Religious	beliefs	and	philosophical	views:	A	qualitative	study Helen	De	Cruz,	Oxford	Brookes	University,	hde-cruz@brookes.ac.uk This	is	an	uncorrected	draft.	The	final	version	is	published	in	Res	Philosophica	(2018,	vol. 95	(3),	477-504. Online	version	here: https://www.pdcnet.org/resphilosophica/content/resphilosophica_2018_0095_0003_0 477_0504 Abstract Philosophy	of	religion	is	often	regarded	as	a	philosophical	discipline	in	which	irrelevant influences,	such	as	upbringing	and	education,	play	a	pernicious	role.	This	paper	presents results	of	a	qualitative	survey	among	academic	philosophers	of	religion	to	examine	the role	of	such	factors	in	their	work.	In	light	of	these	findings,	I	address	two	questions:	an empirical	one (whether	philosophers	of religion	are influenced	by irrelevant factors in forming their philosophical attitudes) and an epistemological one (whether the influence	of irrelevant	factors	on	our	philosophical	views	should	worry	us).	My	answer to	the	first	question	is	a	definite	yes,	my	answer	to	the	second,	a	tentative	yes. 1.	Introduction Philosophers value rational belief-formation, in particular, if it concerns their philosophical views. Authors such as Descartes (1641 [1992]) and al-Ghazālī (1100 [1952]) thought it was possible to cast off the preconceptions they grew up with. Descartes likened the	beliefs	an	adult	has	acquired since	childhood to	apples	one	can cast	out	of	a	basket	one	by	one,	to	critically	examine	which	ones	are	rotten	and	which ones	are	sound.	Al-Ghazālī	wrote	in	his	autobiographical	defense	of	Sufi	mysticism	that 2 he started questioning the beliefs he acquired through his parents the moment he realized	their	pervasive	influence	in	how	religious	views	are	formed: ... as I drew near the age of adolescence the bonds of mere authority (taqlīd)	ceased	to	hold	me	and	inherited	beliefs	lost	their	grip	upon	me,	for I	saw	that	Christian	youths	always	grew	up	to	be	Christians,	Jewish	youths to	be	Jews	and	Muslim	youths	to	be	Muslims (al-Ghazālī,	ca.	1100	[1952], 21). Al-Ghazālī and Descartes assumed that mere reflective awareness of the role of irrelevant influences in one's religious beliefs is enough to counteract their distorting influence. Yet there is an increasing recognition that philosophical viewpoints and arguments are embedded within a broader cognitive and socio-cultural context, and that	one	cannot	simply	cast	off	the	beliefs	one	has	acquired	as	a	result	of	this	context. This	has	become	especially clear	with the	development	of	experimental	philosophy, a philosophical	method	that	aims	to	shed	light	on	philosophical	intuitions	and	background assumptions using empirical means. One branch of experimental philosophy has focused	on	intuitions	(the	so-called	"intuitional	program",	Sytsma	and	Livengood	2016). The intuitional program has uncovered substantial variations in intuitions about knowledge, beliefs, moral responsibility, and free will, depending on factors such as culture (Machery et al. 2004, Machery et al. 2017), and perhaps also-but more contentiously-gender	(Buckwalter	and	Stich	2014,	but	see	Adleberg	et	al.	2015). Experimental	philosophical	studies	have	put	pressure	on	the	tacitly	accepted	view	that philosophical	positions	are	solely	arrived	at	through	careful	reflection	and	argument.	For example,	Schwitzgebel	and	Cushman's (2012,	2015)	experiments	on framing	effects in trolley	scenarios	demonstrate that	philosophers	are	not immune	to	contextual factors when they	make	philosophical judgments. In these	experiments,	philosophy	PhDs	and MAs, non-philosophy PhDs and MAs, and people without PhD or MA degree, were presented	with	a	series	of	trolley	scenarios	involving	a	personal	harming	action	(pushing 3 a man off a footbridge to stop a train that would otherwise kill five people) and scenarios	involving	no	personal	contact	(flipping	a	switch	to	divert	a	trolley	from	a	track that has five people on it to just one person). Participants were then asked to	what extent	they	endorsed	the	doctrine	of	double	effect	(whether	using	one	person's	death as	a	means	of	saving	others	is	morally	better,	worse,	or	the	same	as	killing	one	person	as a	side	effect	of	saving	others)	and	whether	harming	people in	a	personal, face-to-face way is morally better, worse, or the same as harming someone at a distance (the personal principle). Philosophers were less likely to endorse the doctrine of double effect	and	the	personal	principle	if	the	push	scenario	was	presented	prior	to	the	switch scenario.	They	did so	even	when they	were	encouraged to reflect	on this task,	and in spite	of	the	fact	that	the	doctrine	of	double	effect	can	hardly	have	been	new	to	them. There	is	thus	increasing	evidence	that	philosophers	are	subject	to	non-rational	factors	in their work. Several authors have argued that philosophy of religion is particularly vulnerable	to	the	pernicious	influence	of	factors	such	as	personal	beliefs	and	upbringing, and emotional investment. For example, Draper and Nichols (2013) contend that philosophy	of	religion,	more	than	other	philosophical	disciplines,	is	affected	by	cognitive bias	and	group	influence.	Levine	(2000)	diagnoses	analytic	philosophy	of	religion	with	a lack	of	vitality	and	seriousness	in	its	treatment	of	topics,	notably	the	problem	of	evil:	if philosophers of religion weren't already convinced that God exists, they would not accept or formulate the rather slipshod solutions to the problem of evil. The worry these	authors	have is that	philosophy	of	religion is	a	thinly	veiled	form	of	apologetics, where	the	conclusions	philosophers	draw	are	already	accepted	in	advance. A related concern is that philosophy of religion may be intellectually impoverished, reflecting the beliefs of its practitioners (primarily, Christian theists and a	minority of scientific	naturalists), rather than	a	much richer	palette	of religious	views that remain unanalyzed.	Most	analytic	philosophers	work	in	an	environment	where	Christian	theism and scientific naturalism are the two main metaphysical views on offer, which may explain	why	these	are	the	only	ones	that	have	been	subject	to	systematic	philosophical 4 scrutiny. Alternative positions such as pantheism, deism, or ietsism are rarely mentioned (Schellenberg	2015), let alone thick theological views as can	be found, for instance, in	Hinduism	or	Mormonism.	Next to this, philosophy	of religion	may	be too narrowly	focused	on	the	rationality	of	theistic	beliefs	at	the	expense	of	other	questions (Schilbrack	2014).	This	focus	on	rationality	might	be	motivated	by	a	defensive	attitude	in some	philosophers	of	religion	to	desecularize	academic	philosophy,	and	in	others	(of	a naturalistic	inclination)	to	restore	it	to	its	former	secularized	state	(e.g.,	Smith	2001). Recent	studies	suggest	a	non-trivial	role	of	such	contextual	factors	in	shaping	the	views of	philosophers	of religion. For	example,	philosophy	of religion	has	disproportionately many theists compared to other philosophical disciplines (see e.g., Bourget and Chalmers	2014,	see	also	subsection	4.2	for	how	the	present	survey	compares	to	these findings). Philosophers of religion are influenced by their religious beliefs in their evaluation of religious arguments,	with theists reacting	more positively to arguments that are in favor of God's existence (Tobia 2016) and atheists evaluating arguments against	the	existence	of	God	more	positively	(De	Cruz	and	De	Smedt	2016). These findings indicate a correlation between irrelevant influences and philosophical views,	but	do	not	as	such	demonstrate	causation.	Qualitative	data	that	directly	look	at the role of contextual factors in philosophy of religion can shed light on how factors such	as	upbringing,	personal	experience,	and	emotional	attachment	shape	philosophical views. This, in turn, can help us to tackle a broader normative question, which has received	attention	in	the	recent	epistemological	literature:	is	the	role	of	such	factors	in shaping philosophical views rationally permissive? This paper presents a qualitative survey	with	philosophers	of	religion	to	help	answer	two	questions: Empirical question To what extent are philosophers of religion influenced by nonphilosophical factors, such as upbringing, personal experience, and emotional attachment,	in	forming	their	philosophical	attitudes? Epistemological	question	Is	the	role	of	such	influences	in	philosophy	of	religion	rationally 5 permissible? The	paper is	structured	as	follows. In	section	2 I	examine	how	irrelevant	factors	might shape	views in the	philosophy	of religion.	Section	3	discusses the	methodology	of the qualitative survey; section	4	provides a	detailed	analysis of its findings. In section	5, I assess	concerns	that	philosophers	of	religion	might	be	influenced	by	personal	religious beliefs and upbringing. I argue that some of these	worries are exaggerated, but that others	present	a	serious	epistemic	challenge.	I	address	the	broader	question	of	whether irrelevant influences on philosophical practice might interfere with our ability to rationally	maintain	philosophical	beliefs. 2.	Irrelevant	Influences	on	Philosophical	Practice Epistemologists debate to what extent evidence should determine what we could rationally	believe.	Typically,	when	a	subject	S	believes	that	p	she	does	so	on	the	basis	of justifying reasons, such as arguments or evidence for	p, and also as a result of other (non-justifying)	reasons,	such	as	wanting	p	to	be	true.	Broader	causal	factors	also	play	a role,	for	example,	S	may	believe	that	p	because	she	was	raised	in	a	culture	where	belief that	p	is	prevalent.	An	often-discussed	example	comes	from	Cohen	(2000,	16–18),	who mused that the majority of Oxford graduate students of his generation accept the analytic/synthetic	distinction,	whereas	most	Harvard	students	tend	to	reject it.	On	the face	of	it, it	seems	problematic	that	one's	acceptance	or	rejection	of	this	philosophical thesis is	dependent	on	the	graduate	school	one	happened	to	attend.	For	the	purposes of this paper, I will denote non-justifying reasons and broader causal factors as irrelevant	factors	(IFs).	These	are	defined	by	Vavova	(2018,	136)	as	follows: An	irrelevant	influence	(factor)	for	me	with	respect	to	my	belief	that	p	is	one that	(a)	has	influenced	my	belief	that	p	and	(b)	does	not	bear	on	the	truth	of p. 6 Should	philosophers	be	worried	about	the	role	of	IFs	in	their	work?	This	question	relates to the permissivism/uniqueness debate in epistemology. According to proponents of uniqueness,	a	total	body	of	evidence	permits	only	one	rational	doxastic	attitude: for	a given	proposition	p, "there is just	one rationally	permissible	doxastic	attitude	one	can take, given a particular body of evidence" (White 2014, 312). Uniqueness is a strong thesis; it is stronger than evidentialism,	which says that S is justified (not necessarily required)	to	take	a	doxastic	attitude	to	p iff	taking	that	attitude	is	epistemically	fitting, given	her	total	evidence	(Ballantyne	and	Coffman	2012).	White	(2014)	has	argued	that cases where IFs play a large role in belief formation are akin to ingesting a pill that randomly leads to	a	belief that	p nor	not-p, or swallowing	a	pill that	would randomly lower your credence that p to .1 or increase it to .7. The randomness of such pillpopping	cases,	White thinks, is	not	dissimilar to	accidental factors	outside	of	our	own control,	such	as	the	religious	background	of	our	parents. By	contrast,	permissivists	(e.g.,	Schoenfield	2014,	Vavova	2018)	argue	that	there	is	some latitude when we form our beliefs and credences. In some cases, we can rationally respond to	a	given	body	of	evidence in	more than	one	way,	coming from	a	variety	of starting points, and perhaps also use different epistemic principles to arrive at our reasoning.	Proponents	of	permissivism	offer	both	intuitive	and	formal	considerations	for their	position.	Intuitively,	it	seems	obvious	that	there	are	many	instances	where	people rationally disagree, such as scientists coming to divergent conclusions based on their differing evaluations of sources of evidence. To dismiss such disagreements as unreasonable,	or to	deem	the	scientists' conclusions irrational	because	of	background factors	beyond	their	control,	seems implausible.	Formally,	many	theories	of	rationality (e.g., coherentism, subjective Bayesianism) require that permissivism is true (Schoenfield	2014). However, the claim that it is sometimes permissible to have	more than one rational response	to	a	given	body	of	evidence	does	not	mean	that	this	would	always	be	the	case. Indeed,	as	Schoenfield	(2014)	argues,	there	are	many	situations	where	finding	out	that 7 one	has	been	subject	to IFs	when	forming	the	belief that	p is	a	proper	cause	to lower one's	confidence	in	the	credence	that	p.	For	example,	suppose	a	voter	was	targeted	by	a tailored	political campaign (based	on	her FaceBook likes, posts, and	private	messages suggesting she is anxious and xenophobic) with fake news suggesting that Muslim immigrants are swamping the country. After days of seeing such misleading news articles	and	ads, the	voter comes to the	belief that this is indeed the	case.	When	she finds	out	that	she	was	the	target	of	a	tailored	campaign,	it	seems	commendable	for	her to	doubt	her	belief	that	Muslim	immigrants	are	swamping	the	country,	and	she	would probably do well to double-check the news sites and other alleged sources of information she saw.	While there are a few claims in the literature that higher-order evidence is irrelevant when evaluating first-order evidence (e.g., Kelly 2005), most authors argue that not every attitude formed as a result of IFs is rational (e.g., Kelly 2014,	Horowitz	2014). Permissivism	is	thus	a	general	claim	that	it is	sometimes	permissible	to	have	divergent rational	responses,	but	fleshing	out	the	specifics	of	when	the	evidence	permits	multiple rational attitudes	has	been tricky. If IFs	were like	White's (2014)	pill-popping cases, it would be difficult to maintain our beliefs formed as a result of IFs in the face of knowledge	about their	origins.	For	one	thing,	a	pill-induced	belief (if such	a	belief	can exist)	is	highly	isolated,	because	ingesting	the	pill	is	a	single	event	quite	distinct	from	our other	actions.	By	contrast,	religious	and	political	beliefs	are	the	result	of	a	rich	tapestry of IFs such as the religious beliefs of one's parents and friends. Moreover, they are closely connected to other beliefs. Some authors (e.g., Simpson 2017, Vavova 2018) have attempted to outline general principles that	might help us distinguish situations where	permissivism	is	plausible	from	situations	where	we	should	be	genuinely	worried about the role	of IFs in	our	belief formation.	Simpson (2017), for instance, thinks that one	can	be	a	permissivist	about	a	given	question	Q	if	the	agents	involved	disagree	about Q	because they	have	different	cognitive	abilities	and	apply	different standards. In this 8 paper, I	adopt	a	moderately	permissivist	attitude1, i.e., I	hold	that	there is	often	more than	one	way	to	rationally	respond	to	a	given	body	of	evidence,	but	that	not	all	IFs	are equally	epistemically	benign. The	role	of	IFs	may	be	prominent	in	philosophical	domains	that	intersect	with	opinions laypeople commonly hold and express in everyday life, such as ethics, political philosophy	(see	Cohen	2000, for	a	discussion	of	this),	and	philosophy	of	religion. I	will concentrate	on	philosophy	of	religion	as	it	has	recently	been	criticized	for	its	perceived lack	of	impartiality	and	neutrality. 3.	Methodology To	address the	empirical question, I have	used	an	open, anonymized survey that	was exclusively aimed at academic philosophers of religion (i.e., at least at the graduate student	level,	working	in	a	university	context)2.	The	survey	was	structured	as	a	series	of open	and	multiple-choice	questions,	as	follows: Open	questions 1.	How	would	you	describe	your	current	professional	position,	including	your	function	in 1	There is disagreement about what would constitute a moderate degree of permissivism. According to White (2014), strong permissivism means that different people could, in some cases,	believe	p	or	not-p	based	on	the	same	body	of	evidence,	whereas	moderate	permissivism means that they	can	have	different	degrees	of confidence that	p is true.	Horowitz (2014)	and Kelly (2014) see moderate permissivism as the view that rational responses can be situated within	a	certain	range.	Other	forms	of	moderate	permissivism	(e.g.,	Vavova,	2018)	focus	on	the sources	of IFs rather than	how	people respond in the face	of IFs and	evidence. I	will adopt a source-permissivist	position	in	section	5. 2	A detailed examination of the role of qualitative research in philosophy lies outside of the scope of this paper. For a thorough overview of the prospects of qualitative studies in experimental philosophy, see Andow (2016, 1229), who says about qualitative surveys, "The most	straightforward	way	of	gathering	qualitative	data	would	be	via	surveys	which	incorporate open	response	questions."	The	present	study	utilizes	this	method. 9 the department (e.g., assistant professor), the type of school	where you are	working (e.g.,	a	small liberal	arts	college,	a	research-intensive	department,	a	regional	teachingoriented	state	school)?	Is	the	school	faith-based? 2.	What	are	your	primary	areas	of	interest	within	philosophy? 3. Can you tell something about the factors that contributed to your specializing in philosophy	of	religion? 4.	How	would	you	describe	the	reactions	of	others	(e.g.,	your	advisor,	your	colleagues) when	you	considered	to	specialize	in	philosophy	of	religion?3 5.	How	would	you	describe	your	personal	religious	beliefs,	or	lack	thereof? 6.	Do	you	consider	yourself	to	be	a	member	of	one	or	more	religious	denominations	or secular	organizations	with	ideological	content?	If	so,	which	one(s)? 7.	Did	your religious	beliefs	change	over time,	especially in the time	since	you	were	a philosopher?	Could	you	describe	this	change	(if	applicable)? 8.	How	would	you	describe	the	relationship	between	your	personal	religious	beliefs,	or lack	thereof,	and	your	work	in	philosophy	of	religion? 9.	(Optional)	Are	there	any	additional	anecdotes	or	personal	observations	that	you	think are	relevant	for	this	study? Multiple	choice	questions	for	demographic	data What	is	your	age	(in	years)? What	is	your	gender	(male/female/other)? 3	In	the	framework	of	this	paper,	the	responses	to	this	question	were	not	analyzed. 10 How many years have elapsed since you received your PhD? (I am still a graduate student/less	than	1	year/1-5	years/6-10	years/11-20	years/more	than	20	years/I	am	not a	PhD	in	philosophy	and	not	a	graduate	student). In	what	country	do	you	work?	(Dropdown	list	of	countries) As can be seen in this survey, I explicitly ask participants to reflect on the irrelevant influences	that	have	shaped	their	philosophical	thinking.	Thus,	the	survey	relies	on	selfreport, which has limitations that have been discussed in detail in the psychological literature.	The	most	prominent	of	these	are: (1) Inability to identify some of the IFs: given that experimental philosophers are uncovering	IFs	that	philosophers	were	previously	unaware	of,	which	play	a	role	in	their evaluation of philosophical scenarios (e.g., ordering effects, framing effects, cultural differences	in	intuitions),	it	is	likely	that	my	participants	did	not	identify	all	the	IFs	that might	possibly	impact	their	work. (2) Socially desirable responding: this is the tendency of participants to present a favorable image of themselves. It may distort the results of both qualitative and quantitative	studies,	on	a	variety	of	subjects	such	as	charitable	donation,	dietary	habits, and	exercising	(van	de	Mortel	2008).	Likewise,	even	though	this	survey	was	anonymous, philosophers may have responded to it in such a way that it enhanced their image. Given	that	philosophers	like	to	think	of	themselves	as	reasoners	who	are	mainly	guided by	rational	argument	and	inference,	this	might	lead	respondents	to	minimize	the	role	of IFs	in	their	work. From	(1)	and	(2)	we	can	predict	that	the	IFs	discussed	in	the	present	survey	are	likely	an underestimation	of	the	actual	extent	to	which	philosophers	of	religion	are	influenced	by IFs	in	their	work.	Recently,	more	quantitative	approaches	(e.g.,	Tobia	2016,	De	Cruz	and De Smedt 2016) have attempted to reveal unconscious bias in the evaluation of philosophical arguments for the existence of God. While such studies are better at avoiding social desirability responding and can also potentially uncover biases that 11 participants	are	not	consciously	aware	of,	they	are	typically	narrower	in	the	kinds	of	IFs that are being explored (in the studies mentioned, theistic belief). Due to (2) that philosophers	would	overestimate	the	role	of IFs in	their	work.	Therefore,	the	survey	is useful	for	identifying	a	range	of	IFs	that	philosophers	of	religion	experience	in	their	work, even	though	it	might	not	accurately	portray	the	extent	to	which	philosophers	of	religion are	influenced	by	IFs	(which	is	more	likely	to	be	underreported	than	over	reported),	it	is Given	that	my	emphasis	will	be	on	identifying	this	range	of	IFs,	and	given	that	the	survey is qualitative, the results will not in detail explore inferential statistics or possible significant correlations (with a few	motivated exceptions, as can be seen in the next section). The reason for this is that the true range	of IFs is likely	even	wider, and the extent	to	which	they	operate	probably	more	pervasive.	These	limitations	of	the	survey, as	well	as	its	exploratory	character,	need	to	be	kept	in	mind	when	evaluating	the	results. Participants were invited through a philosophy	mailing list (Philos-L) and	widely read philosophy blogs (Prosblogion-now continued-and Feminist Philosophers). The invitation clearly stated that the survey was exclusively aimed at professional philosophers of religion (the	multiple-choice survey	question	on	how	many years had elapsed	post-PhD	was	used to	exclude	people	who	are	not	professional philosophers. Graduate	students	were	included,	but	people	who	were	neither	graduate	students	nor PhD holders were excluded). Participants received an open questionnaire of nine questions,	which	they	could	fill	in	without	upper	or	lower	word	limit;	they	could	choose to	leave	questions	unanswered.	Typed	responses	were	collected	directly	using	Qualtrics survey	software. Two coders coded the answers to questions 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 using coding schemes I developed	for	this	study	(section	4	provides	details	on	the	instructions	coders	received). Coders	were	postgraduate	students	at	the	University	of	Oxford,	one	was	completing	a BPhil	philosophy,	the	other	was	a	graduate	student	in	theology.	They	received	a	training session	on	pilot	responses	that	were	provided	to	the	open	questions	to	make	sure	they understood the coding scheme. To preserve anonymity of the respondents, coders 12 received	a	version	of	the	survey	that	was	stripped	of	all	the	responses	to	multiple-choice questions	(i.e.,	they	had	no	information	about	the	respondents'	gender,	age,	or	country of residence). Given that the coding schemes were quite complex, Cohen's kappa, a measure	of	inter-rater	agreement,	was	moderate	κ=	.78	for	question	3,	.82	for	question 5,	.739	for	question	7,	and	.791	for	question	8.	Disagreements	were	resolved	through	inperson	discussion.	Due	to	the	exploratory	and	qualitative	nature	of	this	study,	the	focus will	be	on	the	reporting	of	qualitative	data	rather	than	statistical	analysis. As	philosophy	of religion is	a relatively	small field, insiders	might	be	able to	guess the identity	of	some	respondents.	To	reduce	this	risk	of	identification,	I	report	at	most	one response per participant (participants were informed about this). I did not edit responses,	except	for	obvious	typographic	errors. 4.	Findings 4.1	Respondents 150	philosophers	of religion	participated in the survey.	134	participants completed	all questions	(that	is,	all	questions	from	1	to	8,	as	question	9	was	clearly	marked	optional), 5	respondents	completed	all	but	one	or	two	of	the	questions,	and	11	answered	only	a few questions. My analysis includes the surveys that were completed or nearly completed	(with	nearly	completed	I	mean	that	one	or	two	of	the	open	questions	were not answered; this does not include the optional question 9), N = 139. 83% of the respondents were male; the remaining 17% were female (no respondent indicated another gender). This sample is thus more skewed toward men than the gender distribution in	philosophy,	which	has about	20-25%	women in the	UK	and the	US4. In 4	Data	from	US	doctoral	granting	departments	in	2015	suggest	about	23.14%	of	tenure track	or	tenured	faculty	members	are	female; 13 philosophy	of	religion,	the	gender	distribution	is	likely	lower	than	the	discipline	average, with informal counts of membership of the Society for Christian Philosophers and attendance	to	philosophy	of	religion	conferences	suggesting	about	10%	are	women	(see Van	Dyke,	2015,	for	discussion	of	the	causes	and	potential	remedies).	The	mean	age	in the	sample	was	43	years	(SD	=	13.6).	Most	participants	were	from	the	USA	(47%),	the	UK (27%),	and	Canada	(5%). Respondents were working in a wide variety of institutions, for example, faith-based small liberal arts colleges in the United States, large research-oriented universities in Germany, research-intensive institutions (Russell Group) in the United Kingdom, and two-year	teaching-focused	community	colleges in	the	United	States.	For	question	1	(Is the school faith-based?), 30% of respondents reported working in faith-based institutions.	Some	of	these	colleges	were	mainly	faith	schools	in	name,	e.g.,	"[my	school is] officially faith-based but it's hard to tell in practice-most students outside our faculty	don't	seem	to	know	or	care",	"The	university	is	religiously	oriented,	but	does	not discriminate	in	hiring	or	admissions	on	the	basis	of	religion." 4.2	The	religious	beliefs	of	philosophers	of	religion Responses to question 5 "How	would you describe your personal religious beliefs, or lack thereof?" were coded into the following categories: (1) Christian theist, for respondents	who	explicitly	identify	as	Christian	or	member	of	a	Christian	denomination, (2) Other theist, for anyone who explicitly mentions a non-Christian monotheistic religion, such as Judaism or Islam, (3) Other religious believer, e.g., polytheist, (4) Unspecified	religious	believer, someone	who	says they	are	religious	but	do	not	specify the religion, (5)	Atheist, someone	who says they	are	an	atheist, or reject any form	of supernaturalism,	(6)	Agnostic,	(7)	It's	complicated/other,	anyone	who	does	not	fit	in	the above categories. Figure 1 shows a summary of the results with the number of participants in	each	category in	N (categories	3	and	7	are	merged	to	make	the	results http://web.csulb.edu/~jvancamp/doctoral_2004.html.	In	the	UK,	the	percentage	of female	permanent	post	holders	stands	at	about	24%	(Beebee	and	Saul	2011) 14 more	readable). Figure	1:	Religious	beliefs	of	participants	in	the	sample	(in	N). In	line	with	earlier	surveys	that	examined	the	religious	beliefs	of	philosophers	of	religion (Bourget	and	Chalmers	2014),	a	majority	of respondents (N	=	85,	61.1%)	were	theists. The	vast	majority	of	these	were	Christian	theists	(N	=	80,	57.6%).	Comparing	the	present findings with earlier surveys (see table 1 for a summary), there is an association between	being	a	philosopher	of	religion	and	being	a	theist.	But,	as	we	will	see	further	on in	this	paper,	this	correlation	does	not	show	what	the	direction	of	causation	might	be. There	might	be	multiple	causal	pathways	to	explain	the	result.	For	example,	it	could	be that	a	religious	believer	has	more	personal	investment	in	philosophical	arguments	about the	supernatural,	just	like	someone	who	likes	or	engages	in	sports	is	more	likely	to	find the	philosophy	of	sport	relevant	(see	De	Cruz	and	De	Smedt	2016). Looking	more	into	the	respondents	who	called	themselves	Christian	theist,	respondents tend to self-identify as traditional or orthodox, e.g., "fairly conservative", "devout, Orthodox,	practicing	open	Christian."	Some	explicitly	endorsed	the	Nicene	Creed:	"I	am committed to the central claims of the Christian tradition, captured in the Nicene Creed", "I	affirm	the	Apostle's	creed	and the	Nicene	Creed.	Beyond that,	while I	have opinions, I regard things as pretty unsettled and tentative."	Moreover, a majority of Christians in the sample identified with specific denominations or movements, for instance: "Committed Christian (Eastern Orthodox, specifically)," "tortured but enthusiastic Roman Catholic", "I'm a relatively theologically conservative Evangelical Christian", "orthodox	Anglican ... a traditionally	minded	Christian", "I	do	not currently attend	an	Anglican	or	Episcopal	church,	but	I	still identify	with	the	worldwide	Anglican 15 Communion". Non-Christian theists were decidedly in the	minority: only one	Muslim and four Jewish participants completed the survey. These results are in line	with the perception	that	the	majority	of	philosophers	of	religion	are	Christian	theists	(e.g.,	Smith 2001),	and	that	most	of	them	are	fairly	traditional. Survey Percentage theists in Philosophy	of religion Percentage of theists not in philosophy of religion Total sample	size Number of philosophers of religion in the	sample Effect Size (Cramer's V) Bourget and Chalmers 2014 72.3% 11.6% 931 47 .38 De Cruz and De Smedt 2016 73.1% 23.9% 802 271 .474 De Cruz 2017 60.5% 15% 518 119 .455 Present survey 61.1% NA (this survey is only focused on philosophers of	religion) 139 139 NA Table	1:	Summary	of	the	association	between	theism	and	philosophy	of	religion	as	area of	specialization	as	found	in	previous	surveys	and	the	present	survey.	All	p-values	are <.001.	The	present	survey	has	no	p-value	or	effect	size	calculated	because	there	is	no contrasting	group	of	non-philosophers	of	religion	for	comparison. 16 Next	to	Christian	theists,	the	most	frequent	self-identification	was	atheist	(N	=	25,	18%). For	example, I	am	an	atheist	(although	I	was	raised	Protestant	Christian).	I	am	not	a	rabid or	evangelical	atheist (I try to	avoid	having	the	"convert's	zeal"); I	merely disbelieve in God's existence. - male associate professor at an international	branch	campus	of	a	large,	research-oriented	US	university. 5.8%	(N	=	8)	respondents	were	agnostic,	for	example: I am agnostic, I am afraid. I put this that way, because I think that agnosticism	is	perhaps	a	most	fair	stance	to	take	(we	do	not	know	whether God	exists	or	not,	and	we	are	unable	to	prove	that	he	does	or	does	not,	so this is the most intellectually fair option), but, altogether, it somehow seems	to	me insufficient (like	a	kind	of ideological	minimalism,	which	can easily	transfer	into	intellectual	laziness).	-	female	graduate	student,	Polish small	liberal	arts	college. 10.8%	(N	=	15)	participants	had	beliefs	that	fall	outside	of	traditional	theism,	atheism,	or agnosticism (coded in the categories 3 and 7). These participants frequently voiced conflicting	beliefs	and	doubts,	for	instance: Struggled	to	carve	out	a	conceptual	space	for	myself	as	a	spiritual	person, without	having	any typically "religious"	beliefs. I believe in a	God, and in my relationship to God as the source of value and meaning in my life. However,	I	doubt	the	veracity	of	almost	all	tenets	of	the	Christian	tradition I was raised in, and	which dominates	my department.	-	male graduate student,	faith-based	institution,	US. Some	of	these	non-orthodox	beliefs	included	panentheism,	pantheism,	and	polytheism, for	instance: Indeterminate	polytheism	(there	is	an	indeterminate	number	of	gods	in	the 17 actual	world,	whose properties/attributes and functions	we don't know.) -	male	assistant	professor,	Turkey. I	suppose	I	am	a	philosophical	panentheist.	I	don't	belong	to	any	organized religious	tradition,	but I	did	have	a	religious	experience	when	I	was in	my teens that convinced	me of the truth of some kind of	minimal superor extra-naturalist picture of the world. I think that what underlies the entirety	of	the	universe	is	divine,	and	that	it	is	not	exhausted	by	what	is	in the	natural	world,	and	that	it	is	purposive.	-	male	graduate	student,	US. The	remainder	either	described	themselves	generically	as	"religious	believer"	or	simply "religious"	without	any	further	specification	(N	=3),	or	declined	to	provide	any	religious affiliation	(N	=	3). 4.3	Motivations	for	Specializing	in	Philosophy	of	Religion Why did respondents choose to specialize in philosophy of religion (question 3, "Can you	tell	something	about	the	factors	that	contributed	to	your	specializing	in	philosophy of religion")? To code responses, coders used the following categories: (1) Religious upbringing, (e.g.,	Christian	parents) that	kindled the respondents interest in the topic, (2) Religious identity or experience (e.g., a personal connection or affiliation to a religious denomination), (3) Proselytism, witness, apologetics: the wish to propagate particular religious or areligious views, (4) Philosophical interest, finding religious questions interesting from	a	primarily	philosophical	perspective, for instance,	wanting to know whether theism is true, whether the existence of God can be proved, connection	to	other	areas	of	philosophy	such	as	metaphysics	or	ethics,	(5)	respondents found Religion a culturally, historically, or sociologically interesting phenomenon, (6) Education, including educational background (e.g., theology undergraduate), an inspiring	professor	or lecture	series, (7)	Other.	Coders	could	select	multiple	categories when	appropriate. The	most	frequent	response	was	religious	identity	or	experience	(36%,	N	=	50),	followed 18 by philosophical interest (33.1%, N = 46), education (20.1%, N = 28), and interest in religion	as	a	culturally,	historically,	or	sociologically	interesting	phenomenon	(14.4%,	N	= 20).	Upbringing	and	childhood	experiences	were	mentioned	by	15	participants	(10.8%). In	spite	of	the	widespread	perception	of	philosophy	of	religion	as	apologetics	(even	by some respondents in this survey, see below), 7.2% (N = 10) mentioned witness, proselytism,	or	apologetics	as	a	motivation	to	specialize	in	philosophy	of	religion.	7.9% of	participants	(N	=	11)	mentioned	reasons	for	specializing	in	philosophy	of	religion	that coders	could	not	fit	in	the	other	groups.	Results	are	summarized	in	figure	2. Figure	2:	Motivations	for	specializing	in	philosophy	of	religion,	in	percentage	(total	over 100%	as	several	participants	offered	more	than	one	reason). Looking	in	more	detail	at	the	responses	to	this	open	question,	the	emerging	theme	from respondents	who	answered	upbringing,	identity	or	both	(i.e.,	1	and/or	2)	is	that	to	them, philosophy of religion is a form of faith seeking understanding. When combining upbringing and religious identity as explicit motivators for engaging in philosophy of religion,	43.9%	of	respondents	mentioned	either	or	both	of	these	factors: I	am	a	catholic,	and	philosophy	of	religion	helps	me	in	deepening	my	faith 19 by	way of-paradoxically-putting the faith itself into question and even criticizing	it.	-	male	assistant	professor,	public	university,	Italy. I'm a cerebral religious person and thinking carefully about	my faith is a plus not a negative. I particularly enjoy working on the philosophical aspects of moral and religious diversity. Perhaps I am getting a better understanding	of	other	faiths	and	denominations	when	I	do	this.	-	female full	professor,	research-oriented	university,	UK. I was raised Catholic and have a strong respect for that tradition. This respect	has	led	me	to	be	interested	in	other	traditions	as	well.	At	the	same time,	as	I	have	studied	philosophy,	I	have	been	intrigued	by	arguments	for atheism.	My	parents	were	deeply	religious	and	intellectually	engaged	with their faith; this has surely had an influence on me. - male associate professor,	secular	small	liberal	arts	college,	US. Some	atheist	philosophers	of	religion	were	also	motivated	by	upbringing	and	questions of	their	religious	identity: When I was a child I was a very committed believer and participant in Christianity. I gradually lost my faith, and the finishing element was a section	on	philosophy	of religion	when I took	an introductory	philosophy course	in	my	first	year	at	university.	The	shock	was	huge	and	(believe	it	or not),	I	was	somewhat	suicidal:	I	felt	I	no	longer	had	any	meaning	in	my	life. I	think,	ever	since	then,	I	have	been	trying	to	understand	what	happened	to me,	and	wondering	whether	I	really	needed	to	abandon	my	faith.	I	also	find philosophy of religion intellectually fascinating. - female full professor, research-intensive	university,	country	not	disclosed. Many	respondents	reported	an interest in the	philosophical ideas	that	are	explored in philosophy	of	religion	(33.1%),	for	instance,	"I	wanted	to	find	out	whether	any	general religious claims about reality like "God exists" are true or false." Some respondents 20 thought philosophy of religion was also a good field to specialize in for pragmatic reasons: I've always been interested in the philosophy of religion but have specialised	in it	for	a	number	of	reasons.	The	contemporary	debates	tend to be on broader (metaphysical) problems than those in metaphysics, which tend to get very technical, and it sometimes seems as though the debate	has	strayed	too	far	from	the	original	question.	The	quality	of	work in	the	philosophy	of	religion	tends	to	be	lower	than	that	in	metaphysics,	so there	are	more	obvious	things	to	say in	the	debates.	Also,	as	an	atheist, I feel I can engage with the arguments and positions from an objective position.	-	female	graduate	student,	research-intensive	university,	UK. Few of the respondents were explicitly motivated by proselytism, witness, or apologetics	(7.2%): My	religious	commitment	helps	to	motivate	some	of	the	work	I	do	(part	of which involves defending and explicating Christian doctrine). - male assistant	professor,	research-oriented	university,	Canada. I	was	and	am	a	Christian.	I	believed	that	philosophy	could	provide	tools	for giving	much-needed	arguments	for	the	existence	of	God	and	for	Christian doctrines, which I would publish. - male emeritus professor, research university,	UK. The respondents who gave this motivation (N = 10) were all Christian theists, which means that 12.5% of Christian theists in this sample aver that they are driven by proselytism	(the	actual	percentage	might	well	be	higher,	but	it	is	interesting	that	there	is a	minority	of	respondents	who	recognize	this	as	an	explicit	motivator). Several	respondents	noted	the	cultural,	historical,	or	sociological	dimensions	of	religion as a motivating factor for engaging in their research (14.4%). More atheists (16% of 21 atheists) than theists (9.6% of theists) were drawn to philosophy of religion for this reason: Even though I do not believe in any religion or God(s), I do know that religion is an essential part of our culture. I am interested in the phenomenology	of	religious	belief	simply	because	it	has	been	so	important in	shaping	our	society,	and	in	particular	art/literature/etc.,	and	even	people who are not religious do live in a society that is importantly religious in many ways.	- female graduate student, research-intensive department, UK. 20.1% of respondents mentioned undergraduate education, inspirational professors, scholars whose work they read during their education, and other education-related reasons	for	specializing	in	philosophy	of	religion,	for	instance	this	respondent	mentions both	educational	reasons	and	philosophical	interests: I	grew	up	in	the	Christian	school	system,	so	I	knew	my	way	around	religion, despite	growing	more	and	more	secular	as the	years	went	by. I	was (and still am)	very interested in	medieval	philosophy,	which is	what led	me to questions	in	philosophy	of	religion.	Since	then,	I	have	spent	a	year	in	a	very old, German theological faculty, which awakened interest in figures like Schleiermacher and	Otto, and	my interests have now turned to religious experience and	philosophical accounts of faith and secularism.	- female postdoctoral	research	fellow,	public	university,	Germany. 4.4	Change	in	Religious	Belief	and	Philosophical	Practice Coders	coded	the	responses	to	question	7,	"Did	your	religious	beliefs	change	over	time, especially	in	the	time	since	you	were	a	philosopher?	Could	you	describe	this	change	(if applicable)?"	using	the	following	categories:	(1)	Little	or	no	change,	(2)	More	grounding or	sophistication	of	beliefs,	e.g.,	believing	something	on	the	basis	of	arguments	that	the respondent held unreflectively before, (3) Tempering of beliefs: participants have 22 become	less	dogmatic	or	less	entrenched	in	their	beliefs,	without	giving	up	those	beliefs, (4)	Change	from	one	religious	view	to	another, (5)	From	religious	belief	to	nonbelief	or agnosticism, (6)	From	agnosticism	or	atheism	to	religious	belief, (7)	Other:	any	pattern that	does	not	fit	1–6. Although	the	coding	scheme	was	fairly	complex	to	be	able	to	categorize	a	wide	variety of	observed	changes,	the	most	common	coding	was	Other	with	23.7%	of	respondents	(N =	33).	18%	(N	=25)	responded	with	little	or	no	change.	16.5%	(N	=	23)	felt	their	religious views	had	become	more	grounded	and/or	sophisticated	as	a	result	of	their	engagement with philosophy of religion. About the same number, 15.8% (N = 22) reported a tempering	of	religious	beliefs	(including	atheism)	to	less	extreme	positions.	Only	3.6%	(N =	5)	changed	from	one	religious	view/affiliation	to	another	as	a	direct	result	of	working in	philosophy	of	religion.	12.2%	(N	=	17)	went	from	religious	belief	to	nonbelief,	often	as undergraduates, when encountering philosophical objections to theism. By contrast, 9.4% (N =13) went from agnosticism or atheism to religious belief. Of the current atheists	in	the	sample	(N	=	25),	7	are	former	religious	believers,	of	the	current	agnostics (N = 8), 5 are former religious believers. This amounts to 33% of both atheists and agnostics	being	former	religious	believers.	By	contrast,	of	the	current	theists	(N	=	85)	in the sample, only 11 (12.9%) were former atheists and agnostics. This difference is statistically	significant,	Fisher's	exact	test,	two-tailed (N	=	118),	p	<	0.01.	Of	the	theists who converted to atheism, several stated that they had held unreflective religious beliefs before they studied philosophy. They subsequently began to question and abandon	them: I was a theist when I began university. It was during reading Hume's Dialogues in	my	second	year that I	began the road to	atheism. I	believed that Hume successfully undermined every rational reason I had for my personal	belief in	God	... I	have	to	admit	that	I initially	felt	very	confused, lost,	ashamed	and	angry	when	I	realized	that	I	no	longer	could	count	myself as a believer. But, at the same time, I had an overriding curiosity to 23 understand	how	it	was	that	I	became	such	an	ardent	believer	to	begin	with. -	male	research	associate,	public	university,	UK. For one respondent, his growing disenchantment	with arguments for theism	was the final	push	for	him	to	become	an	atheist: I	was	a	moderate	Christian	entering	college	...	I	recall	specifically	the	straw that broke the camel's back-that made me finally admit that I was an atheist.	I	was	reading	the	arguments	in	a	book	called	[redacted].	The	theist in the debate	was [redacted], and	his arguments	were so bad and	he so obviously	willfully	ignored	the	arguments	of	his	opponent	that	I	finally	said "I can't be on this side anymore"... This is not what convinced me that atheism	is	true-I	was	already	convinced	of	that-but	this	is	what	made	it okay	in	my	eyes	to	finally	admit	that	I	was	an	atheist.	If	I	truly	cared	about reason,	rationality	and	truth, I	could	not	self-identify	as	a	theist	anymore. -	male	associate	professor,	liberal	arts	college,	US. An	atheist	who	converted	to	theism	after	exposure	to	philosophical	arguments	wrote: In	the	beginning	of	my	studies	in	philosophy	of	religion,	I	was	an	atheist	(at least in the sense of lacking belief in God). I investigated many many arguments	for	and	against	the	existence	of	God.	I	discovered	that	my	initial impression	of	"the"	arguments	was	overly simplistic ... In the	end (or the next	beginning),	the	arguments	for	God	seemed	to	win	out,	and	so	I	began to lean toward belief in God. As I've progressed further in philosophy, I seemed	to	find	many	reasons	to	think	God	exists,	and	the	reasons	against God seemed less persuasive. Of course, I'm aware of the problem of polarization,	and	so	I	try	to	keep	testing	various	arguments	and	listening	to those who see things differently ... rechecking the arguments. - male assistant	professor,	research-oriented	university,	US. Many	respondents	(20.8%)	provided	a	complex	history	of	their	beliefs	over	time: 24 I	went	from	agnosticism	to	atheism	and	back	again	for	a	time,	experienced a	brief	conversion	to	a	broad	theism	about	ten	years	in,	and	more	recently settled	on	a	non-naturalistic atheism.	-	male full professor, small liberal arts	college,	no	country	provided. Some participants expressed more grounding and/or sophistication of their religious beliefs	as	their	work	in	philosophy	of	religion	progressed,	e.g.,	"I	grew	in	understanding of	the	things	I	believed",	"I	have	become	more	historically	grounded	and	sophisticated in	my	beliefs,	as	well	as	having	better	epistemological	support	for	my	beliefs." Some	philosophers	noted	a tempering in	more	extreme	atheist	or religious	views	as	a result	of	their	exposure	to	philosophy;	often	this	was	the	mere	fact	of	being	exposed	to other	views: I was raised in a very conservative, Protestant evangelical home, and I attended a high school and a college that fit well into this tradition. In graduate school I realized for the first time	what it	would	be like (in the Nagelian sense) to have a purely secular mindset ... This precipitated a crisis of faith that lasted about three years. Ultimately I returned to Christian	faith	but	in	a	significantly	changed	way	...	Attitudinally	I	would	say I	emerged	with	a	freer	mindset-a	greater	willingness	to	question	received doctrine,	and	less	worry	about	having	the	"right"	theology-than	I	went	in with.	-	male	associate	professor,	comprehensive	state	university,	US. 4.5	The	Relationship	between	Religious	Beliefs	and	Philosophical	Practice How do participants see the relationship between their religious beliefs and commitments	and their	philosophical	work (question	8: "How	would	you	describe the relationship	between	your	personal religious	beliefs,	or lack	thereof,	and	your	work in philosophy	of	religion")?	The	answers	were	coded	as	(1)	Intimate	relationship,	(2)	Looser relationship, (3) No relationship, (4) Religion takes precedence over philosophy, (5) Philosophy	takes	precedence	over	religion,	and	(6)	Other.	The	largest	group	(33.1%,	N	= 25 46)	saw	the	relationship	as	intimate: The	two	inform	each	other	very	closely.	I	hold	philosophical	views	in	large part	because	I	find	them	to	be	Biblical	and	I	interpret	the	Bible	through	the lens	of	philosophy	of	religion.	For	me,	the	two	do	not	and	should	not	come apart.	-	female	adjunct	professor,	middle-sized	university,	US. 10.1%	(N	=	14)	described	a	looser	relationship: I do not think that I am interested in religion because I am an atheist. Rather, it is fascinating to me that anyone should be anything but an atheist.	In	addition,	I	think	it	vital	that	we	understand	the	impact	of	religion upon society, both in its positive and its negative aspects. - male professor,	private	secular	university,	Poland. For 20 respondents (14.4%), religious beliefs are the most important, and their philosophical	work	is	ancillary	to	it: My philosophy falls under the umbrella of my religion, particularly my reading	of	the	Bible. If	philosophy led	to	some	conclusion	contrary	to	the plain	reading	of	the	Scripture,	I	would	'redo	my	sums,'	so	to	speak.	-	male assistant	professor,	Christian	liberal	arts	college,	US. A smaller group of participants, 6.5% (N = 9) has a "philosophy first" view, where philosophy	has	the	final	word: My	philosophical convictions crowd	out	any	vestiges	of religious	ones.	- female	full	professor,	secular	university,	US. 11.5%	(N	=	16)	claimed	there	was	little	or	no	relationship	between	their	personal	beliefs and	their	philosophical	work: There's	a	presupposition	here	I	reject.	My	beliefs	have	little	to	do	with	my 26 religious	practices,	and	my	work	in	philosophy	of	religion	isn't	about	what	I believe.	It	is	about	defending	various	conservative	theological	stances,	but it	is	a	deep	and	important	question	whether	I	believe	the	things	I	defend.	I am	committed	to	them,	though.	-	male	distinguished	professor,	researchintensive	faith-based	university,	US. The remaining 34 respondents (24.4%) had a relationship that was not easily categorized.	I	will	quote	two	examples	to	give	a	flavor	of	the	complicated	relationships participants	mentioned: I	think	this	relationship	is	complex.	It	is	certainly	there.	Anyone	who	claims their	research	interests	are	not	related	to	their	personal	narratives	is	either lying	or living the sort of soul-stultifying existence that does	not become the life of the mind. What the relationship is exactly is hard for me to discern. At times, I am exploring or even just playing with parts of the conceptual	landscape	that	happen	to	have	something	to	do	with	God	or	a religious	worldview.	At	other	times,	I	feel	I	am	combating	noxious	poisons that threaten truths	of essential importance.	At	other times, I think I am trying to explain	myself to	myself or am even complaining to God in an academic	venue.	-	male	assistant	professor,	small	liberal	arts	college,	US. I	would say that	my	personal religious	beliefs	partly	*motivate*	my	work and	even	*influence*	it,	but	they	do	not	dictate	it. A	recurring	motif	in	my philosophical thinking and	writing is rejection of (or at least a *wariness about*) naturalistic reductionism and methodological skepticism. These are	not	core	religious	doctrines,	of	course,	but	they	make	sense	in	the	light of	my	religious	commitments,	and	they	help	in	turn	to	make	sense	of	those religious commitments as well. And they have brought application in philosophy	generally	–	male	full	professor,	small	liberal	arts	college,	US. 27 4.6	How	Philosophers	of	Religion	View	their	Area	of	Specialization Many respondents spontaneously offered criticisms of their discipline for question 9 ("Are there any additional anecdotes or personal observations that you think are relevant	for	this	study?").	While	most	of	these	were	atheists	or	agnostics,	some	theists were also critical of philosophy of religion. Criticisms were mainly directed at the apologetic	nature	of	philosophy	of religion, its perceived lack	of real-world relevance, and	its	lack	of	attention	for	traditions	outside	of	Christianity.	Here	is	a	selection: Philosophy of religion is too	much focused on issues of	what is true and what is false, from a doctrinal standpoint, and	my latest thinking is that such issues aren't primary.	-	male distinguished philosopher of religion, US. The 'rigour'	and	analytical 'skills' in this	branch	of	philosophy	has	kept its (Christian) philosophers isolated and distant from the social, ethical and political changes taking place in other branches of analytic philosophy. Insularity has allowed the field to protect and to encourage narrowmindedness and overconfidence in the thinking of the best known (and best	funded)	philosophers	of	religion	in	the	world.	-	female	full	professor, secular	university,	UK. I would not be the first to say that philosophy of religion, especially "analytic	theology,"	is	simply	not	philosophy.	It's	Christian	apologetics,	and it	often	is	poorer	philosophically	because	of	that.	A	Christian	bias	pervades everything, and, once one becomes a non-Christian, the irrational faithbased	assumptions	and	intuitions	start	to	stand	out.	Philosophy	of	religion is increasingly out of touch	with the actual practice of religion in Europe and	the	Americas.	It	needs	to	be	revitalized	by	making	contact	with	the	rich religious	pluralism	now	evolving in	Europe	and	the	Americas.	We	need	to see articles by analytic philosophers on	Mormonism, Santeria,	Umbanda, 28 Wicca,	goddess	religion,	religious	naturalism,	new	pantheistic	movements, and	on	and	on.	-	male	full	professor,	state	university,	US. Philosophy	of	religion	is	a	field	well-suited	to	contribute	helpful	resources for clarifying confusion as	well as disagreement at areas	of cross-cultural contact,	but	the	field	may	be	hindered	in	this	effort	so long	as it	employs models of religiosity that have been derived from philosophical debates within Western Christianity. - male visiting assistant professor, small liberal	arts	college,	China. 4.7	Summary	of	the	Findings:	Addressing	the	Empirical	Question With	this	survey,	I	investigated	the	empirical	question	of	the	extent	to	which	IFs,	such	as upbringing and education, shape views in the philosophy of religion. I show that philosophers	of	religion	are indeed influenced	by	such	factors,	and	that	these	have	an impact	on their	philosophical	work.	The	answer to the	empirical	question is therefore yes, philosophers of religion are influenced by IFs in forming their philosophical attitudes. For instance,	43.9%	of respondents	explicitly gave their religious	upbringing and/or	identity	as	a	motivation	for	engaging	in	philosophy	of	religion.	Also,	only	11.5% of	participants said there	was	no relationship	between their personal religious	beliefs and their work in philosophy of religion. As I argued in section 3, due to socially desirable	responding,	and	lack	of	awareness	of	some	biases	and	influences	respondents likely	did	not	list	all	the	IFs	exhaustively,	so	the	role	of	IFs	might	be	even	stronger	than this	study	suggests. In the sample, significantly	more atheists who engage in philosophy of religion were former theists than the reverse. This asymmetry can be explained by the fact that philosophy	of	religion	attracts	people	who	find	religion	important,	and	such	people	are more likely to have a religious background or upbringing. The theme of faith seeking understanding that	emerged in this survey supports this	hypothesis. Those	who	come into contact with philosophy of religion as long-time atheists are less likely to be 29 interested	in	the	subject	matter.	The	high	percentage	of	Christian	theists	in	this	sample (57.6%),	several	of	whom	explicitly	endorse	orthodox	beliefs,	such	as	expressed in	the Nicene Creed, demonstrates that this group is highly represented in philosophy of religion, especially as compared to philosophy in general. The low representation of theists	outside	of	Christianity	(3.6%),	agnostics	(5.8%),	and	the	relatively	small	number of respondents who fall outside of the classical theism, atheism, or agnostic divide (10.8%), is reflected in the published work in philosophy of religion, which is mostly concerned	with	Christian	theism,	generic	theism,	or	atheism. The	view	that	philosophy	of	religion	is	primarily	a	form	of	apologetics-voiced	by	some participants in the survey-is not confirmed in this study, since only 7.2% of respondents (12.5% of Christians in the sample) provide proselytism, witness, or apologetics as a reason to engage in philosophy of religion. Some of the reasons philosophers	of	religion	chose	to	specialize	in	this	discipline	are	probably	similar	to	the reasons	other	philosophers	have	for	their	specializations:	33.1%	expressed	an	interest	in the philosophical ideas that philosophy of religion explores, and 20.1% mentioned education	as	a	source	of	their	enthusiasm	for	the	subject. 5.	Does	the	Role	of	Irrelevant	Factors	Challenge	Views	in	Philosophy	of	Religion? This	paper	started	out	with	two	questions:	the	empirical	question	(whether	philosophy of	religion	is	influenced	by	IFs)	and	the	epistemological	question	(whether	the	influence of	IFs	on	philosophical	views	should	worry	us).	In	the	previous	section,	I	addressed	the empirical	question.	In	this	section,	I	will	concentrate	on	the	epistemological	question.	As we	have	seen,	most	moderate	permissivists	(e.g.,	Vavova	2018)	do	not	think	that	all	IFs are	benign, and	acknowledge that in some	cases	we	do	need to revise	our	beliefs,	or lower	our	confidence	that	p	when	we	become	aware	that	it	was	formed	as	a	result	of	an IF.	By	contrast,	proponents	of	uniqueness (e.g.,	White	2014) think that IFs	are	akin to ingesting	a	pill that	causes	one to form	a	belief	at random.	Unfortunately, there is	no 30 generally-agreed principled account of which IFs are innocuous and which are pernicious. Schoenfield (2014) recommends to look	at the	extent to	which the	beliefs formed through IFs are in tension with one's other beliefs. According to her, beliefs formed	early	in	life	(for	instance,	through	upbringing)	are	less	likely	to	be	in	tension	with one's other beliefs, and thus we are permitted to maintain such beliefs. One unfortunate	consequence	of	this	view	is	that	one	can	hold	patently	false	and	irrational beliefs,	as long	as they form	a	coherent	belief system	and	were	acquired	early in life, e.g.,	someone	who	was	raised	with	scientologist	or	young	earth	creationist	views	could maintain	them	rationally,	as	long	as	she	refuses	to	incorporate	scientific	views	in	tension with her prior beliefs. This	makes the rationality of beliefs overtly dependent on the chronological order in which they are acquired. Kelly (2014) holds a more stringent position, arguing that rational responses are situated within a certain range. For instance, it	would	be irrational to	deny	anthropogenic causes	of climate	change	given the	evidence,	but	there	is	still	a	range	of	rational	responses	about	the	severity	of	effects of	climate	change,	such	as	the	projected	rise	in	sea	levels.	One	problem	with	the	range view5	is that it	does	not	make	any	claims	about	which IFs should	worry	us,	but rather concentrates	on	the	responses	that	are	reasonable	in	the	light	of	IFs.	For	instance,	one could be subject to a clearly bad IF, such as	White's (2014) hypothetical pill-popping cases,	which	would still be fine if the resulting belief fell	within an acceptable range. Vavova	(2018,	145)	proposes	that	we	only	have	to	revise	our	belief	that	p	when	we	have independent reasons to assume that IFs make our belief that p unreliable. She formulates	the	Good	Independent	Reason	Principle (GIRP). If recognizing	such IFs	gives you "good independent reason to think that you are	mistaken	with respect to	p, you must revise your confidence in p accordingly-insofar as you can." Given that this heuristic	still	allows	quite	a	lot	of	latitude,	and	since	IFs	are	pervasive	in	the	formation	of the philosophical views of philosophers of religion, this heuristic seems useful for evaluating	IFs	in	this	field. 5	For	another	criticism,	see	Horowitz	(2014). 31 We	have	so far seen that the	answer to the	empirical	question is	an	unequivocal	yes. Should this influence of IFs on the work of philosophers of religion be a cause for concern?	From the	armchair, some	authors	have	argued that	philosophy	of religion is subject	to	IFs	that	are	harmful	for	the	discipline.	Here	follow	their	main	objections: Self-selection: IFs, such as Christian upbringing or personal religious identity, have motivated a majority of philosophers of religion to specialize in it. There is thus an unhealthy	self-selection	going	on	in	philosophy	of	religion	(Draper	&	Nichols,	2013). Prejudice: IFs, such as atheist and Christian beliefs, make it hard for philosophers of religion	to	assess	evidence	and	arguments	in	their	discipline	in	a	dispassionate	manner because	they	have	a	personal	stake	in	it	(Levine	2000). Constraint:	the	cultural	background	of	the	majority	of	philosophers	of	religion	(western Christian	theism	or	naturalism)	has	led	them	to	regard	Christian	theism	and	naturalism as the default options, thus ruling out a variety of other potentially philosophically viable	beliefs	(Schellenberg	2015,	Schilbrack	2014). Considering	self-selection	first,	as	we	have	seen,	the	majority	of	respondents	admit	they are influenced	by IFs, such	as religious identity (e.g.,	being	a	Christian),	education	and upbringing,	to	a	greater	extent	than	by	intrinsically	philosophical	interests-although	to a	minority,	the latter	was	also	a	contributing	factor.	This leads	to	self-selection	among philosophers	of	religion.	Non-Christians	or	people	with	a	non-Christian	background	lack this	motivation.	While	this	results	in	a	relative	lack	of	diversity	in	the	profession,	does	it provide	individual	philosophers	of	religion	with	reasons	to	revise	their	confidence	in	the philosophical	views	they	hold,	using	GIRP?	Suppose	a	Christian	philosopher	of	religion, upon reading this study realizes he is also one of these Christians who became interested	in	the	subject	because	of	his	religious	upbringing.	This	fact,	by	itself,	does	not give	him independent	reasons	to think	his	philosophical	views	are	unreliable,	unless it turns out that Christians would be less good at engaging in philosophical work. One unfortunate	side-effect	of	self-selection	is	that	one	may	end	up	in	an	echo-chamber.	If 32 philosophers	of	religion	are	mainly	surrounded	by	people	who	think	like	them,	they	are lulled	into	a	false	sense	of	consensus,	i.e.,	that	the	positions	they	endorse	are	accepted in	the	wider	philosophical	community,	which	is	not	the	case6.	Still,	by	itself	self-selection does	not	seem	to	be	a	compelling	reason	to	revise	one's	philosophical	views. Prejudice is a	more serious charge, hinting at an unhealthy conflict of interest	where philosophers of religion, whether atheist, theist, or otherwise inclined, are merely arguing for	and	confirming	what they	already	believe.	Confirmation	bias,	which lies	at the	basis	of	prejudice,	is	a	prevalent	phenomenon	(Nickerson,	1998).	When	a	subject	S	is already	convinced	that	p,	S	will	typically	evaluate	evidence	and	arguments	in	favor	of	p as stronger than arguments against p. She is disposed to devote resources to find counterarguments and evidence against data that do not fit her belief that p. S's philosophical	views	would	be	widely	different,	depending	on	whether	she	was	raised	in a theist	or	atheist	household,	and	so	would	have	been the	arguments	with	which	she defends	her	philosophical	views.	Her	way	of	gathering	and	evaluating	evidence is thus dependent	on	an	initial	state	in	a	way	that	seems	pernicious	(see	Kelly,	2008,	for	similar concerns). This	survey	suggests	that	prejudice	might	not	be	as	serious	a	problem	in	the	philosophy of	religion	as	is	commonly	assumed.	We	can	think	of	prejudice	as	a	claim	about	how	IFs color	one's	evaluation	of	philosophical	evidence:	it	could	be	so	pervasive	that	one	never changes	one's	mind	as	a	result	of	philosophical	inquiry,	or	it	could	be	so	weak	that	one changes	one's	religious	views	profoundly	when	one	comes	into	contact	with	philosophy of religion. The	evidence	presented	here suggests that little	or	no change is relatively rare, but that conversions (from atheism or agnosticism to theism, from theism to agnosticism	or	atheism,	or	from	one	religion,	denomination,	or	movement	to	another) are	not	very	common	either,	together	about	a	quarter	of	respondents.	The	majority	of participants	experienced	some	degree	of	tempering,	deepening,	further	grounding,	or	a more complex change in their views as a result of engagement with philosophy of 6	Thank	you	to	David	Christensen	for	alerting	me	to	this	possibility. 33 religion. Given that lack of change was rare (18% saw little or no change in their outlooks), prejudice is less of a problem in philosophy of religion than is commonly thought. Constraint	looks	at	the	range	of	positions	philosophers	of	religion	typically	defend,	and states that they have been unduly constrained in their consideration of alternative positions (e.g., polytheism, Taoism) as a result of their cultural background. There is relatively	little	work	in	non-Christian	theist	philosophy	which	may	be	due	to	the	fact	that very	few	philosophers	of	religion	are,	for	instance,	Buddhist	or	neo-Pagan.	With	a	mainly western	Christian	or	post-Christian	background,	philosophers	of religion tend to see	a generic form of theism, Christian theism (exploring concepts like the Trinity or the Incarnation),	and	scientific	naturalism	as	the	default	options.	Thick	non-Christian	beliefs, such	as	Mormon	eternal	progression	or	Jain	jiva	(the	essence	of	a	living	being	that	gets reincarnated through different life forms), are ignored. Yet they seem as worthy of philosophical	exploration	as	thick	Christian	views,	which	have	received	ample	attention in the philosophical literature (see e.g., the cottage industry on the Latin and social Trinity	that	has	sprung	up	in	recent	years). Does the realization that philosophers of religion have left	many options unexplored provide them with a reason for skepticism about their current philosophical beliefs? Although	constraint	looks	superficially	similar	to	self-selection,	it	has	considerably	more skeptical	force.	For	self-selection,	a	philosopher	of	religion	is	asked	to	consider	whether her motivations might give her any reasons for doubting the beliefs she holds. For constraint, she has to consider that a vast conceptual space of religious views is left philosophically	unexplored	because	of	haphazard	factors	in	the	upbringing	and	religious backgrounds	of	philosophers	of	religion.	The	realization	that IFs	constrain	the	range	of viable options does provide a reason to reconsider one's confidence in one's philosophical views, given that one did not consider a	much	wider range of possible views from	the	outset.	To	take	an	analogy,	suppose	you	have	a	book	with	challenging puzzles.	For	one	puzzle,	you	are	given	three	possible	answers.	You	are	told	that	there	is 34 only	one	solution,	and	asked	to	provide	good	arguments	for	why	the	one	you	choose	is correct.	You	carefully	consider	the	options,	and	eventually	provide	arguments	in	favor	of one of them. But then you notice that some	pages	were torn out of the book.	Upon browsing	an	undamaged	copy,	it	turns	out	that	instead	of	only	three	answers,	there	are 30 possible answers. It seems rational to reduce your confidence in the position you have	argued	for,	even	though	you	were	even-handed	in	your	(limited)	choice.	Without considering the other solutions, your confidence seems misguided. Likewise, if a philosopher of religion comes to a carefully argued scientific naturalism, thin monotheism, or Christian theism, her confidence should	be shaken in the face	of the role of IFs in leading	her and	other philosophers of religion to consider only these as serious options.	Constraint has a negative epistemic impact on	work in philosophy of religion. 6.	Conclusion Do	irrelevant	influences	play	a	role	in	philosophy,	and	if	so,	should	this	worry	us?	I	have examined	these	questions	through	a	qualitative	study	among	academic	philosophers	of religion.	Philosophy	of	religion	is	a	field	where	we	can	expect	a	large	impact	of	IFs,	given how	intertwined	religious	views	(including	atheism	and	agnosticism)	are	with	everyday life. I	examined	the	empirical	question,	viz.	to	what	extent	philosophers	of	religion	are influenced	by	factors	such	as	personal	motivation	and	upbringing	in	their	choice	of	their area	of	specialization,	and in	their	philosophical	work.	This	qualitative	survey indicates that	philosophers	of	religion	are	at	least	to	some	extent	aware	of	IFs	and	that	personal religious	life	and	philosophical	positions	are	intertwined. For the epistemological question of whether these factors negatively influence philosophy of religion, I have taken a moderately permissivist viewpoint-at least in some	cases,	we	can	rationally	respond	to	a	given	body	of	evidence	while	being	subject to	IFs	and	thereby	come	to	different	conclusions.	However,	if	we	have	reasons	to	think 35 IFs make our beliefs unreliable, we should re-evaluate these beliefs. I have outlined three worries for philosophers of religion: the role of self-selection, prejudice, and constraint in the cultural backgrounds of its practitioners. Although self-selection and prejudice are frequently flagged as problems for philosophy of religion, they do not require	revision	of	opinions.	I	have	shown	that	constraint	plays	a	negative	epistemic	role in philosophy of religion, and that realizing how it limits the scope of philosophical investigation	does	require	a	re-evaluation	of	views	in	philosophy	of	religion. 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