i i :t.I' L 116 REVIEWS cesses of cognition in which the formation of illusions, the "false objectifiction of the presentationat forms," arises. He discusses certain inversions or reversals whereby reality is seen as making a demand rather than the person making a demand of reality, as when, with respect to final causality, the end is construed as a cause. Overgeneralization is identified as a funher source offalsity, wi;h ideologies as a prime example. Finally, illusory forms of everyd ay life, as play, language, and an, are considered. The spirit and methodology of the book are avowedly determined by a Marxist and Lukacsian position. For the reader who does not share this standpoint, rhe most interesting passages will be those where the author turns away from abstract theory to concrete examples. The laner, which reflect Almrisi's very considerable knowledge of history and literature, are often suggestive, but a per$Pective which politicizes the most mundane and inconsequential of activities, right down to games, will not always seem the most illuminating, The theoretical passages, expressed in the often turgid and opaque sryle of this genre, are heavy going, and while the tone of the work is highly reasonable, the observations none the less proceed from a point which does not see the need to go beyond assertion on fundamenral marers. Though this may, of course, be all illusion. BEDE RUNDLE SfeNLny AnONOWITZ, Scimce as Power' Discourse and ldeologl in Modern Socier.7, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1988, xii + 384 pp. A good way of reading this book is as an updated version of Lenin's Materinlism and EmpiioCriticism-except that Aronowitz is accusing virnrally all of Western Marxism (including French, German, and Italian versions) ofretreating to the phenomenalism and uncritical scientism that Lenin originally lambasted as "empirio-criticism." As Aronowitz sees it, Marxism overreacted to positivist strictures against history having a telos by divesting human agency ofany genuine purposefulness. This emasculation of the purposive only serves to enlist Marxists among the passive defenders.of the hegemony of modern science. Aronowitz drives home the point most effectively in his cririque ofHabermas (chapter 6), whose idea ofpurposeful human action is bifurcated between technocratic decision-making and the free expression ofone's personal perspective, Habermas thus fails to open a conceptual space for the transformation of the material conditions in which the sphere of human action is constituted. Aronowitz links this failure to Marxism's traditional aversion ro the material, which he interestingly ffaces to Marx himself being of one mind with classical polfuical economy on the desirability of minimizing physical labor. Aronowitz's positive project, which is explicidy deferred to his next book, is to use feminism and ecologism as a basis for constructing an epistemology that takes seriously the implications ofknowledge ofthe world always being rn the world, specifically in woildly creatures such as ourselves. By any contemporary standard, and especially Marxist ones, the book is remarkably well. informed on a variety ofphilosophical and sociological topics, including recent sociology ofscience. Along the way, Aronowitz offers illuminating reassessmen$ of Taylorism (as an instance of science colonizing a subjec matt€r rather than simply being applied to it), Lysenkoism (as having been better biology than its ideologically inspired detractors have admitted), and the work of Christophet Caudwell (as the first to see th€ indeterminism ofquantum physics as symptomatic ofscience turning against its bourgeois supponers). Curiously, though, the book seems to be less informed on mat' ters direcdy bearing on Aronowitz's own project. For example, no reference is made to the burgeoning epistemologies ofexperimental inrervendon (e.g. Roy Bhaskar, Ian Hacking, Patrick Heelan) or to the quasi-Marxist attempts to incorporate the Eajectory of mature science within a comprehensive social policy (e.g. Gernot Boehme, sal Restivo). Also, one may wish to contest the political feasibility of Aronowiet very quest for a "post-scientific'epistemology. Here it is telling that Aronowitz reads Bruno Latour as arguing that the laboratory is increasingly becoming the model of the world (a la Taylorism), whereas Latour is Probably better read as saying that the laboratory is becoming inlistingaisbablefrom the world, as more and more of society is incorporated into the Production ofscientificknowledge.CoutditbethatAronowitzwillturnouttobeanotheroneofthoseutopian socialiststhatMao*"to"at""g"i""-'ft"ty""'"'itwillbewonhreadinghisnextbooktofindout' STEVE FULLER RICHARDE.AQUILA,MaturinMind:AStudyofKant'sTranscmdcnulDedu''ioz,Bloomington' Indiana University Press, 1989, xiv + 245 pp' "TheKantianselfisorigina\self'conscious"'arguesRichardE'Aquila"'onlythroughconsciousness of the noematic "tit"r"'!' in the world of appearances' of its own noetic structuring of experience." Although.ttn ,t,ik"t me as being exactlt' and imponantly' right' I confess to being alittledisappointedbythebook,stardinessinarrivingatsuchhumdrumcorrelates_Strawsoncalls them,,obiects in.fr" *"igfr.y J.rr..l-^ rfr" hors., alnd ships figuring in Kant's favorite examples' Early on, Aquila acknowleago J"t f it "ptimary concern" lL' ^o'" in the vicinity of the subiective (as contrasted with the otlective) deduction oi the categories, and even in that regard one must not look to him for "n "*pti.iiy ,uroined effort at a ratiinal reconstruction of what might be sup' posed to tre Kant's ".,,,'a t'f1-tnt in th" Dtdo"tion' Connoisseurs of transcendental arguments will be pleased to learn, honi"n.., that Aquila does.provide a highty suggestive specimen of the genreonP.lT6,anditisinfactasanelaborationofthatcompressedargumentthathisbookproves to be most rewarding. The primary emphasis lies very much-in the.l3etic structuring of experience' though even herethereisawelcomesurprise.WheretaditionalKarrtianismhasstressedthenoblerpannerin the form/matter complex, ,io.ir"l, r"r" ""ncerned with the structuring than with what gets to be structrtred, thereby acknow#;;:;;;t subliminalty-the materialist turn in recent philosophy' In the first insrance .f," ..-*l?ti .l"l;; i, id"ntiti"a, in the Aesthetic, with the element of sensation that, on being subiecttJto'l'" forms ofspace and,time' yields sensory intuition' Beyond that' however, a fresh source .i;;;, will be needed to l"urr"h the Transcendental Deduction, and here Aquila appeals to the imagination a familiar.enou gh urtium Wid YeelAal.nq be tween sensa' tion and understanding--Gry pre-conceprual "retentions and anticipations" that even animals may be presumea ,o.,,;oy' nl"Jnlotio" ptonidt' the matter for intuitions' so-pretty much-do the'se reientions and anticipations supply the mafter for empirical concePts' concepts are even J;,;-;; #iodi"a in these r & a''s, and at one point we are told that "orr".pa" lurr'rr" r & a's, though that oversatement is quickly corrected' Concepts are at any rate constituted by r & a's. f" "t' tlpptop'l"tely 'materialist' vein Aquila is pronl to reduce concepts to their imaginatiu" lnntt'inl" '"i*"y' tot'"tai"g' however' that the standard account of concepts (as rules) must be accomodated as well' Rather too p.y"h.l";l;i;;'h" *o" analytically minded' Aquila's approach began to look promising to me only "ftt'";;;;;;;"a tr'" roilo*i"g refinement' ihttt ut" conditional (as well as categorical) anticipations, ;;";i;t;;y *ppose) on tlie animal level; and these vindicate themselves atloveallwhentheyproveinthe.endtosupplythematerialsforthedistinction,onthenoedclevel, betweenreversibleandirreversibleSequencesofrepresentationsthatwilllaterconstitute,byway of rules, the noematic t't"'"' ""a 'iip' of th" S""ond-Analogy" One can now understand why "neces' sity seems to be rhe ,"Iy.;;;;;gories to which KInt gives particular attcntion in the firstedition Deducti.",tr*"r.i"g.. p. fi;r,seeing that r"uerrib-ility and irreversibility are found to feature possibility ana impossibility' So the pure concepts of modaliry supersede even those of relation in the Kantian Program? If it is the A-p.ar,Jo., with its stress on the imagination to which his study is especially atuned, Aquila's .onditiJ ""ticipations pay off anew it hit "h'pt"t on the B-Deduction' Thus REVIEWS tt7 -4 , .=--=-:---7 119 REVIEWS I 118 REVIEWS I was enabled, for the first time, to get a grip on the distinction between subjective and objective judgments, i.e., Kant's judgments of perception vs. his judgments of experience, where the former sort ofiudgment or quasi-judgment is puzzlingly illustrated by this: "IfI supporr a body I feel an impression of weight." Again and again in his book but here above all Aquila demonstrares the power of his approach through a fierce encounter with the Kantian text. JOSE A. BENARDETE ROBERT AlJDl, Praaical Reasoning, London and New York, Routledge, t9B9,x + 214 pp. This book is one ofa series entitled "The Problems ofPhilosophy: Their Past and Present." Each volume in the series has a Part I which is an introduction ro rhe history ofthe problem in question and a Part 2 in which the author defends a preferred solution. Audi's historical introduction (pp. 1 l-82, approximately one third ofthe book) consists ofanalyses ofthe theories ofpractical reasoning of Aristotle, Hume, and Kant. These do not serve very well to define a "problem. of practical reasoning, but they do show that there is no historical consensus on rhe ropic. Although obviously influenced by Aristotle, Audi makes little use of this historical introduction in presenting his own view; so the two parrs of the book can be read independently. In Pan 2 Audi presents atheory ofthe basic elements and structures ofpractical reasoning. He makes a useful distinction between a "practical argumenf," which is a certain sffucture of propositions, and "practical reasoning" which is a corresponding process, normally involving motiva. tional and cognitive premises from which a practical judgment is concluded. He calls it an inferential realization of the corresponding argument. Audi devotes chapters to the relation ofpractical reasoning to intenrional action, to the dynamics of action, and to rational action, and has a chapter on the aJsessment of practical reasoning. He argues that practical reasoning does not genetically underlie the performance of every intentional action, but he does claim that to every intentional action (at least every one performed for a reason) there corresponds a practical argument, even ifthe agent did not reason accordingly. Such an argument is "reconstructively available" and often provides at least panial explanation and at least prima facie iusti{ication. In regard to the dynamics ofaction, practical reasoning serves both to guide an action based on it and to strengthen the agent's motivation to perform that action. It may also explain both how an intention is generated and why the action is executed when it is. Audi also gives an analysis ofweakness ofwill. A chain ofpractical reasoning may be outweighed by competing practical reasoning, by a standing desire, or by sheer impulse. In his chapter on radonal action, Audi summarizes the positions of Aristotle, Hume, and Kant, and develops his own theory of rationality as "well-groundedness." In the chapter on the assessment ofpractical reasoning, he calls attention to criteria for the soundness of the practical argument corresponding to a piece of practical reasoning, but he also points out that there are additional conditions needed to iustify an agent's making the inference and in believing rhe propositions. HENRY R. WEST C. EDWIN BAKER, Human Liberty and Freednm of Speecb' New York' Oxford Universiry Press' t989, viii + 381 PP' KENT GREENAWALT, Speecb' Crime' 6 tbe IJses ofl'anguage' New York' Oxford University Press' 1939, viii + 349 PP' Professors Greenawalt and Baker have both set out to develop a theory of free speech which can be utilized irr rnd"rrr"rrdirr!i.*i*.a.* of speech.differs from a general theory of human liberty, how it can be '"t"rt"tti '''ito " U'""1 ""a"*tanding of the nature and uses of language' ffi;;;. ;. be distingiished from language'based c"imes' This is no mean task' ;;;;;;;tJscholars these two gentlemen quite naturally ruro totheFirstAmendmentandtoU.S.constitutionaliurisprudencefoitheirmainfocus.Bothauthors are law professo,', b"t a"'pit" their heavy '"lio""t-"po" t"gal scholarship' several br nc es of phlosopi,y are utlized '. h'b ';;i;;;'*-"!'T""'1f li*:il:'liJ.Hit'"lilif t"J.t"'-'ll;r"' In a.ses,ing these two works' one finds Greenawatt' prose of irs arguments and -"iyJr -r* ary and tedious than Bakeii, but also (primarily) trecause -Greenawalt's strength tttt'""tt;;;;"il'i tt" rnaking'of endless distinctions between ryPes of issues and cases-a vitat but il;;;;;;;.". often, having argued strongly-and^coherendY for a panicutar disrinction, t"t"t;;;;;;"' "iy tt"l u" of ii' or"merely asiettt the funher implica' tt* 'r:t|;".|:i:'J:l'.1.",1"J1"., but disturbing error in Greenawarr: "Even in the extraordinarv instance when congress "';;;l;;" "ut" ititl*it"-to "ill " "onut"'ion' the requirement thet itvote by two'thirds in "utr'tiri""' ' ' '" tp' "'' "'.tt)' iio'e familiar with the Fifth Article of the u.s. constitution *u ,"".gii"" rri" conilation of the rwo-rhirds requirement for the convention call by the states with *"$;li:;4;';"-T1':li:congress to implement aconvendon and ro prac e bero'e .h " :':':: i"ri':'il**"*.m T"*: m:lr:l : ;ffi:i:: :::"11'r't well as to select one ol t convendons)' --L-rr^r *,irl,in q -..e seneral error ofinterpretation, for in the course ",0.,,:1':.".'"'"',il:iliii[Tff',,fi.:1*:ff:i:".:H;"i4" "'lm":::ji: "in'len'lion" of an amendmen., ar..""*"r,'"".-".1*ty-.."ogrii"", a" f"t".ll i.p.,t i'to any amendment's original intention, but he then fianslates federal imput to mean congtessional imPut' In the four t"tf'ta"'"i"t""itutional amendment' the;o which involvenational conven' tions do not Produce " '"";;;nJi"*1'1, i'"e11'.'ot" i' -"'av p:'*'l I ::::' ministerial duty: In the absence o{'a cJnventional call by two'thirds of the states, congress isunable to call a convention. tn 't'" p'""nit'of 'uth " ""ttt t"tt' Co"g'"* has no option ltl: :: :"lt '1 -"vention' If a properly called convention properly ProPoses an amendment (at lea'st one on the subiect of its call), Congre" o ut'ot''obUg"Itioit to''"t""i the method ofratification and to transmit the pro' o*"0 iT:lt;.ffil: 8ilifi -hich.both.autho:-,ll*. avoid are an overlv simplified notion of original intent, on tf'" t'""lia"' and a false strict constructionist' on the other' Whatever one may think of the ordinary f*bl.m, of original intent as applied to the body of the constitution' these authors delnon"'utiti"''"";;q;;;;fi" "pp*"tr"*htn applied to the First Amendment' where original intent is wi"di;.JJ#; ar'n"t''îil1l;rroto'" ol communications and sociery fr* ," *il""ffy altered over the intervening two centurles' As for a pn<r"y "ti"t"<r""ttttttit"*rn' l*tice. Black was infamous for telling intervrewers' .,.congress shall make J;;:. :',,;urr. .*-"oly th"t, t "" speech is not to be-restricted'" Now as both these scha*, p,*" *-ai n*are, free ,p.""hi, "l*"y, a'matter of drawing lines. Even ignoring such problems * '"d;;;' ;;'"""ity' "ni 'to"aer/liill' innurnerable crimes consist of (essen' tially) nothing m-" tr'"" tft""ft*tst Blackmail' extordon' harassment' incitement to riot' espronage'