"< I'm having a little trouble figuring out if we have resolved this issue, so just to make it clear what we're talking about, here's the current structure of the ""Finding the mind"" section (where ""->"" means ""rebutted by""): 

 (CHINESE ROOM -> SIMPLE SYSTEMS REPLY (pencils, etc) -> MAN MEMORIZES RULES (no pencils) -> (Ignore),  (CR) -> SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS REPLY (virtual mind) -> JUST A SIMULATION -> WHAT'S WRONG WITH SIMULATION?. CR FAILS. THIS DOESN'T PROVE STRONG AI. 

 It is possible to also add rebuttals to the ""man memorizes"", like this: 

 (CHINESE ROOM -> SIMPLE SYSTEMS REPLY (pencils, etc) -> MAN MEMORIZES RULES (no pencil) -> MAN HAS TWO MINDS IN ONE HEAD. (CR) -> SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS REPLY (virtual mind)  -> ... etc. 

 There are sources for ""man has two minds in one head"", and so this paragraph could be written, if someone wants to. I'm not interested in writing it myself, and I think the article is better without it. 

 The reason I believe it to be a ""waste of the reader's time"": Searle's description of the system reply is a straw man. He thinks the systems reply ascribes intentionality to a set of objects, one of which is a pencil. Searle refutes this reply by throwing out the pencil. He thinks he's disproved the systems reply. Most readers have no idea what Searle is doing or why it matters if there is no pencil. As Likebox says, it's ""mysterious"". The problem is that no one actually ascribed intentionality to the pencil. We all ascribe intentionality to something else. We might call it ""software"" or ""neural correlates"" or ""a running program"" or an ""emulated mind"" or a ""virtual mind"" or a ""functional system"", etc. But we're definitely not talking about just the pencil and the other physical objects.  What's required is a more sophisticated version of the systems reply and, in this article, that's what MInsky's ""virtual mind"" argument is supposed to supply. 

 So the article, as it is written, allows Searle to have ""the last word"" against his straw man, and then moves on to the real argument. A sophisticated systems reply that actually works, and then Searle's basic objection to computationalism: a simulated mind is not the same as a real mind. I think these are the most important points on the ontological side of the argument. 

 So ... he hesitates ... are we all happy with that?     

 "