Chapter 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) Peter John Hartman Abstract Durand of Saint-Pourçain's earliest treatment of cognitive habits is contained in his Sentences commentary, book 3, distinction 23. In the first two questions, he discusses the ontological status of habits and their causal role, establishing his own unique view alongside the views of Godfrey of Fontaines and Hervaeus Natalis. What follows is an analysis of this debate as well as the Latin text and an English translation of Durand's Sentences A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2. Keywords Godfrey of Fontaines • Durand of Saint-Pourçain • Hervaeus Natalis • Cognitive habits Abbreviation add. addidit corr. correctio exp. expunxit hom. homoeoteleuton in marg. in margine om. omisit praem. praemisit ras. rasura repl. replicavit sub. l. sub linea sup. l. supra lineam The two questions dealt with here are whether we need habits and in what ways habits influence our acts.1 In the first, Durand tells us that an acquired natural habit 1This research was supported in part by the Chaire de recherche du Canada en théorie de la connaissance. In particular, I would like to thank Claude Panaccio for his mentorship, P.J. Hartman () Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA e-mail: phartman@luc.edu © Springer International Publishing AG 2017 J. Pelletier, M. Roques (eds.), The Language of Thought in Late Medieval Philosophy, Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action 5, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66634-1_21 331 332 P.J. Hartman is not a thing in the strict sense but it is rather a mode of a thing (modus rei) even though it does fall into the category Quality. This novel view about the ontology of habits received condemnation from his order,2 and it provoked a number of replies from later thinkers,3 including William of Ockham in Rep. III, q. 7 (OTh VI, 202). When Durand returns to the topic later in Sent. C III, d. 23, qq. 1–4 (Venice 1571, ff. 252ra–254rb), he omits this discussion of the ontological status of the habit, and in his Tractatus de habitibus (D TDH) q. 5 ("Utrum habitus acquisitus sit res absoluta vel modus rei"), the two manuscript witnesses break off after presenting nine opening arguments.4 as well as the members of the Montreal medieval research group for thoughtful feedback. Finally, I would like to thank Thomas Jeschke and Simona Vucu for helpful comments and advice. 2Articuli in quibus magister Durandus deviat a doctrina venerabilis doctoris nostri fratris Thomae, edited in J. Koch 1973, 103–104, nn. 158–159: "(n. 158) 3 D. 23 q. 1 qua quaerit utrum indigeamus habitibus, in tertio articulo positionis dicit quod habitus acquisitus animae intellectualis vel moralis vel corporis, sicut sanitas, non est proprie aliqua natura absoluta sed magis est modus rei vel naturae; unde secundum eum sanitas est sola commensuratio humorum, ita quod, sicut equus docetur ambulare per consuetudinem, ex qua nihil rei absolutum acquiritur sed solus modus consuetudinalis, sic habitus et dispositio, quae sunt in prima specie qualitatis, non sunt nisi quaedam pronitas et quidam modi se habendi. Contra opinionem communem. (n. 159) Ibidem dicit quod non solum relatio et sex praedicamenta ultima dicunt modos rerum, immo in quantitate et qualitate inveniuntur aliqua quae non dicunt proprie res sed modos reales, sicut numerus in quantitate non est aliqua natura proprie praeter res numeratas, sed est modus realis circa eas; similiter figura, quae ponitur in quarta specie qualitatis, potius est modus terminans quantitatem quam aliqua res secundum se. Contra opinionem communem." 3 See among others: Durandellus (aka Durandus de Aureliaco), Evid. III, q. 30, ed. Stella (on the authorship, see W. Duba 2014); Bernardus Lombardi, Sent. III, Lect. 12 (in ERFURT Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek CA 2 368); Thomas de Strasbourg (aka Thomas de Argentina), Sent. III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Venice 1564; Iohannes Capreolus, Def. III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues; and Prosper de Reggio Emilia, Sent., Prol., pars 1, q. 5 (in VATICAN lat. 1086). As well, in VATICAN lat. 1086 there are several smaller texts that in some way reference this position: Texts 182, 199, 414, 456, 458. In Sent. III, d. 23, q. 1, after his presentation of Durand's position verbatim (ff. 116rb–117ra), Peter of Palude presents two further opiniones, each of which tackles Durand's position in some detail (opinio 4a at ff. 117vb–118rb and opinio 5a, presumably Palude's, at ff. 118rb–119ra). John Capreolus reports Durand's position and the arguments for it as argumenta quorumdam, telling us that he is relying on John Duns Scotus (quorum dicta recitat Scotus). However, in Scotus, outside of his brief remarks in Quodl. 13 and Ord. I, d. 17 about habits as relational entities, I have not found him discussing Durand's precise arguments here, although in Ord. I, d. 17, q. 3 we find a cryptic remark (ed. Wadding-Vivès, 60, n. 8): "De hac autem quaestione Utrum scilicet habitus sit aliquod absolutum dicetur alias." In the Vatican edition (Ord. I, d. 17, pars 1, qq. 1–2, ed. Vatican, 174, n. 73) this remark is moved out of the main text and treated as a textus interpolatus, with the following remark by the editors at footnote 3: "Non constat utrum hic textus . . . referendus sit ad n. 72 [sc. where the Wadding-Vivès edition has it] vel ad n. 15 [sc. the first argument contra in ibid., ed. Vatican, 144 D Ord. I, d. 17, q. 2, ed. Wadding-Vivès, 42, n. 3]." 4 TDH q. 5 is contained in VATICAN lat. 1076 ff. 9rb–va and VATICAN lat. 1086 ff. 192vb–193ra. 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 333 In the second question, Durand pits Hervaeus Natalis5 against Godfrey of Fontaines6 before presenting his own position.7 According to Hervaeus, there is no real distinction between the act and its modifications because of the habit (e.g. as easier or better), and so the habit and the power both contribute to the causation of a modified act as two partial causes, jointly sufficient. According to Godfrey, or at least according to the Godfridian position found in our text, there is a real distinction between the modification and the act, and the habit is the cause of the modification and the power the cause of the act. In Sent. C III, d. 23 and in TDH this discussion is omitted. Durand's own view is more nuanced. He first (op. 3, art. 1) draws a distinction between kinds of modifications (intensity, moral determination, and ease), and then (art. 2) looks into each one. The intensity of the act is not really distinct from the act pace Godfrey. However, pace Hervaeus, the habit is not a per se cause of the intense act; rather it is a mere per accidens cause insofar as it removes an impediment towards an act's being more intense.8 Moral determination-in the sense that an act is in conformity with right reason or in discord with right reason-and ease 5 Durand seems to have been drawing on either Quodl. I, q. 13 (ed. Yamazaki [D Paris 1513, ff. 28ra–29rb]) or Quodl. IX, q. 4 (Paris 1513, the first principal doubt from f. 161ra through f. 162ra), which are largely the same. We are fairly certain that Hervaeus's Quodl. I dates to Easter 1308 or Christmas 1307, during his first regency in Paris (see R. Friedman 2007, 433–438). We are less certain about Hervaeus's Quodl. IX (Paris 1513, ff. 160va–162rb). However, the current view is that it should be dated before Quodl. I, while Arnold of Lièges was regent master, 1303–1307 (see Friedman, 2007, 440–445). Hervaeus maintains the same position in Quodl. III, q. 7, a. 2, Paris 1513, ff. 78ra–b, although his remarks there are brief, and he refers the reader back to Quodl. I. I rule out Quodl. III, q. 7 as a source on the grounds (among others) that it does not contain the "disjunctive" argument Durand references at n. 9 below, which is present (twice) in Quodl. I, q. 13 and IX, q. 4. 6 The position attributed to Godfrey is closer in content and wording to the Godfridian position that Hervaeus presents in Quodl. I, q. 13 and IX, q. 4. In Godfrey, see Quodl. XI, q. 4, PhB V and XIV, q. 3, PhB V. 7 John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol also pit a view like Hervaeus's against a view like Godfrey's in their discussions. See Iohannes Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 17, pars 2, qq. 1–2, ed. Vatican (via tertia resembles Hervaeus's position; via secunda resembles Godfrey's position) and Petrus Aureolus, Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 4, Rome 1596 (Godfrey: f. 418b–419a et f. 421b; Hervaeus: ff. 421b–422b). 8 Durand received censure from his order on this point as well. Articuli in quibus magister Durandus deviat a doctrina venerabilis doctoris nostri fratris Thomae, edited in J. Koch 1973, 104, n. 160: "(n. 160) Eadem d. q. 2 utrum habitus faciat ad substantiam actus vel ad modum tantum, reprobando duos modos dicendi contrarios dicit quod habitus per actus <acquisitus> tamquam removens prohibens facit ad intensionem actus inquantum habitus virtuosus faciens appetitum sensitivum oboedientem rationi impedit carnem ne retrahat intellectum ab obiecto rectae rationis; ex quo sequitur quod ferebatur intensius quam prius quando ferebatur ex solo tractu sensus ad oppositum; et similiter habitus vitiosus per quem appetitus intellectivus concordat sensitivo removet illud quo prohibebatur ferri intense, scilicet contra tractum appetitus sensitivi. Aliter non videt quod sit causa per se intensionis nisi forte quia ratione habitus obiectum magis apparet conveniens potentiae; in obiectum autem ostensum sub ratione convenientioris potest potentia ferri intensius. Contra opinionem communem quae ponit habitum virtuosum et vitiosum in eodem subiecto, quia contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Secundum autem istam opinionem omnes habitus virtuosi essent in solo appetitu sensitivo ne contra voluntatem traheretur et e converso omnes vitiosi in intellectivo ne contraheret sensum vel ne causaret intensionem illo modo. Item quantum ad secundum non esset dare habitus speculativos qui aliquid facerent ad intensionem actus quia nec faciunt obiectum apparere sub ratione boni vel convenientis." 334 P.J. Hartman are not modifications of the act (be they really distinct from the act or not) but rather modifications of the power or agent performing the act, and so once more a habit is not to be understood as a per se cause of an easily elicited act or a morally correct act; rather it removes the impediment to the power's easily performing an act, or performing an act that is in conformity with right reason. In Sent. C III, d. 23 and TDH his discussion of these three modifications is more detailed, although his position remains mostly the same.9 For some discussion of these texts, see Joseph Koch 1927, 129–143 and P. Hartman (forthcoming). I have used six manuscripts (see below), marking all variants except inversions,10 checked against a verbatim presentation of Durand's position in Peter of Palude's commentary on Book III, d. 23, qq. 1–2 (Paris 1517): q. 1 is at ff. 116rb–117ra (opening arguments and main body of the text) and f. 119ra– b (replies to the opening arguments); q. 2 is at ff. 119rb–120va (including opening arguments and replies to them). In two instances, I have included text from Palude's presentation of Durand's position not included in the manuscripts as additiones. Koch maintains that these two additiones indicate that Palude had access to the so-called first (A) redaction whereas the mansucripts he had studied of Book III, d. 23, q. 1 contained the so-called second (B) redaction (1927, 42–43). This remains the going thesis until further research on the manuscripts of Book III is finished. 11 Manuscripts and Editorial Abbreviations A D AUXERRE Bibliothèque municipale Ms. 26, ff. 107vb–109ra12 B D PARIS Bibliothèque Nationale de France Ms. lat. 12330, ff. 128ra–129va13 C D MELK Stiftsbibliothek Codex Mellicensis 234 (637, L 65), ff. 89va–93vb14 D D NAPLES Biblioteca Nazionale "Vittorio Emanuele III" Ms. XIII A 17, ff. 34vb–36vb15 E D NAPLES Biblioteca Nazionale "Vittorio Emanuele III" Ms. VII C 22, ff. 39vb– 41va16 F D SAINT-OMER Bibliothèque municipale Ms. 559, ff. 1r–12r17 P D Petrus de Palude, Sent. III, d. 23, qq. 1–2, Paris 1517, ff. 116rb–117ra, 119ra–b, 119rb–120va. <. . . > supplevi OE. . .  delenda 9 In Sent. C III, d. 23, he dedicates a question to each mode: intensity (q. 2); determination (q. 3); and ease (q. 4). In TDH q. 2, he dedicates an article to each: intensity (a. 1); determination (a. 2); ease (a. 3). 10 This edition is a preliminary edition in two senses: I have not completed a stemma and I have not had access to the following manuscripts containing Book III: MUNICH Staatsbibliothek Clm 26309, ff. 164ra–205vb (see F. Retucci 2012, 28*–29*); VENICE Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana Cod. Marc. Lat. Z.104 (=2004), ff. 1ra–73va (see T. Jeschke 2012, 28*–29*). 11 See F. Retucci 2014, 72, fn. 7 and T. Jeschke 2009. See as well M. Perrone and F. Retucci 2017, 15*–58*, where the editors working with Book I show that the majority of the manuscripts we have for Book I contain the so-called B redaction and not the A redaction. 12 This manuscript is described in F. Retucci 2012, 26*–27*. Book III: ff. 89ra-129ra. 13 This manuscript is described in F. Retucci 2012, 30*–31*. Book III: ff. 102ra–149vb. 14 This manuscript is described in T. Jeschke 2012, 24*–25*. Book III: ff. 9ra–146ra. 15 This manuscript is described in T. Jeschke 2012, 25*–26*. Book III: ff. 1ra–60vb. 16 This manuscript is described in J. Koch 1927, 52–53. Book III: ff. 4ra–65va. 17 This manuscript is described in J. Koch 1927, 54–55. It contains Book III, dd. 23 to the end. 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 335 Quaestio 1: Utrum indigeamus habitibus 1. CUM VERO SUPRA HABITUM SIT ETC. Distinctio 23a. Circa distinctionem istam quaeritur de tribus: primo de habitibus in generali; secundo de fide in speciali; tertio de formatione et informitate fidei. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primum est 5 Utrum indigeamus habitibus. 2. ET VIDETUR QUOD NON quia actus praecedentes habitum sunt in omnibus similes actibus sequentibus ipsum (C 89vb) nisi quoad facilitatem; sed propter hanc non indigemus habitibus; ergo nullo modo. Maior patet ex secundo Ethicorum ubi expresse dicitur quod actus praecedentes habitum et generantes ipsum similes sunt 10 actibus qui post habitum generatum eliciuntur, nisi quod signum generati habitus est sentire in opere delectationem quae fit propter facilitatem et connaturalitatem actus. Minor declaratur, quia difficultas actus facit ad meritum, facilitas autem minuit. Ergo si habitus facit solum facilitatem in actum, plus nocet quam profit. Si autem dicatur, sicut et consuetum est dici, quod difficultas ex parte operis auget meritum, 15 et hanc non tollit habitus, difficultas vero ex parte operantis non auget sed minuit, et hanc habitus tollit-CONTRA: secundum sententiam domini (F 1v) Mar. XII et Luc. XXI vidua quae posuit duo minuta in gazophilatio plus meruit quam divites qui magna dederunt quia difficilius fuit sibi illud modicum ponere quam divitibus multum. Constat autem quod haec difficultas (E 40ra) non fuit ex genere operis 20 sed (D 35ra) ex conditione operantis, quia pauper erat. Ergo talis difficultas auget meritum. 3. Item potentiae rationales perfectiores sunt naturalibus; sed potentiae naturales non indigent habitibus, nec propter actum nec propter facilitatem seu modum; ergo nec rationales. 25 4. IN CONTRARIUM EST quia habitus est quo quis bene vel male disponitur ad se vel ad alterum, ut dicitur quinto Metaphysicae; sed eo quo bene disponimur indigemus; ergo saltem bonis habitibus indigemus. 5. RESPONSIO. Circa quaestionem istam videnda sunt tria. Primum est: Cum "habitus" multipliciter dicatur in quo sensu nunc accipiatur "habitus"? Secundum 9–11 actus praecedentes . . . generalitatem actus ] ARISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. II.3 1104b5–6 (Ar. lat. 26.3 398). 25–26 habitus . . . alterum ] ARISTOTELES, Met. V.20 1022b10–11. 2 sit ] est C jj Distinctio ] istam add. F 2–3 distinctionem istam ] quam F 3 in speciali ] specialiter B 4 et ] vel B jj informitate ] informatione F 7 ipsum ] om. BF jj sed propter ] secundum autem E 8 non ] ideo(!) E jj indigemus ] in (se dicitur quod actus praecedentes habitum add. sed exp.) digemus E jj secundo ] eh add. sed ras. D 9 dicitur ] dicit B 10 habitum generatum ] generationem habitus B jj nisi quod ] ubi B 11 sentire ] in marg. fientem add. D fientem EF jj delectationem ] dilectionem F jj connaturalitatem ] generalitatem AC 12 declaratur ] probatur F jj actus ] om. B jj meritum ] sup. l. meritum(?) add. sed ras. F jj autem ] om. DE 13 facilitatem ] et connaturalitatem add. DE jj actum ] actu ACF jj profit ] proficit B 14 sicut ] sic E 15 auget ] meritum add. F 16 domini ] magni add. F 16–17 Mar. XII et Luc. XXI ] om. BF 17 vidua ] pauper add. B jj posuit ] ponit DE jj duo ] aera add. F jj plus ] a add. sed exp. D 18 magna ] magis F jj fuit ] sup. l. secundum add. sed ras. F 19 fuit ] ex parte (sed ras.) haec non sint add. D jj genere ] parte DE vel genere add. sub. l. D 22 potentiae1 ] in marg. D om. E 23–24 ergo nec rationales ] om. F 24 nec ] ut ante corr. D ut E 25 ad1 ] a F 26 vel ] sup. l. F jj alterum ] eorum(?) add. sed exp. D jj disponimur ] disponuntur ante corr. D disponuntur E 28 Cum ] sup. l. quod add. sed ras. D quod E 29 dicatur ] habitus add. B jj accipiatur ] homo add. sed ras. D homo add. E jj habitus ] om. B 336 P.J. Hartman 30 est: Propter quid ponendi sunt habitus? Tertium est: Quid sit habitus Utrum proprie sit res (C 90ra) vel modus rei? art. 1: In quo sensu nunc accipiatur "habitus"?18 6. QUANTUM AD PRIMUM sciendum est quod "habitus" dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo est postpraedicamentum; alio modo praedicamentum; tertio modo est deter35 minata species Qualitatis. Quod patet sic. (F 2r) "Habitus" enim ab habendo dicitur; ab eo autem quod est habere nomen "habitus" dupliciter derivatur. Uno modo secundum quod homo vel quaecumque alia creatura dicitur rem aliquam habere. Alio modo secundum quod aliqua res aliqualiter se habet (puta bene vel male) secundum seipsam vel in respectu ad aliam. 40 7. "Habitus" vero primo modo dictus est postpraedicamentum, quia se extendit ad res diversorum praedicamentorum, dicitur enim homo habere manum (quod pertinet ad praedicamentum Substantiae), quantitatem vel albedinem (quod pertinet ad alia duo praedicamenta), et dominus dicitur habere servum (quod pertinet ad praedicamentum Relationis), et homo vestem vel anulum (quod pertinet ad Habitum-qui est 45 speciale praedicamentum, ut statim infra dicetur). Omnes enim modi quibus una res dicitur aliam habere reducuntur ad tres, quia quod habetur vel habetur per modum accidentis inhaerentis, et istud se extendit ad res plurium praedicamentorum, vel per modum correlativi, et istud potest reduci ad praedicamentum Relationis, vel per modum ornatus, et istud cum non reducatur ad aliud praedicamentum facit speciale 50 praedicamentum per se quod vocatur Habitus ut cum dicitur homo armatus vel vestitus vel aliquid huiusmodi. 18 Art. 1 is verbatim (with minor variation) in Sent. C III, d. 23, q. 1, Venice 1571, ff. 252ra–b, nn. 7–8 and TDH q. 1, ed. Takada, 12–14 (with two larger omissions from the latter noted below). 33 tripliciter ] TDH q. 1, ed. Takada, 12, omits the first sense and so has "dupliciter" rather than "tripliciter". 33–35 Uno modo . . . sic ] om. TDH q. 1, ed. Takada, 12. 35–39 habitus . . . ad aliam ] THOMAS DE AQUINO, ST I-II, q. 49, a. 1, ed. Leonine: ". . . habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur, uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud." 44–45 homo . . . dicetur ] om. TDH q. 1, ed. Takada, 12. 30 Propter ] ad add. sup. l. C jj quid1 ] quod (secundum sed exp.) E jj est ] om. F jj Quid sit habitus ] om. A jj Utrum ] habitus add. A 31 vel ] tantum add. DEF jj rei ] om. BF 33 sciendum est ] dicendum B jj est ] om. A jj tripliciter ] d praem. sed exp. C et add. B jj Uno ] primo A 34 est ] om. A jj postpraedicamentum ] praedicamentum A jj praedicamentum ] postpraedicamentum A 35 species ] in marg. D 36 est ] om. F 37 alia ] in marg. D om. E jj dicitur rem ] in marg. D om. E jj aliquam ] aliam CDE 39 vel ] om. F 40 vero ] om. A ergo BF 42 albedinem ] qualitatem B quod pertinet ad praedicamentum substantiae quantitatem vel albedinem add. DE sed ras. D 44 anulum ] habere add. C jj ad ] praedicamentum add. B jj Habitum ] habitus B jj qui ] quod F 45 modi ] in marg. m ante corr. C 46 dicitur ] se habere ad add. C jj habere ] om. C jj quia ] illud add. B jj per modum ] per modum add. DE sed ras. D 47 istud ] illud F 48 istud ] illud F 49 istud ] illud F 50 vocatur ] dicitur B prae add. sed exp. C jj homo ] sup. l. D om. CE 50–51 armatus . . . huiusmodi ] vestitus armatus vel huiusmodi A vestitus armatus vel habitus C 50 vel ] om. E 51 vestitus ] sup. l. D jj vel aliquid ] et DE jj aliquid ] om. F 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 337 8. "Habitus" autem secundo modo acceptus-scilicet prout aliqua res dicitur se habere bene vel male ad se vel ad alteram-est species Qualitatis, quae dicitur habitus vel dispositio. (F 2v) Differt autem "habitus" sic dictus ab aliis duobus 55 primis modis, quia "habitus" primo et secundo modo non dicitur (C 90rb) ipsa res quae habetur sed solum habitudo habentis ad illud quod habetur; sed in tertio modo "habitus" primo et principaliter dicitur illa (B 128rb) res quae habetur secundum quod habens (A 108ra) dicitur aliqualiter se habere-puta bene vel male. 9. Et sic definit PHILOSOPHUS habitum quinto Metaphysicae-quod habitus 60 est dispositio secundum quam disponitur aliquid bene vel male secundum se vel secundum aliud. Et secundo Ethicorum dicitur quod potentia est qua possumus, habitus quo bene vel male possumus.19 Et in hoc sensu loquimur de habitu nunc quaerendo Utrum indigeamus habitibus. 10. [Additio P, f. 116va] Secundum tamen COMMENTATOREM quinto Meta65 physicae respectus seu habitudo quae facit praedicamentum Habitus est habitudo <consistens in> hoc quod est habere aliquid, sicut "contentum habet continens, 19 At this point TDH q. 1 and Sent. C III, d. 23, q. 1 close off the body of the question with the following (TDH q. 1, ed. Takada, 14–15 and Sent. C III, d. 23, q. 1, Venice 1571, f. 252rb, nn. 8–9): "Alio modo definitur sive (seu TDH q. 1) describitur a Commentatore tertio De anima quod habitus est quo quis potest uti cum voluerit. Et idem vult beatus Augustinus libro De bono coniugali dicens quod habitus est quo aliquid (aliquis TDH q. 1) agitur cum opus est. <n. 9> Hiis suppositis dicendum est ad quaestionem quod in nobis sunt aliqui habitus et indigemus aliquibus eorum, scilicet bonis, et oppositi sunt possibiles. Quod patet dupliciter secundum duas descriptiones datas de habitibus. Ex prima sic. Potentia quae est indifferens ad actum bonum et (vel TDH q. 1) malum indiget aliquo determinante ipsam ad actum bonum; sed in nobis sunt plures potentiae quae de se sunt indifferentes ad actum bonum vel malum, sicut intellectus de se est indifferens ad intelligere <p. 15> verum vel falsum quorum unum est bonum intellectus, scilicet verum, aliud malum, scilicet falsum; et (om. Sent. C) voluntas etiam necnon et (om. Sent. C) appetitus sensitivus indifferenter se habent ad appetere bonum vel malum; ergo tales potentiae indigent aliquo determinante ipsas ad actum bonum. Hoc autem facit habitus bonus. Ergo bonis habitibus indigemus. Et per consequens probatur quod habitus mali sunt possibiles quia opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem nisi alterum insit a natura; sed habitus boni non insunt nobis a natura; ergo mali possunt inesse. Ex secunda patet idem sic. Omnis potentia quae in actu suo potest pati difficultatem indiget aliquo facilitante ipsam ad actum; sed plures potentiae sunt in nobis quae in actibus suis possunt pati difficultatem, ut dicit Philosophus septimo Ethicorum de continente qui cum difficultate prosequitur bonum rationis imminente passione; ergo tales potentiae indigent aliquo facilitante ipsas ad actum. Hoc autem facit habitus, ut patet ex secunda eius descriptione. Ergo etc." 58 puta bene vel male ] om. TDH q. 1, ed. Takada, 13–14, and adds: "Et sic patet primum. Quantum ad secundum sciendum quod cum idem importetur per nomen et definitio, quia definitio est ratio quam significat nomen, ut dicitur quarto Metaphysicae, ideo ad sciendum quid importatur nomine habitus, videnda est eius definitio seu descriptio. Definitur <p. 14> autem aut describitur habitus duplicitur." 59–61 habitus . . . aliud ] ARISTOTELES, Met. V.20 1022b10–11. 61– 62 potentia . . . possumus ] ARISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. II.5 1105b24–28. 66–71 contentum . . . Habitus ] AVERROES, Comm. Met. V.23, Iuntina VIII, 135vaH-I. 52 scilicet ] om. B sed sed exp. D 53 se ] ipsam add. A 56 sed2 ] secundum quam F 56– 57 in tertio . . . habitus ] habitus dictus tertio modo A 58 quod ] quam ABF jj aliqualiter ] de aliquo modo B 60 aliquid ] quis A jj secundum se ] sed solum E jj vel2 ] sup. l. D om. E 61 secundum ] om. F jj est ] om. A jj possumus ] est add. F 62 habitus ] vero add. B jj loquimur ] loquitur CF 63 indigeamus ] indigemus B jj habitibus ] om. B 66 consistens in ] consequens P 338 P.J. Hartman sicut animal habet cutem et arbores habent cortices, et hoc est praedicamentum Habitus. Cyphum autem habere aquam et civitatem habere homines e converso, scilicet secundum quod continens habet contentum, et secundum hunc modum locus 70 habet locatum, et hoc est praedicamentum Ubi. Et universaliter respectus in hoc praedicamento est conversus illi quae est in praedicamento Habitus." 11. Et sic patet primum. art. 2: Propter quid ponendi sunt habitus? 12. QUANTUM AD SECUNDUM dicendum quod habitus requiritur propter inde75 terminationem rei quae ad alteram disponitur. Cuius ratio est, quia, sicut patet ex dictis, habitus est quo quis disponitur bene vel male. Ubi ergo ex natura rei non est aliqua indifferentia ad bene vel male, sed est unus determinatus modus, ibi non est necessarius habitus. Et e contrario, ubi est ex natura rei indifferentia ad bene vel male, ibi neccessarius est habitus ad ponendum determinatum modum. Nunc est 80 ita quod potentiae rationales in nobis non sunt ex natura rei determinatae ad unum modum (F 3r) secundum bene vel male, sed habent multam indifferentiam. Potest enim intellectus intelligere vere et false et voluntas appetere bene et male. Propter quod in potentiis rationalibus, sive sint rationales per essentiam sive per participationem, indigemus habitibus ad determinandum per habitum hanc indifferentiam. 85 Determinat autem habitus inquantum inclinat potentiam ad determinatum modum, ad bene si sit bonus, ad male si sit malus. Et hoc est quod dicit PHILOSOPHUS secundo Ethicorum ponendo differentiam inter habitum et potentiam, ubi dicit quod secundum habitus dicimur boni vel mali, secundum potentias vero non. 13. [Additio P, f. 116vb]20 Ex quo satis potest consequenter deduci, ut dicunt, 90 quod in intellectu respectu principiorum non est forte necessarium ponere habitum, quia intellectus est determinatus respectu illorum, cum quasi naturaliter veniant ad mentem (quarto Metaphysicae) et sint sicut locus ianuae respectu <forum> 20 Vide Koch 1927, 43: "Wir haben aber auch ein zweites Zeugnis dafür, dass die obigen Ausführungen wirklich im Text des Durandus gestanden haben. Bernardus Lombardi zitiert in III Sent. Lect. 12 die ersten Worte und verweist für den Rest auf Durandus selbst. 'Patet ergo ex hiis dictis, quare in potenciis naturalibus non ponuntur habitus, in racionalibus vero ponuntur, sic quod in virtutem cadant respectu aliquorum actuum, sed non respectu omnium, quod dico pro tanto, quia intellectus respectu primorum principiorum saltem non habent istam indifferenciam; et ideo amplius esset dicendum, sed sufficit. Vide Durandum.'" 88 secundum habitus . . . vero non ] ARISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. II.5 1106a8–12. 90 in intellectu . . . habitum ] Cf. TDH q. 4, a. 8, ed. Koch. 92 quarto Metaphysicae ] ARISTOTELES, Met. IV.3 passim. 74 secundum ] secundum add. sed exp. E jj dicendum ] sciendum est F est add. C 74– 75 propter indeterminationem ] om. B 77 aliqua ] om. B jj indifferentia ] differentia(!) A 78 habitus ] ad ponendum modum add. A 78–79 Et . . . determinatum ] hom. A 79 determinatum ] declaratum B 80 sunt ] om. F jj ex natura rei ] om. A 81 vel ] et F 82 et voluntas appetere ] in marg. D a propositione E a propositione add. sed exp. D jj et3 ] vel B sup. l. vel add. sed ras. D jj male ] semper add. DE sed ras. D 83–84 per participationem ] in marg. D propter comparationem E propter comparationem add. sed ras. D 84 indigemus ] ab add. D ad add. E 84–85 ad determinandum . . . habitus ] hom. B 84 per ] sup. l. F jj hanc ] in marg. haec add. sed ras. D ad add. E 85 autem ] eam add. D omnes add. E 88 habitus ] habitum B 92 forum ] foris P 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 339 in domo: "in foribus autem quis delinquet" (secundo Metaphysicae). Quasi dicat: nullus! Et hoc maxime intelligendum est de primis principiis simpliciter in terminis 95 entis quantum ad speculabilia; de agibilibus etiam forte non minus, quia semper ad optima deprecatur ratio. Unde continentis et incontinentis rationem laudamus (in fine primi Ethicorum). Ex hoc etiam forte deducitur consequenter secundo: quod in potentia voluntatis non est ponendus habitus, quia non propter passiones secundum quas male <se> habere possit cum nulla passio sit in voluntate; 100 nec propter indeterminationem quia potentialitas rationalis quia illa tollitur per intellectum ex praesentatione obiecti-obiecti autem est determinare potentiam. Et si obiiciatur quod appetitus rationalis vel <imaginatio> determinat intellectum secundum PHILOSOPHUM nono Metaphysicae ergo non determinatur ab obiecto, dicendum quod differenter intellectus determinat voluntatem et voluntas intellec105 tum, quia intellectus determinat voluntatem specificando actum, sed voluntas quoad exercitium actus. 14. Et sic patet secundum. art. 3: Quid sit habitus? 15. QUANTUM AD TERTIUM dicendum est quod habitus, (D 35rb) saltem acquisi110 tus ut excludamus (C 90va) habitum supernaturalem et infusum, non est proprie aliqua natura absoluta sed est magis modus rei vel naturae. Quod patet sic. 16. [1] Quia sicut se habet res ad rem, sic modus ad modum; sed habitus non requiritur nisi propter modum; ergo non est proprie res sed modus. 17. [2] Secundo patet idem comparando habitum corporis ad habitum animae, quia 115 sanitas, quae est habitus corporis, non videtur secundum se esse (E 40rb) aliqua natura absoluta, sed sola commensuratio vel proportio seu determinata habitudo humorum inter se; ergo similiter videtur de habitibus animae. 93 in foribus autem quis delinquet ] ARISTOTELES, Met. II.1 993b5 (Ar. lat. 25.3.1 [M] 43). 97 in fine primi Ethicorum ] ARISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. I.13 1102b15. 97–106 Ex hoc . . . actus ] Cf. TDH q. 4, a. 9, ed. Koch. 98 in potentia . . . habitus ] Cf. TDH q. 4, a. 9, ed. Koch. 103 nono Metaphysicae ] ARISTOTELES, Met. IX.5 1048a10–15 (Ar. lat. 25.3.1 [M] 184). 112–113 Quia . . . modus ] Cf. GUILLELMUS DE OCKHAM, Rep. III, q. 7, OTh VI, 202; DURANDELLUS, Evid. III, q. 30, ed. Stella, 904; PETRUS DE PALUDE, Sent. III, d. 23, q. 1, op. 4, Paris 1517, f. 117vb–118ra et op. 5, f. 118rb–vb; IOHANNES CAPREOLUS, Def. III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues, 292a-b; THOMAS DE STRASBOURG, Sent. III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Venice 1564, f. 36vb. 114–117 Secundo . . . animae ] Cf. GUILLELMUS DE OCKHAM, Rep. III, q. 7, OTh VI, 202; DURANDELLUS, Evid. III, q. 30, ed. Stella, 904; PETRUS DE PALUDE, Sent. III, d. 23, q. 1, op. 4, Paris 1517, f. 118ra et op. 5, f. 118vb–119ra; THOMAS DE STRASBOURG, Sent. III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Venice 1564, f. 36vb. 115–117 sanitas . . . inter se ] Cf. ARISTOTELES, Phys. VII.3 246b4–6. 99 se ] sic P 102 imaginatio ] imaginationis P 110 et infusum ] in marg. D om. E jj infusum ] et add. A 111 patet ] quod probatur primo add. F jj sic ] om. CDE 112 Quia sicut ] in marg. D quod sic E quod sic add. sed quod ras. D jj Quia ] om. F jj sic ] ita ACF se habet add. B sicut E 114 ad habitum ] repl. B 115 videtur ] est B dicitur A jj esse ] om. AB jj aliqua ] res vel add. A 116 sola ] solum B 117 humorum ] humanorum B humanorum ante corr. C jj videtur ] esse add. A 340 P.J. Hartman 18. [3] Tertio (F 3v) idem patet specialiter de habitibus animae sic, quia ut dicitur nono Metaphysicae per actum intra manentem nihil alterum constituitur; sed habitus 120 causantur per actus intra manentes, et per frequentiam actuum; ergo non est proprie res aliqua, sed modus ex tali frequentia derelictus. 19. [4] Quarto, quia illud quod acquiritur per frequentationem actuum et ammittitur per solam cessationem eorum non videtur esse res secundum se sed potius quidam modus consuetudinis; sed omnis habitus acquisitus est huiusmodi; quare 125 etc. Minor de se patet, experimur enim quod per cessationem longam actuum amittimus habitus morales et speculativos. Maior probatur, quia quod est aliqua res secundum se numquam desinit nisi corrumpatur vel corruptione subiecti vel actione contrarii vel cessatione causae efficientis. Actus autem quorum cessatione amittitur habitus absque corruptione vel actione contrarii non sunt causa conservativa habitus, 130 alioquin habitus non manerent in dormientibus in quibus actus cessant. Quare habitus non sunt proprie res secundum se sed quidam modi consuetudinales. 20. Debemus imaginari quod sicut equus docetur ambulare inquantum ex consuetudine sic am(F 4r)bulandi efficitur pronus ad consimiliter ambulandum, nec ex hoc efficitur in eo aliqua res absoluta sed solum talis modus (C 90vb) consuetudinalis 135 et talis pronitas, sic ex consuetudine actuum bonorum vel malorum fit in nobis quaedam pronitas ad consimiliter agendum eo quod consuetudo inclinat quasi per modum naturae. 21. Nec propter hoc debet videri ALICUI quod habitus non sit qualitas eo quod proprie non est res sed modus rei, quia non solum Relatio et sex ultima praedica140 menta dicunt modos rerum immo in Qualitate et Quantitate inveniuntur aliqua 118–121 Tertio . . . derelictus ] Cf. DURANDELLUS, Evid. III, q. 30, ed. Stella, 904; PETRUS DE PALUDE, Sent. III, d. 23, q. 1, op. 4, Paris 1517, f. 118ra et op. 5, f. 119ra; IOHANNES CAPREOLUS, Def. III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues, 292b; THOMAS DE STRASBOURG, Sent. III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Venice 1564, f. 36vb. 119 nono Metaphysicae ] ARISTOTELES, Met. IX.8 1050a34–35. 122–131 Quarto . . . consuetudinales ] Cf. DURANDELLUS, Evid. III, q. 30, ed. Stella, 904–905; PETRUS DE PALUDE, Sent. III, d. 23, q. 1, op. 4, Paris 1517, f. 118ra–b et op. 5, f. 119ra; IOHANNES CAPREOLUS, Def. III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues, 292b; THOMAS DE STRASBOURG, Sent. III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Venice 1564, f. 36vb. 132–137 Debemus . . . naturae ] Cf. DURANDELLUS, Evid. III, q. 30, ed. Stella, 905; PETRUS DE PALUDE, Sent. III, d. 23, q. 1, op. 4, Paris 1517, f. 118rb; IOHANNES CAPREOLUS, Def. III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues, 292b; THOMAS DE STRASBOURG, Sent. III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Venice 1564, f. 36vb. 138–144 Nec . . . secundum se ] Cf. DURANDELLUS, Evid. III, q. 30, ed. Stella, 905. 118 Tertio . . . animae ] hom. B jj sic ] om. A jj quia ut ] quod B jj dicitur ] om. F 119 alterum ] actu A 120 causantur ] causatur DE jj et ] vel ABF jj ergo ] habitus add. F 122– 123 actuum . . . cessationem ] in marg. D om. CE 123 eorum ] eorum sed in marg. aliquorum C jj esse ] aliqua add. B jj sed ] om. E 124 consuetudinis ] consuetudinalis DE 125 longam ] longuam AB 126–127 habitus . . . corrumpatur vel ] hom. B 127 desinit ] esse add. AF jj nisi ] nec D jj vel1 ] vel sed nisi in marg. D jj corruptione ] habitum absque praem. B jj subiecti ] om. B 128 vel cessatione causae efficientis ] om. B jj amittitur ] amittuntur A 129 corruptione ] subiecti add. A jj non ] in marg. D om.(!) E jj conservativa ] in conservando A conservantia F 130 manerent ] remaneret DE jj Quare ] igitur A 131 sunt ] est F jj secundum se ] om. A jj sed ] sunt add. DE jj modi ] modus F jj consuetudinales ] consuetudines DF 132 Debemus ] autem add. B ergo add. F jj sicut ] in marg. ergo add. D quod sicut add. sed exp. E 133 sic ] om. C jj efficitur ] fit B 134 solum ] solus DE jj consuetudinalis ] consuetudinis F 135 consuetudine ] talium add. B 136 inclinat ] se add. sed ras. F jj quasi ] om. B 138 Nec ] sup. l. rerum add. D rerum E 139 modus ] in marg. modum(?) add. D 140 immo ] sed etiam B 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 341 quae non dicunt proprie res sed modos reales, sicut numerus in Quantitate, non enim proprie est res aliqua praeter res numeratas sed est modus realis circa eas. Similiter figura quae ponitur in quarta specie Qualitatis potius est modus terminationis quantitatis quam aliqua res secundum se. Et idem est de habitu et 145 dispositione quae sunt in prima specie Qualitatis, non enim sunt nisi quaedam pronitas et quidam modus se habendi bene vel male in se vel ad alterum. Et hoc expresse videtur dicere PHILOSOPHUS septimo Physicorum ubi probat quod alteratio non est ad qualitates primae speciei, scilicet ad habitum et dispositionem. Dicit enim sic: "virtus omnis et malitia ad aliquid sunt. Sanitas quidem calidorum 150 et frigidorum (F 4v) commensuratio quaedam est aut eorum quae infra sunt ad continens." Idem intelligendum de habitibus animae. Unde concludit: "quoniam igitur malitiae et virtutes sunt ad aliquid, <haec> autem neque <generationes sunt neque> ipsorum <generatio> neque alterationes omnino." Praedicamenta enim non distinguuntur secundum rem et modum neque secundum rem sed secundum formam 155 praedicandi. Et ideo omne illud secundum quod subiectum disponitur aliqualiter ad se vel ad alterum, sive sit res proprie sive modus rei, dicitur qualitas, quia facit subiectum suum aliquale. Et similiter omne illud quod denominat subiectum suum aliquantum vel aliquotum dicitur quantitas-esto quod quandoque non sit proprie et secundum se res, sicut dictum est de numero. 160 Ad argumenta principalia 22. Ad primum argumentum dicendum (C 91ra) quod propter facilitatem et determinationem potentiae ad certum modum indigemus habitibus. Et cum dicitur quod facilitas minuit meritum, dicendum quod non est verum de facilitate quae est ex parte operantis et quam ponit habitus-immo auget supposita aequalitate 165 operis, quia (B 128va) auget voluntarium. Sed facilitas operis minuit et difficultas auget ceteris paribus. Et quod opponitur de vidua quae plus meruit dando duo 146–153 Et hoc . . . omnino ] Cf. DURANDELLUS, Evid. III, d. 30, ed. Stella, 905; PETRUS DE PALUDE, Sent. III, d. 23, q. 1, op. 4, Paris 1517, f. 118rb; IOHANNES CAPREOLUS, Def. III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues, 292a. 149–151 virtus . . . continens ] ARISTOTELES, Phys. VII.3 246b4–6 (Ar. lat. 7.1 266). 151–153 quoniam . . . omnino ] ARISTOTELES, Phys. VII.3 246b4–6 (Ar. lat. 7.1 266). 161 Ad primum argumentum ] supra n. 2. 141 dicunt ] dicuntur C jj modos ] modi sed modos ante corr. C jj non2 ] est add. sed ras. F 142 proprie est ] dicitur A jj aliqua praeter res ] hom. A jj numeratas ] proprie add. A 143 Similiter . . . modus ] om. B 145 nisi ] om. F 146 modus ] modi A jj vel1 ] et B jj in ] ad A jj vel2 ] et B 147 quod ] enim add. DE 148 est ] ad primam add. B jj qualitates ] qualitatem B jj ad2 ] om. DE 149 sic ] om. A jj virtus ] om. E jj omnis ] om. F jj et ] vel B jj ad ] in B 150 est ] om. B jj sunt ] aut add. ABEF jj ad ] aliud D aliquid F 151 intelligendum ] est intentum(?) F 152 igitur ] ergo ADF praeter(?) E jj et virtutes ] in marg. moventes(?) add. sed ras. D moventes E jj sunt1 ] in add. sup. l. D jj ad ] in B jj haec ] om. B horum ACDEF jj autem ] om. B aut F 152–153 generationes sunt neque ] om. ABCDEF 153 generatio ] generationes ABCDEF jj omnino ] omnes E 154 modum ] om. F jj rem2 ] rationem F 155 illud ] sup. l. A jj aliqualiter ] om. C 156 sit ] fuit ante corr. C jj sive2 ] sit add. BF 157 aliquale ] esse quale F jj illud ] om. ABCF jj suum2 ] om. BCDEF 158 dicitur ] qualitas add. sed ras. D jj sit ] fuit ante corr. C 162 habitibus ] virtutibus A 165 voluntarium ] in marg. notabilium(?) add. sed ras. D notabilium(?) E jj minuit et ] meritum quia F jj difficultas ] aug add. sed exp. C 166 quod ] ideo cum BF jj quae ] dedit duo minuta quod add. B 166–167 dando duo minuta ] om. B 342 P.J. Hartman minuta quam divites qui magna dederunt-dicendum quod verum est quia sibi fuit difficilius dare illud modicum quam divitibus multum. Nec ista difficultas fuit ex conditione operantis sicut arguebatur (D 35va) sed potius ex conditione operis. 170 Paupertas (F 5r) enim non dicit conditionem personae sed dicit tenuitatem fortunae. Comparando ergo illud quod vidua dedit ad illud quod sibi remansit plus dedit quam divites quibus proportionaliter plus remansit non accipiendo solum proportionem personae ad personam, sed rei datae ad remanentem. 23. Ad secundum dicendum quod potentiae naturales non indigent habitibus nec 175 quoad substantiam actus nec quoad modum, quia ex natura sua feruntur in actus suos solum secundum unum (E 40va) modum. Sed potentiae rationales cum sint indet(A 108rb)erminatae ad diversos modos indigent habitibus determinantibus ipsas. Nec propter hoc sunt minus perfectae quam naturales-immo perfectiores, quia haec indifferentia est radicaliter ex earum libertate et universalitate. Quaestio 2: Utrum habitus acquisitus faciat aliquid ad eliciendum sequentem actum quoad essentiam actus vel solum quoad modum 1. Secundo quaeritur Utrum habitus acquisitus faciat aliquid ad eliciendum sequentem actum quoad essentiam actus vel solum quoad modum. ET VIDETUR QUOD sit causa eliciendi sequentem actum quoad essentiam actus, quia ex similibus actibus acquiritur habitus et acquisitus similes producit; sed habitus acquiritur 5 ex actibus quoad essentiam actuum (C 91rb) et non ratione modi, quia actus praecedentes habitum non sunt modificati; ergo videtur quod habitus acquisitus sit causa sequentium actuum quoad essentiam eorum. 2. Item actus primus est causa actus secundi quantum ad id quod est; sed scientia, quae est habitus intellectualis, se habet (F 4v) ad scire sicut actus primus 10 ad secundum; ergo est causa eius quantum ad id quod est. Et eadem ratio videtur esse de ceteris habitibus. 174 Ad secundum ] supra n. 3. 167 magna ] magis F jj quia ] quod B 168 difficilius ] om. B jj multum ] magnum B 169 sed ] sup. l. quod add. sed exp. E 170 enim ] om. B jj fortunae ] formae CF 171 Comparando ] operando F jj dedit1 ] comparatum add. F jj illud2 ] sibi add. sed exp. E jj quod2 ] om. B sibi add. sed exp. E jj sibi ] sup. l. F 171–172 plus . . . remansit ] in marg. A 174 potentiae ] personae F 176 solum ] in marg. D om. CE jj potentiae ] om. DE personae F jj cum ] ad E jj sint ] ad add. DE sed ras. D 177 diversos ] actus vel add. A jj indigent ] indicant E jj determinantibus ipsas ] qui determinant eas B jj Nec ] ut ante corr. D ut E 178 immo ] sed B 179 earum ] eorum C jj et ] nobilitate seu add. B jj universalitate ] sub. l. B utilitate F 3 sit ] sint DE jj sequentem ] om. BDEF jj quoad essentiam actus ] repl. C 4 acquiritur ] acquiruntur DE causantur F jj et ] qui dum est F jj similes ] actus add. AF 5 quoad ] quantum ad A jj non ] in(!) A 6 sunt ] sup. l. C jj acquisitus ] om. DE 8 quantum ad ] quoad A 9 est ] om. B 10 quantum ad ] quoad A 11 esse ] om. A 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 343 3. IN CONTRARIUM EST, quia secundum PHILOSOPHUM secundo Ethicorum potentia est qua possumus in actum, habitus vero quo bene vel male possumus; ergo si per habitum simpliciter possumus in actum quoad essentiam actus, iam non erit 15 habitus sed potentia, et sic peribit eorum differentia. 4. Item ad illud solum operatur habitus propter quod indigemus habitu; sed indigemus habitu solum propter modum; unde ubi modus est ex natura potentiae determinatus, non requiritur ibi aliquis habitus, ut ostensum est in praecedenti quaestione; ergo habitus nihil facit ad actum nisi quia ponit modum. 20 5. RESPONSIO. Circa quaestionem istam est duplex modus dicendi. Opinio prima (Hervaei) 6. Unus est quod tam potentia quam habitus realiter faciunt ad eliciendum actum quoad essentiam actus et quoad modum eius ita quod utrumque est a duobus simul tamquam quolibet eorum existente imperfecto agente secundum se sed supplentibus 25 vicem unius perfecti agentis. Tamen secundum rationem cuiusdam appropriationis potentiae attribuitur actus quoad esssentiam, habitui vero quoad modum. 7. Primum probatur sic. Quandocumque duo principia concurrunt simul ad unum simplicem actum ita quod neutrum secundum se est sufficiens talem actum elicere (F 6r) (aut non ita perfecte) oportet quod talis actus secundum totum quod in eo 30 est fit ab utroque et non ab uno secundum unum et ab alio secundum aliud; sed ad eliciendum actum virtuosum sequentem habitum virtutis concurrunt potentia et habitus virtuosus ita quod alterum (C 91va) istorum non sufficit sine altero ad eliciendum talem actum (vel ita perfecte); ergo actus virtuosus secundum totum quod in eo est est ab utroque simul quantum ad essentiam et modum, et non 35 a potentia secundum unum et ab habitu secundum aliud. Maior patet ratione et exemplo. Ratio est, quia in simplici non est dare unum et aliud, et ideo omne simplex secundum totum quod in eo est est ab uno tantum vel a duobus supplentibus vicem unius et non a duobus ita quod ab uno fit secundum unum et ab alio secundum 13 potentia . . . possumus ] ARISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. II.5 1105b24–28. 27 Primum probatur sic ] Cf. HERVAEUS NATALIS, Quodl. I, q. 13, ed. Yamazaki, 11–13 (D Paris 1513, f. 28vb); IX, q. 4, Paris 1513, f. 161vb; III, q. 7, Paris 1513, f. 78ra–b. 12 est ] arguitur F 13 actum ] actu ACD jj habitus ] repl. A jj ergo ] igitur ABF autem E 14 erit ] esset D 17 modum ] solum add. in marg. D 18 ibi ] ubi add. D 19 actum ] actus B 22 quod ] Prima opinio quae est Hervaei, Quodlibe<t> primum, quaestione <13a> in marg. P jj habitus ] habitudo F 23 utrumque ] actus F 24 eorum ] illorum C 25 unius ] subiecti add. sed exp. E 26 attribuitur ] om. F 27 sic ] om. F jj Quandocumque ] quandoque AB jj concurrunt ] similiter add. sed ras. D 28 secundum ] om. F jj talem ] om. A jj actum2 ] illum add. A 29 aut ] vel DE jj totum ] omne F 30 secundum1 ] quod add. CDE jj secundum2 ] quod add. DE 31 habitum ] actus B 32 altero ] alio F 33 talem ] sup. l. F jj ita ] in marg. ista add. sed ras. D jj ergo ] quo F jj actus ] habitus ante corr. C jj virtuosus ] om. F 34 est ] om. F 35 ab ] om. D 36 dare ] nisi add. in marg. D jj unum ] aliud F jj et aliud ] om. E jj et ideo ] om. D 37 est2 ] om. E 38 ita ] fit F jj secundum1 ] per A jj secundum2 ] per A 344 P.J. Hartman aliud. Exemplum etiam est ad hoc, quia ad actum secandi requiritur in securi 40 durities et acuties, nec sufficeret durities sine acutie, nec acuties sine duritie, et certe actus secandi totus est ab utroque simul et non ab uno secundum unum et ab alio secundum aliud. Et sic patet maior. Minor etiam manifesta est, quia actus virtuosus sequens habitum est actus unus simplex aeque sicut unus alius quiscumque praecedens habitum, essentia enim actus (F 6v) et modus non sunt in actu virtuoso 45 duae res sed una tantum. Ad eliciendum etiam talem actum (vel ita perfecte) non sufficit potentia sine habitu nec habitus sine potentia, alioquin alterum superflueret. Quare etc. Sic igitur potentia et habitus concurrunt ad eliciendum actum perfectum ita quod totus secundum essentiam et modum est ab utroque simul quia supplent vicem unius perfecti agentis. 50 8. Verumtamen secundum modum cuiusdam appropriationis potentiae attribuitur generatio actus quoad essentiam eius, habitui vero quoad modum. (D 35vb) Cuius ratio est duplex. [1] Una, quia quando duo principia concurrunt ad unum actum quorum unum supponit alterum, actus quoad essentiam appropriatur ei quod supponitur, quoad modum vero appropriatur ei quod supponit alterum, sicut in ipso actu modus 55 supponit essentiam. (C 91vb) Cum ergo (B 128vb) habitus supponat potentiam et non e converso, ideo essentia actus attribuitur potentiae, modus vero habitui. [2] Alia ratio est, quia quando duo principia concurrunt ad unum (E 40vb) actum quorum unum est magis indeterminatum, aliud vero magis determinatum, essentia actus attribuitur per appropriationem principio magis indeterminato, modus vero 60 principio magis determinato, nam in actu modus est quasi quaedam determinatio essentiae actus. Potentia autem est principium magis indeterminatum, habitus vero principium magis determinatum. Propter quod essentia actus attribuitur potentiae per appropriationem, (F 7r) modus vero habitui. 39–42 Exemplum . . . secundum aliud ] Cf. HERVAEUS NATALIS, Quodl. I, q. 13, ed. Yamazaki, 13 (D Paris 1513, f. 28vb): "Exemplum sensibile possumus habere de hoc, verbi gratia de duritie et figura, nam durities videtur quasi potentia quaedam secativa, figura vero est quasi habilitas ad secandum sic vel aliter; verbi gratia, figura dolabrae, figura serrae, figura terebri disponunt durum ad secandum diversis modis et ad causandum diversas sectiones."; IX, q. 4, Paris 1513, f. 161vb: "Exemplum de praedictis possumus accipere in instrumentis artium mechanicarum ita quod accipiamus duritiem ferri pro potentia secativa, sed figuras ferrae securis et dolabrae et sic de aliis accipiamus quasi pro habitibus. Modo praedictae figurae praesupponunt duritiem et determinant ad secundum sic vel sic in quibus sectionibus sectio et modus secandi non sunt diversae res; sed durities requirit praedicta figuras ut per quas determinetur ad sic vel sic secandum; sic etiam in potentiis indigentibus habitibus praeexigitur potentia et potentia requirit habitum determinantem et habilitantem ipsam et sic patet quod potentia et habitus distinguuntur dato quod habitus una cum potentia possit in substantiam actus."; III, q. 7, Paris 1513, f. 78rb. 50–51 Verumtamen . . . modum ] Cf. HERVAEUS NATALIS, Quodl. I, q. 13, ed. Yamazaki, 13 (D Paris 1513, f. 29vb); IX, q. 4, Paris 1513, ff. 161vb–162ra; III, q. 7, Paris 1513, f. 78rb. 39 quia ] quod E 40 acuties sine duritie ] e converso F 41 certe ] autem add. D jj totus ] om. A jj et ] non add. sed ras. D 44 essentia ] cum A jj sunt ] sint A 45 eliciendum ] in marg. aliquod add. sed ras. D aliquod E jj etiam ] sup. l. F jj talem ] om. F jj vel ] om. F jj perfecte ] perfectum F 46 nec ] vel BF 47 habitus ] actus F 48 totus ] actus add. DEF 49 vicem ] in marg. in esse add. sed ras. D in esse E 50 cuiusdam ] om. F 51 generatio ] om. E determinatio F jj eius ] om. A jj quoad2 ] secundum add. B 52 Una ] om. DE jj quia ] om. F jj actum ] om. F 53 appropriatur ] appropriatus F 54 vero ] autem A jj alterum ] om. A jj sicut ] om. CDE 55 Cum . . . potentiam ] om. F 56 ideo ] quoad add. A ita F jj vero ] autem add. in marg. D non E 57 quando ] repl. sed ras. D 59–60 modus . . . determinato ] om. F 60 actu ] actum E jj quasi ] om. F 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 345 9. Secundum hanc positionem respondetur ad rationes in contrarium. Ad primam 65 cum dicitur quod potentia est qua possumus, habitus vero quo bene vel male, DICUNT ISTI quod in actu simplici (sicut est actus virtuosus) totum (scilicet essentia actus et modus) est a potentia et totum ab habitu realiter, quamvis secundum appropriationem essentia attribuatur potentiae et modus habitui. Et cum subdicitur quod "iam habitus non esset habitus sed potentia," DICUNT quod vere habitus est 70 quaedam potentia. Unde PHILOSOPHUS tertio De anima et octavo Physicorum dicit quod habens scientiam per eam est in potentia accidentali ad scire, quia cum habitus sit potentia accidentalis supponit aliam potentiam priorem quae verius et prius dicitur potentia scilicet essentialis. Et quod sic oporteat dicere probatur, quia modus actus ad quem facit habitus aut est idem quod essentia actus aut aliud. Si idem ergo 75 quod est causa modi actus est causa essentiae eius. Si aliud adhuc sequitur quod habitus sit quaedam potentia, quia omne illud quod est principium eliciendi actum habet rationem potentiae, ut patet ex eius definitione. Si ergo modus sit aliud ab essentia actus et habitus sit principium causativum talis modi, sequitur quod habitus sit quaedam potentia. 64 Ad primam ] supra n. 3. 65 potentia . . . male ] ARISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. II.5 1105b24– 28. 70 tertio De anima ] ARISTOTELES, De an. II.5 417a22–30. jj octavo Physicorum ] ARISTOTELES, Phys. VIII.4 255a25–b23. 73–79 modus . . . potentia ] Cf. HERVAEUS NATALIS, Quodl. I, q. 13, ed. Yamazaki, 6 (D Paris 1513, f. 28ra): ". . . quia substantia actus et modus eius aut sunt idem re aut non. Si sic sequitur quod quidquid realiter est causa unius et alterius. Sed potentia est causa substantiae actus, ergo et habitus. Si non, tunc ergo substantia actus et modus erunt duae res habentes duo principia per quorum unum habens illud est potens in unam illarum rerum et per aliud in aliam. Sed illud quo aliquid est potens est potentia. Ergo habitus erit potentia."; Ibid., 8 (D f. 28ra–b): ". . . substantia actus et modus aut sunt idem re aut diversa. Si sunt idem re quidquid est causa unius et alterius realiter; sed potentia est causa substantiae actus, ergo et habitus. Si autem sunt diversae res, tunc potentia et habitus erunt diversa principia per quae possumus esse causa diversorum; sed secundum rationem quam ipsi adducunt illud quo possumus esse causa alicuius est potentia; ergo etc."; IX, q. 4, Paris 1513, f. 161rb: ". . . quia iste modus aut est idem re cum actu ipso aut non. Si est idem re, sequitur quod quidquid est realiter causa unius sit realiter causa alterius, et sic adhuc stat quod habitus est causa substantiae actus. Si sint respectus diversi et habitus sit causa ipsius modi, sequitur adhuc quod habitus sit potentia, quia adveniens alicui facit ipsum posse quod prius non poterat; potentia est tale quid; ergo etc."; Ibid.: "Quaero utrum actus et modus differant realiter an non. Si non sequitur quod illud quod realiter est causa unius etiam est causa alterius, et sic habitus est causa substantiae actus, et per consequens secundum eos habitus erit potentia. Si autem modus differat realiter a substantia actus ita quod actus et suus modus sint diversae res, ita quod per potentiam causatur actus et per habitum causatur solus modus, adhuc stat quod habitus sit potentia." 64 positionem ] opinionem BF 65 quod ] om. C jj vero ] om. B autem F 66 sicut ] sic F jj est ] om. DE jj actus ] in marg. habitus add. sed exp. C habitus DE 67 secundum ] repl. sed ras. F 68 cum ] om. F 70 quaedam ] om. CDE jj Unde ] quando DE 71 accidentali ] accidentaliter B actuali F jj quia ] quaero F jj habitus ] cum add. AB cum add. sed exp. C 72 accidentalis ] aptitudinalis AF jj aliam ] scientiam add. sed exp. D jj et ] per B jj prius ] proprius A per prius F 73 scilicet ] naturalis ideo non dicitur potentia absolute sed habitus quia talis potentiae scilicet accidentalis add. in marg. A jj essentialis ] accidentalis(!) ACDE 75 eius ] actus DE 76 illud ] om. F jj est ] habet A jj principium ] rationem A 77 aliud ] om. F 78 et ] om. DE jj causativum ] activum A 346 P.J. Hartman 80 10. (C 92ra) Ad secundum DICUNT quod licet habitus requiratur solum propter modum, quia tamen essentia actus et modus coincidunt in idem realiter, necesse est (F 7v) quod illud quod est causa unius sit causa alterius quamvis secundum rationem causatio actus magis approprietur potentiae, causatio vero modi habitui. Opinio secunda (Godefridi) 85 11. Alius modus dicendi est quod sola potentia est causa actus quantum ad essentiam eius, habitus autem solum quoad (A 180va) modum. Cuius ratio est triplex. 12. [1] Prima talis est. Omnis potentia potest in actum sibi proportionatum absque quocumque addito quod sit ratio eliciendi ipsum; sed potentia intellectiva habet 90 intelligere quoad essentiam actus tamquam actum sibi proportionatum; similiter potentia appetitiva habet pro actu sibi proportionato appetere quoad essentiam talis actus; ergo potentia intellectiva potest in omne intelligere et appetitiva in omne appetere quoad essentiam talium actuum absque quocumque addito quod sit ratio eliciendi tales actus. Dico autem "absque alio addito quod sit ratio eliciendi" quia 95 potentia intellectiva vel appetitiva non potest exire in actum suum nisi remoto impedimento si quod sit et praesentato obiecto. Sed haec non sunt ratio elicitiva actus sed sola potentia. 13. [2] Secunda ratio talis est. Sicut se habet potentia supernaturalis ad habitum supernaturalem, sic potentia naturalis ad habitum naturalem, vocando "habitum 100 naturalem" habitum ex naturalibus acquisitum de quo loquimur; sed potentia supernaturalis sola est principium eliciendi actum supernaturalem quoad essentiam actus, habitus vero supernaturalis solum facit ad modum actus; ergo similiter est de 80 Ad secundum ] supra n. 4. 88–97 Omnis . . . potentia ] Cf. GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS, Quodl. XIV, q. 3, PhB V, 342–3; XI, q. 4, PhB V, 23. 98–108 Sicut se . . . conclusio ] Cf. GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS, Quodl. XI, q. 4, PhB V, 22–24. 80 secundum ] secundam C jj dicunt ] dicendum A jj habitus ] om. B jj requiratur ] requirantur ante corr. B referatur F 81 quia ] quod E jj actus ] in marg. DE 82 illud ] sup. l. idem add. sed ras. F jj secundum rationem ] om. A 83 causatio ] causato B jj modi ] in marg. C 85 Alius modus dicendi est ] Secunda opinio quae est <Godefridi> de Fontibus in Quoli<beto> in marg. P jj dicendi ] om. BCF jj actus ] virtuosus add. A 86 eius ] om. A 88 potest ] ponit F 90 quoad essentiam actus ] om. F jj tamquam actum sibi proportionatum ] pro actu sibi proportionato F 90–91 similiter potentia ] om. F 91 habet . . . proportionato ] om. F 92 potest ] ponit F 93 actuum ] accidentalium ante corr. D accidentalium E 93–94 absque . . . actus ] hom. BF 93 quocumque ] alio add. DE 94 tales actus ] om. A jj Dico . . . eliciendi ] in marg. A jj Dico ] et praem. DE jj autem ] sup. l. tamen add. sed exp. E jj sit ] habet E jj eliciendi ] tales actus add. BF jj quia ] quo A 95 potest ] possit A 96 si ] scilicet D jj et ] in D jj praesentato ] privato B jj haec ] hoc ADF jj sunt ] est ADF jj elicitiva ] eliciendi F 97 actus ] om. BF jj sola ] om. F jj potentia ] ergo add. sed ras. ergo etc add. F 98 talis ] om. B jj est ] om. F jj habitum ] poten praem. sed exp. C 99 sic ] se habet add. BF jj habitum1 ] om. DE 100 habitum ] om. F non add. sed exp. A jj ex ] de F jj loquimur ] loquitur BC 101 principium ] ad add. F 102 actus1 ] eius CDE jj ad ] quoad A jj ergo ] quo ante corr. D est add. sup. l. D quo E jj similiter ] actus add. sed exp. C de add. sup. l. D actus add. DE 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 347 potentia naturali et habitu acquisito ex naturalibus. (F 8r) Maior patet per simile. Minor declaratur quia per solam potentiam supernaturalem, puta per potentiam 105 consecrandi, fit actus consecrationis. Per caritatem autem, (C 92rb) quae est habitus supernaturalis, nihil fit circa praedictum actum quoad essentiam actus, sed solum apponitur modus, qui est meritorie consecrare. Quare patet minor. Sequitur ergo conclusio. 14. [3] Tertia talis est. PHILOSOPHUS secundo Ethicorum intendit ponere realem 110 differentiam inter potentiam et habitum et non solum secundum rationem vel adaptationem; sed differentia quam ponit est quod potentia est per quam possumus in actum, habitus vero quo bene vel male possumus; ergo in hoc differunt (D 36ra) realiter habitus et potentia: quod potentia elicit solum actum, habitus vero solum modum, et non tantum per adaptationem, ut PRIMI DICUNT. 115 15. Pro hac opinione videtur multum esse textus ARISTOTELIS: quinto Metahysicae et secundo Ethicorum in pluribus locis-si sola superficies litterae consideretur. 16. Ad argumenta quae sunt contra hanc opinionem respondetur quod primum argumentum ita est contra PRIMAM OPINIONEM sicut contra SECUNDAM, quia si nihil potest causare nisi aliquod simile ei a quo causatum est, sequitur quod 120 habitus non potest causare promptitudinem, facilitatem vel modum in actu sequente, quia hoc non habuerunt actus praecedentes ex quibus causatus (F 8v) est habitus. Et tamen PRIMI DICUNT quod habitus causat talem modum licet non solum. Ergo argumentum ita est contra EOS sicut contra SECUNDOS. Dicendum ergo ad argumentum quod habitus non causatur ex praecedentibus actibus ratione essentiae 125 ipsorum absolute loquendo sed propter frequentationem eorum per quam causatur in (E 41ra) appetitu quaedam dispositio per quam firmius et promptius exit in eosdem actus quantum prius, hoc enim facit circa omnem potentiam consuetudo et frequentatio actuum. 109–114 Tertio . . . dicunt ] Cf. GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS, Quodl. XI, q. 4, PhB V, 24. 111 adaptationem ] Cf. HERVAEUS NATALIS, Quodl. IX, q. 4, Paris 1513, f. 162ra: "Nam ad auctoritates Philosophi quibus videtur quod potentia causat actum et habitus modum, si essent mille potest ad omnes dici quod hoc intelligitur secundum praedictam adaptationem, non autem quin utrumque sit causa utriusque realiter loquendo, ipse enim Philosophus frequenter facit talem adaptationem in reducendo effectus ad causas." 111–112 potentia . . . possumus ] ARISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. II.5 1105b24–28. 117–118 primum argumentum ] supra n. 1. 103 ex ] in marg. et sup. l. D et ante corr. CD et E jj naturalibus ] tali post corr. sed naturalibus ante corr. C 105 consecrationis ] in marg. consecratus add. D consecratus E jj autem ] actus F jj quae ] qui CDEF 106 actus ] eius CDE jj solum ] solus CDE 109 Tertia ] tertio AC ratio add. BF jj est ] om. B jj Philosophus ] in add. C 111 adaptationem ] aptationem BC actus add. sed exp. E jj per quam ] qua F 112 in actum ] om. ABF 113 quod ] sed ABF jj vero ] non(!) DE 114 tantum ] solum BF om. A 115 multum ] om. F jj quinto ] nono DE 116 in ] et BF jj litterae ] latere ante corr. C latere E 117 contra ] circa add. C jj respondetur ] primo add. F 118 opinionem ] om. C 119 aliquod ] aliud F 120 non ] om.(!) B jj promptitudinem ] promptionem F vel add. ADF jj actu sequente ] actum sequentem A jj sequente ] om. F 121 hoc ] om. A 122 talem ] actum vel add. A 123 ita ] in marg. D non E jj Dicendum ] est add. A om. D respondendum E 124 quod habitus ] om. F jj causatur ] causantur A 126 per quam ] om. F jj firmius ] citius BF 127 quantum ] in quos BF quem E 348 P.J. Hartman 17. Ad secundum potest dici quod in eo quod est scire sunt duo, scilicet (B 130 129ra) intelligere (quod pertinet ad essentiam actus) et sic intelligere, scilicet recte et infallibiliter (quod pertinet ad modum actus). Habens ergo scientiam tamquam actum primum ratione scientiae est in potentia ad scire (C 92va) qui est actus secundus, non quoad essentiam eius sed quoad modum iam dictum, et illius modi tamquam actus secundi causa est scientia tamquam actus primus. 135 Opinio tertia (Durandi) 18. Nunc inquirendum est quid veritatis habeat utraque opinio vel in quo deficiat. Circa quod sic proceditur, quia primo ostendetur qui et quot sunt illi modi qui reperiuntur circa actum elicitum a potentia perfecta per habitum et secundo deducetur in quolibet illorum modorum an habitus possit causare talem modum nihil 140 operando ad essentiam talis actus. Opinio tertia, art. 1: Qui et quot sint illi modi 19. QUANTUM AD PRIMUM sciendum est quod triplex modus invenitur circa actum elicitum a potentia perfecta per habitum. Unus modus est intensio in actu, actus enim sequens habitum (bonum vel malum) videtur esse intensior quam actus 145 praecedens et generans ipsum, cuius causa postea reddetur. Alius modus est quod talis actus est praecise concors rectae rationi vel praecise discors a (F 9r) recta ratione: primum est in actu elicito a potentia perfecta per habitum virtuosum; secundum est in actu elicito a potentia disposita per habitum vitiosum; potentia autem sine habitu indifferenter elicit nunc unum nunc alterum-et hic est modus 150 de quo loquitur PHILOSOPHUS secundo Ethicorum dicens quod potentia est qua possumus, habitus autem quo bene vel male possumus. Tertius modus est quod actus sequens habitum facilius elicitur et delectabilius quam actus praecedens ipsum qui elicitur a nuda potentia, ut patet similiter ex secundo Ethicorum. Tantum de primo. 129 Ad secundum ] supra n. 2. 150–151 potentia . . . possumus ] ARISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. II.5 1105b24–28. 130–131 ad essentiam . . . pertinent ] hom. sed ad essentiam actus et similiter intelligere recte et infallibiliter add. in marg. D hom. E 130 et sic ] ante corr. sed etiam post corr. C jj et ] etiam et etiam add. F jj scilicet ] quod est F jj recte ] et faciliter add. B 132–133 scire . . . quoad2 ] hom. A 133 iam ] sup. l. F 136 habeat ] habere D jj vel ] ut A 137 quia primo ] ras. F jj ostendetur ] om. F ponetur A jj sunt ] sint A 138–143 et secundo . . . habitum ] hom. F 139 nihil ] naturaliter DE 140 talis ] om. CDE 142 est ] om. A 143 intensio ] intentio ante corr. C jj in actu ] om. A 145 reddetur ] om. A 146 praecise1 ] praefixe BF praefige ante corr. C perfecte DE jj rectae ] ratione E jj praecise2 ] praefixe BF praefige ante corr. C perfecte DE 146–147 recta ratione ] rectitudine B rationis F 146 recta ] causa(?) ante corr. D aliqua(?) E 148 in actu elicito ] om. B jj disposita ] perfecta D jj vitiosum ] virtuosum F quia add. AF quod add. BDE quod add. sed exp. C 149 autem ] om. AF jj indifferenter ] om. BF jj alterum ] indifferenter add. BF 150 potentia ] in marg. C 151 autem ] vero A est add. BF 152–153 actus . . . elicitur ] om. DE 152 actus ] actum B actum ante corr. C 153 ut ] et hic A et BDE et ante corr. C jj similiter ] etiam F jj ex ] om. F jj Tantum ] Hoc tamen dictum sit A et hoc praem. D et praem. F 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 349 Opinio tertia, art. 2: An habitus possit causare talem modum 155 20. QUANTUM AD SECUNDUM dicendum est quod si loquimur de primo modo qui consistit in intensione actus, sic habitus tantum facit ad essentiam actus quantum facit ad talem modum et e converso. Quod patet breviter, quia intensio actus et cuiuslibet formae attenditur secundum ipsam essentiam actus vel formae et non secundum aliquid additum, (C 92vb) ut probatum fuit libro primo distinctione 160 17a. Propter quod nihil potest attingere ad talem modum quod non attingit ad essentiam actus. Igitur quantum facit habitus ad hunc modum tantum facit ad essentiam actus. Facit autem habitus ad hunc modum qui est intensio actus tamquam removens prohibens, quia enim appetitus intellectivus et sensitivus feruntur in contraria, ideo uterque remittitur in suo actu per alterum, patitur enim quilibet 165 appetitus difficultatem in actu suo ex tractu alterius in contrarium. (F 9v) Quia igitur habitus virtuosus facit appetitum sensitivum oboedientem rationi et non sicut prius trahentem in contrarium, ideo removet illud quod prohibebat appetitum intellectivum ferri intense in obiectum concors rationi rectae. Et similiter habitus vitiosus per quem appetitus intellectivus concordat appetitui sensitivo removet illud 170 quod prohibebat ne ita intense feretur in suum obiectum. (A 108vb) Propter quod habitus tam virtuosus quam vitiosus est causa intensionis actus sicut removens prohibens. Qualiter autem sit causa per se? Non video-nisi forte quod ratione habitus obiectum magis apparet conveniens potentiae; in obiectum autem ostensum sub ratione melioris et convenientioris nata est potentia ferri intensius. 159–160 libro primo distinctione 17a ] DURANDUS DE SANCTO PORCIANO, Sent. B I, d. 17, qq. 3–4, ed. M. Perrone and F. Retucci; Sent. C I, d. 17, qq. 5–10, Venice 1571. Vide Solère 1997 and Solère 2011. 165 ex tractu alterius in contrarium ] Cf. TDH q. 4, a. 9, ed. Koch. 155 dicendum ] sciendum A jj est ] om. F 156 tantum ] om. A 157 talem ] actum add. sed exp. E 158 formae1 ] actum add. B 158–159 attenditur . . . additum ] om. A 158 attenditur ] dicitur BF jj ipsam ] et add. B et ante corr. C 159 secundum ] sup. l. CD om. BE jj aliquid additum ] aliud F jj fuit ] est F 160 17a ] om. F 161 actus ] igitur aliquid add. F 161– 162 facit . . . actus1 ] hom. CDEF 161 Igitur quantum ] om. A jj facit1 ] autem add. A jj tantum ] creatum(!) B quantum add. A 162 actus1 ] igitur aliquid add. A jj autem ] om. AF jj qui est ] sicut F jj intensio ] in intensione A jj actus2 ] om. B 163 removens ] remaens(?) B jj quia ] enim(?) intellectus add. sed ras. F jj feruntur ] fervunt ante corr. C 164 enim ] in A 165 tractu ] contractu ADE 166 igitur ] appetitus add. sed ras. F jj oboedientem ] oboedire A 167 sicut prius trahentem in contrarium ] in marg. C jj sicut ] posset add. sed exp. C jj trahentem ] contrahentem A jj contrarium ] contrario AB contrario ante corr. C jj ideo ] non(!) D 168 rectae ] in marg. ratione add. D ratione E om. F jj habitus ] virtuosus add. sed ras. F 169 vitiosus per quem appetitus ] hom. B jj vitiosus ] virtuosus A 170 prohibebat ] prohibens A prohibet F jj feretur ] feratur F jj quod2 ] om. B 172 autem ] aut ante corr. C 173 potentiae ] ponitur E jj autem ] aut C 174 sub ratione melioris ] alicuius rationis F jj sub ] om. CDE jj est potentia ferri intensius ] om. F jj est ] postea add. sed exp. D 350 P.J. Hartman 175 21. (D 36rb) Si vero loquamur de secundo modo sic dicendum est quod talis modus non est modus actus sed potentiae, determinatur enim potentia per habitum ad talem actum, actus autem non determinatur ad aliquem modum. Cuius ratio est, quia determinans alterum formaliter est in determinabili quod est de se indifferens, alioquin non esset determinabile sed potius esset de natura sua determinatum. 180 Potentia autem est de se indeterminata ut tendat in obiectum concors rationi vel discors a ratione. Nullus autem actus deliberatus est sic indifferens sed necessario est determinatus ad alterum, (F 10r) ut patuit in secundo libro. Ergo modus qui consistit in tali determinatione est modus potentiae (C 93ra) et in potentia quae determinatur ad talem actum et non est modus actus vel in actu. Et ita falsa est 185 imaginatio illa qua creditur quod habitus ponat hunc modum in actu-quin potius habitus ponit hunc modum in potentia vel est ipse modus. Propter quod nulla est quaestio quaerere an illud quod facit ad talem modum faciat ad (E 41rb) essentiam actus, cum supponatur quod talis modus sit in actu vel aliquid ipsius actus-quod est falsum. Sed est solum in potentia tamquam inclinans et determinans eam ad 190 talem actum. Et sic habitus facit ad actum per modum inclinantis et determinantis potentiam solum. 22. Si autem loquamur de tertio modo qui est pronitas et facilitas eliciendi actum, sic utraque opinio praecedens deficit quae aestimat quod iste modus sit ipsius actus vel in actu causatus ab habitu solo secundum SECUNDAM OPINIONEM vel 195 ab habitu et potentia simul secundum PRIMAM. Hoc autem non est verum, talis enim modus qui est pronitas sive facilitas non est modus actus sive in actu sed est modus potentiae, licet in habi(B 129rb)tudine ad actum ita quod cum dicitur quod habitus est quo faciliter elicitur actus, haec facilitas non est modus actus sed agentis, quem ponit habitus formaliter in potentia. Quod patet dupliciter. [1] Primo 200 quia facilitas potentiae in actum suum quae est per (F 10v) naturam in illis in quibus est appetitus sensitivus sine intellectivo (ut sunt bruta animalia) vel intellectivus sine sensitivo (ut sunt angeli) est in hominibus in quibus est uterque appetitus per habitum superadditum potentiae, licet non sit tanta. Sed prima facilitas est naturalis modus vel conditio potentiae et non actus. Ergo et in nobis. [2] Secundo quia actus 182 secundo libro ] Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Sent. C II, d. 40, q. 1, Venice 1571. 175 loquamur ] loquitur C jj sic ] sicut E 176 sed ] licet DE jj enim ] autem F jj per ] talem add. F 177 actus . . . aliquem ] repl. B jj ad2 ] per A 179 esset1 ] cesset ante corr. D cesset E 180 est ] om. DE jj indeterminata ] et determinata E jj rationi ] rei E 181 a ratione ] om. A jj autem ] om. DE jj necessario ] in marg. intensus add. sed exp. D intensus E necessarius B 184 et non ] om.(!) AF jj Et2 ] sup. l. D om. E jj est2 ] sup. l. C 185 imaginatio ] imago E 185–186 actu . . . modum ] hom. F 185 actu ] actum BC 186 modus ] potentiae add. F 187 quaerere ] quare BCE quare ante corr. D et cetera add. E 188 talis ] iste F jj in actu vel ] om. F jj aliquid ] aliquis F 189 est ] enim D jj eam ] ipsam F 190 Et1 . . . actum2 ] hom. F 192 loquamur ] in marg. D om. E jj tertio ] om. A 193 ipsius ] ipse A 194 in ] ipso add. A jj actu ] actum E jj secundam ] potentia add. sed exp. C 195 ab ] om. D jj simul ] om. E jj secundum primam ] om. D jj talis ] quia add. sed ras. D quia add. sed exp. E 196 enim ] sup. l. E jj in ] om. F 198 quod ] om. DE jj elicitur ] in marg. C 199 ponit ] positus C jj Quod ] et E 200 potentiae ] ponitur E jj quae ] qui CF 201 sine ] sive F jj intellectivo ] intellectivus F jj animalia ] om. F 202 sunt angeli ] in angelis A jj est1 ] et A jj in hominibus ] om. F jj per ] ad add. sed exp. F 204 vel conditio ] om. F jj vel ] avel ante corr. E jj et2 ] om. DE 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 351 205 omnino similis quoad obiectum et intensionem est facilis post habitum, difficilis ante habitum. Ergo facilitas et difficultas non est conditio actus, qui de se (C 93rb) est uniformis, sed est agentis. Et confirmatur per simile in corporalibus, quia ferre aliquod pondus est difficile debili et facile forti, quae difficultas ut de se patet est conditio portantis et non actus nec obiecti. Et simile est in proposito quia habitus 210 est quaedam perfectio habentis vel saltem removens prohibens vel impedimentum. Cum ergo hic modus non sit conditio actus, ut dictum est, relinquitur quod non causetur in actu nec a solo habitu, ut dicit SECUNDA OPINIO, nec a potentia simul cum habitu, ut dicit PRIMA, sed causatur in potentia ex praecedentibus actibus. Et fortassis iste modus non est aliud quam ipse habitus. 215 23. Patet ergo quomodo habitus se habet ad ponendum modum in actu, quia per modum inclinantis et quasi applicantis potentiam ad determinatum obiectum-et sic (F 11r) ponit modum qui est bene vel male-vel per modum removentis prohibens- et sic ponit modum intensionis. Et utroque modo habitus tantum facit ad essentiam actus quantum ad modum eius. Dicitur tamen requiri propter modum et non propter 220 actum, quia potentia sine habitu non haberet talem et tam certam determinationem ad determinatum obiectum, sed nunc ferretur in unum nunc in aliud, nec eliceret actum ita intensum. Nec ista est differentia rationis vel adaptationis solum sed realis sic intelligendo et non ut PRIMI INTELLIGUNT. 24. Ad rationes SECUNDAE OPINIONIS, quae videntur probare quod habitus nihil 225 faciat ad essentiam actus, dicendum ad primam quod potentia appetitiva nonimpedita potest in omne appetere quantum ad essentiam actus circumscripto habitu. Nec propter hoc tamen sequitur quod habitus nihil faciat ad essentiam actus nisi de actu qui eliceretur a potentia nondum perfecta per habitum. Sed de actu elicito post habitum non est verum, quia habitus (C 93va) non ponit modum circa actum 230 tamquam quamdam perfectionem ab essentia (D 36va) actus differentem, sed quia determinat potentiam ad obiectum bonum (si sit bonus habitus) vel ad malum (si 225 ad primam ] supra n. 12. 205 obiectum ] in marg. certam(?) add. sed ras. D certam E jj et ] sup. l. E jj difficilis ] vero add. A 206 Ergo ] secundo E jj et ] dad add. sed ras. D ad add. E 207 uniformis ] informis BCDEF 208 quae ] quia DEF jj difficultas ] sup. l. facilitas add. sed exp. F 209 portantis ] repl. B 210 removens ] removentis F jj vel2 ] et A om. DE 211 ergo ] igitur DE jj hic ] om. E jj non sit ] et insit E 212 in ] ab AF jj habitu ] obiecto A jj dicit ] om. F jj nec ] vel D ut E 212–213 simul cum ] et F 213 habitu ] simul add. F jj ut dicit ] cum F jj prima ] opinio add. A opinione add. F 214 iste ] ille F 216 quasi ] om. AF jj applicantis ] determinantis F jj potentiam ] obiectum add. F jj ad determinatum ] vel applicantis in F jj obiectum ] determinatum add. F 217 qui ] quid E 218 Et2 ] cum F jj modo ] om. F 219 eius ] om. F jj propter1 ] pro ante corr. C in marg. mod(?) add. sed ras. D jj modum2 ] incertum(?) E 220 tam certam ] tantam F 221 determinatum ] determinandum B tale F jj sed ] si DF jj nunc2 ] non DE jj eliceret ] haberat F 222 intensum ] in omne sum(?) E jj ista ] illa F jj rationis ] tantum add. F jj adaptationis ] in marg. ad apositionis add. sed ras. D jj solum ] om. F 223 sic ] om. BCE sup. l. D jj intelligendo ] ut dictum est cum add. D ut dictum est add. E jj et non ] om. D 224 secundae opinionis ] in oppositum F 225 faciat ] facit ADF 227 nihil ] non sup. l. C om. DE 228 eliceretur ] elicitur F jj nondum ] in marg. modum add. D modum E 229 circa actum ] om. AF 231 si1 ] om. F 352 P.J. Hartman sit malus habitus), et potentia applicata elicit actum bonum vel (F 11v) malum qui dicitur actus modificatus. Et totus actus est a potentia ut eliciente et ab habitu ut determinante et inclinante potentiam. Ponit etiam habitus intensionem in actu quae 235 non differt ab essentia actus. 25. Ad secundum dicendum quod in nobis aut non est subiective aliqua potestas supernaturalis conficiendi sed a sola virtute divina est effectus cuiuslibet sacramenti aut si sit aliqua non est simile de potentia supernaturali et de habitu supernaturali qui est gratia vel caritas et de actu naturali et habitu acquisito, quia modus quem ponit 240 habitus supernaturalis non est idem essentialiter cum actu potentiae supernaturalis sed est sola acceptatio divina per quam opera nostra facta in caritate sunt meritoria. Et ideo hic modus potest esse ab habitu-dato quod ab eo non sit actus. Modus autem quem ponit habitus acquisitus circa actum potentiae incidit in idem cum actu, (E 41va) et ideo (A 109ra) quidquid est causa unius est causa alterius. 245 26. Ad tertium patet responsio quia non ponimus differentiam inter potentiam et habitum secundum rationem tantum sed realem ut ex dictis patet. Ad rationes principales 27. Ad rationes principales iam patet aliqualiter solutio, duae enim primae sunt pro conclusione nostra quamvis (F 12r) prima supponat falsum, scilicet quod habitus 250 generetur ex actibus praecedentibus ratione essentiae actuum-quod non est verum, sed propter frequentationem et assuefactionem eorum ut ALII DICUNT, et in hoc bene. 28. Secunda etiam quae dicit quod scire est a scientia ut actus secundus a primo- potest concedi eo modo quo concessum est actum sequentem habitum causari ab 255 habitu, (C 93vb) scilicet per modum inclinantis et applicantis potentiam, et non ut ALII PRIUS DIXERUNT distinguentes inter actum et modum qui importatur per "scire", talis enim distinctio non potest esse realis sed rationis tantum. 29. Ad primam rationem alterius partis patet responsio, expositum est enim qualiter illud dictum ARISTOTELIS intelligitur-potentia est qua possumus, habitus 236 Ad secundum ] supra n. 13. 245 Ad tertium ] supra n. 14. 248 duae enim primae ] supra nn. 1 et 2. 249 prima ] supra n. 1. 251 ut alii dicunt ] supra op. 2a, n. 16. 253 Secunda ] supra n. 2. 256 alii prius dixerunt ] supra op. 2a, n. 17. 258 Ad primam rationem alterius partis ] supra n. 3. 259–260 potentia . . . male ] ARISTOTELES, Eth. ad Nic. II.5 1105b24–28. 232 habitus ] om. ABC jj bonum ] om. B 233 ut ] om. C 234 quae ] aut ante corr. C autem E 236 est ] sup. l. C jj subiective ] om. F 237 supernaturalis ] vel add. F jj conficiendi ] cuius Christi add. A subiective add. F jj sed ] vel F jj a ] ex F jj sacramenti ] in marg. sa(?) add. sed ras. D 238 aliqua ] om. CDE jj de ] om. F 240 idem ] supernaturaliter add. sed ras. D jj potentiae ] ponitur E 241 opera nostra ] nostra operatio C 242 potest ] in marg. ponit add. sed ras. D jj actus ] sup. l. F 243 actu ] potentiae add. AF 245 tertium ] secundam A jj responsio ] solutio F 246 tantum ] solum AF jj dictis ] praedictis F 248 iam ] ideo DE jj enim ] om. A jj primae ] potentiae B potentiae ante corr. C potentiae praem. DE 249 scilicet ] om. F jj quod ] si add. F 251 propter ] per D semper E ratione F jj et assuefactionem ] om. F jj et ] om. C vel DE 253 quod scire ] om. B jj a primo ] om. DE 255 inclinantis ] inclinationis D jj applicantis ] post corr. F 256 alii prius ] primi A jj prius ] primi F 257 scire ] in marg. scientiam(?) add. sed ras. D jj talis ] in marg. D jj distinctio ] sup. l. conditio add. sed ras. F 259 intelligitur ] intelligendum B intelligatur F jj est ] om. D enim E 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 353 260 vero quo bene vel male. Hoc enim non dicitur propter realem differentiam actus et modi (B 129va) eius sed quia indifferentiam potentiae. Habitus determinant ad unum-ad bonum si sit bonus et ad malum si sit malus. 30. Ad aliam rationem sufficienter respondetur a PRIMIS. Question 1: Do we need habits? 1. CUM VERO SUPRA HABITUM SIT ETC. Distinctio 23a. In this distinctio we will investigate three issues. The first concerns habits in general; the second is about faith in particular; and the third concerns the form (or lack of form) involved with 5 faith. On the first, two questions are raised. The first is: Do we need habits? 2. IT SEEMS THAT WE DO NOT. Acts that come before a habit are exactly like acts that come after the habit except in terms of ease (facilitas); however, we do not need habits in order to account for this; therefore, we do not need habits at all. The major premise comes from Ethics 2 where it is explicitly stated that acts that 10 come before and generate the habit are like acts that are performed after the habit has been generated, except that the mark (signum) of a generated habit is feeling pleasure in the task (which is an effect of the act's ease and naturalness). The minor premise is made clear: the hardship of an act contributes to its merit whereas its ease diminishes its merit; hence, if a habit only affects the ease in an act, it harms more 15 than benefits. If, however, one were to say-as was often said-that hardship on the side of the task adds to merit (and a habit does not take this away) whereas hardship on the side of the one doing the task does not add to but diminishes merit (and a habit does take this sort of hardship away)-CONTRA: according to the view of our Lord in Mark 12:42 and Luke 21:2 the widow who was able to give two coins in 20 alms merited more than the rich who gave many, for it was harder for her to give that little amount than for them to give so much. But it is agreed that this hardship was not owing to the kind of task involved but it was rather owing to something on the side of the one doing the task, since she was poor. Therefore, such hardship adds to merit. 25 3. Again: rational powers are more perfect than natural powers;21 but natural powers do not need habits, neither for the sake of the act nor its ease or mode; therefore, rational powers also do not need habits. 4. ON THE CONTRARY. A habit is that by which someone is disposed better or worse towards himself or towards something else, as is stated in Metaphysics 5; but 30 we need that by which we are disposed better; therefore, we need good habits at least. 5. RESPONSE. Three things ought to be looked into in this question. First, since "habit" is said in many ways, in what sense of "habit" is the term being used here? 21 Usually, medieval authors took the intellect and the will to be rational powers. 263 Ad aliam rationem ] supra n. 4. jj primis ] supra op. 1a, n. 10. 260 vero ] om. DE jj quo ] ad add. DE jj vel ] ad add. sed ras. D jj dicitur ] debet E 262 unum ad ] actum A jj et ] om. CDE 263 a ] ex F jj primis ] praemissis F 354 P.J. Hartman Second, why should we countenance habits? Third, what is a habit? Is it a thing in 35 the strict sense or a mode of a thing? art. 1: In what sense of "habit" is the term being used here? 6. In connection with the first, it ought to be known that "habit" is said in three ways: (1) as a post-categorical item; (2) as a categorical item; or (3) as a certain kind of Quality. This can be shown as follows. "Habit" is said from having;22 however, 40 the noun "habit" is derived from having in two ways. (a) In one way, when a human being or any given creature is said to have some thing. (b) In another way, when some thing somehow is related (e.g. better or worse) either to itself or to something else.23 7. [a] "Habit" said in the first way [i.e. someone has something] is a post45 categorical item, since its scope includes things that fall into different categories, for a human is said to have a hand (which falls into the category of Substance); some quantity or whiteness (which belong to the two other [absolute] categories), and a lord is said to have a servant (which falls into the category of Relation), and a human to have clothes or a ring (which fall into the category of Habit, which is 50 its own category, as will be discussed below in a moment). In fact, all the ways in which one thing is said to have another can be reduced to three, for that which is had is had (i) in the manner of an inherent accident (and this includes things that belong to many different categories); (ii) in the manner of a correlative (and this can be reduced to the category of Relation); or (iii) in the manner of equipment (and this, 55 since it is not reduced to some other category, constitutes its own category, called Habit, as a human is said to be armed or clothed and the like). 8. [b] However, "habit" taken in the second way, that is, when a thing is said to be related better or worse to itself or something else, is a kind of Quality, called habit or disposition. "Habit" said in this way is different from the two primary ways 60 [i.e. (1) and (2) above, namely as a post-categorical item or as a categorical item in the category of Habit] since "habit" in the two primary ways is not said of the thing which is had but only of the connection between what has and what is had, whereas in this third way "habit" is first and primarily said of the thing which is had inasmuch as the one who has it is said to be related somehow (e.g. better or worse). 65 9. This is how the Philosopher defines a habit in Metaphysics 5: a habit is a disposition according to which someone is disposed better or worse with respect to himself or with respect to something else. And in Ethics 2 it is said that a power is that by which we can whereas a habit is that by which we can better or worse. And it is in this sense that we discuss habits here with the question: Do we need 70 habits? 10. [Additio P] However, according to the Commentator commenting on Metaphysics 5 the relative aspect or connection that constitutes the category of Habit is a connnection that consists in the having of something such that what is contained has what contains it, e.g. an animal has fur or trees have bark, and this is the category 22 In Latin, "habitus" is also the past participle formed from the verb "habere". 23 English misses out on one use of "habere" in the Latin expression "se habere ad"-to be related to. 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 355 75 of Habit.24 But when the bucket has water or the city people, it is the other way around, that is, what contains has what is contained, and in this way a place has what is placed there, and this is the category of Location,25 and in general, the relative aspect in this category is the converse of the one in the category of Habit. 11. And so the first article is clear. 80 art. 2: Why should we countenance habits? 12. In connection with the second question, it ought to be said that a habit is required because of the lack of determination in a thing that is disposed towards something else. The reason for this is as follows. A habit, as is clear from what has already been said, is that by which someone is disposed better or worse. Hence, 85 if there is no indifference with respect to better or worse in a thing from its very nature but rather the thing has one determinate mode [in which it behaves], then a habit is not necessary. Conversely, if there is an indifference in the thing from its very nature with respect to better or worse, then a habit is necessary in order to explain its determinate mode.26 Now, the rational powers in us are not from their 90 very nature determined to one mode (in terms of better or worse) but rather they are quite indifferent, for the intellect can think truly or falsely27 and the will can desire better or worse. Hence, we do need habits in the rational powers (be they essentially rational or rational by way of participation)28 in order to determine by the habit this indifference. However, a habit determines insofar as it inclines the power towards a 95 determinate mode (better if it is a good habit or worse if it is a bad habit). And this is what the Philosopher tells us in Ethics 2 when he maintains that there is a difference between habits and powers, saying that according to a habit we are said to be good or bad whereas according to powers we are not. 13. [Additio P] Based on this, so they say,29 one has sufficient grounds to draw 100 the inference that it is not, perhaps, necessary to maintain that there are habits in the intellect with regard to [first] principles, for the intellect is already determined with respect to such principles, since they come to the mind almost naturally (Metaphysics 4) and are like the door to a house: "Who could miss it?" (Metaphysics 2). That is to say: Nobody! This should chiefly be understood in the case of absolute 105 first principles where the terms involve being in the case of objects of speculative thought; and perhaps no less in the case of objects of deliberation, since reason always evaluates things with an eye towards the best-hence we praise the reasoning of the continent and the incontinent alike (towards the end of Ethics 1). One can also 24 I.e. Habit (Habitus) is the relationship of what is contained to what contains it. 25 I.e. Location (Ubi) is the relationship of what contains to what is contained. 26 I.e. as that which explains the thing's acting better or worse when it acts better or worse. 27 I.e. better or worse. 28 Usually, the intellect and will were taken to be essentially rational whereas imagination and memory in the body, since they are under the direct control of the intellect/will, were taken to be rational by participation. Hence, there can be habits in our (sensitive) memory and imagination, and in animals too, albeit with the proviso that such habits in animals derive ultimately from (human) intellects/wills, i.e. the humans that train the animals to develop those habits. 29 As this text is only found in Palude's presentation of Durand's position, we should take "they" here to be Durand. 356 P.J. Hartman deduce, perhaps, a second thesis from this: that we ought not countenance habits in 110 the power of the will: not owing to the passions in virtue of which it can be related worse, for no passion is in the will; not owing to its indetermination as a rational power, for this is taken away when the intellect presents to it its object and the object determines the power. If one were to raise the objection that the rational appetite or the imagination determines the intellect according to the Philosopher (Metaphysics 115 9) and so it is not determined by the object, we would say in reply that the intellect determines the will in a different manner than the will determines the intellect, for the intellect determines the will when it specifies its act whereas the will determines the intellect when it makes it carry out its act. 14. And so the second article is clear. 120 art. 3: What is a habit? 15. In connection with the third, it ought to be said that a habit-at least an acquired habit, setting aside supernatural and infused habits-is not strictly speaking some absolute nature but rather it is a mode of a thing or nature (modus rei vel naturae). This is clear as follows. 125 16. [1] Just as a thing is related to a thing, so too a mode to a mode; but a habit is not required except for the sake of a mode; therefore it is not a thing, strictly speaking, but a mode. 17. [2] The same is clear in second way if we compare bodily habits with habits of the soul: health (a bodily habit) does not seem to be itself an absolute nature 130 but rather it is merely the right combination or proportion, that is, a determinate relationship among the humors; therefore, likewise, so it seems, with habits of the soul. 18. [3] The same is clear in a third way with habits of the soul in particular. Metaphysics 9 states that an immanent act produces nothing; however immanent 135 acts, through their frequent repetition (frequentia), cause habits; therefore, a habit is not strictly speaking a thing but rather it is a mode left behind by such frequent repetition. 19. [4] Fourth: an item that is acquired through the frequent repetition of acts and lost only when acts stop is not (so it seems) a thing but rather a customary mode 140 (modus consuetudinis); but all acquired habits are like this; therefore etc. The minor premise is clear on its own, for we experience that after going a long time without acting, we will lose our moral and speculative habits. The major premise is proved: if an item is a thing, then it will only stop existing if it is destroyed: when its subject is destroyed, or when its contrary acts, or when its efficient cause stops; however, 145 habits are lost when their acts stop without the destruction [of their subject] or the action of a contrary, and the acts are not the conserving cause of the habits, otherwise habits would not remain in those who sleep (where the acts have stopped). Hence, habits are not strictly speaking things but rather they are customary modes. 20. However, we should imagine that just as a horse is trained to trot inasmuch as 150 it becomes apt at trotting from the custom (consuetudo) of trotting (and no absolute thing is effected in it from this but rather a mere customary mode and aptitude) so 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 357 too from the custom of performing good or bad acts an aptitude for doing similar acts comes about in us, for custom inclines almost by nature. 21. However, because of this it must seem to some people that a habit, then, would 155 not be a quality since it is not a thing strictly speaking but a mode of a thing. However, this is not the case, for not only are Relation and the last six categories modes of things, but also some items can be found in Quality and Quantity that are not things strictly speaking but real modes. Number, for instance, in Quantity, for this is not a thing strictly speaking over and above the enumerated things but it is 160 a real mode. Likewise, in Quality: shape, which is placed in the fourth species of Quality, is the mode of the termination of quantity and not a thing in itself. And the same is the case with habits and dispositions, which are placed in the first species of Quality, for these are nothing but ways of being apt and being related better or worse to oneself or something else. This seems to be what the Philosopher explicitly 165 says in Physics 7 where he proves that change is not [terminated] at a quality of the first species, that is, at a habit or disposition, for he says, "Every virtue or vice is something that exists with respect to some other item. Indeed, health is a particular combination of hot and cold items (or of those items that are contained within them)." The same thing should be understood with habits of the soul. And so he 170 concludes, "Therefore, vices and virtues are with respect to some other item; but these are not generations nor is there generation nor change at all with respect to them." Indeed, the categories are not distinguished in terms of thing and mode nor in terms of thing [and thing], but in terms of the forms of predication. Therefore, whatever is such that through it its subject is somehow disposed with respect to 175 itself or with respect to something else, be it a thing strictly speaking or a mode of a thing, is said to be a quality, since it makes its subject be qualified somehow. Likewise, whatever is such that it denominates its subject as some amount or some number is said to be a quantity, even granted that in some cases it is not strictly speaking a thing in itself, as was said about number. 180 Response to the opening arguments 22. To the first argument, it ought to be said that we need habits in order to account for the ease and the determination of a power to a certain mode. When it is said that ease diminishes merit, it ought to be said that this is not true in the case of ease that is on the side of the one doing the task-which is the sort of ease that a habit explains. 185 Quite the contrary, such ease adds to merit, under the assumption that the task is the same, since it adds to how voluntary it is. However, all things being equal, the ease of a task diminishes merit and its hardship adds to merit. As to the objection about the widow by giving two coins merited more than the rich who gave many-it ought to be said that this is true, because it was harder for her to give that little amount than 190 it was for the rich to give more. However, this hardship was not from the condition of the one doing the task (as was argued) but rather from the condition of the task, for poverty is not a condition of a person but rather it is a scarcity of fortune. Hence, by comparing what the widow gave to what remained to her she gave more than the rich to whom more remained in proportion [to what they had], by not just taking 195 into account the proportion of person to person but of thing given to what remains. 358 P.J. Hartman 23. To the second argument, it ought to be said that natural powers do not need habits, neither in connection with the substance of the act nor in connection with a mode, since from their very nature they are brought into their own acts in just one mode. But the rational powers, since they are indeterminate with respect to different 200 modes, do need habits determining them. Nor, because of this, are the latter less perfect than natural powers-rather they are more perfect, since this indifference is rooted in their freedom and universality. Question 2: Do acquired habits, with respect to the performance of subsequent acts, contribute to the essence of the act or just to a mode? 1. The second question is: Do acquired habits, with respect to the performance of subsequent acts, contribute to the essence of the act or just to a mode?30 IT SEEMS THAT A HABIT IS the cause of the performance of the subsequent act's essence: a habit is acquired from acts that are similar to each other, and an acquired habit, 5 in turn, produces acts that are similar as well; but a habit is acquired from acts in connection with the essence of those acts and not by reason of the mode, for the acts that come before the habit are not modified (modificati); therefore, it seems that an acquired habit is the cause of the subsequent act in connection with its essence.31 2. Again: first act is the cause of second act in connection with to what it is;32 10 but dispositional knowledge (scientia), which is an intellectual habit, is related to episodic knowing (scire) as first act to second; therefore, it is its cause in connection with what it is, and so too, by the same line of reasoning, with other habits, so it seems. 3. ON THE CONTRARY: according to the Philosopher in Ethics 2 a power is that 15 by which we can [perform] an act whereas a habit is that by which we can [perform it] better or worse. Therefore, if a habit is that by which we can without qualification [perform] an act in connection with its essence, then a habit will not be a habit but rather a power, and so the difference between a habit and a power will vanish. 4. Again: a habit contributes only to that in virtue of which we need it; but we 20 need a habit only to explain the mode, and so a habit is not required when a power's mode is determined by its nature, as was shown in the last question. Therefore, a habit contributes nothing to the act except insofar as it explains a mode. 5. RESPONSE. Concerning this issue there are two theories. 30 A wordy way to put the point, but as we'll see it isn't clear what the essence of the act and the mode of the act mean. The general question here is whether the habit's job, so to say, is to simply explain a feature or modification (mode) of the act, like, say, its goodness, whereas the power explains the very existence (essence) of the act itself. The first view (Hervaeus's) holds that the habit together with the power cause both the essence and the mode; the second view (Godfrey's) holds that whereas the habit explains (causes) the mode, the power causes the essence. 31 The idea here is that the habit causes the act to be the sort of act it is. It isn't as if some other item (the power say) causes the act to be the sort of act it is and the habit merely modifies or qualifies that act. 32 I.e. its quiddity or essence. 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 359 Opinion 1 (Hervaeus's) 25 6. One theory holds that, in the performance of an act, both the power and the habit really contribute to both the essence of the act and its mode such that each is from both [the power and the habit] together as two items that, on their own, are imperfect agents but together constitute one perfect agent. However, by reason of a kind of appropriation, the essence of the act is attributed to the power whereas its 30 mode is attributed to the habit.33 7. The first thesis [i.e. the partial-cause thesis] is proved as follows. When two principles work together with respect to one simple act such that neither on its own is sufficient for performing that act (or at least so perfectly) it is necessary that such an act (according to the whole of what is in it) come about from both of them 35 and not from one of them with respect to one [aspect] and the other with respect to another [aspect]. However, in performing a virtuous act coming after a virtuous habit both the power and the virtuous habit work together such that neither on its own is sufficient for performing that act (or at least so perfectly). Hence, the virtuous act (according to the whole of what is in it) is from both together-in connection 40 with both its essence and its mode-and it is not from the power with regard to one of these and the habit with regard to the other. The major premise is supported with an argument and an example. The argument: in a simple item there is not one and another [different item], and so every simple item (according to the whole of what is in it) comes about either from one [agent] or from two [agents] that constitute one 45 [agent] but not such that one [aspect] comes about from one of these and another [aspect] comes about from the other. The example: a knife's hardness and sharpness are both required in order for it to cut something, for hardness without sharpness would be insufficient, and so too sharpness without hardness. Certainly, the whole act of cutting is from both together and not from one of them in connection with 50 one [aspect] and from the other in connection with some other. And so the major premise is clear. The minor premise is obvious since a virtuous act that comes after a habit is one act as simple as any act that came before the habit, for the essence of an act and its mode are not two things in a virtuous act but just one thing. As well, in order to perform this act (or so perfectly) a habit is insufficient without a power and 55 so too a power is insufficient without a habit, for otherwise one or the other of them would be superfluous. Therefore etc. Hence, both power and habit work together in performing a perfect act such that the act as a whole in terms of both its essence and mode comes about from both together, since they constitute a single perfect agent. 8. However, owing to a kind of appropriation, we attribute the generation of the 60 act in connection with its essence to the power and in connection with its mode to the habit. There are two reasons for this. [1] When two principles, one of which presupposes the other, work together [to perform] one act, then the essence of the act is appropriated to the presupposed principle whereas its mode is appropriated 33 This view holds three theses. First, it maintains that a habit causes both the essence of acts and their modes. Second, it holds the partial-cause thesis: that habit and power are joint but partial causes. Third, it maintains the appropriation thesis: that we do find it appropriate to point to the power as responsible for the essence and the habit for the mode. 360 P.J. Hartman to the one that presupposes the other just as in the act itself the mode presupposes 65 the essence. Since, then, a habit presupposes a power and not the other way around, it follows that the essence of the act is attributed to the power whereas its mode to the habit. [2] When two principles work together [to perform] one act, one of which is more indeterminate than the other (which is more determinate), then the essence of the act is attributed through appropriation to the more indeterminate principle 70 whereas the mode to the more determinate principle, for in the act itself the mode is, so to say, a certain sort of determination of the essence of the act. But the power is the more indeterminate principle whereas the habit is the more determinate principle. Hence, the essence of the act is attributed to the power through appropriation whereas the mode is attributed to the habit. 75 9. Following this position, one might answer the opening arguments for the contrary as follows. To the first argument, when it is said that "a power is that by which we can whereas a habit is that by which we can better or worse", they say that in a simple act (like a virtuous act) the whole (that is, the essence of the act and its mode) really is from the power and the whole really is from the habit 80 even though according to appropriation the essence is attributed to the power and the mode to the habit. And when it is said that "then the habit would not be a habit but a power" they say that this is true: a habit is a kind of power. This is why the Philosopher in On the Soul 3 and in Physics 8 says that someone who has dispositional knowledge (scientia) is, by it, in accidental potency (potentia) with 85 respect to episodes of knowing (scire); since a habit is an accidental potency, it presupposes another prior potency which is first and more truly called a potency, namely, essential potency.34 That this is what must be said is proved: the mode of an act (with regard to which the habit contributes) either is the same as the essence of the act or not. If it is the same, then it follows that whatever is the cause of the 90 mode of an act is the cause of its essence. If it is not the same, then it follows that the habit is a kind of power, since whatever is a principle of performing an act has the characteristics of a power, as is clear from the definition of power. Hence, if the mode is different from the essence of the act and the habit is the causal principle of the mode, it follows that the habit is a kind of power. 95 10. To the second, they say that even though the habit is required just to explain the mode, nevertheless since the essence of the act and the mode coincide in the same item in reality it is necessary that that which is the cause of the one be the cause of the other, even though conceptually the causation of the [essence of the] act is appropriated more to the power whereas the causation of the mode to the habit. 100 Op. 2 (Godfrey's) 11. The second theory maintains that the power alone is the cause of the essence of the act whereas the habit alone is the cause of the mode of the act. There are three arguments in defense of this theory.35 34 The Latin term "potentia" can sometimes mean power and sometimes potency. 35 Hence, op. 2 holds at least: (1) A habit causes the mode whereas a power causes the essence. (2) The total cause thesis: A habit is the total cause of the mode; a power is the total cause of 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 361 12. [1] Every power can [perform] an act proportionate to it without some other 105 item added to it which has the characteristics of a principle for performing it; however, the intellective power is related to the act of thinking in connection with its essence as to an act proportionate to it, and likewise the appetitive power is related to the act of desiring in connection with its essence as to an act proportionate to it; therefore the intellective power can [perform] every act of thinking and the 110 appetitive power every act of desiring in connection with the essence of such acts without some item added to them which has the characteristics of a principle for performing such acts. Now, I said "without some item added to them which has the characteristics of a principle for performing" because the intellective or appetitive power cannot transition into its act without the removal of the impediment (if there 115 is one) and the presence of the object. But these are not principles for performing the act; rather the power alone is. 13. [2] Just as a supernatural power is related to a supernatural habit, so a natural power to a natural habit-provided we call a "natural habit" a habit that is acquired from natural [acts], which is what we are talking about here; but a supernatural 120 power alone is the principle for performing a supernatural act in connection with the essence of the act whereas a supernatural habit alone contributes to the mode of the act; therefore, likewise, with natural powers and acquired habits. The major premise is clear by analogy. The minor is made clear: through a supernatural power alone (e.g. through the power for consecration) there comes about an act of consecration; 125 but through charity (which is a supernatural habit) nothing comes about with regard to the previously mentioned act in connection with its essence but all that is added is a mode, viz. to consecrate with merit. So the minor premise is clear. So the conclusion follows. 14. [3] The Philosopher in Ethics 2 means to draw a real distinction between 130 powers and habits and not a mere conceptual distinction or a distinction according to adaptation. But the distinction that he draws is that a power is that by which we can [perform an act] whereas a habit is that by which we can better or worse. Hence, in this way a habit is really distinct from a power-the power performs just the act whereas the habit just the mode-and not merely distinct through adaptation as the 135 first opinion has it. 15. In support of this opinion there seem to be many passages from Aristotle: Metaphysics 5, Ethics 2, and many other passages, at least prima facie. 16. As to the arguments that run against this opinion [i.e. the opening arguments above], it is said that the first argument is just as much against the first opinion 140 as it is against the second opinion, for if something can only cause what is like that from which it was caused, it follows that a habit cannot cause the promptness, ease, or a mode in those acts that come after [the habit], since the acts that come before and cause the habit did not have such modes-yet the first opinion holds that the habit does cause such a mode, albeit not on its own. Hence, the argument runs the essence. As we'll see below he also denies the appropriation thesis, and so holds (3) the nonappropriation thesis: The causation of the essence is really (not conceptually or appropriately) attributed to the power whereas the causation of the mode is really (not conceptually/appropriately) attributed to the habit. 362 P.J. Hartman 145 against them just as much as it does against the second opinion. What one should say, then, in reply is that a habit is not caused by the acts that come before [it] by reason of the essence of those acts (absolutely speaking) but rather it is caused from their frequent repetition. From such repetition a certain disposition is caused in the appetite through which it more firmly and promptly transitions into the same acts 150 as before, for custom (consuetudo) and the frequent repetition (frequentatio) of acts causes this with regard to any power. 17. To the second, it can be said that in that which is an episode of knowing (scire) there are two items, to wit, the act of thinking (intelligere) (which pertains to the essence of the act) and the act of thinking like so (sic intelligere), that is, correctly 155 and infallibly (which pertains to the mode of the act). Therefore, someone who has dispositional knowledge (scientia) as first act by reason of that dispositional knowledge is in potency with respect to an episode of knowing (which is second act) but not in connection with the essence of the act but in connection with the mode just stated, and the cause of that mode as second act is dispositional knowledge as 160 first act. Op. 3 (Durand's) 18. We should look into what truth each opinion contains and where each falls short, concerning which we will proceed as follows. (1) First, we will show what these modes are (which are found in an act performed by a power perfected by a 165 habit) and how many of them there are. (2) Second, we will derive in each mode an answer to our question: Can a habit cause such a mode even if it does nothing at all with respect to the essence of the act? Op. 3, art. 1: What are these modes and how many are there? 19. In connection with the first question, it ought to be known that there are three 170 kinds of modes to be found in an act performed by a power perfected by a habit. One mode is the intensity of the act, for an act that comes after the habit (be it good or bad) seems to be more intense than an act that comes before and generates the habit, the reason for which will be given below. The second mode is the fact that such an act is precisely in concord with right reason or precisely in discord with it, 175 the former is an act performed by a power perfected by a virtuous habit, the latter is an act performed by a power disposed by a vicious habit. However, a power without a habit indifferently performs now one of these and now the other. It is this mode that the Philosopher talks about in Ethics 2 when he tells us that a power is that by which we can whereas a habit is that by which we can better or worse. The third 180 mode is the fact that the act that comes after the habit is performed with more ease or pleasure than the act that comes before the habit, performed by the naked power, as is clear, likewise, from Ethics 2. So much for the first article. Op. 3, art. 2: Does a habit cause the mode? 20. Concerning the second question, it ought to be said that if we are talking 185 about the first mode (which consists in the intensity of the act) then, yes, a habit 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 363 contributes to the essence of the act just as much as it contributes to the mode and vice versa. This is clear, briefly, because the intensity of the act (and of any form) is something in connection with the essence of the act (or form) and not something added to it, as was proved in Book 1, Distinction 17.36 Hence, nothing 190 can have an affect on this mode that does not also affect the essence of the act, and so the habit contributes to this mode as much as it contributes to the essence of the act. But a habit contributes to this mode (i.e. the intensity) in the manner of something that removes an impediment, for the intellective and sensitive appetites are directed at objects that are contraries, and so each of them is weakened in its 195 act because of the other appetite, for each appetite undergoes a hardship in its act owing to its being dragged to the contrary object by the other appetite.37 Since, then, a virtuous habit makes the sensitive appetite obey reason and not be something that drags reason to a contrary object-as it was before-it, thus, removes what was before a kind of impediment to the intellective appetite's being brought intensely 200 into the object in concord with right reason. Likewise, a vicious habit (through which the intellective appetite is in concord with the sensitive appetite) removes what impeded the sensitive appetite from being brought so intensely into its object. Hence, habits-both vicious and virtuous-contribute to the intensity of the act in the manner of something that removes an impediment. But how can it be a per se 205 cause [as opposed to a mere per accidens cause]?38 I do not see an answer to this question, unless, perhaps, it is because by reason of the habit the object appears more fitting to the power, and a power is apt to be brought more intensely into an object shown under the aspect of what is better and more fitting. 21. If we are talking about the second mode [sc. the moral determination of the 210 act],39 then it ought to be said that this mode is not a mode of the act but a mode of the power, for the power is what is determined to such-and-such an act by a habit whereas the act is not determined to some mode. The reason for this: An item that determines some other item formally exists in the item able to be determined (which is in itself indifferent, for otherwise it would not be able to be determined 215 but it would rather, by its very nature, already be determined). However, a [rational] power is indeterminate in itself such that it tends to an object in concord with reason or in discord with reason while a deliberate act is not indifferent in this way-rather 36 Durand defends the thesis (with Scotus) that the intensity of a given form is not something absolute added to the form; rather forms come in degrees and those degrees are part of the essence of those forms. 37 For instance, my intellective appetite (will) desires that I be chaste, but my sensitive appetite desires the opposite of that, and so my sensitive appetite "drags" my intellective appetite towards fornication and my intellective appetite "drags" my sensitive appetite towards chastity. This tugof-war is discussed in detail in Durandus de Sancto Porciano, TDH q. 4, a. 9, ed. Koch. 38 An item that removes an impediment is a per accidens as opposed to a per se cause, for its causal role is very indirect. The notion of a per accidens (sometimes sine qua non cause) was debated. See Hartman 2014. 39 Durand here only talks about the moral determination of the act here (as good or bad). In Sent. C III, d. 23 and TDH q. 2, he also considers the, so to say, epistemic determination of the act (as true or false) and the intentional determination of the act (as of or about this rather than that). For some discussion here, see Hartman (forthcoming). 364 P.J. Hartman it is already determined to one of the two, as was shown in Book 2. Therefore, the mode that consists in such determination is a mode of the power and it is in the 220 power which is determined to such-and-such an act, and it is not a mode of the act or in the act. And so what they believe in is a kind of tall tale, to wit, that a habit explains this mode in the act. Quite the contrary, the habit explains a mode of the power or, rather, it just is that mode. It is for this reason that there is no question: Does what contributes to the essence of the act also contribute to this mode? For this 225 assumes that this mode is in the act or a feature of the act, which is false. Rather, it is only in the power as what inclines and determines the power to such-and-such an act. Hence, a habit contributes to the act only in the manner of what inclines or determines the power. 22. If we are talking about the third mode (i.e. the aptness and ease in performing 230 an act), then each of the previous two opinions falls short, since they suppose that this mode belongs to the act or is in the act and that it is caused by the habit alone (according to the second opinion) or by the habit and the power together (according to the first opinion). But this is not true. This mode (i.e. the aptness or ease) is not a mode of the act or in the act but rather it is a mode of the power. However, there is a 235 connection to the act, for when it is said that a habit is that by which the act is easily performed this ease is not a mode of the act but rather a mode of the agent, and it is this that the habit formally existing in the power explains. This is clear with two arguments. [1] First, the ease of a power in [performing] its act is natural in things where there is no intellective appetite and only sensitive appetite (i.e. brute animals) 240 or where there is no sensitive appetite and only intellective appetite (i.e. angels); however, in human beings where there are both appetites the ease is in virtue of a habit super-added to the power, even if it is not as great. However, the first ease [sc. in brute animals and angels] is a natural mode or condition of the power and not the act. Therefore, in us too. [2] Second, acts altogether similar in connection with 245 their objects and intensity are easy after the habit whereas before they were hard. Therefore, the ease and hardship is not a condition of the act (which is in itself the same) but it is a condition of the agent. We support this argument with an analogy to bodies. Lifting something heavy is hard for someone who is weak and easy for someone who is strong. This hardship (as is obvious on its own) is a condition of 250 the one doing the lifting and not of the act or the object. Likewise, in the case at hand, for the habit is a kind of perfection of the one who has it (or at least it is what removes an impediment). Since, then, this mode is not a condition of the act, as was said, it remains that it is not caused in the act neither by the habit alone (as the second opinion tells us) nor by the power together with the habit (as the first opinion 255 has it), but it is caused in the power from the preceding acts. And perhaps this mode is nothing but the habit itself. 23. It is clear, then, how the habit is related to explaining a mode in the act, since it explains the mode which is better or worse [i.e. determination] in the manner of what inclines or, so to say, applies the power to a determinate object; and it explains 260 the mode of intensity in the manner of what removes an impediment. Hence, in each of these modes the habit contributes to the essence of the act just as much as to the mode of the act. However, it is said that a habit is required to explain the mode and 21 Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent. A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 365 not the act since the power without the habit does not have such and so certain a determination to a determinate object, but at one point it is brought into one and 265 at another point it is brought into another, nor does it perform the act so intensely. Nor is this distinction merely conceptual or according to adaptation,40 but it is real, understood in this way and not as the first opinion explains it. 24. As to the arguments put forward by the second opinion-which seem to prove that a habit contributes nothing to the essence of the act-it ought to be said to the 270 first argument that an appetitive power can [perform] any act of desiring when it is not impeded in connection with the essence of the act even without a habit. However, the claim that a habit contributes nothing to the essence of an act only follows in the case of an act performed by a power that has yet to be perfected by a habit; in the case of an act performed after a habit this is not true, since a habit does not explain 275 a mode of the act as a kind of perfection distinct from the essence of the act but it does determine the power to the object-good if it is a good habit or bad if it is a bad habit-and the power so applied performs a good or bad act (called a "modified act"). And the whole act is from the power as what performs it and from the habit as what determines and inclines the power. Also the habit explains the intensity of 280 the act, which is not distinct from the essence of the act. 25. To the second it ought to be said that either there is no supernatural capacity (potestas) for consecration in us as in a subject but rather it is by divine power alone that there is an effect of any given sacrament whatsoever, or, alternatively, if there is some such [power in us], then there is no analogy between such a supernatural 285 power and a supernatural habit (e.g. grace and charity) and a natural act and an acquired habit, for the mode that a supernatural habit explains is not the same in essence as the act of the supernatural power, but rather it is nothing but the divine approval in virtue of which our works done out of charity are meritorious. Hence, this mode can be from the habit granted that the act is not from it. However, the 290 mode which an acquired habit explains with regard to the act of a power coincides in the same with the act, and so whatever is the cause of the one is the cause of the other. 26. To the third an answer is clear since we do not suppose that there is a merely conceptual distinction between a power and a habit but a real one, as is clear from 295 what has been said. Response to the opening arguments 27. As to the opening arguments, an answer is somehow already clear. For the two first arguments support our thesis, even though the first assumes something that is false, namely, that a habit is generated from the acts that come before [the habit] 300 by reason of the essence of the acts-which is not true, but rather it is from their frequent repetition and habituation (assuefactio), as others [i.e. the second opinion] say, and in this they are right. 28. The second argument which states that an episode of knowing is from dispositional knowledge as second act from first can be conceded in the way in 40 I.e. the denial of the appropriation thesis put forward by the first opinion. 366 P.J. Hartman 305 which it was conceded that the act that comes after a habit is caused by a habit, namely, in the manner of what inclines and applies the power, and not as others said before, those who draw a distinction between an act and the mode imported with the term "episode of knowing", for such a distinction cannot be real but merely conceptual. 310 29. To the first argument for the other part an answer is clear, for it was explained already as to how that dictum of Aristotle ought to be understood-a power is that by which we can whereas a habit is that by which we can better or worse. This claim is not made for the purpose of drawing a real distinction between an act and its mode but rather because of the indifference of the power. A habit determines [the power] 315 to one [mode]-to good if it is good; to bad if it is bad. 30. To the other argument the reply from the first opinion is sufficient. References Aquinas, Thomas (Thomas de Aquino). (1891). 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