UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI NAPOLI "L'ORIENTALE" A N N A L I V O L U M E 6 7 (ESTRATTO) NAPOLI 2007 AION, 67/1-4 (2007), 137-156 KRISHNA DEL TOSO Kārya and kāraṇa in Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikās∗ For surely, if there be any relation among objects which it imports to us to know perfectly, it is that of cause and effect. On this are founded all our reasonings concerning matter of fact or existence. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Digiread edition, 43) 1. Preliminary Remarks: Methodological Considerations In this paper I will try to consider the way according to which Nāgārjuna makes use of the terms kārya and kāraṇa in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (MMK), pointing out how and when these words are employed – the aim of the present study being to underline the typical nāgārjunian usage of them in a peculiarly Buddhist context. I find this particular subject quite interesting because, to my knowledge, until now no specific work has been written on it. This means obviously that the suggestions contained here are necessarily to be taken as a starting point, or as a working hypothesis, for further examinations. To begin with, two preliminary notes are needed: firstly, I will here restrict the field of investigation only to those passages in which kāraṇa means «cause» and kārya means «effect». As it is well known, indeed, in Sanskrit kāraṇa is generally – even if not always – used as synonymous of hetu, whereas kārya is taken to be a synonym of phala. It nonetheless appears to me that, in his MMK, Nāgārjuna operates a distinction between these terms, a distinction that appears to have a fundamental philosophical import. Secondly, as a crosscheck of the main thesis expressed here, we will also take into account – in brief and as a matter subordinated to the study of kāraṇa and kārya – the use of hetu and phala made by Nāgārjuna. Moreover, I have methodologically confined the present study to the MMK for the following two reasons: ---- ∗ I would like to express here all my gratitude to Francesco Sferra for having thoroughly red and minutely discussed with me the various preliminary drafts of this paper. Moreover, I thank Antonio Rigopoulos for having kindly shared with me his impressions on this work. 138 K. Del Toso (a) because the Tibetan and the Chinese translations of Buddhist Sanskrit texts sometimes reveal a loss of semantic deepness and differentiation – as is the case of hetu and kāraṇa, which are both invariably rendered with rgyu into Tibetan and with 因 (yīn) into Chinese, whereas phala and kārya are both translated with 'bras bu into Tibetan, and with 果 (guǒ, lit.: «fruit») into Chinese –, here we necessarily need to refer to those works whose original Sanskrit is preserved; hence, the Śūnyatasaptatikārikās, the Vaidalyaprakaraṇa, a large part of the Yuktiṣaṣṭikakārikās1 and the Suhṛllekha either, cannot be proficiently used; (b) because the aim of this paper is to discuss the abovementioned terms from a philosophical perspective, so to speak, peculiarly nāgārjunian, for this very reason I will not consider here both (b.1) those writings that are not strictly philosophical, and (b.2) those writings in which external – that is, occasioned by non-Buddhist opponents' objections – discussions are dealt with. These limitations are needed because in the texts belonging to (b.1) category it is highly probable that kārya and kāraṇa have been used mostly in their popular or common-sensical meaning, whereas in the texts belonging to (b.2) group they could have been employed in a 'spurious' way or, in other words, in a way that, for dialectical reasons, adheres, or is adapted, to the typical semantic declination of the philosophical tradition to which the non-Buddhist objector is said to belong. Under (b.1) we can, thus, list the Catustava and the extant Sanskrit parts of the Ratnāvalī,2 and under (b.2) most of the Vigrahavyāvartanī, with the exception of the occurrences – which are of a secondary interest here – of hetu and phala in the stanzas 54-56 and 70 (where peculiar Buddhist arguments are expounded), and of those places in which both hetu and pratyaya are mentioned. The partial exclusion of the Vigrahavyāvartanī (which is a philosophical text extant in Sanskrit) deserves here a further specific explanation. As is well known, in the Vigrahavyāvartanī Nāgārjuna refutes the positions held by a hypothetical adherent of the Nyāya (or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) school, who plays here the role of pūravapakṣin. Now, it can be noticed that, for instance in the commentary on the first stanza, the pūrvapakṣin recurs to a typical Buddhist terminology, making use of the couple of terms hetu and pratyaya to refer to «primary cause» and «secondary condition(s)». The reference of pratyaya as «secondary condition» is here of a central interest to us because this very term ---- 1 Consider that the compound kāryavaśāt, occurring twice in kārikā 33 of the Yuktiṣaṣṭikakārikās, means «for a particular purpose», «for a particular reason» and thus does not concern our discussion. We find the term hetu in kārikās 39 (as «primary cause» as opposed to pratyaya, «secondary condition») and 47, where the admission of the reality of the events (bhāva) is said to be the cause (hetu) of all the incorrect points of view. 2 Consider, for instance, the use of kārya in the Ratnāvalī, where it mostly refers to the good practices or to the proper behaviour that the king should follow to be in accordance with the dharma; kāraṇa does not occur in the portions of the text preserved in Sanskrit. kārya and kāraṇa 139 can nowhere be found in the Nyāyasūtras, whereas in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras (7.2.21-22, 24) it occurs always with the meaning of «intuition» or «cognition», never as «condition». Hence, it can be suggested that this is a clear case in which, in the 'fiction' of the text, the non-Buddhist opponent resorts to the uttarapakṣin's vocabulary – according to which pratyaya means «condition» – for disproving the latter's Buddhist thesis. If we admit such a supposition, we should then expect that also the Buddhist uttarapakṣin – that is, Nāgārjuna – is behaving here in a similar manner when he employs philosophical terms in his answers to the pūrvapakṣin's objections, being in a certain way forced to play on the ground established by the opponent's argumentations. To be clearer on this point, let us compare the use of hetu and kāraṇa in the Vigrahavyāvartanī with their use in the Nyāyasūtras and Vaiśeṣikasūtras. Although in the Nyāyasūtras the two words appear to be almost interchangeable, nonetheless in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras only the term kāraṇa means «cause» (50 occurrences of kāraṇa/akāraṇa), whereas hetu (just 5 occurrences) is employed to refer to a logical and/or inferential «ground», «motive»;3 it is probably for this reason that in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras the term phala, which denotes the «effect» of hetu, does not occur at all, whereas kārya (the «effect» of kāraṇa) and its derivatives, as kāryatva, can be found at least 28 times. In the Vigrahavyāvartanī, apart from the commentary on karikā 1 where, as we have seen, we find it in connection with pratyaya – thus reproducing a typical Buddhist concept –, the term hetu is always employed by the pūrvapakṣin with the meaning of «logical reason» (Vigrahavyāvartanī 2 and 17-19), whereas it is kāraṇa to be here used in the sense of «cause» (Vigrahavyāvartanī 20, commentary), and this seems to reflect a philosophical employment of these two words that is more in accordance with the Vaiśeṣikasūtras than with Buddhism in general.4 Now, even if this suggestion, being of course nothing but a working hypothesis, cannot in itself be taken as absolutely certain, it nonetheless appears to be – I think – quite likely. We should expect, hence, that also the uttarapakṣin formulates here his counter-arguments to the objections raised by the opponent by taking into account, and making use of, the same philosophical language adopted in the pūrvapakṣa section. For instance, the particular occurrence, in the commentary on Vigrahavyāvartanī 22, of kārya in the sense of «function», «peculiar operation», could remind us of Nyāyasūtra 3.1.6, ---- 3 It is nonetheless interesting to note, here, that in Vaiśeṣikasūtra 9.20 [= 9.2.4] – where it is affirmed: hetur apadeśo liṅgaṃ nimittaṃ pramāṇaṃ kāraṇam ity anarthāntaram – kāraṇa, as all the other words of the list, has the meaning of logical reason (in a syllogism), that is, it refers to the second term of an inference. 4 According to Bronkhorst (1985: 123), the Nyāyasūtras were compiled «because someone who adhered to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy wrote a handbook on rules of debate». This consideration corroborates the idea that, in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, the Naiyāyika opponent of Nāgārjuna is making use – as he seems to do – of philosophical terms, such as hetu, kāraṇa etc., according to a background which is peculiarly Vaiśeṣika. 140 K. Del Toso where kārya refers indeed to the body as site of the functions of ātman.5 On the contrary, in Vigrahavyāvartanī 54-56 and 70 the uttarapakṣin does not, in primis, refute the opponent's objections, rather he deals – so to speak – directly with subjects that are peculiarly Buddhist, such as pratītyasamutpāda, the four Noble Truths (āryasatya), the three jewels (triratna), saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta dharmas etc. We can, thus, be quite sure that in this case the terms hetu and phala (kāraṇa and kārya being not present) respect a semantic value, which is typically nāgārjunian. Another passage in which hetu could have been used in reference to Buddhist doctrines is the commentary on Vigrahavyāvartanī 69, where mention is made of antecedent (pūrvakālīna), simultaneous (yugapatkālīna) and subsequent (uttara° or paścātkālīna) hetus: although the discussion here has probably been inspired by Nyāyasūtras 2.1.811, nonetheless Bronkhorst (1985: 107-11) has suggested that those very sūtras repeat nothing but the Sarvāstivāda arguments contained in the first chapter, Maudgalyāyanaskandhaka, of Devaśarman's Vijñānakāya – Nyāyasūtras 2.1.1216 being their confutation. It can be argued, hence, that in the commentary on Vigrahavyāvartanī 69 Nāgārjuna, by denying the position of the Naiyāyika, is implicitly refuting also the Sarvāstivāda perspective on the subject matter discussed there, making use of a vocabulary that can be traced back to the abhidharmic speculations. Therefore, apart from these few examples, which all concern hetu and phala and not kāraṇa and kārya, we conclude that the Vigrahavyāvartanī cannot proficiently help us for the present study.6 The recourse to such a methodological sieve, hence, leads us to confine our textual horizon to the sole MMK. Now, as far as the MMK are concerned, a general introductory remark must be pointed out: although in that work a sort of unitary, linear development of the discussion can be detected,7 nonethe- ---- 5 I say that it could remind us because there is still a serious problem in identifying the original composition of the Nyāyasūtras known to Nāgārjuna. See Bronkhorst (1985: 122-23, 129-30, note 14). In any case, kārya in this context seems to echo the concept of kāryakriyāsamartha mentioned in the commentary on Vigrahavyāvartanī 2. 6 The following is a general list of all the occurrences, in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, of the terms under examination here: (1) kāraṇa, in the commentary on kārikās 20, 42, 47-48, 51, always in the sense of «cause» (of course, the occurrences of kāraṇa in expressions like kiṃ kāraṇaṃ etc., are not listed); (2) hetu, in kārikās, or in the commentary on kārikās, 1 as «cause» (with pratyaya), 2 and 17-19 as «logical reason», 21-22 as «cause» (with pratyaya), 23-24, 28, 30 and 33 as «logical reason», 53 as «cause» (with pratyaya), 55-56 as «[moral] cause» (referred to good and bad actions), 67-68 as «logical reason», 69 both as «logical reason» and as «cause» – in the tripartite technical sense of antecedent, pūrvakālīna, simultaneous, yugapatkālīna, and subsequent, uttara° or paścātkālīna –, 70 as «[moral] cause» (the occasion of phala); (3) kārya, in the commentary on kārikās 2 as «effect», «effective» – in the expression kāryakriyāsamartha, which seems to be more or less synonymous of the later arthakriyāsamartha (see Lindtner 1990: 257), note that this term is used in the pūrvapakṣa section – and 22 with the meaning of «function»; (4) phala, in the commentary on the kārikās 54 and 70 as «effect» of good and/or bad actions (phala is in the Vigrahavyāvartanī always used with a moral sense). 7 On account of the internal structure of the MMK see, among others, Kalupahana (1991: 28-31). kārya and kāraṇa 141 less each chapter is written in opposition to different philosophical perspectives, upheld by adherents of other, non-Madhyamika, schools of Buddhism. This means that we have to be cautious in comparing different reasonings inserted in different sections of the work, because if the general context changes also the specific terminology could be subjected to some particular semantic variation. As a general rule, therefore, I assume that comparisons will be allowed only when Nāgārjuna is answering, even if in different chapters, to the same opponent or to the same objection. After having clarified these preliminary points, let us begin by listing the occurrences of kārya and kāraṇa in the MMK. 2. The Occurrences of kārya and kāraṇa in the MMK a) Occurrences of kāraṇa: rūpakāraṇanirmuktaṃ na rūpam upalabhyate | rūpeṇāpi na nirmuktaṃ dṛśyate rūpakāraṇam || MMK 4.1|| Form, separated from the cause of form, is not obtained; also, the cause of form, separated from form is not seen. rūpakāraṇanirmukte rūpe rūpaṃ prasajyate | ahetukaṃ na cāsty arthaḥ kaścid ahetukaḥ kva cit || MMK 4.2|| If form is [considered as] separated from the cause of form, [then] it follows that form is without reason, but nowhere there is anything without reason. rūpe saty eva rūpasya kāraṇaṃ nopapadyate | rūpe'saty eva rūpasya kāraṇaṃ nopapadyate || MMK 4.4|| If indeed there is form, the cause of form does not take place; if indeed there is not form, the cause of form does not take place. niṣkāraṇaṃ punā rūpaṃ naiva naivopapadyate | tasmād rūpagatān kāṃścin na vikalpān vikalpayet || MMK 4.5|| However, a causeless form does not at all take place; therefore, one should not conjecture false notions concerning form. pratītya kārakaḥ karma taṃ pratītya ca kārakam | karma pravartate nānyat paśyāmaḥ siddhikāraṇam || MMK 8.12|| The agent occurs depending on action, and action depending on that agent; we do not see another cause for establishing [the two].8 b) Occurrences of kārya: svayaṃ kṛtaṃ parakṛtaṃ dvābhyāṃ kṛtam ahetukam | duḥkam ity eka icchanti tac ca kāryaṃ na yujyate || MMK 12.1|| ---- 8 No doubt that when we find the term kāraka in Nāgārjuna's writings, it always refers to the «agent», as synonymous of kartṛ, and not to the elements involved in an action (the pāṇinian kārakas). On this point see, among others, the considerations put forward by Scharf (2002: 125). 142 K. Del Toso Some maintain that pain is made by itself, made by other, made by both [itself and other], without cause: but such an effect [i.e. pain] is not admitted. c) Occurrences of both kāraṇa and kārya: rūpeṇa tu vinirmuktaṃ yadi syād rūpakāraṇam | akāryakaṃ kāraṇaṃ syād nāsty akāryaṃ ca kāraṇam || MMK 4.3|| Now, if the cause of form would exist free from form, the cause would be ineffective, but there is not a cause without effect. na kāraṇasya sadṛśaṃ kāryam ity upapadyate | na kāraṇasyāsadṛśaṃ kāryam ity upapadyate || MMK 4.6|| An effect similar to the cause does not take place; an effect dissimilar to the cause does not take place. hetāv asati kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ ca na vidyate | tadabhāve kriyā kartā karaṇaṃ ca na vidyate || MMK 8.4|| If there is not reason, both effect and cause are not found; if those are not existent, activity, agent and the means of doing are not found. kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ caiva lakṣyaṃ lakṣaṇam eva ca | vedanā vedakaś caiva santy arthā ye ca ke cana || MMK 11.7|| Effect and cause, characterized and characteristic, feeling and feeler and whatever objects there are. [MMK 11.8 should here be added: pūrvā na vidyate koṭiḥ saṃsārasya na kevalam | sarveṣām api bhāvānāṃ pūrvā koṭī na vidyate || Not only the prior limit of the flux of existences is not found, but also the prior limit of all events is not found]. kāryaṃ ca kāraṇam caiva kartāraṃ karaṇam kriyām | utpādaṃ ca nirodhaṃ ca phalaṃ ca pratibādhase || MMK 24.17|| You invalidate effect and cause, and agent, means of doing and activity, production, dissolution and fruit. 3. Analysis of the Passages a) The kāraṇa-passages In MMK 4.1-2 and 4-5, rūpakāraṇa is to be intended as rūpaskandhakāraṇa: the cause, here, is whatever allows the existence of the aggregate of form but, according to MMK 4.7, the same can be said also for all the other four aggregates. Therefore, because the five skandhas are the components of a human being, kāraṇa, which is employed to mean the cause of skandhas, refers to the cause of human being. Now, in the light of MMK 12.2cd, where we read: skandhān imān amī skandhāḥ saṃbhavanti pratītya hi || («Those aggregates surely comes to be conditioned by these aggregates»), we assume the idea that the cause of a skandha is nothing but a previous skandha. Hence, kārya and kāraṇa 143 rūpakāraṇa must refer to a previously existing rūpaskandha, from which the present one is derived. The general idea of generation, and the particular idea of birth/rebirth appear to be here involved. In MMK 8.12 we find the compound siddhikāraṇa, referring to the reciprocal link supposed to exist between a doer and his/her deed; although in this place kāraṇa means simply «reason», «motive» etc., and not «cause», it can be noted, nonetheless, that the term seems here to have been used not by chance. Indeed, for instance Jacques May (1959: 154, n. 463) underlined that siddhikāraṇa is to be interpreted as parasparāpekṣikī siddhi[kāraṇa], the cause of/reason for the establishment of «existence en dépendance mutuelle». Now, this particular mutual link is said to take place between a kāraka, a doer, and karman, action/object. In defining karman, Pāṇini (Aṣṭādhyāyī 1.4.49) writes: kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma («karman is the most desirable [thing/action] for the agent»). This definition conveys the idea that the relation existing between agent as kāraka and action/object as karman involves, implicitly or explicitly, some volitive nuances. Now, the pāṇinian interpretation of karman appears to be accepted also by Nāgārjuna, who in MMK 17.2ab writes indeed: cetanā cetayitvā ca karmoktaṃ paramarṣiṇā | («The supreme seer has said that karman is [both] volition and the object of volition»). As is well known, volitions according to Buddhism lead to appropriation: significantly, in MMK 8.13 upādāna, which represents the condition for further existence (bhava), is introduced. The kārikā (pādas abc) runs as follows: evaṃ vidyād upādānaṃ vyutsargād iti karmaṇaḥ | kartuś ca («From the abandonment of actions/objects and agent, one should understand in this way [also] appropriation»). The presence of upādāna in this context acquires even more significance if we consider the fact that the skandhas are generally called upādānaskandhas («aggregates of appropriation»). It can, thus, be suggested that kāraṇa, in the compound siddhikāraṇa, conceptually recalls in a certain manner the way of establishing – as Jacques May has pointed out – the reciprocal link kāraka↔karman, and refers consequently to the succession of kāraka→karman→upādāna→ bhava (= skandhas). Hence, by means of an intelligent semantic play, kāraṇa – although not with the meaning of «cause» – has been used by Nāgārjuna in a context where the idea of (re)birth appears to be involved. b) The kārya-passages In MMK 12.1 we find kārya without kāraṇa. In this chapter Nāgārjuna affirms that pain (duḥkha) cannot be an effect because if it were an effect, it would be produced by something that, for being its cause, has necessarily to exist before pain, but to exist before pain means to exist without pain. Now, duḥkha, according to Buddhist philosophy, is generally identified with skandhas (for instance, Saṃyuttanikāya 5.421: pañcupādānakkhandhā pi dukkhā). The equation between pain and aggregates seems to be the fundamental point of MMK 12, as kārikā 2 indirectly points out, and as Candrakīrti explicitly indi144 K. Del Toso cates in the very beginning of his commentary on this chapter, where the fundamental position of a hypothetical objector is expounded as follows: iha hi pañcopādānaskandhā duḥkham ity ucyate («Because here [i.e., according to the opponent's perspective] it is said that the five aggregates of appropriation are pain») (de la Vallée Poussin 1903-13: 227). Now, if skandhas were the cause of pain, this would contradict the Buddhist doctrine because it would entail that the aggregates could exist before duḥkha. MMK 12.4abc, indeed, by substituting pudgala to skandhas, summarizes such a perspective by saying: svapudgalakṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ yadi duḥkhaṃ punar vinā | svapudgalaḥ («If pain were accomplished by one's own person, one's own person [would be] without pain»), and this is a conclusion that is obviously inadmissible. It is exactly for this reason that MMK 12.1 affirms that duḥkha is not a kārya, it rather – so to speak – belongs both to the previous skandhas (those that in MMK 4 Nāgārjuna has called rūpakāraṇa etc.), and to the subsequent ones (those that, on the basis of the considerations put forward in the following paragraph, could be defined as rūpakārya etc., that is, the effect of rūpakāraṇa etc.). c) The kāraṇa-and-kārya-passages Now, as far as the occurrences of both kāraṇa and kārya together are concerned, we can notice how, in MMK 4.3 and 6, these two terms refer respectively to the cause of skandhas and to their effect. Again, if it is true, as indicated by the abovementioned MMK 12.2cd, that the causes of skandhas are previous skandhas, then it has to be likewise true that also the effects of skandhas must be further skandhas. Hence, in this case too, if kāraṇa refers to skandhas, also kārya, which is the effect of kāraṇa, must refer to them. This consideration sheds more light on MMK 12.1. To say that duḥkha cannot be a kārya means that, because duḥkha is proper to all skandhas, for this very reason it has to be found both in kāraṇa and in kārya: how can, indeed, duḥkha be the effect of kāraṇa if all the kāraṇas are already endowed with duḥkha? Thus, with these logical premises, to uphold that duḥkha could be an effect (kārya) is actually nonsensical. As regards MMK 11.7 (and 8), the reasoning here adopted by Nāgārjuna can be summarized as follows: if things are considered as endowed with svabhāva, then no change is possible, and so no birth (jāti, i.e., the pūrva koṭi of saṃsāra in MMK 11.8) can be consistently proved; without proving birth, also agedness-and-death (jarāmaraṇa) cannot be demonstrated (MMK 11.6). Consequently, both cause and effect, too, remain undetermined. Again, kāraṇa and kārya occur in a context whose principal subjects are existence and (re)birth. This seems to be confirmed also by the presence, in MMK 11.7b, of lakṣya («characterized») and lakṣaṇa («characteristic»), especially if we read this kārikā in the light of MMK 7.1c: trilakṣaṇī («three characteristics»), 7.2a: utpādādyās trayo («the three are origination and so on») and 25.4b: jarāmaraṇalakṣaṇam («the characteristic of agedness-and-death»), from which we kārya and kāraṇa 145 understand that lakṣya alludes to the 'existing', whereas lakṣaṇa refers to the various states of that which exists: origination, permanence and cessation, or birth, life and death. MMK 8.4 is an interesting kārikā. As we have already pointed out above, chapter 8 of MMK deals with the relation between a kāraka and his karman, but not from a moral point of view (as it happens for MMK 17), rather from a – so to speak – 'ontological' perspective – the nature of kāraka and karman being here the matter. In MMK 8.1-2 we find, indeed, the term sadbhūta («who/what is really existent»), applied to both kāraka and karman, that conveys the clear sense of 'substantial existence' or, according to nāgārjunian terminology, 'endowed with svabhāva'.9 MMK 8.2 affirms, against a philosophical position that seems to fit with Vaibhāṣika tenets, that if kāraka and karman were really existent, then, on the one hand, karman would be without a kāraka (pāda b: karma ca syād akartṛkam) and, on the other hand, also kāraka would be without karman (pāda d: kartā ca syād akarmakaḥ). On the contrary, MMK 8.3 deals with the case of a non-existing agent performing a non-existing action/object: karoti yady asadbhūto'sadbhūtaṃ karma kārakaḥ | ahetukaṃ bhavet karma kartā cāhetuko bhavet || («If a non-existing agent performs/produces a non-existing action/object, the action/object would be causeless/groundless and the agent would be causeless/groundless»). Then we have MMK 8.4, which is in its turn followed by two kārikās where references are made, as we will see below, to the fruit (phala) of actions (kriyā) leading to emancipation and/or to further existences. It is here interesting to note that the same strategy of exposition – although in a different context – seems to have been adopted by Nāgārjuna also in MMK 24.17. Indeed, MMK 24.17ab is preceded by MMK 24.16, where it is affirmed that: svabhāvād yadi bhāvānāṃ sadbhāvam anupaśyasi | ahetupratyayān bhāvāṃs tvam evaṃ sati paśyasi || («If you consider the existence of the events [as coming] from svabhāva, thus, you see uncaused and unconditioned existing things»; note the presence of sadbhāva, a concept very similar to sadbhūta of MMK 8.1-2), a conclusion that cannot be accepted. Moreover, MMK 24.17ab is followed by two pādas that point out the logical impossibility of establishing rebirth (pāda c: utpādaṃ ca nirodhaṃ ca) and emancipation (pāda d: phalaṃ ca) when a substantialistic perspective is upheld, and this is exactly the same conclusion that is drawn also in MMK 8.5-6. At this point, as until now it has been noticed that kāraṇa and kārya refer to what undergoes (re)birth, that is, respectively, to skandhas as cause, and to further skandhas as effect, the question is: does this particular interpretation fit also for MMK 8.4 and 24.17? I think yes, and to corroborate and clarify this ---- 9 Nāgārjuna is here probably playing with the term karman, by interpreting it both as «action» and as «object», in clear accordance with the abovementioned definitions of Pāṇini, and of MMK 17.2ab. See May (1959: 144, n. 413). 146 K. Del Toso answer it will be useful, here, to take into account how the commentaries of Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti introduce the main subject matters of the two chapters. Let us begin with MMK 8. Bhāviveka, in his Prajñāpradīpavṛtti, affirms that in this chapter Nāgārjuna intends to discuss nothing but the real nature of skandhas, dhātus and āyatanas, that is, the constituents of human being. Bhāviveka indeed writes:10 da ni stong pa nyid kyi mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi khyad par dgag pas phung po la sogs pa dag ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du bstan pa'i don gyi dbang gis rab tu byed pa brgyad pa brtsam mo Now, because of the specific negation (viśeṣapratiṣedha) of voidness (śūnyatā) [proposed] by the opponent (pratipakṣa), the eighth chapter (prakaraṇa) will commence, on account of the meaning (artha) of the instruction (nirdeśa) on the being without intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāvatva) of the skandhas etc. Bhāviveka continues by considering a possible abhidharmic (probably Vaibhaṣika) objection – to which MMK 8 would be the answer – that can be summarized as follows: the Buddha has pointed out that, according to the highest truth (paramārthatas), only the skandhas, dhatus and āyatanas exist, because agent and action/object, which depend on them, do actually exist; the existence of agent and action/object, in the opinion of the objector, is proved by the reference made by the Buddha to good and bad moral conduct, which entails good and bad karmic retributions; thus, because agent and action/object do exist, it follows that also the skandhas etc. must be existent and cannot, for this reason, be empty (śūnya) – compare the steps of this reasoning with the counterarguments in MMK 8.1-6. Also Candrakīrti, in the Prasannapadā, begins his commentary on MMK 8 by referring to the abhidharmic doctrine of skandhas etc. (de la Vallée Poussin 1903-13: 180): atrāha | vidyanta eva saṃskṛtasvabhāvato vijñānādayaḥ saṃskṛtā dharmāḥ tadhetukakarmakārakasadbhāvāt | [...] ucyate | syād vijñānādikaṃ saṃskṛtaṃ yadi tasya niṣpādakakarmakārakau syātāṃ | na tu staḥ | Objection: The composed dharmas, [like the skandha of] consciousness etc., exist exactly in themselves as composed [entities] because of the existence of action/object and agent, [which are] their cause. [...] Reply: If [the skandha of] consciousness etc. were composed, there would exist an action/object and an agent accomplishing them, but [MMK 8 will demonstrate that] the[se] two are not [existent]. Also Candrakīrti, as we can notice, approaches the problem in a way that is very similar to the one adopted by Bhāviveka: the objector upholds that the skandhas etc. exist because a previous existing agent has performed/produced ---- 10 Peking bsTan-'gyur, dBu-ma, TSHa, f. 140a2-3. Xylograph reproduced in Pandeya (1988). kārya and kāraṇa 147 some likewise existing action/object which have led to the present existence of skandhas etc. These commentarial excerpts confirm that the main purpose of MMK 8 is to analyse the, so to speak, 'ontological' status of the skandhas etc., that is, their actual nature: really existent (the abhidharmic view) or empty (Nāgārjuna's view). On the basis of this consideration, we are allowed to conclude that, in MMK 8.4, Nāgārjuna makes use of kāraṇa and kārya in a context where the skandhas, and consequently (re)birth, are the principal subject matters. Moreover, it is here interesting to note that the passage of the Prasannapadā just quoted affirms that both karman and kāraka are the reason (hetu) of the skandhas. This particular aspect of the matter is, indeed, fundamental for our discussion because in MMK 4.2-3 Nāgārjuna states that neither an existing kāraka can perform an existing karman, nor a non-existing kāraka can perform a non-existing karman; but if karman cannot in any way be performed by a kāraka, then also that which is grounded on both karman and kāraka – that is, according to Candrakīrti, the skandhas – cannot be produced. MMK 8.4 expresses, in my opinion, exactly this concept: without kāraka and karman, neither kāraṇa nor kārya, which represent in this context a consequence of kāraka and karman, can be established. On the basis of these very reasons, my personal suggestion is that, in MMK 8, kāraṇa and kārya could refer, respectively, to skandhas as cause, and to other skandhas as effect. In a word: to skandhas as elements undergoing (re)birth. In any case, to be more cautious (because none among the commentaries, as we will see below, seem to interpret MMK 8.4 in this way), it can be affirmed that kārya and kāraṇa, if not directly referring to them, appear nonetheless to have definitely a strict conceptual relation/link with the skandhas. Moreover, MMK 8.4cd affirms that when kāraṇa and kārya are denied, then also the doer (kartṛ), his/her activity (kriyā) and the means for doing (karaṇa) cannot be possible. It is worth noting here that, whereas kāraka and karman seem to represent the, so to speak, 'ontological' level of the discourse (that is, the basis on which the nature of skandhas is established, as suggested also by the abovementioned MMK 8.13abc, where reference is made to upādāna), kartṛ, kriyā and karaṇa have undoubtedly a moral value: indeed, MMK 8.5 proceeds in the chain of consequences by affirming that, if doer, activity and means for doing were non-existent, also good (dharma) and bad (adharma) actions (kriyā) would not be possible (consider that phala, the moral fruit, is here expressly said to derive from kriyā). As far as MMK 24.17 is concerned, it is interesting to note that the conceptual background, here, appears to be the same as in MMK 8, at least if we make reference to the words of Candrakīrti. In the Prasannapadā ad MMK 24.1, indeed, he introduces the main subject of this chapter by means of the following opponent's words (de la Vallée Poussin 1903-13: 475-76): 148 K. Del Toso iha hi pūrvahetujanitāḥ pratītyasamutpannāḥ pañcopādānaskandhā duḥkhaduḥkhatayā vipariṇāmaduḥkhatayā saṃskāraduḥkhatayā ca pratikūlavartitvāc ca pīḍātmakatvena duḥkham ity ucyate | [...] yady api pañcopādānaskandhā duḥkhasvabhāvā bhavanti tathāpi ya etān duḥkhātmakān paśyanti teṣām eva duḥkhaṃ vyavasthāpyate [...] | kadā ca tad duḥkham āryasatyaṃ yujyate | yadā saṃskārāṇām udayavyayau saṃbhavataḥ | Here [in our school], indeed, the five aggregates of attachment, born from a preceding cause, dependently arisen, are called «pain» because of [their] having the nature of suffering, being [them] disagreeable because [they are] pain that consists in pain, pain that consists in being compounded and pain that consists in transformation. [...] Although the five aggregates of attachment have the intrinsic nature of pain, nonetheless those who see these [five] as having the nature of pain, only by them the pain is [actually] determined [as such] [...]. And when is it proper [to say that] that pain is a Noble Truth? When the appearance and the disappearance of the compounded [i.e., of the skandhas] are occasioned. From this passage we easily infer the fact that the opponent, in MMK 24, must be the same as in MMK 8, that is, probably a Vaibhaṣika. Indeed, in both cases the skandhas are defined as compounded (saṃskṛta and saṃskāra are used as synonymous), and in both cases they are supposed to exist by virtue of an intrinsic nature (svabhāva). Moreover, the fact that this intrinsic nature is here said to be nothing but pain (duḥkha) leads us to suspect that also MMK 12 has been written against the same opponent, who indeed upholds – as pointed out by Candrakīrti in the abovementioned brief fragment of his commentary on that chapter – the identity of duḥkha and skandhas from a substantialistic perspective. Now, if we admit that these three chapters are directed against the same abhidharmic point of view – presumably Vaibhāṣika –, we are in this case allowed to interpret kārya and kāraṇa in MMK 24 according to the readings suggested above, for MMK 12 and MMK 8. Moreover, as regards utpāda, nirodha and phala in MMK 24.17cd, these three terms undoubtedly evoke the dukkhasamudaya, dukkhanirodha and dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā. Now, because Nāgārjuna is here answering to a hypothetical Vaibhāṣika who, as we have seen, upholds from a substantialistic perspective that duḥkha is nothing but the skandhas, we conclude that utpāda and nirodha – phala will be taken into consideration below –, by referring respectively to the origination of pain and to the dissolution of pain, indicate consequently the origination and the dissolution of the skandhas (saṃskārāṇām udayavyayau, in the words of Candrakīrti): this can be, I think, a further corroboration of the idea according to which, if not directly the aggregates, the main subject of MMK 24.17 is at least (re)birth as an event affecting the aggregates. At this point, a first fundamental conclusion can be drawn: Nāgārjuna seems to employ the two words kāraṇa and kārya only in contexts in which the skandhas as substrate of (re)birth are, implicitly or explicitly, dealt with. Now, to be sure that this is the peculiar meaning of kāraṇa and kārya in the kārya and kāraṇa 149 MMK, we need to take into consideration, even if briefly, the way in which Nāgārjuna makes use of hetu and phala. 4. Hetu and phala in the MMK When hetu does not mean «reason», «motive» etc., we find two main ways, in the MMK, according to which Nāgārjuna employs this word in the sense of «cause». On the one hand, hetu is the primary cause, distinct from pratyaya or secondary condition, as in the well-known MMK 1, where mention is made of one hetu, that is, hetupratyaya, and three pratyayas, that is, ārambaṇa°, anantara° and adhipatipratyaya. We find the same distinction in MMK 20, where Nāgārjuna speaks of the combination (sāmagrī) of one cause (hetoḥ) and several conditions (pratyayānāṃ), and in MMK 15.1 in which the impossibility for svabhāva to be derived from hetu and pratyayas is analysed (consider also Vigrahavyāvartanī 21 and commentary thereon). In Yuktiṣaṣṭikakārikā 39ab the description of the strict interrelation existing between cause and condition reaches its summit: hetutaḥ saṃbhavo yasya sthitir na pratyayair vinā | («That which is occasioned by a cause, its permanence is not without conditions»). On the other hand, hetu means 'cause' in general, not necessarily referring to skandhas or (re)birth, as MMK 21.15-16 bear witness to: in these two kārikās, that should be red in the light of MMK 21.13, hetu indeed occurs in a discussion concerning bhāva – which means nothing but «event» –,11 and even if in MMK 21.5c Nāgārjuna speaks of janma («birth») and maraṇa («death»), it rests the fact that these two terms refer here to the concepts of, respectively, saṃbhava («occurrence») and vibhava («destruction»), which are expressly said to apply to bhāvas (MMK 21.8 and 12-14), not to skandhas. This observation acquires all its argumentative force when we take into account MMK 11.8 (quoted above) – where Nāgārjuna seems to draw a sort of distinction (na kevalam... api) between that which undergoes (re)birth (saṃsāra), and a 'bare' event (bhāva) – and MMK 8.13 – where a difference between upādāna (presumably referring to skandhas) and śeṣān bhāvān («the remaining events») appears to be implicitly pointed out. In the light of these considerations, it can be suggested that hetu is used by Nāgārjuna with the value of a, so to speak, objective cause in a broad sense, whereas kāraṇa seems to have the particular meaning of subjective cause. This assumption appears to be confirmed by the analysis of the main subject matters of the chapters in which hetu as «cause» occurs: causation in general in chapter 1, svabhāva in chapter 15, the time or moment of the coming to be of events, bhāvas, in chapter 20, and arising and dissolution of bhāvas in chapter 21 – nowhere is there direct or indirect mention of the skandhas or rebirth. As far as phala is concerned, when this term does not mean «fruit» in its ---- 11 On the philosophical meaning of bhāva in Nāgārjuna's works see Priestley (1993). 150 K. Del Toso literal sense (like in MMK 17.7-8), two principal uses can be detected in the MMK. According to the first one, phala is the general effect of hetu or of the combination of hetu and pratyayas. In MMK 1.11-14, in MMK 20.1-17 and 19-24, and in MMK 21.15-16 the effect of cause and conditions is always referred to as phala. In this case, if we take – as I have suggested – hetu as not necessarily involving subjectiveness, we can conclude that also phala does not. According to the second use, phala is the effect of karman (see MMK 17, and more in particular the kārikās 15d: jāyate karmaṇāṃ phalam, «the effect of actions arises», and 30b: karmajaṃ phalam, «an effect born from actions»; note that phala is employed with this very meaning also by the pūrvapakṣin in kārikās 6 and 9-11) or of kriyā (in MMK 8.5, as underlined above, phala is said to be the effect of good and bad actions: dharmādharmau [...] kriyādīnām), where both these terms, in their respective contexts, refer to the moral aspect, and not – as in the case of karman in MMK 8 – to the 'ontological' aspect, of actions/objects performed. This sense of phala is reminiscent of the Canonical (doctrinal) usage of the term, as several passages of MMK 24 bear witness to: let us, for instance, come back to MMK 24.17cd where, as we have seen, utpāda, nirodha and phala refer respectively to the Pāli concepts of dukkhasamudaya, dukkhanirodha and dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā. Now, as is well-known, the idea of dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā has been elaborated in the abhidhammic context, for example in the Vibhaṅga, under the category of dhamme ñāṇa («knowledge in/of the doctrine»), which refers to the acquaintance with the four maggas and the four phalas, the same four phalas mentioned by Nāgārjuna in MMK 24.3 and 27. In this case, therefore, phala conveys the sense of «effect» developed after the acceptance of, or entrance into, the Buddhist path – a similar employment of phala can be detected also in Vigrahavyāvartanī 54-56, 70 and commentary thereon (where, as we have seen, hetu seems to refer to the moral «cause» of phala, a concept that apparently does not occur in the MMK). 5. Conclusion: Some Consideration on 'Effect' From what precedes, it can be suggested that, in the MMK, kārya represents the effect of a subjective cause (kāraṇa) having primarily a sort of – so to speak – 'organic' or 'existential' meaning, involving (re)birth, life etc. – I use the terms 'organic' and 'existential' in a broad sense, mainly in contrast both to inorganic entities (like pots etc.), and to what is moral –, in other terms, with skandhas; phala, on the contrary, is the word with which Nāgārjuna refers to both the effect of an objective cause (hetu) – i.e., not necessarily involving life and (re)birth – and the effect not of a cause, rather of an activity (karman, kriyā) having moral implications. Consider MMK 8.5cd: dharme cāsaty adharme ca phalaṃ tajjaṃ na vidyate || («If good and bad do not exist, the effect born from them is not found»), also MMK 24.6 (in which the posikārya and kāraṇa 151 tion of the pūrvapakṣin, who is taken to misunderstand the relation between phala and dharma/adharma as something really existent, sadbhāva, is pointed out), and MMK 24.28-29, 34-35 (where Nāgārjuna explains the logical consequences of the pūrvapakṣin's wrong perspective and suggests the right way for analysing the matter). Or, consider the 'positive' role played by phala for emancipation in MMK 8.6ab: phale'sati na mokṣāya na svargāyopapadyate | («If the effect does not exist, one does not arrive neither at liberation, nor at heavens») and in MMK 24.27 (in which it is affirmed that the extreme consequence of the admission of svabhāva is the invalidation of the four phalas). There are also passages in which phala is not explicitly related to good and/or bad fruits, and nonetheless its dependence on karman/kriyā suffices for considering that a moral nuance has to be implicitly intended: MMK 17.15, 19, 30 and 33. This peculiar distinction between kārya and phala appears to be indirectly confirmed by the fact that nowhere in the MMK is affirmed that kārya is the effect of an activity (karman, kriyā). Of course, the difference just drawn between an existential – involving in a certain way 'ontology' – and a moral level has a mere philosophical value, because existence and morality represent the two main manners according to which a single event, in our case human life, can be interpreted. It is, I suppose, in the double philosophical meaning of the term karman (from which both skandhas, as in MMK 8, and phala, as in MMK 17, derive) that Nāgārjuna finds the conceptual knot on which a more complex perspective can be, and must be, pointed out. The complexity here lies in the fact that past actions (karman/kriyā) cause effects (phala) that determine the good or bad conditions (rebirth, liberation, heaven etc.) of the present state of existence (skandhas as kārya), which, in its turn, derives from a previous state of existence (skandhas as kāraṇa). This means that a person should be considered not only as a kārya of a former kāraṇa, but also as a phala of his/her past deeds. Hence, kārya and kāraṇa, on the one hand, and phala and karman/kriyā, on the other, refer to the one and the same subject (I think that it is exactly for this reason that Nāgārjuna introduces a reference to the moral aspect of the matter in both MMK 8.5-6 and MMK 24.17cd, that is, in contexts in which the discussion concerns existence and rebirth from an 'ontological' perspective). But only the first couple of terms indicates the living being as – so to speak – existential support for moral actions, and as receiver or collector of moral retributions, whereas those very actions and retributions are meant by the second couple of terms. 6. Addendum: a Note on the Commentaries on MMK 8.4ab The discussion just concluded represents, of course, nothing but my personal and humble interpretation of a particular aspect of the MMK, which I hope the reader will find consistent both in itself and with the sources here examined. Notwithstanding my conclusions, it is nonetheless interesting to note 152 K. Del Toso that all the commentaries on MMK 8.4 suggest another interpretation of the terms kāraṇa and kārya in pādas ab. Let us analyse them in brief, beginning with Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā (de la Vallée Poussin 1903-13: 182): saty eva hi hetor abhyupagame hetunā yan niṣpādyate tat kāryaṃ tasya ca yo niṣpādakaḥ tat kāraṇam iti yujyate | tadyathā ghaṭasya mṛdā hetur ghaṭaḥ kāryaṃ tasya ca cakrādayaḥ sahakāri kāraṇaṃ || Indeed, only if the cause is admitted, it is proper [to say] that that which is originated by means of the cause is the effect and that which originates that [effect] is the cause. For instance: the cause of the pot is the clay, the effect is the pot and the co-operating cause is the [potter's] wheel etc. Candrakīrti employs here hetu and kāraṇa as two equivalent terms (consider the use of the pronouns yad and tad). He then introduces the concept of sahakāri kāraṇa («co-operating cause», «supporting cause») which is not directly mentioned in the kārikā, unless we interpret sahakāri kāraṇa as referring to karaṇa, the means for action, in pāda d. Unfortunately, there is no evidence for such a reading, even if this is the only possible interpretation because, if hetu is equated to kāraṇa, it follows that kāraṇa in the kārikā must refer not to some auxiliary cause, rather to the primary one. The philosophical problem originated by the presence of sahakāri kāraṇa in this context is that, as we will see by taking into account Buddhapālita's commentary, with all probability it actually refers to kāraṇa, rather than to karaṇa, and this is an interpretation that in itself appears to have some logical inconsistencies (which are, being this the case of the Prasannapadā, of course improbable, but not impossible at all), because kāraṇa cannot, at the same time, function both as primary and as auxiliary cause. In the Akutobhayā we can read: rgyu med pa nyid yin na 'bras bu dang rgyu dag med par thal bar 'gyur ro ||.12 In this passage rgyu med pa nyid can be intended as the Tibetan rendering of ahetutā, which could be translated with «non-causality» or «the condition of no cause/reason» – thus we would have: «if there is non-causality, it follows [that there is also] absence of effect and of cause» – or it can be interpreted as rgyu'i med pa nyid – and in this case the sense would be: «if there is absence (nāstitva) of cause/reason, it follows [that there is also] absence of effect and of cause». As we can observe, this excerpt does not shed more light on the philosophical meaning of our kārikā. Buddhapālita, on the contrary, furnishes a more complex explanation. He indeed writes in his Buddhapālitamadhyamakavṛtti:13 ---- 12 Peking bsTan-'gyur, dBu-ma, TSHa, f. 59b3. Xylograph reproduced in Pandeya (1988). 13 Peking bsTan-'gyur, dBu-ma, TSHa, ff. 224b7-225a2. Xylograph reproduced in Pandeya (1988). Unfortunately, this passage is not included in the Sanskrit fragment of Buddhapālita's commentary recently discovered and published by Ye Shaoyong (2007). kārya and kāraṇa 153 rgyu med na ni 'bras bu dang | | rgyu yang 'thad par mi gyur ro | | rgyu med na 'bras bu cung zad kyang 'thad par mi 'gyur te | rgyu med pa la 'bras bu ji ltar 'thad par gyur | ci ste 'thad na ni glo bur du thams cad 'byung bar 'gyur zhing | rtsom pa thams cad don med pa nyid du yang 'gyur bas de ni mi 'dod de | de lta bas na rgyu med na 'bras bu cung zad kyang 'thad par mi 'gyur ro | | rgyu yang 'thad par mi gyur ro | | zhes bya ba ni rgyu med na rkyen kyang 'thad par mi 'gyur ro | | zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go | de yang ji ltar zhe na | dngos po rgyu las byung ba rnams la rkyen kyang phan 'dogs par byed pa yin na rgyu med cing de nyid mi 'byung na rkyen rnams kyis gang la phan 'dogs par 'gyur ro | | phan 'dogs par mi byed na ni ji ltar rkyen rnams su 'gyur | de lta bas na rgyu med na 'bras bu yang 'thad par mi gyur la | rgyu yang 'thad par mi 'gyur ro || «When the cause does not exist, both the effect and the cause are not evident». If the cause does not exist, not even a little effect is evident: in which way[, indeed,] is an effect evident from a non-existing cause? But if it were admitted [that an effect can exist without a cause, in this case], because all [effects could] originate immediately [i.e., by themselves], every coming to be [of the effects] would be without reason (vaiyarthya), [and] this is not accepted; thus, if the cause does not exist, not even a little effect is evident. «And the cause is not evident» means that, if the cause does not exist, the condition (pratyaya) too is not evident. And how is that [explained]? Conditions, being [them] subsidiary (upakāraka) for the events (bhāva) [which are] originated by a cause, if the cause does not exist and those very [events] do not originate, by means of what conditions is there assistance [to the cause]? If assistance [to the cause] is not performed, in which way are the conditions [supposed to exist]? Hence, when the cause does not exist, both the effect is not evident and the [secondary?] cause is not evident. From the last part of this passage it emerges that Buddhapālita interprets kāraṇa as meaning pratyaya, that is, «condition». Furthermore, pratyaya is said to be «subsidiary» (upakāraka). Even if we cannot be sure, beyond any doubt, that Candrakīrti had in mind Buddhapālita's explanation when he wrote his own commentary on MMK 8.4, it is not so unlikely to think that this particular interpretation of Buddhapālita – which is followed also by Bhāviveka, as we will see in a moment – could have influenced Candrakīrti's abovementioned introduction of the concept of sahakāri kāraṇa. Bhāviveka in his Prajñāpradīpavṛtti says:14 de ltar rgyu med na ni 'bras bu dang | rgyu yang 'thad par mi 'gyur ro | | rgyu dang rkyen so sor ṅes pa'i mthus bya ba nyid kyis 'bras bu zhes bya zhing | lhan cig byed pa'i rgyu tshogs su zin kyang de yod na 'byung ba nyid kyis 'bras bu'i rgyu zhes bya na | bltos pa med pa la ni rgyu med pa yang rgyur mi rung la | de'i 'bras bu med pa yang 'bras bur mi rung ngo || Thus, «when the cause does not exist, both the effect and the cause are not evident». [It is] called 'effect' [that which comes to be] by reason of the power of [certain] fixed (pratiniyata) cause and conditions (pratyaya); moreover, [it is] called 'cause' of the effect for its becoming that (tadbhāvabhāvitā) [effect, which is] grasped in the assem- ---- 14 Peking bsTan-'gyur, dBu-ma, TSHa, ff. 142a8-142b1. Xylograph reproduced in Pandeya (1988). 154 K. Del Toso blage of the co-operating causes (sahakāri kāraṇa); but if the cause does not exist, an independent [secondary?] cause is not admitted (na yujyate), and if the effect of that [first cause] does not exist, an[other] independent effect is not admitted. Now, also Bhāviveka – like Buddhapālita, and may be Candrakīrti – apparently identifies kāraṇa, via sahakāri kāraṇa, if not directly or explicitly with pratyaya, at least with some secondary element involved in a causal process. All the commentaries to MMK 8.4, with perhaps the sole exception of the Akutobhayā, which proposes nothing but a mere paraphrase of the kārikā, seem to agree on interpreting kāraṇa as a secondary cause or as a subsidiary condition of hetu. But, as we have seen, when Nāgārjuna refers to primary cause and secondary condition(s), he always makes use of hetu and pratyaya (not kāraṇa) as a fixed formula. This leads us to suppose that hetu in MMK 8.4 (and consequently also the two occurrences of ahetuka in MMK 8.3, and those in MMK 4.2, too) should mean «motive», «ground» in general, rather than specific «cause».15 To conclude, it is not my intention to say here that the commentaries are definitely wrong on this point: as they are, indeed, the actual expression of the historical development of the Madhyamika philosophical tradition, their being right or wrong does not constitute a significant matter. However, it is exactly because they represent a development of Nāgārjuna's philosophy, that we can suppose that these commentaries contain some differences from the original message of the MMK. And this of ours could be one of such cases: to say the truth, my personal impression is that Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, because of their – so to speak – 'overinterpretation' of the meaning of hetu in MMK 8.3a, are in a certain way forced to render kāraṇa as something subordinated to hetu (Buddhapālita and Bhāviveka undoubtedly uphold this point of view) and consequently to consider kārya – as clearly Candrakīrti does –16 as the direct effect of hetu, a conclusion that, we have seen, does not transpire at all from Nāgārjuna's words. Krishna Del Toso Università di Trieste via Tigor 22, 34124 Trieste krishna.deltoso@gmail.com ---- 15 This is the rendering of hetuka adopted for instance also by Bronkhorst (1985: 118) in his translation of MMK 8.3. 16 I mention here only Candrakīrti because his commentary is the only one preserved into Sanskrit, and for this very reason, in the light of point (a) of the preliminary remarks, only in this case we can be sure of the original terminology employed. kārya and kāraṇa 155 REFERENCES a) Primary sources Bhāviveka, Prajñāpradīpavṛtti, see Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (2). Buddhapālita, Madhyamakavṛtti, see Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (2). Candrakīrti, Prasannapadāvṛtti: 1) de la Vallée Poussin, Louis (1903-13) Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti, Sanskrit edn. (Bibliotheca Buddhica IV). St.-Petersbourg. 2) May, Jacques (1959) Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti. Douze chapitres traduits du sanscrit et du tibétain, accompagnés d'une introduction, de notes, et d'une édition critique de la version tibétaine, Tibetan edn. and French trans. Paris. 3) see: Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (2). Gautama, Nyāyasūtra: 1) Vidyābhuṣana, Satīśa Chandra (1930) The Nyāya Sutrās [sic] of Gotama, Sanskrit edn. and Engl. trans. Nandalal Sinha, rev. and enl. edn. Allahabad. Hume, David (1748) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Digiread edn. Stilwell [2006]. Kaṇāda, Vaiśeṣikasūtra: 1) Jambuvijayaji, Muni Śrī (1961) Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, with the Commentary of Candrānanda, Sanskrit edn. Baroda. Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: 1) de Jong, Jan Willem (1977) Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Sanskrit edn. Madras. 2) Pandeya, Raghunath (1988) Madhyamakaśāstram of Nāgārjuna. With the Commentaries Akutobhayā by Nāgārjuna, Madhyamakavṛtti by Buddhapālita, Prajñāpradīpavṛtti by Bhāvaviveka, Prasannapadāvṛtti by Candrakīrti, Critically Reconstructed (2 vols.) edn. Delhi. Nāgārjuna, Vigrahavyāvartanī: 1) Bhattacharya, Kamaleswar, Edward Hamilton Johnston, Arnold Kunst (1957) The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna, Vigrahavyāvartanī, Sanskrit edn. and Engl. trans. Delhi. [Rep. 1990]. 2) Yoshiyasu Yonezawa 米澤嘉康 (2008) Vigrahavyāvartanī, Sanskrit Transliteration and Tibetan Translation. Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies 31, 209-333. Nāgārjuna, Yuktiṣaṣṭikakārikā: 1) Lindtner, Christian (1987) Nāgārjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna, Sanskrit edn. and Engl. trans., 100-119. Delhi. Pāṇini, Aṣṭādhyāyī: 1) Böhtlingk, Otto (1839) Pànini's acht Bücher grammatischer Regeln Band I: Pànini's Sùtra's mit Indischen Scholien, Sanskrit edn. Bonn. Peking bsTan-'gyur: 1) Suzuki Daisetsu Teitarō (1955-1961) The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition. Tōkyō – Kyōto. Piṅgala (?), Akutobhayā see: Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (2). Saṃyuttanikāya: 1) Feer, Léon (1884-1998) Saṃyutta Nikāya (5 vols.), Pāli edn. Oxford. [Rep. 1975-1999]. b) Secondary sources Bronkhorst, Johannes (1985) Nāgārjuna and the Naiyāyikas. Journal of Indian Philosophy 13, 107-32. Kalupahana, David J. (1991) Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna. The Philosophy of the Middle Way. Delhi. Lindtner, Christian (1990) Madhyamaka – The philosophy of Great Humor? Journal of Indian Philosophy 18, 249-60. Priestley, Leonard C.D.C. (1993) The Term 'bhāva' and the Philosophy of Nāgārjuna, in Naren156 K. Del Toso dra K. Wagle, Fumimaro Watanabe (eds.), Studies on Buddhism in Honour of Prof. A.K. Warder, 122-44. Toronto. Scharf, Peter M. (2002) Pāṇini, Vivakṣā and Kāraka-rule-ordering, in Manohar Mahadeorao Deshpande, Peter Edwin Hook (eds.), Indian Linguistic Studies. Festschrift in Honor of George Cardona, 121-49. Delhi. Ye Shaoyong 葉少勇 (2007) The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and Buddhapālita's Commentary (2). Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology 11, 105-51. SUMMARY In this paper, Nāgārjuna's philosophical interpretation of the terms kāraṇa and kārya is analysed after having methodologically confined the specific field of interest to the MMK. From the study of all the occurrences of kāraṇa and kārya in the MMK (listed in paragraph 2), it emerges that Nāgārjuna makes use of these two terms to refer to skandhas as causes (kāraṇa) of further skandhas as effects (kārya), hence conveying with this words the idea of, so to speak, subjectivity and (re)birth. From the principal commentaries on the MMK (particularly Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti), we know also that, even when the reference of kāraṇa and kārya to skandhas is not explicitly pointed out by Nāgārjuna, it nonetheless can be inferred from the peculiar context in which these terms are employed. This conclusion seems to be confirmed also by the crosscheck analysis of the philosophical usage of the parallel terms hetu and phala, which refer either to, so to speak, objective (i.e., concerning general bhāvas) causes and effects, or – in the case of phala as consequence of karman/kriyā – to moral results (these two meanings are confirmed also by some passages from the Vigrahavyāvartanī), but in no cases Nāgārjuna makes recurse to hetu and phala to refer to what could be called a subjective (i.e., concerning skandhas) level of causality. To the paper an addendum is added, in which the commentaries on MMK 8.4 are taken into consideration. From this excursus it appears that at least Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, by 'overinterpreting' the meaning of hetu in the kārika, are consequently forced to readapt the philosophical significance of kāraṇa and kārya in a way that does not fit so much with Nāgārjuna's original message.