D.	Mohammed	&	M.	Lewiński	(eds.)	(2016).	Argumentation	and	Reasoned	Action:	Proceedings	of	the	1st European	Conference	on	Argumentation,	Lisbon,	2015.	Vol.	II,	1093-1104.	London:	College	Publications. 1093 71 Meta-Reasoning	in	Making	Moral	Decisions	under Normative	Uncertainty TOMASZ	ŻURADZKI Institute	of	Philosophy,	Jagiellonian	University,	Poland t.zuradzki@uj.edu.pl In	my	paper	I	analyze	recent	discussions	about	making	moral decisions	under	normative	uncertainty.	I	discuss	whether	this kind of uncertainty should have practical consequences for decisions	and	whether	there	are	reliable	methods	of	reasoning that deal	with the possibility that	we are	wrong about some moral issues. I defend a limited use of the decision theory model	of	reasoning	in	cases	of	normative	uncertainty. KEYWORDS: bioethics, decision theory, metaethics, moral uncertainty,	the	ethics	of	war 1.	INTRODUCTION The simple fact is that even when we feel quite certain about moral issues,	we are susceptible to	mistakes. For example,	we	have to act in the face of uncertainty about the facts, the consequences of our decisions, the identity of people involved, people's preferences,	moral doctrines, specific moral duties, or the ontological status of some entities (belonging to some ontological class usually has serious implications	for	moral	status).	I	want	to	analyze	whether	these	kinds	of uncertainties should have practical consequences for actions and whether there are reliable methods of reasoning that deal with the possibility	that	we	understand	some	crucial	moral	issues	wrong. The	most promising approach is to try to extend the decision theory model of reasoning to encompass normative uncertainty (Lockhart, 2000). But this model, when used to guide our action in moral terms, is highly controversial. It assumes that in the face of normative	risk	or	uncertainty	we	are	rational	if	and	only	if	we	maximize expected	value	(whatever	it	is).	In	this	case	two	things	would	determine what	we	ought	to	do	under	normative	uncertainty:	1)	the	probabilities Tomasz	Żuradzki 1094 assigned to the various normative views; 2) the differences in values between the available actions, according to each of those views. This approach – if successful – would have some interesting applications both	in	metaethics	(e.g.	rejecting	nihilism,	see:	Ross,	2006)	and	applied ethics in	particular the	ethics	of	war	and	bioethics (permissible	killing people or animals, abortion, embryo research, see: Guerrero, 2007; Moller,	2011;	Friberg-Fernros,	2014;	Żuradzki,	2012,	2014).	Moreover, the argument (from moral or normative uncertainty) is also used in other	contexts	(Henning,	2015). The	main	problem	that	the	supporters	of	this	approach	have	to deal with is the question of intertheoretic comparisons of value. Normally,	when	we	use	expected	utility	calculus	we	use	a	common	scale by which it is possible to measure the values attached to different outcomes (this is one reason	why so	many examples refer to	money). But there doesn't seem to be any way of making this kind of intertheoretic	comparison	of	moral	values	between	different	theories	or doctrines. Moreover, recently a few philosophers presented other arguments	against	the	attempts	to	extend	expected	value	maximization style reasoning to encompass moral uncertainty (MacAskill, 2013; Weatherson, 2014; Harman, 2015; Nissan-Rozen, 2015, Hedden, forthcoming). 2.	MANY	FACES	OF	UNCERTAINTY There	are	many	ways	in	which	you	can	be	uncertain	about	the	morally important	aspects	of	your	action.	For	example,	you	could	be	certain	that some action can harm some people (or other beings with the moral significance),	but	uncertain	about	the	identity	and	the	number	of	people involved. A	combatant	who	fires indiscriminately from	his	gun	at	a	place inhabited	by	noncombatants	is	in	this	position.	He	knows	that	there	is	a serious risk that some innocent people could be fatally shot, but he knows neither their identity nor number. Alternatively, you can know that	there	is	a	serious	risk	that	some	action	will	harm	a	person	and	you can	know	who	is	this	person.	Someone	who	plays	Russian	roulette	with a	prisoner	of	war	is	in	this	position. Finally, you can be sure that some action will harm some identified	beings,	but	not	sure	about	its	ontological	or	moral	status.	The real-life examples	of	beings	with	uncertain	ontological	or	moral status (at least from the perspective of some people) include fetus, human embryos	(in	particular	at	the	very	early	stages	of	development)	or	some products (real or only possible) of genetic engineering. Some philosophers have also argued that it is the case of at least some Meta-reasoning	in	making	moral	decisions 1095 animals.	Analogically	to	the	two	above	examples,	one	could	be	tempted to	say	that	someone	who	aborts	fetus,	destroys	human	embryos	(during in	vitro	procedures	or	during	scientific	research)	or	kills	animal is in	a similar	position	as	soldiers	from	the	two	above	examples. In all these cases there is a risk that something that	has	moral status	will be harmed. So the popular argument says that in all these three cases there are strong reasons for agents not to act: not fire indiscriminately	at	area inhabited	by	noncombatants,	not	play	Russian roulette	with	a	prisoner	of	war,	not	harm	human	embryos	or animals. And	this	popular	argument	adds	that	it	is	also	a	reason	to	condemn	such actions no matter what their results are. It is wrong – says this argument	–	to	impose	a	risk	to	someone	who	is	not	liable	to	be	exposed, even if a potential victim is actually not harmed (review article about the problem of risk imposition: Hayenhjelm & Wolff, 2012). This argument	–	presented	very	often	by	Catholic	preachers	or	scholars	(but also, surprisingly, by defenders of animals rights) – treats all three above cases in a very similar way and is used to argue against the permissibility	of	abortion	or	destruction	of	early	human	embryos. It is usually	presented	in	a	form	an	analogy	to	hunting: Example	1:	Deer	hunting If I am	hunting	with	a rifle, and I see something	move in the trees but am unsure whether it is a deer or a person, I am obliged not to shoot until I establish that it is in fact a deer: better	safe	than	sorry	(Shaw,	2008,	p.	219). Catholic preachers or scholars (and vegetarians) argue that when someone	is	unsure	whether	some	being	has	a	full	moral	status	or	not,	he should be obliged not to kill it. Since it is impossible to resolve empirically	whether or not the target has full	moral status, obligation not to	kill is	not time-limited.	According to this	view	(see for	example: Friberg-Fernros, 2014) the same argument can be applied to human embryos (in particular in early stages): since there are reasonable doubts about their personal status, morality requires that human embryos	from	conception	be	treated	as	persons. 3.	FACTUAL	UNCERTAINTY	AND	THE	ETHICS	OF	WAR In this chapter I will use some examples from the ethics of war to demonstrate the difference between cases of factual and normative uncertainty.	In	a	war	context	the	question	of	risk	imposition	is	discussed usually	in	this	kind	of	context: Tomasz	Żuradzki 1096 Example	2:	A	security	checkpoint Imagine	that	you	are	a	soldier,	ordered	to	protect	a	military	or diplomatic convoy as it passes through hostile territory, and you see a car stopped by the side of the road ahead. Or imagine	that	you	are	stationed	at	a	security	checkpoint	and	a car	approaches	despite	signs	and	warnings	directing	it	to	stop. The	occupants	of	the	car	may	be	civilians,	but	they	also	may	be irregular	forces	waiting	to	attack	(Haque,	2014,	p.	65). So the question in this case is how certain should be a soldier that people at the front of him are combatant, rather than	noncombatants, before using deadly force? Surely, soldiers are in a different position than	hunters,	because	the	stake	is	much	bigger:	they	risk	their	lives	and they	risk	the	case	for	which	they	fight. In	a	hunter	case	there is	hardly anything	valuable	in	killing	a	deer	(except	from	hunter's	pleasure,	since I	assume	that	it	is	not	necessary	hunting).	In	this	sense	a	soldier's	case	is more	similar	to	some	cases	of	abortion	or	embryo	research,	where	the stake also can be quite high (the well-being or health of woman; development	of	science	during	embryo	research). The obligation not to kill civilians is well-established in international law and international theory. For example Protocol Additional	to	the	Geneva	Conventions	says: In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population	and	civilian	objects,	the	Parties	to	the	conflict	shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against	military	objectives	(Protocol,	1977,	art.	48). So	firstly,	all	participants	in	conflicts	must	determine	whether	an	aim	is legitimate or illegitimate target: they must distinguish between combatants and noncombatants (I will assume that combatants are people who are directly involved in hostilities, some of them can be civilians).	And	secondly, it is	permissible	to	target	only	combatants	(or other	military	objectives).	Of	course	this	description	is	highly	idealized, and I	we have seen in	A security checkpoint case very often it unclear whether the target of operation are combatants or not. Surprisingly, international law proposes a very similar rule to this one that was proposed	in	Deer	hunting	case: Meta-reasoning	in	making	moral	decisions 1097 In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall	be	considered	to	be	a	civilian	(Protocol,	1977,	supra	note 9). Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall (...) do everything	feasible	to	verify	that	the	objectives	to	be	attacked are	neither	civilians	nor	civilian	objects	and	are	not	subject	to special	protection	but	are	military	objectives	(Protocol,	1977, supra	note	5). This point of the Protocol does not specify any the level of care	with which a soldier must try to distinguish combatants from noncombatants. Neither this point specify how	much effort should be put in verifying (soldiers should only do "everything feasible"). In its literal interpretations it means that if there is any doubt about the nature	of	a	target	proceeding	is	prohibited.	It	would	mean	for	example that	in	cases	like	A	security	checkpoint	when	there	is	any	doubt	whether in an approaching car are noncombatants, soldiers are not allowed to use	deadly	force. In	many	conflict	situation	this	level	of	civilian	protection	would be too restrictive and some Western countries entered reservation about this	provision	(for	example the	UK	states that it "applies	only in cases of substantial doubt" Declaration 2002). Haque noticed that despite literate meaning of this regulation in the literature or commentaries the most common approach to this problem is the balancing approach according to which "both the required level of certainty	and	the	required	level	of	risk	vary	with	the	balance	of	military and	humanitarian	considerations" (Haque,	2012,	p.	63).	This	approach is visible in Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars when he writes about combatants'	obligations: The degree of risk that is permissible is going to vary with nature	of	the	target,	the	urgency	of	the	moment,	the	available technology,	and	so	on	(Walzer,	2000,	p.	156). It is also proposed by commentators who underline that combatants should	"balance"	possible	benefits	and	risk	to	civilians: The reasonable care rule is disquieting. It vests belligerents with considerable discretion in multifaceted balancing and legitimizes	even large-scale injury	to innocent	civilians	under certain	circumstances	(Waxman,	2012,	p.	1393). Tomasz	Żuradzki 1098 So	the	most	common	approach	among	scholars	is	quite	contradictory	to the literal	meaning of the Protocol: now	one expects that soldiers can act	only	if	he	is	100	percent	certain	in	all	cases.	In	some	circumstances solders	can	attack	even	in	the	face	of	substantial	doubts	about	the	status of target (when the military stakes are very high), and in some circumstances	soldiers	must	abstain	from	attack	in	the	face	of	even	very slight	doubts. It can be visible in the next hypothetical example, which is slightly	modified	version	of	the	Example	no.	1	A	security	checkpoint: Example	3:	A	security	checkpoint	(modified) Imagine	that	you	are	a	soldier,	ordered	to	protect	a	military	or diplomatic	convoy	[consisting	of:	a)	5	people;	b)	20	people]	as it	passes through	hostile territory,	and	you	see	a	car	stopped by the side of the road ahead. Or imagine that you are stationed	at	a	security	checkpoint	[consisting	of:	a)	5	soldiers; b) 20 soldiers] and a car approaches despite signs and warnings	directing	it	to	stop.	The	occupants	of	the	car	may	be civilians, but they also may be irregular forces waiting to attack. In	this	case	we	modified	number	of	solders	endangered:	in	the	a)	cases there are only 5 endangered soldiers, in the b) cases there 20 endangered soldiers. I assume that if the occupants of the car are irregular forces they will want to kill all soldiers. According to the balancing	approach	the	way	in	which	soldiers	should	precede	depends on	the	number	of	solders	endangered:	they	are	permissible	to	act	even	if they have	more serious doubts in the b-type cases than in the a-type cases. There	are	serious	objections	to	the	balancing	approach	in	case	of the ethics of	war (Haque, 2012), but I am	not going to evaluate them. Instead, I	want to	demonstrate that this kind	of balancing approach is even	more	difficult	to	use	in	the	cases	of	moral	uncertainty. 4.	MORAL	UNCERTAINTY	AND	BALANCING	APPROACH Let	me	start	this	part	with	a	typical	example	discussed	in	the	literature. Example	4:	Meat	eating Suppose,	for	example,	that	an	agent	is	uncertain	between	two views about the	morality of eating	meat. In one view, eating meat is tantamount to	murder; it is	much,	much	worse, then, to	eat	meat	than	to	abstain	from	it.	In	another	view,	it is	ever so	slightly	better	to	eat	meat	than	to	abstain	–	better,	perhaps, Meta-reasoning	in	making	moral	decisions 1099 for	reasons	of	health	or	pleasure. In	the	most	plausible	views of rationality under	moral uncertainty, it is rational to avoid eating	meat,	even if	one's	belief in	the	second	view	is	slightly higher	(Sepielli,	2013,	p.	581). At	first	sight	it	seems	that	this	example	is	very	similar	to	the	case	of	Deer hunting:	on	the	one	hand	we	can	act	in	a	risky	way	–	we	can	have	a	small benefit (a deer is ours; we eat a nice meal), but there is a serious possibility	that	we	do	something	very	wrong:	we	kill	a	person;	or	we	kill a	being	that	have	full	moral	status	–	the	same	or	almost	the	same	as	an adult	person. So it	may	seem that rationality requires to	do the	action with "the highest expected moral value". What does it mean? "An action's expected moral value is the probability-weighted sum of its moral	values	according	to	the	various	moral	views	or	theories"	(Sepielli, 2013,	p.	581).	Moreover, it seems that	any	plausible theory	of rational decision making under uncertainty will care about moral stakes of decisions	according	to	different	moral	theories.	So,	below	I	demonstrate that the expected moral value solution is only one of many possible solutions	that	were	proposed	recently. It is worth noting that other examples related with decisionmaking	under	normative	uncertainty	(abortion,	destroying	early	human embryos) are more complicated than meat eating because there are important	values	not	on	one	side,	but	on	both	(so	they	are	more	similar to the security checkpoint cases). Abortions are usually defended because of some important values at stake (well-being or health of a woman, the low quality of life of possible child). The same is with destroying of early human embryos either because of reproductive purpose (in	vitro fertilization)	or	because	of scientific research.	Below we	will	see	the	importance	of	this	difference. 4.1	My	Favorite	Theory	and	its	problems Probably the most obvious proposition how to act under normative uncertainty is My Favorite Theory approach. It says that "a morally conscientious agent chooses an option that is permitted by the most credible	moral theory" (Gustafsson	& Torpman, 2014, p. 159). Even if you have doubts about	meat eating, you are permitted to eat it if you believe	that	theory	according	to	which	animals	have	not	any	important moral	status	is	more	reliable	than	any	other	theory	about	animal	status. Although this approach looks very intuitive, there are interesting counter-examples. Consider the following case (adopted from (Gustafsson & Torpman, 2014) in which you can either choose action	A	or	action	B,	and	your	credences	are	divided	between	two	moral Tomasz	Żuradzki 1100 doctrines	MD1 and	MD2. You think that	MD1 is slightly	more reliable than	MD2	(I	introduce	some	numbers	for	convenience,	for	example	that your credence in	MD1 is 0,6 and your credence in	MD2 is 0,4, but of course	in	real	life	this	kind	of	precision	is	not	necessary). A B MD1	(0,6) Slightly	wrong Merely	OK MD2	(0,4) Saintly Morally	terrible Table	1 The descriptions of the results show the	moral evaluation of possible outcomes (wrong, merely OK...). In this kind of cases it seems that despite	the	fact	that	an	agent	thinks	that	the	moral	theory	MD1	is	more reliable	than	MD2,	she	should	act	as	if	the	theory	MD2	were	correct	or right	moral	doctrine.	It	would	mean	that	she	should	prefer	action	A	over action	B	–	against	My	Favorite	Theory.	Why?	Because	–	analogically to our	previous	case	of	Meat	eating	–	an	agent	may	prefer	not	risking	any serious moral wrongdoing. If she decided on B, which seems OK according	to	the	MD1,	the	favorite	theory	for	an	agent,	she	risk	a	serious wrongdoing	if	she	were	not	right	about	moral	theories	and	in	fact	MD2 were	the	right	doctrine. As in our previous cases related to the ethics of	war, this case also assumes the balancing account: the possibility of making comparisons and weighing different values on one scale. In recent literature	there	are	two	approaches	to	this	problem:	non-comparativism and	comparativism. This first	position	(Sepielli,	2013;	Nissan-Rizan,	2014)	assumes that there is no analogy between factual and normative uncertainties and it is impossible to make intertheoretic comparisons of values. It means that tables like Table 1 have no sense, because the moral evaluation of results (wrong, merely OK...) is different for MD1 and MD2.	So	it	is	meaningless	to	say	that	rationality	requires	that	we	avoid doing	something	morally	terrible	(according	to	MD1),	since	there	is	no common	"currency"	for	both	moral	theories.	This	common	currency	is	a necessary	requirement In	the	previous	cases	related	to	the	ethics	of	war	we	compared the values of soldiers' lives, the importance of	military target, and the value of noncombatants lives. Even if it is very hard to compare how much value "one civilian" versus some military target, the balancing account tries to do it. In cases of normative uncertainty this kind of comparisons	are	even	harder:	it	seems	that	there	is	no	way	for	making Meta-reasoning	in	making	moral	decisions 1101 this kind of intertheoretic comparisons of moral values between different	theories	or	doctrines. 4.2	Expected	value	approach	and	dominance	principle Comparativism	in	its	strong	form	(Lockhart,	2000;	Sepielli,	2009)	is	now an unpopular position. The main assumption of this view was to calculate the	expected	moral	values	of the	available	actions,	relative to possible axiologies, and summing up those expected moral values, weighted by the degree of belief that the corresponding axiology is correct.	There	were	two	main	propositions	how	to	do	it:	the	principle	of equity among moral theories (Lockhart, 2000), the reactive-attitude approach	(Sepielli,	2009).	Both	of	them	seem	to	be	obviously	mistaken (Sepielli,	2013). Comparativism in its weak form seems to be much better proposition. It has weak form because it does not require any calculation of expected	moral values of all available actions. It means that it	can	be	applied	only to	very	specific	kinds	of	situations in	which an agent's credences are not divided between two different moral doctrines,	but	between	only	one	moral	doctrine	and	some	doctrine	(or doctrines)	that	does	not	give	any	moral	reasons.	Its	conclusion	says	that if	some	theories	in	which	you	have	credence	give	you	subjective	reason to choose action A over action B, and no theories in which you have credence give you subjective reason to choose action	B over action	A, then	you	should (because	of the requirements	of rationality) choose	A over	B	(Ross,	2006). Let me introduce another example in which this type of reasoning	should	work	perfectly	well (this is	a	modified	version	of the example	discussed	by	Ross,	2006).	Suppose,	for	example,	that	John	must decide whether to kill some being (that could have important moral status)	or	not.	An	agent	strongly	believes	(it	is	doctrine	no.	1	–	D1)	that it	is	highly	probable	that	from	the	moral	point	of	view	it	does	not	matter if	he	kills	this	type	of	being	or	not,	but	he	is	not	absolutely	certain	of	his normative views. Let me assume that his degree of credence is 0.99. This	means	that	he	thinks	that	there	is	a	very	small	chance	that	another doctrine	is	the	right	one	(D2).	According	to	this	second	doctrine	killing this	kind	of	organism	is	in	fact	morally	terrible	(his	degree	of	credence regarding	this	view	is	0.01). A B D1	(0,99) Does	not	matter Does	not	matter D2	(0,01) Morally	right Morally	terrible Table	2 Tomasz	Żuradzki 1102 Accepting My Favorite Theory approach it does not matter what we choose	because	according	to	our	favorite	theory	there	are	no	reasons	in favor or against both possible options. In this case we could – for example	–	decide	by	flipping	a	coin.	But	an	agent	accepts	doctrine	that says that there is very small chance (0,01) that it would be morally terrible	to	kill	this	type	of	organism	and	morally	right	not	to	kill	it.	If	an agent	wants to	maximize the	expected	moral	value	of	his	decisions,	he should choose A, even though he believes that the probability that killing	this	type	of	being	is	morally	wrong	is	indeed	extremely	low. Why this case is different than described in the Table 1? The application	of	expected	moral	value	approach in this type	of	reasoning seems to be correct, because here there is no problem with intertheoretic comparisons of values. An agent does not have to compare in this situation any values or disvalues between different moral doctrines or views on the	moral status of this living organism, since one of views says that everything he does in the situation is morally	neutral.	So	it	seems	that	in	these	types	of	cases,	the	ANU	would indeed give a reason to prefer the safer option, only if the probability that	this	option	is	morally	correct	is	greater	than	zero. 5.	CONCLUSION In	this	paper	I	sketched	the	problem	of	meta-reasoning	in	making	moral decisions	under	normative	uncertainty.	I	found	that	there	is	a	promising type	of	meta-reasoning	proposed	by	Ross	(2006)	that	could	be	applied to	some	cases	of	normative	uncertainty.	However,	it	is	worth	noting	that this	kind	of	meta-reasoning	has	been	recently	extensively	criticized. In this paper – because the lack of space – I have not considered some important	arguments	against	meta-reasoning.	In	recent	literature	there are at least five such critiques. The first refers to the problem of "the infectiousness	of	nihilism"	(MacAskill,	2013).	This	argument	says	that	if we	have	nonzero credence in	nihilism it is impossible to	use	expected value reasoning (also in this weak sense of comparativism) in the situations of normative uncertainty, because the expected value of all options is undefined. The second refers to the problem with accessibility. Even if descriptive facts may often be inaccessible to agents,	we	could	assume	that	normative	facts	are	a	priori,	then	there	is	a sense in which any agent is in a position to know the moral truth (Hedden,	forthcoming).	In	this	case	there	would	be	no	such	situations	as normative uncertainty. Thirdly, some authors say that although nonculpable factual ignorance is an	excusing factor, it is	not the case	with normative ignorance which does not exculpate (Harman, 2014). The Meta-reasoning	in	making	moral	decisions 1103 conclusion	would	be	similar	to	the	first	critique:	there	is	no	such	state	as normative uncertainty. Fourthly, there is an argument from actionguiding	and fetishism	argument. It says that	morally good	people care non-derivatively	about	other	people,	their	well-being	and	the	like.	Metareasoning	would force agents to care not about people but about one thing: doing	what they	believe to be right,	where this is read	de	dicto and	not	de	re	(Weatherson,	2014). If this	critique is	right	probably	the best	theory	under	normative	uncertainty	would	be	My	Favorite	Theory account.	And	fifthly,	as	one	author	has	just	noticed	there	is	an	additional problem related with risk attitudes of agents, who are normatively uncertain. 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