text: Make Tor start faster every time as now sometimes can take forever and an age before the browser appears.
  When browser launched on (about:blank page or default start page) that shows the current IP also to show the country of the IP. This is for many useful reasons not only knowing it is not from same country you are browsing from when don't need it.
  The above is in no order and all are important for Tor future. This is so far seen when connected without bridges what ever that is. Nothing with Tor is easy to set up or use without knowledge no guides exist for this.
  I did try the potable Tor thing once that I burn to cd and run from. But if cannot use the full screen what use is it. Wiki has some pages for pc monitor screen and their sizes such as this http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Display_resolution look at 'Most common display resolutions in the first half of 2012'
  Code Tor portable to support all of those display resolutions would then make Tor portable more use-able than it is now
  Roger's mention of browser-based exploits reminded me of a poorly-developed idea I once had for reducing Tor's attack surface in typical use cases:
  What if relay operators could easily deploy something like a hidden service that allowed for something like VNC over SSH over Tor into sandboxed, user-verifiable, virtualized, ephemeral instances of Tails?
  If there were a user-friendly way to direct users to this particular class of hidden services and for end-users to reliably verify the integrity of the Tails/Qubes instance they were using for browsing, it seems as though the attack surface--especially for browser-based exploits--could be significantly reduced. Packaging it up as something relay operators could easily deploy, reducing the per-instance computing resources required, and facilitating non-technical users' access seem like the main stumbling blocks. I know it's tough enough to get volunteers to run EC2 instances to relay traffic, but costs are still dropping pretty rapidly.
  This doesn't mitigate many of the guard-related attacks Roger described, unfortunately, but I wanted to toss it into the comments anyway because of a somewhat-related personal habit of mine: If I'm a bit nervous about my use of Tor for everyday web browsing on monitored networks I don't control (e.g. at work or a coffee shop), I use VNC over SSH to access a trusted server running Tails in Virtualbox, which makes maintaining a (verifiably) known-good browser state easy.
  What prevents a malicious party from signing up exit nodes at OpenDNS and logging traffic, blocking content, and/or redirecting traffic?
  Please consider switching Tails' DNS to another provider in addition to adding more than one DNS IP, some service where nobody can sign up anonymously and possibly perform MITM attacks via DNS.
  Makes sense, but a comment on a blog post about something different isn't going to get noticed by them. I suggest letting them know via their "found a problem?" page: