary-condition-for-coherence	analysis	does	not	'cancel', as	it	were,	the	requirement	not	to	have	the	two	contradictory	beliefs	in	question. 12 Joseph	Raz	(2005:	19)	puts	it	like	this:	'Rationality	consists	in	part	in	proper	functioning.	People	who fail	[for	example]	to	pursue	the	means	to	their	ends	display	or	manifest	a	form	of	malfunctioning criticisable	as	a	form	of	irrationality.' 13	See	also	A.W.	Price (2008:	86).	Surely, if	you	are	severely irrational,	you	may	not	come	to	believe this.	One	may	argue	instead	that	you	must	be	disposed	to	believe	that	you	have	conclusive	reasons. 11 rationality	puts	you into	a situation	where, from 'a rational	point	of	view',	you could	be	subjected	to	warranted	criticism.14 I am	convinced that	at least	one	of these	views	will turn	out to	be	correct. Apply this to an analysis on which what rationality requires of a subject is equivalent to	whatever turns out to be a necessary condition for	S to be fully attitudinally coherent. Consider a list of necessary conditions for S to be fully attitudinally coherent at w. This list will include properties like 'being alive', 'having a mind', 'thinking with propositions', 'being spatially extended'. No subject can have a property of attitudinal coherence without the listed properties. It would be bizarre to think that because S lacks one of these properties,	S	suffers	from	a	functional	defect,	or	S	must	come	to	evaluate	that	S has conclusive reasons to have (any of) these properties, or that S could be subjected to	warranted criticism. Consider a carpet, for instance. None of this could	ever	apply	to	a	carpet	in	virtue	of	not	being	alive,	or	having	no	mind,	etc., and yet these are evidently necessary conditions for a carpet to be fully attitudinally	coherent	in	any	context. Here is	a further inadequacy	of the	necessary-condition	analysis.	Everything would	be	subject	to	rational	requirements:	carpets,	shoes, lighthouses,	etc.	We can identify necessary conditions for full attitudinal coherence for all these things.	Surely,	this	would	be	an	absurd	outcome.	Carpets,	shoes,	lighthouses	are clearly	not subject to any requirements of rationality.	We should refrain from 14	'[W]e	ought	...	to	use	'irrational'	in	its	ordinary	sense,	to	express	strong	criticism	of	the	kind	that	we also	express	with	words	like	"foolish",	"stupid",	and	"senseless"'	(Parfit	2011:	114). 12 interpreting the requirements of rationality as specifying necessary conditions for	attitudinal	coherence.15 3 Necessary-condition	implication This may not be the end altogether for the necessary-condition-for-coherence line of analysis. A	weakened version	may still be correct. Instead of supposing that the GR is equivalent to 'X is a necessary condition for S to be fully attitudinally	coherent',	the	GR	may	only	entail	'X	is	a	necessary	condition	for	S	to be	fully	attitudinally	coherent'.	Though	this	will	not	give	us	a	complete	analysis	of the	GR,	it	may	still	be	part	of	a	correct	analysis. Necessary-condition-for-coherence	implication.	Necessarily,	for	all	S,	S	Xs, and	w,	if	rationality	requires	of	S	that	S	Xs	at	w,	then	S	Xs	is	a	necessary condition	at	w	for	S	to	be	fully	attitudinally	coherent	at	w. I	read	this	as	follows:	take	all	contexts	in	which,	for	example,	rationality	requires of	Anna	that	Anna	believes	that	the	cat	is	on	the	mat	if	she	believes	she	knows that	the	cat	is	on	the	mat.	Then,	in	all	these	contexts,	'Anna	believes	that	the	cat is on the	mat if she believes she knows that the cat is on the	mat' will be a necessary	condition	for	Anna	to	be	fully	attitudinally	coherent. Many philosophers support (a cognate version of) the	necessary-conditionfor-coherence implication.16 I,	however,	dispute its correctness.	To	show	why, I need	to	provide	a	better	understanding	of	the	necessary-condition-for-coherence implication's	consequent: 15	I	have	discussed	this	and	the	previous	point	in	Fink	(2012:	129).	Mathias	Sagdal	objects	to	me	that computers,	and	other	organisms	or	systems,	might	also	be	rational.	If	so,	'having	a	mind',	'being	alive', etc.	may	not	turn	out	to	be	necessary	conditions	for	being	rational.	But	this	is	not	problematic	for	the point	I	wish	to	make	here;	it	just	changes	what	belongs	on	a	list	of	necessary	conditions	for	rationality. 16	See,	for	example,	Broome	(2013a),	Kolodny	(2005:	511),	Reisner	(2009:	257,	n.	5). 13 Necessary-condition-for-coherence	implication's	consequent.	At	w,	S	Xs	is a	necessary	condition,	at	w,	for	S	to	be	fully	attitudinally	coherent. In	order	to	uphold	the	necessary-condition	implication-for-coherence	we	need	a plausible interpretation of the necessary-condition-for-coherence implication's consequent	that	is	implied	by	the	GR.	But	there	is	none.	In	fact,	only	implausible interpretations of the necessary-condition-for-coherence implication's consequent are so implied. That is why the GR does not imply necessary conditions	for	being	fully	coherent	–	or	so	I	argue. First, let's take an implausible interpretation of the	necessary-condition-for coherence	implication's	consequent	that	is	implied	by	the	GR.	According	to	Albert Blumberg (1976: 133-4), and Jaakko	Hintikka and James	Bachman (1991: 328), necessary conditions can be read as material conditionals. That is, A is a necessary	condition	for	B	if	and	only	if	B	materially	implies	A.	Accordingly,	on	this material analysans, the necessary-condition implication's consequent can be read	as: Material	analysans.	At	w,	if	S	is	fully	attitudinally	coherent,	then	S	Xs, where	the	'if...,	then...'	is	read	as	a	material	conditional. However, this	cannot	be	a	correct	analysans	of the	necessary-condition-forcoherence implication's consequent. Suppose at w1 S is not fully attitudinally coherent.	This	guarantees	the	truth	of	the	material	analysans	for	any	'S	Xs'	at	w1. So, 'S plays tennis' turns out to be a necessary condition for S to be fully attitudinally	coherent	at	w1.	This	is	clearly	ludicrous.	Next,	suppose	at	w2	S	is	fully attitudinally	coherent	and	S	is	blond.	As	this	guarantees	the	truth	of	'if	S	is	fully attitudinally coherent, S is blond', 'being blond' turns out to be a necessary condition	for	S	to	be	fully	attitudinally	coherent.	In	fact,	everything	that	is	true	of 14 S at w2 would count as a necessary condition for S to be fully attitudinally coherent. This is equally ludicrous. We definitely cannot read the necessary condition in necessary-condition-for-coherence implication's consequent as a material	conditional. Nevertheless, the GR evidently implies the material analysans. That is, necessarily, rationality requires of S that S Xs at	w only if, at	w, if S is fully attitudinally	coherent, then	S	Xs.	Put	colloquially,	whenever	rationality	requires of Peter that he does not believe a contradiction, then, if Peter is fully attitudinally	coherent,	Peter	does	not	believe	a	contradiction.	No	doubt,	this	will be	a	minimum	condition	of	the	requirements	of	rationality.	Nothing	is	rationally required	of	you	unless	it	is	implied	of	you	if	you	are	fully	attitudinally	coherent. I now turn to two plausible interpretations of the necessary-condition-forcoherence implication's consequent. Neither of them is implied by the GR, however. First, take the 'strict analysans' interpretation. Accordingly, a necessary condition	expresses	a	strict	(or	necessary)	conditional.	Expressed	generally,	A	is	a necessary	condition	for	B	if	and	only	if	necessarily,	if	B	then	A.	So, Strict	analysans.	Necessarily,	if	S	is	fully	attitudinally	coherent,	S	Xs. This	is	a	plausible	reading	of	the	necessary-condition-for-coherence	implication's consequent.	I	am	sure	there	is	a	type	of	necessity	for	which	it	holds	that	A-ing	is	a necessary	condition	for	your	being	fully	attitudinally	coherent	if	and	only	if,	in	all possible	contexts	in	which	you	are	fully	attitudinally	coherent,	you	A. Admittedly,	you	may	not	share	my	certainty	about this.	You	may think that the strict analysans is too strong a reading of the necessary-condition 15 implication's consequent. So, perhaps you will be satisfied with the 'counterfactual analysans' of the	necessary-condition implication's consequent. In	general, suppose	A is a	necessary condition for	B.	Maybe that reads	as 'If	B were true, A would be true too'. Accordingly, the necessary-condition implication's	consequent	reads	as	follows: Counterfactual	analysans.	At	w, if	S	were fully attitudinally coherent,	S would	X. Again,	I	think	it	is	an	arguable	analysis	of	''S	Xs'	is	a	necessary	condition	for	'S	is fully	attitudinally	coherent'".	However,	neither	the	strict	nor	the	counterfactual analysans	are	implied	by	the	GR.	The	next	section	explains	why. 4 Requirements,	capacity,	and	modal	fragility Suppose Lena is a newborn human. She is just equipped with the average cognitive	abilities	of	a	newborn	child.	Could	Lena	be	subject	to	requirements	of rationality? On	the	face	of	it,	your	answer	to	this	might	be	'yes'.	As	Lena	is	presumably	in possession	of	some	attitudes,	why	not	suppose	that	Lena	and	her	attitudes	are subject	to	requirements	of	rationality? Here is why not. Recall the evaluative consequences of violating a requirement	of rationality I described in section	2. I said violating a rationality requirement either: (i) implies a functional defect; (ii) pushes one towards evaluating that one has conclusive reason to do whatever will satisfy the requirement;	or	(iii)	warrants	rational	criticism. Assume	now	that	being	subject	to	a	requirement	presupposes	the	possibility of	violating	it.	That	is,	if	rationality	requires	you	to	A,	then	it	is	possible	for	you	to 16 not-A. So, if Lena is subject to	a requirement	of rationality, it	must	be	possible that	at	least	one	of	the	evaluative	consequences	will	apply	to	her.	But	this	does not seem to be a tangible possibility. Of course, Lena could suffer from a functional	defect.	But	it	would	not	be	one	of	a	rational	kind.	Furthermore,	Lena could not be pushed towards evaluating that she has conclusive reason to do something – for a newborn, I assume, does not possess the concept of 'conclusive	reason'.	Last,	Lena	could	also	not	receive	warranted	criticism.	I	guess the	capacity	to	receive	such	criticism	presupposes	some	kind	of	understanding	of it. Consequently, newborn Lena will not be subject to any requirements of rationality. But, in all likelihood, this will only be so temporarily. Normally developed	human	beings	are	under	requirements	of	rationality.	If	Lena	develops normally,	there	will	be	a	point	where	rationality	requires	things	of	her.	In	fact,	I assume	this	be	so	when	Lena	has	gained	a	certain	level	of	rational	capacity.	This, in	turn,	will	depend	on	her	cognitive	abilities. If	this	is	correct,	it	implies	that	the	common	theoretical	treatments	of	rational requirements are insufficient. Commonly, theories of rationality are chiefly concerned	with: (i) the (nature of the) content of rationality requirements; (ii) their relationship to normative reasons; and (iii) their nexus with reasoning.17 However, these theories ignore,18 or crudely simplify,19 the conditions under which	a	requirement	of	rationality	applies	to	a	subject.	In	particular,	they	ignore 17	See	Broome	(2007a;	2007b;	2007c;	2013a),	Kolodny	(2005;	2007),	Reisner	(2009). 18 In these early writings on rationality, John Broome ignored the question of when a particular requirement	of rationality	applies to	particular individuals. Implicitly, the	requirements	of rationality applied to	everything.	However, Broome (2007a, p 38) recognised this as a problem	when realising that	this	entails	that	requirements	can	only	be	satisfied	or	violated,	but	not	avoided.	In	his	Rationality Through	Reasoning	(2013a)	he	changed	his	view	so	that	all	such	requirements	apply	to	those	who	are capable	of	rationality. 19	Kolodny	(2005;	2007)	and	Schroeder	(2004)	present	such	crude	simplifications. 17 the relationships that hold between a subject's cognitive abilities, her rational capacity, and the application of requirements of rationality. Elucidating these relationships	is	not	part	of	the	research	programme	on	rationality. In the remainder of this section, I will try to investigate some of this unexplored territory. In	particular, I shall say something	about the relationship that holds between the application of a requirement of rationality and a subject's	rational	capacity.20	This	will	lead	to	an	argument	that	the	strict	and	the counterfactual	analysans	fail	to	be	implied	by	the	GR.	In	section	6,	I	will	then	give some examples of the relationship that holds between a subject's cognitive abilities	and	her	rational	capacity. I suppose	that the	application	of	every individual requirement	of rationality presupposes	the	possession	of	a	rational	capacity.	Or	slightly	more	formally: Capacity-requirement condition. Necessarily, for all requirements of rationality	R,	subjects	S,	and	worlds	w,	R	applies	to	S	at	w	only	if,	at	w,	S possesses	a	capacity	of	rationality. That	is,	a	necessary	condition	for	being	subject	to	a	requirement	of	rationality	is to	have	some	capacity for rationality.	But	why	not think	of rational	capacity	as being sufficient for any requirement to apply? This is because I think that different	requirements	require	different	capacities. Consider the, admittedly highly artificial and (over)simplified,21 example of Jack	and	Jill.	Suppose	Jack,	on	the	one	hand,	is	very	good	at	grasping	the	concept 20 Like moral or legal blameworthiness requires moral or legal culpability, I assume that 'rational blameworthiness' requires rational culpability,	which, I take it, consists in	one's rationality capacity. That is, you can be rationally liable for having or lacking a certain pattern of attitudes (in virtue of being	subject	to	certain	rational	requirements)	only	if	you	are	in	possession	of	a	rational	capacity	that includes some kind of a (perhaps dispositional) understanding why a certain pattern of lack of attitudes	constitutes	an	incoherence	among	your	attitudes. 21	This	example is likely to	be	oversimplified,	as	an	understanding	of	means-relations requires some conceptual	grasp	of	truth.	But,	for	the	sake	of	simplicity,	I	will	ignore	this	complication. 18 of truth, but very bad at understanding	means-end relations. Jill, on the	other hand, is very good with means-end relations, but cannot make sense of the concept	of	truth.	I	assume	that	'being	good	with	truth'	will imply	some	rational capacity, and so will 'being good with means-end relations'. Furthermore, assume	that	one	must	be	good	with	truth	to	be	rationally	required	not	to	believe contradictions.	Also,	one	must	be	good	with	mean-end	relations	to	be	rationally required to intend the	means one believes to be necessary to one's intended ends.	Thus,	though	Jack	will	be	rationally	required	not	to	believe	contradictions, he will not be rationally required to intend the means he believes to be necessary to his ends. Contrarily, Jill will be rationally required to intend the means	she	believes	to	be	necessary	to	her	ends;	yet	she	will	not	be	required	not to believe contradictions. Jack and Jill end up being subject to different requirements	of	rationality.	This	is	why	one's	possession	of	a	specific	capacity	of rationality	does	not	necessarily	suffice	to	make	one	subject	to	every	requirement of	rationality. I	now	turn	again	to	the	GR	and	the	strict	and	counterfactual	analysans.	At	the end	of	section	3, I	asserted	that	the	GR	neither implies	the	strict	analysans	nor the	counterfactual	analysans. The	capacity-requirement condition allows	me to explain	why.	First,	I	take	rational	capacities	to	be	contingent.	That	is,	the	features in virtue of which a subject possesses a certain rational capacity are not a necessary	part	of	this	subject.	Lena's	example	confirms	this:	rational	capacity is something one can gain or lose. To strengthen this claim, here is another example. Suppose	Fiona,	a	normally	developed	adult	human	being,	possesses certain rational capacities. Suppose her capacities constitute themselves in an agglomeration	of	her	logical	skills,	her	understanding	of	concepts	like	'truth'	and 19 'falsity', her ability to understand causal relations, and her skills in applying probabilities to	propositions,	etc. Because	of	her cognitive	abilities, Fiona finds herself subject to a number of requirements of rationality. Suppose now that among	the	requirements	Fiona	is	subject	to,	there	is	one	requirement,	call it	R, that	presupposes	all	of	the	rational	capacities	that	Fiona	possesses. Assume now that, unfortunately, Fiona suffers from a terrible stroke. As a consequence of this, she is no longer able to, say, reliably draw some of the inferences	she	was	easily	able	to	draw	before	her	stroke.	Further,	Fiona	is	also	no longer able to make calculations with rational numbers, and she does not understand why causes precede their effects. Surely, Fiona is less capable of rationality than she was before her stroke. Consequently, Fiona will not be subject	to	R	anymore.	Rationality	will	require	less	of	her	after	her	stroke	than	it did	before. This illustrates what I shall call the 'modal fragility' of requirement of rationality. It	does	not	take large	(or impossible)	changes	to	a	context in	which you	are	subject	to	a	requirement	to	ensure	that	you	become	no	longer	subject	to this requirement. Recall now the strict analysans of the necessary-condition analysis's consequent on page 14. It analyses 'at w, "S Xs" is a necessary condition for	S to be fully attitudinally rational' in terms	of 'Necessarily, if	S is fully	attitudinally	coherent,	then	S	Xs'.	That	is	to	say,	if,	in	one	context,	rationality requires	of	S that	S	Xs, then	S	Xs in	all contexts in	which	S is fully	attitudinally coherent rational, i.e. in	which	S satisfies all of the requirements she is	under. But the modal fragility of the requirements of rationality denies this strict conditional. There might be a context in which S is simply not under the requirement to X. In that context, S does not have to X in order to be fully 20 attitudinally	coherent.22	That	is,	S	does	not	have	to	X	to	satisfy	all	requirements	S is	under.	Consequently,	the	GR	does	not	imply	the	strict	analysans. The	'modal	fragility'	of	rational	capacity	also	shows	the	GR	not	to imply	the counterfactual analysans (see page 15). Following David Lewis, I assume 'If S were	fully	attitudinally	coherent,	S	would	X' is	true	at	a	possible	world	w if	and only	if	there	is	at	least	one	world,	say	w*,	where	S	is	fully	attitudinally	coherent and S	Xs, and	w* is	more similar to	w than any	world	where S is attitudinally coherent,	yet	S	does	not	X.23	In	other	words,	to	arrive	at	a	world	where	S	is	fully coherent	and	S	Xs	from	w,	we	must	depart	less	from	w	than	we	would	in	order	to arrive	at	a	world	where	S	is	fully	coherent,	yet	it	is	not	the	case	that	S	Xs. Allow	me	to	keep	the	notion	of	'similarity'	and	'departure'	intuitive.	Consider again	Fiona's	example	where,	prior	to	her	stroke,	Fiona	was	subject	to	rationality requirement	R.	As	the	example	showed,	Fiona	does	not	necessarily	possess	the rational	capacity	required	for	being	under	R	in	all	nearby	worlds	in	which	Fiona	is fully	coherent.	That	is	to	say,	a	world	where	Fiona	possesses	the	property	of	full coherence	but is	not subject to	R could	be	closer to	a	world	where she is fully coherent	and	is	subject	to	R.	In	general,	sometimes	it	will	be	'easier'	to	lose	the capacity	necessary	for	being	subject	to	a	requirement	of	rationality	R,	than	to	be subject	to	R	and	to	satisfy	it.	At	least,	I	see	no	argument	excluding	this	possibility. This	shows	that	counterfactual	analysans	is	thus	not	implied	by	the	GR. In sum, none of the plausible interpretations the necessary-condition analysis's consequent are implied	by the	GR. They can thus not be a part of a constitutive	account	of	the	GR.	Only	the	material	analysans	is	implied	by	the	GR. 22	I	assume	a	subject	S	is	fully	rational	in	a	certain	context	c	if	and	only	if	S	satisfies	all	requirements	of rationality	that	apply	to	S	in	c. 23	David	Lewis	(1973). 21 However,	this	does	not	suffice	for	conceiving	the	requirements	of	rationality	as specifying	necessary	conditions	of	full	rationality. The upshot may be surprising: the requirements of rationality do not necessarily specify fully-fledged necessary conditions for being fully coherent. When rationality requires you to	X, it is possible that	X-ing is not a necessary condition	for	being	fully	coherent.	Instead,	losing	some	of	your	rational	capacity may	also	make	you	fully	coherent.	If	so,	there	is	a	context	in	which	you	are	fully coherent	without	X-ing,	though,	in	another	context,	rationality	requires	you	to	X. Though rational requirements entail strict liability relative to your rational capacity, they elide from strict liability across possible worlds where your rational	capacity	may	vary. 5 'Rationality	requires'	and	reasons Thus	far,	I	have	examined	interpretations	of	the	requirements	of	rationality	that read 'rationality requires' as expressing a necessary condition. My discussion established that in all contexts in	which rationality requires you to	A, it holds that, if you are fully attitudinally coherent, you A. (Compare the material analysans on page 13.) However, the converse implication does not hold. The material	analysans	can	thus	not	serve	as	an	analysis	of	the	GR.	Consequently,	the GR must express more than the point that possessing the property of full coherence in a particular situation implies materially that one does whatever rationality requires in that situation. Put succinctly, what 'rationality requires' and	what	is	required	for	being	coherent	are	not	the	same	thing. What	could	this	additional	meaning	consist	in?	In	fact,	'requires'	is	often	used to	express	a	normative fact	or relation. It is	often	used to	express	a	normative reason	or	an	ought. 22 Surely, there	are	requirement	systems	for	which	this	holds. I	assume	that if morality requires you to donate a part of your income, then you have a normative	reason	to	donate	a	part	of	your	income.	Likewise,	if	prudence	requires you	to	not	donate	a	part	of	your	income,	then	you	have	a	reason	not	to	donate part of your income.	However, there are systems	of requirements that do	not issue reasons. Arguably, if chauvinism requires you to adopt a set of selfrighteous attitudes, there may be no reason for you to adopt this set of attitudes. On	which	side	do	the	requirements	of	rationality	come	down?	Is	it	normative like	morality	and	prudence,	or	non-normative	like	chauvinism? I	have	argued	elsewhere,	however,	that	rationality	is	only	partially	normative (Fink	ms).	Only	some	requirements	of	rationality	imply	necessarily	that	you	have a	reason	to	satisfy	them.	In	particular,	this	holds	for	the	rational	requirement	for one	to	intend	to	do	what	one	believes	one	ought	to	do.	But	I	can	offer	no	sound argument	that	this	kind	of	normativity	extends	to	other	requirements	too. However, to use normative reasons in the analysis of the GR, it must necessarily hold for	each	and	every requirement	of rationality that you	have	a reason	to	do	what	rationality	requires	of	you.	More	precisely,	it	must	hold	that, necessarily,	if,	at	w,	rationality	requires	of	S	that	S	Xs,	then,	at	w,	S	has	a	reason to	X.	But,	again,	I	am	not	able	to	substantiate	this	claim	with	an	argument.	So,	I cannot	help	myself	to	such	an	analysis. Nevertheless, there might still be a counterfactual relationship between 'rationality requires' and reasons. For example, rationality may require something	of	you	in	one	context	if	and	only	if,	in	some	nearby	context,	you	have (most,	conclusive,	or	perfect)	reason	to	A. 23 In	his	'Rationality	and	reasons',	Derek	Parfit	hints	at	such	a	theory: What	do	we	have	most	reason	to	want,	and	do?	[...]	What	is	it	most	rational	for us	to	want,	and	do?	[...]	While	reasons	are	provided	by	the	facts,	the	rationality of our desires and acts depends instead on our beliefs. When we know the relevant	facts,	these	questions	have	the	same	answers.	But	if	we	are	ignorant, or	have	false	beliefs,	it	can	be	rational	to	want,	or	do,	what	we	have	no	reason to want, or do. Thus, if I believe falsely that my hotel is on fire, it may be rational	of	me to jump into the	canal.	But I	have	no reason to jump. I	merely think I do. And, if some dangerous treatment would save your life, but you don't	know	that	fact, it	would	be irrational	for	you	to	take	this	treatment,	but that	is	what	you	have	most	reason	to	do.	(Parfit	2001:	17) Note	that	Parfit	only	talks	about	a	property	of	rationality	here. In	particular,	he talks about the 'the rationality of our desires and acts'. Let us assume, in an extrapolative	spirit,	that	Parfit's	view	can	be	developed	into	an	account	of	what rationality requires of us. It may thus allow us to construe a counterfactual analysis	of	the	GR.	We	may	perhaps	analyse	the	GR	counterfactually: Counterfactual-reasons	analysans.	If	S's	non-normative	beliefs	were	true, S	would	have	most	reason	to	X. That	is,	for	example,	rationality	requires	you	not	[to	intend	to	A	and	to	intend	to not-A] if and only if you would have	most reason not [to intend to	A and to intend	to	not-A]	if	your	non-normative	beliefs	were	true. However, I doubt that this counterfactual can analyse the GR. First, the counterfactual analysis limits the application of some possibly central rational requirements in	an implausible	way. In	particular, it restricts the	application	of rational requirements that aim at establishing coherence between normative beliefs	and	intentions. Suppose you accept, as it is commonly done, that a normally developed person	is	not	entirely	as	rationality	requires	her	to	be	if	she	fails	to	intend	to	do 24 what	she	believes	she	ought	to	do.24	If	so,	you	will,	I	assume,	need	to	accept	one of	the	two	following	formulas:	(i) if	you	believe	you	ought	to	A,	then	rationality requires	you	to	intend	to	A;	(ii)	rationality	requires	of	you	that	[if	you	believe	you ought	to	A, then	you	intend	to	A]. If	you	think	that	(i) is	correct,	then	you	hold that	ought-beliefs	entail	rational	requirements	on	intentions.	If	you	think	that	(ii) is	correct,	you	commit	yourself	to	the	view	that	rationality	requires	you	[either not	to	believe	that	you	ought	to	A	or	to	intend	to	A]. I argue that the counterfactual analysis is incompatible with a plausible interpretation	of	both	(i)	and	(ii).	To	begin,	the	counterfactual	analysis	excludes that	(i)	can	be	interpreted	as	expressing	a	strict	or	necessary	entailment.25 The following example illustrates this: suppose you are in London and you believe that you ought to take the 1.45pm train to Oxford. You arrive at this belief via deliberating about a lecture that you wish to deliver in Oxford at 4.15pm.	But suppose that	due to	a lapse in your reasoning	you	never form	an intention	to	take	the	1.45pm	train.	Furthermore,	suppose	that	you	also	believe that your	mother lies in hospital and there is a high chance that she will not survive	until the	next	day.	Yet	you	neither form	a	belief that	you	ought	to	visit her	nor	an	intention	to	do	so. If	your	non-normative	beliefs	were	true,	let	us	assume,	you	would	have	most reason	to	stay in	London	and	visit	your	mother.	Thus, it	would	not	be	the	case that	you	ought to take	the	1.45pm	train to	Oxford.	The	counterfactual	analysis 24	Cf., for	example,	Broome	(2013b;	2007c;	2007d),	Kolodny	(2005;	2007)	Raz	(2005).	This	statement simplifies	things,	however.	For	example,	I	assume	that	a	normally	developed	person	is	not	entirely	as rationality	requires	her	to	be	if: (i)	she	believes	that	ought	to	A;	(ii) fails	to intend	to	A;	and	also	(iii) believes	that	bringing	about	A	is	up	to	her	(i.e.	she	believes	A	will	not	happen	if	it	is	not	herself	who brings about A). John Broome's (2013b) provides an excellent discussion on further restrictions concerning	the	'enkratic'	requirement	of	rationality. 25	Kolodny	(2007)	supposes	that	(i)	(or	a	cognate	formulation)	represents	a	necessary	entailment. 25 implies	that	the	entailment	expressed	in	(i)	does	not	hold	true	necessarily.	In	the described situation, your belief that you ought to take the 1.45pm train to Oxford	does	not	entail	that	rationality	requires	you	to	intend	to	take	the	1.45pm train to Oxford. You can believe that you ought to take the 1.45pm train to Oxford	and	not	intend	to	do	so,	yet	still	be	entirely	as	rationality	requires	you	to be. In consequence, if (i) is correctly read as a necessary conditional, the counterfactual	analysis	cannot	be	correct. However, you may not conceive of (i) as a necessary conditional. That is, merely	believing	that	you	ought	to	A	does	not	strictly	suffice	to	guarantee	that rationality	requires	you	to	intend	to	A.	Some	extra	conditions	need	to	be	fulfilled for	(i)	to	hold	true.	For	example,	perhaps	you	think	that	your	ought-beliefs	entail rational	requirements	on	intentions	only	if	your	ought-beliefs	are	supported,	or at	least	not	contradicted,	by	your	evidence.	Or	you	may	think	that	they	need	to be	epistemically	justified,	the	consequence	of	a	correct	reasoning	process,	or	not be	grossly	irrational.26	So,	in	principle,	you	may	welcome	that	the	counterfactual analysis	restricts	the	entailment	expressed	by	(i)	modally. But does the counterfactual analysis restrict (i) in the right way? I do not think	so.	Suppose,	at	w,	you	have	most	reason	to	A	and	hence	you	ought	to	A. Suppose that, at	w, the fact that	both	p and	q	make it the	case that	you	have most	reason	to	A.	However,	neither	p,	nor	q,	on	its	own,	would	make	it	the	case that	you	have	most	reason	to	A.	Suppose	you	believe	p,	yet	you	are	ignorant	of q. You have evidence for	p but no evidence for	q. As (believing)	p, say, poses 26	Ralph	Wedgwood	makes	an	analogous	proposals	for	beliefs	about	an	option's	goodness	that	ensure that a choice is rational. He writes (2003: 203) that '... a choice is rational just in case the agent believes that the	option	chosen is (in the	relevant	way)	a	good	thing to	do.	But this	would	not	be	a very	plausible	thing	to	say:	if	the	agent's	belief	that	the	option	chosen	is	a	good	thing	to	do	is	a	grossly irrational	belief,	then	surely	the	choice	will	be	equally	irrational.	So	it	would	be	more	plausible	to	say this:	a	choice	is	rational	just	in	case	it	is	rational	for	the	agent	to	believe	that	the	option	chosen	is	(in the	relevant	sense)	a	good	thing	to	do.' 26 strong	evidence that	you	ought to	A and justifies	a	belief that	you	ought to	A, you form	– via a correct route of reasoning, let us assume	– a belief that you ought to A. However, due to a slip in your reasoning, you fail to form an intention	to	A. Suppose	you	think	that	the	truth	of	(i)	is	restricted	to	certain	circumstances. Should	we	think	that	the	just	described	situation	is	one	in	which	(i)	does	not	hold true? I do not see how one could possibly argue for this. You are justified in believing	that	you	ought	to	A,	you	hold	evidence	for	this	belief,	and	you	arrived at	it	via	correct	reasoning.	Plus	your	belief	is	true:	you	ought	to	A.	It	seems	that	if ought-beliefs ever entail rational requirements on intentions, then they will certainly	do	in	the	situation	described. But	on	the	counterfactual	analysis	they	do	not.	If,	in	the	situation	described, your non-normative beliefs were true, you	would not have	most reason to	A. Hence, rationality	does	not require	you to intend to	A,	despite	your	normative belief that you ought to A. Your ought-belief does not entail a rational requirement	on	your	intention.	Parfit	could	not	maintain	the	correctness	of	(i)	on his account of 'rationality requires'. For those	defending (i), this	must pose an awkward	result. However, you may not endorse (i) to start with. Perhaps you think that, instead	of (i), (ii) represents	a	correct requirement	of rationality.	But	could (ii), under the counterfactual analysis, constrain your normative beliefs and intentions	in	a	plausible	fashion? Again,	on	Parfit's	view,	(ii)	would	be	far	from	being	a	necessary	requirement. One	plausible	way	to	read	(ii)	is	to	say	that	rationality	requires	you	to	avoid	the combination of believing that you ought to A and not intending to A. 27 Consequently, (ii) would apply to you only if the truth of your non-normative beliefs	would	entail	that	you	have	most	reason	not	[to	believe	that	you	ought	to A	and	not	intend	to	A]. There are three distinct ways of avoiding this combination. You can: (a) believe	that	ought	to	A	and	intend	to	A;	(b)	not	believe	that	you	ought	to	A	and intend	to	A;	or	(c)	not	believe	that	you	ought	to	A	and	not	intend	to	A.	So,	for	(ii) to	apply	to	you,	it	would	need	to	be	the	case	that	no	matter	whether	you	(a),	(b), or	(c),	you	do	something	you	have	most	reason	to	do. No	doubt,	this	limits	the	application	of	(ii)	to	an	implausible	degree.	What	an outlandish	set	of	beliefs	you	must	have	for	this	situation	to	occur.	Just	consider	a situation	where	by	either	(a)	or	(c)	you	ensure	that	you	do	something	you	have most reason to do. To represent such situation, your beliefs would need to guarantee	that,	for	example,	you	have	most	reason	[to	believe	that	you	ought	to visit	your	mother	in	the	hospital	and	to	intend	to	visit	you	mother	in	the	hospital] and,	at	the	same	time,	have	most	reason	[not	to	believe	that	you	ought	to	visit your	mother	in	the	hospital	and	not	intend	to	visit	her	in	the	hospital].	The	set	of beliefs	whose	truth	would	imply	this	would	certainly	be	extraordinary. Nevertheless, consider one example of beliefs that has the potential to guarantee	this.	Suppose	you	believe	that	an	evil	dictator	will	destroy	the	entire world	unless	[you	believe	that	you	ought	to	visit	your	mother	in	the	hospital	and you	intend	to	visit	her]	or	[you	do	not	believe	that	you	ought	to	visit	your	mother in	the	hospital	and	you	intend	to	visit	her].	Though	debatable,	if	this	belief	were true,	you	would	have	most	reason	to	bring	about	this	disjunction	of	attitudes. However, I have no doubt that those defending (ii) would not accept that application	of	(ii)	might	depend	on	such	unlikely	beliefs.	On	Parfit's	counterfacual 28 account	of	rational	requirements,	(ii)	would	be	an	almost	negligible	requirement of	rationality. However,	what	if	you	deem	(ii)	as	incorrect	or	negligible?	Then,	for	you,	this result does not pose a threat to the counterfactual analysis. Does the counterfactual	analysis	come	with	other	shortcomings? Consider a general	worry. As	my examples above show, the counterfactual analysis	makes	the	application	of	rational	requirements	dependent	on	a	feature of	your	attitudes.	In	particular,	the	application	of	a	rational	requirement	depends on a counterfactual feature of the contents of your non-normative beliefs, namely their assumed truth implying that you have most reason for doing something.	Recall that in	this	paper I	am	concerned	with	rational	requirements of	coherence.	I	agree	that	by	adding	or	losing	a	(non-normative)	belief	of	yours you	can	come	to	satisfy	or	violate	a	rational	requirement	of	coherence.	But	I	do not see how adding or losing a belief of yours could alter what counts as a coherent or incoherent relation among your attitudes, thereby altering what rationality	requirements	of	you.27 Here is a further shortcoming of the counterfactual analysis. So far, I interpreted the counterfactual-reasons analysans ('If S's non-normative beliefs were true,	S	would	have	most reason to	X') as follows. Suppose, at	w,	S has	a given	set	of	beliefs.	Suppose	that	all	beliefs	contained	in	this	set	were	true.	If	S would then	have	most reason to	X,	S	would satisfy the counterfactual-reasons analysans. 27	As I	have instead	argued in	section	4, the	application	of	a rational requirement	depends	on	one's rational	capacity,	where	capacity	can	be	roughly	understood	as	one's	understanding	of	and	ability	to establish coherent relations	among	one's	attitudes.	A	more	precise characterisation	of coherence is provided	in	section	7. 29 Assume that, at	w, S's beliefs are such that there could not be a possible world at	which	all of	S's beliefs are true. That is, at	w, either	S believes a flat contradiction, holds a pair contradicting beliefs, or believes something that implies	a	contradiction.	For	example,	suppose	that	if	all	of	your	beliefs	were	true, the	current	temperature	would	be	-5-degrees	Celsius	and	+20-degrees	Celsius	at the	same	point	and	time.	I	assume	that	this	implies	a	contradiction.	There	is	no situation	in	which	this	could	be	the	case.	Hence,	there	is	no	situation	in	which	all of	your	beliefs	are	true. As	it	stands,	this	has	untenable	consequences	for	the	counterfactual	analysis. As S's non-normative beliefs entail a contradiction, a conjunction of their contents would entail anything.28 Hence, in the counterfactual-reasons analysans, 'S has most reason to X' would come out as true for every replacement of X. Put differently, the fact that S's set of beliefs contains or implies a contradiction would make the counterfactual-reasons analysans vacuously	true	for	any 'X'.	Rationality	would	require	absolutely	everything	of	S. This	is	without	doubt	incorrect. There	seems	to	be	a	straightforward	solution	to	avoid	this	problem.	We	could modify	the	counterfactual	analysis	as	follows:	at	w,	rationality	requires	of	S	that S	Xs if and	only if: (i) the contents	of	S's	non-normative	beliefs	do	not imply	a contradiction;	and	(ii)	if	S's	non-normative	beliefs	were	true,	S	would	have	most reason to	X. Consequently, this	modified version	of the	counterfactual-reasons analysans would not apply to subjects whose non-normative beliefs imply an inconsistency. 28	Here	I	assume	the	correctness	of	the	'principle	of	explosion',	as	it	applies	in	classical	logic,	i.e.	one can	validly	derive	any	statement	from	a	conjunction	of	contradicting	propositions	(p	and	not-p). 30 Adding	(i)	to	the	counterfactual-reasons	analysans	avoids	the	possibility	of	it implying	that	everything	is	required	by	rationality.	But	this	modified	account	also comes	with	an	unsatisfactory	consequence.	We	could	use	it	only	as	an	account	of 'rationality requires' for subjects who are ideal in being to a certain degree attitudinally	coherent.	We	could	not	use	it	as	an	account	of	'rationality	requires' for those who are non-ideal in believing a contradiction. This poses a serious problem. By believing a contradiction, one does not 'cancel', as it were, all rational requirements one is under. Instead, one violates some rational requirements,	and	hence	must	be	subject	to	them. Maybe	we	can	vindicate	the	counterfactual	analysis	by	changing	how	we	read the	antecedent	of	counterfactual-reasons	analysans	('If	S's	non-normative	beliefs were	true').	So	far,	I	read	this	antecedent	as	referring	to	the	entirety	of	S's	nonnormative	beliefs.	It	thus	refers	to	a	counterfactual	situation	in	which	everything non-normative	S	believes is true.	So, if you	believe	p,	q, and r, then rationality requires	you to	X if	and	only if you	would	have	most reason to	X if	p,	q,	and r were true. But	maybe an alternative reading gives us a better account. Let us assume that the antecedent refers to S's non-normative beliefs, taken individually.29 That is, suppose again you believe p, q, and r. Then, rationality requires	of	you	that	you	X	if	and	only	if	you	would	have	most	reason	to	X	if	p,	or q,	or	r	were	true. On	this	reading,	rationality	requires	you	to	X	if	and	only	if	the	counterfactual truth	of	any	one	of	your	beliefs	would	imply	that	you	have	most	reason	to	X.	This also	avoids	the	possibility	of	implying	that	everything	is	required	by	rationality	by having	contradicting	beliefs.	Suppose	you	believe	p	and	you	believe	not-p.	This 29	Parfit	(2011:	112-3)	hints	at	this	solution	by	saying	that	'[w]hen	our	beliefs	are	inconsistent,	some	of our	desires	or	acts	may	be	rational	relative	to	some	of	our	beliefs,	but	irrational	to	others.' 31 would not imply that everything is rationally required of one, as	we	would, in fact, replace the antecedent of the counterfactual-reasons analysans with a contradiction.	Instead,	we	would	be	looking	at	the	normative	consequences	of	p, and	not-p,	individually.30 I	doubt	that	this	can	vindicate	the	counterfactual	analysis.	Suppose	that if	p were true, you would have	most reason to	A. If q were true, you have	most reason	to	not-A.	On	the	counterfactual	analysis,	this	would	imply	that	rationality requires	you	to	A,	whilst	requiring	you	to	not-A	at	the	same	time. Here	is	an	illustrative	example.	Imagine	you	intend	to	go	sailing	in	Oslo.	You wonder which outfit you should wear. As it happens, your beliefs about the current temperature are incoherent. On the one hand, you believe that the current	temperature is	25-degrees-Celsius.	On	the	other	hand,	you	also	believe that	the	current	temperature	is	-5-degrees-Celsius.	If	your	first	belief	were	true, you would have most reason to intend to wear your summer jacket. If your second	belief	were	true,	you	would	have	most	reason	to	intend	not	to	wear	your summer jacket. On Parfit's counterfactual analysis, this would imply that rationality	requires	you	to	intend	to	wear	your	summer	jacket,	whilst	at	the	same time	requiring	you	to	intend	to	not	wear	your	summer	jacket. This	is	implausible.	A	fundamental	requirement	of	rationality	is	to	avoid	pairs of inconsistent intentions. Intentions aim at implementation; a joint implementation	of	one's	intentions	is	only	logically	possible	if	one	does	not	have contradictory intentions. In general, rationality should issue requirements that 30	Of	course,	this	solution	works	only	if	we	decompose	'conjunctive	beliefs'.	Suppose	you	have	a	single belief that [p and	not-p].	Then	we	would	need to	decompose this into the	atomic	propositions that constitute	the	content	of	your	conjunctive	belief	and	see	what	their	normative	consequences	would be. That is,	we	would	need to see	what you	have	most reason to	do if p	were true, and	what you would	most	reason	to	do	if	not-p	were	true. 32 guide	you	out	of	an irrational	state,	and	not	deeper into	such	a	state.31	Parfit's counterfactual account of 'rationality requires' can thus not provide us	with a correct	analysis	of	the	GR.32 6 Preferred	analysis I	prefer	a	different	analysis	of	the	GR.	In	this	section,	I	will	suggest	analysing	the GR in terms of what I shall call 'necessary explanation'. Roughly formulated, rationality	requires	you	to	X	if	and	only	if	the	fact	that	you	not-X,	in	conjunction with your rational capacities, explains necessarily why you are not fully attitudinally coherent. I	will refer to this as	my 'preferred	analysis'. I	will show that	this	preferred	analysis	avoids	the	shortcomings	of	the	accounts I	discussed earlier	in	this	paper. In the previous sections, I have already identified a number of things a correct analysis of the GR needs to ensure or avoid. A correct analysis, for instance, needs to avoid that requirements of rationality apply to everything. Stones,	cars,	and	tumble	dryers	are	not	subject	to	any	demands	of	rationality. We also cannot analyse the GR in terms of necessary conditions for full rationality.	Not	every	necessary	condition	for	being	fully	attitudinally	coherent	is required	by	rationality.	For	example:	that	S	uses	propositions	to	think,	is	alive,	or is	spatially	extended,	are	necessary	conditions	for	S	to	be	fully	coherent.	None	of this,	however,	is	required	by	rationality. Moreover, not everything that rationality requires is a genuinely necessary condition for full	attitudinal	coherence.	Rational requirements	apply relative to 31	Broome	(2007:	365)	makes	a	similar	point. 32 For additional criticism of Parfit's counterfactual account of rationality, see section 6 in Broome (2007b). 33 one's rational capacities. Rationality requires you to	X only if you possess the relevant rational capacities that give rise to this requirement. Hence, by not having	some	particular	capacities,	you	might	be	fully	coherent	without	X-ing.	So, rational	requirements	do	not	specify	necessary	conditions	for	full	coherence. Let	me	set	off	by	tackling	the	problem	that	not	every	necessary	condition	for full	rationality	is	itself	required	by	rationality.	In	my	preferred	analysis,	I	intend	to exclude	those	'un-required'	necessary	conditions	as	follows.	Suppose	that	S	Ns	is a	necessary	condition	for	S	to	be	fully	attitudinally	coherent.	One	thing	that	is	not necessarily true	of	S	Ns is this: if it is	not the	case	that	S	Ns, then	this	explains why	S	has	a	non-maximal	degree	of	coherence.33	For	example:	I	assume	that	S's being	alive	is	a	necessary	condition	for	S	to	be	fully	coherent.	But	it	does	not	hold that if S is not alive, then this explains why S has a non-maximal degree of coherence.	For if	S is	not	alive,	S lacks	any	degree	of	coherence.	Consequently, not	being	alive	could	not	explain	why	S	has	a	non-maximal	degree	of	attitudinal coherence. Consider	another	example.	I	assume	that	S's	ability	to	take	attitudes	towards propositions is	a	necessary	condition for	S to	be fully	coherent.	But if	S cannot take	attitudes	towards	propositions,	this fact	will	not	be	part	of	an	explanation why S is non-maximally coherent. Again, without being able to take attitudes towards	propositions,	S	has	no	degree	of	coherence. I intend to exclude these 'un-required' necessary conditions from being rationally required by making sure that my preferred analysis includes the following	condition:	at	w,	rationality	requires	of	S that	S	Xs	only if	S	not-Xs	can 33 By saying that S has a non-maximal degree of rationality, I	wish to express that S has degree of rationality	that	is	not	maximal. 34 explain	why	S is	non-maximally	coherent.34	By	'non-maximally	coherent'	I	mean 'possesses a degree of coherent that is not maximal'. Put colloquially: if rationality requires you to	have a certain feature, then	not	having this feature must	be	able	to	explain	why	you	have	a	degree	of	coherence	among	your	own attitudes	that	is	non-maximal. Does	this	condition	perhaps	even	suffice	as	an	analysis	of	the	GR?	That	is,	is	it possible to analyse the GR in terms of the following 'possible-explanation analysans'? Possible-explanation analysans. The fact that S not-Xs explains possibly why	S	is	non-maximally	coherent. I do not think this is possible. Though it excludes some un-required necessary conditions,	it	would	allow	other	un-required	things	to	be	required	by	rationality. Suppose	you	are	a	lazy	person.	Assume	that	there	is	a	context	in	which	your laziness	explains	why	you	sometimes	fail	to	intend	the	means	you	believe	to	be necessary	to	your intended	ends.	Thus,	your laziness	explains	possibly	why	you are not fully attitudinally coherent. However, not being lazy is not something rationality requires. So, we cannot analyse the GR in terms of the possibleexplanation	analysans. But	maybe a	particular strengthening	of the	possible-explanation	analysans will	do.	Suppose	that	whenever	rationality	requires	of	S	that	S	Xs,	the	fact	that	S not-Xs does not only represent a	possible explanation why S is non-maximally coherent.	.	In	addition,	it	represents	a	necessary	explanation,	as	I	shall	call	it.	This suggests	analysing	the	GR	in	terms	of	the	necessary-explanation	analysans. 34	By	saying	that	'S	not-Xs	can	explain	why	S is	non-maximally	coherent' I	simply	wish	to	express	the notion	that	it	is	possible	for	the	fact	that	S	not-Xs	to	explain	why	S	is	non-maximally	coherent. 35 Necessary-explanation analysans. The fact that S not-Xs explains necessarily	why	S	is	non-maximally	coherent. I	use	'necessary	explanation'	as	a	technical	term	here.	So,	before	I	can	evaluate whether	we	can	analyse	the	GR	in	terms	of	the	necessary-explanation	analysans, I	need	to	elucidate	the	notion	of	'necessary	explanation'	I	am	operating	with. To begin with, I treat 'necessary explanation' as a primitive relation. So, I cannot	give	a	reductive	account	of	this	notion.	In	particular,	as	I	point	out	below, we should	not try to	analyse 'necessary	explanation' in terms	of alethic	modal logic. Nonetheless, I can describe it and point to some of the implications of necessary	explanations	understood	in	the	way	I	am	treating	them. One way to describe necessary explanations is as non-defeasible explanations.	By	'non-defeasible'	I	mean	this:	suppose,	at	w,	some	fact	e	explains necessarily	some	other	fact	f.	This	entails	that	adding	something	to	the	context where	the	explanation	obtains	cannot	defeat,	cancel	or	undo	the	explanation.	In other	words, if, at	w,	e explains	necessarily	why f, then this explanation is	not restricted to	w. This explanation	will obtain in	all possible contexts in	which	e obtains. Here	is	an	example	of	a	necessary	explanation.	Suppose,	at	w, it	is	true	that (i) you are 195 cms tall. It is also true that (ii) I am 190 cms tall. Then, the conjunction	of	(i)	and	(ii)	does	not	only	explain	at	w	why	you	are	taller	than	me. It	explains	this	in	all	in	contexts	in	which	(i)	and	(ii)	obtain.	In	other	words,	there is	no	context	in	which	(i)	and	(ii)	obtain,	and	yet	the	conjunction	of	(i)	and	(ii)	fails to explain why you are taller than I am. Thus, conjoining (i) and (ii) forms a necessary	explanation	for	why	you	are	taller	than	me. 36 I	turn	to	another	feature	of	necessary	explanations.	It	is	of	critical	importance not to try to reduce them to expressions of alethic	modal logic. For example, suppose	again that	some	fact	e	necessarily	explains	some	other fact f.	Call this necessary explanation 'E'. E cannot be analysed as any of the following statements: N1.	Necessarily,	e	explains	f. N2.	Necessarily,	if	e,	then	e	explains	f. N3.	Necessarily,	if	e,	then	f. Consider	N1 first. Here is why E does not entail	N1. I think of explanations as factive relations.	That is,	at	w,	e	explains f	only if,	at	w,	e	and f	obtain.	So, if	E entailed	N1,	then	E	could	hold	true	only if	e	and	f	obtain	necessarily.	But	as	my 'height example' shows, this does not hold for all necessary explanations. The fact	that	you	are	195	cms	and	I	am	190	cms	tall	explains	necessary	why	you	are taller than	me.	But this implies	neither that	necessarily,	you	are	195	cms	and I am	190	cms	tall,	nor	that	you	are	necessarily	taller	than	me.	Hence,	E	does	not imply	N1. Consider	N2.	Unlike	N1,	E	does	imply	N2.	This	is	almost	trivial.	For	example,	if the	fact	that	you	are	195	cms	and	I	am	190	cms	tall	explains	necessarily	why	you are	taller	than	me,	then,	if	you	are	195	cms	tall	and	I	am	190	cms	tall,	this	then will	explain	why	you	are	taller	than	me.	So,	E	does	imply	N2. Likewise,	E	implies	N3.	I	said	that	explanations	are	factive	relations.	So,	if	the fact	that	that	you	are	195	cms	tall	and	I	am	190	cms	tall	explains	necessarily	why you	are	taller	than	me,	then	it	follows	that	whenever	it	is	the	case	that	you	are 37 195	cms	tall	and	I	am	190	cms	tall,	then	you	are	taller	than	me.	Hence,	E	implies N3. But	even	though	E	implies	N2	and	N3,	we	can	reduce	neither	E	to	N2	nor	E	to N3.	For	neither	N2	nor	N3 strictly	entails	E. It is simple to	show	why.	N2	and	N3 state	strict	conditionals.	So,	by	replacing	e	with	a	necessary falsehood,	both	N2 and	N3	will turn	out	to	be	true.	However, if	e	necessarily	explains	f,	replacing	e with	something	impossible	will	not	guarantee	the	correctness	of	the	explanation relation.	So,	for	a	necessary	explanation	to	be	correct,	its	explanans	must	obtain in some possible contexts. In sum, though necessary explanations come with some modal commitments, they cannot be fully analysed in terms of modal necessity. I now return to the issue whether we can analyse the	GR in terms of the necessary-explanation analysans. In fact, I do not think	we can. But as shown below, the necessary-explanation analysans comes very close to a correct analysis	of	the	GR. Here is	why the	necessary-explanation	analysans fails to	analyse the	GR. In section	4,	I	argued	that	rational	requirements	do	not	strictly	entail	the	necessary conditions	for	full	rationality.	I	partly	based	this	argument	on	the	fact	that	the	GR does	not	imply	the	strict	analysans, i.e.	necessarily, if	S is	fully	coherent,	then	S Xs. This is so because rational requirements apply relative to our rational capacities. As our capacities vary between contexts, the rational requirements we	face	vary	with	them.	So,	even	if	in	one	context	rationality	requires	one	to	X,	it does	not	follow	that	in	all	contexts	in	which	one	is	fully	coherent,	one	Xs. The	necessary-explanation	analysans	fails	for	a	similar	reason.	It	fails	because it implies that in	all contexts in	which	S	not-Xs, this fact	explains	why	S is	non- 38 maximally coherent.	However, this implication is incorrect.	S is not necessarily subject to a requirement to X in all possible contexts. So, even if there is a context	in	which	rationality	requires	of	S	that	S	Xs,	it	does	not	follow	that	the	fact that	S	not-Xs	explains	in	all	contexts	that	S	is	non-maximally	rational. But this already suggests a solution. If we could restrict the necessaryexplanation analysans in such a	way that S not-Xs only explains that S is nonmaximally	coherent	in	those	contexts	in	which	rationality	requires	of	S	that	S	Xs, then	it	seems	it	would	get	us	a	correct	analysis	of	the	GR. When	does	a	rational	requirement	apply	to	a	subject?	In	section	4,	I	already suggested an answer to this question. I said that we are subject to individual requirements	of	rationality	in	virtue	of	our	rational	capacities.	I	also	argued	that different requirements presuppose different rational capacities.35 Moreover, I also suggested that our rational capacities construct themselves of out of our cognitive	abilities. Here	are	some	rough	examples	of	how	I	think	particular	capacities	give	rise	to certain	requirements	of	rationality.	Suppose	you	are	reliably	disposed	to	use	the usual introduction and elimination rules implied by conjunctions in your reasoning. Such a disposition will be, I assume, a fundamental part of your rational capacities. It is plausible to think that you are subject to a rational requirement to believe	p if you believe [p and	q] in virtue of this capacity.	Or suppose you are reliably disposed to make conditional inferences and to use modus	ponens.	Again,	this	will	be	a	rational	capacity	of	yours.	Your	possession	of 35	For	example,	being	rationally	required	to	believe	that	the	cat	is	on	the	mat	if	you	believe	that	[the cat	is	on	the	mat	and	it	is	snowing]	will	presuppose	different	rational	capacities	than	being	subject	to	a requirement	that	requires	your	degrees	of	believing	that	it	snows,	it	rains,	and	it	is	sunny	to	add	up	to one if	you	believe	that	[necessarily,	either it	snows	or it rains	or it is	sunny]	and	you	believe	that	[it snows,	it	rains,	and	it	is	sunny	are	mutually	contrary	propositions]. 39 this	capacity	will	ensure	that	rationality	requires	you	not	to	believe	not-q if	you believe	p	and	[if	p	then	q]. Another example: assume that rationality requires you not to believe a contradiction, or not to have contradictory beliefs. Possibly, a necessary, and even	sufficient	condition	for	being	subject	to	this	requirement	is	being	disposed to	understand	some	canonical	facts	about	the	concept	of	negation.	According	to Simon	Evnine (2001:	354), this	may	consist in	a	disposition to	grasp '[...] that	a proposition and its negation are	mutually exclusive, or incompatible	with each other.'	Again,	such	a	disposition	may	possibly	be	part	of	your	rational	capacity. This	brings	me	to	the	following	analysis	of	the	GR.	One	thing	we	already	know is	this:	the	application	of	the	requirements	of	rationality	S	is	subject	to	at	w	will depend	on	the	rational	capacities	S	possesses	at	w.	So,	at	w,	rationality	requires of	S	that	S	Xs	only	if	(i)	at	w,	S	has	certain	capacities	of	rationality.	Let	this	be	the first	condition	of	my	analysis. Here is the	second	condition.	Let 'S	Cs' represent the	totality	of	S's rational capacities	at	w.	I	suggest	that,	at	w,	rationality	requires	of	S	that	S	Xs	only	if	(ii) the conjunction of [S Cs and S not-Xs] explains necessarily why S is not fully attitudinally coherent. In other words, S is rationally required to X only if S's rational capacities S at	w, in conjunction with the fact that S not-Xs, explain necessarily	why	S	has	a	non-maximal	degree	of	coherence	between	S's	attitudes. Including rational capacities as a part of the necessary explanation guarantees	the	following:	it	ensures	that	rationality	requires	of	S	that	S	Xs	only	if S possesses appropriate rational capacities to be subject to this requirement. This analysis thus avoids the shortcomings	of analysing the	GR in terms	of the necessary-explanation	analysans. 40 Here	are	some	less	formal	examples	of	how	this	account	works:	assume	that, at	w,	you	are	reliably	disposed	to	accept	some	canonical	facts	about	conditional inferences and modus ponens. To simplify, suppose further this is the only rational	capacity	you	possess	at	w.	Let	us	ask:	does	rationality	require	you,	at	w, not	to	believe	not-q	if	you	believe	p	and	[if	p	then	q]?	On	the	two	conditions	just suggested,	this	depends	on	whether	your	rational	capacities	at	w,	in	conjunction with	the	fact	that	you	believe	[not-q,	p,	and	if	[if	p	then	q]],	explain	necessarily that	you	have	a	non-maximal	degree	of	coherence.	In	this	case,	I	think	it	is	very plausible	to	assume	that it	does.	Here is	an indication	of	this. I	do	not	see	how you	can	be	fully	coherent	whilst	believing	[not-q,	p,	and	if	[if	p	then	q]]	and	being reliably disposed to accept some canonical facts about conditional inferences and	the	use	of	modus	ponens.	Nevertheless,	you	could	have	this	combination	of beliefs in conjunction with your rational capacities and still have some (nonmaximal) degree of coherence. Hence, I think that your rational capacities in conjunction	with	believing	[not-q,	p,	and	if	[if	p	then	q]]	explain	necessarily	why you	are	non-maximally	coherent. Compare this with another example: suppose, at w, you have the same rational	capacities	as	in	the	example	above.	Are	you	then	rationally	required,	at w,	to	ensure	that	your	degrees	of	believing	that	it	snows,	it	rains,	and	it	is	sunny to	add	up	to	one	if	you	believe	that	necessarily,	either	it	snows	or	it	rains	or	it	is sunny	and	you	believe that that it snows, it rains, and it is sunny	are	mutually contradictory	propositions?	In	this	case,	I	do	not	think	this	is	plausible.	Suppose your	degrees	of	believing	do	not	add	up	as	this	putative	requirement	prescribes. This fact alone, in conjunction with being disposed to accept some canonical facts about conditional inferences and modus ponens, would not suffice to explain	necessarily	why	you	are	non-maximally	coherent. 41 This brings	me to finally state	my preferred analysis. I hold that the	GR is analysable	in	terms	of	the	two	conditions	I	specified	above: Preferred	analysis.	Necessarily,	for	all	w,	S,	S	Xs,	and	S	Cs,	at	w,	rationality requires of S that S Xs if and only if: (i) at w, S possesses particular capacities of rationality (S	Cs); and (ii) the fact that [S	Cs and	S not-Xs] explains	necessarily	why	S	is	non-maximally	coherent. I think this analysis delivers an informative account of 'rationality requires'. Earlier in this paper, I appealed to an understanding of 'rational capacities' in terms	of	a	subject's	cognitive	abilities	and	dispositions.	I	described	some	features of necessary explanations. Consequently, this account can give us a deeper understanding	of	what	makes it the	case	that	some	subjects	are	under	rational requirements. However, there is one	more important detail I need to	mention about the necessary	explanation	in	(ii).	I	will	treat	this	necessary	explanation	as	what	I	shall call	'efficient'. Here is what I mean by 'efficient'. Suppose e1 explains some fact F necessarily. So	will a conjunction of e1 and e2, given that e1 and e2 can occur simultaneously. This is implied by the non-defeasibility I ascribed to this explanation.36 But the conjunction of e1 and e2 will not form an efficient explanation	of	F;	e2	is	not	essential	for	this	to	be	a	necessary	explanation. Efficiency as a requirement thus implies a form of	minimalism. It requires that	no	proper subset	of the facts that	explain	F necessarily can	also	explain	F necessarily. So, if e1 and e2 together form a necessary explanation of F, then neither	e1	nor	e2	alone	should	explain	F	necessarily	too. 36 Compare this with the non-defeasibility of a valid argument. If p validly implies q, so will any conjunction	containing	p. 42 Here is why this is important. Suppose your current rational capacities, in conjunction	with	your	believing	a	contradiction,	explain	necessarily	why	you	are non-maximally coherent. Then, the conjunction of your current capacities and the fact that you [believe a contradiction and desire an ice cream] will also explain	why	necessarily	why	you	are	non-maximally	coherent. If	we	read	'explains	necessarily'	as	'non-efficient,'	then	this	would	entail	that, according to my preferred analysis, rationality requires you [not to believe a contradiction	and	to	desire	an ice	cream].	But, surely, this	would	be	an	absurd requirement.	Efficiency	ensures	that	we	do	not	need	to	embrace	this	result.	The conjunction	of	your current rational capacities	and the fact that	you [believe	a contradiction	and	desire	an ice	cream] is	not	an	efficient	necessary	explanation of why you are non-maximally coherent. We could detach the fact that you desire an ice cream	without losing our necessary explanation for	why you are non-maximally	coherent.37 7 Non-maximal	coherence	and	rational	capacity The	present	paper	aims	to	answer	what	makes	it	the	case	that	one	is	subject	to	a particular requirement of rationality. The answer I have developed is roughly this: one is subject to a rational requirement to X if and only if not-Xing, in 37 Requiring the necessary explanation in the preferred analysis to be efficient brings another advantage. It disallows an implausible aggregation principle for rational requirements. By 'aggregation'	I	mean	this:	if,	at	w,	rationality	requires	of	S	that	S	As	and,	at	w,	rationality	requires	of	S that	S	Bs,	then,	at	w,	rationality	requires	of	S	that	[S	As	and	S	Bs]. Here	is	why	this	principle	is implausible.	Suppose	there	is	a	situation	in	which:	(i)	rationality	requires you	to	believe	A,	(ii)	rationality	requires	you	to	believe	not-A,	yet	also	(iii)	rationality	requires	you	to not	believe	[A	and	not-A].	Considering	'the	preface	paradox'	(Makinson	2005)	such	a	situation	seems quite possible. Now assume that (iv) rationality requires you to not believe [A and not-A] only if rationality	requires	you	not [to	believe	A	and	to	believe	not-A].	That is to	say, in	general, rationality requires you to	not	believe	a contradiction	only if rationality also requires you to	not	believe	every proposition	forming	a	contradiction.	From	(iii)	and	(iv)	we	can	derive	that	(v)	rationality	requires	you not	[to	believe	A	and	to	believe	not-A],	which	in	turn	implies	(iv),	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	rationality requires you [to believe	A and to believe not-A]. Consequently,	we cannot aggregate (i) and (ii) to 'Rationality	requires	you	[to	believe	A	and	to	believe	not-A].' 43 combination	with one's rational capacities,	would explain necessarily	why one has	a	degree	of	coherence	that	is	non-maximal.	(Compare	the	preferred	analysis in	section	6.) As stated above, I take this to be a non-circular account of 'rationality requires'.	To	guarantee	that	this	account	is	also	genuinely	informative,	three	key notions need to be accessible: (i) rational capacity; (ii) necessary explanation; and	(ii)	non-maximal	coherence.	So,	for	my	analysis	not	to	turn	into	a	black	box,	I need	to	ensure	the	understanding	of	these	three	notions. I have already elaborated upon	my (technical) understanding of 'necessary explanation' in the previous section. 'Necessary explanations' are explanations whose	correctness	is	context-independent.	I	will	not	say	more	about	this	here. I also characterised the notion of rational capacity. Essentially, I said that one's	rational	capacity	is	comprised	out	of	one's	logical	and	conceptual	abilities that	form	and	coordinate	our	ability	to	regulate	various	stances	we	take	towards propositions. This	will, for instance, include	one's conceptual understanding of negation,	modality,	conditionality,	one's	ability	to	perform	various	inferences,	as well	as	one's	motivational	dispositions	towards	one's	normative	outlooks. One notion left untouched so far is the notion of 'attitudinal coherence'. Coherence	is	at	the	core	of	the	preferred	analysis;	I	thus	need	to	characterise	it to a sufficient degree. This characterisation will not only give access to the preferred	analysis,	but	also refine	my	characterisation	of rational	capacity.	This will	become	apparent	at	the	end	of	this	section. 44 It	is	common	practice	to	cash	out	attitudinal	coherence	in	terms	of	attitudinal consistency,	unity,38	or	absence	of	attitudinal	conflict.39	However,	none	of	these notions are satisfactory: they fail to ground the broad range of incoherent attitudes	that	can	be	involved	in	violating	rational	requirements.	Sometimes	we violate a rational requirement by having two particular attitudes. Consider for example a pair of contradictory beliefs. Sometimes, however, we violate a rational requirement by having one set of attitudes while lacking another. Consider	believing	that	you	ought	to	A,	yet	lacking	an	intention	to	A.	Neither	the notion	of	attitudinal	consistency,	unity,	or	the	absence	of	attitudinal	conflict	can cover	these	different	types	of	incoherence.40 This	justifies	a	novel	approach.	I	shall	make	a	succinct,	yet	original	proposal	to ground coherence upon what I shall call 'success conditions of propositional attitudes' (just 'success conditions' hereafter). One way a subject S can be incoherent is if it is impossible that S's attitudes fulfil their success conditions simultaneously. I	shall	define	success	conditions	in	terms	of	an	attitude's	constitutive	aim	and its norms of correctness.41 Following David Velleman,42 I will assume that the constitutive aim of an attitude type, such as belief or intention, is what distinguishes one type of attitude from another. Constitutive aims allow us to define	when	an	attitude	counts	as	correct	and	is	thus	a	success. 38 For an excellent discussion of attitudinal consistency and unity, and their relation to rational requirements,	see Reisner	(2013). 39 See Niko Kolody's 'Why be rational?' for one view as to how attitudinal conflict relates to the requirements	of	rationality.	See	also	Fink	(2010:	125). 40	Reisner	(2013)	discusses	this	point	in	detail. 41	See,	for	example,	Engel	(2004),	Wedgwood	(2004),	Velleman	(2000),	and	Bratman	(2009). 42	See	Velleman	(1992). 45 Attitudinal correctness and success conditions are heavily debated topics. This	is	not	the	place	to	contribute	to	the	subtleties	of	this	debate.	Instead,	I	will follow	a	simplifying	standard	approach	and	assume	that,	for	example,	intentions aim,	among	other things, at their	own implementation. So, if you intend to	go shopping	this	afternoon,	then	one	success	condition	of	this	intention	is	that	you go shopping this afternoon. Likewise, I	will assume that	beliefs aim	at truth. If you	believe	that	the	cat is	on	the	mat,	then	a	success	condition	of	this	belief is that	the	cat	is	on	the	mat.	Furthermore,	I	assume	that	normative	beliefs	aim	at correctness	and	implementation.	If	I	believe	that	I	ought	to	become	a	vegetarian, then	this	belief	meets its	success	conditions	only if: (i) it is true	that I	ought to become	a	vegetarian;	and	(ii)	I	will	become	a	vegetarian	in	the	future. With this	notion	of	success	conditions	at	hand, I	can	describe	two	objective (and cognate) types	of	non-maximal coherence that	will prove relevant for	my preferred	analysis.	First,	I	will	assume	that	a	subject	S	is	non-maximally	coherent if	it	is	logically	excluded43	that	S's	contemporaneous	attitudes	meet	their	success conditions	simultaneously.	In	other	words:	one	way	of	being	incoherent	is	when it	is	impossible	that	one's	attitudes	fulfil	their	constitutive	aims	simultaneously. Inconsistent	beliefs	are	the	paradigmatic	example	of	this	type	of	incoherence. If	you,	at	the	same	time,	believe	p	and	you	believe	not-p,	it	is	logically	excluded that your attitudes jointly fulfil their assumed success conditions, i.e. truth. Analogously, if	you intend	that	p	and,	at the	same	time, intend	that	not-p, it is again	logically	excluded	that	your	attitudes	jointly	fulfil	their	success	conditions, i.e.	implementation. 43 The use of 'logically excluded' is pragmatically	motivated here. It ensures that the threshold for objective	incoherence	is	as	low	as	possible. 46 However, this type of incoherence is not confined to attitudes whose conjoined	contents	form	a	logical	contradiction	(as	in	the	two	examples	above). A	slightly	complicated	example	shows	this.	Suppose	(i)	you	intend	that	p;	(ii)	you intend	that	q;	(iii)	you	believe	that	p	only	if	you	see	to	it	that	p;44	(iv)	you	believe that	q	only	if	you	see	to	it	that	q;	yet	(v)	you	believe	that	you	cannot	see	to	it	that [p	and	q].	Again,	though	their	contents	do	not	form	a	contradiction,	it	is	logically excluded	that	attitudes	(i)	to	(v)	meet	their	success	conditions	jointly:	you	cannot implement	your	intentions	(i)	and	(ii)	while	your	beliefs	(iii),	(iv),	and	(v)	are	true. Your	attitudes	(i)	to	(v)	make	you	objectively	incoherent. However,	there	is	a	further	relevant	way	of	being	objectively	incoherent	that is	not	covered	by	the	type	of	incoherence	just	described.	Suppose	(i)	you	intend that	p; (ii) you believe that	p only if	q; and (iii) you believe that	q only if you intend	that	q.	Yet	(iv)	you	have	no	intention	that	q.	I	assume	this	is	a	distinct	way of being instrumentally incoherent.45 You fail to intend something you deem necessary	for	implementing	one	of	your	intentions.	But	the	incoherence	involved here	can	usually	not	be	accounted	for	by it	being logically	excluded	that (i), (ii) and (iii) meet their success conditions simultaneously. It is normally logically possible	that	you	can	implement	your	intention	(i)	while	both	of	your	beliefs	(ii) and	(iii)	are	true.46	What	is	logically	excluded,	however,	is	that	your	intention	(i) and beliefs (ii) and (iii) meet their success conditions unless you form an intention	that	q.	That	is,	you	cannot	implement	intention	(i)	while	beliefs	(ii)	and (iii)	are	true	and	it	is	not	the	case	that	you	have	intention	that	q,	i.e.	(iv). 44	In	other	words:	you	believe	that	p	will	not	be	the	case	unless	you	bring	about	that	p. 45	Cf.	Broome	(2005:	1-2,	n.	5). 46	I	say	'normally'	because	it	could	be	the	case	that	it	is	logically	excluded	that:	(i)	your	intention	that that	p;	(ii)	your	belief	that	[p	only	if	q];	and	(iii)	your	belief	that	[q	only	if	you	intend	that	q]	meet	their success	conditions	jointly.	This	is	precisely	so	if,	necessarily,	p	implies	not-q. 47 This creates a second way in which one can be objectively incoherent: a subject S is non-maximally coherent if by lacking an attitude it is logically excluded	that	S's	attitudes	meet	their	success	condition	simultaneously.47 I	now	return	to	the	preferred	analysis.	Accordingly,	X is	rationally	required	if and only if not-Xing in conjunction with one's rational capacities explains necessarily why one is non-maximally coherent. How does non-maximal coherence	in	this	analysis	relate	to	the	two	types	of	objective	incoherence	I	just defined?	Let	me	outline	first	how	they	are	not	related. Suppose you have two contradictory beliefs. Your beliefs cannot fulfil their success	conditions	simultaneously.	You	are	objectively	incoherent.	However,	this type	of incoherence	exists independently	of	your	rational	capacity.	You	are	not fully coherent independently of whether or not your logical and conceptual abilities dispose you not to have contradictory beliefs. In other words, your subjective	rational	capacity	plays	no	explanatory	role	in	accounting	for	objective attitudinal	incoherence. This	implies	that	'non-maximal	coherence'	in	the	preferred	analysis	cannot	be co-extensive	with	objective incoherence.	Recall	that	the	'necessary	explanation' in	the	preferred	analysis	needs	to	be	'efficient'.	That	is,	if	one's	rational	capacity in conjunction with, say, having a pair of contradictory beliefs explains necessarily why you are non-maximally coherent, then neither your pair of contradictory	beliefs	nor	your	rational	capacity	alone	can	necessarily	explain	why 47	There	is	an	important	restriction	one	needs	to	apply	to	this	type	of incoherence	when	it	comes	to second-order	attitudes.	Suppose	you	believe that	you	know	that	p. Suppose further that	one	of the success	conditions	of	this	belief	is	truth.	Consequently,	as	long	as	it	is	not	the	case	that	you	know	p,	it is	logically	excluded	that	your	belief	that	you	know	p	will	meet	all	its	success	conditions.	But,	arguably, you	are	not	incoherent	in	any	sense	if	you	believe	that	you	know	something	without	knowing	it	–	e.g. suppose	you	believe	you	have	excellent	evidence	that	p,	though	this	is	not	the	case.	This	shows	that this	view	needs	to	be	restricted	when	considering	the	incoherence	of	second-order	attitudes. 48 you	are	non-maximally	coherent.	However,	having	a	pair	of	contradictory	beliefs does explain necessarily why you are non-maximally coherent in an objective sense.	'Non-maximally	coherent'	in	the	preferred	analysis	thus	need	not	refer	to objective	coherence	as	described	above. This	is	not	surprising.	The	type	of	rational	requirements	I	intend	to	develop	a constitutive account for is a subjective one. That is, by infringing a rational requirement,	you	must	have	a	set	of	attitudes	that	are,	in	one	sense	or	another, at	odds	with	your	subjective	stances.48	The	notion	of	'non-maximal	coherence'	in the	preferred	analysis needs to reflect that. The following two	examples	make this	point	plain. Suppose you believe that a particular book cover is entirely red. You also believe that the same book cover is entirely blue. Assuming that this is metaphysically (and thus logically) impossible, your two	beliefs cannot be true simultaneously.	You	are	objectively	incoherent.	However,	intuitively	you	are	not necessarily infringing a requirement of rationality. Suppose on your subjective conception	of colour two things	can	be	entirely	of two	colours simultaneously. You	may	even	express	this	to	yourself	by	explicitly	believing	that	it	is	possible	for one	and	the	same	object	to	have	two	colours	simultaneously.	Intuitively,	you	are not	necessarily	irrational	in	this	situation. Or	consider	another	example.	Imagine	you	intend	that	p	and	you	believe	that p	will	be	the	case	only	if	q.	Furthermore,	you	believe	that	q	will	be	the	case	only if you bring about that q. However, unknown to you, p strictly entails not-q. Again, you	are	objectively incoherent. Your	attitudes cannot fulfil their success 48	On	the	distinction	between	'objective'	and	'subjective'	rationality,	see	Kolodny	(2005). 49 conditions simultaneously. But you are not necessarily irrational, at least in a subjective	sense. Consequently,	to	analyse	the	GR	in	terms	of	coherence,	we	need	a	subjective notion of coherence. I will briefly develop such a notion and argue that subjective coherence is crucially related to objective coherence. This will also elucidate	the	notion	of	rational	capacity. If	the	preferred	analysis	is	correct	and	we	interpret	'non-maximally	coherent' as 'non-maximally subjectively coherent', then we already know something significant	about	subjective	coherence:	by	conjoining	one's	rational	capacity	with whatever	constitutes	the	violation	of	a	rational	requirement	one	must	obtain	a necessary	explanation for	why	one is	not	non-maximally subjectively coherent. For example, if by having two contradictory intentions you violate a rational requirement, then it must be the case that your contradictory intentions together with your rational capacity explain necessarily why you have a nonmaximal	degree	of	subjective	coherence. Accordingly,	I	shall	define	subjective	incoherence	as	a	failure	of	your	rational capacity to avoid objective incoherence. You are subjectively incoherent precisely	when your rational capacity disposes you to be objectively coherent, yet your disposition fails to manifest itself. By saying that it is your rational capacity that disposes you, I mean that your disposition is sensitive towards objective incoherence.	More	precisely: your	disposition is responsive (and thus usually	trigged	by)	the	fact	that	a	set	of	your	attitudes	cannot	meet	their	success conditions simultaneously. It is	not triggered	by	any	other	another	property	of 50 your objectively incoherent attitudes; for example, their phenomenological properties,	etc.49	Accordingly,	I	shall	define	'subjective	incoherence'	as	follows. Subjective incoherence. Necessarily, S is subjectively incoherent if and only	if:	(i)	the	fact	that	S	not-Xs	makes50	S	objectively	incoherent;	(ii)	S's rational	capacity	disposes	S	to	X. That is, subjective incoherence comes	with two necessary conditions (that are jointly	sufficient):	(i)	being	objectively	incoherent;	(ii)	being	rationally	disposed	to avoid objective incoherence. Why assume that subjective incoherence presupposes objective incoherence? This becomes important when using subjective	incoherence	in	an	analysis	of	the	GR,	as	I	do	in	the	preferred	analysis. To begin with, it prevents an analysis of 'rationality requires' in terms of subjective coherence from being susceptible to objections stemming from reducing what rationality requires to 'meeting your own standards'.51 Not all dispositions to form, retain, or change your attitudes entail a rational requirement. Suppose, strangely enough, that you are reliably disposed not to retain a belief that F is a fish whenever you believe that F lives in water. It would be implausible if an account of 'rationality requires' entailed that this disposition gives	rise	to	a	rational	requirement	not	to	simultaneously	believe	that	F	is	a	fish and	that	F	lives	in	water.	Luckily,	(i)	prevents	this:	believing	that	F	is	a	fish	and	F lives in water is clearly not objectively incoherent. By making (i) a necessary condition	of subjective incoherence,	one	guarantees that	an	analysis	of the	GR 49	For	a	detailed	account	as	to	how	mental	dispositions	can	be	sensitive	to	a	particular	property	of	a mental	event,	see	Wedgwood	(2006). 50	By 'makes' I do	not	mean that	S's	not-Xing 'causes'	but 'constitutes the fact' that	S is	objectively incoherent. 51	Cf.	section	5	of	John	Broome	(2007b). 51 via	subjective	incoherence	does	not	lead	to	rational	requirements	with	arbitrary content. However,	objective incoherence	cannot	suffice for subjective incoherence. I have	already	argued	for	this	above.	Therefore,	I	suggest	that	if	not-Xing	makes	S subjectively	incoherent,	it	must	be	the	case	that	S's	rational	capacity	disposes	S to	X. This	condition	has	a	dual	significance.	First,	it	ensures	that	not	every	case	of objective incoherence is also one of subjective incoherence. Suppose you are objectively incoherent by having a pair of contradictory beliefs. This does not suffice	for	your	being	subjectively incoherent.	The	following	example illustrates this	in	the	context	of	irrationality. A paraconsistent logician sees nothing wrong with having some pairs of contradictory	beliefs,	because	she	believes	that	some	contradictions	are	true.	If a paraconsistent logician believes p and believes not p, is she necessarily irrational?	Plausibly	not.	Even	if	paraconsistent	logic	is	false,	we	might	not	think it	irrational	to	believe	it.	And	if	you	do	believe	it,	plausibly	you	are	not	irrational if	you	have	patterns	of	belief	that	conform	to	it.	(Broome	2007b:	40) Stipulation	(ii)	guarantees	that	possibility.	I	assume	that	a	paraconsistent	logician will	have	a set	of rich	conceptual sensitivities to	whether	or	not the truth	of	p excludes the contemporaneous truth of not-p. For some proposition p, her rational capacity will dispose her not to believe not-p while believing p. For others	this	will	not	be	so.	Stipulation	(ii)	therefore	ensures	that	a	paraconsistent logician will not necessarily be subjectively incoherent (and subsequently irrational)	if	she	has	contradictory	beliefs. Here is the second function of (ii). It ensures that subjective incoherence requires more than the failure to manifest a random disposition to avoid objective incoherence. Instead, the disposition must be grounded in one's rational	capacity.	In	conjunction	with	my	preferred	analysis,	(ii)	thus	guarantees 52 that only subjects with a right kind of rational capacity will be subject to particular	rational	requirements. To illustrate this point, consider an artificial person called 'Feelgood'. Suppose	Feelgood's	main	purpose in life is to	pursue	her	own	wellbeing.	Every disposition	she	has	is	instrumental	to	this	aim.	Suppose	further	that	Feelgood	is reliably	disposed	to	avoid	pairs	of	contradictory	beliefs.	However,	this	disposition is not grounded in her rational and cognitive capacity; Feelgood has no conceptual understanding that the truth of p excludes the truth of not-p. Instead,	her	disposition	is	grounded	in	her	non-cognitive	capacity.	On	Feelgood's perception	of attitudes, a	pair of contradictory	beliefs is beset	with a	negative phenomenological quality: contradictory beliefs make her feel irritated and insecure.	It	is	this	aspect	of	contradictory	beliefs	that	usually	triggers	Feelgood's dispostion	to	avoid	them. Assume	now	that,	despite	this	non-cognitive	disposition,	Feelgood	comes	to have a pair of contradictory beliefs. According to	my conception of subjective coherence, Feelgood is	not subjectively incoherent. The	disposition she fails to manifest	is	grounded	outside	her	rational	capacity. For	whatever	this	view	is	worth,	it	certainly	squares	well	with	the	motivation behind	my	preferred	analysis.	Accordingly,	rationality	only	requires	something	if one	is	equipped	the	right	kind	of	rational	capacity.	Feelgood	lacks	the	right	kind of capacity to be subject to a rational requirement not to have contradictory beliefs; a fortiori, her capacity cannot figure in an explanation why she is subjectively incoherent. Consequently, given my account of subjective incoherence,	the	preferred	analysis	guarantees	that	Feelgood	fails	to	be	subject to a rational requirement	not to	have	pairs	of contradictory	beliefs.	As argued 53 above, this is precisely what we should expect from a correct constitutive account	of	'rationality	requires'. Finally,	a	brief	note	on	rational	capacity.	So	far,	I	have	characterised	rational capacity in terms of one's cognitive abilities, conceptual understanding, propensity to perform certain inferences, etc. With the notion of objective coherence, I	can	characterise	rational	capacity	more	precisely:	rational	capacity is what grounds a set of special dispositions towards avoiding objective incoherence.	These	dispositions	are	special	because	they	must	be	responsive	to objective coherence. That is, whenever these dispositions are manifested, a subject avoids being objectively incoherent precisely because a set of her attitudes cannot fulfil its success conditions. It is this aspect of objectively incoherent	attitudes	that	triggers	the	disposition. Suppose	you	are	disposed	to	avoid	contradictory	intentions.	If	this	disposition is sensitive to the non-cognitive fact that it does not feel good to have contradictory intentions, then this	disposition	does	not	belong to	your rational capacity. If, however, it is sensitive to the fact that contradictory intentions cannot meet their success conditions simultaneously, then this disposition belongs	to	your	rational	capacity.	Rational	capacity	can	thus	be	conceived	of	as the	set	of	dispositions	whose	manifestation	is	sensitive	to	objective	incoherence. 8 Summary This	paper tries to	give	a constitutive	account	of 'rationality requires'. Such	an account	must determine the conditions in virtue of	which a particular rational requirement	applies	to	a	subject.	In	particular,	such	an	account	must	avoid	two shortcomings:	(i)	it	must	not	apply	requirements	to	subjects	or	things	that	have 54 no	capacity	of	rationality;	(ii) it	must	not lead	to	requirements	with implausible content. In	section	2,	I	presented	a	putative	analysis	of	the	GR	that	falls	short	in	both respects. If	we think	of the requirements	of rationality	as	necessary	conditions for full	coherence, then: (i) the	requirements	of	rationality	apply	to	everything; and	(ii)	they	require	things	that	cannot	be	required	by	an	evaluative	conception of	rationality.	However,	both	of	these	shortcomings	are	implied	by	assuming	that being	a	necessary	condition for full coherence is	sufficient for something to	be required	by rationality.	They	are	not implied	by	assuming that requirements	of rationality	specify	necessary	conditions	for	being	fully	coherent. Nevertheless, in section 4, I showed that we cannot think of the requirements	of	rationality	as	specifying	necessary	conditions	for	full	coherence either. For this to be the case, the requirements of rationality would need to have	a	higher	degree	of	modal	robustness.	That	is,	if,	in	one	context,	rationality requires	you	to	X,	then,	in	all	nearby	contexts,	rationality	requires	you	to	X	too. But this is not so. I argued that the application	of a requirement	of rationality hinges on the rational capacities a subject possesses. Since rational capacities vary	across contexts, rational requirements	do	not stably	apply	across possible contexts.	Hence,	you	may	become	fully	coherent	and	rational	by	avoiding	being subject to a requirement of rationality instead of satisfying it. That is why requirements	of rationality	do	not	specify	genuine	necessary	conditions for full rationality. Section	5	examined	whether	we	can	analyse	'rationality	requires'	in	terms	of normative reasons. I rejected this idea as I doubt that whenever rationality requires	you	to	X,	you	have	a	normative	reason	to	X.	Surely,	this	still	leaves	open 55 the possibility of analysing the requirements of rationality in terms of a counterfactual	connection	between	what	rationality	requires	and	the	normative reasons one has for something. I concluded, however, that if this is a correct analysis of the requirements of rationality, it cannot be so for a coherentist conception	of	rationality. In view of the lack of a sound analysis of rationality, I presented	my own preferred	analysis of the	GR in section	6. Put roughly, I argued that rationality requires	you	to	X if	and	only if	your	rational	capacities, in	conjunction	with	the fact that you not-X, together explain necessarily why you are non-maximally coherent, where 'non-maximally coherent' is meant to express that one's attitudes cannot fulfil their success conditions simultaneously (i.e. they are 'objectively	incoherent')	and	that	you	have	the	right	kind	of	disposition	to	avoid this	kind	of	objective	incoherence.	This	analysis	guarantees	–	among	other	things – that	specific requirements	of rationality	only	apply to those	with	appropriate capacities	for	rationality. 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