COMPUTABLE RATIONALITY, NUTS, AND THE NUCLEAR LEVIATHAN S. M. Amadae Liberal democracy was saved only by nuclear weapons. ... NATO adopted the doctrine of MAD (mutual assured destruction), according to which ȱȱȱĴȱ ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȬȱȱ ǯȱdzȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱĚ ȱǯ -Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow A rational decision process will be understood ... to refer to the entire reasonȬ ing activity that intervenes between the receipt of a decision stimulus and the ultimate decisions. ... Such an approach forces rational behavior to be ȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ tional player as a suitably programmed computing machine. -Ken Binmore, Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱȱȱǰȱǰȱȱǯ -Paul Erickson et al., How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȬ rity concerns drove the development of decision technologies such as game theory, bounded rationality, operations research, and systems analysis.1 Recollecting such history is important because it enables us to see how these decision theories-game theory in particular-were Ȭȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱĚǯȱȱȱȱȱ "Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear Leviathan," in The Decisionist Imagination: Democracy, Sovereignty and Social Science in the 20th Century," ed. by Daniel Bessner and Nicolas Guilhot New York: Bergahn Books, 2018. ŗŝŚȲȊȲS. M. Amadae ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ǰȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ  ǰȱ neither the agents modeled nor the analysts using the models need an intelligible grasp of the problems they are solving in order to identify solutions. The mindless strategic rationality of game theory came to deȬ ęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȬ foundly entangled with the strategic posture it recommends. ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱ to observers because deterrent threats achieve credibility at the price of absurdly endangering constituents with apocalyptic terror. Far from the ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ sanctioned by game theory is not MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction), but rather NUTS (Nuclear Utilization Targeting Selection), referring to ȱȱ Ȭęȱǯ2ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢Ȭ metrically hold nuclear weapons in reserve to multilaterally counter a ȱĴǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ on coercive bargaining, threatening to introduce nuclear warheads into Ěǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ security because, according to strategic rationality, credible deterrence depends on preparing and intending to wage an omnicidal nuclear ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱǯȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ tisons intelligibility, or understanding of the problem it aims to solve, enables it to rationalize mobilizing and maintaining resources for ends that defy both moral reasoning and purposive action. This alienating logic of unintentional, and not necessarily intelligible, choice informing nuclear deterrence has been elevated to the standard understanding of classical western instrumental rationality, with detrimental conseȬ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ  ȱ ȱȱ ȱ Ȭ Ȭȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ Ȃȱȱ and collective action, including the exercise of national sovereignty. Section one introduces recent historiography to show how Cold ȱ ȱ ¢ȯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ game theory, and rational choice-erased the role of understanding, ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȬǯȱȱȬ ization of rational choice foreclosed on the idea of informed citizens who participate in a process of democratic will formation to oversee executive decisions. Section two investigates the entanglement of the content of game theory with the nuclear security posture it recȬ ommends. The substance of game theory grounds nuclear strategy, Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear LeviathanȲȊȲŗŝś ęȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ and win a nuclear war. Section three investigates how prominent soȬ cial theorists use game theory as a way to unify our understanding ȱȬȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǯȱȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱ

ȂȱLeviathanǯȱ	ȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱěȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱ enact corporate agency without the need for actors to be aware of their ȱȱ£ȱȱȱǯ3 Given the limited view of agency ȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱ game theory as a tool for institutional design and public policy forȬ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱ the introduction of appropriate incentives.4 The conclusion counters contemporary complacency over game theory and atomic warfare, emphasizing that both strategic rationality and the US nuclear weapȬ ons program are more entrenched than ever.ś As this paper shows, ȱ ¢ȂȱȱȱȬǰȱ ȱ ȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ nations to prepare omnicidal measures to engage in nuclear combat in which they can only achieve their end by perpetually threatening, or actualizing, the complete destruction of humanity. The alternative ȱȱȱȱȱȬȱȱȱȱ rationality and interpersonal social commitments that insist on intelȬ ligibility as a criterion of purposive agency. How Rationality Lost Its Mind Nuclear deterrence, as a topic of analysis, is typically left to experts. ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ¡Ȭ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ consultants with mastery of abstract decision theory.6 Although their Ȭȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȬ ǰȱȱȬęȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȬ cision theory was game theory, formalized by John von Neumann and ȱȱȱȱŗşŚŚȱTheory of Games and Economic Behavior.7 Game theory spans both strategic rationality, which refers to individȬ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ŗŝŜȲȊȲS. M. Amadae Ȭȱȱȱǯ8ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ consistently exhibit preferences over whether, for example, she prefers to travel to London, Singapore, or Cairo in all pairwise comparisons.

ȱ ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱ¢ȱŗşŞŖȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȃ¡ǰȱ formalized rationality was the only way to prepare for the vicissiȬ ȱ ȱ ĚǯȄśŘȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ěȱ  ȱ ȱ with game theory for its failure to generate a science of warfare by ȱ ŗşŜŖǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Gaming Agency dedicated to gaming simulations to analyze how Ěȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǯśřȱ ȱ ŗşŝŝǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ wrote a report identifying the American national security state as a ȱȱǯśŚ Nuclear strategists modeled deterrence itself using game theory, and the body of thought comprising it was and remains strategic rationality.śś Game theory thus provided deciȬ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ Ȭ ȱǰȱ ¡ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ and understanding.śŜȱȱȱ¢ȱȬȱ¡ȱȱ sponsor the initial development of game theory to solve logistical and ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱęǰȱ ȱ¢ȱȱŗşŞŖȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱŗşŞŖǯśŝ Possibly their enthusiasm followed from their propensity to believe that marȬ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱǯ Von Neumann and Morgenstern formalized game theory to be an Ȭȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ conceivable circumstances throughout the lifetime of rational agents.śŞ Every consideration of worth, insofar as it impinges on choice, can be, the authors insist, encapsulated into this formalism. Strategic ratioȬ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ¢ȱ ȱ ęǯȄśş Game ¢ǰȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ¢ȱ£ȱȱȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ nal.60 Therefore, only outcomes, and not principled or ethical means, ĴȱȱȬǯ61 Even if individuals can form coalitions to compete against other actors, once spoils are obtained, every group must disintegrate into individuals who compete among each other. ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȃ¢ȱęǰȱ ¢ǰȱȱȄȱ ȱ ȱȱęȱȱǰȱ equilibrium, as though by an invisible hand. ŗŞŘȲȊȲS. M. Amadae ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¡ȱȱ£ȬȱȬ petition.62ȱȱȱȬ£Ȭȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ rational actors would no longer have a clear template for action that results in predictable outcomes. To address this obvious limitation, game theorists consider repeating interactions in which a history of ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱDZȱȱȱ point outcome from which no single actor has any incentive to diȬ verge given the choices that all other actors made. Ĵ¢ȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȬ rists end up endorsing these characteristic limitations. Rules and norms are not deemed to guide action, but rather to merely describe behavȬ ioral regularities.63ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱhow our dominant form of social science and public policy analysis has so roundly accepted that purȬ posive agency can dispense with the meaning of action as a primary motivator.64 The fact that we use this theory of rationality to inform our nuclear security policy and to solve the challenge of credible deterrence ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ¢ȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ no coincidence that the theory of rationality governing the US nuclear ȱȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ rational action used to inform individual and collective action, as well ȱȱȱȱȬǯȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱǰȱ strategic rationality accounts for the most prosaic choices and the most DZȱȱȱȱȱǯ MAD, NUTS, and Game Theory ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ ¢ȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ǯȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȬȱȱȱȱ war rewrites the social contract between citizens and government. ȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ appearance of legitimacy given the impossibility of realizing this promise.Ŝś The state achieves such an appearance by downplaying the role of nuclear weapons in ȱȱ ȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȬȱǯ66ȱȱ most sectors of even US civil society are under the impression that nuclear policy has been and is structured to the end of deterring nuȬ clear war consistent with a policy, and the reality of, mutual assured posture Delete: ", and the reality of," Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear LeviathanȲȊȲŗŞř destruction (MAD), its actual policy stance is, in fact, NUTS. Deudney ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ£DZȱ ȃȱ ȱ of mutual assured destruction gradually became supplemental and then supplanted by nuclear utilization targeting theory and strateȬ ȯ ȱȱȱȱȱdzȱǯȄ67 The reality of NUTS-i.e., the US preparedness to engage in all levels of nuclear ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱǰȱ¢ȱǰȱȬ liferation, and escalation-is not made manifestly clear to the public because this would erode the remaining legitimacy from the social contract.68 Not only does government hold citizens hostage as the ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ nuclear engagement far beyond the outcome that would result from ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱĴȬ ing their alert status. There are four bodies of literature that provide evidence that nuȬ clear deterrence and game theory are coextensive with each other, that rational deterrence theory is the same as rational decision theory. One is the historical record of practice and engagement.Ŝş The second is the ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ on the one hand that the abstract formal theory of rational deterrence is game theory and on the other that the war gaming simulations used ȱȱȱȱěȱȱ ȱȬȱȱ and simulations that were indistinguishable from how actual scenarȬ ios would be handled.70 Third is the literature of strategic practice that ȱ ȱǰȱȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ problem of deterrence was viewed in terms of strategic rationality.71 ǰȱ ȱ ę¢ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ with theoretically exploring problems of nuclear deterrence, most imȬ portantly the credibility problem.72 Ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ě is important to all four bodies of literature. Those who follow his lead modeled the nuclear security ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ game.73ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȃȱȂȱȬ lemma didȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱȱȱȱǰȂȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱ mathematics of optimization to psychological laboratories to probȬ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱǯȄ74ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ ǯȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĚȱ  ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ Replace ',' with ':' ŗŞŚȲȊȲS. M. Amadae remain silent, seemed apt to capture the problem of the "Reciprocal ȱȱȱĴǰȄȱȱȱȱǯŝś However, on the other ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȬȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱȬ ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱ££ȱȱ the core of game theory.76 Given their inability to intentionally collabȬ orate, rational actors achieve suboptimal, and therefore inscrutable, results. ȱ ȱ Ȃȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵ¢ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ ȱDZȱȱȱ silent, or to confess. Four possible outcomes obtain, depending on the Ȃȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȬ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ goes free while the one who remains silent serves a lifetime sentence. ȱ¡ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĴȱěȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȬ ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǻȱȱȱǼȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱǼǯȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱĴȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ from the worst outcome of lifetime imprisonment (Table 6.1). ȱ ȱ ȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱĴȱǻȱŜǯŘǼȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŜǯřǼǰȱȱ ¢ȱȱĴȱěȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ at best dominance and at worst mutual ruin rather than singular deȬ feat. As the analysis goes, in an arms race, regardless of what the USSR ǰȱȱȱȱĴȱěȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ Ȃȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ the worst possible outcome for the other agent. These preferences are consistent with an aggressor or revisionist state.77 Joe Silent   Silent 1 year, 1 year ȱȱȱǰȱ  ǰȱȱȱ 10 years, 10 years Table 6.1:ȱȱȂȱ "both actors achieve" Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear LeviathanȲȊȲŗŞś USSR Defend Ĵ US Defend security, security surrender, victory Ĵ victory, surrender destruction, destruction Table 6.2:ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱǻǰȱǯǯǰȱǰȱStrategy of Ě) USSR Disarm Arm US Disarm peace, peace submission, dominance Arm dominance, submission precarity, precarity Table 6.3: Nuclear Arms Race (see, e.g., Campbell and Sowden, Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation)

ȱȱȱȱȱȱDZȱǰȱȬ tomatic deterrence, institutional deterrence, and the assertive stance of escalation dominance, which he calls nuclear strategism. According to strategic rationality, which is presented as a comprehensive and Ȭȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ Ȭ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ity and intention to wage nuclear war. Additional features of nuclear ǰȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱȱǯȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ land invasion into Europe. However, now that US conventional arms ȱȱĜȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ęȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȬ aration of nuclear weapons from conventional weapons.şŘ This would ȱȱȱȱDZȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȬ paredness and capability to resort to nuclear warfare, deterrence-or, ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȂȱȬ ȯ ȱȱ¢ǯȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱĴǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱ Actors are motivated to avoid harm because it is directly contrary to their interests. The overall strategy of developing and maintaining the physical and institutional infrastructure to perpetuate nuclear threats Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear LeviathanȲȊȲŗŞş ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ¡ȱȱȱȱǯȱ  ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ ¡ȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȬ ing, understanding, and recognition can provide reasons and causes for action. From a Uni!ed Social Ontology to a Uni!ed World Order ȱȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ explain all levels of agency, from the biological and human to the corpoȬ rate and sovereign. Theorists posit that all coherent purposive agency must obey the dictates of rational choice. The state, originally analyzed ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȬȱ¡ȱȱȱ and politics.şřȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱ£ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȬǰȱ that exerting the most singular impact on life planetwide, is how and ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱĚȱȂȱȱ¢ȱȱ devastating and credible threats of harm. The rational choice approach to politics, collective action, and warfare is realist in the sense that it ȱ£ȱęȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȬ dled strategic pursuit of ends.şŚ This realism permeates the analytic decision technology of strategic rationality itself because it promotes an understanding and practice of communication that denies intention, ǰȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ ence of signaling asymmetric information of what world states obtain, ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȂȱǯşś ȱȱȱȱHow Reason Almost Lost Its Mindǰȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȬȬ hand with the abandonment of mindless rationality.şŜȱ  ǰȱȱ as the nuclear security dilemma remains as pressing as during any ȱȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ęȱ ȱȱȱȱ Ȭęȱ¢ǯşŝ Now strategic ratioȬ ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȬȱȱȱȬ rity and logistical planning, as well as a paradigm for rational action, but also serves as a means to provide a unifying logic of action that spans across all levels and types of agency. Thus, rational decision theȬ ory is applied to evolving organisms, cognition, language, individual nation state ŗşŖȲȊȲS. M. Amadae agency, collective agency, hybrid systems of human and robotic acȬ tors, formal and informal institutions, and arriving at sovereign deȬ cisions. The theorist Fancesco Guala refers to this broad application ȱȱȱȱȱȃęȱȱ¢ǯȄşŞ Economist Herbert ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ encompass both animal and human behavior.şş Rather than being a relic of the past, robotic rationality has become so normal that those ȱȱȱȱȯĴȱȬ Ȭ ing, commitment to principles as opposed to only being incentivized by outcomes, solidarity and team reasoning, shared intention, and Ȭȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¡ȯȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ prospective casualties are mind, intention, and intelligibility. The paradigm of computational rationality comfortably sustains the position that mind is an illusion that will gradually fall away.100 Some urge us to grasp that we are in the midst of a fourth revolution. ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ have given way, so too will our view that we are categorically distinct ȱęȱǯ101ȱ  ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱĴȱȱȱ strategic rationality as a template for human intelligence, we already ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬȱ ȱȬ prehension of the meaning of actions is irrelevant to rational choice.102 Furthermore, insofar as this model of rationality presents a normative ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ hension of how following the rules they are incentivized to follow ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęǯ103 ǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱǰȱ¢ȱĚȱȱȱȬ ȱȱ¢ȱȂȱȱȱǯ The titles of two recent papers convey the trend toward viewing the ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱDZȱȃȱ ¢DZȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ¡£Ȅȱȱȃȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱǰȱ ȱǯȄ104 This branch of research, referred to as computational rationality, uses exȬ pected utility theory as the basis for how organisms, including peoȬ ple, register external states of the world in brain states.ŗŖś Life forms ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȬȱȱȱȱȱȃȬȬ cessing mechanisms by selecting an optimal program for a bounded ȱ ȱ¡£ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱǯȄ106 According Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear LeviathanȲȊȲŗşŗ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱScienceǰȱȃȱęȱȱ ęȱȱǻǼǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȬ converging on a shared view of the computational foundations of inȬ ǯȄ107 Along the same lines, economist Herbert Gintis argues that game theory can explain action all the way down to the way that cognition functions. He observes that "expected utility maximization ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȁȱ Ȃȱ ¢Ȅȱȱ ȃȱ ¢ȱ ęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢Ȭ £ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱǯȄ108 These ęȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĚȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱęǯŗŖş ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡¢ȱǯȱ	ȱ theoretic modeling has been applied extensively in evolutionary biolȬ ogy, and lessons learned from these models have been used to draw conclusions about the possibility of and basis for human cooperaȬ tion.110 Game theoretic accounts of individual human and collective action are integrated into public policy.111 Rational choice theory inȬ forms the applied schools of law and economics, public choice, and institutional design.112 Game theory has also been extensively applied in international relations theory spanning nuclear deterrence and heȬ ȱ¢ȱ¢ǰȱȱ¢£ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ they are not enforceable.113 ȱ ȱǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ěȱ ȱȱ ȱǰȱ ȱ possibly predict, political and economic phenomena. However, from the time of its founding, game theory also stood as a normative theory of rational choice with prescriptive implications for individual and ȱȬǯ114 Thus, if, as its advocates propose, game theory is both a normatively valid theory of instrumental action and a descriptively informative account of agency, then it is not surprising ȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ from the nonhuman biological to individual and collective action to superordinate action of organized groups including companies and ǰȱȱ¢ȱȬȱ¢ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ tenets of rational action.ŗŗśȱ  ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ descriptive modeling of agency and normative theories of agency ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢DZȱǻŗǼȱ ȱDzȱǻŘǼȱȬȱȱDzȱǻřǼȱȱ¢ȱ within institutions designed using (a) analytic rational choice and (b) ŗşŘȲȊȲS. M. Amadae behavioral experiments that rely on orthodox game theory to provide a template for perfectly rational conduct; and (4) sovereign bodies which are structured to conform to the theoretical results learned from rational choice modeling. Game theorists address all these expressions of agency with their singular model for action.116 Modeling individual competition, collecȬ tive action, and institutions as games is staple in rational choice. More interesting for purposes here is the application of rational choice theȬ ory to the sovereign function of governance, particularly by way of the Ȃȱǯ117 Revisiting the conceptualization of the state as Leviathan, contemporary political theorists have used game theory to provide an analysis of the state of nature and the maintenance of ȱȱěȱ¢ȱ ǯ118 According to this new assessment, strategic rationality governs all purposive conduct and must account for the exercise of collective sovereignty from the micromotives of inȬ dividual choice.ŗŗşȱ	ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ǰȱęȱ common ground with him in their approach, which associates moȬ ȱ ȱȱȬȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ǯȱ  ǰȱ ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱęĴȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ¡ȱȬ ȱȱȱ ǰȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱ ǯ120 ȱȱ Ȭȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ Ȭ  ȱ Ȃȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱȬ ory.121ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȂȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȬ ęȱǰȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ǰȱȱ¢ȱ rational, motivating forces, game theorists impute to individuals ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ¡£ȱ ¡ȱ ¢ǯ122ȱȱ

ȱ ǰȱǰȱȱȱǯȱGame Theory: A Critical IntroductionǯȱDZȱǰȱŘŖŖŚǯ Hausman, Daniel H. Preference, Value, Choice and Welfareǯȱǰȱ DZȱȬ bridge University Press, 2011. Heath, Joseph. Communicative Action and Rational ChoiceǯȱǰȱDZȱȱ Press, 2001.