Dominic Mclver Lopes A€sthetic Acqüaintânce À nselina Jolie is hot (or Brad Pitt ifyou prefer). Maybe you are one of the Alu"cky ones with fust-hand experience of this, but more likely you have it by word ofmouth, or, more likeþ still, you have seen images ofJolie or Pitt Hohless seems to be reptesented in (1) face-to-face experiences, (2) talk, and (3) images' Tradition stresses a conhast betl¡/een (1) and (2). Thus Richard Wollheim enunciates what has come to be called the acquaintance principle: aesthetic judgements "must be based on firstland experience of their objects "t Alan Tormey echoes the principle, writing that "we require critical judgements to be rooted in 'eye-witnesi' encòunters."' Both philosophers immediately follow up their statements of the acquaintance principle by remarking on what they take to be one of its consequences. Wollheim adds that aesthetic judgements are not "transmissible ftom one person to another" alld Tormey adds that "the epistemically indirect avenues of evidence, inference, and authodty that are permissible elsewhere are anathema here." Thus the acquaintance principle is traditionally hterpreted as an explanation of the weakness of testimony on such mattels as hotness' However, t¡is interpretation ofthe acquaintance principle camot be right if we take (3) seriously To shed light on a contrast between (l) and (3) on one hand and (2) on the other hard, we need a new interpretation ofthe acquaintance principle, which unpacks the requirement that aesthetic judgement be "based on first-hand experience " As it happens, the new interpretation also motivates a distinction between aesthetic juágement and a broader phenomenon which we ca¡ call aesthetic belief' l Although the acquaintance principle is often described as a truism, it is hardly transparent what is meant by "first-hand experience'" One way to lemedy this problem is to interpret the acquaintance principle as meant to explain some fact or facts about aesthetic judgements or the role they play in criticism As already noted, tradition interplets the acquaintance principle as offering to explain the wialmess of aesthetic testimony.s On this interyretation, Wollheim's claim that aesthetic judgement is not transmissible from person-to-person collapses into Tormey'silaim that aesthetic judgement does not travel the epistemically indirect avenué of authority. So, having first ìr¡derstood the claim that aesthetic testimony is weak, we can then interpret the acquaintance principle as explaining the weakness of aesthetic testimonY. fhe Mo¿em Schoolñaù, Ilxwl, M¿rch ann Mav 2049 For sake of simplicity, define testimony as communication fiom one pe¡son to another which consists in the testifier asserting something she believes.a A testifier's communicati¡g an empirical belief(like the Govemor left Sacramento this moming, or the butter is on the middle shelf) normally entitles her audience to that belief Indeed, without testimony, our entitlement to many empirical beliefs would be severely undercut. Most ofus have title to believe, though testimony, that Socrates was Athenian, that humat cbromosomes are made up of DNA, and that brov'n is dark orange.s Aesthetic testimony is a communication ftom one person to another which consists in the testifier asserting an aesthetic judgement. For working purposes, define aesthetic judgement broadly, as an attributìon of evaluative or descriptive aesthetic properties. Our testifier tells he¡ audience that Brad pitt is hot, she describes a song as hauting, she calls a drawing beautifi.rl, or she ¡eviews a movie as discombobulated. The question is whether we accept aesthetic testimony ard whetJrer we are enttled to aesthetic judgements on the basis of aesthetic testimony. The default position comprises tlree claims, all found in Kant.6 The first is psychological: as a matter ofîact, we resist accepting aestheticjudgements solely on the basis oftestimony. When I tell yolthat Black Nctrcissas is deep, you are unlikely to take on board myjudgement. The ¡eason is not that you have evidence to the confa¡y. Rather and this is the second Ka.ntian claim aesthetic testimo-ny simply fails to afford much or any title to aesthetic judgement.? This epistemic claim can explain the first psychological claim: we do not accept aesthetic testimony because we are not entitled to do so. Moreover, the second Kantian claim is not merely a special application ofglobal skepticism about testimony, for Kantians hold that aesthetic testimony is an exception to testimony's general effcacy. One way of explaining the second claim is blocked by a third Kantian claim, which points to an aslmmetry: we axe fully entitled to some aesthetic judgements, just not via testimony. Here is one example of how this rules out some explanations ofthe second Kantian claim.s According to a p mitive aesthetic expressivism, aesthetic judgements axe mere expressions or excitations of feeling.s As a result, they do not express propositions and so there is no question ofour having arty title to believe them. This is why testimony affords no title to aesthetic judgement. Howevet this explanation predicts that testimony affords whatsoever no title to aesthetic judgement, whereas the second Kantian clairn is thàt testimony affords l¡ttle or no title to aesthetic judgement. More seriously, the expla¡ation is too broad. It predicts that we have no epistemic title to a¿), aesthetic judgement, whereas the third Kantian claim is that there is an asyrnrnetry between oul title to aesthetic judgements that axe and are not based on testimony. Obviously, the principle that aesthetic judgement is .,based on first-ha¡d experience" does not explain right offthe bat why aesthetic testimony affords little or no title to aesthetic judgement. After all, perceptual belief is based on firsthand experience and yet perceptual testimony affords title to perceptual beliel 268 Based on first-hand experience ofmy cat's coloration, I believe that she is brown' Now that I have testifi;d that she is brown, you are entitled to believe that she is brown. Evidently, we camot take aesthetic judgement to be "based on first-hand experience" in just the way that perceptual beliefis based on first-hard experience. The challenge is to give an account of the special way in which aesthetic judgement is "based on first-hand experience "r0 2.We might come to understand what it is for aesthetic judgement to be "based on fustland experience" by seeing how that explains the second Kantian claim but only ifthe claim is true. It makes no sense to read the acquaintance principle as explàining the second Kantian claim unless aesthetic testimony really i, *"uk. Mot"ãu"t, the second Kantian claim is true if it best explains the psychological claim that we generally do not accept aesthetic testimony; but if we go on to ask if the psychological clairn is true, we fi¡d little but inconsistent or complex practice at best and clashing intuitions at worst. For Kant, a juclge of "a building, a view, or a poem does not allow approval to be iniemãly imposed upon himself by a hundred voices who all piåise it highly."rr My own intuitions contradict Kant's It seems to me fhat I make maoy aestlt"tic d"clsions based on what I hea¡ ftom othe¡s: I decide what movies to see, what music to listen to, and what exhibitions to visit by picking up testimony about the aesthetic qualities ofmovies, music, and paintings Those whose intuitions run against mine will seek to explain away my intuitions. I tell you that the Nakasen-do is beautiful and so you visit it when you go to Japan. Accórding to one hypothesis, you have taken on the judgement that the Nakasen-do is bãautiful on the basis ofmy say-so However, there is another h¡pothesis. You visit it to see for yourselfwhether it is beautiful What you have øken on is the subjunctive belief that you would judge it beautiful if you saw it, and this is not an aàsthetic judgement but ruther a belief about an aesthetic judgement.12 So my testimony did not lead you to accept an aesthetic judgement' Mo¡e is needed to make a go ofthis hypothesis l tell you that the ball in the um is black and then you lay a bet that wins only if the ball is black' Suppose the idea is to explain away your apparent acceptance ofmy testimony byascribing to you the belùf úat you would believe the ball is black if you saw it for youself' b,ranted, your having this subjunctive belief does not imply that you believe that the Ualt is Ulack, tuiit is grounds for you to believe that the ball is black And if you have grounds to believe that the ball is black (and insufflcient grounds to teüeve otherwise), then why not take your apparent acceptance ofmy testimony at face value? Just so, does the subjunctive beliefthat you wouldjudge that the Nakasen-do is beautifi. ifyou saw it give you grounds tojudge that itis beautiful? Ae s t h e t i c Ac quaint o nc e Dominic Mclve¡ Lopes Ifit does, then it makes sense to take your accaptance ofmy testimony at face value. Kantians who say otherwise must explain why without already having assumed the truth ofthe second Kantian claim. To be fair, those who shaxe my intuitions favoring the acceptance of aesthetic testimony should have a chance to explail away the Ka¡tian intuitions. Here is one idea. Folk theories ofart, beauty, and the aesthetic are shot tbrough with rela_ tivìsm and subjectivism.13 We mindlessly mouth that beauty is in the eye ofthe beholder oq more highfalutinly, that de gustibus non est dísputøndum.perhaepswe take it as a corollary ofthese doctrines that we do not accept aesthetic testinony. One suspects that this clash of intuitions results from inconsistent or complex practices of criticism. Perhaps we refirse aesthetic testimony in some critical con_ texts and accept it in others.raA clash ofintuitions results ifthose with Kantian intuitions generalize f¡om the former and those with solidly contrc-Kantian intuitions generalize ftom the latter If this hlpothesis is conect, then the psychologi_ cal claim needs a more nuanced formulation, a¡d that will be aa opportmityìo better understand our critical practices. Some suggestions along these lines con_ clude this paper 3. Retum for now to the acquaintance principle. This principle states that an aesthetic judgement must be "based on first-hand experience.,, Tradition reads the principle as intended to explaia the epistemic weakness of aesthetic testimony. Thus Wollheim's claim that aesthetic judgements are not transmissible ftom per_ son to person is cashed out as the claim that aesthetic testimony is weak. At the same time, however, classic statements ofthe acquaintance prhciple come with a rider For example, Tormey writes that .,reproductions or representations,, such as photographs and clrawings 'tnay, for critical purposes, be adequate surogates for the object ofcriticaljudgement."rs This rider seems to concem transmission rather than testimonial entitlement, and it suggests that we need a¡ altematìve to the traditional interpretation of tåe acquaintance principle as offering to explain the weakness of aesthetic testimony. The rider is sensible. lrnages are irnportant vehicles for communicating infor_ mation, including information about the aesthetic qualities ofthings, ard people routinely make aesthetic judgements on the basis of images of scenes or objects. ro In the mass media, photographs and drawings are used to convey the aesthetic qualities of all kinds of consumer goods. We may not trust what we see in advertising images, but not all mass media images are geared to advertising. Consider favel reporting, as distinct fiom travel advertishg. Many people make and then act on aesthetic judgements by looking at images in travel guidebooks ard newspape¡ üavel sections. That is the purpose ofthese images. The same goes for clothing and flower catalogues, architectural drawings, and on-line personals. Images also play a key role in communicating the aesthetic qualities of art works. At the same time that painti¡g moved out of church and palace into the secular public space ofthe art museum, it moved onto the printed page, fust through 270 engraving and then through photo$aphy and now Google Images and ARTstor It l, ñ*dlyioing or.tt on a limb to suggest that pahtings and scuþtures' e-specially canonical or famous ones, are more often seen depicted than face-to-face ls it going out on a limb to acld that we often judge these works via-images of them?" iioutty, ¡urt u, .cientifrc studies ofperceptual abilities like face recognition ,rr" i-ug". ái fu""t us stimulus equivalents of faces, many scientists use images of objects ãr scenes in order to probe aesthetic responses to t¡ose objects or scenes Tde technique is routine in studies oflandscape preferences þecause it is ha¡d to niu mOr"up" into u lab), and a recent article reviewing eight studies of the validIty oi,t " toä,noOotogy óoncludes that '\cenic quality evaluations based on phoiãgraphs are similar tãratings made by clifferent observers in the field "r7 Going a ffi fuah"r, ,o-" psychologists isolate the factors responsible for perceptions of fac'ial beauty in the wilcl by measuring responses to facial beauty in composite images of manY different faces.r3-ïln traclitiánal irterpretations, the acquairtance principle is øken to explain the weakness of aesthetic testimony, assuming that the claim that aesthetic judgements are not transmissible from person to pesson cashes out as a claim about the weaknessofaesthetictestimony'However,thiscanrrotberightifaestheticjudgements can be ha.nsmitted ftom person to person via images Or rather' this cannot be right unless the use of images to transmit aesthetic judgements ûom person to p.rrín i, u fotof u"sthetic testimony. But images cannot be vehicles for aesthetic testimony. One might argue that images are not vehicles for aesthetic testimony because testimony irivolve-s assertion artd images never ltgure in assertion-except that the second premise of this argument is false Believing that Josh is taller than nri-, t ,tto* yott u picture of ihem, which I sincerely take to be accurate' with the iot"ntioo of g"fti"j you to believe that Josh is taller than Brian and I take responsibiliry-for my action. In general, images can be used in acts of assertion as vehicles that depict what is asserted le The better ãrgument is this. Testimony involves "bare" assertion When I tell you that Josh is taller than Brian and you subsequently accept my testimony' my reasons for my belief may become your reasons, but you do not have dtect cogni- ,i* u""ar, ,o iy ,"usons because I do not assert them lfl assert my reasons along wittr my UeLief ttrat p, then yow title to believe that p derives fiom your accepting my ,tat"d reurons f'ol p and not fiom my bare assertíon that p Howeve¡ images never hgure in acts ofbare assertion as to the aesthetic qualities ofthings l cannot .Uo* yão u pi.t*" ofthe Nakasen-do that depicts its beauty-wrthout also depicting some of the features that seem to make it beautiful (e g' fig 1) I cannot even Ae sthe t ic Acqwrintance Dominic Mclve¡ Lopes 27t show you a picture that depicts a simple elegant line without depicting some ofthe feahres that seem to make it elegant (e.g. fig. 2). There is no bare dçìction ofaes_ thetic featues, so the¡e is no bare assertion of aesthetic judgements via depic_ tion.r0 If I show you a photograph of the Nakasen-do ancl you judge that the highway is beautiÍirl, then you so judge because, as it were, you seem ti see what makes it beautifirl, not merely because you rely on my say-so, _ Not all ofthe following propositions can be true: (l) the acqüaintance pdnci_ ple explains why aesthetic judgements are not transmissible ftom person to per_ son, (2) aesthetic judgements are not tansmissible ftom person to person in the sense that aesthetic testimony is weaþ (3) aesthetic judgements a¡e transmissible ûom person to person via images, and (4) images cannot be vehicles ofaesthetic testimony. The fÍst ofthese propositions is the name ofthe game and so is not up for grabs. Compelling arguments support (3) and (4). Only traclition gives us (2j. Giving up (2) means we must seek a new way to inte4ret the acquaintance princi_ ple, one that does not rely on considerations of aesthetic tesfimìny. Instead, the acquaintaace principle should be interpreted as explaining two facts: aesthetic judgement is not tansmissible by words, but it is transmissible by images (or "surrogates" more generally). 4. How is aesthetic judgement ,,based on fust_hand experience,,in a special way, given that perceptual beliefis also based on first-hand expe¡ience? Tradition seeks an answer in the weakness of aesthetic testimony. An áltemative strategy seeks an answer in a non-epistemic account oftransmission. Suppose that trans_ mission is a content-preserving relation between representations. For example, Philip Pettit writes that "the state one is in when. . . one sincerely assents to a given aesthetic characterization is not a state to which one can have non_perceptual access" it is "essentially perceptual.,'2r This claim about øcc¿ss is consiclerablysfuonger than any claim aboul entjtlement. When the transmission of an aesthetic judgement is blocked the result is not merely that the pesson on the receiving end lacks title to the judgement. The question of entitlement is not even on the table, for the receiver is not in a position to make the judgement at all. ReFesentational states are transmitted from one person to another only with the help of artifactual representations sentences arid images, for instance. Thustransmission ca¡ be analyzed as a relation that obtains between the cognitive state ofa transmitter and an artifactual representationjust in case full grasp ofthe arti_ factual representation requires that the receiver be in a cognitive state with the same content as that ofthe transmitter That is, R' is ta¡smitted by p. only if full grasp of R is a state R.whose content includes the content of R,. This is obviously only a partial analysis. For one thing, &tra¡smits R, only ifR is caused in the right way by R,. No matteq for the partial aaalysis is all we need for an accormt of what it is for t'?es of states to be hansmissible. A type of cognitive siate is trawmissible by a given type of artifactual representation just in case rep_ resentations of that rype fa¡smit states of that t,?e' By this analysis' mary tlpes ofcognitive state are transmissible by any tlpe of artifactual representation A perceptu'al belief that mondo grass is black is transmissible by my saying "mondo gràss is black" because your grasp ofthis sentence consists in having a thought îhose content ìncludes that ofthe perceptual belief But I have a choice of media und I "un show you a picture of some mondo grass in a gardenirtg catalogue instead. Unclerstood in this way, hansmission is non-epistemic: you might believe that mondo grass is black, or imag re it, wish it, or even doubt it Perhaps aesthetic judgements are orìly transmissible by certain rypesof reFesentations. How so? Remãmbering my walk along the Nakasen-do' I judge that it is beautiful, I tell you so, and you grasp the thought expressed by my words; but yolr, tfto,rg-nt Oltt"ts in content from my judgement because the content of my judg"-"nt"i" ".rr"ntially perceptuat' and tlre content ofyou thought is not Since yo-ri itro,-,ght ao". oot have the same content as my judgement' my judgement is íot transrÃtted to you. Yet when I convey what I judge by shov/ing you a photograph of the Nakasen-do, your grasp ofthe photograph is a state which has the iuni" typ" of "ooteot us -ylu,þãm*t, so aesthetic judgement is tra¡srnissible via images."This explanation ofwhy aesthetic judgements are transmissible ftom person to person by images a¡d not',vords depends on a non-epistemic analysis oftmns- -i.iUlfiry i,f"t "rf"m to the effect that aesthetic judgements have a special kind of content. 5 . What do we make of the suggestion that the content of aesthetic judgements is such as not be transmissiblé from person to person? It will not do simply tostatethattheircontentis"basedonfirst-handexperience"or"essentiallyperceptual," for neither stratement can be taken at face value Yorrr beliefbased on my teåtmooy tttut -y cat is brown has the same content as my belief based on my experience that my cat is brown. Ditto your beliefbased on my pictorial testimony thåt Jorh i, t¿11", ihBrian. So saying that aesthetic judgements about gËce and beauty are like perceptual beliefs about brown and tall fails to explain why only the former and not the latter are transmissible by words' An exfieme view is that aesthetic featues are essentially perceptual in the sense that they ale ineffable and camrot be conceptualized or named Michael iano". writes that aesthetic judgements "must be based on first-hand experience... because one is not capable of understanding the meaning of the tetrns which designate the properties without the experience "22 Perhaps a view as extreme as-this follows lom some conceptions of aesthetic propertiesThen uguio, lt auy U" to "xtreme as to impeach any conception of aesthetic properties ttr-at irnptiesit." More moderate altematives should be considered' Ae s Í h e tic Ac q ua int anc e Domitic Mclver Lopes Materials fo¡ a moderate altemative akeady lie close to hand. Ifaesthetic judgements are trmsmitted by images ard not words, then the materials we seek can come ftom contrasti¡g depiction with description. As we have seen, there is no bare depiction ofaesthetic features, whe¡eas there is ba¡e desc¡iption ofaes_ thetic features. Describing the Nakasen-do as beautiful ancl a line as graceful rep_ resents beauty ard gracefirlness without representing non-aesthetic feàtu¡es ofthe highway or the line. By contrast, no image depicts the Nakasen_do as beautiful without depicting non-aesthetic featues that seem to make it beautifr.ll, a¡d no image depicts a line as graceft]l without depicting non-aesthetic feahres that seem to make it graceful. The contrast goes further The line,s grace is not depict ed in a(lditíon to depicting non-aesthetic feah.res tlat seem to make it graceful. There is nothing more to depicting the line as graceful than depicting non_aesthetic feahrles that seem to make it graceful. [n other words, the only explanation for an image,s fail_ ing to depict a line's grace is that it fails to depict some non-aesthetic features that would-seem to make it graceful. By contrast, as Frank Sibley showed, no descrip_ tion ofa work's non-aesthetic features call imply a clescription ofits aesthetic fea_ tu¡es.2a So the¡e is always something more to describing a line,s grace than listing the non-aesthetic features that seem to make it gracefirl. Although.lhe line fits the equation y(x, + a2) : a3" may describe the line in figure 2 as having the very fea_ ture responsible for its grace, the sentence fails to describe the line as graceful. Of course, some descriptions represent the line,s grace as determined by the non_aes_ thetic featues that make it gracef,ú: ,.the line is gracef,rl because ii fits the equa_ tion y(x, + a2) : a3." Again, howeve¡ with the image, there is nothing more to depicting the line as gracefi.rl than depicting its shape. Some representations have inseparable content. A representation R represents x as F inseparably from its representing x as B just in case R replesents x as F by and only by representing x as B. Figure I depicts the Nakasen-do as beautiful by andonll by depictlng it as having certain non-aesthetic features. In general, aes_ thetic featues are depicted by and only by depicting certain non_aãsthetic fea_ tues. The aesthetic content of depictions is inseparable. By contrast, the aesthetic content ofdescriptions is not inseparable. Aesthetic features are never described by or only by describing non-aesthetic features. My saying ,the Nakasen_do is beautiful because it is twisty,' describes the highway as beautiful and also describes a non-aesthetic feahrre that makes it beautiful, but the beauty is not described by and only by describirg irs nvists and ¡-rms. Sibley briefly touched on a similar point, but mistakenly took it to suggest that inseparable content distinguishes aesthetic judgement from ordinary percep_ tual experience, He wrote that ifa man were not in a position to see or discem that a line had such and such a cuwe.. . he could not conceivably tell that the line was... graceful.... One sees the grace in that particular n4 cuwe. And if one camot cleally see or discem the determinate character or properties which are responsible for the merit-term 'P'being applicable, one cannot discem that 'P'applies."zs Sibley then attempted to dra',v a contast with seeing the brightness of a highway sign. Suppose that speckled signs look brighter than signs with unifom colors, and a given highway sign looks bright because it is speckled. From a distance, one sees ihe sign's brightness without seeing its speckling, so seeing the brightness is separable from seeing the speckling that makes for the brighhless. Sibley inferred that its inseparable content marks aesthetic judgement apart ftom ordirary perceptual experience, which has separable content. Grasping why this inference is too hasty clrives home an important point about inseparable content. One sees the sign's brightness without seeing its speckling, but it does not follow that the brightness is represented inseparably. The sign looks unifomly colored ftom a distance, and experience may well represent the sign's brightness by arrd only by representing its uniform coloration. Perhaps we do see the sign's brightness by and only by seeing other features that seem to make it bright, albeit not always the featwes that actually make it bright. It would be too much to expect that when a state represents x as F inseparably ftom its representirg x as B, tlìe representation ofx as B is in fact responsible for the representation of x as F. The highway sign's speckling and not its uniform color is responsible for its looking bright, but experience may represent its brightness inseparably from its uniform color. Inseparable aesthetic content is no different. From a distance, the scene in Georges Sewat's 1884 Bathers qt Asnièr¿s in the National Gallery in London cerøilly looks calm and dreamy. Moreover, we see this calm dreaminess by and only by seeing the scene's flat and uniform coloration. Ofcourse, this is ar illusion. The calm dreaminess is achieved not through flat and uniform coloration but rather through relatively saturated hues laid down in dots which are visible only from up close, Once we move in for a close up, we are surprised to leam what features are actually responsible for our seeing the scene as dreamy. In this respect, aesthetic judgement is in the same boat as ordinary perceptual experience. Malcolm Budd cha¡acterizes what he calls "appreciation" as the perception ofan aesthetic featue "as it is realized in the work."26 True, it is one thing for a state to represent the beauty ofthe Nakasen-do and it is a.nother for it to represent the beauty as realized by the highway itself. However, more is needed to distinguish an appreciation ofthe beaury as it is realized in the road from descriptions of the beauty as it is realized in the road. My telling you why the road is beautiful represents the beauty as realized in the road, but it falls short ofwhat you get when Ae s t he tic Ac qua¡nt an c e Dominic Mclver Lopes you appreciate the beauty as it is realized in the road. How it falls short is clear if appreciation involves aesthetic judgement, which is "essentially perceptual" in dre sense that it has inseparable aesthetic content. Why do images have inseparable aesthetic content? The answer should touch on the nature ofdepiction. Recognition theories of depiction hold roughly that a picture depicts something as F only if it is so marked as to trigger (in a normal observer in normal conditions) a recognition ability for Fs a recognition abilitythat overlaps an ability to recognize Fs face-to-face.2? Such a theory is easiþ slotted into ar explanation ofwhy pictures have inseparable aesthetic content. Arr image P depicts x as having aesthetic feature F inseparably from depicting x as having non-aesthetic feature B because (1) P depicts x as B, (2) x's being F supervenes on x's being B, (3) P enables a suitable vieu/er to recognize x as F in P by depicting x as B, arìd (4) the abihty to recognize x as F in P's depicthg x as B is the same as is engaged in recognizing x as F when seeing x as B. The recognition theory shows up in clauses (3) and (4), where clause (4) makes the inseparable content ofthe image echo the inseparable content of a corresponding experience. This is simply an example ofhow one theory ofdepiction ca¡ be hamessed to explain the inseparable aesthetic content ofimages. No doubt othet theories can also do the job.,8 No doubt some cannot.2e We are seeking to interpret the acquaintance principle as explaining two facts: aesthetic judgement is not transmissible by words, but it is transmissible by images. If aesthetic judgements have inseparable aesthetic contents, then they a¡e traasmissible by images but not words. The hypothesis tha1 aesthetic judgements have inseparable aesthetic contents explains what it is for aesthetic judgement to be "essentially perceptual" or "based on first-hand experience." 6. According to the working theory adopted at the outset, an aesthetic judgement is an athibution of evaluative or descriptive aesthetic properties. This needs amendment if aesthetic judgements havg inseparable aesthetic contents, since not all states attributing aesthetic properties have inseparable aestletic contents. The statement that "the Nakasen-do is beautiflrl" represents the beauty ofthe highway without representing ary non-aesthetic features that (seem to) make it beautiful. However, this leaves room to add that aesthetic judgement twins with a cognitive state that represents aesthetic properties separably call it "aesthetic belief." Araesthetic beliefis a beliefthat represents aesthetic properties separably. Suppose I tell you that the Nakasen-do is beautiful. This statement cannot t¡ansmit an aesthetic judgement, but must it be an attempt to tra¡smit a.n aesthetic judgement? After all, what I say does not leave you entirely unmoved. You might act on my words. Perhaps you schedule time on your next trip to Japan to take the train and bus to Tsumago, ready to walk the highway and enjoy it. Or perhaps you take it upon yourself to advise others planning trips to Japan to add the Nakasendo to their itinerary Surely this is reason enough to âttribute to you the beliefthat the Nakasen-do is beautifi¡l? What mo¡e reason could be required? n6 Moreover, unless my utterance is capable ofconverting belief, I have failed to assef anything. To make matters worse, I have not even reported myjudgement, since aesthetic judgements cannot be reported in words. Happily, the puzzle is easily solved if I both judge and believe that the Nakasen-do is beautiful. Aesthetic beliefis not the same as aesthetic judgement. It represents aesthetic featules but its content is not inseparable. So the solution is to say that I report my belief and thereby transmit it to you. Cwiously, a distinction between aesthetic judgement aad belief is not entirely new. It is even aclorowledged by those who interpret the acquaintance principle as offering to explain the weakness ol aesthetic testimony. For example, Tormey mentions in passing that "someone might come to believe that q by coming to know that someone else hasjudged that q, but it does not follow that he thereby judges that q."30 Yet ifthe poht is acknowledged, its implications are not given any thought. 7. Distinguishing between aest¡etic judgement and aesthetic belief suggests a second look at aestltetic testimony. Perhaps the distinction isjust what is needed to understand clashing intuitions about oul acceptance of aesthetc testimony, especially ifthis clash amplifres a distinction between two dimensions of criticism. Does one dimension ofcriticism cha¡acteristically trade in aesthetic judgement and a¡other in aesthetic beliefl Ifso, a closer look at these two dimensions of criticism will shed further light on aesthetic judgement arrd belief. Vindicating Kantian intuitions a fortiori, we cannot convert aesthetic testimony to aesthetic judgement, since it camot even ûansmit aesthetic judgement. A ve¡sion of the hrst Kantian claim is true: we do not accept aesthetic testimony jn the sense that it puts us in a position to make an aesthetic judgement. By the same token, however, we no longer need to call upon the second Kantian claim that aesthetic testimony affords little or not title to aesthetic judgement in order to explain why the first Kantian claim is true. So those who wish to maintain the second Kantian claim ca.rmot avail themselves of the argument that it is true because it explains the frst Kantian claim. Likewise, the acquaintance principle is no longer promising as an explanation of the claim that aesthetic testimony affords little or no title to aesthetic judgement. As we saw, Kantians might hope to explain away cases where we seem to accept aesthetic testirnony about an item by re-describing them as cases where we take on a subjunctive beliefabout how we wouldjudge were we to see the item (or maybe a picture of it). The objection was that your believing that you would believe a hidden item is black is grounds for you to believe that it is black, so your acceptance of testimony as to its color should be taken at face value. The challenge for the Kantian was to say why your believing that you would judge ar Ae sthe Í¡c Acqua¡ntanc e Dominic Mclver l¡pes unseen item is beautifrrl is not grounds for youto judge thatit is beautiful. The challenge is met if aesthetic judgement has inseparable aesthetic content. Believing that you wouldjudge the unseen item beautiful is not grounds for you to judge that it is beautiful. You believe that, r¡/ere you to see tle item in the flesh, you would apprehend its beauty by ard only by apprehending some featwes that seem to make it beautifrrl. You might even believe that the feaíres in question are such and such. None ofthis is grounds for making an aestheticjudgement. No matter. A more fundamental objection exploits the distinction between aesthetic judgement and belief. Suppose, as before, that the Kantians propose to explain cases of the apparent accepta¡ce of aesthetic testimony about a.n unseen item by describing them as cases where we take on a subjunctive beliefabout how we wouldjudge were we to see the item. The question is now whether believing that you would judge the unseen item beautiftrl is groulds for yovfo bel¡eve thatit is beautiful. lfthe ans\ryer is that the subjunctive beliefis grounds for an aesthetic belief, then why not take the apparent acceptance of testimony at face value? Altematively, why is dre subjunctive beliefnot grounds for an aesthetic belief? The distinction bet,¡/een aesthetic judgement and belief also promises to explain away the original Kantìan intuition that we neve¡ accept aesthetic testimony. We easily conflrse transmission and testimony, aesthetic judgement and aesthetc belief, equating the non-transmissibility ofjudgement with the weakness of testimonial entitlement to aesthetic belief. The confi.¡sion is thickened by a failure to distinguish the roles of aesthetic judgement and beliel in two different kinds of critical discourse. While these two kinds of critical discourse are often mixed together ard are rarely found in pure form, they are functionally distirct. Taking a cue from Amold Isenberg's famous essay, we can call them "criticism" and "commurrication."rr In both we find the use ofrelatively dch and detailed, often metaphorically laden, descriptions to support overall aestlìetic assessments. However, the purpose of criticism is to prepare us for an encounter with the object of criticism, to prime us to appreciate it, to guide our experience ofit when we come to see it. For Isenberg, 'the critic... gives us directions for perceiving" so as to "induce a sameness of vision, of experienced content."r2In a sloga.n, criticism guides appreciation. By contmst, the purpose ofaesthetic communication is to add to the store oftheoretical and practical beliefs which help us to understa¡d what we appreciate and to control our non-appreciative actions. We order the world in part by attributing aesthetic properties to its bits and pieces, and we manage those bits and pieces as well as our relationship to tåem on the basis of our beliefs about their aesthetic featüres. None ofthis is necessarily very fancy. For example, it shows up in decisions about what musical recordings to bu¡ what places to visit, and what people to dine with. Given the purpose of criticism, it is reasonable to expect critics to speak ftom a position ofaesthetic judgement. And given the pu4)ose of criticism, we do not n8 expect those judgements to be transmissible. The critic tells a story deploys some deft metapho$, paints a kind ofpictwe in words that sets us up to have an experience like her experience when we hear the music or see the dance that she is talkillg about. Tormey tells this story: suppose that I tell someone else, M, that the Mantovar fresco is superior in scope, subtle{, composition, and expressiveness to the frescos of Perugino and Pinturicchio . . . . M ¡eacts with surprise" "I didn't know you'dbeen to Italy recently." "I haven't," I admit. "But, you see, I have it ffom W...." It is, I think, quite evident that I am flying here under false colors, and that I have been caught out."r M's reaction is understandable as long as M takes T to be engaging in criticism. Having missed this qualihcation, Tormey is led to say that aesthetic testimony fails and the acquaintance principle explains why. He overlooks the possibility of aesthetic cornmunication, Italy has a lot to offer, most ofus have to limit what we see, aad so we make decisions based on aesthetic beliefs acquired through the testimony of others. This suggests a hlpothesis. We do not mark the difference between aesthetic belief, the cunency of aesthetic communication, and aesthetic judgement, which is where aesthetic criticism begins and ends. Sincejudgement and criticism dominate philosophical thinking about aesthetic discourse, belief and communication get overlooked. The result is that v/e mistakenly take the non-transmissibility of aesthetic judgement to imply the weakness of aesthetic testimony. Do we accept aesthetic testimony in fact? To answer this question, replace it with another: do we engage in aesthetic communication? Tradition interprets the acquaintance principle as meant to explain the nontrunsmissibility of aesthetic judgement, where aesthetic judgement is non-ha.nsmissible in the sense that aesthetic testimony is epistemically weak. An altemative is that the acquaintance principle explains the non-t¡ansmissibiliq/ ofaesthetic judgement by pointing to its having inseparable aesthetic content. The altemative allows for a distinction between aesthetic judgement and aesthetic belief, and it allows that we may have epistemic title to aesthetìc beliei lf we sometimes doubt that we have such title, perhaps the reason is that we conllate aesthetic belief with aesthetic judgement and we misunderstand how they function in different contexts of aesthetic discoune.3a Aesthetic Acqucintunce Dominic Mclver Lopes I Richard Wollheim, "Alt and Evaluation," in Afi end ¡ts Objects,2ad ed. (Camb¡idge: Cambridge Univ€rsity Press, 1980), 233. See also Fmnk Sibley, "Particularity, Art, and Evaluation," Prcceedin+s of th¿ Aristotelialt Societt Swple eûtary Volume 48 (1974),l-21; Roger Scnrton, Ar¡ dn¿ lfiogination (Lotdo : Methuen, 1974); Philip Pettit, "The Possibility of Aesthetic Reâlism," in Pleasure, Preference, and ualue, ed. Eva Schapel (Câmbridge: Cambridge Unive¡sily Press, 1983), 17-38; and Mary Mothersill, Beauty Reslored (Oxfoñ. Oxford Universrly Press, 1994). Dissenters are MalcoLn Budd, "Tte Acquaintânce Principle," British Joumal oÍAesîhe¡ics 43 Q003),386-92:. Pa¡sley Livi¡gstoo. "On a¡ Apparenl Truism iD Aesthettcs," British Joumal ol Aesîhetics 43 (2001).2ó0-78i and Aaron Meskin, "Aeslhelic Testimony: Whât Can We Leam ftom Othe¡s about Beauly and Artl" Philosophy and Ph onenoloe¡cal Re varch 69 (2004), 65-91 . , Alan Tormey, "Critical Judgments," Theorh39 (t973),39. r E.g. Tormey, "Critical Judgments;" Br.rdd, "The Acquai¡tance P¡inciple," 491; Aarotr Meski¡. "Solv¡og the Problem of Aeslhelic Testimony," tn Knoi,ing Ar¡, ed. Maithev¡ Kieran and Dominic Mclve¡ Lopes (Dor¿hecht: Sp¡inger, 2006), 110-11. a For some complexities, see C. A. J. Coady, Testimony (Oxford: Oxford Univ€¡sily Press, 1992); Peter GÉham, "Wlat Is Testimony?" Philosophical Quañe y 4'7 (1997),22'7-32; aIJd Såtrford Goldberg, "Testimonially-based K¡owledge fiom Fâlse Testimony," Philosophical Quarterb 5l (2001), 512-26. 5 Read this claim as acceptable to both reductìonist and fundamentalist approaches to testimony e.g. El¡zabeth F.icker, "Against Gullibility," in traonir?g Íron Words, ed.. Bìmal K. MatiÌal and Arindam Chakaba¡ti (Dordrecht: Kluwe¡, 1994); and Coady, Testimony. 6 Immanuel Kant, Crilrque of the Povter of Judgenenr. løns. Paul Cuyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Camb¡idge University P¡ess,2000), $ 33. 7 Some recent wdte¡s are moderâte Kaûtiùs, who hold that testimony affords some title to aestheticjudgemeût bùt not as much title as we get ûom testimotry for empirical beliet E.g. Robert Hopkiss, 'Beauty and Testimony," n Philasophy, the Good, the Truq the Beautilul, ed. Anthony O'Hear (Câmbridge: Cambridg€ Un iversiry Press, 2000): and Meski¡. "Aesthetic Teslimony." 2AO 3 Meskin, "Solving the Problem ofAesthetic Testimony," 11416., J. L. Mackie, Ituenting Right andWrcng (london: Penguin, 1977), 15. 0 E.g. Peltil. "The Possibility of Aestheric Realism." tt KaDt, Critique of rhe Power of Judgenent, $ 33. n Torme, "C¡itrcal Judgements," 42; Meskin, ' Aesthetic Testimony," 72. rr Meskin, 'Aesthetic Testimony," 84-5. ra Brian Laetz, "A Modest Defe¡se of Aesthetic Testirnoûy," Joumal ofAesthetics a d Atl Ctiticsstn 66 Q008) 355-63 . 15 Tomey, "Critical Judgments," 39. 'ó Cf. Kathleen Stock, "The Role of Imagining in Seeing-in," loumal ofAesthetics and Aft cnücssm 66 Q008),371-4. '7 Steven Shùttlewo¡th, "The Use of Pbotographs as aD tnviroomental Medium ¡n Landscape Studies," J¿¡rmal oÍ Envircnmental Manasenent 11 (1980),61-70. See also E. H. Zthe, D. E. Simcox, aûd C. S. LaÌv, "Perceptual Landscape Simulations: History ar.dPrcspect," Landscape Journal 6 (1987), 62-80. Thants to Aaron Meskin lor these rcfer- " E.g Randy Thornhill and Stever W. Gangestad, "Hùman Facial Beauty," Hunan Naturc 4 (1993) 23'7 -69 . In sum, aesthelic judgements about items routnoly derive ftom images of those items. l" David Novirz, P;c/¡/rcs and The¡ Use in Commu ic.ttion (The, Hague: Nijhoff, 1977); Marcia Eaton, "Truth in Picl,rlþs," Joumal of Aesthetics and kt Criticisn 39 (1980), 15-26; aûd Carol)î Korsmeyer, '?ictorial Assefion," Joumâl of Aesthetics and Alt Criticism 43 (1985).257-65. 70 Tbere is bâre represertation ofaeslbeLic qùalities by pictües, bùt there is ûo bare depiction of aesthetic qualities. ?r PeniL. The Possibiliry of Aesthelic Realism," 25. 2! Michael Tamer "Ethìcs and Aesthetics Are ?' ii Aú and Mo,(11ìty. ed. José Luis Bermúdez ard Sebastian Gardìner (London: Routledge,2003),33. ¡ Fo¡ a c¡itique, see Livingston, "On an Appa¡ent T¡uìsm iD Aesthetics." a F¡ank Siblef "Aesthelic Concepts," Philosophical Reyiew 68 (1959),4'45. Sibley enters a qualification: desc¡iptions of noD-aesthetic features can imply that an aesthelic te¡m does not apply. For example. _!he line is jågged" implies that it is not gmcetul. 5 Sibley, "Particìiâ¡ity, Art, ând Evaluatio¡, 16. :o Budd. The Acquainlance Principle." Sgl. t? Dorìinic Mclver Lopes, Understanding Pi./¡¡rps (Oxlord: oxlord Universiry Press. t996). ,3 At ñrst glance, Robef Hopkins, Pictu¡¿, lnage, an¿ Expet ience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I 998). ,, At first glance, Nelson Goodman, tû guae?\ oI Ai.2nd ed. {l¡dianapolis: BobbsMenill,1976). r0 Tormey, "C¡it¡cal Judgements," 39-40. Critics of the åcquairtance pinciple sometimes acknowledge this too. E.g. Budd, "The AcqùâintaDce Princrple." rr Amold Isenberg, "C¡itical Corûnumcatior," PhilosophicaL Re|iew 58 (1949), 33044. } Isenberg, "C¡itical Coûmunication," p. 336. 3r Tormey, "Critical Jùdgments," 38. 3a I am very gratefrrl to thosc who offered many ùsefùl sùggestions on an earl¡e¡ drafl of this Faper: Murat Aydede, Jill Fcllows, John G¡eco, Johr Hâwthome, Josh Jolmston,Aaron Meskin, BeDce Nanay, Patrick Rysiew, Chrisropher Will¡ams, and membess oflhe audience at the 2008 Varieties of Pe¡ceptìon Conference åt Saint Louis UnÌvessiry Ae s t he t i c Ac quaint ønc e Domiûic Mclve¡ Lopes