"Hegel's	Philosophy	of	Action" Forthcoming	in	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Hegel,	ed.	Dean	Moyar	(Oxford	University Press) This	is	the	penultimate	version. Please	cite	the	final	version. Christopher	Yeomans Purdue	University cyeomans@purdue.edu There	are	a	number	of	questions,	the	answers	to	which	define	specific	theoretical approaches	to	Hegel's	philosophy	of	action. To	begin	with,	does	Hegel	attempt	to give	a	theory	of	free	will	that	responds	to	the	naturalistic	skepticism	so	prevalent	in the	history	of	modern	philosophy? Though	some	scholars	hold	that	he	is	interested in	providing	such	a	theory,	perhaps	the	majority	view	is	that	Hegel	instead	socializes his	conception	of	the	will	such	that	the	traditional	naturalistic	worries	are	no	longer germane.1 A	second	question	is:	does	Hegel	have	a	theory	of	action	as	such	that competes	with	those	found	in	the	history	of	modern	philosophy	and	more particularly	in	the	Anglophone	literature	from	the	mid-20th	century	onwards? Though	perhaps	the	majority	view	is	that	Hegel	does	have	such	a	theory	of	action,	it is	commonly	held	to	be	independent	of	any	commitments	to	a	conception	of	free will,	and	to	take	a	form	radically	different	from	the	other	offerings	in	the	literature in	virtue	of	introducing	and	essentially	retrospective	rather	than	prospective relation	between	the	agent	and	her	action.2 On	the	one	hand,	the	majority	view	emphasizes	features	of	Hegel's	theory	of	action that	must	be	essential	parts	of	a	complete	presentation	of	it:	the	social	aspect,	which makes	the	recognition	of	action	by	others	an	essential	feature	of	action	itself;	Hegel's distinctive	formulation	of	freedom	as	"being	at	home	with	oneself	in	the	other";	and his	denial	that	the	category	of	causation	can	plumb	the	depths	of	intentional	activity. On	the	other	hand,	Hegel	thinks	that	there	are	objective	structures	of	recognition, and	these	reintroduce	many	of	the	themes	of	the	traditional	free	will	debate;	his technical	formulations	of	the	problem	actually	produce	a	plurality	of	models	of agency	that	have	yet	to	be	acknowledged	in	the	literature;	and	among	those	models are	versions	of	both	the	belief-desire	and	teleological	accounts	that	dominate	the contemporary	literature. I. The	Unavoidable	Problem	of	the	Explicability	of	Free	Action To	take	up	this	first	point	here	–	the	existence	of	objective	structures	of	recognition –	is	to	ask	what	categories	seem	to	be	essential	for	our	attribution	of	actions	to	free agents. We	can	set	out	some	of	these	by	attending	to	the	terms	in	which	one	scholar, Alan	Patten,	argues	for	the	legitimacy	of	seeing	Hegel's	social	(rather	than naturalistic)	conception	of	freedom	as	a	bona	fide	conception	of	free	will. As	Patten argues,	Hegel's	freedom	is	opposed	to	authority,	rather	than	traditional	free	will, which	is	opposed	to	desires	placed	in	the	agent	by	her	history	or	biology: 2 Two	parallel	features	of	the	cases	suggest	that	Hegel's	argument	should	be taken	seriously. First,	in	each	case,	the	agent	allows	the	determination	of some	external	agency	or	mechanism	to	be	a	sufficient	reason	or	justification for	his	action. In	the	first	case,	the	agent	passively	allows	the	instruction	of the	authority	to	stand	as	a	justification	of	his	final	decision	to	act;	in	the second	case,	he	passively	allows	the	social	and	natural	processes	that determine	what	desires	he	experiences	to	count	as	a	sufficient	guide	to	what he	should	do. Secondly,	in	both	cases,	the	agent	could	subject	the	problem	of what	to	do	to	his	own	thought	and	reason.3 Here	action	that	we	do	not	recognize	as	fully	attributable	to	the	agent	is	understood in	terms	of	the	way	in	which	it	allows	a	mechanistic	cause	with	respect	to	which	the agent	is	passive	to	serve	as	an	external	explanation	for	action. By	contrast,	free action	that	is	recognized	as	so	attributable	is	explicitly	understood	as	involving alternate	possibilities	(the	agent	could	have	used	reason,	but	did	not),	and	implicitly as	involving	an	internal	explanation	in	which	the	agent	is	active	with	respect	to	her own	goals. The	key	then,	is	to	provide	an	explanation	of	how	we	could	produce actions	in	this	second	way,	and	that	is	largely	a	conceptual	problem	rather	than either	a	scientific/naturalistic	or	social	problem. We	come	to	the	same	point	by thinking	through	the	second	dominant	aspect	of	contemporary	presentations	of Hegel's	theory	of	agency,	namely	their	emphasis	of	the	retrospective	identification of	the	intention	of	the	agent	subsequent	to	the	action. The	basis	of	such identification	cannot	be	restricted	to	the	agent's	rational	endorsement,	since	I	can endorse	many	things	that	I	do	not	do,	such	as	others'	actions	or	involuntary behaviors	of	my	own	such	as	digestion. Rather,	that	retrospective	endorsement must	go	hand	in	hand	with	some	productive	relation	between	the	agent	and	her action,	and	that	puts	pressure	on	the	categories	we	have	for	such	relations	(i.e.,	the italicized	notions	above).4 In	Hegel,	those	categories	are	largely	discussed	in	his	Science	of	Logic. Here	I	want to	pick	up	on	just	one	form	of	this	discussion,	namely	the	discussion	of	the modalities	(actuality,	necessity	and	possibility). A	usual	way	of	thinking	about alternate	possibilities	is	in	terms	of	free	choice	(i.e.,	'Willkür'	in	German). On	this conception,	there	is	a	range	of	opportunities	that	the	world	makes	possible	quite independent	of	the	agent's	activity,	and	that	activity	is	limited	to	picking	from among	the	given	possibilities. On	this	conception	there	are	a	variety	of	different future	paths	extending	from	past	conditions,	and	the	agent	chooses	to	walk	one rather	than	the	others. Hegel	thinks	that	such	a	notion	has	a	limited	(though	not unimportant)	sphere	of	application,	and	as	a	metaphysical	category	he	calls	this "real	modality." The	deeper	conception	("absolute	modality")	is	one	in	which	the very	continuum	of	possibilities	is	established	by	the	action	itself,	and	comes	to	serve as	the	context	for	retrospective	interpretation	precisely	because	it	is	first discriminated	as	relevant	by	the	action	to	be	interpreted. On	this	conception	there is	only	one	necessary	path	from	the	past	condition	to	the	future,	and	yet	that	path with	its	distinctive	past	condition	and	future	state	is	only	one	possible	path	from among	others	that	connected	different	past	conditions	and	different	states. All	of 3 these	paths	lie	along	a	continuum	and	the	contrasts	provide	the	resources	for interpretation	by	generating	the	contrasting	fact	that	the	agent	took	one	path	rather than	another. It	is	not	that	nothing	is	given	to	the	agent	in	this	second	conception, but	the	ratio	of	the	given	to	the	created	(or	constituted)	shifts	dramatically	in	the direction	of	the	latter. Hopefully,	the	briefest	of	examples	may	help:	consider	agents assisting	a	child	in	need. On	the	model	of	real	modality,	we	take	the	need	as	a	given and	then	interpret	agents'	different	responses	to	it	as	choices	between	options	for response	to	that	condition	(e.g.,	does	the	agent	help,	or	turn	away,	or	call	for someone	else	to	help). But	on	the	model	of	absolute	modality,	we	take	the	need itself	to	be	partially	constituted	by	the	response	of	the	agent. One	can	see	this	in contrasting	parenting	styles:	what	counts	as	a	need	with	respect	to	one	style	counts as	an	opportunity	for	the	child	to	practice	self-reliance	with	respect	to	another. Each	choice	of	parenting	style	generates	a	matrix	of	possibilities	for	evaluation,	for example	the	different	kinds	of	bonds	that	might	be	formed	through	attachment parenting. In	what	follows	we	will	first	set	out	in	the	most	general	way	the	given	field	of possibilities	for	agency	by	taking	up	Hegel's	understanding	of	the	three	sub-projects of	agency	that	combine	to	constitute	free	action	(Section	II). Then	we	will	take	up different	ways	of	doing	those	three	things	at	once	(Section	III),	and	these	will	be instances	of	absolute	modality	that	define	the	continuum	of	alternate	possibilities for	action	by	prioritizing	one	of	the	three	sub-projects. II. Three	projects	of	the	will Buried	in	the	middle	of	the	Introduction	to	the	Philosophy	of	Right	are	correlated lists	of	three	different	kinds	of	subjectivity	and	three	different	kinds	of	objectivity that	Hegel	takes	to	be	relevant	for	understanding	the	basic	project	of	willing. That latter	project	is	the	attempt	to	make	subjectivity	objective	in	such	a	way	that	the former	can	remain	at	home	and	recognizable	in	the	latter	(PR§§25-7). Each	of	these three	correlations	then	characterizes	a	different	aspect	of	that	attempt,	or	defines	a different	constituent	project	of	self-determination. Free	action	qua	successful	selfdetermination	in	general	requires	(at	least	partial)	success	at	each	of	these constituent	projects	in	particular. The	first	correlation	is	between	subjectivity	as	self-awareness	and	objectivity	as	the vocation	and	concept	of	the	will. As	a	constituent	project	of	self-determination	this is	self-appropriation	–	we	belong	to	ourselves	in	virtue	of	knowing	our	actions	to	be fitting	for	a	being	of	a	certain	kind	and	that	means	by	doing	those	kinds	of	things. In Hegel's	conceptual	terms,	this	is	the	universal	drive	of	the	will,	and	so	is	naturally associated	with	a	certain	abstraction. At	the	limit	of	generality,	we	know	ourselves as	rational,	planning	agents	and	so	we	own	our	actions	as	the	kind	of	things	that such	creatures	do. The	second	correlation	is	between	free	choice	(Willkür)	and	desire	as	forms	of subjectivity,	and	objectivity	as	immersion	in	the	particular	features	of	one's 4 experience. As	a	constituent	project	of	self-determination	this	is	specification	of content	–	we	need	to	distinguish	the	signal	from	the	noise	of	our	lives. The	most basic	way	that	we	do	this	is	by	pursuing	and	enjoying	the	objects	of	our	desires	in the	face	of	obstacles	to	such	satisfaction. In	life	this	must	be	done	at	a	relatively fine-grained	level,	and	so	it	is	not	surprising	that	in	Hegel's	conceptual	terms	this	is the	particular	drive	of	the	will	and	is	thus	associated	with	a	continuum	of	often minute	or	idiosyncratic	differences	in	taste,	habits,	resources,	etc. The	third	correlation	is	between	subjective,	unaccomplished	ends	and	objective, accomplished	ends. As	a	constituent	project	of	self-determination	this	is effectiveness	–	the	need	to	see	oneself	as	an	agent	rather	than	a	patient,	to	see	the world	as	embodying	one	of	my	purposes	precisely	because	I	have	made	it	so. In Hegel's	conceptual	terms	this	is	the	individual	drive	of	the	will,	and	is	associated with	strategies	for	taking	the	measure	of	that	continuum	of	particular	desires	and histories	by	reference	to	the	general	or	universal	character	of	willing	beings. That is,	effectiveness	requires	planning	and	planning	requires	a	grip	on	the	essential features	of	situations. It	is	the	individual	project	both	in	the	intuitive	sense	that	here the	agent	makes	her	mark	on	the	world	and	stands	out	in	contrast	to	other	agents, and	in	the	technical	Hegelian	logical	sense	that	it	involves	the	relation	of universality	and	particularity. In	sum,	the	basic	picture	arising	from	these	sections	in	the	Philosophy	of	Right	is	that in	willing	we	are	trying	simultaneously	to	take	possession	of	ourselves,	to distinguish	between	what	is	central	and	what	is	peripheral	in	the	events	of	our	lives, and	to	make	happen	what	we	want	to	happen	in	those	events. All	action	is	an attempt	to	do	these	three	things	at	once,	but	doing	almost	any	three	things	at	once	is very	difficult	for	most	human	beings. In	many	areas	of	our	life	in	which	we	try	to	do multiple	things	at	once	(for	example,	musical	performance),	there	are	explicit training	strategies	designed	to	separate	the	requisite	skills	and	train	them individually	before	combining	them. But	no	one	has	ever	been	taught	first	to	take possession	of	themselves,	then	to	distinguish	the	central	from	the	peripheral,	third to	translate	those	central	ideas	to	the	world,	and	finally	to	put	them	all	together	in	a complete	performance	of	agency. It	takes	Hegel	until	the	1820s	even	to	get	clear	on a	theoretical	description	of	the	three	skills	of	agency,	and	one	shudders	to	think	of the	sort	of	practical	training	plan	he	might	have	devised	for	us. That	said,	at	the same	time	that	he	is	getting	clear	on	these	three	skills	he	seems	to	discover	in	the world	of	lived	experience	three	general	strategies	for	solving	this	problem	implicit in	the	active	lives	of	his	contemporaries. He	calls	these	three	different	forms	of agency	or	accountability	(Zurechnungsfähigkeit),	each	of	which	represents	a conceptual	distillation	of	common	ways	of	life	that	are	themselves	attempts	to manage	this	complexity	on	the	ground,	as	it	were.5 And	it	will	turn	out	that	one	of them	is	an	(admittedly	heterodox)	version	of	the	belief-desire	accounts	common	in the	Anglophone	philosophy	of	action	literature,	and	another	a	version	of	a teleological	account. All	three	are	forms	of	absolute	modality	in	the	sense	that	they are	ways	that	an	agent	can	herself	set	the	context	of	alternate	possibilities	relevant for	the	interpretation	of	her	actions. 5 III.	Three	forms	of	accountability Hegel	labels	each	of	the	forms	of	accountability	by	a	different	right	of subjectivity:	the	rights	of	knowledge,	intention,	and	insight	into	the	good. These rights	are	each	semi-autonomous	conditions	for	the	possibility	of	recognition	of individual	agents,	i.e.,	they	are	different	models	for	such	recognition	and	thus organize	different	ways	of	life. So,	for	example,	an	agent	exercises	the	first	form	of accountability	when	they	legitimately	expect	to	be	held	responsible	for	those	and only	"those	aspects	of	its	deed	which	it	knew	to	be	presupposed	within	its	end,	and which	were	present	in	its	purpose"	(PR§117). But	there	is	also	an	aspect	of	the forms	of	accountability	which	is	more	difficult	to	grasp:	each	of	the	forms	is	equally a	bait-and-switch	routine	in	which	the	agent	achieves	something	slightly	different from	what	they	mean	to	achieve.	This	bait-and-switch	is	not	a	contingent	feature	of some	particular	interpersonal	interactions	(e.g.,	being	conned	by	a	salesman)	but something	essential	to	agency:	we	only	act	at	all	insofar	as	we	mistake	our	goal	for something	that	it	isn't	quite. Hegel	seems	to	take	this	to	be	a	conceptual	fact	about the	project	of	finite	willing	as	such. To	take	just	a	mundane	example,	I	have	seen	the most	experienced	do-it-yourselfers	motivate	themselves	for	a	new	project	on	the basis	of	time	and	cost	projections	that	they	would	not	beforehand	admit	to	be	as unrealistic	as	they	obviously	are,	and	yet	afterwards	would	never	actually	judge their	performance	on	the	basis	of	those	initial	projections. Hegel's	terminology	for	this	second	aspect	of	action	is	"the	ought	[Sollen],"	since the	standards	for	what	we	mean	to	do	and	the	standards	for	what	we	actually	do	are not	precisely	the	same	and	thus	the	latter	have	the	form	of	an	external	requirement on	the	former. It	is	not	just	that	we	miss	a	given	target;	rather,	we	shoot	at	the target	in	one	guise	but	hit	it	in	another. It	is	not	that	we	inevitably	fall	short	of	a high	moral	standard	because	of	our	human	weakness;	rather,	we	are	bound	to misunderstand	or	misperceive	the	standard	we	apply	to	ourselves. In	this	sense,	the subjective	rights	are	equally	the	conditions	of	possibility	of	misrecognition. Understanding	Hegel's	philosophy	of	action	thus	requires	seeing	how	and	in	what respect	each	of	the	forms	of	accountability	is	a	relative	success	and	a	relative	failure at	the	general	project	of	making	subjectivity	at	home	in	objectivity. That	is, understanding	Hegel's	philosophy	of	action	requires	understanding	it	as	a philosophy	of	finitude. We	might	therefore	take	some	direction	from	Hegel's	discussion	of	this paradoxical	project	in	the	Logic: The	finitude	of	this	activity	[of	willing]	is	thus	the	contradiction	that,	in	the self-contradicting	determinations	of	the	objective	world,	the	purpose	of	the good	is	both	carried	out	and	not	carried	out,	and	that	it	is	posited	as something	inessential	just	as	much	as	something	essential,	as	something actual	and	at	the	same	time	as	merely	possible. This	contradiction	presents itself	as	the	endless	progression	in	the	actualization	of	the	good,	that	is	therein established	merely	as	an	ought.	(Here	those	contradictions	come	to	the	fore 6 in	which	one	stumbles	around	on	the	standpoint	of	morality	–	Zusatz.) Formally,	however,	this	contradiction	disappears	in	that	the	activity supersedes	the	subjectivity	of	the	purpose	and	thereby	the	objectivity,	the opposition	through	which	both	are	finite,	and	not	only	the	one-sidedness	of this	subjectivity	but	subjectivity	in	general;	another	such	subjectivity,	that	is to	say,	a	new	generation	of	this	opposition,	is	not	distinct	from	what	was supposed	to	be	an	earlier	one. This	return	into	itself	is	at	the	same	time	the recollection	of	the	content	into	itself,	which	is	the	good	and	the	identity	in itself	of	both	sides,	the	recollection	of	the	presupposition	of	the	theoretical stance	(§224),	that	the	object	is	what	is	substantial	in	itself	and	true.	(The unsatisfied	striving	disappears	if	we	know	that	the	final	purpose	of	the	world has	been	brought	about	and	to	the	same	degree	eternally	brings	itself	about. This	is	generally	the	posture	of	the	adult	man,	while	the	youth	believes	that the	whole	world	is	in	a	bad	way	and	out	of	it	a	completely	different	world must	be	made....This	correspondence	of	is	and	ought...is	not	a	frozen	and inert	correspondence;	for	the	good,	the	final	purpose	of	the	world,	is	only	in that	it	produces	itself	again	and	again...	Zusatz)	(EL§234,Z). There	is	a	lot	going	on	here,	but	at	a	first	pass	we	can	say	that	satisfied	action	("the posture	of	the	adult")	as	much	as	the	philosophical	understanding	of	action	require a	kind	of	stereoscopic	vision	to	see	how	the	tensions	within	agency	that	appear	to	be crippling	contradictions	from	one	perspective	could	be	the	very	way	of	going	on from	another. The	key	here	is	the	substitution	of	one	subjectivity	for	another: successful	action	(1)	translates	subjectivity	into	objectivity	only	for	(2)	a	new opposition	between	subjectivity	and	objectivity	to	arise,	and	the	phenomenon	holds together	only	because	(3)	this	new	subjectivity	can	somehow	be	identified	with	the first	subjectivity. But	then	this	latter	identification	appears	to	be	just	as	much objective	as	subjective,	since	through	that	identification	we	take	up	again	the theoretical	stance	that	sees	the	truth	primarily	in	the	object	rather	than	the	subject. Let	us	take	a	basic	case	as	an	example:	an	agent	(1)	satisfies	her	hunger	by	eating	up a	bit	of	the	objective	world;	(2)	hunger	returns;	and	(3)	she	recognizes	this	new situation	of	being	hungry	as	the	same	as	the	first,	perhaps	as	part	of	a	bit	of	practical planning. The	agent	may	say	to	herself,	'I'm	always	hungry	at	9:30am	so	I	should remember	to	bring	a	bagel	with	me	to	work;'	or,	more	perspicuously	(if	slightly pedantically),	'I'm	the	kind	of	person	who	is	hungry	at	9:30	every	morning	so bringing	a	bagel	to	work	is	fitting	for	me.' In	this	way	the	agent	treats	herself	as	an object	of	a	certain	kind	that	has	a	feature	(hunger	at	9:30)	that	is	independent	of	her subjective	stance	in	the	moment	of	her	regarding	herself	as	having	that	feature,	even though	the	relevant	feature	is	itself	a	subjective	stance	in	the	moment	of	her regarding	the	bagel	as	an	object	to	satisfy	her	hunger. If	hunger	registers	the difference	or	otherness	between	subjective	desire	and	objective	conditions,	and connecting	episodes	of	hunger	by	means	of	a	typology	that	supports	effective planning	is	a	way	of	owning	that	otherness	without	eliminating	it,	then	what	we have	here	is	an	example	of	being	at	home	with	oneself	in	the	other,	i.e.,	of	Hegelian freedom. 7 So	far,	so	good. The	example	we	just	gave	uses	biological	need	to	generate	the renewed	opposition	between	subject	and	object	(i.e.,	hunger),	just	to	try	to	bring	the structure	of	the	phenomenon	into	relief. One	might	think,	then,	that	for	more distinctively	rational	or	abstract	ends,	such	as	justice	or	the	good,	the	agent	could transcend	this	cycle	of	renewed	opposition	and	come	to	a	final	resting	place. But	as the	passage	above	from	the	Encyclopedia	Logic	already	suggests,	such	repose	is	not the	destiny	of	agency	of	any	kind. So	we	need	to	dig	a	little	deeper	to	discover	the more	fundamental	reason	for	this	continual	renewal	of	the	opposition	between subjectivity	and	objectivity. To	get	at	this	reason,	we	need	to	back	up	a	bit	and	say	something	about	the	general context	of	Hegel's	most	detailed	discussion	of	action,	which	is	in	the	Morality	section of	the	Philosophy	of	Right. Hegel	introduces	morality	as	a	way	to	prevent	the generation	of	cycles	of	revenge	in	response	to	conflicting	rights	claims. The	problem with	revenge,	he	thinks,	is	not	its	content	but	its	form. That	is,	it	is	in	principle appropriate	for	someone	to	stand	up	for	their	rights	by	retaliating	against	another who	has	infringed	them,	but	the	personal	nature	of	that	retaliation	makes	it	almost impossible	for	that	other	agent	to	accept	it	as	appropriate	to	what	they	have	done. The	personal	nature	of	revenge	makes	it	difficult	for	the	original	perpetrator	to	own it	as	a	fitting	experience	for	them	to	undergo	as	the	particular	free	agent	that	they are,	since	it	is	natural	to	see	it	as	another	injury	that	treats	them	as	a	thing	rather than	their	own	original	action	being	reflected	back	upon	them	as	just	punishment under	principles	that	they	should	otherwise	endorse	as	protecting	their	own	rights as	well. In	terms	of	the	constituent	projects	of	self-determination,	revenge	succeeds at	specification	of	content,	but	fails	at	self-appropriation	(PR§102). This	is important	for	our	purposes	only	because	it	means	that	self-appropriation	is	the main	problem	of	Morality	and	thus	dominates	and	even	deforms	specification	of content	and	effectiveness. And	this	deformation	has	consequences	that	are	just	as much	objective	as	subjective,	thus	generating	the	contrast	in	standards	that	makes morality	a	"mere"	requirement. It	is	this	deformation	and	its	consequences	that ensure	the	continual	renewal	of	the	opposition	between	subjectivity	and	objectivity at	the	same	time	that	it	makes	possible	the	renewal	of	their	satisfactory	identity. This	is	the	tale	Hegel	tries	to	tell	in	the	prefatory	sections	of	Morality	(esp.	PR§§ 108-113),	though	it	must	be	said	that	his	narrative	technique	leaves	much	to	be desired. What	is	crucial	though	not	at	all	obvious	is	that	these	sections	represent	a modification	of	the	three	forms	of	subjectivity	and	objectivity	from	the	Introduction. To	begin	with,	PR§109	presents	the	orientation	of	specification	of	content	and effectiveness	by	self-appropriation,	and	then	PR§§111	traces	the	deformation	of specification	of	content	required	by	that	orientation. This	deformation	is	the	heart of	the	first	form	of	accountability. A. The	Right	of	Knowledge:	"Relishing	the	Enjoyment	of	Pleasure" In	PR§111	Hegel	says	that	regardless	of	provenance	of	the	particular	conditions	and desires	of	the	will,	we	must	consider	that	content	"as	the	content	of	the	will	reflected 8 into	itself	in	its	determinacy,	and	hence	of	the	self-identical	and	universal	will." We have	seen	this	reflection	into	self	already	in	our	consideration	of	the	Logic's discussion	of	willing,	in	which	a	self-reflecting	agent	makes	a	kind	of	double identification. First,	the	agent	identifies	one	desire	with	another	(in	our	example, the	two	instances	of	hunger). Part	and	parcel	of	this	first	identification	is	the characterization	of	the	agent	as	a	certain	type	or	kind	of	thing	(in	our	rudimentary example,	the	kind	of	a	person	who	is	hungry	in	the	morning). But,	put	another	way, this	is	a	second	identification	of	the	subject	with	an	object	of	that	kind	(and	thus	the way	in	which	it	involves	taking	up	the	theoretical	stance). This	second	identification comes	out	as	an	entailment	of	the	self-reflection	of	the	will:	as	a	result,	the	will	has "the	inner	determination	of	being	in	conformity	with	the	will	which	has	being	in itself,	or	of	possessing	the	objectivity	of	the	concept." Hegel	means	all	of	this	rather	literally:	we	reflect	on	ourselves	and	modify	our subjective	stances	by	means	of	seeing	ourselves	as	a	certain	kind	of	object	in	the world. "[T]he	will	which	has	being	in	itself"	clearly	refers	to	the	agent	regarded from	the	theoretical	perspective	as	an	object	having	its	own	truth	that	can	be known,	but	it	is	slightly	more	difficult	to	say	why	it	should	have	the	"objectivity	of the	concept." The	key	here	is	that	the	agent	is	known	to	be	a	certain	type	or	kind	of object,	which	introduces	generality	or	universality	into	the	agent's	self-relation. The key	point	here	is	that	this	generality	is	initially	introduced	into	the	project	of specification	of	content	because	of	the	way	in	which	this	project	is	now	colored	by the	project	of	self-appropriation. That	is,	in	order	for	the	content	to	be	my	content, it	has	to	have	a	form	consistent	with	the	form	of	mineness	as	such-a	form	that qualifies	it	as	an	object	that	may	be	appropriated	by	an	agent	who	can	in	principle then	see	themselves	in	the	particular	positions	of	another	(even	if	that	other	is	just themselves	at	a	different	time).	Hegel	spells	this	out	nicely	in	his	lectures:	"Now	the content	must	be	mine	as	it	is	accomplished,	and	as	will	it	contains	the	determination of	the	universality	of	the	will,	for	the	will	which	has	being	for	itself	is	the	infinite form,	the	infinite	activity,	and	therefore	the	form	which	is	at	home	with	itself [beisichseinde],	identical	with	itself,	i.e.,	the	universal"	(VPR	III,	344). The	infinity	of the	form	is	connected	with	the	"posture	of	the	adult"	in	which	precisely	the	repeated generation	of	opposition	is	seen	as	appropriate	to	the	nature	of	the	subject. It	is infinite	in	the	quite	technical	sense	that	such	agent	knows	that	she	will	find	herself on	the	other	side	of	that	continually	reappearing	limit,	so	that	there	is	a	helical	or cyclical	shape	to	the	process	rather	than	a	linear	progression. The	types	or	kinds	that	mediate	this	self-relation	are	not	unrelated	to	the	particular content	of	desires	and	conditions;	rather,	the	two	sides	arise	out	of	one	process,	as Hegel	is	trying	to	make	clear	in	the	passage	from	the	lesser	Logic	that	we	quoted	at length	above. In	the	greater	Logic	Hegel	characterizes	this	process	as	a	double reflection	or	Doppelschein	through	which	the	universal	and	the	particular	come	to have	the	distinctive	content	and	significance	that	they	do	only	in	relation	to	each other	(SL	12.35/533). So,	in	the	example	above,	the	self-identification	as	someone hungry	in	the	mornings	picks	out	certain	motivational	stances	as	particular	desires that	contrast	with	other	desires	and	feelings	experienced	at	the	same	time. The 9 agent	is	a	hungry	person	rather	than	a	grumpy	person,	as	the	instances	of	hunger are	picked	out	as	the	particular	signal	of	the	agent's	life	whereas	the	instances	of snapping	at	co-workers	are	explained	as	derivative	on	the	failure	to	satisfy	that hunger	and	thus	as	noise. There	is,	of	course,	ample	opportunity	for	self-deception here,	but	that	is	just	the	way	agency	is. To	take	up	the	notion	of	absolute	modality again,	the	hungry	person	frames	the	action	along	one	continuum	of	alternate possibilities	whereas	the	grumpy	person	frames	the	action	along	another. For	the former,	the	action	contrasts	with	possible	actions	such	as	remembering	to	bring	a snack	or	having	forgotten	breakfast	entirely. For	the	latter,	it	contrasts	with possible	actions	such	as	holding	one's	tongue	or	producing	a	more	complete denunciation. To	briefly	take	stock,	what	we	have	so	far	is	the	orientation	of	specification	of content	by	self-appropriation,	and	not	yet	any	sense	of	deformation	(the	possibility of	self-deception	aside). That	is,	we	have	the	way	in	which	this	particular	relation	of the	projects	of	self-determination	is	a	condition	of	the	possibility	of	recognition,	not yet	of	misrecognition. This	is	the	positive	side	of	what	Hegel	calls	the	"right	of knowledge,"	which	consists	in	recognizing	as	my	own	in	the	content	of	my	action those	actual	features	of	its	public	shape	that	give	form	to	what	I	wanted	to	do	(i.e.,	to my	purpose	(Vorsatz))	(PR§117-8). On	the	one	hand,	this	is	a	common	position	in modern	philosophy	that	defines	accountable	action	by	reference	to	the	(causal) effectiveness	of	the	agent's	beliefs	and	desires. On	the	other	hand,	Hegel	has	a	quite specific	take	on	the	way	in	which	beliefs	(i.e.,	the	theoretical	perspective)	and desires	(i.e.,	the	practical	perspective)	are	related	to	each	other. This	take	is centered	on	the	way	in	which	beliefs	specifically	about	the	self	are	related	to	the self's	active,	practical	stances	towards	the	world	(i.e.,	to	desires). Hegel	also	has	an interesting	take	on	the	way	such	desires	are	related	to	beliefs	in	general	and	in particular	to	perceptual	awareness	of	the	external	world. Let	us	first	of	all	pick	up on	the	positive	aspect	of	this	second	element	of	Hegel's	take	before	turning	to	the way	in	which	both	aspects	generate	the	possibility	of	misrecognition. The	positive	side	of	this	second	element	can	be	found	in	Hegel's	attribution	of wholehearted	enjoyment	to	this	form	of	agency. In	a	revealing	early	manuscript when	discussing	the	way	of	life	of	someone	embodying	this	first	form	of	agency (here,	a	farmer),	he	claims	that	it	is	characteristic	of	this	figure	that	he	"relishes	the enjoyment	of	pleasure	[den	Genuss	des	Vergnügens	geniesst]"	in	contrast	to	the craftsman	who	primarily	appreciates	the	fact	that	he	has	made	himself	what	he	is and	the	merchant	who	is	beyond	any	capacity	for	enjoyment	(Jenaer	Realphilosophie (GW	VIII,	269)). And,	adding	more	detail	to	this	difference,	Hegel	says	in	his	later lectures	that	"This	indifference	[of	craftsmen	and	merchants]	to	time	and	place,	to the	determinate,	is	alien	[to	the	agricultural	estate]	.	.	.	[T]he	insatiability	of	profit	is alien	to	it"	(VPR	IV,	516). We	will	put	aside	Hegel's	social	typology	here;	what	is important	for	our	purposes	is	his	attempt	to	provide	a	conceptually	robust	defense of	the	value	of	basic	desire	satisfaction	as	a	form	of	agency. Such	satisfaction	–	i.e., the	accurate	perception	of	the	change	in	the	objective	world	in	accord	with subjective	desire,	and	the	belief	in	the	goodness	of	the	conditions	in	which	one	finds 10 oneself	immersed	–	is	a	mode	of	being	at	home	with	oneself	in	the	other	and	thus	at least	minimally	solving	each	of	the	constituent	projects	of	self-determination.6 By perceiving	self	and	world	as	in	this	relation,	the	agent	has	made	at	least	part	of	the world	her	own	and	in	so	doing	has	come	to	a	kind	of	self-affirmation	that	is	worthy of	respect. These	two	positive	sides	then	give	us	the	way	in	which	this	first	form	of	agency constitutes	a	condition	for	the	possibility	of	recognition. Self-identification	as	being of	a	certain	type	gives	us	a	conception	of	what	it	is	to	be	at	home	with	oneself,	and the	enjoyment	of	the	satisfaction	of	desire	gives	us	a	sense	of	how	this	is	done	in	the other. But	even	in	his	initial	formulations	of	the	nature	of	morality,	Hegel	raises	the possibility	of	misrecognition. More	specifically,	he	raises	the	possibility	of	a mismatch	between	the	particular,	subjective	content	of	the	will	and	the	objective truth	of	the	will,	and	this	possibility	is	what	makes	the	correspondence	between	the two	"only	a	requirement"	(PR§111). Here	we	get	to	the	deformation	of	the	project	of specification	of	content	by	that	of	form,	specifically	the	form	that	arises	from	the project	of	self-appropriation.	Thus	we	come	to	the	deeper	reason	for	the	recurrence of	the	opposition	between	subjectivity	and	objectivity	as	it	concerns	this	first	form of	agency. Unsurprisingly,	we	can	see	this	deformation	manifesting	itself	along	the same	two	dimensions,	i.e.,	in	both	the	relation	to	the	self	and	the	relation	to	the world. Recall	from	the	previous	section	that	Hegel	initially	thinks	of	the	project	of specification	of	content	as	the	attempt,	by	means	of	free	choice,	to	translate	one's needs	and	desires	into	an	immersive	experience	of	the	world. And	we	have	just seen	the	way	in	which	enjoyment	is	a	kind	of	affective	sign	of	that	immersion. But we	also	saw	the	way	in	which	the	influence	of	self-appropriation	on	content interposed	a	type	or	general	kind	within	the	agent's	relation	to	their	particular desires. To	put	it	structurally,	a	second	kind	of	objectivity	(formal	or	conceptual rather	than	perceptual	objectivity)	intrudes	itself	into	the	formerly	intimate	relation between	desire	and	its	satisfaction.7 As	Hegel	thinks	of	it,	the	bait-and-switch	here is	that	I	aim	at	perceptible	pleasure	but	what	I	achieve	actually	(or	at	least	in addition)	is	a	formal	or	conceptual	status	of	counting	as	a	certain	type	of	person. To put	it	in	the	logical	terms	we	used	earlier,	instead	of	a	direct	relation	between particulars	(i.e.,	between	subjective	desire	and	objective	satisfaction	in	specific conditions),	we	get	a	relation	between	a	particular	and	the	whole	conceptual process	of	the	reflection	of	universal	and	particular	(i.e.,	between	a	specific	desire and	the	Doppelschein	of	particular	desires	and	general	type). But	it	is	very	difficult to	know	exactly	what	kind	of	relation	the	latter	could	be,	and	certainly	it	is	very different	from	the	relation	at	which	the	agent	aimed	and	which	served	as	the	initial (if	implicit)	standard	for	success	of	the	action. The	interpretive	problem	gets	even	worse. Hegel	thinks	through	this	conceptual problem	by	means	of	a	technical,	structural	modification	of	the	second	form	of objectivity	–	i.e.,	the	objectivity	constitutive	of	the	project	of	specification	of	content –	but	for	that	very	reason	his	idea	here	has	remained	opaque	to	most	readers, 11 particularly	those	who	think	that	he	introduces	the	three	forms	of	subjectivity	and objectivity	in	the	Introduction	only	to	immediately	reject	two	of	them	as	irrelevant. Here	is	what	is	actually	going	on: In	his	first	description	of	objective	content	in	the Introduction	as	lacking	the	form	of	self-consciousness,	there	is	no	specific	reference to	sensible	externality	(PR§26(β)). Indeed,	this	initial	conception	of	immersion	in particular	conditions	included	ethical	norms	and	customs.	But	under	the	influence of	the	importance	of	self-appropriation	within	Morality	there	is	a	move	to understand	those	particular	conditions	as	lacking	the	form	of	self-consciousness because	they	are	sensible	givens	(PR§108).	In	Kantian	terms,	the	initial	confident immersion	in	the	customary	pattern	of	one's	life	is	now	being	construed	as heteronomy	rather	than	autonomy.	In	the	Phenomenology,	the	same	thing	happens in	the	struggle	between	faith	and	the	Enlightenment:	the	latter	re-characterizes	the traditional	content	and	devotional	investments	of	faith	as	a	merely	sensible, perceptible	externality	(PhG	425–26/¶576). In	the	actual	practice	of	agency,	this creates	the	possibility	of	misrecognition	because	it	generates	a	need	for	justification and	defense	of	certain	actions	where	that	need	was	not	previously	felt. Any	agent caught	in	the	midst	of	such	a	shift	is	bound	to	be	defensive	and	somewhat	flat-footed in	the	face	of	these	new	expectations. So	the	interpretive	problem	follows	a	conceptual	problem	that	is	a	real	problem	for agents,	in	Hegel's	view. This	is	a	reminder	that	we	must	take	seriously	Hegel's admonition	not	to	indulge	a	"tenderness	for	worldly	things"	(EL§48R):	they	are	as full	of	tensions	and	problems	and	contradictions	as	thought	itself. A	good philosophy	of	action	may	need	to	replicate	those	tensions	if	it	is	to	be	descriptively adequate,	rather	than	attempting	to	paper	over	them	with	a	contrived	solution. And yet	the	philosopher	is	not	the	first	agent	to	face	this	problem	–	real	agents	in	their own	socio-historical	circumstances	have	faced	the	problems	and	cobbled	together some	partial	solutions,	so	it	is	to	Hegel's	understanding	of	these	that	we	now	turn	in an	attempt	to	understand	how	these	possibilities	of	recognition	and	misrecognition hold	together	as	an	integral	practice	of	agency. As	Hegel	understands	agents	embroiled	in	this	historical	mess,	a	common	strategy	is to	re-describe	that	immersion	as	a	tradition,	and	specific	expectations	as	commands or	promises.8	Since	this	re-description	characterizes	immersion	and	expectations retroactively	as	specific	kinds	of	laws	or	norms,	new	laws	or	norms	can	then	be assimilated	under	the	same	rubrics. We	can	then	complete	our	structural	story	as	a conceptual	analysis	of	these	common	strategies. For	a	more	tenderhearted philosopher,	one	might	expect	the	advocacy	of	a	return	to	that	earlier	form	of objectivity	as	immersion,	or	a	restriction	to	it	as	the	controlling	form	in	the	light	of these	tensions. But	Hegel	is	nothing	if	not	a	post-Kantian	in	this	respect,	so	rather than	argue	for	an	immediate	return	to	the	value	of	immersion,	a	second	move	is made	to	replace	those	sensible	givens	with	the	viewpoints	of	other	self-conscious persons	(PR§§112–13).	He	thus	moves	to	thinking	of	the	objectivity	corresponding to	the	subjectivity	of	the	agent's	Willkür	or	contingent	choice	as	now	the	wills	of others.	This	external	subjectivity	is	then	a	way	in	which	subjectivity	is	at	home	in objectivity:	"The	external	existence	is	the	will,	which	becomes	external	as	subject,	a 12 subject	in	general	is	generated,	[and]	I	receive	my	subjectivity	therein	as	object" (VPR	III,	346). In	our	initial	formulation	of	the	problem	of	agency	drawn	from	the	lesser	Logic, above,	this	is	(3),	i.e.,	the	moment	of	identification	of	the	recurring	instances	of subjectivity	with	each	other. But	now	we	see	this	identification	in	a	more	radical sense	than	in	the	case	of	hunger,	in	which	only	instances	of	the	same	agent's intentional	stances	were	identified. On	the	one	hand,	this	move	suggests	a	new other	in	which	I	can	find	myself	at	home,	namely	in	the	opinions	and	attitudes	of fellow	members	of	my	society. On	the	other	hand,	this	external	subjectivity	both highlights	and	challenges	my	own	subjective	particularity,	which	is	the	logical	axis	of specification	of	content:	the	opinions	and	desires	of	others	are	particular subjectivity,	but	subjectivity	external	to	my	own. Thus	we	also	have	a	more	radical sense	in	which	the	opposition	between	subjectivity	and	objectivity	is	necessarily rather	than	merely	contingently	recurrent. If	the	first	move	of	the	shift	–	i.e.,	the	characterization	of	immersive	objectivity	as merely	perceived	–	opened	up	a	gulf	between	that	for	which	we	are	accountable	(the specific	perceptible	features	of	our	effective	actions)	and	that	to	which	we	are accountable	(the	concept	of	the	will	as	such),	the	second	shift	(i.e.,	the	introduction of	the	opinions	and	desires	of	others)	attempts	to	cover	some	of	the	distance between	these	two	senses	of	accountability.	In	this	conception,	that	for	which	we	are accountable	are	changes	in	the	views	of	others: In	the	moral	sphere,	activity	necessarily	relates	itself	to	the	wills	of	others; these	are	in	general	the	world	in	relation	to	which	one	is	active	.	.	.	In morality	I	generate	changes	also,	there	is	an	external	material	on	hand,	[but] it	is	not	a	matter	of	the	alteration	of	the	material,	corporeal	world;	rather,	the world	in	relation	to	which	my	subjectivity	stands	under	the	consideration	of morality,	is	the	subjectivity	of	others	(VPR	IV,	307–08). Furthermore,	Hegel	ambivalently	describes	the	relevant	external	subjectivity	both as	the	wills	of	others	and	as	universal	subjectivity,	so	the	wills	of	others	becomes	a partial	image	of	that	to	which	we	are	accountable	as	well. We	have	a	closing	of	the gap-the	sense	in	which	that	for	which	and	that	to	which	we	are	accountable	now have	a	more	similar	if	not	precisely	identical	form.	If	there	is	a	single	point	in	the Philosophy	of	Right	at	which	one	can	locate	Hegel's	social	re-interpretation	of	the problem	of	free	agency,	this	is	it;	but	he	has	buried	it	so	well	that	it	is	easy	to	miss the	extensive	tensions	within	which	it	is	embedded. As	we	noted	earlier,	it	is	very	difficult	to	know	exactly	what	kind	of	relation	that between	particular	desires	and	the	whole	conceptual	process	of	the	reflection	of universal	and	particular	could	be. And	that	problem	presented	the	first	form	of agency	as	a	bait-and-switch	in	which	we	achieved	a	conceptual	status	when	we aimed	at	pleasure. We	now	have	Hegel's	answer	to	the	question	of	the	nature	of	this relation:	it	is	the	expressive	and	interpretive	relation	between	particular	desire	and 13 the	whole	public	world	of	opinion	and	evaluation. He	then	moves	on	to	asking,	what does	agency	look	like	that	explicitly	aims	at	such	a	conceptual	status	in	the	first place? B.	The	Right	of	Intention There	are	two	particular	features	of	this	second	form	of	agency	that	go directly	to	the	question	of	the	relation	between	the	particular	choice	and	the	public world. The	first	is	purposiveness,	and	the	second	is	universality. Together	these features	define	the	right	of	intention	(Absicht),	which	is	the	subjective	right	at	the heart	of	this	second	form. We	can	begin	with	purposiveness,	which	connects	Hegel's	view	to	the distinction	we	noted	in	the	introduction	to	this	chapter	between	causal	and teleological	theories	of	agency. We	just	learned	that	we	have	to	aim	at	something, and	one	might	think	that	the	notion	of	aiming	just	is	a	notion	of	purposiveness. However	one	thinks	of	the	conceptual	proximity	of	these	two	notions,	Hegel	wants to	draw	some	extensive	consequences	from	the	latter. In	particular,	this	new	(or newly	explicit)	characterization	of	the	relation	between	subjectivity	and	objectivity introduces	a	distinction	between	ends	and	means	into	the	nature	of	action: The	intention	[Absicht]	is	that	which	is	mine	in	the	action	in	a	further determination	[in	weiterer	Bestimmung]	as	the	purpose	[Vorsatz].	In	terms	of its	content,	the	intention	is	something	other	than	the	mere	purpose.	The value	that	the	action	has	for	me,	the	intention,	is	a	content,	[and]	this	content is	first	of	all	the	end	[Zweck]	of	an	action,	and	the	action	is	the	means	for	the end.	This	end	[is]	the	content	of	my	intention	.	.	.	(VPR	III,	352). Whereas	the	notion	of	purpose	(Vorsatz)	from	the	first	form	of	agency	emphasizes the	temporal	relation	of	priority	between	subjectivity	and	objectivity	(both	of	which are	objects	of	perception),	the	notion	of	intention	(Absicht)	emphasizes	the	priority of	the	goal	over	the	conditions	and	resources	for	achieving	that	goal. So,	on	the	one hand,	this	notion	of	purposiveness	appears	to	be	merely	making	explicit	something that	was	implicit	in	the	first	form	of	agency. There	are,	of	course,	goals	within	that first	form;	but	they	are	essentially	taken	as	given	ineluctably	by	circumstances (whether	biological	or	social)	rather	than	as	produced	by	the	process	of	agency	and thus	as	something	for	which	the	agent	can	be	held	responsible. On	the	other	hand, the	notion	of	purposiveness	appears	to	narrow	the	scope	of	agency	or	at	least	to reconceive	its	expressive	center	as	being	an	end	that	animates	the	rest	of	the	action as	a	means,	rather	than	being	a	specifically	mental	stance	than	animates	some succeeding	physical	realization. Second,	Hegel	wants	to	emphasize	the	new	universality	of	this	second	form of	agency,	and	this	he	does	in	his	very	first	presentation	of	it: "the	truth	of	the individual	is	the	universal,	and	the	determinate	character	of	the	action	for	itself	is not	an	isolated	content	confined	to	one	external	unit,	but	a	universal	content 14 containing	within	itself	all	its	various	connections"	(PR§119). To	speak	in	terms	of Hegel's	logical	theory,	we	might	say	that	precisely	because	it	is	a	conceptual	status	at which	the	agent	aims,	that	status	gathers	together	some	particulars	into	a contrastive	relation	both	internally	and	externally. Here	this	second	feature (universality)	contrasts	with	the	first	(purposiveness). Whereas	the	first	seemed	to restrict	the	scope	of	that	for	which	the	agent	was	accountable,	the	second	seems	to expand	it. Together,	these	two	features	help	to	specify	this	second	form	of	agency	as	a	form	of absolute	modality	as	we	have	characterized	it. Specifically,	the	goal	establishes	a continuum	of	alternate	possibilities	in	two	senses: first,	the	goal	contrasts	with other	related	goals	that	might	have	been	chosen;	and	second,	the	goal	establishes	a network	of	means	that	might	be	employed	and	resulting	forms	of	achieving	the	goal. In	fact,	these	first	two	features	are	linked	in	the	determinate	negation	of	the	first form	of	agency: "The	transition	from	purpose	to	intention,	is	from	the	individuality of	the	immediate	modification	[of	actuality]	to	the	universality	of	action,	to	the interiority	of	the	universality	of	the	action"	(VPR	III,	364).	The	"immediate modification"	would	be	an	external,	perceptible	change,	whereas	"the	interiority	of the	universality	of	the	action"	would	be	the	inherent	teleological	connections between	that	modification	and	other	features	of	the	extended	context. It	is important	to	see	that	the	tension	between	these	two	features	–	the	first	contracting and	the	second	expanding	the	scope	of	accountability	–	is	essential	to	this	form	of agency	and	definitional	of	its	integrity. The	easiest	way	to	see	this	is	in	terms	of	the	third	feature. This	form	of	agency	aims not	at	just	any	conceptual	status,	but	at	the	conceptual	status	of	independence. Precisely	by	distinguishing	between	end	and	means	and	adopting	a	purposive relation	with	respect	to	the	network	of	circumstances	and	processes	that	form	the context	of	action,	the	agent	claims	to	be	an	independent	originator	of	action	in	the world: "By	acting,	the	human	being	is	reflected	into	himself,	the	action	comes	out	of him,	he	is	the	beginner	of	the	action.	In	this	movement,	which	he	performs,	is	a content"	(VPR	III,	375). The	universal	conception	of	the	end	makes	this	possible,	but also	threatens	it	in	the	absence	of	a	definite	distinction	between	end	and	means. In moral	theory,	one	can	think	of	the	doctrine	of	the	double	effect	as	a	way	in	which this	first	feature	is	brought	in	to	tame	the	second:	At	first	I	appear	to	be	responsible for	all	of	the	manifold	and	extended	consequences	of	my	action	in	virtue	of	the	fact that	they	obtain	as	part	of	the	necessary	and	enabling	relation	that	the	specific circumstances	of	the	world	have	to	my	purpose. But	the	mere	fact	that	I	foresaw some	consequence	does	not	make	it	a	part	of	my	end	–	i.e.,	it	does	not	make	it	a	part of	the	content	of	my	intention	–	and	so	that	fact	is	insufficient	to	define	such	a consequence	as	one	for	which	I	am	accountable. This	third	feature,	then,	gives	a general	schema	for	all	of	the	different	forms	of	absolute	modality	that	might	be embodied	by	agents	where	one	feature	of	the	goal	that	defines	the	continuum	of alternate	possibilities	is	that	its	achievement	establishes	the	independence	of	the agent. 15 Now	we	can	return	to	our	formulation	of	the	problem	of	finite	agency	according	to which	such	agency	(1)	translates	subjectivity	into	objectivity	only	for	(2)	a	new opposition	between	subjectivity	and	objectivity	to	arise,	and	the	phenomenon	holds together	only	because	(3)	this	new	subjectivity	can	somehow	be	identified	with	the first	subjectivity. What	we	have	so	far	is	(1)	for	this	second	form	of	agency: someone	exercising	it	translates	a	goal	which	is	a	universal	end	into	objectivity	by means	of	the	whole	network	of	conditions	and	resources	in	which	they	are embedded. The	conception	of	the	end	as	universal	articulates	one	of	the	lessons learned	from	the	first	form	of	agency,	which	was	the	need	to	close	the	gap	between that	for	which	we	are	accountable	and	that	to	which	we	are	accountable,	but	without erasing	the	particular	subjective	stance	of	the	agent	in	contrast	to	their surroundings. Here	that	subjective	stance	is	represented	as	the	end	or	goal,	"the interiority	of	the	universality	of	the	action,"	but	because	of	that	form	it	is	inherently connected	to	the	network	of	means,	prominent	among	which	are	other	agents	and the	productive	resources	developed	cooperatively	between	them. Nonetheless	the tension	between	these	two	features	is	supposed	to	be	productive,	to	make	the	third possible	–	the	conceptual	status	of	independence	as	an	object	of	recognition. But	this	is	Hegel,	so	recognition	and	misrecognition	go	hand	in	hand. This	is	(2)– i.e.,	the	way	in	which	this	second	form	is	also	a	bait-and-switch	routine,	or	a	way	in which	we	aim	at	something	under	one	guise	but	hit	it	under	another	with	the	result that	our	initial	goal	and	our	final	achievement	appear	mismatched. And	here	we might	divide	the	two	forms	of	misrecognition	into	the	theoretical	and	the	practical (though	this	is	not	a	label	Hegel	himself	uses). What	I	mean	by	this	is	just	that	the first	form	of	misrecognition	concerns	primarily	the	agent's	understanding	of	the sources	of	their	own	motivation,	and	the	second	concerns	the	actual	failure	of agents	to	be	embedded	in	objective	systems	of	necessary	resources	for	agency. To	get	at	the	theoretical	form	of	misrecognition,	we	have	to	come	back	to	our	three constituent	projects	of	self-determination	(self-appropriation,	specification	of content,	and	effectiveness). This	form	of	misrecognition	is	driven	by	the	idea	that this	new	kind	of	inner	effectiveness	and	this	new	model	of	the	goal-directed	self	in terms	of	which	agents	appropriate	their	actions	to	themselves	create	deep	problems for	specifying	the	content	of	the	subjective	ends	themselves: For	the	content	of	these	ends,	all	that	presents	itself	here	is	(α) formal activity	itself,	inasmuch	as	the	subject	actively	commits	itself	to whatever	it	is	to	regard	and	promote	as	its	end	.	.	.	(β)	But	the	as	yet abstract	and	formal	freedom	of	subjectivity	has	a	more	determinate content	only	in	its	natural	subjective	existence-its	needs,	inclinations, passions,	opinions,	fancies,	etc.	(PR§123) That	is,	the	characterization	of	self-appropriation	as	the	mere	formal	ownership	of effectiveness	(α)	imposes	a	kind	of	cost	on	the	specification	of	content,	namely	that this	content	is	now	to	be	understood	as	naturally	determined. Here	is	how	Hegel puts	the	point	in	the	Griesheim	lectures: 16 Here	is	first	the	found	content,	here	is	not	yet	the	will	which	is	in	conformity with	its	concept;	the	concept	only	is	the	animating,	that	which	generates content	out	of	itself	.	.	.	The	content	is	here	thus	first	something	found.	It	still belongs	to	the	natural	subject,	but	it	must	at	the	same	time	be	internal,	it	is formally	that	which	is	mine,	but	not	the	content	of	my	freedom,	of	my concept;	the	positing	of	my	freedom	therein	is	just	positing	in	general	(VPR IV,	331). So	I	do	not	fully	recognize	myself	–	I	am	not	in	conformity	with	my	concept	–	when	I act	in	this	second	way. Even	worse,	this	looks	to	replicate	a	problem	we	already	saw in	the	first	form	of	agency	in	which	the	content	of	purposes	turned	out	to	be	a source	of	heteronomy	rather	than	autonomy. Here	is	why	the	problem	recurs:	in	order	to	tame	the	potentially	disastrous expansion	of	the	scope	of	accountability	introduced	by	the	universality	of	the	ends and	contexts	of	agents,	this	form	of	agency	insists	on	a	formal	feature	of	teleological processes,	namely	the	distinction	between	ends	and	means. So	it	is	by	means	of such	a	formal	self-conception	that	agents	appropriate	actions	to	themselves,	but	the formality	of	the	model	of	the	goal-directed	or	end-setting	self	has	a	perverse	and unexpected	effect	on	the	moral	psychology	in	which	it	is	taken	to	be	of	paramount significance.	Specifically,	it	structurally	highlights	not	the	desired	pure	activity	of	the rational	agent,	but	rather	the	particular,	given	contents	of	the	subjective	will.	This widens	the	Kantian	gap	between	the	two	aspects	of	the	will	in	such	a	way	that suggests	that	at	best	agents	merely	add	their	"oomph"	to	goals	that	are	already given	to	them	by	the	teleological	nexus	in	which	they	are	embedded. To	put	the point	in	Kantian	terms,	this	formal	self-appropriation	raises	the	specter	that	all practical	reasoning	is	hypothetical	rather	than	categorical,	and	thus	the	possibility that	there	is	no	autonomy	at	all. To	put	it	in	other	terms,	I	aim	at	a	conceptual	status of	independence	but	achieve	a	conceptual	status	of	dependence	on	the	sources	of my	goals,	and	this	means	that	I	achieve	a	status	that	is	just	as	much	achieved	for	me as	by	me:	"the	positing	of	my	freedom	therein	is	just	positing	in	general." But	as	we	saw	with	respect	to	the	first	form	of	agency,	there	is	a	version	of	(3)	here as	well	–	i.e.,	a	way	in	which	this	reoccurrence	of	the	divide	between	subjectivity	and objectivity	can	be	identified	with	the	first	in	a	conception	of	the	agent	as	an	object. In	this	second	form	of	agency	this	is	done	by	way	of	the	value	of	welfare,	which	is understood	first	as	the	satisfaction	of	the	totality	of	the	individual	agent's	needs	and desires	but	then	more	broadly	as	the	satisfaction	of	the	totality	of	all	agents'	needs and	desires. The	broader,	universal	conception	of	welfare	raises	it	to	a	distinctively moral	value,	on	Hegel's	way	of	thinking,	and	so	articulates	a	way	in	which	even	this conceptual	status	of	dependence	is	a	dignified	position	worthy	of	respect. In	this way,	the	formal	rationality	of	the	goal-directed	(end-setting)	self	holds	together	the different	instances	of	need	not	only	across	time	in	an	individual	agent	but	across	the experiences	of	different	agents,	and	so	holds	together	the	conceptual	statuses	of dependence	and	independence. In	Hegel's	dialectic,	however,	this	mitigating	feature introduces	another	distinctive	possibility	of	practical	misrecognition. 17 In	just	the	same	way	that	Hegel	ambivalently	described	the	new	form	of	objectivity arising	in	the	first	form	of	agency	sometimes	as	universal	subjectivity	and sometimes	as	the	choices	and	opinions	of	others,	he	ambivalently	describes	the value	of	welfare	as	both	universal	and	as	merely	involving	"many	other	particular beings	in	general"	(PR§125)	or	even	"the	particular	welfare	of	the	individual" (PR§126R). In	both	cases	part	of	Hegel's	point	is	to	introduce	contingency	into	the relation	between	the	individual	aiming	at	such	a	form	of	objectivity	and	that objectivity	itself	by	showing	that	we	aim	at	it	under	one	guise	but	hit	it	under another. In	this	form	of	agency	we	have	two	guises	of	welfare	–	one	formal	and	one material	–	and	though	Hegel	has	argued	that	in	principle	the	two	can	be	identified we	must	nonetheless	pick	one	and	hope	that	by	hitting	it	we	hit	both	targets. The identity	here	is	partial	–	it	is	like	the	overlap	of	two	spheres	in	a	Venn	diagram. One could	imagine	an	agent	with	color	blindness	who	knew	of	this	overlap,	but	couldn't visually	make	it	out	clearly	because	of	its	coloration. Such	an	agent	would	aim	at	the part	they	could	see	clearly	and	hope	that	by	doing	so	they	hit	the	overlap. Hegel thinks	that	some	of	us	have	a	moral	vision	in	which	the	particular	needs	that constitute	the	content	of	welfare	stand	out	in	relief,	and	some	of	us	have	a	moral vision	in	which	the	formal	self-ownership	of	the	goal-directed	self	(i.e.,	abstract property	right)	stands	out	in	relief. Both	groups	try	to	hit	the	overlap	between	right and	welfare,	but	the	limitations	of	their	perceptions	make	it	the	case	that	at	least some	of	the	time	they	fail	to	hit	their	target. Hegel	describes	both	kinds	of	misses,	both	kinds	of	practical	misrecognition. In	both cases,	an	initial	form	of	subjectivity	(either	right	or	welfare)	is	successfully translated	into	objectivity	only	for	the	other	form	of	subjectivity	to	immediately crop	up	as	in	opposition	to	the	objectivity	so	transformed. His	discussion	of	the	first –	aiming	at	the	identity	under	the	guise	of	welfare	but	missing	its	overlap	with	right –	comes	in	PR§126. Hegel's	example	here	is	stealing	leather	to	make	shoes	for	the poor:	welfare	is	made	objective	but	then	the	subjective	claim	to	property	right	is legitimately	raised	against	this	new	objective	situation. However,	he	is	more concerned	about	the	second	–	aiming	at	the	identity	under	the	guise	of	abstract property	right	but	missing	its	overlap	with	welfare. This	form	of	misrecognition comes	about	when	someone's	abstract	freedoms	of	ownership	and	contract	are respected,	but	they	are	nonetheless	deprived	of	the	material	basis	of	the	satisfaction of	their	needs. So	subjectivity	in	the	form	of	abstract	property	right	is	translated into	objectivity	only	for	the	subjective	claim	of	welfare	to	be	raised	in	opposition	to this	new	objective	situation. In	his	lectures,	Hegel	is	quite	clear	about	why	he	is	more	concerned	about	this second	form:	he	takes	a	fundamental	feature	of	his	world	to	be	the	close	proximity of	the	struggle	for	survival	by	the	poor	and	the	luxury	secured	by	legitimate property	claims	of	the	rich	(see	VPR	III,	397–98	&	VPR	IV,	339). And	so	in	the published	text	of	the	Philosophy	of	Right,	he	has	rather	little	to	say	about	mitigating structures	for	the	first	form	of	practical	misrecognition,	but	more	to	say	about mitigating	structures	for	the	second. 18 This	mitigating	structure	goes	under	the	name	"the	right	of	necessity."	As	Hegel initially	presents	it,	it	is	the	right	of	the	person	who	is	facing	the	catastrophic	loss	of their	life	itself	to	take	what	they	need	to	survive: The	starving	human	being	has	the	absolute	right	to	violate	the	property	of another.	He	violates	the	property	of	another	only	with	respect	to	a	limited content;	it	is	inherent	in	the	right	of	necessity,	however,	that	he	does	not violate	the	right	of	the	other	as	right.	The	interest	is	posited	only	in	this	little piece	of	bread;	he	does	not	treat	the	other	rightlessly	[er	behandelt	den Anderen	night	rechtlos]	(VPR	IV,	341). In	order	to	see	how	this	is	a	version	of	(3)	–	i.e.,	a	way	in	which	reoccurring	gap between	subjectivity	and	objectivity	can	be	partially	bridged	–	we	must	attend	to the	logical	structure	of	Hegel's	understanding	here. It	involves	an	explicit	reidentification	of	welfare	and	right	at	their	extremes,	seemingly	far	removed	from their	overlap	or	partial	identity. In	his	lectures	he	says	"Yes,	the	human	being	has	a right	to	this	unrightful	action.	For	life	is	the	totality	of	particularity,	the	entirety [Gesamtheit]	of	particularity	reduced	to	its	simple	form	.	.	.	Particularity	has	risen	to the	unity	of	the	I"	(VPR	III,	401). That	is,	any	particular	need	of	the	agent	would	be insufficient	to	override	a	rights	claim	or	provide	the	basis	for	a	rights	claim	contrary to	that	of	the	property	owner,	but	the	totality	of	those	needs	shares	the	kind	of formal	selfhood	had	by	the	personality	at	the	basis	of	the	property	claim,	and	so provides	a	competing	rights	claim. In	this	way,	the	new	assertion	of	subjective opposition	in	the	form	of	welfare	can	be	partially	identified	with	the	original assertion	of	subjective	opposition	in	the	form	of	right. But	Hegel	does	not	restrict	this	right	of	necessity	to	the	immediate	situation	of	the starving	person;	rather,	he	draws	wide-ranging	consequences	from	it: From	the	right	of	necessity	arises	the	benefit	of	competence,	whereby	a debtor	is	permitted	to	retain	his	tools,	agricultural	implements	clothes,	and in	general	as	much	of	his	resources	–	i.e.,	of	the	property	of	his	creditors	–	as is	deemed	necessary	to	support	him,	even	according	to	his	estate	[sogar standesgemäss]	(PR§127R). This	consequence	brings	the	partial	identity	of	welfare	and	right	introduced	by	the extreme	case	of	the	right	of	necessity	back	to	the	center,	back	to	common	structures of	life	and	the	ordinary	practice	of	moral	judgment. It	suggests,	then,	a	third	form	of agency	that	would	explicitly	aim	to	make	just	these	kinds	of	judgments	about	what kinds	of	needs	are	centrally	related	to	the	effectiveness	of	agency,	and	which	are peripheral. C.	The	Right	of	Insight	into	the	Good This	third	form	of	accountability	is	simpler,	in	a	way,	but	only	because	its object	has	become	so	complex	that	the	resources	of	morality	as	such	are	only	barely sufficient	to	characterize	it	even	in	outline.	As	we	have	already	noted,	this	third	form 19 aims	at	objectivity	in	the	form	of	the	good,	which	means	that	it	aims	at	an	objective consistency	of	right	and	welfare. But	in	the	previous	discussion	of	practical recognition,	right	and	welfare	showed	up	as	essentially	subjective	claims	(i.e.,	in	the technical	terms	of	the	three	projects	of	self-determination,	as	the	subjectivity	of	selfappropriation	and	the	subjectivity	of	content,	respectively). How	is	it	that	they	now show	up	on	the	objective	side	of	the	equation? The	threefold	pattern	we	have	been following	from	the	Logic	gives	us	the	key:	this	third	form	of	agency	has	taken	up precisely	that	theoretical	stance	that	identifies	the	two	reoccurring	forms	of subjectivity	with	each	other	by	identifying	them	as	shared	features	of	a	certain	kind of	object,	and	it	does	so	as	part	of	a	practical	process	of	planning. This	third	form	of agency	aims	at	an	objective	form	of	existence	in	which	these	two	kinds	of	claims	are in	some	sort	of	harmony	with	each	other	–	this	is	its	subjective	plan	that	it	attempts to	realize	in	the	actual	world. That	is	the	bait,	but	there	is	a	switch	as	well:	"Every	relationship	(Verhältnis) contains	an	ought	(Sollen)	and	even	the	good	does	not	get	beyond	the	ought.	The abstract	idea	of	the	good	should	be	realized.	Freedom	has	the	vocation (Bestimmung)	of	the	good;	freedom	that	is	particularized	in	its	own	self-this should	be	realized"	(VPR	IV,	349).	With	mention	of	the	"ought,"	we	have	moved	on to	(2)	–	misrecognition	or	the	way	in	which	the	opposition	between	subjectivity	and objectivity	recurs. The	obvious	way	that	this	happens	here	is	in	the	Philosophy	of Right's	version	of	Hegel's	so-called	"empty	formalism	objection"	to	Kantian	ethics. Here	is	Hegel's	presentation	from	the	Hotho	lectures: Duty	here	is	thus	completely	without	content,	genus	but	without further	determination	to	species	[Gattung	noch	ohne	Fortbestimmung zur	Art].	But	there	should	be	action	[Aber	es	soll	gehandlet	werden], and	so	the	question	arises:	where	does	the	determining	principle	[das Bestimmende]	fall?	In	duty,	with	respect	to	the	objective	we	have nothing	but	this	abstraction	of	the	good.	This	is	that	which	is	without determination,	so	the	determining	falls	on	the	subjective	side	(VPR	III, 424). We	have	a	conception	of	the	objective	good	that	ought	to	be	able	to	serve	as	the	only needed	aim	or	end	of	a	form	of	agency,	but	is	unable	to	do	so. To	put	it	in	the Kantian	terms	suggested	by	the	previous	comparison,	we	have	no	mediating	terms between	the	abstract	formality	of	the	law	and	the	particular	satisfactions	that compose	welfare. This	lack	of	mediating	terms	undermines	the	goal	of	this	form	of agency,	which	is	to	make	the	kinds	of	judgments	suggested	by	the	benefit	of competence	–	i.e.,	to	make	judgments	about	the	partial	identity	of	right	and	welfare The	question	then	becomes,	how	do	we	get	to	(3)	–	i.e.,	how	does	this	form	of	agency hang	together	despite	these	difficulties. There	can	be	no	real	hope	of	improvement on	the	subjective	side	–	Hegel	does	not	think	that	if	we	just	think	hard	enough	about the	nature	of	teleology	or	the	drive	to	achieve	goals	in	general	we	will	find	any specific	guidance	here. The	improvement	has	to	be	in	the	form	we	expect	from	(3), i.e.,	by	taking	the	theoretical	attitude	to	the	objective	side	and	identifying	these 20 competing	sides	(right	and	welfare)	by	means	of	a	mediating	kind. But	in	searching for	those	mediating	kinds	the	resources	of	morality	as	such	give	out	and	we	are forced,	Hegel	thinks,	to	look	at	the	ways	that	these	forms	of	moral	agency	are embodied	at	the	intersections	of	different	institutions	and	different	ways	of	life. These	institutions	are	the	ones	Hegel	discusses	in	Ethical	Life:	family,	civil	society (i.e.,	all	voluntary	associations),	and	the	state. The	ways	of	life	are	described	by Hegel	as	the	Stände	or	the	estates,	some	of	which	we	have	seen	already.	Each	of these	ways	of	life	is	a	form	of	absolute	modality,	but	Hegel's	interesting	point	is	that aiming	at	other	ways	of	life	as	objects	is	itself	a	distinctive	way	of	life	and	thus	its own	form	of	absolute	modality. IV. Conclusion Though	Hegel	has	a	strikingly	pluralistic	philosophy	of	action,	we	have	seen	that	he intends	that	philosophy	to	make	good	on	a	range	of	traditional	commitments running	from	the	necessity	of	alternate	possibilities	through	the	value	of	desire satisfaction	to	the	centrality	of	goal-directedness. It	is	of	course	true	that	many	of those	possibilities,	desires	and	goals	are	essentially	social	and	even	collective,	and that	determining	their	nature	is	a	public	and	often	retrospective	interpretive	act. But	that	determination	must	also	take	its	cue	from	the	interpretive	direction proposed	with	the	act	by	the	agent	herself,	and	the	notion	of	absolute	modality	is Hegel's	way	of	seeing	that	cue	as	consisting	in	the	suggestion	of	a	context	of interpretation	by	way	of	marking	out	the	contrast	of	the	action	with	a	certain	range of	other	possible	actions. There	is	a	hermeneutic	circle	here,	and	one	of	Hegel's most	unique	contributions	to	the	philosophy	of	action	is	his	development	of	the public	or	social	arc	of	that	circle. This	should	not,	however,	lead	us	to	overlook	the extent	to	which	he	developed	versions	of	the	categories	involved	in	the	more traditional	arc	of	that	circle,	such	as	modalities,	desires	and	goals. Patten,	Alan.	Hegel's	Idea	of	Freedom.	Oxford;	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press, 2002. Pippin,	Robert	B.	Hegel's	Practical	Philosophy :	Rational	Agency	as	Ethical	Life. Cambridge,	UK ;	New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2008. Quante,	Michael.	Hegel's	Concept	of	Action.	Translated	by	Dean	Moyar.	Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press,	2004. Speight,	Allen.	Hegel,	Literature,	and	the	Problem	of	Agency.	1	edition.	Cambridge, U.K. ;	New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001. Stekeler-Weithofer,	Pirmin.	Philosophie	des	Selbstbewusstseins:	Hegels	System	als Formanalyse	von	Wissen	und	Autonomie.	Auflage:	Originalausgabe.	Frankfurt am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	2005. Westphal,	Kenneth	R.	"'The	Basic	Context	and	Structure	of	Hegel's	Philosophy	of Right'."	In	The	Cambridge	Companion	to	Hegel,	edited	by	F.	C.	Beiser,	234–69. Cambridge,	1993. Yeomans,	Christopher	L.	Freedom	and	Reflection:	Hegel	and	the	Logic	of	Agency.	New York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011. 21 ---.	The	Expansion	of	Autonomy:	Hegel's	Pluralistic	Philosophy	of	Action.	New York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2015. 1See,	e.g.,	Pippin,	Hegel's	Practical	Philosophy,	15–16.,	Stekeler-Weithofer, Philosophie	des	Selbstbewusstseins,	355–7,	and	Westphal,	"'The	Basic	Context	and Structure	of	Hegel's	Philosophy	of	Right',"	245. A	related	though	sometimes	distinct interpretive	position	is	to	see	Hegel	as	a	compatibilist. 2See,	e.g., Quante,	Hegel's	Concept	of	Action,	120–38,	Speight,	Hegel,	Literature,	4–5 and	44,	and	Pippin,	Hegel's	Practical	Philosophy. 3	Patten,	Hegel's	Idea,	70. 4	Yeomans,	Freedom	and	Reflection,	sec.	1.1. 5	These	forms	of	accountability	also	have	legal	connotations	–	Michael	Quante translates	'Zurechnungsfähigkeit'	as	'sanity'	–	but	this	aspect	is	outside	the	scope	of this	chapter. 6	See	also	PhG	¶362,	where	Hegel	is	clear	that	all	successful	action	involves	some kind	of	self-confirmation,	even	when	that	success	is	measured	by	"the	enjoyment	of pleasure." 7	See	VPR	IV,	306	for	a	particularly	clear	statement	of	this. 8	Yeomans,	Expansion	of	Autonomy,	chap.	5.