text: The cannabis plant was included at the request of Nigeria -where there is no coca nor opium cultivation. Nigeria considers cannabis to be an "extremely dangerous drug", and felt left out as far as funds for alternative development were concerned, noted Western observers. At the suggestion of the Latin American group of member states (GRULAC) "eradication of opium poppy and coca bush" was changed to "eliminate or significantly reduce". But in the end, without actually mentioning SCOPE itself, the general idea of the strategy is practically endorsed. An earlier version of the draft Political Declaration did not even include such strong commendation of the UNDCP "global approach". Arlacchi may not have gotten SCOPE itself into any declaration, but he got his go-ahead.
  A SCOPE-like program is likely to turn up again, either at UNGASS itself or later when the implementation of its intentions are worked out. Who else is going to produce a global strategy along the lines the UN has already set out? According to insiders, lobbying to get SCOPE on the UNGASS agenda is still going on.
  SCOPE's main objective is worldwide elimination of the illicit cultivation of coca bush and opium poppy by the year 2008. The strategy calls for a 'balanced approach' between law enforcement, alternative development and demand reduction, to rid the world of 'the scourge of heroin and cocaine'. Alternative development is intended to receive the bulk of the approximately US$ 4 billion budget: 74%. Law enforcement is allotted 20% and demand reduction 2%. The UNDCP itself doesn't have innate funds, so it has appealed to the international community to commit itself to SCOPE and to provide the necessary funding. (6)
  The plan focuses on eight key countries in three regions: Bolivia, Colombia and Peru in Latin America; the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar (or Burma as the suppressed democratic opposition prefers to call their nation) and Vietnam in South-East Asia; and Afghanistan and Pakistan in South-West Asia. The supply of illicit opiates and coca derivatives today originates in these "limited number of well-defined geographical areas", according to the UNDCP in summing up the favorable factors in eliminating opiates and coca derivatives in their analysis of the situation.
  Secondly, says the agency, "after three decades of experience, the international community is now equipped with tested methodologies and the know-how to tackle the problem in the producing areas. The strengthening of the drug control mechanisms in the regions concerned has paved the way for full-scale interventions and most producing countries have adopted well-defined national strategies and action plans that are ready for implementation."
  "At the same time," continues the plan's summary, "it is possible to monitor the areas at risk in order to prevent the 'balloon effect' from nullifying the overall impact of elimination programmes." The 'balloon effect' is the movement of cultivation to previously untouched area as a result of increased enforcement in an area of cultivation (when you squeeze one part of a balloon, the air simply moves to another part without reducing the total amount of air).
  The last favorable factor is that "there is no alternative to concerted and comprehensive action". The expression of a "clear political will and the adoption of a common agenda on the part of the international community" is therefore required. The Special Session of the General Assembly on Drug Control "offers an historic opportunity for all positive forces to converge", according to the UNDCP.
  During the lobby for SCOPE, Mr. Arlacchi adapted his tactics. He started to stress especially acceptance of the fact "that demand reduction now is on an equal footing with production and drug trafficking" as "the major achievement" of this PrepCom, in an obvious effort to counter criticism. Looking at SCOPE, it is clear that the plan primarily addresses the problem from the supply side. Choosing this approach is controversial, especially with the Latin American delegations who see the American consumer market as the major feeding-pump of the drug problem: demand generating supply.
  While discussing the Political Declaration, Mexico proposed to include 2003 as a target date for demand reduction in an obvious move to confront the developed consumer countries with the principle of 'equal responsibility'. Now the year 2003 is the target date for "new and enhanced drug demand reduction strategies" and there is a commitment "to achieve significant and measurable results" by the year 2008.
  The UNDCP is looking elsewhere to develop demand reduction. No SCOPE-like approach is available on this issue, neither has the UNDCP developed one in advance – like they did with SCOPE – on the basis of previous versions of the Guiding Principles on Drug Demand Reduction. Looking at the amount of money allocated for demand reduction in SCOPE (2% of the budget), this cannot be considered a substantial element of the strategy. The strategy promotes the eradication of the production narcotic substances in 10 years, not the demand. Thus contradicting the "balanced approach addressing simultaneously the supply of and the demand for illicit drugs" SCOPE says it is advocating.
  To help establish the 'clear political will' it needs, the UNDCP is already mounting a global propaganda campaign. During the PrepCom the above-mentioned commercial The Cleaning Lady was presented -produced at rock-bottom price by the sympathetic US advertisement agency Hal Riney & Partners. It is meant for worldwide distribution on the eve of the New York Special Session. The spot is likely to prove contentious. The herbicide-spraying chopper is rather awkward, to say the least. Chemical fumigation is prohibited by law in Bolivia and Peru. The first message the peasant of these countries receive, is that their government intends to break the law to eradicate their means of subsistence. Given the already strained relations between growers and the government in the region, this is like throwing fuel on a fire.
  Arlacchi has not only had to face scepticism from delegates, but within the UNDCP the recently appointed Executive Director is seen as an outsider who overruled critical assessments of SCOPE by the agency's specialists. He is nicknamed "El Niño", a kind of human equivalent to the meteorologic phenomenon which creates havoc world wide. But UN Secretary General Annan says that the "renowned Italian crime fighter" has brought vitality and credibility to the UNDCP in its fight against drugs. Observers say that the Executive Director has "considerable political support", which is clearly true from the US side.
  International organisations like the UNDCP are a key component of the overall US counternarcotics strategy, says the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997, the yearly overview of drug control by the US State Department. "The US contributions to UNDCP have had significant impact on the operations and expansion of UN counternarcotics programs and policy," the report states bluntly. The US were the first to introduce the 10-year target date into the PrepCom deliberations, consistent with their own national drug control strategy. The US proposal suggested: "States should commit to ending all illicit cultivation of opium poppy and coca bush by the year 2008, using all available means, including alternative development, eradication and law enforcement." In the UNDCP's first draft for a Global Plan for the elimination of Illicit Narcotic Crops, the 10-year target date was not yet mentioned. (7)
  Arlacchi did play an important and brave role in fighting the Mafia in Italy, but the small peasants involved in the cultivation of coca bush and opium poppy are not mafiosi. In his drive to deny organized crime an important source of income, he is irresponsibly putting the onus for the problem on the shoulders of the relatively innocent growers of the raw material - those who depend on these crops to survive - who risk losing their lives and livelihoods as the fight escalates.
  The Executive Director has a habit of turning a deaf ear to critique. After a critical session on SCOPE with some delegations during the PrepCom, he thanked them for their support, while dismissing the strong reservations that had been made. When European Commissioner Emma Bonnino castigated the 10-year US$ 250 million UNDCP-agreement with the Taliban because of their bad human rights record -specifically discriminating policies against women - he disregarded it as "inter-Italian politicking". Asked about the human rights abuses under Taliban rule, Arlacchi responded: "We also champion human rights, to save 8 million heroin addicts." (8) The agreement with the Taliban is likely to violate the gender principle laid down in the Political Declaration - "to ensure that women and men benefit equally, and without any discrimination, from strategies directed against the world drug problem, through their involvement in all stages of programmes and policy-making".
  Since the PrepCom, Arlacchi has been plugged in to the mass media to bolster support. He could be seen on CNN's Global View, and CNN Special Correspondent Christiane Amanpour was taken on a trip through Iran -"one of the world's busiest drug smuggling routes"- to get the message across that "the United Nations says the country needs help to stop the smuggling of heroin across Iran's eastern border and on to Europe". (9)
  Whether or not UNGASS endorses SCOPE in one form or another may not be that important. The UNDCP already has in fact set its strategy in motion through actively assist countries to develop national drug-control plans along the lines of the SCOPE-framework, like the one in Afghanistan -curiously enough with the same 2008 time frame- and the even more ambitious plan in Bolivia With Dignity!. With this US$ 952 million plan the Government of Bolivia "has decided the country should come out of the coca-cocaine circuit in the next five years", by 2002. (10) The allocation of funds within the budget between alternative development, law enforcement (eradication and interdiction) and demand reduction (prevention and rehabilitation), almost equals the 70-20-2 formula of SCOPE.
  A closer look at the confidential 170-page draft of SCOPE reveals the flaws in the strategy, which are less obvious in the summary presented to the PrepCom session. The plan mentions three ideal conditions for alternative development: (1) Effective control of the area by central government and an absence of counterpressure from insurgent groups; (2) The provision of an enabling economic environment at the national and international level which facilitates the presence of market forces that make illicit cultivation less attractive; (3) Consistently applied disincentives through law enforcement and eradication.
  A large part of the strategy is centred around elimination and countering the 'balloon effect' in an almost military fashion: development of satellite reconnaissance, rapid assessment teams (RATs) to monitor displacement of drug crops, and the research and development of biological and chemical weapons for "environmentally safe" eradication. The more general, if tacit thinking behind SCOPE is that since drug crop cultivation has been reduced to a well-defined 'pocket' of production areas in the eight above mentioned countries, the containment of this pocket and a last massive final offensive can eliminate the problem once and for all.
  The first condition -effective control of the area by central government and an absence of counterpressure from insurgent groups- immediately turns into the first obstacle to successful implementation. Some of the major heroin and cocaine producing countries have major problems establishing effective control of large parts of their territory. Afghanistan -now the world's largest illicit producer of opium and one of the key areas of SCOPE's strategy- is in the midst of a long term civil war. Curiously, the UNDCP recently reached an agreement with one of the factions, the Taliban -who control two-thirds of country- while the UN doesn't even recognize the Taliban as the country's representative. The plan is to convince farmers to grow onions in stead of opium poppy. (11)
  The official Afghan delegates at the PrepCom belong to the other faction. They protested the UNDCP deal with Taliban. The agency runs the risk of being used by the warring factions in the fight for international recognition, while no substantial counter drug effort will be made. The US is very sceptical about any meaningful counternarcotics progress by the Taliban, despite the November 1997 response to the UNDCP initiative. Major impediments, according to the US State Department, are "inaction and lack of political will of the Taliban faction, which controls 96 per cent of Afghanistan's opium­growing areas, as well as substantial drug trade involvement on the part of some local Taliban authorities". (12) Narcotics remain Afghanistan's largest source of income, and Taliban authorities reportedly benefit financially from the trade and provide protection to heroin laboratories.
  The same scenario -using drugs as a crowbar to gain international recognition- goes for Burma where the UNDCP and the Government are drafting a 10-year drug control program to erase poppy by 2008 - the magic date. The military regime is trying to improve its dismal human rights record by looking tough on drugs. A Western diplomat dismissed the recent counter-drug efforts of the military junta as 'window dressing': "What this government wants to do is perpetuate itself in power. They know it's got a bad image. They looked at drugs and found this the one issue they have. They'd like to use whatever they've done to improve their image and try to get sanctions lifted." (13)
  According to the US State Department, the regime's highest priority is to end insurrection -notably the opium producing ethnic armies in the North- and counternarcotics interests in these areas are a secondary consideration. (14) The regime employs costly public-relations consultants in the US to try to change the mood in Washington. The US decertified Burma again this year for not achieving full compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and is very concerned about the commitment of the Burmese fighting narcotics. (15)
  Burmese officials are seeking equipment from the US that they say will help them to wage a more effective war on drugs. Among its stepped up enforcement efforts, the government would resume an aerial opium-eradication spraying operation that had been conducted with US help prior to the 1988 aid cutoff. In particular, officials say, they need helicopters, surveillance planes, support arms, including rocket launchers, night vision goggles, satellite navigation equipment, and thermal imaging sensors. Some Burma analysts say any new equipment would be used to fight insurgent armies seeking autonomy from the central government and to strengthen the junta's grip on power rather than to stop opium traffickers. (16)
  There is substantial evidence that the military regime itself is heavily involved in drug cultivation and trafficking. According to a recent investigation by The Sunday Times and human rights groups, the Burmese junta is secretly expanding the number of opium farms in designated 'drug-control areas', and has driven thousands of villagers from their homes in a program to transform rice fields into poppy plantations, despite receiving millions of dollars a year from the United Nations to combat drugs. Last January 5,000 people were evicted from one village alone - Ngape, in the Arakan Yoma mountain range in central Burma. The government claimed they had been ordered out for refusing to destroy poppy crops. However, a farmer who sought refuge on Burma's border with India said: "We had never grown opium before. The soldiers said we had to plant poppies or lose our land." (17)
  The regime has used video footage which appears to show poppy fields being destroyed to support applications for UN aid, the Times reported. (18) But interviews with farmers, soldiers and former civil servants have confirmed that the military presides over a huge network of opium-producing villages in regions officially said to be drug-free. Aid workers admit that restrictions on their movements render them powerless to make checks. "There is no independent monitoring," said a source at the UNDCP.
  Not all experts agree on the direct participation of the regime in the drug trade, but it is widely acknowledged that they at least condone trafficking by ethnic opium war lords as part of peace agreements. The governing generals are seeking to prop up their wheezing economy by appealing to drug traffickers -both current and former- to invest their money in Burma. (19) And yet, an UNDCP mission is colaborating with Burmese authorities to draft a 10-year project for the elimination of poppy cultivation and development of opium substitution, and recently sponsored a seminar on the issue in Rangoon.
  If there is any poppy substition going on in Burma, it is rather the drug market itself which regulates the transition. The substitute is likely to be amphetamine type stimulants. Methamphetamine, or "ya ba" -the "crazy drug"- as it is called locally, is rapidly rising as an export commodity. It is even easier to produce than opium, and laboratories are springing up like mushrooms along the Thai border. Moreover, observers fear that while the Asian financial crisis is hitting Burma hard, the country will become increasingly dependent on earnings from the drug trade. (20)
  Mr. Arlacchi visited Burma in May, chatting with the military junta on behalf of the UNDCP while just three weeks before the fellow UN Commission on Human Rights expressed its deep concern at "the continuing violations of human rights in Myanmar (...), including extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and enforced disappearances, torture, abuse of women and children by government agents, arbitrary seizures of land and property, violations of freedom of movement of people and goods, and the imposition of oppressive measures directed in particular at ethnic and religious minorities, including systematic programmes of forced relocation, and the widespread use of forced labour, including work on infrastructure projects and as porters for the army".
  All this next to more 'conventional' human rights abuses such as severe restrictions on the freedoms of opinion, expression, assembly and association, access to information including censorship controls, the absence of due process of law, including arbitrary arrest and politically motivated arrest and detention, detention without trial, secret trials without proper legal representation, and inhuman treatment of prisoners, leading to illness, injury and death in custody. (21)
  Nevertheless, the UNDCP is collaborating with Burmese government authorities. "Bringing uniform law and order" is one of the goals of the future country plan in which the UNDCP is to cooperate with the military regime, recognizing the fact that it will not be possible to achieve the objective of a drug control program without considerable assistance to the government. So, the UNDCP "will continue to provide assistance to strengthen the national law enforcement capacity", completely ignoring the absolute lack of respect for human rights, supression, torture and the regime's own involvement in the drug business. SCOPE does not mention these well documented facts, it merely regrets that "most bilateral and multilateral aid (notably from the international financial institutions) has been suspended", without even saying why.
  Colombia is another example of a government having trouble in controlling its national territory. Large regions of Colombia are in the hands of FARC guerrillas, who levy taxes on the cultivation and marketing of coca leaves and coca paste. The situation is getting more complex by the day due to the growing influence of paramilitary forces -allegedly backed by the Colombian army- who fight the rebels, and have excellent links with notorious drug trafficking syndicates. (22)
  Consequently, counter-narcotics operations in Colombia consist primarily of chemical fumigation: last year 48.000 hectares of coca and poppy crops were eliminated through the aerial spraying of herbicides. Nevertheless, the total area under drug-crop cultivation expanded by 10 percent, according to the US which is monitoring coca areas by satellite. (23) The fields were simply moved to other areas. One can imagine what will happen next: these fields will then be sprayed and cultivation -which in itself is not particularly friendly to the ecosystem- will again move to other regions. A 'vicious' circle, contaminating ever-expanding areas.
  There is grave concern about the long-term effects of the massive spreading of these chemicals across the vulnerable ecosystem of the Colombian Amazon tropical rainforest, where coca cultivation is concentrated. Not to mention the health problems it causes for peasants, their livestock and food production. The Guaviare and other coca growing regions of Colombia were the scene of widespread social protest in the Summer of 1996, when an estimated 241,000 people participated in massive marches -one of the largest peasant mobilizations in Colombian history- to protest aerial eradication, lack of government support for economic development and the increasing presence of the Colombian military.
  Twelve individuals were victims of extrajudicial executions and seven disappeared in the violence that ensued. A number of protest leaders subsequently received death threats and seven were killed, apparently for their involvement in the protests. (24) Clearly, the actual counter-narcotics strategy of the Colombian government does not comply with the guiding principles on alternative development and eradication set out by the PrepCom: respect for human rights, environmentally safe eradication and participation of the local communities.
  Although spraying has been not successful, there is no intention to revise the policy. "It's ironic and disturbing that the one country where you have massive aerial eradication is the one where you've got an increase in coca production," says Coletta Youngers of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). "There's something fundamentally wrong there." (25) Again, the conventional wisdom seems to be that the reason force has not worked, is that not enough has been applied and that the logical response is escalation - not re-evaluation.
  The liquid herbicide used until now -glyphosate- has not proven sufficiently effective, so a new, granular one is under consideration: tebuthiuron - better known by its trade name Spike 20P. The Colombian environment ministry advised against tebuthiuron in 1994, saying it might damage forests and contaminate ground water. "If everything we've analysed so far is true, and this has to be proven scientifically, our forests, our massive Amazon forests, could basically be converted into prairies," Colombia's Environment Minister Eduardo Verano de la Rosa was quoted as saying recently. He has refused to endorse a proposed field test, but is likely to be overruled by a potent lobby, including the vigorous police chief, General Rosso José Serrano, and Colombia's National Drugs Council, who are in favour of the new chemical. Ivonne Alcala, head of the Colombian anti-drug office, dismisses concerns: "If we were spraying holy water, they would say the holy water is causing birth defects," Alcala said. (26)
  Do not apply Spike 20P near desirable trees or other woody species. Exposure of even a small part of a plant root system may cause severe plant injury or death.
  Dow says it is "very risky" to apply tebuthiuron "where the terrain slopes, rainfall is significant ... and the application is made under less-than-ideal circumstances". (27) An accurate description of the areas in Colombia where most of the coca and poppy is grown.
  At the moment the UNDCP does not actually support fumigation projects in Colombia -the financial support and technical assistance (helicopters and training) is largely provided by the United States-, but it does not oppose to it either, despite the Action Plan guidelines that "eradication efforts should utilize available research and ensure that environmentally safe methods are employed". In discussing the future national drug control strategy of Colombia, the UNDCP endorses forced eradication by aerial spraying, but it "should focus on commercial cultivation instead of the present indiscriminate fumigations". The question is: who is going to establish where subsistence cultivation ends and commercial cultivation begins? Then there is still the problem of environmental damage.
  SCOPE demonstrates that the UNDCP increasingly considers the use of chemical andor biological 'weapons' to counter drug cultivation, provided they are 'environmentally safe'. "As the plan progresses, the importance of eradication will grow," notes SCOPE, both to stop cultivation attempts in new areas and the resurgence in areas where alternative development has been implemented. The development of biological or chemical agents can help to complement "tedious manual eradication".
  In combination with sophisticated reconnaissance satellite systems and Rapid Assessment Teams (RATs) chemical and biological weapons are intended to counter the 'balloon effect' and restrict drug crop cultivation to the 'pocket' of eight key countries where it is concentrated for now. After all, "in areas where viable alternative sources of income already exist, law enforcement measures are required against persistent illicit cultivation", says the Action Plan. Where there was no previous cultivation, one could argue, viable sources of income were available, and alternative development projects are therefore not necessary.
  An UNDCP expert group recently adopted two protocols. Environmental impact studies are included, but these will "focus initially on herbicides currently used" and which may be required for "use in other geographical areas". A contract was signed just prior to the PrepCom for a research program in Uzbekistan to test a biological control agent based on the pathogenic fungus Dendryphion papaveraceae which destroys opium poppy. The donors to the project insisted on anonymity, indicating the controversial nature of the program.
  Colombia's current national drug control strategy is very well described in SCOPE, as "based on two distinct, but complementary courses of action: the carrot and the stick". The stick being forced eradication, the carrot alternative development projects. This approach, albeit less explicitly without using the "carrot and stick" metaphor, is copied in SCOPE. It is caught in the 'balanced approach' guidelines or – in the third of the SCOPE's 'ideal conditions' for alternative development – "consistently applied disincentives through law enforcement and eradication". Alternative development gains in effectiveness when it is backed by credible eradication measures, is the idea.
  Colombia's carrot, the PLANTE presidential, program entitles smallholders in the regions of illicit cultivation to receive technical and financial assistance, if they cease cultivation of illicit crops. PLANTE has only been able to assist 100 percent coca or opium poppy-free campesinos, who then almost invariably find themselves without a livelihood for some time after the eradication. The UNDCP acknowledges that insufficient synchronization between development projects and forced eradication is a major problem in the current Colombian strategy. PLANTE's coverage has been far from total. Furthermore, lack of coordination between PLANTE and the Anti-Narcotics Police has meant that campesinos have had to wait for a long time after eradication before they are offered assistance by PLANTE, if at all. The stick is already used with full force, while the carrot has barely been planted.
  "But the lack of proportion between the big stick and the small carrot only partly explains why Colombia has failed to stop the spectacular increase in coca acreage," notes SCOPE. Even if PLANTE was to improve and be provided with more resources, Colombia would never reach its elimination objective, unless it gained control over the regions of illicit cultivation. The UNDCP acknowledges the problem. It is difficult to imagine a sustainable solution to the illicit crop cultivation issue outside the framework of a solution to Colombia's internal conflict. This is reinforced by deeper involvement in cultivation and first processing stages of the illicit drug chain by the guerrilla and especially the paramilitary bands, according to SCOPE. Intensified fighting has led to a paramilitary advance on the regions of illicit cultivation.
  The situation in Colombia is deteriorating rapidly. The distinction between counter narcotics and counter insurgency operations is becoming more blurred by the day, fuelled by the pressure and military assistance of the United States. The recently appointed US ambassador in Bogota described Colombia as a hemispheric security problem. There is talk that the decades-old internal conflict is being "vietnamized". Alarmed by recent setbacks to the Colombian military in its fight against the guerrilla, the Clinton administration is considering increasing military assistance within the framework of cooperation between the two countries in fighting drug trafficking. (28)
  The White House is considering a Colombian request to buy 12 Cobra attack helicopters, which would make Colombia the first South American country to receive sophisticated weapons since President Clinton lifted a ban on such sales last year. Paramilitary groups -backed by the Colombian military according to many observers- committed 46 massacres on 260 peasants last year, according to a recent report to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva by special UN human rights delegate, Almudena Mazarrasa. Moreover, in 1997 an average of six families an hour were displaced from their homes by the armed conflict, which has forced nearly 1.2 million people to flee their homes in the past five years. (29)
  Although there are several initiatives to start peace negotiations, the largest rebel group FARC is stepping up the struggle rather than thinking in terms of peace. Recently, FARC nearly wiped out a elite battalion of the Colombian army. In spite of the overwhelming signs that conflict is escalating, the UNDCP is looking optimistically to the future. According to the agency's time table for Colombia's internal peace process – a recurrent and unresolved theme on the country's political agenda since 1982 – peace is to be achieved by next year. As for the guerrillas, the UNDCP has already recruited them for counter-narcotics operations: demobilization of guerrilla groups and other armed groups could be facilitated "by giving employment to the former guerrilleros in eradicating by hand illicit cultivation, as well as in reforestation and protection of national reserves".
  The UNDCP applauds the Bolivian drug control master plan 1998-2002, the first to fit with the approach of SCOPE. The plan With Dignity! was approved by the new Government of former military dictator President Banzer at the end of December 1997. According to the plan, all illicit and transitional coca bush cultivation will be eliminated by the year 2002. This will involve the eradication of some 38,000 hectares of coca plantations, at a pace of 8,000 a year. Newly planted coca crops are subject to compulsory destruction by the DEA-trained FELCN. The so-called Plan Banzer also foresees the resettlement of 15,000 coca growers in new colonization areas.
  The bulk of the US$ 952 million budget is destined for alternative development projects (US$ 700 million or 74%). The Bolivian Government is prepared to finance 15% of what is required, with the rest to come from the international community. The Chapare peasants say that as long as alternative sources of income are not available, they will carry on growing coca. Alternative development programs as projected in the Plan Banzer are notoriously slow to bear fruit, and in the past have often been a complete failure (30). According to a 1994 opinion poll, 77% of the Chapare coca-farmers didn't have any confidence in alternative development projects. (31)
  Evo Morales, the coca-growers' most outspoken leader -and a deputy for the Chapare region- said his members would never permit complete coca eradication, and complained that the government had not consulted the growers about the plan. This is contrary to claims of the Government itself, which says there was a lengthy consultation process after General Banzer took office in August 1997. (32) Morales' own coca field was one of the first to be eradicated after the cocaleros in the Chapare revolted against the plan in April 1998.
  The Government says it is determined to ensure that implementation of With Dignity! happens without violence and with the full cooperation of those concerned, but this does not seem to be working out. From April 1, coca farmers blocked the roads to protest broken agreements and the reduction of compensation for voluntary eradication. Compensation was reduced to US$ 1,650 that month while US$ 850 shifted to 'communitarian settlement'. Over a five year period, the individual US$ 2,500 compensation in exchange for one hectare of coca is to be reduced to US$ 500 for 'community development' projects in 2001, which are easier to monitor by the government and are supposedly more beneficial to the region than individual payments. The coca-farmers fear they won't have a say in the development of community projects. In 2002 there will be no economic settlement whatsoever and every illicit crop will be eradicated.
  Some 5,000 troops of several specialized military and police units subsequently moved into the region, virtually converting it into a 'war zone'. The area of Villa 14 de Septiembre was completely surrounded by the military. Human Rights Minister Edgar Montoya was denied access, as was Morales himself and another national deputy. Both have received continuous death threats ever since. The military stated that they were acting under orders to let no-one into the zone. Press access was also denied. The Chapare is living under a virtual state of siege, as the freedom to meet and move has been abolished and military police patrol the zone.
  Approximately 120 hectares of coca were forcibly eradicated immediately. Tear gas was fired every other day. At least eight campesinos were killed and more than 100 wounded. Since human rights groups could not enter the area, reported human rights abuses could not be checked accurately. There are reports that some 40 farmers have disappeared. Many campesinos hid in the jungle and dozens were detained in Cochabamba. Women who had to leave their children behind, are uncertain as to their whereabouts. Interior Minister, Guido Náyar, admitted forced eradication operations reached military proportions, but blamed the cocaleros for the violence and accused them of undermining the Plan Banzer. Behind it all was the "black hand" of drug traffickers, who organised and funded the demonstrations because they own cocaine production laboratories in this zone and political interests manipulating the unrest, said Náyar. (33)
  If With Dignity! is to be considered a pilot project for SCOPE-like strategies, it is not very promising. Forced eradication under the new Banzer Plan is already under way, while alternative development -apart from previous projects- for the more than 30,000 families has barely begun. Until now the approach has not been very 'balanced'. The protests of the cocaleros have been treated as 'counterpressure from insurgent groups' denying 'effective control of the area by central government', instead of the voices of equal counterparts in 'participatory approaches that are based on dialogue'. The government is not planning to withdraw the military from the Chapare, possibly for the next five years. The region risks being declared "zona militar", meaning that the army would have "total sovereingty". The military is proposing to move its national headquarters to Cochabamba near the Chapare, in order to better comply with the goal to eliminate coca in the region, and remove itself from political interference in the capital La Paz. (34)
  "Words get lost in the translation to actions," UNDCP-director Arlacchi could be proven more right than he intends. The present course of affairs is unlikely to boost the confidence of the small-scale coca producers, who after many years of disappointment with alternative development projects, and ruthless confrontations around past forced eradication campaigns coupled with large-scale human rights abuses (35), are not readily convinced of the benefits of the new approach.
  The third 'ideal condition' for SCOPE – the provision of an enabling economic environment at the national and international level which facilitates the presence of market forces that make illicit cultivation less attractive – is something far beyond the reach of the UNDCP. The agency is unable to guarantee high and stable market prices for alternative products which can compete with drug crops. The international community resorts rather to "comprehensive law enforcement programmes [that] affect the profitability of illicitly cultivated drug crops and, in doing so, make alternative sources of legal income more competitive and attractive," as the Action Plan on International Cooperation on Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development puts it. That comes down to fighting poverty by reducing earnings. Ultimately, drug control policies are not designed to fight destitution, but to eliminate drug production and consumption at all costs.