Remove a remaining sensitive memory access in PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption
@@ -1512,14 +1512,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
if( ret != 0 )
goto cleanup;
- /*
- * Check and get padding len in "constant-time"
- */
- bad |= buf[0]; /* First byte must be 0 */
+ /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant
+ * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
+ bad |= buf[0];
- /* This test does not depend on secret data */
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE )
{
+ /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
+ * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
/* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer
@@ -1529,23 +1529,26 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
pad_done |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
}
-
- bad |= buf[pad_count + 2];
}
else
{
+ /* Decode EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00
+ * where PS must be at least 8 bytes with the value 0xFF. */
bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
/* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer
* (minus one, for the 00 byte) */
for( i = 2; i < ilen - 1; i++ )
{
- pad_done |= ( buf[i] != 0xFF );
- pad_count += ( pad_done == 0 );
+ pad_done |= if_int( buf[i], 0, 1 );
+ pad_count += if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 );
+ bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, buf[i] ^ 0xFF );
}
- bad |= buf[pad_count + 2];
}
+ /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */
+ bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 );
+
/* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */
bad |= size_greater_than( 8, pad_count );
@@ -1580,8 +1583,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to
* avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or
* through memory or cache access patterns. */
+ bad = all_or_nothing_int( bad | output_too_large );
for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ )
- buf[i] &= ~( bad | output_too_large );
+ buf[i] &= ~bad;
/* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size.
* Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
