HEGEL ON INTERSUBTECTIVE AND RETROSPECTTVE DETERMINATION OF INTENTION differ? Of course, anyone who tries to act knows that they can differ, and th,rs is the experience of the shapes of consciousness called 'Reason' as well. 41 PS, $401. 42 PS, 5401. +3 See PS, S41741 8 for a very colourful description of this. 4 Fufther, the agent does not have a privilege in defining the result: for exampie, the art-critics and the audience have an equal say with the author on what the result in fact is. The authorial intention is not a privileged perspective on the resulting text. as Taylor 1975,1979. MTay lor 1985,89 . +z In Hegei's view, the nature of intelligent behgs 'is not confined to the shape it assumes in Wolffs psychology namely that of clear representations lVorstellungenf' eR, S132A). In this, Hegel's view of agency precedes the Twentieth century phenomenological criticism of representationalism. See Hegel's philosophy of subicctive spirit, and compare it to e.g. Medeau-Ponty, or Dreyfus' cridcism of Seade. a8 Ricoeur 1970. +e Conceming the epistemic thesis, one need not choose between the extremes of constant firll selfpresence and all intentions being read off from actions in the public space. It is possible to have views in between. Cf. the view of Dudley Knowles: 'In saying that the agents have privileged access to their own inrentions, I don't claim that they alwalt have knort'ledge of their intentions or that such knowledge is atway guned through the route of introspecrion or self-awareness. I can learn from your critical remarks that I intended to spite another, though I have somehow concealed that from myself. On the other hand, it is generally true that I know what I am dorng because I generally act in full light of my intentions. I don't often observe my actions and work out the narure of my action from observance of them, but I somedmes do as when the remarks of others force me to make reviews of them' (I(nowles 2002,352, n.l . 50 But of course, the change does not concern vrhat the intentions were to begrn with. st Pippin 2004,72. s2 There are subdeties here related to the thickness or thinness of 'true self. If I am myself whenever I am minimally responsive to reasons, then disowning an act means admitthg that one was (perhaps momentaril), unaccountable, like children or iunatics are. But rn the thick sense, I can disown some thhgs as not expressing my 'thick self if my self-definition changes, while I admit full responsibility for the deeds. 53 This is a central point of Taylor's norion of authenticity in his Etbir of A*tbenticiE: authenticiry presupposes shared horizons of significance and dialogues. I discuss Taylor's views in Laitinen 2003. sa Pippin RR. BULLETIN OF THE HEGEL SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN On the Role of Intersubjectivity in Hegel's Encyclopaedic Phenomenology and Psychology Heikki Ikiheimo According to a widely shared view, a radical change took place in the role of intetsubjectivity in Hegel's philosophy somewhere between Jena and Berlin. For instance, Jurgen Habermas's judgement is that whereas in the Jena writings in the Jena Realphihnphien, znd perhaps still in the 1807 Phenomenologt 0f Spirit Hegel conceived of intersubjectivity as an essential element in the constitution of subjectivity and of obfectivity, in Betlin Hegel's intersubjectivist conception was replaced bv a metaphysics of the absolute I or absolute self-consciousness, in which intersubjectivity no longer plays any tmportant constitutive role.l Perhaps it is due to somedring like this view having been mosdy taken for granted even among Hegel-specialists that scholady literature on intersubjectivity in Hegel's late Encyclopaedic system is indeed very scarce. Robert R. Williams' Hegel's Ethia of Recognitiorf argues convincingly that the theme of intersubjective recognition can be seen as a central thread running through the whole of Hegel's Encyclopaedic philosophy of objectiue spirit. But very little has so far been written on the theme of intersubjectiviry or intersubjective recognition in Hegel's Encyclopaedic philosophy of sublectiue spitit.3 My thesis in what follows is that intersubjectivity or intersubjective mediation in recognition can and should in fact be seen as an essential constituent also of subjective spirit as Hegel conceptualises it in the 1830 Encyclopaedia.a I A useful contrast to my reading is provided by Vittorio Hosle's two-volume work Htgrlt S1ilem: Der ldealisruas der Subjektiuitrit und das Problem der Intersubjektiuitrit, some 73 pages of which are dedicated to a discussion of subjective spirit.5 Hosle's 73 pages belong to the very rare species of extensive treatments of intersubjectivity in the Encyclopaedia philosophy of subjective spirit, and may be the best known exemplar of this species. In a nutshell, Hosle's view is that in the Encyclopaedia philosophy of subjective spirit Hegel is incapable of doing justice to intersubjectivity, since he does not have the conceptual means fot distinguishing between subject-object-relations and subject-subjectrelations (Hosle, 379). V4-rereas Habemas thinks that the absence of or deficit in intersubjectivity in the Encyclopaedia is a syrnptom of Hegel's more general, deliberate and pol-itically motivated, effort in Betlin to theoretically subordinate the unstable 'teflexive mobility' of intersubjective will-formation to the stable, unconditioned authority of the absolute spirit (Haberrnas, 150), Hosle sees things differendy. According to Hcisle, Hegel rn fact tried but failed to fully account for the role of intersubjectivity in the constitution of spirit. That is, although the objective and absolute spirit are intersubjective 1s/So , Jco 1TH-E ROLE OF INTERSUBJECTTVITY in their constitution, the subjective spirit is not. Due to inadequate conceptual equipment, Hegel's Encyclopaedic theory of spirit thus remains vaguely oscillating 'between subjectivity and intersubjectivity' (Hosle, 272). On Hosle's reading, even though in the philosophy of subjective spirit Hegel does thematise the intersubjective encounter in the chapters Recognitive Self-Consciousness and Universal Self-Consciousness, the theme does not have any significant role in the overall architectonic of subiective spirit (see Hcis le, 378-380). In what follows, I shall try to show that Hosle is wrong. Although intersubiectivity is indeed explicit only in the sub-chapters mendoned, it takes only a small amount of patience and imagination to see that it is built into the general architectonics and thematic development of the text in a highly systematic way. I I Let us start by taking a look at the complicated structure or architectonics of the philosophy of subjective spirit [Sne rnnrn i]. \X4rat are the principles according to which the realphilosophisch materid.in it has been organised? From a putely formal point of view, the text has the famitar triadic structure. On the highest level we have the sections Anthropology, Phenomenology and Psychology indicated by the capital letters A, B, and C tespectively. Each of these secdons contain three chapters marked with a, b, and c, with each of the chapters marked urith a and b containing three sub-chaptets indicated by n, F, and y. TABLE 1 Enzyklop idie der philosophis chen Wis senschaften im Grundrisse (1830) Erste Abteilung. Der subjektive Geist/Subjective Spirit A. Anthropologie. Die Seele./Anthropology. The soul. $ 388 a. Die nariidiche Seele.,/The narural sod. $ 391 a. Nanidiche Qualititen./Natwal qualities. $ 392 p. Nanirliche Verdnderungen./Natutal alterations. $ 396 y. Empfindung./Sensation. $ 399 b. Die fiihlende Seele./The feeling soul. $ 403 a. Die fiihlende Seele in ihrer Unmittelbarkeit./The Feeling soul in its immediacy. s 40s p. Selbstgeftihl./Self-feeling. $ 407 1. Die Gewohnheit./Habit. $ 409 c. Die vrirkliche Seele./The actual soul. $ 411 BULLETIN OF THE HEGEL SOCIETY OF GREAT BRTTAIN B. Die Phinomenologie des Geistes. Das Bevu8tsein./Phenomenologv of spirit. Consciousness. $ 413 a. Das Bev'u8tsein als solches./Consciousness as such. $ 418 cr. Das sinnliche Bewu8tsein./Sensuous consciousness. $ 418 B. Das Wahmehmen./Perception. $ 420 y. Der Verstand./Understanding. $ 422 b. Das Selbstbewu8tsein./Self-consciousness. $ 424 a. Die Begietde./Desire. $ 426 B. Das anerkennende Selbstbew-u8tsein./Recognitive self-consciousness. $ 430 1.Das allgemeine Selbstber*'u8tsein./Universal self-consciousness. $ 436 c. Dic Vernunft./Reason. $ 438 C. Psychologie. Der Geist./Psychology. Spirit. $ 440 a. Der theoretische Geist.,/Theoretical spirit. \ 445 c. Anschauung./Intuition. $ 446 p. Die Vorstellung./Presentation. $ 451 1. Die Erinnerung./Recollection. $ 452 2. Die Einbildungskraft./Imagination. $ 455 3. Das Geddchtnis./Memon. $ 461 y. Das Denken./Thinking. $ a65 b. Der praktische Geist./Practicai spirit. $ 469 a. Das praktische Gefi.ihl./Practical feeling. $ 471 p. Die Triebe und Die Wiilkrir./Drives and wilfulness. $ 473 1. Die Gl.ickseligkeit./Happiness. $ 479 c. Der freie Geist./Free spirit. $ 481 There is ample evidence for saying that the architectonics in some way follows the threepart structure of the logic. It seems that on each level, the first member of the triad somehow exemplifies the category of being, the second thatof essence and the thfud that of the concept. In his notes, Hegel himself says this explicidy about the whole triadic structure of the Encyclopaedia (the logic, the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit), as v/ell as about the general structure of the philosophy of subjective spirit.6 But, as Dirk Stederoth points out, the rule can easily be followed down to the details of the triadic architectonics (see Stederoth, 57). Yet, this is as such still relatively uninformative as regards the specifically realphilosophisch themes in the text. We have not learnt much about, say, understanding in Phenomenology @.u.y) in learning that from the point of view of the whole system it somehow instantiates Concept, ftom the point of view of the philosophy of spirit it instantiates Being, from the point of view of the philosophy of subjective spirit it 74 instantiates Essence (8.".y), from the point of view of Phenomenology lt ^giln instantiates Being @.r.f) and that from the point of view of the chapter on Consciousness as such it again instantiates Concept @.a.7.).7 There is also another way of conceiving the architectonics that at least at first sight may seem more helpful for understanding what this or that sub-chaptet is about and why it is situated in this or that particular place in the architectonics. Since the topic of the philosophy of subjective spirit is 'conctete subjectivity', the 'concrete subject' or 'concrete I' (S 398, 400, 403, 456, 457) that is, a human being or person, living in the wodd in intentional relations with the world together vrith others one is tempted to look for analogies between the structure of the text and the phyloor ontogenesis of human beings. Could it be that, passing over purely formal ot logical considetations, somehow the course of the text follows the empirical developmental or cultivation process of a human person? Certainly not in ^ny straightforward way. The text is not a treatise in developmental psychology, and the course of the presentation does not simply follow the temporal development of the individual or the species. As Hegel puts it, the stages of the presentation are 'Momente, ZustAnde, [oder] Bestimmungen' of a concrete whole, where 'a higher determination can be empirically present in a lower and more abstract determination' (S 380). An attempt to tead, for instance, the whole of Anthropology as a description of the temporally eadiest developmental stages of humans immediately founders on the fact that much of what Hegel discusses in the Anthropology presupposes phenomena that he wili explicidy discuss in later stages of the presentation that is, in the Phenomenology and Psychology sections. And yet, when it comes to scrutinising the intricate connections between the topics discussed in the different sections, chapters and sub-chapters of the text, I believe that looking for something like very abstract or idealised developmental stages of the human person does in fact make good sense of the text. We should not, however, expect to find these developmental srrges presented in the text in a simply linear fashion. Interestingly, Hosle tries to read the text in a straightforwardly linear manner, as if it generally followed the developmental stages of the individual or the species, or at least some kind of an idealised developmental history. This leads him to puzzles that the linear reading simply cannot resolve. Let me mention some of the puzzles. According to Hosle it is, fot instance, 'hard to accept' that Hegel discusses desire (B b.o) on the one hand and drive (C.b.p.) on the other hand in passages so far apart fuom each other, and that something as apparendy primitive as drive is discussed so near to the end of the text (Hosle, 347). Relatedly, he asks why practical feeling (C.b.cr) does not oJready ^ppex in the Anthropology after sensation (4.".y) (Hosle, 348). Hcisle also considers it strange that Hegel discusses understanding and reason twice, frstin Phenomenology @.a.y. and B.c.) and then agunin Psychologyin the sub76 77 tsULLE'I'IN OF THE HEGEL SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN chaptet on Thinking (C.a.f,) (Hosle, 349). And since in Psychology understanding and reason are discussed one after the other (in C.u.y), why is this not so in Phenomenology @.".t. and B.c.) (Hcisle, 387)? According to Hosle, it is also hard to understand what exactly the difference between sensuous consciousness and intuition consists of and why they are discussed in passages so far apart from each other (B.u.r. and C.a.a.) (I{osle, 34e). Furthet, Hosle poses the question that has often puzzled readers of the 1807 Phenomenolog of Spirit. \X/hy is it that something as primitive as 'unreflective desire' should follow understanding? Since in the Encyclopaedia Hegel alteady discusses desire in the philosophy of nature (see $ 358 and 359 and their Additions), it would seem that if there was any reason to discuss rt ^g Jn in the philosophy of subjective spirit, then the most obvious place to do this would rather be at the very beginnhg (Hosle, 371). All in all, F{osle's questions seem to be motivated by the expectation that the thematic development of the text should follow a hnear developmental course, where a less developed moment is, as a rule, followed by a more developed one, and where phenomena that are apparendy of the same level of development or complexity, or would seem to be otherwise closeiy connected, are siruated close to each other. It is clear that the text does not live up to this expectation on the linear reading.s III In his Htgtlt Lthre aom Menscben, published n 1970 but dating back to 1950, Iring Fetscher suggested that parts of the architectonics of the philosophy of subjective spirit can be seen as consisting of several parallel sequences, or, to put it another way, several parallel moments of one and the same developmental sequence fretscher, 105, 37, 194). I think that this suggestion is cortect and further believe that it can be given a relatively clear meaning in terms of idealised developmental stages of the concrete subjecl In what follows, I shall concentrate on the sections on Phenomenology and Psychology, since it is there that the point I want to make about intersubjectivity is most cleady to be seen. Let us do a simple exercise in cutting and pasting. As seen in Table 2, I propose that we should conceive of the structures of Phenomenoiogy and Psychology as parallel to each othet. By this I mean that we should see the sequence from a through p to y as a single developmental sequence and chapters B.a. (Consciousness as such), B.b. (Selfconsciousness), C.a. (Iheoretical spirit) and C.b. (?ractical spirit) as presenting parallel moments of this sequence. To gain some initial plausibility for the proposal, let us return to the questions that Hcjsle posed, and see what we can make of them in light of the parallel scheme of Table 2. In this patallel scheme, the expectation of finding apparendy closely related phenomena close to each other and the apparendy less developed functions of the spirit followed by the more developed ones in the architectonics is indeed fulfi.lled. Desire @.b.o) is now a pa.rilIel stage of the presentation with practical feeling (C.b.a.) and these both represent the fust stage of the sequence. Even if this stiil leaves open the question about the relationship of practical feeling to sensation in Anthropology, at least now, practical feeling seems to have a somewhat more appropriate place at the beginning of this sequence. In this parallel scheme, drive also (C.b,p.) comes closer to the beginning of the sequence, in that it represents a moment of the second stage of the sequence, following both desire and practical feeling. Also, in this scheme, Reason (8.c.) does indeed follow Understanding @.a..7.) in Phenomenology and both of these are even if oniy roughly parallel to understanding and reason in Psychology (these do not show in the table of contents, but they are discussed in C,a.r1.). And whatever the relationship of sensuous consciousness (B.a.a.) to intuition (C.a.a.) is, at least in this scheme these apparently closely connected themes are situated as parallel moments of the first stage of the sequence. Finally, in this ordering, desire in Self-consciousoess does not follow understanding in Phenomenology, but rather fepresents a moment of the first stage of the sequence, whereas understanding represents a moment of the third stage. Even if the question about the relationship of the sub-chapter on desire to the connected discussion 1 in the philosophy of nature remains unanswered, now desire does in fact represent a moment of the very beginning of the developmental sequence of Phenomenology. Although we have not yet learnt much about the reaphilosopbivb content of the sections, chaptets and sub-chapters of Phenomenology and Psychology, we can at least already note that from the point of view of Hosle's questions cited above, the parallel reading seems to make the architechtonics of the text at least initially less enigmatic than the straightforwatdly lineat reading. Apparendy closely related phenomena are now situated close to each other, and apparently less developed functions are followed by appatendy more developed ones. Let us assume that this is not a mere coincidence, but that there is a point in ordering the topics in such ^ w^y that they form a telatively neat parallel structure. \X/hat could the point be? In other words, in what precise sense are the four a-p-y-sequences parallel moments of one sequence (abstacting from the purely logical parallelism noted earlier) ? Let us begin with the question of what the general topics of Phenomenology and Psychology areand how they arctelated to each other. As Table 2 reveals, I believe that the best general charactedsation of the content of these sections is that Phenomenology discusses intentionality (to use a term which Hegel himself did not use) or the intentional telationship of the concrete subject to objectivity. Psychology, on the other hand, discusses the various spiritual or 'cognitive' pjggSlgjl 3lgvitielof the concrete subject cortesponding to the various types of intentionality or object-relation discussed in Phenomenology. TABLE2 Intentionality B. Phenomenolory of sPirit a. Consciousness as such cr. Sensuous consciousness p. Perception y. Understanding c. Reason Cognitive actiuity Intentionality Cognitive actiuity , , ' ; i n.r b. Practical spirit c. Practical feeling p. Drives and wilfi:lness y. Happiness BULLb,I'IN OI I Hh, HbUbL SULITII Y UT UKT,AI TJT(rI AII\ Parallel organisation of Phenomenology and Psychology Theotetical moment Ptactical moment C Psychology a. Theoretical spirit cr. Intuition p. Presentation 1. Thinking B. Phenomenology of spirit C. Psychology b. Self-consciousness a. Desire p. Recogrutive self-consc. y. Universal self-consc. c. Free spirit b. Practical spirit \t I . , a. Practical feeling / (1"' p. Drives and u@?ss 1. Hrppio.s(/ \ Intentionality B. Phenomenology of sPirit Cognitive actiuity C. PsychologY Theotetical noment Ptactical momentTheotetical moment a. Consciousness as such a. Sensuous consciousness p. Perception 1. Understanding Ptactical moment b. Self-consciousness a. Theoretical spirit a. Desire a. Intuition B. Recognitive self-consc. p. Presentation y. Universal self-consc. 1. Thinking c. Reason c. Free spirit The cognitive processes discussed in Psychology te the activities of synthesising the sensuous material of the soul into the organised intentional content of consciousness. AJthough the cognitive processes and intentional relations of the concrete subiect discussed in the various chapters and sub-chaPtefs form a concfete whole, we can znilydcdly separate them from each other and show that a particular Process discussed in psychology corresponds to a particular type or moment of object-relation discussed in LI 78 Phenomenology. In this way, the cognitive activities discussed in the consecutive subchapters of Theoretical spirit correspond to the respective rlpes of theoretical tntentionality discussed in the consecutive sub-chapters of Consciousness as such, whereas the cognitive-cum-volitional activities discussed in the consecutive sub-chaptets of Practical spirit cotrespond to the respective types of practical intentionality discussed in the consecudve sub-chapters of Self-consciousness. How does this relate to the question of intersubf ectiviry? My thesis is that whereas all. of the s-sub-chapters discuss constitutive moments of the concrete subjectivity that do not necessaill involve intersubjective mediation, aX of the p-sub-chaptets discuss constitutive moments of the concrete subjectivity thzt do necessai! involve intersubjective mediation. That is, although intetsubjectivity or intersubjective recognition is explicidy in view only in B.b.p. Recognitive self-consciousness, it is in fact essentiil for the cognitive activities and qpes of intentional relations of the concrete subject discussed n all of tbe psub-chapters. Intersubjective recognition is furthermore constitutive of the.fuqctio$.of the concrete subject discussed in all of the y-sub-chapters, but in these the particularity of a paticular intersubiective community is ideally sublated into universality. IV Hegel is relatively explicit about the general relationship of Phenomenology and Psychology. In the first paragraph of Phenomenology (S 413) he writes: The pure absttact freedom for itself releases its determination, the narural life of the soul, as similarly free, as an independent object, from itself, and it is of this, to it external, that the I inidallv knowsand so it is consciousness. l|.g.t calls the moment of the concrete subiectivity discussed in Phenomenology . ,,.,, i .';\ionscioasnrrsor the L As consciousness or I, the concrete subjecthas'the natural life of the i,. .:,' doul', that is, its inner and outer sensations (see $ 399-402 in Anthropology), organised ' ( and given to it as 'an independent object', that is, as intentional content. Hegel's general name fot being related to intentional content is 'knowing' (IVissen). Consciousness (Bewuftsein) is the state of 'knowing' (ll/issen) abozt objects, or, what comes to the same thing, of having intentional content.e Accotding to the first paragraph of Psychology ($ 440), on the other hand, 'Psychology is ... concetned with the faculties or general modes of the activity of spirit'. Whereas consciousness consists of intentional states or relationships with various types of content, cognition (Erkennen) ($ 445) is the actiuiE of spirit "r 'inlslligence', which is responsible fot the synthesis, or construction and cultivation of the sensadons jnto intentional content, that is, into the content of consciousness. The development of consciousness from the most primitive stages or moments into more developed ones is the work of intelligence. This is reflected in S 415 in Phenomenology and in Boumann's BULLETN OI.'IHH Hb,GI addition to \ 445 in Psychology. According to the fitst passage 'the development of consciousness is [for the I analysed in Phenomenology] not its own activity, but is in itself and fot it tather alteration of the object. Therefore consciousness appears differendy determined according to the alterations of the object given to it'. According to the second passage, 'as we have seen, whereas to consciousness it seems that its development derives ftom the alteration of the object, ... ilte_1lig91gg!.q posited as that form of spirit in which it iiatotn.t words, the organisation and development of intentional relationships d.iscussed in Phenomenology is the work of 'spirit' discussed in Psychology' Note that the quotations above from $ 41.3 and 440 are from the introductions to Phenomenology and Psychology and hence we may assume that what Hegel says in them is meant to characterise botb the theoretical and the practical chapters of Phenomenology and Psychology resPectivelY. Hegel is not always too careful in terminologically distinguishing between the' gener^ and species of the phenomena that he discusses. Hence, on the onehzndggition seems to be a narne only for the theoreticalr fungro;rs of spirit qffhat intelligence does as theoretical has been given the name of cognition' ($ 445)' Yet, on the othet hand, Hegel talks of cognition as a genus for both the theoretical and practical. $1:Pgof the spitit' In the Encyclopaedia logic Hegel conceives of cognition as having as its theoretical moment 'cognitigl ar !{ (Erkennen aJs solches) and as its practical moment 'will' (see $ 225, and generally 55 2Z:-ZIS1. If we follow the latter word usage, this provides partial terminological evidence for the analogousness of the structure of Psychology with that of phenomenology, where consciousness has as its theoretical moment 'consciousness lJ such\BewuftseinaJssolches)andasitsptactica1moment'.self-conscio,,. '.]F* Although not in the 1830 Encyclopaedia, in his Nrirnbetg Bewaftseinshhre fiir die Mittelklasse (S 25), Hegel explicitly denotes consciousness as such, or as he there calls it' .genuine consciousness' (eigentliches Bewuftsein), as jteeetll+l--:o1!919-!ll:ss' and self- -ns.io.r.ness as lpractical consciousness'.10 These then correspond to practical spirit and theoretical tpitit i6sffiEijiil ffi;W pointed out above. Atl in all, there is enough initial plausibility for the thesis that whereas cognition as theoretical or 'as such' is responsible for the organisation of the contents of theotetical consciousness discussed in Consciousness as such, cognition as practical or as 'will' is responsible for organising the contents of praciceJ consciousnes s dis cus s ed in S elf-cons ciousnes s' v Let us first take a look at the theoretical moments of the a-level' The sensuous content of the soul, its 'natural life' is thus now 'released' or posited as an 'independent obiect' ($ 413), as a 'totality cortesponding to the totality of the I' and thus develops ftom something .corporeal belonging to the soul into something confronting it independendy, into an object (Gegenstand) in the pfopef sense of the word' (S 413 Add')' At frst' ' \ . . a n { I 80 8 1 however, the object, or objectivity in general has only a rudimentary srructure that is just barely enough for intentionality. The sensational materid,, or 'Gef)hlsbestianungefl' are 'separated from the soul' and synthesised into rudimentary objects with the determinations of 'a being, something, an existing thing, singular etc.' ($ 418). Essential in this 'general Ufteil or the 'division of consciousness into a subject and object' ($ aaf is grasping the spatio-temporal structures of the environment. Hegel writes: 'The spatial and temporal singuladty, here and now, as I detetmined the obiect of sensuous consciousness in the Phenonenolog of Spirit, belongs in facr to intuition' (S 418). Is Hegel saying hete that he has somehow changed his views about spatiality and temporality since writing the Jena Phenomenology of Spiit?rt No. In the Phenomeno/ogy of Spiit, sensuous consciousness, or 'sensuous certainty', as he there calls it (Werke 3/82-92), is presented only fiom the very limited point of view of the function of the whole book, namely as an atgumentative stage on the way to the standpoint of absolute knowing. Now that Hegel in the Encyclopaedia is writing the outlines of a frrll realpbilosophisch theory of the spatio-temporal organisation of the world for sensuous consciousness, he simply points out that intuition is the particular activity of spirit or the moment of theoretical cognition that organises the sensuous content of outer sensations into a spatio-temporal form.12 It is in this sense that spatial and temporal singularit), the here and the now,'belong'to intuition. Attention (zTafnerksankeifl is the more exact function of intuition responsible for .,. the spatio-temporal organisation of the contents of outer sensations, or of 'projecting .r'1'' th.m into the forms of space and time' (S 448). This means both effggruacns the general, " . . . r r J L - - \ J - / - " " r u .'r-J Lrrrez'l-of c-oggciorl.srle into subjectivity and objectivity and identift/ing objects as spatiotemporally seParate from each other (or as having the form of 'being other to themselves', [$ at A1;. tl If I am right about the c-stage being generally a stage in the development of the concrete subject that does not nece$arilJr involve intersubjective mediation, then at first the spatio-temporal organisation of objectivity is stiJl purely egocentric: identi$'ing objects and events numerically from the point of view of a not yet socially mediated 'here' and 'now'' It is through this primitive egocentric capability of numerical identification that objects gun for the subject the determinations of 'being, something, an existing thing, singular etc.' ($ 418). This egocentricity of sensuous consciousness is the theoretical counterpart of the egocentricity of the desire-orientation discussed in the parallel sub-chapter 'Desire'. Attention, or intuition more generally, also takes more developed forms that do involve intersubjective mediation, but I shall now rurn to the practical moments of the constitution of the concrete subject at this pre-intersubjective stage.la \rI As in Sensuous consciousness and Intuition, also in Desire and Practical feeling we ^re ^t fust confronted with the primitive sensuous givenness of the sentient soul.ls Whereas on the theoretical side Hegel discusses the 'outet sensadons', or the givens of the five senses and their synthesis into'theoretical'intentional content, on the practical side he discusses 'inner sensations' and theit synthesis into practical intentional content. Hegel's diffetentiation between the terms 'innet sensation' (innere Empfnduns and 'practical , i, feeling' (praktivhe Ctfoh4 is rather vague, but we can understand these as names for wo" ,-Y,ll l"r, interrelated aspects of motivating states or emotions innet sensations as their sensational l , . , or colporeal aspect, and practical feelings as their cognitive aspect. : .,.-, . ) "'*;,': ( ^ Emotions, and thus inner sensations and practical feelings allow for ,rariLoi" ,::, modifications and levels of development, some of which cleady presuppose intersubjective mediation in socialisation and developed capacities of evaluation.16 But it seems that the most rudimentary level is the purely animal phenomenon of being in and sensing a state of physical need of some kind. Hegel conceives of the need as a primitive form of normativity, as an oaght. In pangtzph 470 Hegel gives the following general characterisation of the initial development of spirit as practical: Pmctical spirit, as initially formal or immediate, contains a double oaght (ein gedoppeler Sollen). First, tn the opposition of the determinarion posited from itself against the immediate beingdetermined that arises with the [first] mentioned determination, an opposidon against its determined-being and condition (Da:ein nd Za$anQ. This opposition is developed :a:"'lli1!:!y!Y!:!:Y:-9":*ggltgve9:--o-Yl-':.9U9* second!' in that this initial self-determination is itself immediate, it is not at first raised into the universaliry of thinking, which therefore, as regards the form, constitutes an ought in itself against it, and which, as regards the content mav do so. This latter opposition is rutially only for us [emphasis modifiedl. \,X/hat is Hegel sa)ryng here? He says that a cefiun 'double ought' belongs to the constitution of the practical spirit, that is, to the practical cognitive processes of the concrete subject, or of the human being. Firstfi, there is a first-order ought between an immediate being-determined, such as a felt need for nourishment, and the 'determination posited from oneselfl, that is, the urge to satisS' this need. These opposite determinations arise together and together constitute the structure of, say, hunget or thirst. To be hungry _ 'i is to feel alzckand simultaneouslyanufge to fill thatlackwith something. f^. -: ,&, . This immediate ought is the minimal cognitil'e content of the primitive emotionsl,,...'., '' V/hereas theoretical cognition is conceiving how things are, ptactical cognition is ^' conceiving how they ought to be. The practical process takes the form of practical involvement.il/ith the environment in which primitive practical cognition determines or points out particular objects as feasible candidates for satisSring the need.l7 This is what Hegel means by saying that'the opposition [or ought] is developed simultaneously in consciousness into a relation towatds objects'. Here Hegel obviously tefers to the 'practical consciousness' discussed in the Self-consciousrless chaPter, and mote precisely 82 83 its mcrst primitive or immediate moment: desire @.b.o). It is through the activity of 'practical feeling' (C.b.a.) that the mere 'inner sensations' obtain the intentional form in which outer objects function as content in the immediate or unreflected first-order oughtjudgement. Let us take a look at how Hegel conceives of the object-relation of the desidng subject in the sub-chapter, Desire (S 426-9). The object of desire is detetmined as 'null' ('a/s ein I\ichtiges) for the subject in that in being 'selfless' it cannot resist the 'activity' of the desiring subject (S 426). That is, even though the immediate desiring subject is already primitively conscious of things as objects as externally confronting it, they appear to it only from the point of view of their functionality for desire-fulfilment. Objects ate thus determined as 'accordant v/ith the drive' of the desiring subject to fulfil its need (S 427).1s In addition to the theoretical determinations of 'being, something, an existing thing, singular' (S 418), the object is thus determined practically as something that'ought to be had' or 'ought to be avoided' for the immediate desiring subject. \(4rat other determinations or features things have, is a question that simply does not arise for it. As 'selfless', i.e. as not being themselves subiects with their own 'oughts', the objects of desire cannot challenge the subjective activity of reducing them to the viewpoint determined by the 'ought' of practical feeling or desire. What is the second ought of practical spirit in parzgraph 470? It is a second order evaluative processing of, or point of view on, the immediate first order ought of the practical feeling. Hence, there is a formal ('as regards the form) opposition between the flrst and second order oughts. 'As regards the content', there may be an opposition or contradiction, but there need not be. The content of practical feeling and desire may or may not accord with the demands of the second order evaluative point of view. In any case, it ougbt to do so. tVhereas the first order ought is necessarily for the subject itself, the second order ought is 'initially' o.ly an sich, or 'for us', the philosophical observers. But onfi initialfi, since a development of z second order evaluative point of view towards the contents of one's immediate urges and desires belongs to the normal cultivation-process of every human person or concrete subject. Thus, what is initially only an sicb, or for 'us', becomes alsofiir sich, that is, for the subject analysed in the text. VII How does the second order ought, or the second order evaluative practical point of view come into being as a moment of the concrete subject? Here we need to refer to th. gsub-chaptet of Self-Consciousness, Recognitive self-consciousness. Fot objectivity to unfold for the subject as transcending the detetminations of the immediate point of view, an obiect is required that can transcend or challenge it, an object that is not 'selfless'but is itself a self or a subject. The emancipation from the egocentric point of view of desire takes place in the 'consciousness of a free object' (S 429), in confronting and experiencing another subiect 'as an I that is an absolutely independent other object against me' ($ 430). For Hegel then, the other sabject or another I is a kind of a 'proto-objerl, a genuinely independent object that has the power to decentre the egocentrism of the immediate desiring viewpoint.le In a nutshell, the process of recognition in the sub-chapter Recognitive selfconsciousness is a process of taking other subjects as sabjects. In this process the subject becomes aw^re of its point of view as a viewpoint among a plurality of viewpoints. Thus it gains a distance to the immediate first order oughts of its desire. Recognising the other as a subject means also including the oughts of the othet among the determinants of one's own practical viewpoint, This is the birth of the second order processing or ought in the subject and for the subject. Both of the sub-chapters, Recognitive self-consciousness and Drives and wilfulness, arc all about the various initial forms of the appropriation of this second ought as a constitutive moment of the concrete subject. In the sub-chaptery Drives and wilfulness, Hegel analytically separates two moments of the second ordei ought, which we could call 'active reflectivity' and 'relative stability' respectively Viltdg..., ot the 'reflecting *ill' (S 476) is the capacity' of active reflectivity or of choosing modves of action among desires. D=ry on the other hand is subsuming__sm_g4?r_-4-e-sy91."9!+9l partigu!1_19ry Lgg_g9al9 3nd 4.s pugh represents a moment of rql4gye ltzlqry F'ven if the lord and the bondsman are only illustrative figures, and as such their details should not play a central role in a systematic reading, we may see some analogy between the intentionality of the bondsman and the relative stability of the drive on the one hand, and between the intentionality of the lord and the active reflectivity of wilfulness on the other. Compare the following passages from Drives and Wilfulness and Recognitive selfconsciousness: 'Drive has to be distinguished from the mere desire. Desire, as we have seen in S 426, ... is something singular, and yearns only for something singulat for a singular, momentary satisfaction. Drive on the other hand...covers a series of satisfactions' ($ 473 Add.); 'Since the bondsman works for his lord, not from the exclusive interest of his own shgulariry, his desire acquires a breadth (die Breite) of not being only a desire for z tbis (eines Diesen), but also including the desite of anothey' (S 435 Add.). In both passages Hegel talks about the general process of sublating the singular desire or practical feelings under a particular second order point of view. Although the inclusion of the practical point of view (or ought) of the other is thematic onJy in the second passage, we can also understand the first passage in the light of socialisation in which singular desires are subsumed undet more general, in one way or another, socially mediated ends. This is the transirlon to ryork in which the wodd of practical encounter for the subject is determined rad.ically diT6illy than in the point of view of immediate,rn,.'"f'o' desire.2o Wilfulness, on the other hand, ."t b. seen as characterising the viewpoint of rn.l-*;;,'-t 1'"':' eslfe.zu lltulness, O ne Otnef nano, Can De S en S C[lalaclelrsrlrg ulc rcwPUrIL ut LrrL - ,.o., !e lord in thio.rgh it involves the capacity actively to choose among desires, it still]'rr"'f,"ot'l ro l naq arfnougll tL urvurvtrs Lrrc LaPavLLy LLrvsly LU LrruvD! urvrS uvDuurr '" "*_- --tR iil criteria for this activity. Due to the insufficiency of the lord's acknowledgement .*;;,:^ i t the slave's viewpoint or oughts and the resulting insufficient sublation of the lord's ', ^',' , ) at ' tto egocentrism, the lord remains a somewhat indecisive and aimless figure. Although the analogy of the details is fairly rough, in general we can understand Recognitive self-consciousness as discussing the initial forms of the intersubjectively mediated practical wodd-relation or intentionaliry, and Drives and wilfulness as discussing the corresponding 'inner' cognitive-cum-volitional processes. An essendoJ factor here is the process of unfolding a social, second order normativity, a process which begins as . . subjects recognise each other as subjects by acknowledgrng each other's oughts, and as : ,i,,", they begin to orient themselves in a complex web of oughts stemming from a plurality of 'l- , {,;" persons. To use a commonly invoked metaphor, recognition opens a process of t , f t c I ,i1rt .] 'triangulation' whete intersubjective relations (or 'subject-subject-relations) develop in t: tandem with the normative relations to the world in general (or 'subject-object-relations) and the subject's normative self-relations.2l Needless to say, the modifications that this general process can undergo ate innumerable. ' 1t is worth pointing out that intersubjective mediatio"_}( involves a cultivation ' of the temporal determinations of the being in the world'of c-orr.r.t. subjects. The r.f.r.nGll-TJbroadedng of the temporal horizon of desire in drive (S 426) and to 'taking care of and securing for the future' (S 434), i.e. work, can be seen as a continuation of the discussion of temporality in the sub-chapter Intuition. VIII Before going into the theoretical moments of the intersubjectively mediated p-stages of intentionality and cognitive activity, we need to take a brief look at how intersubjective recognition is related to what Hegel calls 'self-consciousness' in the philosophy of subjective spirit. The frst paragraph (S 424) of the chapter Self-Consciousness reads as follows: The truth of consciousness is self-conscioasness, and the latter is the ground of the former, so that in existence ail consciousness of another object is self-consciousness; I know of the object as mine (it is my presentation), I know therefore rn it of myself. The formula of self-consciousness is I=I; abilractfreedom, pure ideality. Therefore it is without realiry; because it itself, which is irs object, is not such, there being present no difference between the object and itself. \X/hat is Hegel sayng here? First of all, all consciousness is in some sense selfconsciousness, At least one sense of this is that in all forms of consciousness, the subject is conscious of objects as determined by its own spiritual or cognitive activity. In this special sense, it thus 'knows of itself in the objects ('I know therefore in it of myselfl). \)flhat is important, however, is that as immediate, the subject is not yet reflectively aware of its objectivity-constitotirg activity, or of its viewpoint as a viewpoint. Because the subject is not ^wzre of its viewpoint as a viewpoint, objects for it do :Al tsRlTAlN not yet transcend the particular detetminations of its viewpoint and are in this sense ,null, (S 426). Self-consciousness as immediate is, as Hegel says in the last firll sentence of pangtaph 424,'w'rthout reality ... there being still no difference between the object and itselfl, or in other words there being still no difference for the subject between the object as transcending the particular viewpoint of the subject on the one hand and as qiven in this viewpoint on the other. 'Whereas the immediate or abstract self-consciousness is still 'pure ideality' or ideality which is not mediated through an object experienced as 'real' or independent, self-consciousness in a fuller, reflective sense is so mediated. In becoming conscious of r ,., other subiects as conscious or self-conscious, i.e. as having points of view on the worldi; ." ":." , the first subiect also becomes aware of its own point of view as a pgint of view. It thus ,rt::' becomes aware of its own consciousness as self-consciousness in the immediate sense of i] '", the word and in this sense becomes reflectively self-conscious. Interestingly, Hegel refers ,.''"J' n patagraph 424 to presentatton (Vorstelluzg), which is the general topic of the p-subchapter of Theoretical spirit (C.a.p.): 'I know the object as mine (it is my presentation)'. In its teflective form, this knowing (i... being conscious) of the object as mine involves the awareness of the difference between the givenness of the object in or as mjt presentation on the one hand, and its independent being on the other. It hence involves reflective selfconsciousness or consciousness of oneself as an intentional creature in the world amonq othet such cfeatufes. i loo '. 1 '; i-rr i Jn ". . 'er:" ' ., The Addition to paragraph 413 in the sub-chapter Consciousness as such reflects this nicely: on the one hand, '[o]tly when I come to grasp myself as I, does the other become objective (gegenstcindlich) for me'; on the other hand, 'the I is revealed to itself onJy insofar as its other is revealed to it as independent from it'. I believe this 'grasping myself as I' is the reflective moment of self-consciousness and the 'independence' of the object refers not (at least primarily) to the rudimentary independence at the cr-level, but rather to the fuller independence at the pJevel. A passage from Theoretical spirit continues the same theme and has important consequences for my teading: 'It is only when I reflect that it is I who have the intuition, that I enter the standpoint of presentation' ($ 449 Add., IVerke 10/254). Since my reflection to myself as 'an I who have the intuition', or more generally to myself as a subject with a particular viewpoint from which things zppe r to me, happens in intersubjective recognition, 'the standpoint of presentation' is hence intersub j ectively mediated. #l r ; i p." i . v ' l ( -* ,e "r - \ ve/ ' t v^ l \ rc I )c ; :b: l j - : I X : , * e , 4 \ . , , - , i l 1 c f t r , i r e a o , . 1 t i - i i r : In the first paragraph of Perception or lYahmehn& p.z.g) Hegel writes Consciousness, insofar as it has superseded sensuousness, wills to take the object rn its tntth (will den Gegen$and in seiner\Yahrheit nehmen), not as merely immediate, but as mediated, as reflected in itselfand universal. (S 420 ) . , i ,l " LVahrnehnen is taking obiects in ibrerLvahrheit, in other words, grasping them in terms of cognitive contenr vdth truthc!ums.2 The parallelism of lYahrvehmen with Presentation (Vorstellun! becomes clear when we note that the sub-chaptet on Vorstellungis d)' about ueification (Bewrihrans of contents given in or for consciousness (see S 398, 406,440 Add., 451 Add., 454,457 Add.). The patallelism of the theoretical and ptactical p-sub-chapten means that the processes of verification or taking oblects in their hath on the one hand, and intersubjective recognition, i.e. taking subjects ftoth oneself and others) as subjects zre moments of a whole. Epistemic normativity for the sabjut presupposes an zv/areness of the formal difference between my presentations of things and things as th.y ate independently of my presentations of them, and this comes about, as we have seen, through intersubjective recognition. Subjects now take their own presentations as well as those of others as candidates for truth to be judged intersubjectively. At the pJevel, this process is however necessarily bound to the paticularity of a paticular communal viewpoint. L%ahmehmen is according to Hegel, 'generally the standpoint of our everyday consciousness and more or less that of the sciences' (S 420). This implies that science is 'more or less', or in pafi, determined by the particular wodd-view or 'everyday consciousness' of the community ot culture in which it is practised. More light is shed on the necessary dependency of l%ahmehmefl on a particulat communal viewpoint in Presentation (C.a.p.). There Hegel conceives of the activity of subsuming sensational givenness undet 'general presentations' (allgeneine Vorstellangen), that is, undet empirical concePts in the following way: the association of presentations is ... to be conceived as the subsumption of singulars under a universal that forms their connection. The intelligence is however not only a general form, but its inwardness is an in itrclf futermined, concrete subjectivity with some content, which arises from some interest, ... concepts or ideas ... The Intelligence is the power of freely connecthg and subsuming the images and presentations belonging to it under its own characteristic . silr,,".r,. ($ 456) . t t . r r ' ' 1 . \ - ,.-ti. "1, if, hripf, .subsuming singulars undet universals is an activity of the concrete subiect and as . - / ' i ( r o . G \ t l C ' e 1 .., , -,t,. such paruy determined by its interests. The:lt*g$l of the concrete subiect ^te at th. PI 'lr,''L level no longer those of the singulat desire.Eut are socially mediated, to some necessary .r.'ro\"''.r,.rr, shared or common with others belonging to the same community. The system of ' o ' empirical concepts, or the particular way of 'carving uP the wodd', of a particular community reflects the specificities of its particular form of life, its l-cbensanscbaaang, needs, ends, valuations in shorg its interests' Each human infanr learns initially the conceptualisations of het culture or community in learning its language. In light of my reading it would be very odd and disappointing if Hegel's theory of language in the Encyclopaedia did not account for the intersubjective ot social nature of language. Both Habermas and Hosle claim that it does not. Accotding to Habermas, language is assimilated in the Encyclopaedia 'to the expressivist model of a body which makes manifest psychological impulses', a model in which intersubjectivity plays no impoftant role (Habermas, 749). According to Hosle, Hegel's theory of language in the Encyclopaedia 'lacks the moment of intersubjectivity altogether' ftIosle, 404). A few considerations ate enough to show that this is a superficial reading. Although language is mostly discussed in Presentation, passages from Anthtopology and Self-consciousness are also important and point to a concrete, intersubjectivist or commr:nicative conception of language. Hegel begins his discussion of the development of signs and lzngmge in the last chapter of Anthropology, Actual Soul (4...). He tracks the begrnning of the process to the more or less animal level of involuntary externalisation of impulses in gestures (Gebrirden) (see $ 411 Add.). He explicidy points out that in these externalisations, the primitive subject not only 'feels itself, but also'makes itself felt' (S 411). That is, the inner life of the subject is revealed not only to itself, but also to others in these extemalisations that Hegel in pangraph 41,1. calls 'signs'. Paragraph 431 n Recognitive self-consciousness> in which Hegel discusses the struggle between the immediate subjects, continues the theme: This immediacy [of the immediate subject] is however at the same dme the colporeiry of self-consciousness, in rvhich it has, in its signs and tools, its own self-feeling and its being for the other. and its mediation with them. The body is the primitive tool of the immediate desiring subiect and it is also its 'sign', or that in which its motives and inner life mote generally are given to other similar subjects. \X4rat is interestingagun is the simultaneous g'ivenness of oneself to others as well as to oneself in the bod-ily 'signs'. rW4reteas inner sensations are a private givenness of thfl motivating inner fotces of the individual@dily symbolism i"g5gr:r ir l a public form of their givenness or appearzrnce. Alth";gh th;l;t ,*t.tr.. J*,t.-j quotation is very condensed, it can be understood as pointing to the intersubjective g.dtr,t." of the subiect's own self-relation thlough a_public jgo...s oggirgg!:g. \Whatever one makes of this, at least it is telatively clear that Hegel conceives of the birth and development of language as part of the process of intersubjective recognition and as such as a social affur ftom the very beginning. In Hegel's terminology, signs differ ftom sl,rnbols in that whereas the relatjon of the symbol and the symbolised is naturd. or based on involuntary associations, the relation of the sign and the signified is ideally wholly conventional (see S 457-9). Taking this into account, it seems at first sight confusing that Hegel uses the word'sign' for the givenness or externalisation of inner states in gestrres to othets and to the subject itself. Are these not rather natural symbols? I believe v/e can understand Hegel's word-usage in 88 89 ITrt, KULI, Ut' lN I'BRSUBJECTTVITY light of his attempt to grasp in extremely condensed fotmulations the birth of communication based on conventional signs out of a natural sl,rnbolism of gestufes between animals. In confronting each other and 'reading' each other's intentions in the gestures of the other, the primitive subjects have already taken the fitst steps along the path which in Hegel's account leads to fully-fledged conventional language. In general, the discussion of signs in Psychology (B.u.F.) points to intersubjectivity by the simple fact that signs, as Hegel conceives them, are conventional. According to Hegel, words or 'names' are the signs with or 'in which' we thhk. 'In the realm of presentation', contents 'exist and ate valid' in names (S 462]).zt In other words, presentation, corresponding to Wabmehnen in Phenomenology, involves organising the ilT:::';i:ffi : fi t:::?TUf.'T:'ft':.',TT::H,L"J**H:i1T this process, the subjects are in principle ^\r^re of the formal irreducibility of objectivity to the given viewpoint of any individual and ate thus in principle reflectively selfconscious. Yet, the cbmmunal process of Wahmehmen bears a necessary moment of particularity in being bound to the interests, world-views and characteristic ways of carving up the world of a particular community or culture. x lVhereas in the a-sub-chapters the Urteil of consciousness has unfolded only in the most rudimentary way, and whereas the p-sub-chapters discuss, as it were, the paradigmatic stage or moment of the subject-obiect-divide,2a in the 1-sub-chapters this divide becomes ideally sublated. As to the practical moments, universal self-consciousness @.b.f) 'knows itself recognised in a free other and knows this insofar as it recognises and knows the other as free' ($ 436). Freedom here means universatty, and 'knowing' oneself recognised by a free other means knowing or believing that one's oughts are acknowledged as valid by another whose point of view one recognises as universal. In this sense, there is in a way no longer a plurality of particular self-consciousnesses with their particular pracncil oughts or claims factng each other, but only one self-consciousness with a universal validity.zs Does this mean that the subjects in question have somehow mysteriously lost their individuality as well as their shared communal particularity and merged into one universal 'world-mind'? Certainly not. Hegel is only sketching the logical outlines of a communal process of testing claims as to their aniuersal validity. Nothing implies that he thinks of pure universality as given once and for all. Rather, universal self-consciousness is (at least among other things26) an ideal for subjects as they negotiate the oudines of an institutional structure of communal living that is universally acceptable. As we know ftom Hegel's philosophy of objective spirit, the extended version of which is his Philosopfu of Ngbt, Hegel means this institutional structure to do justice to and harmonise oughts or claims of vadous sorts, many of which are not at all universal as to their content. " ''.JIT, o"t J"5 n'*g'l ::''flI p: gy,iH yJ:r, ;-----__= .In the parallel chapter of Ptactical Spitiq'F"ppi".* (C.b.y,), Hegel discusses the search for a point of view which synthesises or harmonises the various ends of the individual into one ovetall objective, that is, happiness. The point of this sub-chapter is that this search can find its goal only in freedom, or in the viewpoint of the 'actually free vi[' (wirklich freier Wille) ($ 480). The will is actually free in that it wills itself, ot as Ludwig Siep puts it, 'urills z'plzn' which enables the free self-determination of all subjects. For Hegel this is of course the system of 'right' or the state.z7 The state is the institutional stfucture which is ideally acceptable for 'univetsal self-consciousness', or in practice, for individuals who do their best to judge its acceptability from a universal point of view. That this process of judging involves and presupposes recognising others as co-judges, as to the validity of claims is g,l%t ln Universal Self-Consciousness, ll.', _ :T_L^.. r! j;; j ' r '^ ir' As to the theoretical moments, Hegel conceives of uirderstanding in the subchapter Understanding @.u.f) as a stage in which 'consciousness, which ... contains the independence of subject and object' has 'disappeated', Hegel uses this as a handy transition to the chaptet on Self-Consciousness, but one should not expect this particular transition to c try much systematic weight. After all, Self-consciousness begins from a stage h which the subject-object-divide has not 1et fully unfolded (desire), whereas in Understanding it is ideally aheadl behind.It is behind in the sense that laws of nature as the content of understanding in Phenomenology (S 422-3) are in principle universal, independent of the particularity of a viewpoint, which is characteristic of lYahrnehmen, Again this does not mean some kind of mystical fusion of the individual into one 'worldmind' in which the singularity of individuals as well as the shared communal paric,tlaity vanish, but rather it is an ideal for a process of attempting to find that which is universal in phenomena. In the 1827 lectures, Hegel emphasises the difficulty of this attempt to reach, behind the viewpoint-dependent phenomena, that which in them is universal, or their laws.28 The analogy with universal self-consciousness becomes clear, simply by pointing out the obvious fzct that the process of finding the purely universal structures, or theoretical laws, of phenomena is a communal process which in pdnciple presupposes recognising others as 'free' in the sense of being capable of raising and evaluating theoretical claims to universal validity. The same is true of universal self-consciousness as the standpoint of judgrng the validity of potentially universal practical laps that strlrcture the state (see $ 432 Add. and S 4AZ;.zr The fact that in Phenomenology understanding @.u.y) and reason (B.c.) are situated in separate chapters, whereas in Theoretical spirit Hegel discusses both understanding and reason in one and the same sub-chapter, Thinking (C.r..i,), can!e seen as a problem for the parallel reading. I shall not try to solve this problem heteFt only want to point out the hatdly undeniable fact that for Hegel theoretical cognition includes a universal moment. The systematic place for this in the architectonics of the subjective spirit is Thinking (C.u.y) in Psychology. In this regard, the analogousness of the worldreiation of Understanding in Phenomenology and the activitjes of cognition in Thinking , , '7^ 3 - - .o ,y , . ; - - * . ' . i * , : b , q ' . i . , ' t ' 'l c r e , L r ( o > O | ' e t 4 ^ o c , f i . , . ' . . , I S r a a r e h ' r & 6 Y r r L ' c " _ o [ ' i , i ' " 9 ^ " t ; 1 ' 3 ] ; [:":",;;,*r:::;',; :;1-,.,'.1;l ," ;;; -,.:f).* !--,e*-t ,'on,, ^; " ': r'f 90 f , a ; c - , . l i l r r C . r 5 l ' p t a 9 o r . ' 4 . ' r ' Q . - ^ ' 1 ^ I ' n , , . ) Q c x S r . , . . , . . : . i r . r . . l 3 > r r < l c " ' " " e : a 1 ' r ' 4 1 n ' / t ( " v ' t ' r a r ^ ; e ' r } t ' f a c i ( 9 - . { : ' ' ' e ] l e f r l ' t ; i ^ i ^ ' , o q , " r i , r ? . t . € F ' t , ^ ' ' t i I r ! 5 " 6 7 a 1 + > / + r * e i e l i ^ ' / r < a k r g r t e J in Psychology is clear enough to supPort my overall thesis. Finally, the transitional chapters, Reason (B.c) and Free spirit (C..), are not central to my interpretation, but both can be seen as gathering together points discussed in both the theoretical and the practical chapters of Phenomenology and Psychology, and in complicated ways pointing to furthet stages of the text. XI Let me conclude by emphasising three points to prevent possible misunderstandings. Firsdy, although the parallel a-, pand y-sub-chapters can be seen as discussing developmental stages of the concrete subjecg none of these is wholly negated or left behind in the course of the development. This means that what zre frst developmental stagu, vl.ll become momenls of a whole and as such mutually mediated and determined. Par of the difficulty in intelpreting the chapters and sub-chapters derives from the fact that Hegel almost without exception discusses his topics both ftom the point of vieru of the developmental process and from the point of view of the telos of the process. As a stage, for instance, intuition is not as such mediated by the later stages, but as a moment of the completed whole it is mediated by the other moments. Secondly, the patallel reading does not imply the claim that there is something wrong in the atchitectonics of the text. It is a way of looking at the complex (and as I would say, extremely thoughtfi.rlly crafted) architectonics of the text as it stands. Hcisle's book is evidence of the fact that by insisting on altnear reading as the only way of looking at the text one is in danger of completely ovedooking, or lt least seriously underestimating the systematic role of intersubjectivity in it. Thirdly and finally, I do not claim that the parallel intersubjectivist reading, as sketched above, is wholly unproblematic as regards each and every detail of the text. It could not be, taking into account the fact that the text was a work in progress when Hegel died. It is enough if it is able seriously to question the received view according to which intersubjectivity plays no important role in Hegel's mature philosophy of subjective spirit. Much remains to be done before we c n f"lly appreciate the central role of intersubjectivity or intersubjective recognition in Hegel's mature philosophy of spirit, and the complex ways in which its different parts the subjective, the objective and the absolute contribute to the full picture. Heikki Ikdheimo University of Jyviskyki Notes 1 See e.g. Jiirgen Habermas, 'From Kant to Hegel and Back The Move Towards Detranscendentalization', ErmpeanJourval ofPbibnpfuiT:2, 1.999,pp. 129-157. 2 Robert R. Wdliams, Hegel't Etbics of Recognition (Berkeley: Califomia University Press, 1997). 3 General works on the Encyclopaedia philosophy of subjective spirit include Iring Fetscher, Hegels Lzbre uom Menscben (Sruttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Vedag, 1970), WiJlem deVries, Hegel't Tbeory t'ULLIlI IN UI I|It, HI,UT,L SUUIEI Y UT. GREAI tsRITAIN of Mental ActiuiQ flthaca and London: Cornel] University Press, 1988), Michael Wolft Das Kiirper-SeelePnblen frankfurt am Main: Klostermann,l.992), Christoph Schalhorn, Hegels enVkkpridiyber Begnf uon Selbstbeautstrciz, Hegel-Srudien Beiheft 43 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2000), Dirk Stederoth, Hegelr Pbilorcphie des SnQektiuen Ceistes @erln: Akademre Verlag, 2001), Christoph Halbig Oblektiuu Denken, Spekulation und Erfahrung, Abteilung II: Untersuchungen, Band 48 (Sruttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2002) and the collections of articles, Dieter Henrich (ed.) Hegeh philosopbivhe Pslchologie, Hegel-Srudien Beiheft 19 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1979), Lothar Eley (ed.) Hegeh Theoie det nbjektircn Geistes (Satttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1990),Franz Hespe & Burkhard Tuschling (eds.) Pychologe and Antbropologie ofur Phiknphie det Gei$es (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 19e1). a I shaii concentrate on the 1830 version of the E,rrcyclopaedia @va Moldenhauer & Kad Markus Michel (eds.) IYerke in 20 Brinden fFrankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1,986ff, refetences to the Encyclopaedia, contained in volumes 8-10, with '$', and to other parts of Verke with'X/Y' where X denotes the volume and Y page number]), except for making a few references to the Erdmann-Walter-Nachschrift on Hegei's lectures on subjecrive spirit from 1827 Qranz Hespe & Burkhard Tusch,ling (eds.) Vorlesungen iiber die Pbilosophie det Cei$et [Hamburg: Felix N{einer, '1994,hereafter referred to as'Erdmann']). I am responsible for all translations in this article. Many thanks to Robert Williams for letting me consult his fonhcomrng translation of the Erdmann-Walter-Nachschrift. I have also consulted Petry's bilingual edirion of the 1830 subjective spirit (Michael John Petrl' [ed. & trans.] HegelS Pbilosopfut of Sabledue Spiit, [Dordrecht: Reidel, 197 8-91). s Vittorio Hosle, Hegels S1:ten (Hamburg: Felix Meiner,1987, hereafter 'Hcisle), 338-411. 6 Hegel wdtes: The three logical stages, 1) immediate Being, 2) ... Essence and 3) Concept ... have their concrete determinate beng (Daseln) as 1) the universal logrcal Idea itself, 2) nature il which it is only as essence and 3) as Spint, the free ldea, the Concept existing to itself. Similady, Idea as natural (lJataridee) is further as Being mechanical nature, 2) as Essence ... inorganic and as 3) Concept organic narure. Spirit is as Being the Soul, 2) as Essence or the stage of reflection Consciousness, 3) as Concept Spirit as such' (qUnverciffendiche Diktate aus einer Enzyklopddie-Vorlesung Hegels'. Eingeleitet und hrsg. von Friedhelm Nicolin. Hegel-Stxdten 5, 1.969,21). See Hcjsle, 110-1 15, where Hcisie dismisses this passage as confusion on Hegel's part. Hcisle himself has a strongly 'corrective' attitude towards Hegel's architectonics and insists on a straightforwardly linear correspondence between the logrc and the Rralphilosophiea. As I see it, the implications of this insistence distort Hcisle's reading of subjective spirit from the begioning, but I must pass over this theme here. 7 Stederoth agre€s. See his reconstruction of the principles according to which Hegel organises his material n the Realphilosophie n Stederoth, chapter 2.3. 8 This does not lead Hosle to quesdon the readhg. See e.g. Hrjsle, 387, where, after pointing out the difficulty of conceiving why reason does not ^ppe r straight after understanding in Phenomenology, he quite blundy rejects the possibility of anything othet than a purely linear way of understanding the architectonic s:' diese Rei benfo lge i$ rcin lineal (emphasis, Hcisle). e 'Cognition (Erkennen) must certairly be drstinguished from mere knowing (Wi:sen), for already consciousness is knowing'(S 445 Add.). 10 lVerke 4/1,17:'Self-consciousness posits itself through the negation of otherness and is practical consciousness. When thus in consciousness proper, which is also called theoretical ... '. A-lthough we cannot be sure, due to Rosenkranz's dubious editorial practices, whether this passage is originally from Hegel's pen, it cleady reflects )one alpsct of what Hegel wants to discuss under the tide 'Selfc o n s c i o u s n e s s ' . , a f r ? . , ' l l 11 This is, for instance, Michael Forster's claim in his Hegel't ldca of a Phenomenology 0f Spiit (Chrcago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 558. t2 For Hegel, contra Kant, space and time are not 'merely subjective forms' of intuition, but also real forms of the wotld, which inruition grasps: 'things are in their truth themselves spatial and temporal' ($ 448). 13 Hegel's formulations in $ 418 give the misleading impression that consciousness would independendy effectuate its own Urteil Lnto subject from object The object is now initially to be taken only according to the relationship that it has to consciousness, namely being external to it, and not yet as in itself external or as external to itself; 'According to consciousness, content is onlv an object for it, a relative other; from spirit it receives the rational determination of berng an other to itselP This impression is 92 I Hb, KULL, OT INTERSUBJECTIVTTY contraty to Hegel's statements about the general division of Iabour of consciousness and spirit, as well as many of his statements in the sub-chapter Intuition (see $ 447 ,448 and 448 Add.). 1a On the several levels of compiexity or development that intuition takes, see DeVries, 108-118. I disagtee with DeVries on two points. Firsdy, according to DeVries anention cannotbe responsible for the spatio-temporal organisation of the environment, since it implies 'a high degree of conscious mental activiry and wilfi.rl self-control' (ibid., 112). But this lgnores the fact that Hegel speaks of several developmental stages of attention, as well as the fact that the will has several layers or developmental levels, the most primitive of which is 'practical feeling', corresponding to 'desire' in Phenomenology. Secondly, accordingly to DeVries, 'the objects of consciousness in the Phenomenology do not have spatio-temporal form' (ibid., 112, note 3). But what, for instance, would percepton (lYahnebnnfl be @.".0) - 'the standpoint of our ordinary consciousness and more or less that of the sciences' (S 420) without spatio-temporal organisation? tt M^.y aspects of my discussion of deske and recognition are indebted to Paul Redding's highly illuminating discussion of these themes in the 1807 Phenomenologt of Spirit n bts Hegell Heruteneatict (Ithaca: Corneli University Press, 1996, chapter 5). 16 See the classificarions of emotions in $ 401 Add. and S 472 Add. tr See S 412: 'Pracicai feeling contains the ought, its self-determination in itself, related to existing singulariry [i.e. object] that is valid only in its conformity vdth the practical feeling'. I believe this means that practical feeling directs the attention of the immediate subject in its function of identifying objects as separate objects or'existing singularities'. 18 Hegel uses the term 'drive' in various senses. Here for instance not exacdy jn the sense in which he uses it in the sub-chapter Drives and \ffilfulness (C.b.B). Compare also $ 225 in the Encyclopaedia logic on the 'drive of knowing towards truth' and the 'drive of the good towards realising it, the will, the practical activity of the idea' (8/378). 1e This way of looking at $ 429-430 was first put to me by Christoph Halbig in discussion. 20 The apparent inconsistency of these passages that in the frst passage desire is purely prirnitive and drive represents cultivation, whereas in the second passage deske itself allows for cultivation can be resolved by noung that although desire is in the beginning purely naturai, it too wili assume more cultivated forms in the process of socialisation. Desire as immediate is a developmentil $age, bvt as mediated and cultivated it wll become a moment of the concrete whole that the functions of the cultivated subiectivity form together. 21 Hcisle refers to roughly sirnilar ideas in Peirce and Apel, who replace the dyadic subject-obiect model with a triadic subiect-object-subject model, and laments that Hegel did not do so (Hosle,124-5). This is a serious undetestimarion of the complexity of Hegel's model of intentionality. See also Ftanz Hespe's reading, which is close to mine and critical of Hosle in Hespe, 'System und Funktion der Philosoph.ie des Subjeknven Geistes' (in Hespe & Tuschling (ed.) 1991, pp. a90-521). I disagree with Hespe, however, when he says that Psychology at a abob discusses moments or functions of the concrete subjectirrry which are intersubjectively mediated (515, note 59). This gets the c-sub-chapters wrong. 22 Cf. Hespe 1991,5"16. 2r See also $ 459. 2a 'Since the opposition of subjective and obiective is dominant at this standpoint' (S 451 Add.). 25 'Self-consciousness reaches beyond itself, it continues into another self-consciousness, thete are no more two self-consciousness opposed to each other, but rather it is one self-consciousness, and thus it is universal selfconsciousne ss.' CErdmann. 1 74) j ' l ,u ' * * ,a feac tua I ly -o , . . - , 'p l i . ^ t .d , , i , , . . Ie -@fo l lowAxe lHonneth 's t{" Ianalysis,,hor. of_19r., t.tp..t ^nd.r ee Honneth, Tbe Stngglc-[orRercgnition [Cambridge: Pohrv b::"-a*| Press, 19951, and Heikki Ikdheimo, 'On the Genus and Species of Recognition' n lrydry volume ..' I ,r^a' 145/2000, number 4). I beteve that all of these are rnplied in the norion of recognition in the Self- ( "r I Consciousness chapter of the Encyclopaedia, but these further complexities will be ignored here. zz Ludwig Siep, 'Leibl-rchkeit, Selbstgeftih.l und Personalitdt in Hegels Philosophie des Geistes' (in Eley (ed.) 21,e). 28 'The law does not reside on the surface of phenomena, rather it takes gteat effot to discover it' (Erdmann, 158). lthere is an attempt to grasp the worid of appearances as a realm,a system... of laws' @rdmann,159). 2e Of course, Hegel himself does not emphasise l'ery strongly the importance of individual or communal BULLETIN OF THE HEGEL SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN reflecdon on the validiry of practicai 'iaws', but this moment is built into his rheory of the rational concrete subject living with others in the state of 'being recognised' (Anerkamtsein). I